S p e c ifi c a lly, w ith re g a rd to this c o u n t, the ind ic tm e n t alle g e d tha t A p p e llan t i n te n tio n a lly o r k n o w ing ly 1
e n g a g e d in se x u a l i n te rc o u rs e w ith the vic tim , a p e rs o n A p p e llan t kn e w to b e , w itho u t re g a rd to leg iti m a c y, his h a lf si st er. 

## NO. 12-08-00023-CR

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS
JAM IE L YNN

BABBS , § APP EAL FRO

M T HE T HIR D APPELLANT V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § AN DE RSO N C OU NTY, TE XAS MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION J amie Ly nn Ba bbs appea ls his sentences f ollowing his convic tions f o r s ex u al assault of a
c hil d, pr oh ibi te d s e xua l c on du c t, and ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d. Ap pe lla nt r a ise s tw o is su e s o n a

pp e a l. We a ff ir m. B ACKG ROUND Ap p e ll ant w a s c h ar g e d

b y in d ic tm e nt w it

hs e p ar ate c o unts o f

s e xu a l a s s a

u lt o f a c h ild, prohibited sexual conduct, and indec ency with a child. Appellant pleaded “guilty” to each cha rg ed 1 of fe ns e , a nd the matte r p ro c e e de d to a jur y tr ia l on punis hme nt. F oll ow ingthe tr ia l on punis hme nt, the par ties made their respe ctive jury arguments. Duringthe State’s jury argument, the prosec uting attorney argued that the victim would have to suf fer with the knowledg e that she ha d an abor tion. The prose cutingatt o rn ey further argued that the victim’s unborn c hild was amongAppellant’s victims. Ulti mately , the jury assessed A

ppellant’s punishment at imprisonment for twe nty year s for sexual a ssault of a child, imprisonment f or ten year s for prohibited sexual co n du ct , and imprisonment f

o r f if te e nye ar s f

o r in d e c e n c y

w it ha c h il d

. T h e tria l c o urt s e nte n c e d Ap p e llant
acc ording ly , and this appea l followed.2 F A C TUA L S U FFI C IEN C Y O F P U N I SHM ENT E VI DE NCE As par t of his first issue, Appellant argues that the e vidence is factua lly insufficient to support the s ent ences he re c e ive d. A r e vie w o f t he e vid e nc e fo r f

a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y is i na pp ro priate wi th respe ct to the assessment of punishment. See Bra df ield v . St ate , 4 2 S. W. 3 d

3 5 0 , 3 5 1 ( T e x. Ap p. –T e xar

ka na 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Kano use v . St ate , 958 S.W .2d 509, 510 (Tex. App.–Be aumont 19 98 , n o p e t.) ; Flo re

s v . St ate , 936 S.W .2d 478, 479 (Tex. A pp.–Eastland 1996, pet. re f’d) . Henc e, we de c lin e to co nd

uc t a fa c tua l suf

fi c ie nc y re vie w of the e vid e nc e on punis hme nt. Ap pe lla nt’ s f ir st iss ue is o ve rr

ule d in pa rt
. C RUE L AND U N U SUA L P UNI S HM E NT In the remainder of his first issue, Appellant contends that the se ntence s imposed on him are disproportionate to the respec tive crimes for which he was convicted and that his sentenceviolated the cr uel and unusua l punishment clause of the United States Constitution. SeeU. S. C O N ST . amend. VI I I ; see also T EX . C O N ST . art I , § 13. Howeve r, Appe llant made no t i m el y o b j ec tion to the trial court ra ising the issue of

crue l and unusual punishment a nd has, there fore , waived suc h an issue on appea l. See Wil

lisv . St ate , 1 92 S.W. 3d

58 5, 59 5– 97 (T e x. Ap p. –T yle r 2 00 6, pe t. r e f’ d) ; se eals o T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1. Howeve r, eve n absent wa iver, we conclud eth a t A p p e ll a nt’ s s e n ten c e s d id not constitut e cr uel and unusual punishment. Appe l l an t wa s convicted of sexual assault of a child. SeeT EX . P EN AL C ODE ANN . § 22.011(c) (2)( A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The punishm ent for such an offenseis a term of imprisonment rang ing be tween two a nd twenty year s. SeeT EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § § 1 2

. 3 3, 22.011(f) (Ve rnon 2003 & Supp. 2008). Appellant wa s further convic ted of prohibited se x ual conduct. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 25.02(a) (4) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The punishm ent for such
an o ff en s e i s a ter

m of imprisonment rang ing be tween two a nd ten year s. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . §§ 12.34(a) , 25.02(c) (Ve rnon 2003 & Supp. 2008). Moreove r, Appellant was c onvicted of indece ncy with a child. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 21.11(a) (1) ( Ver non 2003). The punishment for s u ch an o ffe nse is a ter m of imprisonment rang ing be tween two a nd twenty year s. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . §§ 12.33(a) , 21.11(d) (Vernon 2003). Her e, the sentenc es i mposed by the trial court fa ll within t he ra

ng e set for

th b y t h e l egi s l ature
. Id. There fore , the punishments are notU nd er this t est, t he p ro p o rti o na l i t y of a sen t en ce i s eva l ua t ed b y co nsid ering (1 ) t he gra vit y of t he o f f en se 2 and t he hars hness of t he p enal t y , (2) t he sent ences i m p o sed o n other cri m i nal s i n t he same juri sdi ct i o n, and (3) t he se n te n c e s im p o se d fo r c o m m issio n o f t h e sa m e c rim e in o the r j u risd ic tio n s. Sol em , 463 U

. S. at 292 , 103 S. Ct

. at 3 0 1 1

. 3 prohibited as cr

uel, u nusual, or excessive pe r se. See Har risv . St ate , 6 5 6 S. W. 2 d

4 8 1 , 4 8 6 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); Jo rd

an v . St ate , 4 95 S.W. 2d

94 9, 95 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ); Da v is v . St ate , 905 S.W .2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. re f’d)

. No ne the le ss, we have c on sid e re d the thr e sh old qu e sti on of wh e the r Ap pe lla nt’ s sente nc e is grossly disproportionate to the crime. See, e .g., Mc Gruder v . P uckett , 954 F.2d 313, 316 ( 5th Cir.), cert. de nied, 50 6 U. S. 84 9, 11 3 S. Ct . 1 46 , 1 21 L . E d. 2d 98 (1 99 2) ; se eals o Ja cks on v . St ate , 989 S.W. 2d 84 2, 84 5–46 (Te x. Ap p. –T e xar ka na 19 99 , n o p e t.) ; see also Harm elin v. Michigan , 501 U. S. 9 57 , 1 00 5, 11 1 S. Ct

. 26 80 , 27 07 , 1 15 L . E d. 2d 83 6 ( 19 91 ); Sol

em v. H elm , 463 U.S. 277, 298–300, 103 S. Ct . 3001, 3013–15, 77 L . Ed. 2d 637 (1 9 8 3 ). In conductingour ana ly sis, we ar e guided by the holding in Rumm el v

. Es telle , 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. C t. 1133, 63 L . Ed. 2d 382 (1980), in which the Supreme Court uphe ld the petitioner’s mandatory life sentenc e under a prior ver sion of the Te x as habitual off

ender statute for a

conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pr etense s. Id. , 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct . at 1135. The of fense s committed by

Appellan t

— s ex ual assault of a child, prohibited sexual conduct, and indec ency with a child—are each far more serious than a ny of the offe nses committed by the appe llant in Rum m el . Moreove r, Appe llant’s sentenc es ar e ea ch fa r less sever e than the l ife sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rum m el

. Thus , it fo llo ws that if the sentenc e in Rum m el was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither are the sentenc es a sse sse d a g a ins t Ap pe lla

nt in the c a se at ha

nd

. Th e re fo re , sin c e we do no t f ind the thr e sh old

te st t o be satisfied, w e nee d not apply the re maining e lements of the So lem t es t
. The re mainder of 2 Appellant’s f

irst issue is overruled.

I M P ROP E R J URY A RGUMENT In his second issue, Appe llant argues that the State’s comments in its closing argument that the vic tim ha d und e rg on e an a bo rt ion amou nte d to re ve rs ibl e e rr or . App e lla nt c on c e de s th at he did not make a pr oper a

nd timely objection to the prosec utor’s jury argument, but contends that weW e con s t r u e Appel l an t ’ s a r g u men t l i ber al l y i n t h e i n t er es t of j u s t i ce t o s t at e t h at n ei t h er a t i mel y obj ec t i on 3
n o r a n a d v e rs e ru ling is re q u ire d to p re se rv e the e rr o r fo r re v ie w if a n a rg u m e n t i s so p reju d ic ia l t h a t an instr u c tio n to di s r e g a r d t h e a r g u me n t c ou l d n ot c u r e t h e h a r m, or , i n ot h e r w or ds , i f t h e a r g u me n t w a s c l e a r l y c a l c u l a t e d t o i n f l a me the m ind s o f t h e ju ro rs a n d it s im p re ssio n c a n n o t b e w ithd ra w n fro m the ir m ind s. H a rris , 784 S. W

. 2d a t 12 n

. 5; R o d riq u e z v . S ta te , 64 6 S.W

. 2 d 53 9 , 54 2

- 4 3 (T ex. A p p . – H o ust o n [1st D i st
. ] 19 8 2 , no p et
. ). E ven i f t he argume nt ex ce eds t h e bou n ds of

pr oper j u r y a r g u men t a n d a n i n s t r u ct i on t o di s r eg ar d c ou l d n ot c u r e t h e h ar m, i t i s n ot rev ersib l e e rro r unless, i n li gh t o f t he rec o rd as a w ho l e, t he arg um en t i s extrem e o r m an i f estl y i m p ro p er, vio l ates a m a n d a to ry sta tute , o r in je c ts ne w fac ts tha t ar e ha rm ful to the a c c u se d into the trial. F elder , 848 S. W

. 2d a t 95; D i cke r s on , 866 S. W

. 2d a t 699. 4 should consider the issue a s one of f undamental e rror . 3 There are four pe rmissible area s of jury argument: (1) summation of the evide nce; ( 2)
rea sonable deductions from the evidenc e; (3) answe r to a rgument of opposingcounsel; and ( 4) plea s for law enfor ceme nt. Fe ld

e r v . St ate , 8 48 S.W. 2d

85 , 9 4– 95 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Dickerson
v . St ate , 866 S.W .2d 696, 698 (Tex. A pp.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. re f' d). Counsel may draw all infere nces f

rom the re cord that are “reasonable , fair, a nd leg itimate.” Allridg

ev . St ate , 762 S.W .2d 146, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We willf ir s t c o n s id e r

wh e th er the prosec utor’s statement wa s impermissible. Duringthe trial
on punis hme nt, the vic timte sti fi e d th at sh e ha d ma de the de c isi on to a bo rt the ba by . T he victim further testif

ie d th at s h e f

e lt “ h o r r ib le ” a b o ut i t. Ap p e ll ant f

a il e d to o b je c t t o any

o f th e v ic ti m’ s testimony conce rningher a

bortion. As such, we conclude that the prosec uting attorney ’s jury arguments that (1) the vic tim would have to suffe r with the knowledg e that she ha d an abor tion and (2) the vic tim’s unborn child was amongAppellant’s victims was both a summation of the e vidence
and a re a so na ble de du c tio n f

ro m th e evi de nc e or , o the rw ise , r e a so na ble , f a ir , a nd le g iti mate infere nces dr awn f

rom the re cord. There fore , we hold that the se arguments fell within the rea lm of permissible jury

argument. Appellant’s se cond issue is overr uled.
D I S P OS I T I ON Having overr

uled Appellant’s first and second issues, we af fi rm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. JA M ES T. WOR THEN Chief J ustice Opinion delivere d J anuar y 30, 2009. P an elconsi s t ed of

W ort hen, C. J. , G r i

f f i t h, J. , and Hoyl e, J. (DO N OT PUBL I SH)