alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michelle MORTON, a.k.a. Michelle Crocker, a.k.a. Michelle L. CrockerRodgers, a.k.a. Michelle Dalton, a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Dalton, a.k.a. Megan Michelle Davis, a.k.a. Michelle Davis, a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Dunn, a.k.a. Michelle L. Morton, a.k.a. Michelle Lynn Morton, a.k.a. Michelle M. Dalton, a.k.a. Megan Davis, etc., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-11185

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 15, 2010.

Susan H. Rothstein-Youakim, A. Brian Albritton, Adelaide G. Few, Thomas Nelson Palermo, David Paul Rhodes, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tampa, FL, for PlaintiffAppellee.

John L. Badalamenti, Howard C. Anderson, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public *433Defender’s Office, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michelle Morton appeals her sentence of 96 months of imprisonment for bank fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Morton argues that her sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

Morton’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court considered the sentencing factors and explained that Morton’s “absolutely appalling” criminal record required an upward variance. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court stated that a variance of 50 months was necessary to punish Morton adequately for her “serious[ ] ... offenses,” promote respect for the law, protect the public from future similar crimes, and also to address her “conduct in [the] past ... 25 years,” her “lack of conscience” as evidenced by her stealing her minor son’s identity and defrauding an elderly cancer patient, her lack of remorse for her crimes, and her need for education and rehabilitation. The brevity of previous sentences militated in favor of a sentence above the range provided in the Guidelines to remedy Morton’s unrepentant recidivism and disregard for the law. We will not disturb a sentence unless “we ‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’ ” *United States v. Irey,*612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting *United States v. Pugh,*515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.2008)). Morton has been convicted of 54 crimes involving fraud and has amassed 39 criminal history points, three times the amount required for a VI classification. Morton’s sentence is reasonable.

We AFFIRM Morton’s sentence.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 
  (1)
    
    the Form 10-K/A fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Form 10-K/A fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.
 Dated:
March 27, 2006
    
    By: /s/ Robert M. ZakRobert M. Zak, Senior Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
(chief executive officer)Dated:
March 27, 2006
    
    By: /s/ Kenneth J. WilsonKenneth J. Wilson, Vice President & CFO
(chief financial officer)
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

Board of Directors
Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
33-76134) on Form S-3 and in the registration statement (No. 333-16073) on Form
S-8 of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. of our report dated January 29, 1998,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997 and 1996 and the related consolidated
statements of income, shareholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years
in the three-year period ended December 31, 1997, and the related financial
statement schedules, which report appears in the December 31, 1997 annual report
on Form 10-K of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.

                                        KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP

New Orleans, Louisiana
March 25, 1998
CASE ANNOUNCEMENTS

*July 8, 2014*

[Cite as *07/08/2014 Case Announcements #2,*2014-Ohio-3022.]

MOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS

2014-0353.

#### In re R.W.

Hamilton App. Nos. C-130151 and C-130152, 2014-Ohio-175. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.

Upon consideration of appellant’s motion for stay of further proceedings in the juvenile court, it is ordered by the court that the motion is granted.

Pfeifer, O’Donnell, and French, JJ., dissent.
76 A.3d 535

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent v. Eddie EVANS, Petitioner.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Sept. 25, 2013.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2013, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. The Motion to Withdraw as Counsel is Dismissed as Moot.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM STATEMENTS
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,957
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      340
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (156)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,154
<PP&E>                                             366
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (107)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   2,452
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,508
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          4
<COMMON>                                            17
<OTHER-SE>                                         906
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     2,452
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   286
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      216
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   880
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (810)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (810)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (810)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of: ALPINE PCS, INC., Alpine PCS, Inc., Appellant v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee.

No. 09-5293.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Dec. 21, 2010.

Frederick M. Joyce, Venable, LLP, Washington, DC, Lawrence A. Katz, Venable, LLP, Vienna, VA, for Appellant.

Kelsi Brown Corkran, James Christopher Kohn, Lloyd H. Randolph, H. Thomas Byron, III, William Gordon Kanter, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Martha L. Davis, Office of the United States Trustee, Alexandria, VA, for Appellee.

Before: GINSBURG and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

*JUDGMENT*

This appeal was considered on the record and on the briefs and the oral arguments of the parties. Although the issues presented occasion no need for a published opinion, they have been accorded full consideration by the Court. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 36; D.C.Cir. Rule 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

To the extent issues raised here were raised before the district and bankruptcy courts, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in the opinion of the bankruptcy court. Insofar as the appellant argues its request for debt restructuring suspended the automatic cancellation rule, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(iv), that argument is not properly before us because the appellant did not argue it until the reply brief. *See MBI Group, Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Cameroun,*616 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C.Cir. 2010). Insofar as the appellant claims a right to offset its debt owed to the Commission from proceeds obtained in the auc*505tion for new licenses to use the same spectrum, we have no occasion to resolve that issue because there are as of yet no such proceeds.

The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-38,243]

                    On April 16, 2001, the Department issued a notice of affirmative determination regarding application for reconsideration of the denial of trade adjustment assistance for workers of the subject firm. The notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     on May 3, 2001 (66 FR 22263).                

Workers of Color-Tex International, North Carolina Finishing Division, Salisbury, North Carolina, engaged in employment related to dying and finishing fabric, were initially denied TAA because the “contributed importantly” criterion of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, was not met.

The petitioner provided a listing of additional customers of the subject firm. A survey of the additional customers revealed that they had reduced purchases from North Carolina Finishing and increased imports of dyed and finished fabric during the time period relevant to the investigation.

##  Conclusion

After careful consideration of the new facts obtained on reconsideration, it is concluded that increases in imports of articles like or directly competitive with dyed and finished fabric produced at the subject firm contributed importantly to the decline in sales or production and to the total or partial separation of workers of that firm. In accordance with the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, I make the following revised determination:

All workers of Color-Tex International, North Carolina Finishing Division, Salibury, North Carolina, who became totally or partially separated from employment on or after October 4, 1999, through two years from the date of this issuance, are eligible to apply for adjustment assistance under Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974.

Signed at Washington, DC, this 25th day of October 2001.

Linda G. Poole,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. 01-31146 Filed 12-17-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elvis O’Neal GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-60371

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 20, 2016.

Gaines H. Cleveland, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Andrea Cabell Jones, Esq., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Karl Crawford Hightower, Esq., Balch & Bingham, L.L.P., Gulfport, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BARKSDALE, CLEMENT, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

A jury convicted Elvis O’Neal Gray of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, based on his submitting false and fraudulent statements and representations in connection with a BP oil-spill compensation claim. At trial, a Government witness, Jarrell, in response to a question about how she knew Gray had already filed his claim, referred to his ex-wife’s questioning how Gray had money to make purchases, because she testified Gray “wasn’t helping take care of [his] children or everything else except letting them come over and stay”. Gray’s counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, contending, *inter alia,*that Jarrell’s statement was prejudicial character evidence. The court denied the motion; Gray challenges that denial.

Our court reviews the denial of a motion for mistrial, based upon introduction of improper evidence, for abuse of discretion. *E.g., United States v. Lucas,*516 F.3d 316, 345 (5th Cir.2008). A new trial is appropriate “only when ... it appears that there is a significant possibility that the prejudicial evidence had a substantial impact on the jury verdict”. *United States v. Valles,*484 F.3d 745, 756 (5th Cir.2007). The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gray’s motion. Based on the record and the context of Jarrell’s statement, her reference to Gray’s taking care of his children was an “isolated remark[ ], that w[as] not dwelled upon by the parties”, and was not otherwise discussed by counsel or any other witness. *See, e.g., United States v. Paul,*142 F.3d 836, 844 (5th Cir.1998); *United States v. Zamora,*661 F.3d 200, 212 (5th Cir.2011).

In short, any such error was harmless. Although the court did not give a specific curative instruction concerning Jarrell’s remark, it instructed the jury that Gray was not on trial for any other act, conduct, or offense not alleged in the indictment. *See Paul,*142 F.3d at 844. Moreover, there is no significant possibility that Jarrell’s remark had a substantial impact on the jury verdict, in the light of other overwhelming evidence of Gray’s guilt presented at trial. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>

                        Consent of Independent Auditors


Board of Directors
Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.:


We consent to incorporation by reference in registration statements
(No. 33-76134 and No. 333-77511) on Form S-3, and in the registration statement
(No. 333-16073) on Form S-8 of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. of our report
dated January 26, 2001, except for Note H as to which the date is March 8, 2001,
relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the related consolidated
statements of income, shareholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years
in the three-year period ended December 31, 2000, and the related financial
statement schedules, which report appears in the December 31, 2000, annual
report on form 10-K of Sizeler Property Investors, Inc.


                                        KPMG LLP


New Orleans, Louisiana
March 28, 2001
IIB 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3579 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 2, 2022 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 200 East Main Street in Maroa, Illinois, as 

the ‘‘Jeremy L. Ridlen Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 3579 RFS

1 SECTION 1. JEREMY L. RIDLEN POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 200 East Main Street in Maroa, 

4 Illinois, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Jeremy 

5 L. Ridlen Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Jeremy L. Ridlen 

10 Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives February 1, 

2022. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Interlink Electronics, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Kevin Wiley, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ Kevin Wiley        
|Kevin Wiley            
|Chief Executive Officer
|November 12, 2008
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Antonio M. GUZMAN, also known as Compadre, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10156

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 17, 2010.

Suzanna Odette Etessam, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Larry Edward Jarrett, Attorney, Richardson, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Antonio M. Guzman pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He contends that he was entitled to have his plea withdrawn because his plea was unknowing and involuntary as he was being sentenced on information that was not contained within the indictment and that was not seized within the time period of the conspiracy as defined by the indictment.

When determining whether to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court should consider whether: (1) the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) withdrawal would prejudice the Government; (3) the defendant has delayed in filing his withdrawal motion; (4) withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) close assistance of counsel was available; (6) the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) withdrawal would waste judicial resources. *United States v. Carr,*740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir.1984). Guzman has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he was not entitled under the *Carr*factors to have his guilty plea withdrawn. *See id.*Furthermore, because Guzman’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the appeal waiver therein that the Government seeks to invoke bars Guzman’s claim on appeal that his sentence is unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CO-PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:
 
 The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 26, 2009 (the “Form 10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Date:  November 20, 2009
/s/ Don JacksonDon JacksonCo-Principal Executive Officer