COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien , AtLee and Senior Judge Haley Argued at Richmond, Virginia

RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0510

- 21

- 2 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN DECEMBER 6, 2022 JAZLENE WELLS AND DAMIEN ROANE

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

D

. Eugene Cheek , Judge
Keisha Dillard

- Brady, Senior Assistant City Attorney ( Lee L

. Nelms , Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief) , for appellant. 1 Dorothea Kate O’Leary ; Paul S. Kellinger for appellee s
. The Richmond Department of Social Services (the Department) appeals the circuit court’s
dismissal of its petitions to terminate the residual parental rights of Jazlene Wells (mother) and Damien Roane (father) and approve the goal of adoption. T he Departme nt contends that the court
erred in requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence that mother and father abused or neglected the ir child (J.R.) 2 before their parental rights could be terminated

. The Department also challenges the court’s refusal to te rminate parental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(B) and (C)(2 ).
BACKGROUND On January 26, 2019, mother brought three

- month

- old J.R. to the hospital and reported that
he was acting “fussy.” M edical personnel contacted the Department upon discovering that “the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1

- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1 Pursuant to Rule 5A:19(d), t he guardian ad litem filed a notice joining appellant’s brief.

2 We use the child’s initials to protect his privacy. UNPUBLISHED- 2

-

child sustained multiple bruises,” including “a bruise and scratch on the inside back part of hi s throat” and a bruise on his chest “the size of a thumb that was reddish purple in colo r. ” J .R. also
had “scratch marks under both eye s .” Neither parent could explain the child’s injuries.
A social worker who saw J.R. at the hospital about 24 hours later did not observe the bruises and noted that “[t]he child did not appear to be in any pain or discomfort.” However, the treating physician expressed concern about the scratch and bruise at the back of J.R. ’s throat and requested that the parents bring him back for a follow

- up skeletal survey

. After missing three appointments with out explanation, father returned for J.R.’s skeletal survey approximately one month later

. T he survey revealed that the child had “ multiple healing rib fractures” on the “second through sixth ribs” with a “suspected healing fracture of the anterior left

seven th rib” and “a new fracture on [the] left wrist.”
At the time of the s keletal survey, J.R. was living between the households of his paternal and maternal grandmothers and was cared for only by his mother, father, and grandmother s
. None
of his caregivers could explain how J.R. sustained the injuries.
T he Department filed a

n abuse or neglect petition in the j uvenile and d omestic r elations
d istrict c ourt (JDR court) , alleging that “[d]ue to the nature of the injuries sustained (old/new), the vulnerability o f the [child], and the fact that the [child] had multiple caregivers [,] it [was] unsafe for the child to remain in the care of either parent.” The JDR court entered an emergency removal order on February 21, 2019, placing J.R. in the Department’s custody. T h e court subsequently adjudicated that the child was abused or neglected and entered a dispositional order on April 8 requiring the parents t o comply with all of the Department’s recommendations and referrals.
Neither parent appealed the dispositional order. In June 2019, the parents met with Takyra Jefferson, J.R.’s foster care worker , to discuss the services they needed to complete for J.R. to return to their care

. After their meeting, Jefferson sent- 3

-

each parent a letter reiterating the se required services and providing contact information for the
service provider s
. The Department advised both parents to participate in parental support groups and , after completi on , work with a parent coach

. They had to attend individual therapy sessions, which had
been referred in March 2019 when J.R. was placed in foster care. M other and father also needed to show proof of stable housing and employment and submit to criminal background and child protective services (CPS) checks. A fter test ing positive for marijuana use at a court hearing, both parents were directed to obtain a substance abuse assessment. Througho ut this process, t he Department arranged for the parents to have supervised visitation with J.R

. About five months later, Jefferson met with J.R.’s mother , father, and grandmothers

. N either parent had completed any of the services or attended any support groups , and , although they sporadically attended a few individualized therapy sessions , they missed many without calling to
reschedule

. Father submitted proof of employment but did not submit a criminal background check,
CPS check , or proof of stable housing

. Mother produced proof of employment and CPS check but failed to submit a criminal background check and evidence of stable housing. Neither parent had
obtained a substance abuse assessment yet , and they had both failed to attend several scheduled

assessments

. Mother also incurred criminal assault charges. At the meeting, Jefferson stressed the importance of timely complying with service s and explained that “after a certain amount of months, we have to consider a different goal, if returning home is not an option, because of noncompliance.” The Department identified June 30, 2020, as the target date for services to be completed

. On December 16, 2019, the JDR court held a permanency planning hearing. The goal

rem ained for J.R. to return home or secure a relative placement

. The court ordered the parents to- 4

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participate in the services required by the Department and obtain a psychological evaluation focused on parenting with Michele Nelson , Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist. Dr. Nelson received the referral on January 27, 2020, but the parents did not appear for the
evaluation until May 12, 2020

— nearly five months after they had been ordered to do so and after they had missed an April appoin tment

. Based on Dr. Nelson’s recommendations, the Department referred mother to outpatient anger management therapy and father to parent coaching. On May 20, 2020, in anticipation of a June 15 permanency planning hearing, the Department filed a new foste r care plan requesting the JDR court change the goal to adoption , because “at that point [J.R.] had been in care for

. . . over a year, and the services that [were] recommended to the parents had not been completed.”
At the time of the June hearing , mothe r and father had completed only the psychological evaluations, co

- parenting counseling, and substance abuse assessments

. Mother also completed her motherhood support group. Neither parent, however, completed or regularly attended parent coaching or individualized therapy, despite Jefferson making financial arrangements for reduced payment

. Additionally, father only irregularly attended his fatherhood support group sessions and
mother still needed to finish the anger management ses sions recommended by Dr. Nelson

. According to Jefferson , the remaining services could take another eight months to a year to complete. At the hearing, the Department asked the court to give the parents another opportunity to complete services and reinsta te the goal of return home or relative placement, despite the May request to change the goal to adoption

. The court denied the request , set a status hearing for July 13 , and ordered the Department to file a new foster care plan. The Department filed a new plan with the goal of adoption , and it also filed petitions to terminate mother and father’s parental rights

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-

T he JDR court terminated mother and father’s parental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(B) and (C)(2) after a hearing on October 26, and it approv ed the new goal of adoption. Both parents appealed the termination of their parental rights t o circuit court

. On April 2 and 3, 2021, after J.R. had been in foster care for over two years, the c ircuit c ourt held a hearing de novo. At that time, mother and father still had not completed all services and
father again tested positive for marijuana use

. Indeed, s ome services had not yet been started as of the circuit court hearing. At trial, t he Department presented evidence from several of mother and fat her’s service providers. Dr. Nelson, the clinical psychologist , testified that she diagnosed mother with “intermittent explosive disorder” due to her “significant temper outbursts.” Dr. Nelson explained that “individuals with this disorder tend to have l ow frustration tolerance ,” and when “explosive
anger [] is at a level that is problematic ,” it is harder for a parent “ to respond in a calm fashion to [the child] when [the child] does not meet [] expectations or
. . . acts out

. ” Dr. Nelson testified that mother’s inability “to understand [the child’s] limitations as well as her intermittent explosive disorder and ongoing anger issue

. . . would be considered high

- risk factors

. . . associated with parents who are

. . . more likely than other s to abuse children.” Further, she testified that mother “did not see anger as an overall issue for her,” despite the diagnosis, and “had not been working to improve.”
Dr. Nelson de scribed father’s understanding about child development as “ not great” but “coachable” and explained that parent coaching was an important service to teach him how to “relate well to” and “interact with” J.R. Jefferson, J.R.’s foster care worker , testified a bout the services that remained incomplete.
J efferson noted that she h ad trouble communicating with both parents and had only “ minim[al] ”
contact with them

. F ather changed his number several times without informing the Department , and- 6

-

mother was not “able to talk to people on her telephone,” so often the only way the Department
could contact J.R.’s parents was “by sending letters or talk[ing] to the grandparents.” Many of t he phone conversations that did occur were “contentious.”
Jefferson also testified that J.R. ha d been residing with the same family throughout his two
years in foster care

. S he described J.R. as a “healthy, thriving little boy” in his foster family’s care. Tiffany James, a licensed professional counselor , provided co

- parenting and nurturing counseling to mother and father. James testified that al though the parents completed the

co - parenting and nurturing counseling, it took them “about a year to do eight to twelve weekly sessions.” Both parents were inconsistent in meeting with her. They missed appointments without calling ahead “about 30 percen t of the time , ” but w hen they did participate, “they participated very well.” Robert Perkins, a fatherhood facilitator, testified about father’s incomplete participation in the fatherhood support group. Due to the COVID

- 19 pandemic, t he 12

- hour program was conducted virtually through one - hour classes twice per week. Perkins testified his first contact with
father was in M ay 2020, despite father ’s referral to the program in February 2019. Father finished only four of the 12 required course hours

. When Perkins stressed to father that he needed to complete the course by the end of June 2020 because the program was losing it s fundin g , f ather initially agreed to do so; however , Perkins h ad no contact with father after the first week of June

. During the four sessions he attended father was not responsive , and Perkins “didn’t think [father]
was interested [in] complet [ing] the classes.” The Department also presented evidence from the National Counseling Group, which provided therapy, parent coaching, and supervised visitation services to mother and father. A mber Jennings, mother’s anger management therap ist, testified that when mother started therapy in August 2020 , she “did really well” and “attended every week.” Mother’s attendance declined,- 7

-

however, and she missed five consecutive sessions, not meeting with Jennings again until October
19. Mother’s attendance never improved , despite Jennings offering virtual options. Jennings finally discharged mother from therapy in February 2021 due to noncompliance. Blair Gardner, a mental health counselor , provided parent coaching to mother

. F rom August
to October 2020 , mother made “no progress” and participated only minimally

. Mother was initially reluctant to let Gardner attend visitation with J.R. and offer advice, but she ultimately allowed it.
Alth ough mother did not complete coaching, Blair observed that her “ communication ha [d] improved greatly” and she interact ed with J.R. “very well.” Eric Carlson, who supervised mother and father’s visitation with J.R. , testified that from May 2019 to March 20 21, the parents were scheduled to visit with J.R. 65 times. Of the 65 visits,
mother missed 13, providing notice only twice , and was late 17 times. F ather missed seven visits, providing notice only twice , and was late 23 times. Carlson testified concerning behavior he observed during visitation. During a July 2020 visit, J.R. arrived crying and upset , but m other made no effort to console him, appear ing “withdraw[n] ” and “standoffish.” I n August 2020, J.R. again arrived crying. Mother and father responded poorly, appearing “frustrated.” M other used profanity and an “angry [ and ] agitated tone of voice” in front of J.R. who “ was upset and appeared distressed.” Finally, s everal witnesses testified that mother and father had chall enges maintaining stable housing. At the close of the Department’s case, mother moved to strike

. T he court expressed skepticism about the sufficiency of the evidence to support terminating parental rights and stated
that “it’s [the Department’s] burden, clear and convincing, that the bruises and fractures

— bruises and fractures come in different kind of ways. And you have not documented exactly how it happened or what happened.” When the Department noted that the abuse or neglect di spositional- 8

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order had not been appealed and was not before the court to be “relitigated,” the court disagreed , stating, “ Y ou have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the neglect, abuse, likely
condition

— you have to prove that serious and subst antial threat of his life.”
The court also questioned whether termination was in J.R.’s best interest s and noted that “being with the biological parents is very important to some people. Some people, they spend their life looking for their biological par ents.

. . . Kids grow up all the time and they ask for their roots, they ask for their biology.” The court further opined that mother and father had a “relationship” with J.R. and they were capable of improvement. When the Department referred to the delays and failure to comply with services and argued that it was not in J.R.’s best interests to “languish” in foster care, the co urt responded, “ I think the question is: How long would [J.R.] want to wait to get his parents to have him home?” The court also expressed concern that J.R. would grow up “to hate[] the State” if his parents’ rights were terminated

. T he court nevertheles s held that the Department had presented a prima facie case and denied
the motion to strike.
Mother then testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged her difficulties in maintaining stable housing. She testified that she lived in her mother’s home unti l the “end of 2020 , ” when a housefire displaced them. In February 2021, mother told Jefferson and her parent coac h that she
could not take care of J.R. because she was “all over the place ,” did not “ have anywhere to stay , ” and was “living in various places week to week.” M other testified that she moved in with a female acquaintance named “Henderson” in March 2021 who had a place for J.R. in her home

. Although
mother stated that she has known Henderson since she was 12 years old and thinks of her as a grandmother , mother could not provide Henderson’s full name. Mother acknowledged that she did not comply with services for the first “six, seven months” following removal. According to mother, she delayed because she was taking two classes, “pl us- 9

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[she was] seeing [the child], so it was a lot on [her] plate.” Mother stated that her “communication skills [were] better” and she was “willing to do whatever” the court ordered, or the Department required , so that the child could be returned to her ca re. Father called himself and his mother as witnesses. F ather previously lived with his mother ; however , at the time of trial, he was living with his aunt who had not yet undergone a background
check. Like mother, father also acknowledged that “it took [him] a significant amount of time to even begin to engage in [] services .” Father testified that he delayed because he was 17 years old
when J.R. was born , but he had grown up in the years that J.R. was in foster care. Father also
claimed that h e was not required to finish individual therapy because the Department only “recommended” that he go, despite the court order to “comply with all services, recommendations, and referrals offered” by the Departmen t. Father also acknowledged testing positive for marijuana
and a dmitted that he ha d multiple positive tests in the JDR court. Father’s mother testified that she did not know how J.R. sustained his injuries, but she loved J.R. and he could live with her.
A t the end of the case , the court ruled that the Department failed to carry its burden under either Code § 16.1

- 283(B) or (C)(2). The court determined that t he Department failed to prove that
mother and father were the individuals responsible for causing J.R

. ’s injuries , which the court considered to be a prerequisite for termination. The court c ite d due process concerns and stated, “ I n this [c] ourt, it matters who did it and when.” It found that the Department was required to present “more subst antial evidence implicating each one of the persons.”
The court also ruled that the Department did not prove that termination was in J.R.’s best
interests. Th e court referred to J.R. calling mother “mom,” found that there was evidence J.R. and his biolog ical family had a “connection ,” and pointed out that the grandmothers had raised “about ten [other] children” without claims of abuse. The court further found that the child’s injuries did- 10

-

not amount to a “death

- like situation” and commented that “you’ve got a bruise and you’ve got
fractures. And fractures are easy to occur. There are people walking down the street and get fractures or trip up and get fractures. So there’s no explanation of that fracture process.” The court
also noted that father took J.R. to the skeletal survey and queried , “ [W] ould somebody beat up a kid and then take him to the hospital?”
F ive months later, on September 20, 2021, the court entered the final order denying the Department’s petition to terminate mother and father’ s parental rights and remanding the case to the
JDR court. The Department moved for reconsideration, and the court held a hearing on October 4,
2021

. During the hearing, the Department notified the court that mother had outstanding warrants
for ma liciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, malicious wounding, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony for “ events ” that occurred in June 2021. At the end of the hearing, the
circuit court denied the Department’s motion. 3 This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
To terminate p arental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(B) , the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests and that (1) “[t]he neglect or abuse suffered by such child prese nted a serious and substantial threat to his life,
health [,] or development,” and (2) “[i]t is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted

3 The Department did not ask the court to stay or suspend the final order in it s motion to reconsider. The court denied the Department’s motion by written order on October 21, 2021, after it no longer had jurisdiction over this suit under Rule 1:1(a)

. “Neither ‘the filing of post

- trial or post

-

judgment motions, nor the trial court’s taking such motions under consideration, nor the pendency of such motions on the twenty

- first day after final judgment [ , ] is sufficient to toll or extend the running of the twenty

- one day time period of Rule 1:1.’” Wells v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 56 Va. App. 208, 213 (2010) (quoting Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin , 263 Va. 555, 560 (2002)). Accordingly, we will not consider the order denying the Department’s motion to reconsider.- 11

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in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s
safe re turn to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time.” 4

“ On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best
interest s.’” Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs. , 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991) ). “Therefore, in a case involving termination of parental rights, ‘[t]he trial court’s judgment, “ when
based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. ” ’” Eaton v. Wash ington C n ty . Dep’t of Soc. Servs

. , 66 Va. App. 317, 324 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie C n ty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs

. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7 (2005) ). A court ’ s conclusions about questions of law are reviewed de novo. Rusty’s Welding Serv. , Inc. v. Gibson , 29 Va. App. 119, 127 (1999) (en banc)

. I. Proof of A

buse or N eglect The Department first argues that the issue of abuse or neglect was not before the circuit court because neither mother nor father appealed the JDR court’s dispositional o rder entered following the abuse or neglect adjudication

. 5 By failing to appeal the dispositional order, they argue, mother and father “relinquished any claim that [the Department] did not prove J.R. was abused or neglected.” The JDR court’s disposition al order reflects that J.R. was adjudicated as abused or neglected pursuant to Code § 16.1

- 252(G), which requires the JDR court to “determine whether

4 Although the Department also challe nges the court’s dismissal of its petition to terminate parental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(C)(2), we need not address that provision based on our analysis of Code § 16.1

- 283(B). See Kilby v. Culpeper C n ty. Dep ’ t of Soc. Servs. , 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1 (2009)

.

5 Under Code § 16.1

- 278.2(D) , “ [a] dispositional order entered pursuant to this section is a final order from which an appeal may be taken in accordance with § 16.1

- 296. ”- 12

-

the allegations of abuse or neglect have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” By
contrast, in a termination of parental rights proceeding under Code § 16.1

- 283 (B) , the Department must establish abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence. S ee Code § 16.1

- 283 (B) (1)

. Due process mandates th is higher standard . In Wright v. Alexandria D ivis ion of S oc ial
Ser vices , 16 Va. App. 821 (1993), we acknowledged that the D ue P rocess C lause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent ’s right to the “the companionship, care, custody [ , ] and management of his or her children.” Id. at 829 ( quoting Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645,
651

- 51 (1972)). However, the right is not “absolute” and must be “balanced against competing legitimate interests of the state to protect the welfare of its ci tizens.” Id

. Accordingly, “[b]efore a state may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of a parent in his or her natural child, due process requires that the state support its allegations of parental unfitness by at least clear and convincing eviden ce.” Id. This Court app lied that standard in Farrell v. Warren County Department of Social Services , 59 Va. App. 375, 404

- 05 (2012), where we stated:

[A] trial court cannot terminate a parent ’ s rights to his child based solely upon a finding in a prior hearing that the child was abused or neglected. The trial court must find that the abuse or neglect rose to a level that presented a substantial threat to the child ’ s life, health, or developmen t, and Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1) requires that this finding be made upon a showing of clear and convincing evidenc e . . . . Thus , a trial court cannot base its decision to terminate parental rights on a previous preliminary finding, (by the preponderance of the evidence), that a child is abused or neglected. Under this precedent, and the plain language of Code § 16.1

- 283(B), a failure to appeal a prior abuse or neglect adjudication and subsequent dispositional order does not render abuse or neglect conclusivel y established in a termination case under Code § 16.1

- 283(B)

. The court did not err by requiring the Department to prove that J.R was “neglected or abused” and that “ [ t ] he neglect or abuse suffered by [J.R.] presented a serious and substantial threat to h is life, health [,]- 13

-

or development ,” because th e termination statute requires clear and convincing evidence of these
facts

. Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1).
Our inquiry does not end there , however. The court dismissed the case in part because it
also found that the Department did not prove that mother or father “were, in fact, the perpetrators” of any abuse. The court ruled that the Department had to prove “exactly how [the injuries] happened or wha t happened,” and it explained that “[i]n this [c]ourt, it matters who did it and when.” Code § 16.1

- 228 (1) defines an “ [ a ] bused or neglected child” as any child “ [ w ] hose parents or other person responsible for his care creates or inflicts

. . . or allows to be created or
inflicted upon
. . . a physical

. . . injury by other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement [,] or impairment of bodily or mental functions .” Although Code § 16.1

- 283(B) refers to a “neglected or abused” child, nothing in the statute requires the Department to specifically prove who injured the child

. It is enough that the child was injured by the parents, or someone whom the parents had deemed “responsible for his
care.” Code § 16. 1

- 228 (1)

. 6 Alternatively, it was sufficient for the Department to show that mother or father had allowed J.R.’s injuries to happen and did nothing to put a stop to the abuse or prevent future abuse from occurring, or that they created such “ a substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions ” that J.R. continued to find himself in situations where he was repeatedly severely injured. Id

. The circuit court failed to consider
whether J .R.’s circumstances met these other d efinitions, narrowly focusing on whether mother or father had directly caused the f r actures and bruising J.R. suffered.

6 Mother and father agreed that J.R. was always either in the ir care or in the care of his maternal or paternal grandmothe r ; there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child.- 14

-

Thus, the court erred by imposing the added requirement that the Department prove precisely which one of J.R’s four caretakers was resp onsible for his injuries, a requirement not
included in Code § 16.1

- 228 (1) or Code § 16.1

- 283(B)

. We next turn to whether the court’s dismissal of the Department’s termination petition was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
II. Termination under Code § 16.1

- 283(B)
A. Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1)
The Department was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “ [ t ] he neglect or abuse suffered by [J.R.] presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health [ , ]
or devel opment.” Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1)

. Clear and convincing evidence is an “intermediate” standard of proof , “being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt
as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal .” In re Scott , 297 Va. 166, 185 (2019) (quoting In re Watford , 295 Va. 114, 124 n.12 (2018)). “[T]he persuasive quality of
clear

- and

- convincing evidence must establish that ‘the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.’” In re Brown , 295 Va. 202, 227 (2018) (quoting C lear and C onvincing
E vidence , Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
Th e unrebutted evidence established that J.R. was first brought to the hospital with multiple bruises, including “a bruise and scratch on the inside back part of [his] throat.” More significantly, the skeletal survey revealed that sometime during the first three months of his life,
J.R. sustained at least five fractured ribs, with a “suspected healing fracture” on a sixth rib , and a
fresh fracture on his left wrist. The fact that the fractures were in various stages of healing and
that J.R. had sustained a recent wrist fracture , show s that the injuries did not result from a

one - time accident. These un explained fractures on a three

- month

- old infant “presented a serious- 15

-

and substantial threat to his life, health [ , ] or development ,” Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1), despite the
court’s comment s that the injuries did not amount to a “death

- like situation ,” “ fractures are easy
to occur ,” and “ people walk [] down the street and get fractures or trip up and get fractures.” Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the court’s decision was plainly wrong and without evidence to support it; the evidence clearly an d convincingly established that
J. R . was an abused or neglected child and his injuries presented a “ serious and substantial threat to his life, health [,] or development .” Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(1).
B. Code § 16.1

- 283(B) (2) Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(2) requires the Department to establish that “ [ i ] t is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents with in a reasonable period of time.” Proof that the “parent or parents, without good cause, have not responded to or followed through with appropriate, available [,] and reasonable rehabilitative efforts on the part of social, medical, mental health [,] or othe r rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, eliminate[,]

or pr event the neglect or abuse of the child” constitutes “prima facie evidence ” of this basis for terminating parental rights. Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(2)(c). The Department’s evidence established tha t for almost two years before the circuit court
trial , the parents failed to follow through with service s
. Indeed, many services essential to ensur ing J.R.’s safety and well

- being remained incomplete or yet to be started at the time of the circuit court
trial. D r. Nelson expressed concern that mother ’ s inability “to understand [the child’s] limitations as well as her intermittent explosive disorder and ongoing anger issue ” wo uld put her at a high

- risk

to abuse children. Anger management therapy was a critical service to ensure mother’s anger issues would not cause J.R. future harm, but mother had been discharged from therapy due to noncompliance. Additionally, Dr. Nelson tes tified concerning father’s in ability to understand J.R.’s- 16

-

development and identified parent coaching as an important service. Father, however, failed to complete his fatherhood support group, a prerequisite to parent coaching. Indeed, his fatherhood
supp ort group counselor testified that he “didn’t think [father] was interested [in] complet [ing] the classes.” The court’s finding that the parent s had “good cause” for their noncompliance was plainly wrong and without supporting evidence

. At most, the record reflects that mother and father relied only on their youth and immaturity and argued that “there was a lot on their plate

. ” Although they
claimed they would improve if given yet another chance, “Virginia’s jurisprudence recognizes that ‘past actio ns and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Farrell , 59 Va. App. at 425 (quoting Winfield v. Urquhart , 25 Va. App. 688, 695

- 96 (1997)). 7 The court discounted the ample evidence det ailing the range of services
offered , the numerous accommodations that service providers made to increase accessibility, and the length of time the se services were available . The court failed to give sufficient weight to the desultory manner in which mother and father approached services and failed to adequately consider that many services remained incomplete, meaning that neither mother nor father possessed or were working on the skills necessary to ensure J.R.’s well

- being. In sum, the evidence esta

blished that “it is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the
child ’ s safe return to his parent or parents within a reasonable period of time , ” and moth er and father’s failure to follow through with the rehabilitative services offered to them was without good

cause. Code § 16.1

- 283(B)(2) , (B)(2)(c).

7 We also note that during the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the Department proffered that mothe r had outstanding warrants for maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, malicious wounding, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony

.- 17

- C. J.R.’s Best Interests Finally, the court erred in finding that the Department failed to prove that te rmination was in J.R.’s best interests. “When addressing matters concerning a child, including the termination of a parent’s residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial court is in the child’s best interests.” Loga n , 13 Va. App. at 128

. Although “ trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child ’ s best interests , ” id

. (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 32 8 (1990)) , a court abuses its discretion by disregarding proper factors and giving significant weight to improper considerations , Lawlor v. Commonwealth , 285 Va. 187, 213 (2013). Here, the court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider relevant factors and by giving significant weight to improper consideration s
. See id. The court failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of mother and father ’s noncompliance with services designed to ensure J.R.’s safety and their lack of urgency i n engaging with services

. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep ’ t of S oc. Servs

. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990). Moreover, the evidence showed that J.R. was a “healthy, thriving little boy” in his foster family’s care. See, e.g. , Fields , 46 Va. App. at 10 (finding that termination was in a child’s best interests where the child had been in his foster family’s care since birth, was “thriving in every way,” had never lived with or spent significant time with mother alone, and could not be returned to her care due to her failure to accept and obtain
treatment for her mental il lness); Eaton , 66 Va

. App. at 331 (discussing relevant and appropriate factors a court should consider when determining what is in a child’s best interests)

.- 18

-

Instead, t he court gave significant weight to evidence showing that J.R. called mother “mom,” tha t the paternal and maternal grandmothers had raised other children without claims of
abuse , and that father had taken J.R. to the hospital for the skeletal survey

. The court also minimized the severity of J.R.’s injuries and improperly speculated about ab stract future possibilities, such as J.R. growing up to “hate[] the State” and wonder about his biological parents. Cf. Dung Thi Thach v. Arlington Cnty. Dep ’ t of Hum. Servs. , 63 Va. App. 157, 173 (2014) (finding
error where a court determined a child’s best interests by “rel [ying] heavily ” on a parent’s immigration status , “ insufficient employment verification , ” and a finding that the child’s foster family could provide more stability than the parent ).
C ONCLUSION Based on the record before us and applicable law , we are compelled to hold that the court’s decision to dismiss the termination petition was plainly wrong and without evidence to support it
because the Department’s evidence established the eleme nts of Code § 16.1

- 283(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly , we reverse the judgment of the circuit court , terminate mother and father’s parental rights under Code § 16.1

- 283(B ) , approve the Department’s foster care goal of adoption , and remand the matter to the c ircuit court for any other fu r ther proceedings as necessary

. See Code § 16.1

- 283(F).
Reversed and remanded

.