J-A31017-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SCOTT DAVID GRANT

Appellant No. 2101 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004066-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2015

Scott David Grant appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on 

July 30, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, made 

final by the denial of post-sentence motions on October 24, 2013. On March 

13, 2013, a jury convicted Grant of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 

(“IDSI”) (unconscious or unaware person), corruption of minors, and 

furnishing alcohol to minors.1 The court sentenced Grant and an aggregate 

term of seven-and-a-half to 15 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Grant 

raises the following three issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to 

suppress certain statements made by Grant to the police because those 

statements were given during a custodial detention; (2) there was 

____________________________________________

1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(3), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 6310.1, respectively.
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insufficient evidence to support his IDSI and corruption of minors 

convictions; and (3) the court erred in refusing to include Pennsylvania 

Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 3.04(D) in its instructions to the jury 

on voluntariness.2 After a thorough review of the submissions by the 

parties, the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence.

The facts and procedural history are as follows. On April 28, 2012, 

Grant invited four teenagers over to his apartment, one male and three 

females, including the female victim, M.M.3 He plied them with alcohol, 

prescription drugs, and marijuana. While the teenage male left at some 

point during the night, the girls all slept over at the apartment because they 

were concerned about their level of intoxication. Subsequently, M.M. woke 

up during the early morning hours and found Grant, shirtless and sweating, 

positioned with his body over her body on the bed. N.T., 3/12/2013, at 152. 

She testified she pushed him back, and asked “what was going on and what 

he had done.” Id. at 153-154. M.M. stated that Grant said “he ate [her] 

pussy.” Id. at 154. The victim also noticed that she was no longer wearing 

____________________________________________

2

 We have reordered the issues based on the nature of the claims.

3

 We note that the full names of the minors appear in the certified record; 

however, we will refer to these individuals by their initials in our discussion. 

The male is B.E., and the two female friends are K.W. and M.P.
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a pair of sweatpants, which she recalled she had on when she went to sleep 

in Grant’s bed that night. Id. at 151-152.

The victim subsequently reported the incident to police. On June 28, 

2012, Detective Kenneth E. Lockhart, Jr., went to Grant’s apartment to 

interview him. Grant gave a statement, pre-Miranda4 warnings, in which he 

admitting to sexually assaulting M.M. The detective then decided to formally 

document the interview. He read Grant his Miranda rights, which Grant 

waived. The second interview, which was substantially similar to the first, 

was audio-recorded, and Grant signed an authentication of the recorded 

statement form, indicating that he willingly and voluntarily provided his 

recorded statement to the police. 

Grant was subsequently charged with numerous offenses related to 

the incident. On December 19, 2012, he filed a pre-trial motion to suppress 

the incriminating statements he made to Detective Lockhart. A hearing was 

held on March 7, 2013. At that time, the court denied the motion. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial on March 11, 2013. Grant’s defense 

was that he never provided the teenagers with alcohol and drugs, and he 

was merely joking when he made the comment about inappropriately 

touching the victim. He also claimed that his Miranda waiver was 

involuntary, and that he made the incriminating statements because he had 

____________________________________________

4

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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just woke from a nap, was under the influence of prescription medications, 

and he simply wanted the police to leave him alone. Two days later, the 

jury found Grant guilty of IDSI, corruption of minors, and furnishing alcohol 

to minors. Sentencing was deferred for the Sexual Offender Assessment 

Board (“SOAB”) to complete an assessment of Grant, as well as for a 

presentence investigation report to be completed. Subsequently, the SOAB 

conducted an examination and determined that Grant did not meet the 

criteria of a sexually violent predator.

On July 30, 2013, the court imposed a sentence of seven and half to 

15 years’ incarceration for the IDSI conviction, and a concurrent term of six 

months to seven years for the corruption of minors offense. The court also 

imposed a concurrent term of one year of probation for the furnishing 

alcohol to minors offense. Grant filed a post-sentence motion to modify his 

sentence, which was denied on October 24, 2013. This appeal followed.5

In his first issue, Grant claims the court erred in failing to suppress 

statements made by Grant to police because those statements were given 

during a custodial detention, were not preceded by Miranda warnings, and 

were not the product of a free, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his 

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5

 On November 26, 2013, the trial court ordered Grant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Grant filed a concise statement on December 17, 2013. The trial court 

issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 9, 2014.
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privilege against self-incrimination and his right to consult with counsel prior 

to the interrogation. Grant’s Brief at 34. 

By way of background, Detective Lockhart was accompanied by a 

uniformed officer, Officer Schott, who was new to the police department and 

there “to see how to conduct an interview.” N.T., 3/12/2013, at 257. Grant 

invited the officers inside his home and told Detective Lockhart where to 

have a seat. Detective Lockhart stated: “The interview begins with me 

advising Mr. Grant that I want to talk to him about an incident that occurred 

on April 28 into the early morning hours of the 29th when [K.K, M.M., B.E.] 

were at his apartment.” Id. at 259. Grant started talking about an 

unrelated incident and the detective redirected him, testifying: “I explained 

to [Grant] that I knew he told [M.M.], from [M.M.] telling me, that [M.M.] 

woke up the night she was in his apartment, and he told her, when she 

asked, what did you do to me. He said to her, I ate your pussy.” Id. at 

260. Detective Lockhart stated Grant initially did not give a response but did 

not deny the incident occurred. Id. Grant then provided the detective with 

details, which lasted an hour, and he admitted “he licked her vagina” and 

“they were all pretty messed up.” Id. at 260-261. Moreover, Detective 

Lockhart stated that Grant told him the assault lasted approximately five 

seconds and provided the following details:

[M.M.] was laying on the bed, on her back with her legs 

flat on the floor. And [Grant] was over top of her, and he first 

pulled her shirt up slightly, kissed her belly, and then slid down 
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and licked her vagina, at which time she came to, put her hands 

on the back of his head. 

He slid out from behind that and then up over top of her, 

and that is when [M.M.] would have asked, what are you doing 

to me?

Id. at 262. 

Detective Lockhart then explained to Grant that he wanted “to formally 

document the interview.” Id. at 263. Grant agreed to have the interview 

recorded with a digital voice recorder. Id. He indicated that he wanted to 

smoke a cigarette first and he could not do so inside the apartment. Id. at 

264. Grant, Detective Lockhart, and the observing officer went outside for 

approximately ten minutes before returning to the residence. Id. Detective 

Lockhart then read Grant his Miranda rights, to which he said that he 

understood them and signed a written waiver indicated that he was willing to 

make a statement. Id. at 265. The second interview, which was 

substantially similar to the earlier questioning, was audio-recorded, and 

Grant signed an authentication of the recorded statement form. Id. at 265-

268.

Grant now claims the police violated his Miranda rights during both 

interviews. First, he points to the following circumstances, which he claims 

established that he was subject to a custodial detention during the first 

interview: (1) the detective was already convinced that Grant had assaulted 

the victim when the detective decided to interrogate him; (2) the detective 

intentionally decided not to administer Miranda warnings and subjected 
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Grant to one hour of interrogation; (3) the detective posted a uniform 

officer, who was visibly armed, to stand beside the wall that was six feet 

from Grant; and (4) both officers followed him outside when he needed to 

smoke a cigarette. Grant’s Brief at 39. Second, Grants asserts the second 

interview was also improper pursuant to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 

(U.S. 2004) (plurality), on the basis that where police intentionally engage in 

a technique of interrogation during the non-Mirandized portion of the 

interview, the Miranda portion is suppressible as the fruits of a 

constitutional violation. Grant’s Brief at 41. Lastly, Grant claims his 

statements were unknowing and involuntary. Id. at 42-43.

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 

108, 115 (Pa. Super. 2005), quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 

A.2d 495, 499 (Pa. Super. 2004).

With respect to the initial interview between Grant and Officer 

Lockhart, we note the following:

The standard for determining whether an encounter with the 

police is deemed “custodial” or police have initiated a custodial 

interrogation is an objective one based on a totality of the 

circumstances, with due consideration given to the reasonable 

impression conveyed to the person interrogated. Custodial 

interrogation has been defined as “questioning initiated by law 

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 

or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any 
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significant way.” “Interrogation” is police conduct “calculated to, 

expected to, or likely to evoke admission.” When a person’s 

inculpatory statement is not made in response to custodial 

interrogation, the statement is classified as gratuitous, and is not 

subject to suppression for lack of warnings. 

The appropriate test for determining whether a situation involves 

custodial interrogation is as follows: 

The test for determining whether a suspect is being 

subjected to custodial interrogation so as to necessitate 

Miranda warnings is whether he is physically deprived of 

his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a 

situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom 

of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation.

Said another way, police detentions become custodial when, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or 

duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the 

functional equivalent of arrest. 

The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the 

circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as 

to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis 

for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect 

was transported against his or her will, how far, and why; 

whether restraints were used; whether the law enforcement 

officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative 

methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions. The fact that 

a police investigation has focused on a particular individual does 

not automatically trigger “custody,” thus requiring Miranda

warnings. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019-1020 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted), aff’d, 78 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2013), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 

1999).

Here, the trial court found the following:
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At the Suppression Hearing, the court determined that the 

statements [Grant] made in his apartment, prior to the Miranda

warnings being read and waived by him before what was 

essentially the second part of the interview, were not custodial 

because “[the court does] not believe that the mere presence of 

an officer in uniform is sufficient, in and of itself, to create a 

custodial situation.” Further, testimony at the Suppression 

Hearing indicated that [Grant] invited one of the officers 

(Detective Kenneth E. Lockhart, Jr.) to sit down, and [Grant] 

chose his own seat “in proximity to Detective Lockhart.” 

Although the first part of the interview took place prior to the 

reading of the Miranda warnings, it did not involve the assertion 

of authority by the officers, raised voices, or threats for a failure 

to cooperate with questioning. The detective questioning 

[Grant] did not do so in a calculating manner after inhibiting or 

limiting [Grant]’s freedom of action. [Grant] gave the relevant 

inculpatory statements in his apartment before he was given the 

Miranda warnings, and again after freely waiving his Miranda

rights in the second half of the interview. As the court stated at 

the Suppression Hearing, “considering the totality of the 

circumstances here, that confrontation [the initial interview with 

police in [Grant]’s apartment] was not so overtly threatening as 

to wear down [Grant], frighten him or reasonably bring him into 

fear that if he did not answer questions or give certain answers 

that he would suffer some adverse consequence.” It is for these 

reasons that the court determined the initial questioning was 

non-custodial and the statements given were admissible.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/2013, at 4 (record citations omitted). We agree.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, and using an objective 

standard, one cannot conclude Grant was “physically deprived of his freedom 

in any significant way or [] placed in a situation in which he reasonably 

believe[d] that his freedom of action or movement [was] restricted by such 

interrogation.” Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019. As such, and contrary to 

Grant’s assertions, he was not subject to a custodial interrogation when he 

made his initial statement to Detective Lockhart. Other than the officers’ 
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mere presence, Grant does not demonstrate that there was any threat or 

force used against him. Therefore, we do not find the initial interview was 

improper.

Turning to Grant’s post-Miranda interview, we are guided by the 

following:

A confession obtained during a custodial 

interrogation is admissible where the accused’s right 

to remain silent and right to counsel have been 

explained and the accused has knowingly and 

voluntarily waived those rights. The test for 

determining the voluntariness of a confession and 

whether an accused knowingly waived his or her 

rights looks to the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the giving of the confession. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 170, 683 A.2d 

1181, 1189 (1996) (citations omitted). ‘The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing whether a 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda

‘rights.’ Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 

464, 691 A.2d 907, 913 (1997) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Davis, 2004 PA Super 409, 861 A.2d 310, 

317 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 708, 872 A.2d 

171 (2005).

When deciding a motion to suppress a confession, the 

touchstone inquiry is whether the confession was 

voluntary. Voluntariness is determined from the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding the confession. The 

question of voluntariness is not whether the defendant 

would have confessed without interrogation, but whether 

the interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it 

deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free and 

unconstrained decision to confess. The Commonwealth 

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily. 
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Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 162-163, 709 A.2d 

879, 882 (1998) (citations and footnote omitted).

When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the totality of 

the circumstances, a court should look at the following 

factors: the duration and means of the interrogation; the 

physical and psychological state of the accused; the 

conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude of the 

interrogator; and any and all other factors that could drain

a person's ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. 

Id. at 164, 709 A.2d at 882 (citations omitted). “The 

determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a 

conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” 

Commonwealth v. Templin, 568 Pa. 306, 310, 795 A.2d 959, 

961 (2002), citing Nester, supra.

Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 433-434 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(footnote omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

Here, the court found the following:

As for [Grant]’s subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights 

after a proper warning, the court concluded at the Suppression 

Hearing that the warning issued before the second half of the 

interview

distill[ed] and clarify[ied] for [Grant] the scope and nature 

of his rights and allow[ed] him to stop the interview 

process, refuse within his rights to make any further 

statement.... And the waiver seems ... to be consistent 

with all of the things [Grant] had done and his demeanor 

up to that point.

(N.T. Suppression, 68: 22-25, 69: 1-7). Although [Grant] 

raised his health issues and medications in furtherance of the 

argument that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, there 

was no evidence that he was under the influence of any 

medication or medical condition that would impair his ability to 

understand his Miranda rights or to knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waive them. (N.T. Suppression, 64: 3-16, 69: 8-25, 

70:1-3).
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Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/2013, at 4-5.

We again agree with the trial court’s findings. Prior to taking the 

second statement, Detective Lockhart advised Grant of his Miranda rights 

and the waiver portion of the rights, both verbally and in writing, while at 

Grant’s home. See Commonwealth Exhibit 9, Interview, 6/28/2012. Grant 

acknowledged that he understood his rights and initialed the waiver form. 

N.T., 3/7/2013, at 13-14. He denied being under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol. See Commonwealth Exhibit 9, Interview, 6/28/2012, at 1. He 

answered in the negative when asked if any member of the police 

department had threatened him or promised him anything. Id. at 13. 

Furthermore, when asked how Detective Lockhart and Officer Schott had 

treated him that day, Grant responded, “Fine.” Id. As such, the evidence 

contradicts his subsequent claims of any involuntariness.6

Moreover, Grant’s reliance on Seibert, supra, is misplaced as that 

case was a plurality decision, not binding precedent. See Commonwealth 

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6

 Furthermore, any determinations as to credibility of Grant or the officers is 

left to the trial judge at the suppression hearing and then, subsequently to 

the jury sitting as the fact-finder, at trial. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014) (“If there is sufficient evidence of 

record to support the suppression court's ruling and the court has not 

misapplied the law, we will not substitute our credibility determinations for 

those of the suppression court judge..”); (Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 

A.3d 51, 65 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (“It 

was the province of the jury as fact-finder to weigh the evidence and believe 

all, part or none of it. It was also the role of the jury to assess credibility”). 
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v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 525 (Pa. Super. 2011) (rejecting an argument 

that Seibert established binding precedent). Moreover, Seibert is factually 

distinguishable from the present matter. In that case, a plurality of the 

United States Supreme Court concluded that Miranda warnings, 

intentionally issued in the middle of the custodial interrogation and after a 

defendant gave an unwarned confession, were ineffective. Seibert, 542 

U.S. at 612-14. Here, Grant was not subject to a custodial interrogation 

when he gave the initial statements to Detective Lockhart and there is no 

indication the detective intentionally sought to withhold the proper Miranda 

warnings prior to Grant giving the statement. Accordingly, Grant’s first 

argument fails.

In his second issue, Grant complains there was insufficient evidence to 

prove the offenses of IDSI and corruption of minors because the 

Commonwealth failed to prove the corpus delecti beyond a reasonable doubt 

that was independent of his extrajudicial inculpatory statements. Grant’s 

Brief at 16. Specifically, he points to the following: (1) the four teenagers 

all gave inconsistent accounts as what occurred on the night of the assault, 

including whether all four teenagers were present simultaneously in Grant’s 

apartment, the precise point in time when M.P. arrived and the manner of 

her arrival, and the nature and destination of certain trips taken during the 

night via Grant’s car; and (2) there were differences in the testimony of 

M.M. and M.P. as they related the time frame during which Grant made a 
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reference to performing cunnilingus on M.M. Id. at 16-21. Additionally, he 

states during the entire interrogation by Detective Lockhart, he did not 

admit to providing the teenagers with drugs and alcohol, and at trial, he 

denied performing cunnilingus on M.M. Id. at 20-24. Furthermore, he 

contends the Commonwealth failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule because, 

absent his inculpatory statement, there was no other evidence proving that 

a crime had been committed, where there were no eyewitnesses to the act 

or any physical evidence. Id. at 25-27. Moreover, Grant asserts the 

“closely related crimes exception” to the corpus delicti rule does not apply 

because he did not confess to all of the crimes, which is a requirement for 

the applicability of the exception. Id. at 27-34. In other words, he states 

that since he did not confess to furnishing alcohol to minors, and that was 

the only offense whose corpus delicti was proven by independent evidence, 

the “closely related crimes exception” does not apply. Grant further states 

that one cannot not apply the rule to his in-court statements because they 

were not judicial admissions; rather, he alleges he merely testified that he 

was “joking” when he made the statements to the victim and was under a 

form of duress when he speaking with Detective Lockhart. Id. at 34.

With respect to the various inconsistencies or other perceived 

shortcomings regarding the testimony of the four teenagers as well as his 

own testimony, this argument goes more to the weight of the evidence, 

relating to credibility, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. 
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Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Grant has not asserted a weight of the evidence claim on appeal. Moreover, 

“[i]t was the province of the jury as fact-finder to weigh the evidence and 

believe all, part or none of it. It was also the role of the jury to assess 

credibility.” Kearney, 92 A.3d at 65. As such, we decline Grant’s “implicit 

invitation to re-weigh the evidence.” Id.

Turning to Grant’s corpus delicti rule argument, we are guided by the 

following:

Our standard of review for a challenge to the corpus delicti rule 

is well-settled.

The corpus delicti rule is designed to guard against 

the “hasty and unguarded character which is often 

attached to confessions and admissions and the 

consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in 

fact been committed.” The corpus delicti rule is a rule of 

evidence. Our standard of review on appeals challenging 

an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a 

determination of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. The corpus delicti rule places the burden on the 

prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred 

before a confession or admission of the accused connecting 

him to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delicti is 

literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a 

loss or injury has occurred as a result of the criminal 

conduct of someone. The criminal responsibility of the 

accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the 

rule. The historical purpose of the rule is to prevent a 

conviction based solely upon a confession or admission, 

where in fact no crime has been committed. The corpus 

delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. 

Establishing the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step 

process. The first step concerns the trial judge’s admission 

of the accused’s statements and the second step concerns 

the fact finder’s consideration of those statements. In 

order for the statement to be admitted, the 
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Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti by a 

preponderance of the evidence. In order for the statement 

to be considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth 

must establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

Commonwealth v. Young, 2006 PA Super 193, 904 A.2d 947, 

956 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 664, 916 A.2d 

633 (Pa. 2006), (quoting Commonwealth v. Rivera, 2003 PA 

Super 238, 828 A.2d 1094, 1103-04, n.10 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

appeal denied, 577 Pa. 672, 842 A.2d 406 (Pa. 2004)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Additionally, 

[t]he corpus delicti rule is an evidentiary one. On a 

challenge to a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, our standard 

of review is one of deference.

The admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion 

of the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court 

has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding 

or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment 

that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, 

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of 

record.

Commonwealth v. Herb, 2004 PA Super 215, 852 A.2d 356, 

363 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410-411 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 63 A.3d 1244 (Pa. 2013).

However, there is a “closely related crimes” exception to the rule: 

Where the relationship between the crimes to which the 

defendant has confessed is close and the policy underlying the 

corpus delicti rule - to avoid convictions for crimes that did not 
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occur - is not violated, the exception renders the confession 

admissible for all closely related crimes.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587, 596 (Pa. 2003).7 

Here, the trial court found the following:

In [Grant]’s case, the Commonwealth established through 

independent evidence the crime of Furnishing Alcohol to Minors. 

Because the victim was unconscious from the alcohol provided 

by [Grant] at the time of the assault, the Furnishing Alcohol to 

Minors charge related closely to the charges of IDSI and 

Corruption of Minors. It follows logically that where the 

Commonwealth charges a defendant with Furnishing Alcohol to 

Minors and the facts support the claim that the minor became 

unconscious as a result of consuming the alcohol, and there are 

further allegations of sexual misconduct with the unconscious 

minor by the same defendant who furnished the alcohol, the 

offenses go hand-in-hand. It does not appear to the court that 

the scenario here offends the rule in Pennsylvania requiring 

proof of corpus delicti. To the contrary, the facts presented in 

this case appear to fall within the exception carved out by Taylor

and Tessel.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/2013, at 6.

We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis. Moreover,

Grant’s argument, that a defendant must confess to all crimes, including the 

offense for which the corpus delicti was proved by independent evidence, in 

order for the exception to be applicable, is misplaced. As is evident in 

Taylor, “where independent evidence establishes the corpus delicti of only 

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7

 “The purpose behind the corpus delicti rule is the ultimate consideration in 

determining whether two crimes are closely related so as to implicate the 

exception.” Taylor, 831 A.2d at 595-596. It merits mention that in Taylor, 

the Supreme Court discontinued a “common element” requirement that had 

been previously articulated in Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820 

(Pa. 1998). See Taylor, 831 A.2d at 595.
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one of those crimes, the confession may be admissible as evidence of the 

commission of the other crime.” Taylor, 831 A.2d at 592 (emphasis 

added). Even though Grant did not confess to all of the crimes, the 

relationship between the IDSI and furnishing alcohol to minors acts was 

sufficiently close where the four teenagers testified that Grant provided them 

with drugs and alcohol at his apartment and the victim stated that she 

became intoxicated to the point where she and M.P. fell asleep on Grant’s 

bed. Moreover, she testified that when she came to, Grant was over top of 

her on the bed and when she asked him what he was doing, Grant told her 

he had committed the act of cunnilingus. N.T., 3/12/2013, at 153-154. 

M.P. corroborated the victim’s testimony, stating that she saw Grant on top 

of the victim and heard him admit that he had licked the victim’s vagina. 

Id. at 230-231. Therefore, we conclude the confession and independent 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth were sufficient in establishing the 

“closely related crimes” exception and consequently, the corpus delicti rule 

was not violated.8 Accordingly, Grant’s second argument fails.

____________________________________________

8

 See also Tessel, supra (concluded that relationship between a theft and 

a burglary was sufficiently close to allow the court, upon evidence of the

corpus delicti of the theft, to admit the defendant’s confession as evidence 

that appellant had committed not only the theft but also the burglary where 

the defendant gave police a statement in which he admitted that he had 

surreptitiously entered a motel room, removed the television set from that 

room, and left); Commonwealth v. Bardo, 709 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. 1998) 

(held that the confession applied to two crimes, where the defendant 

confessed to strangling his three-year-old niece to death while he was 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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With respect to Grant’s final claim, he argues the court erred in 

refusing to include Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 

3.04(D) (Criminal) in its instructions to the jury on voluntariness and by 

refusing to let defense counsel incorporate the points of law contained in 

that instruction in his closing argument. Grant’s Brief at 44. He relies on 

Commonwealth v. Motley, 372 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1977), for the principle that 

it was essential for the jury to be instructed to consider the absence of 

Miranda warnings in assessing the voluntariness of his extrajudicial 

admissions. Grant’s Brief at 48. He also states that Commonwealth v. 

Baker, supra, does not apply to the present matter because it constitutes 

dicta and is contrary to Motley.

Our standard of review for a trial court's instructions to the jury is well 

established.

When reviewing a challenge to a part of a jury instruction, the 

Court must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it 

is fair and complete. A trial court has broad discretion in 

phrasing its charge and can choose its own wording so long as 

the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the 

jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of 

discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there 

reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa. Super. 2002).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

sexually molested her but the Commonwealth did not present independent 

evidence of aggravated indecent assault before introducing the defendant’s 

confession because “the relationship between the two crimes [was] close 

and the policy underlying the corpus delicti rule ha[d] not been violated.”), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 936 (1998).
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Instruction 3.04D of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal 

Jury Instructions provides:

CONFESSION OR ADMISSION: VOLUNTARINESS--PROOF; 

MIRANDA

1. In determining voluntariness you should also consider 

whether there was any violation of the U.S. Supreme Court case 

of Miranda v. Arizona. Miranda requires that the police, before 

questioning a suspect in custody, give him or her the Miranda

warning. The essence of the warning is that a suspect has a 

right to remain silent, that anything he or she says can be used 

against him or her; and that he or she has a right to the advice 

and presence of his or her own or a free attorney. The police are 

not to question a suspect unless he or she understands the 

warning and knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily gives 

up his or her rights to silence and an attorney.

