In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2494

Harriet Rizzo,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Michael F. Sheahan, in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 3995--Nan R. Nolan, Magistrate Judge.

Argued January 18, 2001--Decided September 20, 2001

 Before Cudahy, Kanne, and Rovner, Circuit

Judges.

 Kanne, Circuit Judge. Harriet Rizzo, a

former employee of the Cook County

Sheriff’s Department, filed suit against

Michael F. Sheahan, the Sheriff of Cook

County, alleging that she was sexually

harassed by her supervisor, Michael

Mahon, and subjected to multiple acts of

retaliation, including her eventual

termination, for complaining about her

treatment. Sheahan moved for summary

judgment on both of Rizzo’s claims. The

district court granted the motion,

finding that Mahon’s alleged conduct was

not so severe or pervasive that it

created a hostile work environment and

that the Cook County Merit Board’s

decision to terminate Rizzo was not an

act of retaliation. Although we disagree

with the district court’s assessment of

the severity of the alleged conduct, we

affirm its decision as to Rizzo’s claim

of sexual harassment because we find that

Mahon’s deplorable behavior did not occur

because of Rizzo’s sex but instead was

the product of Mahon’s animosity toward

Rizzo’s husband. Additionally, we find

that the district court properly found

that Rizzo has not proven that Sheahan’s

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for her termination were a pretext for

retaliation. Therefore, we will also
affirm the court’s grant of Sheahan’s

motion on this claim.

I. History

 Harriet Rizzo was employed by the Cook

County Sheriff’s Department from February

1, 1985 until her termination on February

3, 1994. At the time of her termination,

Rizzo worked as an investigator in the

Electronic Monitoring Unit (the "E.M.U.")

of the Sheriff’s Department of Community

Supervision and Intervention. Rizzo began

working in this position on July 14,

1991, and her immediate supervisor was

Assistant Chief Michael Mahon.

 Rizzo describes three specific incidents

of harassment by Mahon. The first

occurred some time in October of 1992.

Rizzo’s fifteen-year-old daughter,

Jennifer Simpson, was waiting for Rizzo

to finish her shift in the entranceway of

the E.M.U. Mahon noticed Simpson and

asked another officer who she was. The

officer told Mahon that Simpson was

Rizzo’s daughter. Mahon approached Rizzo,

asking her if Simpson was her daughter.

Rizzo indicated that she was, to which

Mahon responded, "Oh, you’re an old thing

aren’t you?" Taken aback by this comment,

Rizzo answered that she guessed she was.

Mahon then commented to Rizzo, "Well I’d

like to fuck her." Understandably, Rizzo

became very upset with Mahon, and she

verbally expressed her anger. Mahon

dismissed her outburst and walked away.

Rizzo told her husband, Joe Rizzo, who

worked as an investigator at the E.M.U.,

about Mahon’s comment. Mr. Rizzo told his

wife that he would report Mahon’s comment

to Chief Ricci, one of Mahon’s

supervisors. 

 The second incident Rizzo describes took

place on February 18, 1993. Mahon

approached Rizzo at work and told her

that he had seen Rizzo’s mother and

daughter at a restaurant the night before

and that he thought that Rizzo’s daughter

was very attractive. He again commented

to Rizzo that he "would like to fuck" her

daughter. Rizzo personally reported

Mahon’s conduct to Chief Ricci.

 The third incident occurred at some

unspecified time while Rizzo was standing

at a copying machine in the E.M.U. Mahon

walked by, "looked Rizzo over," and

stated in a suggestive manner that he
wished he was Rizzo’s husband. Two other

officers who heard this comment told

Mahon to "shut his mouth." Rizzo contends

that Mahon made similar suggestive

comments to Rizzo on several other

occasions. 

 On March 9, 1993, Rizzo tendered a

written memorandum to Chief Randy

Pietrowski, alleging that Mahon had sexu

ally harassed her. Investigator Barbara

Bennett of the Internal Investigations

Division ("IID") of the Cook County

Department of Corrections conducted an

investigation of Rizzo’s allegation.

After interviewing fifteen different peo

ple, including Rizzo, Mahon, Simpson, Mr.

Rizzo, and Rizzo’s mother, Bennett

reported the following findings:

Assistant Chief Michael Mahon has a

strong dislike and animosity against

Investigator Harriet Rizzo’s Husband, Joe

Rizzo, and has succeeded in directing his

hostility against Joe Rizzo through his

Wife, Harriet Rizzo, which by his conduct

has the purpose and the effect of

unreasonably interfering with Harriet

Rizzo’s work performance and creating an

intimidating, hostile and offensive

working environment.

Although it is clear that this

Investigator is unable to sustain the

Charges of sexual harassment against

Assistant Chief Michael Mahon as it is

written under the General Order 3.7A, it

is clear that Assistant Chief Mahon is

unable to perform effectively, fairly and

with reason as Assistant Chief of the

E.M.U., therefore his appointment to that

position should be seriously

reconsidered.

Based on the information obtained through

this Investigation, this Investigator

would classify the Charge in this Case as

"Simple Harassment," with the

understanding that there are no General

Orders written that would sustain that

Charge.

Therefore, the evidence that is presented

in its present state is such that it is

recommended that this Investigation be

classified as:

"INCONCLUSIVE"

Insufficient evidence to either prove or
disprove the Allegation.

 After filing her complaint, Rizzo

contends that she was subjected to

multiple threats and acts of retaliation.

On February 21, 1993, Assistant Acting

Deputy Director Dioguardi visited Rizzo

at her home to discuss her complaint.

According to Rizzo, Dioguardi sought to

intimidate her into withdrawing her

complaint against Mahon. He told her that

she would be fired if she insisted on

pursuing her claim. Dioguardi then became

upset with Rizzo and began screaming at

her. Both Rizzo’s mother and daughter

heard Dioguardi tell Rizzo that she

should not have reported this matter to

IID and that she should consider

transferring out of the E.M.U.

 After Mahon learned of Rizzo’s

complaint, he ordered her into his office

and proceeded to threaten to have her

terminated if she did not withdraw her

complaint. Mahon warned Rizzo that he had

a lot of "clout" at the E.M.U., that all

of the chiefs at the E.M.U. would back

him up, and that he had the ability to

make her and her husband’s lives very

miserable at work. Additionally, Rizzo

received threatening phone calls at work

and at home, warning that she and her

family would suffer if she did not

withdraw her complaint. She also contends

that after she submitted her written memo

in March, she was confronted at the

E.M.U. by Mahon, Dioguardi, and

Pietrowski. According to Rizzo, Mahon

told her that "supervisors don’t say

they’re sorry." Furthermore, Rizzo

alleges that Mahon threatened to alter

her work schedule, purposefully

interfered with her ability to take a

lunch break, and saw to it that she

received two disciplinary warnings and

was eventually transferred out of the

E.M.U. to the records department.

 Rizzo asserts that an investigation into

her educational background and her

eventual termination were acts of

retaliation for her having filed a

complaint against Mahon. According to

Rizzo, the review of her educational

credentials was a sham, designed to set

her up to be terminated, and that the

review did not begin until after she was

interviewed by Investigator Bennett

regarding her complaint in early May

1993. Although the Sheriff’s policy
addressing internal investigations of

sexual harassment complaints requires

investigators to observe "strict

confidentiality" and explains that "only

those with an immediate need to know may

become privy to the identity of the

parties," twoadditional investigators

from the Sheriff’s Inspector General’s

Office, Investigators Beckman and

Podolsky, sat in on the interview.

Investigator Beckman later interviewed

Rizzo on September 15, 1993 regarding her

educational background. At the interview,

Rizzo presented Beckman with a GED

certificate she alleged to have received

in November 1976, under her maiden name

of Harriet Nuzzo. Beckman then showed

Rizzo a copy of a GED certificate that he

said he had retrieved from her file

bearing the name Harriet Wagner. Rizzo

denied having any knowledge of how that

certificate ended up in her personnel

file. According to Rizzo, Beckman took

the certificate she brought to the

interview and she has not seen it since. 

 Rizzo was suspended from work without

pay on February 2, 1994, pending the

outcome of a hearing before the Cook

County Merit Board concerning her

educational background. The hearing

before the Board took place on June, 28,

1994, and the Board rendered its decision

on December 6, 1994, terminating Rizzo,

effective February 3, 1994. Rizzo was

terminated for (1) violating the Board’s

rule requiring a high school diploma or a

certification of equivalent formal

education in order to qualify for the

position of deputy sheriff and (2)

falsely indicating on her employment

application that she graduated from high

school or that she received a certificate

of equivalent formal education. Rizzo

sought administrative review of her

discharge in the Circuit Court of Cook

County, Illinois. The circuit court

affirmed the Merit Board’s decision to

terminate Rizzo, and she appealed that

decision to the Illinois Appellate Court.

While her challenge to her termination

was pending before the Illinois Court of

Appeals, Rizzo filed the current suit in

the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, claiming

that she had been sexually harassed by

Mahon, and then retaliated against for

complaining about his behavior in

violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e
et seq. As explained above, Sheahan moved

for summary judgment on both of Rizzo’s

claims, and the district court granted

the motion. Rizzo now appeals. 

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

 We review the district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. See Warsco v.

Preferred Technical Group, 258 F.3d 557,

563 (7th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is

proper if the "pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct.

2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In

determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists, we must construe

all facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505,

91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 

B. Rizzo’s Claim of Sexual Harassment

 Rizzo alleges that Mahon sexually

harassed her in violation of Title VII by

subjecting her to a hostile work environ

ment. In order to prevail on this claim,

Rizzo must establish that the alleged

harassment occurred because of her sex.

See Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259

F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2001); see also

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,

Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998,

140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998) (quoting Harris

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114

S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993)

(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The critical

issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is

whether members of one sex are exposed to

disadvantageous terms or conditions of

employment to which members of the other

sex are not exposed.")). Additionally, in

order to be actionable, the harassment

Rizzo complains of "must be sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [her] employment and create

an abusive working environment." Cooke v.

Stefani Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 564,

566 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
omitted). "In assessing the severity and

pervasiveness of [Mahon’s] conduct, we

look to all the circumstances, including

’the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance; and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.’" Russell v.

Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 243 F.3d

336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith

v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th

Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, Rizzo must

demonstrate that her work environment was

both objectively and subjectively

hostile. See Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 691.

We have explained that "the work

environment cannot be described as

’hostile’ for purposes of Title VII

unless a reasonable person would find it

offensive and the plaintiff actually

perceived it as such." Hostetler v.

Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 807

(7th Cir. 2000). The two comments Mahon

made to Rizzo regarding her daughter are

extremely severe. These sexually explicit

comments made to a mother by her

supervisor in reference to her fifteenyear-old daughter are significantly more

offensive than the typical crass comments

we have found to be insufficient to

constitute harassment in other cases.

See, e.g., McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t. of

Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.

1996); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co.,

50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995). Indeed,

as a mother, it may be more disturbing to

be subjected to these comments than to be

personally subjected to many of the types

of unwanted sexual advances we have seen

in reviewing other harassment claims.

Thus, it is no surprise that Investigator

Bennett, after interviewing a number of

people well acquainted with Rizzo, Mahon,

and Mahon’s behavior at the E.M.U.,

observed: "Mahon . . . by his conduct

ha[d] the purpose and the effect of

unreasonably interfering with Harriet

Rizzo’s work performance and creating an

intimidating, hostile, and offensive

working environment." We agree with this

finding and conclude that a reasonable

trier of fact could find that these

comments were sufficiently severe to

create a hostile work environment.

 We also find that a reasonable trier of

fact could conclude that Rizzo has

demonstrated that her work environment

was both objectively and subjectively
hostile. Not only would a reasonable

person find that Mahon’s behavior created

an offensive environment, it is likewise

clear from the record that Rizzo

perceived Mahon’s actions as having

subjected her to a hostile work

environment. After the first incident,

Rizzo expressed her distress directly to

Mahon and later pressed her husband to

report the behavior to Mahon’s

supervisor. When Mahon again graphically

suggested to Rizzo that he would like to

have sexual intercourse with her teenage

daughter, Rizzo complained directly to

Mahon’s supervisor and subsequently filed

a written complaint alleging that she had

been sexually harassed by Mahon. 

 Unfortunately, however, Rizzo’s claim

cannot succeed because she has produced

no evidence indicating that Mahon’s

offensive behavior towards her was based

on her sex. To the contrary, Rizzo spent

significant time both in her brief and at

oral argument documenting the animosity

Mahon harbored towards Rizzo’s husband,

and explaining that this animosity was

the reason Mahon was "going after" Rizzo.

Additionally, Investigator Bennett, who

ultimately concluded that Mahon’s

behavior constituted simple harassment,

reinforced Rizzo’s explanation, observing

that "Mahon has a strong dislike and

animosity against Investigator Harriet

Rizzo’s Husband, Joe Rizzo, and has

succeeded in directing his hostility

against Joe Rizzo through his Wife,

Harriet Rizzo." Although we have

concluded in other cases that a

reasonable trier of fact may deduce that

an individual is being harassed because

of her sex even where the harassing

behavior is not overtly gender based, see

Haugerud, 2001 WL 869361, at *9, this

case presents the unique situation where

the plaintiff has produced clear evidence

that the harassing behavior was not

motivated by sex, and thus does not

comply with the requirements of Title

VII, see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("Title

VII does not prohibit all verbal or

physical harassment in the workplace; it

is directed only at ’discriminat[ion] . .

. because of . . . sex.’"). Therefore,

Title VII does not provide a remedy for

Mahon’s conduct. Finally, because we are

unable to find that Rizzo was subjected

to a hostile work environment within the

meaning of Title VII, we need not analyze

whether Sheahan could be held vicariously
liable for Mahon’s actions.

C. Rizzo’s Claim of Retaliation 

 Rizzo also alleges that the

investigation into her educational

background and her eventual termination

were acts of retaliation prohibited by

Title VII for her having filed a

complaint against Mahon and then refusing

to withdraw that complaint. Sheahan

contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

precludes Rizzo from pursuing this claim

because her claim merely challenges the

rulings of the Illinois courts upholding

the Merit Board’s decision to terminate

her. In the alternative, Sheahan asserts

that, even if Rizzo is permitted to

pursue this claim, the district court

properly granted his motion for summary

judgment because there is no causal link

between the filing of Rizzo’s complaint

of harassment and the proceeding before

the Merit Board, especially because the

investigation and proceedings that led to

Rizzo’s termination were initiated before

she filed those charges.

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides

that lower federal courts are precluded

from exercising jurisdiction over claims

that would require them to review a final

judgment of a state court. See Rooker v.

Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct.

149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.

Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). "In

order to determine the applicability of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the

fundamental and appropriate question to

ask is whether the injury alleged by the

federal plaintiff resulted from the state

court judgment itself or is distinct from

that judgment." Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d

1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). "If the

injury alleged resulted from the state

court judgment itself, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine dictates that the federal courts

lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if

the state court judgment was erroneous or

unconstitutional." Centres v. Town of

Brookfield, Wisconsin, 148 F.3d 699, 702

(7th Cir. 1998). If, however, "the injury

alleged is distinct from that judgment,

i.e., the party maintains an injury apart

from the loss in state court and not

’inextricably intertwined’ with the state

judgment . . . res judicata may apply,

but Rooker-Feldman does not." Garry, 82

F.3d at 1365-66. Thus, "the pivotal
inquiry is whether the federal plaintiff

seeks to set aside a state court judgment

or whether [she] is, in fact, presenting

an independent claim." Long v. Shorebank

Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.

1999) (quotation omitted).

 Rizzo contends that she was terminated

in retaliation for having filed a

complaint of sexual harassment

againstMahon. The decision to terminate

Rizzo was made by the Cook County Merit

Board. Rizzo appealed this decision and

both the Illinois Circuit Court and

Appellate Court affirmed the Board’s

ruling. Although Rizzo was certainly

displeased with the conclusion reached by

the Illinois courts, the injury she

alleges before this court did not result

from the state court judgment. Instead,

Rizzo filed this claim because she did

not receive the relief she sought from

the Illinois courts--a determination that

she should not have been terminated. Our

cases contemplating the applicability of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have

recognized the difference between "a

federal claim alleging injury caused by a

state court judgment (necessarily raising

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) and a

federal claim alleging a prior injury

that a state court failed to remedy

(raising a potential res judicata problem

but not Rooker-Feldman)." Garry, 82 F.3d

at 1366. Thus, because the injury Rizzo

alleges in this court was incurred before

she sought relief in state court, we find

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

apply to her claim of retaliation.

 Rizzo’s claim does, however, raise a

potential res judicata problem. Also

known as claim preclusion, res judicata

is an affirmative defense designed to

prevent the "relitigation of claims that

were or could have been asserted in an

earlier proceeding." D & K Props. Crystal

Lake v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 122

F.3d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1997). By asking

us to find that she was terminated in

retaliation for filing a complaint, Rizzo

essentially asks us to ignore the fact

that the Illinois courts affirmed the

Merit Board’s decision to terminate her.

See Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367. ("A plaintiff

who loses and tries again encounters the

law of preclusion. The second complaint

shows that the plaintiff wants to ignore

rather than upset the judgment of the

state tribunal.") However, because
Sheahan did not raise this affirmative

defense before the district court, it has

been waived, and therefore, we need not

further consider its applicability to

Rizzo’s claim. See Marcus v. Sullivan,

926 F.2d 604, 615 (7th Cir. 1991) Thus,

we proceed to the merits of Rizzo’s

retaliation claim. 

 To prevail on her claim of retaliation,

Rizzo must either present direct evidence

of retaliation or use a burden-shifting

approach. See Hoffman-Dombrowski v.

Arlington Int’l Racecourse, Inc., 254

F.3d 644, 653 (7th Cir. 2001). Although

Rizzo alleges that Mahon and Chief

Dioguardi threatened to have her

terminated if she continued with her

complaint against Mahon, these

allegations do not constitute direct

evidence of her claim that the Merit

Board’s decision to terminate her was an

act of retaliation that violated Title

VII. See Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241

F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001) ("When a

plaintiff proceeds under the direct proof

method, allegedly discriminatory

statements are relevant only if they are

both made by the decisionmaker and

related to the employment decision at

issue.") (quotation omitted). Therefore,

she must pursue her claim through the

burden-shifting framework provided in our

case law. Under this framework, Rizzo

must establish a prima facie case of

retaliation by demonstrating that: (1)

she engaged in a statutorily protected

activity; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action subsequent to her

filing the complaint against Mahon; and

(3) there was a causal link between the

adverse action and the protected

activity. See Dunn v. Nordstrom, Inc.,

No. 00-2958, 2001 WL 898757, at *2 (7th

Cir. Aug. 10, 2001); Sanchez v.

Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.

1999). If Rizzo is able to prove these

elements by a preponderance of the

evidence, then the burden shifts to

Sheahan to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Rizzo’s

termination. See Hoffman-Dombrowski, 254

F.3d at 653. Once Sheahan provides such a

reason, the burden shifts back to Rizzo

who must then demonstrate that Sheahan’s

stated reason for terminating her was

merely a pretext for retaliation. See

Alexander v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health and

Family Services, No. 00-2603, 2001 WL

965938, at *6 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001). 
 A plaintiff may establish that the

reasons offered for her termination were

a pretext for retaliation by presenting

either direct evidence indicating that

the defendant was "’more likely than not

motivated by a discriminatory reason,’ or

indirect evidence showing that the

defendant[’s] stated reasons are not

credible." Id. (quoting Sarsha v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th

Cir. 1993)). Because Rizzo has provided

no direct evidence of retaliation in this

case, she must rely on indirect evidence

to demonstrate that Sheahan’s stated

reasons were pretextual. To do so, Rizzo

must prove "one of the following: (1)

Defendant’s explanation of Plaintiff’s

discharge had no basis in fact, or (2)

the explanation was not the ’real’

reason, or (3) at least the reason stated

was insufficient to warrant the

[allegedly retaliatory action]." Johnson

v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 00-3827, 2001 WL

818874, at *3 (7th Cir. July 20, 2001)

(quotation omitted).

 Rizzo has met the first two requirements

of her prima facie case: she engaged in a

statutorily protected right when she

filed a complaint against Mahon for

sexual harassment and she was terminated

after she filed this complaint. It is not

as clear, however, that Rizzo has shown a

causal link between her termination and

her filing the complaint against Mahon.

"To prove a causal link, the plaintiff is

required to show that the employer would

not have taken the adverse action ’but

for’ the plaintiff’s engagement in the

protected activity." Id. (citing McKenzie

v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473,

483 (7th Cir. 1996)). The district court

shared our concern with this aspect of

Rizzo’s prima facie case; however, it

aptly recognized that even assuming argu

endo that Rizzo has established her prima

facie case, she still cannot prevail. See

Rizzo v. Sheahan, No. 97 C 3995, 2000 WL

679982, at *16-24 (N.D. Ill. May 22,

2000). Sheahan has provided two

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for Rizzo’s termination by offering the

reasoning of the Merit Board’s decision:

(1) Rizzo violated the Board’s rule

requiring a high school diploma or a

certification of equivalent formal

education in order to qualify for the

position of deputy sheriff and (2) she

misrepresented on her employment
application and questionnaire that she

graduated from Gage Park High School in

1977 and misrepresented on her

questionnaire that she received a GED

certificate from Daley College in 1978-

79. Thus, Rizzo would be required to

prove that these legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her

termination were a pretext for

retaliation. See Alexander, 2001 WL

965938, at *6. A review of Rizzo’s

allegations reveals that she has failed

to meet this burden.

 Rizzo argues that the following

allegations demonstrate that her

termination was an act of retaliation and

that Sheahan’s stated reasons for her

termination were a pretext for that

retaliation: Mahon threatened to have

Rizzo fired if she did not withdraw her

complaint; Chief Dioguardi told Rizzo

that she would lose her job if she

continued to pursue her complaint; she

received phone calls threatening that she

and her family would suffer if she did

not drop her complaint; Mahon interfered

with her ability to take a lunch break;

Mahon made her work overtime; she

received two disciplinary warnings; she

was transferred out of the E.M.U.; she

was suspended without pay while other

individuals under investigation were

permitted to continue working or were

suspended with pay; and she was

terminated. We cannot agree that these

allegations establish pretext.

 Although pathetic, Mahon and Dioguardi’s

threats, as well as Mahon’s actions

designed to inconvenience Rizzo at work,

fail to demonstrate that the stated

reasons for Rizzo’s termination were a

pretext for retaliation. Rizzo has not

presented any evidence linking Mahon or

Dioguardi to any aspect of the

investigation of her educational

background or the Cook County Merit

Board’s decision to terminate her. Thus,

without more, these allegations are

insufficient to undermine the stated

reasons for Rizzo’s termination.

 Likewise, the phone calls Rizzo received

suggesting that she and her family would

suffer if she did not drop her complaint

fail to establish pretext. Rizzo implies

that Mahon made these telephone calls;

however, she provides no evidence to

support this assertion. Furthermore, even
if Mahon did make these calls, there is

simply no evidence indicating that any of

the individuals involved in the decision

to terminate Rizzo had any knowledge of

these calls or that they affected the

Merit Board’s decision in any way. 

 The investigation of Rizzo’s educational

background also fails to prove that

Sheahan’s legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons were a pretext for retaliation.

Although Rizzo correctly points out that

Investigator Beckman did not conduct a

personal interview with her regarding her

educational background until after she

had given a statement to Investigator

Bennett pertaining to her sexual

harassment complaint, this fact does not

prove that Rizzo was terminated for her

decision to file a complaint. It is

undisputed that the department-wide

investigation of individuals suspected of

having improper educational credentials

began in early September of 1992, over

six months before Rizzo filed her

complaint of sexual harassment. It is

also undisputed that Rizzo, by way of a

different last name, was on the initial

list of suspected employees compiled in

the fall of 1992. Furthermore, over five

months elapsed between Rizzo’s interview

with Bennett regarding her complaint and

her interview with Beckman about her

educational background. 

 Additionally, the fact that Investigator

Beckman was present during Rizzo’s

interview with Investigator Bennett does

not suggest that the grounds provided for

Rizzo’s termination were a pretext for

retaliation. While Beckman’s knowledge of

Rizzo’s complaint seems to exceed the

limits of the Sheriff’s confidentiality

policy, this fact, in the context of the

actual situation offers no evidence of

pretext. Investigator Beckman, along with

other investigators from the Sheriff’s

Inspector General’s Office, was

instructed to begin investigating some

one hundred individuals, including Rizzo,

in September of 1992, six months before

Rizzo filed her complaint. 

 Finally, Rizzo’s transfer to a different

facility and her subsequent suspension

without pay do not prove that Sheahan’s

stated reasons for her termination were a

pretext for retaliation. Despite her

allegation that this transfer was somehow

Mahon’s doing, the only relevant evidence
in the record indicates that this

transfer in January of 1994 was

temporary, pending the Merit Board’s

review of the investigation of Rizzo’s

educational background. Rizzo has failed

to provide any evidence that this

transfer was related to her decision to

file a complaint against Mahon. Likewise,

the record indicates that Rizzo’s

suspension without pay was also a

temporary step taken in connection with

the investigation of her educational

background and that it was unrelated to

her sexual harassment complaint. Here

again Rizzo fails to rebut this evidence.

We are not persuaded by Rizzo’s

unsupported assertion that other

employees who were also under

investigation were either allowed to

continue to work or were suspended with

pay. Although we are to view the facts in

the light most favorable to Rizzo,

drawing all reasonable inferences in her

favor, we are not required to infer that

she was terminated because she filed a

complaint against Mahon based only on her

unsubstantiated statement that other

individuals under investigation were

treated more favorably. See Frost Nat’l

Bank v. Midwest Autohaus, Inc., 241 F.3d

862, 868 ("A court’s obligation to draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of a

non-moving party . . . does not require

that court to stretch existing evidence

to reach conclusions or bolster arguments

it could not otherwise support.").

Therefore, we will affirm the district

court’s grant of Sheahan’s motion for

summary judgement on Rizzo’s claim that

her termination was in retaliation for

her having filed her complaint.

D. Rizzo’s Claim of Pre-Termination

Retaliation 

 Rizzo’s final claim on appeal alleges

that she was subjected to various acts of

retaliation in violation of Title VII

before she was terminated. This claim

asserts that each individual allegation

she offered as evidence that her

termination was an act of retaliation is,

in and of itself, a violation of Title

VII. Adverse employment actions other

than termination can constitute

retaliation in violation of Title VII.

See Knox v. Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th

Cir. 1996) ("There is nothing in the law

of retaliation that restricts the type of

retaliatory act that might be visited
upon an employee who seeks to invoke her

rights by filing a complaint. It need

only be an adverse employment action . .

. ."). However, for the reasons explained

below, we do not find any of these

allegations to be meritorious.

 Rizzo alleges that her transfer out of

the E.M.U. was an act of retaliation,

orchestrated by Mahon, which resulted in

her being placed in a position that

offered significantly less responsibility

than her previous position. This claim

fails regardless of whether the position

to which she was transferred presented

such a decline in responsibility that it

constituted an adverse employment action

because she has failed to establish that

the reasons provided for her transfer

were a pretext for retaliation. As noted

above, the record indicates that Rizzo’s

transfer was a temporary step taken in

connection with the investigation into

her educational background. Although

Rizzo asserts that her transfer was

Mahon’s doing, she presents no evidence

to support this contention or rebut

Sheahan’s stated reason for her transfer.

Without more, Rizzo cannot prevail on

this claim. 

 Rizzo also contends that her suspension

without pay was an act of retaliation

that violated Title VII. As explained

above, however, the only evidence Rizzo

provides in support of this allegation is

her unsubstantiated statement that three

other individuals also under

investigation were either allowed to

continue working or were suspended with

pay. Without affidavits from these

individuals, or some other form of

evidence corroborating her statements,

Rizzo cannot meet her burden to establish

a claim of retaliation. 

 Finally, we combine the rest of the

allegations Rizzo brings before this

court because they all fail for the same

reason. Although disconcerting, we find

that the threats, phone calls, and

inconveniences Rizzo faced at work did

not "alter[ ] the terms or conditions" of

her employment such that they can be

characterized as adverse employment

actions that constitute instances of

actionable retaliation in violation of

Title VII. See Spearman v. Ford Motor

Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000).
III. Conclusion

 For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM

the district court’s grant of Sheahan’s

motion for summary judgment on Rizzo’s

claims.