65000 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and

accessible electronically through the

ADAMS Public Electronic Reading

Room link at the NRC web site (http:/

/www.nrc.gov). If a request for a hearing

or petition for leave to intervene is filed

by the above date, the Commission or an

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,

designated by the Commission or by the

Chairman of the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the

request and/or petition; and the

Secretary or the designated Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board will issue a

notice of hearing or an appropriate

order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the

above date. A copy of the petition

should also be sent to the Office of the

General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, and to the General

Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,

400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 10H,

Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, attorney

for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated April 20, 2001, which

is available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

located at One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,

Maryland, and accessible electronically

through the ADAMS Public Electronic

Reading Room link at the NRC web site

(http://www.nrc.gov).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

L. Mark Padovan,

Project Manager, Project Directorate II–2,

Division of Licensing Project Management,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–30969 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–327 and 50–328]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

is considering issuance of an

amendment to Facility Operating

License Nos. DRP–77 and DRP–79

issued to the Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA or the licensee) for

operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

(SQN), Units 1 and 2, located in SoddyDaisy, Tennessee.

The proposed amendments would

change Technical Specifications (TSs) to

allow SQN to provide incore irradiation

services for the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE). This change would allow

TVA to insert up to 2256 tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods

(TPBARs) into the reactor cores to

support DOE in maintaining its tritium

inventory for national defense purposes.

Each SQN core contains 193 fuel

assemblies and each fuel assembly

contains 264 fuel rods. In this

amendment request, TVA proposes to

insert up to 24 TPBARs in selected fuel

assemblies (adjacent to but not in place

of the 264 fuel rods). The TPBARS

absorb neutrons and are similar to (and

would replace) normal burnable neutron

absorber rods that serve to shape

neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65001

contain no fissile material and will be

installed in fuel assemblies where

burnable absorber rods are normally

placed in selected fuel assemblies.

Therefore, the TPBARs would fill the

same role as burnable absorber rods in

the operation of the reactor. However,

most of the neutron absorber (lithium)

in the TPBARs still remains at the end

of core life as compared to normal

burnable neutron absorbers (boron or

gadolinium). Therefore, the proposed

license amendments involve (1) revising

the measurement range for the source

range neutron monitors specified in TS

Table 3.3–9, (2) increasing the required

boron concentration for both the cold

leg accumulators (TS 3/4.5.1) and the

refueling water storage tank (RWST) (TS

3/4.5.5), (3) deleting the boron

concentration and spent fuel storage

requirements and associated Bases for

the cask pit pool in TS Section 3/4.7.14

and Section 5.6, (4) establishing a limit

on the number of TPBARs that can be

irradiated in TS Section 5.3.1, (5)

providing storage requirements for spent

fuel assemblies that contain TPBARs

after irradiation in TS Section 5.6 and

the Bases for TS Section 3/4.7.13, and

(6) implementing a TPBAR

consolidation activity. This submittal

also provides proposed revisions to the

associated TS Bases in Section 3/4.6.4

regarding combustible gas control.

Changes (1) and (2) above are necessary

because the uranium-235 (U–235)

enrichment of fuel assemblies

containing TPBARs must be increased

(to no more than 4.95 weight percent) to

compensate for the higher neutron

absorbing properties of the lithium-7 in

the TPBARs. The NRC has previously

approved maximum U–235 fuel

enrichments of 4.95 ± 0.05 weight

percent for SQN Units 1 and 2. Five

percent enrichment is the NRC’s upper

limit for reactor licensing. Therefore,

enrichments resulting from the

proposed amendments are bounded by

the current SQN Operating License and

licensing basis.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendments, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration in its application

dated September 21, 2001, which is

presented below:

A. The proposed amendment does not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

1.TS Table 3.3–9—Remote Shutdown

Monitoring Instrumentation—Revised Source

Range Monitor Range

The backup source range monitors are for

indication of unit shutdown conditions only

and do not perform any trip or mitigation

functions. The monitors are not active

components such that they could initiate a

postulated accident and are not considered a

contributor to accident generation. Therefore,

the lowering of the indication range for this

monitor will not increase the probability of

an accident.

Since the monitor has only an indication

function, it does not serve to mitigate

postulated accidents. While the indications

from this monitor can help to identify

changing core conditions and promote

actions to prevent undesired conditions, this

is not a mitigation function credited in the

accident analysis and is considered a diverse

capability of the plant instrumentation

system. Therefore, the proposed change will

not impact any credited accident mitigation

functions, and by improving shutdown

monitoring capability, will not [involve a

significant] increase [in] the [probability or]

consequences of an accident [previously

evaluated].

2.TS 3/4.5.1—Cold Leg Injection

Accumulators—Boron Concentration

Increase

The accumulator boron concentration does

not affect any initiating event for accidents

currently evaluated in the Updated Final

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The

increased concentrations will not adversely

affect the performance of any system or

component which is placed in contact with

the accumulator water. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the accumulator and affected nuclear steam

supply system (NSSS) components/systems

will be maintained. The decrease in solution

pH is small and will not degrade the stainless

steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E

instrumentation and control equipment will

be maintained since the lower sump pH,

resulting from the increased boron

concentrations, is still within the applicable

equipment qualification limits. These limits

are set to preclude the possibility of

chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking

and assure that there is no significant

degradation of polymer materials. The

design, material and construction standards

of all components which are placed in

contact with the accumulator water remain

unaffected. Therefore, the possibility

[probability] of an accident has not been

increased.

The consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not

be increased. The change in the

concentrations increase the amount of boron

in the sump during a loss-of-coolant accident

(LOCA). The increased boron in the sump is

sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical

condition. Testing has indicated that TPBARs

can experience cladding breach at Large

Break LOCA (LBLOCA) conditions if the

cladding temperature and internal pressure

of the TPBARs reach limiting values.

Consequently, the post-LOCA critical boron

calculations account[ed] for the potential loss

of a LiAlO2 [lithium aluminate] pencil, as

well as partial leaching of lithium from the

remaining pencils. Based on conservative

assumptions, the calculations confirm that

the tritium production core will remain

subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a revised

hot leg switchover time has been calculated

and will be implemented in the plant

emergency operating procedures (EOPs).

Thus, there will be no added post-LOCA

long-term cooling problems associated with

boron precipitation in the core following a

large break LOCA (LBLOCA).

An evaluation of the non-LOCA events

shows that the accumulators do not actuate.

An increase in accumulator boron

concentration would have no effect on either

the steam line break (SLB) at hot zero power

event, the feedwater line break event, or the

spurious operation of safety injection (SI)

system event (events in which an SI signal

does occur). Therefore, there is no increase

in consequences of the non-LOCA events

associated with the proposed increase in

accumulator boron concentration.

The accumulators are not assumed to

actuate in the steam generator tube rupture

(SGTR) event analysis, and the SLB mass and

energy (M&E) release evaluation relies on

control rods for shutdown margin and

assumes a minimum boron concentration. In

addition, the increase in accumulator boron

concentrations and subsequent slight

decrease in containment sump and spray pH

does not impact the LOCA dose evaluation

since the analysis of record does not credit

sump pH as an input or assumption

regarding volatile iodine removal

efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis

remains bounding. Also, the slight decrease

in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been

evaluated to not significantly impact the

corrosion rate (and subsequent generation of

hydrogen) of aluminum and zinc inside

containment. Further, the decreased sump,

core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated

to not affect the amount of hydrogen

generated from the post-LOCA radiolytic

decomposition of the sump and core

solution. The likelihood of containment

failure due to hydrogen deflagration is

therefore not impacted by pH changes.

In view of the preceding, it is concluded

that the proposed change in accumulator

boron concentration will not increase the

radiological [probability or] consequences of

an accident previously evaluated in the

UFSAR.

3. TS 3/4.5.5—Refueling Water Storage

Tank—Boron Concentration Increase

The RWST boron concentration does not

affect any initiating event for accidents

65002 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The

increased concentration will not adversely

affect the performance of any system or

component which is placed in contact with

the RWST water. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the RWST and affected NSSS components/

systems will be maintained. The decrease in

solution pH is small and will not degrade the

stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class

1E instrumentation and control equipment

will be maintained since the lower sump pH,

resulting from the increased boron

concentrations, is still within the applicable

equipment qualification limits. These limits

are set to preclude the possibility of chloride

induced stress corrosion cracking and assure

that there is no significant degradation of

polymer materials. The design, material and

construction standards of all components

which are placed in contact with the RWST

water remain unaffected. Therefore, the

probability of an accident has not changed.

The consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not

be increased. The change in the RWST boron

concentration increases the amount of boron

in the sump following a LOCA. The

increased boron in the sump is sufficient to

maintain the core in a subcritical condition.

Testing has indicated that TPBARs can

experience cladding breach at Large Break

LOCA (LBLOCA) conditions if the cladding

temperature and internal pressure of the

TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently,

the post-LOCA critical boron calculations

accounted for the potential loss of a LiAiO2

pencil, as well as partial leaching of lithium

from the remaining pencils. Based on

conservative assumptions, the calculations

confirm that the tritium production core will

remain subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a

revised hot leg switchover time has been

calculated and will be implemented in the

plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no added

post-LOCA long-term cooling problems

associated with boron precipitation in the

core following a LOCA.

An evaluation of the non-LOCA events

indicates that an SI initiation occurs in the

SLB at hot zero power event, the feedwater

line break event, and the spurious operation

of the SI system event. An increase in the

RWST boron concentration would effectively

reduce the return to power subsequent to a

SLB. Boration is not credited in the feedwater

line break analysis and the proposed boron

increase is conservatively bounded by the

boron inputs to the spurious SI system

operation analysis. Therefore, there is no

increase in consequences of the non-LOCA

events associated with the proposed increase

in RWST boron concentration.

The SLB M&E release evaluation relies on

control rods for shutdown margin and

assumes a minimum boron concentration.

For the SGTR, the boron concentration in the

accumulators and the RWST are not

modeled. In addition, the increase in RWST

boron concentrations and subsequent slight

decrease in containment sump and spray pH

does not impact the LOCA dose evaluation.

While higher pH helps maintain volatile

iodine in solution and lower pH drives the

equilibrium to favor volatile iodine in a

gaseous state, the change in sump pH is not

sufficient to result in any measurable change

in post-LOCA releases.

Furthermore, current radiological analyses

do not take credit for volatile iodine removal

efficiencies based on sump pH. Therefore,

since the change in pH is minimal, and no

credit is taken in release analysis, the present

analysis remains bounding. Also, the slight

decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH

has been evaluated to not significantly

impact the corrosion rate (and subsequent

generation of hydrogen) of aluminum and

zinc inside containment and the present

analysis remains bounding. Further, the

decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has

been evaluated to not affect the amount of

hydrogen generated from the radiolytic

decomposition of the sump and core solution

and therefore will not challenge containment

integrity.

In view of the preceding, it is concluded

that the proposed change in RWST boron

concentration will not increase the

radiological [probability or] consequences of

an accident previously evaluated in the

UFSAR.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases—Cask Pit Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Deletion of

Requirements

This change removes the provisions that

allow and support the storage of spent fuel

in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this

provision, the potential for criticality events

associated with stored fuel in the cask pit

pool is no longer credible. Not having boron

concentration requirements for the cask pit

for storage considerations is acceptable based

on the removal of TS provisions that would

allow such storage. The boron concentration

requirement is not considered a contributor

to accident generation and therefore, this

deletion does not increase the potential

[probability] for accident generation because

spent fuel will not be stored in this location.

Likewise, the consequences of an accident

[previously evaluated] will not be

[significantly] increased because the dose

generation source, in the form of spent fuel

stored in the cask pit, will not be allowed.

5. TS 5.3.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

The insertion of TPBARs into the SQN

reactor core does not adversely affect reactor

neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance;

therefore, they do not significantly increase

the probability of accidents or equipment

malfunctions while in the reactor. The

neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics

that of standard burnable absorbers with only

slight differences which are accommodated

in the core design. The reload safety analysis

performed for SQN Units 1 and 2 prior to

each refueling cycle will confirm that any

minor effects of TPBARS on the reload core

will be within fuel design limits.

