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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAXINE THORNE

(AC 43120)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Alexander, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of six counts of the crime of wilful failure to

pay sales tax, the defendant appealed to this court. Held:

1. There was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of

wilful failure to pay sales tax as charged in count four of the operative

information, the state having presented no evidence that the defendant

failed to pay the sales tax allegedly due on the date specified in that

count.

2. There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of

wilful failure to pay sales tax as charged in the remaining counts of the

operative information: the state presented sufficient evidence by which

the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,

as the person responsible to pay sales tax for her husband’s sole proprietorship, was a person who was required by law to pay sale taxes and

that she wilfully failed to do so; moreover, although the information

technically charged that the defendant wilfully failed to pay sales tax

as the owner of a different business entity, the name of the business

entity was not an essential element of the crime, the evidence proved

that the defendant wilfully failed to pay sales tax that was owed for the

sole proprietorship, and the defendant made no claim of variance at

trial, did not object to the admissibility of the evidence regarding the

sole proprietorship on the ground of variance and did not claim that

she was prejudiced in her defense and that substantial injustice had

been done because of the language in the information.

3. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the trial

court misled the jury by giving an improper jury instruction that diluted

the state’s burden of proof and weakened her presumption of innocence;

the defendant conceded that she waived her claim, and, contrary to her

contention, her conviction did not warrant reversal under the plain error

doctrine, as she failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the

court’s instruction misled the jury and affected the fairness and integrity

of and public confidence in the proceeding.

Argued February 8—officially released May 4, 2021

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

six counts of the crime of wilful failure to pay sales

tax, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Hartford and tried to the jury before Baio, J.; verdict

and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed in part; reversed in

part; judgment directed.

Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Linda F. Currie, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, executive

assistant state’s attorney, and Mirella Giambalvo,

senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. The defendant, Maxine Thorne,1

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after

a jury trial, of six counts of wilful failure to pay sales

tax in violation of General Statutes § 12-428 (1). On

appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and (2) the

trial court’s jury instruction substantially misled the

jury. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment

of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.

In October, 1999, Robert C. Thorne, the defendant’s

husband (husband), applied to the Department of Revenue Services (department) for a tax registration number

for his tree work and landscaping business as a sole

proprietorship. Sometime later, the defendant filed an

application for the organization of a domestic limited

liability company known as Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC, with the Secretary of the State and registered the LLC with the department. The defendant, however, did not register the LLC for sales tax remittance

as required. The sole proprietorship and the LLC were

being operated simultaneously. Andrea Closson, a

department tax enforcement special agent, testified, on

the basis of her training and experience, that a new

registration for sales tax remittance often is not filed

to avoid § 12-428 (1) responsibilities2 and to avoid paying taxes.

In March, 2012, the defendant and her husband

opened a business checking account at Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The couple completed a four

page application, stating that the name on the account

was ‘‘Robert Thorne [doing business as] Bob Thorne

Tree & Landscaping,’’ the name of the business was

‘‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping,’’ the type of business

was ‘‘[s]ole [p]roprietor,’’ and the date the business

originally was established was May 8, 2008. The defendant and her husband were the authorized signatories

on the account, and their signatures appear on the application. The husband was listed as the ‘‘[o]wner/[k]ey

[i]ndividual.’’ Thereafter, the defendant entered information pertaining to the Wells Fargo account into the

department’s taxpayer service center account that she

had created for the sole proprietorship. The tax payments that were made to the department were drawn

on checks from the Wells Fargo account.3

On or about April 16, 2016, the defendant filed five

untimely sales and use tax returns with the department,

identifying the business entity as ‘‘Robert Thorne.’’ She

signed the returns as the owner. The documents filed

by the defendant identified five periods for which sales

tax was owed,4 but the department never received payment of the taxes.
In January, 2017, Closson was assigned to investigate

the sole proprietorship of Robert Thorne. During her

investigation, Closson reviewed multiple sales tax

returns that the defendant had signed as the owner of

the business known as ‘‘Robert Thorne.’’ On October

3, 2017, Closson and David Stephens, a department tax

enforcement special agent, visited the defendant and

her husband at their home. At that time, Closson asked

the couple who was responsible for paying taxes on

behalf of the business. The defendant’s husband pointed

to the defendant and stated, ‘‘She is.’’ The defendant

remained silent but did not deny her husband’s representation. The defendant stated to Closson and Stephens that her husband’s original business was closed

and that she had registered a new business entity called

Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC, with the department.

On the basis of her subsequent investigation, Closson

determined that the original business had never been

closed and that the new business called Bob Thorne

Tree & Landscaping, LLC, was not registered with the

department to pay sales tax. Closson consulted the website for the department taxpayer service center and

learned that the defendant was the administrator for

the business known as ‘‘Robert C. Thorne.’’ The website

also contained information regarding the Wells Fargo

account. Closson subpoenaed the financial records for

the Wells Fargo account. Pursuant to her investigation,

Closson concluded that the defendant was the person

responsible for paying the sales tax for the business

known as Robert C. Thorne.

On or about March 1, 2018, the defendant was

arrested pursuant to a warrant. In a six count, amended

long form information (information), the state accused

the defendant of wilfully having failed to pay state sales

tax for six periods in 2015 in violation of § 12-428 (1).5

The charges against the defendant were tried to a jury

in April, 2019. During the trial, Stephens testified that

the person responsible for paying state sales tax ‘‘is

any individual who has a duty and is required by law

to file Connecticut tax returns and pay the tax due,’’

somebody who is financially responsible for the business and who acts like a registered owner in the business. Closson testified that she had determined that the

defendant was the financially responsible party for the

business Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC, and for

the sole proprietorship of Robert Thorne. She made

that determination on the basis of statements made by

the defendant’s husband and the defendant’s having

signed the Wells Fargo checks sent to the department.

The defendant also had signed the sales tax returns

as owner, and she is named the administrator on the

taxpayer service center account.

In its closing argument, the state argued that the case

was about the defendant’s ‘‘trying to get out of paying
sales taxes for the business Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping.’’ The state urged the jury to find that the defendant was the person responsible for paying sales tax

for her husband’s business and that she had failed to

do so. In her closing argument, the defendant stated

that she was not ‘‘responsible for anything’’ and that

‘‘no one was there to verify it was actually even [her]

signature.’’ The jury found the defendant guilty of each

of the six counts of wilful failure to pay sales tax as

charged.

On May 6, 2019, the court sentenced the defendant on

each of the six counts to four months of incarceration,

execution suspended, and two years of probation. The

four month sentences were to be served consecutively

for a total effective sentence of two years of incarceration, execution suspended, followed by two years of

probation. As a special condition of probation, the court

ordered the defendant to make restitution in the amount

of $4221 within the first fifteen months of probation.

Following sentencing, the defendant appealed.

I

The defendant first claims that the state presented

insufficient evidence to support her conviction of wilful

failure to pay sales tax in violation of § 12-428 (1) as

charged in the information. We disagree that there was

insufficient evidence to convict the defendant as

charged in counts one, two, three, five, and six of the

information. We, however, agree that there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant as charged in

count four. In count four of the information, the state

charged the defendant with failure to pay sales tax due

on August 31, 2015. On appeal, the defendant claims

that the state presented no evidence that she failed to

pay sales tax due on August 31, 2015. Our review of

the record supports the defendant’s claim, and the state

concedes that it failed to present any evidence with

respect to count four. We, therefore, reverse the defendant’s conviction as to count four and remand the case

to the trial court with direction to render a judgment

of acquittal as to that count and to resentence the defendant.

In the remaining counts of the information, the state

charged that ‘‘as required by law as the registered owner

of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’ to

pay any tax, [the defendant] wilfully failed to pay such

tax at the time required by law’’ in violation of § 12-

428 (1). The defendant argues on appeal that the state

introduced fourteen documents into evidence, all of

which concerned the business known as ‘‘Robert

Thorne, sole proprietor, or Robert Thorne [doing business as] Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping,’’6 but that it

introduced no evidence with regard to sales tax owed

by the business Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC.

The defendant, therefore, claims that there was insufficient evidence by which the jury reasonably and logi-
cally could have found that she wilfully failed to pay

sales tax as charged.

In response, the state argues that the defendant had

sufficient notice of the crimes against which she had

to defend regardless of any variance between the information, i.e., the inclusion of LLC, and the evidence

adduced at trial that concerned the sole proprietorship

as the business entity for which she had a duty to pay

sales tax. Significantly, the state notes that the defendant does not claim that the evidence did not establish

that she was the person responsible for paying the sales

tax due on behalf of the sole proprietorship or ‘‘Robert

Thorne [doing business as] Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping.’’ We agree with the state.

It is well known that a defendant ‘‘who asserts an

insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an arduous

burden.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Leandry, 161 Conn. App. 379, 383, 127 A.3d 1115, cert.

denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015). When

reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate

court applies a two part test. See, e.g., State v. Juarez,

179 Conn. App. 588, 595, 180 A.3d 1015 (2018), cert.

denied, 331 Conn. 910, 203 A.3d 1245 (2019). ‘‘We first

review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in

the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . .

[Second, we] . . . determine whether the jury could

have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established

and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that

the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In this process of

review, it does not diminish the probative force of the

evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence

that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . The issue

is whether the cumulative effect of the evidence was

sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond

a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty

of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and

inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not

be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic

fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to

consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether

the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the

defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged

beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Daniel B., 164 Conn. App. 318, 326,

137 A.3d 837 (2016), aff’d, 331 Conn. 1, 201 A.3d 989

(2019). An appellate court defers to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their

firsthand observation of their conduct. State v. Juarez,

supra, 179 Conn. App. 596.

Section 12-428 (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any
person required under this chapter to pay any tax . . .

who wilfully fails to pay such tax . . . at the time

required by law, shall, in addition to any other penalty

provided by law, be fined not more than one thousand

dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

. . . As used in this section ‘person’ includes any officer

or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee

of a partnership under a duty to pay such tax . . . .’’7

Section 12-428 (1) required the state to prove that the

defendant was a person required by law to pay state

sales tax and that she wilfully failed to do so. The statute

does not require the state to prove the name of the

entity owing the sales tax.

There are certain fundamental principles applicable

to the statutory construction of tax statutes. ‘‘[W]hen

the issue is the imposition of a tax, rather than a claimed

right to an exemption or a deduction, the governing

authorities must be strictly construed against the

[C]ommissioner [of Revenue Services] and in favor of

the tax payer. . . . [S]tatutes establishing the procedure for the collection of taxes, including statutes

enacted to prevent tax frauds, [however] are given a

liberal, rather than strict, construction.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leonard v.

Commissioner of Revenue Services, 264 Conn. 286, 295,

823 A.2d 1184 (2003).

In the relevant counts of the information, the state

alleged that, on a date certain, the defendant was

required by law as the registered owner of ‘‘Bob Thorne

Tree & Landscaping, LLC,’’ to pay any tax and wilfully

failed to do so. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

‘‘[G]enerally speaking, the state is limited to proving

that the defendant has committed the offense in substantially the manner described in the information. . . .

Despite this general principle, however, both this court

and our Supreme Court have made clear that [t]he inclusion in the state’s pleading of additional details concerning the offense does not make such allegations essential

elements of the crime, upon which the jury must be

instructed. . . . Our case law makes clear that the

requirement that the state be limited to proving an

offense in substantially the manner described in the

information is meant to assure that the defendant is

provided with sufficient notice of the crimes against

which [she] must defend. As long as this notice requirement is satisfied, however, the inclusion of additional

details in the charge does not place on the state the

obligation to prove more than the essential elements

of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Vere C., 152 Conn. App. 486,

527, 98 A.3d 884, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 944, 102 A.3d

116 (2014).

At its core, the defendant’s claim is not one of insufficient evidence but, rather, one of variance. See State

v. Rafanello, 151 Conn. 453, 456, 199 A.2d 13 (1964).
That is, that, although the information charged that the

defendant wilfully failed to pay sales tax as the owner of

‘‘ ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC,’ ’’ the evidence

proved that she wilfully failed to pay sales tax that was

owed for the sole proprietorship. The defendant made

no claim of variance at trial, and she did not object to

the admissibility of any of the evidence regarding the

sole proprietorship on the ground of variance. In the

absence of a ‘‘showing of substantial injustice,’’ we do

not entertain claims not advanced at trial. State v. Rafanello, supra, 456–57. The proper way for the defendant

to have asserted such a claim at trial would have been

by a timely objection to the evidence offered. See id.,

457. If the defendant had suggested the variance at trial

and the trial court found it to exist, it would not have

been a ground for acquittal but would have permitted

the state to amend the information as needed to make

it conform to the evidence.8 See id.

‘‘When the state’s pleadings have informed the defendant of the charge against [her] with sufficient precision

to enable [her] to prepare [her] defense and to avoid

prejudicial surprise, and were definite enough to enable

[her] to plead to [her] acquittal or conviction in bar of

any further prosecution for the same offense, they have

performed their constitutional duty. . . . The inclusion

in the state’s pleading of additional details concerning

the offense does not make such allegations essential

elements of the crime, upon which the jury must be

instructed.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Morrill, 197 Conn. 507, 551,

498 A.2d 76 (1985); id., 552 (location of murder not

essential element of crime); see also State v. Sharpe,

195 Conn. 651, 667, 491 A.2d 345 (1985) (deadly weapon

element did not require court to instruct jury that crime

could only be committed with pistol); State v. Sam, 98

Conn. App. 13, 37–38, 907 A.2d 99 (state need not prove

knife was dangerous instrument used to commit crime),

cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944, 912 A.2d 478 (2006). In the

present case, the name of the business entity was not

an essential element of the crime of wilful failure to

pay sales tax pursuant to § 12-428 (1).

Furthermore, the defendant cannot prevail on her

claim without demonstrating that she was in fact prejudiced in her defense on the merits and that substantial

injustice has been done on the basis of the language in

the information. See Practice Book § 36-18; State v.

Rafanello, supra, 151 Conn. 457. The defendant has

made no such claim; she knew that she was being prosecuted for failure to pay sales tax for her husband’s tree

and landscaping business, regardless of its technical

name.

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that there was sufficient evidence by which the jury

could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, as the person responsible to pay sales tax for the
tree service business, was a person who was required

by law to pay sales tax and that she wilfully failed to

do so. The defendant’s claim therefore fails.

II

The defendant also claims that the court misled the

jury by giving an improper instruction that diluted the

state’s burden of proof and weakened the defendant’s

presumption of innocence. The state contends that the

claim is not reviewable because the defendant waived

it by failing to submit a written request to charge or to

take an exception to the charge given by the court. In

her appellate brief, the defendant acknowledges that

she did not preserve her claim for appellate review but

argues that her claim is reviewable pursuant to the plain

error doctrine. We disagree with the defendant.

Practice Book § 42-16 provides in relevant part that

‘‘[a]n appellate court shall not be bound to consider

error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request

to charge or exception has been taken by the party

appealing immediately after the charge is delivered

. . . .’’

‘‘[W]hen the trial court provides [the parties] with a

copy of the proposed jury instructions, allows a meaningful opportunity for their review, solicits comments

. . . regarding changes or modifications and [the defendant] affirmatively accepts the instructions proposed

or given, the defendant may be deemed to have knowledge of any potential flaws therein and to have waived

implicitly the constitutional right to challenge the

instructions on direct appeal. Such a determination by

the reviewing court must be based on a close examination of the record and the particular facts and circumstances of each case.’’ State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447,

482–83, 10 A.3d 942 (2011).

The record in the present case discloses that the trial

court provided the defendant and the state with a copy

of its proposed charge and the next day solicited comments regarding it. The court agreed to make several

changes to its charge and provided copies of the revised

charge to the defendant and the state. The next day,

the court reviewed the revised charge page by page

with the defendant and the state. The defendant did

not object to the proposed charge. The court further

canvassed the defendant as follows:

‘‘The Court: You have no objections to anything that

has been included in the charge?

‘‘The Defendant: No.

‘‘The Court: You’re not asking that anything be

removed from the charge?

‘‘The Defendant: No.

‘‘The Court: Are you asking that anything be added
to the charge?

‘‘The Defendant: No.

‘‘The Court: Are you taking any exception to the

charge at all?

‘‘The Defendant: No.’’

On the basis of this record, we conclude that the

defendant waived the right to challenge the court’s

instruction on appeal.9

The defendant, however, posits that a Kitchens

waiver does not foreclose claims of plain error. See

State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812, 155 A.3d 209

(2017). Although that is a correct statement of the law,

the plain error exception to the Kitchens waiver rule

is inapplicable in the present case. ‘‘An appellate court

addressing a claim of plain error first must determine

if the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent

[or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually accurate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not

debatable. . . . This determination clearly requires a

review of the plain error claim presented in the light

of the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘The plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of error is so

obvious that it effects the fairness and integrity of and

public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘[I]n addition to examining the patent nature of the

error, the reviewing court must examine that error for

the grievousness of its consequences in order to determine whether reversal under the plain error doctrine

is appropriate. A party cannot prevail under plain error

unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief

will result in manifest injustice. . . . [Previously], we

described the two-pronged nature of the plain error

doctrine: [An appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain

error doctrine] . . . unless [she] demonstrates that the

claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a

failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest

injustice.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

In the present case, the defendant claims that the

court’s charge was improper because the court did not

make clear that (1) she, (2) ‘‘Robert Thorne, sole proprietor, or Robert Thorne [doing business as] Bob Thorne

Tree & Landscaping,’’ and (3) Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC, are three distinct legal entities. Or stated

differently, the court did not instruct the jury as to

the legal distinctions between an individual conducting

business under his own name, an individual conducting

business under an assumed name, e.g., ‘‘doing business

as,’’ and an LLC conducting business under its legal

name. The defendant claims that it was important for

the jury to know the legal distinctions because the information charged the defendant with failing to pay sales
tax as required by law as the registered owner of the

business ‘‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC.’’ The

defendant, however, has not explained why the legal

distinction is relevant in this particular case. The issue

for the jury to decide was whether the defendant was

the person responsible for paying the sales tax, regardless of the name of the business.

As we explained in part I of this opinion, the name

of the business that owed sales tax was not an essential

element of the crime of wilful failure to pay any tax

required by law. An information that includes additional

details concerning an offense does not make such allegations an essential element of the crime. See State v.

Sam, supra, 98 Conn. App. 38.

In the present case, the court instructed the jury in

relevant part as follows: ‘‘The first element that the

state must prove is that the defendant was a person

required to pay sales tax under the statute. Under our

law, any person who makes retail sales, as defined by

our statutes, is required to pay sales tax. Person is

defined in pertinent part as any individual, firm, [or]

limited liability company . . . under a duty to pay such

tax. Sales, as defined by our statutes, includes the rendering of certain services for a consideration . . .

includ[ing] landscaping and horticultural services.

Therefore, in order to find that the state’s burden of

proof has been satisfied as to this element, the state

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a person who was required to pay sales tax

under the law.’’

The defendant has failed to explain why the legal

distinction between various business entities was relevant to the jury’s determining whether she, who identified herself to the department as the owner of the tree

and landscaping business, had a duty to pay sales tax.

The defendant, therefore, has failed to carry her burden

to demonstrate that the court’s instruction misled the

jury and that the instruction affected the fairness and

integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction of wilful failure to pay sales tax does not warrant

reversal pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the defendant’s conviction of wilful failure to pay sales tax as

charged in count four and the case is remanded with

direction to render judgment of acquittal on that charge

only and to resentence the defendant on the remaining

charges; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant represented herself at trial but was represented by counsel

on appeal.

2 General Statutes § 12-428 (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

required under this chapter to pay any tax, or required under this chapter

or by regulations thereunder to make a return, keep any record or supply

any information, who wilfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep

such records or supply such information, at the time required by law, shall,
in addition to any other penalty provided by law, be fined not more than

one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both. . . .’’

3 Copies of the Wells Fargo account application and checks and a screen

shot of the taxpayer service center account were placed into evidence at trial.

4 The tax returns at issue documented sales taxes owed for the following

periods: (1) April, 2015, $641 due by May 31, 2015; (2) May, 2015, $846 due

by June 30, 2015; (3) June, 2015, $256 due by July 31, 2015; (4) September,

2015, $569 due by October 31, 2015; and (5) October, 2015, $733 due by

November 30, 2015. Copies of the tax returns were placed into evidence

at trial.

5 On March 29, 2019, the senior assistant state’s attorney accused the

defendant in the information as follows:

‘‘Count one . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about May 31, 2015 . . . as required by law as the

registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’ . . . .

‘‘Count two . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about June 30, 2015 . . . as required by law as the

registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’ . . . .

‘‘Count three . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about July 31, 2015 . . . as required by law as the

registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’ . . . .

‘‘Count four . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about August 31, 2015 . . . as required by law as the

registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’ . . . .

‘‘Count five . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about October 31, 2015 . . . as required by law as the

registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’. . . .

‘‘Count six . . . wilful failure to pay sales tax in violation of [§] 12-428

(1) . . . [due] on or about November 30, 2015 . . . as required by law as

the registered owner of business ‘Bob Thorne Tree & Landscaping, LLC’

. . . . ’’

6 The defendant did not object to any of the documents the state placed

into evidence at trial.

7 General Statutes § 12-407 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever used

in this chapter . . . (2) ‘Sale’ and ‘selling’ mean and include . . . (I) The

rendering of certain services, as defined in subdivision (37) of this subsection

. . . (12) ‘Retailer’ includes . . . (D) Every seller rendering any service

described in subdivision (2) of this subsection . . . [and] (37) ‘Services’ for

purposes of subdivision (2) of this subsection, means . . . (V) Landscaping

and horticulture services . . . .’’

8 Pursuant to Practice Book § 36-18, ‘‘[a]fter commencement of the trial

for good cause shown, the judicial authority may permit the prosecuting

authority to amend the information at any time before a verdict or finding

if no additional or different offense is charged and no substantive rights of

the defendant would be prejudiced.’’

9

‘‘[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous

of [self-represented parties] and when it does not interfere with the rights

of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the

[self-represented] party. . . . Although we allow [self-represented parties]

some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license

not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 117 Conn. App. 747, 755, 982

A.2d 187 (2009). Consequently, ‘‘[w]hen a defendant elects to proceed without the benefit of counsel, [she] takes the risk that because of [her] inexperience and lack of knowledge [of the law], [she] will suffer disadvantages to

which, with proper representation, [she] would not be subject.’’ State v. Lo

Sacco, 12 Conn. App. 481, 496, 531 A.2d 184, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 814,

533 A.2d 568 (1987).