PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 600 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 551–569 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 30, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 551 

Syllabus 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. v. BROWN 

et al. 

certiorari before judgment to the united states 

court of appeals for the fth circuit 

No. 22–535. Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023 

To alleviate hardship expected to be caused by the impending resumption 

of federal student-loan repayments that had been suspended during the 

multi-year coronavirus pandemic, Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona announced a substantial student-loan debt-forgiveness plan (Plan). 

The Plan discharges $10,000 to $20,000 of an eligible borrower's debt, 

depending on criteria such as the borrower's income and the type of 

loan held. The Secretary invoked the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act), which authorizes the 

Secretary “to waive or modify any provision” applicable to federal “student fnancial assistance” programs “as may be necessary to ensure that 

. . . recipients of student fnancial assistance” are no worse off “fnancially in relation to that fnancial assistance because” of a national emergency or disaster. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1098bb(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)– 

(D). The HEROES Act also exempts rules promulgated pursuant to 

it from the otherwise-applicable negotiated-rulemaking and notice-andcomment processes. 

Before the Plan took effect, various plaintiffs—including respondents 

here—sued to enjoin it. Respondents Myra Brown and Alexander 

Taylor are two borrowers who do not qualify for the maximum relief 

available under the Plan. Their one-count complaint alleges that the 

Secretary was required to follow notice-and-comment and negotiatedrulemaking procedures in promulgating the Plan, which all agree he did 

not do. Brown and Taylor argue that the HEROES Act's procedural 

exemptions apply only when the rule promulgated is substantively authorized by the Act, and because the HEROES Act does not authorize 

the Plan (they argue), the Secretary was required to follow negotiated 

rulemaking and notice and comment. The District Court rejected their 

argument regarding the scope of the HEROES Act's procedural exemptions, but nevertheless vacated the Plan as substantively unauthorized. 

This Court granted certiorari before judgment to consider this case 

alongside Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which presents a similar challenge to the Plan. 

Held: Because respondents fail to establish that any injury they suffer 

from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan, they 

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552 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Syllabus 

lack Article III standing, so the Court has no jurisdiction to address 

their procedural claim. Pp. 560–569. 

(a) “This case begins and ends with standing.” Carney v. Adams, 

592 U. S. –––, –––. The Court's authority under the Constitution is 

limited to resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. The 

Court's jurisprudence has “established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plaintiff 

must plead and—ultimately—prove. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U. S. 555, 560. Those elements are: (1) a “concrete and particularized” injury that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the 

defendant and (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Id., at 560–561 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). But 

where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that she has been deprived of a 

procedural right to protect her concrete interest, she need not show that 

observing the contested procedure would necessarily lead to a different 

substantive result. Id., at 572, n. 7. Pp. 560–562. 

(b) As articulated in this Court, respondents' claim and theory of 

standing are twofold: First, because the HEROES Act does not substantively authorize the Plan, the Secretary was obligated to follow typical 

negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment requirements. Second, 

if the Secretary had observed those procedures, respondents might have 

used those opportunities to convince him not only that proceeding under 

the HEROES Act is unlawful, but also that he should instead adopt a 

different loan-forgiveness program under the Higher Education Act of 

1965 (HEA), and to make that program more generous to respondents 

than the Plan. Respondents assert there is at least a chance that this 

series of events will come to pass now if this Court vacates the Plan. 

Pp. 562–563. 

(c) Respondents' standing claim most clearly fails on traceability: 

They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan relief 

under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department's (allegedly unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act. Pp. 563–569. 

(1) Signifcantly, respondents are not claiming that they are injured 

by not being suffciently included among the Plan's benefciaries: They 

think the Plan is substantively unlawful and instead seek debt forgiveness under the HEA. But a decision regarding the lawfulness of the 

Plan does not directly affect respondents' ability to obtain loan relief 

under the HEA; the Department's authority to grant loan relief under 

the HEA (upon which the Court does not pass) is not affected by 

whether the Plan is lawful or unlawful. Any connection between loan 

forgiveness under the two statutes is speculative. 

While it is true that the Court's procedural-standing case law tolerates uncertainty over whether observing certain procedures would have 
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Syllabus 

led to (caused) a different substantive outcome, see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 

572, n. 7, the causal uncertainty here is not so limited. Instead, the 

uncertainty concerns whether the substantive decisions the Department 

has made regarding the Plan under the HEROES Act have a causal 

relationship with other substantive decisions respondents want the Department to make under the HEA. There is no precedent for tolerating 

this sort of causal uncertainty. Respondents cannot show that the denial of HEA loan relief—their ostensible injury—“fairly can be traced 

to” the Department's decision to grant loan relief in the Plan. Simon 

v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 42–43. 

There is little reason to think that the Department's discretionary decision to pursue one mechanism of loan relief under the HEROES Act has 

anything to do with its discretionary decision to pursue (or not pursue) 

action under the HEA. “The line of causation between” the Department's promulgation of the Plan and respondents' lack of benefts under 

the HEA “is attenuated at best,” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 757, 

and all too dependent on “ `conjecture,' ” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 496. Pp. 564–567. 

(2) Respondents' attempts to tie the Plan to potential HEA relief 

are unavailing. Although the Department has occasionally referred to 

“one-time” student-loan relief in publicizing the Plan, the Plan itself contains no such reference. And any incidental effect of the Plan on the 

likelihood that the Department will undertake a separate loanforgiveness program under a different statute is too weak and speculative to show that the absence of HEA-based loan forgiveness is fairly 

traceable to the Plan. See, e. g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42–43. To the 

extent the Department has determined that the Plan crowds out other 

efforts to forgive student loans, that determination is a discretionary 

one that respondents may petition the Department to reconsider. Finally, respondents cannot demonstrate causation on the theory that the 

Department's failure to observe the requisite procedural rules cost them 

a chance to obtain debt forgiveness; they do not want debt forgiveness 

under the HEROES Act, and nothing the Department has done deprives them of a chance to seek debt forgiveness under the HEA. Respondents cannot meaningfully connect the absence of loan relief under 

the HEA to the adoption of the Plan, so they have failed to show that 

their injury is fairly traceable to the Plan. Pp. 567–568. 

Vacated and remanded. 

Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Principal Deputy Assist-
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554 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Counsel 

ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General 

Fletcher, Vivek Suri, Yaira Dubin, Michael S. Raab, 

Thomas Pulham, and Brian Siegel. 

J. Michael Connolly argued the cause for respondents. 

With him on the brief were Cameron T. Norris, Gilbert C. 

Dickey, James F. Hasson, and Steven C. Begakis.* 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Americans for 

Prosperity Foundation et al. by J. Marc Wheat, Michael Pepson, and Cynthia Fleming Crawford; for Borrower Advocacy and Legal Aid Organizations by Joshua Rovenger and Persis Yu; for the Empire Center for Public 

Policy, Inc., et al. by Misha Tseytlin and Timothy L. McHugh; for the 

Foundation for Government Accountability by Stewart L. Whitson; for the 

Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute et al. by Theodore H. Frank and Curt A. 

Levey; for Legal Scholars by Jeffrey B. Dubner and Sean A. Lev; for Local 

Governments by Jonathan B. Miller, Joshua A. Rosenthal, Atleen Kaur, 

Mark Griffn, Arturo G. Michel, James D. Smiertka, Peter M. Bollinger, 

Leslie J. Girard, John P. Markovs, Diana P. Cortes, Sheena Hamilton, 

Lyndsey M. Olson, and Ronald A. Hope; for the National Education Association by Alice O'Brien and Jeffrey W. Burritt; for Samuel L. Bray et al. 

by Melissa Arbus Sherry; and for Jed Handelsman Shugerman by Brian 

H. Pandya. Briefs of amici curiae urging vacatur were fled for ArchCity Defenders et al. by Seth E. Mermin; for the Cato Institute et al. by 

Anastasia P. Boden and Ilya Shaprio; for Six Veterans' Organizations by 

Boris Bershteyn; and for Student Loan Experts by Christopher J. Wright 

and Stephen W. Miller. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 

Utah et al. by Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak, 

Solicitor General, and Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, Benjamin M. 

