alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### XIAOJIAN ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-76001.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 20, 2008.*

Filed May 27, 2008.

Daniel K.Y. Fong, Law Offices of Daniel K.Y. Fong, Monterey Park, CA, for Petitioner.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, Elizabeth A. Weishaupl, Esq., USDE-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Denver, CO, for Respondent.

Before: PREGERSON, TASHIMA, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Xiaojian Zhang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *see INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481 & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), and we grant the petition for review and remand.

Substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s conclusion that Zhang failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected ground. We conclude that the mistreatment Zhang suffered at the hands of the Chinese police compels a finding of past persecution. *See Guo v. Ashcroft,*361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir.2004). Further, the record compels the conclusion that Zhang suffered persecution on account of his imputed political opinion. *See Zhang v. Ashcroft,*388 F.3d 713, 720-21 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that persecution is on account of imputed political opinion where a petitioner is accused of participating in anti-government activity).

Because we conclude that Zhang suffered past persecution, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well founded fear of future persecution. *See Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft,*371 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (9th Cir.2004). Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. *See INS v. Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 16-18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam).

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-51026 Summary Calendar

CHRISTOPHER SEPEDA, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus LESTER E. FLEMING, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-97-CV-602

- - - - - - - - - - August 10, 1998 Before DUHE’, DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Christopher Sepeda, federal prisoner # 61190-080, appeals the district court’s denial as moot of his application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In Venegas v.
Henman , 126 F.3d 760, 762 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1679 (1998), this court addressed the issue of sentence reductions for inmates who completed substance abuse treatment programs. Specifically, we concluded that it was within the BOP’s discretion to deny a sentence reduction to inmates with aNo. 97-51026 -2- sentencing guideline enhancement for possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. See id. 764-65.

The Bureau of Prisons’ exclusion of felon-in-possession of a weapon convictions and drug convictions with enhanced sentences due to possession of a weapon from eligibility for early release after substance abuse treatment is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Bureau’s authority as derived from section 3621(e). The loss of the mere opportunity to be considered for discretionary early release is too speculative to constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 765 (citing Luken v. Scott , 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1690 (1996)). Given the holding in Venegas , Sepeda has not presented an issue of constitutional dimension. It is on this basis that the dismissal of his § 2241 application is affirmed. See Bickford v. International Speedway Corp. , 654 F.2d 1028, 131 (5th Cir. 1981). Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot is DENIED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
#### Paul M. DEAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2010-5113.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 28, 2010.

Michael D.J. Eisenberg, Law Office of Michael D.J., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John S. Groat, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Paul M. Dean, Jr. moves without opposition for extensions of time to file his opening brief and his reply brief. Dean also moves without opposition for a stay of further proceedings in this court pending action by the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR).

Upon consideration thereof,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) The motions for extensions of time are granted. The court’s dismissal order is vacated, the court’s mandate is recalled, and Dean’s opening and reply briefs are accepted as timely filed.

(2) The motion for a stay of proceedings is denied without prejudice. The case is ready for assignment to a merits panel.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 21-2490

___________________________

 

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Timothy Whittington

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

Submitted: November 23, 2021

Filed: November 30, 2021

[Unpublished]

____________

 

Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

 

PER CURIAM.

Timothy Whittington received a 120-month prison sentence after he pleaded 

guilty to committing a child-pornography offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), 

(b)(1). In an Anders brief, Whittington’s counsel suggests that the sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). A pro 

se supplemental brief raises a host of other claims. 
-2- 

We conclude that Whittington’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See 

United States v. McKanry, 628 F.3d 1010, 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “it 

is nearly inconceivable that” once a district court has varied downward, it “abuse[s] 

its discretion in not varying downward [even] further” (quotation marks omitted)). 

The record establishes that the district court1 sufficiently considered the statutory 

sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or 

commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 

(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

Whittington’s other claims fare no better. The district court’s comments do 

not support a judicial-bias claim, see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 

(1994); the prosecutors did not engage in misconduct, see United States v. Hunter, 

770 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2014); the district court never prohibited him from 

withdrawing his guilty plea, see United States v. Foy, 617 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (8th 

Cir. 2010); and the ineffective-assistance-of-plea-counsel claim will have to await 

“collateral” review, United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826–27 (8th 

Cir. 2006).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no 

other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel 

permission to withdraw.

