* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 29 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

CAROLYN CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-6471 (D.C. No. 97-CV-1331-C) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 The ALJ found, however, that claimant was disabled from April 3, 1992 to

June 15, 1993, and awarded disability insurance ben efits for that period. That determination is not at issue in this appeal. -2- Claimant Carolyn Campbell appeals from the districtcourt’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying her c laim for supplemental social security income (SSI) at step five of the five-partprocess for determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In what stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, the administrative law judge (ALJ) de termined that, while claimant has limitations arising from carpal tunnel problems and borderline intellectual functioning and cannot return to her p ast relevant work as a custodian or housekeeper, she retains the functional capacityto perform a wide range of light work. Relying on a vocational expert’s testi mony, the ALJ found that there were jobs available that claimant could perform andtherefore determined that she was not disabled for purposes of her SSI claim. 1 We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996). On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ failed to meet his step-five burden of showing that there were jobs in the econo my that she could perform. Specifically, she asserts that she does not have th e residual functional capacity to2 As noted in the ALJ’s decision, the vocational expe rt also identified the

position of assembly machine tender. The parties a gree that claimant’s reduced grip strength does not permit her to perform that j ob. -3- perform the light, unskilled jobs identified by the ALJ: gate guard and bakery worker on a conveyor line. 2 Claimant argues that she lacks the intelligence andwriting ability required of a gate guard and that her diminished concentrati on, reclusiveness, and restriction against repetitive movement of the wris ts precludes her from performing as a bakery worker. However, the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert accurately reflected the ALJ’s as sessment of claimant’s impairments and limitations. The hypotheticals des cribed a person with a fourth grade education, limited to reading small words, si mple addition, and no subtraction. See Appellant’s App. at 126. In addition, the hypothe tical person had difficulty holding a pen or pencil, a twenty pe rcent reduction in grip strength, and restrictions on repetitive movement of the wrists. See id. at 127-28. The ALJ’s assessment is supported by substantial ev idence in the record. We note that, after claimant’s second carpal tunnel release surgery, the treating physician released her to light-duty work. Since that time, no treating physician has placed an additional restriction on her activit ies. Moreover, claimant has held numerous jobs in the past, despite her sub-ave rage intellectual functioning. Under these circumstances, the ALJ was under no obl igation to describe the-4-

additional limitations urged by claimant. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that, while hypotheticals to the vocational expert must precisely reflect impairments, “they need only refl ect impairments and limitations that are borne out by the evidentiary record”). Accordingly, the vocational expert’s testimony, eli cited in response to the ALJ’s hypotheticals, provided evidence that both th e gate guard and bakery worker positions were jobs existing in the national economy that claimant can perform. Because neither position must be eliminat ed from consideration, we do not reach claimant’s second argument that the bakery worker position, standing alone, does not exist in significant numbers in the national economy. There is no question that, given the two identified jobs, the C ommissioner has met the burden of identifying jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b); Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995). The ALJ did not err in determining that claimant po ssessed the ability to perform work existing in the national economy and, therefore, she was not disabled. The judgment is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge