The Honor able Milton I
. Shadur, Unit ed S tates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * I llinois , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0155n.06 F iled: F ebruary 23, 2009 No. 08-3312 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
BERNARD GARNER, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. CI TYOF CU YA HOGA F AL LS, D ON RO BA RT , SU SAN TR UB Y, VA LORIE WA X C ARR, and V IR G IL ARRING TON, JR., De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Before: G IBBO NS and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, Senior District Judge. * SHADUR, Senior District Judge. Be rnar d Gar

ner ( “Ga rner ”) a ppeals the district court’s dismissal of his action see king c ompensatory and punitive damag es, as we ll as reinstateme nt, ag ainst City of Cuy ahog a F alls (“City ”) a nd sever al City

officia ls: May or Don Robart (“ Robart”) , Direc tor of Community Deve lopment Susan Truby (“Tr uby ”), D irec tor of Public Service Va lorie Wax Carr ( “Carr ”) a nd Direc tor of L aw Vir g il Arring ton, J r. (“Arring ton”). Ga

rner , a for mer City employ ee, br oug ht suit following his discharg e fr om Cit y ’s employ ment, char g ing that defe ndants (1) ha d violated his fede ral c onstitut ional rig hts under the2

First Amendme nt (as incor porate d by

the Four teenth Amendme nt) and the D ue Proce ss and Eq ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e s o f t he F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt i tse lf

and (2 ) h a d d e fa

me d h im i n vio latio n o f s tate law. Af te r G arn e r f

ile d a n A me nd e d Co mpl a int , d e fe nd ants br ou g ht a F e d. R.C iv. P. ( “ Rul e ” ) 1 2( b) (6 ) m oti on to d ism iss a ll o f t

he fe de ra l c la ims . F oll ow ingfu ll briefingthe district court g rante d that motion and declined to exerc ise supplemental jurisdiction
ov e r G arn e r’ s r e ma ini ngstate law c la im. We a ff ir m. I. Gar ner’ s employ

ment with Cit y

beg an in Marc h 1998, when he was hire d as a B uilding and Z oning I

nspector ( “Inspector” ) in its Com munity Deve lopment Depar

tment. As Inspector Gar ner w as re quired to inspect c erta in locations to ensure the safe ty of City citizens. I n addition t o s e r v i n g a s In s p e c t o r , G ar

n e r w a s a l s o a

r e s e r v e p o l i c e o f

f i c e r f o r C i ty. On J uly 14, 2006 Gar

ner w as assig ned to inspect a n event e ntitled “Rockin on the River Fe stival” (“F estival”). A t about 4:30 p.m. Garne r obser ved seve ral outdoor tents we ighte d down with open bucke ts of water . Be cause the bucke ts had no lids and contained a printed wa

rningon their sides advisingthe public of a drowninghazard if not cove red, G arne r believe d that the open buckets posed a

health and sa fety

risk to y oung children. A s a re sult Garner approa ched Robe rt Early (“Ea rly ”), the vendor r esponsible for the tents, and re quested that he cover the bucke ts. Early ag ree d to Garne r’s re quest, and Ga rner left the a rea to perfor m other duties. At about 6 p.m. Gar

ner r eturne d to the Fe stival in his pol ice unifor m to buy dinner be fore he we nt on duty

as a r eser ve off icer at 8 p.m. Whil e he w as there , Early approa ched G arne r’s po lic e su pe rv iso r a nd qu e sti on e d h im r e g ard ingGa rn e r’ s a uth or ity and e mpl oy me nt s tatus . E arl y also complained that Garne r wa s “pickingon him.” In response Gar ner a dvised his supervisor of3

the drowninghazard a

nd was a llowed to proce ed with his police duties. He the n decide d to eat
e lse wh e re and

le ft the F e sti va l. I mme diate ly

a ft e r G arn e r’ s e ve nin g sh if t st art e d, his po lic e su

pe rv iso r s umm on e d h im back to the F estival and instructe d him to go to a r oom where Robart, Ear ly and L ieutenant Gr amle y (“ Gr amle y ” ), on e of

Ga rn e r’ s su pe rv iso rs , w e re wa iti ng . A c c or din g to G arn e r, Ea rl y is a fina ncial supporter

and political ally

of Robart. When Ga

rner arr ived, Robart beg an to shout loudly at him, calling Gar

ner de rog atory

and insulting names and a sking him why the wate r bu c ke ts w e re a

vio latio n. Ga

rn e r atte mpt e d to e xpla in t hat th e un c ov e re d b uc ke ts w e re a sa fe ty and drowning ha zard and told Robart that he w as simply trying to ke ep City ’s citizens safe. Robart objecte d, continued to y ell at Gar ner a nd spat in his face
. Although it is unclea

r how that mee ting e nded, Ga rner believed that Robart commence d a campa ign to ter

minate him after

the incident at the F estival. As par t of that asser

ted plan Gar ner’ s immediate supervisor Tr uby demande d that Gar

ner write a r eport. Tr

uby did not provide Ga

rner with any details about what she wante d the re port to include, and a lthough Ga rner
su bmi tte d mu lti ple re po rt s to Tr ub y , s he c on tin

ue d to c ha

ng e the re qu ir e me nts and re qu e st
a dd iti on a l r e po rt s. Ac c or din g to G arn e r, Tr ub y wr ote to C ity

of fi c ia ls w ithina c c ur a te information re g ardingthe J uly 14 incident. For

example, say s Garne r, Truby informed Gr amley that Gar ner ha d threatened to har

m him phy sically . In addition, shortly afte r the F estival Robart hir e d a n in de pe nd e nt p ri vate inv e sti g ator to f oll owGa rn e r d ur ingwo rk

and no n- wo rk

ho ur s. R o b artal s o wr o t e t o T rub y th at“M r. Ga rn er

h as o u t l i v edh i s u s ef

u l n es s i nth e C i ty

o f C uy ah o ga Fa lls and would be better serve d in some other line of w ork.”4

Gar ner w as terminate d on Dec ember 18, 2006. Acc ordingto Garne r he ha s been approa ched by

sever al citizens, including non-City employ ees, who have indicated that they hear d Gar ner “ was stea ling c ity

time by cutting his mother’ s g rass while on c ity time.” Gar

ner
c on te nd s th os e c omm e nts are fa lse and c ou ld h ave c ome on ly

fr om d e fe nd ants . H e a lso a sse rt s that Ro ba rt , T ru by , Ca rr and Ar ri ng ton c on sp ir e d to dis c ha

rg e him fo r f a lse and ina pp ro pr iate
rea sons. Although Car

r and A rring ton did hold a pre-te rmination hear ing, G arne r alleg es that the hear ing w as “bogus” bec ause it wa s “cle ar that their minds were made up to ter minate” him on Rob art ’s ins tr

uc tio ns . G arn e r a lso a lle g e s th a t he ha s n ot “ be e n a ff or de d a n a pp ro pr iate nameclea ringhearing.” On J uly 13, 2007 Gar

ner f iled suit in t he fe dera l district court. After defe ndants had filed a motion for judg ment on the pleading s and the pa rties had submitted brief

s on that motion, Gar ner f iled his Amended Complaint, assertingthe claims summarized in the first par ag raph of this opini on. After

defe ndants then filed their motion to di smiss refer

red to in that par ag raph, on Janu ary 29 , 2 00 8 th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d th e mot ion

a s to a ll f e de ra l c la ims , d e c lin e d to exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over the state la w def amation claim and e ntere d judgme nt for defe ndants. Gar

ner timely

filed his notice of a

ppeal with this Court on Febr uary 25, 2008. II. We reviewde novo the district cour t’s dismiss al of a

complaint under Rule 12( b)(6) (D ub ay v. Wel ls, 50 6 F .3 d 4 22 , 4 27 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ). B e c a us e a mot ion to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to state a c laim tests that claim as stated in the complaint and is not a c halleng e to his fac tual alleg ations, we must construe the Amended Complaint in a lig ht most favorable to Garne r,
acc epting all of his fac tual alleg ations as true a nd draw ing a ll reasona

ble infer ence s in his favor5

(id.). Althoug h a complaint’s f actua l alleg ations need not be detailed, B ell Atl. Corp. v. Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S. 5 44 , 1 27 S. Ct . 1 95 5, 19 65 (2 00 7) te a c he s th a t th e y “ mus t be e no ug h to ra ise
a ri g ht t o r e lie f a

bo ve the sp e c ulativ e le ve l.” On that sc or e Ga

rn e r’ s o bli g a tio n to sh ow“ his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ require s more than labe ls and conc lusions, and a formulaic rec itation of the eleme nts of a ca

use of a ction will not do” (id.). III . Count O ne of

the Am e nd e d Co mpl a int a lle g e s th a t de fe nd ants ma de fa lse and pu bli c alleg ations ag ainst Garne r that impaired his g ood name, r eputation, honor a nd integ rity

and te rm inate d h im w ith out a name -c le ari nghe ari ng . T ho se a c tio ns , G arn e r c la ims , v iol a te d h is constitutional right to proc edura l due proc ess. I t is well established that a pe rson’s re putation, good na me, honor a

nd integ rity

are considere d liberty

interests protec ted by

the due pr ocess c lause of the Four teenth Amendme nt (see , e.g ., Chili ng irian v. B oris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 ( 6th Cir. 1989), relying on the seminal de c isi on in B d. of Re g e nts v. Roth, 40 8 U .S. 56 4, 57 3 ( 19 72 )) . A c c or din g ly , in the pu bli c employ ment context, “where a nontenur ed employ ee show s he has be en stig matized by the
vo luntary , p ub lic dis se min atio n o f f a lse inf or matio n in the c ours e of

a de c isi on to t e rm inate his employ ment, the employ er is re quired to af ford him an oppor

tunity to clear his name” ( Bur

khart v. Randles, 764 F.2d 1196, 1201 ( 6th Cir. 1985)). In that respe ct Ludwig v. Bd. of Trs. of F err is St ate Univ., 123 F .3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997) (c itations omi tted) instructs that five e lements must be satisfied to establish that a plaintiff
wa s d ep ri v edo f al i b erty

i n t er es ten t i t l i n g h i mt o a n am e- cl ea ri n g h ea ri n g: First, the stig matizi ng statements must be made in c onjunction with the plaintiff’s te rm inatio n f

ro m e mpl oy

me nt. Se c on d, a

pla int if f i s n ot d e pr ive d o f h is l ibe rt y int e re st6

when the e mploy er ha s alleg ed mer ely improper or

inadequa te per formanc e, incompetenc e, neg lect of duty or malfe asanc e....Third, the stig matizi ng statements or char g es must be made public. F ourth, the plaintiff must claim that the cha rg es made a g a i n s th i mw e r e f

a l s e . L a s t l y, th e p u

b l i c d i s s e m i n a t i o nmu s th av e b e e nv o l un t ar y. Br own v. City

of Niota, 214 F .3d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2000) (e mphasis added) rec onfirms the
a d d it io no f

ane s s e n ti a l i n g r e d ie n t t o th e mi x: On c e a pla int if f h a s e sta bli sh e d th e e xiste nc e of

a ll f ive e le me nts , h e is e nti tle d to a name -cle aringif he re quests one. And in that respe ct Quinn v. Shirley , 293 F.3d 315, 323 ( 6th Cir. 2002) further rec onfirms that “a plaintiff’s fa ilure to reque st a name- clea ringhear ing is fatal to a claim alleg ing a deprivation of a liberty interest without due proc ess.” He nce, to state a viable c laim a plaintiff must alleg e that he reque sted a he aringand wa s denied one (id. at 324). Rule 8(a) (2) r equire s only “a shor t and plain statement of the claim showingthat the pleade r is entitled to relief,” so as to “g ive the def endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.” But a s Twombly , 127 S.Ct . at 1966 explains, a plaintiff’s obligation under Rule 8(a )(2) require s “that the ‘pla in statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that th e ple a de r i s e nti tle d to re lie f. ’” F a c tua l a lle g a tio ns in a c omp la int

mus t at le a st r e a so na

bly sug g est, rathe r than simply be consistent with, an e ssential element of a cla im (id. at 1965-66). In so holding Twombly

reje cted the of

t-quoted standar d in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) that “a c omplaint should notbe dismissed for fa ilure to state a c laim unless it appear s be y on d d ou

bt t hat th e pla int if

f c an p ro ve no se t of

fa c ts i n s up po rt

of his c la im whic h w ou ld entitle him to relief,” stating instea d that the “phr ase is best for g otten as an inc omplete, neg ative g loss on an acc epted plea ding sta ndard” (127 S.Ct. at 1969).Indeed, when probed at ora l argument, Gar ner’ s counsel admitted that he c ould not, as an 1 o ff i ce r o f t h e c o urt , s t at e t h atGa rn er h adcl ea rl y

an d s p ec i fi ca l l y

as k edfo r a n am e- cl ea ri n g h ea ri n g. 7 Her e Ga rner admits he has not spec ifically stated that he r equeste d a name -cle aring he ari ng . A ll that he a lle g e s is that he wa s n ot “ a ff or de d a n a pp ro pr iate name- clea

ringhear ing.” Gar ner c ontends that we should infe r fr om that statement that he a ctually reque sted a he aringbut didn’t g et one. B ut as the district court pr operly noted, the fa ct that a he aringwas not held doe s not nece ssarily

mean that Ga

rner reque sted one-- instead he ma y not have r ece ived a he aring beca use he f ailed to ask for

one. But he re w e nee d not merely choose be tween a

rguably rea sonable infe renc es (with the possibili ty , then, of bring ing into play the leg al equivale nt of baseba ll’s “ties g o to the runner ”). In th is i ns tanc e Ga

rn e r h a d a fu ll o pp or

tun ity to a me nd his ple a din g fu

rt he r t o a sse rt

that he did reque st a hea

ring --if that were indeed so. It is more than re levant that Ga rner had alr eady amende d his origina l Compl aint once, so that his counsel knew pe rfe ctly well that a f

urther amendment wa s available to respond to an a sserted de ficienc y , but instead he c hose to stand pat. I t must be concluded on the rec ord bef ore us that a

reque st for a he aringwas ne ver ma de. 1 Gar ner’ s entitlement to relief in due proce ss terms must be based on de fenda nts’ denial of
a re qu e st f or a name -h e ari ngc le ari ng -- wi tho ut h is h avin g ple a de d th a t ne c e ssa ry fa c t, h e fa ils to meet the Tw ombly

standard. We ther efor e af firm the district cour

t’s dismiss al of Ga

rner ’s due pr oc e ss c la im. IV. Ga rn e r’ s se c on d c la im a sse rt s th a t de fe nd ants te rm inate d h im i n r e ta liatio n f or his exercise of

First Amendme nt rig hts. To establish a prima fa cie c ase of First Amendme nt8

reta liation a plaintiff must show that (1) he w as eng ag ed in constitutionally protec ted spee ch, (2) he wa s subjected to an a dverse action or w as depr ived of some be nefit and ( 3) the prote cted speec h was a

substantial or motivating fa ctor in the a dverse action (B anks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F .3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003)). Al tho ug h p ub lic e mpl oye e s’ ri g hts are su bje c t to c e rt a in l imi tatio ns , “ the F ir st Amendment prote cts a public e mploy ee’ s rig ht, in certa in circumstanc es, to speak a s a citizen addre ssing matter s of public conc ern” (Ga rce tti v. C eballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006))
. Whether a pla intiff’s spee ch touche s upon a matter of public conce rn is a question of law (B arne s v. McDowe ll, 848 F.2d 725, 733 (6th Cir. 1988)). Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1 98 3) te a c he s th at “ [w]he the r a n e mpl oy e e ’s sp e e c h a dd

re sse s a matte r o f p ub lic c on c e rn mus t be de te rm ine d b y

the c on te nt, fo rm , a

nd c on te xt of

a g ive n s tate me nt, a s r e ve a le d b y the wh ole
rec ord.” G arc etti, 547 U.S. at 421 further instructs that “whe n public employ ees make state me nts purs ua

nt t o th e ir of fi c ia l dutie s, the e mpl oy e e s a re no t sp e akin g a s c iti zen s f or F ir st Amendment purpose s, and the Constituti on does not insulate their c ommunications from employ er discipline.” As Gar cetti, id. at 421-22 re asoned: Restricting speec h that owes its exis tence to a public employ ee’ s profe ssional responsibilities does not infring e any liberties the employ ee mig ht have e njoy ed as a private citizen. Even thoug h Gar

ner a dmits t hat he initially spoke to Ear ly

in his capac ity

as Inspector, he argues that he w as spea

king a s a private citizen when he late r re turned to the F estival and expressed conc ern to his police supe rvisor and Robar t. Garne r points to severa l non-prec edential
case s decide d befor e Ga

rce tti in s upport of his position. None of those ca ses, howeve r, involves9

analog ous fac tual alleg ations or is rea lly rele vant in light of the more de manding standard
re c e ntl y art ic ulate d b y

Ga rc e tti
. Whe n G arn e r’ s a lle g atio ns are vie we d in lig ht o f t ho se pr inc ipl e s, it i s c le ar t hat hi s state me nts a

bo ut t he sa fe ty ri sk s p os e d b y

Ea rl y ’s wate r b uc ke ts o we d th e ir e xiste nc e to h is officia l duties. First, when G arne r spoke to his police super visor on his first return to the Fe stival, he was unque stionably respondingto complaints made by Early . Then Ga

rner ’s sec ond return to the F estival was at the summons of his poli ce supe rvisor, who instructe d him to meet wi th R ob art , G ra

mle y and Ea rl y . D ur ingthat me e tin g Ga rn e r d id n ot v olu

nta ri ly ann ounc e his
sa fe ty c on c e rn s, sp e akin g ins te a d o nly in r e sp on se to R ob art ’s a tta c k o n a nd inq uir ie s a bo ut h is
ear lier wa rningto Early . In analy

zing a similar situation, Hay nes v. City

of Circleville, 474 F .3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2006) (bra ckets in orig inal) found that “ [t ]he fact that Ha y nes communicated
so le ly to h is s up e ri or

a lso ind ic ate s th a t ‘ he wa s sp e akin g in [h is] c a pa c ity a s a pu bli c employ ee....’ ” He re too Ga rner was spea king only to his poli ce supe rvisor and the n Robart and Gramley --a ll his superiors--a nd he neve r communicated his conce rns to other membe rs of the public. Ga

rn e r’ s st ate d e ff

or t to ke e p c iti zen s a

nd y oungc hil dr e n s a fe fr om t he wate r b uc ke ts
emanated direc tly

from his role a

nd responsibility

as Inspector of

the Fe stival. Thus his original
wa rn ingto E arl y

and his fu rt he r s tate me nts in d e fe ns e of that w arn ingwe re ma de purs ua nt t o h is profe ssional duties. Bec ause G arne r’s spee ch did not addre ss a matter of public conce rn and w as
no t c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d und e r t

he te a c hin g of

Ga rc e tti , w e a lso a ff

ir m th e dis mis sa l of

his F ir st A me nd

me nt c la im.10 V. Gar ner’ s final fe dera l claim char g es that def endants violated his rig hts under the Equa l Protection Clause. Having a cknowledg ed the f atal impact of

Eng quist v. Or. Dep’ t of Ag ric., 12 8 S. Ct. 21 48 (2 00 8) on his “ c la ss o f o ne ” the or

y , G arn e r p ro c e e ds on

a pp e a l so le ly

on his claim of sele ctive tre atment base d upon the asser ted exercise of

a funda mental rig ht to free dom of spee ch. B ut a s o ur

e arl ie r d isc us sio n ma

ke s p la in, Ga

rn e r’ s sp e e c h w a s n ot c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d. Ga

rn e r’ s r e lia

nc e on the same argume nts that he a dv anc e d in su pp or t of his F ir st Amendment cla im does nothing to cha ng e that ana ly sis. That beingthe ca se, Ga rner ’s equa l protec tion claim based on that spee ch fa ils as a matter of law, and the district court’s dismissal of that c la im i s th e re fo re a ff ir me d a s w e ll. VI . We have thus af

firmed the district c ourt’s dismissal of all of Gar ner’ s fede ral c laims. Wit h no fede ral a

nchor r emainingto moor his state law def amation claim, we also aff irm the district court’s without-pre judice dismissal of that claim (United Mine Worke rs v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). VI I. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s in a ll r e sp e c ts.