### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 20 WY 106

APRIL TERM, A.D. 20 20

Aug ust 18 , 2020

ROY CHARLES SMITH and the

ESTATE OF CURT ALLEN SMITH,

Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

v.

B&G ROYALTIES; ROY G. BARTON,

JR.; MARK E. HODGE and WILLIAM J.

MC CAW,

Appellees

(Defendants). S

- 19

- 0267

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County

The Honor ab le Thomas W. Rumpke , Judge

Representing Appellant s :

Thomas F. Reese, David E

. Shields, and Will Reese, Williams, Porter , Day &

Neville

, P.C., Casper, W yoming.

Rep re senting Appellee s : Lucas Buckley, Hathaway & Kunz

, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming

.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and F OX , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. R ea ders

are reques ted to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming

82002, of a n y typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in

the permanent volume.1 GRAY , Justice.

[¶1] A pp ellants Roy Cha rles Smith and the Estate of C urt Allen Smith sought a

declaratory judgment and to quiet title in certain Campbell County, Wyoming property

, asserting ownership of a royalty interest

. The district court granted summary judgment

an d issued a Dec laratory Judgment and Judgment Qu ieting Tit le to R e al Property in favor

of Appe llees , concluding that A ppellants’ predecessor s in title , Charles B. Smith

(Charles) and his wife ( Marion ) conveyed a 1/8 mineral interest to Roy G. Barton in

1 989

. We affi rm.

ISSUES

[¶2] The issues are:

1. Did Charles and Marion convey a n unrestricted 1/8

mineral interest to Roy G. B arton , Jr. by warrant y deed in

1989 ?

2. Are Appell ee s entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs?

FACT S

[¶3] T he f acts are undisputed. From 1 97 0 t o 2018

, convey ances of the property at

issue here were made as follows :

1. July 30, 1970 Royalty Deed

— Myrtle and Laurence Richmond conveyed t o

Charles a “ T hree and O n e

- E ighth per cent

. . . L andowner’s royalty of all of the oil and of

all the gas produ c ed and sa ved from ” land lo cated in Campbell County describ ed as:

Township 42 North, Range 71 West 6 th P.M.

Section 31: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4

, E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

Containing 314.56 acres more or less.

2. February 19, 1976 Mineral Dee d

— Ro bert and Mary McKee conveyed t o

Charles “a n und ivided one

- fourth (1/4 th ) inter est in and to all of the oil, gas and other

minerals in and under and that may be produced” from Campbell County lands described

as :

Township 42 North

, Range 71 West

, 6 th P.M

. Se ction 31: Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4 ; E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

[ C ] o n ta ining 314.5 4 acres

, m ore or less [

. ]2 3. June 25, 1976 Royalty Deed

— Charles conveyed to F. H. Merback “ AN

UNDIVIDED 1.0416% interest i n and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals

, in, under

an d up on” the land described as:

Townshi p 42 North, Range 71 We s t

, 6th P.M.

S ection 31 : Lots 1, 2, 3, 4

, E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

Containing 314.56 acres more or less.

The deed reserved to Charles “the exclusive right to l ease said lands, or any part thereof,

for oil and ga s pu rpos es, without interference . . . upon the part of the g r an tee [F. H.

Merback] .”

4. Dece mber 1, 1983 Mineral Deed

— Charles conveyed to W. Allene Smith “an

undivided 50% of grantor’s in terest now owned and to all of the oil, gas and othe r

mi nera ls in and under and that may b e produced” from lands in:

Township 42 No r th, Range 71 West

, 6 th P.M.

Section 31: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4

, E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

. . . [ C ] ontaining 314.5 4 acres

, more or less [

. ]

On January 6, 1987, Char les exec uted a corrective deed to W. A llene Smith conta ining

conveyance language identica l to the 198 3 d eed

. 1 Both deeds conveyed the right to

ingress and egress for the purposes of drilling and developing the land and both state “ it

i s th e intention of the grantor to convey one

- half o f the minerals it now owns in the

d escribed lands to the grantee.”

5. De c ember 1, 198 3 Royalty Deed

— Charles also conveyed to W. Allene Smith

“an undivided one

- half of his interest

. . . r oyalty of all of t he oil and o f all the gas

pro duced and saved” from the lands de s cribed as:

Township 42 North, Range 71 West

, 6 th P .M.

Sect ion 31: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4

, E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

. . . Contain ing 314.56 acres

, more or le ss.

T hat deed specifi call y st ates the grant is “ S ubject to that certain Roya lty Deed” from the

Richmonds

, # 1 above.

1 Th e corrective deed made corrections to other mineral int e rest conveyances identifi ed in the Dece mber

1, 1983 deed

. T hose con v eyances are not re le vant here.3 6. January 5, 1987 Mineral Deed

— Charle s con vey ed “an und ivided 100%” of his

“interest now owned and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that

may be produced from” land

, incl u sive of the 314.5 4 acres of land d escribed in each o f

the preceding conveyances

, to his wife Mari on

.

7. M ay 29, 198 9 Mineral Dee d

— Charles and Marion conveyed to Roy G. Barton,

Jr. “an undi vided one

- eight h (1/8 th ) inter est in and to all of the oil, gas and other minera ls

in and under an d that may be produced from ” :

Township 42 North, Range 71 West

, 6 th P. M.

Section 31

, Lots 1, 2, 3

, 4

, E 1⁄2 W 1⁄2

. . . [ C ] ontaining 314.56 acr es

, more or less [

. ]

[¶4] The May 29, 1 989 deed stated it “i s the intent of Grantor to co n vey to Grante e

39.32 net mineral acres” and conveyed the right of ingress and egress fo r min ing

activ itie s along with the right to market and remove mine rals fro m the land. The May 29

, 1989 deed also contained the following w arranty language:

[Charles and Marion] do hereby w arrant said title to [Mr.

Barton

, ] his heirs, executors, administr ators , p ersonal

re presentatives , successors and assigns forever and do hereby

a gree to defen d all and si ngular the said property unt o [Mr.

Barton

, ] his heirs, successors, executors, personal

representatives, and assigns against every p erson whom so ever

clai ming or to claim t he same or an y part thereof.

On June 7, 1989, Char les and Marion ex ecuted a C orrective M inera l D eed to Mr. Barton
amending the legal description from the May 29, 1989 deed

. T he corrected descript ion

set forth the acre age described in ea ch tr ans fer abo ve b ut added add itional acres. The

corrective deed spe cified that it co ntained “320.68 acres , more or less ” and s tat ed that it

was Charles an d Mario n’ s intent to convey “40.085 net mineral acres.” The cor rective

deed cont ained the same warran ty la nguage as the May 29, 1 989 deed

. We ref er to the

May 29, 1989 Min eral Dee d and the June 7, 1989 Corrective Mineral Deed collectively

as the 1989 Deed.

8. October 1 0 , 2017 D ecree of Distribution

— f ollowing Charles ’ s death, the

Converse County district cour t e ntered an order of dist ribution, transf er ring his “oil and

gas inte rest ” in the property at issue here as described in the preceding conve yances to his

two sons , Roy Smith and C urt Smith ( C urt Smith died and his estate along w ith Roy

Smith

, the App ella n ts in this ca se

, a re refer red to here as th e S ons )

.4 9. J anuary 11, 2018 Quit Claim Deed

— Marion c onve yed to the S ons “all of her

right

, title and inte rest” in the property described as:

Township 42 North, Range 71 Wes t

, 6 th P.M.

