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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38572

STEVEN J. SNIDER and MARY A. 

SNIDER, husband and wife,

 Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-

 Respondents,

v.

RONALD D. ARNOLD and DOROTHY A. 

ARNOLD, husband and wife,

 Defendants-Counterclaimants-

 Appellants.

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Lewiston, September 2012 Term

2012 Opinion No. 136

Filed: November 15, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Valley County. Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge. 

District court decision granting constructive trust property interest, affirmed.

Christ T. Troupis, Eagle, argued for appellants.

Michael G. Pierce, Cascade, argued for respondents. 

_______________________

BURDICK, Chief Justice

Ronald (Ron) and Dorothy Arnold appeal the district court’s decision to grant a 

constructive trust property interest in favor of Ron’s sister, Mary Snider (Toni) and her husband, 

Steve Snider. The property in question is a cabin and accompanying forest service permit for 

land located in Valley County, Idaho. Toni and Ron’s father built the cabin and willed it, along 

with the permit, to his wife, Bette Arnold. The district court imposed a constructive trust on the 

property in favor of the Sniders finding that Bette transferred the property to both the Arnolds 

and the Sniders in 1983. The Arnolds appeal the decision, arguing that the Sniders failed to 

present clear and convincing evidence of a constructive trust and the district court’s finding that 

Bette intended to give the property to both parties was clearly erroneous. We affirm the opinion 

of the district court. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ron and Dorothy Arnold are the named holders on a Forest Service special use permit for 

a cabin and 0.5 acres of land located in Valley County, Idaho. The cabin and permit originally 

belonged to Francis Doyle Arnold, Ron and Toni’s father, but he left the property to his wife 

Bette in his will. Soon after her husband’s death, Bette signed a permit transfer form dated 

January 6, 1983, which terminated her interest in the property and requested that it be transferred 

to Ron and Dorothy Arnold and Toni and Steve Snider. 

The Sniders, the Arnolds, and the Cascade District Ranger all signed this permit transfer 

form, however the circumstances surrounding its signing are disputed with the Arnolds claiming 

that the Sniders’ names and signatures were added after Bette signed the form as an 

accommodation to the Sniders. Despite both the Arnolds and the Sniders being listed as 

permittees on the application, the Forest Service returned the permit in the Arnolds’ names alone 

because of a new directive limiting special use permits to one person or entity or to a husband 

and wife. Ron claims he knew that this would be the outcome and never represented otherwise to 

the Sniders either before or after he submitted the permit application. In contrast, Toni claims, 

and the district court found, that Ron made statements to her that they would jointly own the 

cabin and permit despite the permit being in the Arnolds’ name alone. The district court also 

found that Toni had a confidential relationship with her brother and trusted him to hold title to 

the permit for both couples. 

For more than 20 years after the Forest Service issued the permit in the Arnolds’ name, 

the Arnolds and the Sniders shared the use and expenses of the cabin. Ron took care of the 

cabin’s bookkeeping, while the Sniders would inquire about their share of cabin expenses and 

reimburse him for specific amounts. The Sniders and the Arnolds divided the available weeks at 

the cabin equally amongst them and, on at least one occasion, the Arnolds asked the Sniders if 

they could stay into their assigned week. 

In 2009, after noticing a change in the couples’ dynamic with respect to the cabin, Toni 

confronted her brother. Toni claims that this confrontation was the first time that Ron had ever 

told her that he and his wife were the sole owners of the cabin. After further discussions with the 

Arnolds failed, the Sniders filed a complaint later that year seeking a declaratory judgment 

recognizing their right to a one-half undivided interest in the cabin and permit. 
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Following trial, the district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 

Judgment on January 18, 2011, imposing a constructive trust on a one-half interest in the cabin 

and permit in favor of the Sniders. The Arnolds now appeal the district court’s findings of fact 

that the Sniders proved their constructive trust claim by clear and convincing evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A claim that a trust in real property has arisen by implication or operation of the law must 

be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 

772, 774 (1994). “The determination of whether such evidence has been presented is a question 

of fact to be determined by the trial court, and that court’s findings will be disturbed only if they 

are clearly erroneous.” Id. If substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence supports a 

trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are not clearly erroneous. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 

851, 857, 230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010); I.R.C.P. 52(a). “This Court will not substitute its view of the 

facts for that of the trial court.” Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 511, 211 P.3d 118, 120 (2009). 

Instead, it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the 

credibility of witnesses. Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 

(2005). 

III. ANALYSIS

The Arnolds raise two issues on appeal. First, whether the district court erred in finding 

that the Sniders produced sufficient evidence of a constructive trust to satisfy the clear and 

convincing evidence standard. Second, whether the district court’s conclusion that Bette Arnold 

intended to transfer her property to both the Sniders and the Arnolds was clearly erroneous. 

A. The district court’s determination that the Sniders proved a constructive trust by clear 

and convincing evidence is not clearly erroneous.

The Arnolds argue that the Sniders did not prove the elements of their constructive trust 

claim by clear and convincing evidence. A constructive trust arises when “legal title to property 

has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of 

one’s necessities, or under circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of 

legal title to retain beneficial interest in property.” Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 470, 886 P.2d at 775 

(quoting Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986)). Imposition of a 

constructive trust is an equitable remedy and does not require that the holder of legal title intend 

to create a trust interest in another. Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167 P. 481, 483 
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(1917). Indeed, a constructive trust arises from the legal title holder’s wrongful actions and not 

from any intent to create a trust. Id. A party seeking to impose a constructive trust must prove the 

facts alleged to give rise to the trust by clear and convincing evidence. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 

469, 886 P.2d at 774. Whether a party presented sufficient evidence to meet the clear and 

convincing standard is a finding of fact that this Court will uphold if substantial and competent 

evidence supports it. Id. 

The Arnolds argue that the district court’s determination that the Sniders proved their 

constructive trust claim by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous because the 

Sniders did not present any evidence that the Arnolds used inequitable means to obtain title to 

the cabin and permit. They also contend that the Sniders did not present clear and convincing 

evidence of an agreement to create a resulting trust. However, because the district court only 

imposed a constructive trust, never mentioning resulting trusts in its Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, this part of the Arnolds’ argument will not be addressed.1

In this case, the district court imposed a constructive trust after finding that (1) Bette 

intended to give the cabin and permit to both the Sniders and the Arnolds and (2) Ron took 

advantage of his confidential relationship with his sister Toni by representing to her that the 

permit would be in his name, but both couples would jointly own it. The Arnolds argue that they 

did not gain title to the cabin by any wrongful means and the court’s conclusion that Ron told 

Toni he would hold title to the cabin for their mutual benefit was clearly erroneous. They claim 

that both Ron’s and Bette’s testimony prove Bette’s intent to transfer the cabin to the Arnolds 

alone and that Ron never indicated otherwise to Toni. While Ron’s and Bette’s testimony may 

support this claim, the rest of the evidence does not. 

There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that the 

Sniders proved by clear and convincing evidence that Bette intended to transfer the cabin and 

permit to both parties and that Ron represented to Toni that they jointly owned the cabin and 

permit. First, several disinterested, independent witnesses corroborated the Sniders’ claim that 

Ron and Bette made representations concerning the cabin’s joint ownership. Second, the fact that 

the permit transfer form Bette signed listed the Sniders and the Arnolds as the transferees 

 1 Appellants’ Brief deals extensively with an argument concerning resulting trusts and how the Sniders failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Arnolds ever agreed to create a trust in favor of the Sniders. The 

Appellants incorrectly state that the district court’s findings of fact included the conclusion that Arnolds had agreed 

to create a trust in favor of the Sniders. However, the court actually found that a constructive trust had been created, 

which does not require an agreement, and never mentions resulting trusts. 
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indicates that Bette intended, and the couples understood, that the Arnolds and the Sniders were 

to jointly own the cabin and permit. The Arnolds’ claims that the permit transfer form was blank 

when Bette signed it and that the Sniders’ names were added afterward as an accommodation to 

them make little sense and are contradicted by the transfer form itself. The Sniders’ names are 

typed on the line labeled “proposed permittees” below that of the Arnolds on the permit transfer 

form, which would suggest that the Sniders’ names were typed into the form at the same time as 

that of the Arnolds, not “squeezed” in later as the Arnolds claim. Moreover, Ron’s claim that he 

only allowed the Sniders to be named as proposed permittees because he already knew about the 

Forest Service’s policy of limiting special permits to one person or entity or to a husband and 

wife is contradicted by the Cascade District Ranger’s letter to Ron explaining why the Forest 

Service issued the permit in only one name. In this letter the Cascade District Ranger, explained 

that the Forest Service had adopted a new directive to replace its previous policy, which had 

been vague about issuing permits to multiple parties. This was the same District Ranger who 

signed the permit transfer form recommending its approval with both names on it. Finally, the 

Sniders’ and the Arnolds’ conduct with respect to the cabin was consistent with that of joint 

ownership. The Arnolds and the Sniders shared both the use and expenses of the cabin. The 

payments the Sniders made to the Arnolds were not merely contributions as the Arnolds claim, 

but checks for specific dollar amounts that often referenced “insurance” or “taxes” in the subject 

line. 

The district court recognized that there was conflicting testimony in this case, but found 

Toni and Steve to be more credible than Ron and Bette. This Court has held that even where the 

evidence is conflicting, it may still be substantial and competent, and it is for the district court to 

weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses. Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, ___

P.3d 731, 737 (2012). Therefore, the district court’s findings of fact are to be “liberally construed 

on appeal in favor of the judgment entered.” Id. However, liberal construction is not necessary in 

this case. The testimony of the Sniders and their witnesses, the behavior of the parties, the fact 

that the permit transfer form lists both couples as transferees, and the Cascade District Ranger’s 

letter all support the district court’s conclusion that Ron represented to the Sniders that they 

jointly owned the cabin and permit. Therefore, this Court affirms the district court’s finding of 

fact that the Sniders proved their constructive trust claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
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B. Substantial and competent evidence supports the district court’s finding that Bette 

Arnold’s testimony was not credible. 

The Arnolds argue that the district court’s finding of fact that Bette intended to transfer 

her property to both the Arnolds and the Sniders was clearly erroneous because it is contrary to 

what she expressed in her trial testimony and because the court discarded her testimony on 

questionable grounds. While the Arnolds repeat some of the arguments about Bette’s intent to 

transfer the cabin solely to the Arnolds that the preceding section addresses, they mainly 

challenge the district court’s determination that Bette’s testimony is not credible.2

The district court made the following findings of fact as to Bette’s credibility: 

The Court will find Bette Arnold’s testimony is not credible in light of her prior 

statements that she was giving the cabin to both of her late husband’s children, 

her poor memory in light of her age and the will that she executed along with her 

late husband. There was also testimony that Ron Arnold had recently assisted 

Bette Arnold with her financial affairs, in 2010, for which she was very grateful 

and the Court will find that this has an impact on her credibility as well. The 

Court will find that Bette Arnold had no accurate recollection of the conversation 

that occurred between herself and Ron Arnold in January of 1983 or what if any 

names were on the transfer form. 

This Court liberally construes the district court’s credibility determinations because “[i]t 

is the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given 

their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 

334, 338, 247 P.3d 199, 203 (2011). “It is not our role to reweigh the evidence.” In re Doe 2009-

19, 150 Idaho 201, 209, 245 P.3d 953, 961 (2010). We holds that he district court’s finding that 

Bette was not credible is thoroughly explained and supported by substantial and competent 

evidence.

C. The Sniders are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121.

The Sniders seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. To receive an I.C. § 

12-121 award of fees, the entire appeal must have been pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and 

 2 The Arnolds also argue that this determination deprives Bette of her right to dispose of her property as she pleases, 

but do not provide any support for this assertion or why they have standing to raise a claim of right for someone who 

is not a party to this case. 
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without foundation. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, __, 274 P.3d 1256, 1271 

(2012) (citing Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 242, 254 P.3d 1231, 1238 (2011)). Such 

circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to second-guess the 

trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly 

applied well-established law. City of Boise v. Ada Cnty., 147 Idaho 794, 812, 215 P.3d 514, 532 

(2009). Conversely, fees generally will not be awarded when “the losing party brought the appeal 

in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented.” Id. Here, the Arnolds did not 

present any issues of law and merely asked this Court to reweigh the district court’s findings of 

fact. Indeed, the Arnolds admit as much in their reply brief by arguing that there are no grounds 

for awarding attorney fees because their brief “did dispute findings of fact by the trial court.” 

Because the Arnolds brought this appeal unreasonably or without foundation, the Sniders’ 

request for attorney fees is granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s decision that the Sniders proved their constructive trust 

claim by clear and convincing evidence and grant the Sniders request for attorney fees on appeal 

under I.C. § 12-121. Costs to the Sniders.

Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.