The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations

of the Honorable Jonathan G. Lebedoff, United States Magistrate

Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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No. 96-2000

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Stephen Andrew Hodgson, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. *

 * Appeal from the United States

Frank W. Wood, Commissioner of * District Court for the

Corrections; James Bruton, * District of Minnesota.

Deputy Commissioner; Dennis L. *

Benson, Warden of MCF-STW; * [UNPUBLISHED]

John Doe, unknown at this time; *

John Doe, unknown at this time, *

 *

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: February 7, 1997

 Filed: March 6, 1997

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Before HANSEN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Stephen A. Hodgson, a Minnesota inmate, appeals from the district

court's adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 1

We affirm. 

In 1973, the Minnesota legislature enacted Minn. Stat. Ann.

§ 243.88(2), which provides that inmates who work in interstate industry

will be paid the prevailing minimum wage, in compliance with the

Ashurst-Sumners Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1761. See 17 U.S.C.
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§ 1761; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.88(2) (1992). In 1994, the

Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) implemented a statewide

policy of deducting the cost of room and board from the gross wages

of inmates making over $2.20 per hour, pursuant to Minn. Stat. Ann.

§ 243.23(2) (1992) (providing that MDOC commissioner may deduct

cost of room and board from inmate wages, including wages earned

pursuant to section 243.88). 

Hodgson, whose interstate industry work assignment began in

1994 and now earns him $5.00 per hour, commenced this section 1983

action, arguing the room and board deduction deprived him of his

guaranteed wages without due process of law; violated his equal

protection rights because the deduction was applied only to inmates

who made over $2.20 per hour; and increased his criminal punishment

in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court

granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that

Hodgson did not have a property interest in his gross wages; that

Hodgson did not allege he was treated differently than those

similarly situated; and that the MDOC policy was not implemented to

punish Hodgson for a past crime. 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary

judgment and will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996)

(standard of review), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 696 (1997).

We agree with the district court that Hodgson's due process

claim fails. Wages earned pursuant to section 243.88(2) are

conditioned upon section 243.23(2)'s express authorization of

deductions for the costs of room and board. See Minn. Stat. Ann.
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§§ 243.23(2), 243.88(2)-(3) (1992); see also 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1761(c)(2)(B) (permitting states to deduct room and board costs

from inmate wages). Thus, Hodgson failed to demonstrate a

legitimate claim of entitlement grounded in state law to his gross

wage. See Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1986)

(finding state statute authorizing wages was conditioned upon other

statute allowing for deductions; thus, wage statute did not confer

property rights to entire wage); Ervin v. Blackwell, 733 F.2d 1282,

1286 (8th Cir. 1984) (same). 

We also agree with the district court that Hodgson's equal

protection claim fails. "The Equal Protection Clause generally

requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike."

Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995). Even assuming Hodgson

is similarly situated to inmates who earn $2.20 per hour, he did

not rebut defendants' evidence that the policy was rationally

related to the legitimate penological interests of defraying room

and board costs, teaching financial responsibility, and equalizing

the spending ability of inmates. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

78, 79 (1987); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1103 (8th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991).

Finally, the district court correctly concluded that Hodgson's

ex post facto claim fails because he did not rebut defendants'

evidence that section 243.23 was implemented to defray the costs of

supporting the inmate population, not to punish him for his past

criminal acts. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990)

(stating standard for ex post facto claim); Flemming v. Nestor, 363

U.S. 603, 612-21 (1960) (discussing that where statute does not

intend to punish and serves legitimate interest, no violation of Ex

Post Facto Clause).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.