alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 248 (Thursday, December 27, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66974-66975]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-31507]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board

[STB Finance Docket No. 34135]


The Fulton Railroad Co., Ltd.--Acquisition and Operation 
Exemption--Cincinnati Railway Company

    The Fulton Railroad Co., Ltd. (Fulton), a noncarrier, has filed a 
verified notice of exemption under 49 CFR 1150.31 to acquire from 
Cincinnati Railway Company and operate approximately 4,800 feet of 
track from a beginning point of milepost 0.0 and continuing for 4,800 
feet to end of track, in the City of Cincinnati, Millcreek Township, 
Hamilton County, OH (line).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Fulton states that it will be the operator of the line but 
that it is engaging in discussions with the Indiana & Ohio Railway 
Company (IORY) for IORY to assume operations over the line.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The transaction is scheduled to be consummated on or about December 
15, 2001. The earliest the transaction can be consummated is December 
14, 2001, the effective date of the exemption (7 days after the notice 
of exemption was filed).
    If the verified notice contains false or misleading information, 
the exemption is void ab initio. Petitions to reopen the proceeding to 
revoke the exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d) may be filed at any time. 
The filing of a petition to revoke will not automatically stay the 
transaction.
    An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to STB 
Finance Docket No. 34135 must be filed with the Surface Transportation 
Board, Office of the Secretary, Case Control Unit, 1925 K Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, a copy of each pleading must be 
served on Robert L. Calhoun, Esq., Redmon, Peyton & Braswell, LLP, 510 
King Street, Suite 301, Alexandria, VA 22314.

[[Page 66975]]

    Board decisions and notices are available on our Web site at 
www.stb.dot.gov.

    Decided: December 14, 2001.

    By the Board, David M. Konschnik, Director, Office of 
Proceedings.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-31507 Filed 12-26-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-00-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          604042
<SECURITIES>                                    675014
<RECEIVABLES>                                   141950
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      40923
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                920107
<PP&E>                                           54294
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2192455
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           883736
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          6346
<OTHER-SE>                                     1308719
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2192455
<SALES>                                         150916
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                194084
<CGS>                                           140361
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   275175
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (185215)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               37471
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (147744)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (147744)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)
        

</TABLE>
DISCIPLINARY CASES

2013-1253.

#### Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marrelli.

The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio filed a certification of default in the office of the clerk of this court. On September 23, 2013, this court imposed an interim default-judgment suspension upon respondent, Deneen Marie Marrelli, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6a)(B)(l). Respondent was ordered to show cause why the interim default-judgment suspension should not be converted into an indefinite suspension. Respondent filed objections, relator filed an answer, and this cause was considered by the court.

On consideration thereof, it is ordered by this court that this matter is remanded to the board for the consideration of mitigating evidence only.

The court further orders that the interim default-judgment suspension imposed against respondent on September 23, 2013, shall remain in place while this matter is pending before the board. Proceedings before this court in this case are stayed until further order of this court.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 11

     EARNING PER SHARE

     The numerator and denominator of basic and diluted earnings per share are
as follows:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                        Dec. 31, 1998     Dec. 31, 1999
                                                                        -------------     -------------
<S>                                                                     <C>             <C>
       Numerator  - Net loss as reported                                   (90,000)        ($954,000)

       Denominator - Weighted average number of shares outstanding       6,688,300        11,563,700
       Effect of dilutive securities                                             -                 -
          Dilutive weighted average number of shares outstanding         6,388,300        11,563,700

       Basic earnings (loss) per share                                      ($0.01)           ($0.08)
       Diluted earnings (loss) per share                                    ($0.01)           ($0.08)
</TABLE>
<PAGE>



                                  Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of FragranceNet.com, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis
M. Apfel, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




                                By:  /s/ Dennis M. Apfel
                                     ------------------------------------
                                     Chairman, Chief Executive
                                     Officer and Chief Financial Officer



August 12, 2004
EXHIBIT 32(B)

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quaterly Report of Murray United Development
Corp. on Form 10-QSB for the period ending October 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Anthony Campo,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


1. The Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date:  December 12, 2005

                                  /s/ Anthony Campo
                                  ------------------
                                  ANTHONY CAMPO,
                                  Chairman of the Board and Chief Financial and
                                  Accounting Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

             DIVALL INSURED INCOME PROPERTIES 2 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP


                   Certification of Periodic Financial Report
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Divall Insured Income
Properties 2 Limited Partnership (the "Company") certifies that the Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2002
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

                                     THE PROVO GROUP, INC., General Partner


Dated: November 13, 2002                  By /s/ Bruce A. Provo
                                            ------------------------------------
                                          President, Chief Executive Officer and
                                          Chief Financial Officer

     This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose.
#### Jose Eduardo MORALES-LOPEZ, aka Jose Eduardo Morales, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-74465.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 16, 2010.*

Filed Nov. 23, 2010.

Sharon A. Healey, Law Office of Sharon A. Healey, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Timothy Hayes, Trial, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District *226Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, WWS-District, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Eduardo Morales-Lopez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo, *see, e.g., Cerezo v. Mukasey,*512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. *See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.2004). We review factual findings for substantial evidence. *See, e.g., Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006). We deny the petition for review.

We reject Morales’s claim that he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in a particular social group, namely, people who have lived in the United States, are perceived as wealthy, and are parents of children who are United States citizens. *See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,*600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir.2010); *Ochoa v. Gonzales,*406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.2005); *In re A-M-E & J-G-U-,*24 I. *&*N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007). Accordingly, we deny Morales’s petition as to his asylum and withholding-of-removal claims. *See, e.g., Parussimova v. Mukasey,*555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (“The Real ID Act requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution.”).

We also deny Morales’s petition as to his unsupported claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture. *See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,*542 F.3d 738, 747-48 (9th Cir.2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. , Timothy Winfred MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-60398

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 3, 2016.

Glenda Ruth Haynes, Esq., Assistant U.S, Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Jackson, MS, Gaines H. Cleveland, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ellen Maier Allred, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Gulfport, MS, for Defendants Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Timothy Miller appeals the sentence imposed on his conviction of possession of materials involving sexual exploitation of minors. Specifically, Miller challenges the restitution and the special condition of supervised release (“SR”) prohibiting access to the internet and to computers without the permission of a probation officer.

In the plea agreement, Miller waived the right to appeal his “conviction and sentence imposed in this case, or the manner in which that sentence was imposed ... on any ground whatsoever.” Miller claims, however, that the waiver is not enforceable because he could not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to appeal a sentence that has not yet been imposed. He asserts that even if the waiver is enforceable, it does not apply to his challenges to the restitution and SR. The government seeks to enforce the appeal waiver and moves for dismissal of the appeal or, alternatively, summary affirmance.

To determine whether an appeal of a sentence is barred by an appeal waiver, this court analyzes whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of the *266agreement. *See United States v. Bond,*414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir.2005). For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, the “defendant must know that he had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that right.” *United States v. Portillo,*18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record shows that Miller’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. *See United States v. Melancon,*972 F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir.1992).

Miller’s challenge to the condition of SR restricting access to the internet and to computers is barred by the appeal waiver. *See United States v. Higgins,*739 F.3d 733, 738-39 (5th Cir.2014). Because the record shows that a potential restitution order was discussed at rearraignment and at sentencing, and because the plea agreement defined “Sentence” to include restitution, the waiver bars Miller’s challenge to the amount of the restitution order. *See United States v. Keele,*755 F.3d 752, 755-56 (5th Cir.2014).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. The government’s alternative motion for summary affirmance is DENIED as unnecessary.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7496

FRANK MIDDLETON, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versus JOHN H. CARMICHAEL, JR., Warden; CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Robert S. Carr, Magistrate Judge. (CA-97-1711-2-8AJ) Submitted: January 7, 1999 Decided: January 26, 1999 Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and ERVIN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank Middleton, Appellant Pro Se. William Ansel Collins, Jr., SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The parties consented to jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994). 2 PER CURIAM: Frank Middleton, Jr., appeals the magistrate judge’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. * We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s opinion and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. See Middleton v. Carmichael , No. CA-97-1711-2-8AJ (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT

PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY , Appellant,

v.

DAVID A. BLUM, M.D., P.A., a/a/o VANESSA MORENO , Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 4311

[ March 14, 2018 ]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; John D. Fry , Judge; L.T. Case No. 14

- 12198(70)

.
Douglas H. Stein of Association Law Group, P.L., Miami, for appellant.

Marlene S. Reiss, Miami, and Thomas J. Wenzel of Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A., Coral Springs, for appellee.

K UNTZ , J.

We are presented with the following question, certified by the county court to be of great public importance:

PURSUANT TO FLA. STAT. § 627.739, IS AN INSURER REQUIRED TO APPLY THE DEDUCTIBLE TO 100% OF AN INSURED’S EXPENSES AND LOSSES PRIOR TO APPLYING ANY PERMISSIVE FEE SCHEDULE PAYMENT LIMITATION FOUND IN § 627.736(5)(A)(1), FLA. STAT. (2013)?

We rephrase the certified question as follows:

PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 627.736 AND 627.739, FLORIDA STATUTES (2013), IS AN INSURER RE QUIRED TO APPLY A POLICY DEDUCTIBLE TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF A PROVIDER’S INVOICES TO AN INSURED PRIOR TO APPLYING ANY FEE SCHEDULE FOUND IN § 627.736, FLA. STAT.?2 For the reasons explained in our opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co

. v. Car e Wellness Center, LLC a/a/o Bardon

- Diaz

, No. 4D16

- 2254 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar

. 14 , 2018) , also issued today, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative, reverse the county court’s summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in case number 4D16

- 2254. We also certify conflict with Progressive Select Insurance Co. v. Florida Hospital Me dical Center a/a/o Jonathan Parent

, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D318 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 9, 2018)

.
Reversed and remanded; conflict certified.

F ORST , J., concurs

. G ROSS , J., dissents with opinion.

G ROSS , J., dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons set forth in my d issent to the Court’s opinion in USAA Gen. Indem. Co. v. Gogan a/a/o Tara Ricks , No. 4D16

- 3313 ( Mar

. 14 , 2018).

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 31.2
**CERTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**
I, Douglas J. Townsdin, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A for the yearended July 31, 2003 of Lowrance Electronics, Inc., a Delawarecorporation (the registrant).  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
 a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared;  b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and;  c. Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknessesin the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information, and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control; over financial reporting.
     Dated: June 15, 2004                                                /s/ Douglas J. Townsdin   Douglas J. Townsdin   Vice President of Finance andChief Financial Officer
**FEDERALMINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION**

 

SUNSHINE ACT NOTICE

 

BAC 6735-01

 

January 13, 2016

 

 

TIMEAND DATE:                10:00 a.m., Thursday, January 28, 2016

 

PLACE:                                  TheRichard V. Backley Hearing Room, Room 511N, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,Washington, DC 20004 (enter from  F Street entrance)

 

STATUS:                                Open

 

MATTERSTO BE 

CONSIDERED:                     TheCommission will consider and act upon the following in open session: *Secretaryof Labor v. Knife River Construction,*Docket Nos. WEST 2013-827-RM, et al.**(Issues include whether the Judge erred in upholding an imminent dangerorder.)

 

 

Any person attending this meeting who requires specialaccessibility features and/or auxiliary aids, such as sign languageinterpreters, must inform the Commission in advance of those needs. Subject to29 C.F.R. § 2706.150(a)(3) and § 2706.160(d).

 

 

CONTACTPERSON 

FOR MORE INFO:                EmogeneJohnson (202) 434-9935 / (202) 708-9300 for TDD

                                                Relay/ 1-800-877-8339 for toll free.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                __________________________________

                                                SarahL. Stewart

                                                DeputyGeneral Counsel