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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3524 Reported in House (RH)]

<DOC>

                                                 Union Calendar No. 486
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3524

                      [Report No. 117-667, Part I]

 To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
          engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 25, 2021

  Mr. Meeks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
  Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on 
  Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence 
 (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

                           December 30, 2022

    Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

                           December 30, 2022

  Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and 
Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee 
 of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 25, 
                                 2021]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
          engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring American 
Global Leadership and Engagement Act'' or the ``EAGLE Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

             TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global 
                            supply chain diversification and 
                            management.
Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.

        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure 
                            investment standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People's Republic 
                            of China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in 
                            foreign energy development.

             Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the 
                            Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership 
                            in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion.
Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.

             Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for 
                            global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to 
                            cross-border payment and financial 
                            messaging systems.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review.
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources 
                            devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl 
                            trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better 
                            Utilization of Investments Leading to 
                            Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International 
                            Development Finance Corporation for vaccine 
                            manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American 
                            strategic national security and economic 
                            objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays 
                            Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program.
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American 
                            Rescue Plan Act of 2021.
Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding.

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress.
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and 
                            training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in 
                            international waterways and airspace of the 
                            Indo-Pacific and on artificial land 
                            features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and 
                            partners.
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese 
                            Communist Party to the North Atlantic 
                            Treaty Organization.
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA-supported institutions.

     Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America's multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers.
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations.

       Subtitle D--Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners 
                            around the world.

                       Part I--Western Hemisphere

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China's arbitrary imprisonment of 
                            Canadian citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, 
                            human rights, and the rule of law in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense 
                            sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean regarding accountability, human 
                            rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China's Belt 
                            and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership.
Sec. 251. Countering China's educational and cultural diplomacy in 
                            Latin America.
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.

                  Part II--Transatlantic Relationships

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private 
                            sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and 
                            between China and Russia.

                    Part III--South and Central Asia

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review.

                            Part IV--Africa

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of 
                            the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in 
                            Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification.

                  Part V--Middle East and North Africa

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the 
                            Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People's Republic of China-Iran 
                            relationship.

                         Part VI--Arctic Region

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on 
                            the Arctic Council.

                           Part VII--Oceania

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.

                       Part VIII--Pacific Islands

Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definition.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific 
                            Islands.
Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime.
Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights 
                            and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in 
                            Hong Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice.
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police 
                            force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic 
                            minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                            Autonomous Region.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
                            that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the 
                            succession or reincarnation of the Dalai 
                            Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan 
                            Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great 
                            Firewall circumvention tools for the people 
                            of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights 
                            in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with 
                            respect to human rights violations.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and 
                            discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to 
                            international abuses of human rights.
Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII 
                            Paralympic Winter Games.
Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical 
                            capabilities to enable human rights abuses.
Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy.
Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, 
                            coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or 
                            involuntary contraceptive implantation in 
                            the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech.
Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China 
                            exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United 
                            States laws and protections.
Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human 
                            Rights Practices.
Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province.
Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.
Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People's Republic of China's 
                            industrial policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's 
                            Republic of China on nuclear issues and 
                            ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering the People's Republic of China's proliferation of 
                            ballistic missiles and nuclear technology 
                            to the Middle East.

              TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the 
                            People's Republic of China and other 
                            countries account for environmental issues 
                            and climate change.
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate 
                            disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the 
                            People's Republic of China's Belt and Road 
                            Initiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and 
                            economic interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, 
                            adaptation, and security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and 
                            high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological 
                            innovation through the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.
Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.
Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United 
                            States supply chains.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Unless otherwise 
        defined, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its 
        political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and 
        ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global 
        competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly 
        pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the 
        interests and values of the United States, its partners, and 
        much of the rest of the world.
            (2) A number of policies being pursued by the PRC--
                    (A) threaten the future character of the 
                international order and are shaping the rules, norms, 
                and institutions that govern relations among states;
                    (B) will put at risk the ability of the United 
                States to secure its national interests; and
                    (C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, 
                and freedom of the international community in the 
                coming decades.
            (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 
        1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's 
        economic and social development to ensure that it participated 
        in, and benefited from, the free and open international order. 
        The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the 
        welfare of the Chinese people by--
                    (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access 
                to global capital markets;
                    (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World 
                Trade Organization;
                    (C) providing development finance and technical 
                assistance;
                    (D) promoting research collaboration;
                    (E) educating the PRC's top students;
                    (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
                technologies and scientific knowledge; and
                    (G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
            (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue 
        state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly 
        authoritarian governance model at home through increased 
        restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and 
        assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and 
        deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary 
        to core United States values and the values of other nations, 
        both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this 
        strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been 
        compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC 
        and reanimate its defense of the international order.
            (5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of 
        the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the 
        ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation'' as central to the 
        domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands--
                    (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
                    (B) concentration of military power;
                    (C) a dominant role for the CCP in the state and 
                the economy;
                    (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control 
                over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
                    (E) the denial of any universal values and 
                individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
            (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as 
        superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the 
        United States and other democracies. This approach to 
        governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the 
        PRC's status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of 
        the world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ``We 
        firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics 
        develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the 
        superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly 
        apparent . . . [and] our country's road of development will 
        have increasingly greater influence on the world.''.
            (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant 
        position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world 
        power'', shaping an international order that is conducive to 
        the its interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning 
        the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a 
        strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue 
        the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.
            (8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, 
        which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals 
        and principles, by conducting global information and influence 
        operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 
        align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy 
        of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-
        opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations 
        for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at 
        the expense of the interests of the United States and the 
        international community.
            (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its 
        model of development and governance. During the 19th Party 
        Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC could 
        serve as a model of development for other countries by 
        utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to 
        solving problems''.
            (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and 
        attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
                    (A) undermining democratic institutions;
                    (B) subverting financial institutions;
                    (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies 
                of the PRC; and
                    (D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of 
                the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
            (11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global 
        leader in science and technology. In May 2018, General 
        Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and 
        rejuvenation'', it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world 
        center for science and innovation''. The PRC has invested the 
        equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research 
        and development and established joint scientific research 
        centers and science universities.
            (12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing and 
        technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with 
        Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human 
        rights and longstanding international rules and norms with 
        respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to 
        United States national security and the security of allies and 
        like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its 
        illiberal political and social policies through mass 
        surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of 
        the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC 
        increases direct and indirect government control over its 
        citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
        military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research, 
        which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to 
        develop new military capabilities.
            (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve 
        its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological 
        superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in 
        anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. 
        The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively 
        undermine a free and open international market, such as 
        intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, 
        regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to 
        proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements 
        between Chinese and foreign companies.
            (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are 
        designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of 
        the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important 
        markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes 
        potential violation of its World Trade Organization 
        commitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the 
        PRC aims to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and 
        development security . . . in [China's] own hands''.
            (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a 
        variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the 
        Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as 
        ``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and 
        includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC 
        describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan 
        for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of 
        economic relations with the PRC at its center, making it the 
        most concrete geographical representation of the PRC's global 
        ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned 
        PRC firms in global markets, enhances the PRC's political 
        leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides 
        greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. 
        Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic 
        dependence.
            (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States 
        from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has 
        built and supported enduring alliances and economic 
        partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
        rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
        Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military 
        coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
            (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United 
        States military from operating in the Western Pacific and 
        erodes United States security guarantees.
            (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of 
        critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
        Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence 
        beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial 
        activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of 
        security operations in areas permitted under international law.
            (19) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' with Taiwan 
        through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's 
        insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only 
        option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, 
        General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise 
        to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of 
        taking all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic 
        values and economic liberalism challenges General Secretary 
        Xi's goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to 
        exploit Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First 
        Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain 
        and beyond.
            (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an 
        illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of 
        navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the 
        environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, 
        and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an 
        effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters 
        around neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi's 
        September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not 
        militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party 
        Congress, General Secretary Xi announced that ``construction on 
        islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady 
        progress''.
            (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a 
        level of capacity and capability superior to the United States 
        in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations 
        by shifting its military doctrine from having a force 
        ``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force 
        ``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately, 
        this transformation could enable China to impose its will in 
        the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. 
        In 2017, General Secretary Xi established the following 
        developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
                    (A) A mechanized force with increased informatized 
                and strategic capabilities by 2020.
                    (B) The complete modernization of China's national 
                defense by 2035.
                    (C) The full transformation of the PLA into a 
                world-class force by 2050.
            (22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described 
        in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
                    (A) upholding a free and open international order;
                    (B) maintaining the integrity of international 
                institutions with liberal norms and values;
                    (C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the 
                Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
                    (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
                    (F) fostering the free flow of commerce through 
                open and transparent markets; and
                    (G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
            (23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and 
        accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore 
        increased the need for United States global leadership and a 
        competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's 
        focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
                    (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's 
                autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national 
                security law'' on Hong Kong;
                    (B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and 
                South China Seas;
                    (C) increasing its territorial aggression in South 
                Asia, including against India; and
                    (D) engaging in a widespread and government-
                directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC 
                Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of 
                COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the 
                outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, 
                and global health efforts.
            (24) The CCP's disinformation campaign referred to in 
        paragraph (24)(D) has included--
                    (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the 
                pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the 
                outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of 
                person-to-person transmission;
                    (B) claims that the virus originated in United 
                States biological defense research at Fort Detrick, 
                Maryland;
                    (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a 
                possible link between the virus and other United States 
                biological facilities; and
                    (D) efforts to block access to qualified 
                international infectious disease experts who might 
                contradict the CCP's narrative.
            (25) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the 
        United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with 
        the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
            (26) The United States policy of strategic competition with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China is part of a broader 
        strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world that 
        aligns with cooperation with United States allies and partners 
        to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and 
        enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, 
        stable, and diverse region.
            (27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
        Law 115-409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for 
        promoting United State security interests, economic interests, 
        and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 
        over 5 years--
                    (A) to support greater security and defense 
                cooperation between the United States and allies and 
                partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) to advance democracy and the protection and 
                promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between 
                the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through 
                programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
                Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and
                    (E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy 
                security in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States to pursue 
the following objectives:
            (1) The United States global leadership role is sustained 
        and its political system and major foundations of national 
        power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, 
        technological, and military domains.
            (2) The United States position as an indispensable power in 
        the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, 
        multilateralism, and engagement.
            (3) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
            (4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable 
        balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United 
        States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, 
        including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of 
        commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
            (5) The allies and partners of the United States--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; 
                and
                    (C) work closely with the United States in setting 
                global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the 
                international community.
            (6) The combined economic and military strength of the 
        United States and its allies and partners demonstrates to the 
        PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states 
        outweigh the potential benefits.
            (7) The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based 
        international order, which comprises resilient states and 
        institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as 
        sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. 
        The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts 
        at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.
            (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international 
        engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including--
                    (A) the protection of human rights, commercial 
                engagement and investment, and technology; and
                    (B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in 
                alignment with the values and interests of the United 
                States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders 
                in the liberal international order.
            (9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to--
                    (A) undermine open and democratic societies;
                    (B) distort global markets;
                    (C) manipulate the international trade system;
                    (D) coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and 
                military means; or
                    (E) use its technological advantages to undermine 
                individual freedoms or other states' national security 
                interests.
            (10) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by 
        reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, 
        scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the 
        United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;
            (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the 
        PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
        security, informational, and technological realms to maximize 
        the United States' strengths and increase the costs for the PRC 
        of harming the interests and values of the United States and 
        its partners and allies;
            (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free 
        flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and 
        peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and 
        transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
            (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral 
        cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and 
        values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the 
        United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and 
        reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its 
        allies and friends;
            (5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies 
        and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency 
        to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, 
        free from coercion and external pressure;
            (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, 
        constructive competition in United States-China economic 
        relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) improving United States laws and regulations as 
                necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United 
                States economic competitiveness;
            (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) combat corruption;
                    (F) foster and support greater collaboration with 
                and among partner countries and the United States 
                private sector to develop secure and sustainable 
                infrastructure; and
                    (G) support American workers and create American 
                jobs;
            (8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules 
        and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in 
        the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as 
        next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, 
        quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing necessary investment and concrete 
                incentives for the private sector to accelerate 
                development of such technologies;
                    (B) modernizing export controls and investment 
                screening regimes and associated policies and 
                regulations;
                    (C) enhancing the role of the United States in 
                technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for 
                developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and co-development of critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) coordinating and aligning export 
                        control measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in 
                        strategically critical supply chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (F) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to vetted allies and partners;
            (11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open international order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to 
        counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
            (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of 
        these organizations in facilitating solutions to global 
        challenges;
            (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms 
        and human rights in the United States relationship with the 
        PRC;
            (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order 
        and address regional and global challenges posed by the 
        Government of the PRC regarding--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
                    (C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, 
                other international agreements, and other international 
                norms related to human rights;
            (16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and 
        coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other 
        nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in 
        ways that threaten the United States or its allies and 
        partners;
            (17) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including through necessary investments in United 
        States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the 
        Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and 
        interoperability with allies and partners;
            (18) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) initiating armed conflict;
                    (B) coercing nations; or
                    (C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict;
            (19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
        communication and improve both military and civilian crisis 
        avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations 
        and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through 
        high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and 
        military officials and other measures, in alignment with United 
        States interests; and
            (20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, 
        cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through 
        bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as 
        appropriate, and especially in the following areas--
                    (A) global fight against climate change;
                    (B) nuclear security; and
                    (C) global financial stability.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy 
described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
            (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the 
        Indo-Pacific will require the United States--
                    (A) to marshal sustained political will to protect 
                its vital interests, promote its values, and advance 
                its economic and national security objectives; and
                    (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
                persuade the American people and United States allies 
                and partners of--
                            (i) the current challenges facing the 
                        international rules based order; and
                            (ii) the need for long-term investments and 
                        engagement to defend shared interests and 
                        values.
            (2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies 
        and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to 
        encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, 
        greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC 
        behavior.
            (3) Effective United States strategy toward China 
        requires--
                    (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.
            (4) The United States must ensure close integration among 
        economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the 
        private sector, civil society, universities and academic 
        institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open 
        societies to enable such actors--
                    (A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
                    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                            (i) to strengthen the United States and its 
                        allies; and
                            (ii) to promote a compelling vision of a 
                        free and open order.
            (5) The United States must ensure that all Federal 
        departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and 
        resourced to effectively defend and advance United States 
        interests, by--
                    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, 
                DC;
                    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign service 
                officers, international development professionals, 
                members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence 
                professionals, and other United States Government 
                personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (C) ensuring that this workforce has the training, 
                demonstrated proficiency in language and culture, 
                technical skills, and other competencies required to 
                advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
            (6) The United States must place renewed priority and 
        emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of 
        national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, 
        economics, foreign assistance and development finance, 
        commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial 
        for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.
            (7) The United States must sustain military capabilities 
        necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the 
        Indo-Pacific, including--
                    (A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
                Pacific;
                    (B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting 
                them from coercion; and
                    (C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing 
                unwanted conflict.
            (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation 
        to the information environment of the 21st century. United 
        States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must 
        effectively--
                    (A) promote the value of partnership with the 
                United States; and
                    (B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that 
                threatens United States interests.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

    (a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign 
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, 
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities 
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, 
United States Code.
    (b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in 
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

             TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL 
              SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization to Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for 
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and 
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), including--
            (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain 
        production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2); and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons contracted to perform 
the services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of 
        Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance 
        with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of 
        Commerce officers; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the 
        services described in subsection (a).
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises 
with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for 
the purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided 
to an entity--
            (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of 
        the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or other foreign 
        adversary;
            (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign 
        individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or 
        influence of foreign adversaries; and
            (3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the 
        receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the 
        previous one year that is no longer in effect, with--
                    (A) the Government of the PRC;
                    (B) the CCP;
                    (C) the PLA;
                    (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, 
                or majority-financed by the Government of the PRC, the 
                CCP, or the PLA; or
                    (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity 
                described in subparagraph (D).
    (f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or 
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given to those terms in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
or a successor document.

SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, 
        which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is 
        necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense 
        technology;
            (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of 
        defense-related technologies and services to members of the 
        national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 
        2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United 
        States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
        related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 
        to reduce the dependence on other countries, including 
        countries that pose challenges to United States interests 
        around the world, for defense-related innovation and 
        investment; and
            (3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue 
        to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect 
        critical defense-related technology and services and leverage 
        the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to 
        maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 
        innovation.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
                    (A) describes the Department of State's efforts to 
                facilitate access among the national technology and 
                industrial base to defense articles and services 
                subject to the United States Munitions List under 
                section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
                U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
                    (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign 
                policy, or other challenges or considerations that 
                prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps 
                in the respective export control regimes implemented by 
                United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
                Australia, or Canada.
            (2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
              INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Collaborative Standards.--It is the sense 
of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among 
governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the 
adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development 
advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the 
following issues:
            (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which 
        infrastructure investments are made.
            (2) Anti-corruption.
            (3) Rule of law.
            (4) Human rights and labor rights.
            (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
            (6) Social and governance safeguards.
            (7) Transparency.
            (8) Environmental and energy standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress on Commitment to Cooperation.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora 
around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and 
partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, 
including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
              OF CHINA.

    (a) Finding.--It is in the national interest of the United States 
to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the 
resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries 
with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and 
therefore reduces a foreign government's need to enter into agreements 
with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including to obtain support 
from its Belt and Road Initiative.
    (b) Strategy.--
            (1) Authority.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and 
        submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to 
        use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of 
        assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments 
        that are of strategic importance to the United States.
            (2) Components of strategy.--The strategy shall--
                    (A) identify primary sectors where the United 
                States could provide a competitive advantage to 
                increase a country's economic independence;
                    (B) select countries with corresponding economic 
                needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable 
                to Chinese economic influence;
                    (C) identify any corresponding existing financing 
                available from United States Government entities to 
                prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to 
                the needs of such foreign governments if none are 
                currently available;
                    (D) identify any cooperative and complementary 
                assistance and financing from friendly foreign 
                governments, including coordinated assistance and co-
                financing;
                    (E) create a streamlined decision-making process, 
                directed by the National Security Council, to devise 
                financing and make agency decisions and commitments on 
                a timely basis to support United States competitive 
                offers;
                    (F) establish a formal G7+European Commission 
                Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to 
                develop alternatives to the PRC's Belt and Road 
                Initiative for development finance; and
                    (G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy, 
                including efforts to address the Government of the 
                PRC's use of the United Nations to advance the Belt and 
                Road Initiative, including the proliferation of 
                memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United 
                Nations funds and programs regarding the implementation 
                of the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (3) Participating agencies.--Participating Federal agencies 
        should include the Department of State, Department of the 
        Treasury, United States Agency for International Development 
        (USAID), United States International Development Finance 
        Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States 
        Trade and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other 
        Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.
            (4) Execution of strategy.--The President should issue an 
        Executive Order to implement the strategy and make such changes 
        in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put 
        the strategy into effect.
            (5) Relevant congressional committees.--In this section, 
        the term ``relevant congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial 
                Services of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee 
                on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Banking, 
                Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
    (c) Authority.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the USAID, is authorized to establish or continue an 
initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those 
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, 
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-
Pacific region by--
            (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve 
        project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement 
        environments, and project preparation capacity of countries 
        that are partners of the United States in such development;
            (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
        preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
        and
            (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
        for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure 
        that uses United States manufactured goods and services, and 
        catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
    (d) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (c), 
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including 
through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help 
boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential 
infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as--
            (1) legal services;
            (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
            (3) debt sustainability analyses;
            (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
            (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
        sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
    (e) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
            (1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
        Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection 
        (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, 
        including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for 
        technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline 
        development, and other infrastructure project support.
            (2) Joint strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds 
        authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used 
        in coordination with the Department of Defense, the 
        International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded 
        donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to 
        support joint infrastructure projects that are in the national 
        security interest of the United States and vulnerable to 
        strategic competitors.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the 
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 
should be made available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private 
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing, including in the 
form of providing support to companies incorporated in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the 
Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing countries.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs 
        and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the 
        presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and 
        other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals 
        providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including 
        direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial 
        institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
        enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
            (2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, 
        and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand 
        the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies 
        in developing countries;
            (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other 
        financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and 
        local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy 
        technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when 
        appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products 
        as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 
        Chinese financial institutions;
            (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international 
        financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment 
        in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
            (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
        cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
        countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
        Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by 
        the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that 
        negatively impact other countries.
    (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of 
advanced energy technologies to--
            (1) improve energy security in allied and developing 
        countries;
            (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent 
        energy markets;
            (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading 
        relationships; and
            (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN 
              FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report that--
            (1) identifies priority countries for deepening United 
        States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the 
        economic and national security interests of the United States 
        and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
            (2) describes the involvement of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China (PRC) and companies incorporated in 
        the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership 
        of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, 
        or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1);
            (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
        implications for United States national interests and the 
        interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
        respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
        country energy production or transmission; and
            (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United 
        States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the 
        United States and such countries.
    (b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall 
be published on the Department of State's website.

             Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States played a leadership role in 
        constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the 
        international economic order following the Second World War, 
        yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical 
        prosperity and stability.
            (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-
        Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated 
        by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy, 
        leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the 
        Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
        Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard 
        rules for regional economic engagement.
            (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan, 
        Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive 
        Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in 
        terms of GDP.
            (4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led 
        United States allies and partners to question the United 
        States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its 
        distortive and unfair trade practices, the People's Republic of 
        China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its 
        partnerships in the region and promoting its own state-led 
        economic model.
            (5) The United States is increasingly on the outside 
        looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. 
        United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a 
        strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows 
        competitors to expand their economic influence at the United 
        States' expense.
            (6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will 
        define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce 
        over the coming decades, the United States is currently not 
        well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.
            (7) It is in the United States' vital interest to upgrade 
        its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and 
        develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy 
        to fully participle in the region's economic dynamism.

SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY OF THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, including 
any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has 
signed, and their impact on the United States economy, American 
companies and workers, as well as on the countries that have entered 
into agreements with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--The report shall include the 
following:
            (1) A survey and comparison of the PRC's international 
        economic practices, which will--
                    (A) provide an overview of the PRC's distortive 
                trade policies;
                    (B) list the PRC's trade and investment agreements 
                globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into 
                and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual 
                countries or groups of countries;
                    (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to 
                advance its international economic objectives, 
                including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI 
                related activities;
                    (D) compare the United States and Chinese 
                approaches and priorities on trade and investment with 
                major global economies, United States allies, and for 
                each region of the world; and
                    (E) outline what further steps the PRC may take in 
                the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic 
                position and influence.
            (2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC's trade and 
        investment policies, including--
                    (A) the impact of these trade and investment 
                agreements on the PRC's economy, with a focus on its 
                trade and investment profile, the impact on the PRC's 
                economic growth and per-capita income, and the impact 
                on the profitability and market share of Chinese 
                companies and SOEs;
                    (B) the impact of these agreements on the PRC's 
                political and diplomatic relations with the countries 
                it entered into agreements with and by region; and
                    (C) the impact of the PRC's trade and investment 
                relationships with other countries on the market share 
                of United States companies.

SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United 
States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the 
Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:
            (1) Deepening United States trade and investment 
        relationships in the region, especially with key allies and 
        partners.
            (2) Confirming American leadership and participation in 
        global regional economic organizations and fora, including the 
        Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade 
        Organization (WTO).
            (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral 
        agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at 
        the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by 
        writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.
            (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for 
        industries critical for United States national interest, 
        including semiconductors, vaccines, and personal protective 
        equipment.
            (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based 
        economic model.
    (b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall 
submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents 
the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to achieve the 
objectives outlined in subsection (a) and includes specific action 
plans for the following:
            (1) Enhancing United States trade and investment 
        relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, 
        especially with United States allies and the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations.
            (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the 
        region's economic architecture.
            (3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the 
        Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
        Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
        do not undermine the United States' ability to shape regional 
        trade and investment rules.
            (4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and 
        trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging 
        technologies, including semiconductors, and products and 
        components critical for national health, including vaccines and 
        related materials and personal protective equipment.
            (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards 
        and rules for the region in the following areas:
                    (A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.
                    (B) Labor practices and environmental standards.
                    (C) Intellectual property rights.
            (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC's unfair 
        trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on--
                    (A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned 
                enterprises; and
                    (B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce.

SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 
              IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States has benefitted from the regional 
        economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic 
        Cooperation (APEC) forum since its inception in 1989;
            (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member 
        economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global 
        GDP and 48 percent of global trade;
            (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade 
        barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to 
        global value chains, while raising the profile of critical 
        topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and 
        inclusive growth;
            (4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead 
        at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that 
        benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and 
        better integrates the United States economy with others in the 
        region;
            (5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was 
        able to promote United States interests, while reassuring 
        allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region 
        in the economic arena;
            (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make 
        progress on several United States priorities, that are shared 
        by United States allies and partners, including--
                    (A) making regional commerce more inclusive;
                    (B) fostering innovation and digitization; and
                    (C) addressing climate change and environmental 
                protection;
            (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to 
        leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic 
        agenda;
            (8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance 
        several of its own priorities in the region, including to--
                    (A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders 
                to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and 
                other part of civil society;
                    (B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and promote 
                small and medium enterprises;
                    (C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade 
                skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;
                    (D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and 
                development agenda with a focus on green technologies, 
                infrastructure and finance; and
                    (E) advance work on digital trade, including by 
                expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital 
                inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and
            (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States 
        should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023 
        and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members 
        to build support.

SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COERCION.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to deter 
Chinese economic coercion against third countries that includes the 
following:
            (1) An explanation of the means available to the United 
        States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable a country 
        with a smaller economy to withstand such coercion.
            (2) A description of the role that the Secretary of State, 
        acting through the Under Secretary of State for Public 
        Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in the imposition of 
        reputational costs on the PRC for conducting economic coercion.
            (3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development, the Secretary of Defense, the head of each element 
        of the intelligence community (as such term is defined by 
        section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        3003)), the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
        Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the 
        United States International Development Finance Corporation in 
        implementing such strategy.
    (b) Update.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the 
submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and every 2 years 
thereafter for 8 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees an assessment of the implementation and 
effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year, and 
planned changes to the strategy.
    (c) Form.--The strategy and update required by subsections (a) and 
(b), respectively, shall be submitted in classified form with an 
unclassified summary.
    (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

    (a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is the sense 
of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies 
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled 
technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within 
a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
    (b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should 
lead an international effort that uses all of the economic and 
diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of 
information and communications technology products and services to 
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital 
authoritarianism'').
    (c) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure 
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or 
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as 
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for 
communication.
    (d) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten 
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt 
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to 
ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign 
actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they 
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated United States 
        dependence on digital tools, international rules around digital 
        governance and trade have remained largely piecemeal;
            (2) the People's Republic of China is operating under and 
        advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United 
        States values and interests, and those of United States allies 
        and partners;
            (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral 
        digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and 
        Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 
        Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-
        New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have 
        emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should 
        be driving;
            (4) the United States has already underscored the need for 
        such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade 
        Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade 
        or e-commerce chapter in the United States-Mexico-Canada 
        Agreement;
            (5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would 
        allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded 
        economies around common standards and norms, including the 
        principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency, 
        and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly 
        vital for the global economy;
            (6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of 
        common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows, 
        the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of 
        growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, 
        and institutions around the world;
            (7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of 
        small and medium-sized enterprises in the global economy 
        through trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e-
        invoicing and e-payment; and
            (8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation 
        with the Secretary of State should negotiate bilateral and 
        plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital 
        trade with the like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, the European Union, the member countries of the Five 
        Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and 
        allies, as appropriate.

SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The 
President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the 
``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help foreign 
countries--
            (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital 
        infrastructure;
            (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and 
        encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, 
        equitable access, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder 
        models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure 
        information and communications technology (ICT) policies and 
        regulations;
            (3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption 
        and predatory behavior throughout communications and 
        cybersecurity policy and implementation;
            (4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, 
        disinformation and misinformation, and the use of digital 
        technology and services to carry out criminal activity or human 
        rights violations;
            (5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT 
        policy and regulations;
            (6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services 
        and increase United States company market share in target 
        markets;
            (7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods 
        and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from 
        the People's Republic of China;
            (8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, 
        and promote best practices for a national approach to 
        cybersecurity; and
            (9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to 
        facilitate better information sharing with the United States 
        and United States allies and partners, as appropriate.
    (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator 
of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an implementation 
plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submission of 
the plan to advance the goals identified in subsection (a). The 
implementation plan shall also include a description of interagency 
responsibilities to carry out implementation, a description of any 
barriers to successful implementation, and a description of any 
additional resources or authorities needed for successful 
implementation.
    (c) Consultation.--In developing the implementation plan required 
by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development shall consult with--
            (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
            (2) leaders of the United States industry;
            (3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology, 
        telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic development and 
        competitiveness, and human rights, including from the Open 
        Technology Fund;
            (4) representatives from relevant United States Government 
        agencies; and
            (5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 to carry out this section.

SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION.

    It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advisor Jake 
Sullivan correctly observed that the United States and likeminded 
democracies are in an ideological competition with the People's 
Republic of China, under the direction and control of the Chinese 
Communist Party, when he stated, ``China is essentially making the case 
that the Chinese model is better than the American model. . . This is 
not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an explicit 
statement that there is an alternative model to the democratic market 
economy model that the United States has been advancing over the course 
of decades.''.

             Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China operates a system of 
        state-owned financial institutions including retail banks, 
        investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given 
        favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial 
        institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to 
        operate in the PRC.
            (2) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
        2001, the PRC Government committed to opening the credit card 
        payment business to foreign firms by 2006.
            (3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its payment 
        market, the United States brought a case against the PRC before 
        the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated that the PRC open its card 
        payment market to global competitors.
            (4) Even after the WTO's ruling, the PRC Government refused 
        to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required 
        all yuan-denominated payment cards to use the PRC's Union Pay 
        network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had 
        grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the 
        application of foreign firms to enter the market.
            (5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital 
        controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign 
        investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to 
        control their money.
            (6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
        announced that the PRC would launch a technology innovation 
        stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market 
        launched on July 22, 2019.
            (7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma 
        referred to ``pawnshop mentality'' of state-owned banks. 
        Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant 
        Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.
            (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use of a fully 
        digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's first central 
        bank backed digital currency, and the People's Bank of China 
        and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing 
        the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.

SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR 
              GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve 
        currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States 
        and the American people by allowing the United States to 
        maintain economic independence, better control its monetary 
        policy, and finance government outlays;
            (2) American global leadership has benefited from the 
        United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep 
        capital markets, and financial technology innovations;
            (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American 
        national security rely on the United States role as the global 
        financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic 
        opportunity;
            (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center 
        of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused 
        stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital 
        currency, the People's Republic of China is attempting to 
        become the leading hub of finance in the world; and
            (5) the United States must maintain its position as a 
        global financial leader to continue its broader global 
        leadership role around the world.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report that--
            (1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign 
        policy that derive from the United States financial leadership 
        and the dollar's status as the world's global reserve currency;
            (2) describes the actions taken by the People's Republic of 
        China that could cement China's role as the world's leading 
        financial center;
            (3) analyzes the possible impact on American national 
        security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the 
        dollar as the world's leading reserve currency;
            (4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically 
        with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a 
        financial system that is free, open, and fair; and
            (5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve 
        its status as the world's leading financial center and maintain 
        the dollar's position as the global reserve currency.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
            (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
        the Senate.

SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

    (a) Findings.--
            (1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies 
        sought to raise capital and list shares on American stock 
        markets.
            (2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were 
        delisted from the New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud, 
        accounting scandals, and other corporate governance failures.
            (3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United 
        States Government, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
        Board (PCAOB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
        China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry 
        of Finance for the production and exchange of audit documents.
            (4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators 
        continue to hinder the PCAOB's access to relevant documents 
        that are necessary for the PCAOB to carry out its enforcement 
        duties.
            (5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter 
        to American universities warning about national security 
        implications related to Chinese stock holdings.
            (6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President 
        signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public 
        Law 116-222), which requires foreign companies listed on 
        American stock markets to comply with PCAOB auditing rules 
        within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in 
        compliance within three years will be delisted.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
        describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by 
        the presence of companies incorporated in the People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) that are listed on American stock exchanges or 
        traded over the counter, in the form of American depository 
        receipts.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
                    (A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC 
                that--
                            (i) are listed or traded on one or several 
                        stock exchanges within the United States, 
                        including over-the-counter market and ``A 
                        Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded 
                        funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
                            (ii) based on the factors for consideration 
                        described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and 
                        materially contributed to--
                                    (I) activities that undermine 
                                United States national security;
                                    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or
                                    (III) a substantially increased 
                                financial risk exposure for United 
                                States-based investors;
                    (B) describe the activities of the companies 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their 
                implications for the United States; and
                    (C) develop policy recommendations for the United 
                States Government, State governments, United States 
                financial institutions, United States equity and debt 
                exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address 
                the risks posed by the presence in United States 
                capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
            (3) Factors for inclusion of a company.--In completing the 
        report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider 
        whether a company should be identified pursuant to paragraph 
        (2)(A) because the company has--
                    (A) materially contributed to the development or 
                manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the 
                PLA, of lethal military equipment or component parts of 
                such equipment;
                    (B) contributed to the construction and 
                militarization of features in the South China Sea;
                    (C) been sanctioned by the United States or has 
                been determined to have conducted business with 
                sanctioned entities;
                    (D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft;
                    (E) engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
                    (F) contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or 
                missile technology in violation of United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;
                    (G) contributed to the repression of religious and 
                ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;
                    (H) contributed to the development of technologies 
                that enable censorship directed or directly supported 
                by the Government of the PRC; or
                    (I) contributed to other activities or behavior 
                determined to be relevant by the President.
            (4) Factors for making policy recommendations.--In 
        completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall 
        weigh the national security implications and consider the 
        following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3) (except 
        that such report should exclude from its analysis the delisting 
        or potential delisting of companies from United States markets 
        as a result of failing to retain a Public Company Accounting 
        Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm as required 
        by section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 
        7214)):
                    (A) The possibility that banning or delisting 
                companies from United States markets could lead to an 
                outflow of companies to list in the PRC.
                    (B) The possibility that banning or delisting 
                companies from United States markets could impact the 
                status of the United States as the world's leading 
                capital markets center, particularly vis-a-vis the PRC.
                    (C) The impact on American foreign policy and 
                national security if United States leadership in 
                capital markets was weakened vis-a-vis the PRC.
    (c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form.
    (d) Publication.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be 
made accessible to the public online through relevant United States 
Government websites.

SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO 
              CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.

    (a) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
        diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment 
        systems.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy 
                and global leadership hinge upon the current 
                infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border 
                payment and financial messaging systems;
                    (B) examine the durability of the Society for 
                Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
                cooperative;
                    (C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross 
                Border Interbank Payment Systems, cryptocurrencies, and 
                central bank digital currencies could erode this 
                system; and
                    (D) analyze how changes to global cross-border 
                payment systems could undermine United States national 
                security interests including impacts on the efficacy of 
                sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the 
                enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
    (b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form.
    (c) Publication.--The report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made 
accessible to the public online through relevant United States 
Government websites.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
        provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and 
        are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the 
        United States to advance its vital national interests, defend 
        its territory, expand its economy through international trade 
        and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while 
        seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination 
        of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes 
        by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
            (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South 
        Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical 
        allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific 
        region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have 
        collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in 
        areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, 
        infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;
            (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, 
        Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam, as well as its 
        trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional 
        architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
        (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are 
        essential to further shared interests;
            (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands 
        consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening 
        and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these 
        challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete 
        partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security 
        cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level 
        and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, 
        mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key 
        capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual 
        support in the face of political, economic, or military 
        coercion;
            (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
        and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
        the collective ability to advance shared interests;
            (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize 
        human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
            (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert 
        Group of the International Military Council on Climate and 
        Security (IMCCS), entitled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
        Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the 
        regions most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former 
        Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
        Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, 
        climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting 
        security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing 
        patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger 
        and more frequent;
            (8) the United State should continue to engage on and 
        deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia 
        Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas 
        of--
                    (A) forecasting environmental challenges;
                    (B) assisting with transnational cooperation on 
                sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the 
                goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe 
                drinking water;
                    (C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
                    (D) meeting environmental challenges and developing 
                resilience;
            (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States 
        Agency for International Development, should facilitate a 
        robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and 
        adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions 
        needed--
                    (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk 
                reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on 
                strategic interests of the United States and partners 
                and allies of the United States in the region; and
                    (B) to address humanitarian and food security 
                impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and
            (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain 
        essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the 
        Indo-Pacific region.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation with and among United States allies in the Indo-
        Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplomatic 
        engagement, regional development, energy security and 
        development, scientific and health partnerships, educational 
        and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other 
        diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
            (2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral 
        treaty obligations, including--
                    (A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of 
                Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United 
                States of America and Japan, done at Washington, 
                January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent 
                bilateral security agreements and arrangements 
                concluded on or before the date of enactment of this 
                Act;
                    (B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with 
                the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
                the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 
                1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act;
                    (C) defending the Philippines consistent with 
                article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
                United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done 
                at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and 
                subsequent bilateral security agreements and 
                arrangements concluded on or before the date of 
                enactment of this Act;
                    (D) defending Thailand consistent with the 
                Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (``Manila 
                Pact''), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, 
                understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 
                1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act; and
                    (E) defending Australia consistent with the 
                Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States 
                of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951, 
                and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral 
        and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, 
        and New Zealand;
            (4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human 
        rights across the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through 
        regional and multilateral fora and pacts;
            (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
        security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, 
        Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India; and
            (6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable 
        development of the Mekong River Basin, including by providing 
        support for environmental conservation and protection 
        initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through assistance to 
        Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments 
        comprise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States 
        efforts should focus on increasing MRC member countries' 
        capacity in the sustainable conservation and management of 
        natural resources.

SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue 
        to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, 
        (commonly referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or 
        ``Quad'') to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet 
        regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, 
        resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect 
        for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic 
        growth, and that is free from undue influence and coercion;
            (2) the United States should expand dialogue and 
        cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to 
        support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, 
        peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and 
        territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and 
        strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;
            (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders 
        meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and 
        health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
        affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
        access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
        cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
        infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
        disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
        the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so 
        critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
            (4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 
        1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for 
        use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International 
        Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International 
        Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International 
        Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral 
        development banks, should also venture to finance development 
        and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are 
        competitive, transparent, and sustainable;
            (5) the United States should participate in the Resilient 
        Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India 
        in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply 
        chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors 
        to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded 
        countries; and
            (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working 
        Group could--
                    (A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior 
                officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of 
                issues; and
                    (B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing 
                bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United 
                States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as 
                well as other formal and informal parliamentary 
                exchanges.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for 
        bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A description of how the United States intends 
                to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-
                Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India, 
                Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common 
                challenges.
                    (B) A summary of--
                            (i) current and past Quad initiatives 
                        across the whole of the United States 
                        Government, including to promote broad based 
                        and inclusive economic growth, trade, and 
                        investment, and to advance technology 
                        cooperation, energy innovation, climate 
                        mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital 
                        infrastructure development, education, disaster 
                        management, and global health security;
                            (ii) proposals shared among Quad countries 
                        to deepen existing security cooperation, 
                        intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, 
                        and multilateral coordination; and
                            (iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken 
                        jointly with Quad countries, in addition to 
                        other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, 
                        on areas of shared interest.
                    (C) A description of efforts to jointly--
                            (i) expand ongoing COVID-19 cooperation to 
                        prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on 
                        medium-term vaccine and medical supply 
                        production and building a broader dialogue on 
                        global public health;
                            (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 
                        regional economic engagement and integration, 
                        and strengthen regional rules and standards 
                        around trade and investment;
                            (iii) strengthen climate actions on 
                        mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, 
                        capacity-building, and climate finance;
                            (iv) facilitate the development of quality 
                        infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through 
                        joint financing, investment, technical 
                        assistance, and standards setting;
                            (v) enhance joint maritime security and 
                        maritime domain awareness initiatives to 
                        protect the maritime commons and support 
                        international law and freedom of navigation in 
                        the Indo-Pacific; and
                            (vi) develop international technology 
                        standards and share or co-develop new 
                        innovative technologies of the future.

SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into 
negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India 
(collectively, with the United States, known as the ``Quad'') with the 
goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared 
interests and values.
    (b) United States Group.--
            (1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the 
        Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in 
        subsection (a) to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working 
        Group, there shall be established a United States Group, which 
        shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-
        Parliamentary Working Group.
            (2) Membership.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall be 
                comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
                    (B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress 
                appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph 
                (A)--
                            (i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker 
                        of the House of Representatives from among 
                        Members of the House, not fewer than four of 
                        whom shall be members of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Affairs; and
                            (ii) half shall be appointed by the 
                        President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on 
                        recommendations of the majority leader and 
                        minority leader of the Senate, from among 
                        Members of the Senate, not fewer than four of 
                        whom shall be members of the Committee on 
                        Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader 
                        and minority leader determine otherwise).
            (3) Meetings.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek 
                to meet not less frequently than annually with 
                representatives and appropriate staff of the 
                legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any 
                other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad 
                countries.
                    (B) Limitation.--A meeting described in 
                subparagraph (A) may be held--
                            (i) in the United States;
                            (ii) in another Quad country during periods 
                        when Congress is not in session; or
                            (iii) virtually.
            (4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
                    (A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the House from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs.
                    (B) Senate delegation.--The President Pro Tempore 
                of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the Senate from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations.
            (5) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) In general.--There is authorized to be 
                appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years 2022 
                through 2025 for the United States Group.
                    (B) Distribution of appropriations.--
                            (i) In general.--For each fiscal year for 
                        which an appropriation is made for the United 
                        States Group, half of the amount appropriated 
                        shall be available to the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and half of the amount 
                        appropriated shall be available to the 
                        delegation from the Senate.
                            (ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts 
                        available to the delegations of the House of 
                        Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) 
                        shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved 
                        by the chairperson of the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and the chairperson of 
                        the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
            (6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept 
        gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the 
        review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 
        the Senate.
            (7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the 
        chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives 
        or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group 
        shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in 
        the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
            (8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation 
        is made for the United States Group, including a description of 
        its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support 
        greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and 
        respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
            (2) support high-level United States participation in the 
        annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
            (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic 
        engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
        border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's 
        (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
        term economic growth and cooperation with the United States 
        that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in 
        technology, education, disaster management, food security, 
        human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's 
        poorest countries;
            (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to 
        foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, 
        political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic 
        of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
            (5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives 
        such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a 
        commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic 
        relationships in the region;
            (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and 
        territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing 
        claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, 
        legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
        consistent with international law, including through the 
        adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that 
        represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and 
        stability in the region;
            (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
        territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) to cease any current activities, and avoid 
                undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine 
                stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through 
                the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
                    (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and 
                other features, and refrain from new efforts to 
                militarize, including the construction of new garrisons 
                and facilities and the relocation of additional 
                military personnel, material, or equipment;
                    (C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent 
                other countries from exercising their sovereign rights 
                to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and 
                continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas 
                in the South China Sea that lack support in 
                international law; and
                    (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of 
                administrative and military districts in contested 
                areas in the South China Sea;
            (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that 
        cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and 
        support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
        Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
        illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
            (9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common approach to 
        encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the decision 
        of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of 
        the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the 
        People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to 
        continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and 
        trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen 
        regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
        refugees and migrants;
            (11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
            (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN nations, 
        including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the 
        ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN 
        Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;
            (13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN 
        leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open 
        and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and 
        protecting human rights, including releasing political 
        prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
        arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
        freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech 
        and expression;
            (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address 
        corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
        bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the 
        private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency 
        through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the 
        South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
            (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
        as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides 
        skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation 
        that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation 
        and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global 
        challenges of the future;
            (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the 
        Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an 
        emphasis on civil society leaders;
            (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully 
        upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions and international agreements with respect to the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic 
        missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to 
        do the same; and
            (18) allocate appropriate resources across the United 
        States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific 
        strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN 
        and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
        solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Young 
Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act'' or the ``YSEALI Act''.
    (b) Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Department 
        of State the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
        (``YSEALI'') program.
            (2) Goals.--The YSEALI program shall seek to build to 
        capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia to--
                    (A) support young leaders from Southeast Asia by 
                offering professional development and a global network 
                to share expertise, including in the areas of civic 
                engagement, economic empowerment and social 
                entrepreneurship, education and environmental issues; 
                and
                    (B) further strengthen the enduring partnership 
                between the United States and Southeast Asia and 
                connect United States experts with YSEALI participants.
            (3) YSEALI programs.--
                    (A) YSEALI academic fellows program.--There is 
                established the YSEALI Academic Fellows Program to 
                bring students from YSEALI partner countries to the 
                United States for the purposes of building practical 
                expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks 
                relating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The 
                Secretary of State may award fellowships under the 
                Academic Fellows Program to eligible individuals based 
                on the following:
                            (i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI 
                        partner country.
                            (ii) Status as a full-time undergraduate 
                        student, or recent graduate of college, 
                        university, or other institutions of higher 
                        learning.
                            (iii) Other criteria determined appropriate 
                        by the Secretary.
                    (B) YSEALI professional fellows program.--There is 
                established the YSEALI Professional Fellows Program to 
                bring professionals from YSEALI partner countries to 
                the United States for the purposes of building 
                practical expertise, leadership skills, and 
                professional networks relating to one or more of the 
                YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award 
                fellowships under the Professional Fellows Program to 
                eligible individuals based on the following:
                            (i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI 
                        partner country.
                            (ii) Status as an emerging leader in 
                        government, civil society, or the private 
                        sector, and demonstrated expertise relating to 
                        one or more of the YSEALI themes.
                            (iii) Current employment, and two or more 
                        years of professional work experience relevant 
                        to one or more YSEALI themes.
                            (iv) Other criteria determined appropriate 
                        by the Secretary.
                    (C) Other initiatives.--The Secretary of State may 
                designate other initiatives as YSEALI initiatives under 
                this section if they advance the goals of the YSEALI 
                program as described in paragraph (2).
            (4) Activities.--
                    (A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary 
                of State shall oversee all United States-based 
                activities carried out under the YSEALI program, 
                including the participation of YSEALI Academic Fellows 
                in a program at a United States university or college, 
                and the participation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at 
                United States private and public sector organizations 
                for individually-tailored work placements. Both 
                fellowships may include site visits, professional 
                networking opportunities, leadership training, 
                community service, and organized cultural activities, 
                as appropriate.
                    (B) Southeast asia-based activities.--The Secretary 
                of State should continue to support overseas 
                initiatives of the program, including the following:
                            (i) Quality leadership training, 
                        professional development, and networking 
                        opportunities for YSEALI alumni.
                            (ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI 
                        Professional Fellows Program's United States 
                        professional hosts and interlocutors to support 
                        post-United States exchange action plans and 
                        other related public diplomacy goals, as 
                        appropriate.
                            (iii) Opportunities for networking with 
                        YSEALI alumni and professionals and experts who 
                        are American and Southeast Asian.
                            (iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop program, 
                        offering networking, mentoring, hands-on 
                        training, and the tools necessary to lead 
                        communities in addressing economic, 
                        environmental, educational, and civic 
                        engagement issues.
                            (v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future 
                        program, providing small, competitive grants to 
                        young leaders in Southeast Asia to improve 
                        their communities, countries, and the region 
                        towards one or more of the themes of civic 
                        engagement, economic empowerment and social 
                        entrepreneurship, education, or environmental 
                        issues.
                            (vi) The YSEALI Academy at Fulbright 
                        University Vietnam, offering executive-level 
                        seminars for entry to mid-level professionals 
                        around the themes of technology and innovation, 
                        public policy, and entrepreneurship.
                            (vii) The YSEALI Women's Leadership Academy 
                        Program, enhancing people-to-people ties and 
                        engagement with young and emerging leaders by 
                        promoting gender equality and advancing the 
                        status of women and girls, such as in the 
                        public health sector
                    (C) Alumni platform.--The Secretary of State is 
                authorized to convene current YSEALI participants and 
                YSEALI alumni through a platform to promote networking 
                opportunities within the YSEALI community.
                    (D) Implementation.--To carry out this paragraph, 
                United States diplomatic and consular posts, the 
                Secretary of State, and agency external partners 
                managing and implementing the YSEALI program--
                            (i) shall promote United States policy 
                        goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools and 
                        resources to help young Southeast Asian leaders 
                        develop important skills and connections, 
                        including through online campaigns and public 
                        diplomacy initiatives;
                            (ii) shall establish a system for 
                        monitoring, evaluating, and improving the 
                        YSEALI program; and
                            (iii) may accept financial contributions 
                        from foundations, corporations, private donors, 
                        program partners, and implementing agency 
                        external partners intended to foster the goals 
                        of the YSEALI program.
            (5) Reports.--
                    (A) Strategy.--The Secretary of State shall submit 
                to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy 
                for implementing the YSEALI program, including the 
                following:
                            (i) YSEALI program goals, targets, and 
                        planned outcomes for each year and, separately, 
                        for the YSEALI program generally during the 
                        duration of its implementation.
                            (ii) The continuation of YSEALI program 
                        monitoring and evaluation plan, including 
                        metrics for measuring YSEALI program progress 
                        identification of annual YSEALI program goals, 
                        and targets.
                    (B) Annual reports.--Not later than 1 year after 
                the date of the enactment of this section, and annually 
                thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall 
                submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 
                publish on a publicly available website of the 
                Department a report on--
                            (i) YSEALI program progress and an 
                        assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and 
                        outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i), 
                        including information relating to YSEALI 
                        program implementation and outcome activities 
                        during the year covered by each report; and
                            (ii) recommendations for improvements or 
                        amendments to the YSEALI program and strategy, 
                        if any, that would improve their effectiveness 
                        during subsequent years of YSEALI program 
                        implementation.
                    (C) Final report.--Not later than the date of the 
                submission of the last report required under 
                subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall submit 
                to the appropriate congressional committees a final 
                assessment report that evaluates YSEALI program 
                implementation and outcomes during the entire duration 
                of YSEALI program operation, including recommendations 
                regarding whether the YSEALI program should be 
                reauthorized and any changes that would improve its 
                effectiveness.
            (6) Definitions.--In this section:
                    (A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
                ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                            (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                        House of Representatives;
                            (ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                        House of Representatives;
                            (iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
                        the Senate; and
                            (iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                        Senate.
                    (B) Implementing agency external partners.--The 
                term ``implementing agency external partners'' means 
                any external partner that is not a United States 
                Government agency, and may include one or more of the 
                following entities:
                            (i) Local or multinational corporations.
                            (ii) Nongovernmental organizations.
                            (iii) Universities.
                            (iv) Regional institutions.
                    (C) YSEALI theme.--The term ``YSEALI theme'' 
                means--
                            (i) civic engagement;
                            (ii) economic empowerment and social 
                        entrepreneurship;
                            (iii) education;
                            (iv) environmental issues; or
                            (v) any other theme included by the 
                        Secretary of State.
                    (D) YSEALI partner countries.--The term ``YSEALI 
                partner countries'' includes each member country of the 
                Association of Southeast Asian Nations and each other 
                country or political entity the Secretary of State 
                determines appropriate to include in the programs 
                established under this section.

SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the 
Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries 
on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including 
relating to the following:
            (1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
            (2) Building support for international infrastructure 
        standards, including standards agreed to at the G20 summit in 
        Osaka in 2018.
            (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
            (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
            (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual 
        property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other 
        policies and practices.
            (6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is 
        inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development and Paris Club principles.
            (7) International influence campaigns.
            (8) Environmental standards.
            (9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that 
        are not in the G7 and G20.

SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to support the close economic, political, and security 
        relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize 
        Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States 
        Indo-Pacific;
            (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a 
        vital national security interest of the United States;
            (3) to reinforce all existing United States Government 
        commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act 
        (Public Law 96-8), the three joint communiques, and the ``Six 
        Assurances'';
            (4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric 
        defense strategy, including the priorities identified in 
        Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
            (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in 
        order to fully resource its defense strategy;
            (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to 
        Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, 
        particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric 
        capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, 
        air defense, advanced command, control, communications, 
        computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and 
        resilient command and control capabilities, into its military 
        forces;
            (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in international organizations, including the 
        World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation 
        Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, 
        and other international bodies as appropriate;
            (8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the 
        International Agency for Research on Cancer;
            (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United 
        States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
            (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially 
        through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade 
        and Investment Framework Agreement;
            (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a 
        bilateral free trade agreement;
            (12) to expand bilateral economic and technological 
        cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
            (13) to support United States educational and exchange 
        programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of 
        Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
            (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the 
        United States and Taiwan.
    (b) Supporting United States Educational and Exchange Programs With 
Taiwan.--
            (1) Establishment of the united states-taiwan cultural 
        exchange foundation.--The Secretary of State should consider 
        establishing an independent nonprofit entity that--
                    (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the 
                future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
                    (B) works with State and local school districts and 
                educational institutions in the United States to send 
                high school and university students to Taiwan to study 
                the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and 
                other relevant subjects.
            (2) Partner.--State and local school districts and 
        educational institutions, including public universities, in the 
        United States are encouraged to partner with the Taipei 
        Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 
        States to establish programs to promote an increase in 
        educational and cultural exchanges.

SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
        3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United States to ``promote 
        extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other 
        relations between the people of the United States and the 
        people of Taiwan''.
            (2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to the American 
        Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination Council for North 
        American Affairs, was renamed the ``Taiwan Council for U.S. 
        Affairs''.
            (3) It is the policy of the United States to refer to 
        Taiwan as ``Taiwan'', not ``Taipei'' or ``Chinese Taipei''.
            (4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 
        is inaptly named as it works to cultivate the extensive, close, 
        and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between 
        the people of the United States and the people, organizations, 
        and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.
    (b) Negotiations to Rename Tecro.--Reflective of the substantively 
deepening ties between Taiwan and the United States, the Secretary of 
State shall seek to enter into negotiations with appropriate officials 
of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 
States with the objective of renaming its office in Washington, D.C., 
the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States, and its 
subsidiary offices in the United States, accordingly.

SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan Peace 
and Stability Act''.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate.
            (2) International organization.--The term ``international 
        organization'' includes United Nations funds, programs, 
        specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other 
        organizations outside of the United Nations system that the 
        Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with 
        other relevant Federal departments and agencies.
            (3) One-china principle.--The term ``One-China Principle'' 
        means only the PRC's policy toward Taiwan.
            (4) Civil society organizations.--The term ``civil society 
        organizations'' means international civil society organizations 
        that are critical to maintaining Taiwan's international space 
        and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in 
        the global community.
            (5) Potential pla campaigns.--The term ``potential PLA 
        campaigns'' means--
                    (A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;
                    (B) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of 
                Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to accomplish 
                a fiat accompli before intervention is possible; or
                    (C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan's outlying 
                islands.
    (c) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States has consistently sought to advance 
        peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of United 
        States foreign policy toward the region.
            (2) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
        especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has 
        conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan 
        diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that 
        threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait 
        accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan's future.
            (3) In order to ensure the longevity of United States 
        policy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to 
        determine their future independently, it is necessary to 
        reinforce Taiwan's diplomatic, economic, and physical space.
            (4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical 
        assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, 
        Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During 
        the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of 
        personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests to countries 
        in need.
            (5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, 
        the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon 
        Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with 
        Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.
            (6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health 
        Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health 
        Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. 
        Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has 
        increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan 
        was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 
        2021.
            (7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 
        1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home 
        to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest 
        airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from 
        participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization 
        since 2013.
            (8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) 
        does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its 
        people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the 
        right to represent the people on Taiwan.
    (d) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the 
        Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic 
        interests of the United States, and are matters of 
        international concern; and
            (2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and 
        stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other 
        forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional 
        stability.
    (e) Sense of Congress on Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in the 
International Community.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 
        23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the 
        global community;
            (2) multiple United States Government Administrations have 
        taken important steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in international organizations and to enhance 
        cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods, 
        including through development assistance, humanitarian 
        assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral 
        fora;
            (3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal 
        barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's meaningful participation 
        in the international community; and
            (4) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with other parts of 
        the global community could be further enhanced through a 
        systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress 
        and the American public to such efforts.
    (f) Strategy to Support Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in 
International Organizations.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as 
        appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a strategy--
                    (A) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in 
                a prioritized set of international organizations; and
                    (B) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC 
                on foreign governments, international organizations, 
                commercial actors, and civil society organizations to 
                comply with its ``One-China Principle'' with respect to 
                Taiwan.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required under 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to 
                coerce actors to into adhering to its ``One-China 
                Principle'', including those employed against 
                governments, international organizations, and civil 
                society organizations and pressure on commercial 
                actors, to the extent relevant in the context of 
                Taiwan's meaningful participation international 
                organizations;
                    (B) an assessment of the policies of foreign 
                governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify 
                likeminded allies and partners who might become public 
                or private partners in the strategy;
                    (C) a systematic analysis of all international 
                organizations, as practicable, to identify those that 
                best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan's 
                participation, including--
                            (i) the organization's policy on the 
                        requirements to obtain membership and observer 
                        status, as well as the foundational documents 
                        defining membership requirements and observer 
                        status within the organization;
                            (ii) the organization's participation 
                        rules;
                            (iii) the processes for developing 
                        membership requirements and participation 
                        rules;
                            (iv) the policies of current members 
                        regarding Taiwan's political status; and
                            (v) the organization's relative reliance on 
                        contributions from the PRC and how it may 
                        affect internal decision-making;
                    (D) an evaluation of the feasibility and 
                advisability of expanding economic, security, and 
                diplomatic engagement with countries that have 
                demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded 
                relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with United 
                States interests;
                    (E) a survey of international organizations that 
                have allowed Taiwan's meaningful participation, 
                including an assessment of whether any erosion in 
                Taiwan's engagement has occurred within those 
                organizations and how Taiwan's participation has 
                positively strengthened the capacity and activity of 
                these organizations, providing positive models for 
                Taiwan's inclusion in other similar forums;
                    (F) a list of not more than 20 international 
                organizations at which the United States Government 
                will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence to 
                advance Taiwan's meaningful participation over the 
                three-year period following the date of enactment of 
                this Act, to be derived from the organizations 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and
                    (G) a description of the diplomatic strategies and 
                the coalitions the United States Government plans to 
                develop to implement subparagraph (F).
            (3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified 
        summary.
            (4) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall consult 
        with the appropriate congressional committees--
                    (A) not later than 90 days after the date of 
                enactment of this Act, with respect to the 
                international organizations identified pursuant to 
                paragraph (2)(C); and
                    (B) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
                submission of the strategy required under paragraph 
                (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, 
                regarding the development and implementation of the 
                strategy required.
    (g) Expanding United States-Taiwan Development Cooperation.--
            (1) In general.--No later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development (USAID), in 
        consultation with the United States International Development 
        Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on 
        trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through 
        the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required in 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation 
                mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC and 
                relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, including, 
                but not limited to Taiwan's International Cooperation 
                and Development Fund (ICDF).
                    (B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development 
                cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in 
                Taiwan compares to comparable cooperation with partners 
                of similar economic size and foreign assistance 
                capacity.
                    (C) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges 
                the cooperation described in subparagraph (A) has 
                offered to date, including--
                            (i) opportunities collaboration has offered 
                        to expand USAID's and DFC's ability to deliver 
                        assistance into a wider range communities;
                            (ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other 
                        relevant agencies and departments in Taiwan, or 
                        the organizations' implementing partners, have 
                        a comparative advantage in providing 
                        assistance; and
                            (iii) opportunities to transition virtual 
                        capacity building events relevant departments 
                        and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global 
                        Cooperation and Training Framework and other 
                        forums, into in-person, enduring forms of 
                        development cooperation.
                    (D) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, 
                financial, or administrative barriers to expanding 
                cooperation in trilateral or multilateral development, 
                including--
                            (i) availability of personnel at the 
                        American Institute in Taiwan responsible for 
                        coordinating development assistance 
                        cooperation;
                            (ii) volume of current cooperation 
                        initiatives and barriers to expanding it;
                            (iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers 
                        facing the United States or other partners to 
                        including Taiwan in formal and informal 
                        multilateral development cooperation 
                        mechanisms;
                            (iv) resource or capacity barriers to 
                        expanding cooperation facing the United States 
                        or Taiwan; and
                            (v) geopolitical barriers that complicate 
                        United States-Taiwan cooperation in third 
                        countries.
                    (E) Recommendations to address the challenges 
                identified in subparagraph (D).
                    (F) A description of any additional resources or 
                authorities that expanding cooperation might require.
            (3) Form.--The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (h) Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations 
With Taiwan.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan 
        has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan; 
        and
            (2) the United States should explore opportunities to 
        deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan 
        and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the 
        legal templates required to support potential future 
        agreements.
    (i) Sense of Congress on Peace and Stability in the Taiwan 
Strait.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through 
        high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC 
        amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-
        standing United States position that differences in cross-
        Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;
            (2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be 
        highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk 
        of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to 
        reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;
            (3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric 
        defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and 
        resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment 
        and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those 
        capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense 
        cruise missiles; and
            (4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to 
        maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk 
        reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of 
        misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.
    (j) Strategy to Enhance Deterrence Over a Cross-strait Conflict.--
            (1) In general.--No later than 90 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government 
        strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military 
        conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy shall include the 
        following:
                    (A) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, 
                economic, and military tools to establish deterrence 
                over a cross-Strait conflict and an assessment of their 
                efficacy.
                    (B) An examination of the present and future 
                capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to respond 
                to the potential PLA campaigns against Taiwan in 5, 10, 
                and 15 years. The analysis shall include an assessment 
                of the progress Taiwan has made in developing the cost-
                effective and resilient capabilities needed to respond 
                to its strategic environment, as well as any additional 
                personnel, procurement, or training reforms required.
                    (C) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding 
                coordination with United States allies and partners to 
                enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The 
                review shall include a review of the following matters:
                            (i) Expanding coordination of public or 
                        private messaging on deterrence vis-a-vis 
                        Taiwan.
                            (ii) Coordinating use of economic tools to 
                        raise the costs of PRC military action that 
                        could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.
                            (iii) Enhancing codevelopment and 
                        codeployment of military capabilities related 
                        to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or 
                        enhancing coordination on training of Taiwan's 
                        military forces.
                    (D) Recommendations on significant additional 
                diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to 
                the United States Government, unilaterally and in 
                concert with United States allies and partners, to 
                enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over 
                a cross-Strait conflict.
                    (E) A description of any additional resources or 
                authorities needed to implement the recommendations 
                identified in subparagraph (D).
            (3) Form.--The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted classified form but may include an unclassified 
        annex.
            (4) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 
        days thereafter for 7 years, the President (or a designee), as 
        well as representatives from the agencies and departments 
        involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), 
        shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees 
        regarding the development and implementation of the strategy 
        required in this subsection. The representatives from the 
        relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under 
        Secretary level or above.
    (k) Strengthening Taiwan's Civilian Defense Professionals.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a plan for 
        strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals 
        in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan 
        as appropriate.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The plan required by paragraph 
        (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A comprehensive review of existing United 
                States Government and non-United States Government 
                programmatic and funding modalities to support Taiwan's 
                civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional 
                development, educational, and cultural exchanges in the 
                United States, including--
                            (i) opportunities through Department of 
                        State-supported programs, such as the 
                        International Visitor Leaders Program; and
                            (ii) opportunities offered through 
                        nongovernmental institutions, such as think 
                        tanks, to the extent the review can practicably 
                        make such an assessment.
                    (B) A description of the frequency that civilian 
                defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are 
                selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
                    (C) An analysis of any funding, policy, 
                administrative, or other barriers preventing greater 
                participation from Taiwan's civilian defense 
                professionals in the opportunities identified pursuant 
                to subparagraph (A).
                    (D) An evaluation of the value expanding the 
                opportunities reviewed pursuant to subparagraph (A) 
                would offer for strengthening Taiwan's existing 
                civilian defense community, and for increasing the 
                perceived value of the field for young professionals in 
                Taiwan.
                    (E) An assessment of options the United States 
                Government could take individually, with partners in 
                Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or nongovernmental 
                partners, to expand the opportunities reviewed pursuant 
                to subparagraph (A).
                    (F) A description of additional resources and 
                authorities required by the options assessed pursuant 
                to subparagraph (E).
            (3) Form.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan 
International Solidarity Act''.
    (b) Clarification Regarding United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2758.--Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies 
International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 
2019 (Public Law 116-135) (relating to diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 
        (1971) established the representatives of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives 
        of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address 
        the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the 
        United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the 
        resolution take a position on the relationship between the 
        People's Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement 
        pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty.
            ``(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks 
        to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people.''.
    (c) United States Advocacy for International Organizations to 
Resist the People's Republic of China's Efforts to Distort the ``One 
China'' Position.--Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International 
Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to 
the policy of the United States regarding Taiwan's participation in 
international organizations) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' after the 
        semicolon at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the 
        United States Government in all organizations described in 
        paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
        United States to advocate such organizations to resist the 
        People's Republic of China's efforts to distort the decisions, 
        language, policies, or procedures of such organizations 
        regarding Taiwan.''.
    (d) Opposing the People's Republic of China's Efforts to Undermine 
Taiwan's Ties and Partnerships Internationally.--Subsection (a) of 
section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement 
Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with 
Taiwan) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' after the 
        semicolon at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and 
        partners to oppose the People's Republic of China's efforts to 
        undermine Taiwan's official diplomatic relationships and its 
        partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain 
        diplomatic relations.''.
    (e) Report on the People's Republic of China's Attempts to Promote 
Its ``One China'' Position.--
            (1) In general.--Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan 
        Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative 
        (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with 
        Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period at the end 
        the following: ``, as well as information relating to any prior 
        or ongoing attempts by the People's Republic of China to 
        undermine Taiwan's membership or observer status in all 
        organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan's ties and 
        relationships with other countries in accordance with 
        subsection (a) of this section''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) 
        shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
        apply beginning with the first report required under subsection 
        (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection 
        and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as amended by 
        paragraph (1), that is required after such date.

SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan 
Fellowship Act''.
    (b) Findings; Purposes.--
            (1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
                    (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 
                U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ``to 
                preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly 
                commercial, cultural, and other relations between the 
                people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, 
                as well as the people on the China mainland and all 
                other peoples of the Western Pacific area''.
                    (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
                Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has 
                grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant 
                democracy of 23,000,000 people.
                    (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's 
                Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic 
                partners and from international organizations, 
                including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has 
                emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global 
                pandemic response, including by donating more than 
                2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to 
                the United States.
                    (D) The creation of a United States fellowship 
                program with Taiwan would support--
                            (i) a key priority of expanding people-to-
                        people exchanges, which was outlined in 
                        President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National 
                        Security Strategy;
                            (ii) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment 
                        to Taiwan, ``a leading democracy and a critical 
                        economic and security partner'', as expressed 
                        in his March 2021 Interim National Security 
                        Strategic Guidance; and
                            (iii) April 2021 guidance from the 
                        Department of State based on a review required 
                        under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 
                        (subtitle B of title III of division FF of 
                        Public Law 116-260) to ``encourage U.S. 
                        government engagement with Taiwan that reflects 
                        our deepening unofficial relationship''.
            (2) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are--
                    (A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan 
                strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the 
                Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials 
                of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan 
                for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 
                as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or 
                a Taiwanese civic institution;
                    (B) to expand United States Government expertise in 
                Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of 
                the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the 
                Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States 
                personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and 
                understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program 
                established under subsection (c); and
                    (C) to better position the United States to advance 
                its economic, security, and human rights interests and 
                values in the Indo-Pacific region.
    (c) Taiwan Fellowship Program.--
            (1) Definitions.--In this section:
                    (A) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'' means, 
                in the case of the executive branch of United States 
                Government, or in the case of a legislative branch 
                agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the 
                respective agency.
                    (B) Agency of the united states government.--The 
                term ``agency of the United States Government'' 
                includes the Government Accountability Office, the 
                Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research 
                Service, and the United States-China Economic and 
                Security Review Commission of the legislative branch, 
                as well as any agency of the executive branch.
                    (C) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
                ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                            (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the 
                        Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee 
                        on Armed Services of the House of 
                        Representatives; and
                            (ii) the Committee on Appropriations and 
                        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                        Senate.
                    (D) Detailee.--The term ``detailee'' means an 
                employee of an agency of the United States Government 
                on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a 
                change of position from the agency at which such 
                employee is employed.
                    (E) Implementing partner.--The term ``implementing 
                partner'' means any United States organization 
                described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
                Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) 
                of such Code that--
                            (i) is selected through a competitive 
                        process;
                            (ii) performs logistical, administrative, 
                        and other functions, as determined by the 
                        Department of State and the American Institute 
                        of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship 
                        Program; and
                            (iii) enters into a cooperative agreement 
                        with the American Institute in Taiwan to 
                        administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
            (2) Establishment of taiwan fellowship program.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall 
                establish the ``Taiwan Fellowship Program'' (referred 
                to in this section as the ``Program'') to provide a 
                fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for 
                eligible United States citizens through the cooperative 
                agreement established in subparagraph (B). The 
                Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate 
                counterparts at the American Institute in Taiwan and 
                the implementing partner, may modify the name of the 
                Program.
                    (B) Cooperative agreements.--
                            (i) In general.--The American Institute in 
                        Taiwan shall use amounts appropriated pursuant 
                        to the authorization under paragraph (6)(A) to 
                        enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative 
                        agreement with an appropriate implementing 
                        partner.
                            (ii) Fellowships.--The Secretary of State, 
                        in consultation with the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing 
                        partner, shall award to eligible United States 
                        citizens, subject to available funding--
                                    (I) not fewer than five fellowships 
                                during the first two years of the 
                                Program; and
                                    (II) not fewer than ten fellowships 
                                during each of the remaining years of 
                                the Program.
                    (C) International agreement; implementing 
                partner.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act, the American Institute in 
                Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
                shall--
                            (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 
                        Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or 
                        with another appropriate entity, for the 
                        purpose of entering into an agreement to 
                        facilitate the placement of fellows in an 
                        agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; 
                        and
                            (ii) begin the process of selecting an 
                        implementing partner, which--
                                    (I) shall agree to meet all of the 
                                legal requirements required to operate 
                                in Taiwan; and
                                    (II) shall be composed of staff who 
                                demonstrate significant experience 
                                managing exchange programs in the Indo-
                                Pacific region.
                    (D) Curriculum.--
                            (i) First year.--During the first year of 
                        each fellowship under this subsection, each 
                        fellow should study--
                                    (I) the Mandarin Chinese language;
                                    (II) the people, history, and 
                                political climate on Taiwan; and
                                    (III) the issues affecting the 
                                relationship between the United States 
                                and the Indo-Pacific region.
                            (ii) Second year.--During the second year 
                        of each fellowship under this section, each 
                        fellow, subject to the approval of the 
                        Secretary of State, the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in 
                        accordance with the purposes of this section, 
                        shall work in--
                                    (I) a parliamentary office, 
                                ministry, or other agency of the 
                                governing authorities on Taiwan; or
                                    (II) an organization outside of the 
                                governing authorities on Taiwan, whose 
                                interests are associated with the 
                                interests of the fellow and the agency 
                                of the United States Government from 
                                which the fellow had been employed.
                    (E) Flexible fellowship duration.--Notwithstanding 
                any requirement under this section, the Secretary of 
                State, in consultation with the American Institute in 
                Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, 
                may award fellowships that have a duration of between 
                nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum 
                requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.
                    (F) Sunset.--The Program shall terminate ten years 
                after the date of the enactment of this section.
            (3) Program requirements.--
                    (A) Eligibility requirements.--A United States 
                citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section 
                if he or she--
                            (i) is an employee of the United States 
                        Government;
                            (ii) has at least two years of experience 
                        in any branch of the United States Government;
                            (iii) has received at least one exemplary 
                        performance review in his or her current United 
                        States Government role within at least the last 
                        three years prior to beginning the fellowship;
                            (iv) has a demonstrated professional or 
                        educational background in the relationship 
                        between the United States and countries in the 
                        Indo-Pacific region; and
                            (v) has demonstrated his or her commitment 
                        to further service in the United States 
                        Government.
                    (B) Responsibilities of fellows.--Each recipient of 
                a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a 
                condition of such fellowship--
                            (i) to maintain satisfactory progress in 
                        language training and appropriate behavior in 
                        Taiwan, as determined by the Department of 
                        State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
                        appropriate, its implementing partner;
                            (ii) to refrain from engaging in any 
                        intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
                        on behalf of the United States Government; and
                            (iii) to continue Federal Government 
                        employment for a period of not less than four 
                        years after the conclusion of the fellowship, 
                        or for not less than two years for a fellowship 
                        that is one year or shorter.
                    (C) Responsibilities of implementing partner.--
                            (i) Selection of fellows.--The implementing 
                        partner, in close coordination with the 
                        Secretary of State and the American Institute 
                        in Taiwan, shall--
                                    (I) make efforts to recruit 
                                fellowship candidates who reflect the 
                                diversity of the United States;
                                    (II) select fellows for the Program 
                                based solely on merit, with appropriate 
                                supervision from the Department of 
                                State and the American Institute in 
                                Taiwan; and
                                    (III) prioritize the selection of 
                                candidates willing to serve a 
                                fellowship lasting one year or longer.
                            (ii) First year.--The implementing partner 
                        should provide each fellow in the first year 
                        (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by 
                        the Secretary of State and the American 
                        Institute in Taiwan, for those who are not 
                        serving a two-year fellowship) with--
                                    (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 
                                language training; and
                                    (II) courses in the politic, 
                                culture, and history of Taiwan, China, 
                                and the broader Indo-Pacific.
                            (iii) Waiver of required training.--The 
                        Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
                        American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
                        appropriate, the implementing partner, may 
                        waive any of the training required under clause 
                        (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin 
                        Chinese language skills, knowledge of the 
                        topics described in clause (ii)(II), or for 
                        other related reasons approved by the Secretary 
                        of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. 
                        If any of the training requirements are waived 
                        for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the 
                        training portion of his or her fellowship may 
                        be shortened to the extent appropriate.
                            (iv) Office; staffing.--The implementing 
                        partner, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                        State and the American Institute in Taiwan, 
                        shall maintain an office and at least one full-
                        time staff member in Taiwan to--
                                    (I) liaise with the American 
                                Institute in Taiwan and the governing 
                                authorities on Taiwan; and
                                    (II) serve as the primary in-
                                country point of contact for the 
                                recipients of fellowships under this 
                                section and their dependents.
                            (v) Other functions.--The implementing 
                        partner should perform other functions in 
                        association in support of the Program, 
                        including logistical and administrative 
                        functions, as included in the cooperative 
                        agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph 
                        (2)(B) by the Secretary of State and the 
                        American Institute in Taiwan.
                    (D) Noncompliance.--
                            (i) In general.--Any fellow who fails to 
                        comply with the requirements under this section 
                        shall reimburse the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan for--
                                    (I) the Federal funds expended for 
                                the fellow's participation in the 
                                fellowship, as set forth in clauses 
                                (ii) and (iii); and
                                    (II) interest accrued on such funds 
                                (calculated at the prevailing rate).
                            (ii) Full reimbursement.--Any fellow who 
                        violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B) 
                        shall reimburse the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of--
                                    (I) all of the Federal funds 
                                expended for the fellow's participation 
                                in the fellowship; and
                                    (II) interest on the amount 
                                specified in subclause (I), which shall 
                                be calculated at the prevailing rate.
                            (iii) Pro rata reimbursement.--Any fellow 
                        who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall 
                        reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in 
                        an amount equal to the difference between--
                                    (I) the amount specified in clause 
                                (ii); and
                                    (II) the product of--
                                            (aa) the amount the fellow 
                                        received in compensation during 
                                        the final year of the 
                                        fellowship, including the value 
                                        of any allowances and benefits 
                                        received by the fellow; 
                                        multiplied by
                                            (bb) the percentage of the 
                                        period specified in 
                                        subparagraph (B)(iii) during 
                                        which the fellow did not remain 
                                        employed by the United States 
                                        Government.
                    (E) Annual report.--Not later than 90 days after 
                the selection of the first class of fellows under this 
                section and annually thereafter for 10 years, the 
                Secretary of State shall offer to brief the appropriate 
                congressional committees regarding the following:
                            (i) An assessment of the performance of the 
                        implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes 
                        of this section.
                            (ii) The number of applicants each year, 
                        the number of applicants willing to serve a 
                        fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the 
                        number of such applicants selected for a 
                        fellowship.
                            (iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of 
                        the fellows selected by the implementing 
                        partner and the extent to which such fellows 
                        represent the diversity of the United States.
                            (iv) The names of the parliamentary 
                        offices, ministries, other agencies of the 
                        governing authorities on Taiwan, and 
                        nongovernmental institutions to which each 
                        fellow was assigned.
                            (v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to 
                        improve the implementation of the Program, 
                        including added flexibilities in the 
                        administration of the program.
                            (vi) An assessment of the Program's value 
                        upon the relationship between the United States 
                        and Taiwan or the United States and Asian 
                        countries.
                    (F) Annual financial audit.--
                            (i) In general.--The financial records of 
                        any implementing partner shall be audited 
                        annually in accordance with generally accepted 
                        auditing standards by independent certified 
                        public accountants or independent licensed 
                        public accountants who are certified or 
                        licensed by a regulatory authority of a State 
                        or another political subdivision of the United 
                        States.
                            (ii) Location.--Each audit under clause (i) 
                        shall be conducted at the place or places where 
                        the financial records of the implementing 
                        partner are normally kept.
                            (iii) Access to documents.--The 
                        implementing partner shall make available to 
                        the accountants conducting an audit under 
                        clause (i)--
                                    (I) all books, financial records, 
                                files, other papers, things, and 
                                property belonging to, or in use by, 
                                the implementing partner that are 
                                necessary to facilitate the audit; and
                                    (II) full facilities for verifying 
                                transactions with the balances or 
                                securities held by depositories, fiscal 
                                agents, and custodians.
                            (iv) Report.--
                                    (I) In general.--Not later than 180 
                                days after the end of each fiscal year, 
                                the implementing partner shall provide 
                                a report of the audit conducted for 
                                such fiscal year under clause (i) to 
                                the Secretary of State and the American 
                                Institute in Taiwan.
                                    (II) Contents.--Each audit report 
                                under subclause (I) shall--
                                            (aa) set forth the scope of 
                                        the audit at issue;
                                            (bb) include such 
                                        statements, along with the 
                                        auditor's opinion of those 
                                        statements, as may be necessary 
                                        to present fairly the 
                                        implementing partner's assets 
                                        and liabilities, surplus or 
                                        deficit, with reasonable 
                                        detail;
                                            (cc) include a statement of 
                                        the implementing partner's 
                                        income and expenses during the 
                                        year; and
                                            (dd) include a schedule 
                                        of--

                                                    (AA) all contracts 
                                                and cooperative 
                                                agreements requiring 
                                                payments greater than 
                                                $5,000; and

                                                    (BB) any payments 
                                                of compensation, 
                                                salaries, or fees at a 
                                                rate greater than 
                                                $5,000 per year.

                                    (III) Copies.--Each audit report 
                                shall be produced in sufficient copies 
                                for distribution to the public.
            (4) Taiwan fellows on detail from government service.--
                    (A) In general.--
                            (i) Detail authorized.--With the approval 
                        of the Secretary of State, an agency head may 
                        detail, for a period of not more than two 
                        years, an employee of the agency of the United 
                        States Government who has been awarded a 
                        fellowship under this Act, to the American 
                        Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of 
                        assignment to the governing authorities on 
                        Taiwan or an organization described in 
                        paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).
                            (ii) Agreement.--Each detailee shall enter 
                        into a written agreement with the Federal 
                        Government before receiving a fellowship, in 
                        which the fellow shall agree--
                                    (I) to continue in the service of 
                                the sponsoring agency at the end of 
                                fellowship for a period of at least 
                                four years (or at least two years if 
                                the fellowship duration is one year or 
                                shorter) unless such detailee is 
                                involuntarily separated from the 
                                service of such agency; and
                                    (II) to pay to the American 
                                Institute in Taiwan any additional 
                                expenses incurred by the United States 
                                Government in connection with the 
                                fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 
                                separates from service with the 
                                sponsoring agency before the end of the 
                                period for which the detailee has 
                                agreed to continue in the service of 
                                such agency.
                            (iii) Exception.--The payment agreed to 
                        under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a 
                        detailee who leaves the service of the 
                        sponsoring agency to enter into the service of 
                        another agency of the United States Government 
                        unless the head of the sponsoring agency 
                        notifies the detailee before the effective date 
                        of entry into the service of the other agency 
                        that payment will be required under this 
                        subsection.
                    (B) Status as government employee.--A detailee 
                under this paragraph--
                            (i) is deemed, for the purpose of 
                        preserving allowances, privileges, rights, 
                        seniority, and other benefits, to be an 
                        employee of the sponsoring agency;
                            (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 
                        benefits from funds available to such agency, 
                        which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of 
                        title 5, United States Code; and
                            (iii) may be assigned to a position with an 
                        entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if 
                        acceptance of such position does not involve--
                                    (I) the taking of an oath of 
                                allegiance to another government; or
                                    (II) the acceptance of compensation 
                                or other benefits from any foreign 
                                government by such detailee.
                    (C) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency.--
                            (i) In general.--The agency of the United 
                        States Government from which a detailee is 
                        detailed should provide the fellow allowances 
                        and benefits that are consistent with 
                        Department of State Standardized Regulations or 
                        other applicable rules and regulations, 
                        including--
                                    (I) a living quarters allowance to 
                                cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
                                    (II) a cost of living allowance to 
                                cover any possible higher costs of 
                                living in Taiwan;
                                    (III) a temporary quarters 
                                subsistence allowance for up to seven 
                                days if the fellow is unable to find 
                                housing immediately upon arriving in 
                                Taiwan;
                                    (IV) an education allowance to 
                                assist parents in providing the 
                                fellow's minor children with 
                                educational services ordinarily 
                                provided without charge by public 
                                schools in the United States;
                                    (V) moving expenses to transport 
                                personal belongings of the fellow and 
                                his or her family in their move to 
                                Taiwan, which is comparable to the 
                                allowance given for American Institute 
                                in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; 
                                and
                                    (VI) an economy-class airline 
                                ticket to and from Taiwan for each 
                                fellow and the fellow's immediate 
                                family.
                            (ii) Modification of benefits.--The 
                        American Institute in Taiwan and its 
                        implementing partner, with the approval of the 
                        Department of State, may modify the benefits 
                        set forth in clause (i) if such modification is 
                        warranted by fiscal circumstances.
                    (D) No financial liability.--The American Institute 
                in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing 
                authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in 
                Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second 
                year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for 
                the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally 
                provided to the detailee.
                    (E) Reimbursement.--Fellows may be detailed under 
                clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United 
                States by the American Institute in Taiwan.
                    (F) Allowances and benefits.--Detailees may be paid 
                by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances 
                and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).
            (5) GAO report.--Not later than one year before the sunset 
        of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller 
        General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes 
        the following:
                    (A) An analysis of United States Government 
                participants in the Program, including the number of 
                applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, 
                and the places of employment.
                    (B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for 
                participants in the Program and for the United States 
                Government of such fellowships.
                    (C) An analysis of the financial impact of the 
                fellowship on United States Government offices that 
                have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.
                    (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the 
                Program.
            (6) Funding.--
                    (A) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
                authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute 
                in Taiwan--
                            (i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of 
                        which $500,000 should be made available to an 
                        appropriate implementing partner to launch the 
                        Program; and
                            (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each 
                        succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
                    (B) Private sources.--The implementing partner 
                selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and 
                dispose of gifts or donations of services or property 
                in carrying out such program, subject to the review and 
                approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 
              DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated 
        $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and 
        regional foreign assistance resources, including as authorized 
        by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
        2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in 
        the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These 
        amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic engagement 
        budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-
        USAID budget.
            (2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget 
        and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 
        percent of the total, while foreign assistance resources 
        averaged only 4 percent of the total.
            (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to 
        realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel 
        footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, 
        including in the Indo-Pacific.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be 
        sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 
        21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and 
        elsewhere;
            (2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the 
        success of the United States diplomatic corps and integral to 
        its ability to meet national security objectives;
            (3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of 
        an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good 
        governance and sovereignty of countries that adhere to and 
        uphold the rules-based international order; and
            (4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on 
        increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy 
        officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 
        Foreign Service officer generalists, to--
                    (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and 
                open investment environments for United States 
                entities, and engaged in increased commercial diplomacy 
                in key markets;
                    (B) better articulate and explain United States 
                policies, strengthen civil society and democratic 
                principles, enhance reporting on global activities, 
                promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United 
                States influence; and
                    (C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized 
                embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other 
                regions around the world, as necessary.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel 
        footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree 
        of importance and significance to United States political, 
        economic, and security interests; and
            (2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance 
        funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-
        Pacific region respective to the Department of State's total 
        budget.
    (d) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
appropriate congressional committees of Congress an action plan that 
includes the following elements:
            (1) Identification of requirements to advance United States 
        strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and 
        budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to 
        satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained resource 
        environment.
            (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's 
        budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA 
        focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
            (3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in 
        the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the 
        Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at 
        each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a 
        description of how such increases in personnel will advance 
        United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language 
        speakers and translation specialists at posts in the Indo-
        Pacific region and within bureau offices with responsibility 
        for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.
            (5) A description of any staffing or other training or 
        personnel reforms that may be required to quickly increase 
        departmental capacity to address the inter-disciplinary, 
        interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the 
        Indo-Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to 
        climate change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, 
        and digital technology issues.
            (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the 
        Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
            (7) A description of any barriers to implementing the 
        action plan and recommendations to address these barriers, 
        noting whether additional authorities or resources from 
        Congress is needed to address these barriers.
    (e) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 180 days after the 
submission of the action plan described in subsection (d) for not more 
than 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit an update and brief 
the appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of such 
action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment 
of benchmarks reached.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and 
regional foreign assistance resources to carry out the purposes of part 
I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and 
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    (g) Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated under 
subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
Law 115-409).
    (h) Benchmarks Update.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the 
appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which the 
strategic objectives described in the action plan in subsection (d) 
have been satisfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.

SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL 
              TRAFFICKING.

    (a) China's Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid 
Precursors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a written report detailing--
            (1) a description of United States Government efforts to 
        gain a commitment from the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China (PRC) to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such 
        as 4-AP to controls;
            (2) a plan for future steps the United States Government 
        will take to urge the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production 
        and trafficking originating in the PRC;
            (3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit 
        fentanyl trafficking originating in China and illicit 
        environmental trade and possible relationships of trade-based 
        money laundering; and
            (4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit 
        fentanyl trafficking originating in China and counterfeit 
        medicines and medical supplies in the United States.
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.

SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER 
              UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 
              2018.

    (a) Applicability of Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.--Section 
1421(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development 
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
            ``(7) Applicability of federal credit reform act of 1990.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (B) and 
                (C), support provided under paragraph (1) with respect 
                to a project shall be considered to be a Federal credit 
                program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform 
                Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of 
                applying the requirements of such Act to such support.
                    ``(B) Determination of cost.--
                            ``(i) In general.--For purposes of section 
                        502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
                        (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the cost of support 
                        provided under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
                        project shall be the net present value, at the 
                        time when funds are disbursed to provide the 
                        support, of the following estimated cash flows:
                                    ``(I) The purchase price of the 
                                support.
                                    ``(II) Dividends, redemptions, and 
                                other shareholder distributions during 
                                the term of the support.
                                    ``(III) Proceeds received upon a 
                                sale, redemption, or other liquidation 
                                of the support.
                                    ``(IV) Adjustments for risk of 
                                estimated losses, if any.
                            ``(ii) Changes in terms included.--The 
                        estimated cash flows described in subclauses 
                        (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall include 
                        the effects of changes in terms resulting from 
                        the exercise of options included in the 
                        agreement to provide the support.
                    ``(C) Reestimate of cost.--When the estimated cost 
                of support provided under paragraph (1) with respect to 
                a project made in a single fiscal year is reestimated 
                in a subsequent year, the difference between the 
                reestimated cost and the previous cost estimate shall 
                be paid from the balances available in the Corporate 
                Capital Account established under section 1434.''.
    (b) Maximum Contingent Liability.--Section 1433 of the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 
U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking ``$60,000,000,000'' and inserting 
``$100,000,000,000''.
    (c) Funding for Corporate Capital Account.--Section 1434(b) of the 
Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 
(22 U.S.C. 9634(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:
            ``(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursuant to 
        section 1421(c); and''.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report 
on--
            (1) a plan to expand the Corporation's financing to support 
        United States national security and development priorities in 
        critical regions; and
            (2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources 
        that would be required in order to carry out the plan required 
        by this subsection.

SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
              DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE 
              MANUFACTURING.

    (a) In General.--The Development Finance Corporation is authorized 
to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed 
countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following 
purposes:
            (1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA) 
        or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID-
        19 vaccines.
            (2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing 
        therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID-19.
            (3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for 
        preventing, detecting and treating COVID-19, including 
        ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen, 
        diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of 
State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees--
            (1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be 
        most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the 
        goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines by 2022;
            (2) including a detailed explanation of the United States 
        and partner country interests served by the United States 
        providing support to such projects;
            (3) including a detailed description of any support 
        provided by other United States allies and partners to expand 
        the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and
            (4) including a detailed description of any support 
        provided by the People's Republic of China in support of the 
        initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN 
              STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.

    (a) Finding.--With 276 embassies and other representative offices 
globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any 
other country, including the United States. Many of Beijing's new 
missions can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan 
(Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao 
Tome and Principe) or do not have any United States diplomatic physical 
presence despite these countries asking for increased United States 
engagement and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress, that the 
Department of State should conduct an assessment of all United States 
diplomatic missions and posts to verify such missions and posts align 
with United States national security and economic interests, as well as 
ensuring that these locations position the United States appropriately 
with its strategic competitors to advance the national interest in 
every country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking 
any physical United States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy, 
consulate general, or principal officer post.
    (c) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter for 4 years, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report assessing the number, location, and objectives of 
each of its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an 
assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic 
competitors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads of 
other Federal departments and agencies having an overseas presence at 
any United States diplomatic mission or post to ensure such assessment 
reflects all Federal Government equities and viewpoints.

SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS 
              PROGRAM.

    There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period 
beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, 
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

    (a) Authorization of USAGM Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated for the United States Agency for Global Media 
$100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing 
and new programs to support local media, build independent media, 
combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People's Republic 
of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and 
evaluate such programs, of which--
            (1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant 
        to Radio Free Asia language services;
            (2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to 
        serve populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, 
        and Tibetan language services; and
            (3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for 
        digital media services--
                    (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese 
                populations in foreign countries; and
                    (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in 
                China through ``Global Mandarin'' programming.
    (b) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator 
for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly support and 
train foreign journalists on investigative techniques necessary to 
ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, 
and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions 
about pressing issues facing their countries.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for 
International Development $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026, for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, 
training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended 
and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be 
appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of 
journalists.

SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

    (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to 
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to 
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
    (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global 
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic 
messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal 
departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and 
countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO 
Web Operations Center.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global 
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored 
propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID-
        19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, 
        and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;
            (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on all 
        Americans, the American people deserve to know what information 
        the United States Government possesses about the origins of 
        COVID-19, as appropriate;
            (3) it is critical for independent experts to have full 
        access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, 
        biological sample, research, and personnel involved in the 
        early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this 
        pandemic emerged;
            (4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United 
        States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the 
        international team of experts dispatched to the People's 
        Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
        study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly 
        delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and 
        samples'';
            (5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General 
        of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms 
        that the investigative team had encountered ``difficulties'' in 
        accessing necessary raw data, that ``we have not yet found the 
        source of the virus'', and that ``all hypotheses remain on the 
        table'';
            (6) the G7 communique expressing support for full 
        implementation of the International Health Regulations, 
        including ``a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-
        based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID-19 Origins study including, as 
        recommended by the experts' report, in China'' is a valuable 
        commitment by the United States and its allies to investigating 
        the origins of COVID-19 in order to better prepare for future 
        pandemics; and
            (7) Congress supports the effort announced by President 
        Biden, directing the intelligence community to conduct a 90 day 
        review to further analyze information pointing to the origins 
        of COVID-19.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report consisting of--
            (1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of 
        the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of all 
        information the United States possesses that it has identified 
        as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS-
        CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, or 
        other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on 
        the information the United States Government has to date;
            (2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and
            (3) challenges identified to its ability to make such an 
        assessment.
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
        of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the 
        Senate;
            (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world's 
        most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as 
        many challenges to United States interests and values as a 
        result of the growth in authoritarian governance in the region 
        and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the 
        changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human 
        rights principles and obligations;
            (2) the People's Republic of China poses a particular 
        threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized 
        human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices, 
        disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors, 
        engages in malign influence operations, and enables global 
        digital authoritarianism;
            (3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (``ARIA'') 
        enhances the United States' commitment in the Indo-Pacific 
        region by--
                    (A) expanding its defense cooperation with its 
                allies and partners;
                    (B) investing in democracy and the protection of 
                human rights;
                    (C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and
                    (D) supporting people-to-people engagement and 
                other shared priorities; and
            (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy 
        Report concludes that ARIA ``enshrines a generational whole-of-
        government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment 
        to a free and open Indo-Pacific region''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--The Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) is amended--
            (1) in section 201(b), by striking ``$1,500,000,000 for 
        each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023'' and inserting 
        ``$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026'';
            (2) in section 215(b), by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
        ``2026'';
            (3) in section 306(a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``5 years'' and 
                inserting ``8 years''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``2023'' and 
                inserting ``2026'';
            (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ``2023'' and 
        inserting ``2026'';
            (5) in section 410--
                    (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``2023'' and 
                inserting ``2026''; and
                    (B) in subsection (d), in the matter preceding 
                paragraph (1), by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
                ``2026''; and
            (6) in section 411, by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
        ``2026''.

SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN 
              AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish United 
        States strategies to promote, facilitate, and increase trade 
        and investment and development in Africa and Latin America and 
        the Caribbean.
            (2) Focus of strategy.--The strategy required by paragraph 
        (1) shall focus on increasing two-way trade and investment with 
        Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in 
        real dollar value by the date that is 5 years after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act.
            (3) Submission to congress.--
                    (A) United states strategy to promote two-way trade 
                and investment in africa, latin america, and the 
                caribbean.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act, the President, in 
                consultation with the heads of the relevant Federal 
                departments and agencies, shall submit to the 
                appropriate congressional committees and make publicly 
                available a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be 
                known as the Prosper Africa Strategy, and for Latin 
                America and the Caribbean, that provides detailed 
                descriptions of how the United States intends to 
                fulfill the policy objectives described in paragraph 
                (2). The strategies shall--
                            (i) support and be aligned with other 
                        existing United States Government strategies; 
                        and
                            (ii) include specific and measurable goals, 
                        benchmarks, performance metrics, timetables, 
                        and monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure 
                        the accountability and effectiveness of all 
                        policies and initiatives carried out under the 
                        strategy.
                    (B) Specific plans for departments and agencies.--
                The strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) 
                shall also include specific implementation plans, in 
                coordination with the recommendations and activities of 
                the Economic Diplomacy Action Group under section 708 
                of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy 
                Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9904), from each of the relevant 
                Federal departments and agencies that describes--
                            (i) the anticipated contributions of the 
                        department or agency, including technical, 
                        financial, and in-kind contributions, to 
                        implement the strategies;
                            (ii) the efforts of the department or 
                        agency to ensure that the policies and 
                        initiatives carried out pursuant to the 
                        strategies are designed to achieve maximum 
                        impact and effectiveness; and
                            (iii) recommendations on necessary 
                        resources, including staffing, to expand 
                        efforts to promote trade and investment between 
                        the United States and Africa, and the United 
                        States and Latin America and the Caribbean.
                    (C) Interagency coordination.--The strategies 
                submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include 
                plans for coordinating with relevant departments and 
                agencies the implementation of agency-specific plans 
                described in subparagraph (B), particularly as it 
                relates to advancing two-way trade and investment 
                transactions and business enabling environment reforms.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the submission of the 
strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and annually thereafter until 
2026, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report, in coordination with the report required by 
section 707 of the Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act 
of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that--
            (1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United 
        States diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, 
        projects, and activities to advance the policy objectives set 
        forth in subsection (a)(2);
            (2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination 
        among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, including 
        summary of activities and engagements of the Economic Diplomacy 
        Action Group; and
            (3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, 
        mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on the 
        policy objectives of this section.
    (c) Executive Directors for Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean Trade and Investment.--The President shall designate an 
individual to serve as the Executive Director for Trade and Investment 
Strategy in Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive 
Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for Trade 
and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
            (1) oversee the development and implementation of the 
        strategies required by subsection (a); and
            (2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy 
        with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the 
        Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant departments 
        and agencies.
    (d) Business Development Exchanges With Africa and Latin America 
and the Caribbean.--It is the sense of Congress that, not later than 
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, high-level 
officials of relevant departments and agencies of the United States 
Government with responsibility for promoting trade, investment, 
financing, and development should conduct joint activities to advance 
the strategies described in subsection(a), including business 
development exchanges with public and private sector representatives 
from Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean who are focused on 
promoting two-way trade and investment.
    (e) Training, Interagency Coordination, and Information Sharing.--
The President shall develop a plan--
            (1) to standardize the training received by United States 
        and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of 
        the Department of State, and economic officers of the United 
        States Agency for International Development with respect to the 
        programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United 
        States, the United States International Development Finance 
        Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United 
        States Trade and Development Agency; and
            (2) to ensure that--
                    (A) not later than one year after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act--
                            (i) all personnel referred to in paragraph 
                        (1) receive the training described in that 
                        paragraph; and
                            (ii) relevant departments and agencies 
                        share information on trade and investment 
                        transactions facilitated by the United States 
                        Government and funded by the public or private 
                        sector;
                    (B) not later than 60 days after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act, the Administrator of USAID and 
                the Chief Executive Officer of DFC shall develop a plan 
                to enhance coordination and expedite information 
                sharing that includes--
                            (i) a process for sharing of information in 
                        a timely fashion, and at least monthly, on--
                                    (I) active and early stage leads on 
                                transactions initiated, promoted, or 
                                facilitated by DFC;
                                    (II) transactions deemed ineligible 
                                for DFC support or not being pursued by 
                                DFC for other reasons; and
                                    (III) transaction opportunities 
                                identified by USAID or other relevant 
                                United States departments and agencies 
                                submitted for DFC consideration; and
                            (ii) any training required for DFC, USAID, 
                        or other interagency staff to implement the 
                        plan;
                    (C) the Executive Directors and their appointed 
                staff shall be responsible for coordinating 
                implementation of this plan; and
                    (D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation with the 
                Executive Directors and Congress, identify targets for 
                DFC's financial commitments and any private capital 
                mobilized to finalize a transaction.
    (f) Data Sharing Platform.--
            (1) Establishment.--The Administrator of USAID shall, in 
        consultation with the Executive Directors and relevant 
        department and agencies, establish an interoperable digital 
        platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors 
        to--
                    (A) facilitate interagency information sharing and 
                collaboration on trade and investment transactions; and
                    (B) ensure relevant department and agencies use 
                such platform to review, track, and develop consensus 
                on transactions and their relative priorities.
            (2) Coordination.--The Executive Directors shall coordinate 
        regularly with the leadership of relevant Federal department 
        and agencies to--
                    (A) advance and finalize transactions; or
                    (B) provide a written justification for any 
                transaction deemed ineligible for United States 
                Government financing under existing authorities.
    (g) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Relevant federal departments and agencies.--The term 
        ``relevant Federal departments and agencies'' includes--
                    (A) the Department of State;
                    (B) the Department of the Treasury;
                    (C) the Department of Commerce;
                    (D) the United States Agency for International 
                Development (USAID);
                    (E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
                    (F) the United States International Development 
                Finance Corporation (DFC);
                    (G) the United States Trade and Development Agency;
                    (H) the United States African Development 
                Foundation;
                    (I) the Export Import Bank;
                    (J) the Small Business Administration;
                    (K) the Department of Agriculture; and
                    (L) any other entity deemed appropriate by the 
                President.
            (3) Early-stage lead.--The term ``early-stage lead'' means 
        a prospective transaction which is being evaluated by DFC 
        staff, prior to DFC holding an internal screening meeting or 
        accepting an application.
            (4) Two-way trade and investment.--The term ``two-way trade 
        and investment'' means United States exports to Africa and 
        Latin America and the Caribbean, United States public and 
        private investment in Africa and Latin America and the 
        Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin America 
        and the Caribbean investment in the United States.

SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and in 
coordination with relevant offices and bureaus of the Department of 
State, shall implement a ``China Watcher Program'' within the 
Department of State to--
            (1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influence across 
        economic and political sectors in foreign countries; and
            (2) augment the capacity of United States Government 
        engagement with foreign countries and regional and 
        international economic and political organizations and 
        institutions relating to policy coordination regarding China 
        and such Chinese malign influence.
    (b) Placement.--In carrying out the China Watcher Program under 
this section, the Secretary of State shall place Foreign Service 
officers in positions in select United States diplomatic and consular 
posts, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, to engage both 
Chinese and third-country nationals, including host governments, on the 
matters described in subsection (a).
    (c) Annual Report.--Each diplomatic or consular post with a China 
Watcher Program shall produce an annual report outlining the steps each 
such post has taken to advance the mission, trends observed, and the 
nature and extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence in 
key economic and political sectors, including technology, 
manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture, and real 
estate.
    (d) Authorization of Annual Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year 
thereafter to carry out this section.

SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the United 
        States Government should invest heavily into alternative 
        programs and institutions that ensure there remains a robust 
        pipeline of Americans learning China's many languages; and
            (2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by a strategic 
        competition between the United States and China, it is in the 
        national security interests of the United States to ensure that 
        Americans continue to invest in Chinese language skills, as 
        well as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while 
        ensuring they can do so in a context free of malign political 
        influence from foreign state actors.
    (b) Establishment of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese 
Language.--The Secretary of State shall establish in the Department of 
State the ``Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language'' to fund 
study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, 
Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of 
China, abroad or in the United States.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2021 and every 
fiscal year thereafter, $10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund 
for Study of the Chinese Language.
    (d) Required Activities.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (c) shall--
            (1) be designed to advance the national security and 
        foreign policy interests of the United States, as determined by 
        the Secretary of State;
            (2) favor funding mechanisms that can maximize the total 
        number of United States persons given the opportunity to 
        acquire full conversational linguistic proficiency in Mandarin 
        and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other 
        contemporary spoken languages of China;
            (3) favor funding mechanisms that provide opportunities for 
        such language study to areas traditionally under-served by such 
        opportunities;
            (4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process taking 
        into account design inputs of--
                    (A) civil society institutions, including Chinese 
                diaspora community organizations;
                    (B) language experts in Mandarin and Cantonese 
                Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other 
                contemporary spoken languages of China;
                    (C) organizations representing historically 
                disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the United 
                States; and
                    (D) human rights organizations; and
            (5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Mandarin and 
        Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other 
        contemporary spoken languages of China at Alaska Native-serving 
        institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific 
        Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, 
        historically Black college or universities, Native American-
        serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-serving 
        institutions, Predominantly Black institutions, Tribal Colleges 
        or Universities.
    (e) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five 
        years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads 
        of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as 
        appropriate, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate a report detailing activities and 
        disbursements made to carry out this Act over the immediately 
        preceding academic year.
            (2) Report contents.--Each report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall include details on--
                    (A) which institutions, programs, or entities 
                received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of 
                the Chinese Language;
                    (B) funds distribution disaggregated by 
                institution, program, or entity, including 
                identification of the State or country in which such 
                institution, program, or entity is located;
                    (C) the number of United States persons who 
                received language study under the Liu Xiaobo Fund for 
                Study of the Chinese Language, and the average amount 
                disbursed per person for such study;
                    (D) a comparative analysis of per dollar program 
                effectiveness and efficiency in allowing United States 
                persons to reach conversational proficiency Mandarin or 
                Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other 
                contemporary spoken languages of China;
                    (E) an analysis of which of the languages referred 
                to in subparagraph (D) were studied through the funding 
                from the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese 
                Language; and
                    (F) any recommendations of the Secretary of State 
                for improvements to the authorities, priorities, or 
                management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the 
                Chinese Language.
    (f) Interagency Funds Transfers Authorization.--Amounts authorized 
to be appropriated to the Secretary of State to carry out this Act are 
authorized to be transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal 
departments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to prior 
notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
Such heads shall consult with the Secretary in the preparation of the 
report required under subsection (e).
    (g) Limitations.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry 
out this Act may only be made available for the costs of language study 
funded and administration incurred by the Department of State or 
programs carried out by the Department of State (or by another Federal 
department or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out this 
section.
    (h) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Alaska native-serving institution.--The term ``Alaska 
        Native-serving institution'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        1059d(b)).
            (2) Asian american and native american pacific islander-
        serving institution.--The term ``Asian American and Native 
        American Pacific Islander-serving institution'' has the meaning 
        given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act 
        of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
            (3) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term ``Hispanic-
        serving institution'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        1101a).
            (4) Historically black college or university.--The term 
        ``historically Black college or university'' means a part B 
        institution described in section 322(2) of the Higher Education 
        Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
            (5) Native american-serving nontribal institution.--The 
        term ``Native American-serving nontribal institution'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher 
        Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
            (6) Native hawaiian-serving institution.--The term ``Native 
        Hawaiian-serving institution'' has the meaning given such term 
        in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
        U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
            (7) Predominantly black institution.--The term 
        ``Predominantly Black institution'' has the meaning given such 
        term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
        U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
            (8) Tribal college or university.--The term ``Tribal 
        College or University'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        1059c(b)).

SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE AMERICAN 
              RESCUE PLAN ACT OF 2021.

    (a) Authorities and Conditions.--Amounts authorized and 
appropriated under title X of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 
(Public Law 117-2) to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall be subject to the applicable authorities and 
conditions for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K of Public Law 116-
260.
    (b) Oversight and Accountability.--Amounts authorized and 
appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002 of American Rescue Plan Act 
of 2021 may be transferred to the Inspector General of the Department 
of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for 
International Development to expand the capacity of such Inspectors 
General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign assistance 
programs and activities under such Act.
    (c) United States Contributions to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Covid-19 Response Mechanism.--United States 
contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria COVID-19 Response Mechanism under section 10003(a)(2) of 
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021--
            (1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that 
        incentivizes other public and private donor contributions; and
            (2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding 
        requirements under subsections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), 
        (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the United 
        States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
        Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).

SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRANDING.

    The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated or otherwise 
procured and financed by the United States Government shall be clearly 
branded with the United States flag.

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND 
              TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of 
amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military 
education and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the 
Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds may be 
disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, 
consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).

SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN 
              INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
        force to impede freedom of navigation operations in 
        international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to 
        alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific 
        region;
            (2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 
        Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South 
        China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in 
        international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 
        provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
        decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that 
        the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources 
        across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
            (4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to 
        abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, 
        despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United 
        Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including with respect to 
        the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies;
            (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
        lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are 
        available to all countries, and oppose the militarization of 
        new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
            (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC 
        claims in the South China Sea, specifically--
                    (A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, 
                including to offshore resources across most of the 
                South China Sea, are unlawful;
                    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime 
                claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the 
                Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the 
                Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its 
                continental shelf;
                    (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 
                nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it 
                claims in the Spratly Islands; and
                    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or 
                maritime claim to James Shoal;
            (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and 
        provocative land reclamation;
            (5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
        coercion, or force;
            (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
        accordance with international law;
            (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime 
        claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must 
        derive from land features and otherwise comport with 
        international law;
            (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations 
        covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations 
        which have raised tensions in the region;
            (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of 
        Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant 
        countries and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's 
        Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
        and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
        Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
        (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
        between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
        countries, including the People's Republic of China;
            (11) support the development of regional institutions and 
        bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
        Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
        ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the 
        region and reinforce the role of international law;
            (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
        countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter 
        risky and dangerous activities;
            (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other 
        country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources 
        of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by 
        making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have 
        no support in international law; and
            (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, 
        in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of 
        navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.

SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners 
        consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for 
        alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies 
        and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
        United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
        Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and 
        international commitments;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
            (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense, should--
                    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and
                    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions; and
            (5) it is in the United States interest to not authorize 
        arms transfers or security cooperation to governments that 
        demonstrate patterns of gross violations of human rights if 
        such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit or 
        support such violations.
    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes 
        United States priorities for building more capable security 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must 
                possess for the United States to be able to achieve its 
                military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to expedite fielding 
                        the capabilities identified in subparagraph 
                        (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the requirements for United States 
                security assistance, including International Military 
                Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
                a part of the means to deliver critical partner 
                capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
                    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet the 
                requirements for United States security assistance, and 
                identify resource gaps;
                    (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance in 
                the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and 
                personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy 
                barriers, and factors related to specific partner 
                countries;
                    (G) identify limitations on the ability of the 
                United States to provide such capabilities, including 
                capabilities identified under subparagraph (B), because 
                of existing United States treaty obligations, United 
                States policies, including sections 502B and 620M of 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 
                2378d), or other regulations;
                    (H) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for United States partner 
                capabilities; and
                    (I) identify required jointly agreed 
                recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based 
                on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
            (3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT POSED BY THE CHINESE 
              COMMUNIST PARTY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
              ORGANIZATION.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-minded 
        partners, in particular with the European Union, to protect 
        critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain a 
        technological edge, and address the challenges to the rules-
        based international order posed by the Chinese Communist Party;
            (2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to monitor and 
        defend against any activity of the Chinese Communist Party that 
        could impact collective defense, military readiness, or 
        resilience in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's Area of 
        Responsibility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key 
        sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the European 
        Union;
            (3) push for NATO allies to establish a consultative body 
        to bring together such allies, and other institutions and 
        partners as relevant, to exchange information, share 
        experiences, and discuss all aspects of such allies' security 
        interests with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; and
            (4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the burden 
        that comes with collective security in an increasingly complex 
        security environment by reaching by 2024 the pledge set at the 
        2014 Wales Summit to spend two percent of GDP on defense 
        spending and 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new 
        equipment.

SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall publish and disseminate to United States institutions and places 
of study a list identifying the research, engineering, and scientific 
institutions that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or 
funded by, the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
    (b) Form.--The list published and disseminated under subsection (a) 
shall be unclassified and publicly accessible, but may include a 
classified annex.

     Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance 
        the UN's core budget in order to ensure that these missions are 
        properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every 
        three years by the UN General Assembly.
            (2) While the United States is the largest single financial 
        contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial 
        because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or 
        small, to help shoulder the UN's regular and peacekeeping 
        budgets at specified levels.
            (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN 
        also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls 
        to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to 
        leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and 
        peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States 
        interests and values.
            (4) The People's Republic of China is now the second 
        largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone 
        from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 
        15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to 
        UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four 
        permanent members of the Security Council combined.
            (5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and 
        PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push 
        back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-
        based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using 
        United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.
            (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key 
        posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the 
        top posts of four of the UN's 15 specialized agencies, while 
        the United States occupies only one.
            (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the 
        heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds 
        and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme, 
        none are currently led by Americans.
            (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection 
        found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not 
        have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting 
        the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their 
        recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.

SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) the Permanent Representative of the United States to 
        the United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;
            (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in 
        full in a timely fashion;
            (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under 
        section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of 
        title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to detail and 
        transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), 
        to detail or transfer employees to relevant international 
        organizations;
            (4) the Secretary of State should assist the Department of 
        State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) 
        to the fullest extent;
            (5) the Secretary of State should support qualified 
        American candidates in their bid to win election to United 
        Nations-related leadership positions; and
            (6) the Secretary of State should support the placement of 
        Junior Professional Officers sponsored by the United States in 
        United Nations-affiliated agencies.

SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs an Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.
    (b) Duties.--The office established under subsection (a) of this 
section shall be responsible for--
            (1) promoting United States leadership and participation in 
        the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where 
        authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and 
        determining the agenda of the United Nations system;
            (2) establishing and implementing a standard operating 
        procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United 
        States citizen employment at the United Nations and other 
        international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;
            (3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and 
        identifying qualified United States citizens and other 
        qualified nationals to promote for such positions;
            (4) tracking leadership changes in United Nations 
        Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing 
        strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded countries 
        are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by 
        countries that do not share United States interests;
            (5) eliminating current barriers to the employment of 
        United States citizens in the United Nations Secretariat, 
        funds, programs, and agencies; and
            (6) increasing the number of qualified United States 
        candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United 
        Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other 
        international organizations.

SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.

    (a) Increase in Junior Professional Officer Positions.--The 
Secretary of State should increase the number of Junior Professional 
Officer positions sponsored by the United States within the United 
Nations system.
    (b) Report.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary 
of State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees 
information regarding the amount of funding each bureau has designated 
during the immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional 
Officer positions in the United Nations system and the number of such 
positions that exist as of the end of the prior fiscal year.

SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are 
currently detailed or transferred to an international organization 
during the immediately preceding 1-year period and a strategy for 
increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred 
        to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5, 
        United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal 
        Regulations (relating to the detail and transfer of Federal 
        employees to international organizations), including--
                    (A) an identification of the Federal agency from 
                which such employees were detailed or transferred; and
                    (B) an identification of the international 
                organizations to and from which such employees have 
                been so detailed or transferred.
            (2) A list of international organizations to and from which 
        the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal 
        employees.

       Subtitle D--Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              AROUND THE WORLD.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-
        minded countries around the globe; and
            (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
        partners--
                    (A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, 
                and military challenges posed by the People's Republic 
                of China (PRC);
                    (B) to deter the PRC from pursuing military 
                aggression;
                    (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial disputes in accordance with international 
                law;
                    (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
                economic development while countering efforts by the 
                Government of the PRC to leverage predatory economic 
                practices as a means of political and economic coercion 
                in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
                    (E) to promote the values of democracy and human 
                rights, including through efforts to end the repression 
                by the PRC of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other 
                Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and 
                other ethnic minorities;
                    (F) to respond to the crackdown by the PRC, in 
                contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-
                British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of 
                Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people 
                of Hong Kong; and
                    (G) to counter the PRC Government's efforts to 
                spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond with 
                respect to its response to COVID-19.

                       PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship 
        based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep 
        economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision 
        to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) the United States and Canada can better address the 
        People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security 
        influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, 
        environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public 
        procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 
        connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral 
        legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and 
        human rights;
            (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and 
        Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border 
        management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, 
        a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of 
        China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, 
        energy security, and environmental stewardship;
            (4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation 
        to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, 
        economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
            (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, 
        extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose 
        national security risks for the United States and Canada;
            (6) the United States should share, as appropriate, 
        intelligence gathered regarding--
                    (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
                    (B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to 
                5G expansion;
            (7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance 
        collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, 
        United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals 
        Development Collaboration; and
            (8) the United States and Canada should prioritize 
        cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including 
        by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
        (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and 
        tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range 
        missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern 
        Hemisphere.

SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF 
              CANADIAN CITIZENS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian 
        nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent 
        retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng 
        Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
            (2) the Government of Canada has shown international 
        leadership by--
                    (A) upholding the rule of law and complying with 
                its international legal obligations, including 
                obligations pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between 
                the United States of America and Canada, signed at 
                Washington December 3, 1971; and
                    (B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary 
                Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been 
                endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and 
                reaffirms well-established prohibitions under 
                international human rights conventions against the 
                arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as 
                leverage in country-to-country relations; and
            (3) the United States continues to join the Government of 
        Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor 
        and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national 
        Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, a strategy that describes how 
the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of 
Canada in managing relations with the Government of the People's 
Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and Canada in managing 
        relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure 
        supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
            (2) include a description of United States development and 
        coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the 
        cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect 
        to--
                    (A) managing economic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights in the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues involving the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues involving the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (E) international law enforcement and transnational 
                organized crime issues;
            (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with 
        Canada to counter the People's Republic of China's projection 
        of an authoritarian governing model around the world;
            (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
        cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology;
            (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
                    (A) to advance joint United States-Canadian 
                priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic 
                Region; and
                    (B) to counter the People's Republic of China's 
                efforts to project political, economic, and military 
                influence into the Arctic Region; and
            (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track 
        and counter the People's Republic of China's attempts to exert 
        influence across the multilateral system.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than every 180 days 
thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the 
development and implementation of the strategy required under this 
section.

SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, 
              HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
              THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as 
appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on 
Ways and Means and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, particularly in the areas of--
            (1) investment;
            (2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development;
            (3) commercial relations;
            (4) anti-corruption activities; and
            (5) infrastructure projects.
    (b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection 
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve 
measurable progress, to--
            (1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin American and 
        Caribbean countries to advance the sustainable and inclusive 
        development of equitable economies;
            (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between such 
        countries;
            (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive 
        environment for United States businesses in the region;
            (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term 
        financial sustainability and security implications of foreign 
        investments in strategic sectors or services, including 
        transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
            (5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive 
        infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that 
        promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition, 
        financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, 
        and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
            (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
        democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, 
        and ending impunity; and
            (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access 
        to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western 
        Hemisphere.
    (c) Briefing Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, 
the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the 
congressional committees specified in subsection (a) regarding the 
implementation of this section, including examples of successes and 
challenges.

SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE 
              SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress a report that assesses the nature, intent, and 
        impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese 
        diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, 
        procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, 
        International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, 
        and the Inter-American Development Bank.
            (2) Defense sector.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and 
        impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military 
        activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 
        education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-
        related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such 
        as--
                    (A) the satellite and space control station the 
                People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina; 
                and
                    (B) defense and security cooperation carried out by 
                the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the 
                Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and 
                monitoring technology to governments in the region such 
                as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the 
                potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 
                intelligence services.
            (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and include classified annexes.

SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military 
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall modernize and 
strengthen the programs receiving funding in accordance with subsection 
(a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the 
preeminent choice for international military education and training for 
Latin American and Caribbean partners.
    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to 
        Latin American and Caribbean security services;
            (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
                    (A) improving the functioning and organization of 
                security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (B) creating a better understanding of the United 
                States and its values; and
                    (C) using technology for maximum efficiency and 
                organization;
            (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and 
        rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and 
        full compliance with requirements under section 620M of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly 
        referred to as the ``Leahy law''); and
            (4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals 
        proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M 
        of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 
        2378d).

SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
              RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
        exporting its model for internal security and state control of 
        society through advanced technology and artificial 
        intelligence; and
            (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to 
        pressure from governments or security services without reliable 
        legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of 
        citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations 
        of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.
    (b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct 
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
            (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties 
        posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); 
        and
            (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open 
Technology Fund of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working 
through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet 
Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and 
prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services 
to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance 
their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.
    (d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to--
            (1) support and promote programs that support internet 
        freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable 
        access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (3) provide integrated support to civil society for 
        technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied 
        research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary 
        to ensure public accountability and prevent government 
        overreach in the digital sphere;
            (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and 
        develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance 
        and human rights topics;
            (6) provide training for journalists and civil society 
        leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve 
        transparency and accountability in government and the private 
        sector;
            (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business, and 
        commercial practices;
            (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen 
        their capacity to monitor the incidents and practices described 
        in paragraph (7); and
            (9) identify local resources to support the preponderance 
        of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT 
              AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon 
        imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their 
        energy production.
            (2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
                    (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent 
                of its electricity;
                    (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of 
                its electricity;
                    (C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for 
                nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
                    (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent 
                of its electricity.
            (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a 
        detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and 
        competitiveness in the Caribbean.
            (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral 
        reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution. 
        Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil 
        fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a 
        significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, 
        and natural beauty.
            (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
                    (A) has serious health impacts in the form of 
                higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and
                    (B) can also exacerbate climate change.
            (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea 
        level rise and stronger storms.
            (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries 
        of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led 
        Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
                    (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
                    (B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent 
                of their energy production needs.
            (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political 
        turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to 
        retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and 
        step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives 
        preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from 
        Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are 
        experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
            (9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy 
        projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this 
        spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the 
        largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
            (10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need 
        $12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
            (11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased 
        dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic 
        alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have 
        fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market 
        growth, and according to data released by the International 
        Renewable Energy Agency, \1/3\ of global power capacity is 
        based in renewable energy.
            (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated 
        that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total 
        primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
            (13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, 
        Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of 
        $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 
        by 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors reach net 
        zero emissions.
            (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore 
        resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, 
        geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
            (15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in 
        providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the 
        Caribbean on energy issues through--
                    (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the 
                Americas;
                    (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
                    (C) bilateral assistance programs.
            (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders' 
        Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
        of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico 
        reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and 
        increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening 
        wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
            (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the 
        Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with 
        individual countries--
                    (A) to transform its energy sector;
                    (B) to work to increase access to finance, good 
                governance, and diversification; and
                    (C) to maximize the impact of existing donor 
                effects.
            (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central 
        American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally 
        launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy 
        (C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and 
        action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional 
        market and transmission system.
            (19) The United States has an important opportunity--
                    (A) to deepen this engagement;
                    (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries 
                on a more regional and coordinated basis;
                    (C) to help ease the region's dependence on 
                imported oil; and
                    (D) to promote affordable alternative sources of 
                energy.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries'' 
        means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not include 
        Cuba or Venezuela.
            (2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean 
        governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean 
        countries.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
help Caribbean countries--
            (1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic 
        energy resource mobilization;
            (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
            (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other 
        petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
            (4) increase production of renewable energy; and
            (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their 
        national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
    (d) Strategy.--
            (1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that 
        describes how the Department of State will promote regional 
        cooperation with Caribbean countries--
                    (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow 
                domestic clean energy production in the region, 
                strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy 
                sector greenhouse gas emissions;
                    (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 
                transportation sector;
                    (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 
                conservation, and investment in alternatives to 
                imported fuels;
                    (D) to improve grid reliability and modernize 
                electricity transmission networks;
                    (E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions 
                to expand community and individuals' access to 
                electricity;
                    (F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good 
                regulatory governance and to promote a climate of 
                private sector investment; and
                    (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the 
                energy and transportation sector.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a thorough review and inventory of United 
                States Government activities that are being carried out 
                bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with 
                multilateral institutions--
                            (i) to promote energy and climate security 
                        in the Caribbean region; and
                            (ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil 
                        for electricity generation;
                    (B) opportunities for marshaling regional 
                cooperation--
                            (i) to overcome market barriers resulting 
                        from the small size of Caribbean energy 
                        markets;
                            (ii) to address the high transportation and 
                        infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean 
                        countries;
                            (iii) to ensure greater donor coordination 
                        between governments, multilateral institutions, 
                        multilateral banks, and private investors; and
                            (iv) to expand regional financing 
                        opportunities to allow for lower cost energy 
                        entrepreneurship;
                    (C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean 
                government has--
                            (i) an independent utility regulator or 
                        equivalent;
                            (ii) affordable access by third party 
                        investors to its electrical grid with minimal 
                        regulatory interference;
                            (iii) effective energy efficiency and 
                        energy conservation;
                            (iv) programs to address technical and 
                        nontechnical issues;
                            (v) a plan to eliminate major market 
                        distortions;
                            (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
                            (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean 
                        energy solutions; and
                    (D) recommendations for how United States policy, 
                technical, and economic assistance can be used in the 
                Caribbean region--
                            (i) to advance renewable energy development 
                        and the incorporation of renewable technologies 
                        into existing energy grids and the development 
                        and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate 
                        and feasible to boost energy security and 
                        reliability, particularly to underserved 
                        communities;
                            (ii) to increase the generation of clean 
                        energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 
                        the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 
                        generation units in Caribbean countries;
                            (iii) to create regional financing 
                        opportunities to allow for lower cost energy 
                        entrepreneurship;
                            (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the 
                        region to help attract private investment and 
                        break down any market or regulatory barriers; 
                        and
                            (v) to establish a mechanism for each host 
                        government to have access to independent legal 
                        advice--
                                    (I) to speed the development of 
                                energy-related contracts; and
                                    (II) to better protect the 
                                interests of Caribbean governments and 
                                citizens.
            (3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this 
        subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the 
        Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
                    (A) the Secretary of the Interior;
                    (B) the Secretary of Commerce;
                    (C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
                    (D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import 
                Bank of the United States;
                    (E) the Board of Directors of the Development 
                Finance Corporation;
                    (F) the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development;
                    (G) the Caribbean governments;
                    (H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
                    (I) the World Bank Group; and
                    (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 
                Corporation.

SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a 
        collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects 
        the lives and the economies of our citizens.
            (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano 
        is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many 
        natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the 
        region's vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, 
        the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of 
        the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma 
        devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017, 
        including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511 
        plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around 
        two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.
            (3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a 
        natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will 
        incur as much as six times more damage.
            (4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts 
        will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed, 
        we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries, 
        driving irregular migration.
            (5) While the United States has considerable expertise and 
        capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there 
        remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional 
        resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms, 
        protecting people and speeding recovery.
            (6) The People's Republic of China has dramatically 
        increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five 
        years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster 
        response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights 
        in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States 
        national security interests.
            (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-
        Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and 
        investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the 
        Caribbean region, including--
                    (A) to streamline early warning response networks 
                and formalize communication channels;
                    (B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively 
                on further developing aviation disaster resilience 
                plans and partnerships;
                    (C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in 
                energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;
                    (D) to increase communications network 
                interoperability between Caribbean partners and the 
                United States;
                    (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share 
                real-time information in preparation for potential 
                damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;
                    (F) to use meteorological services to strengthen 
                and deepen physical and communications infrastructure, 
                data collection networks, and human and technical 
                capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions 
                with the public;
                    (G) to understand that while the use of 
                international and military and civil defense assets in 
                disaster response may only be considered as a last 
                resort, when local, national, and international 
                civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military 
                coordination should occur, in support of the affected 
                nation;
                    (H) to develop a framework that would govern the 
                deployment of international military and civil defense 
                assets in disaster response when local, national, and 
                international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in 
                support of the affected nation;
                    (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid 
                disaster response and recovery, including waiving or 
                expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or 
                reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and 
                airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first 
                responders have the ability to rapidly respond to 
                disasters in other countries;
                    (J) to promote the integration and coordination of 
                regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean, 
                including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
                Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United 
                States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that 
                facilitate more effective and efficient planning, 
                mitigation, response, and resilience to natural 
                disasters;
                    (K) to share best practices in improved building 
                codes with national disaster organizations, including 
                building better programs, at regional, national and 
                community levels; and
                    (L) to promote community-based disaster 
                preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in 
                underserved communities, with the aim of increasing 
                broad public participation and resilience.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help 
Caribbean countries--
            (1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural 
        disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a 
        changing environment;
            (2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local 
        agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and 
        assistance activities;
            (3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs 
        (1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;
            (4) increase investment from United States companies in the 
        Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-
        related mitigation efforts;
            (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the 
        United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners 
        complement each other; and
            (6) further assist with the efforts described in subsection 
        (a)(7).
    (c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that 
describes how the Department of State will achieve the policies 
described in subsection (b).
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for activities, programs, technical assistance, and 
engagement under this section the following:
            (1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
            (2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
            (3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year 
        thereafter.
    (e) Reporting and Monitoring.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (d), at 
        least five percent of all programming funding allocation shall 
        support and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and 
        assessment of effectiveness.
            (2) Engagement and collaboration.--The Department of State 
        shall ensure that at least 20 percent of amounts authorized to 
        be appropriated pursuant to subsection (d) directly support the 
        training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange 
        of expertise on resilience between United States Federal, 
        State, and local officials and their Caribbean government 
        counterparts. Such amounts should also support, as appropriate, 
        increased academic, civil society, media, and private sector 
        engagement in the fields of resilience-building, adaptation, 
        and mitigation.

SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN 
              LATIN AMERICA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to a report by the National Endowment for 
        Democracy, China has spent the equivalent of billions of 
        dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the 
        world through thousands of people-to-people exchanges, cultural 
        activities, educational programs, and the development of media 
        enterprises and information initiatives with global reach.
            (2) Educational and exchange programs are a core element of 
        United States public diplomacy, elevating our culture, 
        policies, and interests worldwide.
            (3) These programs provide students with access to 
        international knowledge, an opportunity to learn foreign 
        languages, and a unique environment for developing cultural 
        understanding, all of which are valuable skills in today's 
        global economy.
            (4) 90 percent of ECA's appropriation is spent in the 
        United States or invested directly in American citizens or 
        American organizations.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) China's efforts to mold public opinion and influence 
        educational institutions undermine United States' influence in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean and threaten democratic 
        institutions and practices in the region;
            (2) the United States Government should expand current 
        educational and cultural exchange programs in Latin America and 
        the Caribbean, which are cost-effective and strengthen people-
        to-people diplomacy, to promote national security and foreign 
        policy interests of the United States; and
            (3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cultural, and 
        educational skills that advance United States economic 
        competitiveness, strengthen alliances, and support democracies 
        worldwide.
    (c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and 
in coordination with the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of 
Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United States Agency 
for International Development, shall devise a strategy--
            (1) to evaluate and expand existing programs and, as 
        necessary, design and implement new educational, professional, 
        and cultural exchanges and other programs to--
                    (A) create and sustain mutual understanding with 
                other countries necessary to advance United States 
                foreign policy goals by cultivating people-to-people 
                ties among current and future global leaders that build 
                enduring networks and personal relationships; and
                    (B) promote United States national security 
                interests and values, including through the expansion 
                of exchange visitor programs such as international 
                visitor leadership programs and the Young Leaders of 
                the Americas Initiative, as well as professional 
                capacity building programs that prioritize building 
                skills in entrepreneurship, promoting transparency, and 
                technology;
            (2) to ensure that exchange programs for Americans abroad 
        and international visitors attract a diverse pool of 
        participants, including from underrepresented, marginalized, 
        and low-income communities; and
            (3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing programs, 
        and, as necessary, design and implement new basic and higher 
        education programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, in 
        accordance with the United States Strategy on International 
        Basic Education and the United States Agency for International 
        Development Education Policy, to enable all young adults, 
        youth, and children to acquire the quality education and skills 
        needed to be productive members in society, which will lead to 
        better individual and societal outcomes.
    (d) Report With Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
assesses the nature and impact of the People's Republic of China's 
educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, its impact on United States' strategic interests, and 
recommendations for the United States Government to expand people-to-
people ties.

SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a security 
        threat to the countries and peoples of Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;
            (2) other forms of transnational organized crime, including 
        arms trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and 
        illicit financing, are drivers of irregular migration;
            (3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments that 
        fail to curb the illicit drug trade by adequately regulating 
        the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals 
        used to produce fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic 
        drugs;
            (4) further, governments that do not cooperate sufficiently 
        on financial investigations and prosecutions, withhold 
        information with respect to money laundering crimes, or are 
        determined to facilitate illicit activities, particularly by 
        transnational organized criminal organizations, should be held 
        accountable;
            (5) as noted in the International Narcotics Control 
        Strategy Report 2020, China ``has not cooperated sufficiently 
        on financial investigations and does not provide adequate 
        responses to requests for financial investigation 
        information'';
            (6) the United States should apply economic and other 
        targeted financial sanctions with respect to individuals 
        engaged in financial crimes and money laundering that fosters 
        narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the 
        Caribbean; and
            (7) the United States should look to policies to hold 
        accountable countries that fail to sufficiently investigate 
        financial crimes and money laundering that foster narcotics 
        trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the 
        Caribbean.

                  PART II--TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, 
        and other European countries are close partners, sharing values 
        grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the 
        rules-based international order established after World War II;
            (2) without a common approach by the United States, 
        European Union, the United Kingdom, and other European 
        countries on connectivity, trade, transnational challenges, and 
        support for democracy and human rights, the People's Republic 
        of China will continue to increase its economic, political, and 
        security leverage in Europe;
            (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of 
        assistance to European countries following the COVID-19 
        outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also 
        highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) as European countries seek to recover from the economic 
        toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in 
        partnership with Europe to support our collective economic 
        recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and 
        defend shared values;
            (5) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, 
        and other European countries should coordinate on joint 
        strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the 
        People's Republic of China, especially in the medical and 
        pharmaceutical sectors;
            (6) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, 
        and other European countries should leverage their respective 
        economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic 
        recovery from the COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with 
        the centralized economy of the People's Republic of China;
            (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union 
        should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, 
        including negotiating a United States-European Union trade 
        agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both 
        the United States and European Union;
            (8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should 
        continue trilateral efforts to address the security, economic, 
        democracy, and human rights challenges posed by the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (9) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, 
        and other European countries should enhance cooperation to 
        counter People's Republic of China disinformation, influence 
        operations, and propaganda efforts;
            (10) the United States and Europe share serious concerns 
        with the repressions being supported and executed by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China, and should 
        continue implementing measures to address the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong 
        Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and 
        programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian 
        governance model to countries around the world;
            (11) the United States and Europe should remain united in 
        their shared values against attempts by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China at the United Nations and other 
        multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ``community of 
        a shared future for mankind'' and ``democratization of 
        international relations'';
            (12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments around the world, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could 
        threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of 
        key countries;
            (13) as appropriate, the United States should share 
        intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G 
        capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in 
        Europe;
            (14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation, 
        which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome 
        development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC 
        investments in their countries through their own national 
        investment screening measures;
            (15) the President should actively engage the European 
        Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act 
        regulations and to better harmonize United States and European 
        Union policies with respect to export controls;
            (16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing 
        of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports 
        controlled at the National Security and above level to the 
        People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
            (17) the United States should explore the value of 
        establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for 
        Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically 
        coordinate United States and European Union export control 
        policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive 
        technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
            (18) the United States should work with counterparts in 
        Europe to--
                    (A) evaluate United States and European 
                overreliance on goods originating in the People's 
                Republic of China, including in the medical and 
                pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to 
                diversify supply chains;
                    (B) develop a common strategy for promoting energy 
                security and economic growth in eastern Europe and the 
                Balkans that addresses shared concerns related to 
                China's Belt and Road Initiative in these regions, 
                including complementary investments in the Three Seas 
                Initiative Fund for clean energy and digital 
                connectivity projects;
                    (C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-related 
                assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing 
                countries by offering relevant United States and 
                European expertise and assistance; and
                    (D) leverage the United States and European private 
                sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the appropriate 
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance 
cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner 
countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The briefing required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements with respect to the strategy referred to 
in such subsection:
            (1) An identification of the senior Senate-confirmed 
        Department of State official who leads United States efforts to 
        cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner 
        countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (2) An identification of key policy points of convergence 
        and divergence between the United States and European allies 
        and partners with respect to the People's Republic of China in 
        the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.
            (3) A description of efforts to advance shared interests 
        with European counterparts on--
                    (A) security and economic challenges with respect 
                to the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights challenges with 
                respect to the People's Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond 
                to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (4) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European 
        allies and partners on the People's Republic of China.
            (5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the date of the 
        briefing and future plans to work with European allies and 
        partners to counter the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China's advancement of an authoritarian governance model around 
        the world.
            (6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up to the 
        date of the briefing and future plans to support European 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology.
            (7) A detailing of how United States public diplomacy 
        tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department 
        of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities 
        within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
            (8) A description of the staffing and budget resources the 
        Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United 
        States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China 
        and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 
        such strategy.
            (9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with European 
        allies and partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to 
        exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the 
        World Health Organization.
    (c) Form.--The briefing required under section (a) shall be 
classified.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for three years, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding 
the development and implementation of the elements described in 
subsection (b).

SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE 
              SECTOR FINANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic 
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance 
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance 
Institutions (referred to as the ``DFI Alliance'') to enhance 
coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led 
development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed 
financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People's 
Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by 
integrating efforts such as--
            (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
        Asia;
            (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative 
        Fund;
            (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, 
        and Australia; and
            (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged 
        $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes 
        transparency standards.
    (b) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should 
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible 
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with 
developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND 
              BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial 
        Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Report and Briefing Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
        other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers 
        appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
        report and brief such committees on cooperation between--
                    (A) the People's Republic of China and the Islamic 
                Republic of Iran; and
                    (B) the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
                Federation.
            (2) Contents.--The report and briefing under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic 
                energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, 
                military, and space cooperation--
                            (i) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
                            (ii) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Russian Federation.
                    (B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19 
                pandemic on such cooperation.
                    (C) An assessment of the effect that United States 
                compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
                (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States 
                withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the 
                cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
                    (D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation 
                described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by 
                the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA 
                or a successor agreement and the effect of the United 
                States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 
                reaching a successor agreement.
            (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is 
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should 
share with important allies and partners of the United States, as 
appropriate, the findings of the report required under subsection (b).

                    PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to stand with friends 
        and partners, while also working to establish new partners in 
        South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in 
        their respective political systems and encroach upon their 
        sovereign territory; and
            (2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the 
        Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and 
        further deepen bilateral defense consultations and 
        collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a 
        major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
and, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a 
strategy for how the United States will engage with the countries of 
South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with 
respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the security and economic 
        challenges that the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to 
        the countries of South and Central Asia, including border 
        disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border the 
        People's Republic of China, and PRC investments in land and sea 
        ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects 
        across the region.
            (2) A detailed description of United States efforts to 
        provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and 
        other sectors in South and Central Asia.
            (3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional 
        efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to 
        build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their 
        political systems and economies.
            (4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on 
        addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan 
        mineral sector.
            (5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters 
        relevant to the People's Republic of China, including 
        investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan 
        through the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (6) In close consultation with the Government of India, 
        identification of areas with respect to which the United States 
        Government can provide diplomatic and other support as 
        appropriate for India's efforts to address economic and 
        security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China in 
        the region.
            (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the 
        countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal 
        departments and agencies, including the Department of State, 
        the United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
        Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
        countries of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce 
        links that will help those countries diversify their trade away 
        from the People's Republic of China.
            (9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other 
        countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other 
        ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic 
        of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting 
        ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect 
        ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Government 
        authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly 
        and expression.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and not less often than annually thereafter for 
five years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate 
congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the 
strategy required under subsection (a).

SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of 
        the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political, 
        economic, and security interests.
            (2) The United States has an interest in working with 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and 
        Australia, to address regional governance, economic 
        connectivity, and security challenges including threats to 
        freedom of navigation.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--As a part of the United States engagement 
in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to 
strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, 
including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such 
countries to--
            (1) promote United States political engagement with such 
        region, including through active participation in regional 
        organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with 
        United States partners in such region;
            (2) enhance United States economic connectivity and 
        commercial exchange with such region;
            (3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from 
        security challenges, including related to piracy;
            (4) support the ability of governments and organizations in 
        such region to respond to natural disasters;
            (5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and 
        partners as net providers of security to such region and as 
        partners to the United States in addressing security challenges 
        in such region, including through assistance to such allies and 
        partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime 
        domain awareness;
            (6) continue to build the United States-India relationship 
        in order to regularize security cooperation through the 
        negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and 
        navigation, including through foundational agreements; and
            (7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the 
        Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense 
        partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the 
        United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in 
        such region.
    (c) Strategy.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress a multi-year strategy for United States engagement 
        to support United States interests in the Indian Ocean region. 
        Such strategy shall--
                    (A) define United States political, economic, and 
                security interests in the Indian Ocean region;
                    (B) outline challenges to the interests of the 
                United States in such region;
                    (C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between 
                the United States and members of the Quad, including 
                India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in 
                diplomacy and development priorities, joint military 
                exercises and operations, and other activities that 
                promote United States political, economic, and security 
                interests;
                    (D) outline efforts to support economic 
                connectivity in such region, including through the 
                United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure 
                Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and 
                other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across 
                the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of 
                Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of 
                investment and support for civil society and people-to-
                people connectivity;
                    (E) describe how the United States can engage with 
                regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, 
                including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote 
                United States political, economic, and security 
                interests in such region;
                    (F) review the United States diplomatic posture in 
                such region, including an assessment of United States 
                diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent 
                United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an 
                assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the 
                Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;
                    (G) review United States diplomatic agreements with 
                countries in such region that facilitate United States 
                military operations in such region, including bilateral 
                and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to 
                expand United States cooperation with such countries 
                through the negotiation of additional agreements; and
                    (H) include a security assistance strategy for such 
                region that outlines priorities, objectives, and 
                actions for United States security assistance efforts 
                to governments of countries in such region to promote 
                United States political, economic, and security 
                interests in such region.
            (2) Inclusion.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to 
        the Indo-Pacific.
            (3) Report on implementation.--Not later than one year 
        after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph 
        (1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        progress made toward implementing such strategy.
    (d) United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.--
            (1) In general.--Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of 
        the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended--
                    (A) by inserting ``, including in the Indian Ocean 
                region'' after ``deployments of the People's Republic 
                of China military''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                sentence: ``In this subparagraph, the term `Indian 
                Ocean region' means the Indian Ocean, including the 
                Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral 
                areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
        shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
        apply beginning with the first report required under section 
        1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is 
        submitted after such date.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
            (2) Indian ocean region.--The term ``Indian Ocean region'' 
        means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay 
        of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

                            PART IV--AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature 
and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic, 
socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact 
on United States strategic interests, including information relating 
to--
            (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, 
        development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other 
        preferential trading arrangements;
            (2) the involvement of People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        state-owned enterprises in Africa;
            (3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC;
            (4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and 
        media companies in Africa;
            (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African 
        countries;
            (6) the scope of PRC investment in and control of African 
        energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and 
        foundational technologies;
            (7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC's aid and 
        assistance to African countries and African countries 
        supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;
            (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate 
        illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit 
        and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and 
        wildlife products, between Africa and the PRC;
            (9) the methods and techniques that the PRC uses to exert 
        undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt 
        activity in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-party 
        training program, and to influence African multilateral 
        organizations; and
            (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
        educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to 
        expand its influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
              AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for--
            (1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, including 
        property rights; and
            (2) improved transparency, anti-corruption efforts, and 
        good governance.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) a description and assessment of barriers to United 
        States investment in Africa for United States businesses, 
        including a clear identification of the different barriers 
        facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an 
        assessment of whether existing programs effectively address 
        such barriers;
            (2) a description and assessment of barriers to African 
        diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome 
        such barriers;
            (3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United 
        States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;
            (4) a determination of priority African countries for 
        promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of 
        additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and 
        governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive 
        operating environment in priority countries;
            (5) an identification of opportunities for strategic 
        cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in 
        Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, 
        development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
            (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders 
        Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic 
        engagement, and security in Africa.
    (d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources 
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
            (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial 
        Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at 
        United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
            (2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in 
        such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various 
        trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, 
        including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper 
        Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Interagency Working Group to Counter PRC Cyber Aggression in 
Africa.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives 
        of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other 
        agencies of the United States Government as the President 
        considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression 
        with respect to Africa.
            (2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this 
        subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a set of recommendations, such as 
        for--
                    (A) bolstering the capacity of governments in 
                Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks 
                and critical infrastructure, where applicable;
                    (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
                    (C) an action plan for United States embassies in 
                Africa to provide assistance to host-country 
                governments with respect to protecting their vital 
                digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, 
                including an assessment of staffing resources needed to 
                implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
                    (D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC 
                disinformation and propaganda in traditional and 
                digital media targeted to African audiences; and
                    (E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital 
                authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance 
                to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, 
        is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of 
        African leaders;
            (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is 
        vital for the United States to support strong and enduring 
        partnerships with the next generation of African leaders; and
            (3) the United States Government should prioritize 
        investments to build the capacity of emerging young African 
        leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to 
        enhance leadership skills, encourage entrepreneurship, 
        strengthen public administration and the role of civil society, 
        and connect young African leaders continentally and globally 
        across the private, civic, and public sectors.
    (b) Young African Leaders Initiative Program.--
            (1) In general.--There is established in the Department of 
        State the Young African Leaders Initiative (``YALI'') program.
            (2) Purpose.--The YALI program shall seek to build the 
        capacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
        areas of business, civic engagement, or public administration, 
        including through efforts to--
                    (A) support young African leaders by offering 
                professional development, training, and networking 
                opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, 
                innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, 
                entrepreneurship, good governance, and public 
                administration; and
                    (B) provide increased economic and technical 
                assistance to young African leaders to promote economic 
                growth and strengthen ties between United States and 
                African businesses.
            (3) Fellowships.--The YALI program shall award fellowships 
        under the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African 
        Leaders program to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have 
        demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, 
        innovation, public service, and leadership, and who have had a 
        positive impact in their communities, organizations, or 
        institutions.
            (4) Regional leadership centers.--The YALI program shall 
        seek to establish regional leadership centers in sub-Saharan 
        Africa to offer training to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 
        who have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, 
        innovation, public service and leadership, and who have had a 
        positive impact in their communities, organizations, or 
        institutions.
            (5) Activities.--
                    (A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary 
                of State, in coordination with the Administrator for 
                the United States Agency for International Development 
                and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
                agencies, shall oversee all United States-based 
                activities carried out under the YALI program, 
                including the following:
                            (i) The participation of Mandela Washington 
                        fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a 
                        United States university or college in 
                        business, civic engagement, or public 
                        management, including academic sessions, site 
                        visits, professional networking opportunities, 
                        leadership training, community service, and 
                        organized cultural activities.
                            (ii) The participation by Mandela 
                        Washington fellows in an annual Mandela 
                        Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such 
                        Fellows the opportunity to meet with United 
                        States leaders from the private, public, and 
                        non-profit sectors.
                    (B) Africa-based activities.--The Secretary of 
                State, in coordination with the Administrator for the 
                United States Agency for International Development and 
                the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
                agencies, should continue to support YALI programs in 
                sub-Saharan Africa, including the following:
                            (i) Access to continued leadership training 
                        and other professional development 
                        opportunities for Mandela Washington Fellowship 
                        for Young African Leaders alumni upon their 
                        return to their home countries, including 
                        online courses, technical assistance, and 
                        access to funding.
                            (ii) Training for young African leaders at 
                        regional leadership centers established in 
                        accordance with paragraph (4), and through 
                        online and in-person courses offered by such 
                        centers.
                            (iii) Opportunities for networking and 
                        engagement with--
                                    (I) other alumni of the Mandela 
                                Washington Fellowship for Young African 
                                Leaders;
                                    (II) alumni of programs at regional 
                                leadership centers established in 
                                accordance with paragraph (4); and
                                    (III) United States and like-minded 
                                diplomatic missions, business leaders, 
                                and others as appropriate.
                    (C) Implementation.--To carry out this paragraph, 
                the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
                Administrator of the United States Agency for 
                International Development and the heads of other 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies shall seek to 
                partner with the private sector to pursue public-
                private partnerships, leverage private sector 
                expertise, expand networking opportunities, and 
                identify funding opportunities as well as fellowship 
                and employment opportunities for participants in the 
                YALI program.
            (6) Implementation plan.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development and the heads of other relevant 
        Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a plan for implementing 
        the YALI program, including the following:
                    (A) A description of clearly defined program goals, 
                targets, and planned outcomes for each year and for the 
                duration of implementation of the program.
                    (B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the program 
                and progress made toward achieving such goals, targets, 
                and planned outcomes.
                    (C) A strategy to ensure the program is promoting 
                United States foreign policy goals in Africa, including 
                ensuring that the program is clearly branded and paired 
                with robust public diplomacy efforts.
            (7) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
        Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish 
        in a publicly accessible, internet-based form, a report on the 
        following:
                    (A) The progress made toward achieving the goals, 
                targets, and planned outcomes described in paragraph 
                (6)(A), including an overview of the program 
                implemented in the previous year and an estimated 
                number of beneficiaries.
                    (B) An assessment of how the YALI program is 
                contributing to and promoting United States-Africa 
                relations, particularly in areas of increased private 
                sector investment, trade promotion, support to civil 
                society, improved public administration, and fostering 
                entrepreneurship and youth empowerment.
                    (C) Recommendations for improvements or changes to 
                the program and implementation plan, if any, that would 
                improve their effectiveness during subsequent years of 
                implementation of the program.
            (8) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
            (9) Sunset.--The requirements of this section shall 
        terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act.

SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global 
Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an 
organization the mission of which shall be to promote democratic values 
and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and 
relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter 
disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries in which a 
free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about 
the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, 
responsible discussion, and open debate.

SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
support increased access to energy in Africa and reduce Africa's energy 
dependence on countries that use energy reliance for undue political 
influence such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of 
China.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Lack of access to energy remains a significant barrier 
        to economic advancement and opportunity in Africa. As of 2018, 
        an estimated 789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in 
        sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern electricity. 
        Even in the region's most advanced economies, average annual 
        per capita electricity consumption is often under 200 kilowatt-
        hours, less than what is needed to power a typical 
        refrigerator. Only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 young 
        Africans who enter the job market each year find employment; 
        and the cost and reliability of electricity remain top 
        constraints to job creation and economic competitiveness.
            (2) The United States' global strategic competitors have 
        stepped in to address this disparity and finance energy sector 
        development across Africa. China is the single largest trading 
        partner for African countries in aggregate, and the largest 
        bilateral lender for public sector loans across Africa. 
        Approximately 65 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to 
        infrastructure, and between 2013-2020, the energy sector 
        consistently accounted for the largest share of all investment 
        under China's Belt and Road Initiative.
            (3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is the 
        foundation for all modern economies and necessary for 
        increasing growth and employment.
            (4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower middle-
        income countries is necessary in the next decades in order to 
        meet human, social, security, and economic needs.
            (5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclusive 
        economies, and making energy systems resilient in low- and 
        lower middle-income countries will require diversified power 
        systems and a mix of technologies that align with local 
        conditions, resources, and needs.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that countries 
in Africa continue to be important partners to the United States and 
the DFC should continue to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to 
facilitate technologies that contribute to energy security and 
reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and lower middle-
income countries.
    (d) Amendment.--Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 
(Public Law 114-121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting 
        a semicolon; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
            ``(10) advance United States foreign policy and development 
        goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence 
        on energy resources from countries that use energy dependence 
        for undue political influence, such as the Russian Federation 
        or the People's Republic of China, which have used energy and 
        financial resources to influence other countries;
            ``(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners 
        of the United States by encouraging the development of 
        accessible, transparent, and competitive energy markets that 
        provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and 
        sustainable power;
            ``(12) encourage United States public and private sector 
        investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge 
        the gap between energy security requirements and commercial 
        demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity; 
        and
            ``(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy 
        resources, technology, and expertise to global markets in a way 
        that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the 
        United States, including in Africa.''.

                  PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE 
              MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the People's Republic of China is upgrading its 
        influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its 
        energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and 
        arms sales;
            (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish 
        military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic 
        locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its 
        Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States 
        national security interests; and
            (3) the export of certain communications infrastructure 
        from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of 
        partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, 
        threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security 
        cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
        China's authoritarian surveillance model.
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator 
        of the United States Agency for International Development, and 
        the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly 
        develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
        and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
        House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting 
        the People's Republic of China's influence in, and access to, 
        the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's intent with regards to increased cooperation 
                with Middle East and North African countries and how 
                such cooperation fits into its broader global strategic 
                objectives;
                    (B) an assessment of how governments across the 
                region are responding to the People's Republic of 
                China's efforts to increase its military presence in 
                their countries;
                    (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through 
                foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build 
                partner capacity and increase interoperability with the 
                United States;
                    (D) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's joint research and development with the Middle 
                East and North Africa, impacts on the United States' 
                national security interests, and recommended steps to 
                mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in 
                such area;
                    (E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons 
                technology transfers from the People's Republic of 
                China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in such area;
                    (F) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's military sales to the region, including lethal 
                and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
                    (G) an assessment of People's Republic of China 
                military basing and dual-use facility initiatives 
                across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in such area;
                    (H) efforts to improve regional security 
                cooperation with United States allies and partners with 
                a focus on--
                            (i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, 
                        the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
                            (ii) integrated air and missile defense;
                            (iii) cyber security;
                            (iv) border security; and
                            (v) critical infrastructure security, to 
                        include energy security;
                    (I) increased support for government-to-government 
                engagement on critical infrastructure development 
                projects, including ports and water infrastructure;
                    (J) efforts to encourage United States private 
                sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare 
                technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy 
                sectors;
                    (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
                professional education exchanges with key partner 
                countries;
                    (L) specific steps to counter increased investment 
                from the People's Republic of China in 
                telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic 
                efforts to stress the political, economic, and social 
                benefits of a free and open internet;
                    (M) efforts to promote United States private sector 
                engagement in and public-private partnerships on 
                renewable energy development;
                    (N) the expansion of public-private partnership 
                efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation 
                projects; and
                    (O) efforts to warn United States partners in the 
                Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated 
                with the People's Republic of China's 
                telecommunications infrastructure and provide 
                alternative ``clean paths'' to the People's Republic of 
                China's technology.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (b) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the international community have 
        long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity 
        of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) In addition to and apart from military and security 
        efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government 
        approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, 
        economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with 
        and counter PRC influence.
            (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United 
        States engagement, transparent governance structures, and 
        active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign 
        investment and influence efforts.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
that the United States and the international community should continue 
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa that support reform efforts to--
            (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
            (2) foster private sector development;
            (3) strengthen civil society;
            (4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the 
        rule of law; and
            (5) promote greater regional integration and intraregional 
        cooperation, including with Israel.

SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-IRAN 
              RELATIONSHIP.

    It is the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China's 
economic relationship with Iran, including oil purchases in violation 
of United States sanctions, undermines United States efforts to compel 
Iran to abandon its malign activities.

                         PART VI--ARCTIC REGION

SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of 
Congress that--
            (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
                    (A) creates new national and regional security 
                challenges due to increased military activity in the 
                Arctic;
                    (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a 
                major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic 
                competition;
                    (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral 
                countries have inadequate capacity to patrol the 
                increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which 
                is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
                    (D) impacts public safety due to increased human 
                activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue 
                capacity remains very limited; and
                    (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile 
                and pristine environment and the unique and highly 
                sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and 
                terrestrial ecosystems; and
            (2) the United States should reduce the consequences 
        described in paragraph (1) by--
                    (A) evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of 
                security and safety risks developing in the Arctic;
                    (B) developing policies and making preparations to 
                mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the 
                Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and 
                partners in the Arctic region to deter potential 
                aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
                    (C) adequately funding the National Earth System 
                Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, 
                ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary 
                to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
                    (D) investing in resources, including a 
                significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that 
                the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and 
                respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
                    (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states 
                in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for--
                            (i) maintaining peace and stability in the 
                        Arctic region;
                            (ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship 
                        and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
                            (iii) ensuring safe and efficient 
                        management of commercial maritime traffic in 
                        the Arctic;
                            (iv) promoting responsible natural resource 
                        management and economic development; and
                            (v) countering China's Polar Silk Road 
                        initiative;
                            (vi) examining the possibility of 
                        reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; 
                        and
                            (vii) reducing black carbon and methane 
                        emissions in the Arctic Region, including by 
                        working with observers of the Arctic Council, 
                        including India and the People's Republic of 
                        China, to adopt mitigation plans consistent 
                        with the findings and recommendations of the 
                        Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black 
                        Carbon and Methane.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize only the states specified in subsection 
        (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to such 
        status; and
            (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious 
        threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of 
        United States allies and partners.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Arctic states.--The term ``Arctic states'' means 
        Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including 
        Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
            (2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the 
        geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north 
        of the equator.
    (d) Designation of Ambassador At Large for Arctic Affairs.--There 
is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large 
for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the ``Ambassador''), 
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).
            (1) Appointment.--The Ambassador shall be appointed by the 
        President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
            (2) Duties.--
                    (A) Diplomatic representation.--Subject to the 
                direction of the President and the Secretary of State, 
                the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United 
                States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic 
                Region in--
                            (i) contacts with foreign governments, 
                        intergovernmental organizations, and 
                        specialized agencies of the United Nations, the 
                        Arctic Council, and other international 
                        organizations of which the United States is a 
                        member; and
                            (ii) multilateral conferences and meetings 
                        relating to Arctic affairs.
                    (B) Chair of the arctic council.--The Ambassador 
                shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the 
                United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic 
                Council.
            (3) Policies and procedures.--The Ambassador shall 
        coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region, 
        including--
                    (A) meeting national security, economic, and 
                commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;
                    (B) protecting the Arctic environment and 
                conserving its biological resources;
                    (C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural 
                resource management and economic development;
                    (D) strengthening institutions for cooperation 
                among the Arctic states;
                    (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions 
                that affect them;
                    (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on 
                local, regional, and global environmental issues;
                    (G) integrating scientific data on the current and 
                projected effects of climate change in the Arctic 
                Region and ensure that such data is applied to the 
                development of security strategies for the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (H) making available the methods and approaches on 
                the integration of climate science to other regional 
                security planning programs in the Department of State 
                to better ensure that broader decision-making processes 
                may more adequately account for the effects of climate 
                change; and
                    (I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in 
                the Arctic Region.
    (e) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Ambassador shall develop a 
policy, to be known as the ``Arctic Region Security Policy'', to 
assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and 
actions--
            (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States 
        in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic 
        missions and facilities, participation in regional and 
        bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and 
        coordination of United States initiatives and assistance 
        programs across agencies to protect the national security of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states 
        to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian 
        and military activity by Arctic states and other states that 
        may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;
            (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and 
        Arctic states that--
                    (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
                environment; and
                    (B) are strategically significant to the United 
                States;
            (4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change 
        and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into 
        the decision making process on foreign assistance awards with 
        Greenland;
            (5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging 
        and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative 
        approaches--
                    (A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the 
                Arctic Region;
                    (B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety 
                in the Arctic Region;
                    (C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions 
                by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral 
                policies among Arctic states on the management of 
                maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and 
                work cooperatively on the transit policies for access 
                to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic 
                states; and
                    (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region 
                Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public 
                safety in disaster situations in a humane and 
                responsible fashion;
            (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, 
        and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense 
        assets in the Arctic Region; and
            (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the 
        Arctic.

SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON 
              THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.

    It is the policy of the United States to urge that Taiwan be given 
observer status on the Arctic Council.

                           PART VII--OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic 
        national security and economic priority of the United States 
        Government;
            (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
        democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely 
        Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the 
        Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
        through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development 
        exchanges that promote the goals of individual countries and 
        the entire region;
            (4) to work with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, 
        and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania 
        region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster 
        resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and 
        unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic 
        development;
            (5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in 
        existing regional organizations and international structures to 
        promote the national security and economic goals of the United 
        States and countries of Oceania;
            (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States 
        strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
        term growth and development throughout the region, especially 
        as such relates to protecting marine resources that are 
        critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the 
        countries of Oceania against current and future threats 
        resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in the 
        environment;
            (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence 
        and corruption aimed at undermining the political, 
        environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and 
        governments of the countries of Oceania;
            (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of 
        Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global 
        health security;
            (9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based 
        private sector investments that adhere to best practices 
        regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental 
        and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed 
        investments by authoritarian governments;
            (10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain 
        safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and 
        other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;
            (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States 
        support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in 
        Oceania; and
            (12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania 
        to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of 
        the United States Armed Forces who are missing in action from 
        previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

    (a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for 
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals 
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
    (b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) A description of United States regional goals and 
        concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with 
        the countries of Oceania.
            (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States 
        regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to 
        anti-corruption efforts, maritime and other security issues, 
        environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth 
        and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
            (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the 
        Governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and 
        Japan in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns.
            (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by 
        regional organizations and other related intergovernmental 
        structures aimed at addressing shared regional goals and 
        concerns.
            (5) A plan for aligning United States programs and 
        resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and concerns, as 
        appropriate.
            (6) Recommendations for additional United States 
        authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to 
        execute the strategic roadmap.
            (7) Any other elements the Secretary of State considers 
        appropriate.

SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the 
appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability 
of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security 
dialogue (to be known as the ``Oceania Security Dialogue'') among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and 
discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national 
security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
    (b) Report Required.--The briefing required by subsection (a) 
shall, at a minimum, include the following:
            (1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to 
        participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.
            (2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United 
        States.
            (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania 
        Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of 
        representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
            (4) A review of the funding modalities available to the 
        Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security 
        Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the 
        Department of State.
            (5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or 
        other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of 
        the Department of State.
            (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
        including its emphasis on the changing environment as the 
        greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
            (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help amplify the issues and work of existing regional 
        structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the 
        Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific 
        Environmental Security Forum.
            (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would 
        help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by 
        section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the 
        United States.
    (c) Interagency Consultation.--To the extent practicable, the 
Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where 
appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for 
Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 
Dialogue.

SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on strategies to 
reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in 
Oceania, with the goals of--
            (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all 
        currently feasible locations in Oceania; and
            (2) working with regional and international partners of the 
        United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers 
        in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate 
        resilience initiatives.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall--
            (1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence 
        of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;
            (2) examine potential remedies that include working with 
        United States Government agencies and regional governments, 
        including governments of United States allies--
                    (A) to increase the health infrastructure and 
                medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of 
                Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps 
                volunteers while in such countries;
                    (B) to address physical safety concerns that have 
                decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in 
                Oceania; and
                    (C) to increase transportation infrastructure in 
                the countries of Oceania to better support the travel 
                of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary 
                facilities;
            (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of 
        Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities that require specific professional expertise; 
        and
            (4) explore potential new operational models to address 
        safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the 
        countries of Oceania, including--
                    (A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
                    (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to 
                regional or United States-based healthcare facilities 
                for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.
    (c) Volunteers in Low-income Oceania Communities.--
            (1) In general.--In examining the potential to expand the 
        presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
        communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace 
        Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described 
        in paragraph (2).
            (2) Initiatives described.--Initiatives described in this 
        paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities, including by--
                    (A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-
                based interventions, the vulnerability that communities 
                in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe 
                environmental change, and other climate related trends; 
                and
                    (B) improving, through smart infrastructure 
                principles, access to transportation and connectivity 
                infrastructure that will help address the economic and 
                social challenges that communities in Oceania confront 
                as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
    (d) Oceania Defined.--In this section, the term ``Oceania'' 
includes the following:
            (1) Easter Island of Chile.
            (2) Fiji.
            (3) French Polynesia of France.
            (4) Kiribati.
            (5) New Caledonia of France.
            (6) Nieu of New Zealand.
            (7) Papua New Guinea.
            (8) Samoa.
            (9) Vanuatu.
            (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
            (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
            (12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
            (13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
            (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
            (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
            (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
            (17) The Republic of Palau.
            (18) The Solomon Islands.
            (19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
            (20) Tonga.
            (21) Tuvalu.
            (22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

                       PART VIII--PACIFIC ISLANDS

SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.

    This part may be cited as the ``Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement 
in the Pacific Act'' or the ``BLUE Pacific Act''.

SEC. 296. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Pacific Islands--
                    (A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, 
                including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea, 
                constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;
                    (B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific 
                Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth's surface, 
                including the three sub-regions of Melanesia, 
                Micronesia, and Polynesia; and
                    (C) face shared challenges in development that have 
                distinct local contexts, including climate change and 
                rising sea levels, geographic distances from major 
                markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as 
                natural disasters.
            (2) The United States is a Pacific country with 
        longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the 
        Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free 
        Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of 
        the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
        the Republic of Palau.
            (3) The United States has vital national security interests 
        in the Pacific Islands, including--
                    (A) protecting regional peace and security that 
                fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;
                    (B) advancing economic prosperity free from 
                coercion through trade and sustainable development; and
                    (C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule 
                of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.
            (4) Successive United States administrations have 
        recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the 
        Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including 
        the following:
                    (A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which 
                first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, 
                affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and 
                paved the way for subsequent United States engagement 
                with the Pacific Islands, including several new 
                policies focused on conservation and resilience to 
                climate change announced in September 2016.
                    (B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which 
                includes a commitment to ``shore up fragile partner 
                states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their 
                vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural 
                disasters''.
                    (C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which 
                identified the Pacific Islands as ``critical to U.S. 
                strategy because of our shared values, interests, and 
                commitments'' and committed the United States to 
                ``building capacity and resilience to address maritime 
                security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; 
                drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate 
                change and disaster response''.
            (5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic 
        engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent 
        initiatives, including--
                    (A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 
                additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in 
                2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the 
                United States provides annually to the region to 
                support shared priorities in economic and human 
                development, climate change, and more; and
                    (B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies 
                (SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to 
                strengthen United States collaboration with island 
                countries and territories, including in the Pacific 
                Islands, on COVID-19 economic challenges, long-term 
                economic development, climate change, and other shared 
                interests.
            (6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by 
        leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that 
        climate change ``remains the single greatest threat to the 
        livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the 
        Pacific'' and asserted ``the sovereign right of every Member to 
        conduct its national affairs free of external interference and 
        coercion''.
            (7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the 
        Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in 
        investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a 
        year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same 
        period.
            (8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies 
        to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 
        2019 (commonly referred to as ``COVID-19'') pandemic to their 
        populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000 
        in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19 
        response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued 
        success in preventing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
        achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-
        term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including 
        through--
                    (A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of 
                needed medical supplies, including available COVID-19 
                vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a 
                reliable supply chain;
                    (B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening 
                of economic and social activities; and
                    (C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of 
                the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system and the 
                reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost 
                tourism revenue and other economic and food security 
                damages caused by the pandemic.
            (9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have 
        proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-
        to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States 
        commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the 
        COVID-19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four 
        countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers 
        continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have 
        been requested across the region.

SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, 
        and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands 
        that--
                    (A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for 
                all countries through a rules-based regional order that 
                respects the sovereignty and political independence of 
                all nations;
                    (B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and 
                vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and 
                promotes trade and sustainable development that 
                supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all 
                nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related 
                to public health, education, renewable energy, digital 
                connectivity, and more;
                    (C) supports regional efforts to address the 
                challenges posed by climate change, including by 
                strengthening resilience to natural disasters and 
                through responsible stewardship of natural resources;
                    (D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic 
                governance and the rule of law, and promotes human 
                rights and the preservation of the region's unique 
                cultural heritages;
                    (E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and 
                containing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and in 
                pursuing long-term economic recovery; and
                    (F) supports existing regional architecture and 
                international norms;
            (2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of 
        existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, 
        such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, 
        including--
                    (A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
                    (B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; 
                and
                    (C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;
            (3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of 
        Free Association and related United States law that will expire 
        in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 
        Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of 
        Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and
            (4) to work closely with United States allies and partners 
        with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific 
        Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in 
        advancing common goals.

SEC. 298. DEFINITION.

    In this part, the terms ``Pacific Islands'' means the Cook Islands, 
the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of 
Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the 
Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.

SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.

    (a) Authority to Consolidate Reports.--Any reports required to be 
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this part 
that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same 
units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is 
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such 
deadlines and that contains all information required under such 
reports.
    (b) Form of Reports.--Each report required by this part shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands 
        necessitates an examination of whether United States 
        diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence 
        in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively 
        support United States objectives and meaningful participation 
        in regional fora;
            (2) improving shared understanding of and jointly 
        combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the 
        Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands 
        and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
        and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term 
        interests of stability, security, and prosperity;
            (3) the United States should seek to participate in and 
        support efforts to coordinate a regional response toward 
        maritime security, including through continued United States 
        and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre 
        in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and 
        robust cooperation with regional allies and partners; and
            (4) the United States Government should commit to sending 
        appropriate levels of representation to regional events.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five 
        years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development, shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
        diplomatic and development presence of the United States in the 
        Pacific Islands.
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A description of the Department of State, 
                United States Agency for International Development, 
                United States International Development Finance 
                Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and 
                United States Commercial Service presence, staffing, 
                programming, and resourcing of operations in the 
                Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing 
                not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.
                    (B) A description of gaps in such presence, 
                including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.
                    (C) A description of limitations and challenges 
                such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives, 
                including--
                            (i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands 
                        due to operations being conducted from the 
                        United States Agency for International 
                        Development offices in Manila and Suva; and
                            (ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.
                    (D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence 
                to fill such gaps, including by establishing new 
                missions, expanding participation in regional forums, 
                and elevating United States representation in regional 
                forums.
    (c) Authority to Enhance Diplomatic and Economic Engagement.--The 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire 
locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of 
promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial 
engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.
    (d) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every five years 
thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific 
Islands.

SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall consult and 
coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to 
provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs 
established by this Act, including for purposes of--
            (1) deconflicting programming;
            (2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect 
        the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
            (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific 
        Islands to the maximum extent practicable.
    (b) Formal Consultative Process.--The Secretary of State shall 
establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and 
partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years 
programming.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Armed 
Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives a 
report that includes--
            (1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs 
        undertaken by regional allies and partners, including 
        multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in 
        this Act;
            (2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs 
        undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as 
        being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or 
        more countries of the Pacific Islands;
            (3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific 
        Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the 
        efforts of regional allies and partners identified in paragraph 
        (1); and
            (4) a review of the formal consultative process required in 
        subsection (b) to summarize engagements held and identify 
        opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and 
        partners.

SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should leverage the full 
        range of authorities and programs available to assist the 
        Pacific Islands in achieving their development goals;
            (2) United States development assistance should seek to 
        build on existing public and private sector investments while 
        creating new opportunities toward a favorable environment for 
        additional such investments; and
            (3) United States development efforts should be coordinated 
        with and seek to build on existing efforts by like-minded 
        partners and allies and regional and international multilateral 
        organizations.
    (b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to--
            (1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 
        including transport connectivity, information and 
        communications technology, food security, coastal zone 
        management, marine and water resource management, and energy 
        security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with 
        an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;
            (2) provide technical assistance to assist local government 
        and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, 
        especially those posed by climate change, consider and 
        implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen 
        resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for 
        their efficacy and sustainability; and
            (3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem 
        conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use 
        of ecosystem services, especially those that mitigate effects 
        of climate change and those that support food security and 
        livelihoods.
    (c) Conduct of Strategy.--The strategy developed under this section 
shall be coordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and 
international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for 
development in the Pacific Islands.
    (d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the 
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the 
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian 
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific 
Islands.
    (e) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
        of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees, the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
        Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
        Resources of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure 
        developments in the Pacific Islands.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments 
                in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and 
                partners;
                    (B) assessments of the environmental impact and 
                sustainability of such developments; and
                    (C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of 
                such developments and their impacts on the debt of host 
                countries in the Pacific Islands.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
to carry out this section.

SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY FOR THE PACIFIC 
              ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall develop and implement 
a plan to expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement 
Academies (ILEA) program for the Pacific Islands, including by--
            (1) expanding coverage of the regional program located in 
        Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; or
            (2) establishing a new regional program for the Pacific 
        Islands.
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall include consultation and coordination with existing regional law 
enforcement entities, including the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police 
and civil society, including those focused on human rights and 
specializing in victim-centered approaches, and take into consideration 
costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the Pacific 
Islands to participate in the ILEA program.
    (c) Briefing Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the 
appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the plan developed 
under this section.

SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Strategy.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the 
        concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination 
        with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall develop and 
        implement a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to and 
        build the capacity of local civilian and national security 
        institutions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of--
                    (A) enhancing maritime security and maritime domain 
                awareness to address challenges such as illegal, 
                unreported, and unregulated fishing;
                    (B) assisting local law enforcement in detecting, 
                preventing, and combatting human and drug trafficking 
                and other forms of transnational crime;
                    (C) participating in efforts by regional 
                institutions and frameworks to coordinate and 
                facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; 
                and
                    (D) expanding information sharing and to work 
                toward operational coordination and interoperability 
                among Pacific Island maritime security forces, 
                including through regional fusion centers.
            (2) Programs and authorities described.--The strategy 
        required by this subsection shall build on but not be limited 
        to the following programs and authorities:
                    (A) The International Military Education and 
                Training program.
                    (B) The Foreign Military Financing program.
                    (C) The authority to build the capacity of foreign 
                security forces under section 333 of title 10, United 
                States Code.
                    (D) The authority to provide excess defense 
                articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
                    (E) The Department of Defense State Partnership 
                Program.
            (3) National police forces and coast guards.--The national 
        police forces and coast guards of the Pacific Islands are 
        eligible to receive assistance under the programs and 
        authorities described in paragraph (2) (other than the programs 
        and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of 
        paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required by this 
        subsection.
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--The strategy required by subsection 
(a) shall seek to preserve peace and regional stability in the Pacific 
Islands and take into consideration and seek to build upon but not 
duplicate existing assistance provided by United States allies and 
partners.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the 
        strategy developed under this section.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of security challenges to the 
                Pacific Islands;
                    (B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of the 
                Pacific Islands for assistance;
                    (C) a review of existing security assistance 
                programs in the Pacific Islands, including programs and 
                efforts provided by United States allies and partners;
                    (D) a plan for programs for training, equipping, 
                and sustainment, including excess defense equipment and 
                related materials;
                    (E) a list of militaries, national police forces, 
                coast guards, and other national security forces of the 
                Pacific Islands receiving assistance under the 
                strategy;
                    (F) a review of existing cross-border maritime law 
                enforcement operations (commonly known as ``shiprider 
                agreements'') with the Pacific Islands, an assessment 
                of additional resourcing needs to enhance operational 
                capacity, and a plan to improve on these programs and 
                operations;
                    (G) a review of existing Department of Defense 
                State Partnership Programs with the Pacific Islands and 
                an assessment of additional opportunities to leverage 
                Department of Defense State Partnership Programs to 
                address national security, law enforcement, disaster 
                relief and emergency management, and related 
                priorities;
                    (H) a review of current efforts and progress in 
                removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific Islands and 
                an assessment of additional resourcing needed to ensure 
                continued progress, including to support coordination 
                with regional efforts and those of United States allies 
                and partners;
                    (I) a review of existing regional fusion centers 
                and other cooperative intelligence sharing efforts in 
                the Pacific Islands to address maritime security, 
                transnational crime, natural disasters, and other 
                security challenges and an assessment of opportunities 
                for the United States to participate in such efforts, 
                including by allocating staff and supplying resourcing;
                    (J) measures to evaluate success for the strategy; 
                and
                    (K) a detailed assessment of appropriations 
                required to achieve the objectives for the strategy in 
                future years.
            (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Transportation 
                and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.

    (a) Ratification of International Legal Instruments.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize 
        efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in ratifying and 
        implementing international legal conventions related to 
        transnational crime, such as--
                    (A) the Convention on International Trade in 
                Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora;
                    (B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; and
                    (C) relevant protocols supplementing the United 
                Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
                Crime, such as--
                            (i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and 
                        Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women 
                        and Children; and
                            (ii) the Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
                        Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.
            (2) Biennial report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act and every two years 
        thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a report on--
                    (A) the status of the progress of each country of 
                the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and implementing 
                international legal conventions related to 
                transnational crime; and
                    (B) United States plans for assisting those 
                countries that have yet to fully ratify such 
                conventions with their respective ratification efforts.
    (b) Updates of Certain Reports.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall identify 
and update existing reports to include forms of transnational crime 
affecting the Pacific Islands, such as--
            (1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy report;
            (2) the Improving International Fisheries Management 
        report; and
            (3) the Trafficking in Persons report.
    (c) Illegal Logging and Associated Trade.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
        Federal agencies, shall submit to appropriate congressional 
        committees a report that identifies countries of the Pacific 
        Islands that are countries of concern with respect to illegal 
        logging and associated trade.
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A description of the impact illegal logging and 
                associated trade have had on local communities, good 
                governance, and biodiversity, including an 
                identification of those foreign countries that may be 
                financing or in any other manner supporting illegal 
                logging activities.
                    (B) A description of efforts taken by countries 
                identified under paragraph (1) to comply and take 
                appropriate corrective action to mitigate illegal 
                logging, and an evaluation of the progress of those 
                efforts.
                    (C) A description of steps taken by the heads of 
                relevant Federal agencies to assist the Pacific Islands 
                in adopting and implementing international measures 
                comparable to those of the United States, such as the 
                Lacey Act, to reduce impacts of illicit logging.
            (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Finance of the Senate.
    (d) Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.--Section 3553 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 
8033) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amended) the 
        following:
            ``(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability 
        of the United States to effectively assist priority regions and 
        priority flag states relating to IUU fishing due to resource 
        constraints and the additional resources necessary to overcome 
        those constraints; and''.

SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--The Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall develop and implement an initiative to 
assist the Pacific Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and 
resilience to natural disasters and other emergencies.
    (b) Conduct of Program.--The program developed under this section 
shall include--
            (1) education and training programs on natural disaster 
        prevention and preparedness for emergency management 
        professionals in the Pacific Islands, including by leveraging 
        the expertise of nonprofit organizations and institutions of 
        higher education in the United States;
            (2) technical assistance, including through grants and 
        cooperative agreements for qualified United States and local 
        nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early warning 
        systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures, and 
        post-disaster relief and recovery; and
            (3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation and 
        response plans in the region, including by United States allies 
        and partners in the region.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
        program developed under this section.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of disaster risks in the Pacific 
                Islands and existing local and regional capacity to 
                respond to such risks;
                    (B) a review of existing efforts by United States 
                allies and partners to provide assistance and training 
                for natural disaster preparedness and emergency 
                management; and
                    (C) objectives, means of implementation, and 
                measures of success for the initiative.
            (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the 
                Senate.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $40,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
to carry out this section.

SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands 
        should be expanded and the Peace Corps should reopen its 
        programs in as many of the Pacific Islands as possible, 
        including where it has previously operated but has suspended 
        operations;
            (2) consulting like-minded regional allies and partners, 
        such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is crucial 
        for identifying and overcoming challenges for increased Peace 
        Corps presence in the Pacific Islands;
            (3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world 
        peace and friendship in part by helping the people of 
        interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and 
        women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the 
        American people with the people of the Republic of the Marshall 
        Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic 
        of Palau; and
            (4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its programs in 
        the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
        Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
            (1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in 
        the Pacific Islands region to other regions of the world, 
        including a cost-benefit analysis of placement in the region 
        versus elsewhere globally;
            (2) analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps 
        expansion in the Pacific Islands region;
            (3) outcomes of consultations among United States agencies, 
        and with regional allies and partners, on areas in which 
        cooperation can reduce factors limiting Peace Corps expansion, 
        particularly those related to medical transportation and 
        personal safety; and
            (4) a plan and timeline for implementing outcomes 
        identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expansion of Peace 
        Corps presence in the region, where appropriate.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS 
              AND FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China (``PRC'') continues to disregard 
        its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration 
        of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
        Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China on the Question of Hong Kong (``Joint Declaration''), in 
        which the PRC committed that--
                    (A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of 
                autonomy;
                    (B) for at least 50 years the ``social and economic 
                systems in Hong Kong'' would remain unchanged; and
                    (C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people 
                of Hong Kong would be protected by law.
            (2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the 
        established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National 
        People's Congress Standing Committee (``Standing Committee'') 
        passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally 
        vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that 
        grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of ``separating 
        the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic 
        activities''.
            (3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee 
        imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong 
        Kong's local government in a potential violation of the Basic 
        Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
        People's Republic of China (``Basic Law''), and involved 
        unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
        legislation was only the second law since 2008 that the 
        Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for 
        public comment.
            (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-
        democracy candidates from participating in the September 6 
        Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently 
        postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the 
        public health risk of holding elections during the COVID-19 
        pandemic.
            (5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert 
        extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced 
        indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists 
        living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu, 
        for alleged violations of the national security law.
            (6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four 
        lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the 
        Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those 
        who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to 
        acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise 
        violates the national security law, from running for or serving 
        in the Legislative Council.
            (7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua 
        Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for 
        participating in 2019 protests.
            (8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as 
        ``the Hong Kong 12'') who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong 
        to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and 
        sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from 
        seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.
            (9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest court revoked 
        bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and 
        publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with 
        foreign forces and endangering national security under the 
        national security legislation.
            (10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in 
        Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of 
        two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.
            (11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force 
        arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-
        democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for 
        their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select 
        candidates for the general election originally scheduled for 
        September 2020, despite other political parties having held 
        similar primaries without retribution.
            (12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court convicted Choy 
        Yuk-ling, a video producer with Radio Television Hong Kong, in 
        relation to her investigative reporting on the Hong Kong 
        police.
            (13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong Kong's only 
        surviving pro-democracy newspaper, published its final edition 
        following months of intimidation and repression by the HKSAR 
        Government, including through the arrest of its senior editors, 
        police raids on its offices, and the freezing of its financial 
        assets.
    (b) Statement of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China (``PRC'') and the Government of the 
        Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (``HKSAR''), including 
        the adoption and implementation of national security 
        legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that 
        violate the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that 
        are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and its implementing 
        document, the Basic Law;
            (2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who 
        face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;
            (3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and HKSAR to--
                    (A) respect and uphold--
                            (i) commitments made to the international 
                        community and the people of Hong Kong under the 
                        Joint Declaration; and
                            (ii) the judicial independence of the Hong 
                        Kong legal system; and
                    (B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians 
                arrested under the national security law; and
            (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and 
        the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and 
        partners and continue United States efforts to respond to 
        developments in Hong Kong, including by--
                    (A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents 
                who fear persecution;
                    (B) supporting those who may seek to file a case 
                before the International Court of Justice to hold the 
                Government of the PRC accountable for violating its 
                binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;
                    (C) encouraging allies and partner countries to 
                instruct, as appropriate, their respective 
                representatives to the United Nations to use their 
                voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment 
                of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor 
                and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;
                    (D) ensuring the private sector, particularly 
                United States companies with economic interests in Hong 
                Kong, is aware of risks the national security 
                legislation poses to the security of United States 
                citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of 
                United States businesses in Hong Kong;
                    (E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities, 
                especially authorities recently enacted to address 
                actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong 
                Kong people, such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public 
                Law 116-149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
                Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76), with respect 
                to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
                Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR 
                who are responsible for undermining such rights and 
                freedoms; and
                    (F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure 
                that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN 
              HONG KONG.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the 
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the 
Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.

    (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
            (1) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force 
        on May 27, 1985.
            (2) Priority hong kong resident.--The term ``Priority Hong 
        Kong resident'' means--
                    (A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who--
                            (i) holds no right to citizenship in any 
                        country or jurisdiction other than the People's 
                        Republic of China (referred to in this section 
                        as the ``PRC''), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the 
                        date of enactment of this Act;
                            (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less 
                        than the last ten years as of the date of 
                        enactment of this Act; and
                            (iii) has been designated by the Secretary 
                        of State or Secretary of Homeland Security as 
                        having met the requirements of this 
                        subparagraph, in accordance with the procedures 
                        described in subsection (f) of this section; or
                    (B) the spouse of a person described in 
                subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such 
                term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration 
                and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that 
                a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven 
                years of age.
            (3) Hong kong national security law.--The term ``Hong Kong 
        National Security Law'' means the Law of the People's Republic 
        of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by 
        the National People's Congress and signed by President Xi 
        Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region (referred to in this section as 
        ``Hong Kong SAR'') on July 1, 2020.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July 
        1, 2020--
                    (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
                Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act 
                as ``the Basic Law'') that provides in Article 23 that 
                the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact 
                legislation related to national security;
                    (B) violates the PRC's commitments under 
                international law, as defined by the Joint Declaration; 
                and
                    (C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the 
                ``one country, two systems'' principle and further 
                erodes global confidence in the PRC's commitment to 
                international law.
            (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of 
        the Hong Kong National Security Law, President Trump signed an 
        Executive order on Hong Kong normalization that, among other 
        policy actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong 
        persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of 
        immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.
            (3) The United States has a long and proud history as a 
        destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based 
        on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
        membership in a particular social group.
            (4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural, 
        and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a 
        shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the 
        protection of human rights.
            (5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and 
        welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes, 
        including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4, 
        1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the 
        people of the United States and those individuals seeking to 
        contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human 
        rights, and the respect for the rule of law.
            (6) The United States has reaped enormous economic, 
        cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive 
        generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists, 
        intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism, 
        communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive 
        ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
        Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and 
        Iran.
            (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in 
        its long-term strategic competition with the Communist Party of 
        China is the ability of people from every country in the world, 
        irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to 
        immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in 
        the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
        383), specifically that--
                    (A) the United States has ``a strong interest in 
                the continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of 
                Hong Kong'';
                    (B) ``support for democratization is a fundamental 
                principle of United States foreign policy'', and 
                therefore ``naturally applies to United States policy 
                toward Hong Kong'';
                    (C) ``the human rights of the people of Hong Kong 
                are of great importance to the United States and are 
                directly relevant to United States interests in Hong 
                Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued 
                economic prosperity''; and
                    (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous 
                from the PRC to ``justify treatment under a particular 
                law of the United States, or any provision thereof, 
                different from that accorded the People's Republic of 
                China'';
            (2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and 
        fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as 
        enumerated by--
                    (A) the Joint Declaration;
                    (B) the International Covenant on Civil and 
                Political Rights, done at New York, December 19, 1966; 
                and
                    (C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done 
                at Paris, December 10, 1948;
            (3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of 
        the people of Hong Kong, including the ``ultimate aim'' of the 
        selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the 
        Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in 
        the Basic Law;
            (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent 
        actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong Kong, including 
        allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a 
        high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and 
        ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect 
        the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong 
        Legislative Council by universal suffrage;
            (5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic 
        option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief 
        Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and 
        direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong 
        Legislative Council;
            (6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong 
        Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other 
        fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint 
        Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights;
            (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, 
        detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as 
        provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
            (8) to draw international attention to any violations by 
        the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the 
        people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant 
        on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the 
        autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint 
        Declaration;
            (9) to protect United States citizens and long-term 
        permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people 
        visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;
            (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that 
        provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong 
        Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange 
        program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;
            (11) to coordinate with allies, including the United 
        Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, 
        to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and
            (12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents 
        of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe 
        haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the 
        fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.
    (d) Temporary Protected Status for Hong Kong Residents in the 
United States.--
            (1) Designation.--
                    (A) In general.--For purposes of section 244 of the 
                Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong 
                Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated 
                under subsection (b)(1)(C) of such section, subject to 
                the provisions of this section.
                    (B) Period of designation.--The initial period of 
                the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall 
                be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of 
                enactment of this Act.
            (2) Aliens eligible.--As a result of the designation made 
        under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the 
        requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to 
        paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien--
                    (A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the 
                time such individual arrived into the United States and 
                is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an 
                individual having no nationality, is a person who last 
                habitually resided in Hong Kong);
                    (B) has been continuously physically present in the 
                United States since the date of the enactment of this 
                Act;
                    (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as 
                otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section, 
                and is not ineligible for temporary protected status 
                under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and
                    (D) registers for temporary protected status in a 
                manner established by the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security.
            (3) Consent to travel abroad.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in 
                accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration 
                and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien 
                who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to 
                the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien 
                establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating 
                circumstances beyond the control of the alien require 
                the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.
                    (B) Treatment upon return.--An alien returning to 
                the United States in accordance with an authorization 
                described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any 
                other returning alien provided temporary protected 
                status under section 244 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).
            (4) Fee.--
                    (A) In general.--In addition to any other fee 
                authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for 
                each application for temporary protected status under 
                section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a 
                person who is only eligible for such status by reason 
                of paragraph (1).
                    (B) Waiver.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees 
                associated with filing an application referred to in 
                subparagraph (A).
    (e) Treatment of Hong Kong Residents for Immigration Purposes.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the five fiscal year 
period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after 
the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be 
considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated 
under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 
(Public Law 101-649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on 
immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).
    (f) Verification of Priority Hong Kong Residents.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
        publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule 
        establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong 
        Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United 
        States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, 
        immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and 
        revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The 
        Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than one 
        year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule 
        shall establish procedures--
                    (A) for individuals to register with any United 
                States embassy or consulate outside of the United 
                States, or with the Department of Homeland Security in 
                the United States, and request designation as a 
                Priority Hong Kong Resident; and
                    (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the 
                residency of registered individuals and designate those 
                who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
            (2) Documentation.--The procedures described in paragraph 
        (1) shall include the collection of--
                    (A) biometric data;
                    (B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards, 
                and other documentation establishing residency; and
                    (C) other personal information, data, and records 
                deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
            (3) Guidance.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue 
        guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the 
        Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and 
        from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and 
        partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent 
        residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as 
        Priority Hong Kong Residents.
            (4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the 
        Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to 
        implement the requirements described in this subsection.
            (5) Protection for refugees.--Nothing in this section may 
        be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from 
        seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under 
        section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).
    (g) Reporting Requirements.--
            (1) In general.--On an annual basis, the Secretary of State 
        and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
        other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on the 
        Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the previous 
        fiscal year--
                    (A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have 
                applied for United States visas or immigration 
                benefits, disaggregated by visa type or immigration 
                benefit, including asylum, refugee status, temporary 
                protected status, and lawful permanent residence;
                    (B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections 
                of applicants for visas or immigration benefits 
                described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa 
                type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;
                    (C) the number of pending refugee and asylum 
                applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the 
                length of time and reason for which such applications 
                have been pending; and
                    (D) other matters determined relevant by the 
                Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and 
                facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of 
                persecution in Hong Kong.
            (2) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-
        searchable, publicly available website of the Department of 
        State and the Department of Homeland Security.
    (h) Strategy for International Cooperation on Hong Kong.--
            (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States--
                    (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing 
                safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals 
                of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong 
                National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong 
                persons at risk of persecution; and
                    (B) to encourage like-minded nations to make 
                similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing 
                persecution by the Government of the PRC.
            (2) Plan.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
        heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop 
        a plan to engage with other countries, including the United 
        Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to--
                    (A) provide refugee and asylum protections for 
                victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution 
                in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other 
                authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;
                    (B) enhance protocols to facilitate the 
                resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from 
                Hong Kong;
                    (C) identify and prevent the exploitation of 
                immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt 
                officials; and
                    (D) expedite the sharing of information, as 
                appropriate, related to the refusal of individual 
                applications for visas or other travel documents 
                submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on--
                            (i) national security or related grounds 
                        under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and 
                        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or
                            (ii) fraud or misrepresentation under 
                        section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and 
                        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).
            (3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and 
        the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the 
        plan described in paragraph (2).
    (i) Refugee Status for Certain Residents of Hong Kong.--
            (1) In general.--Aliens described in paragraph (2) may 
        establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under 
        sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), 
        that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on 
        account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
        particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such 
        a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility 
        of such persecution.
            (2) Aliens described.--
                    (A) In general.--An alien is described in this 
                subsection if such alien--
                            (i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and--
                                    (I) had a significant role in a 
                                civil society organization supportive 
                                of the protests in 2019 and 2020 
                                related to the Hong Kong National 
                                Security Law and the encroachment on 
                                the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;
                                    (II) was arrested, charged, 
                                detained, or convicted of an offense 
                                arising from their participation in an 
                                action as described in section 
                                206(b)(2) of the United States-Hong 
                                Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 
                                5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in 
                                nature; or
                                    (III) has had their citizenship, 
                                nationality, or residency revoked for 
                                having submitted to any United States 
                                Government agency a nonfrivolous 
                                application for refugee status, asylum, 
                                or any other immigration benefit under 
                                the immigration laws (as defined in 
                                section 101(a) of the Immigration and 
                                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)));
                            (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 
                        spouse or child of an alien described in clause 
                        (i); or
                            (iii) is the parent of an alien described 
                        in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of 
                        the PRC and no other foreign state.
                    (B) Other categories.--The Secretary of Homeland 
                Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
                may designate other categories of aliens for purposes 
                of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution 
                under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common 
                characteristics that identify them as targets of 
                persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion, 
                nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
                or political opinion.
                    (C) Significant role.--For purposes of subclause 
                (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall 
                include, with respect to the protests described in such 
                clause--
                            (i) an organizing role;
                            (ii) a first aid responder;
                            (iii) a journalist or member of the media 
                        covering or offering public commentary;
                            (iv) a provider of legal services to one or 
                        more individuals arrested for participating in 
                        such protests; or
                            (v) a participant who during the period 
                        beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June 
                        30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or 
                        convicted as a result of such participation.
            (3) Age out protections.--For purposes of this subsection, 
        a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made 
        using the age of the alien on the date an application for 
        refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named 
        beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.
            (4) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens provided 
        refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted 
        against the numerical limitation on refugees established in 
        accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).
            (5) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the Committee on the 
                Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on 
                the matters described in subparagraph (B).
                    (B) Matters to be included.--Each report required 
                by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to 
                applications submitted under this section--
                            (i) the total number of refugee and asylum 
                        applications that are pending at the end of the 
                        reporting period;
                            (ii) the average wait-times for all 
                        applicants for refugee status or asylum 
                        pending--
                                    (I) a prescreening interview with a 
                                resettlement support center;
                                    (II) an interview with United 
                                States Citizenship and Immigration 
                                Services; and
                                    (III) the completion of security 
                                checks;
                            (iii) the number of approvals, referrals 
                        including the source of the referral, denials 
                        of applications for refugee status or asylum, 
                        disaggregated by the reason for each such 
                        denial; and
                            (iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to 
                        interview populations that would include Hong 
                        Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the 
                        number planned for the subsequent 90-day 
                        period.
                    (C) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall 
                make each report submitted under this paragraph 
                available to the public on the internet website of the 
                Department of State.
    (j) Admission for Certain Highly Skilled Hong Kong Residents.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding any other provision 
        of law, the Secretary of State in consultation with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, may provide an alien described 
        in subsection (b) with the status of a special immigrant under 
        section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien--
                    (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the alien, 
                submits a petition for classification under section 
                203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4));
                    (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant 
                visa;
                    (C) is otherwise admissible to the United States 
                for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for 
                inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such 
                Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and
                    (D) clears a background check and appropriate 
                screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security.
            (2) Aliens described.--
                    (A) Principal aliens.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if--
                            (i) the alien--
                                    (I) is a Priority Hong Kong 
                                Resident; and
                                    (II) has earned a bachelor's or 
                                higher degree from an institution of 
                                higher education; and
                            (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                        determines that such alien's relocation to the 
                        United States would provide a significant 
                        benefit to the United States.
                    (B) Spouses and children.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of 
                a principal alien described in paragraph (1).
            (3) Numerical limitations.--
                    (A) In general.--The total number of principal 
                aliens who may be provided special immigrant status 
                under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for 
                each of the five fiscal years beginning after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland 
                Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals 
                with a bachelor's or higher degree in science, 
                technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or 
                health care.
                    (B) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens 
                provided immigrant status under this section shall not 
                be counted against any numerical limitation under 
                section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).
            (4) Eligibility for admission under other classification.--
        No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission 
        under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an 
        immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant 
        classification.
            (5) Timeline for processing applications.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State and the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all 
                steps under the control of the United States Government 
                incidental to the approval of such applications, 
                including required screenings and background checks, 
                are completed not later than one year after the date on 
                which an eligible applicant submits an application 
                under subsection (a).
                    (B) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
                relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to 
                process applications described in paragraph (1) if 
                satisfaction of national security concerns requires 
                such additional time, provided that the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary, 
                has determined that the applicant meets the 
                requirements for status as a special immigrant under 
                this section and has so notified the applicant.
    (k) Termination.--Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this 
section shall cease to have effect on the date that is five years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE 
              FORCE.

    Section 3 of the Act entitled ``An Act to prohibit the commercial 
export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force'', 
approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 Stat. 1173), is 
amended by striking ``on December 31, 2021.'' and inserting the 
following: ``on the date on which the President certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that--
            ``(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of 
        the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of 
        the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong 
        warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner 
        as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 
        1997;
            ``(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross 
        violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on 
        the date of such certification; and
            ``(3) there has been an independent examination of human 
        rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the 
        Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region has adequately addressed those 
        concerns.''.

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC 
              MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim 
        Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) in the northwest of the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC).
            (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and 
        clashes with government security personnel and other violent 
        incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders sought to 
        ``stabilize'' the XUAR through large-scale arrests and extreme 
        security measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged 
        terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.
            (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ``Strike Hard Against 
        Violent Extremism'' campaign, which placed further restrictions 
        on and facilitated additional human rights violations against 
        minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
            (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo 
        member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party 
        Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security 
        operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as 
        Party Secretary of the XUAR.
            (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have sought to 
        forcibly ``assimilate'' Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities 
        into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known 
        as ``Sinicization''.
            (6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from the BBC, 
        France24, and the New York Times has shown that the Government 
        of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which 
        it calls ``vocational training'' centers, and detained Uyghurs 
        and other groups in them and other facilities.
            (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained 
        an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs--12.5 percent of the XUAR's 
        official Uyghur population of 12,000,000--and a smaller number 
        of other ethnic minorities in the ``vocational training'' 
        centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
            (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent 
        of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in 
        China.
            (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have 
        revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their 
        Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, 
        language, and identity.
            (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human 
        rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject 
        to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and 
        unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, 
        both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food 
        and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.
            (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
        suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed 
        in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.
            (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data 
        collection programs, including facial recognition technology, 
        to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom 
        authorities may detain.
            (13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose 
        parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and 
        boarding schools without the consent of their parents.
            (14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local 
        PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out 
        in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.
            (15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and 
        systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to 
        take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or 
        abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.
            (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates 
        inside and outside China from having regular communications 
        with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as 
        journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.
            (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on 
        the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that 
        Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC ``has effectively outlawed 
        the practice of Islam''.
            (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been 
        forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected 
        to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, 
        involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights 
        abuses.
            (19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, 
        scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic 
        nature of many of these abuses.
            (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United 
        Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's 
        deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in 
        Xinjiang, and called on the international community ``to act 
        collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human 
        rights and abides by its international obligations''.
            (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries 
        issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by 
        PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to 
        Xinjiang.
            (22) The United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human 
        Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145).
            (23) The United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky 
        Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of 
        Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used 
        to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in 
        the XUAR.
            (24) The United States Government has implemented 
        additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and 
        imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and 
        entities for their activities in the XUAR.
            (25) The United States Government has documented human 
        rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the 
        XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on 
        International Religious Freedom.
            (26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, 
        Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that ``forcing men, 
        women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in 
        effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist 
        Party--all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide''.
            (27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet 
        L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated 
        that China is guilty of ``horrendous human rights abuses''.
            (28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from 
        the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that 
        his ``judgement remains that genocide was committed against the 
        Uyghurs''.
            (29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on 
        Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken 
        reiterated, ``We`ve been clear, and I've been clear, that I see 
        it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and 
        we'll continue to make that clear.''.
            (30) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human 
        Rights Practices: China states that ``[g]enocide and crimes 
        against humanity occurred during the year against the 
        predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
        minority groups in Xinjiang''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against Uyghurs and 
        other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including 
        forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 
        individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned;
            (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly 
        about the ongoing human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in 
        formal speeches at the United Nations and other international 
        fora;
            (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the 
        United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and 
        public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by 
        supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for 
        individuals and entities involved in abuses against the people 
        of the XUAR;
            (4) the United States should continue to use targeted 
        sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to hold those 
        responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to account;
            (5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade, 
        climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include 
        human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in 
        developing United States policy;
            (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the 
        only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of 
        Chinese government influence; and
            (7) the United States recognizes the repeated requests from 
        the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for 
        unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply, 
        and therefore--
                    (A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered access by 
                the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
                Human Rights to the XUAR;
                    (B) the United States should urge collaborative 
                action between the United States Government and 
                international partners to pressure PRC authorities to 
                allow unfettered access to the XUAR;
                    (C) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
                United States Ambassador to the United Nations should 
                simultaneously outline a strategy to investigate the 
                human rights abuses and crimes that have taken place in 
                the XUAR, collect evidence, and transfer the evidence 
                to a competent court; and
                    (D) United States partners and allies should 
                undertake similar strategies in an effort to build an 
                international investigation outside of the PRC if PRC 
                authorities do not comply with a United Nations 
                investigation in the XUAR.

SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles, 
        or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in 
        part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and 
        particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise 
        produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly 
        referred to as ``Xinjiang'' or ``XUAR'') of China;
            (2) to encourage the international community to reduce the 
        import of any goods made with forced labor from the People's 
        Republic of China, particularly goods mined, manufactured, or 
        produced in the XUAR;
            (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to effectively 
        implement Article 23.6 of the United States-Mexico-Canada 
        Agreement to prohibit the importation of goods produced in 
        whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, which includes 
        goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory 
        labor in the People's Republic of China;
            (4) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end 
        human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to 
        restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a 
        modern form of slavery;
            (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its 
        national interest, including efforts to prevent torture, 
        enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, 
        including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread 
        and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting 
        any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and
            (6) to address gross violations of human rights in the XUAR 
        through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral 
        institutions where both the United States and the People's 
        Republic of China are members and with all the authorities 
        available to the United States Government, including visa and 
        financial sanctions, export restrictions, and import controls.
    (b) Prohibition on Importation of Goods Made in the XUAR.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), all 
        goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or 
        manufactured wholly or in part in the XUAR of China, or by 
        persons working with the XUAR government for purposes of the 
        ``poverty alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance'' 
        program which subsidizes the establishment of manufacturing 
        facilities in the XUAR, shall be deemed to be goods, wares, 
        articles, and merchandise described in section 307 of the 
        Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled 
        to entry at any of the ports of the United States.
            (2) Exception.--The prohibition described in paragraph (1) 
        shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
        Protection--
                    (A) determines, by clear and convincing evidence, 
                that any specific goods, wares, articles, or 
                merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not 
                produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced 
                labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and
                    (B) submits to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and makes available to the public a report 
                that contains such determination.
            (3) Effective date.--This section shall take effect on the 
        date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act.
    (c) Enforcement Strategy to Address Forced Labor in the XUAR.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
        Force, established under section 741 of the United States-
        Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively 
        address forced labor in the XUAR of China or products made by 
        Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other 
        persecuted groups through forced labor in any other part of the 
        People's Republic of China. The enforcement strategy shall 
        describe the specific enforcement plans of the United States 
        Government regarding--
                    (A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States directly from the XUAR or made by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other 
                persecuted groups in any other part of the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States from the People's Republic of China 
                and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the 
                XUAR or by persons working with the XUAR government or 
                the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for 
                purposes of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the 
                ``pairing-assistance'' program; and
                    (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States from third countries and are mined, 
                produced, or manufactured in part in the XUAR or by 
                persons working with the XUAR government or the 
                Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes 
                of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the 
                ``pairing-assistance'' program.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A description of the actions taken by the 
                United States Government to address forced labor in the 
                XUAR under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
                U.S.C. 1307), including a description of all Withhold 
                Release Orders issued, goods detained, and fines 
                issued.
                    (B) A list of products made wholly or in part by 
                forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other 
                persecuted groups in any other part of the People's 
                Republic of China, and a list of businesses that sold 
                products in the United States made wholly or in part by 
                forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of other 
                persecuted groups in any other part of the People's 
                Republic of China.
                    (C) A list of facilities and entities, including 
                the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, that 
                source material from the XUAR or by persons working 
                with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production and 
                Construction Corps for purposes of the ``poverty 
                alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance'' 
                program, a plan for identifying additional such 
                facilities and entities, and facility- and entity-
                specific enforcement plans, including issuing specific 
                Withhold Release Orders to support enforcement of 
                subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or 
                entity.
                    (D) A list of high-priority sectors for 
                enforcement, including cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon, 
                and a sector-specific enforcement plan for each high-
                priority sector.
                    (E) A description of the additional resources 
                necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to 
                effectively implement the enforcement strategy.
                    (F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with 
                appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private 
                sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for 
                products made in the XUAR.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex, if necessary.
            (4) Updates.--The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall 
        provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees 
        on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the 
        strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions 
        taken to address forced labor in the XUAR, including actions 
        described in this section.
            (5) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the 
        earlier of--
                    (A) the date that is eight years after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the XUAR.
    (d) Determination Relating to Crimes Against Humanity or Genocide 
in the XUAR.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
                    (A) determine if the practice of forced labor or 
                other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
                members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR of 
                China can be considered systematic and widespread and 
                therefore constitutes crimes against humanity or 
                constitutes genocide as defined in subsection (a) of 
                section 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and make available to the public a report 
                that contains such determination.
            (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
                include a classified annex, if necessary; and
                    (B) may be included in the report required by 
                subsection (e).
    (e) Diplomatic Strategy to Address Forced Labor in the XUAR.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report that contains a United States 
        strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international 
        awareness of and to address forced labor in the XUAR of China.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral 
                coordination, including sustained engagement with the 
                governments of United States partners and allies, to 
                end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
                members of other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;
                    (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-
                messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human 
                rights situation, including forced labor in the XUAR; 
                and
                    (C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate 
                with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and 
                private sector entities to raise awareness about forced 
                labor made products from the XUAR and to provide 
                assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 
                other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR, including 
                those formerly detained in mass internment camps in the 
                region.
            (3) Additional matters to be included.--The report required 
        by paragraph (1) shall also include--
                    (A) to the extent practicable, a list of--
                            (i) entities in the People's Republic of 
                        China or affiliates of such entities that 
                        directly or indirectly use forced or 
                        involuntary labor in the XUAR; and
                            (ii) foreign persons that acted as agents 
                        of the entities or affiliates of entities 
                        described in clause (i) to import goods into 
                        the United States; and
                    (B) a description of actions taken by the United 
                States Government to address forced labor in the XUAR 
                under existing authorities, including--
                            (i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
                        of 2000 (Public Law 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et 
                        seq.);
                            (ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
                        Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 
                        115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and
                            (iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                        Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
            (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex, if necessary.
            (5) Updates.--The Secretary of State shall include any 
        updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual 
        Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the 
        Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).
            (6) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect the 
        earlier of--
                    (A) the date that is eight years after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the XUAR.
    (f) Imposition of Sanctions Relating to Forced Labor in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) Report required.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act and not less 
                frequently than annually thereafter, the President 
                shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report that identifies each foreign 
                person, including any official of the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China, that the President 
                determines--
                            (i) knowingly engages in, is responsible 
                        for, or facilitates the forced labor of 
                        Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other 
                        Muslim minority groups in the XUAR; and
                            (ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to, 
                        assists, or provides financial, material or 
                        technological support for efforts to contravene 
                        United States law regarding the importation of 
                        forced labor goods from the XUAR.
                    (B) Form.--The report required under subparagraph 
                (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                contain a classified annex.
            (2) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall impose 
        the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each 
        foreign person identified in the report required under 
        paragraph (1)(A).
            (3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
        subsection are the following:
                    (A) Asset blocking.--The President shall exercise 
                all of the powers granted to the President under the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and 
                prohibit all transactions in property and interests in 
                property of a foreign person identified in the report 
                required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and 
                interests in property--
                            (i) are in the United States;
                            (ii) come within the United States; or
                            (iii) come within the possession or control 
                        of a United States person.
                    (B) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or 
                parole.--
                            (i) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien 
                        described in paragraph (1)(A) is--
                                    (I) inadmissible to the United 
                                States;
                                    (II) ineligible to receive a visa 
                                or other documentation to enter the 
                                United States; and
                                    (III) otherwise ineligible to be 
                                admitted or paroled into the United 
                                States or to receive any other benefit 
                                under the Immigration and Nationality 
                                Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
                            (ii) Current visas revoked.--
                                    (I) In general.--An alien described 
                                in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to 
                                revocation of any visa or other entry 
                                documentation regardless of when the 
                                visa or other entry documentation is or 
                                was issued.
                                    (II) Immediate effect.--A 
                                revocation under subclause (I) shall--
                                            (aa) take effect 
                                        immediately; and
                                            (bb) automatically cancel 
                                        any other valid visa or entry 
                                        documentation that is in the 
                                        alien's possession.
            (4) Implementation; penalties.--
                    (A) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
                authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
                    (B) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in 
                subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1705) shall apply to a foreign person that engages in 
                an activity described in paragraph (1)(A) to the same 
                extent that such penalties apply to a person that 
                commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of 
                such section 206.
            (5) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
        sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person 
        identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the 
        President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national 
        interest of the United States.
            (6) Exceptions.--
                    (A) Exception for intelligence activities.--
                Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any 
                activity subject to the reporting requirements under 
                title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
                3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities 
                of the United States.
                    (B) Exception to comply with international 
                obligations and for law enforcement activities.--
                Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with 
                respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien 
                into the United States is necessary--
                            (i) to permit the United States to comply 
                        with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters 
                        of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
                        June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 
                        21, 1947, between the United Nations and the 
                        United States, or other applicable 
                        international obligations; or
                            (ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement 
                        activity in the United States.
            (7) Termination of sanctions.--The President may terminate 
        the application of sanctions under this section with respect to 
        a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the 
        appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days 
        before the termination takes effect that--
                    (A) information exists that the person did not 
                engage in the activity for which sanctions were 
                imposed;
                    (B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately 
                for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
                    (C) the person has credibly demonstrated a 
                significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate 
                consequence for the activity for which sanctions were 
                imposed, and has credibly committed in the future to 
                not engage in such activity; or
                    (D) the termination of the sanctions is in the 
                national security interests of the United States.
            (8) Sunset.--This section, and any sanctions imposed under 
        this section, shall terminate on the date that is five years 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (9) Definitions of admission; admitted; alien.--In this 
        section, the terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' 
        have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
    (g) Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Certain Activities Related to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) Policy statement.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to protect American investors, through stronger 
        disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of 
        Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of 
        human rights in United States capital markets, including 
        American and foreign companies listed on United States 
        exchanges that enable the mass internment and population 
        surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim 
        minorities and source products made with forced labor in the 
        XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, material risks to the 
        share values and corporate reputations of certain of these 
        companies and hence to prospective American investors, 
        particularly given that the United States Government has 
        employed sanctions and export restrictions to target 
        individuals and entities contributing to human rights abuses in 
        the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Disclosure of certain activities relating to the 
        xinjiang uyghur autonomous region.--Section 13 of the 
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by 
        adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(s) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            ``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual 
        or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that 
        report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the 
        period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of 
        the issuer--
                    ``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in 
                creating or providing technology or other assistance to 
                create mass population surveillance systems in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to 
                as `Xinjiang' or `XUAR') of China, including any entity 
                included on the Department of Commerce's `Entity List' 
                in the XUAR;
                    ``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or an affiliate of an entity building and 
                running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 
                Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in 
                the XUAR;
                    ``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or an affiliate of an entity described in 
                section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring American Global 
                Leadership and Engagement Act, including--
                            ``(i) any entity engaged in the `pairing-
                        assistance' program which subsidizes the 
                        establishment of manufacturing facilities in 
                        the XUAR; or
                            ``(ii) any entity for which the Department 
                        of Homeland Security has issued a `Withhold 
                        Release Order' under section 307 of the Tariff 
                        Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or
                    ``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had 
                dealings with--
                            ``(i) any person the property and interests 
                        in property of which were sanctioned by the 
                        Secretary of State for the detention or abuse 
                        of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members 
                        of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;
                            ``(ii) any person the property and 
                        interests in property of which are sanctioned 
                        pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                        Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or
                            ``(iii) any person or entity responsible 
                        for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in 
                        the XUAR.
            ``(2) Information required.--
                    ``(A) In general.--If an issuer described under 
                paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged 
                in any activity described in paragraph (1), the 
                information required by this paragraph is a detailed 
                description of each such activity, including--
                            ``(i) the nature and extent of the 
                        activity;
                            ``(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, 
                        if any, attributable to the activity; and
                            ``(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate 
                        of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to 
                        continue the activity.
                    ``(B) Exception.--The requirement to disclose 
                information under this paragraph shall not include 
                information on activities of the issuer or any 
                affiliate of the issuer activities relating to--
                            ``(i) the import of manufactured goods, 
                        including electronics, food products, textiles, 
                        shoes, and teas, that originated in the XUAR; 
                        or
                            ``(ii) manufactured goods containing 
                        materials that originated or are sourced in the 
                        XUAR.
            ``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under 
        paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has 
        knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, 
        the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, 
        concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under 
        subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity 
        has been included in that annual or quarterly report that 
        identifies the issuer and contains the information required by 
        paragraph (2).
            ``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a 
        notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report 
        includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph 
        (1), the Commission shall promptly--
                    ``(A) transmit the report to--
                            ``(i) the President;
                            ``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                        the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                        House of Representatives; and
                            ``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
                        and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
                        Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
                    ``(B) make the information provided in the 
                disclosure and the notice available to the public by 
                posting the information on the Internet website of the 
                Commission.
            ``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under 
        paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity 
        described in paragraph (1), the President shall--
                    ``(A) make a determination with respect to whether 
                any investigation is needed into the possible 
                imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky 
                Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 
                or section 306(f) of the Ensuring American Global 
                Leadership and Engagement Act or whether criminal 
                investigations are warranted under statutes intended to 
                hold accountable individuals or entities involved in 
                the importation of goods produced by forced labor, 
                including under section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, 
                United States Code; and
                    ``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any 
                such investigation, make a determination with respect 
                to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal 
                investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or 
                the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
            ``(6) Atrocities defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        `atrocities' has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of 
        the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 
        (Public Law 115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).''.
            (3) Sunset.--Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act 
        of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier 
        of--
                    (A) the date that is eight years after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the XUAR.
            (4) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (2) 
        shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed 
        with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that 
        is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (h) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and 
                Means of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and 
                the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
            (2) Atrocities.--The term ``atrocities'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
        Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 22 
        U.S.C. 2656 note).
            (3) Crimes against humanity.--The term ``crimes against 
        humanity'' includes, when committed as part of a widespread or 
        systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
        with knowledge of the attack--
                    (A) murder;
                    (B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;
                    (C) torture;
                    (D) extermination;
                    (E) enslavement;
                    (F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of 
                sexual violence of comparable severity;
                    (G) persecution against any identifiable group or 
                collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
                cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are 
                universally recognized as impermissible under 
                international law; and
                    (H) enforced disappearance of persons.
            (4) Forced labor.--The term ``forced labor'' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
        (19 U.S.C. 1307).
            (5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
        person that is not a United States person.
            (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
        entity.
            (7) Mass population surveillance system.--The term ``mass 
        population surveillance system'' means installation and 
        integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data 
        collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial 
        intelligence technology with the ``Sharp Eyes'' and 
        ``Integrated Joint Operations Platform'' or other technologies 
        that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and 
        big-data predictive policing.
            (8) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Uyghur Human 
Rights Protection Act''.
    (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other 
        Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly referred to as ``Xinjiang'' 
        or ``XUAR''), also known as East Turkestan. Central and 
        regional PRC government policies have systematically 
        discriminated against these minority groups by denying them a 
        range of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of 
        religion. Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials bear 
        direct responsibility for these gross human rights violations.
            (2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention 
        of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
        members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working 
        age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the 
        integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in 
        detention facilities and internment camps in the XUAR have 
        described forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings, 
        food deprivation, sexual assault, coordinated campaigns to 
        reduce birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims 
        through forced sterilization, and denial of religious, 
        cultural, and linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports 
        indicate that since 2019, the PRC government has newly 
        constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention 
        facilities with higher security or prison-like features in 
        Xinjiang.
            (3) The PRC government's actions against Uyghurs, ethnic 
        Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in 
        the XUAR violate international human rights laws and norms, 
        including--
                    (A) the International Convention on the Elimination 
                of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the PRC 
                has acceded;
                    (B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
                Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the 
                PRC has signed and ratified;
                    (C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
                of the Crime of Genocide, which the PRC has signed and 
                ratified;
                    (D) the International Covenant on Civil and 
                Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; and
                    (E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
                the International Labor Organization's Force Labor 
                Convention (no. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor 
                Convention (no. 105).
    (c) Refugee Protections for Certain Residents of the XUAR.--
            (1) Populations of special humanitarian concern.--The 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of 
        special humanitarian concern--
                    (A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC and 
                residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021;
                    (B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 30, 2009, 
                and reside in other provinces of the PRC or in a third 
                country where such alien is not firmly resettled; and
                    (C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such 
                terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 
                101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A) 
                and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried 
                person under 27 years of age.
            (2) Processing of xuar refugees.--The processing of 
        individuals described in paragraph (1) for classification as 
        refugees may occur in the PRC or a third country.
            (3) Eligibility for admission as a refugee.--
                    (A) In general.--Aliens described in subparagraph 
                (B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a 
                refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 
                208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a 
                well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
                religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
                social group, or political opinion by asserting such a 
                fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about 
                the possibility of such persecution.
                    (B) Aliens described.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if such alien has been identified as a 
                person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to 
                paragraph (1) and--
                            (i) has experienced persecution in the XUAR 
                        by the PRC government, including--
                                    (I) forced and arbitrary detention 
                                including in an internment or re-
                                education camp;
                                    (II) forced political 
                                indoctrination, torture, beatings, food 
                                deprivation, and denial of religious, 
                                cultural, and linguistic freedoms;
                                    (III) forced labor;
                                    (IV) forced separation from family 
                                members;
                                    (V) other forms of systemic 
                                threats, harassment, and gross human 
                                rights violations; or
                                    (VI) has been formally charged, 
                                detained, or convicted on account of 
                                their peaceful actions as described in 
                                the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 
                                2020 (Public Law 116-145).
                            (ii) is currently a national of the PRC 
                        whose residency in the XUAR, or any other area 
                        within the jurisdiction of the PRC, was revoked 
                        for having submitted to any United States 
                        Government agency a nonfrivolous application 
                        for refugee status, asylum, or any other 
                        immigration benefit under United States law.
                    (C) Eligibility for admission under other 
                classification.--An alien may not be denied the 
                opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or 
                asylum under this section solely because such alien 
                qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the 
                United States or is eligible for admission to the 
                United States under any other immigrant classification.
            (4) Priority.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize 
        bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former 
        residents of the XUAR and who face significant diplomatic 
        pressures from the PRC government.
            (5) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security shall submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the Committee on the 
                Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on 
                the matters described in subparagraph (B).
                    (B) Matters to be included.--Each report required 
                by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to 
                applications submitted under this section--
                            (i) the total number of applications that 
                        are pending at the end of the reporting period;
                            (ii) the average wait-times and number of 
                        applicants who are currently pending--
                                    (I) a pre-screening interview with 
                                a resettlement support center;
                                    (II) an interview with United 
                                States Citizenship and Immigration 
                                Services;
                                    (III) the completion of security 
                                checks;
                                    (IV) receipt of a final decision 
                                after completion of an interview with 
                                United States Citizenship and 
                                Immigration Services; and
                            (iii) the number of denials of applications 
                        for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason 
                        for each such denial.
                    (C) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall 
                make each report submitted under this subsection 
                available to the public on the internet website of the 
                Department of State.
    (d) Statement of Policy on Encouraging Allies and Partners to Make 
Similar Accommodations.--It is the policy of the United States to 
encourage United States allies and partners to make accommodations 
similar to the accommodations made in this section for residents of the 
XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government.
    (e) Termination.--This section shall terminate on the date that is 
ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
              THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

    The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to--
            (1) reform the process for removing Member States of the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and 
        systemic violations of human rights, including--
                    (A) lowering the threshold vote at the United 
                Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple 
                majority;
                    (B) ensuring information detailing the Member 
                State's human rights record is publicly available 
                before the vote on removal; and
                    (C) making the vote of each country on the removal 
                from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly 
                available;
            (2) reform the rules on electing members to the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations Member 
        States that have committed gross and systemic violations of 
        human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
            (3) oppose the election to the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council of any United Nations Member State--
                    (A) currently designated as a country engaged in a 
                consistent pattern of gross violations of 
                internationally recognized human rights pursuant to 
                section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or 2304);
                    (B) the government of which the Secretary of State 
                currently determines has repeatedly provided support 
                for international terrorism pursuant to--
                            (i) section 1754(c) of the National Defense 
                        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019;
                            (ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
                        Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
                            (iii) section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
                        Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or
                            (iv) any other provision of law;
                    (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under 
                the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 
                U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
                    (D) the government of which is identified on the 
                list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
                section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 
                2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that 
                recruits and uses child soldiers; or
                    (E) the government of which the United States 
                determines to have committed genocide or crimes against 
                humanity.

SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

    (a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), as 
        subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection:
    ``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be 
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or 
higher.''.
    (b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
        Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States 
        Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC).
            (2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph 
        (1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the PRC 
        permits--
                    (A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, 
                PRC, to reopen; or
                    (B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, 
                Tibet, to open.
            (3) Staff.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary shall--
                            (i) assign not fewer than two United States 
                        direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit 
                        established under paragraph (1); and
                            (ii) hire not fewer than one locally 
                        engaged staff member for such unit.
                    (B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make 
                Tibetan language training available to the personnel 
                assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the 
                Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE 
              SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND 
              RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

    (a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any 
``interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or 
any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or 
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would 
represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists and the Tibetan people''.
    (b) International Efforts to Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States 
allies and partners to--
            (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole 
        religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai 
        Lama;
            (2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the authority to 
        decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
            (3) reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the 
        religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT 
              FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly 
        violated its obligations under the Joint Declaration by 
        suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of the people of Hong 
        Kong.
            (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed 
        a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
            (3) The Government of the PRC continues to utilize the 
        National Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights of 
        the Hong Kong people through suppression of the freedom of 
        speech, assembly, religion, and the press.
            (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes 
        unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity 
        in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force 
        internet service providers to censor content, hand over user 
        information, and block access to platforms.
            (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network 
        blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting 
        pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National 
        Security Law.
            (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers 
        blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission 
        website in Hong Kong.
            (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter, 
        WhatsApp and Google, have stopped reviewing requests for user 
        data from Hong Kong authorities.
            (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in 
        Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security 
        Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to 
        maintain their freedom to access information online; and
            (2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate 
        the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance 
        of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
                    (A) to suppress internet access;
                    (B) to increase online censorship; or
                    (C) to inhibit online communication and content-
                sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
    (c) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
            (1) Working group.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State is 
                authorized to establish a working group to develop a 
                strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online 
                access in Hong Kong.
                    (B) Membership.--The working group under 
                subparagraph (A) shall consist of--
                            (i) the Under Secretary of State for 
                        Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
                            (ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for 
                        East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
                            (iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the 
                        United States Agency for Global Media and the 
                        President of the Open Technology Fund of the 
                        Agency; and
                            (iv) the Administrator of the United States 
                        Agency for International Development.
            (2) Hong kong internet freedom programs.--
                    (A) Department of state.--The Secretary of State 
                shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in 
                the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the 
                Department of State.
                    (B) Open technology fund.--The President of the 
                Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency for 
                Global Media is authorized to establish a Hong Kong 
                Internet Freedom Program.
                    (C) Operation.--The Programs referred to in 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate independently, 
                but in strategic coordination with other entities in 
                the working group under paragraph (1). The Open 
                Technology Fund shall remain independent from 
                Department of State direction in its implementation of 
                the Program of such Fund, and any other internet 
                freedom programs.
            (3) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023, 
        the Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs described in paragraph 
        (2) shall be carried out independently from any other internet 
        freedom programs relating to the People's Republic of China 
        carried out by the Department of State or the Open Technology 
        Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media, as the case 
        may be, in order that such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs 
        may focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the 
        people of Hong Kong.
            (4) Consolidation of department of state program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may--
                    (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom 
                Program of the Department of State with any other 
                internet freedom programs relating to the People's 
                Republic of China carried out by the Bureau of 
                Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (3).
            (5) Consolidation of open technology fund program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open 
        Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global Media 
        may--
                    (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet Freedom 
                Program of the Fund with any other internet freedom 
                programs relating to the People's Republic of China 
                carried out by the Fund; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (3).
    (d) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
            (1) Grants authorized.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State, working 
                through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
                Labor, and President of the Open Technology Fund of the 
                United States Agency for Global Media, are each 
                separately and independently authorized to award grants 
                and contracts to private organizations to support and 
                develop programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand--
                            (i) an open, interoperable, reliable and 
                        secure internet; and
                            (ii) the online exercise of human rights 
                        and fundamental freedoms of individual 
                        citizens, activists, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations, and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong.
                    (B) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed 
                pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) 
                should be--
                            (i) to make the internet available in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (ii) to increase the number of the tools in 
                        the technology portfolio;
                            (iii) to promote the availability of such 
                        technologies and tools in Hong Kong;
                            (iv) to encourage the adoption of such 
                        technologies and tools by the people of Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (v) to scale up the distribution of such 
                        technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
                            (vi) to prioritize the development of 
                        tools, components, code, and technologies that 
                        are fully open-source, to the extent 
                        practicable;
                            (vii) to conduct research on repressive 
                        tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 
                        and support is available to repressed 
                        individual citizens, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong; and
                            (ix) to engage United States private 
                        industry, including e-commerce firms and social 
                        networking companies, on the importance of 
                        preserving internet access in Hong Kong.
                    (C) Grant recipients.--Grants awarded pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall be distributed to multiple 
                vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, 
                competitive, and evidence-based decision process--
                            (i) to diversify the technical base; and
                            (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad 
                        actors.
                    (D) Security audits.--New technologies developed 
                using grants awarded pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall 
                undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure such 
                technologies are secure and have not been compromised 
                in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United 
                States or to individuals or organizations benefitting 
                from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.
            (2) Funding source.--The Secretary of State is authorized 
        to expend funds made available to the Human Rights and 
        Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
        Labor of the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022 
        and 2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by any 
        entity in the working group established under subsection 
        (c)(1).
            (3) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) Open technology fund.--In addition to the funds 
                authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), 
                there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open 
                Technology Fund of the United States Agency for Global 
                Media $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 
                for grants to carry out this subsection. Such amounts 
                are in addition to any amounts authorized to be 
                appropriated for the Open Technology Fund under section 
                1299P of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
                Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).
                    (B) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--
                In addition to the funds authorized to be expended 
                pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be 
                appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs 
                of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of 
                the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal 
                years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection.
                    (C) Availability.--Amounts authorized to be 
                appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
                shall remain available until expended.
    (e) Strategic Planning Report.--Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
working group under subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a classified report that--
            (1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and 
        increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and 
        internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year 
        2022;
            (2) outlines a plan for--
                    (A) supporting the preservation of an open, 
                interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong 
                Kong;
                    (B) increasing the supply of the technology 
                referred to in paragraph (1);
                    (C) accelerating the dissemination of such 
                technology;
                    (D) promoting the availability of internet freedom 
                in Hong Kong;
                    (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 
                existing relevant portfolios for further use in the 
                unique context of Hong Kong;
                    (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to 
                diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and 
                resiliency of the circumvention efforts;
                    (G) providing training for high-risk groups and 
                individuals in Hong Kong; and
                    (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and 
                evolving censorship threats;
            (3) includes a detailed description of the technical and 
        fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred 
        to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the 
        market conditions in Hong Kong;
            (4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding 
        grants to private organizations for the purposes described in 
        subsection (d)(1)(A);
            (5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding 
        the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal 
        efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and
            (6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to 
        influence global internet legal standards at international 
        organizations and multilateral fora.
    (f) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
              IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise 
made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115-409) should include programs 
that prioritize the protection and advancement of the freedoms of 
association, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights 
activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People's Republic 
of China (PRC).
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to section 409 of 
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public Law 115-409) may be 
used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region 
that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the 
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult 
with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of 
civil society regarding--
            (1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations 
        referred to in subsection (b);
            (2) protecting members of the groups referred to in 
        subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, 
        forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or 
        intimidation, including members residing outside of the PRC; 
        and
            (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible 
        audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts 
        to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and 
        the rights of ethnic minorities.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS WITH 
              RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

    (a) Definitions.--Section 1262 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--(1) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by inserting after section 1262 the 
following new section:

``SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    ``It is the sense of Congress that the President should establish 
and regularize information sharing and sanctions-related decision 
making with like-minded governments possessing human rights and anti-
corruption sanctions programs similar in nature to those authorized 
under this subtitle.''; and
    (2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of 
division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 (Public Law 114-328) are each amended by inserting after the items 
relating to section 1262 the following:

``Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.''.
    (c) Imposition of Sanctions.--
            (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1263 of the 
        Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of 
        title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is 
        amended to read as follows:
    ``(a) In General.--The President may impose the sanctions described 
in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President 
determines, based on credible information--
            ``(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly 
        or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse or any 
        violation of internationally recognized human rights;
            ``(2) is a current or former government official, or a 
        person acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is 
        responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly 
        engaged in--
                    ``(A) corruption; or
                    ``(B) the transfer or facilitation of the transfer 
                of the proceeds of corruption;
            ``(3) is or has been a leader or official of--
                    ``(A) an entity, including a government entity, 
                that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, 
                any of the activities described in subparagraph (A) or 
                (B) related to the tenure of the leader or official; or
                    ``(B) an entity whose property and interests in 
                property are blocked pursuant to this section as a 
                result of activities related to the tenure of the 
                leader or official;
            ``(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided 
        financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or 
        services to or in support of--
                    ``(A) an activity described in subparagraph (A) or 
                (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;
                    ``(B) a person whose property and interests in 
                property are blocked pursuant to this section; or
                    ``(C) an entity, including a government entity, 
                that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, 
                an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) 
                conducted by a foreign person; or
            ``(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is purported to 
        act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person whose 
        property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this 
        section.''.
            (2) Consideration of certain information.--Subsection 
        (c)(2) of such section is amended by inserting ``corruption 
        and'' after ``monitor''.
            (3) Requests by congress.--Subsection (d) of such section 
        is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), in the matter preceding 
                subparagraph (A), by striking ``subsection (a)'' and 
                inserting ``subsection (a)(1)'';
                    (B) in paragraph (2)--
                            (i) in subparagraph (A)--
                                    (I) in the subparagraph heading, by 
                                striking ``Human rights violations'' 
                                and inserting ``Serious human rights 
                                abuse or violations of internationally 
                                recognized human rights''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``described in 
                                paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection 
                                (a)'' and inserting ``described in 
                                subsection (a)(1) relating to serious 
                                human rights abuse or any violation of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights''; and
                            (ii) in subparagraph (B)--
                                    (I) in the matter preceding clause 
                                (i), by striking ``described in 
                                paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection 
                                (a)'' and inserting ``described in 
                                subsection (a)(1) relating to 
                                corruption or the transfer or 
                                facilitation of the transfer of the 
                                proceeds of corruption''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``ranking member 
                                of'' and all that follows through the 
                                period at the end and inserting 
                                ``ranking member of one of the 
                                appropriate congressional 
                                committees.''.
    (d) Reports to Congress.--Section 1264(a) of the Global Magnitsky 
Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``;''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(7) a description of additional steps taken by the 
        President through diplomacy, international engagement, and 
        assistance to foreign or security sectors to address persistent 
        underlying causes of serious human rights abuse, violations of 
        internationally recognized human rights, and corruption in each 
        country in which foreign persons with respect to which 
        sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are located; and
            ``(8) a description of additional steps taken by the 
        President to ensure the pursuit of judicial accountability in 
        appropriate jurisdictions with respect to those foreign persons 
        subject to sanctions under section 1263 for serious human 
        rights abuse, violations of internationally recognized human 
        rights, and corruption.''.
    (e) Repeal of Sunset.--(1) Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky 
Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.
    (2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title XII of 
division A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 (Public Law 114-328) are each amended by striking the items 
relating to section 1265.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
              DISCRIMINATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and 
        discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have 
        risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations 
        Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
        continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
        scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
        ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
        the virus of hate''.
            (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make 
        up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines 
        of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all 
        essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers 
        also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent 
        based on sector--of the biomedical field.
            (3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian 
        descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States 
        population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
        growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
        represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent 
        and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in 
        the United States and around the world have no place in a 
        peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
            (2) the United States is a diverse country with a proud 
        tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the 
        United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and 
        tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and 
        Pacific Islanders;
            (3) the United States Government should encourage foreign 
        governments to use the official and scientific names for the 
        COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health 
        Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention; and
            (4) the United States Government and other governments 
        around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, 
        and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the 
        spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO 
              INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

    Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (227 U.S.C. 
2151n(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the 
        end and inserting a semicolon; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the 
        government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially 
        intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-
        censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or 
        associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in 
        such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or 
        contractors for the same, including any instance in which the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China has sought to 
        extraterritorially censor or punish speech that is otherwise 
        legal in the United States on the topics of--
                    ``(A) repression and violation of fundamental 
                freedoms in Hong Kong;
                    ``(B) repression and persecution of religious and 
                ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    ``(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance 
                technologies to surveil activists, journalists, 
                opposition politicians, or to profile persons of 
                different ethnicities; and
                    ``(D) other gross violations of human rights; and
            ``(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a company or 
        entity located in or based in a third country has censored or 
        self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors, 
        customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human 
        rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such 
        employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or 
        the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.''.

SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII 
              PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the United Nations 
        Third Committee of the General Assembly appealed for action on 
        the mass arbitrary detentions and other crimes against the 
        Uyghur Muslim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region.
            (2) The 2018 concluding observations of the United Nations 
        Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decried 
        reports of mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs.
            (3) Over 400 international nongovernmental organizations 
        have joined together to decry the mass arbitrary detentions of 
        Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            (4) The Olympic Charter states that the practice of sport 
        ``is a human right'' that ``shall be secured without 
        discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual 
        orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
        national or social origin, property, birth or other status'', a 
        right that by definition cannot be secured in a country in 
        which over 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps because of 
        their race, language, and religion.
            (5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accompanied by 
        widespread tracking, arrest, and intimidation of foreign 
        journalists and bloggers, as well as restrictions on movement 
        of journalists, contrary to explicit commitments made by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the 
        International Olympic Committee.
            (6) The Government of the PRC denied visas for some 
        journalists granted press accreditation for the 2008 Olympic 
        Games, and the Beijing Organising Committee of the Olympic 
        Games repeatedly refused to address incidents involving freedom 
        of expression.
            (7) The International Olympic Committee faced broad 
        criticism for failing to adequately anticipate infringements by 
        the Government of the PRC's on freedom of expression and press 
        for international media and 2008 Olympics participants, and 
        failing to hold the Government of the PRC to their own 
        commitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008 games.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
International Olympic Committee should--
            (1) consider that the Olympic Charter's principles of 
        solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard to reconcile with 
        holding the 2022 Winter Games in a country the government of 
        which stands credibly accused of perpetrating crimes against 
        humanity and genocide against ethnic and religious minorities;
            (2) take into account the recent precedent of the 2008 
        games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators, and international 
        media had their fundamental freedoms severely challenged, and 
        the likely limitations the Government of the PRC will seek to 
        enforce on participants speaking out about ongoing persecution 
        of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the PRC, 
        despite repeated commitments by the Government of the PRC;
            (3) emphasize that the International Olympic Committee is 
        not opposed to moving an Olympic competition in all 
        circumstances, and should immediately rebid the 2022 Winter 
        Olympic Games to be hosted by a country that recognizes and 
        respects human rights;
            (4) affirm the International Olympic Committee's--
                    (A) desire to stay above politics does not permit 
                turning a blind eye to mass atrocity crimes, which 
                cannot and should not be dismissed as mere political 
                concerns; and
                    (B) commitment to the fundamental rights 
                instruments of the international system, which are 
                beyond partisan or domestic policy, and upon which the 
                success of the entire Olympic project depends;
            (5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to be taken 
        by the International Olympic Committee upon infringement of 
        freedom of expression by a host country's government during any 
        Olympics event, including the 2022 Winter Olympics, against 
        athletes, participants, and international media; and
            (6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which restricts 
        the freedom of expression by athletes when competing during 
        Olympics events, and affirm the rights of athletes to political 
        and other speech during athletic competitions, including speech 
        that is critical of their host countries.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to implement a presidential and cabinet level 
        diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the 
        XIII Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC;
            (2) to encourage other nations, especially democratic 
        partners and allies, to do the same; and
            (3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist Party's 
        ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.

SEC. 317. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL 
              CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
use export controls to the extent necessary to further the protection 
of internationally recognized human rights.
    (b) Review of Items With Critical Capabilities to Enable Human 
Rights Abuses.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate, 
shall conduct a review of items subject to controls for crime control 
reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Administration 
Regulations.
    (c) Controls.--In furtherance of the policy set forth in subsection 
(a), not later than 60 days after completing the review required by 
subsection (b), the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other 
Federal agencies as appropriate, shall determine whether additional 
export controls are needed to protect human rights, including whether--
            (1) controls for crime control reasons pursuant to section 
        742.7 of the Export Administration Regulations should be 
        imposed on additional items, including items with critical 
        capabilities to enable human rights abuses involving--
                    (A) censorship or social control;
                    (B) surveillance, interception, or restriction of 
                communications;
                    (C) monitoring or restricting access to or use of 
                the internet;
                    (D) identification of individuals through facial or 
                voice recognition or biometric indicators; or
                    (E) DNA sequencing; or
            (2) end-use and end-user controls should be imposed on the 
        export, reexport, or in-country transfer of certain items with 
        critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses that are 
        subject to the Export Administration Regulations if the person 
        seeking to export, reexport, or transfer the item has 
        knowledge, or the Secretary determines and so informs that 
        person, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use the 
        item to enable human rights abuses.
    (d) Cooperation of Other Agencies.--Upon request from the 
Secretary, the head of a Federal agency shall provide full support and 
cooperation to the Secretary in carrying out this section.
    (e) International Coordination on Controls to Protect Human 
Rights.--It shall be the policy of the United States to seek to secure 
the cooperation of other governments to impose export controls that are 
consistent, to the extent possible, with the controls imposed under 
this section.
    (f) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1752(2)(A) of the Export Control 
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20 4811(2)(A)) is amended--
            (1) in clause (iv), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
        semicolon;
            (2) in clause (v), by striking the period and inserting ``; 
        or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(vi) serious human rights abuses.''.
    (g) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) End-user; knowledge; ultimate consignee.--The terms 
        ``end-user'', ``knowledge'', and ``ultimate consignee'' have 
        the meanings given those terms in section 772.1 of the Export 
        Administration Regulations.
            (2) Export; export administration regulations; in-country 
        transfer; item; reexport.--The terms ``export'', ``Export 
        Administration Regulations'', ``in-country transfer'', 
        ``item'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given those terms 
        in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 
        U.S.C. 4801).
            (3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of Commerce.

SEC. 318. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT CONTROL POLICY.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should reexamine 
United States commercial export control policy for any country, 
including the People's Republic of China, that is known to supply arms 
or dual use items to any country the government of which has been 
designated pursuant to any applicable provision of law as a state 
sponsor of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary of 
State as a foreign terrorist organization.

SEC. 319. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE, 
              COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 
              CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR 
              AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by 
inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
                    ``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced 
                sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                implantation policies and practices.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to the first report required by 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 
        submitted after such date of enactment.

SEC. 320. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL SPEECH.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The People's Republic of China censors political speech 
        of throughout the country through many means including through 
        mass censorship of the Internet, the Great Firewall, radical 
        curtailment of the freedom of the press.
            (2) The PRC employs several other means to stifle dissent 
        including instigating private person to target dissenting 
        individuals and private companies to target offending 
        companies.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) censorship of political speech in China is contrary to 
        the human rights of the Chinese people;
            (2) censorship of political speech, whether conducted by 
        the government, or private or quasi-private entities is 
        antithetical to United States values and interests; and
            (3) the democratic way to conduct political disputes is 
        through argument and persuasion, not force or political speech.

SEC. 321. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 
              EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND 
              PROTECTIONS.

    Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 
U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF 
              CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS 
              AND PROTECTIONS.

    ``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent 
to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to 
circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.
    ``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
            ``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National 
        Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States export 
                controls; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such controls during the reporting period.
            ``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury 
        and the Secretary of Commerce--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise 
                exported to the United States from the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such duties during the reporting period.
            ``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of 
        National Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of China 
                uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the 
                United States or pursuant to multilateral regimes; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of China used Hong Kong to circumvent 
                such sanctions during the reporting period.
            ``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an 
        assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or 
        informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals, 
        including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            ``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the 
        Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland 
        Security--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, 
                security, and law enforcement agencies of the 
                Government of China, including the Ministry of State 
                Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the 
                People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security 
                Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to 
                conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including 
                United States persons, conduct influence operations, or 
                violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of 
                Hong Kong; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents of such 
                espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil 
                liberties during the reporting period.
    ``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--
            ``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        index.
            ``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report 
        required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly 
        available internet website of the Department of State.
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
                Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
                Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways 
                and Means of the House of Representatives.
            ``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign national' means 
        a person that is neither--
                    ``(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of 
                the People's Republic of China; or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within 
                the People's Republic of China.
            ``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting period' means 
        the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required 
        by subsection (a).
            ``(4) United states person.--The term `United States 
        person' means--
                    ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an 
                entity.''.

SEC. 322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
              RIGHTS PRACTICES.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Department of State's annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices should include relevant 
information regarding whether a particular country has provided 
assistance to the PRC or any entity under the influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, including through 
the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the PRC without reasonable 
opportunity for them to be assessed and protected as refugees.

SEC. 323. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREEDOM IN THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that the People's Republic of China 
maintains one of the worst media environments in the world and seeks to 
curtail political speech inside and outside the country, including by--
            (1) targeting independent and foreign media in China 
        through systematic harassment including the denial of visas to 
        foreign journalists, imprisonment, the denial of medical care 
        to imprisoned journalists, and curtailing access to legal 
        representation;
            (2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online and social 
        media content, including through the banning of virtual private 
        networks;
            (3) using the full force of the State to stifle internal 
        dissent including dissent online, particularly dissent that 
        could lead to political change and content that criticizes 
        China's leaders, however trivial, reportedly even to the point 
        of censoring comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with Winnie the 
        Pooh;
            (4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences through the 
        United Front Work Department and related activities;
            (5) seeking to intimidate American-based journalists 
        working for Radio Free Asia and reporting on gross human rights 
        violations in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by 
        jailing or otherwise harassing members of their families; and
            (6) championing a ``sovereign Internet'' model and 
        exporting technology to enhance the ability of like-minded 
        authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent online and monitor 
        the activity of their people.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the freedom of the press is an unalienable right that 
        is necessary for citizens to hold their government to account;
            (2) the PRC should cease its repression of journalists, 
        citizen journalists, news organizations; and
            (3) the PRC should cease the censorship of political 
        satire, including comparisons of Xi Jingping's looks with 
        Winnie the Pooh.

SEC. 324. UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY FOR XINJIANG PROVINCE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish within the 
Department of State the position of United States Special Envoy for 
Xinjiang Province (in this section referred to as the ``Special 
Envoy'').
    (b) Appointment.--The Secretary may appoint an individual to the 
position of Special Envoy from among officers and employees of the 
Department of State. The Secretary may allow such officer or employee 
to retain the position (and the responsibilities associated with such 
position) held by such officer or employee prior to the appointment of 
such officer or employee to the position of Special Envoy.
    (c) Duties.--The Special Envoy shall coordinate diplomatic, 
political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, sanctions, 
counterterrorism, security resources, and congressional reporting 
requirements within the United States Government to respond to the 
gross violations of universally recognized human rights occurring in 
Xinjiang Province of the People's Republic of China, including by 
addressing--
            (1) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other predominantly 
        Muslim ethnic minorities;
            (2) the deployment of technologically advanced surveillance 
        and police detection methods; and
            (3) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism claims used 
        to justify the policies of the Chinese Government in Xinjiang 
        Province.

SEC. 325. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.

    (a) Report on Censorship and Intimidation of United States Persons 
by the Government of the People's Republic of China.--
            (1) Report.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
                State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement 
                with a qualified research entity that is independent of 
                the Department of State to write a report on censorship 
                and intimidation in the United States and its 
                possessions and territories of United States persons, 
                including United States companies that conduct business 
                in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China.
                    (B) Matters to be included.--The report required 
                under subparagraph (A) shall--
                            (i) assess major trends, patterns, and 
                        methods of the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China's efforts to direct or 
                        directly support censorship and intimidation of 
                        United States persons, including United States 
                        companies that conduct business in the People's 
                        Republic of China, which are exercising their 
                        right to freedom of speech;
                            (ii) assess, including through the use of 
                        illustrative examples, as appropriate, the 
                        impact on and consequences for United States 
                        persons, including United States companies that 
                        conduct business in the People's Republic of 
                        China, that criticize--
                                    (I) the Government of the People's 
                                Republic of China;
                                    (II) the Chinese Communist Party;
                                    (III) the authoritarian model of 
                                government of the People's Republic of 
                                China; or
                                    (IV) a particular policy advanced 
                                by the Chinese Communist Party or the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China;
                            (iii) identify the implications for the 
                        United States of the matters described in 
                        clauses (i) and (ii);
                            (iv) assess the methods and evaluate the 
                        efficacy of the efforts by the Government of 
                        the People's Republic of China to limit freedom 
                        of expression in the private sector, including 
                        with respect to media, social media, film, 
                        education, travel, financial services, sports 
                        and entertainment, technology, 
                        telecommunication, and internet infrastructure 
                        interests;
                            (v) include policy recommendations for the 
                        United States Government, including 
                        recommendations regarding collaboration with 
                        United States allies and partners, to address 
                        censorship and intimidation by the Government 
                        of the People's Republic of China; and
                            (vi) include policy recommendations for 
                        United States persons, including United States 
                        companies that conduct business in China, to 
                        address censorship and intimidation by the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China.
                    (C) Applicability to united states allies and 
                partners.--To the extent practicable, the report 
                required under subparagraph (A) should identify 
                implications and policy recommendations that are 
                relevant to United States allies and partners facing 
                censorship and intimidation directed or directly 
                supported by the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China.
            (2) Submission of report.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
                State shall submit the report written by the qualified 
                research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) 
                to the appropriate congressional committees.
                    (B) Publication.--The report referred to in 
                subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public 
                online through relevant United States Government 
                websites.
            (3) Federal government support.--The Secretary of State and 
        other Federal agencies selected by the President shall provide 
        the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph 
        (1)(A) with timely access to appropriate information, data, 
        resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to write the 
        report described in paragraph (1) in a thorough and independent 
        manner.
    (b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.--
            (1) Certification.--Upon receipt and review of the report 
        described in subsection (a), the President shall make a 
        determination on whether the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China engages in the censorship and intimidation of 
        United States persons, including United States companies that 
        conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are 
        exercising their right to freedom of speech, taking into 
        account the contents of the report and other information 
        available to the government of the United States.
            (2) In general.--If there is a determination under 
        paragraph (1) that the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China engages in the censorship and intimidation of United 
        States persons, including United States companies that conduct 
        business in the People's Republic of China, which are 
        exercising their right to freedom of speech, the President 
        shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known 
        as the ``China Censorship Monitor and Action Group'' (referred 
        to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
            (3) Membership.--If, upon receipt and review of the report 
        described in subsection (a), he deems it in the national 
        interest, the President shall--
                    (A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among 
                the staff of the National Security Council;
                    (B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from 
                among the staff of the National Economic Council; and
                    (C) direct the head of each of the following 
                executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to 
                participate in the Task Force:
                            (i) The Department of State.
                            (ii) The Department of Commerce.
                            (iii) The Department of the Treasury.
                            (iv) The Department of Justice.
                            (v) The Office of the United States Trade 
                        Representative.
                            (vi) The Office of the Director of National 
                        Intelligence, and other appropriate elements of 
                        the intelligence community (as defined in 
                        section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
                        (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
                            (vii) The Federal Communications 
                        Commission.
                            (viii) The United States Agency for Global 
                        Media.
                            (ix) Other agencies designated by the 
                        President.
            (4) Responsibilities.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) oversee the development and execution of an 
                integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and 
                address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly 
                supported, by the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States 
                or in any of its possessions or territories, any United 
                States person, including United States companies that 
                conduct business in the People's Republic of China, 
                which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; 
                and
                    (B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional 
                committees not later than 120 days after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act.
            (5) Meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not less 
        frequently than twice per year.
            (6) Consultations.--The Task Force should regularly 
        consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with--
                    (A) Federal agencies that are not represented on 
                the Task Force;
                    (B) independent agencies of the United States 
                Government that are not represented on the Task Force;
                    (C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and 
                the media; and
                    (D) relevant stakeholders among United States 
                allies and partners facing similar challenges related 
                to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China.
            (7) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) Annual report.--The Task Force shall submit an 
                annual report to the appropriate congressional 
                committees that describes, with respect to the 
                reporting period--
                            (i) the strategic objectives and policies 
                        pursued by the Task Force to address the 
                        challenges of censorship and intimidation of 
                        United States persons while in the United 
                        States or any of its possessions or 
                        territories, which is directed or directly 
                        supported by the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China;
                            (ii) the activities conducted by the Task 
                        Force in support of the strategic objectives 
                        and policies referred to in clause (i); and
                            (iii) the results of the activities 
                        referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of 
                        such activities on the national interests of 
                        the United States.
                    (B) Form of report.--Each report submitted pursuant 
                to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (C) Congressional briefings.--Not later than 90 
                days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
                annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide 
                briefings to the appropriate congressional committees 
                regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute 
                the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).
    (c) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that is five 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Qualified research entity.--The term ``qualified 
        research entity'' means an entity that--
                    (A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a 
                federally funded research and development center;
                    (B) has appropriate expertise and analytical 
                capability to write the report required under section 
                3; and
                    (C) is free from any financial, commercial, or 
                other entanglements, which could undermine the 
                independence of such report or create a conflict of 
                interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, 
                with--
                            (i) the Government of the People's Republic 
                        of China;
                            (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
                            (iii) any company incorporated in the 
                        People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of 
                        such company; or
                            (iv) any company or entity incorporated 
                        outside of the People's Republic of China that 
                        is believed to have a substantial financial or 
                        commercial interest in the People's Republic of 
                        China.
            (2) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 326. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ON BIS LICENSING INFORMATION.

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
shall make aggregate statistics on licensing information, ensuring all 
confidential business information is protected, for PRC companies on 
the Entity List contained in the Export Administration Regulations 
available to the public.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S 
              INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like 
        the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which has 
        captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in 
        many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and 
        sustained long-term focus and engagement;
            (2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects 
        of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-directed mercantilist economic 
        strategy, the United States must adopt policies that--
                    (A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual 
                property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, 
                and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign 
                markets, and the global economy;
                    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and 
                consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
                    (C) provide options for affected United States 
                persons to address and respond to unreasonable and 
                discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
                    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for secure but 
                open investment, innovation, and competition;
            (3) the United States must work with its allies and 
        partners and multilateral venues and fora--
                    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted 
                principles of fair competition and market behavior and 
                address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and 
                industrial policies that undermine decades of global 
                growth and innovation;
                    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same 
                treatment as that of a free-market economy until it 
                ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, 
                policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage 
                to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and 
                impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal 
                burdens on market-based international commerce; and
                    (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
                state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 
                such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union;
            (4) the United States and its allies and partners must 
        collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies 
        to cooperate in areas such as--
                    (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 
                property rights in markets around the world;
                    (B) fostering open technical standards; and
                    (C) increasing joint investments in overseas 
                markets; and
            (5) the United States should develop policies that--
                    (A) insulate United States entities from PRC 
                pressure against complying with United States laws;
                    (B) together with the work of allies and partners 
                and multilateral institutions, counter the potential 
                impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by 
                the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, 
                when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ``Rules on 
                Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application 
                of Foreign Legislation and other Measures''; and
                    (C) plan for future actions that the Government of 
                the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of 
                United States legal authorities, including with respect 
                to the use of sanctions.

SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

    (a) Pilot Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and implement a 
pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response 
teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a 
country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures 
(in this section referred to as a ``partner country'') and to play a 
liaison role between the legitimate government of that country and the 
United States Government. Such assistance and support may include the 
following activities:
            (1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to 
        coercive economic measures.
            (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an 
        adversary could cause to the partner country.
            (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency 
        plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of 
        such measures.
            (4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or 
        improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing 
        vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the 
        future.
            (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign 
        sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that 
        may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.
            (6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific 
        efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic 
        coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty, 
        including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that 
        undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner 
        country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a 
        manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of 
        the partner country.
            (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium 
        term economic or other assistance from the United States and 
        marshalling other resources in support of effective responses 
        to such measures.
    (b) Reports Required.--
            (1) Report on establishment.--Upon establishment of the 
        pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of 
        State shall provide the appropriate congressional committees 
        with a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot 
        program, the major elements of the program, the personnel and 
        institutions involved, and the degree to which the program 
        incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
            (2) Follow-up report.--Not later than one year after the 
        date on which the report required by paragraph (1) is 
        submitted, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate 
        congressional committees with a detailed report and briefing 
        describing the operations over the previous year of the pilot 
        program established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the 
        Secretary's assessment of its performance and suitability for 
        becoming a permanent program.
            (3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.--
            (1) Notification.--The President may activate an economic 
        defense response team for a period of 180 days under the 
        authorities of this section to assist a partner country in 
        responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive 
        threat by an adversary of the United States upon the 
        declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with 
        notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
            (2) Extension authority.--The President may activate the 
        response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of 
        a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph 
        (1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic 
        defense response team in response to the economic emergency is 
        in the national security interest of the United States.
    (d) Sunset.--The authorities provided under this section shall 
expire on December 31, 2026.
    (e) Rule of Construction.--Neither the authority to declare an 
economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of 
an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be 
construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to 
the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense 
response team as described in this section.
    (f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, 
        Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and 
        Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
        Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the 
        Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means 
        of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their 
        power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich 
        themselves at the expense of their countries' economic 
        development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to 
        solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic 
        institutions abroad.
            (2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United 
        States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds 
        terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime, 
        enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies 
        economic growth.
            (3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries 
        through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as 
        kleptocrats launder money, use shell companies, amass offshore 
        wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.
            (4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading 
        model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-
        sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from 
        within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening 
        the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.
            (5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian 
        Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of 
        political leadership, use stolen money--
                    (A) to purchase key assets in other countries, 
                often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of 
                a sector;
                    (B) to gain access to and influence the policies of 
                other countries; and
                    (C) to advance Russian interests in other 
                countries, particularly those that undermine confidence 
                and trust in democratic systems.
            (6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership 
        of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Government of the 
        PRC is used--
                    (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain PRC 
                economic entities;
                    (B) to increase other countries' economic 
                dependence on the PRC to secure greater deference to 
                the PRC's diplomatic and strategic goals; and
                    (C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments 
                and among other political elites to enable PRC state-
                backed firms to pursue predatory and exploitative 
                economic practices.
            (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other 
        kleptocratic actors requires the international community to 
        strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law. 
        International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit 
        finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering 
        reformers in foreign countries during historic political 
        openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those 
        countries.
            (8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption 
        and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance 
        provided by the Department of State's Bureau of International 
        Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States 
        Agency for International Development, and through programs like 
        the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
        Development, Assistance and Training and the International 
        Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have 
        lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United 
        States interests.
            (9) There currently exist numerous international 
        instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit 
        finance, including--
                    (A) the Inter-American Convention against 
                Corruption of the Organization of American States, done 
                at Caracas March 29, 1996;
                    (B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
                Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
                of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
                Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly 
                referred to as the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'');
                    (C) the United Nations Convention against 
                Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York 
                November 15, 2000;
                    (D) the United Nations Convention against 
                Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;
                    (E) Recommendation of the Council for Further 
                Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
                International Business Transactions, adopted November 
                26, 2009; and
                    (F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task 
                Force comprising the International Standards on 
                Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
                Terrorism and Proliferation.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
                Committee on Finance, and the Committee on the 
                Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, 
                and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance'' 
        means foreign assistance authorized under the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).
            (3) Foreign state.--The term ``foreign state'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United 
        States Code.
            (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (5) Public corruption.--The term ``public corruption'' 
        includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for 
        private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud, 
        extortion, or embezzlement.
            (6) Rule of law.--The term ``rule of law'' means the 
        principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and 
        entities, whether public or private, including the state, are 
        accountable to laws that are--
                    (A) publicly promulgated;
                    (B) equally enforced;
                    (C) independently adjudicated; and
                    (D) consistent with international human rights 
                norms and standards.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and 
        foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;
            (2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat 
        corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including 
        instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other 
        relevant international standards and best practices, as such 
        standards and practices develop; and
            (B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such 
        laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;
            (3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance 
        and combating public corruption;
            (4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to 
        identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial 
        architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell 
        companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that 
        are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial 
        systems;
            (5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate, 
        prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of 
        corruption by malign actors, including authoritarian 
        governments, particularly the Government of the Russian 
        Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China, as a tool of malign influence worldwide;
            (6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related stolen 
        assets for victims, including through the use of appropriate 
        bilateral arrangements and international agreements, such as 
        the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New 
        York October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Convention 
        against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York 
        November 15, 2000;
            (7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Global 
        Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title 
        XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 
        7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
        Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public 
        Law 116-94), to identify and take action against corrupt 
        foreign actors;
            (8) to ensure coordination between relevant Federal 
        departments and agencies with jurisdiction over the advancement 
        of good governance in foreign states; and
            (9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-
        minded states--
                    (A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption, 
                kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and
                    (B) to strengthen collective financial defense.
    (d) Anti-corruption Action Fund.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established in the United 
        States Treasury a fund, to be known as the ``Anti-Corruption 
        Action Fund'', only for the purposes of--
                    (A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to 
                prevent and fight public corruption;
                    (B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of 
                law-based governance structures, including accountable 
                civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial 
                institutions;
                    (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen 
                domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat 
                public corruption, including the adoption of best 
                practices under international law; and
                    (D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and 
                diplomacy with respect to efforts described in 
                subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
            (2) Funding.--
                    (A) Transfers.--Beginning on or after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and 
                penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against 
                a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
                1977 (Public Law 95-213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of 
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 
                78dd-1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal 
                prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred 
                prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a 
                declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other 
                resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or 
                the Attorney General shall impose an additional 
                prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such 
                person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption 
                Action Fund established under paragraph (1).
                    (B) Availability of funds.--Amounts deposited into 
                the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of 
                State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1), 
                without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent 
                appropriation.
                    (C) Limitation.--None of the amounts made available 
                to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption 
                Action Fund may be used inside the United States, 
                except for administrative costs related to overseas 
                program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).
            (3) Support.--The Anti-Corruption Action Fund--
                    (A) may support governmental and nongovernmental 
                parties in advancing the purposes described in 
                paragraph (1); and
                    (B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to 
                existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy, 
                and anti-corruption activities.
            (4) Allocation and prioritization.--In programming foreign 
        assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action 
        Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 
        General, shall prioritize projects that--
                    (A) assist countries that are undergoing historic 
                opportunities for democratic transition, combating 
                corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law; 
                and
                    (B) are important to United States national 
                interests.
            (5) Technical assistance providers.--For any technical 
        assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section, 
        the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 
        General, shall prioritize United States Government technical 
        assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office 
        of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training 
        and the International Criminal Investigative Training 
        Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.
            (6) Public diplomacy.--The Secretary of State shall 
        announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action 
        Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt 
        Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are--
                    (A) contributing to international anti-corruption 
                work; and
                    (B) reducing the pressure that United States 
                businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby 
                contributing to greater competitiveness of United 
                States companies.
            (7) Reporting.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually 
        thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that contains--
                    (A) the balance of the funding remaining in the 
                Anti-Corruption Action Fund;
                    (B) the amount of funds that have been deposited 
                into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and
                    (C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of 
                such funds.
            (8) Notification requirements.--None of the amounts made 
        available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption 
        Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for 
        obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or 
        entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
        of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than 
        15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.
    (e) Interagency Anti-corruption Task Force.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation 
        with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 
        pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government 
        effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and 
        agencies and donor organizations with a role in--
                    (A) promoting good governance in foreign states; 
                and
                    (B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to 
                combat public corruption.
            (2) Interagency anti-corruption task force.--Not later than 
        180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency 
        Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the 
        ``Task Force''), which shall be composed of representatives 
        appointed by the President from appropriate departments and 
        agencies, including the Department of State, the United States 
        Agency for International Development, the Department of 
        Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of 
        Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
        Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the 
        intelligence community.
            (3) Additional meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not 
        less frequently than twice per year.
            (4) Duties.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness 
                of existing foreign assistance programs, including 
                programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, 
                that have an impact on--
                            (i) promoting good governance in foreign 
                        states; and
                            (ii) enhancing the ability of foreign 
                        states to combat public corruption;
                    (B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the 
                whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);
                    (C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-
                government effort could be enhanced; and
                    (D) recommend specific programs for foreign states 
                that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government 
                effort.
            (5) Briefing requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than 
        annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the 
        Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task 
        Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a 
        representative of each of the departments and agencies 
        described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.
    (f) Designation of Embassy Anti-corruption Points of Contact.--
            (1) Embassy anti-corruption point of contact.--The chief of 
        mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-
        corruption point of contact for each such embassy.
            (2) Duties.--The designated anti-corruption points of 
        contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from 
                the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 
                pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach 
                within United States embassies to combat public 
                corruption in the foreign states in which such 
                embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of 
                such foreign states, including all relevant Federal 
                departments and agencies with a presence in such 
                foreign states, such as the Department of State, the 
                United States Agency for International Development, the 
                Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, 
                the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
                Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the 
                intelligence community;
                    (B) make recommendations regarding the use of the 
                Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign 
                assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts 
                in their respective countries of responsibility that 
                aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and
                    (C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried 
                out within their respective countries of responsibility 
                are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of 
                State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force, 
                including United States embassy strategic planning 
                documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as 
                appropriate.
            (3) Training.--The Secretary of State shall develop and 
        implement appropriate training for the designated anti-
        corruption points of contact.
    (g) Reporting Requirements.--
            (1) Report or briefing on progress toward implementation.--
        Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
        submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that summarizes progress made in 
        combating public corruption and in implementing this Act, 
        including--
                    (A) identifying opportunities and priorities for 
                outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and 
                implementation of relevant international law and 
                standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy, 
                and illicit finance;
                    (B) describing--
                            (i) the bureaucratic structure of the 
                        offices within the Department of State and the 
                        United States Agency for International 
                        Development that are engaged in activities to 
                        combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and 
                        illicit finance; and
                            (ii) how such offices coordinate their 
                        efforts with each other and with other relevant 
                        Federal departments and agencies;
                    (C) providing a description of how the provisions 
                under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have 
                been applied to each project funded by the Anti-
                Corruption Action Fund;
                    (D) providing an explanation as to why a United 
                States Government technical assistance provider was not 
                used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental 
                entity is not implemented by a United States Government 
                technical assistance provider;
                    (E) describing the activities of the Interagency 
                Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to 
                subsection (e)(2);
                    (F) identifying--
                            (i) the designated anti-corruption points 
                        of contact for foreign states; and
                            (ii) any training provided to such points 
                        of contact; and
                    (G) recommending additional measures that would 
                enhance the ability of the United States Government to 
                combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit 
                finance overseas.
            (2) Online platform.--The Secretary of State, in 
        conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development, should consolidate existing 
        reports with anti-corruption components into a single online, 
        public platform that includes--
                    (A) the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights 
                Practices required under section 116 of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n);
                    (B) the Fiscal Transparency Report required under 
                section 7031(b) of the Department of State, Foreign 
                Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
                2019 (division F of Public Law 116-6);
                    (C) the Investment Climate Statement reports;
                    (D) the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
                Report;
                    (E) any other relevant public reports; and
                    (F) links to third-party indicators and compliance 
                mechanisms used by the United States Government to 
                inform policy and programming, as appropriate, such 
                as--
                            (i) the International Finance Corporation's 
                        Doing Business surveys;
                            (ii) the International Budget Partnership's 
                        Open Budget Index; and
                            (iii) multilateral peer review anti-
                        corruption compliance mechanisms, such as--
                                    (I) the Organisation for Economic 
                                Co-operation and Development's Working 
                                Group on Bribery in International 
                                Business Transactions;
                                    (II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for 
                                the Inter-American Convention Against 
                                Corruption; and
                                    (III) the United Nations Convention 
                                Against Corruption, done at New York 
                                October 31, 2003.

SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE COMPANIES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 2040, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to 
persons in China that the Secretary determines--
            (1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise provided, 
        directly or indirectly, items or services related to targeted 
        digital surveillance to--
                    (A) a foreign government or entity located 
                primarily inside a foreign country where a reasonable 
                person would assess that such transfer could result in 
                a use of the items or services in a manner contrary to 
                human rights; or
                    (B) a country or any governmental unit thereof, 
                entity, or other person determined by the Secretary of 
                State, in a notice published in the Federal Register, 
                to have used items or services for targeted digital 
                surveillance in a manner contrary to human rights; or
            (2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided 
        financial, material, or technological support for, or items or 
        services to or in support of, the activities described in 
        paragraph (1).
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--The report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) The name of each foreign person that the Secretary 
        determines--
                    (A) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(1); 
                and
                    (B) meets the requirements of subsection (a)(2).
            (2) The name of each intended and actual recipient of items 
        or services described in subsection (a).
            (3) A detailed description of such items or services.
            (4) An analysis of the appropriateness of including the 
        persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list maintained by the 
        Bureau of Industry and Security.
    (c) Consultation.--In compiling data and making assessments for the 
purposes of preparing the report required by subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State shall consult with a wide range of organizations, 
including with respect to--
            (1) classified and unclassified information provided by the 
        Director of National Intelligence;
            (2) information provided by the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
        Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom, Business and Human Rights 
        section;
            (3) information provided by the Department of Commerce, 
        including the Bureau of Industry and Security;
            (4) information provided by the advisory committees 
        established by the Secretary to advise the Under Secretary of 
        Commerce for Industry and Security on controls under the Export 
        Administration Regulations, including the Emerging Technology 
        and Research Advisory Committee;
            (5) information on human rights and technology matters, as 
        solicited from civil society and human rights organizations 
        through regular consultative processes; and
            (6) information contained in the Country Reports on Human 
        Rights Practices published annually by the Department of State.
    (d) Form and Public Availability of Report.--The report required by 
subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form. The report 
shall be posted by the President not later than 14 days after being 
submitted to Congress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly 
available internet website.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Targeted digital surveillance.--The term ``targeted 
        digital surveillance'' means the use of items or services that 
        enable an individual or entity to detect, monitor, intercept, 
        collect, exploit, preserve, protect, transmit, retain, or 
        otherwise gain access to the communications, protected 
        information, work product, browsing data, research, identifying 
        information, location history, or online and offline activities 
        of other individuals, organizations, or entities, with or 
        without the explicit authorization of such individuals, 
        organizations, or entities.
            (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an 
        individual or entity that is not a United States person.
            (3) In a manner contrary to human rights.--The term ``in a 
        manner contrary to human rights'', with respect to targeted 
        digital surveillance, means engaging in targeted digital 
        surveillance--
                    (A) in violation of basic human rights, including 
                to silence dissent, sanction criticism, punish 
                independent reporting (and sources for that reporting), 
                manipulate or interfere with democratic or electoral 
                processes, persecute minorities or vulnerable groups, 
                or target advocates or practitioners of human rights 
                and democratic rights (including activists, 
                journalists, artists, minority communities, or 
                opposition politicians); or
                    (B) in a country in which there is lacking a 
                minimum legal framework governing its use, including 
                established--
                            (i) authorization under laws that are 
                        accessible, precise, and available to the 
                        public;
                            (ii) constraints limiting its use under 
                        principles of necessity, proportionality, and 
                        legitimacy;
                            (iii) oversight by bodies independent of 
                        the government's executive agencies;
                            (iv) involvement of an independent and 
                        impartial judiciary branch in authorizing its 
                        use; or
                            (v) legal remedies in case of abuse.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies 
        and partners, arms control negotiations and sustained and 
        regular engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC)--
                    (A) to enhance understanding of each other's 
                respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;
                    (B) to improve transparency; and
                    (C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and 
                misperception;
            (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the 
        PRC on relevant issues that lays the groundwork for a 
        constructive arms control framework, including--
                    (A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to 
                the convening of strategic security talks;
                    (B) negotiating norms for outer space;
                    (C) developing pre-launch notification regimes 
                aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
                    (D) expanding lines of communication between both 
                governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of 
                conventional war and increasing transparency;
            (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with 
        United States allies and partners to ensure the security of 
        United States and allied interests to slow the PRC's military 
        modernization and expansion, including on--
                    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
                    (B) integrated air and missile defense;
                    (C) hypersonic missiles;
                    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
                    (E) space-based capabilities;
                    (F) cyber capabilities; and
                    (G) command, control, and communications; and
            (4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to 
        reassure United States allies and partners.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the interest of the United States and China to 
        cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear 
        escalation;
            (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other People's 
        Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United States early warning 
        satellites, other portions of the nuclear command and control 
        enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a high risk to 
        inadvertent but rapid escalation;
            (3) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        promote international norms on military operations in space, 
        the employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and
            (4) United States allies and partners should share the 
        burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the 
        weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe behavior that 
        violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and 
        proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in 
        space and all other domains.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 
              ISSUES.

    (a) Report on the Future of United States-PRC Arms Control.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that 
outlines the approaches and strategies such Secretaries will pursue to 
engage the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on arms 
control and risk reduction, including--
            (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of 
        the United States and the PRC, including on ballistic, 
        hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, 
        nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other new 
        strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, 
        limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a 
        destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) how the United States Government can engage the 
        Government of the PRC in a constructive arms control dialogue;
            (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the PRC 
        that the United States Government is most concerned about and 
        how limiting these capabilities may benefit United States and 
        allied security interests;
            (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, 
        conventional, and unconventional military escalation between 
        the United States and the PRC;
            (5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively 
        engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms control 
        dialogues; and
            (6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency 
        from the PRC.
    (b) Report on Arms Control Talks With PRC.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
describes--
            (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the PRC;
            (2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, 
        what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for 
        ensuring the security of the United States and its allies 
        through international arms control negotiations;
            (3) effects on the credibility of United States extended 
        deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control 
        negotiations do not materialize and the implications for 
        regional security architectures;
            (4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms control talks, 
        whether on a bilateral or international basis; and
            (5) the interest level of the Government of PRC in joining 
        arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or international 
        basis, including through--
                    (A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials 
                from the PRC, and to each of the permanent members of 
                the United Nations Security Council, to observe a 
                United States-Russian Federation New START Treaty on-
                site inspection to demonstrate the security benefits of 
                transparency into strategic nuclear forces;
                    (B) discussions on how to advance international 
                negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;
                    (C) an agreement with the PRC that allows for 
                advance notifications of ballistic missile launches, 
                through the Hague Code of Conduct or other data 
                exchanges or doctrine discussions related to strategic 
                nuclear forces;
                    (D) an agreement not to target or interfere in 
                nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
                referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
                    (E) any other cooperative measure that benefits 
                United States-PRC strategic stability.
    (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
        Resources of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF 
              BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE 
              EAST.

    (a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a written determination, and any documentation 
to support that determination detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in the People's Republic of 
        China (PRC) knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in 
        trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex 
        to any foreign person in the previous three fiscal years; and
            (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to 
        impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who 
        knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that 
        item or items.
    (b) PRC's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in the PRC engaged in 
        cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three 
        fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel 
        cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency and would be subject to 
        complementary access if an Additional Protocol was in force; 
        and
            (2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to 
        any future effort by the PRC to export to any foreign person an 
        item classified as ``plants for the separation of isotopes of 
        uranium'' or ``plants for the reprocessing of irradiated 
        nuclear reactor fuel elements'' under Part 110 of the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
    (c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection 
(b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified 
with a classified annex.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
        and ``person'' mean--
                    (A) a natural person that is an alien;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is 
                organized under the laws of a foreign country or has 
                its principal place of business in a foreign country;
                    (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a 
                business enterprise; and
                    (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any 
                entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

              TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT 
              FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published 
        by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8, 
        2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first 
        published by the United States Global Change Research Program 
        in 2018, concluded that--
                    (A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most 
                notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the 
                degradation of natural resources that absorb 
                atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the 
                dominant causes of climate change during the past 
                century;
                    (B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
                            (i) causing sea levels to rise;
                            (ii) increasing the global average 
                        temperature of the Earth;
                            (iii) increasing the incidence and severity 
                        of wildfires; and
                            (iv) intensifying the severity of extreme 
                        weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, 
                        typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other 
                        disasters that threaten human life, healthy 
                        communities, and critical infrastructure.
            (2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2 
        degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would 
        cause--
                    (A) the displacement, and the forced internal 
                migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin 
                America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if 
                insufficient action is taken (according to the World 
                Bank);
                    (B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 
                people worldwide by floods every year (according to the 
                Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the 
                exacerbating effects of climate change;
                    (C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual 
                economic output in the United States (a 10 percent 
                contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the 
                Fourth National Climate Assessment);
                    (D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to 
                be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World 
                Bank);
                    (E) greater food insecurity and decreased 
                agricultural production due to climate change's effects 
                on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme 
                weather events;
                    (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and 
                crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading 
                ecosystems, and water scarcity; and
                    (G) more than 350,000,000 additional people 
                worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
            (3) According to the International Energy Agency, the 
        United States, China, India, and the European Union (including 
        the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global 
        greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world's top 
        greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the 
        United States' core interest in climate stability--
                    (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions 
                mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in 
                its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to 
                ``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
                    (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated 
                on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon 
                neutrality by 2060;
                    (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to 
                strictly control coal fired power generation projects, 
                as well as strictly limit the increase in coal 
                consumption over the 14th five year plan period and 
                phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and
                    (D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally 
                recognized metrics for achieving these goals.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must 
        leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and 
        foreign assistance to promote our national security and 
        economic interests related to climate change;
            (2) in the absence of United States leadership on global 
        issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it 
        would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the Nation's 
        global competitiveness;
            (3) promoting international instruments on climate action 
        and other relevant international standards and best practices, 
        as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of 
        the American people and protect United States environmental 
        resources and the planet;
            (4) promoting the adoption and implementation of 
        international climate-related agreements, standards, and 
        practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for 
        United States businesses and other stakeholders;
            (5) working with international allies and partners to 
        promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the 
        American people's interests;
            (6) finding common ground with the People's Republic of 
        China (PRC) on climate action where possible is important, but 
        the United States must also continue to hold the PRC 
        accountable where its actions undermine the interests of the 
        United States and its allies and partners;
            (7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United 
        States should--
                    (A) explore opportunities for constructive 
                cooperation on climate action initiatives with the PRC 
                and other countries while ensuring the United States 
                maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related 
                fields of expertise and industry, including--
                            (i) support for international cooperative 
                        policies, measures, and technologies to 
                        decarbonize industry and power, including 
                        through circular economy, energy storage and 
                        grid reliability, carbon capture, and green 
                        hydrogen; and
                            (ii) increased deployment of clean energy, 
                        including renewable and advanced nuclear power; 
                        green and climate resilient agriculture; energy 
                        efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon 
                        transportation;
                    (B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane 
                and other non-CO<INF>2</INF> greenhouse gases;
                    (C) cooperate on addressing emissions from 
                international civil aviation and maritime activities;
                    (D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;
                    (E) implement the Paris Agreement that 
                significantly advances global climate ambition on 
                mitigation, adaptation, and support;
                    (F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and 
                local departments and agencies on climate action 
                related initiatives;
                    (G) provide resources, authorities and support for 
                enhancing United States ambition and commitment to 
                solving the climate crisis including climate action 
                specific assistance and multilateral fund 
                contributions; and
                    (H) integrate considerations for climate change 
                into broader United States foreign policy decision-
                making and the United States national security 
                apparatus.
    (c) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide 
authorities, resources, policies, and recommended administrative 
actions--
            (1) to restore United States global leadership on 
        addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate 
        action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United 
        States foreign policy;
            (2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more 
        ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas 
        emission and improve developing countries' resilience and 
        adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
            (3) to ensure the United States maintains competitive 
        advantage over global strategic competitors in diplomacy and 
        new technological development;
            (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation 
        agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance 
        global clean energy innovation and other measures to mitigate 
        global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change 
        adaptation capacities;
            (5) to ensure that the United States national security 
        apparatus integrates critically important data on the 
        compounding effects that climate change is having on global 
        security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where, 
        and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions 
        in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other 
        drivers of insecurity; and
            (6) to authorize funding and programs to support a 
        reaffirmation of the United States' commitments to 
        international cooperation and support for developing and 
        vulnerable countries to take climate action.
    (d) Definitions.--In this title:
            (1) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
                    (A) renewable energy and related systems;
                    (B) energy production processes that emit zero 
                greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
                    (C) systems and processes that capture and 
                permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil 
                fuel production and electricity generation units; and
                    (D) products, processes, facilities, or systems 
                designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency 
                and electricity generated from electrical generation 
                units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power 
                production resources, or less feedstocks.
            (2) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means 
        enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
        strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced 
        impacts, including--
                    (A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
                    (B) integrating climate change measures into 
                national policies, strategies and planning; and
                    (C) improving education, awareness-raising, and 
                human and institutional capacity with respect to 
                climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact 
                reduction, and early warning.
            (3) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the 
        social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on 
        people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem 
        health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects 
        on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result 
        of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic 
        activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce 
        natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric 
        carbon.
            (4) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy'' 
        means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of 
        foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, 
        cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues 
        related to addressing global climate change, including--
                    (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas 
                emissions;
                    (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific 
                data and information on the cause and effects of 
                climate change;
                    (C) the security, social, economic, and political 
                instability risks associated with the effects of 
                climate change;
                    (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters 
                that are related to or associated with climate change 
                and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
                    (E) building resilience capacities and adapting to 
                the effects of change;
                    (F) sustainable land use and natural resource 
                conservation;
                    (G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to 
                the effects of climate change;
                    (H) just transition of carbon intense economies to 
                low or zero carbon economies and accounting for 
                laborers within affected economies;
                    (I) technological innovations that reduce or 
                eliminate carbon emissions; and
                    (J) clean energy and energy systems.
            (5) Climate financing.--The term ``climate financing'' 
        means the transfer of new and additional public funds from 
        developed countries to developing countries for projects and 
        programs that--
                    (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;
                    (B) enhance and restore natural carbon 
                sequestration; and
                    (C) promote adaptation to climate change.
            (6) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means 
        the effects of climate change on--
                    (A) United States national security concerns and 
                subnational, national, and regional political 
                stability; and
                    (B) overseas security and conflict situations that 
                are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental 
                factors and events, including--
                            (i) the intensification and frequency of 
                        droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, 
                        and other extreme weather events;
                            (ii) changes in historical severe weather, 
                        drought, and wildfire patterns;
                            (iii) the expansion of geographical ranges 
                        of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions 
                        that had not regularly experienced such 
                        phenomena;
                            (iv) global sea level rise patterns and the 
                        expansion of geographical ranges affected by 
                        drought; and
                            (v) changes in marine environments that 
                        effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as 
                        the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the 
                        South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the 
                        Beaufort Sea.
            (7) Green climate fund.--The term ``Green Climate Fund'' 
        means the independent, multilateral fund--
                    (A) established by parties to the United Nations 
                Framework Convention on Climate Change; and
                    (B) adopted by decision as part of the financial 
                mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
                Climate Change.
            (8) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means 
        the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of 
        Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
        Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.
            (9) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability 
        of human made and natural systems (including their component 
        parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover 
        from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient 
        manner, including through ensuring the preservation, 
        restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures 
        and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE 
              DISRUPTIONS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall conduct biennial 
comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions to the 
global climate system, including--
            (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural 
        disasters;
            (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including 
        fresh water;
            (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
            (4) conditions that contribute to--
                    (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
                    (B) foreign political and economic instability;
                    (C) international migration of vulnerable and 
                underserved populations;
                    (D) the failure of national governments; and
                    (E) gender-based violence; and
            (5) United States and allied military readiness, 
        operations, and strategy.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted under 
subsection (a) are--
            (1) to support the practical application of scientific data 
        and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the 
        world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and 
        stability despite growing global environmental risks and 
        changes;
            (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission 
        execution of United States international development and 
        diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and 
        dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of 
        climate change;
            (3) to improve coordination between United States science 
        agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and 
        effects of climate change and United States national security 
        agencies;
            (4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of 
        global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous 
        communities, and other historically marginalized populations; 
        and
            (5) to inform the development of the climate security 
        strategy described in subsection (d).
    (c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks 
        associated with global, regional, and localized effects of 
        climate change; and
            (2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures 
        to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with 
        effects, including--
                    (A) sea level rise;
                    (B) freshwater resource scarcity;
                    (C) wildfires; and
                    (D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme 
                weather conditions and events, such as flooding, 
                drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical 
                cyclones.
    (d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the 
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
            (1) to inform the development and implementation of a 
        climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and 
        Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military 
        Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other 
        offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, 
        including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention 
        and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, 
        prevention, and assistance; and
            (2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, 
        budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and 
        actions--
                    (A) to account for the impacts of climate change to 
                global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food 
                production, fresh water and other critical natural 
                resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized 
                groups, and economic activity;
                    (B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, 
                security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United 
                States interests and non-defense assets abroad;
                    (C) to coordinate the integration of climate change 
                risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign 
                policy and security decision-making processes, 
                including awarding foreign assistance;
                    (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions 
                and countries that are--
                            (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate 
                        change; and
                            (ii) strategically significant to the 
                        United States;
                    (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign 
                countries to the effects of climate change as a means 
                of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
                    (F) to advance principles of good governance by 
                encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations 
                that are least capable of coping with the effects of 
                climate change--
                            (i) to conduct climate security 
                        evaluations; and
                            (ii) to facilitate the development of 
                        climate security action plans to ensure 
                        stability and public safety in disaster 
                        situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
                    (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 
                susceptibility, and resiliency of United States 
                interests and nondefense assets abroad;
                    (H) to build international institutional capacity 
                to address climate security implications and to advance 
                United States interests, regional stability, and global 
                security; and
                    (I) other activities that advance--
                            (i) the utilization and integration of 
                        climate science in national security planning; 
                        and
                            (ii) the clear understanding of how the 
                        effects of climate change can exacerbate 
                        security risks and threats.
    (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following 
20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives an unclassified report, 
with a classified annex if necessary, that includes--
            (1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in 
        support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as--
                    (A) an assessment of the funding expended by 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, 
                procedural, and resource constraints faced by the 
                Department of State and the United States Agency for 
                International Development throughout respective 
                budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to 
                support the prevention of and response to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (B) current annual global assessments of emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (C) recommendations to further strengthen United 
                States capabilities described in this section; and
                    (D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and 
                policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and 
                nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and 
                partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
            (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
                    (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 
                preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change; and
                    (B) strengthening regional organizations; and
            (3) the implementation status of the recommendations 
        included in the review under paragraph (1).
    (f) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director 
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in the Director's 
annual (or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, 
accompanied by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats 
to United States national security--
            (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging 
        events exacerbated by climate change; and
            (2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries 
        and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by 
        climate change.

SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas 
        emissions and changes to the environment require global 
        cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding 
        other countries such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        accountable for their actions and commitments to ensure a level 
        playing field with the United States and its allies and 
        partners;
            (2) other countries look toward the United States and the 
        PRC, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies, for 
        leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas 
        emissions, develop and deploy energy generation technologies, 
        and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the 
        inevitable effects of climate change;
            (3) given the volume of the PRC's greenhouse gas emissions 
        and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global 
        greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050, 
        China should--
                    (A) revise its long-term pledge;
                    (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
                    (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
                significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050 
                reductions target; and
                    (D) update its nationally determined contribution 
                along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more 
                ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;
            (4) it is in the United States national interest to 
        emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral 
        engagement with the PRC, as global climate risks cannot be 
        mitigated without a significant reduction in PRC domestic and 
        overseas emissions;
            (5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent 
        practicable, should coordinate on making and delivering 
        ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with 
        aspirations towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions 
        by 2050;
            (6) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        work together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold the 
        PRC accountable for any failure by the PRC--
                    (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally 
                determined contribution, in line with net zero 
                greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th 
                Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for 
                November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally 
                determined contribution;
                    (B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles, 
                goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;
                    (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or 
                devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying 
                framework, particularly within areas of accountability 
                transparency, and shared responsibility among all 
                parties;
                    (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects 
                from the PRC's Belt and Road Initiative and other 
                overseas investments, including--
                            (i) working with United States allies and 
                        partners to eliminate support for coal power 
                        production projects in the Belt and Road 
                        Initiative;
                            (ii) providing financing and project 
                        support for cleaner and less risky 
                        alternatives; and
                            (iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives'' 
                        to enhance capacity building programs and 
                        overseas sustainable investment criteria, 
                        including in areas such as integrated energy 
                        planning, power sector reform, just transition, 
                        distributed generation, procurement, 
                        transparency, and standards to support low-
                        emissions growth in developing countries; and
                    (E) to phase out existing coal power plants and 
                reduce net coal power production;
            (7) the United States should pursue confidence-building 
        opportunities for the United States and the PRC to undertake 
        ``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research, development, 
        finance, and deployment, including through economic and 
        stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and 
        policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, 
        nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation, 
        which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a 
        global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;
            (8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives 
        to reduce global deforestation, including efforts to shift 
        toward the import and consummation of forest and agricultural 
        commodities that are produced in a manner that does not 
        contribute to deforestation; and
            (9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific 
        cooperative exchanges and research that align with United 
        States interests and those of its international partners and 
        allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual 
        property rights, and preserve the values and human rights 
        interests of the American people.

SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner 
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing 
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to 
support investments in developing countries that--
            (1) support low carbon economic development; and
            (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental 
        changes and natural disasters.
    (b) Partnership Agreement.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek 
to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and 
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available 
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include 
clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects, 
environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.
    (c) Co-financing of Infrastructure Projects.--
            (1) Authorization.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary 
        of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development, and the heads of other relevant 
        Federal agencies are authorized to co-finance infrastructure, 
        resilience, and environmental adaptation projects that advance 
        the development objectives of the United States overseas and 
        provide viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise be 
        included within the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road 
        Initiative.
            (2) Conditions.--Co-financing arrangements authorized 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless--
                    (A) the projects to be financed--
                            (i) promote the public good;
                            (ii) promote United States national 
                        security or economic interests;
                            (iii) promote low carbon emissions, 
                        including clean energy renewable and nuclear 
                        energy projects; and
                            (iv) will have substantially lower 
                        environmental impact than the proposed Belt and 
                        Road Initiative alternative; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 
                days in advance of entering into such co-financing 
                arrangements.

SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
              ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

    (a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State shall 
prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States 
foreign policy by--
            (1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency 
        coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address 
        the climate crisis; and
            (2) improving coordination and integration of climate 
        action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
    (b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State shall--
            (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the 
        bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary 
        for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
            (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating 
        with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the 
        integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-
        cutting imperative across the Department of State;
            (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
                    (A) to assess how issues related to climate change 
                and United States climate action are integrated into 
                their operations and programs;
                    (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and 
                diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
                    (C) to make available the technical assistance and 
                resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant 
                expertise to provide technical assistance and expert 
                support to other bureaus within the Department of State 
                regarding climate action, clean energy development, and 
                climate diplomacy;
            (4) manage the integration of scientific data on the 
        current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied 
        strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and 
        regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the 
        Department of State's decision making processes;
            (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide 
        appropriate technical support and resources--
                    (A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and 
                their respective designees charged with addressing 
                climate change and associated issues;
                    (B) to United States diplomats advancing United 
                States foreign policy related to climate action; and
                    (C) for the appropriate engagement and integration 
                of relevant domestic agencies in international climate 
                change affairs, including United States participation 
                in multilateral fora; and
            (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the 
        Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related 
        foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas 
        mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global 
        climate security.
    (c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall 
ensure that all foreign missions are--
            (1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
            (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral 
        climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
            (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating 
        adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of 
        State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that--
            (1) assesses how climate action and United States climate 
        diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of 
        State; and
            (2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross 
        bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate 
        action and climate diplomacy.
    (e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions of Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and 
the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or 
undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries 
under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of 
State, as appropriate.
    (f) Climate Change Officers.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish and 
        staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall 
        serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission 
        or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
        Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The 
        Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic 
        mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to 
        paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff 
        to support such Officers.
            (2) Assignment.--Climate Change Officers shall be assigned 
        to the following posts:
                    (A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate, 
                consulates.
                    (B) United States diplomatic missions to, or 
                liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations, 
                including the United States diplomatic missions to the 
                European Union, African Union, Organization of American 
                States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate 
                regional organization, and the United Nations and its 
                relevant specialized agencies.
                    (C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.
            (3) Responsibilities.--Each Climate Change Officer shall--
                    (A) provide expertise on effective approaches to--
                            (i) mitigate the emission of gases which 
                        contribute to global climate change and 
                        formulate national and global plans for 
                        reducing such gross and net emissions; and
                            (ii) reduce the detrimental impacts 
                        attributable to global climate change, and 
                        adapt to such impacts;
                    (B) engage and convene, in a manner that is 
                equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and 
                organizations which represent a government office, a 
                nongovernmental organization, a social or political 
                movement, a private sector entity, an educational or 
                scientific institution, or any other entity concerned 
                with--
                            (i) global climate change; the emission of 
                        gases which contribute to global climate 
                        change; or
                            (ii) reducing the detrimental impacts 
                        attributable to global climate change;
                    (C) facilitate engagement by United States entities 
                in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate 
                change; and
                    (D) carry out such other responsibilities as the 
                Secretary may assign.
            (4) Responsibilities of under secretary.--The Under 
        Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of 
        the Department of State shall, including by acting through the 
        Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
        Affairs of the Department of State--
                    (A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change 
                Officers established under this subsection;
                    (B) develop relations with, consult with, and 
                provide assistance to relevant individuals and 
                organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and 
                adapting to global climate change, or reducing the 
                emission of gases which contribute to global climate 
                change; and
                    (C) assist officers and employees of regional 
                bureaus of the Department of State to develop 
                strategies and programs to promote studying, 
                mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or 
                reducing the emission of gases which contribute to 
                global climate change.
    (g) Actions by Chiefs of Mission.--Each chief of mission in a 
foreign country shall--
            (1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or 
        equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote 
        actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and 
        adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of 
        gases which contribute to global climate change by--
                    (A) consulting and coordinating with and providing 
                support to relevant individuals and organizations, 
                including experts and other professionals and 
                stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and
                    (B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant 
                individuals and organizations relating to such 
                strategy; and
            (2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders 
        of such country regarding progress to improve and increase 
        studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or 
        reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global 
        climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and 
        just in such country; and
            (3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the 
        maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate 
        change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the 
        environment were incorporated in activities, management, and 
        operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic 
        post under the director of the chief of mission.
    (h) Training.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish 
curriculum at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that 
supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in 
order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training 
with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 
change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global 
climate change. Such training shall include the following:
            (1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational 
        agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and 
        programs involved in the international commitments of the 
        United States regarding global climate change and the emission 
        of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science 
        of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and 
        adapting to global climate change.
            (2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to 
        global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which 
        contribute to global climate change that are equitable, 
        inclusive, and just.
            (3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral 
        agencies, international financial institutions, and the network 
        of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global 
        climate change.
            (4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and 
        methods of the entities specified in subsection (f)(3)(B).
    (i) Contracting.--Contracting and agreements officers of the 
Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel 
responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive 
training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for 
considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating 
impacts from climate change.
    (j) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the 
role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which they have 
been assigned, and the strategies developed by the chief of mission, as 
applicable.
    (k) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of State 
shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies toward contributing 
technical cooperation, engagement, development finance, or foreign 
assistance relevant to United States international climate action and 
in support of United States climate diplomacy.
    (l) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that climate 
diplomacy tools as described in this section are critical for 
demonstrating the commitment to include climate changes issues as core 
tenets of foreign policy priorities, as well as preserving the United 
States' role as a global leader on climate change action.

SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE STRATEGY.

    (a) Amendment.--Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance to 
programs and initiatives that--
            ``(i) promote resilience among communities facing harmful 
        impacts from climate change; and
            ``(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected by 
        climate change.
    ``(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Coordinator of 
Climate Change Resilience.''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year 
strategy, which shall be referred to as the `Global Climate Change 
Resilience Strategy', to mitigate the impacts of climate change on 
displacement and humanitarian emergencies.
    ``(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall--
            ``(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset 
        effects of events caused by climate change, consider the 
        effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the 
        key features of successful strategies to prevent such 
        conditions;
            ``(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral 
        approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;
            ``(C) promote United States national security and economic 
        interests while leading international climate-related 
        policymaking efforts, on which the absence of United States 
        leadership would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in 
        the nation's global competitiveness;
            ``(D) promote international instruments on climate action 
        and other relevant international standards and best practices, 
        as such standards and practices develop, that serve the 
        interests of the American people and protect United States 
        environmental resources and the planet;
            ``(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such 
        international climate-related agreements, standards, and 
        practices by foreign states;
            ``(F) work with United States allies and partners to ensure 
        a level playing field exists when it comes to climate action 
        and to encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar 
        or even greater commitments than the United States;
            ``(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership, 
        as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society, 
        local partners, and the affected communities, including 
        marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the 
        design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change 
        programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to 
        displacement;
            ``(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid 
        duplication of efforts, while ensuring that--
                    ``(i) the Department of State is responsible for--
                            ``(I) leading the Global Climate Change 
                        Resilience Strategy;
                            ``(II) establishing United States foreign 
                        policy;
                            ``(III) advancing diplomatic and political 
                        efforts; and
                            ``(IV) guiding security assistance and 
                        related civilian security efforts to mitigate 
                        climate change threats;
                    ``(ii) the United States Agency for International 
                Development is--
                            ``(I) responsible for overseeing programs 
                        to prevent the effects of events caused by 
                        climate change;
                            ``(II) the lead implementing agency for 
                        development and related nonsecurity program 
                        policy related to building resilience and 
                        achieving recovery; and
                            ``(III) responsible for providing overseas 
                        humanitarian assistance to respond to 
                        international and internal displacement caused 
                        by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit 
                        of durable solutions for climate-displaced 
                        persons; and
                    ``(iii) other Federal agencies support the 
                activities of the Department of State and the United 
                States Agency for International Development, as 
                appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
                State and the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development;
            ``(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to 
        achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of 
        existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;
            ``(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between 
        the United States, foreign governments, and international 
        organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, 
        regional organizations, and private sector organizations;
            ``(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships 
        and leverage private sector resources;
            ``(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for 
        monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the 
        Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;
            ``(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience 
        Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-
        specific;
            ``(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social 
        conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental 
        stressors from evolving into national security risks;
            ``(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the 
        Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
        Review; and
            ``(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable, 
        for international climate resilience in support of this Global 
        Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
    ``(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a 
report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in 
part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that 
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, 
if necessary.
    ``(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global 
Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal 
Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience 
Strategy.
    ``(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of 
the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the 
Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into 
department and agency policies, including the resources that have been 
allocated for such purpose.
    ``(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess--
            ``(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the 
        United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
        are--
                    ``(I) developing climate change risk assessments; 
                and
                    ``(II) providing guidance to missions on how to 
                include climate change risks in their integrated 
                country strategies;
            ``(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have 
        sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in 
        paragraph (2); and
            ``(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and 
        USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such 
        requirements.''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global 
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, 
              ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United 
        Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New 
        York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
            (2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term 
        ``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means 
        communities and populations that are at risk of substantial 
        adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to 
        respond to such effects, including women, impoverished 
        communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal 
        workers.
            (3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most 
        vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development, developing countries that are at risk of 
        substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited 
        capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches 
        included in any international treaties and agreements.
            (4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International 
        Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program 
        established pursuant to subsection (c).
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities 
for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional 
international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage 
private resources, in support of host country driven projects, 
planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of 
host countries--
            (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and 
        reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while 
        facilitating the transition in key global markets from 
        electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean 
        energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and 
        communities;
            (2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and 
        forecasted effects of climate change; and
            (3) to employ--
                    (A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate 
                desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
                from deforestation and forest degradation; and
                    (B) agricultural production practices that reduce 
                poverty while improving soil health, protecting water 
                quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
    (c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator 
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
shall establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate 
Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide 
bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, 
projects, and activities described in subsection (e).
    (d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under this 
section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other 
Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities 
that fit the characteristics of the Program.
    (e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure 
that the Program provides resources to developing countries, 
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such 
countries, to support the development and implementation of programs, 
projects, and activities that--
            (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration 
        and deployment of clean energy, including transmission, 
        distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while 
        facilitating the transition from electricity generated from 
        fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a 
        manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
            (2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread 
        deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester, 
        or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
            (3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility 
        of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and 
        development of transportation networks and land use practices 
        that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
            (4) support building capacities that may include--
                    (A) developing and implementing methodologies and 
                programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and 
                verifying emissions mitigation, including building 
                capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet 
                reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;
                    (B) assessing, developing, and implementing 
                technology and policy options for greenhouse gas 
                emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions, 
                including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation 
                strategies;
                    (C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory 
                authorities, planning agencies, and related 
                institutions in developing countries to improve the 
                deployment of clean energy technologies and practices, 
                including through increased transparency;
                    (D) training and instruction regarding the 
                installation and maintenance of renewable energy 
                technologies; and
                    (E) activities that support the development and 
                implementation of frameworks for intellectual property 
                rights in developing countries;
            (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and 
        adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate 
        change;
            (6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job 
        opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that 
        emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean 
        energy;
            (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience 
        capacities of communities to the effects of climate change, 
        including effects on--
                    (A) water availability;
                    (B) agricultural productivity and food security;
                    (C) flood risk;
                    (D) coastal resources;
                    (E) biodiversity;
                    (F) economic livelihoods;
                    (G) health and diseases;
                    (H) housing and shelter; and
                    (I) human migration;
            (8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the 
        environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness, 
        and growth strategies that take into account current and 
        forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
            (9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and 
        biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to 
        ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy 
        and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of 
        climate change such as extreme weather;
            (10) provide resources, information, scientific data and 
        modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance 
        to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the 
        effects of climate change;
            (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, 
        including through improvements to make critical infrastructure 
        less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
            (12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures, 
        including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures, 
        that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas 
        emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors 
        of developing countries;
            (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce 
        greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry 
        practices;
            (14) promote sustainable land use activities, including 
        supporting development planning, design, and construction with 
        respect to transportation systems and land use;
            (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that 
        mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and 
        water security of communities;
            (16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and 
        nongovernmental international development organizations to 
        assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities 
        that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives 
        described in subsection (b);
            (17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities 
        of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional 
        nationally determined contributions of those countries;
            (18) establish investment channels designed to leverage 
        private sector financing in--
                    (A) clean energy;
                    (B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource 
                management; and
                    (C) the transportation sector as described in 
                paragraph (3); and
            (19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
        extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth 
        opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural 
        carbon sinks.
    (f) Provision of Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Administrator of USAID, in 
        consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, shall 
        provide assistance under the Program--
                    (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to 
                the requirements under subsection (g);
                    (B) to multilateral funds or international 
                institutions with programs for climate mitigation or 
                adaptation in developing countries consistent with the 
                policy described in subsection (e); or
                    (C) through a combination of the mechanisms 
                specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
            (2) Limitation.--
                    (A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds 
                or international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the 
                Administrator of USAID may provide up to 40 percent of 
                the assistance available to carry out the Program to 1 
                or more multilateral funds or international 
                institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph 
                (B).
                    (B) Multilateral fund or international institution 
                eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international 
                institution is eligible to receive assistance under 
                subparagraph (A)--
                            (i) if--
                                    (I) such fund or institution is 
                                established pursuant to--
                                            (aa) the Convention; or
                                            (bb) an agreement 
                                        negotiated under the 
                                        Convention; or
                                    (II) the assistance is directed to 
                                1 or more multilateral funds or 
                                international development institutions, 
                                pursuant to an agreement negotiated 
                                under the Convention; and
                            (ii) if such fund or institution--
                                    (I) specifies the terms and 
                                conditions under which the United 
                                States is to provide assistance to the 
                                fund or institution, and under which 
                                the fund or institution is to provide 
                                assistance to recipient countries;
                                    (II) ensures that assistance from 
                                the United States to the fund or 
                                institution and the principal and 
                                income of the fund or institution are 
                                disbursed only--
                                            (aa) to support projects, 
                                        planning, policies, and 
                                        initiatives described in 
                                        subsection (b);
                                            (bb) consistent with the 
                                        policy described in subsection 
                                        (e); and
                                            (cc) in regular 
                                        consultation with relevant 
                                        governing bodies of the fund or 
                                        institution that--

                                                    (AA) include 
                                                representation from 
                                                countries among the 
                                                most vulnerable 
                                                developing countries; 
                                                and

                                                    (BB) provide public 
                                                access.

                    (C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of 
                State, the Administrator of USAID, or the Secretary of 
                the Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional 
                committees not later than 15 days before providing 
                assistance to a multilateral fund or international 
                institution under this subsection.
            (3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and 
        activities supported by assistance provided under this 
        subsection shall require consultations with local communities, 
        particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in 
        such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any 
        programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such 
        communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of 
        information, public participation, and consultation, including 
        full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable 
        communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local 
        communities.
    (g) Bilateral Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with 
        this subsection, the administrative authorities under the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall 
        apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same 
        extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the 
        implementation of such Act in order to provide the 
        Administrator of USAID with the authority to provide assistance 
        to countries, including the most vulnerable developing 
        countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent 
        with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy 
        described in subsection (e).
            (2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the 
        Administrator shall ensure that--
                    (A) the environmental impact of proposed programs, 
                projects, and activities is considered through adequate 
                consultation, public participation, and public 
                disclosure of relevant information; and
                    (B) programs, projects, and activities under this 
                subsection--
                            (i) avoid environmental degradation, to the 
                        maximum extent practicable; and
                            (ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent 
                        practicable, with broader development, poverty 
                        alleviation, or natural resource management 
                        objectives and initiatives in the recipient 
                        country.
            (3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to 
        ensure that--
                    (A) local communities, particularly the most 
                vulnerable communities and populations in areas in 
                which any programs, projects, or activities are carried 
                out under this subsection, are engaged in the design, 
                implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such 
                programs, projects, and activities through disclosure 
                of information, public participation, and consultation; 
                and
                    (B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable 
                communities and populations are addressed in national 
                or regional climate change adaptation plans developed 
                with USAID support.
            (4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country 
        receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator 
        shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure 
        of information to, local, national, and international 
        stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities 
        carried out under this subsection.
    (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.

SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND 
              HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.

    (a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``high-GWP HFC'' means 
newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential 
calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as described in 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change.
    (b) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to 
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent 
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate 
that each such body or conference--
            (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce 
        black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
            (2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources, 
        industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products 
        to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
            (3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
                    (A) to increase production and distribution of 
                clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and 
                products that will replace sources of black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP HFC;
                    (B) to develop action plans to mitigate black 
                carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from various private 
                sector operations;
                    (C) to encourage best technology, methods, and 
                management practices for reducing black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP HFC;
                    (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the 
                incremental costs associated with mitigating black 
                carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants; and
                    (E) to grow economic opportunities and develop 
                markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon, 
                methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;
            (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory 
        authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to 
        investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions, 
        including--
                    (A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
                    (B) the implementation of policies requiring 
                industrial and agricultural best practices for 
                capturing or mitigating the release of methane from 
                extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
                    (C) climate assessment, scientific research, 
                monitoring, and technological development activities;
            (5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
        based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects 
        described in paragraph (4); and
            (6) engage international partners in an existing 
        multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an 
        international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve 
        global cooperation for--
                    (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating 
                efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
                HFC;
                    (B) developing and implementing best practices for 
                phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-
                GWP HFC, including expanding capacity for innovative 
                instruments to mitigate black carbon, methane, and 
                high-GWP HFC at the national and subnational levels of 
                foreign countries, particularly countries with little 
                capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deploy 
                clean energy facilities, and countries that lack 
                sufficient policies to advance such development;
                    (C) encouraging the development of standards and 
                practices, and increasing transparency and 
                accountability efforts for the reduction of black 
                carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;
                    (D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems 
                into industrial processes;
                    (E) fostering research to improve scientific 
                understanding of--
                            (i) how high concentrations of black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect human 
                        health, safety, and our environment;
                            (ii) changes in the amount and regional 
                        concentrations of black carbon and methane 
                        emissions, based on scientific modeling and 
                        forecasting;
                            (iii) effective means to sequester black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and
                            (iv) other related areas of research the 
                        United States representatives deem necessary;
                    (F) encouraging the World Bank, the International 
                Monetary Fund, and other international finance 
                organizations--
                            (i) to prioritize efforts to combat black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and
                            (ii) to enhance transparency by providing 
                        sufficient and adequate information to 
                        facilitate independent verification of their 
                        climate finance reporting;
                    (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council 
                (including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans 
                consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
                Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon 
                and Methane;
                    (H) collaborating on technological advances in 
                black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutant 
                mitigation, sequestration and reduction technologies; 
                and
                    (I) advising foreign countries, at both the 
                national and subnational levels, regarding the 
                development and execution of regulatory policies, 
                services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation 
                and the collection and safe management of black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP HFC.
    (c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United 
States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
            (1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United 
        States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction 
        programs and strategies established by the Environmental 
        Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
            (2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign 
        partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the 
        Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build 
        partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign 
        countries and to support international efforts to reduce black 
        carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.
    (d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of 
Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a 
report to Congress that--
            (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new 
        international agreements, new targets within existing 
        international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the 
        creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally 
        black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC to support the efforts 
        described in subsection (b);
            (2) describes the provisions that could be included in such 
        agreements;
            (3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
            (4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and 
        Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016 
        North American Leaders' Summit; and
            (5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries 
        of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon 
        targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for 
        Action.
    (e) Consideration of Black Carbon, Methane, and High-gwp Hfc in 
Negotiating International Agreements.--In negotiating any relevant 
international agreement with any country or countries after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
            (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
        HFC are having on the increase in global average temperatures 
        and the resulting global climate change;
            (2) consider the effects that climate change is having on 
        the environment; and
            (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to 
        eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC from such 
        country or countries.
    (f) Plan to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions From Ships.--Consistent 
with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions 
from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. 
The plan shall provide for such reduction through--
            (1) a clean freight partnership;
            (2) limits on black carbon emissions; and
            (3) efforts that include protection of access to critical 
        fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.
    (g) Establishment of Interagency Working Group on Black Carbon, 
Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.--
            (1) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
        of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task 
        force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Black 
        Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.
            (2) Membership.--The members of the Working Group shall 
        include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant 
        Federal agency.
            (3) Duties.--The Working Group shall--
                    (A) not later than 180 days after the date of 
                enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees a report that includes 
                specific plans of each relevant Federal agency--
                    (B) look for opportunities with other countries to 
                promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition 
                over time to equipment that uses safer and more 
                sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;
                    (C) review the policy recommendations made by--
                            (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
                        Change;
                            (ii) the United States Climate Alliance;
                            (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce 
                        Methane Emissions;
                            (iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness 
                        and Resilience;
                            (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
                            (vi) the International Maritime 
                        Organization; and
                            (vii) other relevant organizations and 
                        institutions; and
                    (D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants that incorporates 
                any appropriate proposals or recommendations made by 
                the entities referred to in subparagraph (C).

SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
              INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.

    (a) Green Climate Fund.--
            (1) Findings.--Congress finds that--
                    (A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable 
                and disadvantaged communities in the United States and 
                around the world;
                    (B) it is the responsibility of the United States 
                Government to work with and press other countries to 
                address environmental justice and climate justice;
                    (C) the report of the United Nations Environment 
                Programme entitled ``Climate Change and the Cost of 
                Capital in Developing Countries'', dated May 2018, 
                found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of 
                the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20 
                nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate 
                change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest 
                payments alone;
                    (D) individuals and families, particularly 
                communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-
                income communities, that are on the frontlines of 
                climate change across the globe are often in close 
                proximity to environmental stressors or sources of 
                pollution;
                    (E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)--
                            (i) are often the first exposed to the 
                        causes and impacts of climate change; and
                            (ii) have the fewest resources with which 
                        to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;
                    (F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate 
                change must include specific protections for and 
                acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to 
                communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and 
                other frontline communities and marginalized peoples 
                around the world;
                    (G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to 
                the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
                Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark 
                agreement--
                            (i) to combat climate change;
                            (ii) to accelerate and intensify the 
                        actions and investments needed for a 
                        sustainable low carbon future; and
                            (iii) that acknowledges, ``Parties should, 
                        when taking action to address climate change, 
                        respect, promote and consider their respective 
                        obligations on human rights, the right to 
                        health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local 
                        communities, migrants, children, persons with 
                        disabilities and people in vulnerable 
                        situations and the right to development, as 
                        well as gender equality, empowerment of women 
                        and intergenerational equity'';
                    (H) the Paris Agreement--
                            (i) notes the importance of ``climate 
                        justice'' when mitigating and adapting to 
                        climate change; and
                            (ii) recognizes ``the need for an effective 
                        and progressive response to the urgent threat 
                        of climate change'';
                    (I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake 
                mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of 
                limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees 
                Celsius;
                    (J) developed countries have the greatest capacity 
                to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while--
                            (i) developing countries have the least 
                        capacity to engage in mitigation activities; 
                        and
                            (ii) the capacity of developing countries 
                        to engage in mitigation activities is less than 
                        the national mitigation potential of those 
                        developing countries;
                    (K) the determination for the fair share of 
                mitigation and adaptation activities for each country 
                must take into account--
                            (i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions 
                        of each country; and
                            (ii) the current capacity of each country 
                        to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and 
                        adapt to climate impacts;
                    (L) developed countries that have historically 
                emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse 
                gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of 
                those polluting activities, have a corresponding 
                disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in 
                global mitigation and adaptation activities, as 
                compared to less industrialized countries that have 
                historically polluted far less;
                    (M) the only realistic way for less industrialized 
                countries to meet their full mitigation potential is 
                through international climate financing by more 
                developed countries;
                    (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed 
                countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in 
                2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate 
                financing (as well as private investment and other 
                alternative forms of finance), for developing 
                countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 
                1/CP.21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
                Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;
                    (O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in 
                subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls 
                short of the actual financing needs for climate action 
                in developing countries;
                    (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that 
                the transition to renewable energy sources in 
                developing countries will require hundreds of billions 
                of dollars annually;
                    (Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has 
                estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate 
                change in developing countries may be as much as 
                $300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;
                    (R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by 
                194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism 
                to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse 
                gas emissions and adapt to climate change;
                    (S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework 
                Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green 
                Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris 
                Agreement, which states that ``developed country 
                Parties shall provide financial resources to assist 
                developing country Parties with respect to both 
                mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their 
                existing obligations under the Convention'';
                    (T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 
                institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate 
                Fund ensures--
                            (i) balanced governance between developed 
                        and developing countries;
                            (ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;
                            (iii) a balanced approach between 
                        mitigation and adaptation;
                            (iv) fair and equal labor and working 
                        conditions;
                            (v) conservation of biodiversity and 
                        critical habitats; and
                            (vi) strong environmental, social, and 
                        gender protections;
                    (U) the Green Climate Fund--
                            (i) promotes and protects human rights and 
                        the rights of marginalized groups, including 
                        indigenous peoples, women, children, and people 
                        with disabilities; and
                            (ii) continues to take steps to strengthen 
                        protection for marginalized groups;
                            (iii) the United States committed 
                        $3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000 
                        raised for the initial resource mobilization 
                        period of the Green Climate Fund, though only 
                        \1/3\ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the 
                        United States the only country to fall 
                        substantially short of a commitment of a 
                        country to the Green Climate Fund; and
                    (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational 
                and proven institution supporting well over 100 
                projects and programs in developing countries around 
                the world.
            (2) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to provide climate financing--
                    (A) as an essential part of the global effort to 
                combat climate change; and
                    (B) that--
                            (i) upholds the principles of environmental 
                        justice and climate justice;
                            (ii) supports programs and projects 
                        developed by recipient countries and 
                        communities;
                            (iii) is designed and implemented with the 
                        free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous 
                        peoples and other impacted communities;
                            (iv) promotes gender equality as essential 
                        in all of the projects and programs supported 
                        by climate financing;
                            (v) includes best practices for 
                        environmental and social safeguards to ensure 
                        that projects and programs supported by climate 
                        financing respect fundamental human rights; and
                            (vi) addresses both mitigation and 
                        adaptation as essential aspects of responding 
                        to climate change.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $4,000,000,000 
for each of the fiscal years 2022 and 2023.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions required to keep the planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius 
of global warming are significantly greater than the amount of funds 
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a).

SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE ACTION.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in this section as the ``Task 
Force'') with the mandate to--
            (1) monitor climate and related impacted social conditions 
        to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental stressors 
        from evolving into national security risks;
            (2) monitor and assess climate action undertaken by other 
        countries in response to national strategies and international 
        commitments, and coordinate closely with allies and partners to 
        ensure a coordinated response against any state or non-state 
        actors, including the People's Republic of China (PRC) and PRC 
        companies, undermining global climate objectives, norms, and 
        practices;
            (3) strengthen the efforts of the Department of State and 
        the United States Government to act proactively to mitigate the 
        human harms and potential for national security risks resulting 
        from emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and
            (4) assist other Federal departments and agencies, foreign 
        partners, and multilateral organizations in their efforts to do 
        the same.
    (b) Leadership.--The Secretary of State shall designate a senior 
career official, as appropriate, of the Department of State to serve as 
the Chair of the Task Force. Such official shall report to the 
Secretary of State.
    (c) Responsibilities.--Under the direction of the Chair, the Task 
Force shall--
            (1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacerbated by 
        climate change and the risk of emerging events exacerbated by 
        climate change throughout the world are adequately considered 
        and addressed;
            (2) facilitate the development and execution of policies 
        and tools to enhance the capacity of the United States to 
        prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate 
        change worldwide;
            (3) monitor developments throughout the world that heighten 
        the risk of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
            (4) identify gaps in United States foreign policy related 
        to the prevention of and response to emerging events 
        exacerbated by climate change with respect to certain regions 
        or particular countries;
            (5) incorporate lessons learned from past United States 
        efforts to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated 
        by climate change and other impacts that are comparable in 
        scope or severity;
            (6) provide the Secretary of State with recommendations and 
        potential improvements to policies, programs, resources, and 
        tools related to the prevention of and response to emerging 
        events exacerbated by climate change;
            (7) coordinate the Department of State's engagement in 
        interagency processes led by the National Security Council that 
        share the Task Force's objectives;
            (8) conduct outreach not less frequently than biannually, 
        with representatives of nongovernmental organizations dedicated 
        to the prevention of and response to emerging events 
        exacerbated by climate change and other appropriate parties, 
        to--
                    (A) receive assistance relating to the Task Force's 
                efforts to address emerging events exacerbated by 
                climate change and develop new or improved policies, 
                programs, resources, and tools; and
                    (B) provide a public understanding of the work of 
                the Task Force;
            (9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), focus on 
        particular ways for the United States to develop, strengthen, 
        and enhance its capabilities to--
                    (A) monitor, receive early warning of, and 
                coordinate responses to potential emerging events 
                exacerbated by climate change;
                    (B) engage allies and partners, including 
                multilateral and regional institutions, to build 
                capacities and mobilize action for preventing and 
                responding to emerging events exacerbated by climate 
                change;
                    (C) encourage the deployment of civilian advisors 
                to prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated 
                by climate change;
                    (D) increase the capacity of and develop doctrine 
                for the United States Foreign Service, civil service, 
                Armed Forces, development professionals, and other 
                actors to engage in the full spectrum of activities to 
                prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by 
                climate change;
                    (E) develop and implement tailored foreign 
                assistance programs that address and mitigate the risks 
                of emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, and 
                sharing of appropriate information; and
                    (G) address any other issues that the Task Force 
                determines appropriate;
            (10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), receive 
        support from bureaus and offices of the Department of State, as 
        the Secretary of State determines appropriate; and
            (11) facilitate annual coordination between the Department 
        of State and other appropriate departments and agencies to 
        ensure international and domestic climate change objectives are 
        aligned.
    (d) Composition.--The Task Force shall--
            (1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and support 
        interagency processes led by the National Security Council that 
        share the Task Force's objectives; and
            (2) operate with regular consultation and participation of 
        designated representatives, at the Assistant Secretary level or 
        higher, from all such executive departments, agencies, or 
        offices as the Chair may designate.
    (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter for the following 10 
years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Task Force, 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an 
unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, that 
includes--
            (1) a review, in consultation with the designated 
        representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting of--
                    (A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current 
                efforts based on United States and locally identified 
                indicators, including capacities and constraints for 
                United States Government-wide detection, early warning 
                and response, information-sharing, contingency 
                planning, and coordination of efforts to prevent and 
                respond to emerging events exacerbated by climate 
                change;
                    (B) an assessment of the funding expended by 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, 
                procedural, and resource constraints faced by the 
                Department of State and the United States Agency for 
                International Development throughout respective 
                budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to 
                support the prevention of and response to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (C) current annual global assessments of emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (D) recommendations to further strengthen United 
                States capabilities described in subparagraph (A); and
                    (E) consideration of analysis, reporting, and 
                policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and 
                other nongovernmental organizations and institutions to 
                prevent and respond to emerging events exacerbated by 
                climate change;
            (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
                    (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 
                preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change; and
                    (B) strengthening regional organizations; and
            (3) the implementation status of the recommendations 
        included in the review under paragraph (1).
    (f) Briefings and Materials.--The Chair and members of the Task 
Force shall, not less frequently than annually, provide briefings and 
materials to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
    (g) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director 
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in his or her annual 
(or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a 
classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States 
national security--
            (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging 
        events exacerbated by climate change; and
            (2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries 
        and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by 
        climate change.
    (h) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that rapid and 
robust climate change response mechanisms, including the establishment 
of the Task Force, are critical for ensuring other countries remain 
accountable to their climate action commitments as well as preserving 
the national security and economic interests of the United States.

SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO REDUCE DEFORESTATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is having a 
        substantial impact on the most important forest ecosystems in 
        the world, and illegal logging and agricultural expansion have 
        caused the massive forest loss. According to the World 
        Resources Institute, the PRC has become the world's leading 
        importer and consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm 
        oil, as well as the largest manufacturing and export country of 
        forest products.
            (2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more than 100 
        countries in the world. According to a Global Witness report, 
        between January 2013 and April 2020, Chinese financial 
        institutions provided more than $22.5 billion to major 
        companies that produce and trade commodities at high risk of 
        driving deforestation. These commodities include beef, soy, 
        palm oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.
            (3) Further, the growing international demand for such 
        agricultural commodities causes the majority of deforestation 
        emissions globally, and most of the associated land-clearing 
        violates applicable national or local laws. According to a 2021 
        Forest Trends report, at least 69 percent of forest land 
        converted to pasture or cropland was cleared illegally.
            (4) The growing demand for timber and agricultural 
        commodities has accelerated unsustainable--and often illegal--
        logging and the trade of timber products, which harms the 
        countries in which it takes place by siphoning away government 
        tax revenue, transforming the livelihoods of communities 
        dependent on forests, and hurting legal businesses' 
        competitiveness. Further, illegal logging and illegal 
        conversion of forest to agricultural land threatens 
        biodiversity and accelerates deforestation and forest 
        degradation in key timber supply countries, undermining United 
        States and global climate goals.
            (5) The United States should work with international 
        partners to ensure that Chinese and other banks factor into 
        lending practices the environmental and social impact of the 
        companies they finance. This should include pressuring the PRC 
        and other countries to revise regulations to require the 
        banking sector not to finance companies linked to deforestation 
        and include rigorous checks on the companies operating in 
        sectors or regions where there is a high risk of deforestation 
        to ensure they are not associated with deforestation.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Administrator.--Except as otherwise expressly provided, 
        the term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the 
        United States Agency for International Development.
            (2) Deforestation.--The term ``deforestation'' means a 
        change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any 
        other land use.
            (3) Developing country.--The term ``developing country'' 
        means a country eligible to receive official development 
        assistance according to the income guidelines of the 
        Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for 
        Economic Co-operation and Development.
            (4) Emissions reductions.--The term ``emissions 
        reductions'' means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved 
        from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.
            (5) Forest.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``forest'' means a 
                terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests, 
                comprised of native tree species generated and 
                maintained primarily through natural ecological and 
                evolutionary processes.
                    (B) Exclusion.--The term ``forest'' does not 
                include plantations, such as crops of trees planted by 
                humans primarily for the purposes of harvesting.
            (6) Forest degradation.--The term ``forest degradation'' is 
        any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the 
        effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use 
        activities on peatlands.
            (7) Intact forest.--The term ``intact forest'' means an 
        unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent 
        of forest cover that--
                    (A) covers an area of at least 500 square 
                kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each 
                direction; and
                    (B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems 
                minimally influenced by human economic activity and 
                large enough that all native biodiversity, including 
                viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be 
                maintained.
            (9) Leakage.--The term ``leakage'' means the unexpected 
        loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of 
        activities in a project area to areas outside the project, 
        resulting in carbon emissions.
            (10) Leakage prevention activities.--The term ``leakage 
        prevention activities'' means activities in developing 
        countries that are directed at preserving existing forest 
        carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that 
        might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.
            (11) National deforestation reduction activities.--The term 
        ``national deforestation reduction activities'' means 
        activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of 
        greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is calculated 
        by measuring actual emissions against a national deforestation 
        baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of 
        subsection (d)(4).
            (12) Subnational deforestation and forest degradation 
        reduction activities.--The term ``subnational deforestation and 
        forest degradation reduction activities'' means activities in 
        developing countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas 
        emissions from deforestation and forest degradation that is 
        calculated by measuring actual emissions using an appropriate 
        baseline, or an alternative determined under subsection 
        (d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the Administrator at the State or 
        provincial level.
    (c) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to provide United 
States assistance to developing countries to develop, implement, and 
improve actions that reduce deforestation and forest degradation or 
conserve or restore forest ecosystems--
            (1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect 
        to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in 
        which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and
            (2) in a manner that--
                    (A) is consistent with and enhances the 
                implementation of complementary United States policies 
                that support the good governance of forests, 
                biodiversity conservation, and environmentally 
                sustainable development;
                    (B) takes into consideration the views and 
                participation of local communities and most vulnerable 
                communities and populations, particularly forest-
                dependent communities; and
                    (C) incorporates the right to free prior and 
                informed consent of indigenous peoples.
    (d) Emissions Reductions Through Reduced Deforestation.--
            (1) Establishment of program.--Not later than 1 year after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in 
        consultation with other appropriate agencies, shall establish a 
        program to provide assistance to reduce deforestation in 
        developing countries and its impacts, in accordance with this 
        section.
            (2) Objectives.--The objectives of the program established 
        under paragraph (1) shall be--
                    (A) to achieve--
                            (i) emissions reductions of at least 
                        7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
                        in 2025;
                            (ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at 
                        least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide 
                        equivalent by December 31, 2030; and
                            (iii) additional emissions reductions in 
                        subsequent years;
                    (B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a 
                national level in developing countries experiencing 
                deforestation, which may include--
                            (i) preparing developing countries to 
                        participate in international markets for 
                        international offset credits for reduced 
                        emissions from deforestation;
                            (ii) supporting the development of overseas 
                        domestic policy frameworks to ensure effective, 
                        efficient, and equitable benefit-sharing of the 
                        proceeds of such credits issued by national and 
                        subnational governments; and
                            (iii) promoting and expanding land titling 
                        initiatives and programs in other countries;
                    (C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries 
                where such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage, 
                particularly in developing countries with largely 
                intact native forests;
                    (D) to build the scientific knowledge and 
                institutional capacity to help developing countries--
                            (i) monitor the effects of climate change 
                        on their forests;
                            (ii) develop and implement strategies to 
                        conserve their forests; and
                            (iii) support forest-dependent communities 
                        adapt to climate change;
                    (E) to the extent practicable, to reduce 
                deforestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability and 
                increase the resilience to climate effects for forests 
                and forest-dependent communities;
                    (F) to prevent degradation and fragmentation of 
                forests and other intact ecosystems, particularly in 
                tropical countries, including by providing assistance 
                or supporting policies to--
                            (i) conserve, protect, and restore the 
                        integrity of such ecosystems; and
                            (ii) support the rights of Indigenous 
                        People and local communities and their ability 
                        to continue their effective stewardship of 
                        their intact traditional lands and territories;
                    (G) to build capacity to address illegal 
                deforestation for agricultural commodities; and
                    (H) to remove subsidies that favor deforestation;
    (e) Requirements for International Deforestation Reduction 
Program.--
            (1) Eligible countries.--
                    (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (B), the Administrator may provide assistance under 
                this section only with respect to a developing country 
                that--
                            (i) the Administrator, in consultation with 
                        other appropriate agencies, determines--
                                    (I) is experiencing deforestation 
                                or forest degradation; or
                                    (II) has standing forest carbon 
                                stocks that may be at risk of 
                                deforestation or degradation;
                            (ii) has the legal regimes, standards, and 
                        safeguards to ensure that the rights and 
                        interests of indigenous peoples and forest-
                        dependent communities are protected in 
                        accordance with the standards established under 
                        paragraph (4); and
                            (iii) has entered into a bilateral or 
                        multilateral agreement or arrangement with the 
                        United States, or is part of an international 
                        program supported by the United States to 
                        prevent deforestation, that establishes the 
                        conditions of participation by the country in 
                        the program established under this section, 
                        which shall include an agreement to meet the 
                        standards established under paragraph (4) for 
                        the activities to which such standards apply.
                    (B) Exception.--A developing country that does not 
                meet the requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) 
                may receive assistance under this section for the 
                purpose of building capacity to meet such requirement.
            (2) Authorized activities.--Subject to the requirements of 
        this section, in providing assistance under this section, the 
        Administrator may support activities to achieve the objectives 
        described in subsection (c)(2), such as--
                    (A) national deforestation reduction activities;
                    (B) subnational deforestation and forest 
                degradation reduction activities, including pilot 
                activities, policies, and measures that reduce 
                greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to significant 
                uncertainty;
                    (C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify 
                deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of 
                deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially 
                explicit land use plans that identify intact and 
                primary forest areas and managed forest areas;
                    (D) leakage prevention activities;
                    (E) the development and implementation of 
                measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification 
                capacities and governance structures, including legal 
                regimes, standards, processes, and safeguards, as 
                established under paragraph (4), to enable a country to 
                quantify emissions reductions for purposes of 
                purchasing or trading subnational emissions reduction 
                credits in carbon markets;
                    (F) the identification of, and actions to address, 
                the drivers of land use emissions;
                    (G) programs that would exclude from the United 
                States illegally harvested timber or products made from 
                illegally harvested timber, in accordance with and 
                consistent with the objectives of the Lacey Act 
                Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);
                    (H) the development and strengthening of governance 
                capacities to reduce deforestation and other land use 
                emissions and to combat illegal logging and associated 
                trade, including the development of systems for 
                independent monitoring of the efficacy of forest law 
                enforcement and increased enforcement cooperation, 
                including joint efforts with Federal agencies, to 
                enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 
                3371 et seq.);
                    (I) programs to help countries strengthen the 
                necessary governance and technological capacity to 
                trace and make publicly available the origin of 
                agricultural commodities associated with tropical 
                deforestation, such as beef, soy, palm oil, paper, 
                pulp, cocoa, and rubber;
                    (J) the development and strengthening of governance 
                capacities and associated implementation activities to 
                combat illegal deforestation related to the production 
                of agricultural commodities, such as those described in 
                subparagraph (I);
                    (K) the provision of incentives for policy reforms 
                to achieve the objectives described in subsection 
                (c)(2);
                    (L) the development of pilot projects--
                            (i) to examine where mitigation and 
                        adaptation activities in forest ecosystems 
                        coincide; and
                            (ii) to explore means for enhancing the 
                        resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-
                        dependent communities;
                    (M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver 
                resources for local action and to address the needs, 
                rights, interests, and participation of local and 
                indigenous communities;
                    (N) the promotion of land tenure and titling 
                programs, including legal recognition and effective 
                protection of the land tenure, access and use rights of 
                Indigenous People and local communities; and
                    (O) the monitoring and evaluation of the results of 
                the activities conducted under this section.
            (3) Mechanisms.--The Administrator shall apply the 
        administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent 
        inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same 
        extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the 
        implementation of such Act in order to support activities to 
        achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by--
                    (A) developing and implementing programs and 
                project-level activities that achieve such objectives;
                    (B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in 
                any review process to activities under paragraph 
                (2)(A); and
                    (C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding 
                arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this 
                section.
            (4) Standards.--The Administrator, in consultation with 
        other appropriate agencies, shall establish program standards 
        that--
                    (A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved 
                through supported activities--
                            (i) are additional, measurable, verifiable, 
                        and monitored;
                            (ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and 
                        permanence; and
                            (iii) at a minimum, meet the standards 
                        established under the emissions unit criteria 
                        of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme 
                        for International Aviation (CORSIA) developed 
                        by the International Civil Aviation 
                        Organization (ICAO);
                    (B) require--
                            (i) the establishment of a national 
                        deforestation baseline for each country with 
                        national deforestation reduction activities 
                        that is used to account for reductions achieved 
                        from such activities; or
                            (ii) if a developing country has 
                        established policies and taken measures to 
                        reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands, 
                        deforestation, or forest degradation, but has 
                        not established a national baseline, the 
                        provision of a credible, transparent, accurate, 
                        and conservative alternative for quantifying 
                        emissions;
                    (C) provide that each national deforestation 
                baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)--
                            (i) is national, or subnational on an 
                        interim basis, in scope; and
                            (ii) is consistent with nationally 
                        appropriate mitigation commitments or actions 
                        with respect to deforestation, taking into 
                        consideration--
                                    (I) the average annual historical 
                                deforestation rates of the country 
                                during a period of at least 5 years; 
                                and
                                    (II) the applicable drivers of 
                                deforestation and other factors to 
                                ensure additionality;
                            (iii) establishes a trajectory that would 
                        result in zero net deforestation by not later 
                        than 20 years after the date on which the 
                        baseline is established;
                            (iv) is adjusted over time to account for 
                        changing national circumstances; and
                            (v) is designed to account for all 
                        significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions 
                        from deforestation in the country;
                    (D) with respect to assistance provided for 
                activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
                paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to be 
                achieved and verified before the provision of any 
                assistance under this section;
                    (E) with respect to accounting for subnational 
                deforestation and forest degradation reduction 
                activities that lack the standardized or precise 
                measurement and monitoring techniques needed for a full 
                accounting of changes in emissions or baselines, or are 
                subject to other sources of uncertainty, apply a 
                conservative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty 
                regarding the levels of reductions achieved;
                    (F) ensure that activities under this section are 
                designed, carried out, and managed--
                            (i) using forest management practices that, 
                        in an open and transparent process--
                                    (I) improve the livelihoods of 
                                forest communities in a manner that 
                                promotes the maintenance of intact 
                                forests, protects associated 
                                biodiversity, and restores native 
                                forest species and ecosystems while 
                                avoiding the introduction of invasive 
                                nonnative species;
                                    (II) maintain natural biodiversity, 
                                resilience, and carbon storage capacity 
                                of forests;
                                    (III) to the extent practicable, do 
                                not adversely affect the permanence of 
                                forest carbon stocks or emissions 
                                reductions;
                                    (IV) include broad stakeholder 
                                participation and the free prior and 
                                informed consent of affected indigenous 
                                peoples; and
                                    (V) take into account the needs and 
                                interests of local communities, forest-
                                dependent communities, indigenous 
                                peoples, and vulnerable social groups;
                            (ii) in consultation with, and with the 
                        full and effective participation of, local 
                        communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
                        dependent communities in affected areas, as 
                        partners and primary stakeholders, before and 
                        during the design, planning, implementation, 
                        monitoring, and evaluation of activities; and
                            (iii) with equitable sharing of profits and 
                        benefits derived from the activities with local 
                        communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
                        dependent communities; and
                    (G) with respect to assistance for all activities 
                under this section, seek to ensure the establishment 
                and enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes, 
                and safeguards by the country in which the activities 
                are conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as 
                a proposed activity for which such assistance may be 
                provided, which--
                            (i) protect the rights and interests of 
                        local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-
                        dependent communities, human rights defenders, 
                        and vulnerable social groups; and
                            (ii) promote consultations with local 
                        communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
                        dependent communities in affected areas, as 
                        partners and primary stakeholders, before and 
                        during the design, planning, implementation, 
                        monitoring, and evaluation of activities under 
                        this section; and
                            (iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits 
                        and benefits from incentives for emissions 
                        reductions or leakage prevention with local 
                        communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
                        dependent communities.
            (5) Scope.--
                    (A) Reduced emissions.--The Administrator shall 
                include reduced emissions from forest degradation and 
                disturbance of peatlands within the scope of activities 
                under this section.
                    (B) Expansion of authorized activities.--If the 
                Administrator determines, in consultation with other 
                appropriate agencies, that sufficient methodologies and 
                technical capacities exist to measure, monitor, and 
                account for the emissions referred to in subparagraph 
                (A), the Administrator may expand the authorized 
                activities under this section, as appropriate, to 
                include reduced soil carbon-derived emissions 
                associated with deforestation and degradation of 
                forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a 
                comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing 
                forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing 
                emissions, and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.
            (6) Accounting.--The Administrator shall use a publicly 
        accessible registry to account for and register the emissions 
        reductions achieved through assistance provided under this 
        section each year, after appropriately discounting for 
        uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the 
        standards established under paragraph (4).
            (7) International deforestation reduction program insurance 
        account for noncompletion or reversal.--In furtherance of the 
        objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator 
        shall develop and implement a program that--
                    (A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with 
                respect to any greenhouse gas emissions that were not, 
                or are no longer, sequestered; and
                    (B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a 
                portion of the amount allocated for projects to support 
                the program.
            (8) Extension of assistance.--
                    (A) In general.--The Administrator may extend, for 
                an additional 5 years, the period during which 
                assistance is authorized for activities supported by 
                assistance under this section, if the Administrator 
                determines that--
                            (i) the country in which the activities are 
                        conducted is making substantial progress toward 
                        adopting and implementing a program to achieve 
                        reductions in deforestation measured against a 
                        national baseline;
                            (ii) the greenhouse gas emissions 
                        reductions achieved as a result of the 
                        activities are not resulting in significant 
                        leakage;
                            (iii) such greenhouse gas emissions 
                        reductions are being appropriately discounted 
                        to account for any leakage that is occurring; 
                        and
                            (iv) such extension would further advance 
                        or ensure achievement of the objectives of the 
                        activities.
                    (B) Assistance for subnational deforestation and 
                forest degradation reduction activities.--
                            (i) In general.--If the Administrator 
                        extends the period during which assistance is 
                        authorized for activities under subparagraph 
                        (A), the Administrator shall determine, based 
                        on the criteria specified that subparagraph, 
                        whether such assistance should include 
                        assistance for subnational deforestation and 
                        forest degradation reduction activities.
                            (ii) Continued assistance.--The 
                        Administrator may extend the period during 
                        which assistance is authorized for subnational 
                        deforestation and forest degradation reduction 
                        activities beyond the 5-year period described 
                        in subparagraph (A) in order to further the 
                        objectives described in subparagraph (B) or (C) 
                        of subsection (c)(2).
            (9) Coordination with foreign assistance.--Subject to the 
        direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the 
        extent practicable and consistent with the objectives described 
        in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities under this 
        section with broader development, poverty alleviation, or 
        natural resource management objectives and initiatives in 
        countries receiving assistance under this section.
            (10) Assistance as supplement.--The provision of assistance 
        for activities under this section shall be used to supplement, 
        and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local support 
        available to carry out activities under this section.
            (11) Funding limitation.--Of the funds made available to 
        carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7 
        percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the 
        United States Agency for International Development in support 
        of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be 
        in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such 
        purposes.
    (f) Legal Effect.--
            (1) In general.--Nothing in this section may be construed 
        to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction 
        imposed by Federal law (including regulations) on any 
        interaction between an entity located in the United States and 
        an entity located in a foreign country.
            (2) Role of the secretary of state.--Nothing in this 
        section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary of 
        State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under section 
        622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
        2382(c)).
    (g) International Financial Institutions.--The President shall 
direct the United States representatives to the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and other international financial 
institutions (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International 
Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to 
combat deforestation.

SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED 
              STATES SUPPLY CHAINS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) It is in the national security interests of the United 
        States to ensure that the export of electronic waste does not 
        become the source of counterfeit goods that may reenter 
        electronics supply chains in the United States, and for other 
        purposes.
            (2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee Report 
        ``discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air 
        Force's largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special 
        Operations helicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among 
        1,800 cases of bogus parts''.
            (3) Further, exporting such material has often resulted in 
        environmental damage because of illegal dumping or inadequate 
        environmental regulations in other countries for ensuring their 
        safe and secure disposal.
            (4) China, the single largest producer of electronic waste, 
        is on track for its e-waste industry to total $23,800,000,000 
        by 2030, given its high supply of used products, demand for 
        recycled materials, and capacity to transport these materials.
            (5) As the second largest producer of electronic waste, the 
        United States has a strong economic and national security 
        incentive to enhance domestic e-waste recycling capacity rather 
        than exporting to China and other countries.
            (6) Given China's lack of regulations and worker 
        protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been exposed 
        to over 1,000 harmful substances, including lead and mercury, 
        endangering the health and wellbeing of workers.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Electronic waste.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``electronic waste'' 
                means any of the following used items containing 
                electronic components, or fragments thereof, including 
                parts or subcomponents of such items:
                            (i) Computers and related equipment.
                            (ii) Data center equipment (including 
                        servers, network equipment, firewalls, battery 
                        backup systems, and power distribution units).
                            (iii) Mobile computers (including 
                        notebooks, netbooks, tablets, and e-book 
                        readers).
                            (iv) Televisions (including portable 
                        televisions and portable DVD players).
                            (v) Video display devices (including 
                        monitors, digital picture frames, and portable 
                        video devices).
                            (vi) Digital imaging devices (including 
                        printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image 
                        scanners, and multifunction machines).
                            (vii) Consumer electronics--
                                    (I) including digital cameras, 
                                projectors, digital audio players, 
                                cellular phones and wireless internet 
                                communication devices, audio equipment, 
                                video cassette recorders, DVD players, 
                                video game systems (including portable 
                                systems), video game controllers, 
                                signal converter boxes, and cable and 
                                satellite receivers; and
                                    (II) not including appliances that 
                                have electronic features.
                            (viii) Portable global positioning system 
                        navigation devices.
                            (ix) Other used electronic items that the 
                        Secretary determines to be necessary to carry 
                        out this section.
                    (B) Exempt items.--The term ``electronic waste'' 
                does not include--
                            (i) exempted electronic waste items;
                            (ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle; 
                        or
                            (iii) electronic components, or items 
                        containing electronic components, that are 
                        exported or reexported to an entity under the 
                        ownership or control of the person exporting or 
                        reexporting the components or items, with the 
                        intent that the components or items be used for 
                        the purpose for which the components or items 
                        were used in the United States.
            (2) Exempted electronic waste items.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``exempted electronic 
                waste items'' means the following:
                            (i) Tested, working used electronics.
                            (ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.
                            (iii) Recalled electronics.
                    (B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
                            (i) Tested, working used electronics.--The 
                        term ``tested, working used electronics'' means 
                        any used electronic items that--
                                    (I) are determined, through testing 
                                methodologies established by the 
                                Secretary, to be--
                                            (aa) fully functional for 
                                        the purpose for which the items 
                                        were designed; or
                                            (bb) in the case of 
                                        multifunction devices, fully 
                                        functional for at least one of 
                                        the primary purposes for which 
                                        the items were designed;
                                    (II) are exported with the intent 
                                to reuse the products as functional 
                                products; and
                                    (III) are appropriately packaged 
                                for shipment to prevent the items from 
                                losing functionality as a result of 
                                damage during shipment.
                            (ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.--The 
                        term ``low-risk counterfeit electronics'' means 
                        any electronic components or items that--
                                    (I) have been subjected to 
                                destruction processes that render the 
                                items unusable for their original 
                                purpose; and
                                    (II) are exported as a feedstock, 
                                with no additional mechanical or hand 
                                separation required, in a reclamation 
                                process to render the electronic 
                                components or items recycled consistent 
                                with the laws of the foreign country 
                                performing the reclamation process.
                            (iii) Recalled electronics.--The term 
                        ``recalled electronics'' means any electronic 
                        items that--
                                    (I) because of a defect in the 
                                design or manufacture of the items--
                                            (aa) are subject to a 
                                        recall notice issued by the 
                                        Consumer Product Safety 
                                        Commission or other pertinent 
                                        Federal authority and have been 
                                        received by the manufacturer or 
                                        its agent and repaired by the 
                                        manufacturer or its agent to 
                                        cure the defect; or
                                            (bb) have been recalled by 
                                        the manufacturer as a condition 
                                        of the validity of the warranty 
                                        on the items and have been 
                                        repaired by the manufacturer or 
                                        its agent to cure the defect; 
                                        and
                                    (II) are exported by the 
                                manufacturer of the items.
                            (iv) Feedstock.--The term ``feedstock'' 
                        means any raw material constituting the 
                        principal input for an industrial process.
            (3) Counterfeit good.--The term ``counterfeit good'' means 
        any good on which, or in connection with which, a counterfeit 
        mark is used.
            (4) Counterfeit military good.--The term ``counterfeit 
        military good'' means a counterfeit good that--
                    (A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting 
                military specifications; or
                    (B) is intended for use in a military or national 
                security application.
            (5) Counterfeit mark.--The term ``counterfeit mark'' has 
        the meaning given that term in section 2320 of title 18, United 
        States Code.
            (6) Export administration regulations.--The term ``Export 
        Administration Regulations'' means the regulations set forth in 
        subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal 
        Regulations, or successor regulations.
            (7) Export; reexport.--The terms ``export'' and 
        ``reexport'' have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 
        of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
            (8) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of Commerce.
            (9) Used.--The term ``used'', with respect to an item, 
        means the item has been operated or employed.
    (c) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), no 
person or entity may export or reexport electronic waste or exempted 
electronic waste items.
    (d) Export Prohibition Exemptions.--A person or entity may export 
or reexport exempted electronic waste items, but only if the following 
requirements are met:
            (1) Registration.--The person or entity is listed on a 
        publicly available registry maintained by the Secretary.
            (2) Filing of export information.--For each export 
        transaction, the person or entity files in the Automated Export 
        System, in accordance with part 758 of the Export 
        Administration Regulations (or any corresponding similar 
        regulation or ruling), electronic export information that 
        contains at least the following information:
                    (A) A description of the type and total quantity of 
                exempted electronic waste items exported.
                    (B) The name of each country that received the 
                exempted electronic waste items for reuse or recycling.
                    (C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee to which 
                the exempted electronic waste items were received for 
                reclamation, recall, or reuse; and
                    (ii) documentation and a declaration that such 
                consignee has the necessary permits, resources, and 
                competence to manage the exempted electronic waste 
                items as reusable products or recyclable feedstock and 
                prevent its release as a counterfeit good or 
                counterfeit military good.
            (3) Compliance with existing laws.--The export or reexport 
        of exempted electronic waste items otherwise comply with 
        applicable international agreements to which the United States 
        is a party and with other trade and export control laws of the 
        United States.
            (4) Export declarations and requirements.--The exempted 
        electronic waste items are accompanied by--
                    (A) documentation of the registration of the 
                exporter required under paragraph (1);
                    (B) a declaration signed by an officer or 
                designated representative of the exporter asserting 
                that the exempted electronic waste items meet the 
                applicable requirements for exempted electronic waste 
                items under this section;
                    (C) a description of the contents and condition of 
                the exempted electronic waste items in the shipment;
                    (D) for tested, working electronics, a description 
                of the testing methodologies and test results for each 
                item;
                    (E) the name of the ultimate consignee and 
                declaration of the consignee's applicable permits, 
                resources, and competence to process or use the items 
                as intended; and
                    (F) with respect to low-risk counterfeit 
                electronics only and when required by the importing 
                country, the written consent of the competent authority 
                of the receiving country to allow the products in such 
                country.
    (e) Exception for Personal Use.--The Secretary may provide for an 
exception to the requirements of this section, subject to such 
recordkeeping requirements as the Secretary may impose, for the export 
or reexport of 5 or fewer items that are or contain electronic 
components intended for personal use.
    (f) Effective Date.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), this section 
        shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period 
        beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (2) Modification of ear.--The Secretary shall, not later 
        than the effective date under paragraph (1), ensure that the 
        Export Administration Regulations are modified to carry out 
        this section.
    (g) Penalties for Violations.--Any person who violates this section 
or the regulations issued under subsection (e)(2) shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those that apply to any person violating any 
other provision of the Export Administration Regulations.
                                                 Union Calendar No. 486

117th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 3524

                      [Report No. 117-667, Part I]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
          engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           December 30, 2022

    Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment

                           December 30, 2022

  Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and 
Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee 
 of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
```