alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### NUMBER 13 - 20 - 0 0 503 - C V
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

IN RE C & J ENERGY SERVICES, INC.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.



## ORDER

Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Tijerina Order Per Curiam

Relator C & J Energy S ervices, Inc. filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to vacate its June 24, 2020 discovery order requiring relator to respond to specified requests for producti on propounded by real parties in interest, Jimmy
Allen and Dale Allen

. Relator has also filed an agreed motion for temporary relief seeking to stay production under the trial court’s or der until ten or t wenty 1 days after the date of this Court’s final disposition of the petition for writ of mandamus.

1 The agreed motion for temporary relief requests that we stay the ordered production of discovery for a period of both ten days after disposition and twenty days after disposition. This discrepancy is not material to o ur analysis and ruling herein.2 The Court, having examined and fully considered the agreed motion for temporary relief, is of the opinion that it should be granted. Accordingly, we GRANT the agre ed motion or temporary relief and ORDER the date for production under the trial court ’s June 24, 2020 order, and all hearings pertaining to that production , to be STAYED until t en days after final disposition in this Court or further ruling of the Court

. S ee T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 52.10. The Court requests that the real part ies in interest, Jimmy Allen and Dale Allen , or any others whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought, including but not limited to Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, C ameron Technologies Inc. and Cameron Technologies US, Inc., Ervin Well Site Consultants, LLC, Jaguar Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., Key Energy Services, Inc. and Key Energy Services, LLC, Nitro Fluids, LLC, and Westbrook Manufacturing Company, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before the expiration of ten days from the date of this order. See id. R. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8.
PER CURIAM
D elivered and filed the 20th day of November, 2020

.
Aura Systems, Inc.
                                   Term Sheet



Instrument

                    Convertible Note

Amount

                    $250,000

Use of Proceeds

                    Working capital

Closing

                    October 17, 2002

Interest

                    8% simple interest due in arrears.

Term

                    180 days

Conversion Price

                    $0.071 per share

Registration Rights

                    To be included in Registration  Statement to be filed within
                    ninety   days   following    issuance   of   common   stock.

Documentation

                    Company will provide  complete  documentation  subsequent to
                    Closing.

Other Conditions

                    If Aura Systems,  Inc.  ("Aura") receives equity funding for
                    an  amount  of  at  least  $2  million   (unrelated  to  the
                    contemplated  sale-leaseback of the building) between August
                    1,  2002 and the time of the final  payment  of the loan and
                    accrued  interest,  the loan will  convert into common stock
                    either  at a  conversion  rate of  $0.071  per  share or the
                    average of the new equity sale rate, whichever is lower.

                    Should,  at any  time  prior  either  to the  conversion  or
                    payment in full of the note, Aura grant a security  interest
                    in the patents to one or more  entities as part of an equity
                    funding,  Aura will  grant the  participant  note  holders a
                    security interest pari passu. This provision is inapplicable
                    to strategic  transactions involving technology licensing or
                    transfers.


On behalf of Aura Systems, Inc.

         __________________________on this date_________________
         Neal F. Meehan, Chairman



On behalf of Investors:

                                    Amount of participation $250,000

         __________________________on this date_________________
         The Prudent Bear Fund
105 A.3d 1100

#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. WILLIAM R. JOE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

January 23, 2015.

ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted and the matter is summarily remanded to the Superior Court, Appellate Division for reconsideration on the plenary-calendar. Jurisdiction is not retained.
EXHIBIT
32.2


CERTIFICATION
OF CO-PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned
officer of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to
such officer’s knowledge, that:





The
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 27, 2008 (the “Form
10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and information contained in the
Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.








Date:  December
      11, 2008
            /s/ J. Clinton RiversJ.
      Clinton RiversCo-Principal
      Executive Officer
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<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JANUARY 31, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>

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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     43425
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<CHANGES>                                                0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                            0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0



</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Derrick MOORE, also known as Black, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10149

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 22, 2010.

Derrick Moore, Fort Worth, TX, pro se.

*890Before JOLLY, GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Derrick Moore, federal prisoner #29110-177, appeals the district court’s denial of his second motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Moore’s § 3582(c)(2) motion was based upon Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the guidelines offense levels for crack cocaine offenses. Moore is serving a 140-month sentence for a conspiracy conviction in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) & (b)(1).

Moore argues that he is eligible for a sentence reduction because his offense involved crack cocaine, that he was entitled to a hearing in the district court, and that the district court erred in failing to appoint him counsel in connection with his § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Moore was not entitled to a hearing in the district court, *see*Fed.R.CrimP. 43(b)(4); *United States v. Patterson,*42 F.3d 246, 248-49 (5th Cir.1994); and there was no plain error in the failure of the district court to appoint counsel for Moore sua sponte, *see United States v. Hereford,*385 Fed.Appx. 366, 367-68 (5th Cir.2010); *United States v. Whitebird,*55 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir.1995).

Section 3582 permits a defendant to move, under certain circumstances, for discretionary modification of his sentence if it was based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission later lowered. § 3582(c)(2); *United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas,*105 F.3d 981, 982 (5th Cir.1997). Amendment 706 applies to those whose sentences were determined by calculating their guidelines offense levels in accordance with the pertinent Guideline for crack cocaine, i.e., cocaine base. *See United States v. Burns,*526 F.3d 852, 861 (5th Cir.2008).

The district court denied Moore relief under § 3582(c)(2) based upon a finding that his offense involved powder cocaine and not crack cocaine. Thus, the district court concluded that Moore was ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction based upon Amendment 706.

The second addendum to Moore’s presentence report (PSR) makes clear, however, that Moore’s sentence was calculated based solely upon a quantity of cocaine base. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for consideration of Moore’s § 3582(c)(2) motion in light of the second addendum to the PSR.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS OF ABLE TELCOM  HOLDING CORP.  FOR THE QUARTER ENDED APRIL
30,  1997 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH  FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
                                         

       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              OCT-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 FEB-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1997
<CASH>                                           6,311,297
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,967,630
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0                 
<INVENTORY>                                      1,088,867
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,899,177
<PP&E>                                          13,531,932
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,040,406
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  43,767,664
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,327,519 
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0 
<PREFERRED>                                      6,572,600
<COMMON>                                             8,313
<OTHER-SE>                                      12,614,798
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    43,767,664
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                20,871,009
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   19,112,955
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 408,431
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,391,509  
<INCOME-TAX>                                       539,531
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0                     
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0 
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       337,378
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .04
        



</TABLE>
#### John Philip MEDLEY, Appellant, v. William F. STEINER, Warden, Maryland House of Correction, Appellee.

No. 7376.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 13, 1957.

Decided April 1, 1957.

John Philip Medley, pro se.

James H. Norris, Jr., Special Asst. Atty. Gen., of Maryland (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., of Maryland, on brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and SOBELOFF, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant is imprisoned under the judgment and sentence of a Maryland state court. He complains of matters which could be reviewed only by appeal or writ of error, not by habeas corpus. He alleges that he has made sixty applications for relief to the state courts; and the opinion of the Court of Appeals of the state in his latest application shows that his contentions are entirely without merit. See Medley v. Warden, 210 Md. 649, 123 A.2d 595, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 858, 77 S.Ct. 77, 1 L.Ed.2d 64. See also Medley v. Warden, 207 Md. 634, 115 A.2d 287, certiorari denied Medley v. Steiner, 350 U.S. 925, 76 S.Ct. 215, 100 L.Ed. 809. The decision of Judge Chesnut below in denying the petition for habeas corpus was manifestly correct for reasons adequately stated in his memorandum opinion, 151 F.Supp. 93, and appellant was not, and is not, entited to the certificate of probable cause, which is a prerequisite to prosecuting an appeal to this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. For lack of such certificate the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
84 A.3d 293

#### Ashley ZAUFLIK, Petitioner v. PENNSBURY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 16, 2014.

*2
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 16th day of January 2014, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to the remaining issue. The issues, as stated by petitioner are:

> (1) Does the Act’s liability cap violate equal protection principles in this case where (a) the cap reduced the jury’s verdict by over 96% because [petitioner] was injured by a local agency [that] operated the school bus; (b) [petitioner] would be entitled to recover the jury’s full verdict had a private entity instead operated the school bus, as in commonplace among school districts; and (c) as this Court held forty years ago, political subdivision immunity is “an anachronism, without rational basis” because local agencies may purchase liability insurance and tort liability promotes accountability and accident-prevention? *See Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Educ.,*453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877, 881-83 (1973).

> (2) Does the Act’s liability cap violate equal protection principles in this case where (a) Pennsbury purchased $11 million in insurance, funded by taxpayers, including [petitioner’s] parents; (b) [petitioner] could recover her judgment at least to the extent of the available insurance; and (c) the Commonwealth Court’s majority opinion acknowledged that the available insurance presented “intriguing, and perhaps appealing” issues regarding the Act’s constitutionality?

> (3) Does the liability cap violate [petitioner’s] right to jury trial guaranteed by Article I, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania constitution where Pennsbury did not challenge the verdict’s excessiveness yet the liability cap eviscerated the verdict by reducing [petitioner’s] recovery by over 96%?

> (4) Does the liability cap impermissibly infringe on the judicial power set forth in Article V, Section 1 of the *3Pennsylvania constitution by forcing a more than 96% remittitur of the jury’s verdict in this case, and thereby usurping the judiciary’s exclusive and inherent power to determine remittitur requests?

> (5) Does the liability cap violate the open courts provision of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania constitution by forcing a more than 96% remittitur of the jury’s verdict and therefore denying [petitioner] full redress of her injuries?

> (6) Does the liability cap violate the guarantee against liability limitations set forth in Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution, where this is not a workers’ compensation matter?
1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-28-1997

Township of Center v. First Mercury

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-3290

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Township of Center v. First Mercury" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 174.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/174
iled July 28, 1997 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 96-3290 

TOWNSHIP OF CENTER, BUTLER COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA; DEAN E. SCHWEINSBERG; and 

DEBRA J. OESTERLING, 

Appellants 

v. 

FIRST MERCURY SYNDICATE, INC. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cv-00837) 

Before: BECKER and ROTH, Circuit Judges

and ORLOFSKY,1 District Judge

ORDER AMENDING OPINION 

IT IS ORDERED that the slip opinion in the above case, 

filed June 26, 1997, be amended as follows: 

The sentence on page 7, lines 15-17, of the slip opinion 

is amended to read: 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Honorable Stephen M. Orlofksy, United States District Judge for the 

District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
"Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiffs, the 

allegedly injured parties here, were insureds of First 

Mercury at the time of the wrongful act." 

By the Court, 

/s/ Jane R. Roth 

Circuit Judge 

Dated: July 28, 1997 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit
CAUSE NUMBER 03

— 15

— 00284

— CR

EX PARTE X IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

X

X THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

X

LEONARD RAY BARKER X STATE OF TEXAS

APPELLANT ’S AMENDED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR

FILING OF APPELLANT’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW THE APPELLANT, by and through his appointed

attorney of record, Paul M. Evans, in the above entitled and numbered

cause, and moves this Court, to grant the Appellant’s Motion to Extend

Time for Filing Appellant’s Brief, and, in support thereof, would show the

Court as follows:

I.

Appellant ’s Brief was due before this Court on June 18, 2015

. No

previous Motions to Extend Time have been sought.

II.

The undersigned counsel needs additional time to examine the record

and complete the research necessary to complete the Appellant’s Brief

.

Counsel reasonably anticipates that he will need only three weeks from the ACCEPTED

03-15-00284-CR

6048015

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/13/2015 7:41:19 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERKdate of t he filing of the instant motion to complete all requisite tasks while

not causing undue slight to other pending clients, and would hereby

respectfully request the deadline be extended to August 5 , 2015.

III.

This Motion is not made for purpose s of delay, but so that justice

might be served.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant respectfully

prays that this Court, upon good cause shown, grant the Appellant’s Motion

to Extend Time for Filing Appellant’s Brief.

Respectfully submitted,

Law Office of Paul M. Evans

811 Nueces Street

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 569

- 1418

(512) 6 92

- 8002 FAX

_/s/ Paul M. Evans

________ PAUL M. EVANS

SBN 24038885

Attorney for DefendantCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing

was delivered by facsimile unto the office of the prosecuting attorney for the

S tate of Texas

— the Travis County District Attorney, mailing address P.O.

Box 1748, Austin, TX, 78767, physical address 509 W. 11 th Street, Austin,

TX, 78701

— on this the 1 3 th day of July , 201 5

.

_/s/ Paul M. Evans

________ PAUL M. EVANS

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the present document contains 3 48 words, all

contents included.

_/s/ Paul M. Evans

________ PAUL M. EVANS
Exhibit 10.73

(LOGO)                                                 Dah Sing Financial Centre
Dah Sing Bank                                          108 Gloucester Road,
                                                        Hong Kong

25th September, 2007

Private & Confidential

Concord Camera HK Ltd.
14/F ADP Pentagon Centre
98 Texaco Road
Tsuen Wan
N.T.

For kind attention of
Mr. Wong Kim Fai Paul

Dear Sirs,

Re:   Banking Facilities

We have the pleasure to inform you that we will extend your banking facilities
for another one-month time with expiry date amended to 31st October, 2007. Your
existing facilities will be unchanged for these period. In the meantime, your
facilities are under review and detailed facility letter will be issued
immediately to you upon approval of our review.

Yours faithfully,
For and on behalf of
Dah Sing Bank, Limited

      Henry P.H. Lau
---------------------------
Authority Signature
Commercial Banking Division
VT/(3916)/hh

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                     <C>                   <C>                    <C>               <C>
Telephone: 2507 8866    Cable: Dahsingbank    Telex: 74063 DSB HX    Fax: 2598 5052    Website: www.dahsing.com
</TABLE>