Section 31: Lots 7, 8

, 9, 1 0, 15, 16, 17 , 18

, former ly describe d as: W 1/ 2

The deed describes the interest as a “landowner’s r oyalty as set forth, the said oil and gas

so prod uced and saved from said land s . . . . ”

[¶5] On Septe mber 21, 2 018, t he Sons filed thi s action seeking d eclar at o ry judgmen t

and to quie t titl e to a 1.0417% royalty interest 2 in the property described in the

conveyances s upra

. The action named B&G Royalties, Roy G . Barto n, Jr., Mark E.
Hodge

, and William J. McCaw as defendant s. Roy G. Barton, Jr

. i s the ori g inal gr antee

and the remaining defendants are succe ssor grantees

. We refer to the

defendant s /appellees collectively as B&G

. B&G filed an answer and counter claim, a l so seeking a declaratory judgment

, quiet tit le

, and other a lt ernative reli ef

. The partie s fil ed

cros s

- moti ons for summa ry judgment

. A fter a hearing, the district court granted

summary judgment i n favor of B &G f ollowed by a declaratory j udgme nt and j udg m ent

q ui eting t itle in B&G to a 1/8 mineral interest “ including a ll royalty interests

. . . in s aid

1/8 miner al interest

. ” The Sons appeal

.

DIS CUSSION

[¶6] The district court determined that the 1989 D eed was unambiguous, and Charles

and Mari on c onve yed a 1 /8 m in eral interest in the described property

— including the

royalty intere s t

— to B&G

, reser ving nothi ng

. On appe a l

, the S o ns argue that th e mineral

inte rest conveyed by the 1989 Deed did not include the royalty interest

. They a sser t

Ch arle s an d M ar ion retained the royalty interest

, and it was distributed to the Sons out of

Charl es ’ s estate and by M arion ’s quit claim deed

. B &G contends that the 1989 D eed

unambiguously included the 1/8 royalty inte rest and t hat B&G is entitled to attorney s ’

fees and costs in curred in this appeal.

I. Did Charle s and Marion c onvey an unrestricted 1/8 mineral interest to Roy G.

Barton , Jr

. by warr anty deed in 1989 ?

2 A roy alty inte r es t is one interest containe d in the “ bund le” of interests owned by the owner of a mineral

fee. Boley v. Greenough , 2001 WY 47, ¶ 15, 22 P.3d 854, 859 (Wy o. 2001). A royalty i nterest includes

the right to a share of product io n that is n ot charg eable to p ro ducti on costs, but exclude s rig hts t o ex plore,

grant leases, and receive bonuses or delay rentals. Id. ¶ 14, 22 P.3d at 858; see al so W yo. Stat. Ann. § 30

- 5

- 304(a)(vii) (defi ning a “ R oyalty” as “ the mine r al owner’s share o f production, free of the cost s o f

pro duction ”).5 A. Standa rd o f Review

[¶7] Summ ary judgm ent can be granted on ly when there are no genuine issues of

materia l fac t and the movin g party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P.

56(c) ; Montierth v. Deutsch e Ban k N at ’ l Tr. C o. for Am eriquest Mortg. Se c. Tr. 2 00 5

- R7

, asset

- back ed pass

- t hrough c ertificate, s eries 2005

- R7 , 2018 WY 41, ¶ 6, 415 P. 3 d 654,

658 ( W yo. 2018)

.

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo and afford no deferenc e to the district

court’s r uling. Thornock v . Pacifi Co rp

, 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10,

379 P.3d 17 5, 179 (Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same

ma t er ials and u s es the same le gal standard as the district

court. Id. The record is assessed from the vantage point m ost

f

avo rable to t he party opposing the motio n , and w e gi ve a

party opp osing sum mary jud gment the ben efit of all favorable

inferences that m ay fairly be drawn from th e record. Id. A

material fact is one that would have the effect of establishing

or refut ing a n e ssential e lement of the cause of acti on or

de fe ns e asserted by the parti es. Id.

Bd. of Tr u s t e e s of Laramie Cty. v. Bd. of Cty. Co m m ’ rs of Lara m ie Cty. , 2 020 WY 41,

¶ 6, 460 P.3d 251, 254 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Estate of Weeks by and through Rehm v.

W

eek s

- R ohner , 201 8 WY 112, ¶ 15, 427 P.3d 72 9, 734 ( Wy o. 2 018 ) ).

[¶8] Warr anty deed s are co ntracts

, Caba llo Coal Co. v. Fid. Ex p l . & Prod. Co.

, 2004

WY 6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 3 11, 3 14 (Wyo. 2004), and a re construed by examining the “ specific

language of the deed.” Gils tra p v. June Eisele Wa rren Tr

. , 2005 WY 21, ¶ 12

, 10 6 P.3d

858, 86 2 (Wyo. 2 005) (ci tation omitte d)

. Summary judgment is appropriately entered in

t h e interpretati on of a contract when the contract language is clear and unambiguous.

Trabing v. Kinko ’ s , Inc

. , 2002 WY 17 1, ¶ 20, 57 P.3d 1248, 1254 (Wyo. 20 02 ) ; Q uestar Expl. & Prod. Co. v. R ocky Mountain Res., LLC , 2017 WY 10, ¶¶ 26

– 27, 388 P .3d 523,

530 (Wyo. 2017) ; s ee al so McGee v. Caballo Coal Co. , 2003 WY 68, ¶ 6, 69 P.3d 908,

910 (Wyo. 2003)

.

B. Rules of C ont ract Inter pretation

[¶9] We apply general principl es o f contract int erpretati on to de eds conveying and

reservi ng interests in oil and ga s , including r oyalty interes ts

. See Caballo , ¶ 11, 84 P.3d

at 314 ; Gilstrap , ¶ 12, 106 P.3d at 862

. When language in a dee d

is clea r and una mbiguous, our inqui ry is li mi te d to the four

corners o f the do cument, givin g the word s contained therein6 their or d inary meanin g

. The parties are free to agree to

whatever lawful terms they desire, and we will not rewrite the

agr eemen t u nde r the g uise of j udicial constructio n. Only

w he n the contract is ambig uous do we apply our rules of

c onstruction. A contract is a mbiguous if i ndefiniteness of

ex pression or double meaning obscures the parties ’ intent.

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. S orens on

, 20 16 WY 3 4, ¶ 41, 371 P.3d 120, 129

– 30 (Wyo.

2 01 6) ( i nternal c itation o mitted)

. We construe the contract as a whole and give effe c t to

its lan g uage “in accor dance with the meaning which that language would convey to

reasonable persons at the time and pla ce of its use.” Ul tra Res., Inc. v. Hartman

, 2 01 0

WY 36, ¶ 22, 226 P.3d 889, 90 5 (Wyo. 2010) (citation omitted)

. We look “ to the

s urrounding c i rcumstanc es, t he subject matter, and the purpose of the agreements to

ascertain the intent of the parti es at th e time the agreemen ts were made. ” Pe nnaco

En er gy

, Inc. v. KD C o. LLC , 2 015 WY 1 52, ¶ 26, 363 P.3d 18, 26 (Wyo. 2015) (citing

Stone v. Devon E n e r gy Prod. Co., L

. P

. , 2008 WY 4 9

, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 936, 942 (Wyo.

2008) )

. “ Extrinsic evidence can be consi dered in interpret ing an un ambiguous contract t o

the ex te nt i t involves f acts and circumst ances surroun ding execution of the contract. ”

KD

, ¶ 26, 36 3 P.3d at 26 (c i ting Wells Fargo Bank Wyom ing, N.A. v. Hodder

, 2006 WY

128

, ¶ 31, 144 P.3d 401, 412 (Wyo. 2 006 ) ).

C. Analysis

[¶10] It is un disputed that C harles f ir st o btained a 3 1/8 % roy alty in a ll the minera ls in

the described tract (314.56 acre s) in Section 31, Township 42 North, Range 71 West, 6 th

P.M. , C ampbell County, Wyoming

. He later obtained an undivided 1/4 fee interest i n all

the minerals in tha t same t ract. Be ginning in 1976 and conti nuing un til 1 989, h e made

various conveyances, a ppearing to alw a ys c on side r his royalty interest as unbundled from

his fee intere st. Eventually Charles and Marion transfe rre d an undivided 1/8 inter est in

the miner als to Roy G. Barton , Jr.

, using a wa rrant y “ mineral de ed ”

— t he 1989 Deed.

[¶11] A “mineral fee,” sometimes re ferred to as a “mineral estate” o r “mineral interest,”

is “an estate in fee si mple in and to the mi nerals.” P icard v. Richar ds , 366 P .2 d 119, 1 23

( Wyo. 196 1) (cit ation omitte d ). A conveyance or r eservati on of a mineral fee gives title

to the minerals i n place

. Id. (citation o mitted)

. “The ownership of an unrestricted

mineral int erest includes all the i ncide nts of ownership, some of w hi ch are t he r ight to

execute oil, gas an d mine ral leases and t he right t o receive bonuses, rentals and

royalties .” Id. ( emphasis added). 3 Min e ral fee ow ners “have the capacity t o create and

3 The owne rship of a min eral fee includes five essential interes ts: the right to develop, the right to lease,

the ri g ht to receive bonus payments, the right to receive delay re ntal s, and t h e right to receive r oyalty

paym ents. R eed v. Ma l ts berge r/Storey Ranc h, LLC

, 534 S .W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. App. 2017) (citatio n7 convey any one or all of a myriad of se parately identi fiable in te rests in oil and gas under

their proper ty, in cluding roy alty interest s. ” Boley v. Greenough , 2001 WY 47, ¶ 15, 22

P.3 d 854, 859 (Wyo. 2001); s ee also Wi lliams v. Watt , 668 P.2d 6 20, 624 (Wyo. 1983)

(“A landowner has the power to create separate interest s in oil a nd g as by gr ant or exception

. . . . ” ).

[¶12] Notabl y, Charles an d M arion did not reserve any separately identifiabl e interest s

. T he 1989 Dee d conveyed “ an undi vided one

- eight h (1/8 th ) interest i n and to all of the oil,

ga s a nd other minera ls in and under and th at may be produced from ” the land described

i n the deed to B&G. The term s “in and under” an d “ produced fr om

, ” absent a ny

q ualifying or limit ing language, create a mineral fee interest

. 4 See Laura H. Burne y, Interpre ti n g Mineral and R oyal ty D eeds: The Legacy of the O ne

- Eighth Royalty and

Other St ories , 33 St. Mary ’ s L. J. 1 (2001 ) (citing cases) ; 38 Am. Jur

. 2d Gas and Oi l § 30

(20 19 )

.

[¶13] T he 1989 Deed further stated

, “ [ i ] t is the inte nt of Grant or to c onvey t o Grantee

40

. 085 net minera l acres

. . . together with the ri ght of ingress an d egress at a ll times fo r the purpose of mining, drilling, explo ring, operating and develo ping ” the land. “ A

conveyance pur porting to tran sfer to a g rantee the right of ingress and eg ress fo r the

purpose o f mining , dr illing and explor ing is b y def inition a ‘ mineral interest ’ rather than a

royalty interest .” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and O il § 30 , at 44 5

– 46 ; see also Laura H. Burney,

s upra at 47 n. 265

.

[¶14] T he 1989 D eed contains no la nguage reserv ing an y interest t o C harle s or Marion

. “A c onvey ance of a mi neral estate need not dispose of all intere sts; individual inter est s

can be held back, or reserved, in the grantor.” Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC

, 534 S.W.3d 5 1, 56 (Tex. Ap p. 2017) (quoti ng French v. Ch evron U. S.A . Inc.

, 896 S.W .2d

7 95, 7 97 (Tex . 1995) )

. “Ho weve r, when an undivided miner al interest is convey ed

. . . , it is presumed that all attributes remain with the mineral interest unless a cont rary intent

is e xpressed.” Id

. (quoting Fre nch

, 896 S.W .2d at 7 97 ). Absent limitin g language, that

interest nece ssarily include s the right to receive royalties. P icard , 366 P.2d at 123. The

pla in languag e of the 19 89 Deed conveyed an unq ualifie d mineral interest to Roy G

. Barton, Jr.

[¶15] Notwit hst a nding the 1 989 Deed ’ s plain l anguage , t he Sons argue tha t Charles and

Marion could no t have i ntended to con vey an unrest ricted mineral estate becau se Charles

had always kept his royalty i nterests separa te from his mineral interes ts and those

omitted)

. 4 Conver sely, t he conveyance or reservation of “oil and gas produced and saved” creat es a

nonp articipat ing royalt y interest. Bole y , ¶ 14, 22 P .3d at 858 ( quoting Ferguson v. Coronado Oi l Co

. , 884

P.2 d 971, 977 (Wyo. 1994) (citing 1 Eugen e Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 16.2 , at 483 (19 87) ) ).8 i nterests nev er merged. The y ass ert tha t Charles con veyed mineral interests by “ mineral

deeds ” and r oya lty interests by “ royalt y deeds

, ” 5 and that th e se unb undled interests ne v er merged

. W e need not decide the question of m erger bec a us e t he Sons are estopped from

ass e rti ng Charle s a nd M arion conveye d any less than a n unrestricted 1/8 mineral interest

.

[¶16] W e have long held that e stoppel by de ed “ precludes a party to the deed and a l s o

those in privity with h im fro m asserti ng as again st the other party the reto and his priv ies

any right o r ti tle in derogation of the deed or from denying the truth of any mate rial fact

asserted in it. ” Kennedy O il v. Lance Oil & Gas Co., Inc. , 2006 WY 9, ¶ 28 , 126 P.3d

875, 88 3

– 8 4 ( Wyo. 2 006) (quoting 3 A. James Casner ed

. , A mer ican Law of Pr oper ty
§ 15. 18, at 841 ( 1952) ).

One who assumes to convey an e state by deed will not be

h eard, for the purpose of defeating t he title of the grantee, to say that at the time of th e conveyance he had n o title, or that

non e passed by the d eed, and he canno t de ny the fu ll

ope ration and effect of the deed as a conveyance

. I n other

words, he is est opped to dispute the title granted.

Ke nnedy

, ¶ 28 , 126 P.3d at 8 8 4 (quot ing 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 12

( 2000) ).

[¶17] As we ex plained in Gilstr ap

, if a “ gr a nt is m ade w ith a warranty deed, the granto r

is warranting, or p romising, that he own s what the deed purports to convey and if he does

not, he is liable for a breach of warranty. ” Gi lstrap

, ¶ 1 7, 106 P.3d at 863 (citing 1

How ar d R. William s a nd C harles J

. Mey ers, Oil and Gas Law

, § 311

, at 580. 29 ( 20 03) ) ; see

also Body v. McDonald

, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959)

. We have more t ypicall y applied estoppel by deed where a mineral owne r make s a grant and a lso attempts to rese rve

5 Charles acquired his i nte res ts to the min erals at issue in a piecemeal fashion. See s upra ¶¶ 3

– 4

. A mo ng

the d eeds in the chain of conveyances from 19 70 to 1989

, so me are titled “royalty” deeds and othe rs are

titl ed “mineral” deeds

. The Sons argue th is indicates that Charle s kep t his i nterests separately and

intended to con vey them separa tely. T he langua ge of th e de e d a nd not its title governs our inq uiry. 1

Howar d R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers

, Oil and Gas Law

, § 304.1

, at 467 ( 1990 ) (opining th at a n

instrument ’ s title is “never given con cl usi ve effect in the constructi on process and rarely, if ever, ha s

para mount im por tance ”) ; La u ra H. Burney, s upra a t 35 ( “[T] he titl es of document s generally accord little

weight in th e i nterpretation process. ”)

. The S ons also point t o a 2004 division or der and a 2010 title opinion to su pport their assertion

th a t Charl es and M ario n con tinued to ow n a royalty interest after executing the 1989 Deed

. Th e Court
may consider extri nsic evidence to determine th e in tent of the p arti es in formi ng an unambiguous co ntract

if that evidence “ involv es facts and circumstances surrounding ex ecuti on of the contra ct .” KD , ¶ 26, 363

P .3d a t 26 (ci ting Wells Fargo

, ¶ 31, 144 P.3d at 412). Th e 2004 division order and the 2010 title o pi nion

clea rly do not concern “facts and circ umstances surroun ding exe c ution” of the 1989 Dee d

. Acc ordingl y,

we w ill n ot consider that evidence h ere.9 an interest but does not own a suf f

icient inte rest to cover b oth

. Gi lstrap

, ¶ 1 7, 106 P.3d at

863 Applying the Duhig 6 r ule to t h ose circumstan ces

, the reservation fail s to the extent

necessary to a ffect the grant

. Gi lstrap

, ¶ 1 7, 106 P.3d at 863 ; Body

, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2 d

513

.

[¶18] H er e, t h e o w n e r s g r a n t e d an unrestricted minera l int erest wi th out re serv ing w h a t is

argued t o b e a n unbundled, or separate, royalty inter est

. T h e warranty language in the

mineral deed estops the m and their successors (the Sons ) from claimi ng a nyth ing les s

th an an unres tric ted 1/8 min er al interest w as trans ferred

. Accordingly, we affir m the

judgmen ts recogni zing title to an un restricted 1/8 mineral interest in B&G

.

II. Are Appelle e s entitled to attorneys’ fees an d costs?

[¶19] W.R.A.P. 10.05(b) provides :

I f the co u rt certifies

. . . there was no reasonable cause fo r the

appe al, a reason ab le amou nt f or at torneys’ fees and damages

to the app ellee shall be fixed

. . . an d taxed as part of the costs

in the case.

B&G argues i t is entitled to at torneys ’ fees bec ause the S on s “present ed no argument or

auth ority upon which r eversa l is warrant ed .”

[¶20] “ We are generally reluctant to order sanctions under thi s rule. ” Burnett v. Burnett

, 2017 W Y 57, ¶ 9, 394 P. 3d 480, 483 (Wyo. 201 7)

. We will do s o, h owever, i f an appeal

lacks cogent argume nt, fa ils to provi de perti nent authori ty to sup port the claims of error,

or when there is a failure to cite to the record adequately. Id. The S on s’ brief complied

with ou r rules, presented co gen t legal argume nt

, pertinen t case law, and cit ed to the

rec ord. Th is is not on e of t he rare circ um stances whe re sa nctions pursuant to W.R.A.P.

10.05 a re appropriate

. We decline t o certify that there was no cause fo r appeal and do n ot

award B&G its atto rneys ’ fees

.

6 In Duhig

, a third party owned an outstanding 1/2 mineral interest in

certain land and the grantor owned the surface and the remaining 1/2

mine ral interest. Th e grantor co n veyed the surface to th e gran tee by

warrant y dee d w ith a reservation of 1/2 interest in all the minerals under

the surface. The grantor and grantee both claimed the 1/2 mineral

interest that was not owned by the third party. The Texas Suprem e Court

conc l uded that the grantee o wned t he surface and a 1/ 2 m ineral interest,

the third party owned th e outstanding 1/2 mineral interest, and the

grantor owned nothing.

A coma Oil Corp. v. Wilson

, 471 N.W.2d 476, 479 (N.D. 1991)

. This Court adopted Du hig in Body

, 79

Wyo. 371, 3 34 P.2d 5 13 ; Gi lstrap

, 106 P. 3d 8 5 8

.10 CON CLUS ION

[¶21] The 1989 Deed conveyed an unrestric ted 1/8 mineral in te re st t o B&G

. B&G is

not e ntitl ed to att orneys’ fees and costs. Affirmed.