No. 95-006 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

DARLENE M. VINCELETTE, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. 

and BILLINGS SHERATON HOTEL, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Randy S. Laedeke, Laedeke Law Office, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Calvin J. Stacey, Stacey & Walen, Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: July 27, 1995 

Decided: October 12, 1995 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Appellant brought suit against respondents in the Thirteenth 

Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, seeking to recover for 

injuries sustained when she fell in the Billings Sheraton Hotel. 

At the close of discovery, respondents moved for summary judgment, 

claiming no material issues of fact remained in dispute, and 

therefore they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 

law. After the motion was briefed by both parties, the District 

Court entered summary judgment in respondents' favor. Appellant 

appeals and we reverse. 

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in granting summary judgment. 

On March 20, 1989, appellant fell while entering the Billings 

Sheraton Hotel (the Hotel). According to her complaint, she was in 

the foyer of the parking lot entrance, between the inner and outer 

sets of doors. She approached the inner doors and then stepped 

backwards to allow them to be opened out towards her. As she 

stepped back, she fell and injured her back. Appellant believes 

she fell because she had caught the heel of her high-heeled shoe in 

a small hole in the carpet and could not maintain her balance as 

she stepped back. She therefore alleges her fall was caused by 

either a defect in the carpet or negligent maintenance of the 

carpet. 

The Hotel generally denied the allegations, and both sides 

conducted discovery. At the end of discovery, respondents moved 

for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court. 

2 
Did the District Court err in granting respondents' motion for 

summary judgment? 

Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment 

as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Brown v. Demaree 

(1995), __ Mont. __, _, 52 St.Rep. 819, 820; White v. Murdock 

(1994), 265 Mont. 386, 389, 877 P.2d 474, 476. In summary judgment 

cases, this Court's standard of review is identical to the trial 

court's, and we will utilize the same criteria employed by the 

trial court to determine whether summary judgment should have been 

granted. Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820; Minnie v. City of Roundup 

(1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214. 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of 

demonstrating the absence of genuine factual issues. If the moving 

party demonstrates such an absence, then the burden shifts to the 

non-moving party, who must show that a genuine issue of fact does 

exist. First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Jones (1990), 243 Mont. 

301, 303, 794 P.2d 679, 681. All inferences which may be 

reasonably drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the 

non-moving party. Simmons v. Jenkins (1988), 230 Mont. 429, 432, 

750 P.2d 1067, 1069; Reaves v. Reinhold (1980), 189 Mont. 284, 287, 

615 P.2d 896, 898. 

A cause of action in negligence consists of four elements: 

(1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. 

Brown, 52 St.Rep. at 820, citation omitted. Negligence cases are 

generally not susceptible to summary judgment. Brown, 52 St.Rep. 

3 
at 820; See also Dillard v. Doe (1992), 251 Mont. 379, 382, 824 

P.2d 1016, 1018-19; Brohman v. State (1988), 230 Mont. 198, 201, 

749 P.2d 67, 69. In particular, negligence cases where the 

question of causation is in dispute are rarely amenable to summary 

judgment because "it is axiomatic that questions of causation are 

for the finder of fact to decide." Bossard v. Johnson (19941, 265 

Mont. 272, 281, 876 P.2d 627, 632 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 

In the case at bar, appellant was at the Hotel as a guest, 

and, as such the Hotel owed to her a duty of due care. " [Tlhe 

owner of a premises has a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining 

his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn of any 

hidden or lurking dangers." -, Brown 52 St.Rep. at 820 (citations 

omitted). Under this standard, the element of duty is clear and 

the parties do not contest it. Likewise, the parties do not 

contest that appellant fell while at the Hotel. But respondents 

contend the Hotel's carpet was not the cause of her fall. However, 

"when a duty is imposed upon the defendant and the plaintiff's 

allegations, if proven, would support a finding of a breach of the 

duty, summary judgment is improper." Cereck v. Albertson's Inc. 

(1991), 195 Mont. 409, 412, 637 P.2d 509, 511, citing Rennick v. 

Hoover (19801, 186 Mont. 167, 606 P.2d 1079. "Liability should not 

be adjudicated upon a motion for summary judgment where factual 

issues concerning negligence and causation are presented." 

Dillard, 824 P.2d at 1018, citing Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County 

(1971), 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. Because causation 
is the issue in dispute, this case is particularly ill-suited for 

summary judgment. 

Respondents cite several cases where this Court has found 

summary judgment to be appropriate. See Cooper v. Sisters of 

Charity of Leavenworth Health Services Corp. and St. James 

Community Hospital, Inc. (1994), 265 Mont. 205, 075 P.2d 352; 

Fauerso v. Maronick Const. Co (1983), 203 Mont. 106, 661 P.2d 20; 

and Krone v. McCann (1982), 196 Mont. 260, 638 P.2d 397. However, 

in both Cooper and Fauerso the issue was duty, not causation, and 

they are therefore distinguishable. Causation was the issue in 

Krone, but that case is also distinguishable. 

The incident in Krone took place in a rural open field, where 

the plaintiff acknowledged she had seen common debris such as logs 

and mounds of dirt lying around before she fell. Krone, 638 P.2d 

at 400. The court therefore agreed that the danger had been open 

and obvious. The incident in this case took place in a hotel, and 

appellant contends her fall was caused by a small hole in the 

carpeting--a hole that was not obvious and that could not 

reasonably have been anticipated. Moreover, in Krone, the Court 

noted that the plaintiff had been unable to specifically describe 

what caused her injury; she could not say what had caused her to 

trip. Krone, 638 P.2d at 400. In this case, appellant 

specifically alleges a small hole in the carpet to be the cause of 

her fall. She has therefore raised causation as a genuine issue, 

which the plaintiff in Krone apparently could not do. 

5 
The court found appellant had not brought forth evidence 

showing the carpet to be the cause of her fall. But the initial 

burden in the summary judgment proceeding should have been on 

respondents. It was up to them to show that no genuine issue of 

material fact existed. Only when and if they successfully made 

such a showing would the burden properly shift to appellant. 

Absent such an affirmative showing on the part of respondents, the 

moving party, it was error to shift the burden of proof to 

appellant, the non-moving party. 

Respondents presented no evidence proving the fall was not 

caused by the carpeting. Instead they focused on the small amount 

of proof appellant offered to show that it was the carpeting. They 

correctly noted that appellant relied almost wholly on her own 

deposition and sworn affidavit. In response, respondents pointed 

out it was snowy and icy that night, and appellant had been 

drinking. Appellant has alleged it was the carpet that made her 

fall, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact as to what 

caused the fall. Respondents have not shown that it was not the 

carpet. They have failed to dispose of this genuine issue of 

material fact. 

If there is any genuine issue of material fact, summary 

judgment is inappropriate. "The question to be decided on motion 

for summary judgment is whether there is a genuine issue of a fact 

and not how that issue should be determined. The hearing on the 

motion is not a trial." Duchesneau, 492 P.Zd at 930 (citation 

omitted). 

6 
Because appellant has raised a genuine issue of material fact 

that respondents have failed to rebut, summary judgment is not 

warranted. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

We concur: 

‘-‘\/ Chief Justiced