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ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-13-1041-KiTaD

)

RONALD A. NEFF, ) Bk. No. 1:11-bk-22424-VK

)

Debtor. ) Adv. No. 1:12-ap-01027-VK

)

 )

)

DOUGLAS J. DeNOCE, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) O P I N I O N

)

RONALD A. NEFF, )

)

Appellee. )

)

 )

Submitted Without Oral Argument

on November 21, 2013

Filed - February 4, 2014

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Victoria S. Kaufman, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Patrick L. Swanstrom, on brief for appellant

Douglas J. DeNoce; Michael D. Kwasigroch on brief,

for appellee Ronald Neff.

 

Before: KIRSCHER, TAYLOR and DUNN, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

FEB 04 2014

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter, code and rule 1

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be referred to as “Civil

Rules.”

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KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judge:

Creditor, Douglas J. DeNoce (“DeNoce”), appeals the orders

granting partial summary judgment to chapter 7 debtor, Ronald A. 1

Neff (“Neff”), and denying DeNoce’s cross-motion for partial

summary judgment. Approximately eighteen months before Neff filed

the instant chapter 7 case, he had filed the first of two

successive chapter 13 cases, both of which were dismissed. During

the course of his first chapter 13 case and about seventeen months

before he filed the instant chapter 7 case, Neff transferred

certain real property to his revocable living trust. DeNoce

contended that the transfer was fraudulent and sought to deny

Neff’s discharge under § 727(a)(2). The bankruptcy court held

that Neff’s discharge would not be denied, because any alleged

fraudulent transfer occurred more than one year before the chapter

7 petition was filed, and the one-year “lookback” period was not

subject to equitable tolling based on Neff’s prior bankruptcies. 

Accordingly, it granted partial summary judgment to Neff on that

issue and denied it as to DeNoce.

The issue presented here is a matter of first impression in

this circuit: Whether the one-year “lookback” period in

§ 727(a)(2)(A) is a “statute of limitations” subject to equitable

tolling or whether it is a “statute of repose” not subject to

equitable tolling. We hold that the one-year period is a statute
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 Neff’s dental license was revoked by the California dental 2

board in January 2010 due to his substance abuse and other issues.

 DeNoce, a former attorney, was disbarred by the California 3

State Bar in 1997.

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of repose, and we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Events leading to Neff’s first bankruptcy case

In 2007, Neff, a former dentist, treated DeNoce with the 2 3

surgical placement of eight dental implants. It was a major fullday surgery. Within a month or so, each tooth had either fallen

out or failed. Neff performed further surgery to correct the

eight implants, but, within a couple of months, each fell out or

failed again. DeNoce still apparently suffers from the improper

implant procedures. In October 2008, DeNoce filed suit against

Neff in state court for medical malpractice. Ultimately, DeNoce

was awarded a judgment of $310,000.

In March 2008, a few months prior to DeNoce’s filing of the

medical malpractice action, Neff executed a revocable living trust

(the “Retirement Trust”). The trust res consisted solely of

certain real property (the “Lake Harbor Property”), which Neff had

owned since 1978. According to Neff, after executing the

Retirement Trust at his attorney’s office, he was sent home to

prepare a quitclaim deed transferring the Lake Harbor Property

from himself to the Retirement Trust. It is undisputed, however,

that the quitclaim deed was not recorded until two years later, on

April 7, 2010.

B. The first bankruptcy case 

Neff filed his first chapter 13 bankruptcy case on March 4,
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 About one year later, on September 27, 2011, the chapter 13 4

trustee also moved to dismiss Neff’s Second Bankruptcy Case for a

variety of reasons, including an objection to Neff’s use of the

Lake Harbor Property as a retirement vehicle and the fact that

Neff had insufficient income to fund a plan.

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2010 (the “First Bankruptcy Case”). It was dismissed on April 9,

2010, for Neff’s failure to appear at the scheduled § 341(a)

meeting of creditors.

C. The second bankruptcy case

Neff filed his second chapter 13 bankruptcy case two months

later on June 18, 2010 (the “Second Bankruptcy Case”). In his

Schedule B, Neff reported that the Retirement Trust owned the Lake

Harbor Property. He did not disclose the recent transfer of it to

the Retirement Trust in Question 10 of his Statement of Financial

Affairs (“SOFA”).

