Filed 1/14/22 Ruiz-Bouvet v. Harrison CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

VINCENT RUIZ BOUVET,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SARA T. HARRISON, 

 Defendants and Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B304805

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-

00515518-CU-OR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR REHEARING AND 

MODIFYING OPINION

(No Change in Judgment)

THE COURT:

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. It is ordered 

that the opinion filed on December 16, 2021 be modified as 

follows:

On page 2, line 4, delete the entire sentence beginning “He 

repeated that claim . . .” and insert the following sentence 

instead: Vincent testified that he repeated that claim “at the 

funeral home when [the siblings] made arrangements for [their] 

mother’s burial.” 

On page 2, footnote 3, delete both sentences in the footnote 

and insert the following instead: Vincent, who is an attorney, is 

an inactive member of the California State Bar.
2

On page 3, third full paragraph, second to the last 

sentence, delete “the next day,” so that the sentence now reads: 

He testified he repeated this claim to all of them at the funeral 

home.

On page 3, third full paragraph, last sentence, delete 

“Vincent acknowledged there was” and insert instead “Vincent 

produced,” so that the sentence now reads: Vincent produced 

nothing in writing evidencing Victoria’s intent to leave him the 

property, i.e., there was no will, trust or conveyance of any kind.

On page 8, second full paragraph, delete “a practicing 

attorney at the time” in the first sentence and insert instead “an 

attorney,” so that the sentence now reads: Although the trial 

court noted that Vincent was an attorney and had failed to give 

his siblings written notice of the ouster, it did not state that 

written notice is an absolute requirement. 

On page 8, second full paragraph, delete the second 

sentence beginning “Vincent testified” in its entirety and insert 

the following sentence instead, including the quotation marks: 

According to the reporter’s transcript, Vincent testified: “[B]eing 

an attorney and handling property law, I was aware I had to take 

exclusive control and exclude my siblings from any – any control

of the house.” 

On page 9, second sentence, delete “the next day,” so that 

the sentence now reads: He claims the testimony, which was not 

presented in the trial court, establishes that the siblings were not 

upset the day their mother died or at the funeral home. 

No change in judgment.

____________________________________________________________

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.
Filed 1/14/22 Ruiz-Bouvet v. Harrison CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

VINCENT RUIZ BOUVET,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SARA T. HARRISON, 

 Defendants and Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B304805

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-

00515518-CU-OR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR REHEARING AND 

MODIFYING OPINION

(No Change in Judgment)

THE COURT:

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. It is ordered 

that the opinion filed on December 16, 2021 be modified as 

follows:

On page 2, line 4, delete the entire sentence beginning “He 

repeated that claim . . .” and insert the following sentence 

instead: Vincent testified that he repeated that claim “at the 

funeral home when [the siblings] made arrangements for [their] 

mother’s burial.” 
2

On page 2, footnote 3, delete both sentences in the footnote 

and insert the following instead: Vincent, who is an attorney, is 

an inactive member of the California State Bar.

On page 3, third full paragraph, second to the last 

sentence, delete “the next day,” so that the sentence now reads: 

He testified he repeated this claim to all of them at the funeral 

home.

On page 3, third full paragraph, last sentence, delete 

“Vincent acknowledged there was” and insert instead “Vincent 

produced,” so that the sentence now reads: Vincent produced 

nothing in writing evidencing Victoria’s intent to leave him the 

property, i.e., there was no will, trust or conveyance of any kind.

On page 8, second full paragraph, delete “a practicing 

attorney at the time” in the first sentence and insert instead “an 

attorney,” so that the sentence now reads: Although the trial 

court noted that Vincent was an attorney and had failed to give 

his siblings written notice of the ouster, it did not state that 

written notice is an absolute requirement. 

On page 8, second full paragraph, delete the second 

sentence beginning “Vincent testified” in its entirety and insert 

the following sentence instead, including the quotation marks: 

According to the reporter’s transcript, Vincent testified: “[B]eing 

an attorney and handling property law, I was aware I had to take 

exclusive control and exclude my siblings from any – any control

of the house.” 

On page 9, second sentence, delete “the next day,” so that 

the sentence now reads: He claims the testimony, which was not 

presented in the trial court, establishes that the siblings were not 

upset the day their mother died or at the funeral home. 

No change in judgment.
3

____________________________________________________________

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.
Filed 12/16/21 Ruiz-Bouvet v. Harrison CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

VINCENT RUIZ-BOUVET, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v.

SARA T. HARRISON, 

individually and as 

Administrator of the Estate of 

Victoria Ruiz, 

 Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civ. No. B304805

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-

00515518-CU-OR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Appellant Vincent Ruiz-Bouvet (Vincent) and his three 

siblings, respondent Sara T. Harrison (Sara), Annette Ruiz 

(Annette) and Robert Ruiz (Robert) (collectively “siblings”) 

inherited the single-family residence owned by their mother, 
5

Victoria Ruiz (Victoria), when she died intestate in 2012.

1

 On the 

day Victoria died, Vincent privately told each of his siblings that 

Victoria had given him both the property and her savings so that 

he would have a place to live. He repeated that claim to all his 

siblings at the funeral home the next day. 

Vincent and Annette continued to live on the property as 

they had prior to Victoria’s death. Vincent made no attempt to 

secure sole ownership of the property until 2018, when Sara filed 

a probate proceeding on behalf of Victoria’s estate. Vincent then 

brought this action to quiet title based on adverse possession. 

The case was tried by the court in November 2019. At the 

close of Vincent’s case-in-chief, Sara moved for judgment under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.

2 The trial court granted 

the motion, finding that Vincent had “failed to meet his burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that he gave notice to 

the other cotenants [i.e., his siblings] of his claim of exclusive 

ownership” of the property. It entered judgment for Sara. 

Vincent, appearing in propria persona,3 contends the trial 

court (1) applied the wrong burden of proof and improperly added 

an element to his adverse possession claim, (2) improperly 

admitted his deposition testimony, (3) made erroneous findings of 

fact, (4) made inferences that are unsupported by the record and 

(5) improperly found that his testimony did not establish all the 

1 For the sake of clarity, we refer to the family members by 

their first names. No disrespect is intended. 

2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

3 Vincent was a practicing attorney at the time of trial. He 

is now an inactive member of the State Bar. 
6

elements of his adverse possession claim. None of these claims 

has merit. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Victoria and Vincent Canalez Ruiz acquired the property 

located at 6825 Dove Street in Ventura in 1972. They are the 

siblings’ parents. 

Vincent Canalez Ruiz quitclaimed the property to Victoria 

in 1978. Victoria remained the sole legal owner of the property 

until her death in March 2012. There was no mortgage on the 

property and “no known liens or encumbrances.” 

Vincent and Annette lived with Victoria until her death. 

Annette paid the monthly utility and cable TV bills and Vincent

paid $150 per month in rent. On the day Victoria died, the 

distraught siblings met at the property. Vincent testified his 

siblings were “running around like chickens with their heads cut 

off and trying to get their heads around what had just happened” 

and “people [were] just kind of in a daze.” Vincent claims he took 

each sibling aside and explained that Victoria wanted him to 

have the property and that he would own it “‘to the exclusion of 

each of his siblings.’” He testified he repeated this claim to all of 

them at the funeral home the next day. Vincent acknowledged 

there was nothing in writing evidencing Victoria’s intent to leave 

him the property, i.e., there was no will, trust or conveyance of 

any kind. 

Vincent and Annette continued to live on the property, and 

Annette continued to pay the monthly utility and cable TV bills. 

No sibling was excluded from the property. 

Vincent paid the property insurance and property taxes. 

He also paid for certain repairs. None of the other siblings 
7

contributed to those expenses. Neither Sara nor Robert objected 

to Vincent and Annette’s continued occupancy. 

Because Victoria died intestate, the siblings became equal 

tenants in common by operation of law. Thus, as of her date of 

death, each sibling owned an equal one-quarter share of the 

property as tenants in common. (See Mannheim v. Superior 

Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 691 [“It is . . . settled that when a 

decedent dies intestate, his heirs, both known and unknown, 

acquire an interest in his estate by operation of law at the 

moment of death”].) “According to the Tax Collector and Assessor 

records received [by the trial court], Victoria remains the legal 

owner of record title.” 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Vincent misstates and misapplies the applicable standard 

of review. “‘The standard of review after a trial court issues 

judgment pursuant to . . . section 631.8 is the same as if the court 

had rendered judgment after a completed trial -- that is, in 

reviewing the questions of fact decided by the trial court, the 

substantial evidence rule applies.’” (Medrazo v. Honda of North 

Hollywood (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.) “Under that standard, 

our review begins and ends with a determination as to whether 

there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, 

to support the findings below. [Citations.] . . . [W]e view the 

record in the light most favorable to respondents, giving them the 

benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in 

their favor. [Citation.] ‘[I]t is not our role to reweigh the 

evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if 

there is evidence to support it.’” (Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 
8

Cal.App.5th 1294, 1299-1300; accord People ex rel. Dept. of Motor 

Vehicles v. Cars 4 Causes (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1006. 1012 

[“The purpose of [section] 631.8 is ‘to enable the court, when it 

finds at the completion of plaintiff’s case that the evidence does 

not justify requiring the defense to produce evidence, to weigh 

evidence and make findings of fact’”].) 

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Entry of Judgment

on Vincent’s Adverse Possession Claim

As we explained in Preciado v. Wilde (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 321 (Preciado), “‘[i]n an action to quiet title based on 

adverse possession the burden is upon the claimant to prove 

every necessary element: (1) Possession must be by actual 

occupation under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable 

notice to the owner. (2) It must be hostile to the owner’s title. (3) 

The holder must claim the property as his own, under either color 

of title or claim of right. (4) Possession must be continuous and 

uninterrupted for five years. (5) The holder must pay all the 

taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶] But ‘“[w]here, as here, a claim of 

ownership by adverse possession is asserted against a cotenant 

additional principles become operative. . . .” [Citation.]’

[Citation.] ‘“[E]ach tenant in common has a right to occupy the 

whole of the property. The possession of one is deemed the 

possession of all; each may assume that another in exclusive 

possession is possessing for all and not adversely to the others.

. . .”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 325.) 

“‘“‘Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as 

between cotenants, the occupying tenant must bring home or 

impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of 

ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, 
9

that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the common 

property. [Citations.] Such evidence must be stronger than that 

which would be required to establish a title by adverse possession 

in a stranger. [Citation.]’ . . . In short, one tenant in common 

cannot by mere exclusive possession acquire the title of his 

cotenant. [Citation.]”’ [Citations.]” (Preciado, supra, 139 

Cal.App.4th at p. 325, italics omitted.) 

“‘An ouster, in the law of tenancy in common, is the 

wrongful dispossession or exclusion by one tenant of his cotenant 

or cotenants from the common property of which they are entitled 

to possession.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Hughes (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 1607, 1612 [absent any evidence of actual exclusion 

from the property in dispute, the court could not find an ouster].) 

“[O]uster must be proved by acts of an adverse character, such as 

claiming the whole for himself, denying the title of his 

companion, or refusing to permit him to enter.” (Zaslow v. 

Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 548 [denial of title, changing locks, 

posting “no trespassing” signs on the property and denying 

admittance thereto constituted ouster].) 

Contrary to Vincent’s assertions, the trial court correctly 

stated the elements of his adverse possession claim, correctly 

identified the burden of proof as clear and convincing evidence 

and did not add an extra element to the claim. As the court 

observed, “the presumption of title in each of the four [sibling] 

cotenants can be overcome only by Vincent’s clear and convincing 

evidence of ouster.” 

1. Burden of Proof

It is true that the cases tend to describe the applicable 

burden of proof in an adverse possession claim as “clear and 

satisfactory” or “clear and positive,” rather than clear and 
10

convincing. (See, e.g., Yuba River Sand Co. v. City of Marysville 

(1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 421, 429-430 [“[B]urden is on one who 

claims by adverse possession to prove all the essential elements 

by clear and satisfactory evidence”]; Clark v. Stotts (1954) 127 

Cal.App.2d 589, 592 [“[S]uch possession cannot be made out by 

inference, but only by clear and positive proof”]; Weller v. 

Chavarria (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 234, 242 [“[B]urden is on the 

claimant to prove every essential element by clear and 

satisfactory evidence”].) 

Vincent cites Vieira Enterprises, Inc. v. McCoy (2017) 8 

Cal.App.5th 1057, for the proposition that the burden of proof to 

establish ouster is preponderance of the evidence. That case, 

however, involved a claim for termination of easement by adverse 

possession. It did not involve an adverse possession claim as 

between cotenants, which requires evidence “‘“‘stronger than that 

which would be required to establish a title by adverse possession 

in a stranger.’”’” (Preciado, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) 

In any event, Viera appears to be the only case holding that 

the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. (Husain v. 

California Pacific Bank (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 717, 726, fn. 4.) 

Citing earlier cases, including our decision in Grant v. Ratliff 

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1304, Husain reiterated that the burden 

of proof on a prescriptive easement claim is clear and convincing 

evidence. (Husain, at p. 726.) 

2. Evidence of Ouster 

The trial court found that Vincent had clearly and 

convincingly proven two of the elements of ouster, i.e., occupation 

of the property for at least five years and payment of the property 

taxes for at least five years. It found, however, that Vincent had 

failed to prove “[o]ccupation under circumstances giving the 
11

cotenants notice of [his] assertion of exclusive ownership and 

intent to ouster the cotenants.” 

Substantial evidence supports trial court’s finding that 

“[o]ther than an oral statement to his siblings shortly after his 

mother’s death, Vincent did not signal in any manner the open 

hostility and exclusivity of [his] occupation of the property to the 

extent of an ouster of the other cotenants.” The court also found 

“that Vincent’s testimony that he told his siblings he was 

claiming sole ownership to the exclusion of their rights as cotenants lacks credibility,” and that “[t]he circumstance of the 

gathering and [Vincent’s] discussions with his siblings do not 

lend themselves well to notice of ouster in clear and unequivocal 

terms.” 

Although the trial court noted that Vincent was a 

practicing attorney at the time and had failed to give his siblings 

written notice of the ouster, it did not state that written notice is 

an absolute requirement. Vincent testified that he was “an 

attorney and handling property law” and that he was “aware that 

[he] had to take exclusive control and exclude [his] siblings from 

any . . . control of the house.” Given that this testimony

“evince[d] an understanding of the law relating to the ouster of 

co-tenants generally,” the court found it implausible that Vincent 

did not take other actions consistent with ouster, such as placing 

a lien on the property, putting title in his name, physically 

excluding his siblings from the property or making major 

improvements. 

Vincent’s burden was to show “‘“‘acts of ownership of the 

most open, notorious and unequivocal character.’”’” (Precisado,

supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) Even if we accept that Vincent 

told his siblings when Victoria died that she wanted him to have 
12

the property, his actions do not demonstrate an open, notorious 

and unequivocal intent to oust his cotenants. The siblings were 

in a state of shock and mourning when Vincent approached them 

at the house and funeral home. Notwithstanding Vincent’s claim 

of exclusive ownership, Annette continues to live on the property, 

paying the same utility bills she paid prior to Victoria’s death. 

The siblings continue to come and go from the property. There is 

no clear and convincing evidence of the kind necessary to 

establish ouster. As the trial court aptly observed, Vincent and 

Annette’s “occupation of the property was not materially different 

after Victoria’s death than it was before her passing.” 

3. Vincent’s Deposition Testimony

Vincent challenges the trial court’s admission of his 

deposition testimony in which he states his siblings were 

“running around like chickens with their heads cut off and trying 

to get their heads around what had just happened” and “people 

[were] just kind of in a daze.” The testimony was offered to show 

the siblings’ state of mind at the time of Victoria’s death. As Sara 

points out, Vincent waived any challenge to the admission of this 

testimony by failing to object at trial. (See In re Riva M. (1991) 

235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412 [“As a general rule, a party is 

precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial 

court”].) 

4. Vincent’s Motion To Augment the Record on Appeal

Vincent seeks to augment the record on appeal with 

evidence in the form of deposition testimony. He claims the 

testimony, which was not presented in the trial court, establishes 

that the siblings were not upset the day their mother died or the 

next day at the funeral home. He contends that if they were not 
13

upset, the oral notice he gave them was sufficient to establish 

ouster. 

The deposition testimony was available at the time of trial. 

In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, we do not consider 

evidence that was not before the trial court. (See In re Zeth S. 

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) We therefore deny the motion to 

augment. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her 

costs on appeal. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. 

YEGAN, J. 
14

Matthew P. Guasco, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Vincent A. Ruiz, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Arnold Larochelle Matthews Vanconas & Zirbel, Susan L. 

McCarthy, for Defendant and Respondent.