## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Sm ith , 2013 IL App (2d) 121164

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGE SMI TH, De fenda nt-Appellee

.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-1164

Filed November 20, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) An indictment char gi n g defe ndant with a felony of driving while his license was suspended at a time when his license was revoke d or suspended was improperly modified to a misdemeanor based on the trial court’s acc eptanc e of defe ndant’s argu m en t that a statutory summary suspension had been enter ed when his license had alre ady been revoke d, there by rende ringthe suspension a nullity that require d the dismiss al of the felo n y ch arg e, since the revoc ation of a driver’ s license does not prec lude the future re vocation or suspension of the same license; there f o r e , d e f e n d ant’s conviction for a misdemeanor was reve rsed and the

cause was re manded f

or fur ther proc eeding s.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Kane County
, No. 12-CF- 169; the Hon. Timothy Q. Sheldon, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded.Counsel on

Appea l J oseph H. McMahon, State’s At t o rney , of St. Charles (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Sc o t t J acobson, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for the People.

Michae l J

. Pelletier, Thomas A. L ilien, and J amie L

. Montgome ry , all of State Appellate D efe nder’ s Offic e, of Elg in, for appe llee.

Panel J USTI CE BI RKETT deliver ed the judgment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices J org ensen a

nd Hudson conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endant, Geor g e Smit h, was charg ed by indictment with, inter alia
, driving while his license was suspended (DWL S) (625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2012)). That o ff en s e was charg ed as a Class 2 felony pursuant t o s ection 6-303(d- 5) of the I llinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-5) (West 2012)). The State appea ls from an order of the circ uit court of K ane County

modifying the indictment by reduc ing the charg e to a misdemea nor. We reve rse a

nd rema nd. ¶ 2 The indictment orig inally alleg ed that on or about J anuar y 25, 2012, “def

endant ope rate d

a motor vehicle upon a road in North Aurora
, I llinois at a time when the defe ndant’s driver’ s license was suspended or revoke d for a violation of I llinois Compil ed Statutes Chapter 625, Act 5, Section 11-501 a

nd afte r having fourteen or more prior

violations for the off

ense of driving while license was revoke d or suspended.” The State was later permitted to amend the indictment to alleg e that defe ndant was driving while a statutory summary suspension of his license (see 625 I L CS 5/11-501.1 (West 2012) ) was in e ffe ct. Def endant moved to dismiss the charg e. At the hearin g o n t h e motion, defe ndant submitt ed the abstrac t of his driving

re co rd t o show that the statutory summary suspension had been enter ed when his driver’ s license had alre ady been revoke d. Relying on People v. Heritsch
, 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, defe ndant argued that the statutory summary suspension was there fore a nullity

. Def endant further argued that his license had been revoke d for a rea son other than those enumer ated in section 6-303( d-5) a s prer equisites for enhanc ing the cha rg ed off ense to a felony . The trial
court agree d, but instead of dismiss ing the ch arg e, the trial court order ed the indictment amende d so as to reduc e the c harg ed off ense to a misdemeanor. ¶ 3 Section 6-303(a ) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/6-303(a) (West 2012)) provides, in pe rtinent part, that “any person who drives or is in actua l phy sical control of a motor vehic le on any highw ay of this State at a time when such person’ s driver’ s license, permit or privileg e to do

so or the privileg e to obtain a driver’ s license or permit is revoke d or suspended as provided by this Code or the law of another state, except as may be specific ally allowed by a judicial

-2-driving permit issued prior to J anuar y 1, 2009, monitoring device driving permit, family financ ial responsibility driving permit, probationar y license to drive, or a restric ted driving permit issu ed p u rs u an t to this Code or under the law of another state, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.” At the time of the alleg ed offe nse in this case , subsections (d-2)
, (d3), (d-4)
, and (d-5) provided for esca lating penalti es , b ased on the number of prior convictions, “if the revoc ation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code, or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or a simil ar provision of a local ordinanc e, or

a statutory s u m m ary suspension or revoc ation under Section 11-501.1 of this Code.” 625 I L CS 5/6-303(d-2)
, (d-3)
, (d-4)
, (d-5) (West 2012). Section 11-401 perta ins to the duties of 1

a motorist involved in an acc ident involving death or persona l injurie s, and section 11-501

cre ates the offe nse of driving under the influence of alcohol or drug s (DUI ). 625 I L CS 5/11- 401, 11-501 (West 2012). Under section 6-205(a ) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/6-205(a) (West 2012)), the Sec reta

ry of State (Sec reta

ry ) “sha ll imm ediately

revoke the license
, permit, or driving privil ege s o f any driver upon rec eiving a repor t of the driver’ s conviction” of a

v iolation of section 11-401 or 11-501. Section 11-501.1, the so-ca lled “implied conse nt la w , ” provides that a motorist operating a vehicle on a public highw ay in I llinois is deeme d to have
consente d that, if arr ested for DUI
, he or she will submit to chemica l testing to deter mine his

or her blood alcohol level. I f the motorist ref uses to underg o testing, or submits to testing that

reve als a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, his or her driving privileg es will be summarily suspended. Un d er s ec tion 6-303(d- 5), a driver whose license is revoke d for one of the specifie d rea sons is guilty of a Class 2 felony
, and is ineligible for probation or conditional discharg e, if he or she has 14 or more prior convictions of driving wit h a s u s p en ded or revoke d license. 625 IL CS 5/ 6-303(d- 5) (West 2012). ¶ 4 In re du ci n g t h e DW L S ch ar ge i n t h is case from a Class 2 felony to a Class A misdemeanor, t h e t ri al co urt relied on the decision of a divided panel of this court in Heritsch

. In Heritsch
, the defendant’s conviction of driving whil e h i s license was revok ed (DWL R) was enhanc ed to a Class 2 felony under section 6-303(d- 5). The offe nse occur red in 2008. The defe ndant’s license had been revoke d for the first time in 1991, but not for any of t he r ea s o n s t h at result i n an enhance d sentenc e under section 6-303(d-5). Rather, it had b ee n revoked beca

use the defe ndant had used a motor vehicle to commit a drug -re lated felony

. The defenda

nt did not obtain a new driver’s lice nse after the revoc ation. Howeve r, the abstrac t of the defe ndant’s dri v ing rec ord showed that, in 2001, the defe ndant had violated section 11-501 of the Code– i.e.
, he had committed the offe nse of DUI –and that the Secre tary had revoke d his license for that rea son. Be cause the 1991 revoc ation could not be the basis for an enhanc ed sentenc e under section 6-303(d- 5), the validity of the defe ndant’s felony conviction depende d on whether he was elig ible for an enhanc ed sentenc e on the basis that his license had been revoke d in 2001 for DUI

. The Heritsch majority conclude d that he
was not elig ible for enhance d sentenc ing on t h at b as i s. The majority rea soned, i n essenc e,

At pre sen t, eac h of the pri or con victi ons m ust al so h a ve occ urr ed whil e the def end ant ’s 1 li cen se was sus pen ded or re vok ed for one of the se re aso ns. See Pub. Act 98- 418, § 5 (e ff

. Aug. 16, 2013 ) (a m end ing 625 I LCS 5/6

- 303( d- 2), (d-3), (d-4), (d-5)); Pub. Act 98- 573, § 5 (e ff

. Aug. 27, 2013 ) ( amendin g 625 I LCS 5/ 6- 303( d- 2), (d

- 3), (d

- 4), (d

- 5))

.
-3-that, afte r the defe ndant’s license had been revoke d in 1991, there was no license that could

be revoke d when the defe ndant comm i t t ed DU I in 2001. There fore
, acc ording to the majority
, “the Secre tary ’s 2001 formal administrative sanction of revoc ation had no eff ect.” Heritsch
, 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, ¶ 9. The Heritsch majority ’s rea soning would apply with equal f orce to the statutory

summary suspension of a pr eviously revoke d driver’ s license. ¶ 5 He re , t h e State raises both proce dural and substantive challeng es to the trial co u rt ’s ruling

. Acc ording to the State, the ruling was proce durally infirm beca use the trial court: (1) had no authority to modify the charg e and (2) should have consid er ed o nly whether the indictment, on its fac e, proper ly charg ed a felony DWL S. With respe ct to the latter point, the State insists that the trial court err ed b y considering whether the abstrac t of defe ndant’s d riv in g rec ord ref

uted the alleg ations. Substantively
, the State arg ues that, even if d e f

e n d a nt’ s l i cense had been revoke d prior to the statutory summary suspension of the licen s e, t h e

revoc ation did not vitia t e the statutory summary suspension. In other words, the State cha l l en g es the proposition that a motorist’s driving privileg es, having once been revoke d,
cannot there afte r (unless restore d through the issuance of a permit or a new license, or in

some other manner) be suspended or “re -re voked.” The State rec og nizes that this argument is contra ry to Heritsch

. The State contends, howeve r, that Heritsch was decide d incorre ctly and should be a

brog ated. ¶ 6 As discussed below, we agree with the State’s substantive argument. In our view, whe n

a motorist’s driving privileg es are subject to statutory summary suspen s ion under the implied consent law , the suspension is valid notwithstanding any prior revoc ation or suspension of
t he motorist’s driving privileg es. Such a suspension may there fore be the basi s fo r an enhanc ed penalty for violating section 6-303(a ) while the suspension is in eff ect. Be fore we explain this conclusion, we note t hat a narr ower decision on proce dural grounds would be inappropriate under the circ umstances of this case

. Were we to reve rse the t ri al court’s decision solely on the basis that the indictment was valid on its fac e or that the trial court had

no power to modify the indictment, there would be a signific ant likelihood that the substantive issue would arise on rema nd. Thus, reg ardle ss of our views on th e p ro ce du ra l issue, it would be appropriate to consider the State’s substantive challeng e to the trial court’s ruling

. Moreove r, because w e agree with the S tate’s substantive challeng e, the proce dural issues are purely

aca demic, so we need not a ddress them. ¶ 7 We further note that, althoug h the trial court was require d to follow Heritsch (see State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. McFadde n , 2012 I L App (2d) 120272, ¶ 9), we are not bound to do so. Our supreme court ha s noted:
“ ‘ “[ S ] tare decisis require s courts to follow the decisions of highe r courts, but does not bind courts to follow decisions of equal or inferior courts.” ’ [C itation.] Thus, the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels. [C itation.] ” O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society ofIllinois
, 229 I ll. 2d 421, 440 (2008). Although w e ar e not obligated to follow Heritsch , it is “a dec ision from another panel of a

co u rt of equal stature” (

In re Marriage of Gutman
, 232 I ll. 2d 145, 150 (2008))
, an d we there fore lack the pow er to grant the State’ s reque st to abrog ate it ( id. ).

-4-¶ 8 The issue on appea l–whether
, for purposes of the DWL S law, dri v ing privileg es that have

been revoke d are subject to statutory summary suspension while the revoc ation rema ins in eff ect–is p rincipally one of statutory construction. Our supreme court has rec ently offe red the followingsummary

of the ba sic principles that guide our a naly sis:
“It is well settled that issues of statutory construction are questions of law subject to de novo revie w. [Ci tation.] When construing a statute, this c ourt’s primary objective is
to a scer tain and g ive eff

ect to the leg islature’s intent, ke eping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator

of t hat i ntent is the s tatutory languag e it self, given its plain and ordinary meaning

. [C itation.] In deter m ining the plain meaning of the statute, we

co nsider the subject the statute addre sses and the leg islative purpose in enact i n g i t

. [C itation.] This court h as repe atedly held that statutes should be rea d as a whole and construed so that no part is rende red meaning less or superf luous. [C itation.] In doing so,

we may consider the statute’s context, rea ding the provision at issue in light of the entire

s ection in which it appea rs, and the Act of which that section is a part. [C itation s

. ] ” People v . Lloyd , 2013 I L113510, ¶ 25. ¶ 9 When the languag e of a statute is clea r and unambiguous, courts may not depar t from the languag e by incorpora

ting exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that the Gene ral Assembly did not express. W

ilkins v. W

illiams
, 2013 I L 114310, ¶ 22. Howeve r, “the task of interp r e ti n g the languag e of a statute cannot alway s be reduc ed to ‘the mecha nical application of the dictionary definitions of the individual words and phrase s involved,’ ” so courts must take car e “not to r ead statutory languag e in an ove rly

literal manne r.” People v. W ood
, 379 I ll. App. 3d 705, 708-09 (2008) (quoting W helan v. County Office rs’ Electoral Board
, 256 I ll. App. 3 d 5 55, 558 (1994))

. To simil ar eff ect, our supreme court has observe d that “[a]
statute or ordinanc e must rec eive a sensible construction, even though such construction qualifies the universality of its languag e.” In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Liti gation
, 161 I ll. 2d 233, 246 (1994). For these rea sons, “[a] literal interpre tation is not controlling wher e the spirit a

nd intent of the Gene ral Assembly in e nacting a statute are clea rly expressed, its objects and purposes are clea rly set forth, and a literal interpre tation of a p ar ticular clause would defe at the obvious intent [citation] ; wher e literal enfor ceme nt of a statute will result in great injusti ce that was not contemplated by the Gene ral Assembly [citation] ; or wher e a literal interpre tation would lead to an absurd result [citation] .” Grev er v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 I ll. App. 3d 263, 266-67 (2004). ¶ 10 Pursuant t o section 1-176 of the Code, “re vocation” of a driver’ s license means “ [t ]he termination by formal action of the Secre tary of a person’ s license or privileg e to ope rate a motor vehicle on the public highw ay s, which termination shall not be subject to rene wal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be prese nted and acte d upon by the Secre tary afte r the expiration of at least one year afte r the date of revoc ation.” 625 I L CS 5/1-176 (West 2012). ¶ 11 I f the statutory definition of “re vocation”–the “ termination *** of a person’ s license or privileg e to operate a motor vehicle” (empha sis added) (625 I L CS 5/1-176 (West 2012))–is
g iven its most literal meaning
, the argument that revoc ation is a singula r occ urre nce might
appea r to be an ontologica l truism: afte r one’s license or privileg e to opera te a vehicl e is terminated, it no longe r exis ts and there fore cannot ag ain be terminated. By the same logic
,

-5-a revoke d license could not be suspended either. It is rea sonably clea r from examination of the Code as a whole, howeve r, that the Gene ral Assembl y d i d not intend for the term “re vocation” to be rea d so literally

. To the contra ry , “re vocation” appea

rs to be used, in part,

as a t erm of art that ref ers to a formal act of the Secre tary and its attendant l ega l
conseque nces. Thus, se ction 6-205(a ) pl ace s no express limit ation on the number of times the Secre tary may revoke a driver’ s license. Nor does section 6-205(a ) expressly limit

revoc ation to case s where no prior re vocation is in eff ect. ¶ 12 Other Code provisions support our conclusion that the r ev o ca t i o n of a driver’ s license does not p re cl u d e t h e future revoc ation or suspension of the same license. For instance, section 6-208(b) (1.5) of the Code formerly pro v i d ed
, “If the person is convicted of a violation of Section 6-303 of this Code committed while his or her driver’ s license, permit,

or privileg e was revoke d beca use of a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating to the offe nse of rec kless homicide, or a simil ar provision of a law of another state, the person may not make application for a license or permit u n t il the ex piration of 3 year s from the effective date of the most rece nt revoc ati on .” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/6- 208(b)( 1.5) (West 2008). The words “most rec ent” would have been sup erfluous if the

revoc ation of a driver’ s license wer e a singula r occur renc e. See Heritsch
, 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, ¶ 40 (B irkett, J
., dissenting)

. Section 6-205(c )(2) of the Code provides, “I f a person’ s license or permit is revoke d or suspended due to 2 or more convic tions of violating Section 11-501 of this Code or a similar pr ovision of a local or dinance or a similar out-of

state offe nse, or Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, wher e the use of alc ohol or other dr ug s is recited as an element of t he offense, or a similar out-of-state offe nse, *** that person, if issued a restricted driving permit, may not operate

a vehicle unless it has been equipped with an ignition interlock device as define d in Section 1-129.1.” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/6-205(c) (2) (West 2012). To hold that revoc ation is a singula

r occur renc e would make this provision meaning less. See Heritsch
, 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, ¶

40 (B irkett, J ., dissenting)

. ¶ 13 Not only is the literal interpre tation of “re vocation” in conflict with the usag e of that term in sections 6-205(c )(2) and 6-208(b) (1.5), the literal int erp re t ation leads to absurd results. The Fifth District rec og nized a s much in People v. Masten
, 219 I ll. App. 3d 172 (1991). In that case , the defendant’s I llinois driver’ s license wa s revoke d in 1976, and between 1976 and 1983 he wa s convicted on three occa sions of driving while his lice nse was revoke d. In May 1989, the Secre tary order ed the statutory summary suspension of the defe ndant’s still

revoke d driver’ s license for a six -month period. In J un e 1 9 8 9
, t he defe ndant obtained a Virg inia driver’ s licen s e. I n 1 9 90, the defendant was charg ed with DWL R. The trial court dismiss ed that charg e, evidently beca use the defe ndant held a Virg inia license at the time of the offe nse. Howeve r, Virg inia, like I ll i n ois, was a party to the Driver ’s L icense Compact (Compact) (see 625 I L CS 5/6-700 through 6-708 (West 2012)), which bars a party state from issuing a license to a

n individual while a license issued by another party state is suspe nded (625 I L CS 5/6-704 (West 2012)). In reve rsing the dismiss al of the charg e, the Masten court

rea soned as f

ollows: “The question befor e us is whether defe n d an t’s license should be considere d ‘suspende d’, thereby rende ring the issuance of the Virg i n ia license invalid under the

-6-Compact. We conclude that defe ndant’s license was in fac t ‘suspende d’ on June 9, 1989, that defe ndant’s Virg inia license was invalid under the Compact, and that the trial court improperly dismiss ed the drivin g while license revoke d charg e. Were we to hold otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that one whose license has been previously revoke d could avoid the eff ect of the summary suspension by obtaining a license in a fore ign State a s defe ndant did in this case.” Masten , 219 I ll. App. 3d at 174-75. ¶ 14 The Masten court “under stood what is obvious from t h e C o d e an d t h e case law. A revoke d driver can be suspended; a suspe nded drive r can be revoke d; a nd a revoke d driver

can be revoke d ag ain and ag ain, as defe ndant was in the instant case .” Heritsch
, 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, ¶ 50 (B irkett, J
., dissenting)

. That understanding is at least implicit in case s such as People v. Y

aworski
, 2011 I L App (2 d ) 090785, ¶ 8 (noting that the abstrac t of the defe ndant’s driving rec ord showed that his license was revoke d pursuant to section 6- 205(a) (2) o f the Code on August 6, 2005, and ag ain on August 12, 2005, and that “the

revoc at i o n s ” (empha sis added) wer e in eff ect when the defe ndant committed his seventh DUI
, there by enhanc ing that offe nse to a Class 2 felony under section 11-501(c -1)( 3) of the Code (625 I L CS 5/11-501(c- 1)(3) (West 2004)))
, and People v. Smith
, 162 I ll. App. 3d 739, 741 (1987) (“At trial, the State introduc ed as e vidence three separ ate orders of revoc ation,

cer tified by the Secre tary of State, all of which wer e for drivi ng under the influence of intox icatingliquor and all of whic h wer e in ef fec t on Febr

uary 3, 1986.”). ¶ 15 Her e, defe ndant would have us hold, contra ry to Masten
, that, beca

use of the revoc ation of his license, he had no license that could be subject to a statutory summary suspension. By dint of that rea soning, a

driver whose license is revoked and never reissued would have no incentive to comply with the implied consent law. Such a driver, if arr ested for DUI
, could, without conseque nce, ref use the chemica l testing provided for by the implied consent law and could theore tically apply for a new driver’ s license during the period when an otherwise simil arly situated licensed driver would be prohibited from driving

. It is inconce ivable that the Gene ral Assembly intended such an u t terly incongruous result. Moreove r, under the analy sis that defe ndant advocates, a DUI conviction i n such a c ase w ould not prec lude t he defe ndant from immediately applying for a new license. Such a result “make s a mocker y of the law.” Heritsch , 2012 I LApp (2d) 090719, ¶ 59 (B irkett, J ., dissenting)

. ¶ 16 Our conclusion also finds support in our decision in People v. Odumuyiwa
, 188 I ll. App. 3d 40 (1989). In that case , the def endant wa s convicted of

DWL S. The rec ord showed that the defendant’s license had been canc elled abou t two weeks befor e it was suspended. The defe ndant argued that, beca use the canc elled license was no longe r in forc e, the suspension of the license was a null act. We disagree d, seeing “no rea son why thes e t wo actions [t he

canc ellation and the suspension o f th e d ef endant’s license] by the Secre tary should be considere d mutually

exclusive or logic ally

inconsistent.” Id. at 45. ¶ 17 During the pendenc y of this appea l, our Gene ral Assembly amende d section 6-303. See Pub. Act 98-418, § 5 (ef

f. Aug

. 16, 2013); Pub. Act 98-573, § 5 (ef f. Aug

. 27, 2013). Among other thing s, the Gene ral Asse mbly added subse ction (a- 10), which pr ovides:
“A person’ s driver’ s license, permit, or privileg e to obt ai n a driver’ s license or permit
may be subject to multipl e revoc ations, multipl e suspensions, or any combination of both

-7-simult aneously

. No revoc at i o n o r suspension shall serve to neg ate, invalidate, canc el, postpone, or in a

ny way lessen the eff

ect of any other re vocation or suspe nsion entere d prior or subsequent to any other revoc ation or suspension.” Pub. Act 98-418, § 5 (ef f. Aug . 16, 2013); Pub. Act 98-573, § 5 (e ff. Aug . 27, 2013). Def endant arg

ues that the amendment is presumed to chang e the law as it previously exis ted and that the amendment repr esents the Gene ral Assembly ’s “tac it acc eptanc e of the [ Heritsch ] majority ’s interpre tation of the st atut e, insofar as the leg islature took eff orts to

corr ect what it perc eived to be a defe ct i n the s tatu t e. ” T o ac cept that rea soning, however
, would cre ate a catc h-22 for the Gene ral Assembly ; it is clea r that, had the Gene ral Assembly amende d section 6-303 without adding subsection (a- 10), or other languag e to that eff ect, defe ndant would have been able to argue that the failure to amend the statute repr esente d leg islative acquie scenc e in the Heritsch majority ’s interpre tation. See, e.g. , People v. Downs
, 371 I ll. App. 3d 1187, 1191 (2007) (“It is axiom atic that wher e a statute has been judicially construed a

nd the construction has not evoked a n amendment, it will be pre sumed that the leg islature has acquie sced in the court’s exposi tion of the leg islativ e inte nt.”). Thus, althoug h amendatory acts are ordinarily presumed to chang e the law, “that presumption is overc ome wher e the nature of [t he] amendment sug g ests that its draf ters intended to interpre t or clar ify the orig inal statute.” Friedman v. Krupp Corp.
, 282 I ll. App. 3d 436, 444 (1996). The nature of the amendment in this case sug g ests clar ification of the Gene ral Assembly ’s pree x isting intent and a r epudiation of the inter pretation adopted by

the Heritsch majority

. ¶ 18 We note that the Gene ral Assembly has had occa sion in the past to clar ify its intent with
reg ard to section 6-303’s senten ci n g s ch eme. Prior to August 10, 2001, section 6-303(d) provided, “Any person convicted of a second or subsequen t v iolation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony

if the original

revoc ation or suspension was f or a violation of Se ct i o n 1 1 -4 01 or 11-501 of this Code, or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or a simil ar provision of a l o ca l o rdinanc e, a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, relating to the of

fense of re ckless homicide, or a simil ar out-of-state offe nse, or a statutory summary suspens i o n under Section 11-501.1 of this Code.” (Emphase s added.) 625 I L CS 5/6-3 0 3 (d) (West 2000). The Gene ral Assembly deleted the emphasized words when it amende d the statute to add subsections (d- 1 ) th r o u gh ( d

- 3 ) ( which provided further esca lation of the penalties for re p ea t o ff en ders)

. See Pub. Act 92-340, § 5 (ef f. Aug

. 10, 2001). In People v. Bloomberg
, 378 I ll. App. 3d 686 (2008), the court relied on the deletion of the word “orig inal” to uphold a Class 4 felony conviction for a motorist whose first violation of section 6-30 3 d i d n o t occur while his license was suspended or revoke d for one of the specifie d rea sons. The Bloomberg court rejecte d t h e defe ndant’s argument that its rea ding led to an unjust and absurd result. Id. at 688-89. There afte r, howeve r, the Gene ral Assembly promptly restore d the word “orig inal” to section 6-303(d) (see Pub. Act 95-991, § 5 (ef f. J une 1, 20 0 9 ))
, rec og nizi ng that “whe n it omitted the word ‘orig inal’ from subsection (d), a defe ndant like Bloomber g with only one prior DWL S violation, no matter the rea son for the suspension, would b e s ubject to felony sentenc ing for only his second violation, an admittedly harsh result.” Heritsch , 2012 I L App (2d) 090719, ¶ 34 (B irkett, J
., dissenting)

. Section 6-303(d- 5), in contra st, has neve r expressly conditioned the penalty on the rea son for the “orig inal” revoc ation or suspension. This distinction betwe en section 6-303(d) and

-8-section 6-303(d- 5) makes it all t h e m ore clea r that: (1) in case s of multipl e revoc ations or suspensions, the latter provision was alway s meant to apply without reg ard to the rea son for the “orig inal” revoc ation or suspension and (2) the rec ent amendment of section 6-303(d- 5)

was a rea ction to Heritsch ’s er

roneous inter

pretation of that provision. ¶ 19 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit c ourt of Kane County is r ever sed and the c ause is re manded f or fur ther proc eeding s.

¶ 20 Reverse d and re manded.

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