If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re A. T. S. HARRIS, Minor. November 3, 2022

No. 359788

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2014-516981-NA

Before: LETICA, P.J., and SERVITTO and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her

minor child, AH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i) (child abandoned and parent unidentifiable), 

(a)(ii) (desertion for 91 or more days without seeking custody), (c)(i) (conditions that led to 

adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide 

care and custody), (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child returned to parent’s home), and (k)(i)

(abuse involving abandonment). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Respondent gave birth to AH when she was 15 years old. In June 2014, approximately six 

months after respondent gave birth to AH, petitioner, the Michigan Department of Health and 

Human Services (MDHHS), filed a petition seeking to remove AH from respondent’s care 

because, in part, she did not have proper income or housing. When MDHHS filed the petition, 

respondent was 161⁄2 years old. The trial court developed a case services plan for respondent. The 

plan required respondent to participate in mental health services, including psychological and 

psychiatric evaluations and counseling, and attend parenting and employment-development 

classes. When respondent’s mother refused to allow respondent to live with her, and would not 

sign paperwork to allow respondent to receive services, respondent was made a temporary court 

ward (in this case) and placed in a residential treatment facility. After completing some services, 

respondent was transitioned to semi-independent living, and AH was placed with her. In lateSeptember 2016, the trial court terminated its jurisdiction, noting that respondent was a temporary 

ward herself and would continue to receive services.

In December 2017, respondent, who, at some point, obtained employment, lost her job and 

did not have stable housing. She called Children’s Protective Services (CPS) seeking assistance. 
-2-

CPS then placed AH with respondent’s maternal great aunt. At a hearing in mid-December 2017, 

respondent admitted she was unable to care for AH because she did not have stable housing or a 

legal source of income. She also admitted that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar 

disorder, and depression. Though she was prescribed medication, she was not taking it and was 

not attending mental health treatment. She also identified AH’s father, but that individual had not

established paternity. Based on respondent’s admissions, the trial court exercised jurisdiction over 

AH and ordered AH’s father to establish paternity.

At the initial dispositional hearing in late January 2018, Jeremy Davis, the foster-care 

worker at the time, indicated that an initial service plan was prepared for respondent. Initially, 

respondent was noncompliant with services. But by the mid-July 2018 review hearing, respondent 

was progressing toward unsupervised, overnight visits with AH. She had completed parenting 

classes, as well as psychological and psychiatric evaluations. She was also participating in 

individual therapy. Although respondent still needed stable housing at this point, she had steady 

employment.

In October 2018, respondent was compliant with services and the permanency plan was 

reunification. At a review hearing that month, the trial court anticipated discussing AH’s return to 

respondent’s care by the next hearing, and a DNA test confirmed the identity of AH’s biological 

father. The court found that individual to be AH’s legal father.

During a February 2019 review hearing, respondent informed the court that she had 

recently moved and although she lost one job, she had another. Respondent acknowledged having 

not visited AH since Christmas Day 2018. There was also a discussion of respondent’s access to 

bus passes to assist with transportation issues. Davis also testified at the hearing and discussed his 

conversation with AH’s father, who had indicated that he could not take custody of AH because 

he did not have housing and only wanted to visit AH. After respondent testified, however, AH’s 

father informed the court that he wished to seek custody of AH. In March 2019, the trial court 

held an emergency hearing at which MDHHS asked the court to place AH with his father. 

Respondent did not object to the placement and indicated that she understood that AH would be 

placed with his father.

Respondent was not present at an April 2019 hearing. It appeared that respondent believed

she did not have to visit with AH or continue services because AH was placed with his father. In 

April 2019, Kendra Byrd replaced Davis as the caseworker and spoke with respondent around the 

same time. According to Byrd, respondent asked “how visitation would be set up.” Byrd told 

respondent that she had to work out visitation with AH’s father. Byrd testified at another hearing 

that AH’s father told her that respondent had reached out to him about visitation, but they had not 

agreed on a date. Byrd also testified that respondent’s services were terminated because she was 

noncompliant with services, and that the agency would file a supplemental petition seeking 

permanent custody because respondent had abandoned AH.

At a hearing in mid-November 2019, Byrd informed the court that respondent had gone to 

the agency to contact Byrd two weeks earlier and asked about visitation. Respondent also texted 

Byrd asking about visitation before the November 2019 hearing. Several months later, in midJuly 2020, MDHHS filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
-3-

In January 2021, the trial court held a hearing at which a new caseworker, Michelle 

Houstell Jones, testified. Jones testified that she was assigned to the case in mid-October 2020 

and that respondent had been visiting AH through Zoom because she was pregnant at the time1

and had concerns about COVID-19. Jones indicated that respondent was present for all of her 

visits with AH, but had not participated in services because the last court order was “kind of out 

of date.” According to Jones, respondent acknowledged that the case was still open but did not 

believe she needed to do anything else because AH was in his father’s custody. At the time of the 

January 2021 hearing, respondent lived with family and was not employed. Jones asked the court 

to order a new psychological evaluation because respondent was diagnosed with depression and 

bipolar disorder, but was not addressing her mental health issues.

In November 2021, the trial court held a termination hearing. Jones testified that she 

contacted respondent in November 2020 to give her information about an upcoming hearing. Jones 

indicated that she found respondent’s number “in the system,” a process that took her “[j]ust a few 

minutes,” and called and spoke with her. Contrary to her testimony at the January 2021 hearing,

Jones also testified that when she spoke with respondent in November 2020, respondent believed 

her case was closed because AH was placed with his father. Jones also testified that respondent 

completed a parenting class in 2018 and a 12-week parenting class in July 2021. She testified that 

respondent had several jobs throughout this case, including as a dancer, self-employed hair stylist, 

White Castle employee, and certified nurse assistant in a nursing home. Further, Jones testified 

that from November 2020 to July 2021, respondent missed only five of her weekly Zoom visits 

with AH. Those that she missed were because of work. In July 2021, respondent began in-person 

visits. Though she missed two of the four visits, it was because she had transportation issues. 

There was also testimony that respondent attended one of AH’s dental appointments. In late 

October 2021, a new foster-care worker, Shakita Wilkerson, observed respondent’s residence at 

the time, a hotel room, and found it not suitable for AH.

Respondent also testified at the termination hearing. She stated that after her Christmas 

Day 2018 visit with AH, AH’s father told respondent that the visits were cutoff. When respondent 

contacted Davis to find out why, he told her he was no longer assigned to her case. Respondent 

traveled to an MDHHS office and asked about the new worker assigned to her case, Byrd. No one 

respondent spoke with knew Byrd’s contact information. Respondent also tried contacting AH’s 

father and the father’s family. When she reached AH’s father, he would set a date for a visit, but 

never follow through. Respondent also indicated, at one point, that she only arranged visitation 

through the girlfriend of AH’s father because AH’s father tried to grope her when she attended 

AH’s dental appointment. Respondent also indicated that the last time she had mental health 

treatment was when Davis was her foster-care worker. She further testified that although she had 

money for housing, every place she applied had a waiting list. At the time of the termination 

hearing, respondent had been living in a motel since July 2021. And she indicated that she was 

working at Amazon at the time of the termination hearing and had provided Wilkerson a 

photograph of her paystub.

 

1 Respondent gave birth to a baby girl, NH, in February 2021. NH is not at issue in this appeal.
-4-

After closing arguments, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported 

statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.2b(a)(i), (a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (j), and 

(k)(i). The court was most concerned with what it described as respondent’s abandonment of AH 

for two years. It also agreed with MDHHS that respondent had become complacent because AH 

was in his father’s care. Further, the court found that it was in AH’s best interests to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground 

under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 

Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding 

whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

MCR 3.977(K). This Court also reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual finding that 

MDHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify a respondent with their child. In re Atchley, ___ Mich 

App ___; ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos 358502, 358503); slip op at 3. “A finding is 

clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must find that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights. 

In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Whether termination is in the 

best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 

Mich App at 90. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s determination regarding a 

child’s best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding that several statutory grounds

for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. She argues that some of the 

statutory grounds were inapplicable, and that others were not supported by the evidence. We agree

and address each statutory ground in turn.

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i), 

(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (j), and (k)(i). Those statutory grounds permit termination of parental 

rights under the following circumstances: 

(a) The child has been deserted under either of the following circumstances:

(i) The child’s parent is unidentifiable, has deserted the child for 28 or more 

days, and has not sought custody of the child during that period. For the purposes 

of this section, a parent is unidentifiable if the parent’s identity cannot be 

ascertained after reasonable efforts have been made to locate and identify the 

parent.
-5-

(ii) The child’s parent has deserted the child for 91 or more days and has 

not sought custody of the child during that period.

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s 

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, 

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received 

notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the 

conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified 

within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.

(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included 

1 or more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will 

be harmed if returned to the care of the parent:

(i) Abandonment of a young child.

