J-S55002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ALEXANDER THOMAS TAYLOR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 663 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0017134-2009

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2019

Alexander Thomas Taylor (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after the trial court revoked his probation. Upon review, 

we affirm. 

The trial court recounted the factual and procedural background at 

length: 

At a [s]entencing [h]earing held on August 10, 2010, . . . it 

was stipulated that the Affidavit of Probable Cause and relevant 

police reports and any lab reports in this matter formed a 

sufficient basis for Appellant’s guilty plea [to] causing a minor to 

have indecent contact with him, when the minor was less than 13 

years old and not married (Count II) and corruption of a child 

under the age of 18 by inappropriate sexual contact when 

Appellant was over 18 (Count IV).[1] Counts I, III, and V were 

withdrawn. Details of the serious sexual offenses were not 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1). 
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disclosed in open [c]ourt. At the time of the sentencing, Appellant 

was 20 years old. 

By agreement, Appellant was sentenced to a period of 

incarceration for time served with a period of probation of five 

years to follow. He was required to register under the auspices of 

Megan’s Law for a period of ten years. He was to be paroled within 

48 hours and begin his period of five years probation, effective 

August 10, 2010. 

On December 9, 2015, Appellant attended a Probation 

Violation Hearing before this [c]ourt. A pre-sentence report had 

been provided to the [c]ourt. Appellant had established residency 

in the state of Maryland three years earlier and his probation was 

transferred to the Maryland Department of Public Safety and 

Correctional Services. On June 30, 2014, during a maintenance 

polygraph, Appellant admitted to improper contact with a minor. 

On August 21, 2014, Maryland Officials submitted a Probation 

Violation Report. Appellant was charged, but pled not guilty and 

later adjudicated so. A new Probation Violation warrant was 

issued for Appellant due to his technical violation and he was 

extradited and transferred to the Allegheny County Jail. Probation 

requested that Appellant’s probation be revoked and a new period 

of supervision with electronic monitoring be imposed. During 

open [c]ourt, the only reference to the probation violation was in 

the context that Appellant had been sent back from Maryland. 

Appellant was released from [c]ounty jail on November 21, 

2015, and placed on electronic monitoring. Probation reviewed 

the special conditions with Appellant and on December 1, 2015, 

he reported to the probation office. Again, the specific conditions 

were reviewed, and Appellant was also instructed to call and make 

an appointment with any of the sex offender treatment providers 

on a list given [to] him during this meeting. By December 9, 

2015, Appellant had made no calls to anyone. This [c]ourt warned 

Appellant that his next hearing would be his last, because he 

would be put into state time for any further violation. 

The [c]ourt then declared the Probation Violation Hearing a 

Stage 2 hearing and imposed zero tolerance. Probation was 

instructed that [if] Appellant violated the terms of his probation, 

to notify the [c]ourt and another hearing would be scheduled. 

Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was given another five 

years probation, nine months on electronic monitoring, and 
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specific conditions, which [h]is counsel assured the court she had 

reviewed with Appellant twice. 

Appellant’s final Probation Violation Hearing was held before 

this [c]ourt on April 4, 2018. A pre-sentence report was provided 

to the [c]ourt. Appellant had appeared on January 10, 2018 for a 

Gagnon I violation hearing.[2] He had been cited for violations 

including being unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender 

treatment due to lack of progress and continued denial of the 

offenses and lack of motivation. Noting that this was not 

Appellant’s first violation, as he was in violation of his supervision 

back in 2015, due to violations including out-of-state for sexual 

offenses on children. He had two years treatment in Allegheny 

County and failed to make necessary adjustments and progress 

needed to comply with the terms of his probation. The [p]robation 

department recommended that Appellant’s probation be revoked 

and that this time he be sentenced to a period of incarceration. 

Defense counsel argued that Appellant did not violate his 

probation because he was mentally ill, but trying, and he believed 

he was making progress. Probation countered that he had been 

receiving lack of progress reports from Appellant’s therapist since 

June of 2017, and that issue was discussed with Appellant on a 

monthly basis. In November of 2017, Appellant was confronted 

by group members and admitted to having inappropriate thoughts 

and feelings. Appellant was discharged from treatment also 

because he was denying that any sexual advances occurred in the 

underlying Pennsylvania case. 

This [c]ourt quoted from the pre-sentence report the 

following: 

“The goal of sex offender treatment is to rehabilitate the 

Defendant and to prevent further victimization. These goals 

cannot be attained if the Defendant continues to minimize the 

severity of his offenses and his deviant behavior.” 

Appellant was reminded that he had multiple occasions to 

make a positive adjustment and had not complied with community 

supervision, that the victims in this case were ages five and seven, 

and that in 2017 he had admitted having past victims in this case, 

but still did not make any progress. 

____________________________________________

2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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Accordingly, Appellant’s probation was revoked and he was 

sentenced to 31⁄2 to 7 years incarceration with credit for time 

served. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted). 

On April 16, 2018, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The 

trial court denied the motion and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. 

Appellant presents two issues for review: 

[1.] WHETHER THE TESTIMONY FAILED TO ESTABLISH, BY A 

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT [APPELLANT] 

COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF HIS PROBATION? 

[2.] IN REVOKING [APPELLANT’S] PROBATION AND RESENTENCING HIM, IN THE AGGREGATE, TO 21⁄2-6

[3] YEARS’ TOTAL 

STATE CONFINEMENT, WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION BY IGNORING [APPELLANT’S] REHABILITATIVE 

NEEDS AND THE NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY, AS REQUIRED BY 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

produced at his Gagnon II hearing, claiming that the Commonwealth “failed 

to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed a 

violation of his probation.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant does not dispute 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s April 4, 2018 sentencing order reflects a sentence of 31⁄2 to 7 

years of incarceration. See Trial Court Order of Sentence, 4/4/18, at *1. It 

appears Appellant subtracted the credit for time served in calculating his 

aggregate sentence, which may explain the discrepancy in the length of his 

incarceration in his question presented. 
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that sex offender treatment was a condition of his probation and that he was 

“unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender treatment.” N.T., 4/4/18, at 2. 

Rather, Appellant argues that because he was discharged for progressing “too 

slowly,” the trial court erred in finding him in violation of his probation. 

Appellant’s Brief at 16 (“In other words, [Appellant] was not discharged 

because he failed to attend treatment or failed to participate in the program; 

rather, [Appellant] was discharged because he was progressing too slowly.”). 

He further states: 

In order to sufficiently prove that [Appellant] willfully and 

flagrantly disregarded his duties and obligations of sex offender 

treatment, the Commonwealth needed to present testimony 

explaining how and to what extent [Appellant] performed in 

treatment. The Commonwealth simply did not do that here. 

Instead, the record demonstrates only that, although his progress 

may have been slow in coming, [Appellant] nevertheless was 

making a good-faith effort to participate in, and successfully 

complete, sex offender treatment. Given these circumstances, 

the trial court’s finding of a violation cannot, as a matter of law, 

be sustained, and Appellant’s judgment of sentence must be 

vacated. 

Appellant’s Brief at 28-29. We disagree.

“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be disturbed on 

appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

Relevant to the revocation of a probationary sentence, Section 9771 of 

the Sentencing Code provides: 
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(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate 

continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon 

which an order of probation has been imposed. 

(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order of probation 

upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. 

Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court 

shall be the same as were available at the time of initial 

sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent 

serving the order of probation. 

(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court 

shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation 

unless it finds that: 

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another 

crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is 

likely that he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or 

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of the court. 

(d) Hearing required.--There shall be no revocation or increase 

of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing 

at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing 

proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant 

while on probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term 

decreased without a hearing. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771. 

We recognize: 

The first step in a Gagnon II revocation decision involves a wholly 

retrospective factual question: whether the parolee or probationer 

has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole 

or probation. It is this fact that must be demonstrated by 

evidence containing probative value. Only if it is determined that 

the parolee or probationer did violate the conditions does the 

second question arise: should the parolee or probationer be 
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recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect 

society and improve changes of rehabilitation? 

Commonwealth v. Moriarty, 180 A.3d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citation omitted). “Unlike a criminal trial where the burden is upon the 

Commonwealth to establish all of the requisite elements of the offenses 

charged beyond a reasonable doubt, at a revocation hearing the 

Commonwealth need only prove a violation of [] probation by a preponderance 

of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth 

v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019), addresses when a defendant may be 

found to have violated probation. In Foster, the defendant was on probation 

when he was detained by his probation officer for posting photographs to his 

social media accounts “depict[ing] guns, drugs, large amounts of money and 

his sentencing sheet from his plea agreement[.]” Id. at 1243. At defendant’s 

revocation hearing, the Commonwealth argued that posting the photos was a 

violation of probation because the photos depicted contraband belonging to 

the defendant. The Commonwealth asserted that the defendant “was using 

his social media accounts as an ad agency to sell the drugs.” Id. However, 

“[o]ther than the photographs in question, the Commonwealth presented no 

evidence at either [violation of probation] hearing in support of its 

contentions. At no time did the Commonwealth mention the conditions of 

[defendant’s] current probation, or suggest that his conduct violated a specific 

condition.” Id. at 1244.
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At the conclusion of the defendant’s Gagnon II hearing, the trial court 

found him in violation of his probation and resentenced him to a period of 

incarceration. Foster, 214 A.3d at 1244. The defendant appealed, and this 

Court affirmed. Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address 

the following issue: 

Did not the Superior Court err by ignoring the governing statute 

and due process protections that permit revocation only for a 

violation of specified conditions of probation, and by holding that 

[defendant’s] inappropriate offensive social media posting, that 

violated no condition of probation, warranted revocation? 

Id. at 1245-46. 

In reversing this Court, the Supreme Court held that a court may find a 

defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has violated one of 

the “specific conditions” of probation or committed a new crime. Id. at 1250. 

Therefore, in order to revoke probation:

The [] court must find, based on the preponderance of the 

evidence, that the probationer violated a specific condition of 

probation or committed a new crime to be found in violation. 

Absent such evidence, a violation of probation does not occur 

solely because a judge believes the probationer’s conduct 

indicates that probation has been ineffective to rehabilitate or to 

deter against antisocial conduct.

Id. at 1243. 

Instantly, Appellant’s case is distinguishable from Foster because the 

trial court found Appellant to have violated “a specific condition” of his 

probation. In its December 9, 2015 sentencing order, the trial court specified: 

Sex Offender Court - Special Conditions: [Appellant] is to comply 

with the Special Conditions of the Sex Offender Court. Other: 
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[Appellant] is placed on ZERO TOLERANCE, per SOC Review 

Hearing on 12/9/15.

Trial Court Order, 12/9/15, at 1. As noted above, Appellant does not argue 

that sex offender treatment was not part of the “Special Conditions of Sex 

Offender Court.”

On December 27, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a Gagnon I Probation 

Violation Report in which Appellant’s probation officer requested a Gagnon II

hearing. The report states: 

[Appellant’s] Charge Specific Special Conditions include: 

“[Appellant] shall attend and participate in a mental health 

treatment program and/or sex offender treatment 

program as approved and directed by the probation/parole 

officer . . .” 

[Appellant] is currently in violation of PROBATION by reason of 

the following: 

Following his previous revocation hearing in December of 2015, 

[Appellant] started attending sex offender treatment with Mercy 

Behavioral Health-The Gatehouse. Unfortunately, despite having 

attended regularly for approximately two years and multiple 

warnings regarding his treatment progress, [Appellant] was 

unsuccessfully discharged from his Court ordered sex 

offender treatment program on 12-6-17, due to “Failure to 

follow through with your recommended treatment plan” 

and “Continued denial of the offense(s) and lack of 

motivation.” . . .

The goals of sex offender treatment are to rehabilitate [Appellant] 

and prevent further victimization. These goals cannot be attained 

if [Appellant] continues to minimize the severity of his offense and 

deviant behaviors. [Appellant] has been provided multiple 

opportunities to make positive adjustments and comply with 

community supervision, namely his Court ordered sex offender 

treatment program. 
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It is respectfully recommended a Gagnon II Violation Hearing be 

held; at which time the Probation Department will recommend 

that [Appellant’s] probation be revoked, and a period of 

incarceration be imposed. 

Gagnon I Probation Violation Report, 12/27/17, at 2 (headings omitted, 

emphasis added). 

The trial court convened a Gagnon II hearing at which Appellant’s 

probation officer, Pedro Hersan, testified that Appellant was “unsuccessfully 

discharged from sex offender treatment due to lack of progress and continued 

denial of the offense and lack of motivation.” N.T., 4/4/18, at 2. Further 

noting that Appellant was two years into treatment and failed “to make the 

necessary adjustments and progress needed to comply,” Mr. Hersan 

recommended that the trial court revoke Appellant’s probation and resentence 

him to a period of incarceration. Id. at 2-3. On April 4, 2018, the court 

revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced him to incarceration. Id. at 

9-10. 

Our review confirms that Appellant’s probation officer filed a probation 

violation report because Appellant failed to meet the specific condition 

requiring him to attend and participate in sex offender treatment. Appellant 

concedes that he was discharged from sex offender treatment. See e.g., 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Thus, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the 

trial court concluded that Appellant violated his probation. Foster, 214 A.3d 

at 1243; see also N.T., 4/4/18, at 10. Appellant’s first issue challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit. 
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In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. We recognize: 

The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation 

is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which, 

absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. 

An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment — a 

sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record 

discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations omitted). “Also, upon sentencing following a revocation of 

probation, the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could 

have imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” Id. at 

1286-87 (citation omitted).

Further, “[t]he right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of 

a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission 

to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. 

Super. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. 

We conduct this four-part test to determine whether:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the 

time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the 

appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth 

a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises 

a substantial question for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a 
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plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing 

code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted).

Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test by raising 

his sentencing claim in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of 

appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See

Appellant’s Brief at 30-36. Therefore, we examine whether Appellant presents

a substantial question.

Appellant’s discretionary claim alleges the trial court, “ignor[ed 

Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs and the needs of the community, as required 

by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 6; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b) (sentencing court shall follow general principle that sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and 

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant). This claim 

presents a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 

987, 994-95 (Pa. Super. 2016) (claim that a VOP sentencing court failed to 

consider the factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) raises a substantial 

question).

Appellant also claims that the trial court relied upon an impermissible 

factor in imposing an excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-34. 
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This claim also raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“This Court has held that a 

claim that the sentence is excessive because the trial court relied on 

impermissible factors raises a substantial question.”) (citation omitted). 

Turning to the merits, we reiterate: 

Upon revoking probation, a sentencing court may choose from any 

of the sentencing options that existed at the time of the original 

sentencing, including incarceration. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). 

However, the imposition of total confinement upon revocation 

requires a finding that either “(1) the defendant has been 

convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant 

indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is 

not imprisoned; or (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate 

the authority of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S. 9771(c).

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338 (Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote 

omitted). Further: 

In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the 

court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which 

the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the 

court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court 

at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons 

for the sentence imposed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Following revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy 

discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence of total confinement, but the 

record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts 

of the crime and character of the offender. Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 
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A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010). Also, “[w]hen a sentencing court has 

reviewed a pre-sentence investigation report, we presume that the court 

properly considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the 

defendant’s sentence.” Baker, 72 A.3d at 663 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

Here, the trial court stated that it had read and considered Appellant’s 

pre-sentence investigation report. N.T., 4/4/18, at 2. “Our Supreme Court 

has determined that where the trial court is informed by a [pre-sentence 

investigation report], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so 

informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. 

Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637-38 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 202 A.3d 41. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court considered 

the required factors and considerations, including those delineated in Section 

9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, in sentencing Appellant. 

Appellant further claims that the trial court “improperly considered 

conduct for which [Appellant] went to trial on in Maryland, and was fully 

acquitted by a jury of his peers.” Appellant’s Brief at 45. Appellant contends 

it was error for the trial court to make the following statement: 

But [Appellant] did fail the polygraph regarding sexual contact 

with the two-year-old girl in Maryland. In that case he was found 

not guilty, although [Appellant] did admit that the offense had 

occurred.

N.T., 4/4/18, at 7-8.
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With respect to the consideration of impermissible sentencing factors, 

we have explained: 

It is an abuse of discretion, as a denial of due process of law, for 

the sentencing court to consider irrelevant factors during 

sentencing. Thus, previous sentences have been vacated 

because, in imposing sentence, the sentencing court relied upon, 

e.g.: the defendant’s decision to stand trial rather than plead 

guilty, Commonwealth v. Bethea, [] 379 A.2d 102, 106, 107 

([Pa.] 1977); prior constitutionally infirm convictions, 

Commonwealth v. Calvert, [] 344 A.2d 797 ([Pa.] 1975); the 

defendant’s political ideology, Commonwealth v. Berrigan, [] 

535 A.2d 91 ([Pa. Super.] 1987) (en banc) . . .; unverified 

hearsay, id.; and the defendant’s status as a naturalized citizen, 

Commonwealth v. Dugan, [] 483 A.2d 965 (Pa. Super. 1984).

Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 1993). 

Likewise, “[i]t is beyond peradventure that when a defendant has been 

exonerated in the legal system, either by a jury or on constitutional grounds, 

with respect to a criminal act, that act cannot be used to enhance a sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 130 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations 

omitted). However, “[i]t is not enough that a trial court simply entertained

impermissible evidence in its deliberations.” Smithton, 631 A.2d at 1057 

(emphasis in original). “A court is ordinarily presumed to be capable of 

identifying and properly disregarding all but the most prejudicial and 

inflammatory evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, a sentence must be 

vacated only where it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court 

relied in whole or in part upon such an impermissible factor.” Id. (emphasis 

in original, citation omitted).
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After careful consideration, we conclude the trial court did not rely on 

an impermissible factor in imposing Appellant’s sentence. In reviewing the 

record, including the notes of testimony from Appellant’s hearing, it is clear 

that while the trial court made a passing reference to an impermissible factor, 

i.e., Appellant’s case in Maryland, the trial court did not rely on that factor in 

sentencing Appellant. The trial court articulated its reasoning as follows: 

Okay. I do find that it’s some mitigation, that you have 

been employed and that there were times when you were in 

compliance. However - - and I’m going to quote from the 

presentence report. 

“The goal of sex offender treatment is to rehabilitate 

[Appellant] and to prevent further victimization. These goals 

cannot be attained if [Appellant] continues to minimize the 

severity of his offenses and his deviant behaviors.” 

You have been provided with multiple occasions to make a 

positive adjustment and have not complied with community 

supervision. I would also add that you -- in 2007 you admitted 

having passed [sic] victims in the case, but still did not make any 

progress. I would also add that the victims in the case which are 

before me were ages five and seven. For these reasons I find 

it is not appropriate for County supervision. And I’m going to at 

Count 2 revoke and order you to serve three and a half to seven 

years with credit for time served. . . . 

N.T., 4/4/18, at 9-10 (emphasis added). 

Consistent with the foregoing, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that 

the trial court relied on an impermissible factor in imposing his sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.

Judge Colins files a dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2019