Filed 6/20/13 In re A.L. CA4/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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COURT OF APPAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

In re A.L., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

A.L., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 D061800 

 (Super. Ct. No. JCM222463) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura H. 

Parsky and Richard R. Monroy, Judges, and Peter Fagan, Temporary Judge.* Affirmed. 

 Laurel M. Nelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 

* Pursuant to article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution. 
2 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Donald W. 

Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 A.L. appeals from the juvenile court's order declaring him a ward of the court after 

sustaining an amended petition alleging he violated Penal Code1 section 148, subdivision 

(a)(1) (resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer; count 1) and section 594, 

subdivision (a) (vandalism; count 2), and after making a true finding that A.L. committed 

the vandalism for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street 

gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist criminal conduct by gang 

members in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (d). 

A.L. contends the trial court erred when it found he resisted or obstructed a police 

officer in count 1 because the police officer who arrested him used excessive force and 

was therefore acting unlawfully. A.L. also contends the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to suppress evidence stemming from his arrest on count 2 because the 

arresting officer only had probable cause to believe that A.L. committed a misdemeanor, 

not a felony, and therefore the arresting officer first had to obtain an arrest warrant 

because the crime was not committed in the officer's presence. 

As we explain, we disagree with these contentions and affirm the order declaring 

A.L. a ward of the court. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted otherwise. 
3 

DISCUSSION 

I 

Resisting Arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) 

 A.L. contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding he violated 

section 148, subdivision (a)(1) because the prosecution failed to establish that the 

arresting officer was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties at the time he 

handcuffed and arrested the minor. 

 A. Background

 San Diego Police Officer Zack Pfannenstiel testified he received a "hot call" from 

dispatch about 10:40 p.m. on January 5, 2012, about a group of Hispanic males—

including one carrying a gun—running in an area in Linda Vista known for its gang 

activity. Police believed the males had been involved in a "disturbance fight." At least 

five patrol units responded to the call, as did a police helicopter and a canine unit. 

 When Officer Pfannenstiel arrived at the scene, two of the individuals in the group 

had been apprehended. Officer Pfannenstiel recognized one of those individuals as a 

member of the criminal street gang Linda Vista 13. Officer Pfannenstiel testified he was 

familiar with members of this gang and their monikers. 

 Based on the information provided from dispatch, Officer Pfannenstiel and his 

partner then proceeded to the location where the other individuals had been seen running. 

At that point, Officer Pfannenstiel spotted three other individuals near an apartment 

complex. Officer Pfannenstiel recognized one of the individuals as A.L., who went by 
4 

the moniker "Alex Boy," and who Officer Pfannenstiel had previously encountered at 

least four or five times while on patrol in the area. According to Officer Pfannenstiel, 

A.L. also matched the description given by dispatch of one of the individuals seen 

running in the area. As the officers in their marked patrol car approached the individuals, 

they took off running, A.L. included. Officer Pfannenstiel got out of the patrol car and 

yelled, "Stop. Police." He then started chasing the three individuals on foot. 

Officer Pfannenstiel testified that he believed one of the three individuals he was 

chasing was armed because police had not found a gun on the two individuals they 

already had detained and because the initial report was that one of individuals in the 

group was seen with a gun. While Officer Pfannenstiel gave chase, his partner drove the 

police car up a small driveway near an apartment complex. At some point, the three 

individuals must have seen the patrol car because, according to Officer Pfannenstiel, they 

tried to "double back." As they did, A.L. ran right into Officer Pfannenstiel's path. 

Officer Pfannenstiel testified he ordered A.L. to the ground, but the minor refused. 

At that point, Officer Pfannenstiel was not sure whether A.L. was carrying a gun or other 

weapon, although he testified that in his experience a large percentage of gang members 

carry "guns, knives, something" and thus, when dealing with such individuals, Officer 

Pfannenstiel assumes they are armed. 

Officer Pfannenstiel next pushed A.L. to the ground. After he had done so, A.L. 

clenched his fists and tensed his upper body, as demonstrated by Officer Pfannenstiel 

while testifying on the witness stand. Officer Pfannenstiel testified he thought 
5 

"something [was] coming" from A.L. at this point. Because A.L. also was not following 

Officer Pfannenstiel's orders to roll over and/or to stop resisting and continued to tense 

his body and clench his fists, Officer Pfannenstiel testified he punched A.L. once in the 

stomach as a "distraction blow." Officer Pfannenstiel, who was alone at the time, again 

ordered A.L. to roll over onto his stomach. When A.L. did not comply, Officer 

Pfannenstiel testified he rolled A.L. over and handcuffed him. As Officer Pfannenstiel 

was apprehending A.L., he saw the two other individuals he had been chasing hiding 

behind a bush. One of those individuals Officer Pfannenstiel knew as also being a 

member of the criminal street gang Linda Vista 13. 

Officer Pfannenstiel next placed A.L. in the back of the patrol car. Because the 

back partition inside the patrol car was open, A.L. leaned up and spat on the car seat and 

on parts of the front dash of the patrol car. A.L. did not suffer any injuries and declined 

medical treatment. 

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

A.L. "willfully and unlawfully" resisted arrest in violation of section 148, subdivision 

(a)(1). In making its finding, the court found Officer Pfannenstiel "not only was credible, 

but having sat right next to the officer, I find there to be a certain affinity between the 

officer and [A.L.] and I don't find there to be any hostility or animosity at all. I think the 

officer was doing his job and he was carrying his job out to the best of his abilities given 

the very difficult circumstances that he was under that evening. And I think if [Officer 

Pfannenstiel and A.L.] are [to] run into each other again in the future on the street, it 
6 

would be an amicable encounter again if the circumstances are not similar to the January 

5th evening. I thought the officer showed due restraint in a very difficult situation, and as 

I said, shows no animosity towards [A.L.] at all. So I am finding Count 1 to be true." 

B. Governing Law 

To establish a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), the prosecution must 

show that (1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) 

who was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or 

reasonably should have known the other person was a peace officer engaged in the 

performance of his or her duties. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 

Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.) "The offense is a general intent crime, proscribing only the 

particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference to an intent to do a further act or 

achieve a future consequence." (In re Muhammad C., supra, at p. 1329.) 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal as in the instant 

case, we "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment [or order] 

below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 

578.) In viewing the evidence favorably to the judgment or order, we must also 

"'presume in support of the judgment [or order] the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify 

the trial court's findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances 
7 

might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citations.]'" (In re Ryan N. 

(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372.) "The same standard of appellate review is applicable 

in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction." (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 

137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.) 

As relevant here, a "[d]efendant cannot be convicted of an offense against an 

officer engaged in the performance of official duties unless the officer was acting 

lawfully at the time. [Citation.] 'The rule flows from the premise that because an officer 

has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in "duties," for purposes of an 

offense defined in such terms, if the officer's conduct is unlawful. [Citations.]' 

[Citation.]" (People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1109, fn. omitted.) 

Thus, when a peace officer employs reasonable force to make a lawful arrest, the 

officer is acting in the performance of his or her duties; the arrestee is obliged not to 

resist and has no right of self-defense against such force. (People v. Adams (2009) 176 

Cal.App.4th 946, 952; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52, disapproved on other 

grounds as stated in In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [noting that "it is the duty of 

every citizen to submit to lawful arrest"].) 

However, a peace officer is not engaged in the performance of his or her duties if 

an arrest is unlawful. An arrest is unlawful if the officer uses excessive force. (People v. 

Delahoussaye (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 

45.) 
8 

C. Analysis

Here, A.L.'s contention involves the second element of section 148, subdivision 

(a)(1), to wit: the requirement that Officer Pfannenstiel was engaged in the performance 

of his lawful duties. A.L. contends there is insufficient evidence to establish this element 

because Officer Pfannenstiel used excessive and unreasonable force. We disagree. 

We conclude ample evidence in the record supports the finding that when Officer 

Pfannenstiel pushed A.L. to the ground, he used objectively reasonable force as the 

officer was then facing "very difficult circumstances" as found by the juvenile court, 

which included chasing known members of a criminal street gang late at night, while 

concerned that one or more of those members could be armed, and doing so alone. The 

record also shows that A.L. initially ran when Officer Pfannenstiel ordered him to stop 

and that A.L. also refused to follow the officer's simple instruction that he get on the 

ground after the two crossed paths. 

Moreover, the record shows that after Officer Pfannenstiel pushed A.L. to the 

ground, Officer Pfannenstiel ordered A.L. to roll over onto his stomach. Again, A.L. 

refused the officer's simple instruction and instead tensed up and clenched his fists. At 

that point, the record shows Officer Pfannenstiel understandably was concerned the 

minor might strike him. In response, Officer Pfannenstiel punched A.L. once in the 

stomach as a "distraction blow" in order to secure A.L.'s compliance, but A.L. continued 

to refuse to comply with the officer's instructions. Nevertheless, Officer Pfannenstiel 

then was able to roll A.L. over and handcuff him. Under the circumstances, we conclude 
9 

substantial evidence also supports the finding that Officer Pfannenstiel's single 

"distraction blow" to A.L.'s stomach was reasonable and not excessive force. As such, 

we reject A.L.'s contention that the true finding in count 1 for violation of section 148, 

subdivision (a) was not supported by substantial evidence. 

II 

Motion to Suppress 

 A.L. next contends the juvenile court erred when it denied his motion to suppress 

evidence pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 because the arresting 

officer lacked an arrest warrant.2

A. Background

Bernal Lund was the assistant pastor at the Canyon Ridge Baptist Church (church) 

located in Linda Vista. On or about January 6, 2012, while checking church property, he 

discovered what turned out to be gang graffiti on a concrete storm drain on the property. 

Lund reported the incident to San Diego police. 

San Diego Police Officer Joel Hoolihan testified at the suppression hearing that he 

responded to a vandalism call at the church. After taking pictures and making a report of 

the vandalism, Officer Hoolihan contacted San Diego Police Detective William Miles 

because in the past the church had worked with Detective Miles in other incidents of 

vandalism on the property. 

 

2 We reach the merits of this issue despite the fact A.L. did not raise this specific 

ground in his motion to suppress. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128-

131 [specific ground for suppressing evidence must be litigated in trial court].) 
10 

Detective Miles testified that he was assigned to the graffiti strike task force and 

that he was responsible for all graffiti-related incidents in Linda Vista. He investigated 

the incident at the church, including reviewing the photographs and Officer Hoolihan's 

report, and was able to make out a "gang set and monikers" for those responsible. 

Specifically, Detective Miles determined the gang responsible was the "Linda Vista 13 

Tiny Locos." Under the "gang set," Detective Miles identified two monikers, "Alex Boy" 

and "Conejo1," followed by the letters "C.K." Based on his training and experience, 

Detective Miles opined that "C.K." meant "Crip Killer." 

Detective Miles testified he spoke to other gang experts in the police department 

familiar with the Linda Vista area, conducted computer searches of these monikers in a 

database and identified A.L. as the name associated with the "Alex Boy" moniker. 

Detective Miles along with other San Diego police officers then went to A.L.'s residence. 

A.L. was not present, but Detective Miles spoke to A.L.'s mother and younger sister. 

A.L.'s younger sister confirmed that A.L. went by the moniker "Alex Boy." 

A.L.'s mother subsequently contacted Detective Miles and he, along with another 

officer, met A.L. and A.L.'s mother and father at a street corner near the family residence. 

Detective Miles determined A.L. smelled of alcohol, but A.L. denied he had been 

drinking. Because A.L. was uncooperative and because they were located on a street 

corner, Detective Miles placed A.L. under arrest for the vandalism to the church. 

The juvenile court, after hearing testimony and argument from counsel, denied the 

motion to suppress, ruling as follows: 
11 

"Based on the evidence adduced during this hearing and having considered the 

papers of both parties, the court finds that there was probable cause to arrest the minor. 

[¶] The court is considering the totality of the circumstances and looking at it from the 

point of view of a reasonable officer using ordinary care and prudence and finds that such 

an officer would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime had been 

committed, specifically, that the vandalism had been committed, and the defendant or the 

minor was the one who had done that. 

"Based on the information he had from his database and the field interview of the 

minor, who admitted to being Alex Boy, which was the graffiti which was on the church 

property, the sister's comment that the minor had written down that moniker, 'Alex Boy,' 

the detective's training and experience in working on graffiti and gang cases and 

interviewing . . . people involved in graffiti and gang activity, and also this conservation 

with [another gang expert], who also gave his opinions about the meaning of the graffiti 

and connecting Alex Boy to Linda Vista 13. [¶] Based on all of those factors, the court 

finds there was probable cause. Therefore, the motion is denied." 

B. Governing Law and Analysis

"The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well 

established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. '"On appeal from the 

denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the 

trial court's ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact 

by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine 
12 

whether the facts support the court's legal conclusions." [Citation.]'" (In re Lennies H.

(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) 

As relevant here, under section 836, subdivision (a), a police officer may arrest a 

person without a warrant when "(2) [t]he person arrested has committed a felony, 

although not in the officer's presence" or "(3) [t]he officer has probable cause to believe 

that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has 

been committed." Probable cause to arrest "is measured by an objective standard based 

on the information known to the arresting officer, rather than a subjective standard that 

would take into account the arresting officer's actual motivations and beliefs. . . ." 

(Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045.) 

Here, A.L. wisely does not argue that Detective Miles lacked probable cause to 

believe that A.L. was responsible (at least in part) for the vandalism on the church 

property, inasmuch as the record contains ample evidence to support that finding. 

Instead, A.L. contends his conduct in vandalizing that property was not a felony because 

under section 594, subdivision (b)(1), vandalism that causes $400 or more in damage is 

chargeable as a felony. According to A.L., because the assistant pastor of the church 

testified at the suppression hearing that the church spent $150 to paint over the graffiti, 

A.L's conduct could only have been charged as a misdemeanor. We reject this 

contention. 

First, that the church spent $150 after the fact to repair the vandalism is not 

relevant to the issue of whether an arresting officer like Detective Miles had reasonable 
13 

cause at the time of arrest to arrest A.L. for the vandalism. (See Gillan v. City of San 

Marino, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.) 

Second, under section 594.3, subdivision (a), it is a felony to vandalize a "church, 

synagogue, temple, building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution, or 

other place primarily used as a place of worship where religious services are regularly 

conducted . . . ." For this separate reason, we find A.L.'s contention unavailing. 

Finally, under section 186.22, subdivision (d), any misdemeanor offense may be 

charged as a felony when, as here, it is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or 

in association with, any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further 

or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. The record shows A.L. was properly 

charged for, and ultimately the juvenile court made a true finding of, felony vandalism 

under this statute. We thus independently conclude the record supports the finding of the 

trial court that Detective Miles had probable cause to arrest A.L. without first obtaining a 

warrant. (See In re Lennies H., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The juvenile court's order declaring A.L. a ward of the court is affirmed. 

BENKE, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 McCONNELL, P. J. 

 HALLER, J.