During the Second Bankruptcy Case, the bankruptcy court

became aware of the transfer of the Lake Harbor Property and the

fact that the transfer occurred during the First Bankruptcy Case. 

Facing resultant dismissal, Neff agreed to record a quitclaim deed

transferring the Lake Harbor Property back to himself. He

thereafter filed an amended SOFA, reporting both the initial and

subsequent transfers.

In September 2010, DeNoce moved to dismiss Neff’s Second

Bankruptcy Case for bad faith, contending, among other things,

that the transfer of the Lake Harbor Property to the Retirement

Trust during the course of his First Bankruptcy Case was

fraudulent. After four days of evidentiary hearings on the 4

matter, Neff agreed to withdraw his opposition to the motion to

dismiss as long as he was not barred from filing a chapter 7 case. 
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The bankruptcy court accepted his withdrawal and orally granted

DeNoce’s motion dismissing the Second Bankruptcy Case. It entered

the related order on November 14, 2011.

While the motion to dismiss the Second Bankruptcy Case was

pending, DeNoce had filed a first amended nondischargeability

complaint against Neff on July 22, 2011, seeking to except his

debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6). However, once Neff’s

Second Bankruptcy Case was dismissed, DeNoce’s § 523 action also

was dismissed.

D. Neff’s third bankruptcy case and the § 727 action

Neff filed a third bankruptcy case under chapter 7 on October

24, 2011 (the “Third Bankruptcy Case”), before the order

dismissing the Second Bankruptcy Case was entered on November 14.

DeNoce filed a complaint seeking to deny Neff’s discharge

under § 727(a)(2) (the “727 Complaint”). DeNoce contended that

the transfer of the Lake Harbor Property into the Retirement Trust

and Neff’s acts and schemes to conceal it were fraudulent and done

with the intent to avoid paying his creditors’ claims. Neff’s

answer denied the allegations and asserted several affirmative

defenses, including that the 727 Complaint failed to state a claim

for which relief could be granted and that it was barred by all

applicable statutes of limitations.

Neff later moved for partial summary judgment on DeNoce’s

claim under § 727(a)(2)(A) (the “PSJ Motion”) on the basis that

the transfer of the Lake Harbor Property into the Retirement

Trust, which occurred on April 7, 2010, was more than one year

prior to the filing of the Third Bankruptcy Case on October 24,

2011. Alternatively, the date upon which Neff transferred the
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 Because DeNoce had not properly set the PSJ Cross-Motion 5

for hearing, the bankruptcy court did not hear that motion until

August 22, 2012. It is not entirely clear what happened after

that, but the PSJ Cross-Motion was ultimately denied.

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Lake Harbor Property back into his name — August 4, 2010 — was

still more than one year prior to the filing of the Third

Bankruptcy Case. Therefore, argued Neff, DeNoce’s claim could not

support a denial of discharge, and he was entitled to discharge

notwithstanding § 727(a)(2)(A) as a matter of law.

DeNoce opposed the PSJ Motion and filed a cross-motion for

partial summary judgment (“PSJ Cross-Motion”), contending he was

entitled to judgment on his claims under § 727(a)(2)(A) and (B). 

DeNoce contended that the one-year limitation did not apply

because Neff had filed three consecutive bankruptcy cases, and so

the actual bankruptcy “process” started with his First Bankruptcy

Case in March 2010. Thus, he argued that the “postpetition”

transfer on April 7, 2010, supported a claim under § 727(a)(2)(B). 

Alternatively he argued that since the transfer occurred within

one year prior to his Second Bankruptcy Case filed on June 18,

2010, it supported a claim under § 727(a)(2)(A). Finally, DeNoce

contended that the one-year limitation did not apply because Neff

continued to conceal the transfer, claiming it as an exempt

retirement asset up until the day before he filed his PSJ Motion.

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the PSJ Motion on July

11, 2012. After some preliminary argument by the parties, the 5

court ruled that the one-year provision in § 727(a)(2)(A) was a

statute of repose and not subject to equitable tolling. Hence,

assuming that the transfer occurred when the quitclaim deed

transferring the Lake Harbor Property from Neff to the Retirement
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Trust was recorded on April 7, 2010, that was more than one year

prior to the filing of the Third Bankruptcy Case and could not be

the basis for a claim under § 727(a)(2)(A). Therefore, because

the initial transfer occurred outside the statutory period, Neff

would not be denied a discharge.

An order granting the PSJ Motion was entered on August 10,

2012 (the “PSJ Order”).

DeNoce timely filed a motion to reconsider the PSJ Order,

which the bankruptcy court denied. The only issue before it was

whether the one-year “lookback” period in § 727(a)(2)(A) is a

statute of repose or a statute of limitations subject to equitable

tolling. Noting the lack of any controlling authority on the

matter, the bankruptcy court reviewed Womble v. Pher Partners (In

re Womble), 299 B.R. 810 (N.D. Tex. 2003), aff’d on other grounds,

108 F. App’x 993 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Womble”), which, relying upon

Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002), held that the one-year

period in § 727(a)(2)(A) is a limitation period that can be

equitably tolled, and a Fourth Circuit case, Tidewater Fin. Co. v.

Williams (In re Williams), 498 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2007)

(2-1 decision) (“Tidewater”), which criticized Womble and held

that the eight-year lookback period for denial of discharge under

§ 727(a)(8) is a statute of repose not subject to equitable

tolling. The bankruptcy court found Tidewater’s analysis more

convincing and reasoned that the one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A)

was more akin to the period in § 727(a)(8) than the three-year

lookback period in § 523(a)(1)(A) and § 507(a)(8)(A), the statutes

at issue in Young. Consequently, the bankruptcy court held that

§ 727(a)(2)(A) represents a statute of repose that is not subject
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 Generally, orders granting partial summary without the 6

certification required by Civil Rule 54(b) are interlocutory

orders. Belli v. Temkim (In re Belli), 268 B.R. 851, 856-57 (9th

Cir. BAP 2001). “Unlike final orders, interlocutory orders decide

merely one aspect of the case without disposing of the case in its

entirety on the merits.” Thomas J. Salerno & Jordan A. Kroop,

Bankruptcy Litigation & Practice: A Practitioner’s Guide

§ 3.16[B], at 3-63 (4th ed. rev’d 2007-2013); see also United

States v. 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The bankruptcy court granted the PSJ Motion only as to DeNoce’s

claim under § 727(a)(2)(A). However, once the bankruptcy court

dismissed the 727 Complaint, the PSJ Order became a final

appealable order. Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d

1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1994) (judgments whose finality would

normally depend upon a Civil Rule 54(b) certification may be

treated as final and appealable if remaining claims subsequently

have been finally resolved).

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to equitable tolling.

DeNoce’s remaining claims for relief on his 727 Complaint

were later dismissed without prejudice to his right to appeal the

PSJ Order.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334

and 157(b)(2)(J). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.6

III. ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court err in granting the PSJ Motion and

denying the PSJ Cross-Motion? Specifically, did it err in ruling

that the one-year “lookback” period in § 727(a)(2)(A) is a statute

of repose not subject to equitable tolling?

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In an action for denial of discharge, we review: (1) the

bankruptcy court’s determinations of the historical facts for

clear error; (2) its selection of the applicable legal rules under

§ 727 de novo; and (3) its application of the facts to those rules

requiring the exercise of judgments about values animating the
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rules de novo. Searles v. Riley (In re Searles), 317 B.R. 368,

373 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d, 212 F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The bankruptcy court’s interpretation of § 727(a)(2)(A) is a legal

conclusion we review de novo. See B-Real, LLC v. Chaussee (In re

Chaussee), 399 B.R. 225, 229 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and are

bound by the same principles as the bankruptcy court. Marciano v.

Fahs (In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 35 (9th Cir. BAP 2011), aff’d,

708 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper when

the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is “no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Civil Rule 56(a),

incorporated by Rule 7056. The party moving for summary judgment

bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings,

discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Governing law

Section 727(a)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part, that the

bankruptcy court must deny discharge if, “the debtor, with intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has transferred,

removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed . . . (A) property of

the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the

petition.” The burden of proof is on the objector to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the debtor transferred or

concealed property, (2) the property belonged to the debtor,

(3) the transfer occurred within one year of the bankruptcy
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filing, and (4) the debtor executed the transfer with the intent

to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. Aubrey v. Thomas (In re

Aubrey), 111 B.R. 268, 273 (9th Cir. BAP 1990). “[A]cts and

intentions occurring prior to this period will be forgiven.” 

Hughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 122 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.

