IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-50513

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GEOVANNY ANTONIO LOYOLA-VILLEGAS, also known as Loyola 

Geovanny Anto Villegas, also known as Giovanny Loyola, also known as 

Geovanny Antonioloyo Villegas, also known as Geovanny Antoni 

Villegasloyola, also known as Geovanny Anton Loyola-Villegas, also known as 

Geovanny Loyolavillegas, also known as Geovanny Loyola, also known as 

Geovanny A. Loyola-Villegas,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:18-CR-48-1

Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Geovanny Antonio Loyola-Villegas pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into 

the United States. The district court sentenced him to 24 months of

imprisonment. This sentence was within the range prescribed by the United 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 12, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-50513

2

States Sentencing Guidelines. Loyola-Villegas now appeals, arguing that his 

sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to 

accomplish the sentencing goals listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Because Loyola-Villegas did not object to the substantive reasonableness 

of his sentence in the district court, plain error review applies.1 See United 

States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 425 (5th Cir. 2013). Loyola-Villegas’s sentence 

is presumptively reasonable because it fell within his advisory Guidelines 

range. See id. at 424. “The presumption is rebutted only upon a showing that 

the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant 

weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it 

represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” Id. at 

424-25 (quoting United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Loyola-Villegas argues that his sentence overstates the seriousness of 

his offense and his dangerousness because § 2L1.2 overemphasizes a 

defendant’s criminal history by “double counting” prior convictions, factoring 

them into both the offense level and the criminal history calculation. He 

further contends that the sentence fails to reflect his personal history and 

characteristics. Finally, he argues that the then-impending arrival of his first 

child changed his outlook on life and provided him a reason to stay in Mexico; 

thus, the sentence is greater than necessary to provide adequate deterrence 

and to protect the American public. 

 

1 For the sake of preserving the issue, Loyola-Villegas challenges the standard of 

review, arguing that other circuits review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. Likewise, Loyola-Villegas also wishes to preserve his argument that a 

presumption of reasonableness should not apply to a within-Guidelines sentence calculated 

under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines because § 2L1.2 is not the result of empirical 

evidence or study. As Loyola-Villegas concedes, these arguments are foreclosed by our 

precedent and we therefore do not address them. See Heard, 709 F.3d at 425; United States 

v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 231, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2011).

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We have rejected the argument that a sentence based on § 2L1.2 is 

substantively unreasonable because § 2L1.2 counts a defendant’s criminal 

history twice. See United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 529-31 (5th Cir. 2009). 

As for Loyola-Villegas’s remaining arguments, the record makes clear that the 

district court reviewed the presentence report, the § 3553(a) factors, and 

Loyola-Villegas’s criminal history. Loyola-Villegas has not shown that his 

sentence reflects an improper balancing of the sentencing factors. Thus, he 

has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. 

Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

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