IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

DIMETRIOUS WOODS,

Appellant,

v.

MISSOURI BOARD OF PROBATION 

AND PAROLE,

Respondent.

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WD77882

OPINION FILED:

November 24, 2015

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri

The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Judge

Before Division Three: Joseph M. Ellis, Presiding Judge, and

Karen King Mitchell and Gary D. Witt, Judges

Dimetrious Woods appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Missouri 

Board of Probation and Parole on Woods’s petition for declaratory judgment. Woods sought 

declarations concerning his conditional release date and parole eligibility on sentences arising 

from multiple convictions. Because the trial court incorrectly calculated the date on which 

Woods becomes eligible for parole, although not in the manner that Woods argues, we reverse 

the trial court and enter the judgment the trial court should have entered.

Background

In February of 2007, Woods was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon. The Circuit 

Court of Boone County sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment in the Missouri Department
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of Corrections. Because Woods had a prior commitment to the Department, he was required to 

serve forty percent of the four-year sentence before he was eligible for parole. § 558.019.

1

In 

November of 2007, the Board notified Woods that he was scheduled to be released from 

confinement on September 18, 2008.

In December 2007, Woods was convicted of second-degree drug trafficking. The Circuit 

Court of Clay County found Woods to be a prior drug offender and sentenced him to twenty-five 

years’ imprisonment in the Department, to be served consecutively to his Boone County 

sentence. In February of 2008, following the Clay County conviction, the Board notified Woods 

that his previous release date had been canceled, and he was scheduled to be released from 

confinement on October 11, 2029, his conditional release date. The Board also notified Woods

that he was ineligible for parole due to the Clay County Circuit Court’s finding that he was a 

prior drug offender.

Woods filed a petition for declaratory judgment, challenging the Board’s determination 

that he was ineligible for parole. Woods argued that he should be parole eligible on 

September 17, 2028. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court

granted. The trial court determined that the Board correctly calculated Woods’s conditional 

release date and did not err in canceling Woods’s parole release date “when the imposition of a 

new sentence rendered him ineligible for release.”

Woods timely appealed.

Standard of Review

“‘Our review of a grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo.’” Powell v. City of 

Kansas City, WD 78138, 2015 WL 5821845, at *4 (Mo. App. W.D. Oct. 6, 2015) (quoting 

 

1 All statutory citations are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, as updated through the current 

Cumulative Supplement, unless otherwise noted.
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Lucero v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013)). “‘The criteria on 

appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those employed by 

the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.’” Id. (quoting Frye v. 

Levy, 440 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Mo. banc 2014)). “‘Summary judgment is appropriate when the 

moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a 

right to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Frye, 440 S.W.3d at 407). “‘The record 

below is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was 

entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.’” Id. 

at *5 (quoting Shiddell v. Bar Plan Mut., 385 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)).

Analysis

Woods argues that the trial court erred in determining that he is ineligible for parole at 

any point during his sentence. Under Woods’s calculations, he believes that he is eligible for 

parole on September 17, 2028, over a year before the Board’s calculated conditional release 

date.

2

 Woods’s calculation, however, is based on a misunderstanding regarding the difference 

between parole and conditional release.

“While conditional release is akin to parole, the two are not identical or interchangeable 

terms.” Edger v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 307 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). “The 

operation of conditional release is specifically dictated by statute, while parole is almost entirely 

left to the discretion of the Parole Board.” Id. “Section 558.011.4 specifies the time tables under 

 

2

In his point relied on, Woods argues that the circuit court erred in granting the Board’s motion for 

summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact. But he does not identify a factual dispute. 

Rather, in his argument, Woods contends that the Board inaccurately calculated his parole eligibility date, a 

calculation that is made as a matter of law. “[A]n appellant abandons any claim of error as to an issue not raised in 

its points relied on in its appellant’s brief.” Kabir v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 845 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Mo. App. W.D. 

1993). However, because we are generally able to understand the nature of the claim presented, and because the 

Board was clearly able to understand and effectively address the claim in its responsive brief, we exercise our 

discretion to review Woods’s claims ex gratia. See Powell v. City of Kansas City, WD 78138, 2015 WL 5821845, at 

*4 n.9 (Mo. App. W.D. Oct. 6, 2015).
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which an offender is entitled to be conditionally released, although a conditional release date can 

be extended if the procedures of [§] 558.011.5 are followed.” Id. “On the other hand, 

[§] 217.690 allows the Parole Board to determine if and when an offender may be released on 

parole.” Id. “‘With the exceptions of the mandatory minimum sentences set forth in statutes or 

14 C.S.R. 80-2.010, offenders can be paroled virtually anytime during their sentence at the 

discretion of the Parole Board under conditions set by the Board.’” Id. (quoting Cooper v. 

Holden, 189 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). “This also means that the Parole Board 

can deny parole to an offender throughout his or her entire sentence.” Cooper, 189 S.W.3d at 

618.

Because both are at least tangentially relevant to our decision, we will review Woods’s 

conditional release and his parole eligibility dates.

I. Woods is eligible for conditional release on October 11, 2029.

“[S]ection 558.011 provides that a sentence of imprisonment consists of a prison term 

and a conditional release term.” Short v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 456 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Mo. 

App. W.D. 2015). “During the conditional release term, which is the last few months or years of 

a sentence, the offender is discharged, subject to the Board’s conditions and supervision.” Id. at 

75-76; § 558.011.4(2). “The portion of the sentence before the conditional release term is the 

prison term.” Id. at 76. “Section 558.011.4(1) specifies the conditional release terms for all 

lengths of sentences.” Id.

In this case, Woods received two sentences that run consecutively to each other. “This 

court has ruled that, in determining the conditional release date on consecutive sentences, the 

offender is to serve all of his prison terms consecutively, followed by the consecutive running of 

the conditional release terms.” Id. Woods was sentenced to four years on his unlawful use of a 

weapon conviction, and twenty-five years for second-degree drug trafficking. 
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Section 558.011.4(1) sets “[o]ne-third of the term” as the conditional release portion of a 

four-year term, meaning that Woods must serve two years and eight months of his first sentence, 

which began on February 13, 2007, and ended on October 12, 2009. At that point, the 

calculation of the conditional release date on the twenty-five-year sentence began, of which 

§ 558.011.4(1) sets twenty years as the prison term, and five years as the conditional release 

term. Accordingly, Woods’s prison term expires on October 11, 2029, his conditional release 

date.

II. Woods is eligible for parole on September 17, 2033.

“[B]ecause parole and conditional release are distinct, [§] 217.690 and 14 CSR 80-2.010 

govern the calculation of parole eligibility and not [§] 558.011, which governs conditional 

release.” Id. at 77. The parole eligibility date is arrived at “by simply adding together the 

minimum parole eligibility term[s]” for each sentence. Id. The parties agree that Woods has a 

prior commitment with the Department of Corrections, which means that he must serve at least 

“forty percent of his . . . [four-year] sentence,” or roughly nineteen months. § 558.019.2(1). 

This date coincides with Woods’s original release date of September 18, 2008. The parties also 

agree that, as a prior drug offender, Woods is ineligible for parole on the twenty-five-year term 

under § 195.295.3. When this is the case, the full length of the sentence to which parole does not 

apply, becomes the “minimum term for parole eligibility,” for purposes of adding the minimum 

terms together. Short, 456 S.W.3d at 79. Woods is therefore eligible to be considered for parole 

on September 17, 2033.

In arguing that he should be eligible for parole in September of 2028, Woods proposes 

adding the minimum parole eligibility term for his four-year sentence (nineteen months) to the 

minimum prison term (conditional release eligibility) of the twenty-five-year sentence (twenty 

years). Short rejected this precise argument, dismissing it as being “based upon . . . confusion 
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between conditional release and parole.” 456 S.W.3d at 75. Woods may not mix and match 

parole eligibility and conditional release dates to come to a desired release date. Rather, the 

parole eligibility date is reached by adding up the minimum eligibility terms for each sentence, 

and the conditional release date is determined by adding together the prison terms.

The trial court also incorrectly determined the parole eligibility date. In support of its 

summary judgment motion, the Board argued that, because Woods was found to be a prior drug 

offender, and must therefore serve the entire twenty-five-year sentence “without probation or 

parole” under § 195.295.3, Woods was therefore ineligible for parole for the entire term of his 

consecutive sentences. The trial court agreed. The trial court issued its judgment before our 

decision in Short, in which we determined that statutory prohibitions on parole apply only to the 

sentence for which parole is prohibited, and do not institute a “lifetime ban on parole . . ., 

regardless of whether any other crime committed by the offender allows for parole.” 456 S.W.3d 

at 78.

The Board acknowledges that the trial court’s judgment is in error under Short, but 

nevertheless urges us to affirm because Woods’s conditional release date, which has been 

correctly calculated, is his earliest release date by nearly four years, meaning he has not been 

harmed. The Board’s suggestion has some persuasive appeal, as “this [c]ourt is primarily 

concerned with the correctness of the result, not the route taken to reach that result,” and the trial 

court’s judgment did state Woods’s earliest release date. Trimble v. Pracna, 167 S.W.3d 706, 

716 (Mo. banc 2005). But Woods filed a petition for declaratory judgment requesting, among 

other things, a definitive determination of his earliest parole eligibility date, and the Board has 

not offered any argument as to why he is not entitled to that. Additionally, a conditional release 

date “may be extended up to a maximum of the entire sentence of imprisonment by the [B]oard” 
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under certain circumstances. § 558.011.5. The entire twenty-nine-year sentence will not end 

until February of 2036, years after Woods will have become eligible for parole.

The sole point on appeal is granted.3

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. “‘[W]hen a trial 

court fails to make a [correct] declaration settling rights, . . . a reviewing court may, in its 

discretion, make the declaration that should have been made.’” State ex rel. Koster v. Charter 

Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting Vowell v. Kander, 451 

S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)); Rule 84.14 (Appellate courts are authorized to issue 

“such judgment as the court ought to give. Unless justice otherwise requires, the [appellate] 

court shall dispose finally of the case.”). Here, there is no dispute about the material facts, only 

the application of the law to those facts. We exercise our discretion to enter the judgment that 

should have been entered by the trial court: the Board correctly set Woods’s early release date 

on October 11, 2029; Woods will be eligible for parole for the sentences he is currently serving 

on September 17, 2033.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge

Joseph M. Ellis, Presiding Judge, and Gary D. Witt, Judge, concur.

 

3 Taken with the case were the Board’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Remand, and 

Woods’s Motion to Grant Relief on the Merits or in the Alternative Motion for Remand. To the extent that the 

motions request relief different than that granted in this opinion, they are denied.