IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11149

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

EFRAIN SIFUENTES, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and HO, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:

Efrain Sifuentes pleaded guilty to a drug-related money laundering 

conspiracy. Sifuentes now challenges his below-Guidelines sentence of 160 

months as both procedurally incorrect and substantively unreasonable. We 

reject his arguments and affirm.

I

Sifuentes’s cousin Pablo Zavala sold large quantities of 

methamphetamine smuggled in from Mexico to Fernando Obregon in Dallas. 

Sifuentes worked with Zavala to launder and return the drug proceeds to 

Mexico. He also recruited the help of Aaron Gonzalez to launder the money 

and conduct wire transfers to Mexico. Sifuentes let Gonzalez know the money 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 19, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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came from the sale of drugs, telling him that Zavala concealed illegal drugs 

inside “candies, soaps, and other items,” which Zavala then shipped to Dallas. 

From his recruitment until the time of his arrest, Sifuentes exchanged over 

600 electronic communications with Zavala and Obregon, primarily via 

WhatsApp and phone calls.

On at least one occasion, Sifuentes tried to convince Gonzalez to pick up 

a load of methamphetamine in Dallas. He explained to Gonzalez that he 

needed “some cokes and soap” moved—objects Sifuentes previously told

Gonzalez contained hidden drugs. Sifuentes could not pick up the drugs 

himself because he was busy collecting proceeds of other drug sales in Kansas. 

But Gonzalez did not want to leave the drugs in “[his] car for a long time.” 

Sifuentes then asked Gonzalez to transport the drugs to a nearby hotel on his 

behalf, stating he could pick up the drugs later. Gonzalez again refused, 

claiming he was “spooked,” and worried Zavala would not “have [his] back in 

jail . . . .” Two weeks later, the FBI arrested Sifuentes.

In February 2018, Sifuentes proceeded to a jury trial on the indictment 

alleging a money laundering conspiracy. In March, the trial ended in a hung 

jury. The court set a second trial date, but before trial, Sifuentes pleaded guilty 

without a plea agreement. He admitted he knowingly conspired to conduct 

financial transactions with proceeds he knew were exclusively derived from 

drug trafficking.

The probation officer writing the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)

for Sifuentes’s sentence included the attempted drug pickup with Gonzalez in 

his calculation. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a). The Sentencing Guidelines establish two 

different methods for calculating a sentence for a money laundering conviction, 

depending on whether the defendant also committed, aided, abetted, 

counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused the substantive 

underlying offense, or laundered money only. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(1)–(2). 

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The PSR here applied the former method, relying on an underlying drug 

conspiracy to calculate the base offense level.

Sifuentes objected, claiming that his one abortive attempt to facilitate 

drug distribution should not lead to culpability under section 2S1.1(a)(1). The 

Government countered that his “near constant contact” with leaders in the 

drug conspiracy, as well as his acts of money laundering and attempt on at 

least one occasion to direct another person to pick up drugs, showed a pattern 

of engaging in the underlying and ongoing criminal activity.

The district court overruled Sifuentes’s objection to his base offense level 

and calculated a preliminary Guidelines imprisonment range of 262 to 327 

months, capped by statute at 240 months. To get to that range, the PSR

applied section 2S1.1(a)(1), which determined the base level for the underlying 

offense through cross-reference to section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Applying section

1B1.3(a)(1)(A) led the district court by cross-reference to section 2D1.1. 

Finding Sifuentes laundered $93,974 in drug proceeds, the PSR found 

Sifuentes accountable for 14.91 kilograms of methamphetamine. A drug 

offense involving between five and fifteen kilograms of methamphetamine

leads to a base offense level of 34. After final adjustments, the district court 

found an offense level of 38, with a criminal history category of II.

Sifuentes made several arguments for a downward departure. He 

requested a sentence of 60 months. The district court acknowledged 

Sifuentes’s arguments and ultimately decided on a sentence of 160 months—

an 80-month reduction below the statutory cap and Guidelines-suggested 

range. Sifuentes objected to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of 

this sentence.

