Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense o f res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : CHRIS M. TEAGLE GREGORY F. ZOELLER Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

NAT HAN W. GOLDEN, ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 05A02

- 1204

- CR

- 345 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE BLACKFORD SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable J. Nicholas Barry , Judge Cause No. 05D01

- 1110

- FD

- 428
September 28, 2012 MEMORAN DUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION B ARNES, Judge2 Case Summary Nathan Golden appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for Class D felony theft. We affirm.
Issue The sole issue before us is whether Golden’s three

- year sentence, with two yea rs suspended, is inappropriate.
Facts On October 28, 2011, Golden went to a gas station in Hartford City and shoplifted a candy bar. Golden claims that at the time of the offense he was under the influence of
p ropofol, an anesthetic that he received for a back injury he sustained several years earlier. On October 31, 2011, the State charged Golden with one count of Class D felony theft. On January 12, 2012, Golden agreed to plead guilty to the charge , with the State agreeing to a cap of one year for any executed part of the sentence. On March 21, 2012, the trial court sentenced Golden to a term of three years, with one year executed and two years suspended to probation. Golden now appeals. Analysis Golden argues solely that his sentence is inappropria te under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of his character and the nature of the offense. See Ang lemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007)

. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing deci sion, we still must give due3

consideration to that decision. Rutherford v. State , 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a d efendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Id. The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and thos e charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State , 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest

— the aggregate sentence

— rather than the trees

— consec utive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad othe r factors that come to light in a given

case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State , 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). We concede that the nature of the offense here is about as insignificant as it could possibly be for a count of Class D felony theft. Golden shoplifted o ne can dy bar from a gas station . Golden also asserts that he was under the lingering influence of the anesthetic propofol at the time of the crime, which he took under medical guidance for a back injury.4

Regarding Golden’s character, however, he has several pr ior convictions, including three for Class D felony receiving stolen property, one for Class D felony theft, one for Class C felony possession of a handgun with altered identification marks, one for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, and one for Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness with a vehicle. He also had probation revoked on one prior occasion and was on probation for the criminal recklessness conviction when he committed the present offense. Although Golden argues that mo st of his criminal history
was not recent

— except for criminal recklessness, all of his convictions occurred before
2003

— the sheer number of convictions, together with the similarity of many of the convictions to the present offense, is egregious. Golden d id plead guilty. We acknowledge that courts should “carefully assess the potential mitigating weight of any guilty plea.” Marlett v. State , 878 N.E.2d 860, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied . Golden received a benefit from the plea agreement in tha t the executed portion of his sentenced was capped at one year. A guilty plea is less mitigating when the defendant receives a substantial benefit from it. Lindsey v. State , 877 N.E.2d 190, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied

. Moreover, as instructe d by Davidson , it is relevant that two years of Golden’s
three

- year sentence were suspended and only one year is executed. In other words, even though Golden technically received a maximum sentence for this crime, the punitive effect of that sentence is l ess than if he had been required to serve all three years of his5

sentence in prison. We conclude that despite the minor nature of the offense here, Golden’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of his character. Conclusion Golden’s sentence is not inap propriate. We affirm. Affirmed. VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.