SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3502-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

JOHN T. BRAGG, 

a/k/a JOHN WHITE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________ 

Argued April 29, 2024 – Decided May 7, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Chase. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 18-12-0715.

Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, 

Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel 

and on the brief). 

Colin J. Rizzo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Colin J. Rizzo, of counsel and on 

the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3502-21

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant John T. Bragg appeals from his convictions for: first-degree 

attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1), (counts 

one and two); first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1) and (2), (counts 

three, four, and five); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), 

(counts six and seven); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b) and 

2C:12-3(a), (counts eight and ten); third-degree possession of a weapon for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), (counts fourteen and fifteen); thirddegree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2), (count 

seventeen); and lesser-included offenses of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), 

(counts eleven and twelve).1 After merging the remaining counts (nine, thirteen,

sixteen, eighteen, and nineteen), the trial judge sentenced defendant to an 

aggregate term of life imprisonment, which defendant also challenges on this 

appeal. We affirm. 

In the early morning hours of October 1, 2017, Trenton Police Officers 

Frankie Guzman and Tomas Martinez were dispatched to a ninth-floor 

apartment located in a high-rise complex on Cooper Street for a domestic 

1

 Counts eleven and twelve were originally indicted as second-degree 

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), and third-degree terroristic threats, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b). 
3 A-3502-21

dispute. When Officer Guzman approached the apartment and knocked on the 

door, a female voice asked who was at the door. Officer Guzman told her it was 

the police, and the voice instructed him to come in. When Officer Guzman tried 

the door, it was locked. 

A male voice then asked who was at the door, and Officer Guzman again 

responded that it was the police. After another exchange with the female voice, 

the officer heard "some sort of physical altercation happening, and a female 

voice definitely in distress and asking for help." The officers kicked down the 

door on the third attempt and saw a "Black male, skinny in stature covered in 

blood" who seemed "[s]cared like he had been fighting for his life." That man, 

whom they later identified as Daquan Anderson, had a piece of porcelain in his 

hand. When he saw the officers, he yelled: "[H]elp, help. He's killing her, he's 

stabbing her." 

As officers followed the man into a darkened hallway inside the 

apartment, Lorenza Fletcher emerged and began running toward Officer 

Guzman. He testified Fletcher 

was completely covered in blood, naked. At first[, he] 

didn't know she was naked because there was so much

blood until she got out into the hallway. 

. . . . 
4 A-3502-21

[S]he was definitely in the fight for her life. She was 

scared, crying, breathing very heavily and just kept 

saying . . . something [like] . . . he killed me or he's 

trying to kill me. 

Officers saw Anderson with a small child, L.I., who is Fletcher's threeyear-old son. Officer Guzman testified the child's "t-shirt was covered in 

blood," but aside from a small mark on his elbow, the child was uninjured. 

Fletcher and Anderson had numerous wounds. 

When paramedics arrived, they determined Fletcher had a tension 

pneumothorax, which is a bleeding into her chest cavity. This required them to 

perform a needle decompression by inserting a large catheter into her chest to 

evacuate air or blood and allow the lungs to expand properly. Paramedics also 

noted Anderson was bleeding from his arms and neck. A paramedic testified 

Anderson also "had some sort of shoelaces wrapped around both wrists and . . .

ankles." 

At the hospital, a physician treated Fletcher for the pneumothorax, as well 

as multiple laceration wounds on her face, scalp, chest, neck, arms, and hands. 

Fletcher also had surgery to repair the tendons in her hands. The same physician 

also treated Anderson for wounds on his arms, right side of his neck, shoulder, 

and hand. 
5 A-3502-21

According to Officer Guzman, when police found defendant inside the 

apartment, he "was calm, he cooperated, he laid there" but he "had a 

sweater . . . covering his head and his face" and the sweater had blood on it. 

When the sweater was removed, it revealed "a real big gash wound laceration to 

the left side of his head." At the hospital, defendant was treated for: a 

concussion; two large lacerations on his scalp and forehead; and several smaller 

lacerations to his head. 

After everyone was removed from the apartment, officers returned to 

inspect the crime scene. Detective Samuel Gonzalez recalled it seemed to be "a 

vacant apartment." Sergeant Luis Nazario testified that "it looked like a vacant 

apartment somebody may have moved out of. It looked like they were beginning 

to move in, but there was next to nothing in there," and the only items in the 

apartment were a deflated air mattress, a curtain that was knocked down, and 

"some stuff in the kitchen, like a frying pan . . . . But it was . . . almost empty." 

Anderson and Fletcher testified for the State, and defendant testified in 

his own defense. Fletcher had a history of drug abuse and had sent L.I. to live 

with her mother while Fletcher attended a rehabilitation facility. Although 

Fletcher saw her son every day, she was not allowed to stay with him. 
6 A-3502-21

 Fletcher met defendant in the summer of 2017. She would have sex with 

him in exchange for Percocet and cocaine. She testified he assaulted her shortly 

after they first met, and there were other occasions when he smacked, choked, 

or threatened to kill her. Nevertheless, Fletcher and defendant continued to see 

each other regularly and defendant gave her a phone. 

Anderson testified he and Fletcher are cousins and he has known her his 

entire life. They were close and would see each other multiple times a week. 

He met defendant through Fletcher, in the summer of 2017, and defendant would 

call his cell phone whenever he could not find Fletcher. He described Fletcher's 

relationship with defendant as transactional, "sex for money and drugs." 

Although Anderson used drugs, and testified defendant had offered it to him, he 

did not accept drugs or money from defendant because he had his own supply. 

On September 30, 2017, Anderson, Fletcher, and L.I. attended Fletcher's 

mother's wedding and reception. That night, they returned to Anderson's 

cousin's house,2 where Anderson had been staying. After changing out of her 

wedding clothes, Fletcher called defendant to have him bring her a baby bottle, 

Percocet, and cocaine. 

2

 This was a different cousin than Fletcher. 
7 A-3502-21

Defendant drove Fletcher, Anderson, and L.I. to two different stores in 

search of a bottle, but when they were unsuccessful, defendant told them he 

wanted to make a stop at the apartment. Fletcher testified she had never been to 

the apartment and was unaware defendant lived there. Fletcher told Detective 

Gonzalez that defendant said "he had to make a stop at a friend's house." 

Defendant had a key to the apartment. However, Anderson was skeptical 

the apartment belonged to defendant. He had never visited defendant at the 

apartment and once inside it he found mail with "a lady's name and address and 

the place looked vacant. . . . It was . . . empty. There wasn't really nothing in 

there, [only] an air mattress[ and] a tv. It just didn't look like . . . it was 

operable." However, defendant tried to make Anderson and Fletcher 

comfortable by plying them with pills, drugs, and liquor. Once they were 

settled, defendant left to continue the search for a bottle or sippy cup for L.I. 

Anderson explained defendant returned with a used sippy cup that 

belonged to a girl and still had "juice or something in it." Fletcher became upset 

and began "calling him all type[s] of names." Fletcher testified she told 

defendant that L.I. would not use the cup because it had a hard nipple, and L.I. 

liked the soft kind. Defendant became angry, and Fletcher said they were going 

to leave. Fletcher called a taxi using Anderson's phone. 
8 A-3502-21

Defendant asked Anderson if he agreed with Fletcher's name-calling, and 

when Anderson agreed and said defendant was "stupid for bringing that cup in 

here," defendant became angry. Anderson testified defendant "jumped up and 

punched [Anderson] in [the] face" and a fight ensued. During the fight, 

Anderson saw a knife jutting out of his hand. He testified as follows: 

I didn't even see or notice [that defendant] had enough 

time to even pull out a knife so maybe he had already 

had it or whatever. I don't know. But I know the knife 

came out of my hand. I looked and it's going out 

again. . . . I'm, like, Lorenza, . . . he just stabbed me. 

Like, this man just stabbed me. . . . [S]o [I] just, grab 

[L.I.] and I'm . . . trying to think . . . what do I do now. 

So I'm . . . backing up towards the window. I start 

kicking out a window but . . . in my head, [I'm thinking] 

if you kick this window out, he's going to throw you out 

of it so I'm just trying to think of things to do, you 

know. 

And so then he kind of gave me, like, an 

ultimatum, 'cause after that, he's, like, listen, man. 

[S]he's going to die today. You have a chance to live 

and, if you want to live, that starts by me tying you up. 

Fletcher testified she saw defendant and Anderson "tussling" and that 

defendant was holding a knife. Her testimony mirrored Anderson's, except she

said she was the one who kicked out the window so she could yell for help. 

After the initial struggle, Fletcher testified she, Anderson, and L.I. were 

ushered into the bathroom. Anderson testified he went into the bathroom, 
9 A-3502-21

opened the medicine cabinet, and took a piece of a shattered shelf from it, 

concealing the glass shard in his hand. He dialed 9-1-1, but defendant came in 

and broke the phone. Anderson and Fletcher took off their shoes, and defendant 

used their shoelaces to bind Anderson's feet and tie his hands behind his back. 

Fletcher testified she and Anderson were hurt and bleeding, and defendant told 

her "I want to have sex with you for the last time." He also told her it was her 

"killing day." Fletcher undressed, and defendant took her to the living room. 

 While Anderson was alone in the bathroom, he used the glass shard to free 

his hands and untied his feet. Although the bathroom door was open, he would 

not leave the apartment to save himself if he could not save Fletcher and L.I. as 

well. Anderson removed the toilet tank lid and, when defendant returned to the 

bathroom, Anderson struck defendant in the head with it. 

 Anderson testified he and Fletcher then began hitting defendant, and the 

struggle moved out of the bathroom and into the kitchen, where Anderson armed 

himself with a pot or pan. While they were fighting, L.I. ran out of the bathroom 

toward the fight, and the fighting ceased. Fletcher pleaded with defendant not 

to hurt her son, and defendant returned her to the bathroom, where she started 

cleaning up the blood. Anderson testified that defendant then faced him, told 

him he was going to die with Fletcher, and stabbed him in the neck. Anderson 
10 A-3502-21

retreated into the bathroom with Fletcher. When defendant came into the 

bathroom, Anderson tried to douse him with a cleaning product. 

As she was cleaning, Fletcher recalled hearing knocking on the apartment 

door. Although defendant told her to be quiet, she yelled for help. She recalled 

defendant then jumped on her and started stabbing her while Anderson and L.I. 

ran for the door. Anderson testified when they heard knocking at the door, 

Fletcher dropped everything and tried to run to the door, but defendant "grabbed 

her down by the hair" and began "stabbing away, just stabbing, and she's trying 

to block with her hands and he's just stabbing." Anderson and Fletcher then 

began trying to hit defendant, but defendant did not stop stabbing. When 

Anderson saw his efforts were not working, he went to the apartment door and 

opened it. Fletcher testified that while Anderson ran to open the door, she tried 

to grab the knife from defendant and injured her hands to the point where she 

could no longer bend some fingers on each hand. 

Before defendant testified, the trial judge addressed the jury charges for 

the close of the case, particularly on self-defense, and whether he could charge 

the jury that defendant had no obligation to retreat in his own dwelling. The 

judge noted that part of the charge was not included in the jury instruction in 

defendant's case because, based on "the evidence before the [c]ourt, it 
11 A-3502-21

appears . . . that [the apartment]'s not his dwelling." Defense counsel agreed 

and responded, "I think the charge as it reads is fine the way it is." 

Defendant testified he met Fletcher in the summer of 2017. At the time, 

"[s]he was heavily into drugs, getting high," but he "liked being around her." 

He admitted giving her Percocet and cocaine. When he found out she was 

"selling herself for two or three Perc[ocet]s," he decided he would give her "the 

Perc[ocet]s she wanted so she wouldn't have to run the streets and . . . have her 

son more." He also enjoyed spending time with L.I. and would take him to the 

zoo, watch movies, or "just hang out" with him. 

Defendant testified he had been living with his niece but was now "in 

transit" and "in the process of moving into" the apartment complex when he 

brought Fletcher, Anderson, and L.I. to his apartment the night of the incident. 

Defendant was not on the lease and paid no rent, but claimed he was subletting 

the apartment from a customer of his car business by giving a car to the customer 

in exchange for staying in the apartment for four to six months. Defendant 

claimed he had been living in the apartment for a few weeks. He had a key fob 

for the apartment, but recalled it only worked sometimes, and other times, he 
12 A-3502-21

would have to be buzzed in by security.3 He previously resided in Georgia. He 

had a Georgia driver's license, and his car was registered there. 

Defendant acknowledged neither Fletcher nor Anderson had ever been to 

the apartment. He claimed he would never have brought them to the apartment 

"if they didn't have [L.I. with them.]" He "would have never trusted them in 

that apartment" because they were the reason he was kicked out of his niece's 

apartment. He believed Anderson needed Fletcher because she supplied him 

with the Percocet. 

 Defendant left the apartment because Fletcher insisted L.I. needed a sippy 

cup. As defendant was driving, Fletcher called saying she wanted to have sex 

with him. He believed Fletcher was "trying to hold [him] up" and decided to 

return to the apartment. When he returned, he saw his belongings in his duffel 

bag. When he confronted Fletcher, he was hit in the head from behind. 

Defendant attempted to use his mace but could not get the canister out of his 

pocket. Meanwhile, Anderson was still swinging at him, so defendant pulled

out his knife and stabbed him. 

3

 The former director of security for the complex testified someone with 

defendant's surname signed in as a visitor the night of the incident. A detective 

also testified he received the building sign-in sheet, which listed "John Bragg" 

as a visitor and the name of a different person in the spot designated for the 

tenant. 
13 A-3502-21

 Defendant testified Fletcher joined in the fight, which moved into the 

bedroom. L.I. was asleep on an air mattress, so defendant tried to stay to the 

side of the room. When L.I. woke up, Fletcher stopped fighting to grab her son 

and moved him away from the fight. Fletcher managed to break up the fight, 

telling Anderson and defendant not to fight in front of her son. 

When defendant pulled out his phone, Anderson tried to hit him again, the 

fighting resumed, and Fletcher again managed to break it up. Fletcher tried to 

talk to defendant, but he refused to approach her. Defendant testified Fletcher 

then pretended to tie up Anderson. Defendant followed Fletcher into a room to 

try to talk to her, but Anderson again struck him from behind with a pan. 

Defendant tried to walk to the bathroom, but only made it to the bedroom, 

where he sat down, and Anderson and Fletcher took the knife from him. He 

testified he heard them in the bathroom, and believed they were trying to clean 

up their blood. They also tried to tie him up with shoelaces, but he could not 

remember which one was tying him up. 

According to defendant, when the police knocked on the door, Fletcher 

went to answer, but Anderson stopped her and handed her the knife. She then 

attacked defendant, and they began fighting again, with defendant stabbing at 

Fletcher and Fletcher biting defendant. Anderson answered the door and came 
14 A-3502-21

back, again striking defendant. When the police entered, defendant fell onto the 

living room floor while Fletcher ran out. Defendant claimed as soon as the 

police heard Fletcher's story, they did not listen to his side and instead 

handcuffed him. 

Defendant denied tying up or threatening to kill Anderson. He claimed 

he never threatened Fletcher, and that "the only thing [he] was doing was trying 

to survive out of that situation." He testified "[t]hey cracked [him] in the head 

first." Defendant only used force "because [Anderson] hit [him] in the head, 

and he still was swinging at [defendant]." He claimed he had no choice but to 

defend himself. Defendant testified he would have retreated but when Fletcher 

was pretending to tie Anderson up, defendant claimed "they got [him] blocked 

off[ and he could] go nowhere." 

 During its summation, the State pointed out the inconsistencies in 

defendant's testimony and argued he did not act in self-defense. It argued 

defendant could recall every detail about Fletcher's and Anderson's actions but 

could not remember the details about when he claimed he was tied up. The State 

asked the jury to consider why Fletcher would tie Anderson up, rather than just 

leave the apartment when defendant was drifting in and out of consciousness or 

when he dropped his knife, and why would they bind defendant's feet but not his 
15 A-3502-21

hands. There were no bindings on defendant's legs when police arrived, but 

there were bindings on Anderson that were so tight, they were cutting off 

circulation to his hands. The State pointed out defendant did not leave the 

apartment, despite the opportunity to do so. Moreover, Fletcher and Anderson 

had numerous defensive wounds to their hands, whereas defendant did not. 

At the conclusion of the case, the trial judge held a charge conference, and 

regarding the issues raised by defendant here, noted the "self-defense charge 

obviously is included." The judge asked counsel if they were satisfied with the 

proposed self-defense charge, which addressed self-defense but did not state the 

apartment was defendant's dwelling, and both sides responded the instructions 

were satisfactory. 

Following summations, the trial judge instructed the jury at length on selfdefense and the duty to retreat. Consistent with instruction that was prepared 

and discussed during the charge conferences, the charge did not instruct the jury 

that defendant had no duty to retreat in his own home. The defense did not 

object to the jury charge. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict. 

At sentencing, the trial judge found aggravating factors three, six, and 

nine, N.J.S.A 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and (9), and no mitigating factors. He granted 

the State's motion for an extended term and sentenced defendant to life 
16 A-3502-21

imprisonment on count three, which ran concurrent to two twenty-year sentences 

on counts one and two, and two thirty-year sentences on counts four and five. 

 Defendant raises the following points on appeal: 

POINT I 

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND 

A FAIR TRIAL BY A FAULTY SELF-DEFENSE 

JURY CHARGE THAT FAILED TO CORRECTLY 

INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT HAD 

NO DUTY TO RETREAT IN HIS OWN DWELLING. 

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; N.J. CONST. ART. 1, 

PARS. 1, 9, AND 10. (NOT RAISED BELOW). 

POINT II 

THE IMPOSITION OF AN EXTENDED-TERM 

SENTENCE OF LIFE FOR KIDNAPPING WAS 

MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND UNDULY 

PUNITIVE WHERE DEFENDANT RAISED A BONA 

FIDE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE. 

I.

 In Point I, defendant argues the self-defense instruction was erroneous 

because the trial judge did not instruct the jury defendant had no duty to retreat 

in his own apartment. Defendant asserts the no-retreat exception applied 

because he was in the process of moving into the apartment when the incident 

occurred, and the apartment was his dwelling. The instruction was critical 

because so much of the State's case centered on whether and why he did not 
17 A-3502-21

retreat. He argues the charge led to an unjust result because there was a "very 

real possibility that the jury found self-defense to be inapplicable because of a 

duty to retreat from the dwelling—a duty defendant did not have under the law." 

"When a defendant fails to object to an error or omission [about a jury 

charge] at trial, we review for plain error. Under that standard, we disregard 

any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) 

(quoting R. 2:10-2). Reversal is warranted only where an error raises 

"reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise 

might not have reached." Ibid. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 

(2004)). "The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough." Ibid. A jury 

instruction is particularly "crucial to the jury's deliberations on the guilt of a 

criminal defendant," and "'[e]rrors [having a direct impact] upon these sensitive 

areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation' under the plain 

error theory." State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422-23 (1997) (quoting State v. 

Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979)). 

A "trial court must give 'a comprehensible explanation of the questions 

that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts 

that the jury may find.'" State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (quoting State 
18 A-3502-21

v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)). Accordingly, "the court has an 

'independent duty . . . to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on 

the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case, irrespective of the 

particular language suggested by either party.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Reddish, 

181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004)). 

Evidence should be viewed in "the light most favorable to the defendant" 

when deciding whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction. State v. 

Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 648-49 (1993) (citing State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 

617 (1987)). However, when reviewing a jury instruction for error, it "must be 

evaluated in the light of the totality of the circumstances—including all the 

instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the 

evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors." State v. Camacho, 218 

N.J. 533, 551 (2014) (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979)). 

The use of force against another person is "justifiable when the actor 

reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 

protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a). Deadly force is not justifiable when an actor can "avoid the 

necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating." N.J.S.A. 

2C:3-4(b)(2)(b). 
19 A-3502-21

However, "[t]he actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless 

he was the initial aggressor." N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i). The Model Jury 

Charges reiterate that where applicable, "[a]n exception to the rule of retreat 

however, is that a person need not retreat from his or her own dwelling, 

including the porch, unless he/she was the initial aggressor." Model Jury 

Charges (Criminal), "Justification—Self Defense: In Self Protection (N.J.S.A. 

2C:3-4)" at 3 (rev. Nov. 13, 2023). 

In order to succeed on a self-defense claim where the defendant used 

deadly force, the jury must find that: (1) the defendant had an honest and 

reasonable belief that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself 

or herself from serious bodily injury or death, and (2) the defendant did not 

provoke the attacker. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) and (b)(2)(a); State v. Gentry, 439 N.J. 

Super. 57, 66-69 (App. Div. 2015). Whether the defendant's belief was 

reasonable is measured by what the jury, not the defendant, considers reasonable 

under an objective standard. State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 16 (1968). Accord State 

v. Handy, 215 N.J. 334, 356-57 (2013). 

Applying these principles, we discern no plain error that led to an unjust 

result. The State presented substantial objective evidence showing the 

apartment was not defendant's dwelling. Defendant presented only his self-
20 A-3502-21

serving testimony. Moreover, given the guilty verdict returned on fourteen of 

the nineteen counts, it is clear the jury did not believe defendant's testimony and 

was obviously convinced he was the aggressor. Indeed, the jury found defendant 

guilty of kidnapping Fletcher, Anderson, and L.I. This required them to find he 

purposely acted to unlawfully confine his victims for a substantial period with 

the purpose to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize them. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(2). 

The jury further found defendant abused or neglected L.I. and purposely 

harassed Fletcher. The evidence simply did not support a finding of selfdefense, regardless of whether the apartment belonged to defendant. 

II. 

 In Point II, defendant argues the life sentence he received for count three 

was excessive. He claims the court failed to find mitigating factors, including 

that: he acted under strong provocation; there were substantial grounds tending 

to excuse or justify his conduct; and the victims induced or facilitated 

defendant's conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3), (4), and (5). He reiterates the 

mistaken jury charge on self-defense led the jury to convict him on the firstdegree kidnapping charge in count three, which in turn prevented the judge from 

considering these mitigating factors, leading to an unjust sentence. 
21 A-3502-21

On appeal, we review a sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019). We must "consider whether the trial 

court has made findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably 

credible evidence and whether 'the factfinder [has] appl[ied] correct legal 

principles in exercising its discretion.'" State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 

(2010) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)). 

We may not substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court. State v. 

Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). A sentence will be affirmed unless a trial court 

violated the sentencing guidelines, found aggravating or mitigating factors not 

based on competent and credible evidence in the record, or applied the 

guidelines in such a manner as to "make[] the sentence clearly unreasonable so 

as to shock the judicial conscience." Miller, 237 N.J. at 28 (quoting Fuentes, 

217 N.J. at 70). 

At sentencing, a court must identify and balance the aggravating and 

mitigating factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) and explain the 

factual basis supporting its findings. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 73, 81. "It is sufficient 

that the trial court provides reasons for imposing its sentence that reveal the 

court's consideration of all applicable mitigating factors in reaching its 

sentencing decision." State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 609 (2010). "After 
22 A-3502-21

balancing the factors, the trial court may impose a term within the permissible 

range for the offense." Id. at 608. 

A defendant convicted of first-degree kidnapping "shall be sentenced" to 

a term of imprisonment "for a specific term of years which shall be between 

[thirty] years and life imprisonment." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

3(a), this sentence may be extended if the defendant is a "persistent offender" 

who is at least twenty-one years of age and "who has been previously convicted 

on at least two separate occasions of two crimes, committed at different times, 

when he was at least [eighteen] years of age." Defendant conceded he was 

eligible for an extended term under this statute due to his age and prior record, 

which included multiple convictions in New Jersey and in three other states, one 

of which was a federal offense. The judge noted defendant had spent most of 

his adult life in prison. 

 The sentencing record shows the trial judge considered the mitigating 

factors argued by defendant but found them inapplicable. As relates to the 

arguments raised on appeal, the judge found the verdict showed the jury 

"emphatically" rejected defendant's self-defense theory. Moreover, based on the 

judge's observations of the trial, he found defendant's testimony "was selfserving, and not credible, and very simply not true." 
23 A-3502-21

 The judge rejected defendant's argument regarding mitigating factor two, 

noting he agreed with the jury's finding that "defendant's conscious object was 

to kill." Defendant's actions, therefore, were not merely negligent or reckless 

but purposeful. 

The judge rejected mitigating factor three because defendant's actions 

were the result of "not having his evening go exactly the way he wanted it to 

go," not, as defendant argued, a result of any provocation. Mitigating factor 

four was also inapplicable because there was "no basis to justify . . . defendant's 

conduct." 

As for the aggravating factors, the judge considered defendant's past 

charges, convictions, and sentences, and concluded defendant was likely to 

reoffend because of his lengthy criminal history. Further, the sentence would 

deter defendant and protect society. 

The trial judge found "[t]he aggravating factors substantially outweigh the 

non-existent mitigating factors." He concluded the extended sentence was 

appropriate. 

Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record, we are 

satisfied the sentence was supported by the credible evidence in the record and 

was not an abuse of discretion. The trial judge's findings are consistent with the 
24 A-3502-21

sentencing guidelines and applicable law. The evidence in the record supported 

the application of the aggravating factors found by the judge and did not support 

the application of any of the mitigating factors argued by defendant at 

sentencing or on appeal. Under the facts and circumstances presented, 

defendant's extended sentence of life imprisonment does not shock the judicial 

conscience. 

Affirmed.