Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices 66949

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Sunshine Meeting Notice

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.

DATE: Weeks of December 24, 31, 2001,

January 7, 14, 21, 28, 2002.

PLACE: Commissioners’ Conference

Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland.

STATUS: Public and Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Week of December 24, 2001

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of December 24, 2001.

Week of December 31, 2001—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of December 31, 2001.

Week of January 7, 2002—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of January 7, 2002.

Week of January 14, 2002—Tentative

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Status of

Nuclear Materials Safety (Public

Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at

the Web address—www.nrc.gov.

Week of January 21, 2002—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of January 21, 2002.

Week of January 28, 2002—Tentative

Tuesday, January 29, 2002

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Status of

Nuclear Reactor Safety (Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at

the Web address—www.nrc.gov.

Wednesday, January 30, 2002

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Status of OCIO

Programs, Performance, and Plans

(Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at

the Web address—www.nrc.gov.

2:00 p.m. Discussion of

Intragovernmental Issues (Closed—Ex.

1&9)

*The schedule for Commission

meetings is subject to change on short

notice. To verify the status of meetings

call (recording)—(301) 415–1292.

Contact person for more information:

David Louis Gamberoni (301) 415–1651.

* * * * *

The NRC Commission Meeting

Schedule can be found on the Internet

at: www.nrc.gov.

* * * * *

This notice is distributed by mail to

several hundred subscribers; if you no

longer wish to receive it, or would like

to be added to the distribution, please

contact the Office of the Secretary,

Washington, DC 20555 (301–415–1969).

In addition, distribution of this meeting

notice over the Internet system is

available. If you are interested in

receiving this Commission meeting

schedule electronically, please send an

electronic message to dkw@nrc.gov.

Dated: December 19, 2001.

Sandra M. Joosten,

Executive Assistant, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01–31919 Filed 12–21–01; 11:40

am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Notice of Opportunity To Comment on

Model Safety Evaluation on Technical

Specification Improvement To

Eliminate Post Accident Sampling

Requirements for Boiling Water

Reactors Using the Consolidated Line

Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has prepared a

model safety evaluation (SE) relating to

the elimination of requirements on post

accident sampling imposed on licensees

through orders, license conditions, or

technical specifications. The NRC staff

has also prepared a model no significant

hazards consideration (NSHC)

determination relating to this matter.

The purpose of these models is to

permit the NRC to efficiently process

amendments that propose to remove

requirements for the Post Accident

Sampling System [or Station] (PASS) for

Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs).

Licensees of nuclear power reactors to

which the models apply could request

amendments conforming to the models.

In such a request, a licensee should

confirm the applicability of the SE and

NSHC determination to its reactor and

provide the requested plant-specific

verifications and commitments. The

NRC staff is requesting comments on the

model SE and model NSHC

determination before announcing their

availability for referencing in license

amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires

January 28, 2002. Comments received

after this date will be considered if it is

practical to do so, but the Commission

is able to ensure consideration only for

comments received on or before this

date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be

submitted either electronically or via

U.S. mail.

Submit written comments to: Chief,

Rules and Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, Mail Stop: T–6 D59,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001.

Hand deliver comments to: 11545

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,

between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on

Federal workdays.

Copies of comments received may be

examined at the NRC’s Public Document

Room, One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,

Maryland.

Comments may be submitted by

electronic mail to CLIIP@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

William Reckley, Mail Stop: O–8H1,

Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone 301–415–1389.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06,

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement

Process for Adopting Standard

Technical Specification Changes for

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March

20, 2000. The Consolidated Line Item

Improvement Process (CLIIP) is

intended to improve the efficiency and

transparency of NRC licensing

processes. This is accomplished by

processing proposed changes to the

Standard Technical Specifications (STS)

in a manner that supports subsequent

license amendment applications. The

CLIIP includes an opportunity for the

public to comment on proposed changes

to the STS following a preliminary

assessment by the NRC staff and finding

that the change will likely be offered for

adoption by licensees. This notice is

soliciting comment on a proposed

change to the STS that removes

requirements for the PASS for BWRs.

The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to

evaluate any comments received for a

proposed change to the STS and to

either reconsider the change or to

proceed with announcing the

availability of the change for proposed

adoption by licensees. Those licensees

opting to apply for the subject change to

technical specifications are responsible

for reviewing the staff’s evaluation,

referencing the applicable technical

justifications, and providing any

necessary plant-specific information.

66950 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices

Each amendment application made in

response to the notice of availability

would be processed and noticed in

accordance with applicable rules and

NRC procedures.

This notice involves the elimination

of requirements for PASS and related

administrative controls in technical

specifications for BWRs. This proposed

change was proposed for incorporation

into the standard technical

specifications by the BWR Owners

Group (BWROG) participants in the

Technical Specification Task Force

(TSTF) and is designated TSTF–413.

TSTF–413 is supported by the NRC

staff’s safety evaluation dated June 12,

2001, for the BWROG topical report

NEDO–32991, ‘‘Regulatory Relaxation

for BWR Post Accident Sampling

Stations (PASS),’’ which was submitted

to the NRC on November 30, 2000. The

BWROG request followed the staff’s

approval of similar requests for

elimination of PASS requirements from

the Combustion Engineering Owners

Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse

Owners Group (WOG).

Applicability

This proposed change to remove

requirements for PASS from technical

specifications (and other elements of the

licensing bases) is applicable to BWRs.

To efficiently process the incoming

license amendment applications, the

staff requests each licensee applying for

the changes addressed by TSTF–413

using the CLIIP to address the following

plant-specific verifications and

regulatory commitments. The CLIIP

does not prevent licensees from

requesting an alternative approach or

proposing the changes without the

requested verifications and regulatory

commitments. Variations from the

approach recommended in this notice

may, however, require additional review

by the NRC staff and may increase the

time and resources needed for the

review. In making the requested

regulatory commitments, each licensee

should address: (1) That the subject

capability exists (or will be developed)

and will be maintained; (2) where the

capability or procedure will be

described (e.g., severe accident

management guidelines, emergency

operating procedures, emergency plan

implementing procedures); and (3) a

schedule for implementation. The

amendment request need not provide

details about designs or procedures.

Each licensee should verify that it

has, and make a regulatory commitment

to maintain (or make a regulatory

commitment to develop and maintain):

a. Contingency plans for obtaining

and analyzing highly radioactive

samples from the reactor coolant

system, suppression pool, and

containment atmosphere;

b. A capability for classifying fuel

damage events at the Alert level

threshold (typically this is 300 μCi/ml

dose equivalent iodine). This capability

may use a normal sampling system or

correlations of radiation readings to

coolant concentrations; and

c. An I–131 site survey detection

capability, including an ability to assess

radioactive iodines released to offsite

environs, by using effluent monitoring

systems or portable sampling

equipment.

Public Notices

In a notice in the Federal Register

dated August 11, 2000 (65 FR 49271),

the staff requested comment on the use

of the CLIIP to process requests to delete

post-accident sampling requirements

from plants with Westinghouse and

Combustion Engineering designs.

Following the disposition of comments,

the staff published a notice of

availability of the staff’s SE and NSHC

determination for referencing using the

CLIIP (65 FR 65018, October 31, 2000).

Each request to eliminate PASS

requirements by licensees for

Westinghouse and CE plants using the

CLIIP has also included notices prior to

issuance of the subject license

amendments and upon issuance.

This notice requests comments from

interested members of the public within

30 days of the date of publication in the

Federal Register. Following the staff’s

evaluation of comments received as a

result of this notice, the staff may

reconsider the proposed change or may

proceed with announcing the

availability of the change in a

subsequent notice (perhaps with some

changes to the safety evaluation or

proposed no significant hazards

consideration determination as a result

of public comments). If the staff

announces the availability of the

change, licensees wishing to adopt the

change will submit an application in

accordance with applicable rules and

other regulatory requirements. The staff

will in turn issue for each application a

notice of consideration of issuance of

amendment to facility operating

license(s), a proposed no significant

hazards consideration determination,

and an opportunity for a hearing. A

notice of issuance of an amendment to

operating license(s) will also be issued

to announce the elimination of the

PASS requirements for each plant that

applies for and receives the requested

change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Consolidated Line Item Improvement,

Technical Specification Task Force

(TSTF) Change TSTF–413, Elimination

of Requirements for Post Accident

Sampling System [or Station] (PASS)

1.0 Introduction

In the aftermath of the accident at

Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

imposed requirements on licensees for

commercial nuclear power plants to

install and maintain the capability to

obtain and analyze post-accident

samples of the reactor coolant and

containment atmosphere. The desired

capabilities of the Post Accident

Sampling System [or Station] (PASS)

were described in NUREG–0737,

‘‘Clarification of TMI Action Plan

Requirements.’’ The NRC issued orders

to licensees with plants operating at the

time of the TMI accident to confirm the

installation of PASS capabilities

(generally as they had been described in

NUREG–0737). A requirement for PASS

and related administrative controls was

added to the technical specifications

(TS) of the operating plants and was

included in the initial TS for plants

licensed during the 1980s and 90s.

Additional expectations regarding PASS

capabilities were included in Regulatory

Guide 1.97, ‘‘Instrumentation for LightWater-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To

Assess Plant and Environs Conditions

During and Following an Accident.’’

Significant improvements have been

achieved since the TMI accident in the

areas of understanding risks associated

with nuclear plant operations and

developing better strategies for

managing the response to potentially

severe accidents at nuclear plants.

Recent insights about plant risks and

alternate severe accident assessment

tools have led the NRC staff to conclude

that some TMI Action Plan items can be

revised without reducing the ability of

licensees to respond to severe accidents.

The NRC’s efforts to oversee the risks

associated with nuclear technology

more effectively and to eliminate undue

regulatory costs to licensees and the

public have prompted the NRC to

consider eliminating the requirements

for PASS in TS and other parts of the

licensing bases of operating reactors.

The staff has completed its review of

the topical report submitted by the

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners

Group (BWROG) that proposed the

elimination of PASS. The justifications

for the proposed elimination of PASS

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices 66951

requirements center on evaluations of

the various radiological and chemical

sampling and their potential usefulness

in responding to a severe reactor

accident or making decisions regarding

actions to protect the public from

possible releases of radioactive

materials. As explained in more detail

in the staff’s safety evaluations for the

topical report, the staff has reviewed the

available sources of information for use

by decision-makers in developing

protective action recommendations and

assessing core damage. Based on this

review, the staff found that the

information provided by PASS is either

unnecessary or is effectively provided

by other indications of process

parameters or measurement of radiation

levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with

the owners group that licensees can

remove the TS requirements for PASS,

revise (as necessary) other elements of

the licensing bases, and pursue possible

design changes to alter or remove

existing PASS equipment.

2.0 Background

In its letter dated November 30, 2000,

the BWROG submitted for the NRC

staff’s review Topical Report NEDO–

32991, ‘‘Regulatory Relaxation for BWR

Post Accident Sampling Stations

(PASS),’’ for eliminating PASS

requirements from BWRs. The NRC

staff’s safety evaluation for the BWROG

topical report is dated June 12, 2001

(ADAMS Accession Number

ML011630016). The BWROG proposed

that relaxation of the PASS

requirements be incorporated into the

standard technical specifications by

submitting TSTF–413.

The NRC staff prepared this model

safety evaluation (SE) relating to the

elimination of requirements on post

accident sampling for BWRs and

solicited public comment [ FR ] in

accordance with the CLIIP. The use of

the CLIIP in this matter is intended to

help the NRC to efficiently process

amendments that propose to remove the

PASS requirements from TS. Licensees

of nuclear power reactors to which this

model apply were informed [ FR ] that

they could request amendments

conforming to the model, and, in such

requests, should confirm the

applicability of the SE to their reactors

and providing the requested plantspecific verifications and commitments.

3.0 Evaluation

The ways in which the requirements

and recommendations for PASS were

incorporated into the licensing bases of

commercial nuclear power plants varied

as a function of when plants were

licensed. Plants that were operating at

the time of the TMI accident are likely

to have been the subject of confirmatory

orders that imposed the PASS functions

described in NUREG–0737 as

obligations. The issuance of plant

specific amendments to adopt this

change, which would remove PASS and

related administrative controls from TS,

would also supercede the PASS specific

requirements imposed by post-TMI

confirmatory orders.

The technical evaluations for the

elimination of PASS sampling

requirements are provided in the safety

evaluation dated June 12, 2001, for

BWROG topical report NEDO–32991. As

described in its safety evaluation for the

topical report, the staff finds that the

post-accident sampling requirements for

the following may be eliminated for

BWR plants:

1. Reactor coolant dissolved gases.

2. Reactor coolant hydrogen.

3. Reactor coolant oxygen.

4. Reactor coolant chlorides.

5. Reactor coolant pH.

6. Reactor coolant boron.

7. Reactor coolant conductivity.

8. Radioisotopes in the reactor coolant.

9. Containment hydrogen.

10. Containment oxygen.

11. Radioisotopes in the containment

atmosphere.

12. Suppression pool pH.

13. Chlorides in the suppression pool.

14. Boron in the suppression pool.

15. Radioisotopes in the suppression

pool.

The staff agrees that sampling of

radioisotopes is not required to support

emergency response decision making

during the initial phases of an accident

because the information provided by

PASS is either unnecessary or is

effectively provided by other

indications of process parameters or

measurement of radiation levels.

Therefore, it is not necessary to have

dedicated equipment to obtain this

sample in a prompt manner.

The staff does, however, believe that

there could be significant benefits to

having information about the

radioisotopes existing post-accident in

order to address public concerns and

plan for long-term recovery operations.

As stated in the safety evaluation for the

topical report, the staff has found that

licensees could satisfy this function by

developing contingency plans to

describe existing sampling capabilities

and what actions (e.g., assembling

temporary shielding) may be necessary

to obtain and analyze highly radioactive

samples from the reactor coolant system

(RCS), suppression pool, and

containment atmosphere. (See item 4.1

under Verifications and Commitments.)

The contingency plans for obtaining

samples from the RCS, suppression

pool, and containment atmosphere may

also enable a licensee to derive

information on parameters such as

hydrogen concentrations in containment

and the pH of water in the suppression

pool. The staff considers the sampling of

the suppression pool to be potentially

useful in confirming calculations of pH

and confirming that potentially

unaccounted for acid sources have been

sufficiently neutralized. The use of the

contingency plans for obtaining samples

would depend on the plant conditions

and the need for information by the

decision-makers responsible for

responding to the accident.

In addition, the staff considers

radioisotope sampling information to be

useful in classifying certain types of

events (such as a reactivity excursion or

mechanical damage) that could cause

fuel damage without having an

indication of a loss of reactor coolant

inventory. However, the staff agrees

with the topical report’s contentions

that other indicators of failed fuel, such

as radiation monitors, can be correlated

to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 4.2

under Verifications and Commitments.)

In lieu of the information that would

have been obtained from PASS, the staff

believes that licensees should maintain

or develop the capability to monitor

radioactive iodines that have been

released to offsite environs. This

information would be useful for

decision makers trying to assess a

release of and limit the public’s

exposure to radioactive materials. (See

item 4.3 under Verifications and

Commitments.)

The staff believes that the changes

related to the elimination of PASS that

are described in the topical report,

related safety evaluation and this

proposed change to TS are unlikely to

result in a decrease in the effectiveness

of a licensee’s emergency plan. Each

licensee, however, must evaluate

possible changes to its emergency plan

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to

determine if the change decreases the

effectiveness of its site-specific plan.

Evaluations and reporting of changes to

emergency plans should be performed

in accordance with applicable

regulations and procedures.

The staff notes that redundant, safetygrade, containment hydrogen

concentration monitors are required by

10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are addressed in

NUREG–0737 Item II.F.1 and Regulatory

Guide 1.97, and are relied upon to meet

the data reporting requirements of 10

CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section

VI.2.a.(ii)(3). The staff concludes that

during the early phases of an accident,

66952 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices

the safety-grade hydrogen monitors

provide an adequate capability for

monitoring containment hydrogen

concentration. The staff sees value in

maintaining the capability to obtain grab

samples for complementing the

information from the hydrogen monitors

in the long term (i.e., by confirming the

indications from the monitors and

providing hydrogen measurements for

concentrations outside the range of the

monitors). As previously mentioned, the

licensee’s contingency plan (see item

4.1) for obtaining highly radioactive

samples will include sampling of the

containment atmosphere and may, if

deemed necessary and practical by the

appropriate decision-makers, be used to

supplement the safety-related hydrogen

monitors.

Note 1: Each licensee should specify a

desired implementation period for its

specific amendment request. The

implementation period would be that period

necessary to develop and implement the

items in 4.1 through 4.3 and, as necessary, to

make other changes to documentation or

equipment to support the elimination of

PASS requirements. As an alternative, the

licensee may choose to have a shorter

implementation period and include the

scheduling of items 4.1 through 4.3 as part

of the regulatory commitments associated

with this amendment request. Amendment

requests that include commitments for

implementation of the items in Section 4

within 6 months of the implementation of the

revised TS will remain within the CLIIP.

Note 2: There may be some collateral

changes to the TS as a result of the removal

of the administrative controls section for

PASS. The following paragraphs address

three potential changes that the staff is aware

of (editorial changes, mention of PASS as a

potential leakage source outside

containment, and revision of the bases

section for post accident monitoring

instrumentation).

(A) The elimination of the TS and other

regulatory requirements for PASS would

result in additional changes to TS such as

[e.g., the renumbering of sections or pages or

the removal of references]. The changes are

included in the licensee’s application to

revise the TS in order to take advantage of

the CLIIP. The staff has reviewed the changes

and agrees that the revisions are necessary

due to the removal of the TS section on

PASS. The changes do not revise technical

requirements beyond that reviewed by the

NRC staff in connection with the supporting

topical reports or the preparation of the TS

improvement incorporated into the CLIIP.

(B) The TS include an administrative

requirement for a program to minimize to

levels as low as practicable the leakage from

those portions of systems outside

containment that could contain highly

radioactive fluids during a serious transient

or accident. The program includes preventive

maintenance, periodic inspections, and leak

tests for the identified systems. PASS is

specifically listed in TS [5.5.2] as falling

under the scope of this requirement. The

applicability of this specification depends on

whether or not PASS is maintained as a

system that is a potential leakage path. [Note

that several options (see following) exist for

handling the impact that eliminating PASS

requirements would have on the

specification for the program to control

leakage outside containment.

(i) The licensee has stated that a plant

change would be implemented such that

PASS would not be a potential leakage

path outside containment for highly

radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS piping

that penetrates the containment would

be cut and capped). The modification

would be made during the

implementation period for this

amendment such that it is appropriate

to delete the reference to PASS in TS

[5.5.2]. Requirements in NRC

regulations (e.g., 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix J) and other TS provide

adequate regulatory controls over the

licensee’s proposed modification to

eliminate PASS as a potential leakage

path.

(ii) The licensee has stated that a

plant change might be implemented

such that PASS would not be a potential

leakage path outside containment for

highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS

piping that penetrates the containment

might be cut and capped). The

modification would not be made during

the implementation period for this

amendment. The licensee has proposed

to add the following phrase to the

reference to PASS in TS [5.5.2]:

‘‘(until such time as a modification

eliminates the PASS penetration as a

potential leakage path).’’

The above phrase would make clear

that TS [5.5.2] remains applicable to the

PASS as long as it is a possible leakage

path and reflects that the actual

modification of the piping system may

be scheduled beyond the

implementation period for this

amendment. Requirements in NRC

regulations (10 CFR part 50, Appendix

J) and other TS provide adequate

regulatory control over the licensee’s

modification to eliminate PASS as a

potential leakage path. Following the

modification to eliminate PASS as a

potential leakage path, the licensee may

elect (in order to maintain clarity and

simplicity of the requirement) to revise

TS [5.5.2] to remove the reference to

PASS, including the phrase added by

this amendment.

(iii) The licensee has stated that the

configuration of the PASS will continue

to be a potential leakage path outside

containment for highly radioactive

fluids (e.g., the PASS piping will

penetrate the containment with valves

or other components in the system from

which highly radioactive fluid could

leak). The licensee has [not proposed to

change TS (5.5.2) or has changed TS

(5.5.2) to revise the reference to this

system from PASS to ( )]. The staff

agrees [that TS 5.5.2 is not affected or

that the change to revise the reference

from PASS to ( )] is acceptable. A

separate amendment request will be

required if the licensee, subsequent to

this amendment, decides to modify the

plant to eliminate this potential leakage

path and proposes to change the

requirements of TS [5.5.2].

(C) [Note-optional section if licensee

provides markup of affected Bases

pages] The elimination of PASS requires

that the licensee revise the discussion in

the Bases section for TS [3.3.3, ‘‘Post

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation’].

The current Bases mention the

capabilities of PASS as part of the

justification for allowing both hydrogen

monitor channels to be out of service for

a period of up to 72 hours. Although the

licensee’s application included possible

wording for the revised Bases

discussion for TS [3.3.3], the licensee

will formally address the change to the

Bases in accordance with [the Bases

Control Program or its administrative

procedure for revising Bases]. The staff

does not believe that the Bases change

will require prior NRC approval when

evaluated against the criteria in 10 CFR

50.59, ‘‘Changes, tests, and

experiments,’’ and, therefore, agrees that

the revision of the Bases to TS [3.3.3]

should be addressed separately from

this amendment and should be included

in a future update of the TS Bases in

accordance with [the Bases Control

Program or the licensee’s administrative

controls].

4.0 Verifications and Commitments

As requested by the staff in the notice

of availability for this TS improvement,

the licensee has addressed the following

plant-specific verifications and

commitments.

4.1 Each licensee should verify that

it has, and make a regulatory

commitment to maintain (or make a

regulatory commitment to develop and

maintain), contingency plans for

obtaining and analyzing highly

radioactive samples of reactor coolant,

suppression pool, and containment

atmosphere.

The licensee has [verified that it has

or made a regulatory commitment to

develop] contingency plans for

obtaining and analyzing highly

radioactive samples from the RCS,

suppression pool, and containment

atmosphere. The licensee has

committed to maintain the contingency

plans within its [specified document or

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices 66953

program]. The licensee has

[implemented this commitment or will

implement this commitment by

(specified date)].

4.2 Each licensee should verify that

it has, and make a regulatory

commitment to maintain (or make a

regulatory commitment to develop and

maintain), a capability for classifying

fuel damage events at the Alert level

threshold (typically this is 300 μCi/ml

dose equivalent iodine). This capability

may utilize the normal sampling system

and/or correlations of radiation readings

to radioisotope concentrations in the

reactor coolant.

The licensee has [verified that it has

or made a regulatory commitment to

develop] a capability for classifying fuel

damage events at the Alert level

threshold. The licensee has committed

to maintain the capability for the Alert

classification within its [specified

document or program]. The licensee has

[implemented this commitment or will

implement this commitment by

(specified date)].

4.3 Each licensee should verify that

it has, and make a regulatory

commitment to maintain (or make a

regulatory commitment to develop and

maintain), an I–131 site survey

detection capability, including an

ability to assess radioactive iodines

released to offsite environs, by using

effluent monitoring systems or portable

sampling equipment.

The licensee has [verified that it has

or made a regulatory commitment to

develop] an I–131 site survey detection

capability, including an ability to assess

radioactive iodines released to offsite

environs, by using effluent monitoring

systems or portable sampling

equipment. The licensee has committed

to maintain the capability for

monitoring iodines within its [specified

document or program]. The licensee has

[implemented this commitment or will

implement this commitment by

(specified date)].

The NRC staff finds that reasonable

controls for the implementation and for

subsequent evaluation of proposed

changes pertaining to the above

regulatory commitments are provided

by the licensee’s administrative

processes, including its commitment

management program. Should the

licensee choose to incorporate a

regulatory commitment into the

emergency plan, final safety analysis

report, or other document with

established regulatory controls, the

associated regulations would define the

appropriate change-control and

reporting requirements. The staff has

determined that the commitments do

not warrant the creation of regulatory

requirements, which would require

prior NRC approval of subsequent

changes. The NRC staff has agreed that

NEI 99–04, Revision 0, ‘‘Guidelines for

Managing NRC Commitment Changes,’’

provides reasonable guidance for the

control of regulatory commitments

made to the NRC staff. (See Regulatory

Issue Summary 2000–17, Managing

Regulatory Commitments Made by

Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC

Staff, dated September 21, 2000

[ADAMS Accession Number

ML003741774].) The commitments

should be controlled in accordance with

the industry guidance or comparable

criteria employed by a specific licensee.

The staff may choose to verify the

implementation and maintenance of

these commitments in a future

inspection or audit.

5.0 State Consultation

In accordance with the Commission’s

regulations, the [ ] State official was

notified of the proposed issuance of the

amendments. The State official had [(1)

no comments or (2) the following

comments—with subsequent

disposition by the staff].

6.0 Environmental Consideration

The amendments change a

requirement with respect to the

installation or use of a facility

component located within the restricted

area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and

change surveillance requirements. The

NRC staff has determined that the

amendments involve no significant

increase in the amounts and no

significant change in the types of any

effluents that may be released offsite,

and that there is no significant increase

in individual or cumulative

occupational radiation exposure. The

Commission has previously issued a

proposed finding that the amendments

involve no significant hazards

consideration, and there has been no

public comment on such finding ( FR ).

Accordingly, the amendments meet the

eligibility criteria for categorical

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b)

no environmental impact statement or

environmental assessment need be

prepared in connection with the

issuance of the amendments.

7.0 Conclusion

The Commission has concluded,

based on the considerations discussed

above, that (1) there is reasonable

assurance that the health and safety of

the public will not be endangered by

operation in the proposed manner, (2)

such activities will be conducted in

compliance with the Commission’s

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the

amendments will not be inimical to the

common defense and security or to the

health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards

Consideration Determination

Description of Amendment Request:

The proposed amendments delete

requirements from the Technical

Specifications (and, as applicable, other

elements of the licensing bases) to

maintain a Post Accident Sampling

System [or Station] (PASS). Licensees

were generally required to implement

PASS upgrades as described in NUREG–

0737, ‘‘Clarification of TMI [Three Mile

Island] Action Plan Requirements,’’ and

Regulatory Guide 1.97,

‘‘Instrumentation for Light-WaterCooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess

Plant and Environs Conditions During

and Following an Accident.’’

Implementation of these upgrades was

an outcome of the lessons learned from

the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit

2. Requirements related to PASS were

imposed by Order for many facilities

and were added to or included in the

technical specifications (TS) for nuclear

power reactors currently licensed to

operate. Lessons learned and

improvements implemented over the

last 20 years have shown that the

information obtained from PASS can be

readily obtained through other means or

is of little use in the assessment and

mitigation of accident conditions.

Basis for proposed no significant

hazards consideration determination:

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration is presented

below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does

Not Involve a Significant Increase in the

Probability or Consequences of an

Accident Previously Evaluated.

The PASS was originally designed to

perform many sampling and analysis

functions. These functions were

designed and intended to be used in

post accident situations and were put

into place as a result of the TMI–2

accident. The specific intent of the

PASS was to provide a system that has

the capability to obtain and analyze

samples of plant fluids containing

potentially high levels of radioactivity,

without exceeding plant personnel

radiation exposure limits. Analytical

results of these samples would be used

largely for verification purposes in

aiding the plant staff in assessing the

extent of core damage and subsequent

offsite radiological dose projections. The

system was not intended to and does

not serve a function for preventing

66954 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices

accidents and its elimination would not

affect the probability of accidents

previously evaluated.

In the 20 years since the TMI–2

accident and the consequential

promulgation of post accident sampling

requirements, operating experience has

demonstrated that a PASS provides

little actual benefit to post accident

mitigation. Past experience has

indicated that there exists in-plant

instrumentation and methodologies

available in lieu of a PASS for collecting

and assimilating information needed to

assess core damage following an

accident. Furthermore, the

implementation of Severe Accident

Management Guidance (SAMG)

emphasizes accident management

strategies based on in-plant instruments.

These strategies provide guidance to the

plant staff for mitigation and recovery

from a severe accident. Based on current

severe accident management strategies

and guidelines, it is determined that the

PASS provides little benefit to the plant

staff in coping with an accident.

The regulatory requirements for the

PASS can be eliminated without

degrading the plant emergency

response. The emergency response, in

this sense, refers to the methodologies

used in ascertaining the condition of the

reactor core, mitigating the

consequences of an accident, assessing

and projecting offsite releases of

radioactivity, and establishing

protective action recommendations to

be communicated to offsite authorities.

The elimination of the PASS will not

prevent an accident management

strategy that meets the initial intent of

the post-TMI–2 accident guidance

through the use of the SAMGs, the

emergency plan (EP), the emergency

operating procedures (EOP), and site

survey monitoring that support

modification of emergency plan

protective action recommendations

(PARs).

Therefore, the elimination of PASS

requirements from Technical

Specifications (TS) (and other elements

of the licensing bases) does not involve

a significant increase in the

consequences of any accident

previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does

Not Create the Possibility of a New or

Different Kind of Accident from any

Previously Evaluated.

The elimination of PASS related

requirements will not result in any

failure mode not previously analyzed.

The PASS was intended to allow for

verification of the extent of reactor core

damage and also to provide an input to

offsite dose projection calculations. The

PASS is not considered an accident

precursor, nor does its existence or

elimination have any adverse impact on

the pre-accident state of the reactor core

or post accident confinement of

radioisotopes within the containment

building.

Therefore, this change does not create

the possibility of a new or different kind

of accident from any previously

evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does

Not Involve a Significant Reduction in

the Margin of Safety.

The elimination of the PASS, in light

of existing plant equipment,

instrumentation, procedures, and

programs that provide effective

mitigation of and recovery from reactor

accidents, results in a neutral impact to

the margin of safety. Methodologies that

are not reliant on PASS are designed to

provide rapid assessment of current

reactor core conditions and the

direction of degradation while

effectively responding to the event in

order to mitigate the consequences of

the accident. The use of a PASS is

redundant and does not provide quick

recognition of core events or rapid

response to events in progress. The

intent of the requirements established as

a result of the TMI–2 accident can be

adequately met without reliance on a

PASS.

Therefore, this change does not

involve a significant reduction in the

margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented

above and the previous discussion of

the amendment request, the requested

change does not involve a significant

hazards consideration.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day

of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William D. Beckner,

Chief, Technical Specification Branch,

Division of Regulatory Improvement

Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–31803 Filed 12–26–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

POSTAL SERVICE

United Postal Service Board of

Governors; Sunshine Act Meeting

TIMES AND DATES: 8 a.m., Monday,

January 7, 2002; 8:30 a.m., Tuesday,

January 8, 2002.

PLACE: Washington, D.C., at U.S. Postal

Service Headquarters, 475 L’Enfant

Plaza, SW., in the Benjamin Franklin

Room.

STATUS: January 7—8 a.m. (Closed);

January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open).

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Monday, January 7—8 a.m. (Closed)

1. Personnel Matters and Compensation

Issues.

2. Management Compensation Strategy.

3. Financial Performance.

4. Strategic Planning.

Tuesday, January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open)

1. Minutes of the Previous Meetings,

December 3–4, and December 13,

2001.

2. Remarks of the Postmaster General

and CEO.

3. Consideration of Board Resolution on

Capital Funding.

4. Annual Report on Government in the

Sunshine Act Compliance.

5. Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Report.

Tuesday, January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open)

[continued]

6. Semipostal Stamps.

7. Quarterly Report on Financial

Performance.

8. Quarterly Report on Service

Performance.

9. Election of Chairman and Vice

Chairman of the Board of

Governors.

10. Tentative Agenda for the February

4–5, 2002, meeting in Phoenix,

Arizona.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:

David G. Hunter, Secretary of the Board,

U.S. Postal Service, 475 L’Enfant Plaza,

SW., Washington, DC 20260–1000.

Telephone (202) 268–4800.

David G. Hunter,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01–31965 Filed 12–21–01; 1:34 pm]

BILLING CODE 7710–12–M

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

[Release No. IC–25320; 812–12684]

Sensar Corporation; Notice of

Application

December 19, 2001.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange

Commission (‘‘Commission’’).

ACTION: Notice of an application for an

order under section 6(c) of the

Investment Company Act of 1940 (the

‘‘Act’’).

SUMMARY OF APPLICATION: Sensar

Corporation (‘‘Applicant’’) requests an

order exempting it from all provisions of

the Act until the earlier of one year from

the date that the requested order is