UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ THE ESTATE OF JAMES ROEMER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. DAVID JOHNSON, in his individual capacity; NATHAN ALGIEN, in his individual capacity ; THOMAS BOYER, in his individual capacity; CHASE FELZEIN, in his individual cap acity; ALI SHOAGA, in his individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-1418 (D.C. No. 1:14-CV -01655-PAB-NYM) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , McKAY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal arises from the June 13, 2012 murderof James Roem er at the hands of his cellmate, Paul Farley. Just shy of the two-year annivers ary of Roemer’s death, his est ate (the Estate) brought suit against several pris on officials (the defendants) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated Roe mer’s Eighth Amendment rights by displaying

* This order and judgment isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata , and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 7, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 deliberate indifference to the s ubstantial risk of serious harm that Farley posed to Roemer’s safety. The defendants then moved for summary judgment , arguing that the Estate’s claims against them wer e time-barred under the applica ble two-year statute of limitations. Specifically, th e defendants asserted that the Estate’s claims accrued approximately ten days before Roe mer’s death—i.e., on or about June 3, 2012—and that the statute of limitations therefore expire d approximately nine days before the Estate filed its June 12, 2014 complaint. The district court agreed and gran ted summary judgment to the d efendants. But in doing so, the district c ourt erred: in de termining when the Estate’s claims against the defendants accrued, it evaluated those claims colle ctively, rather than individually. Instead, the distric t court should have separatel y analyzed when the Estate’s claim against each individual defendant accrued. See Vasquez v. Davis , 882 F.3d 1270, 1276 ( 10th Cir. 2018). In light of this error, the only remaining question before us i s whether the defendants have shown that under the individualized approach ou r cases demand, the Estate’s claims agai nst each of the defendants accrued more tha n two years before the Estate brought its claims. Wit h one exception, we hold that the defendants fail to make this showing. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 1

1 In doing so, we need not and do not decide when the Estate’s c laims accrued. We hold only that, with one excep tion, the defendants fail to d emonstrate those claims accrued more th an two years before t he Estate filed suitagainst them. See Robert L. Kroenlein Tr. ex rel. Alden v. Kirchhefer , 764 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir.3 Background Farley murdered Roemer while the two men were incarcerated tog ether at the Sterling Correctional Facility (SCF) in Sterling, Colorado. 2 Farley came to SCF by way of Arizona, where he spent se veral years in t he custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC). In advance of Farley’s transfer , ADOC Case Manager Herb Haley s ent a letter to the Colorado Department of Co rrections (CDOC) detailing Farl ey’s “extensive disciplinary history.” App. vol . 5, 1316. Thus, CDOC was aware of that history when Farley came into its custody in July 2011. In particular, Haley ’s letter relayed that Farley (1) sexually assaulted a pr evious cellmate with a lethal weapon; (2) helped an inmate in another cell commit sui cide by strangling that inmate “with a braided [bedsheet] that was p assed through the cell vents”; (3) admitte d to attempting to secure placement in protective se gregation so he could kill ano ther inmate housed there; (4) used force to escap e custody during transport; and ( 5) made statements such as, “I just want to do some body,” and “I want to put steel in someone.” App. vol. 2, 467.