1997) (citing Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1531 (3d Cir.

1993)). Section 727 is to be construed liberally in favor of

debtors and strictly against the creditor. First Beverly Bank v.

Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986).

B. Statutory language of § 727(a)(2)(A)

We start, as with any other statutory argument, by reviewing

the language of the statute. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S.

526, 534 (2004). “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the

sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition

required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to

its terms.” Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union

Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (other citations

omitted). A court must consider “the language itself, the

specific context in which that language is used, and the broader

context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).

In reviewing the language of § 727(a)(2)(A), it does not

expressly provide for tolling as do some other Bankruptcy Code

sections, such as § 108, which extends the statutes of limitations

for the benefit of trustees and creditors preserving claims

impacted by the bankruptcy filing, and § 507(a)(8)(A), which tolls
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 Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II) was codified in 2005 as a 7

result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Young v. United States,

535 U.S. 43 (2002).

 We note that DeNoce was never precluded from pursuing a 8

nondischargeability action against Neff under § 523 in any of the

three bankruptcy cases, which he did, to no avail.

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certain lookback periods for tax claims under § 523(a)(1).7

Nonetheless, DeNoce argues that not tolling the one-year period in

§ 727(a)(2)(A) is inequitable, because a debtor could file

successive chapter 13 cases, dismiss them, and then file a

chapter 7 case once the one-year period has expired to avoid

denial of discharge.8

C. Statutes of repose versus statutes of limitations

“A statute of limitations creates an affirmative defense

where plaintiff failed to bring suit within a specified period of

time after his cause of action accrued, often subject to tolling

principles.” Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid

Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1998); P. Stolz Family P’ship v.

Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2004)). “By contrast, a

statute of repose extinguishes a plaintiff’s cause of action after

the passage of a fixed period of time, usually measured from one

of the defendant’s acts.” Id. (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship, 355

F.3d at 102–03). In other words, a statute of limitations sets a

time limit for bringing an action; a statute of repose sets a time

period in which an event giving rise to a claim for relief must

occur.

A statute of repose “bar[s] any suit that is brought after a

specified time since the defendant acted . . . even if this period
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ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.” 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 

Statutes of repose are not concerned with the plaintiff’s

diligence; they are concerned with the defendant’s peace. 

Underwood Cotton Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine (Am.), Inc., 288

F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 2002). “Put more bluntly, there is a time

when allowing people to put their wrongful conduct behind them —

and out of the law’s reach — is more important than providing

those wronged with a legal remedy, even if the victims never had

the opportunity to pursue one.” Lyon v. Aguilar (In re Aguilar),

470 B.R. 606, 614 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012) (quoting In re Exxon Mobil

Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Equitable tolling applies only to limitations periods. See

Young, 535 U.S. at 49; Tidewater, 498 F.3d at 254. A statute of

limitations subject to equitable tolling has two common

characteristics: (1) the statute provides a plaintiff with a

specified period of time within which to pursue a claim to

preserve a remedy; and (2) such period begins when the plaintiff

has or discovers he has a complete and present claim. Tidewater,

498 F.3d at 255-56 (citing Young, 535 U.S. at 47-49); In re

Aguilar, 470 B.R. at 615; In re Maas, 416 B.R. 767, 769-70 (Bankr.

D. Kan. 2009). “When these two circumstances exist, a court will

often toll a period if it concludes that equitable considerations

excuse a plaintiff’s failure to take the required action within

the time period.” Tidewater, 498 F.3d at 256 (citing Young, 535

U.S. at 50-51). See Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Williams (In re

Williams), 341 B.R. 530, 533 (D. Md. 2006) (“The doctrine of

equitable tolling ‘permits a court to suspend the measuring period
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for a party to take action during the time the party was unable to

act.’”) (quoting In re Williams, 333 B.R. 68, 71 (Bankr. D. Md.

2005)).

Equitable tolling is inconsistent with statutes of repose. 

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.

350, 363 (1991). “Statutes of repose do not start to run when the

plaintiff has or discovers he has an action. Rather, the statutes

set an outside limit as to when the cause of action can accrue in

the first place.” In re Aguilar, 470 B.R. at 615 (citing In re

Maas, 416 B.R. at 771).

Section 727(a)(2)(A) does not share either one of the

required characteristics of a statute of limitations. It does not

provide a creditor with a specified period of time for pursuing a

claim to preserve a remedy, and the one-year period is not

dependent on the discovery or accrual of a claim. Rather, the

one-year period is based on when the debtor files the bankruptcy

petition.

D. Analysis

Nonetheless, our inquiry does not stop here, as some courts

have found that certain “lookback” periods in the Bankruptcy Code,

including the one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A), are a limitations

period that can be tolled for the reasons argued by DeNoce. The

only published decision squarely addressing this issue with

respect to § 727(a)(2)(A) is Womble.

In Womble, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

decision to apply equitable tolling to § 727(a)(2)(A) and agreed

that Young compelled this outcome. 299 B.R. at 812-13. In Young,

which DeNoce contends is controlling, debtors failed to include
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 Section 507(a)(8) provides, in relevant part: 9

The following expenses and claims have priority in the

following order:

(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units,

only to the extent that such claims are for—

(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts for a

taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of

the petition—

(i) for which a return, if required, is last due,

including extensions, after three years before the date

of the filing of the petition;

(ii) assessed within 240 days before the date of the

filing of the petition, exclusive of—

(I) any time during which an offer in compromise

with respect to that tax was pending or in effect

during that 240-day period, plus 30 days; and

(II) any time during which a stay of proceedings

against collections was in effect in a prior case

under this title during that 240-day period, plus

90 days[.]

 Section 523(a)(1)(A) provides: “A discharge under section 10

727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not

discharge an individual debtor from any debt — (1) for a tax or a

customs duty — (A) of the kind and for the periods specified in

(continued...)

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payment with their 1992 federal income tax return, due and filed

on October 15, 1993. 535 U.S. at 44-45. They filed a chapter 13

bankruptcy case on May 1, 1996, still owing the bulk of their

$15,000 tax debt. Id. at 45. Debtors moved to dismiss that case

on October 23, 1996. One day before the bankruptcy court

dismissed it, on March 12, 1997, debtors filed a second bankruptcy

case, this time under chapter 7. Debtors received a discharge in

June 1997, and the chapter 7 case was closed in September 2007. 

Upon the IRS’s subsequent demand for payment of the 1992 tax debt,

debtors moved to reopen their chapter 7 case to have the debt

declared discharged. They contended that the tax debt fell

outside the three-year lookback period in §§ 507(a)(8)(A) and 9

523(a)(1)(A), and therefore had been discharged, because it 10
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(...continued) 10

section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a

claim for such tax was filed or allowed.”

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pertained to a tax return due on October 15, 1993, more than three

years before their chapter 7 filing on March 12, 1997. The

bankruptcy court reopened the case and ruled for the IRS, holding

that the lookback period was “tolled” during the pendency of the

prior chapter 13 case and, therefore, the 1992 tax debt was not

discharged. The district court and Fifth Circuit agreed. Id.

Concluding that the terms of the lookback period created a

“loophole” in the law, the Supreme Court held that the three-year

period in § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) was a limitations period subject to

equitable tolling, “because it prescribe[d] a period within which

certain rights (namely, priority and nondischargeability in

bankruptcy) may be enforced” by the claimant. Id. at 47. This

was true regardless of “whether the [prior] petition was filed in

good faith or solely to run down the lookback period.” Id. at 50. 

The Court noted that, like other statutes of limitations, the

three-year period at issue “commence[d] when the IRS ha[d] a

complete and present cause of action” — i.e., the date the

taxpayer’s return was due. Id. at 49.

In Womble, the debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case in

July 2000 that was converted to chapter 11, then to chapter 12,

and ultimately dismissed in November 2001. 299 B.R. at 811. One

month after the dismissal, the debtor filed a second bankruptcy

case, this time under chapter 7. Contending that certain

transfers occurring in June and July 2000 were fraudulent within

the meaning of the statute, a judgment creditor sought to deny
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debtor’s discharge under § 727(a)(2)(A). Relying on Young, the

bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the creditor, holding that the

one-year period was “equitably tolled” due to the prior

bankruptcy. In affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court

reasoned that the “similarities between § 507(a)(8)[A](i) . . .

and § 727(a)(2)(A) dictate similar treatment” because “both

reference ‘the date of the filing of the petition,’ and both act

as limitations periods, requiring creditors to promptly protect

their rights or risk having a debt discharged in bankruptcy.” Id.

at 812. See also In re Seeber, 2005 WL 4677823 (Bankr. E.D. La.