As described in the [Department of

Energy’s] tritium production core (TPC)

topical [report, NDP–98–181, Revision 1], the

TPBAR design is robust to all accident

conditions except the large break LOCA

(LBLOCA) where the rods are susceptible to

failure. However, the failure of TPBARs has

been determined to have an insignificant

effect on the thermal hydraulic response of

the core to this event, and analysis has

shown that the core will remain subcritical

following a LOCA.

The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological

consequences for all evaluated events are

very small, and they remain within [well

below] 10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The

additional offsite doses due to tritium are

small with respect to LOCA source terms and

are well within regulatory limits.

The TPBAR[s] could result in an increase

in combustible gas released to the

containment in a LBLOCA. This increase was

found to be approximately 1495 scf which

remains within the capability of the

recombiners.

Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not

expected to fail during Condition I through

IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the

UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation

and operational transients, Condition II being

faults of moderate frequency, Condition III

being infrequent faults, and Condition IV

being limiting faults] with the exception of a

LBLOCA and a fuel handling accident. The

radiological consequences of these events are

[well] within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore,

there is no significant increase in the

[probability or] consequences of these

previously evaluated accidents.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases—Design

Features/Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Revised

Storage Requirements for Fuel Assemblies

Containing TPBARs

A specified amount of soluble boron is

needed in the spent fuel pool to provide

margin to criticality sufficient to mitigate the

effects of the most serious spent fuel pool

accident condition. Previous spent fuel pool

criticality safety analyses (for Type A fuel)

[spent fuel that has not hosted TPBARs]

determined the required amount of soluble

boron to be 700 parts per million (ppm). The

new spent fuel pool criticality safety analysis

accounting for storage of Type T fuel [spent

fuel that has hosted TPBARS] confirmed that

700 ppm soluble boron still provides the

required margin to criticality. Therefore,

there is no significant increase in the

consequences of previously evaluated

accidents postulated for the spent fuel pool.

Additionally, the administrative controls for

loading the spent fuel pool are not changed

and will continue to maintain acceptable

storage configurations consistent with the

analysis. Therefore, the proposed change will

not [involve a significant] increase [in] the

probability [or consequences] of an accident

[previously evaluated].

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

TPBAR consolidation and associated

handling activities are designed to be

consistent with the existing fuel handling

and heavy load handling processes and

equipment currently utilized at the facility,

and are designed to preclude increased

probability of an accident previously

evaluated.

Consequences of a fuel handling accident

for fuel containing TPBARs is evaluated and

does not result in exceeding [or even

approaching]10 CFR Part 100 limits for offsite dose. All consolidation and heavy load

handling activities are designed such that the

current fuel handling accident scenario

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65003

remains bounding. Therefore the [probability

or] consequences of an accident previously

evaluated [will not be significantly increased]

remains within acceptable limits.

B. The proposed amendment does not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

1. TS Table 3.3–9—Remote Shutdown

Monitoring Instrumentation—Revised Source

Range Monitor Range

The backup source range monitors are for

indication of unit shutdown conditions only

and do not perform any trip or mitigation

functions. The monitors are not active

components such that they could initiate a

postulated accident and are not considered a

contributor to accident generation. Therefore,

the lowering of the indication range for this

monitor will not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident [from any

accident previously evaluated].

2. TS 3/4.5.1—Cold Leg Injection

Accumulators—Boron Concentration

Increase

The change to the accumulator

concentration does not cause the initiation of

any accident nor create any new credible

limiting single failure. The change does not

result in a condition where the design,

material, and construction standards of the

accumulators and other potentially affected

NSSS components, that were applicable prior

to the changes, are altered. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the accumulator and affected NSSS

components/systems will be maintained. The

decrease in solution pH is small and will not

degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity

of the Class 1E instrumentation and control

equipment will be maintained during a

LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting

from the increased boron concentrations, is

still within the applicable equipment

qualification limits. These limits are set to

preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced

stress corrosion cracking and assure that

there is no significant degradation of polymer

materials.