2014) (“The statute of limitati ons is an affirmative defense, s o the defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of demonstrating that there is n o material fact in dispute on the issue of whether t he statute of limitations bars the claim.” (citations omitted)). 2 We take the bulk of these histo rical facts from the district c ourt’s orders granting summary judgment. We vi ew those facts in the light mos t favorable to the Estate as the nonmoving party. See Knopf v. Williams , 884 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2018). We also resolve all factua l disputes and draw all reason able inferences in its favor. See id.4 Notably, Haley’s letter acknowle dged the possibility that Farle y made these last statements in an effort“to ensure a single cell.” Id. But given Farley’s violent history, Haley concluded that F arley “clearly [constituted] a t hreat to[] other inmates”—a conclusion that found additional support in other do cuments that ADOC submitted to CDOC in anticipa tion of Farley’s transfer. Id. For instance, ADOC provided CDOC with a disciplinar y report describing an incidentin which Farley sliced a cellmate’s back open wi th “what appeared to be a razorblade.” App. vol. 3,
647. After receiving this informati on, CDOC scheduled a hearing to d etermine whether it should house Farley i n administrative segregation orinstead place him with the general prison populati on. The notice for that placeme nt hearing expressly acknowledged both Farley’s “extens ive” history of violent behav ior and the “threat” that Farley “pose[d] . . . to the safety and security of . . . other offenders.” App. vol. 2, 477. Case Manager Ali Shoaga chaired the three-person committee thatconducted the placement hearing. Prior to the hearing, Shoaga reviewed th e materials provided by ADOC, including Haley’s letter . And Shoaga later admitted th at he “was aware” at the time of the hearing that F arley “posed more than a low r isk.” App. vol. 5, 1318. Nevertheless, on September 1, 2011, Shoaga recommended placing Farley with the general prison populati on rather than in adm inistrative segrega tion. David Johnson, an associate warden with the De nver Reception and Diagnostic Ce nter, approved5 Shoaga’s recommendation the nextday. And Offender Services Cla ssification Officer Nathan Algien then reviewed th e ADOC materials and assigned Far ley to SCF. On September 22, 2011, CDOC tran sferred Farley to SCF and place d him in general population, where he “was required to have a cellmate.” Id. at 1319. Approximately nine months later , Corrections Officer Thomas Boy er and Housing Lieutenant Chase Felzein approve d a request from Farley and Roe mer in which the two men asked to share a cell. A t that point, the Estate allege s, Roemer was “serving a two-year sentence for trespass ing and was due to be released within months.” Aplt.
Br. 2. As the Estate would later disc over, CDOC had in place a policy that governed requests for such “convenience m oves.” App. vol. 2, 336. Genera lly speaking, that policy warned against housing “a ggressive” offenders with “at r isk” offenders. Id. For instance, the policy stated that prison offi cials should no t “allow an inmate doing a short sentence [to] live with an inmate doing a long sentence .” Id. Similarly, it warned against housing “[o]ffe nders [who] exhibit Sexual Aggres sive Behaviors (SAB)” with “offenders identifie d as Sexual Vulnerability at Ri sk (SVR).” Id. Despite these warnings, and despite the fact that both Boyer an d Felzein were allegedly aware of Farley’s hist ory, Boyer and Felzein assigned Roemer and Farley to share a cell. Shortly thereaf ter, Roemer began to fear that Farley posed a threat to his safety. In particular, the di strict court found that “[b]y March 25, 2012, [Roemer] believed that [Farley] was a murd erer and [had] expressed conce rns about his safety” to his mental-health provider . App. vol. 5, 1328. The district court also found that,6 “[s]hortly thereafter, [Farley] ag gressively pinned [Roemer] ag ainst the wall of his cell and asked, ‘Don’t you know what I could do to you?’” Id. at 1328–29 (quoting App. vol. 3, 771). Subsequently, on or about June 3, 2012, Roem er informed Boyer of his safety concerns and reque sted a cell reassignment. Boyerimmediately denied Roemer’s request. Approximately t en days later, on June 13, 201 2, Farley strangled Roemer to death in the cell that the two men shared. Almost two years after Roemer’s murder, the Estate filed its i nitial complaint naming 17 defendants , including Felzein , Boyer, and Shoaga. 3 It did not name Johnson or Algien. In relevant par t, the Estate’s June 12, 2014 complaint alleged that Felzein, Boyer, and Shoaga viola ted the Eighth Amendment by dis playing deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious h arm that Farle y posed to Roemer’s safety.Felzein, Boyer, and Shoaga moved to dismiss, arguing that the c omplaint failed to state a claim and th at they were entitled to qualifie d immunity. The district court denied the motion as to S hoaga. But it granted the motion to dismiss as to Felzein and Boyer. Notably, in doi ng so, the district court exp lained that to adequately plead its Eighth Ame ndment claims, the Estate was “r equired to allege that each defendant personally participa ted in the alleged constitutiona l violation and that each defendant acted or failed to act in spite of subjective awaren ess of a substantial risk of serious har m.” App. vol. 1, 141 (emphases a dded). And the court

3 Of the claims the Est ate identified in its initial complaint, only the claims against Felzein, Boyer, and Shoaga are at issue in this appeal.7 then chastised the Estate for fa iling to “identif y[] specific a llegations supporting [the Estate’s] claim against each individual defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). After the district court dismi ssed the claims against Felzein and Boyer, the Estate proceeded to conduct disc overy regarding its remaining c laim against Shoaga. Based on the information it obtai ned during the course of that discovery, the Estate then moved to file an amended co mplaint that (1) asserted new E ighth Amendment claims against Johnson and Algien and (2) repleaded the Estate’ s Eighth Amendment claims against Felzein and Boyer . The district court granted th e Estate’s motion for leave to amend, and the Estate f iled its amended complaint on A pril 7, 2017. In the meantime, Shoaga moved fo r summary judgment. As relevanthere, he argued that the Estate’s claim ag ainst him was barred by the ap plicable two-year statute of limitations. Specifi cally, Shoaga asserted that the Estate’s claim accrued as soon as Roemer knew orshould have known tha t his Eighth Amendm ent rights were violated. And Shoaga further alle ged that Roemer had this infor mation on or about June 3, 2012—the date upon which (1) Roemer informed Boyer of h is safety concerns and requested a cell re assignment and (2) Boyer denied that request. Thus, Shoaga maintained, the Estate’s June 12, 2014 complaint came ni ne days too late. The district court agreed and gran ted summary judgment to Shoag a. Johnson, Algien, Felzein, and Boyer then m oved for summary judgment, inc orporating by reference Shoaga’s sta tute-of-limitations a rgument. The Estate opposed their motion for summary judgment and also ask ed the district court to recon sider its earlier order granting summary judgment to Shoaga.8 The district court denied the E state’s motion to reconsider. An d it determined—after applying the sa me analysis it applied to the E state’s claim against Shoaga—that the Estate’s claims against the remaining defendant s were likewise time-barred. Thus, the district c ourt granted the remaining def endants’ motion for summary judgment and entered judgm ent in favor of all five defe ndants. The Estate appeals. Analysis The Estate argues that the distr ict court erred in treating its claims as timebarred and in granting summary judgment to the defendants on th at basis. In support, the Estate advances three argumen ts. First, it asserts that the district court erred in failing to separately analyze wh en the Estate’s claims against each individual defendant accrued. Second, the Est ate argues that under such an individualized approach, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the Estate’ s claims against each of the individual defendants accru ed more than two years before the Estate filed suit against them. Third, the Estate argues that even assuming it fi led suit more than two years after its claims accrued, it is nevertheles s entitled to equitable tolling. We review the Estate’s firs t two arguments de novo. See Nelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. , 419 F.3d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005); McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 ( 10th Cir. 1998). To th e extent we reach th e Estate’s third argument, we review only fo r abuse of discretion. See Chance v. Zinke , 898 F.3d 1025, 1034 (10th Cir. 2018).9 I. The Test for Accrual In granting the defendants’ mot ions for summary judgment, the d istrict court first determined that the Estate ’s Eighth Amendment claim again st one of the defendants accrued more than two years before the Estate filed suit. And it then reasoned that the Estate’s Eight h Amendment claims against allof the defendants therefore did so as well. But according to the Estate, our rece nt decision in Vasquez
v. Davis , 882 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2018), e xpressly forecloses such a c ollective approach to the accrual analysis. Instead, the Est ate asserts, Vasquez requires an individualized assessmen t of each of the Estate’s claims agains t each of the separate defendants. See 882 F.3d at 1276 (holding that plain tiff’s Eighth Amendment cla ims “accrued . . . separately for each of the[] [d]efendants”). Forthe reasons discussed below, we agree with the Estate.
In Vasquez —which we decided after the dist rict court entered judgment in this case but before the parties file d their opening briefs—the plai ntiff alleged that five CDOC medical providers (Jeanne D avis, Brian Webster, Kathleen M elloh, Gatbel Chamjock, and Maurice Fauvel) vio lated his Eighth Amendment rig hts by displaying deliberate indifference to h is serious medical needs. See 882 F.3d at 1272–74. The district court granted summary ju dgment to Davis, Webster, Mell oh, and Chamjock, concluding that because the pla intiff brought suit more than tw o years after his claims against them accrued, t hose claims were untimely under t he applicable twoyear statute of limitations. And the district court granted sum mary judgment to Fauvel as well, ruling that the plaintiff failed to show Fauvel acted with d eliberate10 indifference. We affirmed in both respects. Id. at 1272. Critically, in affirming the district court’s statute-of-lim itations ruling, we mapped out t he analytical path a court must follow in determining when c laims like the ones at issue h ere accrue. See id. at 1275–76. We began by citing the general pr inciple that a plaintiff’s cla ims accrue once he or she can “file[] su it and obtain[] relief.” Id. at 1276; see also Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (explai ning that plain tiff’s claim acc rues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and pr esent cause of action’” (quotin g Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. , 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997))). 4 Notably, a plaintiff doesn’t hav e a complete cause of action un less and until he or she “knows or has reason to know of t he injury” that forms the basi s of that action. Baker v. Bd. of Regents , 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10t h Cir. 1993). And as Vasquezrecognizes, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, the r elevant “injury” is the allege d constitutional violation. Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n , 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Vasquez , 882 F.3d at 1276. Thus, a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitution al rights have been violated.” Smith , 149 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Lawshe v. Simpson , 16 F.3d 1475, 1478

4 At oral argument, the defenda nts asserted—without support—thatthe date upon which a § 1983 claim accrues is different from the date up on which a plaintiff can adequately plead that claim. We disagree. Although it may “ theoretically [be] possible for a statute to creat e a cause of action that accrues at one time for the purpose of calculating when the s tatute of limitations begins t o run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing s uit, we will not infer such a n odd result in the absence of any such indica tion in the statute.” Bay Area Laundry , 522 U.S. at 201 (quoting Reiter v. Cooper , 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993)).11 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also id. (explaining that to dete rmine when § 1983 claim accrues, court must first “identi fy the constitutional violatio n and locate it in time” (quoting Lawshe , 16 F.3d at 1478)). We next explained in Vasquezthat a plaintiff who bri ngs a constitutional claim under § 1983 can’t obtain relief without first satisfying the p ersonal-participation requirement. That is, the plain tiff must demonstrate the defend ant “personally participated in the alleged c onstitutional violation” at issue. 5 882 F.3d at 1275. Indeed, because § 1983 is a “vehi cle[] for imposing personal li ability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to p articulars, especially in

5 A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this requirement will triggerswift and certain dismissal. See, e.g. , Welch v. Saunders , 720 F. App’x 476, 479 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (citing personal-pa rticipation requirement and af firming order dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1983 cl aims because their complaint fa iled to include sufficient “particulars”); Lewis v. Clark , 663 F. App’x 697, 703 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“The district cour t ruled that [plaintiff’s] complaint fails to state any individual-capacity claim again st [defendant] . . . because [pl aintiff] didn’t allege any personal participation by [defe ndant] in any of the alleged con stitutional violations . . . . We discern no error in the district court’s analysis . . . .”); Sherman v. Klenke , 653 F. App’x 580, 590–91 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“The d istrict court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] E ighth Amendment claim against[defendant] because the complaint fails t o sufficiently allege [defendant’s] person al participation in the alleged constitutional violation. ”). In fact, we have gone so f ar as to suggest that failure to satisfy the personal- participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff’s cl aim frivolous. See, e.g. , Esnault v. Suthers , 24 F. App’x 854, 855–56 (10t h Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s orde r dismissing complaint as frivo lous where “complaint fail[ed] to demonstrate suffic ient facts showing how each indiv idual defendant participated in the alleged viol ation of [plaintiff’s] constitu tional rights”; noting that personal-participati on showing “is essent ial to a § 1983 action ”). That is, we have indicated that such allegations d on’t even give rise to an “arg uable,” albeit ultimately “unsuccessful,” claim; instead, su ch a claim is “s o defective t hat [it] should never have been brought at the outset.” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 328–29 (1989).12 lawsuits involving multiple defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas , 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that when plaintiff br ings § 1983 claims against mu ltiple defendants, “it is particularly impor tant . . . that the complaint make clear e xactly who is alleged to have done what to whom ”); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 532–33 (10th Cir. 1998)) (holding that d istrict court’s analysis of pl aintiff’s § 1983 claims was “infirm” where district cour t “lump[ed]” together plaintiff’s claims against multiple defendants—“despite the f act that each of the defendan ts had different powers and duties and took differ ent actions with respect to [p laintiff]”—and “wholly failed to identify spec ific actions taken by particular defenda nts that could form the basis of [a constitu tional] claim”). We then pointed out in Vasquez that an Eighth Amendment deliberateindifference claim has both an o bjective and a subjective compo nent. 882 F.3d at 1275; see also Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833–34, 837 (1994) (explaining that prison officials violate pr isoner’s Eighth Amendment rightto be free “from violence at the hands of other pr isoners” when (1) inmate is “i ncarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” from anot her inmate or inmates and (2) those prison officials are deliberately indifferent to relevant risk—that is, they “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate hea lth or safety”). Next, we combined the personal-pa rticipation requirement with t he deliberateindifference test and concluded that, in order “[t]o recover as to a particular [d]efendant,” the plaintiff in Vasquez would ultimately be r equired “to prove as to13 that [ d ] efendant both an objective and a subjectiv e element of his claim.” 882 F.3d at 1275 (emphases added). And we rea soned that “[t]o prove the sub jective element of his claim,” the plaintiff th erefore “had to show for each . . . [ d ] efendant that such [ d ] efendant ” was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious ha rm. Id. (emphases added). Finally, we combined (1) the gener al test for accrual, (2) the personalparticipation requirement, and (3 ) the elements of a deliberate -indifference claim to formulate the applicable framewo rk for determining when the pla intiff’s claims in Vasquez accrued. Specifi cally, we said: In light of the objective and su bjective elements of [the plain tiff’s] Eighth Amendment claims, those cl aims accrued when he “knew or had reason to know[,]” separately for each of these [ d ] efendants —Davis, Webster, Chamjock[,] and Melloh— to be liable, that they had act ed with deliberate indifference to aknown risk to [the plaintiff’ s] medical needs . . . .
Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omit ted) (quoting Mata v. Anderson , 635 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2011)). Perhaps even more important than what we said in Vasquez , though, is what

we didn’t say—or rather, what we didn’t do . We did not (as the district c ourt did here) simply determine the earli est date upon which the plainti ff could have brought his Eighth Amendment claim against any defendant and then conclude that the plaintiff’s Eighth Ame ndment claims against all of the defendants necessarily accrued on that same date. This mu ch is clear from our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim against Fauvel, the fifth and final medical provider at i ssue in Vasquez

.14 In Vasquez , the plaintiff brought suit agains t all five medical providers (including Fauvel) in May 2014. See 882 F.3d at 1275. We c oncluded that the plaintiff’s deliberate-indifferenc e claims against the other fo ur medical providers accrued no later than February 2012. Id. at 1276. Thus, if the date upon which a plaintiff’s deliberate-indiffe rence claim accrues against any one defendant is the date upon which that plaintiff’s delib erate-indifference claims accrue against all defendants (as the district cour t here suggested), then we woul d have concluded that the plaintiff’s claim against Fauvel was also time-barred. That is, we would have concluded that the claim against Fauvel likewise accrued no lat er than February 2012, thus rendering the plain tiff’s May 2014 complaint untimel y as to Fauvel. But we didn’t take this approach . On the contrary, we explained that the plaintiff’s claim against Fauvel was “different.” Id. at 1277. In particular, we pointed out that “almost all of Fauvel’s interactions with [the plainti ff] occurred within the two-year period immediately pr eceding his filing this suit.” Id. Thus, we concluded, “Fauvel’s deliberate indifferenc e as part of these interactions would support a timely claim against him .” Id. (emphasis added). And in doing so, we necessarily recognized that when a plaintiff brings § 1 983 claims against multiple def endants, the analysis for determining when the plain tiff’s claims accrued as to each of those defendants is an individualized one. Thus, the E state alleges, the district c ourt erred in failing to perform that individualiz ed assessment here. The defendants lodge two objecti ons to the Estate’s reading of Vasquez . First, they assert that to the extent w e “made reference to determinin g a date of accrual15 ‘separately’” for each defendant in Vasquez , we did so only because Davis, Webster, Melloh, and Fauvel “were represen ted by [one] attorney,” while Chamjock “was represented by” another . Aplee. Br. 35 (quoting Vasquez , 882 F.3d at 1276). According to the defendants, the se two different attorneys “ass erted different dates of accrual” in their briefing below , thus explaining why we didn’t apply a single accrual analysis to all of the plaintiff’s claims in Vasquez

. Id. But the defendants fail to identi fy any textual support for thi s novel interpretation of Vasquez , and we see none. In partic ular, our analysis in Vasquez makes no mention of the defendant s’ different attorneys. Nor do es it reference their allegedly disparate theories reg arding when the claims against their respective clients accrued. What’s more, we generall y discussed Davis, Webster, Me lloh, and Chamjock together and then separat ely addressed Fa uvel—despite the fact that it was Chamjock, rather than Fauvel, w ho was represented by a differen t attorney. See Vasquez , 882 F.3d at 1272, 1275–79. We th erefore reject the defendants ’ argument that this procedural irregul arity drove the result in Vasquez

. Alternatively, the defendant s assert that even assuming Vasquez supports the Estate’s position, our decision in Vasquez could not and did not “ overturn” our earlier decisions in Alexander v. Oklahoma , 382 F.3d 1206 (10t h Cir. 2004), and Baker , 991 F.2d 628. Aplee. Br. 34; see also United States v. Burns , 800 F.3d 1258, 1261 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[A] panel o f this court cannot overrule a pr ior panel’s decision . . . .”). But neither Alexander nor Baker addresses (1) the personalparticipation requirement or (2 ) the subjective component of an individual-liability16 deliberate-indifference claim, l et alone explains how these con siderations impact the accrual analysis when a plaintif f asserts that multiple defenda nts were deliberately indifferent in different ways a nd on different dates. Our decis ion in Vasquez , on the other hand, does. Thus, Vasquezcontrols our analysis. See Webster v. Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions [that ] merely lurk in the record, n either brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.”); Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 654 F.3d 1073, 1084 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is elementary that an opinion is not binding precedent on an issue it did not address.”). In short, Vasquez unequivocally and expressly hol ds that when a plaintiff brings deliberate-indifference cl aims against multiple defendan ts in a § 1983 action, those claims may accrue “separat ely for each of th[o]se [d]efen dants,” depending on when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that each of thos e defendants acted with deliberate indifference, i .e., that each of those defendan ts knew of and disregarded a substantia l risk of serious harm. Id. This holding is entirely consis tent with the earlier binding au thority we cite above. See Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388; Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Pahls , 718 F.3d at 1225; Robbins , 519 F.3d at 1250; Tonkovich , 159 F.3d at 532–33; Smith , 149 F.3d at 1154. What’s more, it’s consis tent with the Third Circuit’s recent decision Mullin
v. Balicki , 875 F.3d 140 (3d Cir . 2017)—a case with f acts that are remark ably similar to those before us here.17 In Mullin , the Third Circuit indicated tha t when a plaintif f alleges mul tiple defendants violated the plainti ff’s Eighth Amendm ent rights by acting with deliberate indifference on different dates a nd in different ways, the plai ntiff’s claims against each of those various defendants may well accrue on different d ates, depending on when the plaintiff knew or should have known “of the elements c omprising [each] separate injury.” 875 F.3d at 158 –60. More specifically, the Th ird Circuit noted that the plaintiff’s claims against th e defendants named in her init ial complaint “stemmed from a different [and earlier] as serted injury” than the plaint iff’s claim against a different defendant whom she named in her subsequent proposed a mended complaint. And because the plaintiff “could not have learned of the partic ular nature of this [later constitutional violation] —or who was at fault—until” les s than two years before she attempted to amend he r complaint, the Third Circuit held that her “attempt to amend therefore fell well wit hin the applicable two-year lim itations period.” Id. at 159. Notably, that is precisely the s cenario before us in this appea l. That is, the Estate doesn’t allege that all of the defendants were deliberat ely indifferent when, on the same date, they all participated in the decision to h ouse Farley with the general prison population, rather than i n administrative segregation. N or does the Estate allege that all of the defendant s were deliberately indifferentwhen, on the same date, they all participated in assigning Roemerand Farley to the same cell. Instead, the Estate alleges that (1) Shoaga w as deliberately indifferent whe n, on September 1, 2011, he recommended housing Farl ey with the general prison pop ulation;18 (2) Johnson was deliberately indi fferent when, on September 2, 2011, he ratified Shoaga’s placement recommendation; (3) Algien was subsequently deliberately indifferent in assigning Farley t o SCF; (4) Felzein was deliber ately indifferent when, approximately nine months after F arley arrived at SCF, Felzein agreed to allow Farley and Roemer to share a cel l; and (5) Boyer was deliberate ly indifferent in both agreeing to allow Farley and Roem er to share a cell and in subs equently denying Roemer’s request for a cell re assignment on or about June 3, 20 12. Under these circumstances, the district court was required to s eparately analyze when the Estate’s claims against each of these defendan ts accrued. See Vasquez , 882 F.3d at 1276 (holding that, “[i]n light of the objective and subjective elements of [plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment claims , those claims accrued when he ‘knew or had reason to know[,]’ separately for each of the[] [d ]efendants . . . , that they had acted with d eliberate indifference to a known risk to [plaintiff’s] medical needs” (third alteration in o riginal) (citation omitted)); Mullin , 875 F.3d at 158–60; cf. Tonkovich , 159 F.3d at 532 (holding that dis trict court’s analysis of pl aintiff’s constitutional claims was “infirm because it lump[ed] all of [t he defendants] together despite the fact that each of th e defendants had different powe rs and duties and took different actions with res pect to [plaintiff]”). But the district court failed t o do so. Instead, it reasoned th at the Estate’s claims all accrued on or about J une 3, 2012—i.e., the date upon which (1) Roemer informed Boyer of his safety c oncerns and requested a cell reas signment and (2) Boyer denied that request. By then, the district court dedu ced, Roemer “knew that19 [Farley] posed an objectively se rious risk to [Roemer’s] safety .” App. vol. 5, 1329. And “Roemer also knew or had reason to know that prison officials disregarded the risk to his safety because [Boye r] immediately denied [Roemer’s ] request to be moved out of the cell.” Id. (emphasis added). In applying this collective appr oach to the accrual analysis, r ather than the individualized assessment our cas es require, the district courterred. Thus, we must next determine whether, under th e appropriately individualized inquiry set forth above, the defendants have demons trated that the Estate’s claim s against them accrued more than two years before the Estate filed those claim s. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (setting forth appli cable statute of limitations); Robert L. Kroenlein Tr. , 764 F.3d at 1274 (explaining thatdefendant bears burden of dem onstrating that statute of limitations b ars plaintiff’s claims). II. Applying Vasquez ’s Individualized Approach Notably, the defendants make no effort to establish that, unde r the individualized approach we outli ne above, the Estate’s claims a gainst Shoaga, Johnson, Algien, or Felzein accrue d more than two years before the Estate brought suit against them. In stead, the defendants merely double down o n their initial assertion that the Estate’s clai ms against these four defendant s accrued when Roemer knew or should have known that Boyer knew of and disregarded the substantial risk of harm that Farley posed. For t he reasons discussed above, we reject this argument. And because we see no indication that Shoaga, Johnson, Algien, or Felzein are entitled to summary judgment unde r the individualized accrual a nalysis our caselaw20 requires, we reverse the district court’s orders granting summa ry judgment to Shoaga, Johnson, Algien, and Felzein. That leaves only the district c ourt’s order granting summary j udgment to Boyer. In asking us to reverse th at order as well, the Estate c ites CDOC’s policy governing convenience moves, ar gues that Boyer violated this po licy by allowing Roemer and Farley to live toge ther, and notes that this policy only surfaced “[d]uring the course of discovery conducte d in this matter.” Aplt. Br. 6. Further, the Estate points out, the district court in itially dismissed its claim ag ainst Boyer for failure to state a claim. And according to t he Estate, it wasn’t until the Estate identified CDOC’s policy that the district court “permitted [its] claim ag ainst Boyer to proceed.” Id. at 26. Thus, the Estate maintain s, its claim against Boyer nec essarily didn’t accrue until the policy wa s or should have been discover ed. See Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388 (holding that claim a ccrues “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’”—i.e., “when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief’” (quoting Bay Area Laundry , 522 U.S. at 201)). But the Estate’s argument mischa racterizes the basis for the di strict court’s initial ruling dismissing the Esta te’s claim against Boyer. In dismissing that claim, the district court noted the Est ate failed to alle ge that when Roemer asked Boyer for a cell reassignment, Roemer “provi ded [Boyer] with a reason for h is request.” App. vol. 1, 132. Thus, the district cour t dismissed the Estate’s cl aim against Boyer not because the Estate failed to al lege facts showing that Boyer vi olated CDOC policy in allowing Roemer and Farley to sh are a cell, but because the Est ate failed to allege21 that Boyer was subjectively aware , when he later denied Roemer’ s reassignment request, that Farley posed a subs tantial risk of serious harm t o Roemer’s safety. See
Farmer , 511 U.S. at 829 (holding that p rison official cannot be delib erately indifferent to substantial riskof serious harm unless that “of ficial was subjectively aware of the risk”). Later, howev er, the Estate alleged that Ro emer informed Boyer “he could not live with [Farley] due to safety concerns .” App. vol. 3, 765 (emphasis added). And regardless of wheth er the district court relied on this new allegation in subsequently allowing the Estate to replead its claim against B oyer, this allegation is sufficient to establish that on or about June 3, 2012, Roemer k new or should have known that Boyer knew of and disr egarded the substantial risk o f serious harm that Farley posed to Roemer’s safety . Accordingly, Roemer’s claim ag ainst Boyer accrued on or about that date. Nevertheless, that doesn’t autom atically entitle Boyer to summa ry judgment on statute-of-limitations groun ds. Instead, according to the Es tate, the doctrine of equitable tolling operates to re nder timely its claim against B oyer. See Morrison v. Goff , 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004) (“Courts apply the doctrine o f equitable tolling to suspend a statute of l imitations period when ‘flexib ility is required to accomplish the goals of justice.’ For example, we have tolled t he statute of limitations when plaintiffs did not timely file their claims be cause of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ or because defenda nts’ wrongful conduct prevente d them from doing so.” (citation omitted) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman , 911 P.2d22 1094, 1096–97 (Colo. 1996))). We therefore turn next t o the Estate’s equitabletolling argument. III. Equitable Tolling In its third and final argument, t he Estate asserts that “[Roem er] and [the] Estate are entitled to tolling dur ing the period that would hav e been available to Roemer, had he not been murdered , to pursue his administrative remedies.” Aplt. Br. 28 (citing Roberts v. Barreras , 109 F. App’x 224, 226 (10t h Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“Every circuit to address the i ssue has held that the filing o f a mandatory administrative grievance tolls th e statute of limitations for § 1983 . . . claims.”)). But in advancing this argument, the Estate fails to “cite the precise reference[] in the record where the [argumen t] was raised and ruled on” bel ow. 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A). Further, the Estate fail s to make a plain-error argume nt. This presents a problem. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for pla in error and its application on appeal . . . marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”). But the bigger problem is that the Estate did raise this argument be low. Specifically, it raised its tolling argument for the first time in its motion to reconsider the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Shoaga. Thus, the di strict court treated the argument as waived and declined to consider it. See Servants of Paraclete v.
Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that motion to r econsider is “inappropriate vehicle[]” in whi ch to advance new arguments tha t litigant could have presented previously).23 Because the Estate fails to ac knowledge—let alone challenge—the district court’s waiver ruling, the Estat e necessarily fails to demonstr ate the district court abused its discretion in declin ing to equitably toll the statut e of limitations. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver , 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir . 2015) (noting that appellant cannot prevail on appeal “if the r easons that were given by the district court” for rejecting an argument “go unc hallenged”; instead, appellant mus t “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in r eaching its decision”). And because that means the dist rict court’s equitable-tolling ruling stands on appeal,
see id. at 1369, we conclude that the Es tate’s claim against Boyer is t ime-barred. We therefore affirm the district c ourt’s order granting summary ju dgment to Boyer.
Conclusion For the reasons discussed above , the district court erred in concluding that the Estate’s claims against all the defendants were time-barre d without first asking when the Estate’s claims against each defendant accrued. Further , with the exception of Boyer, the defendants fail to de monstrate that under such an in dividualized approach, the Estate’s claims accrued more than two years before it filed suit. Accordingly, although we affirm the district c ourt’s order granting summary judgment to Boyer, we reverse the district court’ s orders granting summary judgmen t to Shoaga, Johnson, Algien, and Felzein and remand to the district court f or further proceedings24 on the Estate’s cla ims against them.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge