### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JA N U A RY 23, 200 4 S es sio n THE RESA CALDWE LL, ET AL 

### . v. CANADA TRACE, INC.
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County Nos. 90025 T.D. & 90029 T.D. K aren R. William s, Jud ge

No. W2003-00264-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 28, 2004

T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e s t h e a t t a c h m e n to f a m o b i l e h o m e a n d i t s s u b s e q u e n ttr a n s p o r tt o a s t o r a g e f a c i l i t y. The Appe llee sued out a n attachme nt on the Appellants’ mobile home to se cure payment of past re nt due on a te nancy

at Appellee ’s trailer

park. A ppellee ha d the m obile home transported af ter it was a tta c he d a ndAp pe lla nts su e d A pp e lle e fo r d a ma g e s to the mob ile ho me
. Th e She lby Cou nty Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt fou nd in fa vo r of Ap pe llants , an d App e lle e app e a le d to the Cir c uit Cou rt

. The Circuit Court found in fa vor of Appel l ee , an d Appellants now a ppeal to this Court. For the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m in pa rt , r e ve rs e in p art , a ndre ma ndfo r f urther p ro c e e din g s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Reve rsed in Par t & Re m anded
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
W. Ray Jami e so n, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe llant T he re sa

L . Ca ldw e ll
Willi a m E . Fri e dman, Me mph is, TN , f or Ap pe llants M. J. Poc ra ss & Sus a n Po c ra ss
J . D. B arton, Millington, TN, f or Appe llee
OP IN ION
F acts and P roce dural Hi story
Susan and M.J

. Pocrass (collectively the “Pocrasses”) purcha sed a 1997 Clarksdale model mobile home on J uly

24, 1996, for the sum of $25,780.85. Shortly there afte r, t he Pocra sses enter ed into a lease contra ct with Canada Trac e, Inc. (“ Canada Trac e” or “Appe llee”) for a

periodic te nancy of a pad in Appellee ’s mobile home par k, and the Pocr asses moved the ir mobile home to that pad.-2-

Ho we ve r, the Poc ra sse s d id n ot l ive i n th e mob ile ho me a ndwo uldvis it o nly on c e a we e k to maintain the home and w ash laundry

. As a re sult of complaints ag ainst the Pocrasse s by other tenants in the mobil e home pa rk and the fa c t th a t th e Pocr a sse s c on tin ue d to pay re nt w ithou t- of

-s ta te c he c ks , A pp e lle e a tte mpt e d to terminate the Pocrass’ tenanc y
. Appellee filed a series of forc ible entry and d et ai n er (“ FED ”) actions, the fir st two of which the Ge nera l Sessions C ourt found in fa vor of the Pocrasses. The P o cr as s es co n t i n u ed t o at t em p t t o t en d er p ay m en to f r en tt o Ap p el l ee fr o mNo v em b er1 9 9 6 t h ro u gh Fe bruary 1997, but eac h attempt was re fused by Appellee . Appellee filed a thi rd FE D ac tion on Marc h 5, 1997, but unlike the first two ac tions, the warr ant was r eturne d with a “not to be found” notation made by

the private proce ss server . After the filing of this third action, the Pocra sses signe d a bill of sale transfer

ring the mobile home to There sa Caldwell (“ Caldwell” or collectively with the Pocrasse s, the “Appe llants”), their attorney in Arka nsas, on Marc h 21, 1997, in return f or ser vices rende red in a matter pending in Arkansa s. Thoug h the Pocra sses and Caldwe ll contend that such a g re e me nt o nly

pr ov ide d Ca ldw e ll w itha se c urity int e re st i n th e ho me , th e do c ume nt e nti tle d “ B ill of Sa le ” app e ars to t

rans fe r o wn e rs hip of

the mob ile ho me to C a ldw e ll andstate s:
KN OW A LL

ME N B Y T HE SE PR ESE NT S:
That I , th e u n d e r s ig n e d , o f M e mp h is , T e n n e s s e e in c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e sum of Twenty Thousand Dollar s ($20,000) to me pa id by There sa L

. Caldwell, the re ceipt wh e re of is h e re by a c kn ow l- e dg e d, do e s he re by g rant, se ll, tr a ns fe r andde liv e r u nto the sa id p e rs on the fo llo wi ng g oo ds a ndc hatte ls:
On e De lta

16 X 8 0 1 99 7 Cl ark sd a le MSD 97 16 80 SN1 06 6 M ob ile Ho me
HA VEAN D T O H OLD a ll a ndsin g ula r the g oo ds a nd c hatte ls u nto the g rante e (s ) his/her/their leg al re prese ntatives, heirs a nd assig ns, to his/her/their own use a nd behoof f oreve r. And t h e u n d er s i gn ed d o es h er eb y co v en an twi t h s ai d gra n t ee (s ) t h ath e/ s h e/ they is/are the la wf ul o wn e r of sa id g oo ds a ndc hatte ls; that th e sa me is f re e a ndc le ar f

ro m a ll encumbr ance s; that he/she/they has/have g ood rig ht to se ll the same as a fore said, and that he/she/they

will warrant and def

end the sa me ag ainst the lawful c laims and de ma nd s o f a ll p e rs on s. Dated at L ittle Rock, Arkansa s, this 21 day of Mar ch, 1997.
/s/ M. J. Poc ra ss /s/ Sus a n Po c ra ss-3-

Ne ith e r the Poc ra sse s n or Ca ldw e ll n oti fi e d A pp e lle e that the Poc ra sse s h a d g ive n Ca ldw e ll t itl e to the mobile home. I n addition, Caldwell never reg istered the title of the mobile home in her na me. Pub lic a tio n w a s ma de on Ap ri l 16 , 2 3, 30 a ndMa y 7, 19 97 , bu t ne ith e r the Poc ra sse s, Caldwell, or their c ounsel, appe are d for a hearing, and judgme nt for possession of the trailer pa rk pad was rende red in f

avor of Appellee

. A writ of possession w as issued by the Ge n er al S essi ons Court on J une 4, 1997, but th i s wr i t wa s n ot executed by the sherif

f’s off ice, and counsel for Ap pe lle e advise d th e sh e ri ff ’s of fi c e to l e t th e writ d ie . Su bs e qu e ntl y , A pp e lle e fi le d a fo urth complaint in the Gene ral Sessions Court, seeking overdue rent in the amount of $1,309 for the plat on wh ic h th e mob ile ho me c on tin ue d to sit . A g a in, se rv ic e of pr oc e ss w a s atte mpt e d at th e mob ile home and the hote l at which the Pocr asses ha d resided pr eviously , but it wa s returne d “not to be found.” The Pocrasse s g ave no notice to A ppellee of wher e they

could be located. I n addition, the attorney who re prese nted the Pocra sses in the first two FE D ac tions initially ref used to acc ept servic e for the Pocr asses.
On J une 25, 1997, Appe llee sec ured an att ac h m ent of the mobil e home f rom the Ge nera l Sessions Court, and it was executed by taping notice of the attachme nt to the m obile home door. On J une 26, 199 7 , t h e Pocra ss’ attorney acc epted se rvice of proc ess for the Pocrasse s when it was discovere d that the mobile home had be en attac hed. Af ter the issuanc e o f t h e attachment, the employ ees f

or Appe llee positioned a ba ckhoe in f ront of the t railer, preve nting its remova l by Appellants. Whil e encumbe red by the judicial attachme nt, A ppellee paid Dick Moore , I nc. (“ Dick Moore” ) to transport the home to Dick Moore’ s storag e fa cility and it did so on J uly

11, 1997. There is no evidence that the sherif f wa s consulted or wa s prese nt for such transport of the home.
When A p p e ll a n ts s a w th e mo b il e h o me a t D ic k M o o r e ’ s s to r a g e f

a c il ity , it h a d s u s tain ed wi d es p re ad d am age , i n cl u d i n g a f l att i re , s p l i t t i n g wa l l s , u n ev en wa l l s an d fl o o ri n g, cr u s h ed s i d i n g, sag g ing spots in the floor, de bris sprea d over the living room floor, a nd destruction of the home’s porch. As a result, Caldwell took bids for the sale of the hom e and sold the mobile home to Dick Moore f or $13,000. I n addition, Caldwell gav e Di ck Moore a re lease from any liabilityfor a n additional $1,000. I n October 1997, Dick Moore perf

ormed some repairs to the mobile home and sold it for $25,600.
I n J uly 1997, Caldwell intervene d in the s uit and filed a mot ion to quash t he attac hment of the mobile home base d upon a lac k of a diligent sear ch for he r or the Pocr asses. On July31, 1997, the Gene ral Sessions Court quashed the judicia l attachment and re s er v ed h earing the issue of damag es until Aug ust 13, 1997. The Pocrasse s broug ht a suit ag ainst Appellee on Aug ust 15, 1997 for da mag es base d on wrong ful attac hment of the mobile home

. On Aug ust 21, 1997, the Gene ral S e s s i o n s C o u r ta w a

r d e d a j u d g m e n tt o t h e P o c r a s s e s a g a i n s tA p p e l l a n tf o r $ 2 5 , 0 0 0

. T h a ts a m e d a y, the Gene ral Sessions Court awar ded Caldwe ll a judgme nt a g ainst Appellant for $25,000. Appe llee appea led both judgme nts to the Circuit Court of Shelby County and the two case s wer e consolidate dO n January 23 , 20 0 2 , A p p el l ee C anad a T race f i l ed a t hi rd p art y co m p l ai nt ag a ins t K ennet h and 1 B arba ra D ay, t wo of i t s fo rme r emp l o y ees, who m anaged t he t rai l er p ark i n 19 9 6 and 19 9 7

. H o wever, t he C i rcui t C o urt re n d e re d a ju d g m e n t i n fav o r o f t h e D a ys a n d the A p p e llee d o e s n o t ap p e a l t h is d e c isio n
.

T he t ri al co urt de d uct ed t he P o crass ’ ori gi nal de p o si t of $ 1 8 7 f rom t he d eb t sued upo n. T hi s award 2 i s no t ap p ea l ed b y A p p ell an t s. -4- into one proce eding

. After a hea ring on the issues, the Circuit Court awa rded a judgme nt in favor 1 of Appe llee in the amount of $1,122 f or past re nt due and found that Appellants’ complaints we re 2 with o u t m e r it

. A p p e ll a n ts ap p e a l t o th is Co u r t an dp r e s e n t th e f o ll o w in g is s u e s , a s w e p e rce ive the m:
I

. Whe the r the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d whe n it fo un d tha t th e a tta c hme nt o f the mob ile ho me

was not wrong ful; and I I

. Whether Appe llants should be entitled to damag es b as ed upon the a ctions of Appellee in transporting the mobile home.
F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m in pa rt , r e ve rs e in p art , a ndre ma ndfo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s. Stand ard of Review

“ Un le ss o the rw ise re qu ir e d b y statut e , r e vie w o f f

ind ing s o f f

a ct by the t

ri a l c ou rt in c ivi l ac tions shall be de novo u p o n th e r e c o r d o f th e tria l c o u r t, a c c o mp a n ie d b y a p r e s u mp ti o n of the corr ectne ss of the finding , unless the pre ponderance of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Te nn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) . F or

qu e sti on s o f law , our

sc op e of re vie w i s de novo aff

ording no presumption of corr ectne ss to the trial court’s c onclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( c i t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. Wr ong ful A tt ac hm e nt On appe al, Appellants challeng e the trial court’ s finding that the judicial attachme nt of the mobile home was prope r whe n issued. Specifica lly , Appellant s ar gu e that the attachment wa s imp ro pe r ( 1) fo r l a c k o f an a ff idavit statin g bo th that the a mou nt of the de bt ow e d a ndthat it is a jus t claim, as re quired b y

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 6-113; (2) f or lac k of a suf

ficient bond posted by Appellee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-6-115 and -116; (3) for the e x cessive le vy as prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 9 -6 -1 3 4; and (4) f or lac k of a dilig ent sea

rch f or Appe llants in serving proce ss prior to the attac hment. We will address ea ch one of these c halleng es in turn.
Affida vit Appellants ar g ue that the attachment of the mobile home was wr ong ful bec ause A ppellee ne ve r e xec ute d a n a ff

ida vit statin g the natur e of

the de bt andthat it

was a ju st cla im. Pur su a nt t o Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 6-113 (1997), “[i] n order to obtain an attac hment, the plaintiff, his ag ent orW e no te th a t d e m u rr e rs a n d p le a s in a b a te m e n t h a v e b e e n su p e rc e d e d b y the T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C ivil 3 Proc edu r e. Se e Commi t t ee Commen t , T

. R. Ci v
. P. 12. 02. -5- attorney , shall make oath in writing , stating the nature and amount of the debt or de mand, and that i ti s a j u s tc l a i m
. . . a n d , a l s o , t h a to n e o r m o r e o f t h e c au s e s e n u m e r a t e d i n § 2 9

- 6

- 1 0 1 e x i s t s
. ” In addition, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-6-123 (1997) s tates t hat “[ a]ttachments issued without affidavit and b o n d , as h ere in prescribed, may be abated by

plea of the def endant.” We also note that “[i] f the defe cts appe ar on the fac e of the pleading or attachme nt w rit, a motion to quash the attac hment or a de mur re r mus t be fi le d, oth e rw ise the de fe ns e s shou ld be raise d by ple a in ab a te me nt o r the y wi ll be wa ived.” Gi lbe rt v . S mi th , 1 4 T en n
. Ap p
. 5 0 0 , 5 0 8 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 3 2 ) ( ci t i n g Padgett v. Duck town Sulphur, C opper & Iron Co. , 3 7 S. W. 6 98 (T e nn . 1 89 6) ). A p le a in abat e me nt o nly be c ome s nec e ssa

ry wh e n the de fe c t c omp la ine d o f d oe s n ot a pp e ar o n th e fa c e of

thepr oc e e din g s. Id

. (q u o t i n g Bryan v. Norfolk W . Ry. Co. , 10 4 S.W. 52 3, 52 4 (T e nn
. 19 07 ))

. L a c k o f an a ff ida vit is such an appar ent defect that a plea in abate ment is not required to c halleng e such de fec t. Howeve r, 3 afte r our r eview of

the re cord, w e cannot say that such at t ac hment was wr ong ful for la ck of an aff idavit. Thoug h no such affidavit signe d by Appellee , its ag ent or attorney , appea rs in the re cord, the Appell an t s d i d not challeng e such de fec t in a motion to quash or a plea in a batement. The Tenne ssee Code and our jurisprudenc e plac e the burden of challeng ing an attachme nt f or lack of an aff idavit on the defe ndant, in this c ase the Appellants. No such motion to quash or plea in abateme nt alleg ing a lack of an af fidavit appe ars in the r ecor d.

Suffic ie nc y o f Bond Appellants also cha lleng e the pr opriety of the attachme nt, c ontending that the bond posted by Appellee was insuffic ient in amount. As stated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 6-115 (1997) :
Th e of fi c e r t o w ho m app li catio n is ma de , s ha ll, be fo reg ranti ng thea tta c hme nt, r e q u i r e t h e p l a i n t i f

f, h i s a g e n t o r a t t o r n e y, t o e x e c u t e a b o n d w i t h s u f

f i c i e n ts e c u r i t y, pay ab l e t o the def

endant, a nd conditioned that the plaintiff will prosec ute the attachme nt with eff

ect, or, in case of failure, pay the defendant a ll costs that may be adjudg ed against him, and, also, all such damag es as he may sustain by the wrong ful su ing ou t of

the a tta c hme nt.
B e c aus e it is undi sp ute d tha t the mob ile ho me wa s w orth m or e than th e de bt o we d b y the Poc ra sse s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 6-116(1) (1997) a pplies stating the a

ppropriate amount of the bond:
When the amount of the c lai m i s l es s than the value of the prope rty soug ht to be attache d, a bond in a pe nalty equal to the a s s er t ed amount of the plaintiff’ s or complainant’s de bt or lien plus an additional sum which in the opinion of the issuing office r will be suffic ient to cover the proba ble cost of litigation and all damag es that may be sustained by

rea son of the wr ong ful suing out of the writ. . . .-6-

We note that the s ufficie ncy of t he bond was not raised by Appellants i n the pl eading s or during the he ari ng . “ [A]pp e llate c ou rt s wi ll or din ari ly de c lin e to c on sid e r iss ue s be ing raise d f or the fi rs t ti me on appea l” and “ [t ]hus, arg uments not asserted at trial are deeme d waived on appea l.” Villages of Brentwood Homeowners Assoc ., Inc. v . W estermann , No. 01A01-9708- CH-00388, 1998 Tenn. A pp. LE XIS 3 6 7 , at * 5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. J u n e 5, 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Civil Serv. Me rit Bd. v. Burson , 816 S.W .2d 72 5, 73 4- 35 (T e nn . 1 99 1) ; Dep’ t of Human Servs. v . Defriec e , 937 S.W .2d 954, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 96 ); Dev orak v. Patterson , 907 S.W .2d 815, 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)) . There fore , we de cline to a dd re ss the su ff

ic ie nc y of the bo ndpo ste d b y

Ap pe lle e be fo rethe e xec uti on of thea tta c hme nt. Excessive Levy Next, Appella n t s ar gu e that, bec ause the mobile home was worth more than the de bt sued u p o n , t h e a t t a c h m e n t o f t h e h o m e w a s w r o n g f u l b e c au s e i t w a s a n e x c e s s i v e l e v y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Appellants ci t e T en n . Code Ann. § 29-6- 128 (1997), whic h states that “[t] he writ of attachme nt should direct so much of the property of t he defenda nt to be attached a s will be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s de bt or demand, and all costs.” For violation of this provision, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 6- 13 4 ( 19 97 ) e sta

bli sh e s that “ [i]f the of

fi c e r m ake a n e xce ssi ve le vy , h e sh a ll b e lia ble a s inc a se of excessive levy

by execution.” While the Tennesse e Code doe s not establish any liabilityfor the Appellee as plaintiff in the action, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s described the re quirements for ho ldi ng su c h p la int if

f l ia ble fo r e xce ssi ve le vy

a s f oll ow s:
I f a sh e ri ff make a n e xce ssi ve le vy

he is lia ble to the de fe nd a nt in the pr oc e ss, a ndif the plaint i ff in the pr ocess pr ocure s, knowing ly , the sherif f to make an excessive levy , he mig ht also be, under pr oper pr ocee dings, ma de liable with him. But we are awa re of no principle of la w that require s a plaintiff to know be fore hand the e x act amount of p ro p er t y t o l evyon in order to makehis debt; nor do we think that the mere levy upon more than e noug h can subje ct him, without more, to an ac tion for a wrong ful and malicious use of proce ss. We see very littl e evide nce in this rec ord that the plaint if

f w a s ac tuate d by a ny ind ir e c t or mal ic iou s motiv e in the a tta c hme nt s uit , bu t a s th e c a se mus t un de rg o a no the r t ri a l, w e make no fu rthe r c omm e nt u po n it

. Beasley v. Johnson , 57 Tenn. 413, 414 (T enn. 1873). A fter our revie w of the r ecor d, we c annot say that the Ap pe lle e kn ow ing ly pr oc ur e d the sh e ri ff to ma ke a n e xce ssi ve le vy

by a tta c hin g the mob ile home or that the Appellee held any indirect or ma licious moti ve for such attac hment. The e vidence at trial showed that the Pocra sses spent little tim e in the mobile home, they held no re sidence s which could be attached, and the mobile home itself was locke d, preve nting attachment of any appliance s inside. There fore , the Appellee may not be held liable f

or wrong ful attac hment on the basis of e x c e s s i v e l e v y. Diligent Search Finally , Appellants arg ue that the attac hment was wr ong ful for la ck of a diligent se arc h by Appellee ’s private proce ss server prior to t h e i s s u an ce of the attac hment. One g round for-7-

attachme nt, as enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-6-101( 4) (1997) , is “[w] here [t he debtor ] conce als himself, so that the ordinary proce ss of law cannot be serve d upon him.” Further, “ [i ]n any civil action, when the summons has been re turned ‘not to be f ound in my

count y ,’ as to all or any one of the defe ndants, residents of the county , the plaintiff may have an alias and plurie s summons for the de fendant, or, at hi s elec tion, sue out attachme nt ag ainst the estate of such defe ndant.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-6-107( a) (1997). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the lang uag e of “ not to be found within [the sheriff ’s] county ” “clearly imports that, after dilig ent inquiry and sea rch, by the sherif f, at the usua l residenc e of the defe ndant and e lsewher e, he is not to be found, be ing e ither actua lly absent from the county , or having concea led hi mself s o as t o evade the s ervic e of pr ocess.” W elch v . Robinson , 29 Tenn. 264, 266 (Tenn. 1849). Thoug h a private pr ocess se rver was utiliz ed by Appellee in serving the def en d ants rathe r than the she riff, this Court knows no rea son, and Appellee prese nts no a

rg ument, why

a private proc ess serve r should not be held to the same deg ree of dilige nce a s a sheriff, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201( 10) (1997) , g iven the extraordinary nature o f a tt a c h me n t to c o mp e l ap p e ar a n c e in court. S ee W elch , 2 9 T e nn . at 26 6. Th e re fo re , w e mus t examine the evidenc e and de termine if the r ecor d supports the trial court’s finding that Appellee ’s proce ss server

made a diligent se arc h and inquiry befor e re turning with a “not to be f ound” re turn.
I n this case, ther e is evidenc e that the proce ss se rver attempted to se rve the Pocrasse s at the mobile home, which they visited infreque ntly , and the hotel room at which the proce ss server had found them pre viously . These two addre sses wer e the only locations at which the Pocr asses we re known to reside and there is no evidenc e the Pocrasse s informed the Appellee or its employ ees of any other location at which they could be f

ound. There is also evidencethat, initiallyand bef ore attachme nt was issued, t he P ocra ss’ attorney from the f irst two FED a ctions ref

used to ac cept se rvice for the Pocr asses. I n ad d i tion, there is no evidenc e that the Appe llee wa s place d on notice of Caldwell’s owne rship of the mobile home and, further , no evidenc e that C aldwell re g istered title of the m obile home i n her name. There fore , we c annot say that the trial court erre d when it found that the Appellee ’s private proce ss serve r m ade a di lige nt sear ch and inquiry befor e returning with a “not to be found” return.
Conversion Finally , Appellants ar g ue that Appe llee should be li able to Appellants for the conversion of the mobile home when Appellee direc ted Dick Moore to tr ansport the mobile home to D ick Moore’ s sto rag e fa c ili ty . “ Con ve rs ionis the app ro pria tio n o f t a ng ibl e pr op e rty to a pa rty ’s ow n u se in e xc lu s io n o r d e f

ian c e o f th e o w n e r ’ s r ig h ts.” H & M En t ers., Inc. v. Murray , No. M1999-02073- C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 2 T en n
. Ap p
. LE XIS 2 6 1 , at * 7 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Ap r. 1 7 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Barger v. W ebb , 3 91 S.W. 2d66 4, 66 5 ( Te nn . 1 96 5) ; Lance Prods., Inc . v. Comme rce U nion Bank , 764 S.W .2d 207, 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)) . As an intentional t ort, conver sion require s proof of the following to m ake ou t a prima fa c ie c a se : (1) app ro pria tio n of an oth e r’ s pro pe rty to one ’s ow n use a ndbe ne fi t; (2 ) by the in t e n t i o n a l e xe r c i s e o f d o m i n i o n o v e r

i t ; a n d ( 3 ) i n d e f

i a n c e o f t h e tru e o w n e r ’ s r i g hts

. Id

. (c i t i n g Kinnard v. Shoney’ s, Inc. , 1 00 F . Su pp . 2 d 7 81 , 7 97 (M .D . T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Oldham , 569 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977))

. One such scena rio of-8-

c on ve rs ioninc lud e s d isp os se ssi ng a no the r o f t a ng ibl e pr op e rty thr ou g h the a c tiv e us e of a n a g e nt. Id

. (c i t i n g McCall v. Owens , 820 S.W .2d 748, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991))

. We are also mindful that “[g]oods attache d are in the custody of the law and an attaching cre ditor has no prope rty

in, or rig ht to, possessi o n of the attached pr operty by rea son of the levy .” 7 C.J .S. Attachment

§ 2 2 9 ( 1 9 8 0 )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, w i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a t t a c h e d p r o p e r t y: The attaching office r is not an ag ent of the at t ac h i n g cre ditor with respec t to the custody of attac hed prope rty , and an attaching plaintiff who d oes not direc t the a tta c hin g of

fi c e r a s to the c are of

the pr op e rty , or wh o d oe s n ot o the rw ise pa rt ic ipate in any wr on g fu l a c t or

ne g lig e nc e of

su c h o ff ic e r, is n ot l ia

ble fo r i nju ry

to, or lo ss o f, t h e p r o p e r t y. Id . § 23 0. I n situ a tio ns wh e re the a tta c he d p ro pe rty su ff e rs inj ury , th e a tta c hin g plaint if f i s n ot l ia ble for suc h injury

unless the injury

was dire ctly ca u s ed b y t h e plainti ff or by the wrong ful ac t of the attaching office r to which the pla intiff direc tly contributed. Id

. I t follows from these r

ules that, if the attaching plaintiff does not utilize the sheriff to oversee the transport of the attache d property and cause s injury to the property , as in this case, the attaching plaintiff may

be held liable for the injury to the attache d property

. Se e id . I f this were not the case , a plaintiff c ould attach a

person’ s property , direc t its di sposal without the presenc e of the sheriff , and esca pe any possibili ty

of liabilitysince the pla intiff would not have dir ec ted the sheriff. Such a situatio n w ou ld e nc ou ra g e c ir c umv e nti on of the pr op e r us e of the le g a l pr oc e ss andru n c on tr ary to the ru le s o f atta c hme nt.
I n th is c a se , A pp e lle e ha d Ca ldw e ll’ s mo bil e ho me a tta c he d, a nd a t tha t time , the ho me c a me un de r the c us tod y

of the sh e ri ff

of She lby Cou nty . A pp e lle e a c te d u nd e r n o auth ority wh e n it contac ted Dick Moore to ta ke the mobile home off its land and to a storag e fa cility . Such an ac t was an appr opriation of Caldwe ll’s property for Appe llee’s use , which wa s an intentional ex er cise of do min ionov e r th e mo bi le home , a ndin d e fi a nc e , n ot o nly of thetrue ow ne r’ s rig hts , b ut a lso in defia nce of the leg al proce ss, w hich place d the mobile home under the custody

of the law and not the Appellee . There fore , we must reve rse the trial court’s de cision in so far a s it fails to award Caldwell any d amage s for the injury to the mobile home. We now turn to the question of what da ma g e s Ca ldw e ll, a s o wn e r o f the mob ile ho me , is e nti tle d to un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s.
Th is C ou rt

ha s a dd re sse d th e iss ue of da ma g e s in a n a c tio n f

or c on ve rs iona s f

oll ow s: As a g ener al rule, pla intiff’s damag es in an a ction for c onversion ar e measured by the su m ne c e ssa

ry to c omp e ns a te him

fo r a ll ac tua l lo sse s o r i nju ri e s su staine d a s a natura l and proxim ate r esult of the def endant’ s wrong . 89 C.J .S., Trover and Conversion § 1 62 , 6 42 ; Polskee v. Friedlander , 8 Tenn. App. 533 ( 1928).
Howeve r conse quential damag es must be prove d with r easona ble certainty

. Duff v. Go ff , 98 I daho 379, 565 P.2d 572 (1977).-9-

Th e or din ary

me a su re of dam a g e s f

or c on ve rs ionis the va lue of the pr op e rty converted at the time and place of conver sion, with int ere st. 89 C.J .S., Trover and Conversion § 163, 642.
I f s p ec i al damag es ar e plea ded and pr oved, plaintiff may rec over f or all injuries or losses sustained as a proxi mate re sult of the conver sion, but there can be no re covery fo r l os se s o r i nju ri e s w hic h a re too re mot e or

un c e rt a in, or

wh ic h th e plaint if

f c ou ld have avoided by the exercise of ordinary diligenc e. 8 9 C

. J

. S ., Trover and Conversion § 170, 648.
Where da mag es, thoug h the n atural results of the ac t complained of, a re not the nece ssary result of it, they

are termed “ specia l damag es” w hich the law doe s not implyand which must be a lleg ed in orde r that ev i d en ce o n t he subjec t may be admissible. Lasater Lumber Co. v. Harding , 28 Tenn. App. 296, 189 S.W .2d 583 (1945).
I t is ge nera lly held t hat s pecia l damag es m ust be particularly aver red in the c omplaint to warr ant proof the reof

or a r ecove ry

there for. 25 C.J.S . 131, 1185.

... Ordinarily , in the absenc e of ma licious intent to harm, there can be no rec overy for mental ang uish or humiliation resulting from c onversion of pe rsonal property . 89 C.J .S., Trover and Conversion § 117, 651. Lance Prods., Inc . v. Comme rce U nion Bank , 764 S.W .2d 207, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 8 8 ). Howe v e r , in th is c a s e , Ca ld w e ll r e s u me d o w n e r s h ip o f th e mo b il e h o me w h e n s h e s o ld it to Dick M o o r e , In c
. f

o r $ 1 3 , 0 0 0 a n d c o l l e c t e d t h a ts u m
. A s t h i s C o u r th a s s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y: [I ]t is well settled that when the ow ner of property , afte r a te chnica l conver sion, resumes posse ssion of the property as the owne r this constitutes a waiver of the tort of conve rsion. Sc ru gg s v . D av is , 3 7 T e nn . ( 5 Sn e e d) 26 1, 26 5 ( 18 57 ); see H uffman v . H ug hle tt & Py att , 7 9 T e nn . ( 11 L e a ) 5 49 (1 88 3) . T he ow ne r stil l has the ri g ht t o sue in trespa ss on the case for the damag es sustained. Scruggs , 37 Tenn. (5 Snee d) at 265. The me asure of damag es for eac h action is laid down in Traynor v. Johnson , 38 Tenn. (1 H ead) 51 (1858):
Th e on ly ma te ri a l di ff

e re nc e be tw e e n tr ov e r and c a se is in r e sp e c t to the rule of

damag es pec uliar to ea ch ac tion. I n trover, upon the fac t of c on ve rs iona lon e , th e va lue of the pr op e rty is r e c ov e ra

ble a s a matter of c ourse; whe rea s, in case the damage s are measure d by the nature and extent of the injury , and the value, or a less amount, may-10- be allowe d by

the jury , acc ording to the intrinsic merits of ea ch particula r ca se. Id . at 55.
Via v. Prod. Credit Assoc. , 1 9 8 9 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 3 4 0 , a t* 5

- 6 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. M a y 9 , 1 9 8 9 )

. In this case, ther e wa s undisputed testimonythat, aft er t h e m obile home was transported by Dick Moore, upon Appellee ’s direc tion a nd supervision, the mobile home sustained ac tual damag e to one o f t h e t i r e s , t h e w al l s , t h e f l o o ri n g, t h e p o rc h , an d t h e a p p l i an ce s i n s i d e t h e h o m e. T h e d am age awa rd for injury to a chattel is the di minution in value of the chattel, that is the diffe renc e betwe en the fa ir marke t value of the property befor e the injury and the f air mar ket value of

the prope rty

afte r the injury . 75 Am. J ur. 2d Tre sp as s § 139 (1991). As state d above, f rom the re cord it appe ars that the Poc ra sse s tr a ns fe rr e d o wn e rs hip of themob ile ho me to C a ldw e ll, a nd , thu s, c a nn ot m ake ou t a claim for damag es to the mobile home. Ther efor e, we rema nd this case fo r a d et er m i nation of da ma g e s th a t Ca ldw e ll, a s o wn e r o f the mob ile ho me , is e nti tle d to a s a re su lt o f A pp e lle e ’s tr e sp a ss. Conclusion
For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm in part, re verse in part, and rema nd this c ase f or further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. Costs of t his appea l are taxed equally to Appellee, Ca nada Trac e, I nc., and A ppellants, M.J . Pocrass, Susan Pocra ss, and Ther esa Caldwe ll, and their sure ty for w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

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ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE