Filed 6/12/20; Certified for publication 7/7/20 (order attached) 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

WFG NATIONAL TITLE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as 

Trustee, for Park Place 

Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed 

Pass-Through Certificates, Series 

2005-WCW2, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B294249

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC640157

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Elizabeth J. Feffer, Judge. Affirmed.

Hershorin & Henry, Lori C. Hershorin and Claudia Mourad 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Wargo & French, Mark L. Block, Shanon McGinnis and 

Jeffrey N. Williams for Defendants and Respondents.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of an alleged mortgage fraud scheme 

designed to defraud mortgage lenders and involving numerous 

realtors, loan brokers, loan officers, and real estate brokers. One 

defrauded lender is Milestone Financial d/b/a Alviso Funding 

(Alviso), the original plaintiff in this case. 

The operative complaint alleges that various defendants set 

up a sham transaction by which a seller purported to sell a 

property in Sherman Oaks (property) to a buyer who obtained a 

mortgage loan from Alviso to fund the purchase. As it turned out, 

the seller did not own the property because the recorded trustee’s 

deed upon sale that appeared to convey title to the seller was 

forged. When the buyer subsequently defaulted on the mortgage 

loan, Alviso was left holding the proverbial bag because its deed 

of trust, purportedly secured by the property, is predicated on the 

forged trustee’s deed upon sale.

Alviso sued numerous parties allegedly involved in the 

sham transaction and, as pertinent here, the senior lienholder on 

the property, defendants and respondents Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A.,1 and its loan servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing 

(collectively, Wells Fargo). The title insurer involved in the sham 

transaction, plaintiff and appellant WFG National Title 

Insurance Company (plaintiff or WFG Title), is Alviso’s successorin-interest and is now prosecuting the action.

Essentially, plaintiff contends that Wells Fargo—the 

beneficiary of an indisputably valid deed of trust recorded well 

1 Wells Fargo, N.A., was sued in its capacity as trustee for Park Place 

Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-

WCW2. 
3

before the forged deed was recorded—was required to 

immediately discover the forged deed and promptly record a 

rescission of it in order to protect unknown third parties such as 

Alviso from the possibility of being defrauded. Because Wells 

Fargo failed to do so, plaintiff argues, principles of equity demand 

that Alviso’s interest in the property should be senior to Wells 

Fargo’s. 

Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, asserting it had 

no legal obligation to monitor the status of its title or to take 

affirmative steps to rid public records of improperly recorded 

documents relating to the property. The court agreed with Wells 

Fargo, finding that it had no legal obligation to maintain public 

title records and further finding that equity did not justify 

displacing Wells Fargo as senior lienholder. The court granted 

Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment and we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Status Quo Prior to the Sham Transaction

The property is located at 4050 Camino de la Cumbre in 

Sherman Oaks. In 2005, Jubilio Escalera and Jose Alonzo (the 

borrowers) obtained a mortgage loan from Argent Mortgage 

Company (Argent) in the amount of $710,460. The promissory 

note was secured by a deed of trust on the property in favor of 

Argent. In 2012, an assignment of that deed of trust was 

recorded, showing that Argent’s interest in the deed of trust had 

been transferred to Wells Fargo.2 (We refer to this instrument as 

Wells Fargo’s deed of trust.) 

2 The loan is serviced by Select Portfolio Servicing. 
4

The borrowers defaulted on the loan. In December 2014, 

Wells Fargo’s foreclosure trustee, Quality Loan Service 

Corporation (Quality), recorded a notice of default and election to 

sell under deed of trust. Quality subsequently recorded a notice of 

trustee’s sale on February 3, 2016, setting the date of the 

foreclosure sale on February 26, 2016. Apparently, no sale took 

place on that date because Quality recorded a second notice of 

trustee’s sale on April 4, 2016, setting the date of sale on April 

26, 2016. No sale took place, however. 

