1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 30, 2014 Session

JAMES MICHAEL ADLER ET AL. v. CITY OF JOHNSON CITY ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County

No. 23764 Walter C. Kurtz, Senior Judge1

No. E2013-01309-COA-R3-CV-FILED-APRIL 27, 2015

James Michael Adler and Kim Kidner Adler2filed this action against Johnson City and 

Purofirst of Tri-Cities, LLC, alleging damage from sewage that backed up and entered 

their basement. Later, they filed another complaint alleging that their attorneys in the 

sewage case were guilty of malpractice. In the sewage case, the trial court dismissed the 

defendant Purofirst with prejudice as a sanction for the Adlers‟ repeated failure to comply 

with the court‟s discovery orders. The Adlers did not attempt to amend their malpractice 

complaint to include a claim based on Purofirst‟s dismissal until almost six years after the 

dismissal of Purofirst. Their motion to amend was filed on July 2, 2012, in violation of 

the trial court‟s scheduling order, which provided that “[n]o amendments shall be allowed 

after May 15, 2012.” The trial court denied the Adlers‟ motion to amend. The trial court 

also refused to allow the Adlers to bring Purofirst back into the sewage litigation. It did 

so despite the fact that another defendant had recently alleged the comparative fault of 

Purofirst. This latter action of the trial court was taken in an order entered pursuant to 

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We hold that the Adlers did not timely appeal this order. We 

further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Adlers‟ motion 

to amend their malpractice action. The trial court‟s judgment is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the 

Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

 

1

Sitting by designation.

2 At the time they filed their complaint, Michael Adler and Kim Kidner were engaged and living 

together in his house. At some time during the twelve-year pendency of this case, they were married. We 

will refer to them collectively in this opinion as “the Adlers.”
2

Jeffrey A. Cobble, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellants, James Michael Adler and 

Kim Kidner Adler.

K. Erickson Herrin, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellee, City of Johnson City. 

Suzanne S. Cook, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rick Leslie dba ABC 

Plumbing.

Gregory S. McMillan and Preston A. Hawkins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Purofirst of Tri-Cities, LLC.

William T. Wray, Jr., Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, T. Martin Browder, Jr.

R. Wayne Culbertson, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, George Todd East.

OPINION

I.

In September of 2003, sewage backed up into the basement of the Adlers‟ house, 

causing property damage and contamination. On August 27, 2004, the Adlers, 

represented by attorneys George Todd East3and T. Martin Browder, Jr., filed their 

complaint, alleging that Johnson City was responsible for the back-up. The Adlers 

further alleged that they hired defendant Purofirst to clean up the sewage mess, and that,

“in the process of performing its work, Purofirst negligently caused additional damage[ ]

by operating the central heating and air conditioning system which resulted in further 

contamination of the entire home.”

On April 27, 2005, Johnson City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on 

two grounds, (1) failure to validly serve process upon it and (2) the statute of limitations. 

One day earlier, on August 26, 2005, the Adlers filed a separate legal malpractice action 

against East and Browder (“the attorney defendants”), alleging that neither attorney took 

“any official action” on their sewage contamination case for a period of eight months, 

 

3

The parties do not agree on the scope and extent of East‟s representation. Michael Adler and 

East executed a contract for East‟s legal representation, but Browder is the one who entered an 

appearance and signed the documents filed on behalf of the Adlers in the sewage contamination case. It 

thus appears that East‟s involvement was limited, but he did not present this as a defense to the 

malpractice claim. The precise scope and extent of East‟s involvement and representation, however, is 

not material to the issues raised on, or the disposition of, this appeal.
3

and that both attorneys failed to communicate with Michael Adler during this eightmonth period despite his numerous attempts to reach them. The Adlers were represented 

by Jeffrey A. Cobble in the malpractice action. In that action, it was alleged that the 

amount of damages “is not fully known at this time, but it is sure to be extensive, in that 

the initial [sewage contamination] case may be dismissed due to the negligence of” the 

defendant attorneys.

On January 11, 2006, the trial court denied Johnson City‟s motion to dismiss. In 

an unusual twist, attorney Browder, who had been sued by the Adlers for legal 

malpractice, continued, with the Adlers‟ consent, to represent them in the sewage 

contamination case. On February 13, 2006, Purofirst filed its first motion to compel 

discovery. The next day, the trial court entered an order requiring the Adlers to respond

within twenty days to Purofirst‟s interrogatories and requests for production of 

documents. On May 30, 2006, the trial court granted Purofirst‟s second motion to 

compel discovery, again giving the Adlers twenty days to answer. On July 18, 2006, 

Purofirst filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to it, based on the Adlers‟ repeated 

failure to comply with the trial court‟s discovery orders. On July 25, 2006, the trial court

entered an order dismissing Purofirst with prejudice. On August 28, 2006, the Adlers 

filed a motion to set aside or vacate the order dismissing their suit against Purofirst. On 

January 28, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to set aside. 

Johnson City filed an answer on December 10, 2008, alleging, among other things,

the comparative fault of ABC Plumbing, a company allegedly hired by the Adlers. The 

Adlers then filed a motion to amend their complaint to add Rick Leslie dba ABC 

Plumbing as a defendant, which motion the trial court granted. On February 27, 2009, 

Leslie filed an answer, alleging, among other things, the comparative fault of Purofirst. 

The Adlers responded on May 18, 2009, by filing a motion to amend their complaint to 

add Purofirst as a defendant pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (2009). Purofirst 

filed a motion to dismiss. On August 17, 2010, the trial court granted the Purofirst

motion, finding that “the previous dismissal of Purofirst . . . was with prejudice and 

therefore on the merits under Rules 37 and 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” The trial court held that Purofirst “shall be placed on the jury verdict form as 

a comparatively at fault tortfeasor against whom the jury may assess fault.” The Court, 

however, further held that no damages could be awarded against non-party Purofirst. The 

trial court‟s order provides that “[t]his Order shall be final pursuant to T.R.C.P. 54.02 as 

to Purofirst of Tri Cities, LLC, [and] the Court expressly directs entry of this Order as 

final, there being no just reason for delay.” The Adlers did not appeal this latter

judgment until they filed their notice of appeal in this case on May 31, 2013, more than 

two years after the Rule 54.02 order was entered.
4

On February 1, 2012, the Adlers moved to consolidate the sewage contamination 

and attorney malpractice cases. The trial court granted the motion. On March 26, 2012, 

the trial court entered a scheduling order providing that “[a]ny motion to amend 

pleadings shall be filed by May 15, 2012, and responses to any such motion shall be filed 

by May 22, 2012 . . . No amendments shall be allowed after May 15, 2012.” On June 4, 

2012, attorneys East and Browder each filed a motion for summary judgment in the 

attorney malpractice case. On July 2, 2012, the Adlers filed a motion to amend their 

malpractice complaint “to add a claim for damages against each attorney-defendant due 

to the effects of the dismissal of Purofirst from the initial sewage contamination case.” 

The trial court denied the motion as untimely under its scheduling order and barred by the 

statute of limitations. The trial court granted the attorney defendants summary judgment 

in an order entered July 23, 2012.

The jury trial of the sewage contamination case took place on March 4 through 7, 

2013. The jury found that the Adlers incurred $65,000 in damages from the sewage 

contamination. Regarding the comparative fault of the defendants and Purofirst, the jury 

assessed Johnson City 88% at fault, Purofirst 12% at fault, and zero fault on the part of 

the plumber Rick Leslie. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury 

verdict. As previously noted, the Adlers filed a notice of appeal on May 31, 2013.

II.

As can be seen from the above, the procedural history of this case is long and 

convoluted. The Adlers seek to raise three issues. One of these issues – the one 

pertaining to the trial court‟s decision denying the Adlers‟ attempt to bring Purofirst back 

into the litigation – must first overcome the finality concept embedded in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

54.02. Therefore, that issue is properly stated as follows:

Can the Adlers now appeal the trial court‟s order of August 

17, 2010, denying their attempt to bring Purofirst back into 

this litigation, which order was entered pursuant to the 

provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 and which order was not 

appealed within thirty days of its entry?

As to the other issues pertaining to the grant of summary judgment to the attorney 

defendants, the sole issue is as follows:

Did the trial court err in granting the attorney defendants 

summary judgment, said judgment being based upon the fact 

that the Adlers never properly pled as a basis for the 
5

malpractice suit the attorneys‟ conduct which led to the 

dismissal by the trial court of the suit against Purofirst?

These issues involve conclusions of law by the trial court, which we review de 

novo. Lambdin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2015 WL 369349 at *5 (Tenn. filed 

Jan. 29, 2015) (“on questions of law, our standard of review is de novo with no 

presumption of correctness”). 

III.

A.

The Adlers argue that the trial court should have allowed them to amend their 

complaint to add Purofirst as a defendant after Leslie named it as a comparative fault 

tortfeasor. They take this position notwithstanding the trial court‟s dismissal of Purofirst

with prejudice by order entered July 25, 2006. In support of their argument, the Adlers 

cite Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) In civil actions where comparative fault is or becomes an 

issue, if a defendant named in an original complaint initiating 

a suit filed within the applicable statute of limitations, or 

named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable 

statute of limitations, alleges in an answer or amended answer 

to the original or amended complaint that a person not a party 

to the suit caused or contributed to the injury or damage for 

which the plaintiff seeks recovery, and if the plaintiff‟s cause 

or causes of action against that person would be barred by any 

applicable statute of limitations but for the operation of this 

section, the plaintiff may, within ninety (90) days of the filing 

of the first answer or first amended answer alleging that 

person‟s fault, either:

(1) Amend the complaint to add the person as a defendant 

pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued 

for that person; or

(2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a 

summons and complaint.

The trial court‟s order denying the Adlers‟ attempt to bring Purofirst back into this 

litigation was entered on August 17, 2010, and states:
6

the previous dismissal of Purofirst of Tri-Cities, LLC was 

with prejudice and therefore on the merits under Rules 37 and 

41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court finds that, following its initial dismissal from the 

case in 2006, Purofirst . . . was named as a potentially 

comparative at fault entity pursuant to T.C.A. § 20-1-119.

Having determined that Purofirst . . . was named as a 

comparatively at fault tortfeasor subsequent to it having been 

dismissed with prejudice, the Court now holds that Purofirst 

. . . shall be placed on the jury verdict form as a 

comparatively at fault tortfeasor against whom the jury may 

assess fault. The Court further holds that no damages may be 

assessed against Purofirst of Tri Cities, LLC.

* * *

This Order shall be final pursuant to T.R.C.P. 54.02 as to 

Purofirst of Tri Cities, LLC, [and] the Court expressly directs 

entry of this Order as final, there being no just reason for 

delay.

(Emphasis added; numbering in original omitted.)

As can be seen, the trial court‟s order denying the Adlers‟ attempt to bring 

Purofirst back into this litigation – said attempt being based upon the provisions of Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 20-1-119 – was entered on August 17, 2010. It was designated by the trial 

court as “final pursuant to T.R.C.P. 54.02.” Under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a), “[i]n civil 

actions every final judgment entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the . . . 

Court of Appeals is appealable as of right.” Under Tenn. R. App. 4(a), “[i]n an appeal as 

of right to the . . . Court of Appeals . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 

filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of judgment appealed from[.]” The 

Adlers‟ notice of appeal was filed on May 31, 2013, almost three years after the August 

17, 2010 Rule 54.02 order of the trial court. The notice of appeal was not timely; it 

should have been filed within thirty days of August 17, 2010. See, e.g., Ball v. 

McDowell, 288 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tenn. 2009) (“The date of entry of a final judgment in 

a civil case triggers the commencement of the thirty-day period in which a party 

aggrieved by the final judgment must file either a post-trial motion or a notice of an 

appeal. . . .[I]f the notice of appeal is untimely, the Court of Appeals lacks subject matter 
7

jurisdiction over the appeal.”). We do not have jurisdiction to reach the Adlers‟ issue 

with respect to the trial court‟s order of August 17, 2010. Accordingly, this issue is 

found adverse to the Adlers. 

B.

The Adlers argue that the trial court erred in granting the attorney defendants 

summary judgment in the malpractice case. Their legal malpractice action was filed on 

August 26, 2005. Their complaint alleges as follows in pertinent part:

Despite their knowledge of [the Adlers‟] costs and conditions, 

neither East nor Browder took any official action on the case 

until August of 2004, a period of over eight (8) months.

During the eight (8) month period, Adler would call both East 

and Browder at least weekly, but neither of them was 

available to take the call and Adler would leave a message.

Neither East nor Browder would return any of the calls.

As the statute of limitations neared, Adler would call East and

Browder almost daily and no one would return his calls.

* * *

On April 28, 2005, Johnson City filed a Motion to Dismiss 

which rested primarily upon the fact that faulty service of 

process rendered the filing of the Complaint and Amended 

Complaint “ineffective” and that the claims were then timebarred.

* * *

[B]oth East and Browder have a duty to [the Adlers], . . . both 

have breached that duty, and . . . regardless of how the 

Motion to Dismiss is resolved, the actions of East and 

Browder have caused [the Adlers] to suffer delay, financial 

loss, spoliation of evidence, and have perhaps irreversibly 

prejudiced the case against Johnson City and Purofirst.
8

Regardless of the amount, if any, that can still be recovered 

from Johnson City and Purofirst, [the Adlers] have been 

inalterably injured and damaged by the conduct and inaction 

of Browder and East.

Both Defendants breached the contract with Adler and were

negligent in that they had a duty to complete service of the 

Complaint and Summons in a timely manner consistent with 

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and said duty was 

breached, said breach being a proximate cause of Plaintiff‟s 

damages.

* * *

The described conduct and inactivity, plus additional 

unnamed and unidentified conduct and inactivity, rise to the 

level of breach of contract, legal negligence, and legal 

malpractice.

* * *

The amount of damages attributable to Defendant[s] is not 

fully known at this time, but it is sure to be extensive, in that 

the initial case may be dismissed due to the negligence of 

Defendants.

(Numbering in original omitted.)

The attorney defendants each moved for summary judgment on June 4, 2012. 

Despite the trial court‟s scheduling order establishing a deadline of May 15, 2012 for the 

parties to file motions to amend, the Adlers filed their motion to amend the malpractice 

complaint on July 2, 2012. The motion to amend stated, “as a protective measure, 

Plaintiffs seek permission to add a claim for damages against each attorney-defendant 

due to the effects of the dismissal of Purofirst from the initial sewage contamination 

case.” 

The trial court entered two orders on July 23, 2012. The first granted summary 

judgment to the attorney defendants, stating in pertinent part:

The plaintiffs‟ present counsel explained at oral argument that 

the malpractice case was filed in 2005 because the plaintiffs 
9

feared that E[ast] and Browder‟s negligence might result in 

the dismissal of the sewage damage case.

* * *

Looking at the malpractice complaint of August 2005 is 

instructi[ve].

A. The summons. The fear that the summons would not be 

served did not come to fruition. The defendants were served.

B. At the time the August 26, 2005 complaint was filed Adler 

was concerned that a pending motion to dismiss would be 

granted. Again, this fear expressed in paragraph 45-48 of the 

complaint never came to fruition.

C. Delay. The 2005 Complaint alleges delay attributable to 

East and Browder. However, Browder and East have been 

out of the sewage case for five (5) years and still this case has 

not gone to trial. There is no contention that a 2004/2005 trial 

date was feasible given the procedural history of this case. 

The plaintiffs do not point out what East and Browder could 

have done in 2004 to get them instant relief for the damage 

they suffered in September 2003. The City and the other 

defendants would not agree that they were at fault.

D. Bar problems. The complaint alleges that Browder was 

having “problems” with his license. The record does not 

indicate how this damages Adler and his now wife.

E. Lack of communication. The failure of East and Browder 

to communicate with their clients is inexcusable. Browder, 

by his own admission[,] violated [Rule of Professional 

Conduct] 1.4 and if the allegations in the Complaint are 

true[,] so did East. The failure to communicate[,] however[,]

does not equate to prejudice to the sewage damage claim still 

pending.

* * *
10

The Court finds it incumbent to address the dismissal of 

Defendant Purofirst . . . . Purofirst was dismissed from this 

lawsuit in July 2006 as a result of Mr. Browder‟s inaction. 

This oversight by Browder, however, was never properly 

pled. It is not part of this lawsuit. The attempt to bring it in 

at this late date is denied by an order contemporaneously 

entered denying the plaintiff‟s motion to amend.

The Court must conclude based on the record before it that 

the filing of the malpractice case was a prophylactic measure 

and that none of the deficiencies alleged in that 2005 

complaint have had any effect on the sewage damage case. 

Put another way, the catastrophe predicted in the August 2005 

complaint never materialized. The conduct of East and 

Browder in 2004/2005 was not commendable, but it does not 

rise to the level of supporting a viable cause of action for

legal malpractice as set forth in the August 26, 2005 

complaint.

(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) 

As can be seen from the above, the gist of the trial court‟s ruling is that the Adlers 

filed the malpractice action as a protective measure to avoid the potential effect of the 

running of the one-year statute of limitations in the event that they were damaged by the 

alleged failure to serve process and the potential resulting dismissal of the sewage 

contamination case. As the trial court noted, however, the case was not dismissed, and 

thus, under the undisputed material facts, the Adlers could not have proven any damages 

as a result of the acts of malpractice alleged in the complaint. On appeal, the Adlers do 

not challenge this aspect of the trial court‟s ruling. They do argue that the court erred in 

holding that the “oversight” of Browder in allowing Purofirst to be dismissed as a 

discovery violation sanction ‒ which happened almost a year after the filing of the 

malpractice complaint ‒ “was never properly pled” and “is not a part of this lawsuit.” 

The trial court‟s second order entered on July 23, 2012 denied the Adlers‟ motion 

to amend the malpractice complaint. It states:

The motion is untimely pursuant to the scheduling order. See

Order of March 23, 2012. All motions to amend were to be 

filed by May 15, 2012.

* * *
11

The attempt by amendment to add the “dismissal of Purofirst”

is also barred by [the] statute of limitations. The complaint 

was filed on August 27, 2005, and alleged legal malpractice 

committed as of the date of the filing. The dismissal of 

Purofirst took place on July 25, 2006. It obviously involved 

conduct of Browder not contained in the 2005 Complaint. It 

was an alleged separate incident of legal malpractice. It could

not then relate back pursuant to T. R. Civ. Pro. 15.03.

The Adlers assert that their complaint should be broadly construed to have alleged 

not only the facts pleaded, but also to encompass future claims that might arise after the 

complaint. At the hearing on this motion, the trial court summarized it this way:

MR. COBBLE (attorney for Adlers): We filed within that 

year and we alleged not only all current actions but we 

alleged actions that could occur in the future.

* * *

THE COURT: . . . I must say, Mr. Cobble, this a new one on 

me and I‟ve been up here for 30 years. Yeah, I‟ve seen 

plaintiff complaints that try to bring in, you know, damages 

that may not be foreseeable because of future events but the

dismissal of Purofirst was . . . an event that took place

subsequent to the filing of the legal malpractice claim. That‟s 

a little bit different. You don‟t file a ‒ I haven‟t seen a 

complaint that says, “Mr. Defendant, you committed a tort 

and I‟m suing you for that tort and, furthermore, I‟m suing 

you for any tort you might commit in the future.” I – that‟s ‒

now, that‟s a new one on me.

On appeal, the Adlers cite no authority supporting their proposition that a 

complaint can fairly be construed to include possible future claims that might happen but 

have not yet occurred. The one decision they cite, Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for 

Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426-27 (Tenn. 2011), states in pertinent part as 

follows:

Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Tennessee 

follows a liberal notice pleading standard, see Leach [v. 

Taylor], 124 S.W.3d [87,] 92–93 [(Tenn. 2004)], which 
12

recognizes that the primary purpose of pleadings is to provide 

notice of the issues presented to the opposing party and court.

Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare–Memphis Hosps., 325 

S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. 2010); see also Robert Banks, Jr. & 

June F. Entman, Tennessee Civil Procedure § 5–4(a) (3d ed. 

2009) (“The essential function of the pleadings is simply to 

give notice of a claim or defense. History, as Professors 

Wright and Miller point out, has shown that the pleadings 

cannot successfully do more.”) (footnotes omitted). Our 

state‟s notice pleading regime is firmly established and 

longstanding; this Court recognized well before the 

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted that “[t]he 

object and purpose of any pleading is to give notice of the 

nature of the wrongs and injuries complained of with 

reasonable certainty, and notice of the defenses that will be 

interposed, and to acquaint the court with the real issues to be 

tried.” Hammett v. Vogue, Inc., 179 Tenn. 284, 165 S.W.2d 

577, 579 (1942).

To be sufficient and survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must not be entirely devoid of factual allegations. Tennessee 

courts have long interpreted Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8.01 to require a plaintiff to state “ „the facts upon 

which a claim for relief is founded.‟ ” Smith v. Lincoln Brass 

Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn. 1986) (quoting W 

& O Constr. Co. v. City of Smithville, 557 S.W.2d 920, 922 

(Tenn. 1977)). A complaint “need not contain detailed 

allegations of all the facts giving rise to the claim,” but it 

“must contain sufficient factual allegations to articulate a 

claim for relief.” Abshure, 325 S.W.3d at 103–04. “The 

facts pleaded, and the inferences reasonably drawn from 

these facts, must raise the pleader’s right to relief beyond the 

speculative level.” Id. at 104. Thus, as we observed in 

Leach,

“While a complaint in a tort action need not 

contain in minute detail the facts that give rise 

to the claim, it must contain direct allegations 

on every material point necessary to sustain a 

recovery on any legal theory, even though it 

may not be the theory suggested . . . by the 
13

pleader, or contain allegations from which an 

inference may fairly be drawn that evidence on 

these material points will be introduced at trial.”

(Emphasis added.) Applying these principles from the Supreme Court‟s landmark Webb

decision, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the complaint did not state a 

claim for “future” acts of alleged malpractice that had not yet happened. The allegation 

of the Adlers‟ complaint, upon which they now rely, stating that “[t]he described conduct 

and inactivity, plus additional unnamed and unidentified conduct and inactivity, rise to 

the level of breach of contract, legal negligence, and legal malpractice,” is insufficient to 

“give notice of the nature of the wrongs and injuries complained of with reasonable 

certainty.” Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 427. Neither does it “raise the pleader‟s right to relief 

beyond the speculative level.” Id. 

Furthermore, the Adlers had an abundance of time and opportunity to amend their 

complaint to include a claim based on the dismissal of defendant Purofirst, and failed to 

timely do so, as the trial court correctly held. The injury occurred on July 25, 2006, when 

the trial court entered its order dismissing Purofirst with prejudice. Any doubt of the 

injury was removed on January 28, 2008, when the court denied the Adlers‟ motion to set 

aside that order. The trial court‟s scheduling order, entered over four years later, clearly 

provided the Adlers notice that “[a]ny motion to amend pleadings [must] be filed by May 

15, 2012,” and that “[n]o amendments shall be allowed after May 15, 2012.” Despite all 

this, the Adlers waited until July 2, 2012 ‒ almost six years after their alleged injury ‒ to 

file their motion to amend, an amendment clearly barred by the statute of limitations. 

“[T]he trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend, and this court 

will reverse the decision only for an abuse of discretion.” Freeman Indus., LLC v. 

Eastman Chemical Co., 227 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). Given the 

timeframe of events as discussed above, the trial court was well within its discretion to 

deny the Adlers‟ motion to amend, and we find no abuse of that discretion. 

IV.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the 

appellants, James Michael Adler and Kim Kidner Adler. The case is remanded for 

enforcement of the trial court‟s judgment and collection of costs assessed below, all 

pursuant to applicable law.

______________________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., CHIEF JUDGE