If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

TERESE ALLEN, ATLAS VALLEY GOLF AND 

COUNTRY CLUB, INC., CYNTHIA BEEBE, 

DAVISON COUNTRY CLUB, KENNY 

HUBBARD, GAIL HUBBARD, IMA 

RECREATION ASSOCIATION, TIM KLEINDL, 

APRIL KLEINDL, JULIA NEVILLE, JOHN 

PAVLICK, CAITLIN PAVLICK, TRACEY 

PLUMMER, and COREY ROBINSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

BRENT OSKEY, HANNI OSKEY, LAWRENCE 

PETE, JESSICA PETE, and EDWARD WELCH,

Plaintiffs,

UNPUBLISHED

April 25, 2024

v No. 359732

Genesee Circuit Court

VILLAGE OF GOODRICH, LC No. 14-103184-NZ

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

GENESEE COUNTY DRAIN COMMISSIONER 

DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER 

MANAGEMENT, 

Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellee,

and

GENESEE COUNTY DRAIN COMMISSIONER 

DIVISION OF WATER AND WASTE SERVICES,
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Defendant/Cross-Defendant,

and

GOODRICH COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and PATEL and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Terese Allen, Atlas Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc., Cynthia 

Beebe, Davison Country Club, Kenny Hubbard, Gail Hubbard, IMA Recreation Association, Tim 

Kleindl, April Kleindl, Julia Neville, John Pavlick, Caitlin Pavlick, Tracey Plummer, and Corey 

Robinson, appeal by right the circuit court’s orders granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) with respect to the claims brought by plaintiffs Atlas Valley 

Golf and Country Club, Inc., Davison Country Club, and IMA Recreation Association 

(collectively, the business plaintiffs) against defendants, Village of Goodrich, Genesee County 

Drain Commissioner Division of Surface Water Management, and Goodrich Country Club, Inc.; 

granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) with 

respect to the claims brought by plaintiffs Allen, Beebe, Kenny Hubbard, Gail Hubbard, Tim 

Kleindl, April Kleindl, Neville, John Pavlick, Caitlin Pavlick, Plummer, and Robinson 

(collectively, the individual plaintiffs) against the Village; granting summary disposition pursuant 

to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) with respect to the claims brought by plaintiffs

Allen, Beebe, Tim Kleindl, April Kleindl, Neville, John Pavlick, Caitlin Pavlick, and Plummer 

against the Drain Commissioner; and granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) with respect to most of the plaintiffs’ claims 

against defendant Goodrich Country Club.

1

 Later, the trial court separately granted summary 

disposition with respect to the claims of the Hubbards and Robinson against the Drain 

Commissioner under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity), and it denied plaintiffs’ motion 

for reconsideration of the initial order granting summary disposition. We affirm in part, reverse 

in part, and remand for additional proceedings.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves the flooding of the properties along the Goodrich Millpond and Kearsley 

Creek, which are downstream of the millpond and into which the Watkins Wheelock Drain drains. 

The drain was built in the late 1800s and substantially rebuilt and altered between 1950 and 1951. 

 

1 The Drain Commissioner failed to move for summary disposition against the Hubbards and

Robinson, and the circuit court did not grant summary disposition with respect to the claims of 

those plaintiffs. The court also did not grant summary disposition with respect to the Petes’ claims 

against the Goodrich Country Club.
-3-

As early as 1994, the business plaintiffs were reporting excessive downstream water flow. In 

1996, the Village’s council resolved to petition the Drain Commission to improve the Watkins 

Wheelock Drain, but the Drain Commission discovered that the petition concerned a private drain 

over which the Commission lacked easements. In 2008, the Village adopted another petition for 

the Drain Commission to take over 110 feet of drain, but again, the drain was a private drain. 

Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered damage from storm water on the following dates: July 27 and 

28, 2011; May 3 to 9, 2012; April 1 to 3, 2013; April 18 to 25, 2013; June 18, 2013; June 27 to 30, 

2013; April 1 to 9, 2014; and July 7, 2014. Plaintiffs’ individual claims differ, but each plaintiff 

experienced flooding on at least one of those dates.

Following discovery, the governmental defendants moved for summary disposition 

pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that plaintiffs had failed to establish elements of the 

sewage-disposal-system-event exception to governmental immunity, including that the defect was 

a substantial proximate cause of plaintiffs’ flooding events. The Goodrich Country Club moved 

for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), also asserting that plaintiffs could not establish 

that its actions had caused plaintiffs’ flooding. Instead, the defendants argued that heavy rains on 

the days in question and other factors had caused the flooding. In response to defendants’ 

causation arguments, plaintiffs relied on an engineering report and two affidavits of experts.

Although the parties offered a variety of other arguments, the trial court based its decision 

primarily on issues of governmental immunity and proximate cause. The court noted that MCL 

600.5805(10) provided that the limitations period for injury to person or property was three years 

from the time of injury. It held that, because the business plaintiffs’ claims began more than three 

years before the action was filed, the statute of limitations barred their claims.

The court then considered the application of the sewage-disposal-system-event exception 

to governmental immunity pursuant to the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 

et seq. The court opined that the existence of a defect did not, standing alone, demonstrate that 

the defect proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Considering the individual plaintiffs’ claims 

against the Drain Commissioner, the trial court held that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a 

factual issue regarding whether the drain system was a substantial proximate cause of the flooding 

events. It noted that affidavits of plaintiffs’ experts had been filed after the motions for summary 

disposition, did not address contributing factors to the case, and did not exclude other factors that 

could have contributed to the flooding. Considering plaintiffs’ claims against the Goodrich 

Country Club, the court opined that “the expert opinion affidavits again falter.” The affidavits did

not exclude any of the numerous other hypothetical factors that could have contributed to 

plaintiffs’ flooding problems2, and plaintiffs could not rely on multiple, competing theories of 

flooding.

Following several motions for summary disposition, the trial court ultimately dismissed 

the business plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations; granted summary disposition 

on the individual plaintiffs’ claims against the Drain Commissioner; dismissed the claims by all 

 

2 Defendants did not, however, identify the supposed other contributing causes or provide any 

evidentiary support that they were a, much less a substantial, proximate cause of the flooding 

events. 
-4-

of the individual plaintiffs against the Village; and dismissed all of the individual plaintiffs’ claims 

(except those of the Petes) against the Country Club.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A party is entitled to summary disposition when a claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations. MCR 2.116(C)(7). This Court reviews de novo whether a statute of limitations bars 

a claim. Scherer v Hellstrom, 270 Mich App 458, 461; 716 NW2d 307 (2006). Additionally, “[a] 

defendant is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) if the plaintiff’s claims are 

barred because of governmental immunity.” Pew v Mich State Univ, 307 Mich App 328, 331-332, 

859 NW2d 246 (2014).

When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the court must accept factual 

pleadings as true unless other evidence contradicts them. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 

406, 428; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). It must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, and other 

documentary evidence and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 429. 

If there are no questions of fact, whether the claim is barred is a matter of law, but “if a question 

of fact exists as to the extent that factual development could provide a basis for recovery, dismissal 

is inappropriate.” Id. at 429.

B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

As an initial matter, we note that the trial court misapplied the continuing-wrongs doctrine 

to the claims of the business plaintiffs.3 As recently discussed in Fraser Twp v Haney, 509 Mich 

18, 28-29; 983 NW2d 309 (2022), “[a] plaintiff is free to bring a new action each time a defendant 

commits a new violation.” Id. at 28-29. The continuing-wrongs doctrine does not prevent a 

plaintiff from bringing an action for a claim that accrued during the limitations period, even if a 

plaintiff did not bring an action at the time of a previous injury. Id. at 29. Because the business 

plaintiffs alleged that they were damaged by the flooding in the three-year period before the 

plaintiffs filed their complaint, even though they had noticed the flooding many years earlier, the 

court erred by granting summary disposition of the business plaintiffs’ claims during the 

limitations period. However, this Court may affirm when the lower court reaches the correct result 

for the wrong reason. Gleason v Dep’t of Transp, 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003). 

Therefore, we will examine the court’s other bases for summary disposition as applied to all 

plaintiffs.

 

3 This issue is not preserved because plaintiffs did not raise their argument regarding the 

application of the continuing-wrongs doctrine until their motion for reconsideration. While 

“Michigan generally follows the ‘raise or waive’ rule of appellant review,” Walters, 481 Mich 

at 388, we exercise our discretion to decide the issue because the question is one of law and the 

facts necessary for its resolution have been presented. See Autodie, LLC v Grand Rapids, 305 

Mich App 423, 431; 852 NW2d 650 (2014).
-5-

C. GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS

Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity regarding the 

Drain Commissioner and Village because they established each element of the sewage-disposalsystem-event exception, including proximate cause. We agree. 

The GTLA provides “broad immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies

whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function[.]” Ross v 

Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 595; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). Governmental 

functions are those that are expressly or impliedly either mandated or authorized by law. 

Moraccini v Sterling Hts, 296 Mich App 387, 392; 822 NW2d 799 (2012). A plaintiff may only 

sue a governmental entity in tort if the suit falls within one of the six statutory exceptions to 

governmental immunity. Id. 

One of the six exceptions to governmental immunity is the sewage-disposal-system-event 

exception. Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75, 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). A 

sewage disposal system includes, in pertinent part, “storm sewers . . . and includes a storm water 

drain system under the jurisdiction and control of a governmental agency.” MCL 691.1416(j). A 

party making a claim pursuant to the sewage-disposal-system-event exception must establish five 

elements to avoid governmental immunity:

(a) The governmental agency was an appropriate governmental agency.

(b) The sewage disposal system had a defect.

(c) The governmental agency knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 

diligence should have known, about the defect.

(d) The governmental agency, having the legal authority to do so, failed to 

take reasonable steps in a reasonable amount of time to repair, correct, or remedy 

the defect.

(e) The defect was a substantial proximate cause of the event and the 

property damage or physical injury. [MCL 691.1417(3).]

For the purposes of the sewer exception, “ ‘[s]ubstantial proximate cause’ means a 

proximate cause that was 50% or more of the cause of the event and the property damage or 

physical injury.” MCL 691.1416(l). Proximate cause is distinct from cause in fact, which is the 

but-for type of cause. Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52, 63; 903 NW2d 366 (2017). In a negligence 

action, a plaintiff must establish both factual cause and proximate cause. Id. at 64. Proximate 

cause concerns legal cause, which is whether the harm to the plaintiff “was the general kind of 

harm the defendant negligently risked.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, 

“nonhuman and natural forces, such as a fire, cannot be considered ‘the proximate cause’ of a 

plaintiff’s injuries for the purposes of the GTLA.” Id. at 72. The existence of natural forces 

“bear[s] on the question of foreseeability, in that they may constitute superseding causes that 

relieve the actor of liability if the intervening force was not reasonably foreseeable.” Id.
-6-

Plaintiffs asserted the sewage exception to general governmental tort immunity. To 

establish a genuine issue of material fact on the “substantial proximate cause” element under the 

sewage-disposal-system-event exception to governmental immunity, a plaintiff’s expert witnesses 

should address other possible proximate causes of flooding. In Fingerle v Ann Arbor, 308 Mich 

App 318; 863 NW2d 698 (2014), aff’d but vacated 498 Mich 910 (2015), this Court addressed the 

issue of proximate cause in the context of the sewage exception to the GTLA, but the Supreme 

Court vacated the lead opinion and adopted the concurring opinion. In that case, the plaintiff lived 

in a neighborhood that was prone to flooding, so in the early 1990s, the city constructed a drainage 

system to serve the area. Id. at 321. In 2002, the plaintiff constructed a finished basement in his 

house that included “a large egress window directly across from a private retention basin that had 

overflowed in past rain events.” Id. Eight years later, a storm caused flooding in the area, and 

water penetrated the plaintiff’s home through the egress window. Id.

In the concurring opinion adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court, Fingerle v Ann Arbor, 

498 Mich at 910, the concurring judge opined that the plaintiff could not establish substantial 

proximate cause pursuant to the sewage-disposal-system-event exception to governmental 

immunity, Fingerle, 308 Mich App at 339 (O’CONNELL, J. concurring). The concurring judge

drew attention to the “multiple causes of the rainwater in plaintiff’s basement,” which included 

“the unusually intense rainstorm, the allegedly defective relief storm sewer, and the installation of 

plaintiff’s basement egress window.” Id. at 340. The concurring judge noted that periodic 

flooding occurred in the neighborhood both before and after the city built its relief storm sewer. 

Id. The affidavits prepared by the plaintiff’s expert were insufficient to establish a genuine issue 

of material fact regarding substantial proximate cause because “the expert [did] not address the 

multiple causes of the overflow and of the basement rainwater,” such as the degree of flooding 

that has historically occurred and the egress window. Id. at 341. Instead, the affidavit addressed 

only the defects in the storm sewer. Id. Because there were multiple causes of the flooding, and 

the experts did not address the impact of those other causes, the evidence did not establish that the 

allegedly defective sewer was 50% or more of the cause of the plaintiff’s flooding. Id. 

Accordingly, while reasonable minds might differ about whether the relief storm sewer was 

defective, reasonable minds could not differ about whether the plaintiff established that the relief 

storm sewer proximately caused the plaintiff’s flooding. Id. at 341-342.

This case is distinguishable from Fingerle. First, in Fingerle, the sewage system was 

installed in the 1990s in response to complaints of flooding in the area, and the complaint 

essentially alleged that the city was negligent by failing to make a system as large and extensive 

as initially promised. Fingerle, 308 Mich App at 320-321. In this case, the system was built in 

the late 1800s then rebuilt in the early 1950s, and the community had gone up around the system 

and become dependent on it. The community had been alerting the city to the problems with the 

system since as early as 1994, and the allegations were that the government was negligent for 

failing to repair a system upon which the community had depended for more than a century. 

Second, in Fingerle, the plaintiff had constructed a large egress window that was facing an 

area that was known to have had a history of flooding, and the egress window had been identified 

as a contributing cause to the flooding. But in this case there is no indication that any plaintiffs 

made modifications to their homes that could be considered contributing proximate causes to the 

flooding. Id. at 321. To the extent that the drain commissioner testified that a walkout basement 

could be a contributing factor, there was no expert evidence submitted to support that bald 
-7-

statement.

4 See MCR 2.116(G)(3), compelling the moving party to support its motion with 

affidavits, depositions, or admissions, or other documentary evidence. Only if the moving party 

complies with MCR 2.116(G)(3) does the burden shift to the opposing party to respond. Barnard 

Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 370; 775 NW2d 618 

(2009). Here, the drain commissioner’s speculative testimony was insufficient to meet this burden.

Finally, in Fingerle, there continued to be flooding in the area even after the sewage system 

was created, a system which the city never had a duty to erect to begin with. Id. at 340-341 

(O’CONNELL, J. concurring). In the present case, reports of excessive downstream flow did not 

arise until decades after the system had been rebuilt. 

In sum, Fingerle involved a relatively new system that had never fully solved the problem 

and a plaintiff complaining that the city did not do a good enough job solving a problem it had no 

obligation to address to begin with. Therefore, having an expert opine that the system was 

inadequate did not establish that the system was a substantial proximate cause without addressing 

other identified contributing causes, such as the large window in the plaintiff’s basement. In this 

case, however, the area had become reliant on the system such that it was foreseeable to the city 

that allowing it to become inadequate would cause damage to neighboring property. Therefore, 

an expert’s opinion that the system’s deficiencies caused the damage was sufficient to survive 

summary disposition notwithstanding the fact that it did not address all the other possible causes 

in existence. Moreover, we reject the suggestion that Fingerle stands for the proposition that an 

expert must exclude any alternative explanation imaginable. Rather, the expert should address 

viable alternative contributing proximate causes for the flooding, which are supported by

admissible evidence. 

Ray v Swager in instructive to the interpretation of “substantial proximate cause,” and, in 

our opinion, undermines the holding in Fingerle that a flooding event itself can be a contributing 

proximate cause for purposes of establishing liability under MCL 691.1417(3). In Ray,

interpreting MCL 691.1407(2), the Supreme Court addressed “the role that factual and legal 

causation play when analyzing whether a defendant's conduct was ‘the proximate cause’ of a 

plaintiff’s injuries under the GTLA.” Ray, 501 Mich at 64-65. While Ray examined the meaning 

of “the proximate cause,” the analysis is analogous and instructive. Regarding proximate cause 

the Court explained:

It is not uncommon that more than one proximate cause contributes to an injury. 

However, under the GTLA, we have held that when assessing whether a 

governmental employee was “the proximate cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries, a 

 

4 Defendants cite to plaintiffs’ experts’ reports, which state that the Village should not have issued 

building permits for walkout basements, as an admission that plaintiffs claim that walkout 

basements were a contributing proximate cause to the floods. This interpretation misreads the 

affidavits as a whole. The affidavits focus on the Village and Drain Commissioner’s knowledge 

of historical flooding events, and failure to fix known drain problems. The statements regarding 

the walkout basements do not provide any information regarding causation; they merely opine 

that, given the defendants knowledge of the risk of flood, building permits should not have been 

issued. 
-8-

court must determine whether the defendant’s conduct was the one most immediate, 

efficient, and direct cause of the injury. 

. . . “[T]he proximate cause” is not determined by weighing factual causes. Such an 

approach distorts the meaning of “the proximate cause” by severing it from the 

concept of legal causation. [Id. at 65-66 (quotation marks, citations, and alteration 

omitted).]

The Court applied a definition of proximate cause to the GTLA that it had first articulated nearly 

a century prior:

If a man does an act and he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable foresight 

should have known, that in the event of a subsequent occurrence, which is not 

unlikely to happen, injury may result from his act, and such subsequent occurrence 

does happen and injury does result, the act committed is negligent, and will be 

deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. [Id. at 67-68 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).]

Therefore, traditional proximate cause considerations apply to the GTLA, including the wellestablished rule that “only a human actor’s breach of a duty can be a proximate cause. 

Consequently, nonhuman and natural forces . . . cannot be considered ‘the proximate cause’ of a 

plaintiff's injuries for the purposes of the GTLA.” Id. at 72. Likewise, nonhuman and natural 

forces, like the heavy rainfalls involved in this case, cannot be a proximate cause, much less 

substantial proximate cause of the drain failures and flood events. 

Plaintiffs produced two affidavits from experts that, within the circumstances of this case, 

were adequate to establish substantial proximate cause for the purposes of the GTLA. First, one 

of plaintiffs’ experts stated that he conducted a hydrologic evaluation of the Village’s stormwater 

system. He opined that, as a result of the modeling, the Village’s addition to drainage from the 

Goodrich Country Club “inlets into the Watkins and Wheelock drain system and is a substantial 

proximate cause for flooding in the Village,” which had caused damage to homes. However, the 

expert did not address any of the other hypothetical possible causes of flooding. 

Plaintiffs also relied on a second affidavit, in which the expert opined that, though the Drain 

Commissioner stated that a private storm pipe operated between Ridge Road and the Watkins 

Wheelock Drain, the Drain Commissioner maintained the storm pipe and therefore operated the 

storm pipe. The expert expressed that the Village and Drain Commissioner allowed additional 

runoff to be directed into the pipe, which added flow to the undersized Watkins Wheelock Drain. 

The expert further opined that the Village allowed the Goodrich Country Club to construct a cart 

storage facility, which generated additional runoff, and the improvements to Ridge Road replaced 

the permeable gravel with impervious pavement. The expert opined that a defect exists in the 

“private storm pipe” Drain as both the Village and the Drain Commissioner allowed additional 

flow and volume into the system without performing downstream improvements to convey the 

additional flow and volume. The expert further opined that the Village should not have issued 

building permits to houses with walkout basements on three parcels considering the history of 

flooding. The affidavit focused on the history of flooding in the area, and knowledge of the 

problem by the Village and the Drain Commissioner. The experts’ affidavits are sufficient to 
-9-

establish that the Village and Drain Commissioner’s conduct was a substantial proximate cause of 

the flooding events. 

Defendants do not take issue with the experts’ causation analysis. Instead, they argue that 

the affidavits are insufficient because the experts did not address other possible causes for the 

flooding. But plaintiffs have no obligation, through their experts, to imagine up and knock down 

straw possible contributing factors to the floods. Instead, it was defendants’ responsibility and 

burden to identify other proximate causes of the flooding and produce sufficient evidence 

regarding these alternative causes. See MCR 2.116(G)(3). The defendants failed to provide any 

such evidence and cannot now claim that plaintiffs’ affidavits were insufficient for not addressing 

alternative causes that defendants never did. 

The city relies on evidence pertaining to unusually heavy rainfalls, suggesting that the rain 

was the proximate cause of the flooding. However, natural forces cannot be a hazard’s proximate 

cause; rather, “these forces bear on the question of foreseeability, in that they may constitute 

superseding causes that relieve the actor of liability if the intervening force was not reasonably 

foreseeable.” Ray, 501 Mich at 72. We are not persuaded that no rational fact-finder could 

conclude that it was not reasonably foreseeable that at some point in time the city would experience 

a higher-than-usual volume of rainfall. See Dohany v Birmingham, 301 Mich 30, 42; 2 NW2d 907 

(1942) (“It cannot be successfully maintained that the duty of the city to care for its sewage 

disposal continues only during the time of normal weather and ends when there is an excessive 

rainfall.”). While there was also evidence suggesting a correlation between flooding and homes 

with walkout basements, the absence of evidence suggesting that the installation of such a 

basement should assign responsibility to the homeowner renders this line of reasoning mere 

conjecture, and summary disposition cannot be granted based on conjecture. See Ahmed v Tokio 

Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 7; 972 NW2d 860 (2021).

Therefore, this trial court erred by granting summary disposition on the basis that the 

government defendants were entitled to immunity pursuant to the GTLA.

D. GOODRICH COUNTRY CLUB

We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs have failed to put forth evidence sufficient to 

establish actionable wrongdoing by Goodrich Country Club.

Plaintiffs brought claims of negligence and trespass against the country club. “To establish 

a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant 

owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered 

damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.” 

Anderson v Transdev Servs, Inc, 341 Mich App 501, 508; 991 NW2d 230 (2022) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). To establish trespass, a plaintiff must establish that there was “an 

unauthorized direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object onto land over which the 

plaintiff has a right of exclusive possession.” Wiggins v Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 555; 805 

NW2d 517 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When the elements of trespass are 

established, “the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to at least nominal damages.” Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 
-10-

The upstream plaintiffs are the dominant estates of the Goodrich Country Club. The owner 

of the lowlands “must accept surface water which naturally drains onto his land.” Le Van v 

Hedlund Plumbing & Heating, 37 Mich App 271, 274; 194 NW2d 725 (1971).5 A negligence 

claim may exist when the raising of a lowland causes water to flow back onto the higher property. 

Id. The downstream plaintiffs and the business plaintiffs are the servient estates of the Goodrich 

Country Club. “[T]he owner of the dominant estate may not, by changing conditions on his land, 

put a greater burden on the servient estate by increasing and concentrating the volume and velocity 

of the surface water.” Wiggins v City of Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 563; 805 NW2d 517 (2011) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The unauthorized installation of a drain that causes excess 

waters to flow onto another’s land is a trespass. Id. at 566.

The record has a distinct absence of evidence relevant to the country club. The section of 

plaintiff’s brief discussing this issue does not direct us toward any such evidence; instead, it is 

filled with conclusory allegations without citations to the record. “An appellant may not merely 

announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, 

nor may he give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” In re 

Warshefski, 331 Mich App 83, 87; 951 NW2d 90 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The court cited deficiencies with the experts’ affidavits, and with respect to this defendant, we 

agree that they were inadequate. The expert affidavit from Alan Morris criticized the village for 

allowing the country cub to construct a cart storage facility, but while this statement suggests 

negligence by the village, it does not allow an inference of wrongdoing by the country club. In his 

expert affidavit, Charles Morris opined that “the addition by the Village of Goodrich, Michigan of 

the drainage from the Golf Course and Ridge and Hegel Roads inlets into the Wheelock and 

Watkins drainage system is a substantial and proximate cause for flooding” within the village. 

Again, this statement is directed toward the government defendants, not the country club.

With this record, we cannot say that the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiffs could 

not establish their claims against the country club.

III. CONCLUSION

With respect to the government defendants, the trial court’s order granting summary 

disposition is reversed. With respect to Goodrich Country Club, the trial court’s order granting 

summary disposition is affirmed. This case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado 

 

5 While decisions issued before November 1990 should be “considered to be precedent and entitled 

to significantly greater deference than are unpublished cases,” this Court is not “strictly required 

to follow” such decisions. Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 114-115; 923 NW2d 

607 (2018) (emphasis omitted).