*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 01-31258

Summary Calendar

_____________________

CHRISTELLA B. JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(98-CV-904; 00-CV-1642)

April 30, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Christella B. Jackson, pro se, appeals the summary judgment

granted BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., on several bases,

against her claims for race, gender, and age discrimination under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§

2000e—2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (ADEA). Jackson contends the

district court erred, inter alia, in holding she had failed to

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact issue on whether
2

BellSouth’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for her firing was

merely pretext for discrimination.

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standard as the district court ... [and] view[ing] the

evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant”. Vela v.

City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal

citations omitted). “Summary judgment is proper when ‘there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(c)).

Jackson’s claims are governed by the tripartite burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglass Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (Title VII). See also Bodenheimer v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Flanagan

v. Aaron E. Henry Comty. Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233-34

(5th Cir. 1989) (§ 1981). Assuming Jackson established a prima

facie case of discrimination, BellSouth has proffered a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for her termination: Jackson had violated

the company’s Tuition Aid Plan (TAP) by, inter alia, cashing

duplicate reimbursement checks, seeking reimbursement for expenses

that had already been reimbursed, and using reimbursements for nontuition-related expenses. As discussed in the district court’s

detailed and comprehensive opinion, Jackson v. Bellsouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 98-CV-0904 (W.D. La. 21 Sept. 2001),
3

Jackson has proffered evidence she was unaware of certain TAP

guidelines; but, she has failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact on whether her termination was illegally motivated or

the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered for her

termination was false. See Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp.,

La., 234 F.3d 899, 903-904 (5th Cir. 2000).

Although Jackson raised other claims in the district court, as

well as other issues on appeal, she has not briefed them here.

Accordingly, they are deemed abandoned. E.g., Yohey v. Collins,

985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED