UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DUANE C. RAWLINGS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-2492

MARVIN RUNYON, Postmaster

General, United States Postal

Service,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-95-2071-JFM)

Submitted: March 13, 1997

Decided: March 21, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

James J. Nolan, Jr., PIERSON, PIERSON & NOLAN, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States

Attorney,

Charles J. Peters, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Duane C. Rawlings appeals from the district court's orders granting

summary judgment to Defendant in Rawlings' suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213

(West 1995) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-

797b (West Supp. 1996) and denying Rawlings' motion for reconsideration. Rawlings asserts that his employer breached its duty to

reasonably accommodate a disabled employee. We affirm the judgment

of the district court.

Rawlings was employed as a Parcel Post Distributor for the United

States Postal Service from 1985 until 1994. The last day that Rawlings actually performed any work for the agency was in August 1992.

Due to a work related injury in December 1988, Rawlings was

granted a one year leave of absence from September 1, 1992 until

September 1, 1993. However, Rawlings did not return to work on

September 2 or any date thereafter nor did he communicate with any

of his supervisors at the Postal Service after September 1. He was

terminated on January 18, 1994.

Rawlings asserts that he spoke with his union representative prior

to September 1, and was told that the Postal Service had agreed

that

he did not have to come back to work pending a decision on his

application for disability retirement. On October 2, 1993, Rawlings

received an "Absence Inquiry," instructing him to return to work or

submit documentation to substantiate the reasons for his continued

absence. Thereafter, Rawlings again spoke with his union

representative and was told that the Postal Service was not going to wait for

his

disability retirement decision.

Thereafter, Rawlings received a "Notice of Proposed Removal."

Although he claims that he spoke again with his union

representative

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and provided him with reports from his therapist and from his

orthopedist, it is undisputed that Rawlings did not personally contact

the

Postal Service and did not provide any of his supervisors with the

alleged documentation. Moreover, the union representative states

that

he did not communicate with the Postal Service after the "Notice of

Proposed Removal," and the Postal Service asserts that no documentation was received. Rawlings was then terminated.

The ADA provides: "The term `qualified individual with a disability' means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment

position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 12111(8). Employers, therefore, are only required to impose those

modifications that qualify as "reasonable." See Myers v. Hose, 50

F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, Rawlings asserts that the

Postal

Service was required to grant him a period of time in which to

process

his disability retirement. He sets no limit on how long this might

take.

Reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to wait

indefinitely while an employee attempts to improve his status. See

id.

Accordingly, the orders of the district court are affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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