II

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 394 

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(5th Cir. 2010). We review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for 

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 

2015).

Both Sifuentes and the Government agree that section 2S1.1(a) should 

be used to calculate Sifuentes’s sentence. But they disagree about which of the 

two subsections should apply.

Section 2S1.1(a)(1) applies the offense level for the underlying offense 

from which the laundered funds were derived if (A) the defendant committed, 

aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused 

the underlying offense, and (B) the offense level can be determined. See United 

States v. Torres, 856 F.3d 1095, 1098–99 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. 

Charon, 442 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 2006). In this case, the underlying offense 

from which the funds were derived is the sale of with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance, not conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance. The government needs to show a likelihood the 

underlying conduct occurred by a preponderance of the evidence to include 

relevant facts in sentencing. United States v. Harper, 448 F.3d 732, 735 (5th 

Cir. 2006).

By contrast, section 2S1.1(a)(2) is used to calculate the sentence if the 

defendant either is not responsible for the underlying offense or if the proper 

offense level for the underlying offense cannot be calculated. Under this 

subsection, the court determines the offense level based on the value of the 

laundered funds. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(2).

Sifuentes argues that the court should have applied section 2S1.1(a)(2)

because he was not involved in the underlying drug offense. His calculation 

under section 2S1.1(a)(2) leads to an offense level of 26. The Guidelines range 

for an offense level of 26 and Criminal History Category II is 70 to 87 months.

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To support his claim, Sifuentes invokes a commentary to the Guidelines, 

which explains that a person who is hired to help unload a single drug 

shipment is not culpable for all of the shipments in a given conspiracy. See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.4(c)(III). But that commentary does not apply here. 

Sifuentes was not a one-time unloader. Unlike a stevedore hired to unload a 

single shipment of drugs, and nothing more, Sifuentes repeatedly 

communicated with and moved money for higher ranking members in a broad 

drug and money laundering conspiracy. So there is sufficient evidence from 

which the district court concluded that Sifuentes at least aided and abetted the 

distribution of drugs from which the laundered funds were derived. See United 

States v. Mata, 409 F. App’x 740, 743 (5th Cir. 2011). His attempt to convince 

Gonzalez to take drugs and move them to a hotel for safekeeping is merely one 

illustration of his continued involvement in the drug distribution and money 

laundering conspiracy. See United States v. Barfield, 941 F.3d 757, 763 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (“Particularly in drug cases, this circuit has broadly defined what 

constitutes ‘the same course of conduct’ or ‘common scheme or plan.’”) (quoting 

United States v. Bryant, 991 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1993)).

The Government argued, and district court agreed, that because the 

district court found Sifuentes not only tried to convince Gonzalez to move the 

methamphetamine, but also consistently communicated with and coordinated 

with senior individuals in the ongoing drug distribution and money-laundering 

conspiracy, he is responsible for the substantive conduct underlying the money 

laundering. As such, he is eligible to be sentenced under section 2S1.1(a)(1). 

The PSR’s Guidelines range of 240 months, due to the statutory cap, is correct.

Sifuentes’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

also fails. Recognizing that the sentencing court is in a better position to find 

facts and judge their import under section 3553(a), substantive reasonableness 

of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Diehl, 775 F.3d at 724. 

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We apply a presumption of reasonableness to a below-Guidelines sentence. 

United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2015). To rebut this

presumption, Sifuentes must demonstrate that the sentence: “(1) does not 

account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2) gives 

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear 

error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” Id. at 558.

Sifuentes reprises the arguments and resubmits the evidence arguing 

for a downward departure at the district court. The district court took account 

of the evidence and, consistent with section 3553, issued a downward variance 

of 80 months. Mere disagreement with the sentence is insufficient to rebut the 

presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 231, 

235 (5th Cir. 2011). Sifuentes has not offered any sufficient grounds to rebut 

the presumption of reasonableness for a below-Guidelines sentence.

The sentence is affirmed.

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