IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA 

December 28, 2016 

ALFRED McDONALD, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D15-4950 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 

 The appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. The opinion dated May 

13, 2016, is hereby withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor. No 

further motions for rehearing will be entertained. 

I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A 

TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER. 

MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL 

CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

ALFRED McDONALD, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D15-4950 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. )

___________________________________) 

Opinion filed December 28, 2016. 

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Vivian T. Corvo, Judge. 

Alfred McDonald, pro se. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Alfred McDonald appeals the order denying his motions filed under Florida 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and 3.850(b)(2). We affirm the denial of ground 

two of McDonald's rule 3.800(a) motion, but we reverse the denial of ground one and 

the denial of his rule 3.850(b)(2) motion, in which he asked that ground one of his rule 

3.800(a) motion be converted to a claim under rule 3.850(b)(2). 

 McDonald argued that his sentence of life with the possibility of parole for 

a first-degree murder he committed when he was sixteen years of age was 
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unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).1 He contended that 

he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, 

Laws of Florida. See Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015) (holding that the 

remedy for a sentence that is unconstitutional under Miller is resentencing under 

chapter 2014-220). 

 The postconviction court denied McDonald's motion based on thenexisting case law holding that Miller did not apply to life sentences with the possibility of 

parole. See McPherson v. State, 138 So. 3d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Atwell v. 

State, 128 So. 3d 167, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). However, the supreme court has now 

reversed Atwell, concluding "that Florida's existing parole system, as set forth by 

statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of Atwell's juvenile status at 

the time of the murder, as required by Miller, and that his sentence, which is virtually 

indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional." 

Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 2016). The court held that juveniles 

sentenced to life with the possibility of parole are entitled to resentencing in 

conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida. Id. at 1050 (citing Horsley, 160 

So. 3d at 399); see Landy v. State, 2D15-4827, 2016 WL 6776120 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 

16, 2016). The supreme court has now also quashed this court's decision in 

McPherson.2 See McPherson v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Oct. 28, 2016) 

 1McDonald was also sentenced to a consecutive term of fifteen years' 

imprisonment for armed robbery. 

2From the allegations of McDonald's motion, it appears that McPherson 

was his co-defendant in the murder and robbery. 
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(citing Atwell and remanding for resentencing in conformance with sections 775.082, 

921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court's denial of McDonald's 

rule 3.850(b)(2) motion and ground one of his rule 3.800(a) motion and remand for 

resentencing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which was 

codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. 

KHOUZAM, CRENSHAW, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.