Docket No. 92482–Agenda 15–September 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

								MONICA GLISSON, Appellee.

	Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a jury trial, defendant, Monica Glisson, was

convicted of chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance

pursuant to section 401.5(a–5) of the Illinois Controlled

Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401.5(a–5) (West 1998)) and

misdemeanor theft; judgment was entered November 3, 1999.

Effective January 1, 2000, the General Assembly added a

subsection to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act exempting

defendant’s conduct from criminal liability. 720 ILCS 570/401.5(c)

(West 2000). Both parties agree that this amendment, in effect,

repealed the crime of possession with the intent to manufacture the

illicit controlled substance methamphetamine from the section on

chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance. The appellate

court vacated defendant’s conviction for chemical breakdown of

illicit controlled substance and reversed defendant’s conviction for

misdemeanor theft. 324 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253-54. Before this court,

the State challenges only the vacatur of the conviction for chemical

breakdown of illicit controlled substance. More specifically, the

issue presented for review by this court is whether the general

savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4

(West 2000)) applies to repeals.

I. BACKGROUND

	Shortly after midnight on March 10, 1999, Massac County

sheriff’s deputy Kent Miles, while on routine patrol on Highway

45, observed a vehicle stopped on the road. The vehicle was about

three hundred yards from the Fruitbelt Services Company, which

housed tanks of anhydrous ammonia. Miles watched a person close

the trunk and enter the passenger side of the vehicle. He followed

the vehicle after it pulled out and drove down Highway 45. After

checking the vehicle’s plates, Miles initiated a traffic stop for

illegally stopping on the highway. He detected the faint odor of

anhydrous ammonia during the traffic stop. Miles spoke with defendant, who was driving, and the passenger, Joseph Draffen. He

checked defendant’s license and insurance information and ran

Draffen’s name through his computer. Miles called for backup, and

Deputy Richard Douglas arrived shortly thereafter.

	As defendant explained the reason she had been stopped on

the highway, Douglas noticed a key in the keyhole of the trunk.

After defendant refused permission to search the car, Douglas

touched the key and the trunk automatically opened. The officers

had been trained that if anhydrous ammonia is in an enclosed space,

the area should be ventilated as much as possible given the

volatility of the material. The smell of anhydrous ammonia became

much stronger when the trunk was opened. The State Police Drug

Task Force was called to assist in the handling of the anhydrous

ammonia, and Officers Dean Hamilton and Rick Griffey were

dispatched. Inside the trunk was a five-gallon bucket sealed with

duct tape. The officers also found a cooler containing anhydrous

ammonia, a respirator mask, and a piece of wood wrapped with

duct tape inside the trunk. Hamilton disposed of the anhydrous

ammonia.

	At trial, Douglas testified on the basis of his training that

anhydrous ammonia is one of the antecedents in the production of

methamphetamine. The only legitimate use of anhydrous ammonia

is to fertilize corn; for this purpose, large quantities are required.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. While the case

was pending on direct appeal, the General Assembly adopted

section 401.5(c), which removed from sanction the possession of

methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals with the intent to

manufacture methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 570/401.5(c) (West

2000). The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction for

chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance (720 ILCS

570/401.5(a–5) (West 1998)) because the statute defining the

offense of which defendant was convicted had been repealed. 324

Ill. App. 3d at 253. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Rule

315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

II. ANALYSIS

	Effective after the date of the relevant conduct and defendant’s

conviction, the General Assembly passed section 401.5(c), which provides: “This Section does not apply to the possession of any

methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals with the intent to

manufacture methamphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of

methamphetamine, or an analog of methamphetamine.” 720 ILCS

570/401.5(c) (West 2000). This change repealed the crime of

which defendant was convicted. No specific savings clause was

passed with section 401.5(c). Therefore, the sole issue before this

court is whether the general savings clause of section 4 (5 ILCS

70/4 (West 2000)) preserves the conviction for chemical

breakdown of illicit controlled substance despite the subsequent

repeal of the statutory prohibition of the conduct in question while

defendant’s conviction was pending on direct appeal. Because this

issue is one of statutory interpretation, this court reviews the

question de novo. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177-78 (1997).

	At common law, the repeal of a penal statute abated

prosecutions that had not reached final judgment, unless other

authority supported the continuation of pending prosecutions.

United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 223, 78 L. Ed. 763, 765-66, 54 S. Ct. 434, 435 (1934); People v. Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d 175, 177 (1956). The common law doctrine established a

presumption of abatement for nonfinal prosecutions for courts to

apply where the legislature was silent. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 322, 13 L. Ed. 2d 300, 311, 85 S. Ct. 384, 394-95

(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

	Dissatisfaction with the common law rule developed because

the conviction and punishment of similarly situated defendants

could be disparate solely because the proceedings of one had

moved more quickly and had become final before the change in the

law. Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d at 181. This problem was addressed through the passage of general savings clause legislation, section

4, which reversed the common law presumption. People v. Chupich, 53 Ill. 2d 572, 583 (1973); Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d at 181. The Illinois courts rarely have interpreted section 4 as it relates to

repeal of criminal statutes because the General Assembly

infrequently decriminalizes behavior.

A. Statutory Construction of Section 4

	The primary concern of the court when interpreting a statute

is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. Whenever possible, the court applies the plain and ordinary

meaning of the statutory language. People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 150 (2002). Only where the language of the statute is ambiguous may the court

resort to other aids of statutory construction. People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 90-91 (2001). In addition, where a statute is clear

and unambiguous, courts cannot read into the statute limitations,

exceptions, or other conditions not expressed by the legislature.

People ex rel. Devine, 199 Ill. 2d at 150-51. The court should evaluate a statutory provision as a whole rather than reading

phrases in isolation. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. The court should construe a statute to give a reasonable meaning to all words and

sentences so that no part is rendered superfluous. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). Finally, courts may assume that the legislature did not intend absurdity,

inconvenience or injustice to result from legislation. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).

	Section 4, the general savings clause of Illinois, first passed in

1874, states:

			“No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law,

whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as

to any offense committed against the former law, or as to

any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment

incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising under the

former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such

offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty,

forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as

practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such

proceeding. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision

may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to

any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in

any other act.” (Emphases added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000).

	In People v. Speroni,1 the appellate court interpreted “ ‘No new law shall be construed,’ ” at the start of the provision, and the

first italicized phrase to mean that section 4 is applicable only to

amendments and not to outright repeals. People v. Speroni, 273 Ill. App. 572, 577-78 (1934). Defendant argues that, under Speroni, section 4 should not preserve her conviction because the crime of

which defendant was convicted was repealed outright. This court,

however, has criticized the Speroni analysis in Bilderback. We said: “This conclusion [by the Speroni court] of course wholly disregards the last sentence of section 4.” Bilderback, 9 Ill. 2d at 180.

	Statutory construction principles require the court to apply the

plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language whenever

possible. People ex. rel Devine, 199 Ill. 2d at 150. This final sentence provides that section 4 applies to both express and

implied repeals, regardless of where the repealing language is

located. This sentence confirms the broad applicability of section

4 rather than restricts it, as defendant suggests. We now expressly

hold what we implied in Bilderback: section 4 applies to both outright repeals and amendments.

	In addition, we give a different interpretation to the first

italicized phrase of section 4 than did the Speroni court. This is the first time we have interpreted this phrase directly. When

interpreting a statute, the court should evaluate a statutory

provision as a whole rather than reading phrases in isolation.

O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at 91. The court should construe a statute to give a reasonable meaning to all words and sentences so that no

part is rendered superfluous. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232. Section 4 starts with a prohibition on construing a new statute to affect

penalties, punishments, or rights accrued; this forbids retroactive

application of substantive changes to statutes. The italicized portion, beginning with “save only,” allows proceedings to

conform to the present law; this allows retroactive application of

procedural changes to statutes. Therefore, we read the first

italicized part of section 4 above to require that retroactive

application of amendments or repeals in criminal statutes is

permissible only if such changes are procedural in nature. We

expressly reject the holding of Speroni to the extent that it is inconsistent with this interpretation.

	We note that our present interpretation of this clause in section

4 is consistent with an interpretation of nearly identical statutory

language in our sister state of West Virginia. West Virginia’s

general savings clause provides in part:

			“The repeal of a law, or its expiration by virtue of any

provision contained therein, shall not affect any offense

committed, or penalty or punishment incurred, before the

repeal took effect, or the law expired, save only that the proceedings thereafter had shall conform as far as

practicable to the laws in force at the time such

proceedings take place, unless otherwise specially provided ***.” (Emphasis added.) W. Va. Code §2–2–8

(2002).

When interpreting the italicized portion of this provision, the

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained:

		“Even should it be conceded, as claimed, that Sec. 15 of

Chap. 144 of the Code was repealed by the Act of 1920-

21, the offense if committed before the repeal is kept alive

and also the penalty. The procedure alone is affected; it

must conform to the new law as far as practicable.” State v. Sanney, 91 W. Va. 477, 480-81, 113 S.E. 762, 764 (1922).

Only procedural changes are given retroactive application under

this substantially identical savings clause language.

B. Section 4 Applied to the Present Case

	Both parties agree that the legislature in effect repealed the

crime of possession with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine from the section on chemical breakdown of

illicit controlled substance, of which defendant was convicted. Clearly, this statutory change is not of a procedural nature. This is

a substantive change to the scope of the crime of chemical

breakdown of illicit controlled substance. As such, section 4 bars

retroactive application of the statutory change repealing the offense

of which defendant was convicted. Section 4 preserves defendant’s

conviction for chemical breakdown of illicit controlled substance

because section 401.5(a–5) criminalized defendant’s conduct at the

time the conduct occurred.

C. Changes to Special Remedial Statutes

	The appellate court in this case stated: “The general savings

clause *** has no application to repeals.” 324 Ill. App. 3d at 253,

citing Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 970, 974 (1996). However, the Randall case and the cases that are cited to support this assertion address statutory changes to special remedial

statutes. Randall, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 973; Shelton v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 468, 474 (1969); People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 373-75 (1939). Special remedial statues are statutory provisions that are purely remedial or procedural in

nature; they do not involve vested rights. Randall, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 973.

	In criminal cases in which the statutory changes affect only

procedure, Illinois courts hold that the changes can be applied

retroactively. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 438, 440-41 (1973) (noting that lengthening the speedy-trial deadline

after defendant was charged was procedural and therefore could be

applied retroactively). In contrast, however, courts apply section

4 and bar retroactive application where statutory changes alter or

repeal the crime itself. For example, in People v. Tanner, 27 Ill. 2d 82 (1963), this court reviewed an indictment that was quashed

based on the repeal of the charging statute by the Criminal Code of

1961 (“new Code”). We held that the prosecution could continue

despite the repeal. The new Code, however, also incorporated

section 4 by reference explicitly, which we acknowledged in our

analysis. Tanner, 27 Ill. 2d at 83-85. Soon after, the First District of the appellate court evaluated a case in which the repealing

statute did not refer expressly to section 4 in People v. DeStefano, 64 Ill. App. 2d 389 (1965). In that case, the charging statute was

repealed after defendant’s conduct but before his indictment. The court found that Tanner did not require that a repealing statute explicitly refer to section 4 for that provision to apply. Citing

Bilderback, the court held that the prosecution could proceed. DeStefano, 64 Ill. App. 2d at 398. Therefore, the appellate court and defendant incorrectly assert that section 4 is inapplicable to all

repeals. In accordance with our interpretation of section 4, courts

can apply retroactively statutory changes to procedural or remedial

provisions, whether they are outright repeals or amendments.

Section 4 prohibits retroactive application of statutory changes that

affect substantive provisions or vested rights.

III. CONCLUSION

	We hold that the general savings clause of Illinois, section 4 (5

ILCS 70/4 (West 2000)), applies to preserve defendant’s

conviction despite the fact that, while her appeal was pending, the

legislature repealed the statute describing the crime for which she

was convicted without a specific savings clause. Therefore, we

reverse the appellate court in part and vacate the order of the

appellate court vacating defendant’s conviction for chemical

breakdown of illicit controlled substance; we affirm the appellate

court order reversing defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor

theft, which was not challenged before this court. We remand the

cause to the appellate court to consider the issues raised by

defendant challenging the chemical breakdown of illicit controlled

substance conviction before that court that were not reached in

light of its interpretation of section 4, if that court deems it to be

appropriate. The appellate court then may remand the cause to the

circuit court for further proceedings if necessary. See Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 146-47 (1999).

Appellate court judgment vacated in part

and affirmed in part;

cause remanded.