2. Whether or not there was a violation of Miranda requirements 

may be an important factor for you in determining whether a 

standard meets the basic test of voluntariness. The importance 

of any Miranda violation depends upon the nature, seriousness, 

and reasons for the violation and whether it affected the 

defendant at the time [he] [she] made the statement.

Pa. SSJI (Crim) 3.04D.

Here, the court noted it did not give instruction 3.04D, but it did give 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions 3.01, 3.01A, 

3.04A, 3.04B, 3.04C, and 3.05. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/2013, at 7; 

see also N.T. 3/13/2013, at 448-451. The court stated it “provided these 

instructions to ensure that the jury was properly instructed in the law and 

that voluntariness was addressed in accordance with the proper legal 

standards[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/2013, at 8. We agree with the 

court’s rationale.
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Moreover, we find Grant’s reliance on Motley is misplaced. In 

Motley, on the day following the defendant’s arrest, prior to his 

arraignment, he made a detailed statement to the police implicating himself 

in a robbery and murder. His statement “constituted the heart of the 

Commonwealth’s case” against him as there was no independent evidence 

linking him to the crime. Motley, 372 A.2d at 767. “[F]ollowing his arrest, 

and throughout his lengthy interrogation, he was never advised of his 

constitutional right to remain silent and of his right to retained or appointed 

counsel.” Id. The trial court refused his request “that the jury be instructed 

that the failure of the police to advise him of these rights was a ‘significant 

factor’ in determining whether the statement was voluntary.” Id. (footnote 

omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, concluding the 

defendant “was entitled to an appropriate instruction informing the jury that 

the absence of warnings or advice as to his constitutional rights was a 

relevant factor in determining the voluntariness of his admissions.” Id. at

767. Motley is factually distinguishable from the present matter because, 

as we stated before, Grant was not placed in a custodial detention or arrest 

when he gave the pre-Miranda statement to Detective Lockhart. 

In Baker, supra, the defendant challenged the same issue with 

respect to the court’s refusal to give instruction 3.04D. A panel of this Court 

found that the defendant technically waived the issue because he did not 

object subsequently to the instructions given to the jury. Baker, 24 A.3d at 
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1024. Nevertheless, the panel determined the trial court’s instructions were 

appropriate, and that the refusal to give instruction 3.04D was not in error 

because the trial court had ruled the defendant’s statement did not require 

suppression due to the fact that he was not in custody, requiring Miranda

warnings. Therefore, the panel stated the defendant could not present 

evidence at trial challenging the admissibility of the statements he made to 

police but he could raise the issue of the voluntariness of the statements 

to the jury. Id. at 1024-1025. This Court concluded: 

Having raised the issue of the voluntariness of his statements, 

[the defendant] was entitled to jury instructions on that issue, 

and, in fact, received such instructions. Because those 

instructions given, as a whole, “clearly, adequately, and 

accurately” presented the law to the jury for its consideration, 

we find no abuse of discretion or error of law[.]

Id. at 1025.

Although the discussion in Baker may technically be dicta based on 

waiver, we find the reasoning persuasive and reject Grant’s argument. In 

accordance with Baker, Grant cannot challenge the admissibility of his 

statements to police because the trial court denied his request to suppress 

them, but he was permitted to challenge the voluntariness of those 

statements, which he did through cross-examination of Detective Lockhart 

and his own testimony. Moreover, a review of the court’s instructions 

reveals that as a whole, they “‘clearly, adequately, and accurately" 

presented the law to the jury for its consideration[.]” Baker, 24 A.3d 
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at1025. As such, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part 

of the trial court. Accordingly, Grant’s third and final claim fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/18/2015