2. The Sham Transaction

Although the property had not been sold by the foreclosure 

trustee on April 26, 2016, a trustee’s deed upon sale was recorded 

on July 8, 2016, i.e., the forged deed. The forged deed appeared to 

have been recorded by Quality and it represented that on June 8, 

2016, defendant Adeliya Timirova Investments (ATI) purchased 

the property at the trustee’s foreclosure sale, purportedly 

extinguishing Wells Fargo’s deed of trust.

A number of other defendants allegedly participated in the 

next phase of the scheme—the sale of the property from ATI to 

Tatiana Vovk, also a named defendant. The preliminary title 

report indicated, by way of the forged deed, that title was vested 

in ATI. Relying on representations by various defendants, Alviso 

agreed to loan Vovk $850,000 in exchange for a first deed of trust 

on the property. Meanwhile, on August 2, 2016, Quality recorded 

another notice of trustee’s sale, setting a sale date of August 25, 

2016. This document was not discovered by Alviso or WFG Title 

prior to the close of escrow.

The loan funded and escrow for the sham purchase of the 

property by Vovk closed on October 7, 2016. A deed of trust in 
5

favor of Alviso (Alviso’s deed of trust) was duly recorded on the 

same date. No payments on the loan were ever made, however. 

Alviso first became aware that the Vovk transaction might 

be fraudulent after WFG Title was contacted by the Los Angeles 

Police Department in late October 2016. Wells Fargo filed a 

notice of rescission of the forged deed on November 16, 2016.

3. The Lawsuit and Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment

In November 2016, Alviso filed the underlying lawsuit 

against numerous individuals and entities it alleged were 

involved in the mortgage fraud scheme. It later assigned its claim 

to WFG Title, which substituted into the lawsuit. (From this 

point, we refer to WFG Title, to the extent it is standing in the 

shoes of Alviso, as “plaintiff.”) As pertinent here, plaintiff sought 

to quiet title to the property in itself as against Wells Fargo and 

sought declaratory relief to the effect that Alviso’s deed of trust is 

senior to Wells Fargo’s deed of trust.

Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment and/or summary 

adjudication. As to both of plaintiff’s claims, Wells Fargo argued 

that the forged deed, upon which plaintiff based its claim to title, 

was wholly void. As a matter of law, then, plaintiff failed to 

obtain any valid interest in the property which could defeat Wells 

Fargo’s indisputably valid interest. Anticipating plaintiff’s 

argument that equitable principles should bar it from asserting 

its right as a senior lienholder, Wells Fargo also asserted that no 

law or statute required it to monitor public records regarding the 

property and/or act to correct public records in the event that a 

forged deed or other notice was recorded, as plaintiff claimed. 

Accordingly, Wells Fargo could not, as a matter of law, be 

equitably estopped from asserting its valid interest in the 
6

property. Moreover, Wells Fargo contended, equity should not 

defeat Wells Fargo’s interest because Alviso and WFG Title had 

constructive notice that the forged deed might be fraudulent by 

virtue of the trustee’s notice of sale recorded on August 2, 2016—

which should have put the parties on notice that the forged deed 

might not be valid—more than two months before escrow closed 

on the sham transaction. 

Plaintiff attacked Wells Fargo’s motion on several 

procedural grounds relating to the admissibility of evidence and 

correctness of the separate statement. On the merits, and as 

pertinent here, plaintiff offered three main arguments. First, 

plaintiff asserted that Wells Fargo should be equitably estopped 

to claim a superior lien position “after it knowingly allowed the 

purportedly forged Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale of its Deed of Trust 

to remain in the public record for a period of time resulting in an 

$850,000 loss to” Alviso. Although plaintiff acknowledged that a 

forged deed ordinarily does not transfer good title, it claimed that 

Wells Fargo’s “excessive and unreasonable delay” in recording a 

rescission of the forged deed constituted sufficient grounds to 

estop Wells Fargo from asserting its senior lien position. Second, 

plaintiff urged that Wells Fargo’s failure to correct public title 

records in a timely manner constituted a ratification of the forged 

deed—conduct which would also estop Wells Fargo from claiming 

a senior lien position. Third, plaintiff argued that under Civil 

Code section 3543,3 Wells Fargo’s “complete disregard ... that 

innocent third parties, like WFG [Title and Alviso], would rely on 

3 That statute states: “Where one of two innocent persons must suffer 

by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it happened, must be the 

sufferer.” 
7

the status of the Property’s title in making decisions whether to 

lend money secured by the Property,” demanded that plaintiff’s 

interest in the property should be given the senior position.

4. The Court’s Ruling and the Appeal 

The court found in favor of Wells Fargo on both the quiet 

title and declaratory relief claims. The court first addressed, and 

largely rejected, plaintiff’s procedural arguments regarding 

alleged deficiencies in Wells Fargo’s motion for summary 

judgment and supporting documents.4

On the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the court first addressed 

the validity of plaintiff’s interest in the property. The court noted, 

as Wells Fargo had argued, that as a matter of law, a forged deed 

is void ab initio and cannot provide a basis for superior title 

against a prior, valid interest in real property. And a void 

instrument infects the entire chain of title, such that any 

subsequent conveyance stemming from the void instrument is 

also void as a matter of law. In a straightforward application of 

that well-settled law, the court concluded that Alviso’s deed of 

trust was void as a matter of law because it related to ATI’s 

conveyance to Vovk, which in turn flowed from the void, forged 

deed purporting to convey title to ATI. No triable issue of fact 

existed that would support a different conclusion.

As to plaintiff’s equitable arguments, the court made 

several observations. First, with respect to the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel generally, a party will not be estopped in the 

absence of some action or inaction on their part amounting to 

4 To the extent plaintiff’s procedural challenges are relevant to the 

appeal, we address them post.
8

constructive fraud. Here, the court concluded, Wells Fargo was 

under no obligation to discover forged documents relating to the 

property and, thus, its action or inaction on that point could not 

form the basis of an estoppel. Further, the court concluded, 

plaintiff had constructive notice that the forged deed might be 

fraudulent more than two months before escrow closed on the 

sale of the property to Vovk by virtue of the August 2, 2016 notice 

of trustee’s sale. Given those facts, the court concluded no triable 

issue of fact sufficient to permit an estoppel existed.

Finally, and as to plaintiff’s argument that Civil Code 

section 3543 required Wells Fargo to suffer any loss resulting 

from the fraud, the court reiterated that the code section requires 

a finding of negligence. Here, however, Wells Fargo owed no duty 

to either Alvsio or WFG Title—or, indeed, to any third party—to 

monitor public records for potentially fraudulent documents. As a 

result, plaintiff would be unable to establish that Wells Fargo 

was negligent—a necessary prerequisite to application of the 

statute.

The court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary 

judgment and entered judgment accordingly on October 25, 2018. 

Plaintiff timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

The applicable standard of review of a ruling on a motion 

for summary judgment is well established. “The purpose of the 

law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism 

to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine 

whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to 

resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 
9

Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) As such, the summary judgment 

statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c),

5 “provides a particularly 

suitable means to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie 

case and/or of the defendant’s [defense].” (Caldwell v. Paramount 

Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203.) A summary 

judgment motion must demonstrate that “material facts” are 

undisputed. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The pleadings determine the 

issues to be addressed by a summary judgment motion. 

(Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 885, 

reversed on other grounds by Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 

Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490; Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life 

& Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74.)

The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that 

there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 

p. 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must 

“ ‘show[ ] that one or more elements of the cause of action ... 

cannot be established’ by the plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 853.) 

A defendant meets its burden by presenting affirmative evidence 

that negates an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim. (Guz v. 

Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) 

Alternatively, a defendant meets its burden by submitting 

evidence “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot 

reasonably obtain, needed evidence” supporting an essential 

element of its claim. (Aguilar, at p. 855.)

On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record 

de novo and independently determine whether triable issues of 

5 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
10

material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 334.) We resolve 

any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the party 

opposing summary judgment. (Saelzler, at p. 768.)

In performing an independent review of the granting of 

summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by 

the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the 

elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes 

facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the 

opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to 

decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the 

existence of a triable, material fact issue. (Oakland Raiders v. 

National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 629–630.) 

We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the 

reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of 

the trial court, not its rationale. (Id. at p. 630.)

2. The court properly granted Wells Fargo’s motion for 

summary judgment.

Plaintiff argues the court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on its declaratory relief and 

quiet title claims. As to both claims, plaintiff sought a judicial 

declaration that Alviso’s deed of trust is senior to Wells Fargo’s 

deed of trust. 

Primarily, plaintiff asserts that the court erred as a matter 

of law in concluding that Alviso’s deed of trust is void. 

Alternatively, plaintiff contends triable issues of material fact 

exist regarding Wells Fargo’s conduct vis a vis the forged deed, 

such that a court sitting in equity could displace Wells Fargo’s 

deed of trust and place Alviso’s deed of trust in the senior 

position. We address these issues in turn. 
11

2.1. A fraudulent or forged deed does not convey 

valid title.

Plaintiff asserts the court erred as a matter of law in 

finding that Alviso’s deed of trust is void as against Wells Fargo. 

We disagree.

The parties agree that the trustee’s deed upon sale 

recorded on July 8, 2016 purporting to convey the property to ATI 

(i.e., the forged deed) was not recorded by Quality, as it appears 

from the face of the deed. The deed is forged and therefore void

rather than voidable. (Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 

Cal.App.4th 374, 378 [“A deed is void if the grantor’s signature is 

forged”]; 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 8:52, 

p. 8-152 [“A forged deed is completely void and ineffective to 

transfer any title to the grantee”].) 

Further, “[a] subsequent title derived through a forged 

instrument is completely unenforceable, even if recorded and held 

by a bona fide purchaser, unless the grantor is estopped to assert 

that the deed is invalid.” (3 Miller & Starr, supra, § 8:52, at pp. 8-

152–8-153, fns. omitted; see Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 

Cal.App.2d 553, 557 [“ ‘A void deed passes no title and cannot be 

made the foundation of a good title even under the equitable 

doctrine of bona fide purchase’ ”].) These principles apply to 

purchasers as well as encumbrancers such as Alviso and Wells 

Fargo.6 (See, e.g., Triple A Management Co. v. Frisone (1999) 69 

6 In limited circumstances, a senior lienholder may be estopped to 

assert that a bona fide purchaser’s (or good faith encumbrancer’s) 

interest in real property is void. We discuss this issue in the next 

section. 
12

Cal.App.4th 520, 530–533 [explaining good faith encumbrancer is 

similar to bona fide purchaser].)

Alviso’s deed of trust is derived from the forged deed. The 

forged deed purported to convey title to ATI which, in turn, 

purported to sell the property to Vovk, Alviso’s borrower. Because 

the entire transaction was fraudulent and predicated on the 

forged deed, Vovk did not obtain a valid interest in the property. 

Accordingly, neither did Alviso. 

Plaintiff claims the court misread and misinterpreted 

Wutzke v. Bill Reid Painting Service (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 36 

(Wutzke),7 a case relating to the effect of a forged deed of 

reconveyance on a subsequent encumbrancer. In Wutzke , the 

plaintiff sold property to the Millers and took back a promissory 

note and a deed of trust. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the 

trustee designated by the Millers was an escrow company owned 

by the Millers themselves. (Id. at p. 39.) One of the Millers later 

executed and recorded a deed of reconveyance eliminating the 

plaintiff’s security interest in the property. The reconveyance 

falsely represented that the trustee had received a written 

request to reconvey from the trustor (the plaintiff) and that all 

sums secured by the deed of trust had been paid. The Millers 

signed the reconveyance with the fictitious names of the 

executive officer of the escrow company and a notary. Having 

cleared the property of debt, the Millers then borrowed money 

from a third party, who knew nothing of the fraud, and executed 

a promissory note secured by a new first deed of trust on the 

property. (Ibid.)

7 Plaintiff’s reply brief erroneously represents that Wutzke was decided 

by the California Supreme Court.
13

The Millers defaulted on both obligations and the matter 

came before the court for trial.8 As between the plaintiff and the 

third party encumbrancer, the court found that the plaintiff had 

a superior interest. In that case, the deed of reconveyance itself 

had been forged with the intent to defraud. The Court of Appeal, 

in affirming the court’s judgment, emphasized that although the 

law protects innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, “that 

protection extends only to those who obtained good legal title. 

[Citations.] ... [A] forged document is void ab initio and 

constitutes a nullity; as such it cannot provide the basis for a 

superior title as against the original grantor. [Citations.]” 

(Wutzke, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 43.) The court ordered a 

foreclosure sale and a distribution of the proceeds to the plaintiff 

and, to the extent any excess proceeds existed, to the 

encumbrancer. (Id. at p. 45.) 

Plaintiff contends that because the court in Wutzke

determined that the encumbrancer held a junior lien on the 

property, the court in this case erred in finding that Alviso’s deed 

is void. Instead, plaintiff urges, the court should have ruled that 

Alviso holds a second deed of trust on the property. Wutzke is 

distinguishable. There, the court determined that the 

encumbrancer’s deed was void as against the senior lienholder 

and therefore the encumbrancer could not displace the senior 

lienholder. On that point, Wutzke supports the court’s ruling in 

this case. But in Wutzke, the court was also required to allocate 

the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the property at issue 

and, as to that issue, the court considered the relative priority of 

8 The opinion does not specify the causes of action asserted by the 

plaintiff. 
14

the two interests. Here, however, the court was not asked to 

allocate sale proceeds, nor was there a need for it to determine 

the parties’ relative priority in the event proceeds become 

available at some future point. That second issue simply is not 

present here9 and therefore Wutzke’s resolution of that point is 

not applicable.

2.2. Because Wells Fargo was not negligent, neither 

equitable estoppel nor Civil Code section 3543 is 

applicable.

Plaintiff makes a variety of arguments generally asserting 

that Wells Fargo was negligent because it failed to detect the 

forged deed and act immediately to rescind it in order to prevent 

any third parties, such as plaintiff, from relying on it. As a result, 

plaintiff asserts, Civil Code section 3543 and/or equitable 

estoppel should prevent Wells Fargo from disputing the 

superiority of Alviso’s deed of trust. Plaintiff contends that triable 

issues of fact exist regarding Wells Fargo’s knowledge of the 

forged deed and its failure to take action to clarify the public 

records relating to the property. 

Plaintiff again relies on Wutzke, which provides a helpful 

starting point for our discussion. “It is settled that the doctrine of 

equitable estoppel ‘may be invoked by an innocent purchaser, in 

9 Plaintiff sought to establish that its interest is senior to Wells 

Fargo’s. In the prayer for relief in the operative complaint, plaintiff 

requested “a judicial declaration that [Alviso’s deed of trust] occupies a 

first lien against the PROPERTY” and, as to the quiet title claim, it 

requested “a judgment of the Court quieting title to [Alviso’s deed of 

trust], adjudging that [Alviso’s deed of trust] occupies a senior lien 

position against the PROPERTY as of October 7, 2016 and the [Wells 

Fargo deed of trust] is in a junior lien position.”
15

spite of the fact that ordinarily a forged instrument cannot carry 

title. “ ‘The owner of property cannot be divested thereof by a 

forged instrument, but his conduct ... may estop him from 

denying its validity.’ [Citation.]” (Crittenden v. McCloud (1951) 

106 Cal.App.2d 42, 50; see also Common Wealth Ins. Systems, 

Inc. v. Kersten (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1025.) The principle of 

estoppel is based on Civil Code section 3543, which provides that 

“ ‘[w]here one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a 

third, he, by whose negligence it happened, must be the 

sufferer.’ ” (Wutzke, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 44–45.)

Plaintiff overstates the significance of these principles, 

claiming that “California Courts apply the basic principle that 

the person with the best chance of preventing the loss must suffer 

the consequences.” That is not the law. In order to invoke 

equitable estoppel generally or Civil Code section 3543 in 

particular, it must be established that the party to bear the loss 

was, at a minimum, negligent. Civil Code section 3543 expressly 

requires a finding of negligence, specifying that “he, by whose 

negligence it happened, must be the sufferer.” And myriad cases 

have required a finding of negligence before applying equitable 

estoppel. (E.g., Wutkze, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 44–45 

[holding no basis for estoppel existed where plaintiff was not 

negligent]; Crittenden v. McCloud, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d at p. 50 

[quoting Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652 as holding that 

“ ‘[a]n innocent purchaser taking a void instrument can, however, 

find protection in the doctrine of estoppel, where circumstances 

are presented which establish negligence or some other 

misconduct by the other party, which contributed to the loss’ ”]; 
16

see also 3 Miller & Starr, supra, §§ 7.54, 8.52.) None of the cases 

cited by plaintiff hold otherwise.10

In order to prove negligence, plaintiff must establish duty, 

breach of that duty, causation, and damages. (Regents of 

University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 

618 (Regents).) “ ‘Duty, being a question of law, is particularly 

amenable to resolution by summary judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff urges that Wells Fargo was negligent because it failed to 

take immediate action to correct the public records after the 

forged deed was recorded or, at a minimum, after Wells Fargo 

had actual knowledge of the forged deed. Wells Fargo responds 

that it did not owe anyone, including plaintiff, a duty to monitor 

and correct public records relating to the property. 

Notably, plaintiff cites no statute or case stating that a 

property owner or beneficiary of an interest in property has an 

ongoing duty to monitor public records in order to detect, and 

correct, a fraudulent or erroneous recording. As a general matter, 

though, “each person has a duty to act with reasonable care 

under the circumstances. [Citations.] However, ‘one owes no duty 

10 Wurzl v. Holloway (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1740, cited by plaintiff , 

confirmed that negligence is a necessary prerequisite to the application 

of Civil Code section 3543. (Id. at p. 1752 [“ ‘ “It has been held that 

although the true owner is guilty of no more than misplaced 

confidence, such misplaced confidence is negligence within the 

meaning of section 3543” ’ ”].) Andrade v. Casteel (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 

729, is in accord: “ ‘Where, as here, the true owner permits another to 

appear as the owner of the property or as having full power of 

disposition over it, it is established that an innocent third party who is 

thus led into dealing with the apparent owner will be protected by a 

court of equity against the claims of the true owner whose conduct 

made the fraud possible.’ ” (Id. at p. 732.) 
17

to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered 

by such conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘A person who has not created a peril 

is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to 

assist or protect another unless there is some relationship 

between them which gives rise to a duty to act.’ [Citations.]” 

(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619.) There is no evidence of a 

relationship, special or otherwise, between Wells Fargo and 

plaintiff at the pertinent time. 

Consistent with general negligence principles, our Supreme 

Court held long ago that “a party whose conveyance is duly 

recorded is not obliged to thereafter keep constant[ ]watch of the 

records, lest some party, without his consent or authority, should 

fraudulently or feloniously attempt to convey away his property.” 

(Meley v. Collins (1871) 41 Cal. 663, 665 (Meley).) Specifically, the 

Court held that a property owner who knew a forged deed had 

been recorded as to her property had no duty to monitor title 

records and, so long as the deed was not authorized or sanctioned 

by the property owner, she would not be estopped to assert her 

valid interest as against a party deceived by the forged deed. (Id. 

at p. 666.) In short, the Court rejected the precise argument 

advanced by plaintiff here. 

Plaintiff responds that “[t]he Trial Court’s reliance on the 

case of Meley v. Collins (1871) 41 Cal. 663 for the proposition that 

estoppel does not apply to lenders is misguided and misplaced.” 

But the court did not do so. Rather, it concluded that estoppel 

does not apply to Wells Fargo because it had no duty to protect 

plaintiff from the consequence of relying on a forged deed. 

In any event, plaintiff asserts, “[s]ubsequent to Meley and 

the enactment of California Civil Code section 3543, numerous 

cases hold that homeowners/lenders are precluded from attacking 
18

the title of bona fide purchasers/encumbrancers, like [plaintiff], 

based upon a forged deed where there is sufficient evidence of 

carelessness or negligence on the part of the lender/homeowner.” 

We agree. But we take issue with plaintiff’s subsequent 

assertion—unsupported by any legal citation—that “[t]he law 

imposes a duty upon lenders to protect their own interests to 

avoid loss, and if they fail to do so, suffer the consequences of 

their own inaction.” To the extent plaintiff suggests Wells Fargo 

had a duty to monitor and correct public records regarding the 

property, it is incorrect. 

Plaintiff also appears to suggest that we should disregard 

Meley because the case was decided in 1871. Plaintiff apparently 

contends that Meley is obsolete because “vehicles, modern 

technology, and the internet ... make recording documents fast 

and simple, and monitoring the title to property [is] easy for 

lenders,” as contrasted with the circumstances in existence when 

Meley was decided, i.e., days of the “horse and carriage.” The age 

of an opinion does not constitute a valid ground to disregard it. 

(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara 

County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) 

2.3. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are forfeited.

To prevail on appeal, an appellant must establish both 

error and prejudice from that error. (Douglas v. Ostermeier (1991) 

1 Cal.App.4th 729, 740.) In order to demonstrate error, an 

appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent 

argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. 

Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the 

appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not 

supported by accurate citations to the record. (City of Lincoln v. 

Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 & fn. 16; Cal. Rules 
19

of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Similarly, we may disregard 

conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal 

authority. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 

266, 286–287; Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 

Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(B).) These principles apply to several of plaintiff’s 

arguments. 

In argument section C of the opening brief, for example, 

plaintiff argues the court abused its discretion by overruling its 

objections to a declaration submitted in support of Wells Fargo’s 

motion for summary judgment. The argument section, which is 

just over one page in length, does not include any record citations 

or legal analysis. By failing to support the factual assertions in 

its legal argument with citations to the evidence, plaintiff has 

forfeited the argument.

Similarly, plaintiff asserts at several points in the opening 

brief that Wells Fargo had actual knowledge of the forged deed 

and deviated from its normal practice by failing to timely file a 

rescission or cancellation of the deed. Even if these purported 

facts were relevant, which they are not, plaintiff failed to include 

record citations in its discussion of these facts and any related 

argument is likewise forfeited.11

And in Argument section K, plaintiff asserts the court 

abused its discretion by permitting Wells Fargo to proceed with 

11 The obvious explanation for this significant omission is that the 

appellate record does not include the compendium of evidence plaintiff 

submitted in opposition to Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment 

and/or adjudication. Instead, the record includes a compendium of 

evidence plaintiff submitted in response to a motion by a different 

defendant.
20

its motion despite defects in its separate statement of undisputed 

facts. Again, plaintiff fails to include any relevant record citations

and has forfeited the argument. We reach the same conclusion 

with respect to plaintiff’s argument that the court should have 

granted its request for a continuance of Wells Fargo’s motion, as 

the argument is unsupported by either record citations or legal 

analysis. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., as Trustee, and Select Portfolio Services shall recover their 

costs on appeal.

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

EGERTON, J.

DHANIDINA, J.
Filed 7/7/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

WFG NATIONAL TITLE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

as Trustee, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B294249

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC640157

Order Certifying Opinion 

for Publication

[No change in judgment]

BY THE COURT:*

Non-parties California Mortgage Association, Caliber Home 

Loans, Inc., and Quality Loan Service Corporation have

requested that our opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed 

June 12, 2020, be certified for publication. It appears that our 

opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.1105(c). The opinion is ordered published in the 

Official Reports.

*LAVIN, Acting P. J. EGERTON, J. DHANIDINA, J.