## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 6 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

HARVEY BARNETT, INC., a Florida corporation; INFANT SWIMMING RESEARCH, INC., a Florida corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. ANN SHIDLER, individually and d/b/a Infant Aquatic Survival; JUDY HEUMANN, individually and d/b/a Infant Aquatic Survival; ALISON GEERDES, individually and d/b/a Infant Aquatic Survival, Defendants-Appellees. No. 02-1047

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 00-B-731 (OES))
Douglas Jaffe of San Diego, California, for the Pla intiffs-Appellants. Mark W. Fischer (Kristin M. Berdan with him on the brief), Faegre & Benson, LLP, Boulder, Colorado for the Defendants-Appellees

.

Before SEYMOUR , McKAY, and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.-2-

LUCERO , Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Harvey Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming Research, Inc. (collectively, “ISR”) filed a complaint against thr ee former employees, alleging state-law claims of misappropriation of trade secre ts, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, as well as claims of unfair comp etition and deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Ac t (“CCPA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105. ISR further alleged federal claim s of trademark infringement and misleading trade practices in violation of the Lanh am Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125. Finding that ISR failed to produce suffi cient evidence with respect to any of its claims, the district court granted summa ry judgment to the defendants. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I In 1966, Dr. Harvey Barnett, the founder and presid ent of ISR, began to develop the Infant Swimming Research program (“ISR program”), which plaintiffs describe as a “scientific , behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevent ion.” (Appellants’ Br. at 4.) ISR’s program utilizes a m ethod known as “swim, float, swim,” and contains nearly two-thousand “prompts an d procedures” for teaching infants as young as six-months old how to survive i n the water. (Id. ) In addition, the ISR program maintains safety protocols to keep children safe during-3-

instruction and provides a “BUDS” Record Sheet allo wing parents to monitor children’s bodily functions, diet, and sleep in ord er to evaluate physical responses to the ISR program. In a five-week course, ISR trains and certifies ins tructors. ISR-certified instructors teach survival skills to infants in pri vate lessons, ten minutes a day, five days a week for three to four weeks. Instruct ors receive a videotape entitled “Prompts and Procedures,” which illustrates how to use behavioral conditioning in teaching infants and covers other water-safety issu es. ISR’s program also includes the ISR Master Instructor System, in which individu als become certified as Master Instructors to train other potential ISR instructor s. Dr. Barnett has written various books detailing som e of the techniques and methods used in ISR’s aquatic-survival program, inc luding Precision Strokes for Little Folks , published in 1974. More than ten years later, he wrote, but never published, a manual entitled The Science of Infant Swimming , which is used to help instructors understand “the psychology of infants and young children, their anatomy, and the physics involved as their small bo dies move through the water.” (Appellants’ Br. at 5.) In 1989, ISR began publish ing the “Parent Resource Book,” now in its ninth edition, an educational book distr ibuted to parents regarding the dangers of infant drowning and the theory and proce sses used by ISR.1 Beginning in 1986, ISR required its instructors t o sign license agreements

every two years. -4- Judy Heumann, Ann Shidler, and Alison Geerdes, defe ndants in the instant case, are former ISR instructors who left the company in early 2000. ISR trained Heumann as an instructor and Master Instructor in 1 984 and 1987, respectively. Shidler was trained as an instructor in 1990, and a s a Master Instructor in 1993, and Geerdes was trained as an ISR instructor and workedfor less than a year before leaving ISR. She is not a Master Instructor. Defe ndants paid fees ranging from $5,000 to $10,000 for the instruction. While employed by ISR, Heumann, Shidler, and Geerde s each signed a “Nondisclosure and Confidentiality Agreement” and a lic ense agreement containing a further “Confidentiality of Information” provision as well as a “Covenant Not to Compete.” 1 (1 Appellants’ App. at 60, 77–80, 81–85.) Notwithstanding these agreements, on leaving ISR in 2000, the three forme r employees started Infant Aquatic Survival (“IAS”), a new company devoted to teaching infant and child swimming in Colorado. It is this conduct that is t he subject of this litigation. Defendants’ program is allegedly similar to the ISRprogram in that it utilizes the same “swim, float, swim” method, implements some of the same safety protocols, uses a Daily Health Data Sheet similar to the BUDS sheet, uses a comparable registration form, and distributes a comparable par ent resource book to parents of2 Judgment as a matter of law favoring Geerdes was granted on the basis

