NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BENIGNO TERRONES ROMERO, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-70183 

Agency No. A200-199-101 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 9, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: MURGUIA, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Benigno Terrones Romero, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 15 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Terrones Romero’s asylum 

application as untimely. An asylum application must be filed within one year of 

the applicant’s last arrival in the United States, or one year from April 1, 1997, 

whichever is later; otherwise, the applicant must demonstrate that an exception to 

the deadline applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(ii). 

Terrones Romero last arrived in the United States in January 1993, but he did not 

file an asylum application until 2013. He claims that his lack of knowledge about 

his possible eligibility for asylum constitutes an extraordinary circumstance 

justifying the delay. But there is no exception to the one-year deadline for 

ignorance of the law, which is generally “no excuse” under our precedent. See

Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. The agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that Terrones

Romero’s 2011 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is a 

particularly serious crime that bars him from withholding of removal under 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and the CAT. See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (an applicant convicted of a 

particularly serious crime is ineligible for withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(d)(2). The agency first determined that DUI is “inherently an extremely 

dangerous crime,” that can constitute a particularly serious crime. See Bare v. 
3 

Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that if “‘the elements of 

the offense are examined and found to potentially bring the offense within the 

ambit of a particularly serious crime,’ then the other factors [including the 

individual facts and circumstances of the conviction] are considered”) (quoting 

Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007)). The agency then relied 

on appropriate factors and proper evidence in concluding that Terrones Romero’s 

2011 DUI offense constitutes a particularly serious crime. See Arbid v. Holder, 

700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in a particularly 

serious crime determination where the agency reviewed the conviction and related 

records). Thus, the agency did not abuse its discretion in determining Terrones 

Romero is not eligible for withholding of removal.

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of deferral of removal 

under the CAT because the record does not compel the conclusion that Terrones 

Romero would more likely than not be tortured by or with the consent or 

acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Flores-Vega v. Barr, 

932 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that generalized evidence of violence 

and crime not particular to a petitioner is insufficient to meet the CAT standard);

Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1089–92 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming 

denial of CAT protection to petitioner, a gay man, despite country conditions 

evidence showing hostility, discrimination, and violence against gay men). But see 
4 

Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1186, 1186–88 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(concluding that the record evidence “together” compelled a finding of likely 

future torture and granting deferral of removal under the CAT based on “the 

evidence that LGBTQ individuals are at heightened risk throughout Mexico” and 

the petitioner’s testimony about “multiple instances of such [government] 

acquiescence in the past involving her personal circumstances”).

4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand to the IJ to 

permit Terrones Romero to submit additional evidence. In earlier proceedings, this 

court granted the government’s motion to remand to the BIA for it to “apply the 

case-by-case approach set forth in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 

1982), and Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), in determining 

whether” Terrones Romero was “ineligible for withholding of removal as an alien 

convicted of a particularly serious crime.” The remand order did not require or 

contemplate remand to the IJ, and Terrones Romero has not identified any 

additional facts or evidence he would have presented on remand. See INS v. 

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (stating that remand can be for 

“additional investigation or explanation”) (citation omitted). To the extent that he 

alleges a due process violation, his claim fails because he has not established 

prejudice from any alleged violation. Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 

1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that to succeed on a due process claim, a petitioner 
5 

“must show prejudice”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.