IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
WILLIAM D. WAHL, an individual, Appellant,

v. MICHAEL L. AND HOROMI RITTER, Individually and on behalfofthe marital Community comprised thereof, Respondents. No. 70049-9- DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: May 12. 2014 ro

Spearman, C.J.

— This lawsuit concerns an easement dispute between the owners of two adjacent residential properties, WilliamWahl and Michael and Horomi Ritter. Wahl filed suit against the Ritters, seeking to quiet title and 

### asserting claims and damages fortrespass, timbertrespass/waste, and assault. After a bench trial, the trial court interpreted the easement agreement in favor of the Ritters, dismissed all ofWahl's claims, and awarded attorney fees and costs to the Ritters under the small claims settlement statute, RCW 4.84.250 et seq. We affirm the trial court's dismissal ofWahl's claims, with the sole exception of 

### his challenge to the numberofboats that may be permanently moored at his dock. And because the record shows that the Ritters had notice priorto trial that o i r-~

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Wahl was seeking more than $10,000 indamages, we reverse the attorney fee award. FACTS 

### In 1976, William and Patricia Wahl1 purchased a parcel of real property on Lake Washington in Bellevue. The Podls (predecessors in interestto the Ritters) owned the property directly upland from the Wahls. The Wahls' property was burdened by a 1955 recreational easementthat benefited the Podl property by providing access to the waterfront. In 1978, while the Wahls' home was under construction, the Podls filed a lawsuit against the Wahls regarding the easement. In October 1978, the Wahls and the Podls resolved the dispute by executing and recording a new easement agreementwhich replaced the 1955 easement. This easement agreement describes six easement areas (EA), including four "areas ofmutual concern" (EA I, EA II, EA III, and EA IV) and two additional "common interest areas" (EA V and EA VI). Three ofthese easement
areas are at issue inthis lawsuit. EA Iis located directly west ofthe Ritter 

### residence on a steep slope. EA II runs along the north boundary ofthe Wahl property, connecting EA Iwiththe waterfront. Its narrowest point is a 5-foot-wide 

### strip adjacentto Wahl's circular driveway. EAIII is a dock, which is accessed by
land via EA II. 

### In 1999, the Ritters purchased the Podl property. Shortly thereafter, the Ritters discovered a leaking underground storage tank (UST) on their property. In Patricia Wahl no longer lives at the residence, and is not a party in the lawsuit.

-2No. 70049-9-1/3 2000, contractorTerraSolve removed the UST and began a large scale soil and groundwater remediation project. This required removal and replacement of landscaping and other improvements on portions ofthe Wahl and Ritter 

### properties, including Wahl's driveway. In February 2004, the Washington State Department of Ecology refused to approve TerraSolve's remediation work. The Ritters' insurance company then retained a new contractor, Sound Environmental 

### Strategies (SES), to resume the remediation project. A few months later, the Ritters had the area surveyed. A dispute then arose between the parties 

### regarding the location ofWahl's driveway inrelation to EA II. InAugust 2008, when Wahl was on vacation, the Ritters hired a contractor to remove the northernmost strip ofWahl's driveway which encroached on EA II. Wahl asserted 

### thatthis action shortened the turning radius of his driveway and made itdifficult to enter and exit his garage. 

### InJuly 2009, SES commenced large-scale cleanup and removal ofthe remaining contaminated soil. In May2010, the permit forthe remediation work
was finalized. Contractors for the Ritters then installed sand, concrete pavers, 

### bushes and lights in EAII; a retaining walltopped with a concrete patio and planters which encroach onto EAI; and five-foot wide stairs in EAI. Wahl 

### objected to the location and configuration of many ofthese improvements. Wahl also revoked permission he had previously granted to the Ritters to attach a 

### hydraulic boat lift and two jet skilifts to the dock(EA III) and to run power and waterfrom their home across EA Iand II to operate the boat lifts.

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Wahl filed a complaint against the Ritters on March 23, 2011 to quiet title and asserting claims and damages for trespass, timbertrespass/waste, and assault. The Ritters denied these claims and also asked the court to quiet title. 

### Followingdiscovery, a bench trial commenced on September 12, 2012. On October 26, 2012, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying all of Wahl's claims and requests for damages. On February 21, 2013, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The trial court 

### subsequently granted the Ritters' requestfor a partial award ofattorney fees and costs underthe small claims statute, limited to the portion offees and costs 

### attributable to the damages claims. RCW 4.84.250 et seq. Wahl appeals. DISCUSSION 

### "The interpretation of an easement is a mixed question of law and fact." Sunnvside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). 

### "Whatthe originalparties intended is a question of fact and the legal 

### consequence of that intent is a question oflaw" (citing Veach v. Culp, 92 Wn.2d 570, 573, 599 P.2d 526 (1979)). Sunnvside Valley. 149 Wn.2d at 880. Findings offact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, defined as a 

### quantum of evidence sufficientto persuade a fair-minded person that the premise is true. Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan Cntv.. 141 Wn.2d 169, 176, 4 

### P.3d 123 (2000). Questions of law and conclusions of laware reviewed de novo. Sunnvside Valley. 149 Wn.2d at 880 (citing Veach. at 573).

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Indetermining the scope ofan easement created by express grant, the 

### court looks to the original grant language to determine the permitted uses. Brown
v. Voss. 105 Wn.2d 366, 371, 715 P.2d 514 (1986). "The intent ofthe original parties to an easement is determined from the deed as a whole." Sunnvside, 149 

### Wn.2d at 880 (citing Zorbrist v. Culp. 95 Wn.2d 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981)). "Ifthe plain language is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence will not be considered." 

### Sunnvside. 149 Wn.2d at 880 (citing City ofSeattle v. Nazarenus. 60 Wn.2d 657, 665, 374 P.2d 1014 (1962)). "Ifambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence is allowed to 

### show the intentions ofthe original parties, the circumstances ofthe property when the easementwas conveyed, and the practical interpretation given the parties' prior conduct or admissions." Sunnvside, 149 Wn.2d at 880 (citing Nazarenus. 60 Wn.2d at 665. Recreational Easement Wahl argues that the trial court erred in concluding that EA II is a recreational easement path for pedestrian use only, thereby ignoring his right to
use EA II for parking and navigating his circular driveway. The agreement regarding EA II provides: This Easement shall be for recreational use, including but not limited to access, gardening, lawns, rockeries, boating, picknicking, fishing, swimming, lawn sports, ingress and egress, or any other recreational use. [Ritter]haspriorityuse ofEasement II. It is intended that the use ofthis Easement does not unreasonably interfere with the privacy of [Wahl] in the enjoyment of his residence. [Ritter] shall have the responsibility and authority for the maintenance of landscaping, rockeries, etc. on Easement II in accordance with paragraph 6. Temporary storage by [Ritter] of small equipment used inthe abovementioned recreational activitiesNo. 70049-9-1/6
is allowed so long as itdoes not detract from the aesthetics ofthe landscaping. It is understood that this use does not include storage of items such as boats, trailers, automobiles, etc. [Wahl] shallhave the right to the use ofEasement II foringress and egress and landscape maintenance, and such othernon-recreational uses which do notunreasonablyinterfere with [Rater's] priorityuse ofthis easement. In the event of a conflict between [Wahl and Ritter]over use ofEasement II, [Ritter]shallhave prioritywith the understanding that Easement II is [Rater's] private area, to the extent provided herein. Trial Exhibit (Ex.) 1 at 5. (Emphasis added.) The trial court concluded that "Easement Area II is a recreational easement," and that "[g]iven the pedestrian use ofthe easement path, which use could occur at any time, night or day, rain or shine, and in light of priorities granted to [Ritter's] use, and the identification of [Ritter's] use as a privacy right within the terms of EA II... and the express intent ofthe parties that the privacy of each is of 'paramount importance', together with the primacy of recreational use of EA II, this Court interprets EA II as providing that the use ofthe easement path in EA II cannot be used by motor vehicles for ingress or egress, or for parking for any period of time." Clerk Papers at 636-37. The court noted thatWahl presented 

### evidence ofdifficulty in turning vehicles from the driveway into his garage without crossing EAII, but found "it is clearthat such conflicts are resolved in favor of 

### [Ritter's] scope ofuse, the recreational nature ofthe primary use, and [Ritter's] privacy rights." CP at 633. 

### Despite evidence that it is difficultto use Wahl's driveway without crossing EA II, we conclude thatthe trial court properly ruled thatthe Ritters' recreational


### use controls. The language inthe easement agreement creates an extremelyNo. 70049-9-1/7 

### broad grant ofrecreational use rights in EAII to the Ritters, limiting Wahl to nonrecreational uses which do not unreasonably interfere withthe Ritters' priority
use. Wahl contends that his continuous use of EA II forturning vehicles, which he exercised without complaint from 1979-2004, indicates that the parties intended to allow this use. However, the easement agreement expressly provides that the Ritters have priority use in the event of a conflict. Wahl's reliance on York
v. Cooper. 60 Wn.2d 283, 373 P.2d 493 (1962) is misplaced. In York, the court upheld the plaintiffs' right to drive and park on an easement that had been historically used for that purpose by the owners and occupants ofboth properties. Id. at 285. Here, the easement is expressly recreational, and only Wahl drove on it. Wahl also argues that the trial court erred by ordering that the Ritters may prevent vehicles from going onto the easement path by installing concrete traffic barriers, because Paragraph 6 ofthe easement agreement provides that mutual consent is required to change the original landscaping plan, "which will not be unreasonably withheld." Trial Ex. 1 at 8. We conclude that Paragraph 6 does not control where, as here, the concrete barriers are being installed for safety purposes. Moreover, even ifParagraph 6 controlled, it would not be reasonable for Wahl to withhold consent under the circumstances. Patio and Stairs 

### Wahl argues that a narrow strip ofthe Ritters' new concrete patio and planterboxes (138 square feet in total) encroaches on EA Iand constitutes aNo. 70049-9-1/8 

### trespass. The trial court found that the patio and planterboxes encroach on EAI, but concluded that the encroachment was permissible. The agreement regarding EA Iprovides: 

### This Easementshall be foringress and egress (pedestrian only and shall not include parking or storage of anything), and to permit view controlby [Ritter] and safetyoftheirpropertyby 

## installingandmaintainingrockeries, likeretainingdevicesf,]and steps and paths. [Ritter] shall have controloverthe landscaping and rockeries, etc., ofEasementIand shall be responsible to 

### maintain the same in accordance with paragraph 6 in a manner 

### mutually agreeable to [Ritterand Wahl] at [Ritter's] sole expense. 

### Neither [Ritter] nor [Wahl] will construct any fence or gate overthis Easement Iwithout [Ritter's] prior written consent. Trial Ex. 1 at4-5. (Emphasis added.) 

### Wahl contends thatthe patio and planterboxes serve no safety purpose and therefore fall outside the scope of EA I. But Wahl does not challenge the location ofthe retaining wall that underlies the patio and planter boxes, even though ittoo encroaches on EA I. Rather, he appears to argue that nothing whatsoever should have been installed on top ofthe encroaching portion ofthe retaining wall. We disagree. The plain language of EA Ipermits installation of "rockeries, similar retaining devices, and steps and paths," for both view control and safety purposes. CP at 634. Italso gives Ritter "control overthe landscaping and rockeries, etc." in EA I. The project manager who built Ritter's patio testified on cross examination that the patio and planter boxes could have been placed further back on the property so as notto fully coverthe top surface ofthe retaining wall. However, the courtfound that doing so would

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create "a flat open semi-circular area approximately 40' in length, with a width of 4' at its widest part and less than 1' at each end, which could conceivably be a safety hazard as the area is at the top edge of a steep slope." ]cLThe court also found that the encroachment ofthe patio does not interfere with any other use of EA I.These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Wahl further contends that the patio and planters violate the easement agreement because EA Irequires "mutual consent" for construction and maintenance of landscaping and rockeries, which he did not provide. The trial court concluded thatWahl's consent was not required, based on its finding that EA Iexpressly gives Ritter "control over 

### the landscaping and rockeries" and thatthe reference in EA Iregarding consent refers only to maintaining the landscaping in accordance with Paragraph 6. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

### Wahl also argued thatthe trial court erred in allowing the Ritters to violate 

### EAIbyexpanding the width ofthe new steps fromthree feet to five feet. He contends that the original parties did not intend to allow future expansion ofthe original landscape design into new areas withoutWahl's consent. Again we 

### disagree. The trial court found "[t]herewas no showing at trialthat extending the width ofthe steps within EA Ifrom 3 to 5 feet in any way interfered with or 

### impaired use by [Wahl], and were done forsafety reasons, all clearlywithin theNo. 70049-9-1/10 

### authority granted [Ritter] in EAI." CP at 628. This interpretation was proper, and supported by substantial evidence. Dock 

### Wahlargues that the trial court erred in permitting the Ritters toexceed the scope ofEA III bymooring two jet skis at the dock, in addition to their boat. The agreement regarding EA III provides: This Easementshall be for recreational use, including but not limited to the use ofthe dock, for the permanentmooring ofnot 

### over two boats belonging to[Ritter], neitherofwhich shallexceed 50 feet, access, swimming, boating, fishing, ingress, egress or any 

### other recreational use. [Ritter] shall have priorityuse ofEasement III. It is intended that the use ofthis Easement does not 

### unreasonably interferewith [Wahl's] privacy in the use and 

### enjoyment of his residence. Maintenance of the NewDockto be built on Easement III... shall be thejoint responsibility of [Wahl and 

### Ritters]. [Wahl] shall have the rightto use Easement III for ingress and egress, short-term oroccasional boat moorage (on a space available basis) and maintenance so long as the same do not 

### unreasonably interfere with [Ritter's] priority use of this easement. In the event of a conflictbetween [Wahland Ritter] over use of 

### Easement III, [Ritter] shall have priority with the understanding that 

### Easement III is [Ritter's] private area, to the extent provided herein. Trial Ex. 1 at 6. (Emphasis added.) 

### The trialcourt concluded that "two jet skis can be one boatforthe 

### purposes ofthevessel limitation ofEA III, in partdue totheirsmallersize." CP at 638. This conclusion was based in part on the trial court's finding that the 

### Bellevue Municipal Code counts one jet ski as halfof a boat for storage 

### purposes. Wahl contends that there is no suchprovision in theBellevue 

### Municipal Code. He iscorrect. TheRitters failed toprovide acitationto the

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### alleged code provision, and our research revealed none.2 The sole reference in the record in support ofthis finding is hearsay testimony from Ritter. This finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, given clear language in the easement limiting Ritter's use to "not overtwo boats... neither of which shall exceed 50 feet," we conclude that the trial court erred in interpreting EA III to 

### allowthe Ritters to moor more than two boats (includingjet skis) at the dock.3 Wahl also argues that the Ritters exceeded the scope of EAIII by attaching boat lifts to the dock without his express agreement. He relies primarily
on Paragraph 4 ofthe easement agreement, which provides that itwas Wahl's 

### responsibility to constructthe dock, and that "[a]ny additional improvements to the New Dock shall be as mutually agreed by [Wahl] and [Ritter]." Trial Ex. 1 at 7. 

### However, EA Iexpressly provides forthe permanent mooring of two boats. The trial courtfound that although boat liftsare not expressly mentioned inthe 

### easement agreement, they are "a recognized aspect of mooring boats" and that EAIcannot be expected to specify allthe details ofmooring, given that new 

### methods and accessories are constantly changing. CP at 635. The trial court also

2Following oral argument, counsel for the Ritters submitted "Respondent's Clarification Regarding Bellevue Municipal Code" confirming thatBellevue does not have a municipal code addressing whether a jet ski is equal to halfa boat and requesting that we strike any briefing or oral argument representing the existence of such a code provision. We grant this request. 3Wahlalso argues thatEA III does notpermitjet skis because they are not"boats." However, it is clear that jet skis are considered "boats" under state and locallaw. A "personal watercraft" is a "vessel ofless than sixteen feet...."; RCW 79A.60.010(22); BMC 12.04.020(T). A "vessel" is "everydescription of watercrafton the water." RCW79A.60.010(29), BMC 12.04.020(AA). And a "boater" is "any person on a vessel "RCW 79A.60.010(3), BMC 12.04.020(D).

11No. 70049-9-1/12 

### found thatthe boat lifts do notexpand the scope of the moorage or interfere with any other use or activity of EA III. Given the broad grant ofauthority to the Ritters 

### in EAIII and the difficulty ofaccomplishing permanent moorage withoutthe use ofboat lifts, we conclude thatthe trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Because we conclude that EA III limits the Ritters to two boats, itfollows that they are limited to two boat lifts as well. Wahl further argues that the Ritters exceeded the scope ofthe easement agreement by running electrical cords, water hoses, and power lines from their house across EA Iand II to the dock. He contends that nothing inthe easement agreement permits "utilities," only "recreational use." The trial courtfound this use permissible, finding that "there is no basis in EA II for limiting Owner B [the Ritters] from running power lines
. .. ." CP at 634. The court also found that without access to water and power, which are necessary to operate the boat lifts, Ritterwould be deprived of full use of EA III, which would be an absurd result. We agree, and conclude thatthese findings are supported by substantial evidence. Wahl, citing Castanza v. Wagner. 43 Wn. App. 770, 719 P.2d 949 (1986), 

### argues thatthe Ritters have no right to run power and waterto EAIII inthe absence ofan express grant. The Castanza court held that an easement of right 

### of way for "road purposes" authorized ingress and egress, but inthe absence of
an express grant, did not include the right to place utility lines. ]d. at 776-666. But here, unlike in Castanza, the easement agreement contains very broad language

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infavor ofthe Ritters' recreational use, including the permanent mooring of boats. Attorney Fees The trial court initiallydenied the Ritters' request for an award of attorney fees and costs in excess of$180,000 based on the small claims settlement statute, RCW4.84.250 et seq. However, upon reconsideration, the trial court concluded: While the litigation in this case primarily involved a dispute overthe interpretation ofthe scope and use of a written easement that does not contain an attorney-fee clause, Plaintiff, in addition to the petition for enforcement ofthe easement, included in his complaint 

### a demand for damages ofless than $10,000, which invokes RCW 4.84.250. Pre-trial litigation and trial focused almost, ifnot exclusively, on issues arising out ofthe interpretation ofthe written easement. As Defendants accurately point out, this court, following a bench trial, found that the damage claims were not supported by evidence at trial, which is accurate, though itwas not because evidence was offered and rejected, but because, based on the court's recollection at this time, no evidence at all was presented in support ofthe damage claims. CP at 1054. 

### Accordinglythe trial court invitedthe Ritters to resubmit a fee petition limited to the hours attributable to defending againstWahl's damages claims. The Ritters did so, and the trial court issued an order awarding $22,288 in total reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 

### We reviewthe legal basis for an award ofattorney's fees de novo. Hulbert v. Port of Everett, 159 Wn. App. 389, 407, 245 P.3d 779 (2011). The general rule 

### is that each party in a civil action must bear its ownfees and costs. Cosmopolitan

13No. 70049-9-1/14 

### Engineering Group. Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont. Inc.. 159Wn.2d 292, 296, 149 

### P.3d 666 (2006). "Atrial court may award attorney fees only where there is a contractual, statutory, or recognized equitable basis." Riss v.Angel. 80 Wn.App. 553, 563, 912 P.2d 1028 (1996). 

### RCW4.84.250 et seq. authorizes a trial court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party where the amount pleaded is $10,000 or less. The small 

### claims settlement statute has "multiple purposes ofencouraging out-of-court settlements, penalizing parties who unjustifiably bring or resist small claims, and 

### enabling a party to pursue a meritorious small claim without seeing the award diminished by legal fees." Williams v. Tilave. 174 Wn.2d 57, 62, 272 P.3d 235 (2012) (citing Beckmann v. Spokane TransitAuth.. 107 Wn.2d 785, 788, 733 P.2d 96 (1987)).The defendant is deemed the prevailing party ifthe plaintiff
recovers nothing or a sum not exceeding that offered by the defendant in settlement. RCW 4.84.270; Reynolds v. Hicks. 134 Wn.2d 491, 502, 951 P.2d 761 (1998). The Ritters contend that they are entitled to a fee award under RCW 4.84.270 because, following requests for production directed to Wahl during discovery, his claims for actual damages attrial were less than $10,000 and he rejected their pretrial offer to settle for $9,900. Wahl citing Reynolds, argues that RCW 4.84.250 et seq. does not apply because he pleaded an open-ended

14-No. 70049-9-1/15 "award oftreble damages caused by the wrongful acts ofdefendants in an 

### amountto be proven at trial" ratherthan a specific amount.4 CP at 1332. In Reynolds, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the defendants' requestfor a fee award as the prevailing party under RCW4.84.250 because "[n]o specific amount was pleaded in the complaint; rather, the amount was setto be proven at trial. Thus, the Plaintiffs did not limittheir award and based on their claim for damages and reliefcould have received well above $10,000 in damages." Reynolds, 134 Wn.2d at 502. However, a defendant is entitled to attorney fees, even ifthe plaintiff did not plead an exact amount, ifhe or she had constructive knowledge that the amount ofthe claim was $10,000 or less. Schmererv. Darcv. 80 Wn. App. 499, 510, 910 P.2d 498 (1996). Thus, the fact 

### thatWahl did not expressly plead damages inexcess of$10,000 is not fatal to the Ritters' claim for attorney fees. The question is whetherthe Ritters had notice 

### prior to trialthatWahl's damages claims exceeded $10,000. The Ritters insistthatWahl failed to articulate or disclose any actual 

### damages prior to trialotherthan a $4,400 driveway bid, a $2,000 dock repair estimate, and a $659.32 repairestimate for alleged electrical damage, for a total of$7,059.32. The Ritters are incorrect. The record before us also includes a 

### certified arborist's reportfindingthatthe value ofWahl's property decreased by

4RCW4.24.630 (damage to land) and RCW64.12.030 (timbertrespass) allow treble damages.

15No. 70049-9-1/16 

### $68,000

- $113,500 based on the alleged timbertrespass,5 and a professional land value market study reporting an estimated property value of $163 to $165 square feet, in support ofWahl's claim for land trespass based on the 138 square feet ofencroaching patio and planterboxes in EA I. Counsel for the Ritters expressly acknowledged having received the arborist's damages report approximately two weeks prior to trial. Thus, the Ritters clearly had notice prior to trial thatWahl's damages claims exceeded $10,000. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record thatWahl retreated from his request for an award oftreble 

### damages in an amountto be proven at trial. Even ifWahl only submitted evidence ofdamages inthe amount of$7,059.32, when tripled, this would be sufficient to exceed the threshold. 

### The Ritters appearto argue that any evidence ofdamages that was deemed inadmissible at trial does not counttowards the $10,000 threshold. But 

### the ultimate admissibility of the evidence has no bearing on the question of whetherthe Ritters were on notice thatWahl's damages claims exceeded 

### $10,000. The record shows thatthey were. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 

### court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Ritters under RCW 4.84.270, and we

reverse the award.

5"Thestandard measure ofdamages for the loss of ornamental trees in actions brought pursuanttoRCW64.12.030 is eithertherestoration cost or thediminution in value oftheaffected property." Happy Bunch. LLC v. Grandview North. LLC. 142 Wn. App. 81, 91 n.3, 173 P.3d 959 (2007).

16No. 70049-9-1/17 

### The Ritters request reasonable attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.1 

### and RCW 4.84.290.6 "We may award attorney fees under RAP 18.1(a) if applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees and ifthe party requests the fees as prescribed by RAP 18.1." Wachovia SBA Lending. Inc. v. Kraft. 165 Wn.2d 481, 493, 200 P.3d 683 (2009). Because RCW 4.84.250 et seq. has no applicability to this case, we decline the Ritters' request for an award offees on appeal. We also deny Wahl's requestfor fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RCW 4.24.630(1) based on the location ofthe Ritters' 

### concrete patio, as he is not the prevailing party.7 Affirmed and reversed.

WE CONCUR: 

# Cvft{J •

6RCW 4.84.290 provides "ifthe prevailing party on appeal would be entitled to attorneys' fees under the provisions of RCW4.84.250, the courtdeciding the appeal shall allow to the prevailing party such additional amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorneys' fees for the appeal." 7RCW4.24.630(1) provides for an award ofattorneys' fees and costs to the injured party in a claim for liability for damage to land and property.

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