### IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, ; Respondent, ;

w > No. 71111-3-1 DIVISION ONE C •-•i.C" £? "S3. yz* p"
,**v* ——, C3 :;;_i V. DENNIS WYATT, ) 

## I UNPUBLISHEDOPINION5 f| Appellant. ] FILED: April 20, 2015 Appelwick, J. — Police officers performed a warrantless search of closed containers found outside Wyatt's tent in a city park while Wyatt was away from his campsite. The officers found materials used to make meth inside the containers. The search resulted in Wyatt's arrest, confession, and subsequent conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine. The trial courtdenied Wyatt's motion to suppress the items inside the containers, finding that Wyatt had no expectation of privacy in those items. We reverse and remand. FACTS On October 30, 2011, City of Kent Police Department Officer Kenneth Clay and 

### Sergeant Andrew Kelso1 were working routine bicycle patrol. During their patrol, the officers spoke with a street source. The source claimed to have heard someone named "Dennis" brag about stealing wiring from a railroad. The source also said that Dennis cooks meth inholes inthe ground. The source told the officers that Dennis lived in a tent camp inRiverview Park, a parkowned bythe city of Kent. The sourcewas ableto identify
a more specific location for the campsite on a map. The source confirmed that Dennis

was a homeless individual. Sergeant Kelso was an officer atthe time these events took place.No. 71111-3-1/2

Based on the source's description, Sergeant Kelso recalled that he previously had contact with a man matching the description. After checking his earlier contact report, Sergeant Kelso was able to confirm thatthe source was describing Dennis Wyatt. The following afternoon, on October 31, 2011, Officer Clay and Sergeant Kelso went to Riverview Park to find the camp. At the end of a well-worn pathway the officers 

### found a camp that was occupied by Wyatt, JenniferJohnson, and anothermale.2 Sergeant Kelso notified and warned Wyattand Johnson that itwas illegal to camp in the park. The officers advised Wyatt and Johnson that they had 24 hours to gather 

### their belongings and leavethe campsite. Wyatt andJohnson saidthattheyknew camping inthe park was illegal, but thatthey had been camping there for only two days. Johnson further stated thatthe tentwas theirs, butthe remaining items at the campsitewere there when they arrived. 

### Forty-five minutes after the officers left the campsite, they sawWyatt and Johnson walking away from the campsite. The officers returned to the camp. While no one was there, the officers looked under a tarp located roughly eight to fifteen feet from the tent. 

### Sergeant Kelso found a black zipped up bag that was inside a five gallon bucket under the tarp. Inside the zipped bag, Sergeant Kelso found a bottle with a hole drilled in the top with a hose sticking out of the hole. The bottle had a dark, amber liquid init. The officers also found a blue soft-sided container (similarto a cooler) outsidethe 

### tent. Therewere plastic bottles, duct tape, tubing, and a small pressurized gas container inside theblue container. Based on both SergeantKelso's and OfficerClay'straining and 

### 2The other male was just visiting the campsite and was later arrested based on outstanding warrants.No. 71111-3-1/3 

### experience, they believed the items in the black bag and the blue container were associated with a methamphetamine (meth) lab. The officers did not look inside the tent. The officers replaced the tarp, left the scene, and contacted the Department of Ecology's on-call spill responder about the lab. The officers and the spill responder decided that the lab should be processed in the morning during the daylightwhen itwould be safer. On November 1, 2011, atapproximately 10:45 a.m., Sergeant Kelso and Sergeant Mike O'Reilly returned to Riverview Park to process the meth lab with Richard Walker, a Department of Ecology spill responder. Sergeant Kelso and Sergeant O'Reilly went to the camp and called out to see ifanyone was inside the tent. Moments later, Wyatt and Johnson came out of the tent. Both Wyatt and Johnson were arrested for unlawful 

### camping and investigation of manufacturing meth and read their Miranda3 rights. Both Wyattand Johnson waived their rights and spoke with the officers. The officers led Wyatt and Johnson away from the tent, across a field, and toward patrol vehicles before questioning them. Sergeant Kelso spoke with Wyatt. Wyatt eventually told Sergeant Kelso that he 

### had been camping in Riverview Parkforseveral weeks. Wyatt initially denied knowledge ofthe meth lab inthe camp. But, after a little while, Wyatt admitted that he knew there
was a meth lab and admitted that his fingerprints would be on the items from cleaning up the area.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).No. 71111-3-1/4 

### Sergeant O'Reillyspoke withJohnson. Johnson denied any involvementwith the meth lab but admitted that she rummaged through all of the property when the two first got to the camp. Johnson said thatthey had been at the camp for twoweeks. 

### SergeantO'Reillythen went tospeakwithWyatt. Wyatt toldSergeantO'Reillythat they had been at the campsiteforthree weeks. Employing a ruse, SergeantO'Reillytold Wyatt that he heard Wyatt was cooking meth and selling it to kids. Sergeant O'Reilly indicated that if Wyatt was selling to kids, as opposed to for personal use, Sergeant O'Reilly would "have a real problem with his actions." Wyatt then admitted to cooking meth atthe campsite for his personal use. After Wyatt and Johnson were transported to the station, the officers and Walker returned to the camp. At the camp, there was a tent and items around or nearthe tent. Some of the items were under a tarp. The officers could not remember ifthe blue container was covered by the tarp when they returned. The officers opened the blue container and found many materials used to make meth. The officers also found the zipped blackbag with a soda bottlewithtubing coming outof it,muriatic acid, and another bottle containing liquids. While these items were being processed, Sergeant O'Reilly went into the tent and found several bags with items related to a meth lab. Sergeant O'Reillytook into custody items from the tent, which were eitherassociated with the meth lab, illegal contraband, or weapons. The State charged Wyatt and Johnson with manufacturing meth in violation of RCW 69.50.401(1), (2)(b). Wyattmoved to suppress both the physical evidencefromthe campsite and his statements to the officers. After a combined CrR 3.5 and CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court partly granted and partly denied the motions. The trial courtNo. 71111-3-1/5 suppressed the evidence obtained from inside the tent, but admitted the evidence 

### obtained in the closed containers found outside the tent. The court reasoned thatWyatt had no reasonable expectation of privacy inthe area outside ofthe tent, but that he did 

### have a reasonableexpectation of privacy inthe items inside the bags inside thetent. The trial court did not suppress Wyatt's confession to Sergeant O'Reilly or any other

statements. Thejury convicted Wyatt ofmanufacturing a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Wyatt to a prison based drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) with 41.75 months in prison and 41.75 months in the community. The trial court enhanced Wyatt's sentence by 24 months based on the jury's finding that the offense had been committed inside a public park. Wyatt appeals. DISCUSSION Wyatt argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the warrantless search of the containers nearby his tent was lawful. Wyatt challenges the trial court's conclusionthat he had no expectation ofprivacy inthe closed containers outsidethetent. Wyattcontendsthatclosed containers within a camp are both a private affairunderarticle I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those closed containers on his campsite under the Fourth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution. This court reviews de novo conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the suppression ofevidence. State v. Valdez. 167 Wn.2d 761, 767, 224 P.23d 751 (2009). When violations of both the federal and Washington constitutions are alleged, it isNo. 71111-3-1/6 appropriate to examine the state constitutional claim first. State v. Young. 123 Wn.2d 173, 178, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). I. Article I, section 7 Article I, section 7 ofthe Washington Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." The relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred is whether the state unreasonably intruded into the defendant's "private affairs," not whether a person's expectation ofprivacy is reasonable. State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 587-88, 800 P.2d 

### 1112 (1990). The private affairs inquiry focuses on those privacy interests in which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental 

### trespass absent a warrant. State v. Surge. 160 Wn.2d 65, 71-72, 156 P.3d 208 (2007). It is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the Fourth 

### Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d at 126. But, a determination that a given state 

### constitutional provision affords enhanced protection inone context does not necessarily mandate such a result in a different context. State v. McKinnev. 148 Wn.2d 20, 26, 60 

### P.3d 46 (2002). We must therefore determine whether article I, section 7 affords enhanced protection in this particularcontext. Surge. 160 Wn.2d at 71. 

### WyattcontendsthattheWashington Supreme Court in Boland. 115 Wn.2d at 580, determined that article 1, section 7 affords enhanced protection in this context. Wyatt 

### argues that Boland stands for the proposition that containers and their contents are among the private affairs protected by article I, section 7.No. 71111-3-1/7

In Boland. the court held that garbage placed in a closed trash container left outside of a home on a curb is a private affair to be protected under article I, section 7. 

### 115 Wn.2d at 578. The court emphasized the fact thatthe garbage was in a closed can and that the discarder ofthe garbage expected that it would be picked up by a licensed garbage collector—notsearched by the government. Jd. at 578. The court noted thatthe fundamental purpose ofthe state constitution is to govern the relationship between the people and their government, rather than to govern the relationship between private parties. Id at575. Thus, the courtreasoned, itfollows thatthe constitutionwould concern itself with only the reasonableness of governmental intrusion into a private individual's garbage. Id. Thecourtacknowledgedthatitmaybe unreasonableto expectthatchildren, scavengers, or snoops will not sift through one's garbage, ]d_. at 578. However, it concluded that average persons would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they placed intheirclosedtrash cans will be protectedfrom warrantless governmentintrusion. Id Here, like in Boland. Wyatt's items were in closed containers in close proximity to
a residence. While the residence here was admittedly temporary, that did not diminish the private nature ofWyatt's containers. Likegarbage on a curb, unattended belongings 

### in a park may be susceptible to intrusion from snoops and scavengers. However, it is reasonable to believe that police officers would not open and search containers associated with a campsite without a warrant. This beliefis even more reasonable than 

### in Boland, because Wyatt did not discard his belongings. And, the officers specifically warned Wyatt that he had 24 hours to leavethe park, reinforcing Wyatt's expectationthat his containers would be safe from police intrusion. An average citizen hearing thatNo. 71111-3-1/8

statementshould be entitledto expectthathe and his possessions would notbe disturbed by the officers for at least 24 hours. Garbage in a closed containersetouton the curb for all to see and to be collected constitutes a private affair. Wyatt's closed containers, stored in his sequestered campsite
near his tent, not put out as discarded garbage surely also constitutes a private affair underarticle I,section 7. Search ofthe containers withouta warrantwas unconstitutional. 

### Thetrialcourterred when itdeniedWyatt's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as

a result ofthe search. II. Fourth Amendment 

### Even ifthe contents ofWyatt's closed containers were not considered a private affairunderarticle I, section 7, the search would stillhave been improperunderthe Fourth Amendment. See State v. Cleator, 71 Wn. App. 217, 857 P.2d 306 (1993). 

### The Fourth Amendmentprovides thatthe "right ofthe people to be secure in their 

### persons, houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." Const. Amend. IV. Underthe Fourth Amendment, a search occurs if 

### the governmentintrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Young. 123 Wn.2d at 181. The relevant inquiry for whether an individual has a reasonable 

### expectation of privacy is (1) whether an individual by his conduct has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in a particular place or object and (2) whether that expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The trial court concluded that the search of the area outside of Wyatt's tent was 

### permissible,becauseWyatt had no expectation of privacyinthose items. Relying on this

8No. 71111-3-1/9


### court's holdings inStatev. Pentecost, 64 Wn. App. 656, 825 P.2d 365 (1992) and Cleator, 71 Wn. App. 217, the trial court opined that courts have held there is no reasonable 

### expectation of privacy in the area surrounding an illegal camp. Both Pentecost and Cleator held thatthe defendants inthe unlawful encampments at issue were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Pentecost, 64 Wn. App. at 659-60; Cleator, 71 Wn. App. at 222. Consequently, the trial court concluded that the search of the items, all items, outside ofthe tent was proper and thatthose items were admissible attrial. At issue in Pentecostwere an illegal camper's privacy rights in unenclosed items

on the ground around his campsite. 64 Wn. App. at 657-58. A property ownercalled the police to report a trespasser camping on his private property and noted that he believed there were marijuana plants growing on his property. Id. at 657. Officers arrived to investigate, jd. When the officers approached the camp, Pentecostwas sitting on a chair in front of a tent. Id. One ofthe officers informed Pentecostthat he was trespassing and the officer asked him for identification. Id. When Pentecost went into his tent to retrieve his identification, one of the officers was able to see a shotgun inside the tent. Id. The officerentered thetentto retrievethe shotgun. I<± While conducting a cursory searchfor otherweapons around the campsite, the officersaw items (nails, boots, fertilizer, and bug repellent) linking Pentecostto a marijuana growing operation found aboutthree-quarters of a mile away. Id. at 657-58. The other items were in plain view, scattered around the campsite. Id. The officer arrested Pentecostfor manufacturing marijuana. Id. at 658. On appeal, Pentecost argued that the officer's entry into the area within his campsite and observation of his items constituted an illegal search and seizure, because he had an expectation ofprivacy inthe surrounding curtilage of his campsite. Id. at 658-No. 71111-3-1/10 

### 59. The court opined that Pentecost's argument failed under the second prong of the Katz test—Pentecost's subjective expectation of privacy inthe campsite is not one that society is prepared to recognize. \± at 659. 

### Inrejecting Pentecost's privacy interest, inthe items surrounding the campsitethe court stated, 

### Mr. Pentecost cites no direct authority for his assertion society regards unenclosed items left around a campsite as private. As for his analogyto the curtilageof a residence, we see materialdistinctions between a campsite and such an area. Principal among these distinctions isthefact 

### a homeowner or tenant has the rightunder property law to exclude others. Weknow of no similarright inonewho trespasses and camps upon another person's land. Pentecost, 64 Wn. App. at 659-60. Notably, the Pentecost court explicitly stated that a different question is presented where items are enclosed in a suitcase or some other container. IdL at660 n.3. As such, Pentecostis distinguishablefrom the case here, where Wyatt's items were inan enclosed bag and a container. In Cleator, a trespassing camper's privacy rights as to items inside his tent were at issue. 71 Wn. App. 218, 222. There, police responded to a report of burglary, jd. at 218. An officer found a camp with a tent about 150 yards in the woods behind the burglarized house, jd. The officerbelieved thatthetentwas erected on city property, jd. The officercalled outforthe occupant, and no one replied, jd. The officer liftedopen the flap ofthetentto see ifa personwas hiding insidefor officer safetypurposes andto check for weapons, jd. Inside, without moving any items, the officer saw items matching the burglarized items. See id The officer went into the tent and took the burglarized items, jd. The police returned the next day and arrested Cleator. Id. at 219.

10No. 71111-3-1/11 

### Cleatormoved to suppress the property recovered from the tent on thegrounds that he had a reasonableexpectationof privacy inthe tent. jd. The Cleator courtaffirmed 

### the denial of Cleator's motion to suppress, reasoning that most courts reject an individual's claim to the right ofprivacy in the temporary shelter he or she wrongfully occupies onpublic property. See Id at222-23. The court reasoned that, as awrongful occupantof public land, Cleator had noreasonableexpectationof privacy at the campsite 

### because he had noright to remain on the property and could have been ejected at any time. jdat222. 

### Cleator is also distinguishable. The Cleator court based its holding on its reasoning that Cleator had no expectation of privacy in his tent. jd. However, itstated 

### that Cleator's privacyexpectations, to the extentthey existed, were limitedto hispersonal belongings. Id. The stolen items in plain viewwere not Cleator's personal belongings, jd. at 218. By virtue ofthe charge the State brought againstWyatt, itcontends that the items are Wyatt's personal belongings. See RCW 69.50.401(1). Moreover, the items here were inside closed containers. Secondly, the Cleator court relied on two cases from other federal circuits for the 

### proposition that Cleatorhad no reasonable expectation of privacy in his tent, because he had no right to remain on the land. Cleater, 71 Wn. App. at 221 (citing United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1986); Amezguita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1975)). The Ninth Circuit has since then disagreed with those cases. See United States v. Sandoval. 200 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000). The Sandoval court 

### disagreed with the idea that a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy turns on whether he had permission to camp on the public land. jd. at 660-61. The Sandoval

11No. 71111-3-1/12



### courtconsidered an illegalcamper's privacy rights in a medicine bottle found in a tenton 

### federal land. jd. at 660. The court explicitly disagreed with the majority opinion in Ruckman and held that Sandoval had a subjective expectation of privacy in his tent. Id. at 660, 661 n.4. The court rejected the argument that a person lacks a subjective expectation of privacy because he is engaged in illegal activity or could have expected the police to intrude on his privacy, jd. at 660. 

