COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Lemons 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

PATRICIA D. HILLSMAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1658-98-4 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 DECEMBER 7, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

 James W. Hundley (Briglia & Hundley, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Patricia D. Hillsman (appellant) appeals from her bench 

trial conviction for two counts of embezzling property valued at 

more than $200. On appeal, she contends the evidence was 

insufficient to prove (1) that she wrongfully converted property 

to her own use and (2) that the value of the embezzled property 

was greater than $200. We hold the evidence on both these 

elements was sufficient to support her convictions, and we 

affirm. 

 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine 

the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court will be 

disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. See id. The credibility of a witness, the weight accorded 

the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts 

are matters to be determined by the fact finder. See Long v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 A conviction for embezzlement under Code § 18.2-111 

requires proof "that the accused wrongfully appropriated to her 

use or benefit, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner 

thereof, . . . property entrusted to her by virtue of her 

employment or office." Waymack v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 547, 

549, 358 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1987); see Code § 18.2-111. 

Embezzlement is punishable as grand larceny if the value of the 

property wrongfully appropriated exceeds $200. See Code 

§ 18.2-111; see also Code §§ 18.2-95, 18.2-96. The value of the 

stolen property is measured as of the time of the theft, and the 

original purchase price may be admitted as evidence of its 

current value. See Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705, 284 

S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981). 

While proof that property entrusted to the 

possession of the accused has been 

misappropriated is not enough, standing 

alone, to prove that the accused was the 

embezzler, where . . . there is additional 

evidence, sufficient to show that the 

accused acted with the requisite criminal 

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intent and that his conduct was designed to 

conceal his criminal purpose, we will uphold 

a finding that the accused was the criminal 

agent. 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 646, 652, 283 S.E.2d 209, 212 

(1981). 

 Intent may, and usually must, be proven by circumstantial 

evidence, see Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 

S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988), such as a person's conduct and 

statements, see Long, 8 Va. App. at 198, 379 S.E.2d at 476. 

"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as 

much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 

864, 876 (1983). "[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, 

not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant." 

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 

29 (1993). 

 Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, established that appellant "wrongfully 

appropriated to her use or benefit, with the intent to 

permanently deprive the owner thereof, . . . property entrusted 

to her by virtue of her employment or office." Waymack, 4 Va. 

App. at 549, 358 S.E.2d at 766. Appellant was responsible for 

ordering office supplies for her five-person branch of the 

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Fairfax County Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and 

for tracking orders for such supplies made by the department as 

a whole. Between March 10 and May 12, 1997--covered by the 

indictment alleging embezzlement between January 1 and May 31, 

1997--appellant ordered 299 inkjet printer cartridges. Between 

June 10 and August 15, 1997--covered by the indictment alleging 

embezzlement between June 1 and September 30, 1997--appellant 

ordered 210 inkjet printer cartridges. The uncontroverted 

evidence established that these orders were prepared and placed 

by appellant and, in all cases except one, that the cartridges 

were received by appellant upon their delivery to her location 

code, EJ26L. Although office policy required the authorizing 

signature of Leora Motley or Needham Kelly on purchase orders 

for office supplies, the uncontroverted evidence established 

that appellant did not obtain authorization for any of these 

orders. 

 On one occasion, appellant improperly added an order for 

sixty printer cartridges to a purchase order already prepared by 

Joyce Murphy and authorized by Needham Kelly. She also altered 

the delivery location code to have the cartridges delivered to 

her rather than to Murphy. On five other occasions, appellant 

placed orders in the names of other employees, but all the 

orders requested delivery to appellant's location and were 

signed for by appellant, and the employees whose names appeared 

on the orders denied requesting or receiving the ordered 

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cartridges. The only reasonable hypothesis flowing from this 

evidence is that appellant "acted with the requisite criminal 

intent and that [her] conduct was designed to conceal [her] 

criminal purpose." Smith, 222 Va. at 652, 283 S.E.2d at 212. 

 Additional circumstantial evidence established that 

appellant's orders constituted embezzlement. In the period of 

approximately five months between March 10 and August 15, 1997, 

appellant personally ordered, without authorization, at least 

509 inkjet printer cartridges. In the six-and-one-half months 

after she was terminated, her branch ordered only thirteen such 

cartridges. During the period of time covered by the 

indictments, it was not unusual for appellant to leave the 

office with supplies, ostensibly to distribute them to other DEM 

employees who had ordered them. However, given evidence that 

appellant placed all these orders without authorization and 

placed several of the orders in the names of employees who did 

not request the listed supplies, the fact finder could infer 

that appellant took advantage of this opportunity to remove the 

cartridges from DEM's premises. 

 The evidence also establishes that the inkjet cartridges 

appellant embezzled were valued at more than $200 for the period 

covered by each indictment. It remains a possibility that at 

least a portion of the 509 printer cartridges appellant ordered 

remained on the premises and were used by DEM for legitimate 

business purposes. However, the evidence establishes that the 

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financial management branch never kept more than about a dozen 

inkjet cartridges on hand at any one time and that it ordered 

only thirteen cartridges in the six months following appellant's 

termination. Therefore, the branch's usage for a period of 

about six months did not exceed twenty-five cartridges, the 

total of the thirteen cartridges ordered and the twelve on hand. 

Subtracting twenty-five cartridges from both the 299 appellant 

ordered between March 10 and May 12, 1997, and the 210 appellant 

ordered between June 10 and August 15, 1997, leaves a total of 

274 and 185 cartridges, respectively. 

 Using a price of $22.23 per cartridge, the lowest price per 

unit paid by DEM for an inkjet cartridge during the relevant 

period, the approximate value of the cartridges appellant 

embezzled was $6,091.02 during the period of the first 

indictment and $4,112.55 during the period of the second 

indictment.1 Although the exact value of the cartridges 

embezzled may not be ascertainable, under any reasonable 

calculation, the evidence of value fully supported the 

convictions for embezzlement of property valued at more than 

$200. 

 For these reasons, we hold the evidence was sufficient to 

prove appellant embezzled more than $200 worth of property 

 1

 Even using the lowest estimated street value of $8 per 

cartridge, the approximate value of the cartridges appellant 

embezzled was $2,192 during the period of the first indictment 

and $1,480 during the period of the second indictment. 

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during each of the two periods covered by the indictments, and 

we affirm appellant's convictions. 

Affirmed.

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