that she was not trained as a Master Instructor. -5- children enrolled in the IAS program. It is uncont ested that defendant Shidler’s husband sought to reserve the names Harvey Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming Research, Inc. with the Colorado Secretary of State . On more than one occasion, defendants falsely advertised that their program, I AS, had been in business since
1990. ISR filed in district court a complaint against the defendants, alleging statelaw claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, br each of contract, and unjust enrichment, as well as unfair competition and decep tive trade practices under the CCPA, along with federal claims of trademark infrin gement and misleading trade practices under the Lanham Act. ISR then sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from teaching the ISR program to other instructors. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied ISR’s request for a preliminary injunction as to Heumann and Shidler. 2 Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted. In its ruling, the district court concluded that the ISR program was not a trade secr et as a matter of law and dismissed ISR’s misappropriation-of-trade-secrets c laim. The district court further concluded that both the covenant not to compete and the confidentiality provision in the license agreement were not enforceable, and dismissed ISR’s breach-of-3 ISR did not appeal the district court’s denial of its request for a preliminary injunction. -6- contract claim. As to ISR’s remaining claims—trade mark infringement and misleading trade practices under the Lanham Act, an d violations of the CCPA—the court concluded that, because ISR failed to advance sufficient evidence on each element, those claims must be dismissed as well. I SR appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendants. 3
II We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, ap plying the same legal standard used by the district court. Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “if th e pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In our review, we examine the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Simm s v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). “Although the movant must show the absence of a gen uine issue of material fact, he or she need not negate the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. Once the movant carries this burden, the nonmoving party must “bring forward spe cific facts showing a genuine-7-

issue for trial as to those dispositive matters forwhich he or she carries the burden of proof.” Id. (quotation omitted). An issue of material fact is genuine if the nonmovant presents facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. Id.
A In evaluating the district court’s decision regardi ng ISR’s trade-secrets claim, we look to Colorado law. Colorado has adopt ed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which defines a trade secret as “any scientifi c or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, [or] improvement . . . which is secret and of value.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-102. In order “[t]o be a ‘ trade secret’ the owner thereof must have taken measures to prevent the secret from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have acce ss thereto for limited purposes.” Id. Trade-secret status is a question of fact. Colo. Supply Co. v. Stewart , 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. , 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding thatin this context “doubts as to existence of triable issue of fact . . . must be resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues”). Factors considered in determining whether a trade secret exists include: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e., by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the hol der of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected-8-

and the value to the holder in having the informati on as against competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expe nded in obtaining and developing the information; and (6) the amount of time and expense it would take for others to acquire and dup licate the information. Colo. Supply Co. , 797 P.2d at 1306. In Rivendell , we held, consistent with Colorado law, that information can be a trade secre t notwithstanding the fact that some of its components are well-known. 28 F.3d at 1045. “[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and compo nents each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified process, desi gn and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.” Id. (quotation omitted). In arriving at its conclusion that the ISR program is not a trade secret as a matter of law, the district court determined that ( 1) “[v]ariations of the swim, float, swim method are known both inside and outside the c hildren’s aquatic business,” (2) ISR did not take precautions to guard the secre cy of its information “until at least 1996, after hundreds of instructors had been trained and thousands of students taught,” (3) “[p]arents and bystanders were allowedto watch and videotape lessons,” and (4) “a variation on ISR’s methods cou ld be created through a perusal of commercially available child psychology, child h ealth, and swimming instruction4 ISR contends that the district court improperly r elied on library books

and information downloaded from the internet. ISR suggests these books and materials are hearsay and should not have been cons idered when ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ISR’s hearsay argument lacks merit. As correctly explained by the defendants in their r eply brief, these pieces of evidence were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but rather for the very fact of their existence.

5 Consistent with this theory, ISR asserts that non e of its publications, including Precision Strokes for Little Folks , discloses trade secrets. Although its publications provide general information about the techniques used by ISR and the psychological foundations for those techniques, ISR’s position is that the ISR program, as a whole, is a trade secret and cannot b e learned from its publications. -9- books.” 4 Barnett v. Shidler , No. 00-B-731, slip op. at 5 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 200 2). Ultimately, the court found that “ISR allowed its p rogram to become part of the public domain before seeking protection . . . [and] the Prompts and Procedures, based on principles of behavioral conditioning, was already in use to teach children swim, float, swim throughout the nation” and thus “ as a matter of law . . . ISR has no protectable trade secret.” Id. at 5–6. Our review leads us to conclude that the district court improperly looked at components of the ISR program in isolation, rather than as a whole, in determining that ISR does not possess a trade secret. This run s afoul of the analytical approach set forth in Rivendell . 28 F.3d at 1045–46 (concluding that the districtcourt improperly examined the separate elements of an all eged trade secret rather than the combination of elements). ISR’s position is th at the ISR program, as a whole, is a trade secret. 5 (See Appellants’ Br. at 15 (“The unified process, desig n and-10-

operation of the ISR Program, in unique combination , affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.”).) In fail ing to follow our holding in Rivendell —that a trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics, each of which, considered separately, is in the public doma in, but, taken together, may yield a competitive advantage that results in a pro tectable trade secret—the district court applied an inappropriate standard. We do notsuggest that had the district court merely stated that it was also considering it s findings in the aggregate, that would have been sufficient. Rivendell ’s requirement of analysis in the aggregate is more than a formality. It is a substantive compone nt of trade-secret analysis integral to a court’s ultimate conclusion regarding the existence of material facts for trial. On our review of the record, we conclud e that a Rivendell analysis sets in relief numerous genuine issues of material fact pre cluding summary judgment. In support of the first and second factors used by Colorado courts to determine the existence of a trade secret—the exten t to which the information is known outside the business and to those inside the business—ISR submitted four affidavits attesting to the uniqueness of the ISR p rogram. First, Tom Werts, an aquatic safety consultant with over thirty years of experience, including a position as the National Director of Water Safety for the Am erican Red Cross, stated in his affidavit: “The ISR program and the techniques use d by its instructors are unique. They are not taught by other aquatic organizations. The ISR program is a6 Emphasizing the difference between standard swimm ing programs and

the ISR program, Dr. Barnett points out that althou gh the YMCA, American Medical Association, and American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) recommend notteaching children to swim until they are four year s of age, the ISR program teaches infants as young as six months old how to s urvive in the water. (See 1 id. at 64.) -11- behavioral approach to pediatric drowning preventio n.” (1 Appellants’ App. at 71.) Second, in his affidavit, Dr. Barnett stated that t he ISR program “is not simply teaching children to swim. The ISR Program is a un ique and specially designed behavioral approach to pediatric drowning preventio n.” 6 (4 id. at 1455.) Third, Lisa Grether, a current ISR instructor, averred that the ISR program uses trade secrets and is unique. Finally, Dr. David Carr, wh o, in his role as an advisory board member for the State of Florida, had the oppo rtunity to evaluate various infant-swimming programs for certification in Flori da, submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that “Dr. Barnett’s program was th e only program which offered a behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevent ion” and that the ISR program is “unique unto itself” and “not capable of being c opied simply by watching from poolside.” (1 id. at 358–59.) In further support of the first and second factors, ISR points to testimony from two current ISR instructors, Carol Gnam and Ci ndy Asay, who relayed repeated admissions by Shidler and Heumann regardin g the uniqueness of the ISR program. ISR also elicited testimony from David Du bois, one of defendants’7Dubois claimed that the only other program he was aware of that could

train instructors to teach infants with the same re sults as ISR was a program run by Ginny Flahive. During her testimony, however, F lahive explained that in order to become an instructor under her program, in contr ast to the ISR program, individuals must first spend one year teaching chil dren age four and older. -12- experts, stating that he knows of no other aquatic program whose specific goal is to certify instructors, in a five-week time frame, to teach infants and toddlers aquatic survival skills. 7 In support of the third factor—the precautions take n by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the informatio n—ISR presented Dr. Barnett’s affidavit, franchise agreements, and license agreem ents. In his affidavit, Dr. Barnett averred that “ISR has protected the confide ntiality of all of the ISR research and materials since the 1970’s by franchis e agreements with confidentiality restrictions and later by the restr ictions of the license agreements.” (4 id. at 1455.) As for the franchise agreements, they c ontained a “Confidentiality of Information” provision providing that “[f]ranchi see shall not at any time or in any way divulge, disclose, or communicate to any pe rson or organization in any manner whatsoever any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of Franchisor.” (3 Appellees’ Supp. App. at 1158.) Moreover, license agreements, prior to 1996, contained a “Confidentia lity of Information” provision stating:8 The first three factors are the focus of this app eal. Assuredly, however,

we are satisfied that ISR submitted sufficient evid ence in support of the final three factors as well. In support of the fourth fa ctor—the value to the holder of possessing trade-secret information—ISR cites the a ffidavits of Dr. Barnett, Dr. Carr, and Dr. Werts, in which they attest to the co mpetitive advantages of the ISR program. Finally, as to the fifth and sixth factor s—the amount of effort or money expended in developing the trade-secret information and the amount of time and expense it would take for others to duplicate the i nformation—ISR produced evidence that Dr. Barnett spent his entire adult li fe developing the ISR program and evidence that no other infant swimming program compares. -13- LICENSEE shall not at any time or in any way divulge, disclose or communicate to any person or organization in any ma nner whatsoever any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of LICENSOR . . . . LICENSEE further agrees not to write for publication any article concerning Infant Swimming Research teaching and data techniques and theory, infant swimming or infa nt and young child aquatic activities and drowning accidents and . . . not to train or endeavor to train instructors or assistants in the same or simi lar methods or techniques without SPECIFIC WRITTEN CONSENT FROM LICENSOR . . . . Upon termination of this agreement, LICENSEE will surren der all documents pertaining to LICENSOR’S business, technique, advertising and trade secrets. (1 Appellants’ App. at 61.) Beginning in 1996, th e Confidentiality of Information section provided that “Licensee acknowledges that t he materials contain trade secrets of Licensor and as such provide a competiti ve advantage.” (1 id. at 74.) Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude th at ISR has raised genuine issues of material fact as to the contested factors. 8 ISR submitted evidence that its program is unique in that it instructs ind ividuals, in a five-week period, how to teach aquatic-survival skills to infants as youn g as six-months old. ISR further submitted evidence showing that, through franchise agreements and license9 Defendants’ arguments that ISR did not protect th e confidentiality of the

ISR program until 1996 are not dispositive at this summary judgment stage. Defendants first contend that Dr. Barnett conceded at the preliminary-injunction hearing that ISR did not possess a trade secret unt il 1996 and that information available to the public before 1996 is identical to information after 1996. We have reviewed the record and are not persuaded thatDr. Barnett has conceded the case. At a minimum, there is conflicting evidence on this question. Defendants also ask us to consider the fact that the franchise agreements did not expressly mention trade secrets and that the license agreemen ts did not expressly refer to the ISR program as a trade secret until 1996. A rational jury could consider the franchise agreements, as well as the license agreem ents, in determining whether ISR took reasonable precautions to guard the secrec y of the ISR program. In any event, the question of whether the ISR program beca me a protectable trade secret after 1996 is for the trier of fact.

10 The district court also dismissed ISR’s unjust-en richment claim because, among other reasons, ISR failed to state that claim in the Pre-Trial Order. As noted by the district court, claims in the Pre-Tria l Order supercede claims in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Because ISR did not proper ly raise its claim below, we will not engage in this “highly fac t-intensive” inquiry here. Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs. , 11 P.3d 441, 445 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). -14- agreements, it has taken precautions to guard the s ecrecy of its program. 9 Factual issues remain in regard to whether the nuanced ISR program is distinguishable from standard infant-swimming programs and whether ISR t ook reasonable precautions to guard the secrecy of its alleged trade-secret pr ogram. Indulging all inferences in favor of ISR, we hold that summary judgment is not appropriate on the question of whether the ISR program, viewed comprehensively, is a trade secret.
B We turn to the district court’s dismissal of the co ntract claims. 10 Each defendant signed a “Nondisclosure and Confidentiali ty Agreement,” which required-15-

them to hold ISR’s confidential information in secr ecy and use it solely for the purposes contemplated in the parties’ license agree ments. As discussed above, the license agreements contain (1) a covenant not to co mpete and (2) a confidentiality provision. 1. Covenant Not to Compete The covenant not to compete provides that: Licensee shall not, during the terms of this Agreem ent and for 2 (two) years immediately following the termination of this Agree ment, regardless of who initiates the termination, engage directly or indir ectly in the teaching of infants or young children to swim or engage in the business or training other individuals for the purpose of teaching infants or young children to swim, other than pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. . . . This Covenant Not to Compete shall be effective within a five hundred (5 00) mile radius from the present site of the business address of Licensee. This Covenant applies to self-employment or employment on behalf of any othe r person, firm, corporation, partnership or other business organization. (1 Appellants’ App. at 61–62.) Under Colorado law, covenants not to compete are void, save under limited circumstances. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2). One exception protects “[a]ny contract for the protecti on of trade secrets.” Id. § 8-2- 113(2)(b). “For a covenant not to compete to fit w ithin the trade secret exception to § 8-2-113(2), the purpose of the covenant must b e the protection of trade secrets, and the covenant must be reasonably limited in scop e to the protection of those trade secrets.” Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay , 937 P.2d 907, 910 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). Having concluded that the ISR program was not a trade secret as a matter of law, the district court determined that t he covenant not to compete was11 Defendants argue that the covenants not to compet e are unreasonable as

to the scope of conduct the covenants purport to pr ohibit. Because the district court did not address this argument, we decline to do so for the first time on appeal and remand for that purpose. See R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek, Inc. , 951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991). -16- necessarily void under Colorado law. This being th e primary basis of the district court’s rationale, and given our conclusion that ge nuine issues of material fact remain on ISR’s trade-secrets claim, it follows that this breach-of-contract claim must go forward as well. 11 2. Confidentiality provision Contained in the license agreements signed by defen dants after 1996, the confidentiality provision provides: The research and printed materials provided by Dr. Harvey Barnett, Harvey Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming Research, Inc., w hich pertain to the education of infants and children in aquatic surviv al and swimming techniques, are unique intellectual properties enti tled to protection as such at law. Licensee shall not at any time or in any way during the term of this Agreement or after its termination, divulge, d isclose or communicate to any person or organization in any ma nner whatsoever any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business and trade secrets of Licensor . . . . Licensee agrees not to train or not to endeavor to train instructors or assistants in the same or similar methods without SPECIFIC WRITTEN CONSENT FROM LICENSOR . . . . Licensee acknowledges that the materials co ntain trade secrets of Licensor and as such provide a competiti ve advantage. ANY BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE A MATERIAL BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT AND SHALL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE AND TERMINATIONOF THIS AGREEMENT. . . . Licensee will not disclose to another person any of the methods, techniques, trade secrets or systems u sed by Licensor in business. Further, at any time following terminati on of this Agreement, use12 Although Mai Basic involved a contract dispute in New Mexico, its

rationale is equally applicable here. -17- of Licensor’s trade secrets, under any other name o r organization constitutes unfair competition due to the distinctive results o f Licensor’s techniques. Terms of this and all paragraphs are permanent

. (1 Appellants’ App. at 74.) In dismissing ISR’s cl aim relating to this provision, the district court concluded that, even if this provisi on created an enforceable duty on defendants not to disclose confidential information not rising to the level of a trade secret, the provision was a disguised restrictive c ovenant that was unenforceable as vague and overly broad. In Mai Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc. , 880 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1989), we held that the confidentiality and non-disclosure agreeme nts at issue could not be characterized as restrictive covenants because they “serve entirely different purposes than do agreements not to compete and mustbe analyzed on the basis of those distinct purposes alone.” 12 Id. at 288. We noted that the Mai Basic defendants remained “free to work for whomever theywish, wherever they wish, and at whatever they wish, subject only to the proh ibition against misusing plaintiff’s proprietary information and the require ment that defendants assign to plaintiff any work product relating to plaintiff’s business that was developed by defendants while they were employed by plaintiff orshortly thereafter.” Id.-18-

Defendants distinguish Mai Basic on the ground that the present confidentiality provision prevents licensees from d ivulging “any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business and trade secrets of Licensor ,” thus preventing competition regardless of whethe r it involves the use of trade-secret information. (Appellees’ Br. at 25.) We disagree with the defendants’ proposed distinction. As in Mai Basic , the pertinent provision preserves “the valuable confidential information plaintiff necessa rily had to disclose to the individual defendants during the course of their employment.” 800 F.2d at 288. This provision is different from a blanket covenantnot to compete in that it does not purport to prevent defendants from teaching swi mming to infants using widely known techniques. As indicated by its title, the p urpose of the confidentiality provision is to prevent defendants from divulging c onfidential information; it prevents defendants from teaching infants utilizing the allegedly confidential techniques possessed by ISR. We conclude the district court erred in determining that the confidentiality provision is a disguised restrictive covenant. Thu s, we reverse the district court’s decision on this breach-of-contract claim as well. On remand, the trier of fact should consider whether the ISR program contained c onfidential information13 We note that the license agreements contain a sev erability clause. In

granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant s, the district court did not address the question of severability. Should the d istrict court ultimately conclude that certain provisions of the license agreements a re unenforceable, severability is an option.

14 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1 )(A), Any person who, on, or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or d evice, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of or igin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mislead ing representation of fact, which—is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or as sociation of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sp onsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commerci al activities by another person, . . . shall be liable in a civil ac tion by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damag ed by such act.

15 Pursuant to the CCPA, (1) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice w hen, in the (continued...) -19- protected under this provision. 13 See Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., Inc. , 739 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that “confidentia l information acquired during the course of employment may be protected” and “[t] he determination of what constitutes confidential information is a question for the trier of fact” (quotation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds , 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
C ISR’s remaining claims address misleading trade pra ctices in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, 14 as well as unfair competition and deceptive trade practices in violation of the CCPA, Colo. Rev. Stat . § 6-1-105. 15 These claims are15 (...continued) course of such person’s business, vocation, or occupation, such person: (a) Knowingly passes off goods, services, or property as those of another; (b) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods, services, or property; (c) Knowingly makes a false representation as to aff iliation, connection, or association with or certification by another . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105. -20- predicated on the defendants’ allegedly false and m isleading advertisements to the public. In dismissing these claims, the district c ourt found that summary judgment was appropriate because there was (1) no evidence o f any resulting confusion or mistake and (2) no evidence of damages. See Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc. , 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (elements of the Lanham Act); Hall v. Walter , 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (elements of the CCPA). ISR’s disagreement with the district court’s decisi on that ISR failed to advance evidence of likelihood of confusion is base d entirely on a quote from our decision in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co

. , 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983) (quotation omitted): “Intent on the part of the alleged infringer to pass off its goods as the product of another raises an infer ence of a likelihood of confusion.” ISR is correct that a party need not s et forth evidence of actual confusion in order to prevail in a trademark-infrin gement action. See id. In16 We have held that de minimus evidence of actual confusion does not

establish the existence of a genuine issue of mater ial fact regarding the likelihood of confusion in a trademark-infringement claim. Se e King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrylser Corp. , 185 F.3d 1084, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999).

17In support of its position, ISR contends that the parties agreed to liquidated damages. That the parties agreed to liq uidated damages in the event of a breach of the license agreement does not create agenuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether the defendants, through the ir misleading advertisements, caused the requisite injury under the Lanham Act an d CCPA. -21- devoting merely a single sentence in its opening br ief to this issue, only to quote
Beer Nuts , however, ISR has failed to advance evidence on wh ether there was so much as a likelihoodof confusion resulting from the defendants’ false representations—a showing necessary to prevail on i ts Lanham Act misleadingtrade-practices claim. 16 As for injury—a further required element under the Lanham Act as well as the CCPA—ISR fails on two counts: it does not deve lop its argument and it advances no evidence whatsoever of loss of business or loss of profits. It merely makes an argument about the appropriate measure of damages. 17In the absence of an adequately developed argument, and in the absenc e of any evidence of injury, we must affirm the district court. “Conclusory all egations that are unsubstantiated do not create an issue of fact and are insufficientto oppose summary judgment.” Elsken v. Network Multi-Family Sec. Corp. , 49 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). We conclude that ISR has failed to show a genuine i ssue for trial as to whether it suffered an injury in fact as a result of the defen dants’ misleading advertisements.18 In its complaint, ISR also alleged trademark infr ingement in violation of

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). ISR’s trademark infringeme nt claim is based on the defendants’ use of the phrase “Infant Aquatic Survi val” as the name of its program. In dismissing this claim, the district co urt found that defendants’ use of the phrase “Infant Aquatic Survival” was merely des criptive and used in good faith to describe its services, which is a defense under the relevant statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (listing as a defense to a char ge of trademark infringement that the “use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party”). ISR has not challenged this decision by the distric t court on appeal and thus we affirm on this ground the district court’s ruling.

19 We do so notwithstanding appellants’ counsel’s fa ilure to meet basic standards relating to the record on appeal. Appell ants inexcusably failed to include in the record, among other things, the comp laint and defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See 10th Cir. R. 10.3(C). In many instances, appellan ts’ record-designation deficiencies were bailed out by the appellees themselves. -22- See, e.g. , Hall , 969 P.2d at 235 (holding that a CCPA plaintiff “m ust be able to show that the defendant’s actions in violation of t he CCPA causedthe plaintiff’s injury” (emphasis added)). We affirm the district court on these remaining claims. 18

III In sum, we REVERSE the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on ISR’s claim of m isappropriation of trade secrets, and on its claim of breach of contract, an d we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 19 We AFFIRM the district court’s decision in all other respects.