### Neither Pentecost nor Cleator resolves the issue currently before us. While touched on indicta in both cases, Washington courts have not yet determinedwhatFourth Amendment privacy rights, if any, a defendant has in personal belongings in closed 

### containers found outside an illegal encampment. Wyatt contends that the privacy protections traditionally afforded to containers coupled withthe language from Pentecost and Cleator regarding closed containers and personal belongings dictates that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the black bag and blue container at his campsite. We agree. The Fourth Amendment protects people, notplaces. Katz. 389 U.S. at 351. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, jd. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner ofevery containerthat conceals its contents from plain viewwiththe level ofprotection afforded varying based on the setting. United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 822-23, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). The rule applies equally to all containers and there are no "worthy" and "unworthy" containers, jd. at 822 ("[A] travelerwho carries a toothbrush and a few articles ofclothing

12No. 71111-3-1/13


### in apaperbag or knotted scarfclaim an equalrighttoconcealhispossessionsfromofficial inspection as the sophisticated executivewiththe locked attache case."). 

### The State contends that concealed items and containers that are not physically found on or nearby a person or near an area regarded as a person's home have been and should remain unprotected. Itcontends thatWyatt lacked a reasonable expectation 

### of privacy in items stored illegally on public property, incontravention of Kent City Code. The State relies on Statev. Jeffries. 105 Wn.2d 398, 413-14, 717 P.2d 722 (1986) 

### for this assertion. InJeffries, the court heldthatadefendanthad noexpectationof privacy in possessions that he hid inthe woods, covered by a tarp and leaves. jj± at 414. The Jeffries courtrelied on United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972), and reasoned that a search of the items in the woods was lawful, because the defendant could not expectto keep anybodywho discoveredthe itemsfrom looking underthetarp and leaves, jd. at414. In Pruitt, the courtlikewise held thatdefendants had no expectation ofprivacy in boxes of marijuana hidden under trees, covered with underbrush, in a grove oftrees located off of a road. 464 F.2d at495-96. The courtspecificallyopined thatthe area was not adjacentto a home, thatthere was no indication thatthe site ofthe cache was being occupied as a camp, and that any casual passerby would feel free to ascertain what he had found. jdat496. This case is distinguishablefrom both Jeffries and Pruitt. The items were not only in closed containers, but also, the items were adjacent to a camp that was clearly occupied. As discussed above, simply because an individual is engaged in illegal activity does not mean that he or she forfeits an expectation of privacy. Sandoval, 200 F.3d at

13No. 71111-3-1/14


### 660. Even though Wyatt was unlawfully camping in the park, he did not forfeit his reasonable expectation of privacy inthe closed containers. We hold that under the Fourth Amendment, Wyatt had a reasonable expectation 

### of privacy in the closed containersfound outside his tent. Consequently, the warrantless search of those containers was unconstitutional. The trial court erred when it denied 

### Wyatt's motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the search. III. Abandonment Alternatively, the State contends that the search satisfied an exception to the warrant requirement—abandonment. The State contends this is so, because Johnson explicitly disclaimed any interest in the property outside ofthe tent that she shared with Wyatt. And, Wyatt implicitlyagreed with the disclaimer, ostensibly because he did not refute Johnson's statement. The State contends that this disclaimer coupled with Wyatt and Johnson leaving the items atthe campsite without attempting to secure them in any way, demonstrates that they intentionally relinquished any expectation of privacy in the items and abandoned them. Thetrialcourtorally opinedthat"it'sprobablethat [the itemswere] not abandoned," but it did not enter a conclusion oflaw on the abandonment issue. Itdecided that whether or not Wyatt abandoned the items was immaterial in light of its conclusion thatWyatt had
no reasonable expectation ofprivacy inthe area anyway. Becausewe disagree withthe trial court's conclusion thatWyattdid not have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy inthe items, we will now consider the State's alternative argument that Wyatt abandoned the
containers.

14No. 71111-3-1/15


### The exceptions to the warrant requirement are carefully drawn and the burden rests with the State to prove the presence ofan exception. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 

### 402, 407, 150 P.3d 105 (2007). One ofthe exceptions to the warrant requirement is for 

### voluntarily abandoned property, jd at 407-08. A determination of voluntary abandonment is generally based upon a combination of act and intent, jd. at 408. The issue is not abandonment in the strict property right sense but, rather, whether the defendant in leaving the property has relinquished his or her reasonable expectation of privacy so thatthe search and seizure is valid, jd. Where the person has an expectation of privacy, disclaiming ownership ofthe property is not sufficient, by itself, to constitute abandonment, jd. at 412. The circumstances surrounding the disclaimer of ownership dictate whether a defendant has abandoned his or her property, jd. at412-413. Therefore, Johnson's disclaimer of ownership, even ifshe were able to disclaim ownership on behalfofWyatt, is not sufficient by itselfto find voluntary abandonment by Wyatt. The State contends that, because Johnson's and Wyatt's actions—walking away from the campsite withouttaking the items or attempting to secure them afterthe officers told them to remove their things from the park—establishes that they abandoned the property. However, the officers told Wyatt and Johnson thatthey had 24 hours to packtheir 

### belongings and leave. Wyatt and Johnson were not up againstthat deadline when they lefttemporarily. Nothing inthe record suggests that they selectively took any personal items when they left, and that those items remaining were those they did not want. 

### Nothing inthe record suggests thatthey were physically capable of removing everything
on theirbacks inonetrip iftheytried. And, Wyatt and Johnson returned to the camp and

15No. 71111-3-1/16 

### spent the night. The items the officers searched while Wyatt and Johnson wereaway werein approximatelythe same location when theofficers returnedthe nextday. Wyatt and Johnson were stillpresent. 

### This recordwill notsupporta legal conclusion that Wyatt and Johnson abandoned 

### the propertywhich was the subject of the illegal search. The abandonmentexception to the warrant requirement does not apply. IV. Confession 

### Wyattcontends that the trial court erred when it did not suppress his confession. 

### Because the warrantless search of Wyatt's containers was unconstitutional, any evidence derived from the illegal search may also be subject to suppression under the fruit ofthe poisonous tree doctrine. State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 717, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). Under the fruit ofthe poisonous tree doctrine, evidence is excluded that was 

### derived directly and indirectly from the illegal police conduct. State v. Le. 103 Wn. App. 354, 361, 12 P.3d 653 (2000). Derivative evidence will be excluded unless itwas not 

### obtained by exploitation ofthe initial illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged ofthe primarytaint, jd. Here, the unconstitutional search provided the evidence of manufacturing meth, which provided the basis of the arrest. Therefore, the arrest for investigation of 

### manufacturing meth was illegal. Even ifthe officers had a basis for Wyatt's arrest for unlawful camping, they had no basis to question him about manufacturing meth other 

### than that obtained from the unconstitutional search.4 The basis for the questioning that 4 The officers may have had probable cause to arrest Wyatt and Johnson for unlawful camping during their first encounter on October 31 and did not do so. Officer Clay and Sergeant Kelso told Wyatt that he had 24 hours to vacate the campsite. The

16No. 71111-3-1/17


### led to a confession was exclusively fruit of the illegal search. The resulting confession should have been suppressed. 

### The trial court erred in denying Wyatt's motion to suppress the evidence in the closed containers andWyatt's statements afterhe was arrested. We reverse and remand 

### for further proceedings.5

WE CONCUR: 

# ^J. •t <



### officers gave Wyatt that warning inthe afternoon. 24 hours had not yet elapsed at the time ofarrest. 5 Because we reverse, we do not address Wyatt's argument about his sentence 

### enhancement. We similarly do not address Wyatt's remaining challenges to the trial court's findings offact and conclusions of law.

17