IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

v. ) ID Nos. 1812006782

) 1812014043

JOSHUA CIRWITHIAN, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

On this 5th day of April, 2024, upon consideration of Defendant Joshua 

Cirwithian’s (“Defendant”) pro se Objection to the Superior Court Commissioner’s 

Report and Recommendation (the “Objection”),

1

the Commissioner’s Report and 

Recommendation,2 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. On August 1, 2021, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief to

set aside his judgment of conviction. Consideration of the motion was delayed 

because Defendant filed motions for appointment of counsel and was appointed 

counsel, who subsequently filed a motion to withdraw.3

1 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.

2 D.I.s 1812006782-92, 1812014043-106; State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 862447 (Del. Super. Feb. 

28, 2024). The Court adopted this Report and Recommendation in its entirety on March 20, 2024.

State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 1219137, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 20, 2024).

3 On August 6, 2021, Defendant filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel. D.I. 

1812014043-73. On November 1, 2021, the Court granted that motion. D.I. 1812014043-75. On 

August 8, 2022, postconviction counsel was appointed for Defendant. D.I. 1812014043-78. On 

February 14, 2023, postconviction counsel filed a motion to withdraw. D.I. 1812014043-88. On 

March 8, 2023, Defendant filed a response to postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw. D.I. 

1812014043-91.
2

2. On June 6, 2023, Defendant filed a first brief to supplement his motion for 

postconviction relief.

4 On June 12, 2023, the State filed a brief in opposition to the 

motion.5 On July 11, 2023, Defendant filed a brief in response to the State’s brief.6

On October 26, 2023, Defendant filed a second brief to supplement his motion.7

3. On January 30, 2024, Defendant sent a pro se letter to the Court, in which 

he alleged that the State forged the Certificate of Authenticity document that was 

presented at trial to authenticate Facebook messages.8 The State had offered these 

messages to corroborate the testimony of the victim.9

4. Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was referred to the 

Commissioner pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 62 for proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On February 28, 

2024, the Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation, in which he 

recommended that the Court summarily dismiss Defendant’s motion.

10

5. On February 29, 2024, the Court wrote to the parties, requesting that they 

file responses to the allegations that Defendant made against the State in his January 

30, 2024 pro se letter.11

4 D.I.s 1812006782-79, 1812014043-94.

5 D.I.s 1812006782-80, 1812014043-95.

6 D.I. 1812006782-81.

7 D.I. 1812014043-103.

8 D.I.s 1812006782-91, 1812014043-105.

9

Id.

10 D.I.s 1812006782-92, 1812014043-106.

11 D.I. 1812014043-110.
3

6. On March 5, 2024, the State responded by letter to this Court, in which it 

denied forging the certificate that was offered to authenticate the Facebook 

messages. The State emphasized the Commissioner’s statement that “the State 

established a rational basis from which the judge could conclude the evidence was 

connected to the Defendant.”12 The State asserted that Defendant had not factually 

supported his conclusory allegation of forgery.

7. A party can file and serve written objections to a Commissioner’s report 

and recommendation on postconviction relief “[w]ithin ten days after filing of a 

Commissioner’s proposed findings of fact and recommendations.”13 In this case, 

neither party filed and served a written objection on or before March 12, 2024, ten 

days after the Commissioner filed his Report and Recommendation. Then, on March 

20, 2024, the Court issued an order, in which it adopted the Commissioner’s Report 

and Recommendation in its entirety and denied Defendant’s motion for 

postconviction relief.

14

8. On March 21, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Objection. In it, Defendant 

asks the Court to (1) vacate his convictions and sentences; (2) schedule a new trial 

12 D.I.s 1812006782-92, 1812014043-106.

13 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii).

14 State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 1219137, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 20, 2024).
4

or reduce his sentence; (3) schedule an evidentiary hearing on his allegations from 

the Objection; and (4) appoint new postconviction counsel.15

9. Pursuant to Rule 62(b), a party “appealing the findings of fact and 

recommendations of a Commissioner under subparagraph (5) who fails to comply 

with the provisions of this rule may be subject to dismissal of said motion for 

reconsideration or appeal.”

10. Defendant’s Objection is subject to dismissal because Defendant failed to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 62. Rule 62(a)(5)(ii) requires that written 

objections be filed within ten days after the filing of the Commissioner’s proposed 

findings of fact and recommendations.

16 Defendant did not serve and file his written 

objections within ten days after the Commissioner filed his Report and 

Recommendation on February 29, 2024.

17 The temporal window to file written 

15 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112. Defendant was previously appointed postconviction 

counsel to represent him in his motion for postconviction relief. That counsel filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel on February 10, 2023. That motion was referred to the Commissioner. On 

February 28, 2024, the Commissioner recommended that the Court grant the motion to withdraw.

On March 20, 2024, after considering the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, the Court 

granted the motion to withdraw. State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 1219137 (Del. Super. Mar. 20, 

2024); State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 862447 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2024). Accordingly, Defendant 

currently proceeds pro se.

16 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii) (“Within 10 days after filing of a Commissioner’s proposed 

findings of fact and recommendations under subparagraph (5), any party may serve and file written 

objections to the Commissioner’s order which set forth with particularity the basis for the 

objections.”).

17 Also, Defendant did not title his written objections “Appeal from Commissioner’s Findings of 

Fact and Recommendations,” as the Rule requires. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii) (“The written 

objections shall be entitled ‘Appeal from Commissioner’s Findings of Fact and 

Recommendations.’”).
5

objections closed on March 12, 2024.18 Defendant waited until after this window 

had closed, and the Court had already issued an order adopting the Report and 

Recommendation, to file his written objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Further, Defendant provides no reason for this delay.19

11. Even if Defendant had filed the Objection within the prescribed time

period, the arguments he raises in the Objection lack merit.20 A judge determines,

de novo, which of the Commissioner’s findings of fact and recommendations to 

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part.21 The Court adopted the 

Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety by order on March 20, 

2024.22

12. First, Defendant argues that the Commissioner erred by failing to 

repudiate the authentication of Facebook messages at trial by testimony from the 

victim.

23 Defendant asks the Court to reject the Commissioner’s findings, which 

18 See Cirwithian, 2024 WL 1219137, at *2.

19 The Court can shorten or enlarge the time periods of Rule 62 for “good cause.” Super. Ct. Crim. 

R. 62(c). Defendant has not shown any good cause for the Court to extend the Rule 62(a)(5)(ii)

filing period.

20 Further, Defendant’s failure to follow the Rule 62(a)(5)(ii) timeline deprived the State of the

opportunity to timely respond to Defendant’s written objections. Under the Rule, the State should 

have ten days from service of Defendant’s written objections to file and serve a written response. 

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii). Defendant did not timely file his Objection, so the State did not 

file and serve a written response within ten days after Defendant filed the Objection. Hence, the 

Court has not received the benefit of a response to the Objection from the State.

21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(iv).

22 See Cirwithian, 2024 WL 1219137.

23 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.
6

were based on Delaware law, in favor of Defendant’s application of standards from 

other jurisdictions.

24 To do so would be nonsensical.

13. Second, Defendant argues that the Commissioner erred by dismissing his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims because, in Defendant’s view, his counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

25 The 

Commissioner stated that Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 

procedurally barred and, nonetheless, failed on the merits under the standard of 

Strickland v. Washington.

26 In the Objection, Defendant does not raise any 

substantive challenges to the Commissioner’s findings that would cause the Court 

to reconsider adoption of the Report and Recommendation.

14. Third, Defendant argues that the Commissioner erred by determining that 

Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred under Rules 

61(i)(3) and/or 61(i)(4).27 Defendant does not argue that these procedural bars do 

not apply, merely that the substance of his claims justifies an exception to the bars.

Delaware recognizes an exception to these procedural bars when the postconviction 

24 The Commissioner concluded that the messages had been properly authenticated, based on 

Delaware Rule of Evidence 901 and Bowers v. State, 2023 WL 6938238, at *3 (Del. Oct. 20, 2023). 

State v. Cirwithian, 2024 WL 862447, at *6-7 (Del. Super. Feb. 28, 2024). Defendant asks the 

Court to reject the Commissioner’s analysis of on-point law in favor of Defendant’s dubious

application of United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), United States v. Safavian, 

435 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2006), and United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014). D.I.s 

1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.

25 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.

26 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Cirwithian, 2024 WL 862447, at *6-12.

27 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.
7

motion satisfies the standard of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii), which require pleading 

with particularity new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive

on collateral review. None of the arguments that Defendant raises in opposition to 

the application of the procedural bars fit within that exception.28

15. Fourth, Defendant argues that the Commissioner erred by determining

that the trial judge did not improperly assist or coach the witness at trial.29 The 

Commissioner found that the trial judge had merely directed the witness to answer 

the questions posed by Defendant’s counsel, not coached the witness.30 In the 

Objection, Defendant fails to clarify which statements by the trial judge he finds 

objectionable. Rather, he conclusorily states that the trial judge created an unfair 

advantage for the prosecution. Defendant’s arguments do not warrant reconsidering

the Court’s adoption of the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

16. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Objection to the Commissioner’s

Report and Recommendation is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________ _________

 Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

28 Defendant cites Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 

(1986), Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012), and Reed v. 

Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.

29 D.I.s 1812006782-98, 1812014043-112.

30 Cirwithian, 2024 WL 862447, at *7-8.