SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

March 15, 2023

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. 

The following order was passed:

It appearing that the attached opinion decides a second-term 

appeal, which must be concluded by the end of the December Term, 

it is ordered that a motion for reconsideration, if any, must be 

received in the Supreme Court E-Filing/Docket (SCED) System by 

2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 22, 2023.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the

minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
1

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 15, 2023

S22A1243, S22A1244. THE STATE et al. v. SASS GROUP, LLC et 

al.

 BETHEL, Justice.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as enshrined in our 

Constitution, bars suits against the State and its employees in their 

official capacities unless a statute or the Constitution itself 

specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I,

Sec. II, Par. IX (e). The doctrine’s history in Georgia is long and 

sometimes winding.1 Here, we are called upon to examine the 

 1 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 745 (1) (452 SE2d 476) 

(1994) (noting that Georgia adopted “[t]he common law doctrine of sovereign 

immunity” in 1784); Intl. Bus. Machines Corp. v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215, 216 (1) 

(453 SE2d 706) (1995) (holding that sovereign immunity does not bar suits 

seeking injunctive relief to curtail alleged illegal or ultra vires acts of 

government entities), overruled by Ga. Dept. of Nat. Res. v. Center for a 

Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 596-603 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014); Ga. 

Dept. of Nat. Res., 294 Ga. at 596-603 (2) (holding that sovereign immunity 

barred injunctive relief against the State and overruling Evans); Olvera v. 

Univ. System of Georgia’s Bd. of Regents, 298 Ga. 425, 426-429 (782 SE2d 436) 

(2016) (declaratory judgment action against state agency barred by sovereign 

immunity); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 440 (III) (C) (801 SE2d 867) (2017) 
2

newest chapter in this history. 

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results 

of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended our 

Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. 

See Ga. L. 2020, Act 596, p. 917, § 1. See also Ga. L. 2021, p. 362A 

(setting forth referendum results). This new waiver allows citizens 

to sue the State (and, in provisions unrelated to this appeal, to sue 

local governments) for declaratory relief. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. 

I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (“Paragraph V”). To the extent that citizens 

obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they 

may then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] 

judgment.” See id. at Para. V (b) (1). To take advantage of this new 

waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the 

Constitution provides that such actions must be brought 

“exclusively” against the State. See id. When a plaintiff’s suit

violates this exclusivity provision, the Constitution requires the suit 

 

(extending sovereign immunity to suits against the State for declaratory and 

injunctive relief).
3

to be dismissed. See id. at Para. V (b) (2).

For reasons set forth more fully below, we hold that this 

exclusivity provision of Paragraph V means what it says: it requires 

dismissal of a lawsuit brought under that paragraph against the 

State if it names defendants other than the State or local 

governments specifically authorized by that provision. When other 

defendants are named in such a lawsuit, the Constitution requires 

that the entire suit be dismissed. Here, the plaintiffs’ suit named a 

defendant for whom a waiver is not provided by Paragraph V.

Accordingly, the Constitution requires the suit to be dismissed. We

therefore vacate the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, 

reverse the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remand this 

case with direction that it be dismissed.

I. Background

The plaintiffs in the underlying suit are purveyors of, among 

other things, hemp-derived products. As such, they operate in 

treacherous waters created by the tension among existing federal

criminal law and its selective enforcement, existing state law and 
4

related enforcement decisions, and the public policy battles still

swirling around the use of marijuana, hemp, tetrahydrocannabinol 

(“THC”), cannabidiol (“CBD”), and related compounds. Plaintiffs’ 

litigation interest is based upon a desire to affirm their right to sell 

certain products. More specifically, SASS Group, LLC and Great 

Vape, LLC (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) seek declaratory judgment 

affirming the legality of their actions and injunctive relief to protect 

their future commercial activities.

As background, in 2018, the United States Congress enacted 

the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, which, among other 

things, legalized the possession and distribution of hemp and hemp 

extracts. See Pub. L. No. 115-334, 132 Stat. 4490, and 7 USC § 1639o

(1). That same year, the federal Controlled Substances Act was also 

amended to exclude the THC found in hemp from the list of 

controlled substances. See 21 USC §§ 802 (16) (B) (i), 812 (Schedule 

I (c) (17)). Several states similarly enacted legislation distinguishing

hemp as a non-controlled substance, including Georgia. In 2019, the 

Georgia General Assembly passed the Georgia Hemp Farming Act, 
5

which adopted the federal definition of hemp and hemp products and 

permitted their cultivation and sale under certain circumstances. 

See OCGA §§ 2-23-3 – 2-23-12. The hemp industry, it appears, has 

since taken root in Georgia. Plaintiffs are businesses in Gwinnett 

County, which, until recently, sold Delta-8-tetrahydrocannabinol 

(“Delta-8-THC”), Delta-10-tetrahydrocannabinol (“Delta-10-THC”), 

and other hemp-derived products that they allege fall within 

Georgia’s definition of legal “hemp products.”

On January 25, 2022, the Gwinnett County District Attorney 

issued a press release announcing that her office would pursue the 

prosecution of “individuals and businesses who engage in the 

possession, sale or distribution of . . . [S]chedule 1 controlled 

substances.” The press release further described Delta-8-THC and 

Delta-10-THC as controlled substances. Plaintiffs allege that the 

District Attorney subsequently directed raids and arrests related to 

the possession of Delta-8-THC and Delta-10-THC, which included 

the seizure of millions of dollars in currency, inventory, and other 

property from businesses similar to Plaintiffs’ businesses.
6

Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against the State of Georgia 

and the District Attorney in her individual capacity in the Superior 

Court of Fulton County. Plaintiffs sought a judgment against the 

State declaring that commercial products containing cannabinoids 

derived from hemp, including, but not limited to, products 

containing Delta-8-THC, Delta-10-THC, CBD, cannabinol (“CBN”), 

and cannabigerol (“CBG”) are “hemp products” as defined by OCGA 

§ 2-23-3 and thus may be lawfully possessed and sold throughout 

Georgia. Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking a temporary 

restraining order and an interlocutory injunction against the 

District Attorney in her individual capacity. The trial court granted 

Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order, and, after a 

hearing, an interlocutory injunction against the District Attorney in 

her individual capacity, finding that Plaintiffs would otherwise 

continue to suffer economic harm as a result of the District 

Attorney’s course of conduct described in the January 25 press 

release.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing primarily 
7

that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by sovereign immunity.2 The

Defendants argued, among other things, that the limited waiver of 

sovereign immunity in Paragraph V did not apply to Plaintiffs’ case 

because both the State of Georgia and the District Attorney were 

named as defendants, and Paragraph V states that an action 

brought pursuant to its limited waiver must name the State 

exclusively as the defendant. The trial court denied the motion to 

dismiss.3 The Defendants’ sovereign immunity argument, however,

was not substantively addressed in the trial court’s order.4

Following the grant of separate certificates of immediate 

review, the Defendants sought leave to file interlocutory appeals 

from the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss and the trial 

 2 The Defendants incorporated arguments made in their response to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for interlocutory injunction regarding the lack of likelihood 

that Plaintiffs would prevail on the merits.

3 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended verified complaint seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief against the District Attorney and declaratory 

relief against the State. 

4 In a separate order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for an interlocutory 

injunction, the trial court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on 

the merits, finding persuasive decisions in another Georgia trial court and in 

Texas and Kentucky that held that products containing Delta-8-THC are legal 

and are not considered a controlled substance.
8

court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory injunction. We 

granted leave to seek interlocutory review, and the Defendants 

timely brought these appeals. Case S22A1243 concerns the trial 

court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction. Case S22A1244 concerns 

the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the 

Defendants. 

II. Analysis

Article I, Section II, Paragraph V of the State Constitution 

waives sovereign immunity for certain “actions” seeking declaratory 

relief for alleged constitutional violations by state entities, officials, 

and employees specifically listed therein.5 See Ga. Const. of 1983, 

Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V.6 “Actions filed pursuant to this Paragraph” 

 5 As noted in footnote 6 below, Paragraph V also pertains to suits against 

local governments. Our omission of any reference to those potential parties 

here is meant only to avoid confusion in addressing the questions presented by 

this case. Further, nothing in our analysis should be read as pertaining to a 

case involving multiple defendants who are all specifically delineated in the 

waiver provision of Paragraph V. That issue is not presented in this case, and 

we do not address it here.

6 The portion of Ga. Const. Art. I, § II, Para. V relevant here provides as 

follows:

(b) (1) Sovereign immunity is hereby waived for actions in 

the superior court seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state 
9

must be filed “exclusively against the state and in the name of the 

State of Georgia.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (2). 

Such actions which name “as a defendant any individual, officer, or 

entity other than as expressly authorized under this paragraph shall 

be dismissed.” Id.

The crux of the dispute between the parties in this matter is 

 

or any agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, 

department, office, or public corporation of this state or officer or 

employee thereof or any county, consolidated government, or 

municipality of this state or officer or employee thereof outside the 

scope of lawful authority or in violation of the laws or the 

Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. 

Sovereign immunity is further waived so that a court awarding 

declaratory relief pursuant to this Paragraph may, only after 

awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such acts to enforce its 

judgment. Such waiver of sovereign immunity under this 

Paragraph shall apply to past, current, and prospective acts which 

occur on or after January 1, 2021.

(2) Actions filed pursuant to this Paragraph against this 

state or any agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, 

department, office, or public corporation of this state or officer or 

employee thereof shall be brought exclusively against the state 

and in the name of the State of Georgia. Actions filed pursuant to 

this Paragraph against any county, consolidated government, or 

municipality of the state or officer or employee thereof shall be 

brought exclusively against such county, consolidated government, 

or municipality and in the name of such county, consolidated 

government, or municipality. Actions filed pursuant to this 

Paragraph naming as a defendant any individual, officer, or entity 

other than as expressly authorized under this Paragraph shall be 

dismissed.
10

the meaning of the word “action” as used in this constitutional 

provision. Plaintiffs argue that “action” as used here means a claim

or cause of action rather than an entire lawsuit. Under that view, 

they say, courts determine whether the exclusivity provision is met 

on a claim-by-claim basis. If a claim relies on the waiver provided by 

Paragraph V—such as a claim for declaratory relief from the acts of 

a state agency—then the claim must comply with the exclusivity 

provision or the claim is subject to dismissal. But a different claim

within the same lawsuit that does not rely on Paragraph V’s waiver 

would not implicate the exclusivity provision. In other words, 

Plaintiffs say that a lawsuit can include all kinds of claims against 

all kinds of defendants, and the exclusivity provision requires 

dismissal only of claims within that lawsuit that both attempt to 

avail themselves of Paragraph V’s waiver and name in that same 

claim a defendant other than the State (or the local government at 

issue).

The Defendants, by contrast, argue that “action” as used in this 

Paragraph means the entire case or lawsuit. Under this view, courts 
11

determine whether the exclusivity provision is met by looking at the 

lawsuit as a whole. If the plaintiffs in the lawsuit try to avail 

themselves of Paragraph V’s waiver of sovereign immunity in any 

way—i.e., even for one claim—then it is an “[a]ction filed pursuant 

to” that Paragraph and the lawsuit must be brought “exclusively 

against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia” (or against 

the relevant local government as may be the case). If a lawsuit does 

not comply, then the entire lawsuit must be dismissed, even if some 

claims within the lawsuit could have otherwise been brought on 

their own without relying on Paragraph V’s waiver. For the reasons 

that follow, we agree with the Defendants that “action” as it is used 

in this constitutional provision refers to an entire case or lawsuit, so 

we reverse the trial court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss and vacate the grant of the Plaintiffs’ interlocutory 

injunction.

a. “[W]hen we consider the meaning of a constitutional 

provision, we must seek to ascertain the way in which the text most 

reasonably would have been understood at the time of its adoption, 
12

reading it as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” 

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 440 (III) (C). 

Doing so “requires careful attention to not only the language of the 

clause in question, but also its broader legal and historical context, 

which are the primary determinants of a text’s meaning.” Ammons 

v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 163 (3) (880 SE2d 544) (2022). Our efforts in 

this regard are aided greatly in the present case by the fact that the 

language at issue here was only recently incorporated into our 

Constitution. Unlike those occasions in which we have been called 

upon to review language as it was understood when it was adopted 

many years ago, we find ourselves today considering the ordinary 

meaning of the English language as it is understood in present-day 

Georgia.

“In understanding a constitutional provision, we must be 

mindful that constitutions are the result of popular will, and their 

words are to be understood ordinarily in the sense they convey to 

the popular mind.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Georgia 

Motor Trucking Assn. v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 301 Ga. 354, 357 (2) 
13

(801 SE2d 9) (2017). We therefore consider the ordinary meaning of 

the words as they appear in the Constitution. See id. at 356 (2) 

(“[W]e afford the constitutional text its plain and ordinary meaning, 

view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in 

its most natural and reasonable way[.]” (citation and punctuation 

omitted)); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 635 (4) (b) (774 SE2d 624) 

(2015) (“We similarly presume that the words used in the 

Constitution bear their ordinary meanings at the time those words 

were included.”). And, of course, “it is the understanding of the text 

by reasonable people familiar with its legal context that is 

important, not whether every citizen understood the particular 

meanings of a constitutional provision.”7 Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 

 7 This principle articulated in Elliott, distilled from other cases, should 

not be understood as suggesting that the meaning assigned to constitutional 

language is based on the subjective understanding available only to some 

special group. On the contrary, it is always the original public meaning that 

controls. Thus, the reference to “reasonable people familiar with [the] legal 

context” is not a description of some particular or specific subset of the 

populace. Rather, this principle conveys that the legal context must be 

considered in discerning the meaning of the language, and that legal context 

sometimes takes work to understand. Indeed, the analysis in this case 

illustrates that point. When we consider the meaning of terms appearing in 

the Constitution – like “action” – we do not solely consider the meaning they 
14

179, 207 (III) (C) (ii) (824 SE2d 265) (2019).

The ordinary-meaning question we have to answer here is 

whether the word “action,” as used in Paragraph V, means an entire 

lawsuit or only a claim that is brought in a lawsuit. One place to look 

for ordinary meaning is contemporaneous dictionaries from around 

the time when the text was adopted. Dictionaries cannot be the 

definitive source of ordinary meaning in questions of textual 

interpretation because they are acontextual, and context is a critical 

determinant of meaning. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 70 (2012). But as 

long as we recognize this limitation, they offer a useful reference for 

any such analysis. And here, the dictionaries from the time the text 

was adopted generally define an “action” as a lawsuit or 

“proceeding,” whereas a “claim” is defined as being a distinct part of 

 

might have in ordinary conversation and in isolation; we must consider also 

the broader legal context in which these terms were adopted. The sources we 

consider in that analysis are not private or subjective; constitutional history, 

statutory history, decisional law, and similar sources are objective sources of 

publicly discoverable meaning properly within our consideration. And this is 

so whether or not every member of the public is aware of the substance of those 

sources.
15

that suit that asserts a particular demand or right. See, e.g.,

Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) (defining 

“action” as “the initiating of a proceeding in a court of justice by 

which one demands or enforces one’s right; also : the proceeding 

itself” and “claim” as “a demand for something due or believed to be 

due”); Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 

(6th ed. 2007) (defining “action” as “[a] legal process or suit”). And 

the same is true if we look to legal dictionaries. See, e.g., Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining an “action” as “[a] civil or 

criminal judicial proceeding” and “claim” as “[a] demand for money, 

property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp[ecially] 

the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the 

plaintiff asks for”).

This understanding of “action” as a lawsuit or proceeding in 

which claims are brought finds further support in common usage. In 

both judicial decisions and statutes, “action” is more commonly used 

to refer to a “whole lawsuit” rather than a claim. See, e.g., Joyner v. 

Leaphart, 314 Ga. 1, 4-7 (2) (a) (875 SE2d 729) (2022) (referring to 
16

“actions” as lawsuits and distinguishing between the two-dismissal 

rule’s applicability to “actions” and “claims”); McInerney v. 

McInerney, 313 Ga. 462, 463 (1) (870 SE2d 721) (2022) (using the 

term “action” to refer to a lawsuit); Riley v. Georgia Assn. of Club 

Execs., 313 Ga. 364, 364 (870 SE2d 405) (2022) (same); Dept. of Pub.

Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210, 210 (839 SE2d 541) (2020) (same); 

Plummer v. Plummer, 305 Ga. 23, 23-24 (823 SE2d 258) (2019) 

(same); RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 

302 Ga. 444, 444-445 (807 SE2d 381) (2017) (same); Price v. Dept. of 

Transp. of Georgia, 257 Ga. 535, 536 (361 SE2d 146) (1987), 

superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Lathrop, 301 

Ga. at. 422 (II) (B) (“We note the waiver speaks of ‘actions’ and of 

‘claims.’ For certain actions there is a waiver of sovereign immunity. 

They are: (1) Those actions involving a claim against the state, or 

any department or agency, (2) for which liability insurance 

protection for such claims has been provided, (3) but only to the 

extent of insurance provided. So, the task is to determine if the claim 

asserted here is of the type described in the constitution. If it is, 
17

there is a waiver of sovereign immunity, not for the claim, but for 

the action.” (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted)). See also OCGA 

§§ 9-11-2 (“There shall be one form of action, to be known as ‘civil 

action.’”); 9-11-3 (noting that a “civil action” commences with the 

filing of the complaint and case filing form); 9-2-5 (a) (“No plaintiff 

may prosecute two actions in the courts at the same time for the 

same cause of action and against the same party.”); 9-2-22 (“[T]he 

party plaintiff may join in one action, as parties defendants, all 

parties who allegedly contributed in the construction of the 

improvements. . . .”); 9-2-61 (using the words “case” and “action” 

interchangeably); Davis & Shulman’s, Ga. Practice & Procedure, § 

1:1 (2022-2023 ed.) (“‘Action,’ ‘suit’ and ‘proceeding’ are often used 

synonymously.”).

To be sure, in other instances, “action” can be understood as a 

reference to things other than a lawsuit, such as a claim, as 

Plaintiffs argue. See, e.g., OCGA § 9-3-70 (defining an “action for 

medical malpractice” as meaning “any claim for damages resulting 

from the death of or injury to any person”). Indeed, the Civil Practice 
18

Act broadly defines an “action” as a “judicial means of enforcing a 

right.” OCGA § 9-2-1. See also Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 

259 Ga. 435, 437 (2) (383 SE2d 867) (1989) (considering a third-party 

complaint an “action” under OCGA § 9-2-1); Buckler v. Dekalb 

County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. App. 332, 333 (654 SE2d 184) 

(2007) (noting that an appeal qualifies as an “action”); Jordan v. 

Lamberth, Bonapfel, Cifelli, Willson & Stokes, P.A., 206 Ga. App.

178, 179 (1) (a) (424 SE2d 859) (1992) (qualifying counterclaims as 

an “action”). But “action” is ordinarily and more commonly used to 

mean a case or lawsuit, and other contextual clues within the 

Constitution confirm that to be the case with respect to the specific 

provision at issue here. 

b. Our determination that the exclusivity requirement in 

Paragraph V relates to lawsuits rather than claims is further 

confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other 

parts of the same section of the Constitution. “[W]hen we determine 

the meaning of a particular word or phrase in a constitutional 

provision or statute, we consider text in context, not in isolation.”
19

Elliott, 305 Ga. at 186 (II) (B). See also Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 

372, 379 (1, 2) (6 SE2d 728) (1939) (in interpreting an amendment 

of the constitution, we look to “the language and arrangement of the 

article, section and paragraph,” as well as “the object to be secured, 

and . . . extrinsic matters [such] as the circumstances attending its 

ratification, the sense in which it was understood by 

contemporaries, and its relation to other parts of the constitution”).

We may also “refer to the rules of English grammar, inasmuch as 

those rules are the guideposts by which ordinary speakers of the 

English language commonly structure their words,” and the drafters 

of the constitutional amendment are presumed to know the rules of 

grammar. (Citation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 

(1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (stating the same with respect to 

statutory text).

In applying these principles, we note that subparagraph (b) (4) 

provides that “[n]o damages, attorney’s fees, or costs of litigation 

shall be awarded in an action filed pursuant to this Paragraph, 

unless specifically authorized by Act of the General Assembly.” 
20

(Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) 

(4). We would ordinarily say that attorney fees, litigation expenses, 

or damages would be awarded in a lawsuit at its conclusion. See, 

e.g., OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) (“In any civil action in any court of record 

of this state, reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses 

of litigation shall be awarded to any party against whom another 

party has asserted a claim,” etc. (emphasis supplied)); McGahee v. 

Rogers, 280 Ga. 750, 754 (2) (632 SE2d 657) (2006) (“[A]n award of 

attorney’s fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 in this case would require a 

determination whether McGahee violated the divorce decree.” 

(citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)); L.S. Land 

Co. v. Burns, 275 Ga. 454, 457 (3) (569 SE2d 527) (2002) (“[W]e 

cannot hold as a matter of law that attorney’s fees in this 

reformation case were not authorized under [OCGA] § 13-6-11.”). It 

would not make sense, by contrast, to say that such items shall be 

awarded “in” a claim. In other words, “action” in subparagraph (b) 

(4) logically refers to an entire lawsuit. Because we presume that the 

same meaning of “action” applies throughout subparagraph (b), 
21

Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 164-165 (33 SE2d 425) (1945), this 

phrasing offers further support that “action” as used in the 

exclusivity provision refers to the entire lawsuit.

Additionally, other provisions of our Constitution further 

support interpreting “action” in Paragraph V to mean a lawsuit

rather than a claim. Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (a) authorizes 

enactment of the State Tort Claims Act and, in doing so, states that 

“the General Assembly may provide by law for procedures for the 

making, handling, and disposition of actions or claims” against the 

State and various state entities. (Emphasis supplied.) Georgia 

Constitution of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX (a). This authorizing 

language distinguishes between “actions or claims,” which are set 

forth in the disjunctive. See Rockdale County v. U.S. Enterprises, 

Inc., 312 Ga. 752, 766 (3) (b) (865 SE2d 135) (2021) (noting that the 

word “or” normally indicates an alternative and is commonly 

understood as a disjunctive term). Accordingly, it necessarily follows 

that each of these words was intended to have a different meaning, 

as reading “actions” to mean “claims” in this provision would render 
22

one of the two words superfluous, which runs afoul of this Court’s 

routine admonition that “courts generally should avoid a 

construction that makes some language mere surplusage.” 

(Punctuation omitted.) Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 342 (3) (846 

SE2d 73) (2020). See also Blum v. Schrader, 281 Ga. 238, 241 (2) 

(637 SE2d 396) (2006) (“[I]t is a basic rule of constitutional 

construction that no provision is presumed to be without meaning 

and that all of its parts should be construed so as to give a sensible 

and intelligent effect to each of them.”); Price, 257 Ga. at 536 & n.3 

(distinguishing between “action” and “claim” under a prior version 

of Paragraph IX). We must therefore infer from the Constitution’s 

disjunctive use of “action or claim” in this paragraph that its drafters 

intended a difference in the meanings of these two words.8 See 

generally Blum, 281 Ga. at 241 (2). And in this case, this common 

understanding of “action” applies with equal force to the later-added 

 8 Indeed, other parts of our Constitution likewise distinguish an “action” 

from a “cause of action.” Compare Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I 

(using “action” and “case” interchangeably), with Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXX (c) 

(1) (using “cause of action”).
23

Paragraph V in the same section of our Constitution, as we presume 

that the same meaning attaches to a given word or phrase 

wherever it occurs in a constitution; and where a word or 

phrase is used in one part of a constitution in a plain and 

manifest sense, it is to receive the same interpretation 

when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears, 

from the context or otherwise, that a different meaning 

should be applied to it.

Clarke, 199 Ga. at 164-165. In short, other provisions of our 

Constitution differentiate between “action” and “claim,” and this 

context further confirms that “action” in Paragraph V refers to a 

lawsuit as a whole rather than a claim in a lawsuit. 

c. Plaintiffs offer a final argument based on the consequences 

of this reading. They point out that if “action” in Paragraph V means 

the whole lawsuit, then Paragraph V requires plaintiffs who wish to 

rely on its waiver to file a lawsuit containing only a claim or claims 

for declaratory relief against “the State.” Any other related claims 

(like their claim against the District Attorney here) must be filed in 

a separate lawsuit, or the entire lawsuit will be dismissed—even if 

the related claims do not rely on Paragraph V’s waiver. That 

reading, they contend, favors form over substance, kicks perfectly 
24

viable claims out of court, and runs counter to the goal of judicial 

efficiency.

Plaintiffs are correct that our rules of civil practice and related 

doctrines generally demonstrate a preference that litigants bring all 

relevant claims related to their case in one action. See, e.g., OCGA 

§§ 9-11-13 (regarding counter- and cross-claims); 9-11-18 (joinder of 

claims and remedies); 9-11-19 (joinder of persons); 9-11-22 

(interpleader); 9-11-24 (intervention); Body of Christ Overcoming 

Church of God, Inc. v. Brinson, 287 Ga. 485, 486 (696 SE2d 667) 

(2010) (“The doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of all 

claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have 

been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in 

identical causes of action.”). But the exclusivity provision’s apparent 

tension with this general anti-claim-splitting preference makes 

sense in light of the relevant legal context and history. 

In Lathrop, this Court made clear that 

[t]he constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity 

bar[red] any suit against the State to which it has not 

given its consent, including suits against state 
25

departments, agencies, and officers in their official 

capacities, and including suits for injunctive and 

declaratory relief from the enforcement of allegedly 

unconstitutional laws.

301 Ga. at 444 (IV). See also Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. at 603 (2)

(holding “that sovereign immunity bars the [plaintiff]’s claim for 

injunctive relief against the State”). However, we noted that the 

plaintiffs could pursue “prospective remedies . . . against state 

officers in their individual capacities.” Id. See also Sustainable 

Coast, 294 Ga. at 603 (2) (noting that “citizens aggrieved by the 

unlawful conduct of public officers . . . must seek relief against such 

officers in their individual capacities.”). 

Paragraph V was enacted in the wake of Lathrop, which made 

clear that suits against state officers and employees in their official 

capacities were indeed barred by sovereign immunity. This 

constitutional provision created a new, limited express waiver of 

sovereign immunity for specific types of suits seeking declaratory 

and injunctive relief against the State. But if a plaintiff wants to 

avail himself of the limited waiver provided by Paragraph V, then 
26

he must bring the action “exclusively against the state and in the 

name of the State of Georgia,” which forecloses the option of also 

suing a state actor in his or her individual capacity in that same 

suit. Accordingly, the consequences Plaintiffs point out track the 

provision’s language and context, including the broader context in 

which the constitutional amendment to Paragraph V was enacted,

and therefore are not a reason to deviate from the ordinary meaning 

of the word “action” as used here.

d. In sum: Paragraph V provides a limited waiver of sovereign 

immunity “for actions in the superior court seeking declaratory 

relief from acts of the state” or the state entities specifically listed in 

Paragraph V. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (1). 

Paragraph V (b) (2) further provides that actions filed pursuant to 

Paragraph V must be filed “exclusively against the state and in the 

name of the State of Georgia” and that “[a]ctions filed pursuant to 

this Paragraph naming as a defendant any individual, officer, or 

entity other than as expressly authorized under this Paragraph 

shall be dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Ga. Const. of 1983, 
27

Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (2). And, as explained above, we conclude 

that “actions” in this context means “lawsuit.”

Accordingly, if a lawsuit is filed against the State pursuant to 

Paragraph V and that suit includes an independent claim against 

another party not specified in that paragraph’s waiver provision, 

then the entire lawsuit must be dismissed. See id. Thus, the 

presence of a named defendant to whom Paragraph V’s waiver does 

not apply is fatal to an “action” that relies on Paragraph V’s waiver 

of sovereign immunity. 

Here, because their claims against the State for declaratory 

and injunctive relief required Paragraph V’s waiver of sovereign 

immunity, the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the Defendants 

pursuant to Paragraph V. The District Attorney, in her individual 

capacity, was an additional named defendant not authorized by 

Paragraph V.9 Because we have determined that this suit qualifies 

 9 In briefing and at oral argument, there was disagreement between the 

parties over which complaint was the operative pleading that the Court ought 

to consider. But deciding this issue is not essential to the resolution of this 

case, as both complaints named the District Attorney in her individual capacity
28

as an “action” under Paragraph V, the entire case must be dismissed

under the plain language of that constitutional provision.10 See Ga. 

Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (2).

For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the 

State’s motion to dismiss, vacate the order granting an interlocutory 

injunction as the question should not have been reached by the trial 

court, and remand this case with direction that it be dismissed.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the 

Justices concur.

 

in addition to the State.

In any event, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Court should view their 

amended complaint as one encompassing two separate “actions” that are joined 

or “consolidated” into one case under OCGA § 9-11-20 is problematic. The 

relevant permissive joinder provision of OCGA § 9-11-20 provides that “[a]ll 

persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against 

them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise 

in the action.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-20 (a). The statutory use of 

the singular to describe an action which includes permissively joined claims 

and/or parties does not support the conclusion that the use of “action” in the 

constitutional text should be understood to relate only to the claim against the 

State.

10 Because of our holding here, we need not address arguments as to the 

interlocutory injunction beyond vacating the order granting relief because the 

matter should never have been reached. We need not also address the other 

arguments raised by the Plaintiffs or the Defendants, including whether the 

Plaintiffs may still bring a separate action against the District Attorney in her 

individual capacity.