Baltimore Police Department v. James Brooks et al.

Case Nos. 979, 980, 982, 983, 985, 988, 989, 991, 992, 993, 994, September Term 2019, 

Argued, 05/12/2020

Opinion by Harrell, J.

HEADNOTE

PUBLIC SAFETY – LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS –

FILING ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES

For a police department to “file[] the charges” under Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106(a) in 

an administrative disciplinary action against an officer, it must act with some level of 

formality. The Baltimore City Police Department’s practice was to require a signature as 

the final step before charges may be served upon an officer. As the signatures in each of 

the disciplinary action cases here were affixed on dates after the expiration of the one-year 

limitation period in § 3-106, the police department failed to charge timely the covered 

officers. The circuit court was correct in dismissing the charges.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-19-001466, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,

1126, 1321, 1324, 1325 

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 979, 980, 982, 983, 985, 988, 989, 991, 

992, 993, 994

September Term, 2019

_____________________________________

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT

v.

JAMES BROOKS, ET AL.

_____________________________________

 

Meredith,

Beachley,

Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

 _____________________________________

Opinion by Harrell, J.

 _____________________________________

Filed: July 30, 2020
“When will you make an end?

When I am finished.”

Exchange between Pope Julius II 

(Rex Harrison) and Michelangelo 

(Charlton Heston) (regarding 

painting the ceiling of the Sistine 

Chapel), “The Agony and the 

Ecstasy” (1965, 20th Century Fox).

These cases1call upon us to engage in the frequent judicial task of interpreting 

ambiguous language in a State statute—in this case, the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of 

Rights (“LEOBR”).

2

In doing so, we must reconcile the policy and practice of a specific 

police department regarding that interpretation. This enactment regulated principally the 

administrative process of how covered law enforcement employers investigate, charge, and 

discipline their covered law enforcement personnel with regard to misconduct deemed to 

have violated applicable laws, departmental regulations, and departmental policies. The 

present cases focus on a single provision of the LEOBR, codified originally as Md. Code, 

Art. 27 § 730(b)(1) in 1988, and revised in Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106(a) in 2003 

(without substantive change), that established a one-year period for the employer to decide 

whether to charge an employee and the required act for tolling that limitation period. The 

provision states that:

[A] law enforcement agency may not bring administrative charges against 

a law enforcement officer unless the agency files the charges within 1 

1 Eleven cases, involving a total of fifteen police officers, are consolidated for purposes of 

this opinion because each case poses the same legal question.

2 LEOBR was adopted originally by the Maryland General Assembly in 1974 (1974 Md. 

Laws Chap. 722). 
2

year after the act that gives rise to the charges comes to the attention of 

the appropriate law enforcement agency official.[3]

The parties disagree over what constitutes the filing of charges. The Legislature did 

not provide a definition in the LEOBR. The relevant legislative history does not contain a 

clear clue as to what would satisfy the act of filing of charges. This Court has twice 

considered related questions regarding § 3-106(a), but neither involved circumstances like 

those in the present cases, though there is much in the opinions in those two cases that we 

find helpful here, as we shall explain shortly. See Wilson v. Baltimore City Police 

Department, 91 Md. App. 436 (1992); see also Prince George’s County Police Department 

v. Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. 168 (2001).

I.

In enacting LEOBR, the Legislature appears to leave to local police departments the 

task of putting in place their own policies and practices regarding what constitutes the filing 

of charges. The Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) enacted a departmental written 

policy it believes complies with the LEOBR regarding administrative discipline of its 

officers. Seeking discipline against the fifteen officers here, the BPD deemed the charges 

filed when, during closed-door committee meetings

4—the records in these cases contain 

no evidence of any minutes of the meetings assertedly kept and which, even assuming 

minutes were kept, would not be given to or made available otherwise to an ultimately

3 Emphasis is added to highlight the key phrase which is in dispute.

4 By “closed-door committee meetings,” we mean that only departmental personnel 

attended, but did not include the officer against whom a complaint was lodged or his/her 

counsel or union representative. 
3

charged officer—held during the required one-year period, the police commissioner’s 

designee orally approved the charges. In every case, however, the police commissioner’s 

designee (who attended reportedly the committee meetings in person or by phone) did not 

memorialize in writing his alleged oral approval until after the expiration of the one-year

limitation period. Nonetheless, the BPD urges that the oral approval given by the 

commissioner’s designee at the meeting was sufficient to toll the limitation period.

The officers sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to foreclose the 

adjudication of the charges brought against them because the limitation period under § 3-

106(a) had run before the commissioner’s designee evinced timely his approval of filing 

charges by signing the required paperwork generated by the closed meetings.

5

 The circuit

court determined that the phrase “files the charges” in § 3-106(a) “requires some measure 

of formality,” in order to provide a court with a means to review the action should an officer 

seek a judicial remedy. The court determined that the BPD had installed a practice or 

policy of requiring the commissioner’s designee’s signature on the final draft of a charging 

document. As a result, the one-year limitation period had run for each of the fifteen cases. 

The circuit court dismissed the charges. The BPD appealed timely.

II.

A. Background – In a Nutshell

5 When an officer is denied a right granted by the LEOBR, he or she may apply to a circuit 

court for an order “that directs the law enforcement agency to show cause why the right 

should not be granted.” Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-105(a).
4

Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106(a) states, as noted earlier, that:

A law enforcement agency may not bring administrative charges against a 

law enforcement officer unless the agency files the charges within 1 year 

after the act that gives rise to the charges comes to the attention of the 

appropriate agency official.

As noted earlier, no further explanation, elaboration, or definition is provided in the statute 

regarding the phrase “files the charges,” or in the legislative history of each relevant 

enactment.

In the absence of legislative direction on when charges are deemed to be filed, police 

departments are left to adopt their own policies and/or practices regarding the 

administrative disciplinary process. The BPD adopted a relevant written policy, Policy

308, on 13 September 2017. It states, in relevant part, that its Office of Professional 

Responsibility (the “OPR”) shall investigate allegations of misconduct by officers and

determine whether the allegations are sustained.

6

If the allegations are deemed sustained, 

the OPR submits proposed charges to the Disciplinary Review Committee (the “DRC”). 

The DRC, consisting of sworn and civilian members of the BPD appointed by the police 

commissioner, review the factual findings of the OPR and reputedly a draft of proposed

charges, before making a recommendation for discipline.

Once the DRC crafts its recommendations, the police commissioner’s designee7is 

tasked with approval responsibility over the recommendations, “as is” or as may be 

6

“Sustained” means that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the record before the OPR

establishes that the alleged misconduct occurred.

7 Although the police commissioner is authorized to perform this function personally, on 

the record before us, it was the police commissioner’s designee who attended the DRC 

meetings.
5

amended. It is claimed by the BPD that the designee’s approval occurs verbally initially

at the closed-door DRC meeting. According to the “Disciplinary Flow Chart” contained

in Policy 308, the commissioner’s designee’s approval of charges is the final step prior to 

serving charges on the officer in question, who then either may accept or contest the 

discipline. Neither the flow chart, nor the text of Policy 308, addresses, however, how or

when in the process the commissioner’s designee’s final approval is evinced. The Policy

fails also to provide a definition for when the charges are deemed filed. 

It has been, at all times relevant to the present cases, the practice of the BPD that, at 

some point following completion of a DRC meeting, a member of the DRC and the 

commissioner’s designee, respectively, sign a form titled “Baltimore Police Department 

Internal Affairs Transmittal Cover,” referred to also as the charging document. This 

document lists the accused officer, the investigated allegations, whether the allegations 

were sustained, a summary of the facts, and a handwritten recommendation for discipline. 

Notably, on pages 4-6, the form document provides signature and dating lines. These lines 

are signed and dated by first the DRC representative and then the commissioner’s designee, 

which acts may be concurrent or sequential. It also has sections displaying the date the 

charged officer is served and acknowledgement of service.8 Counsel for BPD, at the final 

hearing before the circuit court regarding the present cases, claimed that the BPD did not 

require the execution of this document by the DRC representative or the commissioner’s 

8 The acknowledgement of service section provides the officer with three options: 1) 

Acceptance of Punishment; 2) Acknowledgement of Non-Punitive Counseling and/or 

Training; or 3) Request for an Administrative Hearing Board.
6

designee as part of the disciplinary process described in Policy 308; however, counsel 

acknowledged also that, to her knowledge, the BPD had never participated in a hearing 

based on charges without the signature of approval by the commissioner’s designee.

In each of the cases, the commissioner’s designee’s signature on the form signifying 

approval was not affixed until after the expiration of the one-year period.9 The record 

contains no basis for determining what any draft charges may have looked like if presented 

to the DRC and, therefore, there is no basis to compare them to the final charges served 

upon the officers. Thus, we have no way of knowing whether amendments were made 

between the DRC meetings and the sign-offs by the commissioner’s designee.

B. More Background – A Deeper Dive

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officer James Brooks on 3 October 2017. 

Officer Brooks was alleged to have failed to secure a building properly while detectives 

were seeking a search warrant for the premises. The DRC met to review the OPR findings

and consider a discipline recommendation on 2 October 2018.

10 The commissioner’s 

designee signed-off on final charges and discipline on 4 October 2018.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officer Damond Durant on 10 November 

2017. Officer Durant was alleged to have failed to identify himself as a police officer and

9

In three instances, for unexplained reasons, officers were served prior to the 

commissioner’s designee signing-off on the final charging documents. Those charges were 

against Officers Damond Durant and Jonathan Boyer and Sergeant Steve Histon. We 

concluded in Wilson v. Baltimore City Police Dept. that providing notice to a police officer 

is not the same as filing the charges. 91 Md. App. 436 (1992). Thus, the early notice to 

these three officers plays no substantive role in our analysis of the question at hand. 

10 In each case, the DRC meeting occurred within 365 days of the BPD learning of the 

complaint.
7

to have displayed his handgun during an off-duty encounter with two individuals suspected 

to be engaged in a crime. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider a 

discipline recommendation on 8 November 2018. The commissioner’s designee signedoff on final charges and discipline on 31 January 2019. 

The BPD received a complaint regarding Sergeant Jared Fried on 18 October 2017. 

Sergeant Fried was alleged to have failed to: provide an individual stopped during an 

investigative traffic stop with a citizen contact receipt before he left the scene, to obtain a 

central complaint number; and, to document the stop properly. The DRC met to review 

the OPR findings and consider a discipline recommendation on 17 October 2018. The 

commissioner’s designee signed-off on final charges and discipline on 13 November 2018.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Sergeant Steve Histon and Officer 

Jonathan Boyer on 27 September 2017. Officer Boyer was alleged to have failed to write 

a report or take proper enforcement action after stopping four suspects, i.e., recovering the 

cell phone of an alleged robbery victim. Sergeant Histon was alleged to have failed to 

ensure Officer Boyer documented the alleged robbery properly and otherwise failing to 

supervise his units. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider a discipline 

recommendation on 26 September 2018. The commissioner’s designee signed-off on final 

charges and discipline on 4 October 2018.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officer Norman Jones on 10 November 

2017. Officer Jones was alleged to have acted disrespectfully toward staff and failed to 

follow a direct order and to write an administrative report explaining why he was missing 

equipment and in possession of malfunctioning equipment at an annual Taser 
8

recertification class. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider a discipline 

recommendation on 9 November 2018. The commissioner’s designee signed-off on final 

charges and discipline on 13 November 2018.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Sergeant Denishia Jordan on 18 December 

2017. Sergeant Jordan was alleged to have been “disrespectful, insubordinate, and/or 

aggressive towards” her captain. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider 

a discipline recommendation on 13 December 2018. The commissioner’s designee signedoff on final charges and discipline on 4 January 2019.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officer Latasha McBride on 12 October 

2017. Officer McBride was alleged to have challenged the authority of a commanding 

officer and to have laughed at an instruction provided by the same officer. The DRC met 

to review the OPR findings and consider a discipline recommendation on 11 October 2018. 

The commissioner’s designee signed-off on final charges and discipline on 16 October 

2018.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officers Raul Rivera and Ryan Oliver on 

16 December 2017. Officer Oliver was alleged to have failed to write a report on an assault 

incident. Officer Rivera was alleged to have failed to ensure that Officer Oliver wrote the

report. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider a discipline 

recommendation on 13 December 2018. The commissioner’s designee signed-off on final 

charges and discipline for Officer Oliver on 4 January 2019 and for Officer Rivera on 7 

January 2019.
9

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officer Richard Whittaker on 6 January 

2018. Officer Whittaker was alleged to have been inebriated and in possession at the time

of his approved and loaded off-duty weapon. The DRC met to review the OPR findings 

and consider a discipline recommendation on 3 January 2019. The commissioner’s 

designee signed-off on final charges and discipline on 7 January 2019.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Sergeant Larry Worsley on 22 December 

2017. Sergeant Worsley was alleged to have harassed another officer over a ten-month 

period, challenged the same officer to a fist fight, and intimidated the officer such that he 

began to fear for his life. The DRC met to review the OPR findings and consider a 

discipline recommendation on 21 December 2018. The commissioner’s designee signedoff on final charges and discipline on 4 January 2019.

The BPD received a complaint regarding Officers Kent Sowers, Eric Baublitz, and 

Isiah Smith on 18 January 2018. The Officers were alleged to have conducted an illegal 

search at an incorrect address when responding to an alarm call. Officers Sowers and 

Baublitz were alleged also to have deactivated their body cameras. The DRC met to review 

the OPR findings and consider a discipline recommendation on 16 January 2019. The 

commissioner’s designee signed-off on final charges and discipline on 29 January 2019.

Each officer filed a petition for a show cause order from the Circuit Court of 

Baltimore City, alleging the BPD failed to file the charges timely, pursuant to Md. Code, 

Pub. Safety § 3-106(a). The circuit court held a hearing 14 June 2019. The judge 

determined that the BPD failed to satisfy the one-year limitation period. Although praising 

generally the BPD’s procedure for handling charges against officers, the hearing judge
10

noted that a definition for what it means to “file” the charges under § 3-106(a) was never 

established, e.g., Policy 308 did not state “whether filing occurs upon signing or not signing 

[the departmental approved form] or oral approval or not oral approval [at the closed DRC 

meeting].” The court determined that the BPD was not due judicial deference to its Policy 

in this regard because it “does not give a definition parallel to the statute such that [the trial 

court] would have to decide whether the Police Department’s adopted definition is 

consistent with the statute and the General Assembly’s intent or not.”

Ultimately, the court concluded that the language of the statute “require[d] some 

measure of formality” in departmental action evincing the filing of charges. Although that 

“formality [is] not [the] equivalent of a court filing where there’s a clerk’s office charged 

with maintaining records,” there must be a “way that that step in the process of approving 

charges can be examined and scrutinized by the court” because the “statute provides 

remedies for the officer to come to court . . . to challenge whether the charges have been 

brought timely or not.” Although “a signature is not necessarily required,” a signature is, 

according to the court, “what the Department has adopted” through its practice of having 

the commissioner’s designee and a DRC member (on behalf of the DRC) sign and date 

their respective approvals of the final charging document:

The charges that [the BPD] issues give places for the signatures and the date 

on which signed, which suggests that the Department treats the approval as 

being when it is signed.

As the commissioner’s designee’s signature was affixed after the one-year 

limitation period expired, the court dismissed all charges against the officers. 
11

III. QUESTION PRESENTED

Appellant frames one question for our consideration, which we have rephrased nonsubstantively:

I. Did the circuit court err in its determination that the charges against 

appellees/officers were not filed timely within the one-year statutory 

limitation as required by Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106(a) when the police 

commissioner’s designee approved the discipline prior to exhaustion of the 

one-year period but failed to sign the charging documents until after 

exhaustion?

IV. RELEVANT GENERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When reviewing an action tried without a jury, we review the judgment of the trial

court “on both the law and evidence.” Banks v. Pusey, 393 Md. 688, 697 (2006). We defer 

to the circuit court’s findings of fact, except where “the judgment of the trial court on the 

evidence [is] clearly erroneous.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). Despite the deference given to its

findings of fact, legal analysis by a trial court receives no deference. Friendly Fin. Corp. 

v. Orbit Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Truck, Inc., 378 Md. 337, 342–43 (2003). In that vein, 

“[s]tautory construction is a legal question,” which we review using a non-deferential 

standard. Miller v. Mathias, 428 Md. 419, 450 (2012).

V. DISCUSSION

The BPD argues that it, through its adherence to Policy 308, complied with Md. 

Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106(a) and filed the charges within one year of when it was put on 

notice of alleged misconduct. As there was no regulatory definition to determine what 

constituted filing of charges in the Policy, the BPD claims it complied with the statute by
12

the act of the commissioner’s designee approving verbally the proposed charges and 

discipline at the DRC meetings. As this argument continues, although a form document 

calling explicitly for a signature and date of signing of the charges contemporaneous with 

or following the DRC meeting was a part of departmental practice, signing of the form

document was not significant for purposes of determining when filing occurs as it was

nothing more than a form of proof of the earlier verbal approval by the commissioner’s 

designee, rather than the approval in and of itself. The filing occurs when the designee 

approves verbally at the DRC meeting the recommended discipline because the final step 

in Policy 308, before presenting charges to the officer, is titled “Presentation of 

Disciplinary Recommendation.” The BPD claims also that its interpretation of what it 

means to file the charges is due deference from a reviewing court.

Appellees do not dispute a number of the claims about the LEOBR made by the 

BPD. In particular, Appellees agree that the declination by the Legislature to define “files 

the charges” leaves open the interpretation and implementation of the requirement by the 

local police through adoption of local policies and practices. The officers note, however, 

that some formal indicia—whether it be in the form of a signature, stamp, or other means—

is required to evince the final act of the filing of charges. Further, the officers claim that, 

although the BPD claims that it adopted an interpretation that the charges are filed upon 

verbal acceptance by the commissioner’s designee at the DRC meeting, the departmental 

practice belies that position because the charges are not final, i.e., not filed, until the 

designee signs-off on the charging document. In signing the charging document the 

designee provided a proper indicia of formality required by the word “filing.” The officers 
13

also disagree with the BPD’s claim that its interpretation of the phrase should be given any

deference as Policy 308 does not provide a definition of what represents filing the charges. 

We shall agree with the circuit court and the officers and affirm the judgment of the circuit 

court.

When considering ambiguous statutory language, we construe the ambiguous words 

“as having their ordinary and commonly-accepted meaning.” Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship 

v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15, 27–28 (1994). We are bound as well to give the words 

“the contextual meaning most probably intended by the Legislature.” Deibler v. State, 365 

Md. 185, 195 (2001). Framed another way, we must use “common sense to avoid illogical 

or unreasonable constructions,” Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56 (1996), and “may not 

extend statutes to make them say what the legislature, by choice or oversight, did not say.” 

Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Adams, 37 Md. App. 165, 173 (1977). “Even if the plain language of 

the statute is clear and unambiguous, we may use extraneous interpretive aids, such as 

legislative purpose, history, and context to confirm our interpretation.” Prince George’s 

County Police Dept. v. Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. 168, 180 (2001) (citing Smith v. State, 

115 Md. App. 614, 621 (1997)).

In determining what the ordinary and commonly accepted meaning of a phrase or 

word is (whether engaged in plain meaning or ambiguity analysis), we often consult an 

appropriate dictionary for guidance, without losing sight of the context provided by the 

statute and the Legislature. See State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Md.-Nat’l 

Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 14 (1997) (“[I]n deciding what a term’s 

ordinary and natural meaning is, we may, and often do, consult the dictionary”). But see 
14

Friends of Frederick County v. Town of New Mkt., 224 Md. App. 185, 202 (2015) 

(“Recourse solely to a dictionary is not the only way, nor indeed usually the best way, by 

which a court can discern legislative intent . . . rather [courts] consider it within the context 

of the statutory scheme”).

To keep it foremost in our minds in this analysis, we reiterate that Md. Code, Pub. 

Safety § 3-106(a) provides in totality that:

Subject to subsection (b)[11] of this section, a law enforcement agency may 

not bring administrative charges against a law enforcement officer unless 

the agency files the charges within 1 year after the act that gives rise to 

the charges comes to the attention of the appropriate law enforcement 

agency official.

The particular context of § 3-106(a) in LEOBR offers little to no help in discerning what 

the Legislature meant by “filing.”

Looking to the legislative history, we find some guidance regarding the purpose of 

the Statute. In enacting the pertinent bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee report explained 

that:

Current law does not provide a time limit for the filing of administrative 

charges against a law enforcement officer under the Law Enforcement 

Officers’ Bill of Rights.

Testimony indicated that there have been many instances where a law 

enforcement officer who has committed a minor infraction has had that minor 

infraction held over his head for an extended period of time, resulting in 

significant uncertainty as to when, or even if, any disciplinary action is to be 

taken. The types of minor infractions referred to in this bill include 

administrative offenses such as improper wearing of a uniform, or not 

completing or signing a gasoline trip ticket. It is unfair, unreasonable, and 

11 Subsection (b) excuses the one-year limitation period in cases of criminal activity or use 

of excessive force matters. None of the charges against Appellees involved either category.
15

serves no useful purpose to allow a supervisor to withhold the filing of such 

administrative charges indefinitely.

At some point, supervisory officials should be required either to file the 

administrative charge against the officer or to drop the charge so that the 

officer is relieved of the anxiety and concern that results from not knowing 

if or when the charges will be officially brought against the officer.

Floor Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee for Senate Bill, at page 1–2 (1988). We 

discern from this language that, in order to deem charges filed, officers were to have some 

protection against the threat of a charge or charges being dangled indefinitely over their

heads.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “filed” as meaning when a paper is “delivered to 

the proper officer, and by him received to be kept on file as a matter of record and 

reference.” The BPD notes that this Court addressed the definition of “filed” previously, 

having recourse to Black’s in the process. In Wilson v. Baltimore Police Department, we 

held that charges were not filed, within the meaning of Md. Code Art. 27 § 730(b)(1) (the 

predecessor to current § 3-106(a)),12 when they were served upon an officer, but rather 

“when charges against a police officer recommending disciplinary actions are presented to 

and approved by one authorized to initiate formal proceedings against the officer. At that 

point, the charges against the officer become a matter of record, subject to adjudication.” 

12 Section 730(b)(1) stated that: “administrative charges may not be brought against a law 

enforcement officer unless filed within 1 year after the act that gives rise to the charges 

comes to the attention of the appropriate law enforcement agency official.”

The Revisor’s Note for Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 3-106 clarifies that it contains “new 

language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, §730(b). Subsection (a) 

of this section was revised to reflect the active voice to clarify that a law enforcement 

agency files administrative charges against a law enforcement officer.”
16

91 Md. App. 436, 438–39 (1992), cert. denied, 327 Md. 525 (1992). In reaching that

conclusion, we took into account the Black’s Law Dictionary definition and noted further 

that the words “file” or “files” “is used loosely to denote official custody of the court or 

the place in the offices of a court where the records and papers are kept.” On the record in 

Wilson, we concluded that the charges were filed when the Deputy Commissioner of Police 

signed-off on the charges against the officer.13

The relevant language of the LEOBR came under scrutiny next by this Court in 

Prince George’s County Police Department v. Zarragoitia. 139 Md. App. 168 (2001). In 

Zarragoitia, the Court was tasked with considering what constituted an administrative 

charge under the LEOBR. Id. The Prince George’s County Police Department argued that

its practice was to treat a document known as a “Report of Investigation” or “ROI” as the 

official charging document for filing purposes, despite the fact that the ROI did not provide 

exact language regarding the charges or references to what the charges were based on, and 

there was additional review mandated by the department’s written policy following signing 

off on the ROI. We held that an “administrative charge . . . is a formal accusation of 

misconduct that evidences a decision by the agency to proceed against the law enforcement 

officer and marks the beginning of the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding.” Id. at 184. 

13 Although a signature was deemed the time of filing in Wilson, we hasten to observe that

that may not always be the case statewide. Determining when charges are filed under § 3-

106(a) is a fact-driven analysis that hinges on the particular police department’s policy and 

practice in handling disciplinary charges. The Legislature did not intend to make a 

signature on a specific document as a requirement for the time of filing across all police 

departments. Based on the record in Wilson, however, that was the determinative act of 

filing based on the department’s policy and practice in place at the time.
17

We noted that signing a document that was little more than a non-binding proposal to 

charge did not qualify as filing charges under the LEOBR as the document did not rise to 

the level of “charges.” To conclude otherwise would be improper as it was antithetical to 

the legislative purpose of adding the one-year limitation period to the LEOBR. The 

limitation period, added in 1988 as Section § 730(b)(1) of the LEOBR, “was enacted 

because ‘[i]t is unfair, unreasonable, and serves no useful purpose to allow a supervisor to 

withhold the filing of such administrative charges indefinitely.’” Id. at 186–87 (quoting 

Floor Report for the Senate Judiciary Committee for Senate Bill 623, at 1). If the 

Department’s practice was valid, “the Department would give itself an indefinite, unlimited 

period of time in which to file charges. During that indefinite and unlimited period, the 

officer would have no information about the proposed charges, no means to prepare a 

defense, and no way to force a matter to a conclusion.” Id.

The BPD interprets these two cases as endorsing the notion that a filing occurs when 

there is no further review to be undertaken and the charges have been approved by the final 

supervisory person empowered to make the decision whether the final version of charges 

are acceptable, e.g., the commissioner’s designee at the DRC meeting. As there was 

assertedly no change between the draft charges alleged to have been presented at the DRC 

meetings and the time the designees signed-off formally on the form document,

14 the BPD 

argues that it is appropriate that the final review occurs at the DRC meeting and thus 

charges are filed formally upon the designee’s giving of his/her/their verbal approval. As 

14 A claim which cannot be verified on these records.
18

such, the BPD states that “[a] signature is nothing more than a handwritten name . . . simply 

one form of proof of the designees’ approvals, not approvals in and of themselves. The 

approvals took place at the DRC meetings; the subsequent signatures merely evidenced

those approvals.” We reject this “rabbit-pulled-from-a-hat” position on the records before 

us.

The record establishes that the full procedural panoply employed by the BPD in 

disciplinary cases is not to consider the charges filed and final until the signing and dating 

of the form document accompanying the final written statement of charges, regardless of 

whether the final charges are unchanged as allegedly approved verbally at the DRC 

meeting or have been revised or amended following the DRC meeting and before submittal

to the commissioner’s designee for his/her signature.

At the circuit court hearing, counsel for the BPD conceded that, although she did 

not believe a signature was required necessarily, the Maryland Office of Administrative 

Hearings (“OAH”), to which an appeal is available to a disciplined officer, had never 

proceeded with a hearing based only on a charge approved at the DRC meeting, without 

the signature on the charging document by the commissioner’s designee. As the circuit 

court stated, “a signature . . . is what the Department had adopted. The charges that it issues 

give places for the signatures and the date on which signed, which suggests that the 

Department treats the approval as being when it is signed.” We agree with the circuit court

and hold that the BPD observed a policy and practice that formal filing of charges comes 

upon the signature by the commissioner’s designee on the form document accompanying 

the final version of the charging document and proposed discipline.
19

This holding is not inconsistent with BPD Policy 308. The policy does not provide 

a definition of when charges are considered filed. According to the flow chart incorporated 

in Policy 308, the relevant steps proceed from “Presentation of Disciplinary 

Recommendations”15 to the officer’s opportunity to accept or contest the proposed

discipline contained in the charges. The BPD claims that the flow chart “makes clear that 

review by the DRC is the final step before a charge is presented to the officer . . . .” The 

lack of recognition in the policy of an otherwise formal practice occurring between the 

presentation of the recommendations to the commissioner’s designee and the service of 

charges on the officers makes problematic the BPD’s attempted reconciliation of what is 

explicit in Policy 308 and what occurs in practice. Although the two ranking officers 

designated as the commissioner’s designee in these respective cases provided affidavits in 

this litigation stating (in conclusory fashion) that the charges are considered filed by the 

BPD after the designee’s verbal approval at the DRC meetings, this conflicts with the 

BPD’s actual practice of requiring a signature by the designee. As easily as appellate 

counsel for the BPD imagines a scenario where an OAH hearing could be held in the 

absence of the designee’s signature on the charging document, she admitted that she knew 

of none ever held without that prerequisite act. This implies that the act of signing the 

charging documents carries weight even outside the police department. Under the 

administrative process followed by the BPD in these cases, nothing forecloses other 

rational hypotheticals, such as where draft charges (with or without amendments/revisions) 

15 This presentation is to the Police Commissioner or his/her designee presumably, but that 

is not explicit in Policy 308.
20

and proposed discipline are approved tentatively by the DRC (including a verbal 

acquiescence by the commissioner’s designee), but new and relevant facts come to light in 

the intervening time between the DRC meeting and before the designee signs-off formally,

or the DRC reopens its consideration for any reason, or the designee changes his/her mind 

about the framing of charges as submitted or the appropriate discipline, or the designee

disagrees with the framing of revisions made in the draft charges subsequent to the DRC 

meeting (whether contemplated or not at the meeting). Under any of these hypotheticals, 

none of which would be inconsistent with Policy 308 as written, the filing does not occur 

until the designee signs-off formally on the charging document form.

Were we to agree with the BPD and hold that Policy 308 establishes that the BPD 

considers charges filed upon the verbal acceptance of the DRC recommendations by the 

commissioner’s designee at the DRC meeting, there would arise a foreseeable danger that

the LEOBR sought to foreclose. It is clear from the text of the statute and our prior relevant 

decisions that a level of formality is required for the filing of charges. See Wilson, 91 Md. 

App. at 439 (holding that the triggering event is when formal proceedings are initiated and

“the charges against the officer become a matter of record, subjection to adjudication”); 

see also Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. at 184 (holding that a charge is a formal accusation 

that sets off the adjudicatory process). If the charges were deemed filed upon verbal 

approval alone, the adjudicatory process would be without the level of formality necessary

for proper review of the department’s compliance with § 3-106(a) of the LEOBR. 

Moreover, adopting the BPD’s view might deny charged officers with a timely opportunity 

to learn of possible violations of the one-year limitation period and contest the charges and
21

discipline meted-out to them. If, as on the records in the present cases, the only evidence 

of what occurred at the meeting and the weight it carries with regard to interpreting and 

applying § 3-106 are the after-the-fact litigation affidavits provided by the commissioner’s

designees, then there is no fair avenue for a contesting officer to challenge violations of § 

3-106(a). That is contrary to the intent of the legislation as it is framed presently.

16

As we noted in Zarragoitia, a legislative purpose behind § 3-106 is to ensure that 

officers do not have the potential of administrative charges hanging-over them indefinitely. 

As shown by this record, time passed after the DRC meetings before the signature of the 

commissioner’s designee was placed on the form accompanying the final charging 

document provided the officer. Although actual notice to the officer, as explained in 

Wilson, is not necessary for charges to be filed, Policy 308, as read by the BPD, does not 

require any formal action that would put the officer on notice of the date of the act that 

charges had been approved finally. “During that [possible] indefinite and unlimited period

[that could follow the DRC verbal action], the officer would have no information about the 

proposed charges, no means to prepare a defense, and no way to force a matter to a 

conclusion,” but for the date of signing by the commissioner’s designee on the final version 

of the charging document. Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. at 186–87.

The BPD advances one final argument. Its interpretation of the statutory language

“files the charges” is entitled to deference by the courts. Indeed, “an administrative 

16 If the Legislature thinks our position off-the-mark regarding a statutory interpretation 

question, it knows how to express its contrary will prospectively (or, in certain 

circumstances, retrospectively).
22

agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should 

ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts,” unless it is “based upon 

errors of law.” Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cty. Police Dep’t, 369 Md. 108, 121 (2002). The 

level of deference we provide an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, 

however, “depends on several factors,” including “the duration and consistency of the 

administrative practice” and “the degree to which the agency’s construction was made 

known to the public.” Marriott Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 

Md. 437, 445 (1997). Policy 308 was published on 13 September 2017. The LEOBR was 

passed in its original form by the Maryland Legislature in 1974 and the one-year limitation

period in § 3-106 was added in 1988. The BPD’s interpretation of its written Policy attracts

less deference here than it would were the record to demonstrate that it was the 

longstanding policy or practice of the Department. 

Further, the BPD’s interpretation of the Policy does not appear explicitly or by 

strong implication in its text. “Another important consideration is the extent to which the 

agency engaged in a process of reasoned elaboration in formulating its interpretation of the 

statute. When an agency clearly demonstrates that it . . . reached its interpretation through 

a sound reasoning process, the agency’s interpretation will be accorded the persuasiveness 

due a well-considered opinion of an expert body.” Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public 

Service Comm’n of Maryland, 305 Md. 145, 161–62 (1986). Additionally, “if the 

interpretation is the product of neither contested adversarial proceedings nor formal rule 

promulgation, it is entitled to little weight.” Id. at 162. For all that these records reveal, 

the Department’s interpretation is made apparent solely in the litigation affidavits prepared 
23

by the commissioner’s designees in these cases. Those affidavits are all dated 26 April 

2019. The conclusory assertions in the affidavits relative to the Department’s interpretation 

state starkly only that: “[t]hrough my approval of the disciplinary recommendation . . . the 

disciplinary charges . . . were deemed formally filed.” From this record, no assessment is 

possible as to the longevity or consistency over time of that interpretation as a departmental 

position, nor is the presence of a sound reasoning process determinable. We think the 

deference due in these cases is on the very low end of the spectrum.

Despite this minimal deference, the BPD requests that we extend still to its 

interpretation, e.g., that charges are filed when verbally approved at the DRC meeting, 

enough deference to allow its view safe passage. When presented this argument, the circuit 

court determined, nonetheless, that the BPD’s interpretation was based on an error of law. 

The judge explained that: 

[Policy 308] certainly lays out a very orderly process for considering and 

approving charges, but it never defines one way or the other whether filing 

occurs upon signing or not signing or oral approval or not oral approval . . . 

it does not give a definition parallel to the statute such that I would have to 

decide whether the Police Department’s adopted definition is consistent with 

the statute and the General Assembly’s or not.

So I don’t see this as a situation where substantial deference is due to the 

Police Department for how it has defined an action relating to a statutory 

requirement.

The circuit court continued that, as Policy 308 did not define what it meant to file charges, 

the proper course of action is to look at the actual practice followed by the BPD in these 

cases. We agree with the circuit court.
24

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here: 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/0979s19cn.pdf