July 5, 2005); In re Riley, 2004 WL 2370640 (Bankr. D. Haw. Apr.

20, 2004) (both reviewing the one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A)

and citing Womble with approval).

We disagree with Womble. While both statutes contain the

phrase “the date of the filing of the petition,” their

similarities end there. The one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A)

does not apply to any one creditor as do §§ 507(a)(8)(A) and

523(a)(1)(A). Further, § 727(a)(2) is not designed to protect the

rights of any one creditor or class of creditors. They simply are

not the intended beneficiaries of the statute.

Sections 523 and 727 serve two entirely different purposes. 

The purpose of § 523 is to except certain specified debts of a

debtor from discharge. The purpose of § 727 is to deny the

discharge of all debts based upon a debtor’s wrongful conduct in

connection with the bankruptcy case. Section 727 is not concerned

with protecting an individual creditor’s claims from being

discharged due to inaction. And, it certainly has nothing to do

with priority. Further, claims for nondischargeable debts under
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 Section 727(a)(8) provides, in relevant part: “The court 11

shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless — the debtor has been

granted a discharge under this section . . . in a case commenced

within 8 years before the date of the filing of the petition[.]”

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§ 523 apply to all debtors, regardless of chapter. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 103(a). Conversely, § 727 applies only to chapter 7 debtors. 

See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b).

In In re Riley, an unpublished decision out of Hawaii, the

bankruptcy court, relying on Young and Womble, held that the oneyear period in § 727(a)(2) is a limitations period because “‘it

prescribes a period within which certain rights (namely, priority

and nondischargeability in bankruptcy) may be enforced.’” 2004 WL

2370640, at *4 (quoting Young, 535 U.S. at 46). For the reasons

stated above, we disagree with In re Riley, and further note its

lack of analysis. The same is true for In re Seeber, also an

unpublished decision, which engaged in even less analysis and

simply cited Womble to hold that “the one year lookback period

found in § 727(a)(2)(A) is tolled during the pendency of the

period of a previous bankruptcy case.” 2005 WL 4677823, at *4.

The Fourth Circuit also has disagreed with Womble and

questioned whether Young applies in cases under § 727. In

Tidewater, a judgment creditor sought to deny the debtor’s

discharge under § 727(a)(8) in her latest chapter 7 case on the 11

theory that her intervening and dismissed chapter 13 cases, filed

between the dates of her prior chapter 7 discharge order and her

latest petition, had equitably tolled the six-year bar on the

debtor from filing a chapter 7 case and getting another discharge. 

498 F.3d at 253. The Fourth Circuit, declining to apply Young as

statutorily distinguishable, held that the six-year lookback
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period (now eight years) in § 727(a)(8) was not a statute of

limitations subject to equitable tolling. Id. at 258. 

Specifically, the court found that § 727(a)(8) does not contain

the two required characteristics for a limitations period — it

does not prescribe a period of time within which a plaintiff must

pursue a claim, and the time period did not commence when creditor

Tidewater had a complete and present claim for relief. Id. at

256. The Tidewater court was concerned about the lack of analysis

in Womble, particularly, why the language “the date of the filing

of the petition” should automatically be interpreted as a

limitations provision. Id. at 256 n.7.

Although one could argue that § 727(a)(8) and § 727(a)(2)

serve different purposes, they do share one important similarity —

neither expressly provides for tolling and neither contains the

two required characteristics for a limitations period which can be

equitably tolled. Therefore, we find the reasoning in Tidewater

persuasive and agree that Young does not control the outcome here. 

We are particularly persuaded by the following discussion from the

district court in Tidewater and believe it applies equally to

§ 727(a)(2)(A):

[I]f equitable tolling were applied to § 727(a)(8), every

debt encompassed by a debtor’s Chapter 7 petition — not

just the debt of the single creditor seeking equitable

tolling — would not be discharged. Thus, potentially

numerous creditors would unwittingly and perhaps

undeservedly benefit from relief granted to a single

creditor. This situation seems inconsistent with

Congress’ determination that specific categories of debt

are excepted from discharge under § 727(b) and § 523, and

effectively “convert[s] the disqualifications of a debtor

from a discharge into a dischargeability test for

particular claims.”

341 B.R. at 537-38 (quoting In re Williams, 333 B.R. at 74). In
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other words, equitable tolling of § 727(a)(2)(A) is “inconsistent

with the text of the relevant statute,” and thus should not be

applied. See Young, 535 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v.

Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998).

Other support exists for our holding here, but these courts

were also short on analysis. See Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones),

292 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003) (post-Young case;

holding that creditor could not “reach back” to debtor’s prior

bankruptcy filing to circumvent the one-year period under

§ 727(a)(2)(A), because the effect of dismissal of the prior

bankruptcy case was to nullify it); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hogan

(In re Hogan), 208 B.R. 459, 463 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) (preYoung case; recognizing that no Code provision or nonbankruptcy

law “suspended” the one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A); however,

the chapter 7 trustee may still be able to avoid any fraudulent

transfers under § 544(b)).

DeNoce contends that if courts refuse to apply the equitable

tolling doctrine to § 727(a)(2)(A), debtors will inequitably be

allowed to take advantage of a “loophole” by filing successive

chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, then filing a chapter 7 bankruptcy

case after the one-year period has expired. The district court in

Tidewater responded best to this argument:

Congress decided not to address any alleged ‘loophole’

with respect to the relation between the serial filing of

Chapter 13 cases and the discharge of a second Chapter 7

case in its recent restructuring of the Bankruptcy Code.

See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection

Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109–8 (2005)[“BAPCPA”]. It is not

the role of this Court to override decisions already made

by Congress with respect to the discharge of a Chapter 7

debtor.

341 B.R. at 538-39. We agree that if this alleged “loophole” in
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§ 727(a)(2)(A) was of concern to Congress, it would have been

addressed with BAPCPA, as was the “loophole” found by the Supreme

Court in Young with the codification of § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II).

We also disagree with DeNoce’s argument that the doctrine of

“continuing concealment” applies in this case. Under this

doctrine, discharge can be denied under § 727(a)(2)(A), even

though the subject transfer occurred more than one year before the

debtor filed bankruptcy, if the debtor allowed his or her interest

in the property to remain concealed into the year preceding the

bankruptcy filing. In re Lawson, 122 F.3d at 1240. “Concealment”

in this sense focuses on the debtor’s intent to conceal any

“interest” in the transferred property into the year before the

bankruptcy filing, not whether the debtor intended to conceal “the

transfer.” Id. Although Neff did not initially disclose the

transfer of the Lake Harbor Property in his first two bankruptcy

cases, no concealment of his “interest” in it occurred into the

year before he filed his Third Bankruptcy Case, thereby triggering

the doctrine. Within the year before he filed his third case,

title to the Lake Harbor Property was in his name only as a matter

of public record. Although the quitclaim deed stated that

“Grantee asserts this is an exempt asset under California law as a

retirement asset or plan,” Neff’s failed attempt at trying to

preserve the property as an exempt retirement asset did nothing to

change the title or his 100% fee interest, as the bankruptcy court

correctly noted. As such, no “concealment” occurred within the

meaning of the doctrine.

Contrary to DeNoce’s contention, the “continuing concealment”

doctrine is not analogous to an “equitable tolling” of the
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 We note that even if § 727(a)(2)(A) were subject to 12

equitable tolling, it would be inappropriate to apply that

doctrine here because DeNoce relentlessly sought and obtained the

dismissal of Neff’s Second Bankruptcy Case, which forced Neff to

then file a third one.

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one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A), and therefore our decision here

is not contrary to In re Lawson. The doctrine is not a “tolling”

of the statute. Rather, it applies only when the offending

conduct — debtor’s intentional concealment of an interest in

transferred property — has been ongoing into the year prior to the

debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Thus, nothing is being “tolled” with

respect to the one-year period.

Because § 727(a)(2)(A) is a statute of repose not subject to

equitable tolling, DeNoce could not prove one of the necessary

elements to deny Neff’s discharge — that the transfer of the Lake

Harbor Property occurred within one year of the filling of Neff’s

Third Bankruptcy Case. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not

err when it determined that no genuine issue of material fact

existed and that Neff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law. Likewise, because the subject transfer occurred more than

one year prior to the filing of Neff’s Third Bankruptcy Case, it

obviously could not have occurred postpetition. Hence, DeNoce had

no claim under § 727(a)(2)(B), and the bankruptcy court did not

err in denying his PSJ Cross-Motion.12

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.