Filed 2/11/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

EDDIE E.,

 Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 

COUNTY,

 Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

 Real Parties in Interest.

 G049637

 (Super. Ct. No. DL039927)

 O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of 

the Superior Court of Orange County, Nick A. Dourbetas, Judge. Petition granted.

Esperanza Immigrant Rights Project, Catholic Charities of Los Angeles,

Lindsay Toczylowski and Rachel Prandini for Petitioner.

No appearance by Respondent.

No appearance by Real Party in Interest.

 
2

Petitioner Eddie E., an undocumented immigrant, petitions for a writ of 

mandate to overturn the court’s refusal to make favorable findings under the Immigration 

and Nationality Act, title 8 of the United States Code section 1101(a)(27)(J)

(section 1101(a)(27)(J) or the SIJ statute), which findings are a prerequisite to him 

applying for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status, a path to citizenship. We issued an 

order to real party in interest to show cause why a writ of mandate should not issue. 

SIJ status cannot be granted unless a state court finds, among other things, 

that petitioner cannot reunify with “1 or both” of his parents due to abuse, neglect, or 

abandonment, and that it would not be in petitioner’s best interest to return to his home 

country. (§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii).) The trial court refused to make either finding. It 

found that even though his mother abandoned him, he was living with his father and thus 

reunification was possible with his father. It also held that mother’s subsequent death 

meant petitioner’s inability to reunify with her was due to death, not abandonment. It 

further found that a “fresh start” in Mexico would be good for petitioner, and thus 

returning him to Mexico was in petitioner’s best interest. 

We disagree. “[One] or both” is disjunctive, and petitioner proved he was 

abandoned by his mother, satisfying that condition. True, mother died, but that only 

made the abandonment permanent. We also disagree with the court’s analysis of 

petitioner’s best interest. The evidence shows beyond dispute that it is not in petitioner’s 

best interest to return to Mexico. Accordingly, we grant the petition. 

FACTS

Petitioner was born in Mexico. When he was five years old, his mother 

brought him and his two older siblings to the United States, apparently without 

documentation, to reunify with his father. Petitioner has never returned to Mexico.
3

Petitioner’s mother left the family when he was eight years old. Mother

never returned, provided financial support, or even attempted to contact the family after 

she left. Mother died approximately seven years after she left.

Petitioner continued living with his father, but lived a hard life. His father 

had diabetes and drank excessively, which further exacerbated his diabetes. Though 

father never abused petitioner, his condition made it hard to find work and provide for the 

family. As a result of his inability to pay rent, the family was frequently evicted. 

Petitioner lived in several cities in California and in Phoenix, Arizona. As a result of 

moving around so much, petitioner rarely went to school, and never attended any school 

for more than one year. 

In April 2011, a juvenile delinquency case was filed against petitioner

leading to a finding that he had unlawfully taken a vehicle, was guilty of hit and run 

causing property damage, and resisted or obstructed a public officer. Petitioner was 

declared a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The 

court imposed probation and eight days in juvenile hall. Petitioner was released from 

juvenile hall directly to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, though he 

remained a ward of the court.

While in custody, petitioner managed to “[get] his life back on the right 

track” by not only graduating from high school, but doing so with a 4.0 grade point 

average (excluding the period before his probation), which petitioner described as “by far 

the most important achievement of my life.” 

In December 2012, petitioner requested that the court make findings 

pursuant to section 1101(a)(27)(J) so that he could file for SIJ status. The request was 

unopposed by the People.
4

The three prerequisite findings to filing for SIJ status are: (1) that the 

petitioner has been declared dependent on a juvenile court or “such a court has legally 

committed [petitioner] to, or placed [petitioner] under the custody of, an agency or 

department of a State” (or an individual or entity appointed by a state), (2) “reunification 

with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 

abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and (3) “it would not be in the 

alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of 

nationality or country of last habitual residence.” (§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii).)

1

 The first 

time the court addressed petitioner’s request, it did not reach the second or third 

prerequisite, finding petitioner’s commitment to juvenile hall and to probation did not 

qualify as being a dependent of the juvenile court. (Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 

223 Cal.App.4th 622, 628 (Eddie E.).)

In October 2013, we issued a writ of mandate reversing the court’s 

decision, holding petitioner need not be a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300 to satisfy the first prerequisite because “[u]nder the plain language of the 

statute [citation], dependency under section 300 is not the only manner in which 

petitioner could satisfy the first part of title 8 United States Code section 

1101(a)(27)(J)(i). Rather, as an alternative basis, a resident alien in petitioner’s position 

may also demonstrate he had been ‘legally committed to, or placed in the custody of, an 

agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or 

juvenile court located in the United States.’” (Eddie E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 

628.) We instructed the court on remand to consider whether petitioner had satisfied this 

alternative basis, and, if so, to consider the second and third prerequisites. (Ibid.)

 

1

The petitioner must still obtain the consent of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, which is in the Secretary’s discretion. (§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).)
5

In early December 2013, the court held a hearing to consider those issues. 

Shortly before that hearing, petitioner admitted to probation violations (the record is not 

clear as to what those were). At the hearing on remand, the court found petitioner

satisfied the first prerequisite because he was in the custody of a state agency, but not the 

second or the third prerequisite.

2

 

With respect to whether “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s 

parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 

State law” (§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)), the court held petitioner could not meet this prerequisite 

because he lived with his father, who did not abuse him. In reaching this conclusion, the 

court followed the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in In re Interest of Erick M. 

(2012) 820 N.W.2d 639 (Erick M.) in holding that the requirement to show an inability to 

reunify with “1 or both” parents meant the petitioner had to prove he could not reunify 

with both parents, not just one. Alternatively, the court held that because petitioner’s 

mother died seven years after abandoning him, the inability to reunify was not “due to”

abandonment, but due to death.

The court also found it would be in petitioner’s best interest to be returned 

to Mexico. Although the court acknowledged that petitioner had “lived the majority of 

his life in the United States,” and that “[h]e appeared to have gotten his life back on the 

right track and graduated from high school with excellent grades,” it found his criminal 

history demonstrated that he had “not been successful on probation and continue[d] to 

make poor choices in his life.” The court specifically noted petitioner’s unresolved drug 

problems. Petitioner’s only family in Mexico is a brother living in Juarez, Mexico. 

Petitioner testified that his brother would not be able to provide for him, however, and 

 

2

Under the holding of Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 

340, 351-352 (Leslie H.), “a minor alien adjudicated a delinquent, placed in juvenile hall, 

and committed upon release to ongoing child welfare agency supervision qualifie[s]

under section 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) as a child in dependent, committed, or custodial care.”
6

expressed concern that Juarez was “one of the most dangerous cities in the world.” But 

the court found those concerns to be “speculative” and opined that an “equally 

compelling, yet speculative argument [is] that to the contrary, it would seem that a fresh 

start away from here might work to his benefit.” The court speculated that petitioner’s 

high school diploma would be a “useful tool” that “could open doors in Mexico for a job 

or even continuing his education at a college or university.”

Petitioner petitioned this court for a writ of mandate and/or other 

appropriate relief, directing the trial court to enter favorable findings on the second and 

third prerequisites for SIJ status. The People have not appeared but have informed us by 

letter that they do not oppose the granting of the relief sought.

DISCUSSION

The SIJ statute sets forth a procedure for classification of certain aliens as 

special immigrants who have been declared dependent on a juvenile court or placed in the 

custody of a state agency (or someone appointed by a state agency). “Congress created 

this classification to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned unaccompanied minors 

through a process that allows them to become permanent legal residents. 

[Citation.] . . . [Citation.] A minor who obtains SIJ status may become a naturalized 

United States citizen after five years.” (In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 915.) 

“While the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to immigration 

[citations], including the final determination whether an alien child will be granted 

permanent status as an SIJ [citations], state juvenile courts” “are charged with making a 

preliminary determination of the child’s dependency and his or her best interests, which 

is a prerequisite to an application to adjust status as a special immigrant juvenile.” (In re 

Mario S. (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 2012) 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (Mario S.).)
7

The SIJ statute was enacted in 1990 and originally required a showing that 

the petitioner was dependent on a juvenile court, eligible for long-term foster care, and 

that it would not be in petitioner’s best interest to return to his or her country of 

nationality. (3 Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure (2014) § 35.09[1], p 35-35

(rel. 141-6/2013).) The SIJ statute has been amended twice since its enactment. (Eddie 

E. supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 626.) “‘In 1997 . . . Congress amended § 1101(a)(27)(J) 

to require that a court, in its order, determine that the juvenile (1) is eligible for long-term 

foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and (2) has been declared a dependent 

of a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency’ [citations]. ‘Under the 

2008 amendment, the eligibility requirements . . . hinge primarily on a reunification 

determination. The amendment expanded eligibility to include juvenile immigrants 

whom a court has committed to or placed in the custody of an individual or a stateappointed entity — not just those whom a court has committed to or placed with a state 

agency or department . . . . Finally, Congress removed the requirement that a state 

juvenile court find that a juvenile is eligible for long-term foster care because of abuse, 

neglect, or abandonment. Instead, a court must find that reunification is not possible 

because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.’” (Mario S., supra, 954 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 848-

849, italics added.)

Section 1101(a)(27)(J), currently defines a special immigrant juvenile as 

follows: “an immigrant who is present in the United States — [¶] (i) who has been 

declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court 

has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a 

State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the 

United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not 

viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; [¶]

(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it 

would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous 
8

country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and [¶] (iii) in whose case 

the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile 

status . . . .”

“The consent determination made by the Secretary, through the [United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services] District Director, is now ‘an

acknowledgement that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide.’” (3 Gordon et al., 

Immigration Law and Procedure § 35.09 at pp. 35-40 to 35-41.) As explained by a 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) field memorandum, this 

means the SIJ benefit was not “‘sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status 

of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of 

obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.’” (Donald Neufeld, USCIS 

Acting Associate Dir. Domestic Operations, mem. to Field Leadership, Mar. 24, 2009.)

Petitioner Satisfied the Second Prerequisite of the SIJ Statute Because His Mother 

Abandoned Him

We first address whether petitioner had been abandoned by “1 or both” of 

his parents for purposes of the second prerequisite. The court held this language required 

petitioner to prove both of his parents abandoned him. 

We begin our analysis with the observation that this holding runs contrary 

to a literal interpretation of the statute. “1 or both” is disjunctive. “The plain and 

ordinary meaning of the word ‘or’ is well established. When used in a statute, the word 

‘or’ indicates an intention to designate separate, disjunctive categories.” (Smith v. Selma 

Community Hospital (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1, 30.) Under the plain reading of the 

statute, therefore, a petitioner may satisfy the second prerequisite by showing an inability 

to reunify with one parent due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under 

state law. The majority of commentators and cases to address this issue have adhered to 

this literal interpretation. (See H.S.P. v. J.K. (N.J.Ct.App. 2014) 87A.3d 255, 265
9

[collecting commentators and cases].) Unless the literal interpretation results in 

absurdities, we are bound to apply it. (Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 583

[“[J]udicial construction of unambiguous statutes is appropriate only when literal 

interpretation would yield absurd results”].)

We have found two cases that depart from this literal meaning, the first of 

which the trial court relied on here. The first is Erick M., supra, 820 N.W.2d 639 from 

the Supreme Court of Nebraska, which interpreted the phrase to mean that if the 

petitioner had lived with both parents prior to the juvenile proceeding, reunification must 

be infeasible with both parents to qualify. (Id. at p. 647.) The court held that proof of 

one absent parent is not the end of the inquiry. “A petitioner must normally show that 

reunification with the other parent is also not feasible. [¶] But if a juvenile lives with 

only one parent when a juvenile court enters a guardianship or dependency order, the 

reunification component under § 1101(a)(27)(J) is not satisfied if a petitioner fails to 

show that it is not feasible to return the juvenile to the parent who had custody. This is 

true without any consideration of whether reunification with the absent parent is feasible 

because the juvenile has a safe parent to whose custody a court can return the juvenile. 

[¶] In contrast, if the juvenile was living with both parents before a guardianship or 

dependency order was issued, reunification with both parents is usually at issue. These 

varied results are all consistent with Congress’ intent that SIJ status be available to only 

those juveniles who are seeking relief from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment.” 

(Ibid., fns. omitted.)

To reach this result, the Erik M. court found the statutory language “1 or 

both” to be ambiguous for the following reason: “[b]ecause ‘or’ describes what a 

juvenile court must determine in the alternative, we could also reasonably interpret the 

phrase ‘1 or both’ parents to mean that a juvenile court must find, depending on the 

circumstances, that either reunification with one parent is not feasible or reunification 

with both parents is not feasible.” (Erick M., supra, 820 N.W.2d at p. 644.) We find this 
10

rationale a bit hard to follow, because that description mostly follows the statutory 

language. But apparently the court believed that in any given case the statute could only 

provide one means of satisfying the second prerequisite. In other words, the word “or” is 

ambiguous. We see no basis for that conclusion, however. As noted above, it is 

commonplace for statutes to provide alternative means of satisfying a condition using the 

disjunctive word “or.” Here, the statute provides that a minor can satisfy the second 

prerequisite by showing that one parent is unfit, or by showing that both parents are unfit. 

Since there is no ambiguity, the inquiry should end there.

3

 (Simmons v. Ghaderi, supra, 

44 Cal.4th at p. 583). 

Even if the statute could be deemed ambiguous, however, we find the Erick 

M. court’s rationale for resolving that ambiguity as it did unpersuasive. After finding an 

ambiguity, the court reached what it termed “the better rule” (Erick M., supra, 820 

N.W.2d at p. 648) by considering USCIS unpublished decisions in which abandonment 

by one or both parents resulted in a petitioner receiving SIJ status (id. at pp. 645-647, fns. 

20, 29, 30, 36, 37).

4

 We have reviewed those cases and find they do not support the 

 

3

Shortly before this opinion was filed, Division Five of the First Appellate 

District of the Court of Appeal, published In re Israel O. (Jan. 16, 2015, A142080) ___ 

Cal.App.4th ___ in which the court agreed with Erick M. to the extent that it found, for 

exactly the same reason, that the statute was ambiguous. ([Id. at p. 8].) The Israel O. 

court, however, went on to interpret the statute in precisely the manner we do here: a 

finding that one parent’s abandonment of the petitioner was sufficient to satisfy the 

second prerequisite even if the juvenile was living with another parent in the United 

States. ([Id. at pp. 11-12].) It reached this result primarily based on its review of USCIS 

materials indicating that this is how USCIS interprets the statute. We agree with the 

result in Israel O., but simply conclude, for the reasons stated above, that the statute is 

not ambiguous. 

4

(Citing In re [Redacted] (U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Citizenship and 

Immigration Serv. Mar. 15, 2011, No. [Redacted]) 2011 WL 7790423; In re [Redacted] 

(U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Serv. Feb. 26, 2010, No. 

[Redacted]) 2010 WL 3426795; In re [Redacted] (U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 

Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Oct. 13, 2009, No. [Redacted]) 2009 WL 6520647; In 
11

Erick M. court’s position. None of them discuss the pertinent issue: whether “1 or both”

can be satisfied by a showing applicable to only one parent when there is another known 

parent. None of them involve a case where one parent was guilty of abuse, neglect, or 

abandonment, but another known parent was not. 

More fundamentally, the Erick M. court’s reliance on USCIS decisions

betrays a misunderstanding of the relative roles of the state court and the USCIS in SIJ

proceedings. It is not the state court’s role to weed out applications based on a court’s 

perception of the lack of good faith of a particular applicant. (See Leslie H., supra, 224 

Cal.App.4th at p. 351 [“A state court’s role in the SIJ process is not to determine worthy 

candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien 

children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned in 

their best interests to their home country”].) The task of weeding out bad-faith 

applications falls to USCIS, which engages in a much broader inquiry than state courts. 

Section 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) specifically requires a petitioner to obtain the consent of the 

Department of Homeland Security to achieve SIJ status. The USCIS field leadership

memorandum for officers implementing this requirement specifically requires them to 

determine the applicant’s “bona fide.” “This means that the SIJ benefit was not ‘sought 

primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect 

or abandonment.’” (Donald Neufeld, USCIS Act. Assoc. Dir. Domestic Operations, 

mem. to Field Leadership, supra.) Even if Erick M. had found a case in which the 

USCIS denied someone SIJ status on the basis that a fit parent was available (which it did 

 

re [Redacted] (U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Oct. 

30, 2009, No. [Redacted]) 2009 WL 6521113; In re [Redacted] (U.S. Dept. of Homeland 

Security, Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Nov. 30, 2009, No. [Redacted]) 2009 WL 

6607581.) 
12

not), it would not follow that this conclusion determines how state courts should fulfill 

their role because USCIS’s charge is broader than ours.

Of the cases the Erick M. court relied on, the only case that even arguably 

supports its rationale is In re [Redacted], supra, 2009 WL 6521113. In our view, 

however, the case is not only distinguishable but only serves to highlight the disparate 

roles of the federal and state authorities in the SIJ process. 

There, the petitioner was brought to the United States by her mother to 

reunify with her father. Sometime later, the father was deported. The petitioner had a 

guardian appointed, obtained the necessary state court findings, and then successfully 

petitioned for SIJ status. It later came to light, that the petitioner continued to live with 

her mother and never lived with the guardian. USCIS instituted revocation proceedings, 

revoked her status, and that order was affirmed on appeal. In the revocation proceeding, 

there was no evidence that the father or mother had abused, neglected, or abandoned the 

petitioner. The administrative court noted on appeal, “the Field Office Director found 

that the petitioner’s continuous residence with her mother undermined her claim of abuse, 

abandonment, neglect, and non-viability of family reunification. [Citation.] Further, the 

Field Office Director determined that the record did not reveal the factual basis for the 

juvenile court’s findings, and the evidence suggested that the dependency order was 

sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining lawful permanent resident status.” (In re

[Redacted], supra, 2009 WL 6521113.) This case is not on point because there was no 

evidence that either parent had abused, neglected, or abandoned the petitioner, and thus it 

does not speak to our situation, where one parent is unfit but another is not. But beyond 

that, it illustrates that it is the USCIS field director’s role to assess whether the petition 

for SIJ status was brought for the right reasons and whether the petitioner merits an 

adjustment of status, not the state court’s role.

5

 

5

As the Erick M. court noted, the USCIS cases it relied on are not considered 

binding precedent. (Erick M., supra, 820 N.W.2d at p. 646.) We analyze them solely for 
13

Thus, not only did the Erick M. court fail to identify an ambiguity in the 

statute, but its resolution of the ostensible ambiguity is unpersuasive. 

The second case to employ a nonliteral interpretation of “1 or both” is

H.S.P., supra, 87 A.3d 255, which reached the same result as Erick M. Unlike the Erick 

M. case, however, the H.S.P. court made little effort to identify an ambiguity in the 

statute. Instead, it jumped straight into the legislative history, which it perceived as 

supporting its conclusion that both parents must have abused, neglected, or abandoned

the petitioner. (H.S.P., at p. 266.) That legislative history generally showed the purpose 

of the SIJ statute was to provide relief for abused, neglected, or abandoned children, “and 

to ensure that the juvenile court determination was not ‘sought primarily for the purpose 

of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than 

for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.’” (H.S.P. at p. 266.) The court 

acknowledged, however, that “[t]here is no specific legislative history on the ‘1 or both’

language.” (Id. at p. 267.) After its review of the legislative history, the court concluded, 

“Thus, the legislative and administrative history of Subparagraph J shows two competing 

goals. Congress wanted to permit use of the SIJ procedure when necessary to prevent the 

return of juveniles to unsafe parents. Where such protection is unnecessary, however, 

Congress wanted to prevent misuse of the SIJ statute for immigration advantage.” (Id. at 

p. 268.) It then concluded that interpreting “1 or both” to mean both better served those 

goals. “The contrary interpretation does not achieve both of Congress’s goals. It would 

mean that a juvenile could apply for SIJ status, with its immigration advantages, even if 

that juvenile could be viably reunified with one parent who never abused, neglected, or 

abandoned the juvenile. Indeed, it would permit SIJ status even if that safe parent had 

raised the juvenile from birth, in love, comfort, and security, and even if reunification 

with the safe parent would not result in any further contact with the unsafe parent. 

 

purposes of analyzing the Erick M. court’s rationale.
14

Nothing in the legislative history of Subparagraph J supports such a broad interpretation.” 

(Id. at p. 268.) Near the end of the decision, the court included one sentence that gave

some recognition of the need to find an ambiguity in the statute: “Finally, that broad 

interpretation [i.e. the literal one] would render Subparagraph J’s words ‘or both’

superfluous, because it would always be sufficient that ‘reunification with 1 . . . of the 

immigrant’s parents is not viable.’” (Ibid.)

Even more so than the Erick M. court, the H.S.P. court fundamentally 

misunderstood its role in the process. Of course the SIJ statute was not designed to 

provide citizenship to petitioners who are comfortably living with a loving, supportive 

parent. But it is USCIS’s role to determine whether the petitioner has applied for SIJ

status primarily for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment, 

not the state court’s role. 

Less obvious, the same misunderstanding infects the H.S.P. court’s 

argument that the statute is ambiguous because a literal reading renders “or both”

superfluous. Why would a petitioner bother to show both parents are unfit due to abuse, 

neglect, or abandonment when showing that one is would suffice? Because showing both 

parents are unfit will be far more effective in proving to USCIS that the petition for SIJ

status is brought in good faith. With the proper understanding of the relative roles of the 

state and federal government in mind, the words “or both” are not superfluous. Showing 

one parent is unfit due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment is the minimum requirement to 

meet the prerequisite, but showing both parents are unfit is more effective. 

Additionally, the Erick M. and H.S.P. courts underestimated the impact the 

abandonment of one parent can have. As the present case amply illustrates, the 

abandonment by one parent, even if another parent is present, can cause a petitioner’s life 

to tailspin out of control, as was the case here. Certainly, petitioner has presented a case 

from which a reasonable USCIS field director could conclude that petitioner has applied 

for SIJ status in good faith to obtain relief from his mother’s abandonment. On the other 
15

hand, a USCIS field director may determine that is not the case. The problem with the 

Erick M. and H.S.P. interpretation is that it completely forecloses the ability of USCIS to 

make that determination. Ultimately, immigration decisions are the purview of the 

federal government, not the state government. (Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p.

351 [“State courts play no role in the final determination of SIJ status or, ultimately, 

permanent residency or citizenship, which are federal questions”].) The Erick M. and 

H.S.P. courts improperly usurped that role.

Accordingly, we hold that the second prerequisite is to be interpreted 

literally: “1 or both” means one or both. A petitioner can satisfy this requirement by 

showing an inability to reunify with one parent due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a 

similar basis under state law.

Mother’s Death Did Not Render the Abandonment Ineffective

Alternatively, the court held petitioner’s inability to reunify with his mother 

was “due to” death, not abandonment. It would be a particularly parsimonious reading of 

the statute, however, to deny relief to a petitioner who had been fully abandoned just 

because his or her parents, by dint of circumstance, died after the abandonment. The 

Family Code provides that abandonment has occurred where “[o]ne parent has left the 

child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any 

provision for the child’s support, or without communication from the parent, with the 

intent on the part of the parent to abandon the child.” (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (a)(3).) 

“The failure to provide identification, failure to provide support, or failure to 

communicate is presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon.” (Id., subd. (b).) The 

facts here amply demonstrate that petitioner’s mother permanently abandoned him. That 

she died only cemented the permanent abandonment already in place. As recounted 

above, the purpose of the SIJ statute is to provide relief from abuse, neglect, or 

abandonment. The deleterious effects of abandonment are not allayed by the parent’s 
16

death. Accordingly, we hold that where a parent, having abandoned a child, dies in that 

state of abandonment, the child’s inability to reunify with that parent is still “due to”

abandonment for purposes of the SIJ statute.

It Was Not in Petitioner’s Best Interests to Return to Mexico

Finally, we reject the trial court’s admittedly speculative rationale for 

determining that it was in petitioner’s best interest to be returned to Mexico. In rejecting 

a similar rationale, another panel of our court recently stated, “The court based its finding 

on anecdotal impressions, untethered to any evidence in this case, that parents of troubled 

immigrant children may sometimes ‘send their children back to Mexico to get them . . .

out of the negative environment that has placed them in the juvenile court.’” (Leslie H., 

supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 352.) The trial court here made similar comments. The 

uncontradicted evidence is that petitioner has lived his entire life here, has family here, 

and has no one in Mexico to turn to. Further, the trial court’s speculation about

petitioner’s high school degree being a useful tool in Mexico was inverted logic. The fact 

that petitioner has, by the court’s description, turned his life around here only shows that 

petitioner may continue to benefit from the services he can receive here. The court’s 

conclusion — that sending petitioner to a foreign country with no support at all is better 

than him remaining here — finds no support in either reason or evidence.

We add one final comment for the benefit of trial courts. We sympathize 

with a court’s discomfort at the prospect of a petitioner obtaining citizenship when there 

is reason to doubt the petitioner’s good faith. And although we have determined that the 

task of weeding out such applicants lies principally with the federal authorities, trial 

courts are not powerless. In a court’s order making the findings required under the SIJ

statute, the court can and should include findings of any relevant facts that the court 

deems pertinent to the federal government’s inquiry. If a trial court finds the petitioner is 
17

living comfortably with another parent, for example, it should say so in its order to ensure 

that that fact does not escape the notice of federal authorities. 

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent Superior 

Court of Orange County to vacate its order of December 12, 2013, denying petitioner’s 

application for SIJ status findings. The juvenile court is directed to enter a new and 

different order sustaining as of December 12, 2013, the requisite state court findings to 

enable petitioner to file his SIJ application with the appropriate federal authorities. Each 

party shall bear its own costs of this writ proceeding. Having served its purpose the order 

to show cause is discharged. 

IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.