United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30243

Summary Calendar

Golden K. Berry, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Sheriff’s Office Ouachita Parish; Sheriff Jay Russell; 

Chief Deputy Marc Mashaw; Colonel James Purvis; 

Scott Smith, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana 

No. 3:18-CV-1397

Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Golden Berry sued the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”)

and several individual officers, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation 

for filing a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances 

set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 26, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

2

mission (“EEOC”). Berry moved for summary judgment on his retaliation 

claim; the defendants moved for summary judgment denying both of Berry’s 

claims. The district court denied Berry’s motion and granted the defendants’. We affirm the denial of Berry’s motion for summary judgment on his 

retaliation claim. We affirm the summary judgment regarding Berry’s racial 

discrimination claim. Finally, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of 

defendants on Berry’s retaliation claim.

I.

OPSO hired Berry, who is black, as a correctional officer in 2000. He 

attained the rank of Corporal in 2003 and maintained his position for thirteen 

years. His job required that he alternate between working day and night 

shifts. Seeking to work consistent day shifts, Berry approached Deputy Scott 

Smith about the possibility of transferring to a role in the Transitional Work 

Release Center. Berry successfully applied for a deputy role at the center—

a demotion from his position as Corporal. He alleges that Smith assured him 

that, despite taking a reduced rank, he would retain his current level of pay. 

Smith denies making any such representation.

After transferring, Berry saw his pay decrease. He contends that

OPSO allowed white employees to transfer while maintaining both their rank 

and their pay. 

In November 2017, Berry filed a charge of racial discrimination with 

the EEOC. He also filed a corrections statement in March 2018. Leaders 

within OPSO learned of Berry’s EEOC complaint in late January or early 

February 2018, at which point Captain Bryan Boney, who had replaced Smith 

as director of the Transitional Work Release Program, reached out to Berry 

and asked why he had filed a complaint.

In January or February 2018, Berry also qualified to run for city council. He won his election in March 2018 and was scheduled to be sworn in as 

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

3

a councilman on June 29. Boney saw the election results on television and 

notified Colonel James Purvis, who had the authority to fire Berry. Four days 

later, Boney and Purvis summoned Berry and terminated his employment on 

the basis that he could not hold office while working as a deputy sheriff. 

OPSO did not offer Berry the opportunity to work until he was sworn in to 

office, nor did OPSO give Berry the option to decline his elected position and 

retain his employment at the Center.

Berry filed a charge of retaliation with the EEOC in May 2018 and 

supplemental charges of retaliation and wrongful termination with the EEOC

in August 2018. In July 2018, the EEOC provided Berry with a right-to-sue 

letter for his racial discrimination charge, and in September 2018 Berry 

received a right-to-sue letter for his retaliation charge. Berry sued for discrimination based on race and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Berry moved for summary judgment on his 

retaliation claim, and the defendants moved for summary judgment on both 

of Berry’s claims. The district court denied Berry’s motion and granted the 

defendants’ motion, dismissing Berry’s claims with prejudice. Berry 

appeals.

II.

We review a summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standards as did the district court. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 969 F.3d 

571, 576 (5th Cir. 2020). Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary 

judgment is proper where the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” We view all evidence in the light most favorable to Berry, the nonmoving party. Id.

A.

We first review the summary judgment on Berry’s racial discriminCase: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

4

ation claim. To analyze whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case 

of racial discrimination under Title VII based on circumstantial evidence, we 

apply the McDonnell Douglas framework.1

 Under that framework, a plaintiff 

must show that he “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified 

for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was . . . treated less favorably than other 

similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” McCoy, 492 F.3d 

at 556. 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 

employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action. Id.

at 557. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who 

then must establish eitherthat the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination or that the plaintiff’s protected status was a motivating factor for the 

action. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007).

Berry bases his racial discrimination claim on circumstantial evidence. 

Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the district court found that he 

failed to satisfy the fourth prong, explaining that he did not show that he was 

treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside his protected 

class. The court stated, however, that even if Berry had established a prima 

facie case, his claim would still fail because he had not shown that OPSO’s 

given reason for his termination was pretext.2

In providing a nondiscriminatory reason for reducing Berry’s pay, 

OPSO contends that it did so because he voluntarily transferred into a posi1 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see 

also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

2 Because the district court was correct in its pretext analysis regarding Berry’s 

racial discrimination claim, we need not assess whether it properly found that Berry had

failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

5

tion with a lower rank in order to maintain a daytime work schedule. Because 

defendants provided a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the 

burden shifted back to Berry to show that the reason was pretextual or that 

his protected status was a motivating factor in his pay decrease. See Alvarado, 

492 F.3d at 611. 

Berry failed to make such a showing. The defendants presented evidence that the other transferees applied to open positions with ranks that 

permitted them to maintain their pay. It is undisputed that Berry knowingly 

and voluntarily transferred to a position with a lower rank. Although there is 

a dispute of fact about whether he was promised that his pay would remain 

the same despite his reduced rank, Berry did not show that other transferees 

were permitted to take a position with a lower rank while maintaining their 

pay. He failed, therefore, to provide evidence of disparate treatment, because

the employees whose transfers he pointed to as evidence of such treatment

were not similarly situated. See Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 

(5th Cir. 2009). Indeed, a plaintiff’s subjective belief that he was the victim 

of racial discrimination is insufficient to create an inference of discriminatory 

intent. Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 654 (5th Cir. 2004). The 

district court properly granted summary judgment on the racial discrimination claim.

B.

Berry contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for 

summary judgment. He also asserts that the district court erred in granting 

OPSO’s motion for summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

Berry maintains that OPSO terminated him because he filed a racial 

discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Under Title VII, employers may 

not retaliate against an employee because the employee opposed a practice 

made unlawful by Title VII, registered a complaint under Title VII, or partiCase: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 5 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

6

cipated in an investigation under the law. Brown, 969 F.3d at 576–77. Where

a retaliation case is based on circumstantial evidence, we apply McDonnell 

Douglas. Id. at 577. That framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima 

facie case of retaliation by demonstrating “(1) that he engaged in activity 

protected by Title VII; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; 

and (3) that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the 

adverse employment action.” Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 

419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000).

As the district court correctly found, Berry established a prima facie

case of retaliation. Lodging his complaint with the EEOC was a protected 

activity. OPSO terminated Berry from his job, and “termination is a classic 

example of adverse employment action under our caselaw.” Hassen v. Ruston 

La. Hosp. Co., 932 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2019). Finally, by, inter alia, producing evidence that OPSO had knowledge of his EEOC complaint before

his termination, Berry met the “causal connection” element. Thus, he satisfied the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation.

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 

employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the 

adverse action. Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. If the employer satisfies that burden, 

then the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated 

reason is pretextual. Id. OPSO offered a nondiscriminatory reason for firing 

Berry: because he violated the OPSO Manual of Rules by running for office 

without notifying his superiors.

Because OPSO proffered a nondiscriminatory explanation, the burden 

shifts to Berry to show that that reason was pretext for retaliation. Id. To

prevail in a claim that the employer’s reason was pretextual, a plaintiff must 

establish “that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the 

employer’s retaliatory motive . . . .” Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of the 

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

7

Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff 

“must show that there is a ‘conflict in substantial evidence’ on this ultimate 

issue.” Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 658 (5th Cir. 2012)). “Evidence is ‘substantial’ if it is of such quality and weight that reasonable and 

fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different 

conclusions.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 658 (cleaned up).

In support of his contention that OPSO’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual, Berry points to (1) the temporal proximity between 

his supervisors’ learning of his EEOC complaint and his termination, 

(2) OPSO’s shifting explanations for his termination, and (3) the inconsistent

application of OPSO policies against him compared to similarly situated

white employees.

Berry notes that OPSO learned of his complaint in late January or early 

February 2018. He further points out that he was fired less than two months 

later, within days of OPSO’s learning of his running for office. A two-month

gap between a protected activity and an adverse action is close enough to 

serve as evidence of pretext—indeed, “‘a time lapse of up to four months’

may be sufficiently close” to provide such evidence. Feist, 730 F.3d at 454

(quoting Evans v. City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)). Temporal 

proximity “is relevant to, but not alone sufficient to demonstrate, pretext,” 

so we proceed to examine Berry’s additional evidence. Brown, 969 F.3d 

at 579.

Berry alleges that OPSO provided shifting explanations for his termination and that that inconsistency is evidence of pretext. “[A]n employer’s inconsistent explanations for its employment decisions at different times 

permits [sic] a jury to infer that the employer’s proffered reasons are preCase: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

8

textual.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., L.P., 482 F.3d 408, 

412 n.11 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

OPSO provided shifting rationales for Berry’s termination. As the 

district court noted, Colonel Purvis, Chief Mashaw, and Captain Boney initially testified that OPSO terminated Berry because he allegedly violated the

Louisiana law against dual officeholding. Similarly, Berry’sseparation notice 

states that his reason for termination was “Violation of Louisiana Law.” 

Berry, however, cited caselaw to show that his employment with OPSO after 

his election but months before assuming office did not violate Louisiana law. 

Moreover, he established that at least one white employee worked for OPSO 

between his election to office and his swearing-in. In response, OPSO offered

a different explanation for Berry’s termination, stating that he was fired for 

violating policies in the OPSO manual. OPSO’s shifting reasons provide 

some evidence of pretext.

Relatedly, Berry asserts that OPSO inconsistently applied its policies, 

enforcing rules against him that it did not enforce against similarly situated 

white employees. The “inconsistent treatment of [a plaintiff] raises disputed 

issues of material fact as to whether[] but for exercising her rights she would 

have been discharged.” Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juvenile Justice Comm’n, 811 F.3d 

702, 711 (5th Cir. 2016). Moreover, a “plaintiff may establish pretext by 

showing that a discriminatory motive more likely motivated her employer’s 

decision, such as through evidence of disparate treatment, or that her employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of 

La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013). 

OPSO contends that Berry violated the manual (1) by running for 

office and, thereby, engaging in political activity and (2) by failing to request 

permission from his supervisor before attaining outside employment. Berry, 

however, points out that multiple OPSO employees have run for elected 

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

9

office. Indeed, one of them wore his OPSO uniform in a political advertisement, contravening the manual’s ban on campaigning in uniform.

OPSO asserts that Berry is not similarly situated to the other employees who ran for office because they informed their supervisors that they were 

running for office and took leaves of absence during their campaigns. Berry, 

however, casts doubt on whether the other employees actually made formal 

requests or took leaves of absence. Indeed, he points out that Sheriff Jay Russell testified that the policy requires employees to submit a letter before running for office. During discovery, Berry requested any documentation pertaining to four other employees’ requests for leaves of absence. OPSO

answered that there were no responsive documents because leave was verbally given. The absence of such documentation shows that, at the very least, 

OPSO was not adhering to its own purported policy of requiring “a written 

summary of proposed duties” before entering outside employment.

Moreover, Berry notes that his discovery requests included inquiries 

for additional documentation of the other employees’ alleged leaves of 

absence, such as payroll sheets. OPSO provided no such documents to show

that the alleged leaves of absence even occurred. The district court took 

OPSO at its word that other employees had informed OPSO of their campaigns and had taken leaves of absence when running for office; thus, the 

district court concluded that OPSO’s reasons for terminating Berry were not

pretextual. 

Berry, however, requested evidence that the other employees actually 

requested and took leaves of absence, and OPSO did not provide any supporting documentation. The absence of such evidence—which should be 

readily available—raises an issue of material fact on the basis of which a reasonable jury could find that OPSO’s purported reasons for terminating Berry 

were pretextual. See, e.g., Garcia v. Prof'l Contract Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/26/2020
No. 20-30243

10

245 (5th Cir. 2019). 

Considering the timing of his firing, OPSO’s shifting explanations for 

his termination, and the possibility that OPSO applied its policy against Berry

but not against other employees who ran for office, we conclude that “taking 

[the] evidence in its totality and in the light most favorable” to Berry “creates 

a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 244. This does not mean that Berry 

will necessarily prevail at trial or that his termination was definitively retaliatory. See id. at 246. But he has produced enough evidence to survive summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

We therefore AFFIRM the summary judgment dismissing Berry’s 

racial discrimination claim. We AFFIRM the denial of Berry’s motion for 

summary judgment on his retaliation claim. We REVERSE the summary 

judgment for defendants on the retaliation claim and REMAND for further 

proceedings as appropriate.

Case: 20-30243 Document: 00515615134 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/26/2020