NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

VERONICA B. WOODWARD, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY G. WOODWARD, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0626 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2010-000789

FC2010-090409

(Consolidated)

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Donaldson Steward, P.C., Chandler

By Heather N. Peláez

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 6-2-2020
2

Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., Phoenix

By Kathi Mann Sandweiss

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Law Offices of Mathew S. Schultz, P.C., Tempe

By Mathew S. Schultz

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Vice Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani

joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Timothy Woodward (“Husband”) appeals from the superior 

court’s order modifying the spousal-maintenance award to Veronica 

Woodward (“Wife”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the couple’s 

twenty-year marriage in February 2010. Before the trial, Husband moved to 

compel disclosure and requested sanctions—asking that the court preclude 

Wife from using evidence at trial she had not disclosed during discovery.

The court granted the motions, stating Wife “shall not be allowed to use as 

evidence at trial or hearing the information not disclosed to [Husband] and 

his attorney.” Thereafter, Husband moved to preclude Wife from testifying 

or submitting evidence to support a spousal-maintenance award. The court

excluded Wife’s witness and documents but allowed her to testify

regarding maintenance.

¶3 After the trial, in January 2011, the court issued a “Decree of 

Dissolution of Marriage” (“Decree”) that included an award of spousal 

maintenance with findings as listed in Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)

section 25-319. The court found:

Wife worked from home during the marriage as a freelance 

graphic artist. Wife attributes her inability to work outside the 

home to health problems, including depression, anxiety, and 
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3

diabetes. But she has provided no medical records or opinion 

or evidence from medical providers to indicate she cannot work 

full time or work outside the home.

(Emphasis added.) Further, the Decree provided Husband was “able to 

meet his own needs and at least some of Wife’s needs as well.” The court 

expected him to maintain his current level of income of “approximately 

$97,827 per year.” The court also found Wife had “not worked outside the 

home during the marriage, but . . . should at least be able to earn the 

equivalent of minimum wage.” Further, the court found Wife had “a 

Bachelor’s degree and experience in her field,” and did “not need additional 

training or education to find appropriate employment.” The court then 

ordered Husband to pay Wife $1500 per month for 96 months, beginning 

February 1, 2011.

¶4 In October 2018, Wife petitioned to modify spousal 

maintenance, arguing that a substantial and continuing change in

circumstances had occurred since the time of the Decree because Husband’s 

income had increased substantially, and her health had deteriorated.

Specifically, Wife alleged that at the time of the Decree, she had 

“depression, anxiety, and diabetes,” and that since that time, her challenges 

had increased in frequency and severity. She also developed “agoraphobia, 

a panic disorder, ulcerative colitis, gastric ulcers, hiatal hernia, urinary 

frequency, hypoglycemia, arthritis, uncontrollable heart rhythm 

disturbances, and insomnia.” Based on her deteriorating health, Wife 

asserted that she should no longer be attributed income. Husband 

contested Wife’s allegations, arguing his income had not substantially or 

continually changed, and Wife’s purportedly new health conditions 

predated the Decree.

¶5 The court held an evidentiary hearing, where Wife presented

evidence that she could not work, including her testimony, testimony of Dr. 

Mary Oakley, and various exhibits. Husband presented evidence of his

income during the years 2010 to 2018. After the hearing, the court issued an 

order (“2019 order”) finding Wife demonstrated a substantial and 

continuing change in circumstances and extended the spousal maintenance 

award through January 31, 2029, based on “Wife’s inability to obtain 

employment and Husband’s substantial increase in income.” Specifically, 

the court used the prior finding that Wife could work as the “circumstance” 

that was the “baseline” upon which it assessed changes, stating “to 

demonstrate a change in circumstances exists at present, [Wife] must 

demonstrate that there has been a change in her ability to work and support 

herself at present as compared to the prior trial court’s finding that she was 
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4

able to work and earn her own income.” Finding Dr. Oakley’s testimony 

credible, the court found Wife could not obtain employment at the time of 

the 2019 order, and therefore her circumstances were “different from what 

the trial court found them to be.” The court also found Husband earned 

substantially more income in 2019 than found by the court in the Decree.

¶6 Husband moved to amend the 2019 order, arguing the court 

should deny Wife’s petition to modify spousal maintenance. The court 

dismissed the motion. Husband appealed, and we have jurisdiction under

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Husband argues the court erred as a matter of law by:

(1) failing to apply res judicata to Wife’s claims, (2) refusing to bind Wife to 

her prior attorney’s actions, and (3) modifying spousal maintenance based 

only on Husband’s purported increase in income. Husband argues,

alternatively, that the court abused its discretion by finding a substantial 

and continuing change in circumstances sufficient to modify spousal 

maintenance.

¶8 We review questions of law, such as application of res judicata

and statutory interpretation, de novo. A. Miner Contracting, Inc. v. Toho-Tolani 

County Imp. Dist., 233 Ariz. 249, 253, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). However, we review

the superior court’s ruling of the sufficiency of changed circumstances for 

abuse of discretion. Scott v. Scott, 121 Ariz. 492, 495 (1979); McClendon v. 

McClendon, 243 Ariz. 399, 401, ¶ 8 (App. 2017). We defer to the court’s 

factual findings when any reasonable evidence supports them. Roberts v. 

Malott, 80 Ariz. 66, 68 (1956); Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 595–97, ¶¶ 11, 

20 (App. 2017) (deferring to the court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence).

A. Res Judicata is Inapplicable.

¶9 Res judicata “preclude[s] a claim when a former judgment on 

the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter 

now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have 

been, determined in the former action.” Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 7 

(1999). We do not apply the doctrine rigidly if it contravenes public policy 

or results in manifest injustice. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 407, ¶ 8 

(App. 2011).
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¶10 Res judicata prevents modification of a spousal-maintenance 

award based on facts that could have been raised at a previous hearing. In 

re Marriage of Rowe, 117 Ariz. 474, 475 (1978); McClendon, 243 Ariz. at 402-03, 

¶ 15. However, the doctrine of res judicata does not prevent a person from 

introducing evidence showing a change of circumstances since the 

dissolution. A.R.S. § 25-327(A); Rowe, 117 Ariz. at 475–76; McClendon, 243 

Ariz. at 403, ¶ 16 (the moving party has the “burden to prove changed 

circumstances arising after” the last order). “Otherwise, a person could 

never satisfy the prerequisites needed to modify a support order, as set 

forth in A.R.S. § 25-327.” Rowe, 117 Ariz. at 476.

¶11 Thus, although res judicata would have prevented Wife from 

presenting evidence to challenge the finding in the Decree that she could 

work for minimum wage at the time of the Decree, it did not prevent her 

from producing evidence arising after the Decree to show that she currently 

cannot work. Likewise, Wife could present evidence to prove that 

Husband’s income had increased after the Decree. Therefore, the court did 

not err as a matter of law by failing to apply res judicata.

B. The Court Correctly Applied the Laws of Agency to Wife’s 

Original Attorney’s Conduct.

¶12 Contrary to Husband’s arguments, whether Wife’s or her 

attorney’s conduct led the original superior court to determine Wife could 

work for minimum wage is irrelevant because that court’s determination 

that Wife could work constituted the evidence from which Wife had to 

show circumstances had changed. The court correctly compared the 

circumstances found in the Decree with those presented at the time of the 

2019 order.

C. We Find Sheeley Inapplicable Because the Court Did Not Consider 

Husband’s Income Alone in Making its Determination.

¶13 In Sheeley v. Sheeley, this court noted that when determining 

whether to modify a spousal-maintenance order, a court “is governed by 

the same factors as are required in determining the reasonableness of an 

award for . . . maintenance at the time of the original decree and in 

determining these questions [it] should consider any change in the 

circumstances of the parties since the original decree.” 10 Ariz. App. 318, 

320 (1969). A change in the financial circumstances of the parties is “one of 

the totality of circumstances which should be considered by the trial court 

in considering a modification of a divorce decree.” Id. at 321. However, an 

increase in the earning capacity of one spouse, standing alone, is not
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sufficient to modify spousal maintenance. Id.; Linton v. Linton, 17 Ariz. App. 

560, 563–64 (1972) (“The mere fact of reduction of income in and of itself is 

not a sufficient basis to justify modification of the decree.”); Platt v. Platt, 17 

Ariz. App. 458, 459 (1972) (change in income “becomes significant when the 

totality of the circumstances is considered”).

¶14 Here, the court factored into its decision not only evidence of 

Husband’s purported increased income, but also evidence showing Wife 

could not obtain employment. Because we hold the court’s finding of 

substantial and continuing changed circumstances regarding Wife’s ability 

to obtain employment was supported by substantial evidence, the court did 

not err by then considering Husband’s increased income.

D. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding a Substantial 

Change of Circumstances Sufficient to Modify Spousal 

Maintenance.

¶15 The party seeking modification under A.R.S. § 25-327(A) has 

the burden of proving changed circumstances that are substantial and 

continuing. Scott, 121 Ariz. at 494. The moving party must prove 

circumstances have sufficiently changed by a comparison with either the 

circumstances existing at dissolution, MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 

588, ¶ 12 (App. 2011), or, if the court has modified the original decree, the 

circumstances existing at the issuance of “the latest court order,” 

McClendon, 243 at 402, ¶ 10.

¶16 Here, reasonable evidence supported the court’s finding that 

substantial and continuing changed circumstances occurred from the time 

of the dissolution to the time of the 2019 order. The court found two 

substantial and continuing changes: (1) while the Decree found Wife could 

work and earn an income, Wife could not obtain employment at the time of 

the 2019 order, and (2) Husband’s income increased by nearly $33,000.

Reasonable evidence supported the court’s first finding of substantial and 

continuing change because Wife presented evidence of the circumstances 

at the time of the dissolution (the Decree finding she could work for 

minimum wage), and evidence showing that she could not obtain 

employment at the time of the 2019 order (Wife’s testimony and testimony 

from Dr. Oakley who opined Wife could not work).

¶17 Further, reasonable evidence supported the court’s second 

finding. The Decree finding was that Husband’s level of income was 

$97,827 per year. At the modification evidentiary hearing, the court 

admitted into evidence Husband’s W-2 statements and tax returns,
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showing Husband’s income during the years 2010 to 2018 fluctuated 

between $113,706.00 and $132,925.00. Because reasonable evidence 

supported the court’s finding that substantial and continuing changed 

circumstances existed based on Wife’s change in the ability to work and 

Husband’s increase in income, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion by modifying the spousal-maintenance award.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶18 Both parties request an award of attorney’s fees and costs on 

appeal. See A.R.S. § 25-324. We decline to award Husband his fees. We 

award Wife her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs upon compliance with 

Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.