[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13574

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-02477-VMC-EAJ

KENNAN G. DANDAR, 

DANDAR & DANDAR, P.A., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC., 

F. WALLACE POPE, JR., 

Wally, 

JOHNSON POPE BOKOR RUPPEL & BURNS L.L.P., 

DAVID MISCAVIGE, 

Defendants-Appellees,

ROBERT V. POTTER, JR.,

Defendant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 10, 2015)

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 1 of 8 
2

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kennan Dandar and Dandar & Dandar, P.A. (collectively “Dandar”) appeal 

from the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the Church 

of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., et al. (the Church), seeking to 

enjoin a state court from imposing sanctions and costs against Dandar. On appeal, 

Dandar argues that the district court erred in dismissing the declaratory and 

injunctive claims based on Younger1 abstention because the state court does not 

have jurisdiction to impose sanctions against him, and the state court’s proceeding 

is not “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial 

functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 588, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 

(2013). Dandar also argues that the state proceeding is in bad faith and he will 

suffer irreparable injury if it is allowed to go forward, and therefore, Younger

abstention is not appropriate. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. 2

I.

This appeal presents the latest development in a long-standing dispute 

between Dandar and the Church. In 1997, Dandar represented the Estate of Lisa 

McPherson in a wrongful-death case against the Church in a Florida state court. 

 1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

2 Dandar’s unopposed motion to file a reply brief out of time is granted. 

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 2 of 8 
3

The case ultimately settled in 2004, and, as part of the settlement, Dandar agreed to 

refrain from “any adversarial proceedings of any description against the [Church] 

under any circumstances at any time.” The settlement agreement provided that the 

state court overseeing the McPherson case would “retain jurisdiction to enforce the 

executory terms of this Confidential Settlement Agreement . . . .” Despite the 

settlement agreement, Dandar filed a wrongful-death action against the Church in

2009 in federal court on behalf of the Estate of Kyle Brennan.

The Church sought to enforce the terms of the McPherson settlement in state 

court, and Dandar moved to declare the settlement agreement void. The state court 

ordered Dandar to withdraw from the Brennan case, held him in contempt, and 

issued monetary sanctions.3

 While that dispute was on-going, Dandar filed the 

instant action in federal court under the Declaratory Judgment Act and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, seeking an injunction to prevent a final hearing in state court on damages 

connected to his violation of the settlement agreement. The Church moved to 

dismiss based on Younger abstention. The district court granted the motion with 

respect to Dandar’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and stayed 

 3

 Dandar filed an “involuntary motion to withdraw” in the Brennan case, which the 

federal district court denied. After the state court ordered Dandar to show cause why he should 

not be held in criminal contempt for failing to follow the court’s order, the federal district court 

enjoined the state court’s enforcement of the sanction order. This court reversed. See Estate of 

Brennan ex rel. Britton v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., 645 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th 

Cir. 2011). The district court later granted summary judgment in favor of the Church in the 

Brennan case, and this court affirmed. See Estate of Brennan ex rel. Britton v. Church of 

Scientology Flag Service Org., 490 F. App’x 229 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 3 of 8 
4

Dandar’s § 1983 claim for damages pending completion of the state-court 

proceeding. 

On appeal, this court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications, Inc. In March 2014, the 

state court entered a final judgment, imposing sanctions, fees, and costs in excess 

of $1 million. Dandar’s appeal from the state-court order is pending. (See Florida 

Second District Court of Appeal Docket No. 2D14-1511).

When the district court reconsidered the case on remand, it again concluded 

that abstention was appropriate. The court found that the state-court proceeding 

was a “civil proceeding involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the 

state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 

134 S.Ct. at 591 (citations omitted). The district court noted that the pending 

appeal in state court did not change its analysis because Dandar raised the issue of 

the state court’s jurisdiction to sanction him in both the state-court and federal 

proceedings. The district court further found that the additional abstention factors 

in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 

423 (1982), supported abstention, and that none of the exceptions to abstention, 

such as bad faith or irreparable injury, applied. Accordingly, the court dismissed 

Dandar’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and stayed his claims for 

damages under § 1983. This is Dandar’s appeal.

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 4 of 8 
5

II.

We review a district court’s abstention decision for an abuse of discretion. 

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Federal courts 

have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear cases for which the courts have 

jurisdiction. Id. Thus, “non-abstention remains the rule.” Id. The Younger

abstention doctrine is “an extraordinary and narrow exception” to that rule. Green 

v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal 

citations omitted). The special circumstances that render abstention appropriate 

are limited to situations in which there is: (1) a parallel and pending state criminal 

proceeding; (2) a state civil enforcement proceeding; or (3) a state civil proceeding 

involving an order that is “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 

perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 588, 591. 

Once the court finds one of these exceptional circumstances is present, there 

are “additional factors” to be considered. Id. at 593 (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics 

Comm., 457 U.S. at 432). These include circumstances in which there is an 

ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests and 

provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges. Id.

Even if one of the three circumstances exists, and the Middlesex County

factors favor abstention, Younger abstention is not appropriate when “(1) there is 

evidence that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable 

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 5 of 8 
6

injury would occur; or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where 

constitutional issues can be raised.” Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258,

1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53-54). To establish the 

bad faith exception, a litigant must make a substantial allegation that shows actual 

bad faith. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48. A litigant shows irreparable injury if a state 

law is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” 

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 

366 (1989) (NOPSI). Finally, litigants need only be afforded an opportunity to 

fairly pursue their constitutional claims in state court in order for Younger

abstention to be appropriate. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 (1976). As long as 

the litigant is not procedurally prevented from raising the constitutional claims in 

state court and thereafter petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court, this exception to abstention is not triggered. Pompey v. Broward 

Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996).

III.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 

Dandar’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Younger abstention

doctrine. First, the court properly determined that there is a state civil proceeding 

involving an order that is “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 6 of 8 
7

perform their judicial functions.” 4 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 588, 591. 

Here, there is a pending state proceeding involving enforcement of a settlement 

agreement entered into in a state-court case. And that settlement agreement 

specifically provided that the state court retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms. 

The state court is thus seeking to protect the viability of its mediation system.

5

 Cf.

Juidice, 430 U.S. at 329-30 (requiring abstention where state-court contempt 

proceedings were pending because the “contempt power lies at the core of the 

administration of a State’s judicial system.”); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 

481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987) (concluding that abstention was required to enable a state 

court to enforce its own orders). For the district court to address claims that 

question the manner in which a state court handles the enforcement of its orders 

would directly cause the federal court to interfere with a state court’s 

administration of its duties. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (abstention is necessary 

where a federal injunction would create an “undue interference with state 

proceedings.”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found 

that the case fell within one of the enumerated circumstances. See Sprint 

Commc’ns, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 591. 

 4

 Because the district court concluded that the third circumstance favoring abstention 

was present here, the court did not consider the second circumstance, that is, whether there was a 

state civil enforcement proceeding. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. 134 S.Ct. at 588, 591.

5

 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.730 permits a state court to impose sanctions to 

enforce the outcome of court-ordered mediation. 

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 7 of 8 
8

Next, having found that one of the three Younger abstention circumstances 

existed, the court properly applied the additional Middlesex County factors to 

determine whether abstention was appropriate. In this case, the state proceedings 

are judicial in nature and represent important state interests, as state courts must be 

empowered to enforce their own orders and judgments. Moreover, Dandar has had 

opportunities to raise his federal challenges in these state proceedings and there has 

been no procedural bar to his doing so. Pompey, 95 F.3d at 1551. 

Finally, none of the exceptions to abstention exist here. Dandar has shown 

neither bad faith nor irreparable injury because his arguments for both essentially 

challenge the merits of the state-court proceedings, which we and the district court 

cannot reach because of the full faith and credit due the state court’s 

determinations. Estate of Brennan ex rel. Britton v. Church of Scientology Flag 

Serv. Org., Inc., 645 F.3d 1267, 1276, n.5 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1738). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-13574 Date Filed: 08/10/2015 Page: 8 of 8