COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Alston, Senior Judge Coleman and Retired Judge Hodges

JOEVANY RODRIGUEZ 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

v. Record No. 0847-13-3 PER CURIAM 

 DECEMBER 10, 2013 

FRANKLIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 (Stephen M. Maddy; Maddy & Nester, PLLC, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (Carolyn H. Furrow; Deanna P. Stone, Guardian ad litem for the 

infant children; Rhodes, Ferguson & Stone, Ltd., on brief), for 

appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief. 

 Joevany Rodriguez, appellant, appeals the order terminating his residual parental rights to 

his three minor children. Appellant contends the trial court erred by finding the Department 

presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to terminate his residual parental rights pursuant 

to Code § 16.1-283(B). Upon review of the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the 

trial court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

When addressing matters concerning the custody and care of a child, 

this Court’s paramount consideration is the child’s best interests. On 

appeal, we presume that the trial court thoroughly weighed all the 

evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its 

determination based on the child’s best interests. The trial court is 

vested with broad discretion in making decisions “necessary to guard 

and to foster a child’s best interests.” We will not disturb a trial 

 

 Retired Judge William H. Hodges took part in the consideration of this case by 

designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D). 

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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court’s factual findings on appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support them. 

Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 211, 597 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2004) 

(quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)) (citations omitted). 

“Furthermore, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and 

its evidence is afforded all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Logan v. Fairfax 

Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 

 In May of 2011, appellant was imprisoned on felony charges in Pennsylvania. Kimberly 

Maul, then mother of the children, was unable to care for and shelter their three minor children. 

Mother and children were homeless and could no longer stay in the shelter in which they had been 

residing. Mother requested that the children be removed from her care. The parents had a history 

of drug abuse, violence, and abandonment. Both appellant and mother had been incarcerated, both 

used drugs, and appellant would beat the children in mother’s absence. 

 The oldest child came into care with seventeen cavities. The middle child was out of 

control, threatening family members and others, was exhibiting psychotic behaviors, and was on 

anti-psychotic medication. The youngest child was in the best physical condition. All children 

were behind in their immunizations. 

 By June of 2011, appellant was on parole and had moved to Virginia, but could not find 

housing. Appellant filed for custody of the children and attended one court hearing. At a July 2011 

hearing, appellant did not appear because he had returned to Pennsylvania since he could not find 

stable housing in Virginia as required for his parole. Appellant and mother were ordered to, inter 

alia, complete psychological and substance abuse evaluations, attend parent, psychological, and 

substance abuse counseling, maintain employment and housing, and cooperate with the Department, 

with the goal of returning the children home. Appellant failed to complete any of the required 

conditions in the service plan. Appellant missed all court appearances after the June 2011 hearing. 
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After he returned to Pennsylvania, he reportedly moved to Georgia and Florida, but his whereabouts 

were unknown. Appellant did not maintain contact with his attorney or the Department. 

 Notably, the children have been thriving in foster care. The children are healthy and have 

resolved many behavioral problems (e.g., the middle child no longer requires anti-psychotic 

medication). 

 Appellant contends the Department failed to show that he abused or neglected the children. 

Appellant asserts there was no evidence that he was not attempting to meet the goals of the service 

plan. We disagree. 

 The Department proffered evidence that appellant beat the children and that they were 

affected by his substance abuse and incarcerations. While appellant filed for custody of the 

children, he did nothing toward complying with the conditions of returning the children home. He 

did not complete any psychological, parenting, or substance abuse evaluations or counseling. 

Appellant was unable to secure housing. Appellant did not maintain contact with the Department 

and failed to notify them of his whereabouts. Appellant failed to appear at all court proceedings 

after June 2011. From this evidence, the trial court reasonably concluded appellant would not 

remedy the conditions that led to foster care and abandoned his children once he relocated and 

discontinued all contact with the Department. The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions 

that the children’s health, safety, and development were threatened, that appellant was not able to 

correct or eliminate the problems that led to foster care placement, and that it was in the children’s 

best interests to terminate appellant’s residual parental rights. “It is clearly not in the best interests 

of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be 

capable of resuming his or [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). 
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 Accordingly, the trial court did not err by terminating appellant’s residual parental rights to 

all three children. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.