______________________________

 1The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri.
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#   Secretary of Labor v. The Doe Run Company

DoeRun CENT 2015-318-RM Meeting Notice 8-16-19.pdf

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100 A.3d 536

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BRUCE E. LIGE, A/K/A BRUCE EDWARD LIGE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued October 6, 2014

Decided October 29, 2014.

*Ashlea D. Newman,*Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant *(John J. Hoffman,*Acting Attorney General, attorney).

*John W. Douard,*Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent *(Joseph E. Krakora,*Public Defender, attorney).

PER CURIAM.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Ashrafi’s opinion of the *21Appellate Division reported at 429 *N.J.Super.*490, 60 A.3d 514 (2013).

*For*affirmance—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON and Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned)—7.

Opposed—None.
769 S.E.2d 442

#### In the Matter of Fred W. AUMAN, III, Respondent.

Appellate Case Nos. 2015-000353 and -000354.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 26, 2015.

ORDER

This order is substituted for all orders issued in this matter on February 25, 2015, which are hereby vacated.

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to issue an order placing respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, or in the alternative, transferring respondent to incapacity inactive status pursuant *465to Rule 28, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver or an attorney pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent’s clients.

IT IS ORDERED that respondent’s license to practice law in this state is suspended and respondent is transferred to incapacity inactive status until further order of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lump-kin, Esquire, Receiver, is hereby appointed to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE.

Mr. Lumpkin shall assume responsibility for respondent’s client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating accounts), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain, and take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, to protect the interests of respondent’s clients. Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent’s trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.

This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating accounts) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court.

Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent’s mail and the authority to direct that respondent’s mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin’s office.

Mr. Lumpkin’s appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested.

/s/Jean H. Toal, C.J.

FOR THE COURT
#### Ronald I. PAUL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul D. DE HOLCZER, individually and as a partner of the law firm of Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; Michael H. Quinn, individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn Law Firm, LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., individually and as partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner; Oscar K. Rucker, in his individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way South Carolina Department of Transportation; Macie M. Gresham, in her individual capacity as Eastern Region Right of Way Program Manager South Carolina Department of Transportation; Natalie J. Moore, in her individual capacity as Assistant Chief Counsel, South Carolina Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

*198No. 15-2059.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 29, 2016.

Decided: Feb. 4, 2016.

Ronald I. Paul, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald I. Paul appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint* and the order denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Paul n de Holczer,*No. 3:15-cv-02178-CMC, 2015 WL 4545974 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015 *&*Sept. 2, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 We conclude we have jurisdiction over this appeal. *See Goode*v. *Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc.,*807 F.3d 619, 623-25 (4th Cir.2015) (providing standard).
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Sudan

On November 3, 1997, by Executive Order 13067, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Sudan pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) and took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan. On April 26, 2006, by Executive Order 13400, the President determined that the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region posed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067, and ordered the blocking of property of certain persons connected to the Darfur region. On October 13, 2006, by Executive Order 13412, the President took additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067 and expanded in Executive Order 13400. In Executive Order 13412, the President also took steps to implement the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-344).

On January 13, 2017, by Executive Order 13761, the President found that positive efforts by the Government of Sudan between July 2016 and January 2017 improved certain conditions that Executive Orders 13067 and 13412 were intended to address. Given these developments, and in order to encourage the Government of Sudan to sustain and enhance these efforts, section 1 of Executive Order 13761 provided that sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order 13067 and the entirety of Executive Order 13412 would be revoked as of July 12, 2017, provided that the criteria in section 12(b) of Executive Order 13761 had been met.

On July 11, 2017, by Executive Order 13804, I amended Executive Order 13761, extending until October 12, 2017, the effective date in section 1 of Executive Order 13761.

                    Despite recent positive developments, the crisis constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan that led to the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997; the expansion of that emergency in Executive Order 13400 of April 26, 2006; and with respect to which additional steps were taken in Executive Order 13412 of October 13, 2006, Executive Order 13761 of January 13, 2017, and Executive Order 13804 of July 11, 2017, has not been resolved. These actions and policies continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. I have, therefore, determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067, as expanded by Executive Order 13400, with respect to Sudan.                          ( print page 50800)    

                    This notice shall be published in the                     *Federal Register*                     and transmitted to the Congress.                

[FR Doc. 2017-24016

Billing code 3295-F8-P