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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3524 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3524

 To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
          engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 25, 2021

  Mr. Meeks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
  Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on 
  Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence 
 (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
          engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring American 
Global Leadership and Engagement Act'' or the ``EAGLE Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Rules of construction.
             TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global 
                            supply chain diversification and 
                            management.
        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure 
                            investment standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in 
                            foreign energy development.
Sec. 116. Ensuring the International Development Finance Corporation is 
                            positioned to achieve national security, 
                            economic, and development objectives.
             Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of PRC trade and economic engagement globally.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the 
                            Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership 
                            in APEC.
Sec. 125. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 126. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 127. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
             Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for 
                            global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to 
                            cross-border payment and financial 
                            messaging systems.
           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 210. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources 
                            devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 211. Diplomatic and economic efforts to deter PRC use of force 
                            against Taiwan.
Sec. 212. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl 
                            trafficking.
Sec. 213. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better 
                            Utilization of Investments Leading to 
                            Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 214. Expanding investment by United States International 
                            Development Finance Corporation for vaccine 
                            manufacturing.
Sec. 215. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American 
                            strategic national security and economic 
                            objectives.
Sec. 216. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays 
                            Program.
Sec. 217. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 218. Global Engagement Center.
               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and 
                            training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in 
                            international waterways and airspace of the 
                            Indo-Pacific and on artificial land 
                            features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and 
                            partners.
     Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America's multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Report on American employment in international organizations.
       Subtitle D--Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners 
                            around the world.
                       Part I--Western Hemisphere

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's 
                            arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian 
                            citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, 
                            human rights, and the rule of law in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense 
                            sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean regarding accountability, human 
                            rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China's Belt 
                            and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. U.S.-Caribbean resilience partnership.
                  Part II--Transatlantic Relationships

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on Transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private 
                            sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and 
                            between China and Russia.
                    Part III--South and Central Asia

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review.
                            Part IV--Africa

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of 
                            the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in 
                            Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-
                            Saharan Africa focused on the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 277. Expansion of authorities of the United States International 
                            Development Finance Corporation in sub-
                            Saharan Africa.
                  Part V--Middle East and North Africa

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the 
                            Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
                         Part VI--Arctic Region

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
                           Part VII--Oceania

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.
                       Part VIII--Pacific Islands

Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definitions.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on the continued violation of rights and 
                            freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in 
                            Hong Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice.
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police 
                            force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress condemning the ongoing genocide and crimes 
                            against humanity against Uyghurs and other 
                            minority groups.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
                            that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the 
                            succession or reincarnation of the Dalai 
                            Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan 
                            Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great 
                            Firewall circumvention tools for the people 
                            of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights 
                            in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global 
                            Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and 
                            discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to 
                            international abuses of human rights.
             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's 
                            Republic of China on nuclear issues and 
                            ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
                            nuclear technology to the Middle East.
              TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China 
                            and other countries account for 
                            environmental issues and climate change.
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate 
                            disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt 
                            and Road Initiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and 
                            economic interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, 
                            adaptation, and security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and 
                            high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological 
                            innovation through the Green Climate Fund.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Unless otherwise 
        defined, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States to pursue 
the following objectives:
            (1) The United States global leadership role is sustained 
        and its political system and major foundations of national 
        power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, 
        technological, and military domains.
            (2) The United States position as an indispensable power in 
        the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, 
        multilateralism, and engagement.
            (3) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
            (4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable 
        balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United 
        States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, 
        including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of 
        commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
            (5) The allies and partners of the United States--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; 
                and
                    (C) work closely with the United States in setting 
                global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the 
                international community.
            (6) The combined weight of the United States and its allies 
        and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that 
        the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the 
        potential benefits.
            (7) The United States leads the free and open international 
        order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that 
        uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, 
        individual freedom, and human rights. The international order 
        is strengthened to withstand attempts at destabilization by 
        illiberal and authoritarian actors.
            (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international 
        engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including--
                    (A) the protection of human rights, commercial 
                engagement and investment, and technology; and
                    (B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in 
                alignment with the values and interests of the United 
                States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders 
                in the liberal international order.
            (9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to--
                    (A) undermine open and democratic societies;
                    (B) distort global markets;
                    (C) manipulate the international trade system;
                    (D) coerce other nations via economic and military 
                means; or
                    (E) use its technological advantages to undermine 
                individual freedoms or other states' national security 
                interests.
            (10) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by 
        reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, 
        scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the 
        United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;
            (2) to maximize the United States strengths in the 
        political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, 
        informational, and technological realms in order to safeguard 
        United States interests and the values of United States allies 
        and partners, and to strengthen incentives for the PRC to 
        collaborate in addressing common global and regional 
        challenges;
            (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free 
        flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and 
        peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and 
        transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
            (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral 
        cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and 
        values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the 
        United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and 
        reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its 
        allies and friends;
            (5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies 
        and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency 
        to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, 
        free from coercion and external pressure;
            (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, 
        constructive competition in United States-China economic 
        relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) improving United States laws and regulations as 
                necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United 
                States economic competitiveness;
            (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) combat corruption; and
                    (F) foster and support greater collaboration with 
                and among partner countries and the United States 
                private sector to develop secure and sustainable 
                infrastructure;
            (8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules 
        and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in 
        the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as 
        next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, 
        quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing necessary investment and concrete 
                incentives for the private sector to accelerate 
                development of such technologies;
                    (B) modernizing export controls and investment 
                screening regimes and associated policies and 
                regulations;
                    (C) enhancing the role of the United States in 
                technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for 
                developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and co-development of critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) coordinating and aligning export 
                        control measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in 
                        strategically critical supply chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (F) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to vetted allies and partners;
            (11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open international order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to 
        counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
            (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of 
        these organizations in facilitating solutions to global 
        challenges;
            (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms 
        and human rights in the United States relationship with the 
        PRC;
            (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order 
        and address regional and global challenges posed by the 
        Government of the PRC regarding--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
                    (C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, 
                other international agreements, and other international 
                norms related to human rights;
            (16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and 
        coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other 
        nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in 
        ways that threaten the United States or its allies and 
        partners;
            (17) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including through necessary investments in United 
        States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the 
        Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and 
        interoperability with allies and partners;
            (18) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) initiating armed conflict;
                    (B) coercing nations; or
                    (C) using malign grey-zone tactics to achieve 
                national goals;
            (19) to attempt to strengthen United States-PRC military-
        to-military communication and improve both military and 
        civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-
        conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; 
        and
            (20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, 
        cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through 
        bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as 
        appropriate, and especially in the following areas--
                    (A) global fight against climate change;
                    (B) nuclear security; and
                    (C) global financial stability.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy 
described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
            (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the 
        Indo-Pacific will require the United States--
                    (A) to marshal sustained political will to protect 
                its vital interests, promote its values, and advance 
                its economic and national security objectives; and
                    (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
                persuade the American people and United States allies 
                and partners of--
                            (i) the current challenges facing the 
                        international rules based order; and
                            (ii) the need for long-term investments and 
                        engagement to defend shared interests and 
                        values.
            (2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies 
        and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to 
        encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, 
        greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC 
        behavior.
            (3) Effective United States strategy toward China 
        requires--
                    (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.
            (4) The United States must ensure close integration among 
        economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the 
        private sector, civil society, universities and academic 
        institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open 
        societies to enable such actors--
                    (A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
                    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                            (i) to strengthen the United States and its 
                        allies; and
                            (ii) to promote a compelling vision of a 
                        free and open order.
            (5) The United States must ensure that all Federal 
        departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and 
        resourced to effectively defend and advance United States 
        interests, by--
                    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, 
                DC;
                    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign service 
                officers, international development professionals, 
                members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence 
                professionals, and other United States Government 
                personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (C) ensuring that this workforce has the training, 
                demonstrated proficiency in language and culture, 
                technical skills, and other competencies required to 
                advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
            (6) The United States must place renewed priority and 
        emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of 
        national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, 
        economics, foreign assistance and development finance, 
        commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial 
        for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.
            (7) The United States must sustain military capabilities 
        necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the 
        Indo-Pacific, including--
                    (A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
                Pacific;
                    (B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting 
                them from coercion; and
                    (C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing 
                unwanted conflict.
            (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation 
        to the information environment of the 21st century. United 
        States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must 
        effectively--
                    (A) promote the value of partnership with the 
                United States; and
                    (B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that 
                threatens United States interests.

SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

    (a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign 
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, 
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities 
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, 
United States Code.
    (b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in 
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

             TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL 
              SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for 
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and 
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the 
PRC, including--
            (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain 
        production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2); and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the 
services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of 
        Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance 
        with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of 
        Commerce officers; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the 
        services described in subsection (a).
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises 
with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for 
the purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided 
to an entity--
            (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese 
        Communist Party, or other foreign adversary;
            (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign 
        individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or 
        influence of foreign adversaries; and
            (3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the 
        receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the 
        previous one year that is no longer in effect, with--
                    (A) the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China;
                    (B) the Chinese Communist Party;
                    (C) the Chinese military;
                    (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, 
                or majority-financed by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China, the CCP, or the Chinese military; or
                    (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity 
                described in subparagraph (D).
    (f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or 
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given to those terms in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
or a successor document.

        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
              INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private 
sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards 
for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at 
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:
            (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which 
        infrastructure investments are made.
            (2) Anti-corruption.
            (3) Rule of law.
            (4) Human rights and labor rights.
            (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
            (6) Social and governance safeguards.
            (7) Transparency.
            (8) Environmental and energy standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the 
commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to 
high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the 
issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.

    (a) Findings.--It is in the national interest of the United States 
to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the 
resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries 
with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and 
therefore reduce a foreign government's need to enter into agreements 
with China, including support from its Belt and Road Initiative.
    (b) Strategy.--
            (1) Authority.--Within 180 days of enactment of this Act, 
        the President should develop and submit a strategy to the 
        relevant congressional committees to utilize the resources of 
        Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and 
        financing from China to foreign governments that are of 
        strategic importance to the United States.
            (2) Components of strategy.--The strategy should--
                    (A) identify primary sectors where the United 
                States could provide a competitive advantage to 
                increase a country's economic independence;
                    (B) select countries with corresponding economic 
                needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable 
                to Chinese economic influence;
                    (C) identify any corresponding existing financing 
                available from United States Government entities to 
                prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to 
                the needs of such foreign governments if none are 
                currently available;
                    (D) identify any cooperative and complementary 
                assistance and financing from friendly foreign 
                governments, including coordinated assistance and co-
                financing;
                    (E) create a streamlined decision-making process, 
                directed by the National Security Council, to devise 
                financing and make agency decisions and commitments on 
                a timely basis to support United States competitive 
                offers;
                    (F) establish a formal G7+European Commission 
                Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to 
                develop alternatives to the People's Republic of 
                China's Belt and Road Initiative for development 
                finance; and
                    (G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy, 
                including efforts to address the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China's use of the United Nations 
                to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, including the 
                proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the 
                People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and 
                programs regarding the implementation of the Belt and 
                Road Initiative.
            (3) Participating agencies.--Participating Federal agencies 
        should include the Department of State, Department of the 
        Treasury, USAID, DFC, MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and 
        other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.
            (4) Execution of strategy.--The President should issue an 
        Executive order to implement the strategy and make such changes 
        in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put 
        the strategy into effect.
            (5) Relevant congressional committees.--For the purposes of 
        this subsection, the phrase ``relevant congressional 
        committees'' shall mean the House and Senate Committees on 
        Appropriations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the House Committee on 
        Financial Services, and the Senate Committee on Banking, 
        Housing, and Urban Affairs.
    (c) Authority.--The Secretary of State in coordination with the 
USAID Administrator is authorized to establish or continue an 
initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those 
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, 
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-
Pacific region by--
            (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve 
        project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement 
        environments, and project preparation capacity of countries 
        that are partners of the United States in such development;
            (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
        preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
        and
            (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
        for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure 
        that utilizes United States manufactured goods and services, 
        and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
    (d) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (c), 
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including 
through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help 
boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential 
infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as--
            (1) legal services;
            (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
            (3) debt sustainability analyses;
            (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
            (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
        sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
    (e) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
            (1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
        Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection 
        (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, 
        including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for 
        technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline 
        development, and other infrastructure project support.
            (2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for 
        the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in 
        coordination with the Department of Defense, the International 
        Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, 
        and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint 
        infrastructure projects.
            (3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized 
        for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support 
        strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national 
        security interest of the United States and vulnerable to 
        strategic competitors.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the 
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 
should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private 
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of 
the People's Republic of China, including support to companies 
incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy 
sectors of developing countries.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs 
        and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the 
        presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and 
        other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals 
        providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including 
        direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial 
        institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
        enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
            (2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, 
        and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand 
        the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies 
        in developing countries;
            (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other 
        financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and 
        local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy 
        technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when 
        appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products 
        as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 
        Chinese financial institutions;
            (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international 
        financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment 
        in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
            (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
        cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
        countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
        Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by 
        the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that 
        negatively impact other countries.
    (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of 
advanced energy technologies to--
            (1) improve energy security in allied and developing 
        countries;
            (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent 
        energy markets;
            (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading 
        relationships; and
            (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN 
              FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that--
            (1) identifies priority countries for deepening United 
        States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the 
        economic and national security interests of the United States 
        and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
            (2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and 
        companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, 
        operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation 
        facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in 
        the countries identified in paragraph (1);
            (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
        implications for United States national interests and the 
        interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
        respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
        country energy production or transmission; and
            (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United 
        States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the 
        United States and such countries.
    (b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall 
be published on the Department of State's website.

SEC. 116. ENSURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION IS 
              POSITIONED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND 
              DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.

    (a) In General.--
            (1) When establishing the U.S. International Development 
        Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress sought to facilitate the 
        participation of private sector capital and skills in the 
        economic development of countries with low- or lower-middle-
        income economies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to 
        market economies in order to complement United States 
        assistance and foreign policy objectives.
            (2) The priority for such support has been and remains 
        intended for less developed countries with a low-income economy 
        or a lower-middle-income economy; however, using income as a 
        discriminator for which countries merit investment will not 
        often capture other important factors, such as the wealth 
        disparity within a country, vulnerability to external shocks 
        including from natural disasters, and United States foreign 
        policy and national security concerns. For this reason, 
        Congress has currently authorized DFC investment in less 
        developed countries with an upper-middle-income economy where 
        the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that such support furthers the national economic or 
        foreign policy interests of the United States and such support 
        is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or 
        provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of 
        that country.
            (3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexibility in 
        DFC directed assistance be made available to all countries, 
        including those with so-called high-income economies such as 
        the Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other 
        allies and partners exceeding the Gross National Income per 
        Capita definition threshold for high-income country. Otherwise, 
        previously eligible partner countries find themselves now 
        ineligible.
            (4) The United States already provides a similar national 
        security interest exception for high income countries under the 
        European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which 
        gives the DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia on 
        energy and energy related investments regardless of the income 
        status of the countries.
            (5) While continuing to prioritize DFC investment in low 
        and lower-middle income countries, it is the sense of Congress 
        that the DFC should support investments in certain projects in 
        both upper-middle income and high-income countries that address 
        key national security and economic interests. The DFC is 
        authorized to and should support projects in any country 
        regardless of income status when not doing so would damage the 
        United States interest or those of its allies and partners vis-
        a-vis its global strategic competitors.
    (b) Amendment.--To address the objectives in paragraph (1) above, 
section 1412 of Public Law 115-254 pertaining to the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the 
text under section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection 
(c) and inserting the following:
    ``(c) Support in Upper-Middle-Income and High-Income Countries/The 
Less Developed Country Focus.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Corporation shall prioritize the 
        provision of support under title II in less developed countries 
        with a low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy.
            ``(2) Support in upper-middle-income and high-income 
        countries.--The Corporation shall restrict the provision of 
        support under title II in countries with an upper-middle-income 
        or high-income economy unless--
                    ``(A) the President certifies to the appropriate 
                congressional committees that such support furthers the 
                national economic, foreign policy, or development 
                interests of the United States; and
                    ``(B) such support is designed to produce 
                significant developmental outcomes or provide 
                developmental benefits to the poorest, marginalized, or 
                equity-disadvantaged population groups of that 
                country.''.

             Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States played a leadership role in 
        constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the 
        international economic order following the Second World War, 
        yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical 
        prosperity and stability.
            (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-
        Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated 
        by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy, 
        leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the 
        Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
        Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard 
        rules for regional economic engagement.
            (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan, 
        Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive 
        Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in 
        terms of GDP.
            (4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led 
        United States allies and partners to question the United States 
        commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its distortive 
        and unfair trade practices, the People's Republic of China is 
        taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partnerships 
        in the region and promoting its own state-led economic model.
            (5) The United States is increasingly on the outside 
        looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. 
        United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a 
        strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows 
        competitors to expand their economic influence at the United 
        States expense.
            (6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will 
        define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce 
        over the coming decades, the United States is currently not 
        well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.
            (7) It is in the United States vital interest to upgrade 
        its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and 
        develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy 
        to fully participle in the region's economic dynamism.

SEC. 122. REVIEW OF PRC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, 
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the PRC's global trade and investment diplomacy and 
engagement over the past decade, including any bilateral or 
plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and their 
impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as 
well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC 
and the global economy as a whole.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report shall include the 
following:
            (1) A Survey and Comparison of China's international 
        economic practices, which will--
                    (A) provide an overview of the PRC's distortive 
                trade policies;
                    (B) list the PRC's trade and investment agreements 
                globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into 
                and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual 
                countries or groups of countries;
                    (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to 
                advance its international economic objectives, 
                including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI 
                related activities;
                    (D) compare the United States and Chinese 
                approaches and priorities on trade and investment with 
                major global economies, United States allies, and for 
                each region of the world; and
                    (E) outline what further steps China may take in 
                the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic 
                position and influence.
            (2) An evaluation of the impacts of China's trade and 
        investment policies, including--
                    (A) the impact of these trade and investment 
                agreements on China's economy, with a focus on its 
                trade and investment profile, the impact on China's 
                economic growth and per-capita income; and the impact 
                on the profitability and market share of Chinese 
                companies and SOEs;
                    (B) the impact of these agreements on China's 
                political and diplomatic relations with the countries 
                it entered into agreements with and by region; and
                    (C) the impact of China's trade and investment 
                relationships with other countries on the market share 
                of United States companies.

SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United 
States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the 
Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:
            (1) Deepening United States trade and investment 
        relationships in the region, especially with key allies and 
        partners.
            (2) Confirming American leadership and participation in 
        global regional economic organizations and fora, including APEC 
        and the WTO.
            (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral 
        agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at 
        the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by 
        writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.
            (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for 
        industries critical for United States national interest, 
        including semiconductors and vaccines and PPE.
            (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based 
        economic model.
    (b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, 
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
presents the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to 
achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) above and includes 
specific action plans for the following:
            (1) Enhancing American trade and investment relationships 
        in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with 
        American allies and ASEAN.
            (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the 
        region's economic architecture.
            (3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from 
        CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine the United States ability to 
        shape regional trade and investment rules.
            (4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and 
        trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging 
        technologies, including semiconductors, and products and 
        components critical for national health, including vaccines and 
        related materials, and PPE.
            (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards 
        and rules for the region in the following areas:
                    (A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.
                    (B) Labor practices and environmental standards.
                    (C) Intellectual property rights.
            (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC's unfair 
        trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on--
                    (A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned 
                enterprises; and
                    (B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce.

SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 
              IN APEC.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States has benefitted from the regional 
        economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic 
        Cooperation forum since its inception in 1989;
            (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member 
        economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global 
        GDP and 48 percent of global trade;
            (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade 
        barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to 
        global value chains, while raising the profile of critical 
        topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and 
        inclusive growth;
            (4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead 
        at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that 
        benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and 
        better integrates the United States economy with others in the 
        region;
            (5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was 
        able to promote United States interests, while reassuring 
        allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region 
        in the economic arena;
            (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make 
        progress on several United States priorities, that are shared 
        by United States allies and partners, including--
                    (A) making regional commerce more inclusive;
                    (B) fostering innovation and digitization; and
                    (C) addressing climate change and environmental 
                protection;
            (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to 
        leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic 
        agenda;
            (8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance 
        several of its own priorities in the region, including to--
                    (A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders 
                to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and 
                other part of civil society;
                    (B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and promote 
                small and medium enterprises;
                    (C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade 
                skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;
                    (D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and 
                development agenda with a focus on green technologies, 
                infrastructure and finance; and
                    (E) advance work on digital trade, including by 
                expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital 
                inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and
            (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States 
        should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023 
        and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members 
        to build support.

SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

    (a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is the sense 
of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies 
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled 
technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within 
a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
    (b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should 
lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and 
diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of 
information and communications technology products and services to 
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital 
authoritarianism'').
    (c) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure 
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or 
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as 
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for 
communication.
    (d) Efforts To Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten 
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt 
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to 
ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign 
actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they 
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated our dependence on 
        digital tools, international rules around digital governance 
        and trade have remained largely piecemeal;
            (2) the People's Republic of China is operating under and 
        advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United 
        States values and interests, and those of United States allies 
        and partners;
            (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral 
        digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and 
        Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 
        the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the 
        Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership 
        Agreement have emerged, creating a set of rules that the United 
        States should be driving;
            (4) the United States has already underscored the need for 
        such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade 
        Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade 
        or e-commerce chapter in the USMCA;
            (5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would 
        allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded 
        economies around common standards and norms, including the 
        principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency, 
        and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly 
        vital for the global economy;
            (6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of 
        common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows, 
        the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of 
        growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, 
        and institutions around the world;
            (7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of 
        SMEs in the global economy through trade facilitation measures, 
        including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-payment; and
            (8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation 
        with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplomacy at the Department of 
        State should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or 
        arrangements relating to digital trade with the like-minded 
        countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European Union, the 
        member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing 
        alliance, and other partners and allies, as appropriate.

SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The 
President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the 
``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help foreign 
countries--
            (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital 
        infrastructure in emerging markets;
            (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and 
        encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, 
        the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet 
        governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and 
        communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;
            (3) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services 
        and increase United States company market share in target 
        markets;
            (4) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply 
        chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and
            (5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, 
        and promote best practices for a national approach to 
        cybersecurity.
    (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator 
of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan 
for the coming three years to advance the goals identified in 
subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation.--In developing the action plan required by 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator shall 
consult with--
            (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
            (2) leaders of the United States industry;
            (3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open 
        Technology Fund;
            (4) representatives from relevant United States Government 
        agencies; and
            (5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 to carry out this section.

             Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China operates a system of 
        state-owned financial institutions including retail banks, 
        investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given 
        favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial 
        institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to 
        operate in China.
            (2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma 
        referred to ``pawnshop mentality'' of state-owned banks. 
        Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant 
        Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.
            (3) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
        2001, the Chinese Government committed to opening the credit 
        card payment business to foreign firms by 2006.
            (4) After years of China refusing to open its payment 
        market, the United States brought a case against China before 
        the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated China to open its card 
        payment market to global competitors.
            (5) Even after the WTO's ruling, the PRC Government refused 
        to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required 
        all yuan-denominated payment cards to utilize China's Union Pay 
        network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had 
        grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the 
        application of foreign firms to enter the market.
            (6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital 
        controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign 
        investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to 
        control their money.
            (7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
        announced that China would launch a technology innovation stock 
        exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on 
        July 22, 2019.
            (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use a fully 
        digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's first central 
        bank backed digital currency, and the People's Bank of China 
        and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing 
        the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.

SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR 
              GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve 
        currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States 
        and the American people by allowing the United States to 
        maintain economic independence, better control its monetary 
        policy, and finance government outlays;
            (2) American global leadership has benefited from the 
        United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep 
        capital markets, and financial technology innovations;
            (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American 
        national security rely on the United States role as the global 
        financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic 
        opportunity;
            (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center 
        of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused 
        stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital 
        currency, the People's Republic of China is attempting to 
        become the leading hub of finance in the world; and
            (5) the United States must maintain its position as a 
        global financial leader to continue its broader global 
        leadership role around the world.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees that--
            (1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign 
        policy that derive from the United States financial leadership 
        and the dollar's status as the world's global reserve currency;
            (2) describes the actions taken by the People's Republic of 
        China that could cement China's role as the world's leading 
        financial center;
            (3) analyzes the possible impact on American national 
        security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the 
        dollar as the world's leading reserve currency;
            (4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically 
        with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a 
        financial system that is free, open, and fair; and
            (5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve 
        its status as the world's leading financial center and maintain 
        the dollar's position as the global reserve currency.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
            (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
        the Senate.

SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

    (a) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
        describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by 
        the presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that are 
        listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter 
        in the form of American depository receipts.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
                    (A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC 
                that--
                            (i) are listed or traded on one or several 
                        stock exchanges within the United States, 
                        including over-the-counter market and ``A 
                        Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded 
                        funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
                            (ii) based on the factors for consideration 
                        described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and 
                        materially contributed to--
                                    (I) activities that undermine 
                                United States national security;
                                    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or
                                    (III) a substantially increased 
                                financial risk exposure for United 
                                States-based investors;
                    (B) describe the activities of the companies 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their 
                implications for the United States; and
                    (C) develop policy recommendations for the United 
                States Government, State governments, United States 
                financial institutions, United States equity and debt 
                exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address 
                the risks posed by the presence in United States 
                capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
            (3) Factors for inclusion of a company.--In completing the 
        report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider 
        whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
                    (A) has materially contributed to the development 
                or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by 
                the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component 
                parts of such equipment;
                    (B) has contributed to the construction and 
                militarization of features in the South China Sea;
                    (C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has 
                been determined to have conducted business with 
                sanctioned entities;
                    (D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft;
                    (E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
                    (F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear 
                or missile technology in violation of United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;
                    (G) has contributed to the repression of religious 
                and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    (H) has contributed to the development of 
                technologies that enable censorship directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the PRC; and
                    (I) has contributed to other activities or behavior 
                determined to be relevant by the President.
            (4) Factors for making policy recommendations.--In 
        completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall 
        weigh the national security implications considering the 
        following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)--
                    (A) the possibility that banning or delisting 
                companies from our markets could lead to an outflow of 
                companies to list in the PRC;
                    (B) the possibility that banning or delisting 
                companies from our markets could impact United States 
                leadership in the asset management industry, 
                particularly vis-a-vis the PRC;
                    (C) the possibility that banning or delisting 
                companies from our markets could impact the impact the 
                United States status as the world's leading capital 
                markets center, particularly vis-a-vis the PRC; and
                    (D) the impact on American foreign policy and 
                national security if United States leadership in 
                capital markets was weakened vis-a-vis the PRC.
    (b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form.
    (c) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under 
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
relevant United States Government websites.

SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO 
              CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.

    (a) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees on the 
        diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment 
        systems.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
                    (A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy 
                and global leadership hinge upon the current 
                infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border 
                payment and financial messaging systems;
                    (B) examine the durability of the Society for 
                Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
                cooperative;
                    (C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross 
                Border Interbank Payment Systems (CIPS), 
                cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies 
                could erode this system; and
                    (D) analyze how changes to global cross-border 
                payment systems could undermine United States national 
                security interests including impacts on the efficacy of 
                sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the 
                enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
    (b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form.
    (c) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under 
subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
relevant United States Government websites.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
        provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and 
        are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the 
        United States to advance its vital national interests, defend 
        its territory, expand its economy through international trade 
        and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while 
        seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination 
        of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes 
        by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
            (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are 
        critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-
        Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, 
        and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared 
        interest in areas such as defense and security, economic 
        prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental 
        freedoms;
            (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, 
        Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as its 
        trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional 
        architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
        (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which 
        are essential to further shared interests;
            (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands 
        consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening 
        and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these 
        challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete 
        partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security 
        cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level 
        and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, 
        mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key 
        capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual 
        support in the face of political, economic, or military 
        coercion;
            (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
        and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
        the collective ability to advance shared interests;
            (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize 
        human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
            (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert 
        Group of the International Military Council on Climate and 
        Security (IMCCS), titled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
        Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the 
        regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former Deputy 
        Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 
        Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate 
        shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security 
        throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns 
        shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more 
        frequent;
            (8) the United State should continue to engage on and 
        deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia 
        Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas 
        of--
                    (A) forecasting environmental challenges;
                    (B) assisting with transnational cooperation on 
                sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the 
                goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe 
                drinking water;
                    (C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
                    (D) meeting environmental challenges and developing 
                resilience;
            (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States 
        Agency for International Development, should facilitate a 
        robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and 
        adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions 
        needed--
                    (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk 
                reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on 
                strategic interests of the United States and partners 
                and allies of the United States in the region; and
                    (B) to address humanitarian and food security 
                impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and
            (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain 
        essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the 
        Indo-Pacific region.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as 
        appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional 
        development, energy security and development, scientific and 
        health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, 
        intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related 
        initiatives;
            (2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral 
        treaty obligations, including--
                    (A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of 
                Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United 
                States of America and Japan, done at Washington, 
                January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent 
                bilateral security agreements and arrangements 
                concluded on or before the date of enactment of this 
                Act;
                    (B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with 
                the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
                the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 
                1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act;
                    (C) defending the Philippines consistent with 
                article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
                United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done 
                at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and 
                subsequent bilateral security agreements and 
                arrangements concluded on or before the date of 
                enactment of this Act;
                    (D) defending Thailand consistent with the 
                Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (``Manila 
                Pact''), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, 
                understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 
                1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act; and
                    (E) defending Australia consistent with the 
                Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States 
                of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951, 
                and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
                agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
                date of enactment of this Act;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States bilateral 
        and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, 
        and New Zealand;
            (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
        Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human 
        rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora 
        and pacts; and
            (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
        security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, 
        Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue 
        to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, 
        (through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ``Quad'') to 
        enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional 
        challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, 
        and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for 
        democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic 
        growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion;
            (2) the United States should expand dialogue and 
        cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to 
        support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, 
        peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and 
        territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and 
        strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;
            (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders 
        meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and 
        health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
        affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
        access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
        cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
        infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
        disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
        the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so 
        critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
            (4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 
        1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for 
        use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International 
        Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International 
        Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International 
        Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral 
        development banks, should also venture to finance development 
        and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are 
        competitive, transparent, and sustainable;
            (5) the United States should participate in the Resilient 
        Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India 
        in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply 
        chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors 
        to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded 
        countries; and
            (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working 
        Group could--
                    (A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior 
                officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of 
                issues; and
                    (B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing 
                bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United 
                States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as 
                well as other formal and informal parliamentary 
                exchanges.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop 
        and submit a comprehensive strategy for bolstering engagement 
        and cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees laying out the strategy.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        subsection (a) shall include the following:
                    (A) A description of how the United States intends 
                to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-
                Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India, 
                Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common 
                challenges.
                    (B) A summary of--
                            (i) current and past Quad initiatives 
                        across the whole of the United States 
                        Government, including to promote broad based 
                        and inclusive economic growth, trade, 
                        investment, and to advance technology 
                        cooperation, energy innovation, climate 
                        mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital 
                        infrastructure development, education, disaster 
                        management, and global health security;
                            (ii) proposals shared among Quad nations to 
                        deepen existing security cooperation, 
                        intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, 
                        and multilateral coordination; and
                            (iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken 
                        jointly with Quad nations plus other like-
                        minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on areas of 
                        shared interest.
                    (C) A description of efforts to jointly--
                            (i) expand ongoing COVID-19 cooperation to 
                        prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on 
                        medium-term vaccine and medical supply 
                        production and building a broader dialogue on 
                        global public health;
                            (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 
                        regional economic engagement and integration, 
                        and strengthen regional rules and standards 
                        around trade and investment;
                            (iii) strengthen climate actions on 
                        mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, 
                        capacity-building, and climate finance;
                            (iv) facilitate the development of quality 
                        infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through 
                        joint financing, investment, technical 
                        assistance, and standards setting;
                            (v) enhance joint maritime security and 
                        maritime domain awareness initiatives to 
                        protecting the maritime commons and supporting 
                        international law and freedom of navigation in 
                        the Indo-Pacific; and
                            (vi) develop international technology 
                        standards and share or co-develop new 
                        innovative technologies of the future.

SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into 
negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India 
(collectively, with the United States, known as the ``Quad'') with the 
goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on the 
recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in section 203(6) 
and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.
    (b) United States Group.--
            (1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the 
        Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in 
        subsection (a), there shall be established a United States 
        Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad 
        Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
            (2) Membership.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall be 
                comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
                    (B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress 
                appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph 
                (A)--
                            (i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker 
                        of the House of Representatives from among 
                        Members of the House, not less than 4 of whom 
                        shall be members of the Committee on Foreign 
                        Affairs; and
                            (ii) half shall be appointed by the 
                        President pro tempore of the Senate, based on 
                        recommendations of the majority leader and 
                        minority leader of the Senate, from among 
                        Members of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom 
                        shall be members of the Committee on Foreign 
                        Relations (unless the majority leader and 
                        minority leader determine otherwise).
            (3) Meetings.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek 
                to meet not less frequently than annually with 
                representatives and appropriate staff of the 
                legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any 
                other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad 
                countries.
                    (B) Limitation.--A meeting described in 
                subparagraph (A) may be held--
                            (i) in the United States;
                            (ii) in another Quad country during periods 
                        when Congress is not in session; or
                            (iii) virtually.
            (4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
                    (A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the House from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs.
                    (B) Senate delegation.--The President pro tempore 
                of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the Senate from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations.
            (5) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) In general.--There is authorized to be 
                appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2022 
                through 2025 for the United States Group.
                    (B) Distribution of appropriations.--
                            (i) In general.--For each fiscal year for 
                        which an appropriation is made for the United 
                        States Group, half of the amount appropriated 
                        shall be available to the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and half of the amount 
                        shall be available to the delegation from the 
                        Senate.
                            (ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts 
                        available to the delegations of the House of 
                        Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) 
                        shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved 
                        by the chairperson of the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and the chairperson of 
                        the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
            (6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept 
        gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the 
        review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 
        the Senate.
            (7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the 
        chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives 
        or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group 
        shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in 
        the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
            (8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation 
        is made for the United States Group, which shall include a 
        description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support 
        greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and 
        respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
            (2) support high-level United States participation in the 
        annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
            (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic 
        engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
        border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's 
        (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
        term economic growth and cooperation with the United States 
        that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in 
        technology, education, disaster management, food security, 
        human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's 
        poorest countries;
            (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to 
        foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, 
        political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic 
        of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
            (5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives 
        like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a 
        commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic 
        relationships in the region;
            (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and 
        territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing 
        claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, 
        legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
        consistent with international law, including through the 
        adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that 
        represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and 
        stability in the region;
            (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
        territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) to cease any current activities, and avoid 
                undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine 
                stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through 
                the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
                    (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and 
                other features, and refrain from new efforts to 
                militarize, including the construction of new garrisons 
                and facilities and the relocation of additional 
                military personnel, material, or equipment;
                    (C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent 
                other countries from exercising their sovereign rights 
                to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and 
                continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas 
                in the South China Sea that lack support in 
                international law; and
                    (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of 
                administrative and military districts in contested 
                areas in the South China Sea;
            (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that 
        cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and 
        support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
        Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
        illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
            (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
        to encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the 
        decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in 
        favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against 
        the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to 
        continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and 
        trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen 
        regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
        refugees and migrants;
            (11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
            (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN 
        countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities 
        Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the 
        United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
        ASEAN Health Futures;
            (13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN 
        leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open 
        and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and 
        protecting human rights, including releasing political 
        prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
        arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
        freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech 
        and expression;
            (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address 
        corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
        bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the 
        private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency 
        through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the 
        South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
            (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
        as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides 
        skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation 
        that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation 
        and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global 
        challenges of the future;
            (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the 
        Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an 
        emphasis on civil society leaders;
            (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully 
        upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions and international agreements with respect to the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic 
        missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to 
        do the same; and
            (18) allocate appropriate resources across the United 
        States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific 
        strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN 
        and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
        solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 206. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting 
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
            (2) the United States should work with its allies and 
        partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure 
        supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
            (3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in 
        telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and 
        its allies and partners is a national security interest of the 
        United States.
    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish an interagency working group to 
                provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 
                the representation and leadership of the United States 
                at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generation mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and
                    (B) work with allies, partners, and the private 
                sector to increase productive engagement.
            (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working 
        group described in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a 
                designee of the Secretary of State; and
                    (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each 
                Federal department or agency the President determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Briefings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently 
                thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the 
                interagency working group described in paragraph (1) 
                shall provide a strategy to the appropriate 
                congressional committees that addresses--
                            (i) promotion of United States leadership 
                        at international standards-setting bodies for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks relevant to 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure, taking into account the 
                        different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting bodies;
                            (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and 
                        partners to share security risk information and 
                        findings pertaining to equipment that supports 
                        or is used in 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure 
                        and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
                            (iii) China's presence and activities at 
                        international standards-setting bodies relevant 
                        to 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure, 
                        including information on the differences in the 
                        scope and scale of China's engagement at such 
                        bodies compared to engagement by the United 
                        States or its allies and partners and the 
                        security risks raised by Chinese proposals in 
                        such standards-setting bodies; and
                            (iv) engagement with private sector 
                        communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.
                    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request 
                from the appropriate congressional committees, or as 
                determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency 
                working group established pursuant to paragraph (1), 
                the interagency working group shall provide such 
                committees an updated briefing that covers the matters 
                described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph 
                (A).

SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.

    (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the President, 
acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with 
G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic 
freedoms, including the following:
            (1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
            (2) Building support for international infrastructure 
        standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka 
        in 2018.
            (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
            (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
            (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual 
        property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other 
        policies and practices.
            (6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is 
        inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development (OECD) and Paris Club principles.
            (7) International influence campaigns.
            (8) Environmental standards.
            (9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that 
        are not in the G7 and G20.

SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to support the close economic, political, and security 
        relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize 
        Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States 
        Indo-Pacific;
            (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a 
        vital national security interest of the United States;
            (3) to reinforce all existing United States Government 
        commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act 
        (Public Law 96-8), the three joint communiques, and the ``Six 
        Assurances'';
            (4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric 
        defense strategy, including the priorities identified in 
        Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
            (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in 
        order to fully resource its defense strategy;
            (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to 
        Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, 
        particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric 
        capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, 
        air defense, advanced command, control, communications, 
        computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and 
        resilient command and control capabilities, into its military 
        forces;
            (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in international organizations, including the 
        World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation 
        Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, 
        and other international bodies as appropriate;
            (8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the 
        International Agency for Research on Cancer;
            (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United 
        States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
            (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially 
        through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade 
        and Investment Framework Agreement;
            (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a 
        bilateral free trade agreement;
            (12) to expand bilateral economic and technological 
        cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
            (13) to support United States educational and exchange 
        programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of 
        Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
            (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the 
        United States and Taiwan.
    (b) Supporting United States Educational and Exchange Programs With 
Taiwan.--
            (1) Establishment of the united states-taiwan cultural 
        exchange foundation.--The Secretary of State should consider 
        establishing an independent nonprofit that--
                    (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the 
                future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
                    (B) works with State and local school districts and 
                educational institutions to send high school and 
                university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese 
                language, culture, history, politics, and other 
                relevant subjects.
            (2) Partner.--State and local school districts and 
        educational institutions, including public universities, are 
        encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
        Representative Office in the United States to establish 
        programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural 
        exchanges.

SEC. 209. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan 
Fellowship Act''.
    (b) Findings; Purposes.--
            (1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
                    (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 
                U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ``to 
                preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly 
                commercial, cultural, and other relations between the 
                people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, 
                as well as the people on the China mainland and all 
                other peoples of the Western Pacific area''.
                    (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
                Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has 
                grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant 
                democracy of 23,000,000 people.
                    (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's 
                Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic 
                partners and from international organizations, 
                including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has 
                emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global 
                pandemic response, including by donating more than 
                2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to 
                the United States.
                    (D) The creation of a United States fellowship 
                program with Taiwan would support--
                            (i) a key priority of expanding people-to-
                        people exchanges, which was outlined in 
                        President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National 
                        Security Strategy;
                            (ii) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment 
                        to Taiwan, ``a leading democracy and a critical 
                        economic and security partner'', as expressed 
                        in his March 2021 Interim National Security 
                        Strategic Guidance; and
                            (iii) April 2021 guidance from the 
                        Department of State based on a review required 
                        under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 
                        (subtitle B of title III of division FF of 
                        Public Law 116-260) to ``encourage U.S. 
                        government engagement with Taiwan that reflects 
                        our deepening unofficial relationship''.
            (2) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
                    (A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan 
                strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the 
                Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials 
                of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan 
                for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 
                as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or 
                a Taiwanese civic institution;
                    (B) to expand United States Government expertise in 
                Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of 
                the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the 
                Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States 
                personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and 
                understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program 
                established under subsection (c); and
                    (C) to better position the United States to advance 
                its economic, security, and human rights interests and 
                values in the Indo-Pacific region.
    (c) Taiwan Fellowship Program.--
            (1) Definitions.--In this section:
                    (A) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'' means, 
                in the case of the executive branch of United States 
                Government, or in the case of a legislative branch 
                agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the 
                respective agency.
                    (B) Agency of the united states government.--The 
                term ``agency of the United States Government'' 
                includes the Government Accountability Office, the 
                Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research 
                Service, and the United States-China Economic and 
                Security Review Commission of the legislative branch, 
                as well as any agency of the executive branch.
                    (C) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
                ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                            (i) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                        Senate;
                            (ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
                        the Senate;
                            (iii) the Committee on Appropriations of 
                        the House of Representatives;
                            (iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
                        the House of Representatives; and
                            (v) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
                        House of Representatives.
                    (D) Detailee.--The term ``detailee'' means an 
                employee of an agency of the United States Government 
                on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a 
                change of position from the agency at which such 
                employee is employed.
                    (E) Implementing partner.--The term ``implementing 
                partner'' means any United States organization 
                described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
                Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) 
                of such Code that--
                            (i) is selected through a competitive 
                        process;
                            (ii) performs logistical, administrative, 
                        and other functions, as determined by the 
                        Department of State and the American Institute 
                        of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship 
                        Program; and
                            (iii) enters into a cooperative agreement 
                        with the American Institute in Taiwan to 
                        administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
            (2) Establishment of taiwan fellowship program.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall 
                establish the ``Taiwan Fellowship Program'' (hereafter 
                referred to in this section as the ``Program'') to 
                provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two 
                years for eligible United States citizens through the 
                cooperative agreement established in subparagraph (B). 
                The Department of State, in consultation with the 
                American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing 
                partner, may modify the name of the Program.
                    (B) Cooperative agreements.--
                            (i) In general.--The American Institute in 
                        Taiwan shall use amounts authorized to be 
                        appropriated pursuant to paragraph (6)(A) to 
                        enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative 
                        agreement with an appropriate implementing 
                        partner.
                            (ii) Fellowships.--The Department of State, 
                        in consultation with the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing 
                        partner, shall award to eligible United States 
                        citizens, subject to available funding--
                                    (I) not fewer than five fellowships 
                                during the first two years of the 
                                Program; and
                                    (II) not fewer than ten fellowships 
                                during each of the remaining years of 
                                the Program.
                    (C) International agreement; implementing 
                partner.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act, the American Institute in 
                Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, 
                shall--
                            (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 
                        Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or 
                        with another appropriate entity, for the 
                        purpose of entering into an agreement to 
                        facilitate the placement of fellows in an 
                        agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; 
                        and
                            (ii) begin the process of selecting an 
                        implementing partner, which--
                                    (I) shall agree to meet all of the 
                                legal requirements required to operate 
                                in Taiwan; and
                                    (II) shall be composed of staff who 
                                demonstrate significant experience 
                                managing exchange programs in the Indo-
                                Pacific region.
                    (D) Curriculum.--
                            (i) First year.--During the first year of 
                        each fellowship under this subsection, each 
                        fellow should study--
                                    (I) the Mandarin Chinese language;
                                    (II) the people, history, and 
                                political climate on Taiwan; and
                                    (III) the issues affecting the 
                                relationship between the United States 
                                and the Indo-Pacific region.
                            (ii) Second year.--During the second year 
                        of each fellowship under this section, each 
                        fellow, subject to the approval of the 
                        Department of State, the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in 
                        accordance with the purposes of this Act, shall 
                        work in--
                                    (I) a parliamentary office, 
                                ministry, or other agency of the 
                                governing authorities on Taiwan; or
                                    (II) an organization outside of the 
                                governing authorities on Taiwan, whose 
                                interests are associated with the 
                                interests of the fellow and the agency 
                                of the United States Government from 
                                which the fellow had been employed.
                    (E) Flexible fellowship duration.--Notwithstanding 
                any requirement under this section, the Secretary of 
                State, in consultation with the American Institute in 
                Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, 
                may award fellowships that have a duration of between 
                nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum 
                requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.
                    (F) Sunset.--The Program shall terminate ten years 
                after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (3) Program requirements.--
                    (A) Eligibility requirements.--A United States 
                citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section 
                if he or she--
                            (i) is an employee of the United States 
                        Government;
                            (ii) has received at least one exemplary 
                        performance review in his or her current United 
                        States Government role within at least the last 
                        three years prior to the beginning the 
                        fellowship;
                            (iii) has at least two years of experience 
                        in any branch of the United States Government;
                            (iv) has a demonstrated professional or 
                        educational background in the relationship 
                        between the United States and countries in the 
                        Indo-Pacific region; and
                            (v) has demonstrated his or her commitment 
                        to further service in the United States 
                        Government.
                    (B) Responsibilities of fellows.--Each recipient of 
                a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a 
                condition of such fellowship--
                            (i) to maintain satisfactory progress in 
                        language training and appropriate behavior in 
                        Taiwan, as determined by the Department of 
                        State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
                        appropriate, its implementing partner;
                            (ii) to refrain from engaging in any 
                        intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
                        on behalf of the United States Government; and
                            (iii) to continue Federal Government 
                        employment for a period of not less than four 
                        years after the conclusion of the fellowship or 
                        for not less than two years for a fellowship 
                        that is one year or shorter.
                    (C) Responsibilities of implementing partner.--
                            (i) Selection of fellows.--The implementing 
                        partner, in close coordination with the 
                        Department of State and the American Institute 
                        in Taiwan, shall--
                                    (I) make efforts to recruit 
                                fellowship candidates who reflect the 
                                diversity of the United States;
                                    (II) select fellows for the Program 
                                based solely on merit, with appropriate 
                                supervision from the Department of 
                                State and the American Institute in 
                                Taiwan; and
                                    (III) prioritize the selection of 
                                candidates willing to serve a 
                                fellowship lasting one year or longer.
                            (ii) First year.--The implementing partner 
                        should provide each fellow in the first year 
                        (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by 
                        the Department of State and the American 
                        Institute in Taiwan for those who are not 
                        serving a two-year fellowship) with--
                                    (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 
                                language training; and
                                    (II) courses in the politic, 
                                culture, and history of Taiwan, China, 
                                and the broader Indo-Pacific.
                            (iii) Waiver of required training.--The 
                        Department of State, in coordination with the 
                        American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
                        appropriate, the implementing partner, may 
                        waive any of the training required under clause 
                        (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin 
                        Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topic 
                        described in clause (ii)(II), or for other 
                        related reasons approved by the Department of 
                        State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If 
                        any of the training requirements are waived for 
                        a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the 
                        training portion of his or her fellowship may 
                        be shortened to the extent appropriate.
                            (iv) Office; staffing.--The implementing 
                        partner, in consultation with the Department of 
                        State and the American Institute in Taiwan, 
                        shall maintain an office and at least one full-
                        time staff member in Taiwan--
                                    (I) to liaise with the American 
                                Institute in Taiwan and the governing 
                                authorities on Taiwan; and
                                    (II) to serve as the primary in-
                                country point of contact for the 
                                recipients of fellowships under this 
                                section and their dependents.
                            (v) Other functions.--The implementing 
                        partner should perform other functions in 
                        association in support of the Program, 
                        including logistical and administrative 
                        functions, as prescribed by the Department of 
                        State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
                    (D) Noncompliance.--
                            (i) In general.--Any fellow who fails to 
                        comply with the requirements under this section 
                        shall reimburse the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan for--
                                    (I) the Federal funds expended for 
                                the fellow's participation in the 
                                fellowship, as set forth in clauses 
                                (ii) and (iii); and
                                    (II) interest accrued on such funds 
                                (calculated at the prevailing rate).
                            (ii) Full reimbursement.--Any fellow who 
                        violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B) 
                        shall reimburse the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of--
                                    (I) all of the Federal funds 
                                expended for the fellow's participation 
                                in the fellowship; and
                                    (II) interest on the amount 
                                specified in subclause (I), which shall 
                                be calculated at the prevailing rate.
                            (iii) Pro rata reimbursement.--Any fellow 
                        who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall 
                        reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in 
                        an amount equal to the difference between--
                                    (I) the amount specified in clause 
                                (ii); and
                                    (II) the product of--
                                            (aa) the amount the fellow 
                                        received in compensation during 
                                        the final year of the 
                                        fellowship, including the value 
                                        of any allowances and benefits 
                                        received by the fellow; 
                                        multiplied by
                                            (bb) the percentage of the 
                                        period specified in 
                                        subparagraph (B)(iii) during 
                                        which the fellow did not remain 
                                        employed by the United States 
                                        Government.
                    (E) Annual report.--Not later than 90 days after 
                the selection of the first class of fellows under this 
                Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the 
                Department of State shall offer to brief the 
                appropriate congressional committees regarding the 
                following issues:
                            (i) An assessment of the performance of the 
                        implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes 
                        of this section.
                            (ii) The number of applicants each year, 
                        the number of applicants willing to serve a 
                        fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the 
                        number of such applicants selected for the 
                        fellowship.
                            (iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of 
                        the fellows selected by the implementing 
                        partner and the extent to which such fellows 
                        represent the diversity of the United States.
                            (iv) The names of the parliamentary 
                        offices, ministries, other agencies of the 
                        governing authorities on Taiwan, and 
                        nongovernmental institutions to which each 
                        fellow was assigned.
                            (v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to 
                        improve the implementation of the Program, 
                        including added flexibilities in the 
                        administration of the program.
                            (vi) An assessment of the Program's value 
                        upon the relationship between the United States 
                        and Taiwan or the United States and Asian 
                        countries.
                    (F) Annual financial audit.--
                            (i) In general.--The financial records of 
                        any implementing partner shall be audited 
                        annually in accordance with generally accepted 
                        auditing standards by independent certified 
                        public accountants or independent licensed 
                        public accountants who are certified or 
                        licensed by a regulatory authority of a State 
                        or another political subdivision of the United 
                        States.
                            (ii) Location.--Each audit under clause (i) 
                        shall be conducted at the place or places where 
                        the financial records of the implementing 
                        partner are normally kept.
                            (iii) Access to documents.--The 
                        implementing partner shall make available to 
                        the accountants conducting an audit under 
                        clause (i)--
                                    (I) all books, financial records, 
                                files, other papers, things, and 
                                property belonging to, or in use by, 
                                the implementing partner that are 
                                necessary to facilitate the audit; and
                                    (II) full facilities for verifying 
                                transactions with the balances or 
                                securities held by depositories, fiscal 
                                agents, and custodians.
                            (iv) Report.--
                                    (I) In general.--Not later than six 
                                months after the end of each fiscal 
                                year, the implementing partner shall 
                                provide a report of the audit conducted 
                                for such fiscal year under clause (i) 
                                to the Department of State and the 
                                American Institute in Taiwan.
                                    (II) Contents.--Each audit report 
                                shall--
                                            (aa) set forth the scope of 
                                        the audit;
                                            (bb) include such 
                                        statements, along with the 
                                        auditor's opinion of those 
                                        statements, as may be necessary 
                                        to present fairly the 
                                        implementing partner's assets 
                                        and liabilities, surplus or 
                                        deficit, with reasonable 
                                        detail;
                                            (cc) include a statement of 
                                        the implementing partner's 
                                        income and expenses during the 
                                        year; and
                                            (dd) include a schedule 
                                        of--

                                                    (AA) all contracts 
                                                and cooperative 
                                                agreements requiring 
                                                payments greater than 
                                                $5,000; and

                                                    (BB) any payments 
                                                of compensation, 
                                                salaries, or fees at a 
                                                rate greater than 
                                                $5,000 per year.

                                    (III) Copies.--Each audit report 
                                shall be produced in sufficient copies 
                                for distribution to the public.
            (4) Taiwan fellows on detail from government service.--
                    (A) In general.--
                            (i) Detail authorized.--With the approval 
                        of the Secretary of State, an agency head may 
                        detail, for a period of not more than two 
                        years, an employee of the agency of the United 
                        States Government who has been awarded a 
                        fellowship under this Act, to the American 
                        Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of 
                        assignment to the governing authorities on 
                        Taiwan or an organization described in 
                        paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).
                            (ii) Agreement.--Each detailee shall enter 
                        into a written agreement with the Federal 
                        Government before receiving a fellowship, in 
                        which the fellow shall agree--
                                    (I) to continue in the service of 
                                the sponsoring agency at the end of 
                                fellowship for a period of at least 
                                four years (or at least two years if 
                                the fellowship duration is one year or 
                                shorter) unless such detailee is 
                                involuntarily separated from the 
                                service of such agency; and
                                    (II) to pay to the American 
                                Institute in Taiwan any additional 
                                expenses incurred by the United States 
                                Government in connection with the 
                                fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 
                                separates from service with the 
                                sponsoring agency before the end of the 
                                period for which the detailee has 
                                agreed to continue in the service of 
                                such agency.
                            (iii) Exception.--The payment agreed to 
                        under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a 
                        detailee who leaves the service of the 
                        sponsoring agency to enter into the service of 
                        another agency of the United States Government 
                        unless the head of the sponsoring agency 
                        notifies the detailee before the effective date 
                        of entry into the service of the other agency 
                        that payment will be required under this 
                        subsection.
                    (B) Status as government employee.--A detailee--
                            (i) is deemed, for the purpose of 
                        preserving allowances, privileges, rights, 
                        seniority, and other benefits, to be an 
                        employee of the sponsoring agency;
                            (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 
                        benefits from funds available to such agency, 
                        which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of 
                        title 5, United States Code; and
                            (iii) may be assigned to a position with an 
                        entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if 
                        acceptance of such position does not involve--
                                    (I) the taking of an oath of 
                                allegiance to another government; or
                                    (II) the acceptance of compensation 
                                or other benefits from any foreign 
                                government by such detailee.
                    (C) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency.--
                            (i) In general.--The agency of the United 
                        States Government from which a detailee is 
                        detailed should provide the fellow allowances 
                        and benefits that are consistent with 
                        Department of State Standardized Regulations or 
                        other applicable rules and regulations, 
                        including--
                                    (I) a living quarters allowance to 
                                cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
                                    (II) a cost of living allowance to 
                                cover any possible higher costs of 
                                living in Taiwan;
                                    (III) a temporary quarters 
                                subsistence allowance for up to seven 
                                days if the fellow is unable to find 
                                housing immediately upon arriving in 
                                Taiwan;
                                    (IV) an education allowance to 
                                assist parents in providing the 
                                fellow's minor children with 
                                educational services ordinarily 
                                provided without charge by public 
                                schools in the United States;
                                    (V) moving expenses to transport 
                                personal belongings of the fellow and 
                                his or her family in their move to 
                                Taiwan, which is comparable to the 
                                allowance given for American Institute 
                                in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; 
                                and
                                    (VI) an economy-class airline 
                                ticket to and from Taiwan for each 
                                fellow and the fellow's immediate 
                                family.
                            (ii) Modification of benefits.--The 
                        American Institute in Taiwan and its 
                        implementing partner, with the approval of the 
                        Department of State, may modify the benefits 
                        set forth in clause (i) if such modification is 
                        warranted by fiscal circumstances.
                    (D) No financial liability.--The American Institute 
                in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing 
                authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in 
                Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second 
                year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for 
                the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally 
                provided to the detailee.
                    (E) Reimbursement.--Fellows may be detailed under 
                clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United 
                States by the American Institute in Taiwan.
                    (F) Allowances and benefits.--Detailees may be paid 
                by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances 
                and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).
            (5) GAO report.--Not later than one year prior to the 
        sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the 
        Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
        on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report 
        that includes the following:
                    (A) An analysis of United States Government 
                participants in the Program, including the number of 
                applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, 
                the places of employment.
                    (B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for 
                participants in the Program and for the United States 
                Government of such fellowships.
                    (C) An analysis of the financial impact of the 
                fellowship on United States Government offices that 
                have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.
                    (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the 
                Program.
            (6) Funding.--
                    (A) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
                authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute 
                in Taiwan--
                            (i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of 
                        which $500,000 should be used by an appropriate 
                        implementing partner to launch the Program; and
                            (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each 
                        succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
                    (B) Private sources.--The implementing partner 
                selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and 
                dispose of gifts or donations of services or property 
                in carrying out such program, subject to the review and 
                approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

SEC. 210. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 
              DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated 
        $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and 
        regional foreign assistance (FA) resources, including as 
        authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
        Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 Stat. 5391), and 
        $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) 
        budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget 
        and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID 
        budget.
            (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel 
        levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the 
        total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
            (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to 
        realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel 
        footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, 
        including in the Indo-Pacific.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be 
        sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 
        21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and 
        elsewhere;
            (2) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of 
        an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good 
        governance and sovereignty of states that adhere to and uphold 
        the rules-based international order; and
            (3) the increase must be implemented with a focus on 
        increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy 
        officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 
        foreign service officer generalists, to--
                    (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and 
                open investment environments for United States 
                companies, and engaged in increased commercial 
                diplomacy in key markets;
                    (B) better articulate and explain United States 
                policies, strengthen civil society and democratic 
                principles, enhance reporting on global activities, 
                promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United 
                States influence; and
                    (C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized 
                embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other 
                regions around the world, as necessary.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--
            (1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure 
        Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in 
        the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance 
        and significance to United States political, economic, and 
        security interests.
            (2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase 
        DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to 
        the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's 
        total budget.
    (d) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following 
elements:
            (1) Identification of requirements to advance United States 
        strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and 
        budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to meet 
        them, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.
            (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's 
        budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA 
        focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
            (3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in 
        the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the 
        Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at 
        each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a 
        description of how such increases in personnel will advance 
        United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the 
        Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
            (5) A description of any barriers to implementing the 
        action plan.
    (e) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 180 days after the 
submission of the action plan described in subsection (c) for no more 
than 3 years, the Secretary shall submit an update and brief the 
appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such action 
plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of 
benchmarks reached.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000, under titles III 
and IV of the Foreign Assistance Act for the Indo-Pacific region and 
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    (g) Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated under 
subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
Law 115-409).
    (h) Secretary of State.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State should report on the 
extent to which the benchmarks described in the action plan in 
subsection (c) have been met or progress has been made.

SEC. 211. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO DETER PRC USE OF FORCE 
              AGAINST TAIWAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--In order to deter the use of force by the 
People's Republic of China to change the status quo on Taiwan, the 
United States should coordinate with allies and partners to identify 
and develop significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and 
impose costs on any such action by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 212. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL 
              TRAFFICKING.

    (a) China's Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid 
Precursors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to 
the appropriate committees of Congress a written report--
            (1) detailing a description of United States Government 
        efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to 
        submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4-AP to 
        controls; and
            (2) detailing a plan for future steps the United States 
        Government will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl 
        production and trafficking originating in China.
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (c) shall 
be unclassified with a classified annex.

SEC. 213. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER 
              UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 
              2018.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that support 
provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) 
should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to 
the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for 
purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.
    (b) Maximum Contingent Liability.--Section 1433 of the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 
U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking ``$60,000,000,000'' and inserting 
``$100,000,000,000''.

SEC. 214. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
              DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE 
              MANUFACTURING.

    (a) In General.--The Development Finance Corporation is authorized 
to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed 
countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following 
purposes--
            (1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Authorization 
        (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing 
        COVID-19 vaccines;
            (2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing 
        therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID-19; and
            (3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies needed for 
        preventing, detecting and treating COVID-19, including 
        ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE), oxygen, 
        diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of 
State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees--
            (1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be 
        most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the 
        goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines by 2022;
            (2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner 
        country interests served by the United States providing support 
        to such projects;
            (3) a detailed description of any support provided by other 
        United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives 
        outlined in subsection (a); and
            (4) a detailed description of any support provided by China 
        in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.

SEC. 215. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN 
              STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--
            (1) With 276 embassies and other representative offices 
        globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world 
        than any other country, including the United States. Many of 
        Beijing's new missions can be found in countries that recently 
        broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, 
        El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao Tome and Principe) or do not 
        have any United States diplomatic physical presence despite 
        these countries asking for increased United States engagement 
        and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
            (2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Department of 
        State conduct an assessment of all United States diplomatic 
        posts to verify that they align with its United States national 
        security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that these 
        locations position the United States appropriately with its 
        strategic competitors to advance the national interest in every 
        country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking 
        any physical United States diplomatic presence whether an 
        embassy, consulate general, or principal officer post.
    (b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 
report assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of its 
diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any 
gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competitors. The 
Secretary of State shall coordinate with other Department and Agency 
heads having an overseas presence at any and all United States 
diplomatic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Federal 
Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify in writing the 
findings of this assessment.

SEC. 216. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS 
              PROGRAM.

    There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period 
beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, 
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 217. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

    (a) Authorization of USAGM Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the 
United States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new 
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat PRC 
disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to 
subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs.
    (b) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator 
for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support and train 
journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public 
accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the 
ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing 
issues facing their countries.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for 
International Development, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, 
$170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, 
training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended 
and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be 
appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of 
journalists.

SEC. 218. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

    (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to 
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to 
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
    (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global 
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic 
messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal 
departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and 
countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO 
Web Operations Center.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global 
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored 
propaganda and disinformation.

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any corporation, 
        company, limited liability company, limited partnership, 
        business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
            (3) Other security forces.--The term ``other security 
        forces''--
                    (A) includes national security forces that conduct 
                maritime security; and
                    (B) does not include self-described militias or 
                paramilitary organizations.

SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND 
              TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of 
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under 
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and 
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN 
              INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
        force to impede freedom of navigation operations in 
        international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to 
        alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific 
        region;
            (2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 
        Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South 
        China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in 
        international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 
        provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
        decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that 
        the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources 
        across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
            (4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to 
        abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, 
        despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United 
        Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including to the mutual 
        defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies as referenced 
        elsewhere in this Act;
            (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
        lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are 
        available to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new 
        and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
            (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC 
        claims in the South China Sea, namely--
                    (A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, 
                including to offshore resources across most of the 
                South China Sea, are unlawful;
                    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime 
                claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the 
                Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the 
                Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its 
                continental shelf;
                    (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 
                nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it 
                claims in the Spratly Islands; and
                    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or 
                maritime claim to James Shoal;
            (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and 
        provocative land reclamation;
            (5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
        coercion, or force;
            (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
        accordance with international law;
            (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime 
        claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must 
        derive from land features and otherwise comport with 
        international law;
            (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations 
        covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations 
        which have raised tensions in the region;
            (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of 
        Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant 
        states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's 
        Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
        and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
        Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
        (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
        between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
        countries, including the People's Republic of China;
            (11) support the development of regional institutions and 
        bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
        Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
        ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the 
        region and reinforce the role of international law;
            (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
        countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter 
        risky and dangerous activities;
            (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other 
        country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources 
        of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by 
        making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have 
        no support in international law; and
            (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, 
        in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of 
        navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.

SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners 
        consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for 
        alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies 
        and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
        United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
        Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and 
        international commitments;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); 
        and
            (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense, should--
                    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and
                    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions.
    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the 
        concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes 
        United States priorities for building more capable security 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must 
                possess for the United States to be able to achieve its 
                military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to expedite fielding 
                        the capabilities identified in subparagraph 
                        (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the requirements for United States 
                security assistance, including International Military 
                Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
                a part of the means to deliver critical partner 
                capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
                    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet the 
                requirements for United States security assistance, and 
                identify resource gaps;
                    (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance in 
                the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and 
                personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy 
                barriers, and factors related to specific partner 
                countries;
                    (G) identify limitations on the ability of the 
                United States to provide such capabilities, including 
                those identified under subparagraph (B), because of 
                existing United States treaty obligations, United 
                States policies, or other regulations;
                    (H) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for United States partner 
                capabilities; and
                    (I) identify required jointly agreed 
                recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based 
                on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
            (3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

     Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance 
        the UN's core budget in order to ensure that these missions are 
        properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every 
        three years by the UN General Assembly.
            (2) While the United States is the largest single financial 
        contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial 
        because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or 
        small, to help shoulder the UN's regular and peacekeeping 
        budgets at specified levels.
            (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN 
        also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls 
        to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to 
        leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and 
        peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States 
        interests and values.
            (4) The People's Republic of China is now the second 
        largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone 
        from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 
        15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to 
        UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four 
        permanent members of the Security Council combined.
            (5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and 
        PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push 
        back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-
        based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using 
        United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.
            (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key 
        posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the 
        top posts of four of the UN's 15 specialized agencies, while 
        the United States occupies only one.
            (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the 
        heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds 
        and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme, 
        none are currently led by Americans.
            (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection 
        found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not 
        have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting 
        the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their 
        recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.

SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) the Special Representative of the United States to the 
        United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;
            (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in 
        full in a timely fashion;
            (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under 
        section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of 
        title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: Detail and Transfer of 
        Federal Employees to International Organizations to detail or 
        transfer employees to relevant international organizations;
            (4) the Secretary of State shall assist the Department of 
        State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) 
        to the fullest extent;
            (5) the Secretary of State shall support qualified American 
        candidates in their bid to win election to UN-related 
        leadership positions; and
            (6) the Secretary of State shall support the placement of 
        Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) sponsored by the United 
        States in UN-affiliated agencies.

SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs (IO) an Office for American Citizens.
    (b) Duties.--The office established under subsection (a) of this 
section will be responsible for--
            (1) advocating for the employment of American citizens by 
        all international organizations of which the United States is a 
        member, including the United Nations and any of its agencies, 
        offices, and other affiliated entities;
            (2) coordinating the interagency support of non-American 
        candidates for leadership roles within all international 
        organizations of which the United States is a member, including 
        the United Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other 
        affiliated entities, when--
                    (A) no American candidate has been nominated for 
                election; and
                    (B) it is determined that providing such support is 
                in the interest of the United States;
            (3) establishing and implementing a standard operating 
        procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United 
        States citizen employment at the United Nations and other 
        international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;
            (4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and 
        identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals 
        to promote for these positions;
            (5) tracking leadership changes in United Nations 
        secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing 
        strategies to ensure that coalitions of likeminded states are 
        assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries 
        that do not share United States interests;
            (6) eliminating current barriers to the employment of 
        United States nationals in the United Nations Secretariat, 
        funds, programs, and agencies; and
            (7) increasing the number of qualified United States 
        candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United 
        Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other 
        international organizations.

SEC. 234. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are 
currently detailed or transferred to an international organization 
during the immediately preceding 12-month period and a one-time 
strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or 
transferred.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred 
        to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5, 
        United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal 
        Regulations: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to 
        International Organizations, and--
                    (A) an identification of the Federal agency from 
                which such employees were detailed or transferred; and
                    (B) an identification of the international 
                organizations to and from which such employees have 
                been detailed or transferred.
            (2) A list of international organizations to and from which 
        the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal 
        employees.
    (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

       Subtitle D--Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              AROUND THE WORLD.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-
        minded countries around the globe; and
            (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
        partners--
                    (A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, 
                and military challenges posed by the People's Republic 
                of China;
                    (B) to deter the People's Republic of China from 
                pursuing military aggression;
                    (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial disputes in accordance with international 
                law;
                    (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
                economic development while countering efforts by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to 
                leverage predatory economic practices as a means of 
                political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific 
                region and beyond;
                    (E) to promote the values of democracy and human 
                rights, including through efforts to end the repression 
                by the People's Republic of China of political 
                dissidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, 
                Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic 
                minorities;
                    (F) to respond to the crackdown by the People's 
                Republic of China, in contravention of the commitments 
                made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 
                and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate 
                aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and
                    (G) to counter the Chinese Government's efforts to 
                spread disinformation in China and beyond with respect 
                to its response to COVID-19.

                       PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship 
        based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep 
        economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision 
        to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) the United States and Canada can better address the 
        People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security 
        influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, 
        environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public 
        procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 
        connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral 
        legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and 
        human rights;
            (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and 
        Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border 
        management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, 
        a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of 
        China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, 
        energy security, and environmental stewardship;
            (4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation 
        to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, 
        economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
            (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, 
        extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose 
        national security risks for the United States and Canada;
            (6) the United States should share, as appropriate, 
        intelligence gathered regarding--
                    (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
                    (B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to 
                5G expansion;
            (7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance 
        collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, 
        United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals 
        Development Collaboration; and
            (8) the United States and Canada must prioritize 
        cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including 
        by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
        (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and 
        tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range 
        missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern 
        Hemisphere.

SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S 
              ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian 
        nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent 
        retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng 
        Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
            (2) the Government of Canada has shown international 
        leadership by--
                    (A) upholding the rule of law and complying with 
                its international legal obligations, including those 
                pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United 
                States of America and Canada, signed at Washington 
                December 3, 1971; and
                    (B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary 
                Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been 
                endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and 
                reaffirms well-established prohibitions under 
                international human rights conventions against the 
                arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as 
                leverage in state-to-state relations; and
            (3) the United States continues to join the Government of 
        Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor 
        and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national 
        Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President should submit a strategy to the 
appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes 
how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of 
Canada in managing relations with the PRC government.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and Canada in managing 
        relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure 
        supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
            (2) include a description of United States development and 
        coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the 
        cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect 
        to--
                    (A) managing economic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights in the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues involving the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues involving the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (E) international law enforcement and transnational 
                organized crime issues.
            (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with 
        Canada to counter the PRC's projection of an authoritarian 
        governing model around the world;
            (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
        cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology;
            (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
                    (A) to advance joint United States-Canadian 
                priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic 
                Region; and
                    (B) to counter the PRC's efforts to project 
                political, economic, and military influence into the 
                Arctic Region; and
            (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track 
        and counter the PRC's attempts to exert influence across the 
        multilateral system.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the 
development and implementation of the strategy required under this 
section.

SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, 
              HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
              THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as 
appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator of USAID, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall 
submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic 
competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the 
rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in 
the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustainable 
development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and 
infrastructure projects, to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection 
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve 
measurable progress, to--
            (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the 
        region to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of 
        equitable economies;
            (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the 
        countries of the Americas;
            (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive 
        environment for United States businesses in the region;
            (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term 
        financial sustainability and security implications of foreign 
        investments in strategic sectors or services, including 
        transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
            (5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive 
        infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that 
        promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition, 
        financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, 
        and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
            (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
        democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, 
        and ending impunity; and
            (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access 
        to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western 
        Hemisphere.
    (c) Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the 
congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the 
implementation of this part, including examples of successes and 
challenges.

SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE 
              SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that assesses the nature, intent, and 
        impact to United States strategic interests of Chinese 
        diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, 
        procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, 
        International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, 
        and the Inter-American Development Bank.
            (2) Defense sector.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and 
        impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military 
        activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 
        education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-
        related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such 
        as--
                    (A) the satellite and space control station the 
                People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina; 
                and
                    (B) defense and security cooperation carried out by 
                the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the 
                Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and 
                monitoring technology to governments in the region such 
                as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the 
                potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 
                intelligence services.
            (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified 
        annexes.

SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military 
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to 
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under 
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, 
and the preeminent choice for international military education and 
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to 
        Latin American and Caribbean security services;
            (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
                    (A) improving the functioning and organization of 
                security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (B) creating a better understanding of the United 
                States and its values; and
                    (C) using technology for maximum efficiency and 
                organization; and
            (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and 
        rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and 
        full compliance with Leahy Law requirements.
    (d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject 
to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
              RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
        exporting its model for internal security and state control of 
        society through advanced technology and artificial 
        intelligence; and
            (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to 
        pressure from governments or security services without reliable 
        legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of 
        citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations 
        of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.
    (b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct 
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
            (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties 
        posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); 
        and
            (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open 
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business 
and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to 
provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely 
access or share digital news and information.
    (d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to--
            (1) support and promote programs that support internet 
        freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable 
        access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (3) provide integrated support to civil society for 
        technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied 
        research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary 
        to ensure public accountability and prevent government 
        overreach in the digital sphere;
            (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and 
        develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance 
        and human rights topics;
            (6) provide training for journalists and civil society 
        leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve 
        transparency and accountability in government and the private 
        sector;
            (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and 
        commercial practices;
            (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen 
        their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph 
        (7); and
            (9) identify local resources to support the preponderance 
        of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT 
              AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon 
        imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their 
        energy production.
            (2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
                    (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent 
                of its electricity;
                    (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of 
                its electricity;
                    (C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for 
                nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
                    (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent 
                of its electricity.
            (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a 
        detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and 
        competitiveness in the Caribbean.
            (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral 
        reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution. 
        Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil 
        fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a 
        significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, 
        and natural beauty.
            (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
                    (A) has serious health impacts in the form of 
                higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and
                    (B) can also exacerbate climate change.
            (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea 
        level rise and stronger storms.
            (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries 
        of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led 
        Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
                    (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
                    (B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent 
                of their energy production needs.
            (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political 
        turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to 
        retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and 
        step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives 
        preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from 
        Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are 
        experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
            (9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy 
        projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this 
        spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the 
        largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
            (10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need 
        $12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
            (11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased 
        dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic 
        alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have 
        fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market 
        growth, and according to data released by the International 
        Renewable Energy Agency, \1/3\ of global power capacity is 
        based in renewable energy.
            (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated 
        that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total 
        primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
            (13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, 
        Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of 
        $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of 
        CO<INF>2</INF> by 2050 if the region's energy and transport 
        sectors reach net zero emissions.
            (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore 
        resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, 
        geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
            (15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in 
        providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the 
        Caribbean on energy issues through--
                    (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the 
                Americas;
                    (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
                    (C) bilateral assistance programs.
            (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders' 
        Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
        of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico 
        reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and 
        increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening 
        wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
            (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the 
        Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with 
        individual countries--
                    (A) to transform its energy sector;
                    (B) to work to increase access to finance, good 
                governance, and diversification; and
                    (C) to maximize the impact of existing donor 
                effects.
            (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central 
        American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally 
        launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy 
        (C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and 
        action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional 
        market and transmission system.
            (19) The United States has an important opportunity--
                    (A) to deepen this engagement;
                    (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries 
                on a more regional and coordinated basis;
                    (C) to help ease the region's dependence on 
                imported oil; and
                    (D) to promote affordable alternative sources of 
                energy.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries'' 
        means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not including 
        Cuba or Venezuela.
            (2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean 
        governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean 
        countries.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
help Caribbean countries--
            (1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic 
        energy resource mobilization;
            (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
            (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other 
        petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
            (4) increase production of renewable energy; and
            (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their 
        national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
    (d) Strategy.--
            (1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Administrator of USAID, shall submit a 
        multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives that describes how the Department of State will 
        promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries--
                    (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow 
                domestic clean energy production in the region, 
                strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy 
                sector greenhouse gas emissions;
                    (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 
                transportation sector;
                    (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 
                conservation, and investment in alternatives to 
                imported fuels;
                    (D) to improve grid reliability and modernize 
                electricity transmission networks;
                    (E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions 
                to expand community and individuals' access to 
                electricity;
                    (F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good 
                regulatory governance and to promote a climate of 
                private sector investment; and
                    (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the 
                energy and transportation sector.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a thorough review and inventory of United 
                States Government activities that are being carried out 
                bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with 
                multilateral institutions--
                            (i) to promote energy and climate security 
                        in the Caribbean region; and
                            (ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil 
                        for electricity generation;
                    (B) opportunities for marshaling regional 
                cooperation--
                            (i) to overcome market barriers resulting 
                        from the small size of Caribbean energy 
                        markets;
                            (ii) to address the high transportation and 
                        infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean 
                        countries;
                            (iii) to ensure greater donor coordination 
                        between governments, multilateral institutions, 
                        multilateral banks, and private investors; and
                            (iv) to expand regional financing 
                        opportunities to allow for lower cost energy 
                        entrepreneurship;
                    (C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean 
                government has--
                            (i) an independent utility regulator or 
                        equivalent;
                            (ii) affordable access by third party 
                        investors to its electrical grid with minimal 
                        regulatory interference;
                            (iii) effective energy efficiency and 
                        energy conservation;
                            (iv) programs to address technical and 
                        nontechnical issues;
                            (v) a plan to eliminate major market 
                        distortions;
                            (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
                            (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean 
                        energy solutions; and
                    (D) recommendations for how United States policy, 
                technical, and economic assistance can be used in the 
                Caribbean region--
                            (i) to advance renewable energy development 
                        and the incorporation of renewable technologies 
                        into existing energy grids and the development 
                        and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate 
                        and feasible to boost energy security and 
                        reliability, particularly to underserved 
                        communities;
                            (ii) to increase the generation of clean 
                        energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 
                        the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 
                        generation units in Caribbean countries;
                            (iii) to create regional financing 
                        opportunities to allow for lower cost energy 
                        entrepreneurship;
                            (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the 
                        region to help attract private investment and 
                        break down any market or regulatory barriers; 
                        and
                            (v) to establish a mechanism for each host 
                        government to have access to independent legal 
                        advice--
                                    (I) to speed the development of 
                                energy-related contracts; and
                                    (II) to better protect the 
                                interests of Caribbean governments and 
                                citizens.
            (3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this 
        subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the 
        Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
                    (A) the Secretary of the Interior;
                    (B) the Secretary of Commerce;
                    (C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
                    (D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import 
                Bank of the United States;
                    (E) the Board of Directors of the Development 
                Finance Corporation;
                    (F) the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development;
                    (G) the Caribbean governments;
                    (H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
                    (I) the World Bank Group; and
                    (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 
                Corporation.

SEC. 250. U.S.-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a 
        collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects 
        the lives and the economies of our citizens.
            (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano 
        is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many 
        natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the 
        region's vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, 
        the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of 
        the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma 
        devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017, 
        including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511 
        plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around 
        two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.
            (3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a 
        natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will 
        incur as much as six times more damage.
            (4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts 
        will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed, 
        we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries, 
        driving irregular migration.
            (5) While the United States has considerable expertise and 
        capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there 
        remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional 
        resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms, 
        protecting people and speeding recovery.
            (6) The People's Republic of China has dramatically 
        increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five 
        years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster 
        response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights 
        in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States 
        national security interests.
            (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-
        Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and 
        investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the 
        Caribbean region, including--
                    (A) to streamline early warning response networks 
                and formalize communication channels;
                    (B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively 
                on further developing aviation disaster resilience 
                plans and partnerships;
                    (C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in 
                energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;
                    (D) to increase communications network 
                interoperability between Caribbean partners and the 
                United States;
                    (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share 
                real-time information in preparation for potential 
                damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;
                    (F) to use meteorological services to strengthen 
                and deepen physical and communications infrastructure, 
                data collection networks, and human and technical 
                capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions 
                with the public;
                    (G) to understand that while the use of 
                international and military and civil defense assets in 
                disaster response may only be considered as a last 
                resort, when local, national, and international 
                civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military 
                coordination should occur, in support of the affected 
                nation;
                    (H) to develop a framework that would govern the 
                deployment of international military and civil defense 
                assets in disaster response when local, national, and 
                international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in 
                support of the affected nation;
                    (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid 
                disaster response and recovery, including waiving or 
                expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or 
                reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and 
                airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first 
                responders have the ability to rapidly respond to 
                disasters in other countries;
                    (J) to promote the integration and coordination of 
                regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean, 
                including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
                Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United 
                States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that 
                facilitate more effective and efficient planning, 
                mitigation, response, and resilience to natural 
                disasters;
                    (K) to share best practices in improved building 
                codes with national disaster organizations, including 
                building better programs, at regional, national and 
                community levels; and
                    (L) to promote community-based disaster 
                preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in 
                underserved communities, with the aim of increasing 
                broad public participation and resilience.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help 
Caribbean countries--
            (1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural 
        disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a 
        changing environment;
            (2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local 
        agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and 
        assistance activities;
            (3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs 
        (1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;
            (4) increase investment from United States companies in the 
        Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-
        related mitigation efforts;
            (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the 
        United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners 
        complement each other; and
            (6) further assist with the efforts listed under subsection 
        (a)(7) above.
    (c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in coordination with 
other departments and agencies shall submit a multi-year strategy to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how the 
Department of State will achieve the policy described in subsection (b) 
above.
    (d) Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for 
U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership activities, programs, technical 
assistance, and engagement the following:
            (1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
            (2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
            (3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and thereafter.
    (e) Reporting and Monitoring.--
            (1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal year, at least 
        five percent of all programming funding allocation must support 
        and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of 
        effectiveness.
            (2) The Department of State will ensure that at least 20 
        percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience 
        Partnership directly support the training of, engagement with, 
        collaboration with, and exchange of expertise on resilience 
        between United States Federal, State, and local officials and 
        their Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should also 
        support as appropriate increased academic, civil society, 
        media, and private sector engagement in the fields of 
        resilience-building, adaptation, and mitigation.

                  PART II--TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in 
        democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) without a common approach by the United States, 
        European Union, and European countries on connectivity, trade, 
        transnational problems, and support for democracy and human 
        rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to 
        increase its economic, political, and security leverage in 
        Europe;
            (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of 
        assistance to European countries following the COVID-19 
        outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also 
        highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) as European states seek to recover from the economic 
        toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in 
        partnership with Europe to support our collective economic 
        recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and 
        defend shared values;
            (5) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify 
        reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of 
        China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
            (6) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries should leverage their respective economic innovation 
        capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the 
        COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized 
        economy of the People's Republic of China;
            (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union 
        should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, 
        including negotiating a United States-European Union trade 
        agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both 
        the United States and European Union;
            (8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should 
        continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges 
        posed by the People's Republic of China;
            (9) the United States, European Union, and countries of 
        Europe should enhance cooperation to counter PRC 
        disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
            (10) the United States and European nations share serious 
        concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China, and should 
        continue implementing measures to address the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong 
        Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and 
        programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian 
        governance model to countries around the world;
            (11) the United States and European nations should remain 
        united in their shared values against attempts by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China at the United 
        Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts 
        that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the 
        ``community of a shared future for mankind'' and 
        ``democratization of international relations'';
            (12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments around the world, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could 
        threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of 
        key countries;
            (13) as appropriate, the United States should share 
        intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G 
        capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in 
        Europe;
            (14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation, 
        which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome 
        development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC 
        investments in their countries through their own national 
        investment screening measures;
            (15) the President should actively engage the European 
        Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act 
        regulations and to better harmonize United States and European 
        Union policies with respect to export controls;
            (16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing 
        of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports 
        controlled at the National Security and above level to the 
        People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
            (17) the United States should explore the value of 
        establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for 
        Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically 
        coordinate United States and European Union export control 
        policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive 
        technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
            (18) the United States should work with counterparts in 
        Europe to--
                    (A) evaluate United States and European 
                overreliance on goods originating in the People's 
                Republic of China, including in the medical and 
                pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to 
                diversify supply chains;
                    (B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-related 
                assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing 
                countries by offering relevant United States and 
                European expertise and assistance; and
                    (C) leverage the United States and European private 
                sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States 
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European 
partner countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the 
following:
            (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of 
        State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate 
        with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries 
        to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (2) Identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and European partners with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, and economic practices.
            (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with 
        European counterparts on--
                    (A) economic challenges with respect to the 
                People's Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights challenges with 
                respect to the People's Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond 
                to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional 
        and functional bureaus within the Department of State and 
        Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European 
        partners on the People's Republic of China.
            (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the 
        briefing and future plans to work with European partners to 
        counter the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the 
        world.
            (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of 
        the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to 
        identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.
            (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, 
        including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of 
        State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within 
        the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
            (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the 
        Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United 
        States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China 
        and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 
        the strategy.
            (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European 
        partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert 
        influence across multilateral fora, including at the World 
        Health Organization.
    (c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be 
classified.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding the development and implementation of the elements 
described in subsection (b).

SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE 
              SECTOR FINANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic 
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance 
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance 
Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on 
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide 
market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging 
markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such 
as--
            (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
        Asia;
            (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative 
        Fund;
            (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, 
        and Australia; and
            (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged 
        $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes 
        transparency standards.
    (b) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should 
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible 
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with 
developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND 
              BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial 
        Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Report and Briefing Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
        other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers 
        appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
        report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on 
        cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran and between the People's Republic of 
        China and the Russian Federation.
            (2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic 
                energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, 
                military, and space cooperation--
                            (i) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
                            (ii) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Russian Federation.
                    (B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19 
                pandemic on such cooperation.
                    (C) An assessment of the effect that United States 
                compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
                (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States 
                withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the 
                cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
                    (D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation 
                described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by 
                the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA 
                or a successor agreement and the effect of the United 
                States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 
                reaching a successor agreement.
            (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is 
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should 
share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with 
important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.

                    PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to stand with friends 
        and partners, while also working to establish new partners in 
        South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in 
        their respective political systems and encroach upon their 
        sovereign territory; and
            (2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the 
        Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and 
        further deepen bilateral defense consultations and 
        collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a 
        major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will 
engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through 
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the security and economic 
        challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the 
        countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes 
        with South and Central Asian countries that border the People's 
        Republic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports, 
        transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the 
        region.
            (2) A detailed description of United States efforts to 
        provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and 
        other sectors in South and Central Asia.
            (3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional 
        efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to 
        build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their 
        political systems and economies.
            (4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on 
        addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan 
        mineral sector.
            (5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters 
        relevant to the People's Republic of China, including 
        investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan 
        through the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (6) In close consultation with the Government of India, 
        identification of areas where the United States Government can 
        provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's 
        efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by 
        the People's Republic of China in the region.
            (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the 
        countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal 
        departments and agencies, including the Department of State, 
        the United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
        Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
        nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce 
        links that will help those nations diversify their trade away 
        from the People's Republic of China.
            (9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other 
        countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other 
        ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic 
        of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting 
        ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect 
        ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese government 
        authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly 
        and expression.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter for 5 
years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives regarding the development and 
implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of 
        the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political, 
        economic, and security interests.
            (2) The United States has an interest in working with 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and 
        Australia, to address regional governance, economic 
        connectivity, and security challenges including threats to 
        freedom of navigation.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--As a part of the United States engagement 
in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to 
strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, 
including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such 
countries to--
            (1) promote United States political engagement with such 
        region, including through active participation in regional 
        organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with 
        United States partners in such region;
            (2) enhance United States economic connectivity and 
        commercial exchange with such region;
            (3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from 
        security challenges, including related to piracy;
            (4) support the ability of governments and organizations in 
        such region to respond to natural disasters;
            (5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and 
        partners as net providers of security to such region and as 
        partners to the United States in addressing security challenges 
        in such region, including through assistance to such allies and 
        partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime 
        domain awareness;
            (6) continue to build the United States-India relationship 
        in order to regularize security cooperation through the 
        negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and 
        navigation, including through foundational agreements; and
            (7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the 
        Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense 
        partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the 
        United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in 
        such region.
    (c) Strategy.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a multi-year strategy for United 
        States engagement to support United States interests in the 
        Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall--
                    (A) define United States political, economic, and 
                security interests in the Indian Ocean region;
                    (B) outline challenges to the interests of the 
                United States in such region;
                    (C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between 
                the United States and members of the Quad, including 
                India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in 
                diplomacy and development priorities, joint military 
                exercises and operations, and other activities that 
                promote United States political, economic, and security 
                interests;
                    (D) outline efforts to support economic 
                connectivity in such region, including through the 
                United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure 
                Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and 
                other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across 
                the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of 
                Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of 
                investment and support for civil society and people-to-
                people connectivity;
                    (E) describe how the United States can engage with 
                regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, 
                including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote 
                United States political, economic, and security 
                interests in such region;
                    (F) review the United States diplomatic posture in 
                such region, including an assessment of United States 
                diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent 
                United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an 
                assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the 
                Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;
                    (G) review United States diplomatic agreements with 
                countries in such region that facilitate United States 
                military operations in such region, including bilateral 
                and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to 
                expand United States cooperation with such countries 
                through the negotiation of additional agreements; and
                    (H) include a security assistance strategy for such 
                region that outlines priorities, objectives, and 
                actions for United States security assistance efforts 
                to governments of countries in such region to promote 
                United States political, economic, and security 
                interests in such region.
            (2) Inclusion.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to 
        the Indo-Pacific.
            (3) Report on implementation.--Not later than one year 
        after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph 
        (1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        progress made toward implementing such strategy.
    (d) United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.--
            (1) In general.--Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of 
        the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended--
                    (A) by inserting ``, including in the Indian Ocean 
                region'' after ``deployments of the People's Republic 
                of China military''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                sentence: ``In this subparagraph, the term `Indian 
                Ocean region' means the Indian Ocean, including the 
                Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral 
                areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.''.
            (2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1) 
        shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
        apply beginning with the first report required under section 
        1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is 
        submitted after such date.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
            (2) Indian ocean region.--The term ``Indian Ocean region'' 
        means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay 
        of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

                            PART IV--AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature 
and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic, 
sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact 
on United States strategic interests, including--
            (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, 
        development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other 
        preferential trading arrangements;
            (2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises in 
        Africa;
            (3) the amount of African debt held by the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and 
        media companies in Africa;
            (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African 
        countries;
            (6) the scope of Chinese investment in and control of 
        African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and 
        foundational technologies;
            (7) an analysis on the linkages between Beijing's aid and 
        assistance to African countries and African countries 
        supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;
            (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate 
        illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit 
        and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and 
        wildlife products, between Africa and China;
            (9) the methods and techniques that the People's Republic 
        of China uses to exert undue influence on African governments 
        and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including through 
        the CCP's party-to-party training program, and to influence 
        African multilateral organizations; and
            (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
        educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to 
        expand its influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
              AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, 
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) a description and assessment of barriers to United 
        States investment in Africa for United States businesses, 
        including a clear identification of the different barriers 
        facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an 
        assessment of whether existing programs effectively address 
        such barriers;
            (2) a description and assessment of barriers to African 
        diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome 
        such barriers;
            (3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United 
        States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;
            (4) a determination of priority African countries for 
        promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of 
        additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and 
        governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive 
        operating environment in priority countries;
            (5) an identification of opportunities for strategic 
        cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in 
        Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, 
        development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
            (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders 
        Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic 
        engagement, and security in Africa.
    (d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources 
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
            (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial 
        Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at 
        United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
            (2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in 
        such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various 
        trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, 
        including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper 
        Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Interagency Working Group To Counter PRC Cyber Aggression in 
Africa.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives 
        of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other 
        agencies of the United States Government as the President 
        considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression 
        with respect to Africa.
            (2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this 
        subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a set of recommendations such as for--
                    (A) bolstering the capacity of governments in 
                Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks 
                and critical infrastructure where applicable;
                    (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
                    (C) an action plan for United States embassies in 
                Africa to provide assistance to host-country 
                governments with respect to protecting their vital 
                digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, 
                including an assessment of staffing resources needed to 
                implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
                    (D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC 
                disinformation and propaganda in traditional and 
                digital media targeted to African audiences; and
                    (E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital 
                authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance 
                to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN SUB-
              SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department 
of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan 
Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the 
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China 
in Africa.

SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a 
positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should 
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation 
and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector 
entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and 
leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing 
their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in 
order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic 
governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective 
countries of origin and across Africa.
    (c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
            (1) In general.--There is hereby established the Young 
        African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary 
        of State.
            (2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to continue 
        to support the participation in the Initiative established 
        under this paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from 
        Africa each year for such education and training in leadership 
        and professional development through the Department of State as 
        the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary 
        shall establish and publish criteria for eligibility for 
        participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows 
        among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
            (3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, United 
        States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in 
        connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows 
        under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
            (4) Networks.--The Secretary is authorized to continue to 
        maintain an online network that provides information and online 
        courses for young leaders in Africa on topics related to 
        entrepreneurship and leadership.
            (5) Regional centers.--The Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development is authorized to 
        establish regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and 
        online training throughout the year in business and 
        entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa 
participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the current 
700 projected for fiscal year 2021.

SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources 
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization 
whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in 
Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and 
information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from 
malign actors, especially in countries where a free press is banned by 
the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, 
and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, 
and open debate.

SEC. 277. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
              DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

    (a) Promotion of and Support for Private Investment 
Opportunities.--
            (1) In general.--The United States International 
        Development Corporation (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Corporation'') shall carry out feasibility studies for the 
        planning, development, and management of, and procurement for, 
        potential bilateral and multilateral development projects 
        eligible for support under title II of the Better Utilization 
        of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 
        9621 et seq.) in sub-Saharan Africa in accordance with the 
        provisions described in section 1421(e) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 
        9621(e)).
            (2) Inapplicability of contributions to costs 
        requirement.--The requirements relating to contributions of 
        costs described in paragraph (2) of section 1421(e) of such Act 
        shall not apply with respect to any person receiving funds 
        under the authorities of paragraph (1).
    (b) Special Projects and Programs.--The Corporation shall 
administer and manage special projects and programs in support of 
specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-
Saharan Africa in accordance with the provisions described in section 
1421(f) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development 
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(f)).
    (c) Engagement With Investors.--
            (1) In general.--The Corporation, acting through the Chief 
        Development Officer, shall, in cooperation with the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development, carry out the activities described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (5) of section 1445(a) of the Better Utilization of 
        Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 
        9655(a)) with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
            (2) Assistance.--To achieve the goals described in 
        paragraph (1), the Corporation shall carry out the activities 
        described in paragraphs (1) through (10) of section 1445(b) 
        with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
            (3) Technical assistance.--The Corporation shall coordinate 
        with the United States Agency for International Development and 
        other agencies and departments, as necessary, on projects and 
        programs supported by the Corporation that include technical 
        assistance with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
    (d) Employees Stationed in Sub-Saharan Africa.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to the availability of 
        appropriations, the Corporation shall take steps to ensure that 
        at least 6 full-time employees of the Corporation, which may 
        include personnel detailed to the Corporation from other 
        Federal agencies, are stationed in sub-Saharan Africa and whose 
        sole duties are to support the functions of the Corporation as 
        described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) or under any 
        provision of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
        Development Act of 2018 with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
            (2) Prohibition on conflicts of interest.--The Corporation 
        may not hire or retain any contractor or subcontractor to 
        support the functions of the Corporation as described in 
        paragraph (1) if the contractor or subcontractor has any equity 
        or other financial interest in any specific transactions 
        undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa 
        as described in this section.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section, the term ``sub-Saharan Africa'' 
has the meaning given that term in section 107 of the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706).

                  PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE 
              MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the People's Republic of China is upgrading its 
        influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its 
        energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and 
        arms sales;
            (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish 
        military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic 
        locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its 
        Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States 
        national security interests; and
            (3) the export of certain communications infrastructure 
        from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of 
        partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, 
        threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security 
        cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
        China's authoritarian surveillance model.
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator 
        of the United States Agency for International Development, and 
        the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly 
        develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
        and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
        House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting 
        the PRC's influence in, and access to, the Middle East and 
        North Africa.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's intent with regards to increased cooperation 
                with Middle East and North African countries and how 
                these activities fit into its broader global strategic 
                objectives;
                    (B) an assessment of how governments across the 
                region are responding to the People's Republic of 
                China's efforts to increase its military presence in 
                their countries;
                    (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through 
                foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build 
                partner capacity and increase interoperability with the 
                United States;
                    (D) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's joint research and development with the Middle 
                East and North Africa, impacts on the United States 
                national security interests, and recommended steps to 
                mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in 
                this area;
                    (E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons 
                technology transfers from the People's Republic of 
                China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in this area;
                    (F) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's military sales to the region including lethal 
                and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
                    (G) an assessment of People's Republic of China 
                military basing and dual-use facility initiatives 
                across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in this area;
                    (H) efforts to improve regional security 
                cooperation with United States allies and partners with 
                a focus on--
                            (i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, 
                        the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
                            (ii) integrated air and missile defense;
                            (iii) cyber security;
                            (iv) border security; and
                            (v) critical infrastructure security, to 
                        include energy security;
                    (I) increased support for government-to-government 
                engagement on critical infrastructure development 
                projects including ports and water infrastructure;
                    (J) efforts to encourage United States private 
                sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare 
                technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy 
                sectors;
                    (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
                professional education exchanges with key partner 
                countries;
                    (L) specific steps to counter increased investment 
                from the People's Republic of China in 
                telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic 
                efforts to stress the political, economic, and social 
                benefits of a free and open internet;
                    (M) efforts to promote United States private sector 
                engagement in and public-private partnerships on 
                renewable energy development;
                    (N) the expansion of public-private partnership 
                efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation 
                projects; and
                    (O) efforts to warn United States partners in the 
                Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated 
                with the People's Republic of China's 
                telecommunications infrastructure and provide 
                alternative ``clean paths'' to the People's Republic of 
                China's technology.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (b) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the international community have 
        long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity 
        of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) In addition to and apart from military and security 
        efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government 
        approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, 
        economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with 
        and counter PRC influence.
            (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United 
        States engagement, transparent governance structures, and 
        active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign 
        investment and influence efforts.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
that the United States and the international community should continue 
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa that support reform efforts to--
            (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
            (2) foster private sector development;
            (3) strengthen civil society; and
            (4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the 
        rule of law.

                         PART VI--ARCTIC REGION

SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of 
Congress that--
            (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
                    (A) creates new national and regional security 
                challenges due to increased military activity in the 
                Arctic;
                    (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a 
                major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic 
                competition;
                    (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral 
                nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the 
                increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which 
                is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
                    (D) impacts public safety due to increased human 
                activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue 
                capacity remains very limited; and
                    (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile 
                and pristine environment and the unique and highly 
                sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and 
                terrestrial ecosystems; and
            (2) the United States should reduce the consequences 
        outlined in paragraph (1) by--
                    (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and 
                dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in 
                the Arctic;
                    (B) developing policies and making preparations to 
                mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the 
                Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and 
                partners in the Arctic region to deter potential 
                aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
                    (C) adequately funding the National Earth System 
                Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, 
                ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary 
                to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
                    (D) investing in resources, including a 
                significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that 
                the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and 
                respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
                    (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states 
                in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for--
                            (i) maintaining peace and stability in the 
                        Arctic region;
                            (ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship 
                        and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
                            (iii) ensuring safe and efficient 
                        management of commercial maritime traffic in 
                        the Arctic;
                            (iv) promoting responsible natural resource 
                        management and economic development;
                            (v) countering China's Polar Silk Road 
                        initiative;
                            (vi) examining the possibility of 
                        reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; 
                        and
                            (vii) reducing black carbon and methane 
                        emissions in the Artic Region, including by 
                        working with observers of the Arctic Council, 
                        including India and the PRC, to adopt 
                        mitigation plans consistent with the findings 
                        and recommendations of the Arctic Council's 
                        Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 
                        Methane.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize only the states enumerated in subsection 
        (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to this 
        status; and
            (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious 
        threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of 
        United States allies and partners.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Arctic states.--The term ``Arctic states'' means 
        Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including 
        Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
            (2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the 
        geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north 
        of the equator.
    (d) Designation of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.--There 
is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large 
for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the ``Ambassador''), 
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).
            (1) Appointment.--The Ambassador shall be appointed by the 
        President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
            (2) Duties.--
                    (A) Diplomatic representation.--Subject to the 
                direction of the President and the Secretary of State, 
                the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United 
                States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic 
                Region in--
                            (i) contacts with foreign governments, 
                        intergovernmental organizations, and 
                        specialized agencies of the United Nations, the 
                        Arctic Council, and other international 
                        organizations of which the United States is a 
                        member; and
                            (ii) multilateral conferences and meetings 
                        relating to Arctic affairs.
                    (B) Chair of the arctic council.--The Ambassador 
                shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the 
                United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic 
                Council.
            (3) Policies and procedures.--The Ambassador shall 
        coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region, 
        including--
                    (A) meeting national security, economic, and 
                commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;
                    (B) protecting the Arctic environment and 
                conserving its biological resources;
                    (C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural 
                resource management and economic development;
                    (D) strengthening institutions for cooperation 
                among the Arctic Nations;
                    (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions 
                that affect them;
                    (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on 
                local, regional, and global environmental issues;
                    (G) integrating scientific data on the current and 
                projected effects of climate change in the Arctic 
                Region and ensure that such data is applied to the 
                development of security strategies for the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (H) making available the methods and approaches on 
                the integration of climate science to other regional 
                security planning programs in the Department of State 
                to better ensure that broader decision-making processes 
                may more adequately account for the effects of climate 
                change; and
                    (I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in 
                the Arctic Region.
    (e) Arctic Region Security Policy.--Arctic Region Security Policy 
shall assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and 
actions--
            (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States 
        in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic 
        missions and facilities, participation in regional and 
        bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and 
        coordination of United States initiatives and assistance 
        programs across agencies to protect the national security of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states 
        to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian 
        and military activity by Arctic states and other states that 
        may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;
            (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and 
        Arctic states that--
                    (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
                environment; and
                    (B) are strategically significant to the United 
                States;
            (4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change 
        and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into 
        the decision-making process on foreign assistance awards with 
        Greenland;
            (5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging 
        and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative 
        approaches--
                    (A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the 
                Arctic Region;
                    (B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety 
                in the Arctic Region;
                    (C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions 
                by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral 
                policies among Arctic states on the management of 
                maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and 
                work cooperatively on the transit policies for access 
                to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic 
                states; and
                    (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region 
                Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public 
                safety in disaster situations in a humane and 
                responsible fashion;
            (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, 
        and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense 
        assets in the Arctic Region; and
            (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the 
        Arctic.

                           PART VII--OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic 
        national security and economic priority of the United States 
        Government;
            (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
        democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely 
        Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the 
        Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
        through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development 
        exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the 
        entire region;
            (4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, 
        and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania 
        region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster 
        resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and 
        unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic 
        development;
            (5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in 
        existing regional organizations and international structures to 
        promote the national security and economic goals of the United 
        States and countries of the Oceania region;
            (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States 
        strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
        term growth and development throughout the region, especially 
        as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical 
        to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the 
        countries of the Oceania region against current and future 
        threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in 
        the environment;
            (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence 
        and corruption aimed at undermining the political, 
        environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and 
        governments of the countries of Oceania;
            (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of 
        Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global 
        health security;
            (9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based 
        private sector investments that adhere to best practices 
        regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental 
        and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed 
        investments by authoritarian governments;
            (10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain 
        safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and 
        other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;
            (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States 
        support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in 
        Oceania; and
            (12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania 
        to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of 
        the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from 
        previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

    (a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for 
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals 
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
    (b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) A description of United States regional goals and 
        concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with 
        the countries of Oceania.
            (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States 
        regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to 
        anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, 
        environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth 
        and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
            (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the 
        governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and 
        Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, 
        including with respect to the issues described in paragraph 
        (1).
            (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by 
        regional organizations and other related intergovernmental 
        structures aimed at addressing the issues described in 
        paragraph (1).
            (5) A plan for aligning United States programs and 
        resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and 
        concerns, as appropriate.
            (6) Recommendations for additional United States 
        authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to 
        execute the strategic roadmap.
            (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.

SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the 
appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability 
of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security 
dialogue (to be known as the ``Oceania Security Dialogue'') among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and 
discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national 
security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
    (b) Report Required.--The briefing required by subsection (a) 
shall, at a minimum, include the following:
            (1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to 
        participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.
            (2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United 
        States.
            (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania 
        Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of 
        representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
            (4) A review of the funding modalities available to the 
        Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security 
        Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the 
        Department of State.
            (5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or 
        other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of 
        the Department of State as described in subsection (a).
            (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
        including its emphasis on the changing environment as the 
        greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
            (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help amplify the issues and work of existing regional 
        structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the 
        Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific 
        Environmental Security Forum.
            (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would 
        help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by 
        section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the 
        United States.
    (c) Interagency Consultation.--To the extent practicable, the 
Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where 
appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for 
Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 
Dialogue.

SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to 
Congress a report on strategies for to reasonably and safely expand the 
number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of--
            (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all 
        currently feasible locations in Oceania; and
            (2) working with regional and international partners of the 
        United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers 
        in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate 
        resilience initiatives.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall--
            (1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence 
        of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;
            (2) examine potential remedies that include working with 
        United States Government agencies and regional governments, 
        including governments of United States allies--
                    (A) to increase the health infrastructure and 
                medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of 
                Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps 
                volunteers while in those countries;
                    (B) to address physical safety concerns that have 
                decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in 
                Oceania; and
                    (C) to increase transportation infrastructure in 
                the countries of Oceania to better support the travel 
                of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary 
                facilities;
            (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of 
        Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities that require specific professional expertise; 
        and
            (4) explore potential new operational models to address 
        safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the 
        countries of Oceania, including--
                    (A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
                    (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to 
                regional or United States-based healthcare facilities 
                for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.
    (c) Volunteers in Low-Income Oceania Communities.--
            (1) In general.--In examining the potential to expand the 
        presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
        communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace 
        Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described 
        in paragraph (2).
            (2) Initiatives described.--Initiatives described in this 
        paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities, including by--
                    (A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-
                based interventions, the vulnerability that communities 
                in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe 
                environmental change, and other climate related trends; 
                and
                    (B) improving, through smart infrastructure 
                principles, access to transportation and connectivity 
                infrastructure that will help address the economic and 
                social challenges that communities in Oceania confront 
                as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
    (d) Oceania Defined.--In this section, the term ``Oceania'' 
includes the following:
            (1) Easter Island of Chile.
            (2) Fiji.
            (3) French Polynesia of France.
            (4) Kiribati.
            (5) New Caledonia of France.
            (6) Nieu of New Zealand.
            (7) Papua New Guinea.
            (8) Samoa.
            (9) Vanuatu.
            (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
            (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
            (12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
            (13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
            (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
            (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
            (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
            (17) The Republic of Palau.
            (18) The Solomon Islands.
            (19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
            (20) Tonga.
            (21) Tuvalu.
            (22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

                       PART VIII--PACIFIC ISLANDS

SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.

    This part may be cited as the ``Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement 
in the Pacific Act'' or the ``BLUE Pacific Act''.

SEC. 296. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Pacific Islands--
                    (A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, 
                including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea, 
                constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;
                    (B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific 
                Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth's surface, 
                including the three sub-regions of Melanesia, 
                Micronesia, and Polynesia; and
                    (C) face shared challenges in development that have 
                distinct local contexts, including climate change and 
                rising sea levels, geographic distances from major 
                markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as 
                natural disasters.
            (2) The United States is a Pacific country with 
        longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the 
        Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free 
        Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of 
        the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
        the Republic of Palau.
            (3) The United States has vital national security interests 
        in the Pacific Islands, including--
                    (A) protecting regional peace and security that 
                fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;
                    (B) advancing economic prosperity free from 
                coercion through trade and sustainable development; and
                    (C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule 
                of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.
            (4) Successive United States administrations have 
        recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the 
        Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including 
        the following:
                    (A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which 
                first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, 
                affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and 
                paved the way for subsequent United States engagement 
                with the Pacific Islands, including several new 
                policies focused on conservation and resilience to 
                climate change announced in September 2016.
                    (B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which 
                includes a commitment to ``shore up fragile partner 
                states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their 
                vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural 
                disasters''.
                    (C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which 
                identified the Pacific Islands as ``critical to U.S. 
                strategy because of our shared values, interests, and 
                commitments'' and committed the United States to 
                ``building capacity and resilience to address maritime 
                security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; 
                drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate 
                change and disaster response''.
            (5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic 
        engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent 
        initiatives, including--
                    (A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 
                additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in 
                2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the 
                United States provides annually to the region to 
                support shared priorities in economic and human 
                development, climate change, and more; and
                    (B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies 
                (SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to 
                strengthen United States collaboration with island 
                countries and territories, including in the Pacific 
                Islands, on COVID-19 economic challenges, long-term 
                economic development, climate change, and other shared 
                interests.
            (6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by 
        leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that 
        climate change ``remains the single greatest threat to the 
        livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the 
        Pacific'' and asserted ``the sovereign right of every Member to 
        conduct its national affairs free of external interference and 
        coercion''.
            (7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the 
        Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in 
        investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a 
        year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same 
        period.
            (8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies 
        to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 
        2019 (commonly referred to as ``COVID-19'') pandemic to their 
        populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000 
        in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19 
        response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued 
        success in preventing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
        achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-
        term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including 
        through--
                    (A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of 
                needed medical supplies, including available COVID-19 
                vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a 
                reliable supply chain;
                    (B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening 
                of economic and social activities; and
                    (C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of 
                the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system and the 
                reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost 
                tourism revenue and other economic and food security 
                damages caused by the pandemic.
            (9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have 
        proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-
        to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States 
        commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the 
        COVID-19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four 
        countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers 
        continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have 
        been requested across the region.

SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, 
        and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands 
        that--
                    (A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for 
                all countries through a rules-based regional order that 
                respects the sovereignty and political independence of 
                all nations;
                    (B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and 
                vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and 
                promotes trade and sustainable development that 
                supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all 
                nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related 
                to public health, education, renewable energy, digital 
                connectivity, and more;
                    (C) supports regional efforts to address the 
                challenges posed by climate change, including by 
                strengthening resilience to natural disasters and 
                through responsible stewardship of natural resources;
                    (D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic 
                governance and the rule of law, and promotes human 
                rights and the preservation of the region's unique 
                cultural heritages;
                    (E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and 
                containing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and in 
                pursuing long-term economic recovery; and
                    (F) supports existing regional architecture and 
                international norms;
            (2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of 
        existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, 
        such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, 
        including--
                    (A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
                    (B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; 
                and
                    (C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;
            (3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of 
        Free Association and related United States law that will expire 
        in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 
        Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of 
        Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and
            (4) to work closely with United States allies and partners 
        with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific 
        Islands, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, 
        in advancing common goals.

SEC. 298. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Except as 
        otherwise provided, the term ``appropriate congressional 
        committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate.
            (2) Pacific islands.--The terms ``Pacific Islands'' means 
        the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of 
        Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated 
        States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic 
        of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the 
        Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of 
        Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.

SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.

    (a) Authority To Consolidate Reports.--Any reports required to be 
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this Act 
that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same 
units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is 
submitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such 
deadlines and that contains all information required under such 
reports.
    (b) Form of Reports.--Each report required by this Act shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands 
        necessitates an examination of whether United States 
        diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence 
        in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively 
        support United States objectives and meaningful participation 
        in regional fora;
            (2) improving shared understanding of and jointly 
        combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the 
        Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands 
        and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
        and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term 
        interests of stability, security, and prosperity;
            (3) the United States should seek to participate in and 
        support efforts to coordinate a regional response toward 
        maritime security, including through continued United States 
        and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre 
        in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and 
        robust cooperation with regional allies; and
            (4) the United States Government should commit to sending 
        appropriate levels of representation to regional events.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, 
        the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Commerce and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development, shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and 
        development presence of the United States in the Pacific 
        Islands.
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A description of the Department of State, 
                United States Agency for International Development, 
                United States International Development Finance 
                Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and 
                United States Commercial Service presence, staffing, 
                programming, and resourcing of operations in the 
                Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing 
                not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.
                    (B) A description of gaps in such presence, 
                including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.
                    (C) A description of limitations and challenges 
                such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives, 
                including--
                            (i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands 
                        due to operations being conducted from the 
                        United States Agency for International 
                        Development offices in Manila and Suva; and
                            (ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.
                    (D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence 
                to fill such gaps, including by establishing new 
                missions, expanding participation in regional forums, 
                and elevating United States representation in regional 
                forums.
    (c) Authority To Enhance Diplomatic and Economic Engagement.--The 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire 
locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of 
promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial 
engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.
    (d) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 5 years 
thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific 
Islands.

SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall consult and 
coordinate with regional allies and partners, including Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the 
Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to 
programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including 
programs established by this Act, including for purposes of--
            (1) deconflicting programming;
            (2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect 
        the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
            (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific 
        Islands to the maximum extent practicable.
    (b) Formal Consultative Process.--The Secretary of State shall 
establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and 
partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years 
programming.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
includes--
            (1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs 
        undertaken by regional allies and partners, including 
        multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in 
        this Act;
            (2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs 
        undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as 
        being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or 
        more countries of the Pacific Islands;
            (3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific 
        Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the 
        efforts of regional allies and partners identified in paragraph 
        (1); and
            (4) a review of the formal consultative process required in 
        subsection (b) to summarize engagements held and identify 
        opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and 
        partners.

SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should leverage the full 
        range of authorities and programs available to assist the 
        Pacific Islands in achieving their development goals;
            (2) United States development assistance should seek to 
        build on existing public and private sector investments while 
        creating new opportunities toward a favorable environment for 
        additional such investments; and
            (3) United States development efforts should be coordinated 
        with and seek to build on existing efforts by like-minded 
        partners and allies and regional and international multilateral 
        organizations.
    (b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to--
            (1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 
        including transport connectivity, information and 
        communications technology, food security, coastal zone 
        management, marine and water resource management, and energy 
        security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with 
        an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;
            (2) provide technical assistance to assist local government 
        and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, 
        especially those posed by climate change, consider and 
        implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen 
        resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for 
        their efficacy and sustainability; and
            (3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem 
        conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use 
        of ecosystem services, especially those that mitigate effects 
        of climate change and those that support food security and 
        livelihoods.
    (c) Conduct of Strategy.--The strategy developed under this section 
shall be coordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and 
international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for 
development in the Pacific Islands.
    (d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the 
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the 
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian 
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific 
Islands.
    (e) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
        of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on foreign infrastructure developments in 
        the Pacific Islands.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments 
                in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and 
                partners;
                    (B) assessments of the environmental impact and 
                sustainability of such developments; and
                    (C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of 
                such developments and their impacts on the debt of host 
                countries in the Pacific Islands.
            (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the 
                Senate.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
to carry out this section.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND 
              FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China (``PRC'') continues to disregard 
        its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration 
        of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
        Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China on the Question of Hong Kong (``Joint Declaration''), in 
        which the PRC committed that--
                    (A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of 
                autonomy;
                    (B) for at least 50 years the ``social and economic 
                systems in Hong Kong'' would remain unchanged; and
                    (C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people 
                of Hong Kong would be protected by law.
            (2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the 
        established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National 
        People's Congress Standing Committee (``Standing Committee'') 
        passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally 
        vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that 
        grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of ``separating 
        the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic 
        activities''.
            (3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee 
        imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong 
        Kong's local government in a potential violation of the Basic 
        Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
        People's Republic of China (``Basic Law''), and involved 
        unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
        legislation was only the second law since 2008 that the 
        Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for 
        public comment.
            (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-
        democracy candidates from participating in the September 6 
        Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently 
        postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the 
        public health risk of holding elections during the COVID-19 
        pandemic.
            (5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert 
        extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced 
        indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists 
        living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu, 
        for alleged violations of the national security law.
            (6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four 
        lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the 
        Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those 
        who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to 
        acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise 
        violates the national security law, from running for or serving 
        in the Legislative Council.
            (7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua 
        Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for 
        participating in 2019 protests.
            (8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as 
        ``the Hong Kong 12'') who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong 
        to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and 
        sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from 
        seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.
            (9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest court revoked 
        bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and 
        publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with 
        foreign forces and endangering national security under the 
        national security legislation.
            (10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in 
        Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of 
        two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.
            (11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force 
        arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-
        democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for 
        their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select 
        candidates for the general election originally scheduled for 
        September 2020, despite other political parties having held 
        similar primaries without retribution.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress--
            (1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China (``PRC'') and the Government of the 
        Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (``HKSAR''), including 
        the adoption and implementation of national security 
        legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that 
        violate the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that 
        are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and its implementing 
        document, the Basic Law;
            (2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who 
        face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;
            (3) calls on the governments of the PRC and HKSAR to--
                    (A) respect and uphold--
                            (i) commitments made to the international 
                        community and the people of Hong Kong under the 
                        Joint Declaration; and
                            (ii) the judicial independence of the Hong 
                        Kong legal system; and
                    (B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians 
                arrested under the national security law; and
            (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and 
        the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and 
        partners and continue United States efforts to respond to 
        developments in Hong Kong, including by--
                    (A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents 
                who fear persecution;
                    (B) supporting those who may seek to file a case 
                before the International Court of Justice to hold the 
                Government of the PRC accountable for violating its 
                binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;
                    (C) encouraging allies and partner countries to 
                instruct, as appropriate, their respective 
                representatives to the United Nations to use their 
                voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment 
                of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor 
                and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;
                    (D) ensuring the private sector, particularly 
                United States companies with economic interests in Hong 
                Kong, is aware of risks the national security 
                legislation poses to the security of United States 
                citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of 
                United States businesses in Hong Kong;
                    (E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities, 
                especially authorities recently enacted to address 
                actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong 
                Kong people such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public 
                Law 116-149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
                Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76), with respect 
                to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
                Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR 
                who are responsible for undermining such rights and 
                freedoms; and
                    (F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure 
                that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN 
              HONG KONG.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the 
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the 
Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.

    (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
            (1) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force 
        on May 27, 1985.
            (2) Priority hong kong resident.--The term ``Priority Hong 
        Kong resident'' means--
                    (A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who--
                            (i) holds no right to citizenship in any 
                        country or jurisdiction other than the People's 
                        Republic of China (referred to in this Act as 
                        ``PRC''), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the date of 
                        enactment of this Act;
                            (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less 
                        than the last 10 years as of the date of 
                        enactment of this Act; and
                            (iii) has been designated by the Secretary 
                        of State or Secretary of Homeland Security as 
                        having met the requirements of this 
                        subparagraph, in accordance with the procedures 
                        described in subsection (f) of this Act; or
                    (B) the spouse of a person described in 
                subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such 
                term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration 
                and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that 
                a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven 
                years of age.
            (3) Hong kong national security law.--The term ``Hong Kong 
        National Security Law'' means the Law of the People's Republic 
        of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by 
        the National People's Congress and signed by President Xi 
        Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong 
        Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act as 
        ``Hong Kong SAR'') on July 1, 2020.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July 
        1, 2020--
                    (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
                Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act 
                as ``the Basic Law'') that provides in Article 23 that 
                the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact 
                legislation related to national security;
                    (B) violates the PRC's commitments under 
                international law, as defined by the Joint Declaration; 
                and
                    (C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the 
                ``one country, two systems'' principle and further 
                erodes global confidence in the PRC's commitment to 
                international law.
            (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of 
        the Hong Kong National Security Law, President Trump signed an 
        Executive order on Hong Kong normalization that, among other 
        policy actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong 
        persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of 
        immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.
            (3) The United States has a long and proud history as a 
        destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based 
        on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
        membership in a particular social group.
            (4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural, 
        and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a 
        shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the 
        protection of human rights.
            (5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and 
        welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes, 
        including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4, 
        1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the 
        people of the United States and those individuals seeking to 
        contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human 
        rights, and the respect for the rule of law.
            (6) The United States has reaped enormous economic, 
        cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive 
        generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists, 
        intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism, 
        communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive 
        ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
        Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and 
        Iran.
            (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in 
        its long-term strategic competition with the Communist Party of 
        China is the ability of people from every country in the world, 
        irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to 
        immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in 
        the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
        383), namely that--
                    (A) the United States has ``a strong interest in 
                the continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of 
                Hong Kong'';
                    (B) ``support for democratization is a fundamental 
                principle of United States foreign policy'' and 
                therefore ``naturally applies to United States policy 
                toward Hong Kong'';
                    (C) ``the human rights of the people of Hong Kong 
                are of great importance to the United States and are 
                directly relevant to United States interests in Hong 
                Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued 
                economic prosperity''; and
                    (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous 
                from the PRC to ``justify treatment under a particular 
                law of the United States, or any provision thereof, 
                different from that accorded the People's Republic of 
                China'';
            (2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and 
        fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as 
        enumerated by--
                    (A) the Joint Declaration;
                    (B) the International Covenant on Civil and 
                Political Rights, done at New York December 19, 1966; 
                and
                    (C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done 
                at Paris December 10, 1948;
            (3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of 
        the people of Hong Kong, including the ``ultimate aim'' of the 
        selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the 
        Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in 
        the Basic Law;
            (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent 
        actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong Kong, including 
        allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a 
        high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and 
        ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect 
        the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong 
        Legislative Council by universal suffrage;
            (5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic 
        option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief 
        Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and 
        direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong 
        Legislative Council;
            (6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong 
        Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other 
        fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint 
        Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights;
            (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, 
        detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as 
        provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
            (8) to draw international attention to any violations by 
        the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the 
        people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant 
        on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the 
        autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint 
        Declaration;
            (9) to protect United States citizens and long-term 
        permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people 
        visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;
            (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that 
        provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong 
        Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange 
        program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;
            (11) to coordinate with allies, including the United 
        Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, 
        to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and
            (12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents 
        of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe 
        haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the 
        fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.
    (d) Temporary Protected Status for Hong Kong Residents in the 
United States.--
            (1) Designation.--
                    (A) In general.--For purposes of section 244 of the 
                Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong 
                Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated 
                under subsection (b)(1)(C) of that section, subject to 
                the provisions of this section.
                    (B) Period of designation.--The initial period of 
                the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall 
                be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of 
                enactment of this Act.
            (2) Aliens eligible.--As a result of the designation made 
        under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the 
        requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to 
        paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien--
                    (A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the 
                time such individual arrived into the United States and 
                is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an 
                individual having no nationality, is a person who last 
                habitually resided in Hong Kong);
                    (B) has been continuously physically present in the 
                United States since the date of the enactment of this 
                Act;
                    (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as 
                otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section, 
                and is not ineligible for temporary protected status 
                under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and
                    (D) registers for temporary protected status in a 
                manner established by the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security.
            (3) Consent to travel abroad.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in 
                accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration 
                and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien 
                who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to 
                the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien 
                establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating 
                circumstances beyond the control of the alien require 
                the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.
                    (B) Treatment upon return.--An alien returning to 
                the United States in accordance with an authorization 
                described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any 
                other returning alien provided temporary protected 
                status under section 244 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).
            (4) Fee.--
                    (A) In general.--In addition to any other fee 
                authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for 
                each application for temporary protected status under 
                section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a 
                person who is only eligible for such status by reason 
                of paragraph (1).
                    (B) Waiver.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees 
                associated with filing an application referred to in 
                subparagraph (A).
    (e) Treatment of Hong Kong Residents for Immigration Purposes.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the 5 fiscal year 
period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after 
the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be 
considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated 
under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 
(Public Law 101-649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on 
immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).
    (f) Verification of Priority Hong Kong Residents.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
        publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule 
        establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong 
        Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United 
        States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, 
        immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and 
        revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The 
        Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than 1 
        year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule 
        shall establish procedures--
                    (A) for individuals to register with any United 
                States embassy or consulate outside of the United 
                States, or with the Department of Homeland Security in 
                the United States, and request designation as a 
                Priority Hong Kong Resident; and
                    (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the 
                residency of registered individuals and designate those 
                who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
            (2) Documentation.--The procedures described in paragraph 
        (1) shall include the collection of--
                    (A) biometric data;
                    (B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards, 
                and other documentation establishing residency; and
                    (C) other personal information, data, and records 
                deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
            (3) Guidance.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue 
        guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the 
        Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and 
        from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and 
        partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent 
        residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as 
        Priority Hong Kong Residents.
            (4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a 
        report to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Judiciary and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and 
        the Judiciary detailing plans to implement the requirements 
        described in this subsection.
            (5) Protection for refugees.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from 
        seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under 
        section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).
    (g) Reporting Requirements.--
            (1) In general.--On an annual basis, the Secretary of State 
        and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
        other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report 
        to the appropriate congressional committees, detailing for the 
        previous fiscal year--
                    (A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have 
                applied for U.S. visas or immigration benefits, 
                disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit, 
                including asylum, refugee status, temporary protected 
                status, and lawful permanent residence;
                    (B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections 
                of applicants for visas or immigration benefits 
                described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa 
                type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;
                    (C) the number of pending refugee and asylum 
                applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the 
                length of time and reason for which such applications 
                have been pending; and
                    (D) other matters deemed relevant by the 
                Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and 
                facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of 
                persecution in Hong Kong.
            (2) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-
        searchable, publicly available website of the Department of 
        State and the Department of Homeland Security.
    (h) Strategy for International Cooperation on Hong Kong.--
            (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States--
                    (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing 
                safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals 
                of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong 
                National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong 
                persons at risk of persecution; and
                    (B) to encourage like-minded nations to make 
                similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing 
                persecution by the Government of the PRC.
            (2) Plan.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
        heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop 
        a plan to engage with other nations, including the United 
        Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to--
                    (A) provide refugee and asylum protections for 
                victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution 
                in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other 
                authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;
                    (B) enhance protocols to facilitate the 
                resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from 
                Hong Kong;
                    (C) identify and prevent the exploitation of 
                immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt 
                officials; and
                    (D) expedite the sharing of information, as 
                appropriate, related to the refusal of individual 
                applications for visas or other travel documents 
                submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on--
                            (i) national security or related grounds 
                        under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and 
                        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or
                            (ii) fraud or misrepresentation under 
                        section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and 
                        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).
            (3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall 
        submit a report on the plan described in paragraph (2) to the 
        appropriate congressional committees.
    (i) Refugee Status for Certain Residents of Hong Kong.--
            (1) In general.--Aliens described in paragraph (2) may 
        establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under 
        sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), 
        that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on 
        account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
        particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such 
        a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility 
        of such persecution.
            (2) Aliens described.--
                    (A) In general.--An alien is described in this 
                subsection if such alien--
                            (i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and--
                                    (I) had a significant role in a 
                                civil society organization supportive 
                                of the protests in 2019 and 2020 
                                related to the Hong Kong National 
                                Security Law and the encroachment on 
                                the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;
                                    (II) was arrested, charged, 
                                detained, or convicted of an offense 
                                arising from their participation in an 
                                action as described in section 
                                206(b)(2) of the United States-Hong 
                                Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 
                                5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in 
                                nature; or
                                    (III) has had their citizenship, 
                                nationality, or residency revoked for 
                                having submitted to any United States 
                                Government agency a nonfrivolous 
                                application for refugee status, asylum, 
                                or any other immigration benefit under 
                                the immigration laws (as defined in 
                                section 101(a) of that Act (8 U.S.C. 
                                1101(a)));
                            (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 
                        spouse or child of an alien described in clause 
                        (i); or
                            (iii) is the parent of an alien described 
                        in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of 
                        the PRC and no other foreign state.
                    (B) Other categories.--The Secretary of Homeland 
                Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
                may designate other categories of aliens for purposes 
                of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution 
                under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common 
                characteristics that identify them as targets of 
                persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion, 
                nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
                or political opinion.
                    (C) Significant role.--For purposes of subclause 
                (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall 
                include, with respect to the protests described in such 
                clause--
                            (i) an organizing role;
                            (ii) a first aid responder;
                            (iii) a journalist or member of the media 
                        covering or offering public commentary;
                            (iv) a provider of legal services to one or 
                        more individuals arrested for participating in 
                        such protests; or
                            (v) a participant who during the period 
                        beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June 
                        30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or 
                        convicted as a result of such participation.
            (3) Age out protections.--For purposes of this subsection, 
        a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made 
        using the age of the alien on the date an application for 
        refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named 
        beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.
            (4) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens provided 
        refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted 
        against the numerical limitation on refugees established in 
        accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).
            (5) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security shall submit a report on the matters 
                described in subparagraph (B) to--
                            (i) the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
                        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
                        and
                            (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
                        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                    (B) Matters to be included.--Each report required 
                by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to 
                applications submitted under this section--
                            (i) the total number of refugee and asylum 
                        applications that are pending at the end of the 
                        reporting period;
                            (ii) the average wait-times for all 
                        applicants for refugee status or asylum 
                        pending--
                                    (I) a prescreening interview with a 
                                resettlement support center;
                                    (II) an interview with U.S. 
                                Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
                                and
                                    (III) the completion of security 
                                checks;
                            (iii) the number of approvals, referrals 
                        including the source of the referral, denials 
                        of applications for refugee status or asylum, 
                        disaggregated by the reason for each such 
                        denial; and
                            (iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to 
                        interview populations that would include Hong 
                        Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the 
                        number planned for the subsequent 90-day 
                        period.
                    (C) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall 
                make each report submitted under this paragraph 
                available to the public on the internet website of the 
                Department of State.
    (j) Admission for Certain Highly Skilled Hong Kong Residents.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding any other provision 
        of law, the Secretary of State in consultation with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, may provide an alien described 
        in subsection (b) with the status of a special immigrant under 
        section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien--
                    (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the alien, 
                submits a petition for classification under section 
                203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4));
                    (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant 
                visa;
                    (C) is otherwise admissible to the United States 
                for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for 
                inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such 
                Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4)); and
                    (D) clears a background check and appropriate 
                screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security.
            (2) Aliens described.--
                    (A) Principal aliens.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if--
                            (i) the alien--
                                    (I) is a Priority Hong Kong 
                                Resident; and
                                    (II) has earned a bachelor's or 
                                higher degree from an institution of 
                                higher education; and
                            (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                        determines that such alien's relocation to the 
                        United States would provide a significant 
                        benefit to the United States.
                    (B) Spouses and children.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of 
                a principal alien described in paragraph (1).
            (3) Numerical limitations.--
                    (A) In general.--The total number of principal 
                aliens who may be provided special immigrant status 
                under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for 
                each of the 5 fiscal years beginning after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland 
                Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals 
                with a bachelor's or higher degree in science, 
                technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or 
                health care.
                    (B) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens 
                provided immigrant status under this section shall not 
                be counted against any numerical limitation under 
                section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).
            (4) Eligibility for admission under other classification.--
        No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission 
        under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an 
        immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant 
        classification.
            (5) Timeline for processing applications.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State and the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all 
                steps under the control of the United States Government 
                incidental to the approval of such applications, 
                including required screenings and background checks, 
                are completed not later than 1 year after the date on 
                which an eligible applicant submits an application 
                under subsection (a).
                    (B) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 
                relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to 
                process applications described in paragraph (1) if 
                satisfaction of national security concerns requires 
                such additional time, provided that the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary, 
                has determined that the applicant meets the 
                requirements for status as a special immigrant under 
                this section and has so notified the applicant.
    (k) Termination.--Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this 
Act shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE 
              FORCE.

    Section 3 of the Act entitled ``An Act to prohibit the commercial 
export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force'', 
approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 Stat. 1173), is 
amended by striking ``on December 31, 2021.'' and inserting the 
following: ``on the date on which the President certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that--
            ``(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of 
        the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of 
        the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong 
        warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner 
        as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 
        1997;
            ``(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross 
        violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on 
        the date of such certification; and
            ``(3) there has been an independent examination of human 
        rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the 
        Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
        Administrative Region has adequately addressed those 
        concerns.''.

SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE ONGOING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES 
              AGAINST HUMANITY AGAINST UYGHURS AND OTHER MINORITY 
              GROUPS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General 
        Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention 
        and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide 
        Convention) signifying a commitment in response to the 
        Holocaust and other crimes against humanity committed in the 
        first half of the twentieth century.
            (2) The Genocide Convention entered into force on January 
        12, 1951, and declares that all state parties ``confirm that 
        genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, 
        is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
        prevent and to punish''.
            (3) The Genocide Convention defines genocide as ``any of 
        the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
        or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
        such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious 
        bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
        inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
        about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
        Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
        (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
        group''.
            (4) The United States ratified the Genocide Convention with 
        the understanding that the commission of genocide requires 
        ``the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial 
        part, a [protected] group as such''.
            (5) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a state party 
        to the Genocide Convention.
            (6) Since 2017, the PRC Government, under the direction and 
        control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has detained and 
        sought to indoctrinate more than one million Uyghurs and 
        members of other ethnic and religious minority groups.
            (7) Recent data indicate a significant drop in birth rates 
        among Uyghurs due to enforced sterilization, enforced abortion, 
        and more onerous birth quotas for Uyghurs compared to Han.
            (8) There are credible reports of PRC Government campaigns 
        to promote marriages between Uyghurs and Han and to reduce 
        birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.
            (9) Many Uyghurs reportedly have been assigned to factory 
        employment under conditions that indicate forced labor, and 
        some former detainees have reported food deprivation, beatings, 
        suppression of religious practices, family separation, and 
        sexual abuse.
            (10) This is indicative of a systematic effort to eradicate 
        the ethnic and cultural identity and religious beliefs, and 
        prevent the births of, Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and 
        members of religious minority groups.
            (11) The birth rate in the Xinjiang region fell by 24 
        percent in 2019 compared to a 4.2 percent decline nationwide.
            (12) On January 19, 2021, the Department of State 
        determined the PRC Government, under the direction and control 
        of the CCP, has committed crimes against humanity and genocide 
        against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups 
        in Xinjiang.
            (13) Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Former Secretary 
        of State Michael Pompeo have both stated that what has taken 
        place in Xinjiang is genocide and constitutes crimes against 
        humanity.
            (14) Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides, 
        ``Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of 
        the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the 
        United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention 
        and suppression of acts of genocide''.
            (15) The International Court of Justice has stated that it 
        is the obligation of all state parties to the Genocide 
        Convention to ``employ all means reasonably available to them, 
        so as to prevent genocide so far as possible''.
            (16) The United States is a Permanent Member of the United 
        Nations Security Council.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress--
            (1) finds that the ongoing abuses against Uyghurs and 
        members of other ethnic and religious minority groups 
        constitute genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention and 
        crimes against humanity as understood under customary 
        international law;
            (2) attributes these atrocity crimes against Uyghurs and 
        members of other ethnic and religious minority groups to the 
        People's Republic of China, under the direction and control of 
        the Chinese Communist Party;
            (3) condemns this genocide and these crimes against 
        humanity in the strongest terms; and
            (4) calls upon the President to direct the United States 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States to--
                    (A) refer the People's Republic of China's genocide 
                and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and members 
                of other ethnic and religious minority groups to the 
                competent organs of the United Nations for 
                investigation;
                    (B) seize the United Nations Security Council of 
                the circumstances of this genocide and crimes against 
                humanity and lead efforts to invoke multilateral 
                sanctions in response to these ongoing atrocities; and
                    (C) take all possible actions to bring this 
                genocide and these crimes against humanity to an end 
                and hold the perpetrators of these atrocities 
                accountable under international law.

SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles, 
        or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in 
        part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and 
        particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise 
        produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China;
            (2) to encourage the international community to reduce the 
        import of any goods made with forced labor from the People's 
        Republic of China, particularly those goods mined, 
        manufactured, or produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region;
            (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to effectively 
        implement Article 23.6 of the United States-Mexico-Canada 
        Agreement to prohibit the importation of goods produced in 
        whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, which includes 
        goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory 
        labor in the People's Republic of China;
            (4) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end 
        human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to 
        restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a 
        modern form of slavery;
            (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its 
        national interest, including efforts to prevent torture, 
        enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, 
        including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread 
        and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting 
        any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and
            (6) to address gross violations of human rights in the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through bilateral diplomatic 
        channels and multilateral institutions where both the United 
        States and the People's Republic of China are members and with 
        all the authorities available to the United States Government, 
        including visa and financial sanctions, export restrictions, 
        and import controls.
    (b) Prohibition on Importation of Goods Made in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), all 
        goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or 
        manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region of China, or by persons working with the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government for purposes of 
        the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-
        assistance'' program which subsidizes the establishment of 
        manufacturing facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region, shall be deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and 
        merchandise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
        (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of 
        the ports of the United States.
            (2) Exception.--The prohibition described in paragraph (1) 
        shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
        Protection--
                    (A) determines, by clear and convincing evidence, 
                that any specific goods, wares, articles, or 
                merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not 
                produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced 
                labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and
                    (B) submits to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and makes available to the public a report 
                that contains such determination.
            (3) Effective date.--This section shall take effect on the 
        date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act.
    (c) Enforcement Strategy To Address Forced Labor in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
        Force, established under section 741 of the United States-
        Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively 
        address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        of China or products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
        Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups through forced 
        labor in any other part of the People's Republic of China. The 
        enforcement strategy shall describe the specific enforcement 
        plans of the United States Government regarding--
                    (A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States directly from the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                Autonomous Region or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
                Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any 
                other part of the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States from the People's Republic of China 
                and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons working 
                with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government 
                or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for 
                purposes of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the 
                ``pairing-assistance'' program; and
                    (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 
                described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into 
                the United States from third countries and are mined, 
                produced, or manufactured in part in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons working with the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government or the 
                Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes 
                of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the 
                ``pairing-assistance'' program.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A description of the actions taken by the 
                United States Government to address forced labor in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under section 307 of 
                the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a 
                description of all Withhold Release Orders issued, 
                goods detained, and fines issued.
                    (B) A list of products made wholly or in part by 
                forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                Autonomous Region or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
                Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any 
                other part of the People's Republic of China, and a 
                list of businesses that sold products in the United 
                States made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary 
                labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made 
                by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of 
                other persecuted groups in any other part of the 
                People's Republic of China.
                    (C) A list of facilities and entities, including 
                the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, that 
                source material from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region or by persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                Autonomous Region government or the Xinjiang Production 
                and Construction Corps for purposes of the ``poverty 
                alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance'' 
                program, a plan for identifying additional such 
                facilities and entities, and facility- and entity-
                specific enforcement plans, including issuing specific 
                Withhold Release Orders to support enforcement of 
                subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or 
                entity.
                    (D) A list of high-priority sectors for 
                enforcement, which shall include cotton, tomatoes, 
                polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement plan for 
                each high-priority sector.
                    (E) A description of the additional resources 
                necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to 
                effectively implement the enforcement strategy.
                    (F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with 
                appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private 
                sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for 
                products made in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex, if necessary.
            (4) Updates.--The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall 
        provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees 
        on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the 
        strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions 
        taken to address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region, including actions described in this Act.
            (5) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the 
        earlier of--
                    (A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region.
    (d) Determination Relating to Crimes Against Humanity or Genocide 
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
                    (A) determine if the practice of forced labor or 
                other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
                members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region of China can be considered 
                systematic and widespread and therefore constitutes 
                crimes against humanity or constitutes genocide as 
                defined in subsection (a) of section 1091 of title 18, 
                United States Code; and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and make available to the public a report 
                that contains such determination.
            (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
                include a classified annex, if necessary; and
                    (B) may be included in the report required by 
                subsection (e).
    (e) Diplomatic Strategy To Address Forced Labor in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report that contains a United States 
        strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international 
        awareness of and to address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region of China.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by 
        paragraph (1) shall include--
                    (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral 
                coordination, including sustained engagement with the 
                governments of United States partners and allies, to 
                end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
                members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region;
                    (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-
                messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human 
                rights situation, including forced labor in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and
                    (C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate 
                with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and 
                private sector entities to raise awareness about forced 
                labor made products from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 
                Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups, 
                including those formerly detained in mass internment 
                camps in the region.
            (3) Additional matters to be included.--The report required 
        by paragraph (1) shall also include--
                    (A) to the extent practicable, a list of--
                            (i) entities in the People's Republic of 
                        China or affiliates of such entities that 
                        directly or indirectly use forced or 
                        involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                        Autonomous Region; and
                            (ii) Foreign persons that acted as agents 
                        of the entities or affiliates of entities 
                        described in clause (i) to import goods into 
                        the United States; and
                    (B) a description of actions taken by the United 
                States Government to address forced labor in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under existing 
                authorities, including--
                            (i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
                        of 2000 (Public Law 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et 
                        seq.);
                            (ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
                        Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 
                        115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and
                            (iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                        Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
            (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex, if necessary.
            (5) Updates.--The Secretary of State shall include any 
        updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual 
        Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the 
        Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).
            (6) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect the 
        earlier of--
                    (A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region.
    (f) Imposition of Sanctions Relating to Forced Labor in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) Report required.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and not less 
                frequently than annually thereafter, the President 
                shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report that identifies each foreign 
                person, including any official of the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China, that the President 
                determines--
                            (i) knowingly engages in, is responsible 
                        for, or facilitates the forced labor of 
                        Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other 
                        Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                        Autonomous Region of China; and
                            (ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to, 
                        assists, or provides financial, material or 
                        technological support for efforts to contravene 
                        United States law regarding the importation of 
                        forced labor goods from the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                        Autonomous Region.
                    (B) Form.--The report required under subparagraph 
                (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                contain a classified annex.
            (2) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall impose 
        the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each 
        foreign person identified in the report required under 
        paragraph (1)(A).
            (3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
        subsection are the following:
                    (A) Asset blocking.--The President shall exercise 
                all of the powers granted to the President under the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and 
                prohibit all transactions in property and interests in 
                property of a foreign person identified in the report 
                required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and 
                interests in property--
                            (i) are in the United States;
                            (ii) come within the United States; or
                            (iii) come within the possession or control 
                        of a United States person.
                    (B) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or 
                parole.--
                            (i) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien 
                        described in paragraph (1)(A) is--
                                    (I) inadmissible to the United 
                                States;
                                    (II) ineligible to receive a visa 
                                or other documentation to enter the 
                                United States; and
                                    (III) otherwise ineligible to be 
                                admitted or paroled into the United 
                                States or to receive any other benefit 
                                under the Immigration and Nationality 
                                Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
                            (ii) Current visas revoked.--
                                    (I) In general.--An alien described 
                                in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to 
                                revocation of any visa or other entry 
                                documentation regardless of when the 
                                visa or other entry documentation is or 
                                was issued.
                                    (II) Immediate effect.--A 
                                revocation under subclause (I) shall--
                                            (aa) take effect 
                                        immediately; and
                                            (bb) automatically cancel 
                                        any other valid visa or entry 
                                        documentation that is in the 
                                        alien's possession.
            (4) Implementation; penalties.--
                    (A) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
                authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
                    (B) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in 
                subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
                International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
                1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates, 
                attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 
                violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such 
                penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful 
                act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
            (5) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
        sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person 
        identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the 
        President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national 
        interest of the United States.
            (6) Exceptions.--
                    (A) Exception for intelligence activities.--
                Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any 
                activity subject to the reporting requirements under 
                title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
                3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities 
                of the United States.
                    (B) Exception to comply with international 
                obligations and for law enforcement activities.--
                Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with 
                respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien 
                into the United States is necessary--
                            (i) to permit the United States to comply 
                        with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters 
                        of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
                        June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 
                        21, 1947, between the United Nations and the 
                        United States, or other applicable 
                        international obligations; or
                            (ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement 
                        activity in the United States.
            (7) Termination of sanctions.--The President may terminate 
        the application of sanctions under this section with respect to 
        a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the 
        appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days 
        before the termination takes effect that--
                    (A) information exists that the person did not 
                engage in the activity for which sanctions were 
                imposed;
                    (B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately 
                for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
                    (C) the person has credibly demonstrated a 
                significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate 
                consequence for the activity for which sanctions were 
                imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an 
                activity described in paragraph (1)(A) in the future; 
                or
                    (D) the termination of the sanctions is in the 
                national security interests of the United States.
            (8) Sunset.--This section, and any sanctions imposed under 
        this section, shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (9) Definitions of admission; admitted; alien.--In this 
        section, the terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' 
        have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
    (g) Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Certain Activities Related to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) Policy statement.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to protect American investors, through stronger 
        disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of 
        Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of 
        human rights in United States capital markets, including 
        American and foreign companies listed on United States 
        exchanges that enable the mass internment and population 
        surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim 
        minorities and source products made with forced labor in the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Such involvements 
        represent clear, material risks to the share values and 
        corporate reputations of certain of these companies and hence 
        to prospective American investors, particularly given that the 
        United States Government has employed sanctions and export 
        restrictions to target individuals and entities contributing to 
        human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Disclosure of certain activities relating to the 
        xinjiang uyghur autonomous region.--
                    (A) In general.--Section 13 of the Securities 
                Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by 
                adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(s) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            ``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual 
        or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that 
        report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the 
        period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of 
        the issuer--
                    ``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in 
                creating or providing technology or other assistance to 
                create mass population surveillance systems in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, including 
                any entity included on the Department of Commerce's 
                `Entity List' in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
                    ``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or an affiliate of an entity building and 
                running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 
                Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in 
                the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
                    ``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an 
                entity or an affiliate of an entity described in 
                section 7(c)(1) of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
                Act, including--
                            ``(i) any entity engaged in the `pairing-
                        assistance' program which subsidizes the 
                        establishment of manufacturing facilities in 
                        the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; or
                            ``(ii) any entity for which the Department 
                        of Homeland Security has issued a `Withhold 
                        Release Order' under section 307 of the Tariff 
                        Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or
                    ``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had 
                dealings with--
                            ``(i) any person the property and interests 
                        in property of which were sanctioned by the 
                        Secretary of State for the detention or abuse 
                        of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members 
                        of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 
                        Uyghur Autonomous Region;
                            ``(ii) any person the property and 
                        interests in property of which are sanctioned 
                        pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                        Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or
                            ``(iii) any person or entity responsible 
                        for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in 
                        the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            ``(2) Information required.--
                    ``(A) In general.--If an issuer described under 
                paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged 
                in any activity described in paragraph (1), the 
                information required by this paragraph is a detailed 
                description of each such activity, including--
                            ``(i) the nature and extent of the 
                        activity;
                            ``(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, 
                        if any, attributable to the activity; and
                            ``(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate 
                        of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to 
                        continue the activity.
                    ``(B) Exception.--The requirement to disclose 
                information under this paragraph shall not include 
                information on activities of the issuer or any 
                affiliate of the issuer activities relating to--
                            ``(i) the import of manufactured goods, 
                        including electronics, food products, textiles, 
                        shoes, and teas, that originated in the 
                        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; or
                            ``(ii) manufactured goods containing 
                        materials that originated or are sourced in the 
                        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            ``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under 
        paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has 
        knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph, 
        the issuer shall separately file with the Commission, 
        concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under 
        subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity 
        has been included in that annual or quarterly report that 
        identifies the issuer and contains the information required by 
        paragraph (2).
            ``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a 
        notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report 
        includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph 
        (1), the Commission shall promptly--
                    ``(A) transmit the report to--
                            ``(i) the President;
                            ``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                        the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                        House of Representatives; and
                            ``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
                        and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
                        Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
                    ``(B) make the information provided in the 
                disclosure and the notice available to the public by 
                posting the information on the Internet website of the 
                Commission.
            ``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under 
        paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity 
        described in paragraph (1), the President shall--
                    ``(A) make a determination with respect to whether 
                any investigation is needed into the possible 
                imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky 
                Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 
                or section 8 of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 
                or whether criminal investigations are warranted under 
                statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or 
                entities involved in the importation of goods produced 
                by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 
                1761 of title 18, United States Code; and
                    ``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any 
                such investigation, make a determination with respect 
                to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal 
                investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or 
                the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
            ``(6) Atrocities defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        `atrocities' has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of 
        the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 
        (Public Law 115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).''.
            (3) Sunset.--Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act 
        of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier 
        of--
                    (A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the 
                enactment of this Act; or
                    (B) the date on which the President submits to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a determination 
                that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other 
                gross violations of human rights experienced by 
                Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
                minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region.
            (4) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (2) 
        shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed 
        with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that 
        is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (h) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and 
                Means of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and 
                the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
            (2) Atrocities.--The term ``atrocities'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
        Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 22 
        U.S.C. 2656 note).
            (3) Crimes against humanity.--The term ``crimes against 
        humanity'' includes, when committed as part of a widespread or 
        systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
        with knowledge of the attack--
                    (A) murder;
                    (B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;
                    (C) torture;
                    (D) extermination;
                    (E) enslavement;
                    (F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of 
                sexual violence of comparable severity;
                    (G) persecution against any identifiable group or 
                collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
                cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are 
                universally recognized as impermissible under 
                international law; and
                    (H) enforced disappearance of persons.
            (4) Forced labor.--The term ``forced labor'' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
        (19 U.S.C. 1307).
            (5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
        person that is not a United States person.
            (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
        entity.
            (7) Mass population surveillance system.--The term ``mass 
        population surveillance system'' means installation and 
        integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data 
        collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial 
        intelligence technology with the ``Sharp Eyes'' and 
        ``Integrated Joint Operations Platform'' or other technologies 
        that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and 
        big-data predictive policing.
            (8) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Uyghur Human 
Rights Protection Act''.
    (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other 
        Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (``Xinjiang'' or ``XUAR''), also known 
        as East Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government policies 
        have systematically discriminated against these minority groups 
        by denying them a range of civil and political rights, 
        particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Communist 
        Party officials bear direct responsibility for these gross 
        human rights violations.
            (2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention 
        of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and 
        members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working 
        age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the 
        integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in 
        detention facilities and internment camps in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region have described forced political 
        indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual 
        assault, coordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among 
        Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced sterilization, 
        and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms. 
        Recent media reports indicate that since 2019, the PRC 
        government has newly constructed, expanded, or fortified at 
        least 60 detention facilities with higher security or prison-
        like features in Xinjiang.
            (3) The Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 
        other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang violate international 
        human rights laws and norms, including--
                    (A) the International Convention on the Elimination 
                of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the 
                People's Republic of China has acceded;
                    (B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
                Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the 
                People's Republic of China has signed and ratified;
                    (C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
                of the Crime of Genocide, which the People's Republic 
                of China has signed and ratified;
                    (D) the International Covenant on Civil and 
                Political Rights, which the People's Republic of China 
                has signed; and
                    (E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
                the International Labor Organization's Force Labor 
                Convention (no. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor 
                Convention (no. 105).
    (c) Refugee Protections for Certain Residents of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
            (1) Populations of special humanitarian concern.--The 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of 
        special humanitarian concern--
                    (A) aliens who were nationals of the People's 
                Republic of China and residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                Autonomous Region on January 1, 2021;
                    (B) aliens who fled the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
                Region after June 30, 2009, and reside in other 
                provinces of China or in a third country where such 
                alien is not firmly resettled; and
                    (C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such 
                terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 
                101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A) 
                and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried 
                person under 27 years of age.
            (2) Processing of xinjiang uyghur autonomous region 
        refugees.--The processing of individuals described in paragraph 
        (1) for classification as refugees may occur in China or a 
        third country.
            (3) Eligibility for admission as a refugee.--
                    (A) In general.--Aliens described in subparagraph 
                (B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a 
                refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and 
                Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 
                208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a 
                well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
                religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
                social group, or political opinion by asserting such a 
                fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about 
                the possibility of such persecution.
                    (B) Aliens described.--An alien is described in 
                this subsection if such alien has been identified as a 
                person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to 
                paragraph (1) and--
                            (i) has experienced persecution in the 
                        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China 
                        including--
                                    (I) forced and arbitrary detention 
                                including in an internment or re-
                                education camp;
                                    (II) forced political 
                                indoctrination, torture, beatings, food 
                                deprivation, and denial of religious, 
                                cultural, and linguistic freedoms;
                                    (III) forced labor;
                                    (IV) forced separation from family 
                                members;
                                    (V) other forms of systemic 
                                threats, harassment, and gross human 
                                rights violations; or
                                    (VI) has been formally charged, 
                                detained, or convicted on account of 
                                their peaceful actions as described in 
                                the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 
                                2020 (Public Law 116-145); and
                            (ii) is currently a national of the 
                        People's Republic of China whose residency in 
                        the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or any 
                        other area within the jurisdiction of the 
                        People's Republic of China, was revoked for 
                        having submitted to any United States 
                        Government agency a nonfrivolous application 
                        for refugee status, asylum, or any other 
                        immigration benefit under United States law.
                    (C) Eligibility for admission under other 
                classification.--An alien may not be denied the 
                opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or 
                asylum under this section solely because such alien 
                qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the 
                United States or is eligible for admission to the 
                United States under any other immigrant classification.
            (4) Priority.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize 
        bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former 
        residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and who face 
        significant diplomatic pressures from the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (5) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security shall submit a report on the matters 
                described in subparagraph (B) to--
                            (i) the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
                        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
                        and
                            (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
                        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                        Representatives.
                    (B) Matters to be included.--Each report required 
                by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to 
                applications submitted under this section--
                            (i) the total number of applications that 
                        are pending at the end of the reporting period;
                            (ii) the average wait-times and number of 
                        applicants who are currently pending--
                                    (I) a pre-screening interview with 
                                a resettlement support center;
                                    (II) an interview with U.S. 
                                Citizenship and Immigration Services;
                                    (III) the completion of security 
                                checks; and
                                    (IV) receipt of a final decision 
                                after completion of an interview with 
                                U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
                                Services; and
                            (iii) the number of denials of applications 
                        for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason 
                        for each such denial.
                    (C) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall 
                make each report submitted under this subsection 
                available to the public on the internet website of the 
                Department of State.
    (d) Statement of Policy on Encouraging Allies and Partners To Make 
Similar Accommodations.--It is the policy of the United States to 
encourage allies and partners of the United States to make 
accommodations similar to the accommodations made in this Act for 
residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region who are fleeing 
oppression by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
    (e) Termination.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, 
shall cease to have effect on the date that is 10 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
              THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

    The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to--
            (1) reform the process for removing members of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and systemic 
        violations of human rights, including--
                    (A) lowering the threshold vote at the United 
                Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple 
                majority;
                    (B) ensuring information detailing the member 
                country's human rights record is publicly available 
                before the vote on removal; and
                    (C) making the vote of each country on the removal 
                from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly 
                available;
            (2) reform the rules on electing members to the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations members 
        that have committed gross and systemic violations of human 
        rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
            (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any 
        United Nations member--
                    (A) currently designated as a country engaged in a 
                consistent pattern of gross violations of 
                internationally recognized human rights pursuant to 
                section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);
                    (B) currently designated as a state sponsor of 
                terrorism;
                    (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under 
                the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 
                U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
                    (D) the government of which is identified on the 
                list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
                section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 
                2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that 
                recruits and uses child soldiers; or
                    (E) the government of which the United States 
                determines to have committed genocide or crimes against 
                humanity.

SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

    (a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d), as 
        subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
    ``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be 
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or 
higher.''.
    (b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
        Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States 
        Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
            (2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph 
        (1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China permits--
                    (A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, 
                People's Republic of China, to reopen; or
                    (B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, 
                Tibet, to open.
            (3) Staff.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary shall--
                            (i) assign not fewer than 2 United States 
                        direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit 
                        established under paragraph (1); and
                            (ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally engaged 
                        staff member for such unit.
                    (B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make 
                Tibetan language training available to the personnel 
                assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the 
                Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE 
              SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND 
              RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

    (a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any 
``interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or 
any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or 
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would 
represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists and the Tibetan people''.
    (b) International Efforts To Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States 
allies and partners to--
            (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole 
        religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai 
        Lama;
            (2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China that the PRC has the authority to decide for 
        Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
            (3) reject interference by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China in the religious freedom of Tibetan 
        Buddhists.

SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT 
              FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China has repeatedly violated 
        its obligations under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the 
        basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.
            (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed 
        a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
            (3) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the 
        fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people through suppression 
        of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.
            (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes 
        unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity 
        in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force 
        internet service providers to censor content, hand over user 
        information, and block access to platforms.
            (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network 
        blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting 
        pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National 
        Security Law.
            (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers 
        blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission 
        website in Hong Kong.
            (7) Major tech companies including Facebook, Twitter, 
        WhatsApp and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user 
        data from Hong Kong authorities.
            (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in 
        Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security 
        Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to 
        maintain their freedom to access information online; and
            (2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate 
        the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance 
        of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
                    (A) to suppress internet access;
                    (B) to increase online censorship; or
                    (C) to inhibit online communication and content-
                sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Working group.--The term ``working group'' means--
                    (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian 
                Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
                    (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
                and Pacific Affairs;
                    (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
                States Agency for Global Media and the President of the 
                Open Technology Fund; and
                    (D) the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development.
            (3) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
    (d) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
        establish a working group to develop a strategy to bolster 
        internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong. The 
        Secretary shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program 
        in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the 
        Department of State. Additionally, the President of the 
        Technology Fund is authorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet 
        Freedom Program. These programs shall operate independently, 
        but in strategic coordination with other entities in the 
        working group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain 
        independent from Department of State direction in its 
        implementation of this, and any other Internet Freedom 
        Programs.
            (2) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023, 
        the Program shall be carried out independent from the mainland 
        China internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on 
        supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong 
        Kong.
            (3) Consolidation of department of state program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may--
                    (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China 
                initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
                and Labor; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (2).
            (4) Consolidation of open technology fund program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open 
        Technology Fund may--
                    (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China 
                initiatives in the Open Technology Fund; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (2).
    (e) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
            (1) Grants authorized.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State, working 
                through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
                Labor, and the Open Technology Fund, separately and 
                independently from the Secretary of State, are 
                authorized to award grants and contracts to private 
                organizations to support and develop programs in Hong 
                Kong that promote or expand--
                            (i) open, interoperable, reliable and 
                        secure internet; and
                            (ii) the online exercise of human rights 
                        and fundamental freedoms of individual 
                        citizens, activists, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations, and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong.
                    (B) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed 
                with grants authorized under subparagraph (A) should 
                be--
                            (i) to make the internet available in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (ii) to increase the number of the tools in 
                        the technology portfolio;
                            (iii) to promote the availability of such 
                        technologies and tools in Hong Kong;
                            (iv) to encourage the adoption of such 
                        technologies and tools by the people of Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (v) to scale up the distribution of such 
                        technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
                            (vi) to prioritize the development of 
                        tools, components, code, and technologies that 
                        are fully open-source, to the extent 
                        practicable;
                            (vii) to conduct research on repressive 
                        tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 
                        and support is available to repressed 
                        individual citizens, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong; and
                            (ix) to engage American private industry, 
                        including e-commerce firms and social 
                        networking companies, on the importance of 
                        preserving internet access in Hong Kong.
                    (C) Grant recipients.--Grants authorized under this 
                paragraph shall be distributed to multiple vendors and 
                suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and 
                evidence-based decision process--
                            (i) to diversify the technical base; and
                            (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad 
                        actors.
                    (D) Security audits.--New technologies developed 
                using grants from this paragraph shall undergo 
                comprehensive security audits to ensure that such 
                technologies are secure and have not been compromised 
                in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United 
                States or to individuals or organizations benefitting 
                from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.
            (2) Funding source.--The Secretary of State is authorized 
        to expend funds from the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the 
        Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department 
        of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants authorized under 
        paragraph (1) at any entity in the working group.
            (3) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) Open technology fund.--In addition to the funds 
                authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), 
                there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open 
                Technology Fund $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
                2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This 
                funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the 
                Open Technology Fund through the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
                92).
                    (B) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--
                In addition to the funds authorized to be expended 
                pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be 
                appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs 
                in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of 
                the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal 
                years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this section.
                    (C) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall remain available until 
                expended.
    (f) Strategic Planning Report.--Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
working group shall submit a classified report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that--
            (1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and 
        increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and 
        internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year 
        2022;
            (2) outlines a plan for--
                    (A) supporting the preservation of an open, 
                interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong 
                Kong;
                    (B) increasing the supply of the technology 
                referred to in paragraph (1);
                    (C) accelerating the dissemination of such 
                technology;
                    (D) promoting the availability of internet freedom 
                in Hong Kong;
                    (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 
                existing relevant portfolios for further use in the 
                unique context of Hong Kong;
                    (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to 
                diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and 
                resiliency of the circumvention efforts;
                    (G) providing training for high-risk groups and 
                individuals in Hong Kong; and
                    (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and 
                evolving censorship threats;
            (3) includes a detailed description of the technical and 
        fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred 
        to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the 
        market conditions in Hong Kong;
            (4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding 
        grants to private organizations for the purposes described in 
        subsection (e)(1)(A);
            (5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding 
        the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal 
        efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and
            (6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to 
        influence global internet legal standards at international 
        organizations and multilateral fora.

SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
              IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise 
made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative (Public Law 115-409) include programs that prioritize the 
protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, 
religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic 
and religious minorities in the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
may be used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific 
region that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the 
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult 
with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of 
civil society regarding--
            (1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations 
        referred to in subsection (b);
            (2) protecting members of the groups referred to in 
        subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, 
        forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or 
        intimidation, including members residing outside of the 
        People's Republic of China; and
            (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible 
        audiences within the People's Republic of China about United 
        States Government efforts to protect freedom of association, 
        expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY UNDER GLOBAL 
              MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.

    Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability 
Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 
note) is repealed.

SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
              DISCRIMINATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and 
        discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have 
        risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations 
        Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
        continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
        scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
        ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
        the virus of hate''.
            (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make 
        up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines 
        of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all 
        essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers 
        also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent 
        based on sector--of the biomedical field.
            (3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian 
        descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States 
        population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
        growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
        represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent 
        and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in 
        the United States and around the world have no place in a 
        peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
            (2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud 
        tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the 
        United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and 
        tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and 
        Pacific Islanders;
            (3) the United States Government should encourage other 
        foreign governments to use the official and scientific names 
        for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health 
        Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention; and
            (4) the United States Government and other governments 
        around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, 
        and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the 
        spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO 
              INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

    Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act (227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) 
is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the 
        end and inserting a semicolon; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the 
        government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially 
        intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-
        censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or 
        associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in 
        such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or 
        contractors for the same, including any instance in which the 
        government of China has sought to extraterritorially censor or 
        punish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States on 
        the topics of--
                    ``(A) repression and violation of fundamental 
                freedoms in Hong Kong;
                    ``(B) repression and persecution of religious and 
                ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    ``(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance 
                technologies to surveil activists, journalists, 
                opposition politicians, or to profile persons of 
                different ethnicities; and
                    ``(D) other gross violations of human rights; and
            ``(14) wherever applicable, instances which a company or 
        entity located in or based in a third country has censored or 
        self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors, 
        customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human 
        rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such 
        employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or 
        the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.''.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like 
        the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of 
        global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and 
        require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and 
        engagement;
            (2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects 
        of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 
        States must adopt policies that--
                    (A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual 
                property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, 
                and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign 
                markets, and the global economy;
                    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and 
                consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
                    (C) provide options for affected United States 
                persons to address and respond to unreasonable and 
                discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
                    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for secure but 
                open investment, innovation, and competition;
            (3) the United States must work with its allies and 
        partners and multilateral venues and fora--
                    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted 
                principles of fair competition and market behavior and 
                address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and 
                industrial policies that undermine decades of global 
                growth and innovation;
                    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same 
                treatment as that of a free-market economy until it 
                ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, 
                policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage 
                to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and 
                impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal 
                burdens on market-based international commerce; and
                    (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
                state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 
                such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union;
            (4) the United States and its allies and partners must 
        collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies 
        to cooperate in areas such as--
            (5) the United States should develop policies that--
                    (A) insulate United States entities from PRC 
                pressure against complying with United States laws;
                    (B) together with the work of allies and partners 
                and multilateral institutions, counter the potential 
                impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by 
                the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, 
                when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ``Rules on 
                Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application 
                of Foreign Legislation and other Measures''; and
                    (C) plan for future actions that the Government of 
                the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of 
                United States legal authorities, including with respect 
                to the use of sanctions.

SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

    (a) Pilot Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and implement a 
pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response 
teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a 
country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures 
and to play a liaison role between the legitimate government of that 
country and the United States Government. Such assistance and support 
may include the following activities:
            (1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to 
        coercive economic measures.
            (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an 
        adversary could cause to that country.
            (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency 
        plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of 
        such measures.
            (4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or 
        improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing 
        vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the 
        future.
            (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign 
        sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that 
        may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.
            (6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific 
        efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic 
        coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty, 
        including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that 
        undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner 
        country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a 
        manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of 
        the partner country.
            (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium 
        term economic or other assistance from the United States and 
        marshalling other resources in support of effective responses 
        to such measures.
    (b) Reports Required.--
            (1) Report on establishment.--Upon establishment of the 
        pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of 
        State shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress with 
        a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot program, 
        the major elements of the program, the personnel and 
        institutions involved, and the degree to which the program 
        incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
            (2) Follow-up report.--Not later than one year after the 
        report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall 
        provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a detailed 
        report and briefing describing the operations over the previous 
        year of the pilot program established pursuant to subsection 
        (a), as well as the Secretary's assessment of its performance 
        and suitability for becoming a permanent program.
            (3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.--
            (1) Notification.--The President may activate an economic 
        defense response team for a period of 180 days under the 
        authorities of this section to assist a partner country in 
        responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive 
        threat by an adversary of the United States upon the 
        declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with 
        notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
            (2) Extension authority.--The President may activate the 
        response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of 
        a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph 
        (1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic 
        defense response team in response to the economic emergency is 
        in the national security interest of the United States.
    (d) Sunset.--The authorities provided under this section shall 
expire on December 31, 2026.
    (e) Rule of Construction.--Neither the authority to declare an 
economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of 
an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be 
construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to 
the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense 
response team as described in this section.
    (f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, 
        Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and 
        Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
        Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the 
        Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means 
        of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their 
        power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich 
        themselves at the expense of their countries' economic 
        development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to 
        solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic 
        institutions abroad.
            (2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United 
        States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds 
        terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime, 
        enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies 
        economic growth.
            (3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries 
        through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as 
        kleptocrats launder money, use shell companies, amass offshore 
        wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.
            (4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading 
        model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-
        sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from 
        within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening 
        the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.
            (5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian 
        Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of 
        political leadership, use stolen money--
                    (A) to purchase key assets in other countries, 
                often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of 
                a sector;
                    (B) to gain access to and influence the policies of 
                other countries; and
                    (C) to advance Russian interests in other 
                countries, particularly those that undermine confidence 
                and trust in democratic systems.
            (6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic of China, 
        often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership of the 
        Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government is used--
                    (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain People's 
                Republic of China economic entities;
                    (B) to increase other countries' economic 
                dependence on the People's Republic of China to secure 
                greater deference to the People's Republic of China's 
                diplomatic and strategic goals; and
                    (C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments 
                and among other political elites to enable People's 
                Republic of China state-backed firms to pursue 
                predatory and exploitative economic practices.
            (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other 
        kleptocratic actors requires the international community to 
        strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law. 
        International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit 
        finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering 
        reformers in foreign countries during historic political 
        openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those 
        countries.
            (8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption 
        and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance 
        provided by the Department of State's Bureau of International 
        Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States 
        Agency for International Development, and through programs like 
        the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
        Development, Assistance and Training and the International 
        Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have 
        lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United 
        States interests.
            (9) There currently exist numerous international 
        instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit 
        finance, including--
                    (A) the Inter-American Convention against 
                Corruption of the Organization of American States, done 
                at Caracas March 29, 1996;
                    (B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
                Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
                of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
                Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly 
                referred to as the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'');
                    (C) the United Nations Convention against 
                Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York 
                November 15, 2000;
                    (D) the United Nations Convention against 
                Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;
                    (E) Recommendation of the Council for Further 
                Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
                International Business Transactions, adopted November 
                26, 2009; and
                    (F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task 
                Force comprising the International Standards on 
                Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
                Terrorism and Proliferation.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (F) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (G) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance'' 
        means foreign assistance authorized under the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).
            (3) Foreign state.--The term ``foreign state'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United 
        States Code.
            (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (5) Public corruption.--The term ``public corruption'' 
        includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for 
        private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud, 
        extortion, or embezzlement.
            (6) Rule of law.--The term ``rule of law'' means the 
        principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and 
        entities, whether public or private, including the state, are 
        accountable to laws that are--
                    (A) publicly promulgated;
                    (B) equally enforced;
                    (C) independently adjudicated; and
                    (D) consistent with international human rights 
                norms and standards.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and 
        foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;
            (2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat 
        corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including 
        instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other 
        relevant international standards and best practices, as such 
        standards and practices develop; and
            (B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such 
        laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;
            (3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance 
        and combating public corruption;
            (4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to 
        identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial 
        architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell 
        companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that 
        are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial 
        systems;
            (5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate, 
        prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of 
        corruption by malign actors, including authoritarian 
        governments, particularly the Government of the Russian 
        Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China, as a tool of malign influence worldwide;
            (6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related stolen 
        assets for victims, including through the use of appropriate 
        bilateral arrangements and international agreements, such as 
        the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New 
        York October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Convention 
        against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York 
        November 15, 2000;
            (7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Global 
        Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title 
        XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 
        7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
        Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public 
        Law 116-94), to identify and take action against corrupt 
        foreign actors;
            (8) to ensure coordination between relevant Federal 
        departments and agencies with jurisdiction over the advancement 
        of good governance in foreign states; and
            (9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-
        minded states--
                    (A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption, 
                kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and
                    (B) to strengthen collective financial defense.
    (d) Anti-Corruption Action Fund.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established in the United 
        States Treasury a fund, to be known as the ``Anti-Corruption 
        Action Fund'', only for the purposes of--
                    (A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to 
                prevent and fight public corruption;
                    (B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of 
                law-based governance structures, including accountable 
                civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial 
                institutions;
                    (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen 
                domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat 
                public corruption, including the adoption of best 
                practices under international law; and
                    (D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and 
                diplomacy with respect to efforts described in 
                subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
            (2) Funding.--
                    (A) Transfers.--Beginning on or after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and 
                penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against 
                a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
                1977 (Public Law 95-213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of 
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 
                78dd-1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal 
                prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred 
                prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a 
                declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other 
                resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or 
                the Attorney General shall impose an additional 
                prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such 
                person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption 
                Action Fund established under paragraph (1).
                    (B) Availability of funds.--Amounts deposited into 
                the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of 
                State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1), 
                without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent 
                appropriation.
                    (C) Limitation.--None of the amounts made available 
                to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption 
                Action Fund may be used inside the United States, 
                except for administrative costs related to overseas 
                program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).
            (3) Support.--The Anti-Corruption Action Fund--
                    (A) may support governmental and nongovernmental 
                parties in advancing the purposes described in 
                paragraph (1); and
                    (B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to 
                existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy, 
                and anti-corruption activities.
            (4) Allocation and prioritization.--In programming foreign 
        assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action 
        Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 
        General, shall prioritize projects that--
                    (A) assist countries that are undergoing historic 
                opportunities for democratic transition, combating 
                corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law; 
                and
                    (B) are important to United States national 
                interests.
            (5) Technical assistance providers.--For any technical 
        assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section, 
        the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 
        General, shall prioritize United States Government technical 
        assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office 
        of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training 
        and the International Criminal Investigative Training 
        Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.
            (6) Public diplomacy.--The Secretary of State shall 
        announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action 
        Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt 
        Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are--
                    (A) contributing to international anti-corruption 
                work; and
                    (B) reducing the pressure that United States 
                businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby 
                contributing to greater competitiveness of United 
                States companies.
            (7) Reporting.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually 
        thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that contains--
                    (A) the balance of the funding remaining in the 
                Anti-Corruption Action Fund;
                    (B) the amount of funds that have been deposited 
                into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and
                    (C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of 
                such funds.
            (8) Notification requirements.--None of the amounts made 
        available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption 
        Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for 
        obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or 
        entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
        of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than 
        15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.
    (e) Interagency Anti-corruption Task Force.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation 
        with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 
        pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government 
        effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and 
        agencies and donor organizations with a role in--
                    (A) promoting good governance in foreign states; 
                and
                    (B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to 
                combat public corruption.
            (2) Interagency anti-corruption task force.--Not later than 
        180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency 
        Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the 
        ``Task Force''), which shall be composed of representatives 
        appointed by the President from appropriate departments and 
        agencies, including the Department of State, the United States 
        Agency for International Development, the Department of 
        Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of 
        Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
        Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the 
        intelligence community.
            (3) Additional meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not 
        less frequently than twice per year.
            (4) Duties.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness 
                of existing foreign assistance programs, including 
                programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, 
                that have an impact on--
                            (i) promoting good governance in foreign 
                        states; and
                            (ii) enhancing the ability of foreign 
                        states to combat public corruption;
                    (B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the 
                whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);
                    (C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-
                government effort could be enhanced; and
                    (D) recommend specific programs for foreign states 
                that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government 
                effort.
            (5) Briefing requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than 
        annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the 
        Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task 
        Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a 
        representative of each of the departments and agencies 
        described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.
    (f) Designation of Embassy Anti-Corruption Points of Contact.--
            (1) Embassy anti-corruption point of contact.--The chief of 
        mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-
        corruption point of contact for each such embassy.
            (2) Duties.--The designated anti-corruption points of 
        contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from 
                the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 
                pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach 
                within United States embassies to combat public 
                corruption in the foreign states in which such 
                embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of 
                such foreign states, including all relevant Federal 
                departments and agencies with a presence in such 
                foreign states, such as the Department of State, the 
                United States Agency for International Development, the 
                Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, 
                the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
                Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the 
                intelligence community;
                    (B) make recommendations regarding the use of the 
                Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign 
                assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts 
                in their respective countries of responsibility that 
                aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and
                    (C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried 
                out within their respective countries of responsibility 
                are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of 
                State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force, 
                including United States embassy strategic planning 
                documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as 
                appropriate.
            (3) Training.--The Secretary of State shall develop and 
        implement appropriate training for the designated anti-
        corruption points of contact.
    (g) Reporting Requirements.--
            (1) Report or briefing on progress toward implementation.--
        Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
        submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that summarizes progress made in 
        combating public corruption and in implementing this Act, 
        including--
                    (A) identifying opportunities and priorities for 
                outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and 
                implementation of relevant international law and 
                standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy, 
                and illicit finance;
                    (B) describing--
                            (i) the bureaucratic structure of the 
                        offices within the Department of State and the 
                        United States Agency for International 
                        Development that are engaged in activities to 
                        combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and 
                        illicit finance; and
                            (ii) how such offices coordinate their 
                        efforts with each other and with other relevant 
                        Federal departments and agencies;
                    (C) providing a description of how the provisions 
                under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have 
                been applied to each project funded by the Anti-
                Corruption Action Fund;
                    (D) providing an explanation as to why a United 
                States Government technical assistance provider was not 
                used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental 
                entity is not implemented by a United States Government 
                technical assistance provider;
                    (E) describing the activities of the Interagency 
                Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to 
                subsection (e)(2);
                    (F) identifying--
                            (i) the designated anti-corruption points 
                        of contact for foreign states; and
                            (ii) any training provided to such points 
                        of contact; and
                    (G) recommending additional measures that would 
                enhance the ability of the United States Government to 
                combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit 
                finance overseas.
            (2) Online platform.--The Secretary of State, in 
        conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development, should consolidate existing 
        reports with anti-corruption components into a single online, 
        public platform that includes--
                    (A) the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights 
                Practices required under section 116 of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n);
                    (B) the Fiscal Transparency Report required under 
                section 7031(b) of the Department of State, Foreign 
                Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
                2019 (division F of Public Law 116-6);
                    (C) the Investment Climate Statement reports;
                    (D) the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
                Report;
                    (E) any other relevant public reports; and
                    (F) links to third-party indicators and compliance 
                mechanisms used by the United States Government to 
                inform policy and programming, as appropriate, such 
                as--
                            (i) the International Finance Corporation's 
                        Doing Business surveys;
                            (ii) the International Budget Partnership's 
                        Open Budget Index; and
                            (iii) multilateral peer review anti-
                        corruption compliance mechanisms, such as--
                                    (I) the Organisation for Economic 
                                Co-operation and Development's Working 
                                Group on Bribery in International 
                                Business Transactions;
                                    (II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for 
                                the Inter-American Convention Against 
                                Corruption; and
                                    (III) the United Nations Convention 
                                Against Corruption, done at New York 
                                October 31, 2003.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies, 
        arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement 
        with the PRC--
                    (A) to enhance understanding of each other's 
                respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;
                    (B) to improve transparency; and
                    (C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and 
                misperception;
            (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China on relevant issues that lays the 
        groundwork for a constructive arms control framework, 
        including--
                    (A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to 
                the convening of strategic security talks;
                    (B) negotiating norms for outer space;
                    (C) developing pre-launch notification regimes 
                aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
                    (D) expanding lines of communication between both 
                governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of 
                conventional war and increasing transparency;
            (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with 
        our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States 
        and allied interests to slow the PRC's military modernization 
        and expansion, including on--
                    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
                    (B) integrated air and missile defense;
                    (C) hypersonic missiles;
                    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
                    (E) space-based capabilities;
                    (F) cyber capabilities; and
                    (G) command, control, and communications; and
            (4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to 
        reassure allies.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the interest of both nations to cooperate in 
        reducing risks of conventional and nuclear escalation;
            (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack 
        on United States early warning satellites, other portions of 
        the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 
        infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid 
        escalation;
            (3) the United States and its allies should promote 
        international norms on military operations in space, the 
        employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and
            (4) United States allies and partners should share the 
        burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the 
        weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe behavior that 
        violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and 
        proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in 
        space and all other domains.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 
              ISSUES.

    (a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms Control.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that 
outlines the approaches and strategies they will pursue to engage the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on arms control and risk 
reduction, including--
            (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China, including 
        on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, 
        conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as 
        well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the 
        likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to 
        occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-
        Pacific;
            (2) how the United States Government can engage the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China in a constructive 
        arms control dialogue;
            (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the 
        People's Republic of China that the United States Government is 
        most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may 
        benefit United States and allied security interests;
            (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, 
        conventional, and unconventional military escalation between 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China;
            (5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively 
        engage the People's Republic of China in strategic stability 
        and arms control dialogues; and
            (6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency 
        from the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the People's Republic of 
China.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report that describes--
            (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the 
        People's Republic of China;
            (2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, 
        what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for 
        ensuring the security of the United States and its allies 
        through international arms control negotiations;
            (3) effects on the credibility of United States extended 
        deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control 
        negotiations do not materialize and the implications for 
        regional security architectures;
            (4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to 
        join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        international basis; and
            (5) the interest level of the Government of China in 
        joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        international basis, including through--
                    (A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials 
                from the People's Republic of China, and to each of the 
                permanent members of the United Nations Security 
                Council, to observe a United States-Russian Federation 
                New START Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the 
                security benefits of transparency into strategic 
                nuclear forces;
                    (B) discussions on how to advance international 
                negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;
                    (C) an agreement with the People's Republic of 
                China that allows for advance notifications of 
                ballistic missile launches, through the Hague Code of 
                Conduct or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions 
                related to strategic nuclear forces;
                    (D) an agreement not to target or interfere in 
                nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
                referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
                    (E) any other cooperative measure that benefits 
                United States-People's Republic of China strategic 
                stability.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
        Resources of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 503. COUNTERING CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND 
              NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

    (a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation 
to support that determination detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in China knowingly exported, 
        transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under 
        Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the 
        previous three fiscal years; and
            (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to 
        impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who 
        knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that 
        item or items.
    (b) China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in China engaged in 
        cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three 
        fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel 
        cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the 
        IAEA and would be subject to complementary access if an 
        Additional Protocol was in force; and
            (2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to 
        any future effort by China to export to any foreign person an 
        item classified as ``plants for the separation of isotopes of 
        uranium'' or ``plants for the reprocessing of irradiated 
        nuclear reactor fuel elements'' under Part 110 of the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
    (c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection 
(b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified 
with a classified annex.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                House of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
        and ``person'' mean--
                    (A) a natural person that is an alien;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is 
                organized under the laws of a foreign country or has 
                its principal place of business in a foreign country;
                    (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a 
                business enterprise; and
                    (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any 
                entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

              TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH CHINA 
              AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND 
              CLIMATE CHANGE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published 
        by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8, 
        2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first 
        published by the United States Global Change Research Program 
        in 2018, concluded that--
                    (A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most 
                notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the 
                degradation of natural resources that absorb 
                atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the 
                dominant causes of climate change during the past 
                century; and
                    (B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
                            (i) causing sea levels to rise;
                            (ii) increasing the global average 
                        temperature of the Earth;
                            (iii) increasing the incidence and severity 
                        of wildfires; and
                            (iv) intensifying the severity of extreme 
                        weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, 
                        typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other 
                        disasters that threaten human life, healthy 
                        communities, and critical infrastructure.
            (2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2 
        degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would 
        cause--
                    (A) the displacement, and the forced internal 
                migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin 
                America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if 
                insufficient action is taken (according to the World 
                Bank);
                    (B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 
                people worldwide by floods every year (according to the 
                Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the 
                exacerbating effects of climate change;
                    (C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual 
                economic output in the United States (a 10 percent 
                contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the 
                Fourth National Climate Assessment);
                    (D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to 
                be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World 
                Bank);
                    (E) greater food insecurity and decreased 
                agricultural production due to climate change's effects 
                on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme 
                weather events;
                    (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and 
                crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading 
                ecosystems, and water scarcity; and
                    (G) more than 350,000,000 additional people 
                worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
            (3) According to the International Energy Agency, the 
        United States, China, India, and the European Union (including 
        the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global 
        greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world's top 
        greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the 
        United States core interest in climate stability--
                    (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions 
                mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in 
                its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to 
                ``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
                    (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated 
                on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon 
                neutrality by 2060;
                    (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to 
                strictly control coal fired power generation projects, 
                as well as strictly limit the increase in coal 
                consumption over the 14th five year plan period and 
                phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and
                    (D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally 
                recognized metrics for achieving these goals.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must 
        leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and 
        foreign assistance to promote our national security and 
        economic interests related to climate change;
            (2) in the absence of United States leadership on global 
        issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it 
        would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the Nation's 
        global competitiveness;
            (3) promoting international instruments on climate action 
        and other relevant international standards and best practices, 
        as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of 
        the American people and protect United States environmental 
        resources and the planet;
            (4) promoting the adoption and implementation of 
        international climate-related agreements, standards, and 
        practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for 
        United States businesses and other stakeholders;
            (5) working with international allies and partners to 
        promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the 
        American people's interests;
            (6) finding common ground with China on climate action 
        where possible is important, but the United States must also 
        continue to hold China accountable where its actions undermine 
        the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners; 
        and
            (7) in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United 
        States should--
                    (A) explore opportunities for constructive 
                cooperation on climate action initiatives with China 
                and other countries while ensuring the United States 
                maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related 
                fields of expertise and industry, including--
                            (i) support for international cooperative 
                        policies, measures, and technologies to 
                        decarbonize industry and power, including 
                        through circular economy, energy storage and 
                        grid reliability, carbon capture, and green 
                        hydrogen; and
                            (ii) increased deployment of clean energy, 
                        including renewable and advanced nuclear power; 
                        green and climate resilient agriculture; energy 
                        efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon 
                        transportation;
                    (B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane 
                and other non-CO<INF>2</INF> greenhouse gases;
                    (C) cooperate on addressing emissions from 
                international civil aviation and maritime activities;
                    (D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;
                    (E) implement the Paris Agreement that 
                significantly advances global climate ambition on 
                mitigation, adaptation, and support;
                    (F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and 
                local departments and agencies on climate action 
                related initiatives;
                    (G) provide resources, authorities and support for 
                enhancing United States ambition and commitment to 
                solving the climate crisis including climate action 
                specific assistance and multilateral fund 
                contributions; and
                    (H) integrate considerations for climate change 
                into broader United States foreign policy decision 
                making and the United States national security 
                apparatus.
    (c) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities, 
resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions--
            (1) to restore United States global leadership on 
        addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate 
        action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United 
        States foreign policy;
            (2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more 
        ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas 
        emission and improve developing countries' resilience and 
        adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
            (3) to ensure the United States maintains competitive 
        advantage over global strategic competitors in diplomacy and 
        new technological development;
            (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation 
        agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance 
        global clean energy innovation and other measures to mitigate 
        global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change 
        adaptation capacities;
            (5) to ensure that the United States national security 
        apparatus integrates critically important data on the 
        compounding effects that climate change is having on global 
        security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where, 
        and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions 
        in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other 
        drivers of insecurity; and
            (6) to authorize funding and programs to support a 
        reaffirmation of the United States commitments to international 
        cooperation and support for developing and vulnerable countries 
        to take climate action.
    (d) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
                    (A) renewable energy and related systems;
                    (B) energy production processes that emit zero 
                greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
                    (C) systems and processes that capture and 
                permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil 
                fuel production and electricity generation units; and
                    (D) products, processes, facilities, or systems 
                designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency 
                and electricity generated from electrical generation 
                units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power 
                production resources, or less feedstocks.
            (2) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means 
        enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
        strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced 
        impacts, including--
                    (A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
                    (B) integrating climate change measures into 
                national policies, strategies and planning; and
                    (C) improving education, awareness-raising, and 
                human and institutional capacity with respect to 
                climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact 
                reduction, and early warning.
            (3) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the 
        social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on 
        people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem 
        health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects 
        on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result 
        of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic 
        activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce 
        natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric 
        carbon.
            (4) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy'' 
        means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of 
        foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, 
        cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues 
        related to addressing global climate change, including--
                    (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas 
                emissions;
                    (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific 
                data and information on the cause and effects of 
                climate change;
                    (C) the security, social, economic, and political 
                instability risks associated with the effects of 
                climate change;
                    (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters 
                that are related to or associated with climate change 
                and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
                    (E) building resilience capacities and adapting to 
                the effects of change;
                    (F) sustainable land use and natural resource 
                conservation;
                    (G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to 
                the effects of climate change;
                    (H) just transition of carbon intense economies to 
                low or zero carbon economies and accounting for 
                laborers within affected economies;
                    (I) technological innovations that reduce or 
                eliminate carbon emissions; and
                    (J) clean energy and energy systems.
            (5) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means 
        the effects of climate change on--
                    (A) United States national security concerns and 
                subnational, national, and regional political 
                stability; and
                    (B) overseas security and conflict situations that 
                are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental 
                factors and events, including--
                            (i) the intensification and frequency of 
                        droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, 
                        and other extreme weather events;
                            (ii) changes in historical severe weather, 
                        drought, and wildfire patterns;
                            (iii) the expansion of geographical ranges 
                        of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions 
                        that had not regularly experienced such 
                        phenomena;
                            (iv) global sea level rise patterns and the 
                        expansion of geographical ranges affected by 
                        drought; and
                            (v) changes in marine environments that 
                        effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as 
                        the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the 
                        South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the 
                        Beaufort Sea.
            (6) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability 
        of human made and natural systems (including their component 
        parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover 
        from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient 
        manner, including through ensuring the preservation, 
        restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures 
        and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE 
              DISRUPTIONS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with other 
relevant agencies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of 
present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system, 
including--
            (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural 
        disasters;
            (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including 
        fresh water;
            (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
            (4) conditions that contribute to--
                    (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
                    (B) foreign political and economic instability;
                    (C) international migration of vulnerable and 
                underserved populations;
                    (D) the failure of national governments; and
                    (E) gender-based violence; and
            (5) United States and allied military readiness, 
        operations, and strategy.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted under 
subsection (a) are--
            (1) to support the practical application of scientific data 
        and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the 
        world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and 
        stability despite growing global environmental risks and 
        changes;
            (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission 
        execution of United States international development and 
        diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and 
        dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of 
        climate change;
            (3) to improve coordination between United States science 
        agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and 
        effects of climate change and United States national security 
        agencies;
            (4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of 
        global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous 
        communities, and other historically marginalized populations; 
        and
            (5) to inform the development of the climate security 
        strategy described in subsection (d).
    (c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks 
        associated with global, regional, and localized effects of 
        climate change; and
            (2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures 
        to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with 
        effects, including--
                    (A) sea level rise;
                    (B) freshwater resource scarcity;
                    (C) wildfires; and
                    (D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme 
                weather conditions and events, such as flooding, 
                drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical 
                cyclones.
    (d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the 
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
            (1) to inform the development and implementation of a 
        climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and 
        Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military 
        Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other 
        offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, 
        including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention 
        and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, 
        prevention, and assistance; and
            (2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, 
        budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and 
        actions--
                    (A) to account for the impacts of climate change to 
                global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food 
                production, fresh water and other critical natural 
                resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized 
                groups, and economic activity;
                    (B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, 
                security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United 
                States interests and non-defense assets abroad;
                    (C) to coordinate the integration of climate change 
                risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign 
                policy and security decision-making processes, 
                including awarding foreign assistance;
                    (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions 
                and countries that are--
                            (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate 
                        change; and
                            (ii) strategically significant to the 
                        United States;
                    (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign 
                countries to the effects of climate change as a means 
                of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
                    (F) to advance principles of good governance by 
                encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations 
                that are least capable of coping with the effects of 
                climate change--
                            (i) to conduct climate security 
                        evaluations; and
                            (ii) to facilitate the development of 
                        climate security action plans to ensure 
                        stability and public safety in disaster 
                        situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
                    (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 
                susceptibility, and resiliency of United States 
                interests and nondefense assets abroad;
                    (H) to build international institutional capacity 
                to address climate security implications and to advance 
                United States interests, regional stability, and global 
                security; and
                    (I) other activities that advance--
                            (i) the utilization and integration of 
                        climate science in national security planning; 
                        and
                            (ii) the clear understanding of how the 
                        effects of climate change can exacerbate 
                        security risks and threats.
    (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following 
20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other 
departments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
annex if necessary, that includes--
            (1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in 
        support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as--
                    (A) an assessment of the funding expended by 
                relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change and the legal, 
                procedural, and resource constraints faced by the 
                Department of State and the United States Agency for 
                International Development throughout respective 
                budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to 
                support the prevention of and response to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (B) current annual global assessments of emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
                    (C) recommendations to further strengthen United 
                States capabilities described in this section; and
                    (D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and 
                policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and 
                nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and 
                partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change;
            (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
                    (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 
                preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging 
                events exacerbated by climate change; and
                    (B) strengthening regional organizations; and
            (3) the implementation status of the recommendations 
        included in the review under paragraph (1).
    (f) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director 
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in his or her annual 
(or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a 
classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States 
national security--
            (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging 
        events exacerbated by climate change; and
            (2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries 
        and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by 
        climate change.

SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas 
        emissions and changes to the environment require global 
        cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding 
        other countries like the People's Republic of China accountable 
        for their actions and commitments to ensure a level playing 
        field with the United States, its allies, and partners;
            (2) other countries look towards the United States and 
        China, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies, 
        for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse 
        gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation 
        technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to 
        the inevitable effects of climate change;
            (3) given the volume of China's greenhouse gas emissions 
        and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global 
        greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050, 
        China should--
                    (A) revise its long-term pledge;
                    (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
                    (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
                significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050 
                reductions target; and
                    (D) update its nationally determined contribution 
                along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more 
                ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;
            (4) it is in the United States national interest to 
        emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral 
        engagement with China, as global climate risks cannot be 
        mitigated without a significant reduction in Chinese domestic 
        and overseas emissions;
            (5) the United States and China, to the extent practicable, 
        should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to 
        reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards 
        achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
            (6) the United States and its allies should work together, 
        using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold China accountable 
        for any failure by China--
                    (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally 
                determined contribution, in line with net zero 
                greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th 
                Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for 
                November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally 
                determined contribution;
                    (B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles, 
                goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;
                    (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or 
                devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying 
                framework, particularly within areas of accountability 
                transparency, and shared responsibility among all 
                parties;
                    (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects 
                from China's Belt and Road Initiative and other 
                overseas investments, including--
                            (i) working with allies and partners of the 
                        United States to eliminate support for coal 
                        power production projects in China's Belt and 
                        Road Initiative;
                            (ii) providing financing and project 
                        support for cleaner and less risky 
                        alternatives; and
                            (iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives'' 
                        to enhance capacity building programs and 
                        overseas sustainable investment criteria, 
                        including in areas such as integrated energy 
                        planning, power sector reform, just transition, 
                        distributed generation, procurement, 
                        transparency, and standards to support low-
                        emissions growth in developing countries; and
                    (E) to phase out existing coal power plants and 
                reduce net coal power production;
            (7) the United States should pursue confidence-building 
        opportunities for the United States and China to undertake 
        ``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research, development, 
        finance, and deployment, including through economic and 
        stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and 
        policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, 
        nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation, 
        which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a 
        global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;
            (8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives 
        to reduce global deforestation; and
            (9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific 
        cooperative exchanges and research that align with United 
        States interests and those of its international partners and 
        allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual 
        property rights, and preserve the values and human rights 
        interests of the American people.

SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT 
              AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner 
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing 
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to 
support investments in developing countries that--
            (1) support low carbon economic development; and
            (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental 
        changes and natural disasters.
    (b) Partnership Agreement.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek 
to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and 
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available 
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include 
clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects, 
environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.
    (c) Co-Financing of Infrastructure Projects.--
            (1) Authorization.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary 
        of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development and other relevant agency heads are 
        authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and 
        environmental adaptation projects that advance the development 
        objectives of the United States overseas and provide viable 
        alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included 
        within China's Belt and Road Initiative.
            (2) Conditions.--Co-financing arrangements authorized 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless--
                    (A) the projects to be financed--
                            (i) promote the public good;
                            (ii) promote United States national 
                        security or economic interests;
                            (iii) promote low carbon emissions, 
                        including clean energy renewable and nuclear 
                        energy projects; and
                            (iv) will have substantially lower 
                        environmental impact than the proposed Belt and 
                        Road Initiative alternative; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 
                days in advance of entering into such co-financing 
                arrangements.

SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
              ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

    (a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State shall 
prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States 
foreign policy by--
            (1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency 
        coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address 
        the climate crisis; and
            (2) improving coordination and integration of climate 
        action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
    (b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State, through 
the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
Environment and any other designees, shall--
            (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the 
        bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary 
        for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
            (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating 
        with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the 
        integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-
        cutting imperative across the Department of State;
            (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
                    (A) to assess how issues related to climate change 
                and United States climate action are integrated into 
                their operations and programs;
                    (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and 
                diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
                    (C) to make available the technical assistance and 
                resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant 
                expertise to provide technical assistance and expert 
                support to other bureaus within the Department of State 
                regarding climate action, clean energy development, and 
                climate diplomacy;
            (4) manage the integration of scientific data on the 
        current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied 
        strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and 
        regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the 
        Department of State's decision making processes;
            (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide 
        appropriate technical support and resources--
                    (A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and 
                their respective designees charged with addressing 
                climate change and associated issues;
                    (B) to United States diplomats advancing United 
                States foreign policy related to climate action; and
                    (C) for the appropriate engagement and integration 
                of relevant domestic agencies in international climate 
                change affairs, including United States participation 
                in multilateral fora; and
            (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the 
        Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related 
        foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas 
        mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global 
        climate security.
    (c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall 
ensure that all foreign missions are--
            (1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
            (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral 
        climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
            (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating 
        adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of 
        State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that--
            (1) assesses how climate action and United States climate 
        diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of 
        State; and
            (2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross 
        bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate 
        action and climate diplomacy.
    (e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions of Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and 
the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or 
undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries 
under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of 
State, as appropriate.
    (f) Climate Change Officers.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish and 
        staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall 
        serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission 
        or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
        Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The 
        Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic 
        mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to 
        paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff 
        to support such Officers.
            (2) Assignment.--Climate Change Officers shall be assigned 
        to the following posts:
                    (A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate, 
                consulates.
                    (B) United States diplomatic missions to, or 
                liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations, 
                including the United States diplomatic missions to the 
                European Union, African Union, Organization of American 
                States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate 
                regional organization, and the United Nations and its 
                relevant specialized agencies.
                    (C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.
            (3) Responsibilities.--Each Climate Change Officer shall--
                    (A) provide expertise on effective approaches to--
                            (i) mitigate the emission of gases which 
                        contribute to global climate change and 
                        formulate national and global plans for 
                        reducing such gross and net emissions; and
                            (ii) reduce the detrimental impacts 
                        attributable to global climate change, and 
                        adapt to such impacts;
                    (B) engage and convene, in a manner that is 
                equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and 
                organizations which represent a government office, a 
                nongovernmental organization, a social or political 
                movement, a private sector entity, an educational or 
                scientific institution, or any other entity concerned 
                with--
                            (i) global climate change; the emission of 
                        gases which contribute to global climate 
                        change; or
                            (ii) reducing the detrimental impacts 
                        attributable to global climate change;
                    (C) facilitate engagement by United States entities 
                in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate 
                change; and
                    (D) carry out such other responsibilities as the 
                Secretary may assign.
            (4) Responsibilities of under secretary.--The Under 
        Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of 
        the Department of State shall, including by acting through the 
        Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
        Affairs of the Department of State--
                    (A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change 
                Officers established under subsection (a);
                    (B) develop relations with, consult with, and 
                provide assistance to relevant individuals and 
                organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and 
                adapting to global climate change, or reducing the 
                emission of gases which contribute to global climate 
                change; and
                    (C) assist officers and employees of regional 
                bureaus of the Department of State to develop 
                strategies and programs to promote studying, 
                mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or 
                reducing the emission of gases which contribute to 
                global climate change.
    (g) Actions by Chiefs of Mission.--Each chief of mission in a 
foreign country shall--
            (1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or 
        equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote 
        actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and 
        adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of 
        gases which contribute to global climate change by--
                    (A) consulting and coordinating with and providing 
                support to relevant individuals and organizations, 
                including experts and other professionals and 
                stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and
                    (B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant 
                individuals and organizations relating to such 
                strategy;
            (2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders 
        of such country regarding progress to improve and increase 
        studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or 
        reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global 
        climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and 
        just in such country; and
            (3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the 
        maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate 
        change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the 
        environment were incorporated in activities, management, and 
        operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic 
        post under the director of the chief of mission.
    (h) Training.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish 
curriculum at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that 
supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in 
order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training 
with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 
change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global 
climate change. Such training shall include the following:
            (1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational 
        agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and 
        programs involved in the international commitments of the 
        United States regarding global climate change and the emission 
        of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science 
        of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and 
        adapting to global climate change.
            (2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to 
        global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which 
        contribute to global climate change that are equitable, 
        inclusive, and just.
            (3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral 
        agencies, international financial institutions, and the network 
        of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global 
        climate change.
            (4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and 
        methods of the entities specified in subsection (a)(3)(B).
    (i) Contracting.--Contracting and agreements officers of the 
Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel 
responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive 
training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for 
considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating 
impacts from climate change.
    (j) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 
report that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are 
assigned the role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to 
which they have been assigned, and the strategies developed by the 
chief of mission, as applicable.
    (k) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of State 
shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and 
other relevant departments and agencies toward contributing technical 
cooperation, engagement, development finance, or foreign assistance 
relevant to United States international climate action and in support 
of United States climate diplomacy.
    (l) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that climate 
diplomacy tools as described in this section are critical for 
demonstrating the commitment to include climate changes issues as core 
tenets of foreign policy priorities, as well as preserving the United 
States role as a global leader on climate change action.

SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE STRATEGY.

    (a) Amendment.--Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance 
        to programs and initiatives that--
                    ``(i) promote resilience among communities facing 
                harmful impacts from climate change; and
                    ``(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected 
                by climate change.
            ``(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a 
        Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year 
strategy, which shall be referred to as the `Global Climate Change 
Resilience Strategy', to mitigate the impacts of climate change on 
displacement and humanitarian emergencies.
    ``(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall--
            ``(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset 
        effects of events caused by climate change, consider the 
        effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the 
        key features of successful strategies to prevent such 
        conditions;
            ``(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral 
        approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;
            ``(C) promote our national security and economic interests 
        while leading international climate-related policymaking 
        efforts, on which the absence of United States leadership would 
        lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the nation's 
        global competitiveness;
            ``(D) promote international instruments on climate action 
        and other relevant international standards and best practices, 
        as such standards and practices develop, that serve the 
        interests of the American people and protect United States 
        environmental resources and the planet;
            ``(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such 
        international climate-related agreements, standards, and 
        practices by foreign states;
            ``(F) work with our allies and partners to ensure a level 
        playing field exists when it comes to climate action; to 
        encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar or even 
        greater commitments than the United States;
            ``(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership, 
        as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society, 
        local partners, and the affected communities, including 
        marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the 
        design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change 
        programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to 
        displacement;
            ``(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid 
        duplication of efforts, while ensuring that--
                    ``(i) the Department of State is responsible for--
                            ``(I) leading the Global Climate Change 
                        Resilience Strategy;
                            ``(II) establishing United States foreign 
                        policy;
                            ``(III) advancing diplomatic and political 
                        efforts; and
                            ``(IV) guiding security assistance and 
                        related civilian security efforts to mitigate 
                        climate change threats;
                    ``(ii) the United States Agency for International 
                Development is--
                            ``(I) responsible for overseeing programs 
                        to prevent the effects of events caused by 
                        climate change;
                            ``(II) the lead implementing agency for 
                        development and related nonsecurity program 
                        policy related to building resilience and 
                        achieving recovery; and
                            ``(III) responsible for providing overseas 
                        humanitarian assistance to respond to 
                        international and internal displacement caused 
                        by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit 
                        of durable solutions for climate-displaced 
                        persons; and
                    ``(iii) other Federal agencies support the 
                activities of the Department of State and the United 
                States Agency for International Development, as 
                appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
                State and the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development;
            ``(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to 
        achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of 
        existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;
            ``(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between 
        the United States, foreign governments, and international 
        organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, 
        regional organizations, and private sector organizations;
            ``(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships 
        and leverage private sector resources;
            ``(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for 
        monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the 
        Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;
            ``(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience 
        Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-
        specific;
            ``(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social 
        conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental 
        stressors from evolving into national security risks;
            ``(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the 
        Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
        Review; and
            ``(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable, 
        for international climate resilience in support of this Global 
        Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
    ``(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a 
report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in 
part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that 
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, 
if necessary.
    ``(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global 
Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal 
Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience 
Strategy.
    ``(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of 
the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the 
Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into 
department and agency policies, including the resources that have been 
allocated for such purpose.
    ``(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess--
            ``(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the 
        United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
        are--
                    ``(I) developing climate change risk assessments; 
                and
                    ``(II) providing guidance to missions on how to 
                include climate change risks in their integrated 
                country strategies;
            ``(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have 
        sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in 
        paragraph (2); and
            ``(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and 
        USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such 
        requirements.''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global 
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, 
              ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United 
        Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New 
        York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
            (2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term 
        ``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means 
        communities and populations that are at risk of substantial 
        adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to 
        respond to such effects, including women, impoverished 
        communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal 
        workers.
            (3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most 
        vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development, developing countries that are at risk of 
        substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited 
        capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches 
        included in any international treaties and agreements.
            (4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International 
        Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program 
        established pursuant to subsection (c).
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities 
for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional 
international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage 
private resources, in support of host country driven projects, 
planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of 
host countries--
            (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and 
        reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while 
        facilitating the transition in key global markets from 
        electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean 
        energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and 
        communities;
            (2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and 
        forecasted effects of climate change; and
            (3) to employ--
                    (A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate 
                desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
                from deforestation and forest degradation; and
                    (B) agricultural production practices that reduce 
                poverty while improving soil health, protecting water 
                quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
    (c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator 
of the United States Agency for International Development, shall 
establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate Change 
Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide bilateral 
and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects, 
and activities described in subsection (e).
    (d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under this 
section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other 
Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities 
that fit the characteristics of the Program.
    (e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure 
that the Program provides resources to developing countries, 
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such 
countries, to support the development and implementation of programs, 
projects, and activities that--
            (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration 
        and deployment of clean energy, including transmission, 
        distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while 
        facilitating the transition from electricity generated from 
        fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a 
        manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
            (2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread 
        deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester, 
        or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
            (3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility 
        of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and 
        development of transportation networks and land use practices 
        that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
            (4) support building capacities that may include--
                    (A) developing and implementing methodologies and 
                programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and 
                verifying emissions mitigation, including building 
                capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet 
                reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;
                    (B) assessing, developing, and implementing 
                technology and policy options for greenhouse gas 
                emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions, 
                including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation 
                strategies;
                    (C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory 
                authorities, planning agencies, and related 
                institutions in developing countries to improve the 
                deployment of clean energy technologies and practices, 
                including through increased transparency;
                    (D) training and instruction regarding the 
                installation and maintenance of renewable energy 
                technologies; and
                    (E) activities that support the development and 
                implementation of frameworks for intellectual property 
                rights in developing countries;
            (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and 
        adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate 
        change;
            (6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job 
        opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that 
        emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean 
        energy;
            (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience 
        capacities of communities to the effects of climate change, 
        including effects on--
                    (A) water availability;
                    (B) agricultural productivity and food security;
                    (C) flood risk;
                    (D) coastal resources;
                    (E) biodiversity;
                    (F) economic livelihoods;
                    (G) health and diseases;
                    (H) housing and shelter; and
                    (I) human migration;
            (8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the 
        environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness, 
        and growth strategies that take into account current and 
        forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
            (9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and 
        biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to 
        ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy 
        and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of 
        climate change such as extreme weather;
            (10) provide resources, information, scientific data and 
        modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance 
        to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the 
        effects of climate change;
            (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, 
        including through improvements to make critical infrastructure 
        less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
            (12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures, 
        including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures, 
        that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas 
        emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors 
        of developing countries;
            (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce 
        greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry 
        practices;
            (14) promote sustainable land use activities, including 
        supporting development planning, design, and construction with 
        respect to transportation systems and land use;
            (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that 
        mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and 
        water security of communities;
            (16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and 
        nongovernmental international development organizations to 
        assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities 
        that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives 
        described in subsection (b);
            (17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities 
        of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional 
        nationally determined contributions of those countries;
            (18) establish investment channels designed to leverage 
        private sector financing in--
                    (A) clean energy;
                    (B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource 
                management; and
                    (C) the transportation sector as described in 
                paragraph (3); and
            (19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
        extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth 
        opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural 
        carbon sinks.
    (f) Provision of Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Administrator of the United States 
        Agency for International Development, in consultation with 
        other departments and agencies, shall provide assistance under 
        the Program--
                    (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to 
                the requirements under subsection (g);
                    (B) to multilateral funds or international 
                institutions with programs for climate mitigation or 
                adaptation in developing countries consistent with the 
                policy described in subsection (e); or
                    (C) through a combination of the mechanisms 
                specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
            (2) Limitation.--
                    (A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds 
                or international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the 
                Administrator of the United States Agency for 
                International Development may provide up to 40 percent 
                of the assistance available to carry out the Program to 
                1 or more multilateral funds or international 
                institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph 
                (B).
                    (B) Multilateral fund or international institution 
                eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international 
                institution is eligible to receive assistance under 
                subparagraph (A)--
                            (i) if--
                                    (I) such fund or institution is 
                                established pursuant to--
                                            (aa) the Convention; or
                                            (bb) an agreement 
                                        negotiated under the 
                                        Convention; or
                                    (II) the assistance is directed to 
                                1 or more multilateral funds or 
                                international development institutions, 
                                pursuant to an agreement negotiated 
                                under the Convention; and
                            (ii) if such fund or institution--
                                    (I) specifies the terms and 
                                conditions under which the United 
                                States is to provide assistance to the 
                                fund or institution, and under which 
                                the fund or institution is to provide 
                                assistance to recipient countries; and
                                    (II) ensures that assistance from 
                                the United States to the fund or 
                                institution and the principal and 
                                income of the fund or institution are 
                                disbursed only--
                                            (aa) to support projects, 
                                        planning, policies, and 
                                        initiatives described in 
                                        subsection (b);
                                            (bb) consistent with the 
                                        policy described in subsection 
                                        (e); and
                                            (cc) in regular 
                                        consultation with relevant 
                                        governing bodies of the fund or 
                                        institution that--

                                                    (AA) include 
                                                representation from 
                                                countries among the 
                                                most vulnerable 
                                                developing countries; 
                                                and

                                                    (BB) provide public 
                                                access.

                    (C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of 
                State, the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development, or the Secretary of the 
                Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional 
                committees not later than 15 days before providing 
                assistance to a multilateral fund or international 
                institution under this subsection.
            (3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and 
        activities supported by assistance provided under this 
        subsection shall require consultations with local communities, 
        particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in 
        such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any 
        programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such 
        communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of 
        information, public participation, and consultation, including 
        full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable 
        communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local 
        communities.
    (g) Bilateral Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with 
        this subsection, the administrative authorities under the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall 
        apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same 
        extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the 
        implementation of such Act in order to provide the 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development with the authority to provide assistance to 
        countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries, 
        for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the 
        purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described 
        in subsection (e).
            (2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the 
        Administrator shall ensure that--
                    (A) the environmental impact of proposed programs, 
                projects, and activities is considered through adequate 
                consultation, public participation, and public 
                disclosure of relevant information; and
                    (B) programs, projects, and activities under this 
                subsection--
                            (i) avoid environmental degradation, to the 
                        maximum extent practicable; and
                            (ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent 
                        practicable, with broader development, poverty 
                        alleviation, or natural resource management 
                        objectives and initiatives in the recipient 
                        country.
            (3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to 
        ensure that--
                    (A) local communities, particularly the most 
                vulnerable communities and populations in areas in 
                which any programs, projects, or activities are carried 
                out under this subsection, are engaged in the design, 
                implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such 
                programs, projects, and activities through disclosure 
                of information, public participation, and consultation; 
                and
                    (B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable 
                communities and populations are addressed in national 
                or regional climate change adaptation plans developed 
                with USAID support.
            (4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country 
        receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator 
        shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure 
        of information to, local, national, and international 
        stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities 
        carried out under this subsection.
    (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.

SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND 
              HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.

    (a) Definition.--The term ``high-GWP HFC'' means newly manufactured 
hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential calculated over a 
100-year period of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
    (b) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to 
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent 
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate 
that each such body or conference--
            (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce 
        black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
            (2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources, 
        industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products 
        to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
        hydrofluorocarbons;
            (3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
                    (A) to increase production and distribution of 
                clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and 
                products that will replace sources of black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
                    (B) to develop action plans to mitigate black 
                carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons from 
                various private sector operations;
                    (C) to encourage best technology, methods, and 
                management practices for reducing black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
                    (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the 
                incremental costs associated with mitigating short-live 
                climate pollutants; and
                    (E) to grow economic opportunities and develop 
                markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon, 
                methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;
            (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory 
        authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to 
        investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions, 
        including--
                    (A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
                    (B) the implementation of policies requiring 
                industrial and agricultural best practices for 
                capturing or mitigating the release of methane from 
                extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
                    (C) climate assessment, scientific research, 
                monitoring, and technological development activities;
            (5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
        based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects 
        described in paragraph (4); and
            (6) engage international partners in an existing 
        multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an 
        international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve 
        global cooperation for--
                    (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating 
                efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
                hydrofluorocarbons;
                    (B) developing and implementing best practices for 
                phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-
                GWP hydrofluorocarbons, including expanding capacity 
                for innovative instruments to mitigate black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons at the 
                national and subnational levels of foreign countries, 
                particularly countries with little capacity to reduce 
                greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy 
                facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies 
                to advance such development;
                    (C) encouraging the development of standards and 
                practices, and increasing transparency and 
                accountability efforts for the reduction of black 
                carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
                    (D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems 
                into industrial processes;
                    (E) fostering research to improve scientific 
                understanding of--
                            (i) how high concentrations of black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
                        hydrofluorocarbons affect human health, safety, 
                        and our climate;
                            (ii) changes in the amount and regional 
                        concentrations of black carbon and methane 
                        emissions, based on scientific modeling and 
                        forecasting;
                            (iii) effective means to sequester black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
                        hydrofluorocarbons; and
                            (iv) other related areas of research the 
                        United States representatives deem necessary;
                    (F) encouraging the World Bank, the International 
                Monetary Fund, and other international finance 
                organizations--
                            (i) to prioritize efforts to combat black 
                        carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
                        hydrofluorocarbons; and
                            (ii) to enhance transparency by providing 
                        sufficient and adequate information to 
                        facilitate independent verification of their 
                        climate finance reporting;
                    (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council 
                (including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans 
                consistent with the findings and recommendations of the 
                Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon 
                and Methane;
                    (H) collaborating on technological advances in 
                short-lived climate pollutant mitigation, sequestration 
                and reduction technologies; and
                    (I) advising foreign countries, at both the 
                national and subnational levels, regarding the 
                development and execution of regulatory policies, 
                services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation 
                and the collection and safe management of black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
    (c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United 
States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
            (1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United 
        States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction 
        programs and strategies established by the Environmental 
        Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
            (2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign 
        partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the 
        Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build 
        partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign 
        countries and to support international efforts to reduce black 
        carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons and combat 
        climate change.
    (d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of 
Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a 
report to Congress that--
            (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new 
        international agreements, new targets within existing 
        international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the 
        creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally 
        black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons to 
        support the efforts described in subsection (b);
            (2) describes the provisions that could be included in such 
        agreements;
            (3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
            (4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and 
        Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016 
        North American Leaders' Summit; and
            (5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries 
        of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon 
        targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for 
        Action.
    (e) Consideration of Black Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP 
Hydrofluorocarbons in Negotiating International Agreements.--In 
negotiating any relevant international agreement with any country or 
countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall--
            (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
        hydrofluorocarbons are having on the increase in global average 
        temperatures and the resulting global climate change;
            (2) consider the effects that climate change is having on 
        the environment; and
            (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to 
        eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 
        hydrofluorocarbons from such country or countries.
    (f) Plan To Reduce Black Carbon Emissions From Ships.--Consistent 
with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions 
from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. 
The plan shall provide for such reduction through--
            (1) a clean freight partnership;
            (2) limits on black carbon emissions; and
            (3) efforts that include protection of access to critical 
        fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.
    (g) Establishment of Interagency Working Group on Short-Lived 
Climate Pollutant Mitigation.--
            (1) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
        of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task 
        force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Short-
        Lived Climate Pollutant Mitigation.
            (2) Membership.--The members of the Working Group shall 
        include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant 
        Federal agency.
            (3) Duties.--The Working Group shall--
                    (A) not later than 180 days after the date of 
                enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees a report that includes 
                specific plans of each relevant Federal agency;
                    (B) look for opportunities with other countries to 
                promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition 
                over time to equipment that uses safer and more 
                sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;
                    (C) review the policy recommendations made by--
                            (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
                        Change;
                            (ii) the United States Climate Alliance;
                            (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce 
                        Methane Emissions;
                            (iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness 
                        and Resilience;
                            (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
                            (vi) the International Maritime 
                        Organization; and
                            (vii) other relevant organizations and 
                        institutions; and
                    (D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon, 
                methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons that 
                incorporates any appropriate proposals or 
                recommendations made by the entities referred to in 
                subparagraph (C).

SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
              INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.

    (a) Green Climate Fund.--
            (1) Congress finds that--
                    (A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable 
                and disadvantaged communities in the United States and 
                around the world;
                    (B) it is the responsibility of the United States 
                Government to work with and press other countries to 
                address environmental justice and climate justice;
                    (C) the report of the United Nations Environment 
                Programme entitled ``Climate Change and the Cost of 
                Capital in Developing Countries'', dated May 2018, 
                found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of 
                the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20 
                nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate 
                change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest 
                payments alone;
                    (D) individuals and families, particularly 
                communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-
                income communities, that are on the frontlines of 
                climate change across the globe are often in close 
                proximity to environmental stressors or sources of 
                pollution;
                    (E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)--
                            (i) are often the first exposed to the 
                        causes and impacts of climate change; and
                            (ii) have the fewest resources with which 
                        to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;
                    (F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate 
                change must include specific protections for and 
                acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to 
                communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and 
                other frontline communities and marginalized peoples 
                around the world;
                    (G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to 
                the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
                Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark 
                agreement--
                            (i) to combat climate change;
                            (ii) to accelerate and intensify the 
                        actions and investments needed for a 
                        sustainable low carbon future; and
                            (iii) that acknowledges, ``Parties should, 
                        when taking action to address climate change, 
                        respect, promote and consider their respective 
                        obligations on human rights, the right to 
                        health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local 
                        communities, migrants, children, persons with 
                        disabilities and people in vulnerable 
                        situations and the right to development, as 
                        well as gender equality, empowerment of women 
                        and intergenerational equity'';
                    (H) the Paris Agreement--
                            (i) notes the importance of ``climate 
                        justice'' when mitigating and adapting to 
                        climate change; and
                            (ii) recognizes ``the need for an effective 
                        and progressive response to the urgent threat 
                        of climate change'';
                    (I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake 
                mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of 
                limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees 
                Celsius;
                    (J) developed countries have the greatest capacity 
                to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while--
                            (i) developing countries have the least 
                        capacity to engage in mitigation activities; 
                        and
                            (ii) the capacity of developing countries 
                        to engage in mitigation activities is less than 
                        the national mitigation potential of those 
                        developing countries;
                    (K) the determination for the fair share of 
                mitigation and adaptation activities for each country 
                must take into account--
                            (i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions 
                        of each country; and
                            (ii) the current capacity of each country 
                        to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and 
                        adapt to climate impacts;
                    (L) developed countries that have historically 
                emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse 
                gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of 
                those polluting activities, have a corresponding 
                disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in 
                global mitigation and adaptation activities, as 
                compared to less industrialized countries that have 
                historically polluted far less;
                    (M) the only realistic way for less industrialized 
                countries to meet their full mitigation potential is 
                through international climate financing by more 
                developed countries;
                    (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed 
                countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in 
                2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate 
                financing (as well as private investment and other 
                alternative forms of finance), for developing 
                countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 
                1/CP.21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
                Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;
                    (O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in 
                subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls 
                short of the actual financing needs for climate action 
                in developing countries;
                    (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that 
                the transition to renewable energy sources in 
                developing countries will require hundreds of billions 
                of dollars annually;
                    (Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has 
                estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate 
                change in developing countries may be as much as 
                $300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;
                    (R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by 
                194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism 
                to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse 
                gas emissions and adapt to climate change;
                    (S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework 
                Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green 
                Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris 
                Agreement, which states that ``developed country 
                Parties shall provide financial resources to assist 
                developing country Parties with respect to both 
                mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their 
                existing obligations under the Convention'';
                    (T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 
                institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate 
                Fund ensures--
                            (i) balanced governance between developed 
                        and developing countries;
                            (ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;
                            (iii) a balanced approach between 
                        mitigation and adaptation;
                            (iv) fair and equal labor and working 
                        conditions;
                            (v) conservation of biodiversity and 
                        critical habitats; and
                            (vi) strong environmental, social, and 
                        gender protections;
                    (U) the Green Climate Fund--
                            (i) promotes and protects human rights and 
                        the rights of marginalized groups, including 
                        indigenous peoples, women, children, and people 
                        with disabilities;
                            (ii) continues to take steps to strengthen 
                        protection for marginalized groups; and
                            (iii) the United States committed 
                        $3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000 
                        raised for the initial resource mobilization 
                        period of the Green Climate Fund, though only 
                        \1/3\ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the 
                        United States the only country to fall 
                        substantially short of a commitment of a 
                        country to the Green Climate Fund; and
                    (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational 
                and proven institution supporting well over 100 
                projects and programs in developing countries around 
                the world.
            (2) It is the policy of the United States to provide 
        climate financing--
                    (A) as an essential part of the global effort to 
                combat climate change; and
                    (B) that--
                            (i) upholds the principles of environmental 
                        justice and climate justice;
                            (ii) supports programs and projects 
                        developed by recipient countries and 
                        communities;
                            (iii) is designed and implemented with the 
                        free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous 
                        peoples and other impacted communities;
                            (iv) promotes gender equality as essential 
                        in all of the projects and programs supported 
                        by climate financing;
                            (v) includes best practices for 
                        environmental and social safeguards to ensure 
                        that projects and programs supported by climate 
                        financing respect fundamental human rights; and
                            (vi) addresses both mitigation and 
                        adaptation as essential aspects of responding 
                        to climate change.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $1,400,000,000 
for fiscal year 2022; $2,600,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; and 
$4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions required to keep the planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius 
of global warming are significantly greater than the amount of funds 
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a).
    (d) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Climate financing.--The term ``climate financing'' 
        means the transfer of new and additional public funds from 
        developed countries to developing countries for projects and 
        programs that--
                    (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;
                    (B) enhance and restore natural carbon 
                sequestration; and
                    (C) promote adaptation to climate change.
            (2) Green climate fund.--The term ``Green Climate Fund'' 
        means the independent, multilateral fund--
                    (A) established by parties to the United Nations 
                Framework Convention on Climate Change; and
                    (B) adopted by decision as part of the financial 
                mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
                Climate Change.
            (3) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means 
        the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of 
        Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
        Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.
                                 <all>
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