Present: All the Justices 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 OPINION BY 

 v. Record No. 972382 CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 September 18, 1998 

EUGENE NAKIA HARLEY 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this case, the defendant, Eugene Nakia Harley, was convicted 

in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach of one count of 

robbery, two counts of abduction, and three counts of the use of a 

firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to serve a 

total of forty-three years in the penitentiary, with twenty-five 

years suspended. 

 Harley appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, 

raising the sole question whether the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for a transcript of a suppression hearing at state 

expense. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that 

Harley was constitutionally entitled to a free transcript of the 

suppression hearing and, therefore, that the trial court erred in 

denying Harley’s motion with respect thereto. Harley v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 342, 350, 488 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1997). 

However, the Court of Appeals found that there were “no significant 

discrepancies between the witnesses’ testimony at the suppression 

hearing and their testimony at trial” and that “[t]he evidence of 

[Harley’s] guilt was overwhelming.” Id. at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 651. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s error 
in denying Harley a free transcript was harmless, and the court 

affirmed Harley’s convictions. Id.

 The Commonwealth filed a petition for appeal with this Court, 

seeking reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as 

it held that “the trial court was constitutionally obligated to 

provide Harley with a free copy of his suppression hearing 

transcript.” Harley filed a brief in opposition in which he 

assigned cross-error to the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the 

failure of the trial court to provide him a transcript at state 

expense was harmless error. In his brief in opposition, Harley also 

attacked the Commonwealth’s standing to appeal the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. 

 We awarded the Commonwealth an appeal and refused Harley’s 

assignment of cross-error. He has not participated further in this 

proceeding. 

 On the question of standing, the Commonwealth asserts that it 

is a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of Code § 17-116.08, which 

provides in pertinent part that “any party aggrieved by a final 

decision of the Court of Appeals, including the Commonwealth, may 

petition the Supreme Court for an appeal.” The Commonwealth says 

that “[t]he decision of the Court of Appeals, if not modified, 

inevitably would lead to the squandering of substantial amounts of 

public monies, inasmuch as defendants would be constitutionally 

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entitled to transcripts of a host of pre-trial proceedings in order, 

supposedly, to honor their rights to a fair trial and due process.” 

 The Commonwealth states on brief that the word “‘aggrieved’ is 

defined in the dictionary as ‘feeling distress or affliction’ or 

‘treated wrongly; offended.’ American Heritage Dictionary 87 (2d 

ed. 1991).” The Commonwealth also notes that in Virginia Beach 

Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 

344 S.E.2d 899 (1986), we elaborated upon the meaning of the word 

“aggrieved” as follows: 

 The term “aggrieved” has a settled meaning in 

Virginia when it becomes necessary to determine who is a 

proper party to seek court relief from an adverse 

decision. . . . The word “aggrieved” in a statute 

contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of 

some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or 

imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner 

different from that suffered by the public generally. 

Id. at 419-20, 344 S.E.2d at 902-03 (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted). The Commonwealth then argues that because the 

decision of the Court of Appeals “will have the effect of 

imposing substantial new financial burdens on the Commonwealth 

to provide transcripts to indigent defendants who previously 

would not have been entitled to them, the Commonwealth has 

standing in this appeal.” 

 Finally, the Commonwealth submits that “even though [it] 

ultimately prevailed in the Court of Appeals, it nevertheless 

is an ‘aggrieved’ party under [§ 17-116.08].” The Commonwealth 

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argues that the statute does not state that “the losing party” 

or “the party that did not prevail” may seek review in this 

Court. Instead, the Commonwealth says, the statute provides 

only that “any party aggrieved” may appeal, and the use of this 

less restrictive language evinces “the intent of the General 

Assembly to authorize appeals by the Commonwealth, at least 

under the circumstances of this case.” 

 We do not agree that the Commonwealth is aggrieved by the 

Court of Appeals’ ruling with respect to the issue of Harley’s 

entitlement to a free transcript of his suppression hearing. 

That issue was rendered moot by the Court of Appeals’ further 

ruling that the error in the trial court’s denial of a free 

transcript was harmless. As a result, the Commonwealth was 

excused from providing Harley with a free transcript of his 

suppression hearing. So far as this case is concerned, 

therefore, and we can be concerned only with this case, the 

harmless error ruling avoided the “imposition of a burden” upon 

the Commonwealth and the “squandering of . . . public monies” 

on “transcripts . . . of pre-trial proceedings.” 

 The Commonwealth is apprehensive, of course, about the 

effect the Court of Appeals’ decision will have upon future 

cases. But the Commonwealth’s concerns are hypothetical and 

can only be based, at best, upon speculation and conjecture. 

Its apprehension, therefore, is not sufficient to qualify it as 

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a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of Code § 17-116.08 and 

the explication given the word “aggrieved” in the case of 

Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning 

Appeals, supra. Neither the statute nor the case can be read 

to provide the Commonwealth a present appeal based upon the 

apprehension that it will suffer the imposition of some future 

burden. 

 In reality, the Commonwealth invites this Court to render 

an advisory opinion on a moot question based upon speculative 

facts. This is an exercise in which the Court traditionally 

declines to participate. “The reason . . . is that the courts 

are not constituted . . . to render advisory opinions, to 

decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely 

speculative.” City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-

30, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1964); see also Ridgwell v. Brasco

Bay Corp., 254 Va. 458, 462-63, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); 

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 245 Va. 24, 36, 

426 S.E.2d 117, 123-24 (1993). 

 Accordingly, we decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to 

render an advisory opinion in this case. Instead, we will 

await the arrival of a case in which a conviction has been 

reversed for the failure of a trial court to provide an 

indigent defendant with a free transcript of a pretrial 

hearing. 

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 In the meantime, because in the present case the 

Commonwealth is not a “party aggrieved” within the meaning of 

Code § 17-116.08, we will dismiss this appeal. 

Appeal dismissed. 

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