NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JESSE FRANKLIN SWARTZ, Jr., a.k.a. 

Franklin Wright, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10616 

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00351-MEJ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William H. Orrick, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 23, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Jesse Franklin Swartz, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order 

affirming his misdemeanor conviction for disobeying a lawful order, in violation of 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Swartz’s 

motion for oral argument is denied.

FILED

MAY 25 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-10616 

41 C.F.R. § 102-74.385. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we 

affirm.

Swartz first contends that he did not voluntarily depart his trial and, as a 

result, his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and his right to be 

informed of the nature of the charge against him under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 58 were violated. We review the district court’s conclusion that 

Swartz’s absence from his trial was voluntary for clear error. See United States v. 

Ornelas, 828 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016). The record shows that Swartz 

exhibited aggressive and confrontational behavior at the start of the proceedings 

and was warned by the magistrate judge that if his behavior continued, he would be 

asked to leave the court and the trial would proceed without him. The court did not 

clearly err in concluding that Swartz’s departure following that warning was 

voluntary. Accordingly, Swartz’s Sixth Amendment and Rule 58 claims fail. In 

any event, the record reflects that Swartz had actual notice of the charge against 

him.

Swartz next argues that his constitutional rights were violated because the 

district court did not appoint counsel and he was not provided with access to the 

law library before trial. Swartz was not entitled to appointed counsel. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(A); Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(2)(C). The court nevertheless 

offered Swartz the opportunity to consult with the Federal Public Defender, which 
3 15-10616 

he declined. Moreover, Swartz’s briefs indicate that he availed himself of the law 

library at U.C. Berkeley. 

For the first time on appeal, Swartz argues that his right to pretrial discovery 

was denied, that the government’s refusal to continue his trial date violated his 

constitutional rights, that the government should be sanctioned for its purported 

misbehavior pretrial, and that insufficient evidence supports his conviction. Even 

assuming these claims are properly before us, they are unavailing. The record 

reflects that the government provided Swartz with all of the discovery to which he 

was entitled and did not engage in any misconduct. Furthermore, Swartz suffered 

no prejudice from any failure to delay the trial date. His absence from trial was not 

due to his inability to attend, but rather his voluntary decision to leave the 

courtroom before the trial began. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support 

the verdict. See United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating 

standard for sufficiency of the evidence claims).

Swartz’s remaining claims concerning civil matters he has filed in the 

district court are not properly before us and provide no basis for relief in this 

criminal appeal.

Swartz’s pending motions are denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.