Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices 66899

interested persons. Comments received

during this period will become part of

the public record. After thirty (30) days,

the Commission will again review the

agreement and the comments received,

and will decide whether it should

withdraw from the agreement or make

final the Consent Order in the

agreement.

By accepting the Proposed Consent

Order subject to final approval, the

Commission anticipates that the

competitive problems alleged in the

Draft Complaint will be resolved. The

purpose of this analysis is to invite and

facilitate public comment concerning

the Proposed Consent Order. It is not

intended to constitute an official

interpretation of the Proposed Consent

Order, nor is it intended to modify the

terms of the orders in any way.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01–31778 Filed 12–26–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6750–01–M

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 011 0141]

Valero Energy Corporation, et al.;

Analysis to Aid Public Comment

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Proposed Consent Agreement.

SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this

matter settles alleged violations of

federal law prohibiting unfair or

deceptive acts or practices or unfair

methods of competition. The attached

Analysis to Aid Public Comment

describes both the allegations in the

draft complaint that accompanies the

consent agreement and the terms of the

consent order—embodied in the consent

agreement—that would settle these

allegations.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before January 18, 2002.

ADDRESSES: Comments filed in paper

form should be directed to: FTC/Office

of the Secretary, Room 159–H, 600

Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20580. Comments

filed in electronic form should be

directed to: consent agreement@ftc.gov,

as prescribed below.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peter Richman, FTC, Bureau of

Competition, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue,

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580, (202)

326–2563.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant

to Section 6(f) of the Federal Trade

Commission Act, 38 Stat, 721, 15 U.S.C.

46(f), and Section 2.34 of the

Commission’s Rules of Practice, 16 CFR

2.34, notice is hereby given that the

above-captioned consent agreement

containing a consent order to cease and

desist, having been filed with and

accepted, subject to final approval, by

the Commission, has been placed on the

public record for a period of thirty (30)

days. The following Analysis to Aid

Public Comment describes the terms of

the consent agreement, and the

allegations in the complaint. An

electronic copy of the full text of the

consent agreement package can be

obtained from the FTC Home Page (for

December 18, 2001), on the World Wide

Web, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/12/

index.htm. A paper copy can be

obtained from the FTC Public Reference

Room, Room 130–H, 600 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580,

either in person or by calling (202) 326–

2222.

Public comments are invited, and may

be filed with the Commission in either

paper or electronic form. Comments

filed in paper form should be directed

to: FTC/Office of the Secretary, Room

159–H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20580. If a comment

contains nonpublic information, it must

be filed in paper form, and the first page

of the document must be clearly labeled

‘‘condfidential.’’ Comments that do not

contain any nonpublic information may

instead be filed in electronic form (in

ASCII format, WordPerfect, or Microsoft

Word) as part of or as an attachment to

email messages directed to the following

email box: consent agreement@ftc.gov.

Such comments will be considered by

the Commission and will be available

for inspection and copying at its

principal office in accordance with

Section 4.9(b)(6)(ii) of the Commission’s

Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 4.9(b)(6)(ii)).

Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to

aid Public Comment

I. Introduction

The Federal Trade Commission

(‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’) has issued a

complaint (‘‘Complaint’’) alleging that

the proposed merger of Valero Energy

Corporation (‘‘Valero’’) and Ultramar

Diamond Shamrock Corporation

Corporation (‘‘Ultramar’’) (collectively

‘‘Respondents’’) would violate Section 7

of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15

U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal

Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15

U.S.C. 45, and has entered into an

agreement containing consent orders

(‘‘Agreement Containing Consent

Orders’’) pursuant to which

Respondents agree to be bound by a

proposed consent order that requires

divestiture of certain assets (‘‘Proposed

Consent Order’’) and a hold separate

order that requires Respondents to hold

separate and maintain certain assets

pending divestiture (‘‘Hold Separate

Order’’). The Proposed Order remedies

the likely anticompetitive effects arising

from Respondent’s proposed merger, as

alleged in the Complaint. The Hold

Separate Order preserve competition

pending divestiture.

II. Description of the Parties and the

Transaction

Valero, headquartered in San

Antonio, Texas, is an independent

domestic refining company. Valero is

engaged in national refining,

transportation, and marketing of

petroleum products and related

petrochemical products. Valero reported

2000 net income of $611 million on

revenues of nearly $15 billion. Valero’s

revenues are generated almost

exclusively in the United States from

seven fuel refineries.

Ultramar is an independent North

American refining and marketing

company also headquartered in San

Antonio, Texas. It is primarily engaged

in the refining, marketing and

transportation of petroleum products

and petrochemicals. Ultramar reported

2000 net earnings of $444 million on

operating of $17.1 billion. Ultramar

operates seven refineries in the United

States and Canada with a total

throughput of 850,000 barrels per day,

marketed through a network of over

5,000 branded retail stations.

Pursuant to and agreement an plan of

merger dated May 6, 2001, Valero

proposed to merge with Ultramar in a

transaction valued at approximately $6

billion. Valero intends to acquire 100%

of the voting stock of Ultramar. As a

result of the merger, Valero will be one

of the largest refiners in the United

States.

III. The Investigation and the Compliant

The Complaint alleges that the merger

of Valero and Ultramar would violate

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as

amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of

the Federal Trade Commission Act, as

amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, by substantially

lessening competition in each of the

following markets: (1) the refining and

bulk supply of CARB 2 and CARD 3

gasoline for sale in Northern California;

and (2) the refining and bulk supply of

CARB 2 and CARB 3 gasoline in the

State of California.

To remedy the alleged

anticompetitive effects of the merger,

the Proposed Order requires

Respondents to divest the Ultramar

Golden Eagle refinery located in Avon,

66900 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices

1A bulk supply market consists of firms that have

the ability to deliver large quantities of gasoline on

a regular and continuing basis, such as pipelines or

local refineries.

2Shell Oil Co., C–3803 (1998); Exxon, C–3907

(2000); (Chevron), C–4023 (Proposed Order 2001).

3The Commission measures market concentration

using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘‘HHI’’),

which is calculated as the sum to the squares of the

shares of all firms in the market. FTC and

Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines

(‘‘Merger Guidelines’’) § 1.5. Markets with HHIs

between 1000 and 1800 are deemed ‘‘moderately

concentrated,’’ and markets with HHIs exceeding

1800 are deemed ‘‘highly concentrated.’’ Merger

Guidelines § 1.51.

California. Along with refinery assets,

Respondents will divest bulk gasoline

supply contracts and 70 Ultramar

Northern California retail service

stations. This will assure the new

entrant a consistent CARB gasoline

demand to assure that the entrant

possesses the same incentives to

produce CARB gasoline that Ultramar

had pre-merger.

The Commission’s decision to issue

the Complaint and enter into the

Agreement Containing Consent Orders

was made after an extensive

investigation in which the Commission

examined competition and the likely

effects of the merger in the markets

alleged in the Complaint and in several

other markets, including markets for

asphalt refining and pipeline

transportation, and terminaling or

marketing of gasoline or other fuels in

sections of the country other than those

alleged in the Complaint. The

Commission has concluded that the

merger is unlikely to reduce

competition significantly in markets

other than those alleged in the

Complaint.

The Commission conducted the

investigation leading to the Complaint

in collaboration with the Attorneys

General of the States of California and

Oregon. As part of this joint effort,

Respondents have entered into State

Decrees with these States settling

charges that the merger would violate

both state and federal antitrust laws.

The Complaint alleges that the merger

would violate the antitrust laws in four

product and geographic markets, each of

which is discussed below. The analysis

applied in each market generally

follows the analysis set forth in the FTC

and U.S. Dep’t of Justice Horizontal

Merger Guidelines (1997) (‘‘Merger

Guidelines’’).

Count I—Refining Bulk Supply of CARB

2 and CARB 3 Gasoline for Sale in

Northern California

Valero and Ultramar compete in the

refining and bulk supply of CARB

gasoline for sale in Northern California.1

Refining and bulk supply of CARB 2

and CARB 3 gasoline are relevant

products markets. CARB gasoline meets

the specifications of the California Air

Resources Board (‘‘CARB’’). CARB 2

automotive gasoline meets the current

Phase 2 specifications in effect since

1996 and is the only gasoline that can

be sold to California gasoline

consumers. CARB 3 automotive gasoline

meets the proposed Phase 3

specifications that are scheduled to go

into effect on January 1, 2003. After that

date, CARB 3 will be the only gasoline

that can be sold to California gasoline

consumers. Thus, there are no

substitutes for CARB 2 gasoline today

and there will be no substitutes for

CARB 3 gasoline. In the current

investigation and in past decisions, the

Commission concluded that the refining

and bulk supply of CARB 2 gasoline is

a relevant market.2

The North Coast (Northern California

and Northwest refineries) constitutes a

relevant geographic market for the

refining and bulk supply of CARB 2 and

CARB 3 gasoline for sale in Northern

California. The North Coast refiners can

profitably raise prices in Northern

California by a small but significant and

nontransitory amount without losing

significant sales to other bulk suppliers.

Five California refiners (Chevron Texaco

(Chevron), Equilon (Shell/Texaco),

Phillips (Tosco), Ultramar, and Valero)

supply more than 94% of the CARB

gasoline consumed in Northern

California; Kern Oil (Bakersfield,

California) and Tesoro (Anacortes,

Washington) supply virtually all the

remainder during normal market

operations. The next closest refineries,

located in the Los Angeles area, are

unlikely to supply CARB gasoline to

Northern California in response to a

small but significant and nontransitory

increase in price because of the

transportation costs to ship from

Southern California.

The North Coast market would be

highly concentrated following the

proposed merger.3 Based on current

CARB refining capacity, the proposed

merger would increase concentration for

the refining of CARB 2 gasoline by

Northern California and Northwest

refineries by more than 750 points to an

HHI level above 2,700. Based on

forecasted CARB 3 refining capacity, the

proposed merger would increase

concentration for the refining and bulk

supply of CARB 3 gasoline by Northern

California and Northwest refineries by

more than 1,050 points to an HHI level

above 3,050.

Entry is difficult and would not be

timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent

anticompetitive effects arising from the

proposed merger. Building a new

refinery is extremely unlikely due to the

severe environmental constraints and

substantial sunk costs. Imports of CARB

gasoline from outside California are

unlikely because of substantial import

barriers, including (1) geographic

isolation from potential outside sources;

(2) cost and difficulty of producing

CARB gasoline; (3) lack of potential

customers because of the extensive

integration of refining and marketing

that has eliminated most independent

gasoline marketers and retailers; and (4)

price risk stemming from spot market

volatility in Northern California.

The efficiency claims of the

Respondents, to the extent they relate to

these markets, are not cognizable under

the Merger Guidelines, are small

compared to the magnitude of the

potential harm, and would not restore

the competition lost by the merger even

if the efficiencies were achieved.

The Complaint charges that the

proposed merger would likely

substantially reduce competition in

refining the bulk supply of CARB

gasoline for sale in Northern California,

thereby increasing wholesale prices of

CARB gasoline by (1) eliminating direct

competition between Valero and

Ultramar; (2) increasing the likelihood

that the combined company will

unilaterally raise prices, and (3)

increasing the ability and likelihood of

coordinated interaction between the

combined company and its competitors

in Northern California. The proposed

merger would create a highly

concentrated market in Northern

California. The combined company

would control between 40 and 45% of

CARB gasoline refining capacity in

Northern California. Under the Merger

Guidelines, these figures trigger a

presumption that ‘‘the merger will

create or enhance market power or

facilities its exercise * * *’’ Merger

Guidelines § 1.51(c). These

anticompetitive effects could result

either from unilateral action by the

combined firm or from coordinated

interaction among the remaining

refiners. Valero’s post-merger market

share supports a presumption under the

Merger Guidelines that it would have

the ability and incentive to unilaterally

reduce supply in Northern California

and raise prices. It could do this in a

variety of ways, including reducing or

eliminating capacity expansions at the

Bay Area refineries, running the

refineries at below capacity, or

exporting gasoline out of the market.

The merger increases the likelihood of

coordinate interaction in Northern

California by reducing the number of

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices 66901

significant refiners in the market from

five to four. The market exhibits

characteristics that are conducive to

coordinated interaction, including (1)

homogenous product; (2) small number

of market participants; (3) high

concentration; (4) recognition by

participants that individual output

decisions impact the market; (5)

difficult entry conditions that insulate

the market from outside supply; (6)

vertical integration that eliminates

potential low-cost competitors and

creates a finite and identifiable collusive

group; and (7) industry practices and

conditions that allow the collusive

group to easily detect and punish

cheating on the tacit agreement.

The merger could raise the costs of

CARB gasoline to Northern California

consumers substantially; even a one

cent per gallon price increase would

cost Northern California consumers

more than $60 million annually. To

remedy the harm, the Proposed Order

requires the Respondents to divest

Ultramar’s Golden Eagle refinery, which

refines CARB gasoline, and 70 Ultramar

retail service stations supplied from the

Golden Eagle refinery, as described

more fully below. This divestiture will

eliminate the refining and bulk supply

overlap in the North Coast market

otherwise presented by this merger.

Count II—Refining and Bulk Supply of

CARB Phase 2 and CARB Phase 3

Gasoline for Sale in California

Valero and Ultramar compete in

refining and bulk supply of CARB

gasoline for sale in California. As

explained in Count I, only CARB

gasoline can be sold legally in

California. Refining and bulk supply of

CARB 2 and CARB 3 gasoline are

relevant product markets.

The West Coast constitutes a relevant

antitrust geographic market for refining

and bulk supply of CARB 2 and CARB

3 gasoline for sale in California. The

West Coast refiners can profitably raise

prices by a small but significant and

nontransitory amount without losing

significant sales to other refiners. Seven

California refiners (BP (Arco), Chevron

Texaco (Chevron), Equilon (Shell/

Texaco), ExxonMobil, Phillips (Tosco),

Ultramar, and Valero) supply more than

97% of the CARB gasoline consumed in

California; Kern Oil (Bakersfield,

California) and Tesoro (Anacortes,

Washington) supply virtually all the

remainder during normal market

operations.

The seven refiner-marketers also

account for more than 95% if retail

gasoline sales in California through their

branded retail stations. One effect of the

close integration between refining and

marketing in California is that refiners

outside the West Coast cannot easily

find outlets for imported cargoes of

CARB gasoline, since nearly all the

outlets are controlled by incumbent

refiner-marketers. Likewise, the

extensive integration of refining,

marketing and bulk storage makes it

more difficult for the few non-integrated

marketers to turn to imports as a source

of supply, since the few remaining

independent marketers lack the scale to

import cargoes economically and thus

must rely on California refiners for their

usual supply.

Other than the California refineries

and one Washington refinery, no other

refineries regularly produce CARB

gasoline in significant quantities. The

next closest refineries, located in the

U.S. Virgin Islands, Texas and

Louisiana, do not supply CARB gasoline

to California except during significant

price spikes caused by supply

disruptions at California refineries.

These refineries are unlikely to supply

CARB gasoline to California except

during significant price spikes caused

by supply disruptions at California

refineries. These refineries are unlikely

to supply CARB gasoline to California in

response to a small but significant and

nontransitory increase in price due to

(1) transportation costs from other

refineries; (2) limited access to marine

and bulk storage facilities; (3) lack of

potential customers because of the

extensive integration of refining and

marketing that has eliminated most

independent gasoline marketers and

retailers; and (4) price risk stemming

from spot market volatility in California.

The West Coast market for the

refining and bulk supply of CARB 2

gasoline would be at the upper end of

the moderately concentrated range

following the proposed merger. Based

on current refining capacity, the

proposed merger would increase

concentration for the refining of CARB

2 gasoline by California and Washington

refineries by more than 325 points to an

HHI level above 1,750. Based on

forecasted CARB 3 refining capacity, the

proposed merger would result in a

highly concentrated market, increasing

concentration for the refining and bulk

supply of CARB 3 gasoline by California

and Washington refineries by more than

390 points to an HHI level above 1,850.

