Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00122-CV

William Wesley RUTH,

Appellant

v.

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16375

Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 24, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellant William Wesley Ruth appeals the trial court’s judgment suspending him from 

the practice of law for eighteen months. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND

After being injured in a car accident, Stephanie Alvarado hired Ruth to represent her in a 

personal injury lawsuit against the adverse driver involved in the accident. The lawsuit settled for 

$43,000.00, and a settlement check made payable to Alvarado and Ruth was mailed to Ruth’s 

office. Ruth deposited the check into his spouse’s non-IOLTA bank account and issued a check 
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in the amount of $33,000.00 to Alvarado from a different non-IOLTA bank account. Despite not 

having a written fee agreement with Alvarado, Ruth had charged and collected a contingency fee 

from the settlement amount for his legal representation. He did not provide Alvarado with a 

written statement describing the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to Alvarado 

and the method of its determination. 

In August 2019, Alvarado filed a grievance against Ruth with the Office of the Chief 

Disciplinary Counsel, which ultimately led to the Commission for Lawyer Discipline initiating a 

disciplinary action against Ruth for violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 

Conduct 1.04(d), 1.05(b)(1), 1.14(a), and 8.04(a)(1). See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct 

R. 1.04(d), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (requiring contingency fee 

agreements to be in writing and requiring lawyer to provide client with written statement 

describing outcome and showing remittance and method of determination), 1.05(b)(1) (prohibiting 

lawyer from disclosing confidential information of client), 1.14(a) (requiring lawyer to hold funds 

in separate “trust” or “escrow” account), and 8.04(a)(1) (prohibiting lawyer from violating 

disciplinary rules). The Commission then moved for partial summary judgment on its claims Ruth 

had violated the disciplinary rules. After a hearing, the trial court granted partial summary 

judgment in favor of the Commission, stating Ruth violated Rules 1.04(d), 1.14(a), and 8.04(a)(1). 

On December 14, 2022, the case proceeded to a one-day bench trial on the issue of sanctions, and 

the trial court heard testimony from Alvarado and the Coryell County District Attorney. The trial 

court ultimately entered a final judgment, imposing an eighteen-month active suspension against 

Ruth. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

Ruth contends the trial court’s eighteen-month suspension was an inappropriate sanction 

because: 1) it does not advance the purpose of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 2) he 
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did not cause actual or potential harm to anyone, and 3) it was based on a previous judgment of 

suspension that was pending on appeal. According to Ruth, the suspension should be set aside, 

and we should remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on sanctions. 

Standard of Review

We review the sanction imposed on an attorney for professional misconduct for an abuse 

of discretion. Neely v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 196 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); McIntyre v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 169 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). “The judgment of a trial court in a disciplinary proceeding may 

be so light, or so heavy, as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 

874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1994). “At the same time, the trial court has broad discretion to 

determine whether an attorney guilty of professional misconduct should be reprimanded, 

suspended, or disbarred.” Id.; see Rosas v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 335 S.W.3d 311, 320

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (“A trial court has broad discretion to determine the 

consequences of professional misconduct.”). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an 

unreasonable and arbitrary manner, or when it acts without reference to any guiding principles. 

See Rosas, 335 S.W.3d at 320. But the mere fact the trial court “may decide a matter differently 

than an appellate court does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.” Cantu v. Comm’n for Law.

Discipline, No. 13-16-00332-CV, 2020 WL 7064806, at *20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 3, 

2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242

(Tex. 1985)). 

Applicable Law

For attorney discipline cases involving grievances filed before June 1, 2018, Rule 3.10 of 

the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure sets forth several factors for trial courts to consider in 

determining the appropriate sanctions for misconduct. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 3.10
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(repealed June 1, 2018). For cases involving grievances filed after June 1, 2018, as here, the Texas 

Supreme Court replaced these factors with guidelines in part XV of the current version of the 

Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. See Order Adopting Amendments to the Texas Rules of 

Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 18-9031 (2018); Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 15.01–

.09 reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B. In this case, Alvarado filed her 

grievance against Ruth in August 2019; therefore, we apply the guidelines in the current version 

of the rules. See Order Adopting Amendments to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. 

Docket No. 18-9031 (2018). 

According to the guidelines, “[t]he purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect 

the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not 

discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the

legal system, and the legal profession.” Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 15.01(A). The guidelines 

further provide the disciplinary tribunal should consider “the duty violated,” “the Respondent’s 

level of culpability,” “the potential or actual injury caused by the Respondent’s misconduct,” and 

“the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors” when imposing a sanction. Id. R. 15.02. In 

cases where a lawyer fails to preserve client property, “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when 

a Respondent knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes 

injury or potential injury to a client.” Id. R. 15.04(B)(2). Suspension is also “appropriate when a 

Respondent knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and 

causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” Id. R. 15.07(2). 

Application

We begin our analysis by considering the first factor the guidelines provide the disciplinary 

tribunal should consider—“the duty violated.” See id. R. 15.02. In this case, Ruth does not dispute 

the duties he violated or challenge the trial court’s partial summary judgment, which stated he
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violated Rules 1.04(d), 1.14(a), and 8.04(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tex. 

Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.04(d), 1.05(b)(1), 1.14(a), and 8.04(a)(1). In fact, in his 

brief, Ruth states he “conceded during the sanctions trial that he violated the duties to have a 

written contract, to have a written itemization of the settlement[,] and to deposit the insurance 

check in an IOLTA account.” 

As to Ruth’s level of culpability, Ruth does not dispute he improperly handled Alvarado’s 

settlement proceeds and violated duties owed as a professional; thus, recognizing he knew or 

should have known his actions were improper. See CULPABILITY, Black Law’s Dictionary (11th

ed. 2019) (defining culpability as “moral blameworthiness” and “mental state that must be proved 

for a defendant to be held liable for a crime”). Rather, he attempts to justify his misconduct by 

arguing his level of culpability is “low” because Alvarado testified at the sanctions hearing she 

was not confused about their contractual agreement, a written itemization of the settlement was 

unnecessary because no expenses needed explaining, and paying Alvarado from a personal account 

placed the funds into her possession quicker. However, these justifications lack merit because 

they fail to explain Ruth’s level of culpability and focus instead on minimizing the gravity of his 

actions. 

Turning to the potential or actual injury caused by Ruth’s misconduct, Ruth asserts 

Alvarado was not harmed by his misconduct. It is well-established “[a]mong an attorney’s 

foremost ethical obligations is the proper handling of clients’ funds and trust accounts.” Neely v. 

Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 302 S.W.3d 331, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. 

denied). And we have recognized this ethical obligation, cautioning the potential danger “that 

funds in a commingled account will be viewed as the lawyer’s property, rather than the client’s, 

and will thus be subject to the claims of the lawyer’s creditors.” Brown v. Comm’n for Law. 

Discipline, 980 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see also Tex. 
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Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.14 cmt. 2 (cautioning against commingling because such course 

of dealing increases risk that all assets of account will be viewed as the lawyer’s property and 

subject to creditors); 48 Robert P. Schuwerk, et al., Tex. Prac., Tex. Lawyer & Jud. Ethics § 6:14 

(2024 ed.). Thus, even assuming Alvarado was not actually harmed by Ruth’s actions, the 

guidelines account for the potential for harm. See Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 15.02. 

Finally, with respect to “the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors,” Ruth contends 

the trial court did not consider “the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive” or his “inexperience 

in the practice of law” as mitigating factors. Under the guidelines, a disciplinary tribunal may 

consider mitigating factors, such as those listed by Ruth, in determining mitigation. See id. R. 

15.09(C) (outlining factors which “may” be considered in mitigation). However, it may also 

consider aggravating factors in determining aggravation. See id. R. 15.09(B) (outlining factors 

which “may” be considered in aggravation). Here, the trial court was presented with evidence 

solely of aggravating factors concerning Ruth’s past conduct. During the sanctions trial, the 

Coryell County District Attorney testified in 2019, he was a special prosecutor assigned to

investigate several charges against Ruth, including an assault on a public servant and “some 

misdemeanor evading and resisting charges.” During his investigation, additional charges 

followed for “aggravated perjury” and “[t]he misapplication of fiduciary duty [and] the 

obstruction, retaliation, the fraudulent use of identifying information.” He testified the matters 

were resolved by Ruth pleading guilty to the lesser included offense of assault on a public servant. 

In addition to this testimony, the Commission produced evidence showing Ruth’s legal license had 

been suspended for five years in September 2022. Ruth, however, contends the September 2022

judgment of suspension should not have been considered because it was pending on appeal, but 

there is nothing in the record indicating his judgment of suspension had been stayed and should 
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not have been considered.1 Thus, based on this record, it is clear the trial court considered the 

existence of aggravating factors when determining the degree of discipline imposed. 

When considering the factors a disciplinary tribunal should consider when imposing a 

sanction—“the duty violated,” “the Respondent’s level of culpability,” “the potential or actual 

injury caused by the Respondent’s misconduct,” and “the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors,” we cannot conclude the trial court acted unreasonably or arbitrarily to constitute an abuse 

of discretion. See Neely, 196 S.W.3d at 807; Rosas, 335 S.W.3d at 320. Here, Ruth concedes he 

violated several rules of professional conduct, and the record shows he knowingly violated these 

rules by mishandling the settlement. Such misconduct could have potentially harmed Alvarado, 

and there is evidence of aggravating factors the trial court could have considered. To the extent

Ruth contends the trial court’s eighteen-month suspension does not advance the purpose of the 

disciplinary rules and therefore he should have received a lesser sanction, Ruth fails to cite any 

legal authority supporting this contention. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Furthermore, we must 

remain mindful an abuse of discretion does not occur merely because a trial court may have 

decided a matter differently and imposed a lesser sanction. See Cantu, 2020 WL 7064806, at *20. 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

1 We note on June 20, 2024, this court issued an opinion affirming the September 2022 judgment of suspension 

referenced during the sanctions trial. See Ruth v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, No. 04-22-00796-CV, 2024 WL 

3056655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 20, 2024, no pet. h.) (op.).