J-A22022-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES J. ENGLERT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 204 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-MD-0000004-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES J. ENGLERT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 205 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-MD-0000005-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES J. ENGLERT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 206 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-MD-0000006-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-A22022-21

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v.

JAMES J. ENGLERT 

Appellant

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: No. 207 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-MD-0000011-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES J. ENGLERT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 208 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-MD-0000012-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 15, 2021

Appellant, James J. Englert, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on February 3, 2021, following his bench trial convictions for five 

counts of indirect criminal contempt, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114. We affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with five, separate counts of 

indirect criminal contempt for alleged violations of a protection from abuse 

(PFA) order filed by A.C., an adult female.1 The trial court held a 

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1

 We use the victim’s initials or refer to her as “Victim” to protect her identity. 
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videoconference hearing in this matter on February 3, 2021.2 The trial court 

summarized the facts and procedural history of these cases as follows:

[Victim knew Appellant], she had a prior sexual relationship with 

him and has a [PFA] protecting her from [Appellant] since July of 

2018, [expiring] in March of 2021. The PFA [o]rder evicted 

[Appellant] from [a shared] residence and he was ordered to have 

no contact with [Victim]. They have two children together and 

according to [Victim], [Appellant] has no custody rights because 

there is no existing custody order and the Schuylkill County 

Children and Youth Agency (“C & Y”) has deemed him a threat to 

the children. 

[At docket number] MD-4-21, [Victim] testified that on December 

12, 2020, [Appellant] came to her home [] in Coaldale, 

Pennsylvania, walked into the home and asked to see the children. 

[Victim] told [Appellant] to leave, and he refused to do so without 

receiving a ride. Someone called 911, the police arrived and they 

could not find [Appellant], who had fled. [Victim] testified that 

[Appellant] sends her text messages every day, including that 

day, and some days as many as twenty texts per day, and has 

been doing so since a time prior to Christmas 2020. [Victim] 

testified that [Appellant] never respected the PFA [o]rder.

[At docket number] MD-5-21, [Victim] testified that on December 

14, 2020 she was shopping with their two-year-old son at a Dollar 

Store and was walking toward her car in the parking lot. 

[Appellant] pulled up in his girlfriend’s car, yelling at [Victim] that 

he wanted to see the children. [Appellant] charged at [Victim] 

with the car, and [Victim] ran with the young child back into the 

store to avoid being hit. [Appellant] yelled at her that it was “not 

right,” that someone was “going to pay” if she took the kids away 

from him, that he didn’t care, and that she was a liar. [Victim] 

was terrified. She was scared for her child, and the child was 

mortified. The child went into shock and remained quiet all day 

which was abnormal for him.

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2 The trial court allowed Appellant to represent himself pro se at the 

proceeding, after determining that he voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 

See N.T., 2/3/2021, at 4-8. Appellant, however, is represented by counsel 

on appeal.
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[At docket number] MD-6-21, [Victim] testified that on December 

6, 2020, [Appellant] texted her in the morning making threats, 

telling her that he loved her and wanted to be with her. 

[Appellant] wanted to know why [Victim] was “doing this.” 

[Appellant] always followed up these types of texts with angry 

texts. When [Victim came] back [] from shopping, [Appellant] 

came up into the driveway and pulled [Victim’s] car door open and 

grabbed her by the arm and tried to pull her out of the car. 

[Victim] said that [Appellant] appeared to believe that [Victim] 

was alone in the car and was shocked when [Victim’s] girlfriend 

pulled her back into the car. The girlfriend [] texted her husband 

[] to come outside, because [Appellant] was outside harassing 

them. The girlfriend was scared. [Her husband] asked [Appellant] 

to leave the property. [Appellant] walked out into the street and 

screamed at [the girlfriend’s husband] until the police arrived.

[At docket number] MD-11-21, this incident occurred at [Victim’s] 

home on December 6, 2020. [Victim] received threatening texts 

from [Appellant] throughout the day. Late at night, [Appellant] 

came to [Victim’s] door and started banging on the door. As 

[Victim] was calling the police [Appellant] went to a side window 

and began yelling through the window. [Appellant] called [Victim] 

a tramp and threatened her boyfriend, who was present, calling 

the boyfriend a “dead man.” When the police arrived, [Appellant] 

had fled. However, [Appellant] then texted her, while using her 

wireless internet reception, so [Victim] knew he was somewhere 

close by. The police could not locate him. [Victim] was scared for 

her safety.

[At docket number] MD-12-21, the incident occurred on 

December 4, 2020 at [Victim’s] home. [Appellant] came to her 

door, pounded on the door and threatened to steal her car, 

claiming to have title to it. [Victim] told him that he had stolen

the title out of her mailbox and that she was calling the police. 

[Appellant] spotted [Victim’s] boyfriend through the window and 

threatened to harm him. [Appellant] fled the scene before the 

police arrived and then texted [Victim’s] boyfriend later that day, 

threatening him. 

* * *

[...At docket number] MD-6-21, [Victim’s Father] testified that he 

knows [Appellant] and that on December 2, 2020, [Victim’s 

Father] was watching his daughter’s four children at her home 

while she was out shopping with a friend. While doing so, 
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[Appellant] rode up to the home twice on his motorcycle. Then 

[Appellant] came up to the door and knocked. [Victim’s Father] 

ignored the knocking. After approximately thirty minutes elapsed, 

[Victim’s Father] observed [Appellant] standing in the kitchen of 

the home. [Appellant] had walked around to the rear of the home, 

come in the back, and was standing in the kitchen. [Victim’s 

Father] had the two youngest children on his lap. They were 

sleeping, [Appellant] said that [Victim] owed him money and he 

was also looking for his phone. [Victim’s Father] told [Appellant] 

that he did not know anything about that, that [Appellant] was 

not supposed to be there, and that [Appellant] should leave. 

[Victim’s Father] asked his son [] to call the police for him. When 

the police arrived, [Appellant] was outside, sitting on his 

motorcycle.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2021, at 2-5. 

Following a bench trial on February 3, 2021, the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of all five indirect criminal contempt charges for violating the 

terms of the July 2018 PFA order. See N.T., 2/3/2021, at 29. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 30 months of imprisonment, 

representing six-month, consecutive sentences for each offense. Id. at 

32-34. The trial court also ordered a mental health evaluation and treatment. 

Id. at 33. On February 12, 2021, counsel from the Public Defender’s Office 

entered an appearance on behalf of Appellant. This timely, counseled appeal 

resulted.3

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3

 On February 12, 2021, counsel for Appellant filed five notices of appeal, one

at each docket number. Each notice contains all five trial court docket 

numbers, but each notice of appeal has a separate trial court docket number 

highlighted. Appellant has complied with Pa.R.A.P. 341 and our Supreme 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). 

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020), 

appeal denied, 242 A.3d 304 (Pa. 2020) (“Because Johnson appealed from 

four docket numbers and filed four notices of appeal, Johnson has complied 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in not stating, on the record, 

any reason for imposing a sentence of total confinement.

II. Whether the [trial court’s] decision to sentence [Appellant] 

to the maximum, consecutively for each case, raises the 

aggregate sentence to an excessive level, in light of the 

criminal conduct at issue.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

As Appellant acknowledges, his claims on appeal challenge the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id. at 3. We have previously 

determined:

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

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with Walker. The fact that each notice of appeal listed all four docket 

numbers does not invalidate his notices of appeal, and we decline to quash 

his appeals.”). In an abundance of caution, within the 30-day appeal period 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 903, on February 26, 2021, counsel for Appellant filed 

separate notices of appeal listing only one docket number at each docket to 

ensure compliance with Walker. On February 17, 2021, the trial court 

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied timely on March 9, 2021. 

The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 14, 

2021. By order entered on March 15, 2021, this Court sua sponte consolidated 

the appeals. 
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from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally 

waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a 

motion to modify the sentence imposed. 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“Issues 

challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a 

post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the 

sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary 

aspect of a sentence is waived.”).

At sentencing, Appellant neither objected nor brought his discretionary 

sentencing claims to the attention of the trial court. See N.T., 2/3/2021, at 

32-34. Moreover, Appellant did not file post-sentence motions at any of the 

five dockets, either pro se or with the assistance of counsel after the Public 

Defender’s Office entered its appearance on Appellant’s behalf.

4

 By failing to 

raise his claims at sentencing or by way of a post-sentence motion, Appellant 

deprived the trial court of an opportunity to take corrective action or to modify 

his sentence. Hence, he has not properly preserved his claims or validly 

invoked our jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(1)(a)(iv) provides that 

“[t]he defendant in a court case shall have the right to make a post-sentence 

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4

 Counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Appellant nine days after 

sentencing. 
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motion[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(a). Post-sentence motions requesting the 

modification of sentence, however, are optional. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(B)(1)(a)(iv). A “[w]ritten post-sentence motion shall be filed no later 

than 10 days after imposition of sentence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). We 

examine whether the sentencing court gave “sufficient and accurate 

information regarding the time requirements for filing a post-sentence motion 

and for filing a notice of appeal to this Court.” Commonwealth v. Dreves, 

839 A.2d 1122, 1129 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

Here, the sentencing court properly informed Appellant that he had the

optional right “to file a motion for modification of sentence within ten days 

from [the date of sentencing], but [added that Appellant did not] have to do 

that.” N.T., 2/3/2021, at 34. The sentencing court also informed Appellant 

that he could appeal within 30 days and that he was entitled to the 

representation of counsel on appeal. Id. Thus, the trial court complied with 

Pennsylvania law and accurately advised Appellant about the time 

requirements for filing a post-sentence motion and a notice of appeal.

The trial court’s added observation that post-sentence motions are 

optional does not alter our conclusion that Appellant failed to preserve his 

claims and, in turn, failed to validly invoke our jurisdiction to review his 

discretionary sentencing challenges. “Under Pennsylvania law, pro se

defendants are subject to the same rules of procedure as are represented 

defendants.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014), 
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citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 896 A.2d 523, 534 (Pa. 2006) (pro se

defendants are held to same standards as licensed attorneys). “[P]ro se

status confers no special benefit upon a litigant, and a court cannot be 

expected to become a litigant's counsel[.]” Id. Furthermore, while counsel 

entered her appearance for Appellant within the 10-day period set forth in 

Rule 720, she failed to file post-sentence motions and did not otherwise seek 

leave to file a motion for modification of sentence nunc pro tunc during the 

30-day appeal period. See Dreves, 839 A.2d at 1128 (footnote omitted) (“To 

be entitled to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, a defendant must, 

within 30 days after the imposition of sentence, demonstrate sufficient cause, 

i.e., reasons that excuse the late filing.”). Moreover, Appellant, in his 

counseled brief, did not fully address our four-part test for invoking jurisdiction 

over his discretionary sentencing claims, including whether he properly 

preserved his issues at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and/or modify 

his sentence.

Accordingly, because Appellant never filed post-sentence motions or 

objected to his sentence at the sentencing hearing, he “did not give the 

sentencing judge an opportunity to reconsider or modify his sentence” and, 

therefore, his discretionary sentencing claims are waived. Commonwealth 

v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 2003).

5

 As such, we are constrained to 

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5

 More specifically, in Mann, we noted:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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conclude that Appellant has waived his sentencing challenges and he cannot 

raise them for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2021

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[Mann] filed a post-sentence motion alleging that his sentence 

was unduly severe and that the trial court abused its discretion 

under the Sentencing Code. However, [Mann] failed to raise the 

specific claim regarding the sentencing court's alleged failure to 

state the reasons for his sentence on the record. In addition, 

[Mann] did not raise this specific reason during the sentencing 

hearing. As such, [Mann] did not give the sentencing judge an 

opportunity to reconsider or modify his sentence on this basis, 

and, therefore, the claim is waived.

Mann, 820 A.2d at 794, citing Commonwealth v. Reeves, 778 A.2d 691, 

692–693 (Pa. Super. 2001) (by failing to raise the specific claim that the trial 

court failed to state reasons for sentence on the record in post-sentence 

motion, the trial court was deprived of opportunity to consider claim and thus 

the claim was waived on appeal).