1

The Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-3571

___________

Wilma McGrane, * 

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Saks, Incorporated, doing business * Appeal from the United States

as Younkers, formerly known as * District Court for the Northern

Proffitts, Inc., * District of Iowa.

*

Appellant, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Leslie Volz, *

*

Defendant. *

___________

Submitted: May 13, 2002

Filed: June 10, 2002

___________

Before BOWMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

PER CURIAM.
2

The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, then United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Iowa, now United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit.

-2-

Wilma McGrane brought this action against her former employer, Younkers,

alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

to 2000e-17, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and

the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Chapter 216 of the Iowa Code. Following a week-long

trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of McGrane on the gender discrimination

claim, but found in favor of Younkers on the age discrimination claim. After trial,

the district court2

 denied Younkers' motions for judgment as a matter of law (JAML)

and new trial on the gender discrimination claim. It did, however, grant Younkers'

motion for remittitur, finding the damages award excessive. Younkers appeals from

the denial of its motions for JAML and new trial.

Younkers contends the district court erred by denying its motion for JAML

because there was insufficient evidence McGrane was terminated because of her

gender. We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for JAML. Riley

v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Having carefully

reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and drawing

all reasonable inferences in its favor, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could

have returned the verdict that it did in this case. Because a detailed opinion on this

claim would serve no useful purpose, we affirm on the basis of the district court's

thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Younkers also contends the district court abused its discretion by denying its

motion for new trial based on the district court's refusal to submit a "stray remarks"

instruction to the jury. Younkers requested the instruction because of certain

comments made by McGrane's supervisor, Leslie Volz. Having reviewed this claim

for abuse of discretion, Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 851 (8th Cir. 2001), we

find none. Volz was a decisionmaker and the statements she made about McGrane
-3-

were contemporaneous with McGrane's termination. See Williams v. Lindenwood

Univ., 288 F.3d 349, 357 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that statements did not

constitute stray remarks because they were made by decisionmakers during the

decision-making process). Consequently, because Volz's comments were not "stray

remarks," the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit such an

instruction. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in its entirety.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT