UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4977

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHAUNCEY LAMONT RANDOLPH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00285-CCE-1)

Submitted: July 29, 2014 Decided: July 31, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William S. Trivette, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Timothy Nicholas Matkins, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Chauncey Lamont Randolph pled guilty to possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012). The district court sentenced Randolph 

in the middle of his Guidelines range to 100 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Randolph’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning the substantive reasonableness of Randolph’s 

sentence. Randolph has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, 

despite notice of his right to do so. We affirm.

We review Randolph’s sentence for reasonableness, 

applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When reviewing a 

sentence for substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality 

of the circumstances and, if the sentence is within the 

properly-calculated Guidelines range, apply a presumption on 

appeal that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United 

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant shows “that 

the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v. Montes–

Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).
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On appeal, Randolph’s counsel argues that Randolph’s 

sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to 

accomplish the goals of § 3553(a). We conclude that Randolph 

has failed to overcome the appellate presumption of 

reasonableness afforded his sentence. In arguing for a downward 

variance at sentencing, defense counsel pointed out to the court 

the impact of a single misdemeanor on Randolph’s Guidelines 

range. Counsel further informed the court that Randolph would 

seek employment in the culinary field upon release. The 

district court acknowledged counsel’s arguments, but concluded 

that a sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range was 

appropriate “in order to protect the public,” “to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense,” and in light of Randolph’s “long 

criminal record.” Given the presumption of reasonableness that 

attaches to a within-Guidelines sentence, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the district court’s decision not to vary downward 

and to impose a sentence in the middle of the Guidelines range. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires counsel to inform Randolph, in writing, of his 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Randolph requests that a petition be filed 

but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel 
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may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Randolph. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid in the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED