COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Coleman, 

 Willis, Elder, Bray, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Baker*

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WELFORD V. WASHINGTON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0230-96-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 JANUARY 19, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

UPON A REHEARING EN BANC 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Welford V. Washington appeals his convictions of possession 

of heroin and of cocaine. He contends that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress evidence found when the police 

seized him and entered his home. A panel of this Court reversed 

the convictions. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 

657, 496 S.E.2d 135 (1998). Upon a rehearing en banc, we affirm 

his convictions. 

 Reginald Ford was free on bond, but a felony capias had been 

issued for his arrest. His bondsman received a tip from an 

 

 *Judge Baker participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on July 

31, 1998 and thereafter by his designation as senior judge 

pursuant to Code § 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01. 
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informant that Ford was at 2347 Bethel Street in Richmond, and 

the bondsman contacted Officer Michael Moore for assistance. 

Before going to that address, Officer Moore verified that a 

capias was outstanding, but he did not obtain a copy of the 

capias. He believed that Ford either had jumped or was about 

ready to jump bail. Officer Moore did not determine Ford's 

residence address and did not have a description of him. The 

bondsman knew and could recognize Ford. 

 Two additional officers met Moore and the bondsman at 2347 

Bethel Street. The additional officers learned that Ford was 

supposed to be in the house. They only knew his name and did not 

have a description. Officer Moore and the bondsman went to the 

front door, and the other two went to the back door. Moore 

knocked on the front door, and Officer Samuels, one of the 

officers at the back door, heard the knocking. 

 Three to four seconds after the knocking began, the 

defendant opened the back door "rather fast" and stepped out. 

Officer Samuels placed his hands on the defendant and asked, "Mr. 

Ford?" The defendant replied, "[N]o. I'm Welford Washington." 

Samuels frisked him and then asked for identification. The 

defendant said that his driver's license was inside and turned to 

go back inside. Samuels stepped in front of him and entered the 

house first as the second officer followed. As soon as they 

entered the kitchen, the officers saw cocaine and heroin on the 

kitchen table. They seized the drugs and arrested Washington. 
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Ford was not in the residence. 

 The defendant contends the officers violated the Fourth 

Amendment when they entered his residence without a search 

warrant. We hold that the officers could go upon the property in 

search of Ford, that they had reasonable belief the person 

exiting the house was Ford, and that they could accompany that 

person back into the house while they completed identifying him. 

The officers did not violate the defendant's rights. 

 The police possessed a capias for Reginald Ford's arrest. 

The capias was issued on probable cause, and it required all 

police officers to arrest Ford if they found him. The bondsman 

had pledged to produce Ford according to the terms of the bond. 

The police officers possessed judicially mandated authority to 

seize Ford while the bondsman had statutory authority to seize 

and return him to the court. In exercising their authority, 

either could lawfully approach any citizen and ask if he were 

Ford or if he had information that would help them find Ford. 

 The officers did not implicate the Fourth Amendment when 

they went to 2347 Bethel Street to find Ford. Not every 

encounter that the police have with a member of the public is a 

seizure. "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 

Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in 

another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer 

some questions . . . ." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 

(1983) (citation omitted). "[O]ur recent decision in Royer . . . 
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plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or 

a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, 

constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 

U.S. 210, 216 (1984). 

 Police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment when they 

seize a person or search a person's home or effects. A seizure 

occurs when by physical force or show of authority and submission 

thereto, an individual's freedom of movement is restrained and 

the person is not free to leave. See California v. Hodari D., 

499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 

 The critical moment occurred when the defendant stepped out 

the back door and the police confronted him. The officer seized 

Washington when he placed his hands on the defendant. At that 

instant, if the officers had reason to believe that the person 

was Ford, they had the right to detain that person briefly and to 

identify him. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Cf.

White v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 662, 666-67, 492 S.E.2d 451, 

453 (1997) (en banc). The issue is whether Officer Samuels had a 

reasonable suspicion that Reginald Ford was coming out the back 

door. 

 We need not address whether the officers believed that 

criminal activity was occurring. The police were not 

investigating a crime. The judge who issued the capias 

determined that the person named in the warrant was engaging in 

criminal conduct. The officers were executing lawful process, an 
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arrest warrant. Their investigation was to find Ford. When they 

gathered enough information to develop a reasonable, good-faith 

belief that they had found Ford, they could seize that person. 

Since the warrant gave the officers probable cause to arrest, the 

only issue is whether the officers had a reasonable and 

good-faith belief that the defendant was Ford. See Shears v. 

Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 399, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996) 

(citing United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 

1982)). 

 The informant's tip was unsubstantiated information about 

Ford's location. "An informant's tip can provide the 

justification for a Terry stop even if the informant's 

reliability is unknown and certainly can do so if, as here, the 

information is corroborated." United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 

622, 625 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984). In this 

case, the officers raised their level of knowledge to reasonable 

suspicion by corroborating the tip. 

 To give the tip some indicia of reliability, the officers 

needed only to verify that the person detained was reasonably 

believed to be the person whom they were to arrest pursuant to 

the capias. Anonymous information sufficiently corroborated may 

give reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop although the 

unverified tip by itself would not justify a forcible stop. See

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). 

 Partial corroboration has always been available to bolster 
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the reliability of a tip and increase the accumulated knowledge 

to the level of reasonable suspicion. If partial corroboration 

can raise an unreliable tip to the point that it provides 

probable cause, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 

(1959); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); Alabama v. 

White, 496 U.S. at 331, it can raise such a tip to the point it 

provides reasonable suspicion. 

 Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding 

standard than probable cause not only in the 

sense that reasonable suspicion can be 

established with information that is 

different in quantity or content than that 

required to establish probable cause, but 

also in the sense that reasonable suspicion 

can arise from information that is less 

reliable than that required to show probable 

cause. 

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330. 

 Corroboration of the informant's tip could have been 

accomplished many ways. In this case, Moore verified that there 

was a capias for Ford, and he took the bondsman who could 

identify Ford on sight with him. They went to the house to see 

if Ford was there. The fugitive warrant gave the officer reason 

to suspect that the person might flee. As soon as they knocked 

on the front door, someone exited the back door rather fast. A 

reasonable person could believe that these were the acts of a 

person trying to flee the police. The police were looking for 

just such a person at this address. The defendant's reaction to 

the police knocking at the door provided articulable facts that 

corroborated the tip and raised Officer Samuels' accumulated 
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knowledge to the level of reasonable suspicion. 

 A single instance of attempted flight or furtive behavior by 

a suspect is suggestive of guilt and provides a significant 

reason to believe that the informant was correct and that 

Reginald Ford was at the specified address. See Gregory v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 109, 468 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1996) 

("defendant's . . . behavior tended to support informer's 

report"). "[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the 

approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens

rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the 

officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are 

proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an 

arrest." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968). 

 If articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that a 

person has committed a criminal offense, the police may stop that 

person to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him 

briefly while attempting to obtain additional information. See

Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). "A brief stop of a 

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 

maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known 

to the officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 

146 (1972) (citations omitted). 

 Officer Samuels had reasonable suspicion that Ford was the 

person coming out the back door. He had the authority to detain 
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briefly the person whom he suspected was Ford and to confirm his 

identity. Although Washington gave his name, the officer was 

entitled to verify this statement. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; 

Jones v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 14, 19, 334 S.E.2d 536, 540 (1985) 

(questions about identity did not end when officer was handed 

identification card that appeared to have been tampered with). 

 The next question is whether Samuels could accompany 

Washington inside the dwelling without a search warrant. 

"[W]arrantless entries into dwellings, followed by . . . arrests 

therein, . . ., are presumed to be unreasonable, in Fourth 

Amendment terms, casting upon the police a heavy burden of 

proving justification by exigent circumstances." Verez v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752-53 (1985) 

(citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986). See

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980). 

 One of the situations that has been held sufficient to 

justify a warrantless intrusion upon a citizen's personal privacy 

is that "[o]nce an officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, he is 

'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to 

protect [his and others'] personal safety and to maintain the 

status quo during the course of the stop.'" Servis v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1988) 

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 

U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). As we noted in Servis, relying upon 

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), frisking for weapons 
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based upon the exigency of protecting an officer's safety is not 

limited to a pat-down of the suspect but may extend to nearby 

vehicles, as in Long, or rooms or premises to which the suspect 

may retreat to secure a weapon, as in Servis. See 6 Va. App. at 

520, 371 S.E.2d at 162-63. 

 Once the officer had reason to stop and identify the 

defendant, he could stay with the defendant to keep him in sight. 

See id. at 519, 371 S.E.2d at 162. This protects the police, an 

important consideration during any investigatory detention. It 

also maintains the status quo. 

 Officer Samuels knew that Ford was a fugitive wanted for a 

crime. He detained the person he reasonably suspected was trying 

to evade the officers at the front door. The officer could not 

reasonably be expected to allow that person to re-enter the 

premises alone. Although Samuels could not have entered the 

premises to search for weapons or contraband, he could accompany 

the suspect inside solely to maintain the status quo and ensure 

the officers' safety. See id.

 Samuels reasonably suspected that Washington was Ford, a 

person for whom he possessed a capias as a fugitive. Thus, not 

only could Samuels enter the premises to maintain a safe 

situation while identifying the person, Samuels could enter the 

premises to prevent the suspected fugitive from escaping. Cf.

United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (officer had 

right based on exigencies of situation to pursue individual into 
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private premises without a search warrant where officer had set 

in motion an arrest outside). The subject of an arrest warrant 

can be seized before entering or after leaving the home of a 

third party. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 

(1981). The threshold of one's home may be private under the 

common law of property, but it is a "public place" when 

interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. 

 That Samuels could have taken the defendant around to the 

front door or had the bondsman come to the back door to identify 

defendant does not detract from the propriety of what he did. 

"The reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect 

does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory 

techniques." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989). 

"[D]efining what means are 'least intrusive' is a virtually 

unmanageable and unbounded task." United States v. Sharpe, 470 

U.S. 675, 694 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). When 

"evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, 

common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid 

criteria." Id. at 685. The test is whether the police methods 

were calculated to confirm or dispel the suspicion quickly and 

with minimal intrusion upon the person detained. See Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 856-57, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 

(1993). 

 Officer Samuels possessed reasonable suspicion to detain the 

person he reasonably thought was Ford while verifying his 
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identity. Samuels had the right to accompany Washington into the 

home to prevent him from fleeing and to ensure the officers' 

safety. The contraband was not the fruit of an illegal entry or 

illegal search because the officers immediately observed it in 

the kitchen in open view. We affirm the trial court's decision. 

 Affirmed. 
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Benton, J., dissenting. 

 The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Contrary to the majority's ruling, I believe the officers' entry 

into Welford Washington's residence violated Washington's Fourth 

Amendment rights. For this reason, I would reverse the trial 

judge's refusal to suppress the seized evidence. 

 I. 

 A bondsman informed Officer Michael Moore that he had 

received a tip from an informant that Reginald Ford, for whom a 

capias had been issued, could be found at 2347 Bethel Street. 

Although Officer Moore verified that a capias was outstanding, he 

did not obtain a copy of the capias. Additionally, Moore never 

independently confirmed Ford's address and did not obtain a 

physical description of him. Only the bondsman could identify 

Ford. Based upon the limited information he had received, Moore 

believed Ford "had either jumped or was about ready to jump 

[bail]." 

 At 10:30 a.m., Officer Samuels and Sergeant Kemp met Moore 

and the bondsman at 2347 Bethel Street, which was Welford 

Washington's residence. Samuels testified that he was told that 

Ford "was supposed" to be in the residence. He knew only Ford's 

name, and he did not have a physical description of Ford. 

Samuels knew only that a capias had been issued, "that it was a 
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bondsman's bail piece [and that] the bondsman was there to pick 

[Ford] up." Although he did not know whether Ford had originally 

been charged with a felony or a misdemeanor and he had not been 

told that Ford was dangerous, Samuels testified that he "take[s] 

everybody to be dangerous." 

 Samuels and Kemp went to the back door of Washington's 

residence. With the bondsman accompanying him, Moore went to the 

front door and knocked on the door. Moore did not see anyone 

look out of a window and did not hear any activity in the 

residence. 

 Samuels testified that he heard Moore knock on the front 

door. Three to four seconds after Moore knocked, Washington 

opened the back door and stepped out. Samuels testified that 

Washington opened the door "rather fast." Samuels placed his 

hands on Washington and said, "Mr. Ford." Washington replied, 

"[N]o. I'm Welford Washington." Samuels then frisked Washington 

and asked Washington for identification. Washington said his 

driver's license was inside the residence and turned to go 

inside. Samuels went into the house in front of Washington. 

Sergeant Kemp followed. When Samuels entered the kitchen, he saw 

"syringes with cocaine and heroin" residue and baggies of white 

powder. He arrested Washington. Ford was not in the residence. 

 The trial judge ruled that Samuels' detention of Washington 

and "limited intrusion" into Washington's residence were lawful. 

 II. 
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 On appeal, we review de novo the trial judge's determination 

that reasonable suspicion existed to detain Washington. See

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 674, 682, 496 S.E.2d 143, 

147 (1998). To justify a Terry detention, a "police officer must 

be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 

When a detention is based on an informant's tip, "[t]he informant 

must provide some basis for his knowledge [of the facts he 

reported] before the police officer relies upon it as being 

reliable enough to support an investigatory stop." Beckner v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 537, 425 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1993). 

In addition, "[s]ignificant aspects of the informer's information 

must be independently corroborated . . . to give 'some degree of 

reliability to the . . . allegation' of the informant." Bulatko 

v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993) 

(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)). 

 Clearly, the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion that 

Ford was at 2347 Bethel Street, that Washington was Ford, or that 

Washington was engaging in criminal activity. The evidence 

proved that Washington resided at 2347 Bethel Street. No 

evidence established the basis of the unknown informant's 

asserted knowledge that Ford could be found at Washington's 

residence. The bondsman could not create legal justification to 

stop Washington merely by communicating to the police the 
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bondsman's informant's unsubstantiated tip that Ford might be in 

the residence. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 

(1985) (ruling that if a communication "has been issued in the 

absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective 

reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment"); United States 

v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that if 

a police officer does not have a reasonable basis to conduct an 

investigative stop "he could not create justification simply by 

relaying a direction to a fellow officer to make the stop"). 

 Furthermore, no evidence established that either the 

informant or the bondsman was a reliable informant. The United 

States Supreme Court has held that the police may rely on 

information from an anonymous tipster to briefly detain a suspect 

only if the information from the anonymous tipster is 

"sufficiently corroborated" to provide an indicia of reliability. 

White, 496 U.S. at 331. In White, which the Supreme Court 

itself described as "a close case," id. at 332, the Court found 

indicia of reliability because of the following: 

 [T]he independent corroboration by the police 

of significant aspects of the informer's 

predictions imparted some degree of 

reliability to the other allegations made by 

the caller. 

 [It is] also important that, as in 

[Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)], 

"the anonymous [tip] contained a range of 

details relating not just to easily obtained 

facts and conditions existing at the time of 

the tip, but to future actions of third 

parties ordinarily not easily predicted." 

Id., at 245. 
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Id. at 332. 

 Clearly, the lesson to be gleaned from White, Gates, and 

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), is that a tip from 

an anonymous source does not gain indicia of reliability merely 

because the police decide to act upon the tip. The Supreme Court 

has never lowered the bar to the level that the majority now 

deems acceptable. In this case, the officers corroborated no 

information supplied by the bondsman's unknown, anonymous 

informant. The record contains no evidence, apart from the 

unsubstantiated and uncorroborated informant's tip, that Ford 

might have been in or near the residence. The officers acted 

upon the tip and by so acting set in motion circumstances that 

they deemed suspicious. When the officers knocked on the door, a 

man emerged from the residence. The emergence of an unknown male 

from the residence does not, to my mind, constitute 

corroboration, especially when the officers possessed no ability 

to recognize Ford and the man who emerged immediately identified 

himself. 

 None of the officers attempted to determine Ford's address 

or determine who resided at 2347 Bethel Street.1

 Because neither 

 

 1In fact, the failure of the officers to take reasonable 

steps to corroborate the information supplied by the bondsman 

demonstrates the fallacy of the majority's position. Had the 

officers first determined who resided at 2347 Bethel Street, 

obtained a description of Ford, determined the purpose for which 

the capias had been issued - all perfectly reasonable steps to 

take - the incident may never have occurred. Rather than condemn 

the officers' failure to investigate before acting, the majority 

rewards their conduct and, by so doing, denigrates the 

protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
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the informant's reliability nor the basis for the informant's 

knowledge was established, the officers lacked a reasonable 

suspicion to believe that Ford was in the residence at 2347 

Bethel Street. See McGhee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 203, 

487 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1997) (en banc). See also State v. Rubert, 

612 P.2d 771 (Or. App. 1980). 

 The uncontroverted testimony established that none of the 

officers had a physical description of Ford. Lacking a physical 

description of Ford, Samuels lacked a reasonable suspicion to 

believe that Washington was Ford. He simply speculated that 

Washington might be Ford. The uncorroborated, unsubstantiated 

informant's tip was not enough, alone, to provide Samuels with 

reasonable suspicion to believe that Ford was in the residence or 

that any man in the residence might be Ford. Furthermore, 

Washington promptly identified himself to Samuels by stating that 

his name was Welford Washington. 

 The fact that Washington opened the rear door of the 

residence after Moore knocked on the front door is insufficient 

to justify a detention of Washington. No evidence proved that 

Moore announced his presence or that Washington knew a police 

officer was at the front door. No evidence proved where 

Washington was located in his house when Moore knocked. 

Washington testified that he opened the rear door because he 

believed the knock was at that door. Indeed, the reasonableness 

of his response in opening the rear door is buttressed by the 
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fact that two police officers were at that door. 

 Washington's appearance at the rear door could give rise "to 

no more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

"hunch"'" concerning his intentions. Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 

Va. App. 730, 736, 441 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1994) (quoting Terry, 392 

U.S. at 27). The officer's knock at a door caused Washington to 

respond. Washington opened a door; he did not leave through a 

window. Any conclusion that he opened the door to escape is pure 

speculation. Furthermore, even if Samuels suspected that 

Washington intended to flee, "flight alone may not supply 

sufficient reason to suspect a person of criminal activity." 

Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 303, 456 S.E.2d 534, 536 

(1995). In the absence of any particular information, Samuels 

lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Washington, when 

he opened the door, was fleeing, was involved in a criminal 

offense, or was armed and dangerous. 

 The majority asserts that the officers acted in good faith. 

 I respectfully disagree. The officers had no basis, reasonable 

or otherwise, to conclude that the person who opened the door at 

Washington's residence was Ford. They had never seen Ford and 

had no description of Ford. They had no reliable information 

that Ford was in the residence. The officers cannot bootstrap 

reasonable suspicion from good faith reliance on a tip totally 

devoid of any indicia of reliability. Certainly, good faith is 

not established by ignorance or even innocent disregard of 
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well-established Fourth Amendment principles. The officers had 

no authority to detain any man they met at the residence on the 

chance they might be lucky and find Ford. 

 "Th[e] demand for specificity in the information upon which 

police action is predicated is the central teaching of [the 

United States Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18. Based upon the scant, unverified 

information provided by the informant, I would hold that Samuels 

lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that Ford could be found 

at 2347 Bethel Street, that Washington was Ford, or that 

Washington was involved in a criminal offense. Accordingly, the 

detention and frisk of Washington was unlawful. 

 III. 

 Citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 

(1987), the Commonwealth initially argued at the three-judge 

panel hearing that the officers had a "limited authority to enter 

[Washington's residence] pursuant to the capias." I disagree. 

Even if the police had been armed with an arrest warrant for Ford 

and had a reasonable basis to believe he was in the residence, 

they still would have needed a search warrant to lawfully enter 

Washington's residence to arrest Ford. "[T]he entry into a home 

[of a person not named in an arrest warrant] to . . . make an 

arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done 

pursuant to a [search] warrant." Steagald v. United States, 451 

U.S. 204, 211 (1981). 

 The Fourth Amendment protects the 
- 20 - 

individual's privacy in a variety of 

settings. In none is the zone of privacy 

more clearly defined than when bounded by the 

unambiguous physical dimensions of an 

individual's home -- a zone that finds its 

roots in clear and specific constitutional 

terms: "The right of the people to be secure 

in their . . . houses . . . shall not be 

violated." That language unequivocally 

establishes the proposition that "[a]t the 

very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands 

the right of a [person] to retreat into his 

[or her] own home and there be free from 

unreasonable governmental intrusion." In 

terms that apply equally to seizures of 

property and to seizures of persons, the 

Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the 

entrance to the house. Absent exigent 

circumstances, that threshold may not 

reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (citation 

omitted). Thus, "to the extent that [an arrest warrant] is 

invoked as authority to enter the homes of third parties," that 

entry is violative of the Fourth Amendment rights of those third 

parties. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220. 

 At the en banc hearing, the Commonwealth abandoned that 

argument and contended that Samuels' entry into the residence was 

justified because of "the potential for danger." No evidence 

supports that argument. In fact, the officers had no information 

that Washington's residence was Ford's home. When the officers 

went to Washington's residence, none of them knew whether Ford 

had originally been charged with a felony or a misdemeanor. They 

only knew that a capias had been issued for Ford's detention. 

Indeed, the trial judge found that "Officer Samuels did not know 

whether it was a felony warrant or not, and I know there was a 
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capias, but I don't know . . . what the capias was for, other 

than failure to appear." 

 Samuels justified his entry on the grounds that he "needed 

to know who [Washington] was" and that he considers "everybody to 

be dangerous." Thus, by Samuels' own testimony, his detention of 

Washington supplied the basis for concluding danger existed and 

the justification for the search of and entry into Washington's 

residence. Until today, that generalized, subjective judgment 

has never been sufficient to justify a warrantless search of or 

entry into a private residence. 

 In upholding the officer's warrantless entry into 

Washington's residence, the majority fails to recognize that even 

if Samuels had a legitimate need to verify Washington's assertion 

that he was not Ford, Samuels was not privileged to enter 

Washington's residence. Washington identified himself to 

Samuels. The bondsman, who could identify Ford, was on the 

scene. In view of these circumstances, the conclusion easily and 

necessarily follows that the officers unreasonably entered 

Washington's residence. "'Nothing is more clear than that the 

Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon 

the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions 

be termed "arrests" or "investigatory detentions."'" Dunaway v. 

New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1979) (citation omitted). "[T]he 

Fourth Amendment's command that searches be 'reasonable' requires 

that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our 
- 22 - 

society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a 

more substantial justification is required to make the search 

'reasonable.'" Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985). "At 

the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a 

[person] to retreat into his [or her] own home and there be free 

from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United 

States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). "It is axiomatic that the 

'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Welsh v. 

Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (citation omitted). Because 

of the sanctity of the home, "neither reasonable suspicion nor 

probable cause would suffice to permit the officers to make a 

warrantless entry into a person's house for the purpose of 

obtaining fingerprint identification." Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S 

811, 817 (1985). That the identification the officers sought was 

of another form does nothing to legitimize their entry. 

 The other basis that the majority relies upon to justify the 

entry, the officer's safety, is also unconvincing. Samuels 

lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that Washington was 

dangerous. Nothing about Washington or his conduct indicated 

that he posed a danger to the officers. Samuels' generalized 

belief that everyone is dangerous did not allow him to enter 

Washington's residence at his whim. "[A]n officer may not 

justify a protective search by using legitimate safety concerns 

to bootstrap his or her lack of sufficient suspicion of criminal 
- 23 - 

activity." Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 80, 92, 502 

S.E.2d 151, 157 (1998). Furthermore, it is clear that "any 

exigency arising from [Washington's] retreat was created solely 

by the police action in knocking on [Washington's] door." State 

v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1984). "Where agents create 

the exigency themselves, warrantless activity is per se 

unreasonable and we require suppression of any evidence obtained 

thereby." United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 328 (5th Cir. 

1984). See also United States v. Roselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 

1974) (agents knocking at apartment door and identifying 

themselves as police officers unnecessarily created emergency 

situation). 

 Because Samuels was not justified in stopping Washington in 

the first instance, his entry into Washington's house and search 

of the kitchen cannot be justified by fear that arose during the 

stop. Although this Court ruled in Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. 

App. 507, 519, 371 S.E.2d 156, 162 (1988), that "[o]nce an 

officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, he is 'authorized to take 

such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect [his and 

others'] personal safety," that rule cannot be used to justify 

the officer's entry into the residence of a person who is not 

wanted for a criminal offense solely because a police officer 

suspects that the person may be someone else. 

 The state attempts to bootstrap the police 

officers' entry into Defendant's [home] by 

merging two independent doctrines i.e., the 

stop and frisk doctrine with the emergency 

doctrine, in order to fill the gaps of one 
- 24 - 

doctrine with the arguably permissible scope 

of another. Thus, their "emergency" or 

exigent circumstance, is, in their words, the 

need to "neutralize" the area for their own 

protection while carrying on the questioning. 

 We decline the invitation to stretch either 

of these doctrines in order to justify the 

police officers' actions based on the facts 

presented here. Such a modification or 

blending of the two doctrines would create an 

exception to the warrant requirement which 

would effectively swallow the rule. 

 The very purpose of our constitutional 

provision was to protect a person's home from 

governmental intrusions. This right against 

intrusion should be stringently protected by 

the courts. As such, any exceptions to the 

warrant requirement should be narrowly and 

carefully drawn. The state's proposed rule 

that police officers, having authority to 

encounter a defendant and make reasonable 

inquiry, are thereby entitled to enter a 

defendant's premises in order to serve the 

needs of their safety, would be contrary to 

this principle of carefully drawn exceptions. 

 We are mindful of the dangers inherent in the 

work of police officers. The potential for 

violence exists in all confrontations between 

police and private citizens. But a remote 

possibility of harm to the police officers 

cannot justify a warrantless entry into the 

private recesses of one's house. 

State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (citations omitted). 

 For these reasons, I would reverse the trial judge's refusal 

to suppress the evidence. The illegal entry and search of 

Washington's house was a product of the illegal detention and 

resulted in the unlawful acquisition of evidence. That evidence 

should have been suppressed. See Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 

App. 639, 651, 347 S.E.2d 175, 182 (1986).