1. MCL 712A.19B(3)(A)(I) AND (C)(II)

As an initial matter, we agree with respondent’s argument—with which MDHHS agrees—

that the trial court erred by terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i) 

and (c)(ii). MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i) requires, in part, that the parent be unidentifiable. There was 

no evidence that respondent was ever unidentifiable. The trial court, therefore, clearly erred in 

terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(i). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) 

requires a respondent be notified of other conditions that exist and must be rectified. Respondent 
-6-

was never notified of other conditions that she had to rectify. The trial court, therefore, clearly 

erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii).

2. MCL 712A.19B(3)(A)(II) AND (K)(I)

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) because she did not desert AH, and she sought custody throughout the 

proceedings. Similarly, she argues that termination was improper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(i) 

because she did not abandon AH. We agree.

To support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), MDHHS was required to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that respondent deserted her child for 91 or more days and did not 

seek custody of AH during that period. To support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(i), 

MDHHS had to show by clear and convincing evidence that respondent abused AH by 

abandonment and there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be harmed if returned to 

respondent’s care. “[D]esertion is an intentional or willful act.” In re B & J, 279 Mich App 13, 

18 n 3; 756 NW2d 234 (2008). “ ‘[A]bandon’ is defined, in part, as ‘to leave completely and 

finally; forsake utterly; desert: to abandon a child; to abandon a sinking ship.’ ” Moore v Prestige 

Painting, 277 Mich App 437, 449; 745 NW2d 816 (2007) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).

The trial court found that from December 25, 2018, to November 8, 2020, respondent 

“disappeared” and her location was unknown. The trial court also found that, during that period, 

respondent did not participate in services and had no contact with MDHHS. Before November 

2020, respondent last visited AH on December 25, 2018. She was, however, present at hearings 

on February 4, 2019, and March 4, 2019. At the March 2019 hearing, the trial court authorized 

AH’s placement with his father. At a hearing on April 15, 2019, MDHHS indicated that 

respondent had spoken with Jeremy Davis, the caseworker at the time. On July 12, 2019, Kendra 

Byrd, the newly assigned caseworker, testified that she spoke to respondent in April 2019, and 

respondent asked how to set up visitation with AH’s father. Although AH was still a court ward 

and the trial court had ordered services and visitation to continue, Byrd told respondent to contact 

AH’s father directly to work out visitation. Respondent contacted Byrd again on September 18, 

2019, and again a week later. And at a hearing on November 13, 2019, Byrd testified that 

respondent had come to the agency two weeks earlier to ask Byrd about visitation. Respondent 

also texted Byrd on the morning of the November 2019 hearing. Byrd spoke to AH’s father, who 

confirmed that respondent had contacted him about visitation, but they could not agree on a date. 

There is also no evidence that Byrd offered respondent any services throughout this period or 

completed a home assessment of respondent’s residence to determine whether it was safe for 

visitation with AH.

Michelle Houstell Jones, another caseworker, was assigned to the case on October 20, 

2020. Jones explained that she looked up respondent’s number on her computer and called 

respondent on November 9, 2020, and immediately set up visits between respondent and AH. 

Thereafter, respondent missed only five of her weekly Zoom visits from November 2020 to July 

2021, each because of work. Respondent also completed a 12-week parenting class. Respondent 

testified that, before then, she had contacted AH’s father for visitation with AH, but AH’s father 

never followed through with the actual visits. Respondent also testified that she video chatted with 

AH when AH was visiting an uncle.
-7-

The evidence presented did not clearly and convincingly establish that respondent

abandoned AH or deserted him for 91 or more days without seeking custody. On the contrary, the 

evidence indicated that, despite significant obstacles, respondent made good faith efforts to 

maintain her connection with AH when the process for doing so was clear. Respondent regularly 

visited with AH and had progressed to unsupervised, weekend visits, and the plan up until February 

2019 was reunification. In March 2019, AH was placed with AH’s father, and a new caseworker, 

Byrd, was assigned to the case around this same time. Respondent continued to attend hearings in 

February and March 2019, and Byrd confirmed that respondent inquired in April 2019 how to set 

up visitation after AH was placed with his father. Byrd told respondent that it was her 

responsibility to coordinate with AH’s father for visitation. Thereafter, however, the focus 

apparently became helping AH’s father gain full custody, and Byrd never testified regarding any 

efforts to assist respondent. Byrd told respondent to coordinate with AH’s father regarding 

visitation and respondent attempted to do so, but was unsuccessful. Once Jones was assigned to 

the case and she contacted respondent, visits between respondent and AH immediately resumed 

and respondent completed another set of parenting classes. Even if respondent could have made 

more of an effort to pursue visitation and custody throughout the case, she attended court hearings,

stayed in contact with caseworkers, and attempted to set up visits with AH’s father but was not 

successful. Respondent’s conduct demonstrates that there was not clear and convincing evidence 

thatshe abandoned AH or deserted him for 91 or more days without seeking custody. Accordingly, 

the trial court clearly erred by finding that the evidence supported termination under MCL

712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) and (k)(i).2

B. REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARD REUNIFICATION

Respondent also argues that grounds for termination were not established under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), or (j). She reasons that MDHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to 

reunify her with AH after AH was placed with his father, and the focus of the case changed to 

helping AH’s father gain full custody. We agree.

MDHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before 

seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 

(2017). “While [MDHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to 

secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to 

participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 

(2012). “The adequacy of [MDHHS’s] efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is 

sufficient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 

(2009). The reasonableness of MDHHS’s efforts toward reunification is a case-by-case inquiry; 

it should be tailored to the particular parent and his or her unique attributes, including reasonable 

modifications to services based on disabilities or challenges. See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 

79, 85-90; 893 NW2d 637 (2017).

 

2 We do not give any particular weight to MDHHS’s argument under these two factors that 

although the regional bus pass allowed respondent to travel without limitation, she refused to take 

the bus, particularly in light of respondent’s diagnosis of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
-8-

1. MCL 712A.19B(3)(C)(I)

Regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), more than 182 days had passed since the issuance of 

the initial dispositional order and there was evidence that the conditions that led to the adjudication, 

lack of safe and suitable housing, continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing. This 

statutory ground is established when the conditions that brought the child into care continue to 

exist despite a respondent being given “time to make changes and the opportunity to take 

advantage of a variety of services. . . .” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710, 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when “the totality of the 

evidence amply supports that [the respondent] ha[s] not accomplished any meaningful change in 

the conditions” that led to the adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 

286 (2009).

AH was brought into care in December 2017 because respondent was unable to care for 

him in light of her lack stable housing or a legal source of income. At that time, respondent, then 

age 18, was not participating in any mental health services or treatment despite her previous 

diagnosis of bipolar disorder and depression. At the time of the termination hearing in November 

2021, respondent had been living in a motel since July 2021, which Wilkerson visited and found 

to be unsuitable. The motel was respondent’s third residence in 2021. Respondent was not 

participating in mental health treatment and never followed through with a medication review as 

recommended in the psychiatric evaluation.

Respondent argues that MDHHS did not establish by clear and convincing evidence “that 

there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age” because MDHHS failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification. 

Respondent argues that MDHHS did not adequately explain to her what AH’s placement with his 

father meant for her case and did not continue to provide her with services at that time. We agree.

At the initial dispositional hearing on January 31, 2018, Davis introduced the initial service 

plan. At that time, respondent did not object to the plan or any of the services being offered. 

MDHHS offered respondent parenting classes, home-based individual services for counseling 

sessions, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and a referral for an appointment for 

medication review. MDHHS also provided respondent with regular bus passes and a regional bus 

pass. Davis provided transportation for respondent to visit with AH until respondent was granted 

overnight visitation on the weekends. Respondent received services for young parents. After a 

slow start, respondent participated in services and was progressing toward reunification. Although 

respondent never participated in a medication review as recommended, there was no indication 

that she had problems participating in services, that she did not understand what was expected of 

her, or that the services were not addressing her needs. 

But after AH was placed with his father in March 2019, and the trial court ordered that all 

services and visitation remain in place, MDHHS stopped making any effort toward reunifying 

respondent with AH. Davis wrote in an April 11, 2019 report that respondent had not visited AH

since March 4, 2019. Davis noted, however, that respondent “didn’t know that she was able to 

visit [AH] since [AH] was placed with his legal father . . . .” At the April 15, 2019 hearing,

MDHHS informed the trial court that respondent believed she was no longer required to continue 

with services because AH had been placed with his father. There is no evidence in the record that 
-9-

any worker or other person involved in the case explained to respondent that she was still a 

respondent in an open case and was still obligated to participate in services. 

During this change in circumstances and amid respondent’s confusion, Byrd was assigned 

to the case. The record reveals that Byrd did not make any calls to respondent, offer any services 

to respondent, or facilitate visitation between respondent and AH. Respondent contacted Byrd 

several times by phone and visited Byrd at her office to inquire about visitation with AH. Byrd 

wrote in her report that she gave respondent the contact information for AH’s father and told 

respondent to contact him to arrange visitation. Respondent testified at the termination hearing 

that she tried to arrange visitation with AH’s father, but he would never follow through with the 

visits. There is no indication that Byrd ever attempted to facilitate visitation, or otherwise offered

respondent any services. Through July 2019, respondent was still allowed unsupervised visitation, 

yet there is no evidence Byrd ever attempted a home assessment of respondent’s residence to 

determine whether it was suitable for visitation.

Jones testified that, in October 2020, shortly after she was assigned to the case, she 

contacted respondent. Within a week, respondent began participating in weekly Zoom visits with 

AH and completed a 12-week parenting class. Jones also wanted to offer respondent another 

psychological evaluation because her previous one was outdated.

MDHHS was aware of respondent’s cognitive issues, and Davis offered respondent homebased services, counseling, and a parent partner to assist her. Respondent was participating in 

services and progressing toward reunification when AH was placed with his father and when the 

former caseworker, Davis, was reassigned to another case. Once Byrd was assigned to this case, 

the reunification efforts ceased and Byrd left it to respondent to arrange for visitation with AH’s 

father.

The trial court was not persuaded by respondent’s claim that she thought the case was 

closed and that she no longer had to participate in services. The trial court agreed with MDHHS 

that respondent became complacent because AH was being cared for by his father and respondent 

was free to do as she pleased. The court did not believe that respondent worked as hard as she 

could have to determine the status of her case. The trial court did not, however, address MDHHS’s 

lack of efforts during this time. As the trial court noted, respondent was still obligated to 

participate in services. But Byrd made no effort to offer any of those services to respondent or to 

facilitate visitation. 

MDHHS’s lack of reunification efforts after AH was placed with his father affects the 

likelihood that respondent can rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication within a reasonable 

time. This is especially so considering that once Byrd was taken off the case and replaced with 

Jones, respondent began regular visitation and completed a parenting class. Accordingly, the trial 

court clearly erred by determining that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions 

would be rectified within a reasonable time considering AH’s age.

2. MCL 712A.19B(3)(G)

The trial court also clearly erred by determining that, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), there 

was no reasonable expectation that respondent, although financially able to do so, would be able 
-10-

to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering AH’s age. As discussed, 

AH was placed into care because respondent was unable to provide proper care and custody due 

to her lack of housing and income, and these issues continued to exist in some form at the time of 

the termination hearing. MDHHS, however, failed to make reasonable efforts toward 

reunification. This failure contributed to the continued existence of these conditions, especially 

considering that once a new caseworker was appointed (Jones), respondent immediately resumed 

visitation and again began participating in services. At the termination hearing, respondent 

testified that she was working and provided verification of her employment with and income from 

Amazon. She also testified that she had been looking for housing for months, noting that although

she had the money, she could not find anything appropriate for rent. Davis previously testified 

that MDHHS could help respondent with housing if she could prove she had a legal source of 

income. But MDHHS failed to offer respondent any services or make reasonable efforts from 

April 2019 to November 2020. Therefore, the trial court also clearly erred by determining that 

there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care and 

custody within a reasonable time considering AH’s age.

3. MCL 712A.19B(3)(J)

Similarly, the trial court also clearly erred by determining that, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

there was a reasonable likelihood that AH would be harmed if AH was returned to respondent’s 

home. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was living in a motel that was not suitable 

for children. Respondent testified that although she had sufficient funds, she was unable to secure 

housing due to waitlists for available rental units. Respondent’s unstable housing was a problem 

throughout the case, but had MDHHS made reasonable efforts, it could have assisted respondent 

in finding housing because she was employed and had money (and an income) to rent a new 

residence. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred by determining that the evidence also supported 

termination under MCL712A.19b(3)(j).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred by finding that the evidence 

supported statutory grounds for termination. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.3 We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Anica Letica 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Noah P. Hood 

 

3

In light of our decision on the statutory grounds, it is not necessary to address respondent’s 

additional arguments that termination of her parental rights was not in AH’s best interests, or that 

termination of her parental rights was improper because it was not the “least restrictive means” of 

ensuring AH’s welfare. After review of the best-interest issue, however, we are persuaded that the 

trial court erred in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in AH’s best 

interests. We base this conclusion on much of the same reasoning supporting our analysis of the 

statutory grounds.