I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3426 

To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among 

democratic countries, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 20, 2021 

Mr. MOULTON (for himself, Mr. KEATING, and Mr. KINZINGER) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership 

among democratic countries, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Democracy Technology 

5 Partnership Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) The 21st century will increasingly be de9 fined by economic competition rooted in techno10 logical advances. Leaders in adopting emerging techVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426

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1 nologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum 

2 computing, biotechnology, and next-generation tele3 communications, and those who shape the use of 

4 such technologies, will garner economic, military, 

5 and political strength for decades. 

6 (2) These technologies offer opportunities for 

7 the empowerment of citizens, but also and challenges 

8 to basic norms of democratic governance and inter9 nationally recognized human rights. The collection 

10 and analysis of data from individuals allows govern11 ments to know more about their residents’ behaviors, 

12 preferences, interests, and activities than was pos13 sible years ago. The concentration of this data in 

14 key technologies, such as smart phones, search data15 bases, and facial recognition databases, along with 

16 the sharing of data among governments, creates 

17 pressing concerns about individuals’ scope to exer18 cise their fundamental political and social rights. 

19 (3) This challenge arises as the integrity and 

20 efficacy of post-World War II international institu21 tions are increasingly challenged. New approaches to 

22 multilateral cooperation and arrangements are need23 ed to tackle the challenges ahead to ensure that the 

24 United States continues to lead in critical tech25 nologies. 


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1 (4) As information and communications tech2 nologies have matured and increasingly mediate 

3 large swathes of social, political and economic activ4 ity, it is incumbent on democratic governments to 

5 address the ways in which these technologies have 

6 undermined democratic values, consumer protec7 tions, and social cohesion. Moreover, as authori8 tarian regimes increasingly shape and deploy tech9 nologies to bolster repression, stifle free expression, 

10 and interfere with free and fair elections in other 

11 countries, the world’s advanced democracies will 

12 need to shape technology standards so that emerging 

13 and critical technologies reflect democratic values, 

14 including freedom of expression and privacy. 

15 (5) Technological leadership by the world’s 

16 major liberal-democratic nations collectively will be 

17 essential to safeguarding democratic institutions, 

18 norms, and values, and contributing to global peace 

19 and prosperity, especially as authoritarian govern20 ments seek to promote closed information systems 

21 and technology that is not interoperable, often 

22 through trade and investment practices that are in23 compatible with global norms. A unified approach by 

24 like-minded nations is needed to counteract growing 


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1 investments in, and deployments of, emerging tech2 nologies by authoritarian powers. 

3 (6) In addition to the development of emerging 

4 technologies, democratic nations must lead in shap5 ing expectations for the responsible use of such tech6 nologies and push back against laissez faire ap7 proaches and authoritarian interests on internet gov8 ernance advanced in multilateral forums by— 

9 (A) advocating against efforts to crim10 inalize or limit political dissent and freedom of 

11 speech online, such as those spearheaded by the 

12 Russian Federation, which seek to undermine 

13 the Council of Europe’s Convention on 

14 Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 

15 2001, in favor of a statist alternative; and 

16 (B) prioritizing protections for elections, 

17 and other processes essential for healthy democ18 racies, from cyber-attack. 

19 (7) The world’s leading democracies must also 

20 confront new challenges to their market-driven eco21 nomic systems to ensure their continued leadership 

22 in technology and innovation. The People’s Republic 

23 of China (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘PRC’’) is 

24 pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance 

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1 ligence (referred to in this section as ‘‘AI’’), quan2 tum computing, hypersonics, biotechnology, space 

3 capabilities, and autonomous vehicles. 

4 (8) The PRC seeks to use technological superi5 ority for national security, military-civil fusion, and 

6 economic gains, according to its strategic plans, in7 cluding— 

8 (A) the Made in China 2025 strategy; 

9 (B) the Five-Year Plan for Standardiza10 tion and China Standards 2035; 

11 (C) the 2006 Medium-to-Long Term S&T 

12 Plan; 

13 (D) the 2010 State Council Decision on 

14 Accelerating the Development of Strategic 

15 Emerging Industries; and 

16 (E) the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Devel17 opment of Strategic Emerging Industries. 

18 (9) The PRC seeks to advance in areas in 

19 which democratic countries currently have a techno20 logical advantage and move ahead in emerging tech21 nologies where China seeks a unique opportunity to 

22 overtake such countries. 

23 (10) For many years, the PRC has pursued in24 dustrial policies and discriminatory trade practices 

25 that include— 


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1 (A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 

2 restricting foreign competition, conducting 

3 forced technology transfers, and using both licit 

4 and illicit means to access research and devel5 opment around technologies in order to advan6 tage Chinese companies in specific technology 

7 fields; 

8 (B) providing significant government fund9 ing for research and development in the PRC in 

10 specific technologies to build future competitive11 ness; 

12 (C) seeking to ensure global adoption of 

13 Chinese technologies, and the success of Chi14 nese firms, especially in emerging and strategic 

15 markets, through significant foreign direct in16 vestment, low-cost financing and comprehensive 

17 services for foreign development projects, 

18 through initiatives such as the Belt and Road 

19 Initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road 

20 and the Health Silk Road, as well as the Smart 

21 City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 

22 the use of Chinese exports by offering far 

23 cheaper rates and bundling these deals into 

24 larger development and aid packages; 


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1 (D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led 

2 standards for digital technologies and products 

3 through compensating Chinese firms that sub4 mit standards and flooding forums with tech5 nical experts; and 

6 (E) leveraging the international standard 

7 setting bodies to advance the vision of the PRC 

8 regarding standards and technologies. 

9 (11) As a result of these practices in support of 

10 Chinese companies, the PRC is increasing its influ11 ence in AI, 5G, and a wide range of other science 

12 and technology disciplines that constitute long-term 

13 economic and security threats to the United States, 

14 its allies, and like-minded partners. According to 

15 market research firm Dell’Oro Group, Huawei’s 

16 share of worldwide telecommunications revenue 

17 equipment grew from 20 percent in 2014 to 31 per18 cent in 2020. 

19 (12) While the United States semiconductor in20 dustry is the worldwide industry leader with approxi21 mately 50 percent of global market share and sales 

22 of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the situation may be 

23 changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new semiconductor 

24 fabrication plants that opened worldwide were lo25 cated outside of the United States, with 4 of these 


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1 plants built in China. The Government of the PRC 

2 plans to spend $150,000,000,000 on its computer 

3 chip industry during the next 10 years. 

4 (13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, 

5 facial recognition, and biometrics, to increase control 

6 over its population, facilitating mass surveillance, 

7 scalable censorship, and technology-enabled social 

8 control, including against ethnic and religious mi9 norities including Tibetans, Uyghurs, ethnic 

10 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim mi11 nority groups. 

12 (14) The PRC uses its economic power to co13 erce and censor companies, individuals and coun14 tries. 

15 (15) In the past decade, the Government of the 

16 PRC— 

17 (A) blocked exports of rare earth elements 

18 to Japan; 

19 (B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of 

20 German cars; 

21 (C) cut off tourism to South Korea; 

22 (D) restricted banana imports from the 

23 Philippines; and 

24 (E) imposed large tariffs on Australian 

25 barley exports. 


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1 (16) The Government of the PRC— 

2 (A) has banned United States technology 

3 companies, including Facebook, Google, and 

4 Twitter; 

5 (B) has pressured movie studios based in 

6 the United States to alter content in movies 

7 that it deemed objectionable; and 

8 (C) has retaliated against a range of 

9 American companies for actual or perceived 

10 support for a range of political positions, in11 cluding recognizing territorial claims of coun12 tries in border disputes with China, recognizing 

13 Tibet, and more. 

14 (17) Third countries have become particular 

15 targets of Chinese investments in technology. These 

16 third country investments provide access to innova17 tion, data that allows Chinese companies to refine 

18 their own systems, and influence over the policies of 

19 these governments. The terms on which Chinese in20 vestments are made often are attractive in the short21 term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, 

22 or influence over, major industries in those coun23 tries. 

24 (18) After decades of being the world leader in 

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1 ing behind the PRC in key technologies of the fu2 ture. While private-sector research and development 

3 investments have steadily increased in the United 

4 States, Federal Government spending has declined 

5 as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from ap6 proximately 1.2 percent in 1976 to approximately 

7 0.7 percent in 2018. The decline has been even 

8 steeper in the physical sciences. The Federal Gov9 ernment plays a unique and critical role in Amer10 ica’s innovation ecosystem. Government research and 

11 development spending spurs private-sector invest12 ments, and the United States Government remains 

13 the largest source of basic research funding, which 

14 is foundational to game-changing technological 

15 achievements. 

16 (19) During the past several years, the PRC 

17 has quadrupled its research and development spend18 ing and is on the brink of surpassing the United 

19 States in total investments in key technologies, with 

20 its growth in research and development spending 

21 doubling the United States Government’s spending 

22 increase in this area. Chinese patent publications 

23 have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence, 

24 machine learning, and deep learning. 


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1 (20) The United States is highly dependent on 

2 China for key components of critical technologies in 

3 its supply chains, such as rare earths. 

4 (21) The United States remains a leader in the 

5 science and technology areas of engineering and biol6 ogy as well as key components, including tele7 communications equipment and semiconductors. The 

8 United States does not have a domestic manufac9 turer of radio access network equipment for 5G net10 works, but is well-positioned to lead in 6G tele11 communications, which depend on software and 

12 semiconductors, areas of United States strength. 

13 (22) Other countries have unique knowledge, 

14 expertise, and capabilities in numerous cutting edge 

15 technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing 

16 equipment, such as extreme ultraviolet lithography 

17 machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine 

18 tools for fabrication of custom components. In order 

19 to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 

20 States must partner with such countries. 

21 (23) The private sector in the United States 

22 and partner countries, including Japan, Korea, Aus23 tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 

24 European Union has considerable expertise in both 

25 technology and in standard setting, given the role of 


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1 the private sector in international standard setting 

2 bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in 

3 shaping United States technology policy. 

4 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) emerging technology governance regimes 

7 driven by undemocratic governments that do not re8 flect democratic values are gaining traction inter9 nationally through coercive, diplomatic, and unfair 

10 economic, trade, and development practices; 

11 (2) the United States is failing to lead inter12 national efforts or prioritize multilateral coordina13 tion, institutions, and legal compatibility in the area 

14 of technology governance, ceding leadership to au15 thoritarian regimes and risking the growth of anti16 democratic norms and standards around tech17 nologies; and 

18 (3) promoting greater coordination, common 

19 functional problem-solving institutional mechanisms, 

20 and more compatible legal regimes among demo21 cratic nations is essential to create an international 

22 technology governance architecture that benefits all 

23 nations and effectively counters and contains non24 democratic governance regimes. 


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1 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

2 It shall be the policy of the United States to lead in 

3 the creation of a new multilateral diplomatic architecture 

4 for technology policy composed of the world’s tech-leading 

5 democracies. 

6 SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OF7 FICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

8 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall 

9 establish an interagency-staffed International Technology 

10 Partnership Office (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Of11 fice’’), which shall be housed in the Department of State. 

12 (b) LEADERSHIP.— 

13 (1) SPECIAL AMBASSADOR.—The Office shall be 

14 headed by the Special Ambassador for Technology, 

15 who shall— 

16 (A) be appointed by the President, by and 

17 with the advice and consent of the Senate; 

18 (B) have the rank and status of ambas19 sador; and 

20 (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 

21 otherwise directed by the Secretary of State. 

22 (2) DIRECTORS.—The Secretary of Commerce 

23 and the Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, 

24 from within their respective departments, directors 

25 for International Technology Partnership, who also 

26 shall serve as liaisons between the Office and the 


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1 Department of Commerce or the Department of the 

2 Treasury, as applicable. 

3 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the individuals re4 ferred to in subsection (b), the Office shall include a rep5 resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, 

6 as determined by the Special Ambassador for Technology. 

7 (d) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in8 clude— 

9 (1) creating an international technology part10 nership of democratic countries to develop har11 monized technology governance regimes and to fill 

12 gaps where United States capabilities are currently 

13 insufficient, with a specific focus on key tech14 nologies, including— 

15 (A) artificial intelligence and machine 

16 learning; 

17 (B) 5G telecommunications and other ad18 vanced wireless networking technologies; 

19 (C) semiconductor chip manufacturing; 

20 (D) biotechnology; 

21 (E) quantum computing; 

22 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa23 cial recognition technologies and censorship 

24 software; and 

25 (G) fiber optic cables; 


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1 (2) vigorously identifying existing and, as need2 ed, new multilateral mechanisms to advance the ob3 jectives of the International Technology Partnership 

4 around technology governance that advances demo5 cratic values; 

6 (3) coordinating with such countries regarding 

7 shared technology strategies, including technology 

8 controls and standards, as informed by the reports 

9 required under section 8; and 

10 (4) developing strategies with partner countries 

11 for coordinated, development and financial support 

12 for the acquisition by key countries of the tech13 nologies listed in paragraph (1), or comparable tech14 nologies, in order to provide alternatives for those 

15 countries to systems supported by authoritarian re16 gimes. 

17 (e) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary 

18 of State may— 

19 (1) hire support staff for the Office; and 

20 (2) hire individuals to serve as experts or con21 sultants for the Office, in accordance with section 

22 3109 of title 5, United States Code. 

23 (f) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 

24 of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 

25 the following three years, the Secretary of State shall subVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426

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1 mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

2 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

3 Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 

4 index if necessary, regarding the activities of the Office 

5 undertaken to carry out the purposes described in sub6 section (d), including information on any cooperative ac7 tivities, initiatives, or partnerships pursued with United 

8 States allies and partners, and the results of such activi9 ties, initiatives, or partnerships. 

10 SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP. 

11 (a) PARTNERSHIP CRITERIA.—The Special Ambas12 sador for Technology (referred to in this section as the 

13 ‘‘Special Ambassador’’) shall seek to establish an Inter14 national Technology Partnership with foreign countries 

15 that have— 

16 (1) democratic national government and a 

17 strong commitment to democratic values, including 

18 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech, 

19 and respect for and promotion of human rights, in20 cluding the right to privacy; 

21 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec22 tors; and 

23 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex24 pressed interest in international cooperation and coVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426

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1 ordination with the United States on important de2 fense and intelligence issues. 

3 (b) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNIONS.—The Inter4 national Technology Partnership may include relevant po5 litical and economic unions. 

6 (c) OBJECTIVES.—The Special Ambassador, in co7 operation with International Technology Partnership par8 ticipants, shall pursue, as appropriate, through memo9 randa of understanding, executive agreements, free trade 

10 agreements, and existing multilateral channels— 

11 (1) coordination of technology policies and 

12 standards among International Technology Partner13 ship countries through participation in international 

14 standard setting bodies, such as the United Nations 

15 Group of Governmental Experts, World Trade Orga16 nization, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, 

17 and the International Telecommunications Union, 

18 including pre-attendance meetings, education, and 

19 panels to report on issues; 

20 (2) coordination of policies with the private sec21 tor to ensure private sector led, politically neutral, 

22 standards processes; 

23 (3) the adoption of shared data privacy, data 

24 sharing, and data archiving standards among the 

25 United States and partner countries and relevant 


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1 economic and political unions, including harmonized 

2 data protection regulations; 

3 (4) the creation of coordinated policies for the 

4 use and control of emerging and foundational tech5 nologies through— 

6 (A) use restrictions and export controls; 

7 (B) investment screening coordination, in8 cluding the harmonization of technology-trans9 fer laws, regulations, policies, and practices; 

10 and 

11 (C) the development of other arrangements 

12 to regulate and control technology transfer; 

13 (5) coordination around the resiliency of supply 

14 chains in critical technology areas, with possible di15 versification of supply chain components among the 

16 group, while— 

17 (A) abiding by transparency obligations re18 lated to subsidies and product origin; 

19 (B) conducting risk analyses of products 

20 manufactured in third party nations that fail to 

21 meet established standards similarly; and 

22 (C) coordinating subsidy policies; 

23 (6) the coordination of supply chains regarding 

24 semiconductor fabrication through a fabrication re25 search consortium for the semiconductor industry; 


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1 (7) the facilitation of partnerships and coopera2 tion between research universities, private-sector 

3 stake holders, and other entities in member coun4 tries regarding key technologies, including the cre5 ation of memoranda of understanding regarding 

6 science and technology collaboration with member 

7 countries and coordinated incentives and subsidies; 

8 (8) the coordination of investments and co-fi9 nancing in targeted countries with the goal of— 

10 (A) promoting secure and resilient digital 

11 infrastructure and privacy-enhancing tech12 nologies that protect democratic values and cre13 ate a clear contrast and alternative to the PRC 

14 through the United States International Devel15 opment Finance Corporation, the Export-Im16 port Bank of the United States, foreign devel17 opment finance institutions (including the 

18 World Bank and the International Monetary 

19 Fund), the European Bank for Reconstruction 

20 and Development, the European Investment 

21 Bank, partner country development institutions, 

22 regional banks, other lending institutions, or 

23 new investment mechanisms; and 

24 (B) seeking to ensure that all funding pro25 vided by those institutions, for any purpose, 


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1 should be conditioned upon the protection of 

2 democratic values, and that financing is forbid3 den to entities involved in the international in4 vestment programs of authoritarian or illiberal 

5 governments; and 

6 (9) information sharing among partner coun7 tries to raise awareness of— 

8 (A) the technology transfer threat posed by 

9 authoritarian governments; and 

10 (B) ways in which autocratic regimes are 

11 utilizing technology to erode democracies. 

12 (d) WORKING GROUPS.—In carrying out the objec13 tives described in subsection (c) with respect to particular 

14 technology areas, the Special Ambassador may establish 

15 working groups within the International Technology Part16 nership, composed of representatives from partner coun17 tries, including relevant political and economic unions, to 

18 coordinate on discrete strategies and policies related to 

19 specific technologies. 

20 SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP 

21 FUND. 

22 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the 

23 Treasury of the United States a trust fund, which shall 

24 be known as the ‘‘International Technology Partnership 

25 Fund’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Fund’’). 


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1 (b) DEPOSITS.— 

2 (1) FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There is au3 thorized to be appropriated $5,000,000,000 for the 

4 Fund. 

5 (2) DONATIONS.—In addition to amounts au6 thorized to be appropriated for the Fund pursuant 

7 to paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may 

8 accept donations from International Technology 

9 Partnership member countries. 

10 (c) USE OF FUNDS.—Subject to subsection (d), 

11 amounts deposited into the Fund may be used by the Sec12 retary of State, in consultation with the International 

13 Technology Partnership and other relevant Federal agen14 cies, to support— 

15 (1) joint research projects between government 

16 research agencies, universities, technology compa17 nies, and other entities from International Tech18 nology Partnership member countries; and 

19 (2) technology investments in third country 

20 markets. 

21 (d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The obligation 

22 of funds under subsection (c) is subject to the notification 

23 requirement set forth in section 634A of the Foreign As24 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). 

25 (e) PUBLIC-PRIVATE BOARD.— 


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1 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an 

2 International Technology Partnership Advisory 

3 Board (referred to in this subsection as the 

4 ‘‘Board’’), which shall provide the International 

5 Technology Partnership Office with advice and rec6 ommendations concerning the implementation of this 

7 Act. 

8 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Board shall be com9 posed of individuals— 

10 (A) with demonstrated expertise in the 

11 fields of emerging technologies and inter12 national trade; and 

13 (B) from the private sector, academic insti14 tutions, national or international human rights 

15 organizations, or technology research institu16 tions. 

17 SEC. 8. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTING REGARDING 

18 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY AND 

19 NATIONAL SECURITY. 

20 Not later than one year after the date of the enact21 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

22 with other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the 

23 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 

24 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa25 tives an unclassified report, with a classified index if necVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:26 Jun 22, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3426.IH H3426

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1 essary, that outlines a national strategy for technology and 

2 national security, which— 

3 (1) assesses the emerging and foundational 

4 technologies of the future; 

5 (2) identifies the current capabilities of the 

6 United States in critical technologies and its compo7 nents, including any gaps in such capabilities; 

8 (3) identifies the technology capabilities (hori9 zon scanning and technology forecasting) among al10 lied and partner countries; 

11 (4) identifies governance models for emerging 

12 and foundational technologies being adopted by 

13 other countries and other areas of global policy con14 vergence with respect to which the United States 

15 should better pursue multilateralism or coordination; 

16 (5) identifies a preliminary set of priority tech17 nology areas on which the International Technology 

18 Partnership should be focused; 

19 (6) analyzes the current capabilities of the PRC 

20 in critical technologies and components, including 

21 any gaps in such capabilities; and 

22 (7) includes a set of recommendations for— 

23 (A) rapidly enhancing United States tech24 nological capabilities; 


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1 (B) how the United States should collabo2 rate with allied or like-minded countries, identi3 fying existing and, as needed, new multilateral 

4 mechanisms to fill capability gaps and areas for 

5 the United States to advance democratic values; 

6 and 

7 (C) the criteria for determining which 

8 countries should be included in the Inter9 national Technology Partnership, including a 

10 strong commitment to democratic values and a 

11 history of working closely with the United 

12 States, as reflected in Department of State re13 ports regarding human rights and media free14 dom. 

Æ 


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