Entry is difficult and would not be

timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent

anticompetitive effects arising from the

proposed merger. Building a new

refinery is unlikely due to the severe

environmental constraints and

substantial sunk costs. Imports of CARB

gasoline from outside California are

unlikely because of the substantial

import barriers listed above.

The efficiency claims of the

Respondents, to the extent they relate to

these markets, are not cognizable under

the Merger Guidelines, are small

compared to the magnitude of the

potential harm, and would not restore

the competition lost by the merger even

if the efficiencies were achieved.

The Complaint charges that the

proposed merger would likely reduce

competition in refining and bulk supply

of CARB gasoline for sale in California,

thereby increasing wholesale prices of

CARB gasoline by (1) eliminating direct

competition between Valero and

Ultramar; and (2) increasing the ability

and likelihood of coordinated

interaction between the combined

company and its competitors in

California. This market exhibits the

same characteristics conducive to

coordinated interaction identified in

Count I. The proposed merger reduces

the number of CARB gasoline refiners in

California and increases concentration,

thereby increasing the likelihood of

coordination.

The merger could raise the costs of

CARB gasoline to all California

consumers substantially; even a one

cent per gallon price increase would

cost California consumers more than

$150 million annually. To remedy the

harm, the Proposed Order requires the

Respondents to divest the refining and

marketing assets identified above in

Count I. This divestiture will eliminate

the refining and bulk supply overlap in

the West Coast market otherwise

presented by this merger.

IV. Resolution of the Competitive

Concerns

A. CARB Gasoline Refining and Bulk

Supply

The Commission has provisionally

entered into the Agreement Containing

Consent Orders with Valero and

Ultramar in settlement of the Complaint.

The Agreement Containing Consent

Orders contemplates that the

Commission would issue the Complaint

and enter the Proposed Order and the

Hold Separate Order for the divestiture

of certain assets described below. The

Commission will appoint R. Shermer &

Company, Inc. as the hold separate

trustee.

To remedy the lessening of

competition in refining and bulk supply

of CARB 2 and CARB 3 gasoline alleged

in Counts I and II of the Complaint,

Paragraph II of the Proposed Order

requires Respondents to divest

Ultramar’s Golden Eagle refinery and 70

Ultramar-owned and operated gas

66902 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 248 / Thursday, December 27, 2001 / Notices

stations supplied from the Golden Eagle

refinery to an acquirer approved by the

Commission. (¶ II.A.) The retail

divestiture is ordered to maintain the

likelihood that the owner of the Golden

Eagle refinery will have incentives to

produce CARB gasoline and other

petroleum products equivalent to

Ultramar’s pre-merger incentives. The

divestiture of Ultramar’s Golden Eagle

refinery, with associated Ultramar retail

assets, will not significantly reduce the

amount of gasoline available to nonintegrated marketers, since the refinery

will likely continue to produce CARB

gasoline and other products and will

need outlets for its sale.

Divestiture of the Golden Eagle

refinery will effectively restore the

competitive status quo ante in both

markets. Valero and Ultramar are the

only major refiners in California with

excess capacity above their direct

marketing needs. This excess (or

‘‘swing’’) capacity helps to dampen

price spikes during shortages resulting

from refinery shutdowns. Elimination of

this swing production would lead to

greater and longer price spikes during

refinery outages. The divestiture will

eliminate the combined company’s

ability and incentive to unilaterally

reduce production and raise prices. In

addition, Valero and Ultramar are the

primary suppliers of unbranded

wholesale gasoline to independent

marketers and, in Northern California,

they compete directly for this business.

These unbranded marketers provide

lower-cost competition to the branded

refiner-marketers. The divestiture will

insure that the remaining independent

marketers have two vigorous

competitors for their business, thus

helping them to survive and continue to

provide a lower-cost alternative for

consumers. This competition, in turn,

will increase the incentive for Valero

and the acquirer to supply more CARB

gasoline, thus, increasing swing

capacity. The divestiture will

complicate the ability of the Northern

California refiners to coordinate their

production because there will be more

refiners than there would be without the

divestiture. Valero and the acquirer will

likely have different incentives than the

integrated refiner-marketers and may be

less willing to coordinate output

decisions with the refiner-marketers.

Although the divestiture will have the

most direct effect in Northern

California, it will also help competition

in California as a whole; since supplies

are longer in Northern California, CARB

gasoline typically flows north to south.

Maintaining production in Northern

California will therefore result in more

product availability throughout the

state.

In considering an application to

divest the Ultramar Golden Eagle

refinery and associated marketing assets

to an acquirer, the Commission will

consider the acquirer’s ability and

incentive to invest and compete in the

businesses in which Ultramar was

engaged in California. The Commission

will consider, inter alia, whether the

acquirer has the business experience,

technical judgment and available capital

to continue to invest in the refinery in

order to maintain CARB gasoline

production even in the event of

changing environmental regulation.

B. Other Terms

Paragraphs III–VII of the Proposed

Order detail certain general provisions.

Pursuant to Paragraph III, if

Respondents fail to comply with the

divestiture ordered in Paragraph II, the

Commission may appoint a trustee to

effectuate the divestiture of the Golden

Eagle Refinery and the 70 retail stations,

or substitute a package containing

Ultramar’s two California refineries and

all of Ultramar’s company-operated

retail stations. Paragraph IV requires the

Respondents to provide the Commission

with a report of compliance with the

Proposed Order every sixty days until

the divestitures are completed.

Paragraph V provides for notification

to the Commission in the event of any

changes in the corporate Respondents.

Paragraph VI requires that Respondents

provide the Commission with access to

their facilities and employees for the

purposes of determining or securing

compliance with the Proposed Order.

Finally, to avoid conflicts between the

Proposed Order and the State consent

decrees, Paragraph VII provides that if a

State fails to approve any of the

divestitures contemplated by the

Proposed Order, then the period of time

required under the Proposed Order for

such divestiture shall be extended for

sixty days.

V. Opportunity for Public Comment

The Proposed Order has been placed

on the public record for thirty (30) days

for receipt of comments by interested

persons. The Commission, pursuant to a

change in its Rules of Practice, has also

issued its Complaint in this matter, as

well as a Hold Separate Order.

Comments received during this thirty

day comment period will become part of

the public record. After thirty (30) days,

the Commission will again review the

Proposed Order and the comments

received and will decide whether it

should withdraw from the Proposed

Order or make final the Proposed Order.

By accepting the Proposed Order

subject to final approval, the

Commission anticipates that the

competitive problems alleged in the

Complaint will be resolved. The

purpose of this analysis is to invite

public comment on the Proposed Order,

including the proposed divestitures, and

to aid the Commission in its

determination of whether it should

make final the Proposed Order

contained in the agreement. This

analysis is not intended to constitute an

official interpretation of the Proposed

Order, nor is it intended to modify the

terms of the Proposed Order in any way.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01–31779 Filed 12–26–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6750–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention

Citizens Advisory Committee on Public

Health Service Activities and Research

at Department of Energy (DOE) Sites:

Savannah River Site Health Effects

Subcommittee (SRSHES)

In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of

the Federal Advisory Committee Act

(Pub. L. 92–463), the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC), and the

Agency for Toxic Substances and

Disease Registry (ATSDR) announce the

following meeting.

Name: Citizens Advisory Committee

on Public Health Service Activities and

Research at Department of Energy (DOE)

Sites: Savannah River Site Health

Effects Subcommittee (SRSHES).

Times and Dates: 8:30 a.m.–4:45 p.m.,

January 10, 2002. 8:30 a.m.–12 noon,

January 11, 2002.

Place: Charleston Riverview Hotel

(formerly Radisson Hotel Charleston)

170 Lockwood Drive, Charleston, South

Carolina 29403, telephone (843) 723–

3000, fax (843) 723–0276.

Status: Open to the public, limited

only by the space available. The meeting

room accommodates approximately 50

people.

Background: Under a Memorandum

of Understanding (MOU) signed in

December 1990 with DOE, and replaced

by MOUs signed in 1996 and 2000, the

Department of Health and Human

Services (HHS) was given the

responsibility and resources for

conducting analytic epidemiologic

investigations of residents of

communities in the vicinity of DOE