No. 82-22 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

VERLIN F. WIPPERT and LORETTA L. WIPPERT, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

vs. 

THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET 

INDIAN RESERVATION, et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Glacier 

Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Frisbee, Moore & Stufft, Cut Bank, Montana 

Selden Frisbee argued, Cut Bank, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Werner, Nelson & Epstein, Cut Bank, Montana 

James Nelson argued, Cut Bank, Montana 

Cannon, Parish & Sheehy, 

Ed Sheehy argued, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: May 10, 1982 

Decided: December 1, 1952 

Filed: 

ail; : 1982 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

The Wipperts appeal a Glacier County District Court 

judgment that the Blackfeet Tribe is entitled to enforce a 

tribal court judgment as a matter of comity, and that the 

Robertsons are entitled to recover certain cattle pasturage 

fees from the Wipperts. The Wipperts contend that the ~ribe 

cannot enforce its tribal court judgment by filing a notice 

of that judgment as a lien in the District Court, and that 

it cannot be tacitly implied that the ~ipperts, as assignors 

of the right to recover the pasturage fees, guaranteed that 

their assignee would pay those fees. We agree, and hold 

that a tribal court judgment can only be enforced in Montana 

courts by the institution of a special proceeding or action, 

but that the Tribe is entitled to enforcement of its judgment 

because the Wipperts themselves instituted an action to 

determine the validity of the judgment. We remand, however, 

for further consideration of whether the trial court 

determined the correct amount remaining unsatisfied on the 

judgment, and for amendment of the District Court judgment 

to provide that the Wipperts are not liable to the Robertsons 

for pasturage fees because the Wipperts assigned their right 

to those fees to the Robertsons without guaranteeing that 

the Wipperts would pay them. 

Prior to July 1, 1976, the Wipperts, adult Blackfeet 

tribal members, owned 2,427 acres in Glacier County, Montana, 

known as the Stone Ranch. In 1974, the Blackfeet Tribe 

loaned the Wipperts $46,773.28 due and payable to the Tribe 

with 10 percent interest not later than November 1, 1975. 

After the Wipperts defaulted on the loan, the Tribe obtained 

a $46,773.28 judgment (plus interest) against them in the 
Blackfeet Tribal Court on April 15, 1976. On April 21, 

1976, the Tribe filed a notice of this judgment with the 

Glacier County Clerk and Recorder and the Glacier County 

District Court. 

In June 1976, the Wipperts agreed to sell the Stone 

Ranch to the Robertsons and agreed to provide the Robertsons 

with a title insurance policy showing that the property was 

free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. When the 

title insurer discovered the Tribe's notice of judgment, the 

Robertsons refused to accept title. In order to assure the 

Robertsons that this notice of judgment would be cleared 

from the title, it was agreed that $20,000 of the purchase 

price would be kept in escrow with the title insurance 

". . . to cover the amount still remaining and unpaid to the 

Blackfeet Tribe [by] the Wipperts.. . . Upon release of the 

judgment, the amount held in escrow, together with the 

interest thereon, shall be paid to [the Wipperts].. . ." It 

was also provided that if necessary to clear the judgment 

from the title, the escrow funds could be used to pay the 

j udgment . 

Before June 1976, the Wipperts had agreed that Mrs. 

Wippert's brother, Larry Whitford, could put his cows to 

pasture on the Stone Ranch from June through October 1976 

for $3,000 per month. The Wipperts and Robertsons then made 

a written, supplemental agreement that the Robertsons would 

honor the buy-sell agreement, abide by the terms of the 

pasturage agreement, and defer possession of the Stone Ranch 

until October 1, 1976, in exchange for $12,000 of the 

pasturage fee. 

On July 1, 1976, the Wipperts conveyed the Stone Ranch 

to the Robertsons by warranty deed. Almost a year later, on 
June 29, 1977, the Wipperts filed a complain-t against the 

Robertsons and the Tribe, requesting that the Tribe set 

forth the nature of its claims to both the Stone Ranch and 

the escrow funds and that the court declare that the Tribe 

has no interest in or lien on either one. The Wipperts 

specifically requested that the court adjudicate the rights 

of all the parties in regard to the escrow funds. 

The Wipperts also moved the court to strike the Tribe's 

notice of judgment from the court records on the ground that 

it was not a document entitled by law to be placed on the 

records. The court granted this motion to strike, but a 

copy of the notice of judgment remained on record as a - lis 

pendens in the Glacier County Clerk and Recorder's Office. 

The Tribe counterclaimed for $17,171.55 (the amount 

allegedly remaining unpaid on the tribal court judgment) and 

asked that this amount be taken out of the escrow funds held 

specifically for the purpose of satisfying that part of the 

tribal court judgment which remained unpaid. 

The Robertsons also counterclaimed and requested that 

$10,500, the amount allegedly remaining unpaid under the 

supplemental agreement relating to deferring possession and 

obtaining $12,000 of the pasturage fees, be awarded them 

from the escrow funds. 

The trial court ruled in favor of both the Tribe and 

the Robertsons on their counterclaims. The court held that 

the tribal court judgment was entitled to full faith and 

credit as a matter of comity, regardless of whether the 

Tribe had a valid lien against the Wipperts' property. On 

the Robertsons' counterclaim the trial court ruled that the 

supplemental agreement was more than a mere assignment 

of their right to the Robertsons to receive the pasturage 
fees paid by Larry Whitford for the use of the pasturage 

from June to October of 1976. Rather, the court held that 

the Wipperts had breached the supplemental agreement by not 

paying the $12,000 to the Robertsons. 

The court held that because the Wipperts had asked it 

to adjudicate the rights of all the parties and to quiet 

title to the escrow funds, section 70-2-202, MCA (procedural 

provisions applicable to quiet title actions), authorized 

the use of the escrow funds to satisfy both the Tribe's and 

the Robertsons' judgments. The Wipperts appeal. 

The Wipperts first contend that the judgment in favor 

of the Tribe on its counterclaim is not supported by any 

evidence that the Tribe possessed a valid lien against the 

Stone Ranch. Although we agree that the Tribe did not have 

a lien against the property, we also hold that the Wipperts, 

in their escrow agreement, agreed that the escrow funds 

could be used to satisfy any remaining tribal court judgment. 

The Wipperts, by this same agreement, also invited the Tribe 

to institute special proceedings to establish the validity 

of the tribal court judgment. 

Tribal court judgments are treated with the same 

deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of 

comity. Hilton v. Guyot (1895), 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 16 

S.Ct. 139, 143, 40 L.Ed. 95, 108; In re Marriage of Limpy 

(1981) , - Mont. - , 636 P.2d 266, 38 St.Rep. 1885; State 

ex rel. Stewart v. District Court (1980), - Mont . - , 609 

P.2d 290, 37 St.Rep. 635; Red Fox and Red Fox (0re.App. 

1975), 542 P.2d 918; Wakefield v. Little Light (1975), 276 

Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228; In Re Lynch's Estate (1962), 92 

Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199; Begay v. Miller (1950), 70 Ariz. 

380, 222 P.2d 624. However, there is no Montana law which 
allows a tribe or foreign nation to place a lien against 

property situated in Montana by filing a notice of judgment 

with a Montana court. We do not even allow this for 

judgments rendered by our sister states; that is, to enforce 

a judgment rendered in a foreign country or another state, 

an - action -- or a special proceeding must be instituted in the 

District Court of the county where the judgment is sought to 

be enforced. See section 26-3-203, NCA. Therefore, the 

District Court properly ordered the Tribe's notice of 

judgment be stricken from the court's records, and it was 

correct in declaring that it did not constitute a lien 

against the Wipperts' property. 

Once a party files an action or a special proceeding to 

enforce a tribal or foreign judgment against a person, 

section 26-3-205(2), MCA authorizes, courts of this state 

to presume that the tribal or foreign judgment ". . . is 

evidence of a right as between the parties . . . and can 

only be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want 

of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake 

of law or fact." 

But here the Tribe failed to file an action or special 

proceeding to enforce its judgment. Rather, the Wipperts 

themselves filed that action for the Tribe when they filed 

their complaint requesting that the Tribe set forth the 

nature of its claims and that the court decide the rights of 

all the parties. These requests laid the foundation for the 

court's inquiry into the validity of the tribal court judgment. 

Although the Wipperts alleged in their pleadings that the 

tribal court judgment was obtained by fraud, they offered no 

proof of fraud at any time. 
Nonetheless we must remand for a determination of the 

proper amount of the tribal court judgment. The Wipperts 

have vaguely alleged in their briefs that the trial court 

may have made a factual mistake in determining the unsatisfied 

amount of the tribal court judgment. The Wipperts appear to 

argue that the tribal court judgment was partially satisfied 

because the Tribe confiscated certain lands and cattle which 

had been pledged as collateral for the loan. In addition, 

in determining the amount of the unsatisfied judgment, the 

trial court merely asked counsel for the tribe to submit the 

figure to the court, and the court simply adopted the figure 

submitted by the Tribe. The trial court made no independent 

determination of the correctness of the amount. Under these 

circumstances we can indulge in no presumption that the 

District Court judgment is correct. In all fairness, we 

must remand for a hearing to determine the proper amount of 

the judgment. 

We also hold that the trial court was correct in allowing 

the Tribe to satisfy the unpaid portion of its judgment from 

the escrow funds. The Wipperts' written escrow agreement 

specifically provided that ". . . the sum of $20,000.00 

. . . will be held in an interest bearing escrow account . . . 

to cover the amount still remaining and unpaid to the 3lackfeet 

Tribe [by] the Wipperts.. . . Upon release of the judgment, 

the amount held in escrow . . . shall be paid to . . . [the 

Wipperts]. If necessary in order to clear the judgment 

. . . the escrow funds [may be used] to pay off the judgment 

and obtain a release of said judgment . . ." 

As to the Robertsons' counterclaim asking that the 

escrow money be applied to pay them under the terms of the 

supplemental agreement, the Wipperts correctly claim that 

the Robertsons have no right to the proceeds of the escrow 
fund because the Nippert-Robertson supplemental agreement 

clearly provided that the Robertsons were to receive the 

pasturage fee from Larry Whitford and not from the Wipperts. 

We agree that the supplemental agreement was an assignment 

of the Wippert rights to the pasturage fees to the Robertsons. 

That agreement states: 

"It is understood that you, the Buyer, will 

fulfill and carry out completely the terms 

of this summer pasturage agreement commencing 

with July 1, 1976, and that --- you will be 

entitled to payment -- from Larry Whitford of 

the remainins $12,000 . . . " (Emphasis added.) 

This is clearly an assignment which contains no language 

creating an indebtedness between the Wipperts and the 

Robertsons. Contrary to the trial court's holding that the 

Wipperts should have clearly indicated their intentions to 

assign by using customary words of assignment, the law does 

not require that any special language be used to constitute 

a written assignment. Any language, however informal or 

poorly expressed, is sufficient if it shows an intent to 

transfer a right. See 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 43(b); 

Bergin v. Van Der Steen (Cal. 1951), 236 P.2d 613; Morris v. 

Leach (Ore. 1917), 162 P. 253; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. 

Williamson (Cal.App. 1912), 123 P. 245; Porter v. Title 

Guaranty & Surety Co. (Idaho 1912), 121 P. 548; ~evins v. 

Stark (Ore. 1910), 110 P. 980; Galbreath v. Wallrich (Colo. 

1909), 102 P. 1085. And an assignment may be limited by 

conditions contained therein. Northwest Oil & Refining Co. 

v. Honolulu Oil Corp. (1961), 195 F.Supp. 281. 

We hold that the language stating that ". . . you will 

be entitled to payment from Larry Whitford . . ." was 

sufficient to show a present intent to transfer. Xt is 

an established rule of contract law that the assignor does 

not guarantee that the obligor will pay, and that the assiqnor 
is not liable to the assignee for breaches of the assignment 

by the debtor. Restatement of the Law of Contract 5 175; 6A 

C.J.S. Assignments § 90; Patrons State Bank & Trust Co. v. 

Shapiro (Kans. 1974), 528 P.2d 1198; First National Bank of 

Topeka v. United Telephone Ass'n. (Kan. 1960), 353 P.2d 963; 

Robinson v. St. Maries Lumber Co. (Idaho 1921), 204 P. 671; 

Galbreath, supra. Therefore, we will not imply that the 

Robertsons may recover the unpaid pasturage fee from the 

Wipperts; any recovery must be sought from Larry Whitford. 

We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We Concur: 

/chief Justice 

dge, Sitting f 

ustice John C. 
Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell concurring in part and 

dissenting in part: 

I dissent from that portion of the foregoing opinion 

which determines that a remand to the District Court is 

necessary for a redetermination of the correctness of the 

figure representing the unsatisfied portion of the tribal 

court judgment. 

Particularly, I take issue with the following language 

in the majority opinion: 

". . . In addition, in determining the 

amount of the unsatisfied judgment, the 

trial court merely asked counsel for the 

tribe to submit the figure to the court, 

and the court simply adopted the figure 

submitted by the Tribe. The trial court 

made no independent determination of the 

correctness of the amount. Under these 

circumstances we can indulge in no 

presumption that the District Court 

judgment is correct. In all fairness, we 

must remand for a hearing to determine 

the proper amount of judgment." 

It is well-settled law in Montana that District Court 

To cc .k e.5 

judgmei~ts are presumed to be correct. +kx&es V. Baker 

(1980) Mont . - , 611 P.2d 609, 37 St.Rep. 948; Rock 

Springs Corporation v. Pierre (1980), - Mon t . - , 615 

P.2d 206, 37 St.Rep. 1378. The majority have assumed that 

because the District Court asked the tribe's counsel to 

compute the amount owing on the judgment and submit that 

figure to the court, the District Court did not verify the 

figures so submitted prior to signing the judgment. I find 

nothing in the record to support this assumption and, 

therefore, dissent from the majority's action in remanding 

this case for that purpose. 

I concur in the remainder of tne majority opinion. 

Chief ~ust ice \