Flowers, Solicitor General, Sylvia May Mailman, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: 

Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg R. Taylor of Alaska, Ashley Moody of 

Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, John M. Formella of New Hampshire, 

Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken 

Paxton of Texas, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill of 

Wyoming; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, Jordan A. Sekulow, and Laura B. 

Hernandez; for the Buckeye Institute by David C. Tryon and Robert Alt; 

for Sen. Marsha Blackburn et al. by Steven A. Engel and Michael H. McGinley; for Elisabeth DeVos et al. by Alexander Akerman; for Michael 
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Opinion of the Court 

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In August 2022, the Secretary of Education announced a 

large-scale student-loan forgiveness program. He pledged 

to discharge hundreds of billions of dollars in student-loan 

debt owed by millions of borrowers. According to the Secretary, the discharge was necessary to alleviate hardship 

caused by the impending resumption of loan repayments, 

which had been suspended during the multi-year coronavirus 

pandemic, and he therefore invoked authority that he 

claimed he enjoyed under the Higher Education Relief OpW. McConnell et al. by William R. Levi; for Howard McKeon et al. by 

Caleb Kruckenberg; and for 128 U. S. Representatives et al. by Jennifer 

L. Mascott and R. Trent McCotter. 

Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Elizabeth N. Dewar, Acting Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Yael Shavit, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys 

General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen 

Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Anne 

E. Lopez of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford 

of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, 

Letitia James of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North Carolina, Ellen F. 

Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha 

of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert W. Ferguson of 

Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; for the America First Policy Institute by Craig W. Trainor and Rachel Jag; for the American Federation of Teachers et al. by Yelena Konanova, Faith E. Gay, and Max H. 

Siegel; for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Lawrence S. Ebner; for the 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Robert E. 

Dunn, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Amy Miller; for the Landmark Legal 

Foundation by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard 

P. Hutchison; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 

et al. by Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, David Hinojosa, and Genevieve 

Bonadies Torres; for the New Civil Liberties Alliance by Markham S. 

Chenoweth and Russell G. Ryan; for the Protect Democracy Project by 

Justin Florence and Genevieve Nadeau; for George Miller by Elizabeth 

B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod; and for Lawrence A. Stein by Mr. Stein, 

pro se. 
556 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Opinion of the Court 

portunities for Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act). 117 

Stat. 904, codifed at 20 U. S. C. § 1070 et seq. The following 

month, the Secretary directed that specifc actions be taken 

to implement the loan-forgiveness plan (Plan). The amount 

of relief available to a borrower under the Plan depends on 

various criteria, including the borrower's income and the 

type of loan the borrower holds. 

Before the Plan took effect, however, various plaintiffs— 

including respondents here—sued to enjoin it. Respondents 

are two individual borrowers who, for different reasons, do 

not qualify for the maximum relief available under the Plan. 

They argue that the Department of Education promulgated 

the Plan without following mandatory procedures known as 

(1) negotiated rulemaking and (2) notice and comment. The 

District Court held in favor of respondents, and we granted 

certiorari before judgment to consider this case alongside 

Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which presents a similar 

challenge to the Plan. 

Ultimately, however, we do not resolve respondents' procedural claim because we conclude that they lack standing to 

bring it. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and 

remand with instructions to dismiss. We simultaneously 

deny as moot the Department's application for a stay pending appeal. 

I 

A 

The Court's opinion in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 

(2023), recounts the relevant background of the HEROES 

Act, so only a brief summary is provided here. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Education “to waive or modify any 

provision” applicable to federal “student fnancial assistance” 

programs “as may be necessary to ensure that . . . recipients 

of student fnancial assistance” who live or work in a declared 

disaster area, or suffer direct economic hardship as a result 

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of a national emergency, “are not placed in a worse position 

fnancially in relation to that fnancial assistance because” 

of the disaster or emergency. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1098bb(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–(D). 

In addition to this substantive grant of authority, the 

HEROES Act dispenses with certain procedural rules for 

actions taken pursuant to it. 

First, the HEROES Act permits the Secretary to implement any “waivers and modifcations authorized or required” 

by the Act without engaging in the “negotiated rulemaking” 

that is typically required before proposing regulations relating to student fnancial assistance. § 1098bb(d). Negotiated rulemaking is a lengthy deliberative process involving 

many stakeholders. Pursuant to this process, the Secretary 

must frst obtain “advice of and recommendations” from a 

long list of sources, including “individuals and representatives” of groups “such as students, legal assistance organizations that represent students, institutions of higher education, State student grant agencies, guaranty agencies, 

lenders, secondary markets, loan servicers, guaranty agency 

servicers, and collection agencies.” § 1098a(a)(1). Then, 

informed by this consultation, the Secretary must submit 

draft regulations for consideration in a negotiation process 

involving participants who are “chosen by the Secretary 

from individuals nominated by” such groups. § 1098a(b)(1). 

Only after taking these steps may the Secretary “publis[h] 

proposed regulations in the Federal Register,” ibid., accompanied by a summary of the information the Secretary received throughout the process, § 1098a(a)(2). The HEROES 

Act, however, permits the Secretary to bypass this onerous 

process. § 1098bb(d). 

The HEROES Act also authorizes the Secretary to bypass 

notice-and-comment procedures that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) would otherwise demand. The APA typically requires agencies to give the public “[g]eneral notice 

of [a] proposed rule making” by publication in the Federal 

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Register, and then to provide “interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission 

of written data, views, or arguments” regarding the proposed rule. 5 U. S. C. §§ 553(b), (c). The agency may promulgate a fnal rule only after providing notice and opportunity for comment. § 553(c). But the HEROES Act instead 

permits the Secretary to implement the waivers and modifcations he “deems necessary to achieve the purposes of” the 

Act merely by “publish[ing]” “notice in the Federal Register.” 20 U. S. C. § 1098bb(b)(1). 

B 

On September 27, 2022, Secretary of Education Miguel 

Cardona, invoking authority under the HEROES Act, directed the issuance of waivers and modifcations that would 

bring about the forgiveness of a substantial amount of 

student-loan debt. In particular, he purported to effect the 

discharge of (1) $10,000 of eligible, federally held studentloan debt for any individual borrower with 2020 or 2021 income under $125,000 (or household income under $250,000), 

and (2) an additional $10,000 (making a total of $20,000) for 

any such borrower who had ever received a Pell Grant. Pell 

Grants are Government-funded grants to help defray the 

cost of postsecondary education; eligibility for these grants 

turns principally on the income of a student's family when 

the student applies to and is enrolled in the relevant educational program (almost always undergraduate study). See 

§§ 1070a(b)(2), 1087mm(a), 1091; see also 34 CFR § 690.6(c) 

(2022) (limited eligibility for students in a qualifying “postbaccalaureate program”). Secretary Cardona directed that 

these actions be taken via a publication in the Federal Register, see App. 262; all agree that he did not observe the generally applicable negotiated-rulemaking or notice-andcomment processes in devising and announcing the Plan. 

Notwithstanding the Plan's scope and expense, not all 

student-loan borrowers were pleased with it. Myra Brown 

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and Alexander Taylor, plaintiffs in this case, are two such 

dissatisfed borrowers, albeit for different reasons. Brown's 

loans are “commercially held,” id., at 171, Complaint ¶10, 

meaning that her creditor is an entity other than the Federal 

Government. The Plan, however, applies only to borrowers 

whose loans fall into one or more categories of loans “held 

by the Department.” 87 Fed. Reg. 61513 (2022). Consequently, Brown is not entitled to any loan forgiveness under 

the Plan. 

Taylor, on the other hand, is eligible for loan forgiveness— 

but only $10,000, rather than the maximum $20,000. That is 

because, despite now having an annual income of less than 

$25,000, he never received a Pell Grant. See App. 183, Complaint ¶61. Thus, individuals with annual income up to fve 

times greater than his are eligible for twice as much loan 

forgiveness as he is if they ever received a Pell Grant. 

Accordingly, both Brown and Taylor object to certain elements of the Plan—Brown to its limitation to federally held 

loans, and Taylor to the additional relief it doles out based 

on prior Pell Grants, with no regard for current income. Because the Department did not engage in negotiated rulemaking or notice and comment, however, Brown and Taylor 

had no formal opportunity to voice their views on the Plan 

prior to its adoption. 

Alleging that the law entitles them to such an opportunity, 

Brown and Taylor brought this action in the U. S. District 

Court for the Northern District of Texas. Their one-count 

complaint claims that the Plan is unlawful because the Department promulgated it without observing the requirements of negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment. 

As a result, they claim, we should “[v]acate and set aside 

the” Plan under 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(D). App. 186. 

Brown and Taylor recognize that the HEROES Act supplies exemptions from these procedural requirements. 

They argue, however, that an action of the Secretary falls 

within these exemptions only if it is substantively authorized 

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by the Act; the Secretary, in their view, cannot merely invoke 

the “HEROES Act” to bypass negotiated rulemaking and 

notice and comment. According to Brown and Taylor, the 

Act does not substantively authorize the Plan, and so the 

Secretary was required to follow these procedures. 

The District Court agreed with Brown and Taylor—in 

part. It rebuffed their central argument that the HEROES 

Act exempts from procedural requirements only those actions that the Act substantively authorizes. But the District Court nonetheless held that the Plan exceeds the Secretary's authority under the HEROES Act and therefore 

entered judgment vacating it. 640 F. Supp. 3d 644, 668 

(2022). 

After the Fifth Circuit denied the Department's motion 

for a stay pending appeal, the Department applied to this 

Court for such a stay. The Department advised in the alternative that we could treat its application as a petition for 

certiorari before judgment. We did just that, granting the 

Department's petition for certiorari before judgment and 

deferring consideration of its application for a stay. 598 

U. S. ––– (2022). We now review the judgment in No. 22– 

535 and dispose of the pending application in No. 22A489. 

II 

We ultimately do not address Brown and Taylor's argument that the Department failed to observe proper procedures in promulgating the Plan. “We have `an obligation to 

assure ourselves' of litigants' standing under Article III” before proceeding to the merits of a case. DaimlerChrysler 

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 340 (2006) (quoting Friends of 

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180 (2000)). And because we conclude 

that Brown and Taylor lack standing, “[t]his case begins and 

ends with standing.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. –––, ––– 

(2020). In particular, we hold that Brown and Taylor fail to 

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establish that any injury they suffer from not having their 

loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan. 

A 

Our authority under the Constitution is limited to resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, § 2. “The doctrine of standing,” among others, “implements this” limit on 

our authority. Carney, 592 U. S., at –––. Our jurisprudence has “established that the irreducible constitutional 

minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plaintiff must plead and—ultimately—prove. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). “First, the plaintiff 

must have suffered an `injury in fact' ” that is both “concrete 

and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural 

or hypothetical.” Ibid. (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). Second, the plaintiff's injury must be “fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” meaning 

that “there must be a causal connection between the injury 

and the conduct complained of.” Ibid. (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted). “Third, it must be `likely,' 

as opposed to merely `speculative,' that the injury will be 

redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 561 (some internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have found, however, that when a statute affords a 

litigant “a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,” 

the litigant may establish Article III jurisdiction without 

meeting the usual “standards for redressability and immediacy.” Id., at 572, n. 7. For example, we hypothesized a person “living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of 

a federally licensed dam” and explained that this person “has 

standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he 

cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will 

cause the license to be withheld or altered.” Ibid. In this 

context, the fact that the defendant might well come to the 

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same decision after abiding by the contested procedural requirement does not deprive a plaintiff of standing. 

Regardless of the redressability showing we have tolerated in the procedural-rights context, we have never held a 

litigant who asserts such a right is excused from demonstrating that it has a “concrete interest that is affected by the 

deprivation” of the claimed right. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 496–497 (2009). 

We emphasized this requirement in Summers, where we 

were asked to review U. S. Forest Service regulations exempting certain minor land-management decisions from the 

typical notice-and-comment process. Id., at 490–491. The 

plaintiffs in that case did not have any “concrete plans to 

observe nature in [a] specifc area” affected by actions the 

Service took pursuant to this exemption, id., at 497, and we 

therefore held that they lacked standing, id., at 494–497. As 

we put it, the “deprivation of a procedural right without 

some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation— 

a procedural right in vacuo—is insuffcient to create Article III standing.” Id., at 496. 

B 

Before applying this framework, we pause to explain both 

respondents' theory of standing and the substance of their 

claim, which have not always been readily ascertainable—or 

consistently described—during this litigation. 

Upon initial inspection, respondents' merits theory appears to be in tension with the possibility that the Department could redress their injury. Respondents argue simultaneously (1) that the Department might have treated them 

more generously if it had solicited their input in developing 

the Plan and (2) that the Department lacks substantive authority to promulgate broad-based loan forgiveness under 

the HEROES Act. It would be quite odd for Brown and 

Taylor to complain about being unable to seek an increase 

in the scope of an administrative action that they think the 

Department cannot lawfully take. 

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Respondents belatedly attempted to address this strange 

feature of their argument. Their complaint does not say a 

word about standing. But in their reply supporting their 

motion in the District Court for an injunction against the 

Plan, they ventured a brief attempt to explain their position 

on this threshold issue. They insisted that the Department 

cannot adopt the Plan under the HEROES Act regardless 

of the procedures it follows. Reply in No. 4:22–cv–908 

(ND Tex., Oct. 20, 2022), ECF Doc. 26, pp. 3–4. But they 

observed that the Department has claimed it also has authority to forgive loans under a different statute, the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), which authorizes the Secretary 

to “compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, lien, 

or demand.” 20 U. S. C. § 1082(a)(6). Thus, respondents argued, there is a chance that vacating the Plan would prompt 

the Department to pursue loan relief under the HEA instead. 

In this Court, Brown and Taylor discuss the HEA at length 

for the frst time in this litigation. See Brief for Respondents 28–32. 

Having recounted this history, we now understand respondents' claim and theory of standing as follows. First, 

because the HEROES Act does not substantively authorize 

the Plan, the Department was obligated to follow the typical 

negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment requirements. Second, if the Department had observed those procedures, respondents might have used those opportunities 

to convince the Department (1) that proceeding under the 

HEROES Act is unlawful or otherwise undesirable, and 

(2) that it should adopt a different loan-forgiveness plan under 

the HEA instead, one that is more generous to them than the 

HEROES Act plan that they allege is unlawful. They assert there is at least a chance that this series of events will 

come to pass now if we vacate the Plan. Id., at 19. 

C 

Describing respondents' claim illustrates how unusual it is. 

They claim they are injured because the Government has not 

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Opinion of the Court 

adopted a lawful benefts program under which they would 

qualify for assistance. But the same could be said of anyone 

who might beneft from a benefts program that the Government has not chosen to adopt. It is diffcult to see how such 

an injury could be particular (since all people suffer it) or 

concrete (since an as-yet-uncreated benefts plan is necessarily “ `abstract' ” and not “ `real' ”).1 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

578 U. S. 330, 340 (2016); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 

737, 755–756 (1984) (rejecting a theory that would “extend 

[standing] nationwide”). Nor have we ever accepted that an 

injury is redressable when the prospect of redress turns on 

the Government's wholly discretionary decision to create a 

new regulatory or benefts program. 

Nonetheless, we think the defciencies of respondents' 

claim are clearest with respect to traceability. They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan 

relief under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department's 

(allegedly unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the 

HEROES Act. 

1 

At the outset, we reiterate what respondents' claim is not. 

Respondents are not claiming that they are injured by not 

being included in the Plan (or, in Taylor's case, by being 

remunerated by the Plan less generously than he thinks himself entitled to). After all, they think the Plan is substantively unlawful, a merits contention that “we accept as valid” 

for purposes of analyzing standing. Federal Election 

Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022). 

It would be quite strange to think that a party experiences 

an Article III injury by not being affected by an unlawful 

action (in Brown's case) or not being more affected by such 

action (in Taylor's). 

1 In contrast, a claim of unlawful exclusion from an existing benefts 

program can be ft for judicial resolution. See, e. g., Trinity Lutheran 

Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462 (2017). 

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Instead, respondents seek relief under a separate statutory source. They name the HEA as that potential source, 

but presumably they would be pleased for the Department 

to invoke any other lawful source (if one exists) as grounds 

for granting them loan relief. Their interest is in obtaining 

loan forgiveness in general. 

The Plan, however, is independent of any student-loan relief the Department might craft under the HEA (or any other 

statute). A decision by this Court that the Plan is lawful 

would have no effect on the Department's ability to forgive 

respondents' loans under the HEA.2 Thus, the Plan poses 

no legal obstacle to the Department's choosing to fnd other 

ways to remedy the harm respondents experience from not 

having their loans forgiven. 

Put differently, the Department's decision to give other 

people relief under a different statutory scheme did not 

cause respondents not to obtain the benefts they want. 

The cause of their supposed injury is far more pedestrian 

than that: The Department has simply chosen not to give 

them the relief they want. Ordinarily, a party's recourse to 

induce an agency to take a desired action is to fle not a 

lawsuit, but a “petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.” 5 U. S. C. § 553(e). The denial of such a 

petition “must be justifed by a statement of reasons,” which 

in turn “can be appealed to the courts” if the litigant has 

standing to maintain such a suit. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 

452, 459 (1997). Contesting a separate benefts program 

based on a theory that it crowds out the desired one, however, is an approach for which we have been unable to fnd 

any precedent. 

It is true that in procedural-standing cases, we tolerate 

uncertainty over whether observing certain procedures 

would have led to (caused) a different substantive outcome, 

2 We do not opine on the substantive lawfulness of any action the Department might take under the HEA or add anything to our construction 

of the HEROES Act as set forth in today's opinion in Nebraska. 
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566 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Opinion of the Court 

as with Lujan's example of the dam and the bypassed environmental impact statement. See 504 U. S., at 572, n. 7. In 

this case, however, the causal uncertainty is not merely over 

whether observing certain procedures would have led to a 

different substantive outcome. Instead, the uncertainty 

concerns whether the substantive decisions the Department 

has made regarding the Plan under the HEROES Act have 

a causal relationship with other substantive decisions respondents want the Department to make under the HEA. 

There is no precedent for tolerating this sort of causal 

uncertainty. 

Our other procedural-standing cases demonstrate the 

point. In the example posited in Lujan, proceeding with 

building the dam as planned and simultaneously sparing the 

adjacent landowner from the negative effects of the dam are 

mutually exclusive options. See ibid. While it might be 

uncertain whether undertaking an environmental impact 

statement would prevent the dam from being built, it is clear 

that building the dam would directly injure the landowner. 

Similarly, in a case like Summers, it might be uncertain 

whether public comment would alter any particular landmanagement decision the Forest Service makes. There 

would be no uncertainty, however, that a plaintiff with concrete plans to observe nature in a particular area “would 

be harmed if the [land-management project] went forward 

without incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested” 

in his comments. 555 U. S., at 494.3 

Accordingly, Brown and Taylor need not allege that observing negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment 

would “ `force' ” the Department to reach substantive results 

3 Although no plaintiff in Summers had standing because none had 

alleged specifc plans to observe nature in one of the areas at issue in 

the case, see 555 U. S., at 500, the point remains that, in an equivalent 

case featuring those specifc plans, environmental damage to such a plaintiff's esthetic interests could fairly be traced to the Service's landmanagement choices. 
Cite as: 600 U. S. 551 (2023) 567 

Opinion of the Court 

more favorable to them than those embodied in the Plan. 

Lemon v. Geren, 514 F. 3d 1312, 1314–1315 (CADC 2008). 

But they must still show—pursuant to our customary traceability standards—that the Plan's substance causes their injury by impairing loan relief under the HEA. 

Brown and Taylor cannot meet this standard. “It is 

purely speculative whether the denia[l]” of HEA loan relief—their ostensible injury—“fairly can be traced to” the 

Department's decision to grant loan relief in the Plan. 

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 

U. S. 26, 42–43 (1976); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 

503–504 (1975). 

As noted above, HEROES Act loan relief and HEA loan 

relief function independently of each other. If the Department may lawfully grant loan relief under both the HEROES 

Act and the HEA, it is entitled to choose to do both, neither, 

or only one (provided that it suffciently explains its reasoning, see 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A)). There is little reason to think 

that its discretionary decision to pursue one mechanism of 

loan relief has anything to do with its discretionary decision 

to pursue (or not pursue) another. “The line of causation 

between” the Department's promulgation of the Plan and respondents' lack of benefts under the HEA “is attenuated 

at best,” Allen, 468 U. S., at 757, and all too dependent on 

“ `conjecture,' ” Summers, 555 U. S., at 496. 

2 

Respondents' attempts to tie the Plan to potential HEA 

relief are unavailing. They point to a handful of documents 

related to the Plan that say that the Department is providing 

“one-time” student-loan relief. See, e. g., App. 215, 221, 225. 

Such statements, Brown and Taylor argue, show that the 

decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act foreclosed HEA relief. 

This is insuffcient. The Plan itself—the action under review here—contains no reference to “one-time” relief. See 

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568 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Opinion of the Court 

87 Fed. Reg. 61512–61514. And to the extent that the Department's decision to adopt the Plan under the HEROES 

Act might have some incidental effect on the likelihood that 

the Department will undertake a separate loan-forgiveness 

program under a different statute, the relationship is not suffciently close to persuade us that the latter is fairly traceable 

to the former. See, e. g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42–43 (accepting that certain tax rules might “ `encourag[e]' ” or “ `discourage' ” particular behavior, but nonetheless holding that connection to be insuffcient to establish standing where it was 

“just as plausible” that actors would “forgo favorable tax 

treatment”). Moreover, no one argues that the existing references to one-time relief are legally binding. To whatever 

extent the Department has determined that the Plan crowds 

out other efforts to forgive student loans, that, too, is a discretionary and independent decision that respondents may 

ask it to reconsider with a § 553(e) petition. 

Finally, Brown and Taylor also argue that they have demonstrated causation because the Secretary's failure to observe the requisite procedural rules cost them a “ `chance' ” 

to “obtain debt forgiveness.” Brief for Respondents 28. 

But referring in the abstract to a “chance” of obtaining “debt 

forgiveness” does not solve their problem. They do not 

want debt forgiveness under the HEROES Act, which they 

claim is unlawful. They want debt forgiveness under the 

HEA. Nothing the Secretary has done deprives them of a 

“chance” to seek that result. 

Because respondents cannot meaningfully connect the absence of loan relief under the HEA to the adoption of the 

Plan, they have failed to show that their injury is fairly 

traceable to the Plan. 

* * * 

For these reasons, respondents lack standing, and we 

therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. By vacating the 
Cite as: 600 U. S. 551 (2023) 569 

Opinion of the Court 

District Court's judgment, we obviate the need to grant the 

interim relief the Department requests in its application in 

No. 22A489. We therefore deny the application as moot. 

It is so ordered. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None