The changes in the concentrations increase

the amount of boron in the sump following

a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is

sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical

condition. Also, a revised hot leg switchover

time has been calculated and will be

implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there

will be no boron precipitation in the core

following a LOCA.

All systems, structures, and components

previously required for the mitigation of an

event remain capable of fulfilling their

intended design function. The proposed

change has no adverse a[e]ffect on any safetyrelated system or component and does not

challenge the performance or integrity of any

safety[-]related system. Therefore, the

proposed increase in accumulator boron

concentration does not create the possibility

of a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated.

3. TS 3/4.5.5—Refueling Water Storage

Tank—Boron Concentration Increase

The change to the RWST concentration

does not cause the initiation of any accident

nor create any new credible limiting single

failure. The change does not result in a

condition where the design, material, and

construction standards of the RWST and

other potentially affected NSSS components,

that were applicable prior to the changes, are

altered. The integrity and operability of the

stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and

affected NSSS components/systems will be

maintained. The decrease in solution pH is

small and will not degrade the stainless steel.

Also, the integrity of the Class 1E

instrumentation and control equipment will

be maintained during a LOCA since the

lower sump pH, resulting from the increased

boron concentrations, is still within the

applicable equipment qualification limits.

These limits are set to preclude the

possibility of chloride[-]induced stress

corrosion cracking and assure that there is no

significant degradation of polymer materials.

The changes in the concentrations increase

the amount of boron in the sump following

a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is

sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical

condition. Also, a revised hot leg switchover

time has been calculated and will be

implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there

will be no boron precipitation in the core

following a LOCA.

All systems, structures, and components

previously required for the mitigation of an

event remain capable of fulfilling their

intended design function. The proposed

change has no adverse affect on any safetyrelated system or component and does not

challenge the performance or integrity of any

safety[-]related system. Therefore, the

proposed increase in RWST boron

concentration does not create the possibility

of a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases—Cask Pit Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Deletion of

Requirements

This change removes the provisions that

allow and support the storage of spent fuel

in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this

provision, the potential for criticality events

associated with stored fuel in the cask pit

pool is no longer credible. The boron

concentration requirement for the cask pit

pool is not considered a contributor to

accident generation and therefore, this

deletion does not increase the [possibility of]

potential for [a new or different kind of]

accident [from any accident previously

evaluated] generation because spent fuel will

not be stored in this location.

5. TS 5.3.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

TPBARS have been designed to be

compatible with existing fuel assemblies

supplied by Framatome-ANP and its

predecessor Framatome Cogema Fuels and

with conventional Burnable Poison Rod

Assembly (BPRA) handling tools, equipment,

and procedures. Therefore, no new [or

different kind of] accidents or equipment

malfunctions are created by the handling of

TPBARs. * * *

TPBARs use materials with known and

predictable performance characteristics and

are compatible with pressurized water

reactor coolant. The TPBAR design has

specifically included material similar to

those used in standard burnable absorber

rods with the exception of internal

assemblies used in the production and

retention of tritium. As described in the TPC

Topical Report, these materials are

compatible with the reactor coolant system

(RCS) and core design. Therefore, no new

accidents or equipment malfunctions are

created by the presence of the TPBARs in the

RCS.

Mechanical design criteria have been

established to ensure that TPBARs will not

fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis

has shown that TPBARs, appropriately

positioned in the core, operate within the

established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to

the expected high reliability of TPBAR

components, the frequency of TPBAR

cladding failures is very small, such that

multiple adjacent TPBAR failures in limiting

locations is not considered credible. In

addition, analysis has shown that if a single

TPBAR fails catastrophically in a high power

location during normal operation and the

lithium is leached out, the global reactivity

increase is negligible and the local power

peaking is small enough that DNBR

[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits

and fuel rod integrity are not challenged.

Therefore, no new [or different kind of]

accidents or equipment malfunctions are

created by the presence of the TPBARs in the

reactor.

Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not

fail during Condition III and IV events with

the exception of a LBLOCA and a fuel

handling accident. The radiological

consequences of these events are within 10

CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no

significant increase in consequences of these

previously evaluated accidents.

TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor

neutronic [or] thermal-hydraulic

performance, therefore they do not create the

possibility of [new or different kinds of]

accidents or equipment malfunctions of a

different type [of accident] than previously

evaluated while in the reactor.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases—Design

Features/Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Revised

Storage Requirements for Fuel Assemblies

Containing TPBARs

The storage in the spent fuel pool of spent

fuel that has contained TPBARs is not a

fundamental change in the use of the spent

fuel pool. Specific provisions have been

made for burnup and cooling time

requirements in allowable configurations to

ensure safe storage. The same administrative

program to control storage requirements in

the spent fuel pool will be utilized to handle

Type A and Type T spent fuel. Therefore, the

possibility of a new or different [kind of]

accident than [any accident] previously

evaluated has not been created.

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

The consolidation and handling systems

are designed to preclude the possibility of a

consolidating and/or handling event which

could damage more than 24 TPBARs.

Therefore, this proposed amendment does

not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any [accident]

previously evaluated.

65004 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

C. The proposed amendment does not

involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

1. TS Table 3.3–9—Remote Shutdown

Monitoring Instrumentation—Revised Source

Range Monitor Range

The backup source range monitors are for

indication of unit shutdown conditions only

and do not perform any trip or mitigation

functions. The lowering of the monitor’s

range does allow improved indication of core

conditions with the TPCs. While this monitor

does not have any trip or accident mitigation

functions, this change will improve the

ability to assess the conditions of the unit

such that necessary actions can be initiated

to prevent undesired conditions. Therefore,

the proposed change will not reduce [does

not involve a significant reduction in] a

margin of safety.

2. TS 3/4.5.1—Cold Leg Injection

Accumulators—Boron Concentration

Increase

The change does not invalidate any of the

non-LOCA safety analysis results or

conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety

analysis acceptance criteria continue to be

met. The licensing basis small break LOCA

(SBLOCA) analysis does not credit the

accumulator boron and is not affected by the

proposed change. Therefore, there is no

reduction in the margin to the peak clad

temperature (PCT) limit for the SBLOCA.

There is no increase in the LBLOCA PCT;

therefore, the ECCS acceptance criteria limit,

dictated by 10 CFR 50.46, is not exceeded

with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The

increased boron concentration is sufficient to

maintain subcriticality during the LBLOCA,

and a post-LOCA long-term core cooling

analysis demonstrated that the post-LOCA

sump boron concentration is sufficient to

prevent recriticality. The revised hot leg

switchover time, which will be implemented

in the EOPs, will prevent long-term cooling

problems associated with boron precipitation

in the reactor vessel and core. The licensing

analyses for containment, equipment

qualification, and environmental

consequences remain bounding and

applicable and the acceptance criteria of the

related events continue to be met. The

proposed increase in accumulator boron

concentration, therefore, does not involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

3. TS 314.5.5—Refueling Water Storage

Tank—Boron Concentration Increase

The change does not invalidate any of the

non-LOCA safety analysis results or

conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety

analysis acceptance criteria continue to be

met. The licensing basis SBLOCA analysis

does not credit the RWST boron and is not

affected by the proposed change. Therefore,

there is no reduction in the margin to the

PCT limit for the SBLOCA. There is no

increase in the LBLOCA PCT; therefore, the

ECCS acceptance criteria limit, dictated by 10

CFR 50.46, is not exceeded with regard to the

LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron

concentration is sufficient to prevent

recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover

time, which will be implemented in the

EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The

licensing analyses for containment,

equipment qualification, and environmental

consequences remain bounding and

applicable and the acceptance criteria of the

related events continue to be met. The

proposed increase in RWST boron

concentration, therefore, does not involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases—Cask Pit Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Deletion of

Requirements

This change removes the provisions that

allow and support the storage of spent fuel

in the cask pit pool. This change will not

alter plant systems, operating methods, or

plant setpoints that maintain the margin of

safety. Boron concentration will continue to

be properly maintained for the storage of

spent fuel in the spent fuel pool as required

by the analysis to control inadvertent

criticality events. Therefore, this change will

not reduce [does not involve a significant

reduction in] the margin of safety.

5. TS 5.3.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

TPBARs have been designed to be

compatible with existing fuel assemblies.

TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor

neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance.

Analysis indicates that reactor core behavior

and offsite doses remain relatively

unchanged. For these reasons, the proposed

amendment does not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases—Design

Features/Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Pool

Minimum Boron Concentration—Revised

Storage Requirements for Fuel Assemblies

Containing TPBARs

Addition of fuel assemblies containing

TPBARs to the spent fuel pool is consistent

with the pool design function. Specific

provisions have been made as a result of

reanalysis of spent fuel pool criticality safety

analysis to limit storage configurations and

burnup or cooling time requirements to those

that will provide for safe storage of fresh and

spent fuel. Therefore, the proposed

amendment does not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

The changes do not affect the safety-related

performance of any plant operations, system,

structures, or components. Therefore, there is

no [it does not involve a] significant

reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the no

significant hazards consideration

analysis provided by TVA with respect

to the three criteria listed in 10 CFR

50.92(c). The staff’s safety evaluation is

in its early stages and will require

several months to complete. However,

in terms of 10 CFR 50.92(c), the staff

finds that the TVA application

addresses all applicable accidents

discussed in the UFSAR, including

LOCAs, SGTRs, and fuel handling

considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS

for the purpose of producing tritium

(which is sealed inside the TPBARs)

requires a higher degree of fuel

enrichment with uranium-235. Because

the TPBARs neither contain fissile

material nor replace normal reactor fuel,

and because the TPBARs will not

adversely affect reactor neutronic or

thermal-hydraulic performance, their

presence in the core should have no

effect upon the probability or

consequences of previously analyzed

accidents, including fuel handling

accidents. For the same reasons, the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident would not be expected to result

from irradiation of the TPBARS in the

SQN reactor cores. TVA’s analysis of a

possible reduction in safety margins

addressed PCT limits resulting from an

SBLOCA and the increased boron

concentration to maintain subcriticality.

Based on the NRC staff’s review of the

analysis provided by the licensee, it

appears that the three standards of 10

CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the

NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, and should cite the publication

date and page number of this Federal

Register notice. Written comments may

also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two

White Flint North, 11545 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30

a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Documents may be examined, and/or

copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public

Document Room, located at One White

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first

floor), Rockville, Maryland.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By January 16, 2002, the licensee may

file a request for a hearing with respect

to issuance of the amendment to the

subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65005

CFR part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714,

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or

electronically on the Internet at the NRC

Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/

index.html. If there are problems in

accessing the document, contact the

Public Document Room Reference staff

at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or

by E-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. If a request

for a hearing or petition for leave to

intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the

above date. A copy of the petition

should also be sent to the Office of the

General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, and to General

Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,

ET 11A, 400 West Summit Hill Drive,

Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

Further details with respect to this

action may be found in the application

for amendment dated September 21,

2001, which is available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, located at One White

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first

floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly

available records will be accessible from

the Agencywide Documents Access and

Management Systems (ADAMS) Public

Electronic Reading Room on the Internet

at the NRC Web site, http://

www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html.

Persons who do not have access to

ADAMS, or who encounter problems in

accessing the documents located in

ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public

Document Room Reference staff by

telephone at 1–800–397–4209, 301–

415–4737 or by E-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ronald W. Hernan,

Senior Project Manager, Section 2, Project

Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–30970 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–390]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

is considering issuance of an

amendment to Facility Operating

License No. NPF–90 issued to the

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the

licensee) for operation of the Watts Bar

Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1, located in

Rhea County, Tennessee.

The proposed amendment would

change Technical Specifications (TSs) to

allow WBN to provide incore irradiation

services for the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE). This change would allow

TVA to insert up to 2304 tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods