COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

B. JACQUELYNE MORRELL 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2881-96-1 PER CURIAM 

 JUNE 24, 1997 

CHARLES MORRELL 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 

N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 

 (Kenneth B. Murov; Jones, Blechman, Woltz & 

Kelly, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Paul M. Lipkin; Goldblatt, Lipkin & Cohen, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 B. Jacquelyne Morrell (wife) appeals the equitable 

distribution decision of the circuit court. Wife contends that 

the trial court erred by (1) equally dividing the parties' 

marital assets; (2) failing to properly consider the 

circumstances which contributed to the dissolution of the 

marriage, see Code § 20-107.3(E)(5); (3) excluding evidence of 

debts wife incurred to pay marital debt and maintain marital 

assets; and (4) awarding attorney's fees to Charles Morrell 

(husband). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, 

we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Equitable Distribution

 "In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we 

recognize that the trial court's job is a difficult one. 

Accordingly, we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge 

in weighing the many considerations and circumstances that are 

presented in each case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 137, 

354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987). 

 "Unless it appears from the record that the 

[trial judge] has abused his discretion, that 

he has not considered or has misapplied one 

of the statutory mandates, or that the 

evidence fails to support the findings of 

fact underlying his resolution of the 

conflict in the equities, the . . . equitable 

distribution award will not be reversed on 

appeal." 

Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 244-45, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 

(1987) (citation omitted). 

 Wife contends that the trial court erred in equally 

distributing the parties' marital assets. There is no 

presumption in Virginia favoring equal division of marital 

property. See Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341 

S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1986). Both parties worked throughout the 

marriage and devoted time to manage their various real estate and 

commercial undertakings. While husband acknowledged wife's 

monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the family and the 

acquisition of marital assets, wife "refuse[d] to acknowledge in 

great part [husband's] contribution" to either the family's 

well-being or to the acquisition, care, and maintenance of 
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marital property. 

 "The court is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, 

and its findings are of great weight on appeal." Klein v. Klein, 

11 Va. App. 155, 161, 396 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1990). The trial 

court found husband's testimony more credible. Based in part on 

that testimony, the court found that the parties made equal 

monetary contributions to the family and that husband made the 

greater nonmonetary contributions. The trial court found that 

the evidence "amply supports the Husband's request for an equal 

division." The record does not demonstrate that the court erred 

in giving each party fifty percent of the marital assets. 

Code § 20-107.3(E)(5)

 In considering the "amount of any division or transfer of 

jointly owned marital property," the court is expressly 

authorized to consider the "circumstances and factors which 

contributed to the dissolution of the marriage." Code 

§ 20-107.3(E)(5). While noting that the parties received a 

"no-fault" divorce, the court found that wife "was an angry 

person" who contributed negatively to the marriage and who 

conducted herself "hostilely toward [husband], her employees, and 

patrons of their business" and who was "frequently . . . in 

conflicts" with husband, her family, employees, and customers. 

The trial court ruled that wife's temper was a factor in the 

demise of the parties' marriage and was a relevant factor to be 

considered in the equitable distribution. 
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 Husband's testimony, as well as the testimony of at least 

one employee, supported the court's finding. The weight to be 

afforded this factor was left to the court's discretion, and we 

find no abuse of that discretion. 

Marital Debt

 Wife contends the trial court erred by excluding her 

evidence concerning debts she incurred in maintaining and caring 

for the property. However, the trial court allowed wife an 

opportunity to establish that the debts were related to the 

marital assets. The court found that wife's records were 

insufficient to link the expenses with any marital assets. The 

record does not support wife's claim that she was denied an 

opportunity to prove she incurred debts for the maintenance of 

marital assets. Wife was given an opportunity but was unable to 

substantiate her claims. 

Attorney's Fees

 An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal 

only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. 

App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper 

award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the 

circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 

338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). The court awarded husband $2,000 in 

fees, ruling that wife "has contributed significantly to the 

protracted litigation in her recalcitrant conduct and attitude." 
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 The record reflects the fact that wife's inability to 

substantiate her claimed debts required an hour recess and the 

subsequent rescheduling of the remainder of the hearing. We 

cannot say that the award was unreasonable or that the trial 

court abused its discretion in making the award. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.