UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

KAREN BETH SALYER,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-0752-17-0635-I-1

DATE: May 20, 2024

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Martin Jefferson Euchler, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the 

appellant.

Kathleen Pohlid, Esquire, and Lois F. Prince, Esquire, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 

BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts as set forth in the initial decision are as follows: The

appellant was formerly employed by the agency as a GS-14, Medical

Administrative Officer, Chief of the Business Office, at the James H. Quillen VA

Medical Center. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 69, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2.

On May 12, 2017, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on

9 charges: (1) conduct unbecoming a VA Service Chief (16 specifications);

(2) privacy violation (2 specifications); (3) failure to observe the opening hours

established for her tour of duty; (4) failure to adhere to established luncheon

period; (5) unauthorized absence (10 specifications); (6) failure to follow proper

leave request procedures (12 specifications); (7) careless or negligent

performance of duties; (8) failure to follow policy; and (9) failure to follow

instructions. Id. at 3-4. After affording the appellant an opportunity to respond,

the agency issued a decision, removing her, effective July 11, 2017. Id.

The appellant filed a Board appeal, disputing the charges and raising

affirmative defenses of due process violations, sex discrimination, and

whistleblower reprisal. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 23 at 5-7, Tab 33 at 6. After

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holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an

initial decision sustaining her removal. ID at 1-2. The administrative judge

found that the agency proved five of its nine charges, that there was a nexus

between such charges and the efficiency of the service, and that the penalty of

removal was reasonable. ID at 1-69, 85-87. He further found that the appellant

failed to prove any of her affirmative defenses. 2 ID at 69-84.

The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1. The agency has opposed the appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the appellant’s

motion for sanctions.

On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in

failing to impose additional sanctions as a result of the agency’s failure to

produce certain documents during discovery. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-11. During

the course of the hearing,3 on January 4, 2018, the agency notified the appellant

that it had received electronic documents. IAF, Tab 60 at 10. Agency counsel

notified the appellant via email that she had not had time to review the

documents, and did not anticipate that they would be responsive to the appellant’s

discovery requests, but that she reserved the right to introduce any documents for

rebuttal or impeachment purposes. Id. The appellant responded by informing the

agency that she would object to the use of any documentation that was not

previously submitted in accordance with the administrative judge’s orders. Id.

The appellant did not request that the agency produce the documents or

supplement its discovery responses, nor did she move to compel the agency to do

so. During the remainder of the hearing, the agency attempted to use some of the

2 On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge's findings as to

her sex discrimination and whistleblower reprisal claims, and we see no reason to

disturb them.

3 The hearing was conducted in person from December 5-8, 2017, and via video

conference from February 6-8, 2018. ID at 1.

3
documents during its examination of the appellant’s witnesses, but the

administrative judge denied the use of such documents as a sanction. ID at 3-4

n.2. After the hearing concluded, the appellant filed a motion for sanctions on

February 26, 2018. IAF, Tab 60. The administrative judge denied the appellant’s

motion, finding that the agency had represented that the documents located during

its electronic search were not responsive to the appellant’s discovery requests and

noting that he had already imposed a sanction upon the agency by denying the

agency’s use of any such documents during the hearing. ID at 3 n.2. Under these

circumstances, we find that the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion

in declining to impose additional sanctions. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Department

of Justice, 107 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 25 (2007) (stating that the Board will not reverse

an administrative judge’s rulings regarding sanctions absent a showing of an

abuse of discretion), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Department of

Labor, 2022 MSPB 9.

The agency’s specifications in support of its conduct unbecoming charge were

sufficiently detailed to satisfy the appellant’s due process rights.

On review, the appellant reiterates her argument below that many of the

specifications in support of the agency’s conduct unbecoming charge were too

vague to provide proper notice to her because they did not specify the dates or

locations of the alleged misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-18. In support of her

argument, she cites Mason v. Department of the Navy, 70 M.S.P.R. 584 (1996).

Id. at 11. In Mason, the agency charged the appellant with making racial slurs,

but did not indicate when or where he allegedly did so. Mason, 70 M.S.P.R.

at 586-88. Despite requesting such information during discovery, the employee

did not learn until the hearing, when agency witnesses testified regarding the

alleged remarks, that those remarks were alleged to have been made 3 to 4 years

earlier. Id. at 587. Under those circumstances, the Board found that the agency’s

failure to provide the appellant with adequately detailed notice of his alleged

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misconduct prior to the hearing prejudiced his ability to mount a meaningful

defense and denied him due process. Id. at 588.

We find the proposal notice here to be more specific than that in Mason to

the extent it describes the general time period when the misconduct occurred as

between December 27, 2015, and May 12, 2017. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-10. In addition,

more detailed information was available to the appellant in the form of statements

from employees obtained during the course of the agency’s investigation that

described the appellant’s behavior on a daily basis and how it personally affected

them or others. IAF, Tabs 6-9. Further, greater specificity was not possible

given the nature of the charges, which alleged a pattern of conduct over time,

rather than particular incidents. See, e.g., Lewis v. Department of Agriculture,

268 F. App’x 952, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 4 Under these circumstances, we find

that the appellant was not denied due process. 

The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved its conduct

unbecoming charge.

On review, the appellant argues generally that the agency’s charges are

frivolous, her conduct was not improper or very serious and did not rise to the

level of misconduct, and nobody complained contemporaneously about her

behavior. As set forth below, her arguments, which generally amount to a

restatement of her arguments in her closing brief are unpersuasive and fail to

establish any error in the administrative judge’s findings. Further, to the extent

the appellant has not identified any specific error in the administrative judge’s

analysis concerning the agency’s proof of its charges, the Board will not embark

upon a complete review of the record. See Baney v. Department of Justice,

109 M.S.P.R. 242, ¶ 7 (2008); Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R.

90, 92 (1992).

4 The Board may rely on unpublished decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit if it finds the court’s reasoning persuasive, as we do here. See Mauldin

v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 513, ¶ 12 (2011).

5
Many of the appellant’s arguments on review constitute mere disagreement

with the administrative judge’s findings and do not provide a basis for reversal.

See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-106 (1997) (stating that

the Board will give due deference to the credibility findings of the administrative

judge and will not grant a petition for review based on a party’s mere

disagreement with those findings); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human

Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Regarding specification 1, the

appellant argues that her conduct did not amount to misconduct because she was

permitted to raise her voice to make a point or express frustration. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 15. She further argues that her actions were not directed at anyone else

and she was not trying to achieve some improper purpose. Id. However, we

agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s conduct in yelling at

employees on a regular and recurring basis was improper and unsuitable for a

Federal employee. ID at 8-11. Regarding specification 2, the appellant disputes

that she made disparaging comments and asserts that employees did not complain

about any comments contemporaneously. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16. Such an

argument amounts to mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s findings

based on credibility determinations that the appellant often referred to employees

as stupid or idiots, among other derogatory terms. ID at 11-14. Regarding

specification 4, the appellant disputes that she kicked a subordinate employee.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. However, the administrative judge credited the testimony

of the subordinate and a human resources representative that the appellant kicked

the subordinate in November 2016, and the appellant has not established any

basis for the Board to reverse the administrative judge’s credibility findings. ID

at 15-16. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.

2002) (the Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility

determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of

the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such

determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).

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On review, the appellant also disputes that she engaged in certain alleged

incidents of misconduct described in the agency’s proposal notice that the

administrative judge did not address. Nonetheless, we discern no error in the

administrative judge’s analysis because an agency need not prove each factual

specification in support of its charge and is only required to prove the essence of

its charge. See, e.g., Hicks v. Department of the Treasury, 62 M.S.P.R. 71, 74

(1994), aff’d 48 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Regarding specification 3, the

appellant argues that it was not misconduct for her to tell a supervisor that certain

employees need to do their damn job because worse things are said in most

workplaces every day. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17. The administrative judge did

not make any findings concerning such a statement. Nonetheless, the appellant

has not shown any error in the administrative judge’s findings that she used

profanity in the workplace, ID at 11-14, which is the essence of the agency’s

specification. Regarding specification 5, the appellant’s assertions on review do

not dispute the administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved that she

pantomimed the act of stripping off her clothes and discussed purchasing sex toys

while at work. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18; ID at 16-18. Similarly, the appellant’s

cursory arguments regarding specifications 12, 15, and 16 fail to identify specific

errors in the administrative judge’s analysis. PFR File, Tab 1 at 27-28.

The appellant’s remaining arguments also fail to provide a basis for

reversal. Regarding specification 6, the appellant argues that she should not have

been disciplined for her actions because the matter had been resolved months

before the agency issued her the proposal notice and witnesses during one of the

agency’s fact-findings confirmed that the allegation was without merit. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 19. However, she cites no evidence in support of her argument. To the

contrary, the record supports the administrative judge’s finding that the agency

proved that the appellant made disparaging remarks about the new assistant chief

of the business office because both of the agency’s fact-findings in May 2016 and

May 2017 substantiated such an allegation. ID at 18-19; IAF, Tab 5 at 60, Tab 6

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at 30. Regarding specification 8, the appellant argues that the administrative

judge improperly analyzed the charge solely as whether she had a personal

relationship with a subordinate without concluding that she favored the

subordinate in any way. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-25. We find that the

administrative judge properly analyzed the charge as drafted to conclude that the

agency proved that the appellant’s actions created a perception of favoritism

towards the subordinate. ID at 22-28. Regarding specification 11, the appellant

argues that her behavior in questioning the propriety and feasibility of an

employee’s reasonable accommodation was not inappropriate given the context in

which her statements occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-27. The administrative

judge, however, acknowledged that the seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct

in this specification was mitigated by the context in which her statements were

made in her office to her assistant chief. ID at 35. Nonetheless, he found that her

comments were derisive and could have been interpreted as antagonistic to the

agency’s policy of reasonable accommodation. Id.

In specification 7, the agency alleged that the appellant behaved in a

manner that could have been perceived as attempting to interfere with employees’

rights to file a grievance or complaint. IAF, Tab 6 at 6. Among numerous other

alleged incidents, the agency alleged that, during a meeting with subordinate

employees on May 9, 2016, the appellant stated that she did not like when people

went to the union or filed equal employment opportunity complaints and

employees who did so were committing career suicide. Id. On review, the

appellant argues that this incident was investigated in an earlier May 2016

fact-finding and that the administrative judge failed to recognize that the

witnesses on whose testimony he relied had previously, during the May 2016

fact-finding, denied that the incident occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20. However,

we find that the administrative judge properly weighed the evidence, including

acknowledging inconsistencies in some of the witnesses’ statements and

8
testimony over time.5

 ID at 20-22. Regarding specification 10, the appellant

asserts that it is plausible that she was late for executive leadership team

meetings, but she argues that there is no basis to sustain the charge because none

of the managers raised concerns or indicated that it was problematic. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 25-26. Such arguments pertain to the reasonableness of the penalty,

which is different from whether the agency has proven its charge. See, e.g.,

Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 12 (2013). Finally,

regarding specification 13, the appellant argues that her inaccurate notification to

her supervisor that she had rescheduled an employee award ceremony was at most

an honest mistake. PFR File, Tab 1 at 28. Such an argument similarly pertains to

the reasonableness of the penalty and does not establish any error in the

administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved its charge. Accordingly,

the administrative judge properly found that the agency proved its conduct

unbecoming charge.6

The administrative judge properly found that the penalty of removal was

reasonable.

When the agency proves fewer than all of its charges, the Board may not

independently determine a reasonable penalty. Tisdell v. Department of the Air

Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 16 (2003). Rather, the Board may mitigate to the

maximum reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated either in its

5 Because we find that the administrative judge properly sustained specification 7 based

on the May 9, 2016 incident, we need not address the appellant’s arguments concerning

the additional alleged incidents set forth in paragraphs (b)-(g) of specification 7 of the

agency’s proposal notice. IAF, Tab 6 at 6-7; PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-23; see Hicks v.

Department of the Treasury, 62 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1994), aff’d 48 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir.

1995). 

6 We do not address the appellant’s arguments on review concerning the additional

sustained charges of privacy violation, unauthorized absence, failure to follow leave

request procedures, and failure to follow instructions because, as set forth below, we

find that the penalty of removal is reasonable based on the conduct unbecoming charge

alone. PFR File, Tab 1 at 29-32; see, e.g., Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force,

103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 41 (2006); Gaines v. Department of the Air Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 527,

¶ 6 (2003); Luciano v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 10 (2001), aff’d,

30 F. App’x. 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

9
final decision or during proceedings before the Board that it desires that a lesser

penalty be imposed on fewer charges. Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260

(Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board may impose the same penalty imposed by the agency

based on a justification of that penalty as the maximum reasonable penalty after

balancing the mitigating factors. Tisdell, 94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 16. The Board’s

function with regard to its review of an agency’s penalty selection is not to

displace management’s responsibility but to determine whether management

exercised its judgment within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Gray v. U.S.

Postal Service, 97 M.S.P.R. 617, ¶ 11 (2004).

Here, the administrative judge found several of the sustained specifications

in support of the agency’s conduct unbecoming charge to be serious. ID at 87.

He noted that, as a supervisor, the appellant’s misconduct in yelling at and

making disparaging comments about employees, discouraging employees from

exercising their rights to complain, and creating a perception of favoritism toward

another employee raised legitimate concerns about the appellant’s ability to

perform the duties of a service chief in a professional manner. Id. He further

recognized that the appellant had not acknowledged her misconduct in any way or

expressed remorse for her actions. Id. at 86-87. Finally, he noted that that the

appellant had previously received a 5-day suspension for giving the appearance of

improper preference in the hiring of her son. Id. at 86. 

We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s misconduct in

support of the conduct unbecoming charge was serious and find that the conduct

unbecoming charge alone warranted removal, notwithstanding the appellant’s

lengthy 24-year career with the agency. 7 See, e.g., Wilson v. Department of

7

In analyzing the reasonableness of the penalty, the administrative judge noted that,

although he had sustained the charges of unauthorized absence and failure to follow

leave request procedures, the appellant’s attendance-related misconduct was not

particularly egregious. ID at 86. In particular, he acknowledged that the appellant’s

misconduct amounted to her taking a long lunch and reporting late on several occasions,

but that there was unrebutted evidence that the appellant regularly worked on the

weekends and beyond her tour of duty without additional compensation. Id. In his

penalty analysis, the administrative judge did not discuss the other sustained charges of

10
Justice, 68 M.S.P.R. 303, 310 (1995) (noting that disrespectful conduct is

unacceptable and not conducive to a stable working atmosphere; an agency

therefore is entitled to expect employees to comport themselves in conformance

with accepted standards). Accordingly, we find that the administrative

judge properly found that the penalty of removal was reasonable. See, e.g.,

Holland v. Department of Defense, 83 M.S.P.R. 317, ¶¶ 10-12 (1999) (sustaining

a removal for rude and discourteous behavior); Wilson, 68 M.S.P.R. at 309-10

(sustaining a removal for disrespectful conduct and the use of insulting and

abusive language); Peters v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 23 M.S.P.R.

526, 529 (1984) (sustaining a removal for discourteous and unprofessional

conduct), aff’d, 770 F.2d 182 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS8

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

privacy violation or failure to follow instructions.

8

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions to provide a comprehensive

summary of all available review options. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot

advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 

11
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

12
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

13
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

14
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Gina K. Grippando

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

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