[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-14803

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

MATTHEW FRIEDSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHERIFF DAVID SHOAR, 

DEPUTY RYAN WALLACE, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00237-TJC-PDB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

Before BRANCH and GRANT, Circuit Judges.1

PER CURIAM:

On February 27, 2015, Deputy Ryan Wallace of the St. Johns 

County Sheriff’s Office stopped a vehicle driven by Matthew 

Friedson, who is deaf, for a traffic violation. After Friedson drove 

away during the traffic stop, Deputy Wallace followed him and 

conducted a second stop. During that second stop, Deputy 

Wallace handcuffed Friedson and seated him in the back of the 

patrol vehicle, and then released him and issued a citation for the 

traffic violation. Friedson sued Deputy Wallace, bringing false 

arrest claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state common law. He 

also brought claims against Sheriff David Shoar, claiming that 

Sheriff Shoar is liable for the false arrest under state law and for 

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 

Rehabilitation Act.

Friedson now appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Deputy Wallace and Sheriff Shoar, the resulting final 

judgment, and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the

judgment. We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as 

a matter of law. In addition, we find that the district court did not 

err in denying Friedson’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. 

We therefore affirm.

1 This opinion is being issued by a quorum. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

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20-14803 Opinion of the Court 3

I. 

Matthew Friedson was driving distractedly—he was looking 

for papers and the radio was playing.2 Friedson did not realize that 

he was behind a St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office patrol vehicle. 

Deputy Wallace, who was operating the patrol vehicle, initiated a 

traffic stop for the violation of a Florida statute that prohibits 

drivers from following too closely behind other vehicles. See Fla. 

Stat. § 316.0895(1).

When Deputy Wallace approached Friedson’s vehicle, 

things became chaotic. According to Friedson, when Deputy 

Wallace approached with his gun drawn, Friedson motioned that 

he was deaf and tried to gesture to the officer that they should 

communicate by writing back and forth. He then motioned that 

they should relocate to a nearby parking lot, where his ex-wife and 

children were waiting and could interpret for them. Friedson was 

under the impression that they had reached an agreement to drive 

to the second location. Deputy Wallace, however, believed that 

Friedson was trying to flee. So after Friedson drove away, Deputy 

Wallace followed him to the parking lot and conducted a second 

stop.

During that second stop, Deputy Wallace communicated to 

Friedson by using gestures as he spoke. According to Friedson, he 

“complied with all the Deputy’s commands.” When Friedson got 

2 The record does not specify how the radio created a distraction for Friedson, 

in spite of his deafness.

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

out of his car, Deputy Wallace gestured for him to get back in it, 

and he complied. Deputy Wallace later gestured to Friedson to get 

out of the vehicle, and when he exited the vehicle as commanded, 

Deputy Wallace took him to the ground, handcuffed him, and 

seated him in the back of the patrol vehicle. A second deputy 

arrived and communicated with Friedson as his daughter 

interpreted. Deputy Wallace then released Friedson and issued a 

ticket for the traffic violation, which Friedson paid.

Just shy of the four-year statute of limitations following the 

incident, Friedson sued. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). In his amended 

complaint, he brought two counts against Deputy Wallace in his 

individual capacity: the first for warrantless arrest without probable 

cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and the second for false arrest under state law. He also 

brought three counts against Sheriff Shoar in his official capacity: 

two for failing to provide reasonable accommodations under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act 

(RA) and the third for false arrest under state law.

Deputy Wallace and Sheriff Shoar moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted both motions and entered 

final judgment in their favor. Friedson responded by filing a 

motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e), which the district court denied. Friedson now 

appeals the district court’s order on the summary judgment 

motions, its final judgment against him, and its ruling on the Rule 

59(e) motion.

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II. 

We review the district court’s grant of a summary judgment 

motion de novo. Baez v. Banc One Leasing Corp., 348 F.3d 972, 

973 (11th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment should be granted “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In making this determination, we view the 

evidence, draw all reasonable factual inferences, and resolve all 

reasonable doubts in favor of the non-movant.” Stryker v. City of 

Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020). We review the 

district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. 

Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).

III. 

We start with the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Deputy Wallace and Sheriff Shoar. We find no 

genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment 

on any of Friedson’s claims.

A. 

First is the federal false arrest claim against Deputy Wallace 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Friedson alleged that Deputy Wallace 

arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. In response, Deputy Wallace argued that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity and is therefore protected from 

liability for civil damages. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009).

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

To establish entitlement to qualified immunity, an officer 

must first show that he acted “within his discretionary authority.” 

Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019). If the 

officer meets that burden, the plaintiff must show both that he 

“suffered a violation of a constitutional right” and that the 

constitutional right was “clearly established at the time of the 

alleged misconduct.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that Deputy Wallace was acting 

within his discretionary authority as a law enforcement officer 

when he stopped Friedson and placed him in handcuffs. Friedson 

thus bears the burden of showing that Deputy Wallace is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. But he fails to meet this burden 

because he has not shown that he suffered a violation of a 

constitutional right.

The district court concluded that Friedson failed to show 

that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Deputy 

Wallace had probable cause to arrest Friedson for his traffic 

violation. Deputy Wallace contends that two additional grounds 

exist for concluding that no Fourth Amendment violation 

occurred: (1) he had probable cause to arrest Friedson for violating 

a different Florida statute that makes it a criminal offense to “resist, 

obstruct, or oppose any officer”; and (2) he had reasonable 

suspicion to detain Friedson because he appeared to pose a 

potential safety threat after failing to remain in his vehicle. See Fla. 

Stat. § 843.02.

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20-14803 Opinion of the Court 7

On appeal, Friedson vigorously contests Deputy Wallace’s 

alternative contentions in support of the judgment below. But he 

raises no argument against the district court’s actual finding that 

Deputy Wallace had probable cause to arrest him for his traffic 

violation. Because Friedson has failed to challenge the district 

court’s finding, he has abandoned any argument against it. See 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 

2014); Little v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 

2012).

Friedson also argues on appeal that Deputy Wallace violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him for an 

unreasonable length of time. Such an allegation, if properly made, 

could have formed the basis of a § 1983 claim. But here it cannot. 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment by 

assessing the record in light of Friedson’s allegations as stated in his 

complaint, not as stated in later responses or motions. See 

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 716 F.3d 

535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013). Friedson first raised this theory of liability 

in his motion to alter or amend the judgment—it did not appear in 

his amended complaint. We will not take up this new theory of 

liability now.

Because Friedson abandoned any argument against the 

district court’s probable cause finding and did not allege an 

unreasonable time of detainment in his complaint, we affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment to Deputy Wallace on 

the § 1983 claim.

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

B. 

Next are the state-law false arrest claims against Deputy 

Wallace and Sheriff Shoar. Under Florida law, a false arrest claim 

“requires the plaintiff to establish three elements: (1) an unlawful 

detention and deprivation of liberty against the plaintiff’s will; (2) 

an unreasonable detention which is not warranted by the 

circumstances; and (3) an intentional detention.” Manners v. 

Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 975 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation and brackets 

omitted). A plaintiff cannot establish the first element if there is 

probable cause to arrest. Id. Actual probable cause bars Florida 

false arrest claims against both individual officers and municipal 

entities. See, e.g., id.; Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th 

Cir. 2021).

The district court granted summary judgment for the statelaw false arrest claims on the same ground as it did for the federal 

false arrest claim: Deputy Wallace had probable cause to arrest 

Friedson for his traffic violation. The standard for probable cause 

is the same under Florida law and federal law. Rankin v. Evans, 

133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998). So again, because Friedson 

failed to challenge the district court’s finding of probable cause, we 

deem any argument against it abandoned and affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims.

C. 

We turn now to the claims against Sheriff Shoar in his 

official capacity under the ADA and the RA. Title II of the ADA 

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20-14803 Opinion of the Court 9

and Section 504 of the RA prohibit discrimination against an 

individual because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794(a); see Silva v. Baptist Health S. Florida, Inc., 856 F.3d 824, 

830–31 (11th Cir. 2017). Friedson alleges that Deputy Wallace 

discriminated against him by not providing him with a necessary

interpretive aid and that Sheriff Shoar is liable for damages 

resulting from Deputy Wallace’s discrimination.

Friedson contends that Sheriff Shoar should be vicariously 

liable for Deputy Wallace’s statutory violations. This Circuit has 

not decided whether vicarious liability applies for ADA and RA 

violations. Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 

n.6 (11th Cir. 2019). But even assuming that vicarious liability is 

available under both Acts, and that Sheriff Shoar is thus a proper 

defendant, Friedson would also have to show that he otherwise has 

a claim.

To establish a claim for damages under either Act, Friedson 

must prove discriminatory intent, which can be established by a 

showing of deliberate indifference. McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l 

Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1146–47 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Deliberate indifference is an “exacting standard” that “plainly 

requires more than gross negligence.” Liese v. Indian River Cnty. 

Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). 

As we have described in another context, the deliberate 

indifference standard is “far more onerous than normal tort-based 

standards of conduct sounding in negligence, and is in fact akin to 

subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Hoffer v. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(quotations omitted).

Friedson faces a difficult burden. For the denial of an 

interpretive aid to amount to deliberate indifference, Friedson 

must show that Deputy Wallace (1) knew there was a “substantial 

likelihood” that he would be unable to communicate effectively 

with Friedson absent any interpretive aid, and (2) nevertheless 

made a “deliberate choice” not to provide that aid. See McCullum, 

768 F.3d at 1147–48 (quotation omitted). Even construing the facts 

in the light most favorable to Friedson, we do not see sufficient 

evidence to make the required showings.

First, there is no genuine issue of material fact about 

whether Deputy Wallace knew that it was substantially likely that 

the methods of communication he used would be ineffective and 

that it would be necessary to provide an interpretive aid to 

communicate effectively. Friedson argues that Deputy Wallace 

must have known that they were unable to communicate 

effectively without an interpretive aid because of the “colossal 

misunderstanding” between the two of them when Friedson 

thought they had agreed to move to a second location and Deputy 

Wallace assumed that Friedson was trying to flee. Because we 

construe the facts in the light most favorable to Friedson, we will 

presume that this misunderstanding between him and the deputy 

existed. But Friedson does not show that Deputy Wallace ever 

realized that he had misunderstood Friedson—that he had been 

mistaken in his belief that Friedson was trying to flee. Friedson 

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20-14803 Opinion of the Court 11

argues only that Deputy Wallace must have understood, based on 

Friedson’s efforts to communicate using “unconventional” 

methods, that Friedson was deaf, because Deputy Wallace “cited 

no belief” that Friedson “was demonstrating signs of impairment 

or mental derangement.”

This falls short of satisfying the knowledge requirement of 

our deliberate indifference doctrine. Friedson must show not only 

that the deputy had knowledge of Friedson’s deafness, but that the 

deputy knew it was substantially likely that they would be unable 

to communicate effectively without an interpretive aid. And even 

if Deputy Wallace had realized that they had miscommunicated 

and that Friedson had not been trying to flee, that fact alone could 

not support an inference that Deputy Wallace knew there was a 

substantial likelihood that they would be unable to communicate 

effectively going forward.

As it turns out, during the second traffic stop, Friedson and 

Deputy Wallace did communicate effectively—though not 

perfectly—using gestures. Deputy Wallace first ordered Friedson 

to return to his vehicle, and later ordered him to exit his vehicle. 

Friedson complied with both orders, understanding the commands 

even though Deputy Wallace communicated through gestures. As 

Friedson expected when he drove away from the first stop, his exwife and children were present at the second stop. Friedson’s exwife communicated to Friedson during the stop using gestures, and 

there is no evidence that his ex-wife or children expressed to 

Deputy Wallace that he was not communicating effectively with 

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

Friedson. We see no evidence that Deputy Wallace knew that it 

was necessary to provide an interpretive aid.

The circumstances at the second stop are analogous to those 

in McCullum v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc., where 

we found insufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to ward 

off summary judgment in the healthcare context. Id. at 1147–49. 

There, a deaf patient indicated that he understood the hospital 

employees’ communications, and neither the patient nor his family 

did anything to dispel the employees’ belief that they were 

communicating effectively. See id. We reach the same conclusion 

here that we did in that case—there is insufficient evidence of the 

requisite knowledge for deliberate indifference.

Second, there is no genuine issue of material fact about 

whether Deputy Wallace made a “deliberate choice” not to 

provide Friedson with an interpretive aid. Based on Friedson’s 

version of events, after he initially gestured that he and Deputy 

Wallace should communicate by writing back and forth, he then 

gestured for Deputy Wallace to follow him to the second location, 

where his ex-wife and children were waiting and could interpret 

for them. Deputy Wallace did follow him there, and there is no 

evidence that Deputy Wallace impeded Friedson’s ex-wife or 

children from interpreting.

Our cases have already established that the failure to provide 

a requested interpretive aid is “not enough to support a finding of 

deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1147; see Liese, 701 F.3d at 343. 

Federal regulations under the ADA state that public entities “shall 

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20-14803 Opinion of the Court 13

furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary” to 

afford equal opportunity to individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.160(b)(1). The regulations further explain that the “type of 

auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective 

communication will vary in accordance with the method of 

communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and 

complexity of the communication involved; and the context in 

which the communication is taking place.” Id. § 35.160(b)(2). And 

while public entities “shall give primary consideration to the 

requests of individuals with disabilities,” they need not provide 

“any and all auxiliary aids even if they are desired and demanded.” 

Id.; McCullum, 768 F.3d at 1147. Friedson has offered no evidence 

that writing back and forth was necessary beyond the fact that he 

requested to do so; a mere request is insufficient justification.

This case is a far cry from Liese v. Indian River County 

Hospital District, where, again in the healthcare context, we 

concluded that a disabled patient’s testimony that the doctor had 

mocked her when she told him that her ability to read lips was 

limited and ignored her multiple requests for an interpreter was 

sufficient evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. 

701 F.3d at 351. We have been unable to find any case in which 

this Court has found that the failure to provide an interpreter 

during a high-pressure, chaotic traffic stop amounts to deliberate 

indifference. We are especially reluctant to wade into these 

unprecedented waters where interpretive assistance by family 

members was readily available and evidently unimpeded.

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14 Opinion of the Court 20-14803

Because no genuine issue of material fact exists over 

whether Deputy Wallace acted with deliberate indifference, we 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Sheriff Shoar on Friedson’s ADA and RA claims.

IV. 

Finally, we review the district court’s denial of Friedson’s 

motion to alter or amend the judgment. District courts may only 

grant a Rule 59(e) motion based on “newly-discovered evidence or 

manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343 (quotation 

omitted). Parties may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to “relitigate old 

matters” or raise new arguments “that could have been raised prior 

to the entry of judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Friedson has not shown that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his Rule 59(e) motion. To the extent that 

Friedson presented any arguments not already included in his 

response to the officers’ summary judgment motions—including 

his new theory that Deputy Wallace committed a Fourth 

Amendment violation by detaining him for an impermissible 

duration—he showed no reason why he could not have raised 

those arguments before the district court’s decision on the 

motions. And he did not point to any manifest errors of law or fact 

in the district court’s order. The district court correctly denied 

Friedson’s Rule 59(e) motion.

* * * 

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.

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