alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4973-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LLOYD N. RIDDICK, a/k/a

TIGUE LLOYD RIDDICK,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued November 9, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Whipple. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 17-04-0560.

Justin M. Blasi, Special Deputy Attorney General/

Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for 

appellant (Dennis Calo, Acting Bergen County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Justin M. Blasi, of counsel and on 

the brief).

James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., Susan

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 19, 2018
2

A-4973-16T4

C. Green and Michele Friedman, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defenders, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendant Lloyd N. Riddick pled guilty under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) to 

fourth degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension 

by operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for a second or 

subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. On July 24, 2017, the trial court 

sentenced defendant to 180 days in the county jail under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c), 

suspended the sentence, and imposed a one-year noncustodial probationary 

term. On appeal, the State contends the suspended custodial sentence is an 

illegal sentence requiring reversal. Although we agree the sentence was illegal, 

we are nonetheless constrained to dismiss this appeal. 

The State can move to correct an illegal sentence at any time. State v. 

Shepard, 125 N.J. Super. 332, 336 (App. Div. 1973). However, the sentence 

must be corrected before it has been completed. State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 

247 (1998). The court may stay a probationary sentence "on appropriate terms 

if an appeal is filed." R. 2:9-3(c). If the State fails to move for a stay pending 

appeal and the sentence has already been completed, double jeopardy principles 

will bar a sentence increase. See State v.Farr, 183 N.J. Super. 463, 470-72 (App. 

Div. 1982). Once the period of probation or sentence suspension is over, the 
3

A-4973-16T4

sentence is complete. See N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2(c). The court cannot enlarge the 

punishment after the sentence imposed has been satisfied and the defendant 

discharged. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309 (2012). Notably, the State did

not addressed this issue.

The State did not request a stay of sentence, and defendant has completed 

his probationary term. The sentence cannot be corrected. Accordingly, this 

appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1



DIVALL INSURED INCOME PROPERTIES 2

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP



Certification of Periodic Financial Report

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Divall Insured Income
Properties 2 Limited Partnership (the Company) certifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three month period ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |                                        |  |                                       
|--------------------- |  | -------------------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------
|                      |  | THE PROVO GROUP, INC., General Partner
|                      |  |                                       
|Dated: August 9, 2004 |  | By                                     |  | /s/ Bruce A. Provo                    
|                      |  |                                        |  | President, Chief Executive Officer and
|                      |  |                                        |  | Chief Financial Officer               



This certification is
made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained

therein, and not for any other purpose.
#### Alexander M. DAISLEY, Appellant v. RIGGS BANK, N.A. and Robert C. Roane, Appellees.

No. 07-5300.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

April 30, 2008.

James M. Ludwig, Bode & Grenier, Martin Francis McMahon, Martin F. McMahon & Associates, Washington, DC, for Appellant.

Tina Marie Maiolo, Carr Maloney PC, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington, DC, for Robert C. Roane.

Before: RANDOLPH, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. R. 34(j). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

Alexander Daisley contends that Riggs Bank, his former employer, breached his employment agreement when it failed to honor certain provisions of his compensation package. Although Daisley alleges that those provisions were contained in an initial oral agreement, they are unenforceable because he subsequently signed a fully integrated written employment agreement that did not contain those provisions. Daisley nonetheless maintains that he is entitled to enforcement of those provisions because, a year after the date of the written agreement, his new supervisor orally ratified the terms of the initial oral agreement. Daisley contends that the ratification of the initial oral agreement effected a modification of the written agreement to incorporate all of the compensation terms contained in the former. He also alleges that thereafter his supervisor fraudulently induced him to forgo those terms by accepting a disqualifying promotion.

The district court granted Riggs’ motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract and fraud claims. *Daisley v. PNC Bank, N.A.,*2007 WL 2071682 (D.D.C.2007). With regard to the former, the court concluded that Daisley offered no evidence that Riggs had ratified the initial oral agreement or modified the written agreement. *Id.*at *5. And because the success of Daisle/s fraud claim depended upon there having been a ratification or modification, the court concluded that the lack of evidence of ratification or modification was also determinative of that claim. *Id.*at *6. We agree that Daisley did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding ratification or modification and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(b), this decision will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold the issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after the disposition of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. R. 41(a)(1).
January 2,1997






M. Thomas Makmann, President
Shepherd Surveillance Solutions, Inc.
7 Perimeter Road, Suite 4
Manchester,  NH 03103

Re:  Commitment to Extend Maturity Date

Dear Mr. Makmann:

         This  letter  hereby  confirms  the  irrevocable  commitment  of Trilon
Dominion Partners,  L.L.C. ("Trilon").  Pursuant to a Credit Agreement currently
being  negotiated,  to  extend  the  maturity  date  of the  $1,000,000  secured
promissory note to Shepherd Surveillance Solutions, Inc. (the"Company") in favor
of Trilon from August 8,1996 to August 8,2000.  Such note will bear at the prime
rate plus 4%.

         We hereby consent to the furnishing of a copy of this letter to Ernst &
Young LLP, and the reliance of such firm upon this letter,  in  connection  with
the completion of its audit of the Company's financial statements for the fiscal
year ended September 30,1996.



                                                By:/s/ Jack R. Sauer
                                                   ------------------------
                                                Title: Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000827065
<NAME>                        LOGIPHONE GROUP, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              APR-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 NOV-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   JAN-31-1997
<CASH>                                         36,457
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  73,744
<ALLOWANCES>                                   3,687
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               190,355
<PP&E>                                         687,289
<DEPRECIATION>                                 166,794
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 808,074
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,046,427
<BONDS>                                        550,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       900
<OTHER-SE>                                     (245,108)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   808,074
<SALES>                                        263,365
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               265,535
<CGS>                                          288,962
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  785,657
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             6,319
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (526,441)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (526,441)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (526,441)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .058
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .041
        


</TABLE>
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1331 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW

SUITE 520N

WASHINGTON, DC 20004

February 26, 2014

TIME AND DATE: 2:00 p.m., Thursday, March 6, 2014

PLACE: The Richard V. Backley Hearing Room, Room 511N, 1331 

Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004 (entry from F 

Street entrance)

STATUS: Open 

MATTERS TO BE 

CONSIDERED: The Commission will consider and act upon the following in open 

session: Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., Docket Nos.

WEST 2009-241, et al., and Secretary of Labor v. Twentymile 

Coal Co., Docket Nos. WEST 2009-1323, et al. (Issues include 

whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in affirming citations

for failing to provide additional insulation for a communications 

circuit.) Public meetings in these matters have twice been 

postponed because of severe weather problems.

Any person attending this meeting who requires special accessibility 

features and/or auxiliary aids, such as sign language interpreters, 

must inform the Commission in advance of those needs. Subject to 

29 C.F.R. § 2706.150(a)(3) and § 2706.160(d).

CONTACT PERSON 

FOR MORE INFO: Jean Ellen (202) 434-9950 / (202) 708-9300 for TDD Relay / 

1-800-877-8339 for toll free.
**Exhibit 2.4****AMENDMENT NO. 1****TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT**     This Amendment No. 1, made as of December  , 2007 (this “*Amendment*”), amends the StockPurchase Agreement (the “*Stock Purchase Agreement*”) made as of October 30, 2007, by and amongQuiksilver, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“*Quiksilver*”), Rossignol Ski Company, Inc., a Delawarecorporation (“*Seller*”), Roger Cleveland Golf Company, Inc., a California corporation (“*Company*”),and SRI Sports Limited, a Japanese corporation (“*Buyer*”). For purposes of this Amendment,capitalized terms used but not otherwise define herein shall have the meanings ascribed to suchterms in the Stock Purchase Agreement.**RECITALS**     A. Section 4.11 of the Stock Purchase Agreement provides that the parties may agree toadjustments to the Restructuring (prior to the Closing), including without limitation, adjustingthe Restructuring plan such that the shares of one or more of the Acquired Companies are notcontributed or sold by Quiksilver (or its Affiliates) to the Company prior to Closing, but insteadare directly purchased by Buyer at Closing.     B. As part of the Restructuring, effective October 31, 2007, Riviera SNC was converted to a*société par actions simplifiée*under the laws of France and is now known as Riviera S.A.S. Forpurposes of this Amendment and the Stock Purchase Agreement, Riviera S.A.S. will continue to bereferred to as Riviera SNC.     C. The parties desire that pursuant to Section 4.11 of the Stock Purchase Agreement theRestructuring be adjusted to cause Riviera SNC, Cleveland Golf Canada Corp. and Cleveland Golf AsiaYK to be direct wholly-owned subsidiaries of Seller, with Cleveland Deutschland GmbH and BelfryGolf remaining direct wholly-owned subsidiaries of Riviera SNC. Consequently, at the Closing,Buyer will purchase directly from Seller all of the outstanding shares of the Company, Riviera SNC,Cleveland Golf Canada Corp. and Cleveland Golf Asia YK.     D. Pursuant to Section 11.8 of the Stock Purchase Agreement, the Stock Purchase Agreement maybe amended or modified in whole or in part at any time prior to the Closing Date by an agreement inwriting between Buyer and Quiksilver.**AGREEMENT**     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual representations, warranties and agreementscontained herein and in the Stock Purchase Agreement, and in accordance with Section 11.8 of theStock Purchase Agreement, the parties to the Stock Purchase Agreement agree as follow:
 

 
**ARTICLE I**
#### Luis MENDOZA-GUILLEN, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

Nos. 06-71276, 06-73001.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 20, 2008.*

Filed May 27, 2008.

Christopher J. Stender, Stender & Pope, PC, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.

Julie M. Iversen, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Mark C. Walters, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: PREGERSON, TASHIMA, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

In these consolidated cases, Luis Mendoza-Guillen, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and denying his motion to reconsider. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law in immigration proceedings, *Vasquez-Zavala v. Ashcroft,*324 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir.2003), and we review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider, *Oh v. Gonzales,*406 F.3d 611, 612 (9th Cir.2005). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review in No. 06-71276, and deny the petition for review in No. 06-73001.

In No. 06-71276, to the extent that Mendoza-Guillen challenges the agency’s discretionary denial of a § 212(c) waiver, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim. *See Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales,*497 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir.2007) (“Discretionary decisions, including whether or not to grant § 212(c) relief, are not renewable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”)

We reject Mendoza-Guillen’s contention that the agency improperly relied upon police reports in denying relief. *See Paredes-Urrestarazu v. INS,*36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (BIA may consider an alien’s past conduct when making a § 212(c) determination).

In No. 06-73001, the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Mendoza-Guillen’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. *See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS,*272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

No. 06-71276: PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

No. 06-73001: PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 10946 Summary Calendar

STEPHEN M. AVDEEF,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v. GOOGLE, INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:14 -CV- 788

Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Stephen M. Avdeef appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his copyright infringement complaint against Google, Inc. While pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction, even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them. Yohey v. Co llins , 985 F.2d 222, 224

- 25 (5th Cir. 1993). Avdeef fails to set forth the substance of his claims in meaningful detail and does not address the grounds upon which the district court dismissed his

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 3, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-10946 Document: 00513896444 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/03/2017No. 15

- 10946

2 complaint. H e does not mention the district court’s finding that Google was entitled to protection under the safe harbor provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512

. By failing to challenge the district court’s reasons for granting summary judgment in favor of Google, Avdeef has abandoned the claim on appeal. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)

. In his complaint, Avdeef also named Google’s chief legal officer, David C. Drummond, as a defendant. In a final appealable order, the district court dismissed Avdeef’s complaint against Drummond for lack of personal jurisdiction. See F ED

. R. C IV . P. 54(b). Because Avdeef failed to file a timely notice of appeal as to this order, we lack jurisdiction to consider any claim challenging the dismissal of Drummond as a defendant in the instant action. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P . 4(a)(1); Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. Case: 15-10946 Document: 00513896444 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/03/2017
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

Health Outcomes Management, Inc. and Subsidiaries
CALCULATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE (1)
Years ended February 28, 1997, February 29, 1996 and February 28, 1995


                                                    1997            1996           1995
                                                -----------     -----------    -----------
<S>                                            <C>             <C>            <C>        
Earnings used in calculations:

Net income (loss) used in per
    share calculation                           $  (113,244)    $    95,615    $    10,995
                                                ===========     ===========    ===========



Shares used in calculation:

  Average number of shares outstanding            8,434,058       8,081,426      7,824,289

  Additional shares issuable assuming ex-
      ercise of outstanding stock options              --           467,176        322,903

  Additional shares issuable assuming ex-
      ercise of outstanding warrants                   --           172,381        176,731

  Additional shares issuable assuming con-
      version of Convertible Preferred Stock           --              --          650,685
                                                -----------     -----------    -----------

Weighted average number of common and
  common equivalent shares outstanding            8,434,058       8,720,983      8,974,608
                                                ===========     ===========    ===========

Income (loss)  per common share                        (.01)            .01            .00
                                                ===========     ===========    ===========
</TABLE>

(1) Earnings per share assuming full dilution are not different from primary
earnings per share.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                   CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


         Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of Lowrance
Electronics, Inc. (the "Company") certifies that the Annual Report on Form 10-K
of the Company for the year ended July 31, 2002 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that information contained in that Form 10-K fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated: October 16, 2002                /s/ Darrell J. Lowrance
                                       -----------------------
                                       Darrell J. Lowrance
                                       President and Chief Executive Officer



Dated: October 16, 2002                /s/ Douglas J. Townsdin
                                       -----------------------
                                       Douglas J. Townsdin
                                       Vice President of Finance
                                       and Chief Financial Officer





        This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
        subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any
        other purpose.