1

FILED

May 26, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt

Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

JOHN G. TABOR, Individually, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9902-CV-00043

and TABOR CONSTRUCTION, INC., )

 )

Plaintiffs-Appellants, )

 )

v. )

 ) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE

 ) KNOX COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

 )

CHRISTI EAKIN, GETTYSVUE )

PARTNERS, L.P., CLUB PARTNERS, )

INC., and WANG LAU and wife, )

FLORENCE LAU, )

 ) HONORABLE DALE C. WORKMAN,

Defendants-Appellees. ) JUDGE

For Appellants For Appellees Christi Eakin,

 Gettysvue Partners, L.P.,

THOMAS R. HENLEY and Club Partners, Inc.

Lufkin, Henley & Conner

Knoxville, Tennessee RICKY L. APPERSON

Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom, PLLC

Knoxville, Tennessee

For Appellees Wang Lau and

 Florence Lau

JAMES Y. (BO) REED

JAMES C. CONE

Jenkins & Jenkins, PLLC

Knoxville, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
1

Tabor apparently has abandoned the slander claim.

2

Gettysvue Polo, Golf and Country Club was also named as a defendant in

the complaint, but was dismissed on its motion. Tabor specifically excepted

Gettysvue Polo, Golf and Country Club from the notice of appeal, and it is

therefore not a party to this appeal.

2

The plaintiffs, John G. Tabor and Tabor Construction,

Inc. (collectively, “Tabor”), brought this action for damages

against Christi Eakin (“Eakin”), Gettysvue Partners, L.P., Club

Partners, Inc., and Wang Lau and his wife, Florence Lau (“the

Laus”), alleging that the defendants were guilty of “libel and

slander1 and defamation.” The trial court dismissed each of

Tabor’s claims against the various defendants,2 Tabor appeals,

raising the following issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the

Laus on the ground that they did not publish

the libelous letter from Eakin?

2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the

Laus on the ground that their libelous

communications were absolutely privileged?

3. Did the trial court err in dismissing

Eakin, Gettysvue Partners, L.P., and Club

Partners, Inc., on the ground that the

libelous letter from Eakin was an absolutely

privileged communication?

We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The core facts of this controversy are essentially

undisputed. The Laus contracted with Tabor to build a house in

Gettysvue Subdivision in Knox County. Various disputes arose

between the Laus and Tabor regarding the construction of the

house and the amount owed by the Laus. According to the Laus,
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Tabor, among other things, had failed to complete the agreed-upon

landscaping work; had failed to complete construction in various

areas of the house; had demanded an excessive amount to complete

work on the basement; and had failed to build a sun deck in

accordance with proper safety specifications.

The Laus subsequently received a letter from Eakin, the

Vice President of Gettysvue Partners, L.P., which letter states

as follows:

On Tuesday, April 15, 1997 and on behalf of

the Gettysvue developers, I inspected the

landscaping at your home. Gettysvue

covenants and restrictions require that your

yard be sodded and landscaped according to

the landscaping plans which were submitted

and approved. Although you have taken

residence, the sod and landscaping at your

home have not been completed. Clearly, the

incomplete status of your landscaping is in

violation of the covenants and restrictions.

As I understand, the builder, John Tabor,

refuses to complete the landscaping which he

is required to do pursuant to your building

contract. I am sorry and do sympathize with

your situation. In fact, I daily receive

complaints regarding Mr. Tabor’s actions from

not only his customers, but also from vendors

and suppliers in the Knoxville area. As you

know, Gettysvue has officially notified Mr.

Tabor that he is no longer allowed to build

in Gettysvue. His total lack of cooperation

and refusal to abide by the Gettysvue

restrictions as well as the complaints

prompted this decision.

I am very concerned about all of the

unsuspecting potential home customers with

whom he may come in contact, because just as

you did, others will place faith in him that

he will fulfill his contract obligations. 

Just recently, I learned that he is building

a home in the “Parade of Homes” in

Whittington Creek on Northshore Drive. 

Amazing, isn’t it? It is difficult to

believe that the Tennessee Board of Licensing

Contractors and/or Knoxville Home Builders
4

Association would continue to allow him to

conduct business.

While as [sic] I have communicated my

understanding of your situation, I still need

to understand the resolution. Please keep me

updated, and I will do whatever I can to

help.

(Underlining in original.)

Shortly thereafter, the Laus filed a complaint against

Tabor with the Tennessee Board for Licensing Contractors (“the

Board”). Along with various other information in the complaint,

the Laus forwarded a copy of Eakin’s letter, as well as a letter

from Mr. Lau which states as follows:

I am filing a complaint against Tabor

Construction, Inc. and Mr. John Tabor and am

reporting violations as the Tennessee

registration law requires. Please see

attachment.

This complaint is not an ordinary complaint

regarding [a] Contractor not performing work. 

This Contractor has been “disbarred” from

building at the Gettysvue Polo, Golf, and

Country Club, a new and big subdivision in

Knoxville where Mr. Tabor had started at

least seven houses.... This Contractor has

also persisted in the violation of safety

practices and building codes and has also

engaged in the practice of gouging his

clients for money. The professional conduct

of the Contractor is highly questionable.

It is understood that the license of Tabor

Construction, Inc., is up for renewal on May

31, 1997.

I trust that the Board will make a timely

inquiry into this matter. I shall be in full

cooperation with the Board as the law

requires.

(Bold lettering in original.)
3

Club Partners, Inc. apparently is the general partner of Gettysvue

Partners, L.P.

5

Tabor subsequently filed this action against Eakin,

Gettysvue Partners, L.P., Club Partners, Inc.,3 and the Laus. In

the complaint, Tabor alleges that the majority of Eakin’s letter,

several statements in Mr. Lau’s letter to the Board, and numerous

other statements contained in the Laus’ complaint to the Board

are libelous. With regard to Eakin’s letter, Tabor’s theory is

set forth in the complaint as follows:

...Wang L. Lau, with the full knowledge and

consent and approval and assistance and

cooperation and in conspiracy with defendants

Christi Eakin and his wife Florence Lau did

solicit, encourage, urge and assist defendant

Eakin to write the said letter with the

express purpose of publishing it in his

complaint to [the Board] which he filed with

the Board on or about May 1, 1997. Defendant

Lau informed defendant Eakin that he was

going to use it in his complaint to the

Board, and she composed and published the

said letter knowing that it would be used

against plaintiffs and that it would be

published to the Board and to others.

The Laus filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary

judgment. They also filed a joint affidavit in which they

stated, among other things, that they did not cause, request or

suggest that Eakin’s letter be written or mailed to them, and,

furthermore, that they did not act in conspiracy with any of the

other defendants to cause the letter to be published. Eakin,

Gettysvue Partners, L.P., and Club Partners, Inc., also filed a

motion to dismiss. Their motion was unsupported by any material

outside the pleadings. Tabor did not file any factual matters in

response. The trial court granted the motion of each defendant,

and Tabor appealed.
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II. Applicable Law

The Supreme Court has held that “statements made in the

course of a judicial proceeding that are relevant and pertinent

to the issues involved are absolutely privileged and cannot be

the predicate for liability in an action for libel....” Lambdin

Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn.

1978); Jones v. Trice, 360 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1962). This

concept is to be liberally construed so as to insure unfettered

access to the judicial process. See Myers v. Pickering Firm,

Inc., 959 S.W.2d 152, 161 (Tenn.App. 1997).

This general rule applies in “administrative

proceedings before boards or commissions that are clothed with

the authority to revoke a license ‘after a hearing for good cause

shown....’” Lambdin, 559 S.W.2d at 792. As the Court in Lambdin

explained,

[t]he “judicial proceeding” to which the

immunity attaches has not been defined very

exactly. It includes any hearing before a

tribunal which performs a judicial

[f]unction, ex parte, or otherwise, and

whether the hearing is public or not.... It

extends also to the proceedings of many

administrative officers such as boards and

commissions, so far as they have powers of

discretion in applying the law to the facts

which are regarded as judicial, or “quasijudicial” in character. Thus the ordinary

administrative proceeding to revoke a license

is held to lie within the privilege.

Id. (quoting from PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964)). (Emphasis

in Lambdin).
4

In Myers, we found a consultant’s report criticizing an architectural

firm’s work to be absolutely privileged, as published to the party with whom

the firm had contracted, where the report contained information that was

pertinent and relevant to pending litigation and was prepared in anticipation

of testimony. Id. at 160-61.

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In Lambdin, the plaintiffs brought suit after the

defendant had, among other things, filed charges against them

with the Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, and

had participated in the ensuing hearing before that Board. The

Supreme Court observed that the Board in question possessed the

authority to revoke the plaintiffs’ license, and also noted that

the statements at issue had been pertinent to the issues involved

in that proceeding. Finding that the defendant’s statements were

absolutely privileged, the Court affirmed the trial court’s

dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for slander, libel,

conspiracy to libel and defame the plaintiffs, and invasion of

privacy. Id. at 791-92. 

We have previously pointed out the Supreme Court’s

“willingness to extend the doctrine [of absolute privilege] to

communications preliminary to proposed or pending litigation.” 

Myers, 959 S.W.2d at 161.4 (Emphasis added.)

III. Tabor’s Claim Against the Laus

We shall first address the propriety of the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment to the Laus.

We review the trial court’s decision against the

standard of Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P., which provides in

pertinent part as follows:
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...the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law....

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court

must decide anew if judgment in summary fashion is appropriate. 

Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn.

1991); Gonzalez v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45

(Tenn.App. 1993). Since this determination involves a question

of law, there is no presumption of correctness as to the trial

court’s judgment. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn.

1997); Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn. 1996). In

making our determination, we must view the evidence in a light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Byrd v. Hall, 847

S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate

only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the

undisputed material facts entitle the moving party to a judgment

as a matter of law. Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P.; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d

208, 211 (Tenn. 1993).

As explained in Byrd, “the party seeking summary

judgment has the burden of demonstrating to the court that there

are no disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue for

trial... and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 215. One method of accomplishing this is by “conclusively

establish[ing] an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving

party’s claim....” Id. at 215 n.5.
5

Even if the Laus had prompted Eakin to write them the letter, we do not

understand how they can be held legally responsible for publishing a libelous

letter to themselves.

9

In the instant case, the Laus submitted an affidavit in

which they denied being responsible, in any way, for the initial

publication of Eakin’s letter. The trial court subsequently

determined that no material issues of fact existed as to whether

the Laus had caused, or had conspired to cause, the publication

of the letter. Significantly, Tabor submitted no affidavits or

other material to contradict the Laus’ affidavit. Accordingly,

we hold that the trial court was correct in granting summary

judgment to the Laus as to the publication of Eakin’s letter to

the Laus. On the facts before the trial court, and now before

us, the Laus were not culpable with respect to the initial

publication of Eakin’s letter, and therefore under no

circumstances can they be found liable for its initial

publication.5

Tabor also alleges a cause of action against the Laus

predicated on their filing of the complaint with the Board. 

Tabor contends that the filing of the complaint and the

supporting documentation, including the re-publication of the

Eakin letter, amount to an actionable publication of libelous

material. On the contrary, we agree with the trial court’s

determination that such material is absolutely privileged. This

conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s holding in

Lambdin, discussed above, and the cases holding that the doctrine

of absolute privilege espoused in Lambdin is to be broadly

applied. See, e.g., Myers, 959 S.W.2d at 151. Furthermore, it

is clear that the statements in question concerned the
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circumstances surrounding the various disputes between the Laus

and Tabor, and, as such, were “relevant and pertinent to the

issues involved” in the Laus’ complaint to the Board. See

Lambdin, 559 S.W.2d at 792.

In light of the fact that the statements in the Laus’

complaint to the Board, including the supporting material, are

absolutely privileged, we hold that the Laus conclusively

established an affirmative defense to Tabor’s libel claim. It is

also clear that Tabor failed to set forth specific facts

demonstrating the existence of disputed, material facts creating

any genuine issue that would require a determination by a trier

of fact. See Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215. Accordingly, the trial

court’s grant to the Laus of summary judgment with respect to

their complaint to the Board was proper. Rule 56.04,

Tenn.R.Civ.P.; Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215.

IV. Tabor’s Claim Against Eakin,

Gettysvue Partners, L.P., and Club Partners, Inc.

We next turn to the trial court’s grant of the

remaining defendants’ joint motion to dismiss. Our standard of

review of a trial court’s decision on such a motion is wellsettled:

In considering a motion to dismiss, courts

should construe the complaint liberally in

favor of the plaintiff, taking all

allegations of fact as true, and deny the

motion unless it appears that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of [his]

claim that would entitle [him] to relief. In

considering this appeal from the trial

court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to

dismiss, we take all allegations of fact in
6

Tabor does not allege that anyone other than the Laus and the Board

received Eakin’s letter.

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the plaintiff’s complaint as true, and review

the lower courts’ legal conclusions de novo

with no presumption of correctness.

Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997).

(Citations omitted.)

As noted earlier, Tabor alleges in the complaint that

the Laus and Eakin had conspired to effectuate the publication of

Eakin’s letter, and, specifically, that Eakin had “composed and

published the said letter knowing that it would be used against

plaintiffs and that it would be published to the Board and to

others.”6 The trial court, however, in ruling on the motion to

dismiss, held that the allegedly libelous letter from Eakin to

the Laus was an absolutely privileged communication. Although

the trial court did not specify the basis for this conclusion, we

are of the opinion that the same reasoning applicable to the

Laus’ communications to the Board applies here, i.e., the

statements contained in Eakin’s letter were absolutely privileged

by virtue of the fact that they were made -- according to the

complaint itself -- in anticipation of a quasi-judicial

proceeding before the Board. See Lambdin, 559 S.W.2d at 792;

Myers, 959 S.W.2d at 161. In other words, Tabor is bound by the

factual allegations contained in the complaint, and, taking those

allegations as true, Eakin’s statements would be absolutely

privileged. Furthermore -- as in the case of the statements

communicated to the Board by the Laus -- the statements contained

in Eakin’s letter were “pertinent and relevant” to the Laus’

anticipated complaint to the Board. See Lambdin, 559 S.W.2d at
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792. Thus, they cannot form the predicate for a finding of

liability for libel on the part of Eakin, Gettysvue Partners,

L.P., and Club Partners, Inc. On its face, the complaint as to

these defendants makes out an affirmative defense to the alleged

cause of action.

We therefore hold that the trial court correctly

granted the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss.

V. Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on

appeal are taxed to the appellants. This case is remanded to the

trial court for the collection of costs assessed there, pursuant

to applicable law.

__________________________

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.

CONCUR:

_________________________

Houston M. Goddard, P.J.

_________________________

Herschel P. Franks, J.