F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

AUG 6 2003

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

HARVEY BARNETT, INC., a Florida

corporation; INFANT SWIMMING

RESEARCH, INC., a Florida

corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ANN SHIDLER, individually and

d/b/a Infant Aquatic Survival; JUDY

HEUMANN, individually and d/b/a

Infant Aquatic Survival; ALISON

GEERDES, individually and d/b/a

Infant Aquatic Survival,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1047

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No. 00-B-731 (OES))

Douglas Jaffe of San Diego, California, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Mark W. Fischer (Kristin M. Berdan with him on the brief), Faegre & Benson,

LLP, Boulder, Colorado for the Defendants-Appellees.

Before SEYMOUR, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
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LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Harvey Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming Research, Inc.

(collectively, “ISR”) filed a complaint against three former employees, alleging

state-law claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and

unjust enrichment, as well as claims of unfair competition and deceptive trade

practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”), Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 6-1-105. ISR further alleged federal claims of trademark infringement and

misleading trade practices in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114

and 1125. Finding that ISR failed to produce sufficient evidence with respect to

any of its claims, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in

part.

I

In 1966, Dr. Harvey Barnett, the founder and president of ISR, began to

develop the Infant Swimming Research program (“ISR program”), which plaintiffs

describe as a “scientific, behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevention.” 

(Appellants’ Br. at 4.) ISR’s program utilizes a method known as “swim, float,

swim,” and contains nearly two-thousand “prompts and procedures” for teaching

infants as young as six-months old how to survive in the water. (Id.) In addition,

the ISR program maintains safety protocols to keep children safe during
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instruction and provides a “BUDS” Record Sheet allowing parents to monitor

children’s bodily functions, diet, and sleep in order to evaluate physical responses

to the ISR program.

In a five-week course, ISR trains and certifies instructors. ISR-certified

instructors teach survival skills to infants in private lessons, ten minutes a day,

five days a week for three to four weeks. Instructors receive a videotape entitled

“Prompts and Procedures,” which illustrates how to use behavioral conditioning in

teaching infants and covers other water-safety issues. ISR’s program also includes

the ISR Master Instructor System, in which individuals become certified as Master

Instructors to train other potential ISR instructors. 

Dr. Barnett has written various books detailing some of the techniques and

methods used in ISR’s aquatic-survival program, including Precision Strokes for

Little Folks, published in 1974. More than ten years later, he wrote, but never

published, a manual entitled The Science of Infant Swimming, which is used to

help instructors understand “the psychology of infants and young children, their

anatomy, and the physics involved as their small bodies move through the water.”

(Appellants’ Br. at 5.) In 1989, ISR began publishing the “Parent Resource Book,”

now in its ninth edition, an educational book distributed to parents regarding the

dangers of infant drowning and the theory and processes used by ISR.
1

 Beginning in 1986, ISR required its instructors to sign license agreements

every two years.

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Judy Heumann, Ann Shidler, and Alison Geerdes, defendants in the instant

case, are former ISR instructors who left the company in early 2000. ISR trained

Heumann as an instructor and Master Instructor in 1984 and 1987, respectively. 

Shidler was trained as an instructor in 1990, and as a Master Instructor in 1993, and

Geerdes was trained as an ISR instructor and worked for less than a year before

leaving ISR. She is not a Master Instructor. Defendants paid fees ranging from

$5,000 to $10,000 for the instruction.

While employed by ISR, Heumann, Shidler, and Geerdes each signed a “Nondisclosure and Confidentiality Agreement” and a license agreement containing a

further “Confidentiality of Information” provision as well as a “Covenant Not to

Compete.”1

 (1 Appellants’ App. at 60, 77–80, 81–85.) Notwithstanding these

agreements, on leaving ISR in 2000, the three former employees started Infant

Aquatic Survival (“IAS”), a new company devoted to teaching infant and child

swimming in Colorado. It is this conduct that is the subject of this litigation. 

Defendants’ program is allegedly similar to the ISR program in that it utilizes the

same “swim, float, swim” method, implements some of the same safety protocols,

uses a Daily Health Data Sheet similar to the BUDS sheet, uses a comparable

registration form, and distributes a comparable parent resource book to parents of
2

 Judgment as a matter of law favoring Geerdes was granted on the basis

that she was not trained as a Master Instructor.

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children enrolled in the IAS program. It is uncontested that defendant Shidler’s

husband sought to reserve the names Harvey Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming

Research, Inc. with the Colorado Secretary of State. On more than one occasion,

defendants falsely advertised that their program, IAS, had been in business since

1990. 

ISR filed in district court a complaint against the defendants, alleging statelaw claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and unjust

enrichment, as well as unfair competition and deceptive trade practices under the

CCPA, along with federal claims of trademark infringement and misleading trade

practices under the Lanham Act. ISR then sought a preliminary injunction to

prevent the defendants from teaching the ISR program to other instructors. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied ISR’s request for a

preliminary injunction as to Heumann and Shidler.2

 Subsequently, the defendants

moved for summary judgment, which was granted. In its ruling, the district court

concluded that the ISR program was not a trade secret as a matter of law and

dismissed ISR’s misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claim. The district court further

concluded that both the covenant not to compete and the confidentiality provision

in the license agreement were not enforceable, and dismissed ISR’s breach-of-
3

 ISR did not appeal the district court’s denial of its request for a

preliminary injunction.

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contract claim. As to ISR’s remaining claims—trademark infringement and

misleading trade practices under the Lanham Act, and violations of the CCPA—the

court concluded that, because ISR failed to advance sufficient evidence on each

element, those claims must be dismissed as well. ISR appeals the grant of summary

judgment to defendants.3

II

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal

standard used by the district court. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th

Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In our

review, we examine the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of

Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). 

“Although the movant must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, he

or she need not negate the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. Once the movant carries this

burden, the nonmoving party must “bring forward specific facts showing a genuine
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issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which he or she carries the burden

of proof.” Id. (quotation omitted). An issue of material fact is genuine if the

nonmovant presents facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the

nonmovant. Id. 

A

In evaluating the district court’s decision regarding ISR’s trade-secrets

claim, we look to Colorado law. Colorado has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets

Act, which defines a trade secret as “any scientific or technical information, design,

process, procedure, formula, [or] improvement . . . which is secret and of value.” 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-102. In order “[t]o be a ‘trade secret’ the owner thereof

must have taken measures to prevent the secret from becoming available to persons

other than those selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes.” 

Id. Trade-secret status is a question of fact. Colo. Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d

1303, 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v.

Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that in this

context “doubts as to existence of triable issue of fact . . . must be resolved in favor

of the existence of triable issues”). 

 Factors considered in determining whether a trade secret exists include:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business;

(2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e., by

the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade

secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected
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and the value to the holder in having the information as against

competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in obtaining

and developing the information; and (6) the amount of time and

expense it would take for others to acquire and duplicate the

information.

Colo. Supply Co., 797 P.2d at 1306. In Rivendell, we held, consistent with

Colorado law, that information can be a trade secret notwithstanding the fact that

some of its components are well-known. 28 F.3d at 1045. “[A] trade secret can

exist in a combination of characteristics and components each of which, by itself, is

in the public domain, but the unified process, design and operation of which, in

unique combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.” 

Id. (quotation omitted). 

In arriving at its conclusion that the ISR program is not a trade secret as a

matter of law, the district court determined that (1) “[v]ariations of the swim, float,

swim method are known both inside and outside the children’s aquatic business,”

(2) ISR did not take precautions to guard the secrecy of its information “until at

least 1996, after hundreds of instructors had been trained and thousands of students

taught,” (3) “[p]arents and bystanders were allowed to watch and videotape

lessons,” and (4) “a variation on ISR’s methods could be created through a perusal

of commercially available child psychology, child health, and swimming instruction
4

 ISR contends that the district court improperly relied on library books

and information downloaded from the internet. ISR suggests these books and

materials are hearsay and should not have been considered when ruling on

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ISR’s hearsay argument lacks merit.

As correctly explained by the defendants in their reply brief, these pieces of

evidence were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but rather

for the very fact of their existence.

5

 Consistent with this theory, ISR asserts that none of its publications,

including Precision Strokes for Little Folks, discloses trade secrets. Although its

publications provide general information about the techniques used by ISR and

the psychological foundations for those techniques, ISR’s position is that the ISR

program, as a whole, is a trade secret and cannot be learned from its publications. 

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books.”4 Barnett v. Shidler, No. 00-B-731, slip op. at 5 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2002). 

Ultimately, the court found that “ISR allowed its program to become part of the

public domain before seeking protection . . . [and] the Prompts and Procedures,

based on principles of behavioral conditioning, was already in use to teach children

swim, float, swim throughout the nation” and thus “as a matter of law . . . ISR has

no protectable trade secret.” Id. at 5–6.

 Our review leads us to conclude that the district court improperly looked at

components of the ISR program in isolation, rather than as a whole, in determining

that ISR does not possess a trade secret. This runs afoul of the analytical approach

set forth in Rivendell. 28 F.3d at 1045–46 (concluding that the district court

improperly examined the separate elements of an alleged trade secret rather than

the combination of elements). ISR’s position is that the ISR program, as a whole,

is a trade secret.5 (See Appellants’ Br. at 15 (“The unified process, design and
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operation of the ISR Program, in unique combination, affords a competitive

advantage and is a protectable secret.”).) In failing to follow our holding in

Rivendell—that a trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics, each of

which, considered separately, is in the public domain, but, taken together, may

yield a competitive advantage that results in a protectable trade secret—the district

court applied an inappropriate standard. We do not suggest that had the district

court merely stated that it was also considering its findings in the aggregate, that

would have been sufficient. Rivendell’s requirement of analysis in the aggregate is

more than a formality. It is a substantive component of trade-secret analysis

integral to a court’s ultimate conclusion regarding the existence of material facts

for trial. On our review of the record, we conclude that a Rivendell analysis sets in

relief numerous genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. 

In support of the first and second factors used by Colorado courts to

determine the existence of a trade secret—the extent to which the information is

known outside the business and to those inside the business—ISR submitted four

affidavits attesting to the uniqueness of the ISR program. First, Tom Werts, an

aquatic safety consultant with over thirty years of experience, including a position

as the National Director of Water Safety for the American Red Cross, stated in his

affidavit: “The ISR program and the techniques used by its instructors are unique. 

They are not taught by other aquatic organizations. The ISR program is a
6

 Emphasizing the difference between standard swimming programs and

the ISR program, Dr. Barnett points out that although the YMCA, American

Medical Association, and American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) recommend

not teaching children to swim until they are four years of age, the ISR program

teaches infants as young as six months old how to survive in the water. (See 1 id.

at 64.) 

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behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevention.” (1 Appellants’ App. at 71.) 

Second, in his affidavit, Dr. Barnett stated that the ISR program “is not simply

teaching children to swim. The ISR Program is a unique and specially designed

behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevention.”6

 (4 id. at 1455.) Third,

Lisa Grether, a current ISR instructor, averred that the ISR program uses trade

secrets and is unique. Finally, Dr. David Carr, who, in his role as an advisory

board member for the State of Florida, had the opportunity to evaluate various

infant-swimming programs for certification in Florida, submitted an affidavit in

which he claimed that “Dr. Barnett’s program was the only program which offered

a behavioral approach to pediatric drowning prevention” and that the ISR program

is “unique unto itself” and “not capable of being copied simply by watching from

poolside.” (1 id. at 358–59.) 

In further support of the first and second factors, ISR points to testimony

from two current ISR instructors, Carol Gnam and Cindy Asay, who relayed

repeated admissions by Shidler and Heumann regarding the uniqueness of the ISR

program. ISR also elicited testimony from David Dubois, one of defendants’
7

 Dubois claimed that the only other program he was aware of that could

train instructors to teach infants with the same results as ISR was a program run

by Ginny Flahive. During her testimony, however, Flahive explained that in order

to become an instructor under her program, in contrast to the ISR program,

individuals must first spend one year teaching children age four and older.

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experts, stating that he knows of no other aquatic program whose specific goal is to

certify instructors, in a five-week time frame, to teach infants and toddlers aquatic

survival skills.7

 

In support of the third factor—the precautions taken by the holder of the

trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information—ISR presented Dr. Barnett’s

affidavit, franchise agreements, and license agreements. In his affidavit, Dr.

Barnett averred that “ISR has protected the confidentiality of all of the ISR

research and materials since the 1970’s by franchise agreements with

confidentiality restrictions and later by the restrictions of the license agreements.” 

(4 id. at 1455.) As for the franchise agreements, they contained a “Confidentiality

of Information” provision providing that “[f]ranchisee shall not at any time or in

any way divulge, disclose, or communicate to any person or organization in any

manner whatsoever any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to

the business of Franchisor.” (3 Appellees’ Supp. App. at 1158.) Moreover, license

agreements, prior to 1996, contained a “Confidentiality of Information” provision

stating: 
8

 The first three factors are the focus of this appeal. Assuredly, however,

we are satisfied that ISR submitted sufficient evidence in support of the final

three factors as well. In support of the fourth factor—the value to the holder of

possessing trade-secret information—ISR cites the affidavits of Dr. Barnett, Dr.

Carr, and Dr. Werts, in which they attest to the competitive advantages of the ISR

program. Finally, as to the fifth and sixth factors—the amount of effort or money

expended in developing the trade-secret information and the amount of time and

expense it would take for others to duplicate the information—ISR produced

evidence that Dr. Barnett spent his entire adult life developing the ISR program

and evidence that no other infant swimming program compares.

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LICENSEE shall not at any time or in any way divulge, disclose or

communicate to any person or organization in any manner whatsoever

any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the

business of LICENSOR. . . . LICENSEE further agrees not to write for

publication any article concerning Infant Swimming Research teaching and

data techniques and theory, infant swimming or infant and young child

aquatic activities and drowning accidents and . . . not to train or endeavor to

train instructors or assistants in the same or similar methods or techniques

without SPECIFIC WRITTEN CONSENT FROM LICENSOR. . . . Upon

termination of this agreement, LICENSEE will surrender all documents

pertaining to LICENSOR’S business, technique, advertising and trade

secrets.

(1 Appellants’ App. at 61.) Beginning in 1996, the Confidentiality of Information

section provided that “Licensee acknowledges that the materials contain trade

secrets of Licensor and as such provide a competitive advantage.” (1 id. at 74.)

Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that ISR has raised

genuine issues of material fact as to the contested factors.8 ISR submitted evidence

that its program is unique in that it instructs individuals, in a five-week period, how

to teach aquatic-survival skills to infants as young as six-months old. ISR further

submitted evidence showing that, through franchise agreements and license
9

 Defendants’ arguments that ISR did not protect the confidentiality of the

ISR program until 1996 are not dispositive at this summary judgment stage. 

Defendants first contend that Dr. Barnett conceded at the preliminary-injunction

hearing that ISR did not possess a trade secret until 1996 and that information

available to the public before 1996 is identical to information after 1996. We

have reviewed the record and are not persuaded that Dr. Barnett has conceded the

case. At a minimum, there is conflicting evidence on this question. Defendants

also ask us to consider the fact that the franchise agreements did not expressly

mention trade secrets and that the license agreements did not expressly refer to

the ISR program as a trade secret until 1996. A rational jury could consider the

franchise agreements, as well as the license agreements, in determining whether

ISR took reasonable precautions to guard the secrecy of the ISR program. In any

event, the question of whether the ISR program became a protectable trade secret

after 1996 is for the trier of fact. 

10 The district court also dismissed ISR’s unjust-enrichment claim because,

among other reasons, ISR failed to state that claim in the Pre-Trial Order. As

noted by the district court, claims in the Pre-Trial Order supercede claims in the

complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Because ISR did not properly raise its

claim below, we will not engage in this “highly fact-intensive” inquiry here. 

Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 445 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).

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agreements, it has taken precautions to guard the secrecy of its program.9 Factual

issues remain in regard to whether the nuanced ISR program is distinguishable from

standard infant-swimming programs and whether ISR took reasonable precautions

to guard the secrecy of its alleged trade-secret program. Indulging all inferences in

favor of ISR, we hold that summary judgment is not appropriate on the question of

whether the ISR program, viewed comprehensively, is a trade secret. 

B

We turn to the district court’s dismissal of the contract claims.10 Each

defendant signed a “Nondisclosure and Confidentiality Agreement,” which required
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them to hold ISR’s confidential information in secrecy and use it solely for the

purposes contemplated in the parties’ license agreements. As discussed above, the

license agreements contain (1) a covenant not to compete and (2) a confidentiality

provision. 

1. Covenant Not to Compete

The covenant not to compete provides that: 

Licensee shall not, during the terms of this Agreement and for 2 (two) years

immediately following the termination of this Agreement, regardless of who

initiates the termination, engage directly or indirectly in the teaching of

infants or young children to swim or engage in the business or training other

individuals for the purpose of teaching infants or young children to swim,

other than pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. . . . This Covenant Not to

Compete shall be effective within a five hundred (500) mile radius from the

present site of the business address of Licensee. This Covenant applies to

self-employment or employment on behalf of any other person, firm,

corporation, partnership or other business organization.

(1 Appellants’ App. at 61–62.) Under Colorado law, covenants not to compete are

void, save under limited circumstances. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113(2). One

exception protects “[a]ny contract for the protection of trade secrets.” Id. § 8-2-

113(2)(b). “For a covenant not to compete to fit within the trade secret exception

to § 8-2-113(2), the purpose of the covenant must be the protection of trade secrets,

and the covenant must be reasonably limited in scope to the protection of those

trade secrets.” Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907, 910 (Colo. Ct.

App. 1997). Having concluded that the ISR program was not a trade secret as a

matter of law, the district court determined that the covenant not to compete was
11 Defendants argue that the covenants not to compete are unreasonable as

to the scope of conduct the covenants purport to prohibit. Because the district

court did not address this argument, we decline to do so for the first time on

appeal and remand for that purpose. See R. Eric Peterson Constr. Co. v. Quintek,

Inc., 951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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necessarily void under Colorado law. This being the primary basis of the district

court’s rationale, and given our conclusion that genuine issues of material fact

remain on ISR’s trade-secrets claim, it follows that this breach-of-contract claim

must go forward as well.11

2. Confidentiality provision

Contained in the license agreements signed by defendants after 1996, the

confidentiality provision provides:

The research and printed materials provided by Dr. Harvey Barnett, Harvey

Barnett, Inc. and Infant Swimming Research, Inc., which pertain to the

education of infants and children in aquatic survival and swimming

techniques, are unique intellectual properties entitled to protection as such at

law. Licensee shall not at any time or in any way during the term of

this Agreement or after its termination, divulge, disclose or

communicate to any person or organization in any manner whatsoever

any information concerning any matters affecting or relating to the

business and trade secrets of Licensor. . . . Licensee agrees not to train or

not to endeavor to train instructors or assistants in the same or similar

methods without SPECIFIC WRITTEN CONSENT FROM 

LICENSOR. . . . Licensee acknowledges that the materials contain trade

secrets of Licensor and as such provide a competitive advantage. ANY

BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THIS PARAGRAPH SHALL BE A

MATERIAL BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT AND SHALL RESULT IN

IMMEDIATE REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE AND TERMINATION OF

THIS AGREEMENT. . . . Licensee will not disclose to another person any of

the methods, techniques, trade secrets or systems used by Licensor in

business. Further, at any time following termination of this Agreement, use
12 Although Mai Basic involved a contract dispute in New Mexico, its

rationale is equally applicable here.

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of Licensor’s trade secrets, under any other name or organization constitutes

unfair competition due to the distinctive results of Licensor’s techniques. 

Terms of this and all paragraphs are permanent.

(1 Appellants’ App. at 74.) In dismissing ISR’s claim relating to this provision, the

district court concluded that, even if this provision created an enforceable duty on

defendants not to disclose confidential information not rising to the level of a trade

secret, the provision was a disguised restrictive covenant that was unenforceable as

vague and overly broad. 

In Mai Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1989), we held

that the confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements at issue could not be

characterized as restrictive covenants because they “serve entirely different

purposes than do agreements not to compete and must be analyzed on the basis of

those distinct purposes alone.”12 Id. at 288. We noted that the Mai Basic

defendants remained “free to work for whomever they wish, wherever they wish,

and at whatever they wish, subject only to the prohibition against misusing

plaintiff’s proprietary information and the requirement that defendants assign to

plaintiff any work product relating to plaintiff’s business that was developed by

defendants while they were employed by plaintiff or shortly thereafter.” Id.
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Defendants distinguish Mai Basic on the ground that the present

confidentiality provision prevents licensees from divulging “any information

concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business and trade secrets of

Licensor,” thus preventing competition regardless of whether it involves the use of

trade-secret information. (Appellees’ Br. at 25.) We disagree with the defendants’

proposed distinction. As in Mai Basic, the pertinent provision preserves “the

valuable confidential information plaintiff necessarily had to disclose to the

individual defendants during the course of their employment.” 800 F.2d at 288. 

This provision is different from a blanket covenant not to compete in that it does

not purport to prevent defendants from teaching swimming to infants using widely

known techniques. As indicated by its title, the purpose of the confidentiality

provision is to prevent defendants from divulging confidential information; it

prevents defendants from teaching infants utilizing the allegedly confidential

techniques possessed by ISR. 

We conclude the district court erred in determining that the confidentiality

provision is a disguised restrictive covenant. Thus, we reverse the district court’s

decision on this breach-of-contract claim as well. On remand, the trier of fact

should consider whether the ISR program contained confidential information
13 We note that the license agreements contain a severability clause. In

granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the district court did not

address the question of severability. Should the district court ultimately conclude

that certain provisions of the license agreements are unenforceable, severability is

an option.

14 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), 

Any person who, on, or in connection with any goods or services . . .

uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any

combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or

misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation

of fact, which—is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or

to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such

person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or

approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by

another person, . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who

believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 Pursuant to the CCPA,

(1) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the

(continued...)

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protected under this provision.13 See Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., Inc., 739 P.2d 889,

892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that “confidential information acquired during

the course of employment may be protected” and “[t]he determination of what

constitutes confidential information is a question for the trier of fact” (quotation

omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).

C

ISR’s remaining claims address misleading trade practices in violation of the

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125,14 as well as unfair competition and deceptive trade

practices in violation of the CCPA, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105.15 These claims are
15(...continued)

course of such person’s business, vocation, or occupation, such

person:

(a) Knowingly passes off goods, services, or property as

those of another;

(b) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source,

sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods,

services, or property;

(c) Knowingly makes a false representation as to affiliation,

connection, or association with or certification by

another . . . 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105.

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predicated on the defendants’ allegedly false and misleading advertisements to the

public. In dismissing these claims, the district court found that summary judgment

was appropriate because there was (1) no evidence of any resulting confusion or

mistake and (2) no evidence of damages. See Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc.,

191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (elements of the Lanham Act); Hall v.

Walter, 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (elements of the CCPA). 

ISR’s disagreement with the district court’s decision that ISR failed to

advance evidence of likelihood of confusion is based entirely on a quote from our

decision in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir.

1983) (quotation omitted): “Intent on the part of the alleged infringer to pass off

its goods as the product of another raises an inference of a likelihood of

confusion.” ISR is correct that a party need not set forth evidence of actual

confusion in order to prevail in a trademark-infringement action. See id. In
16 We have held that de minimus evidence of actual confusion does not

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the likelihood

of confusion in a trademark-infringement claim. See King of the Mountain

Sports, Inc. v. Chrylser Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999).

17 In support of its position, ISR contends that the parties agreed to

liquidated damages. That the parties agreed to liquidated damages in the event of

a breach of the license agreement does not create a genuine issue of material fact

for trial as to whether the defendants, through their misleading advertisements,

caused the requisite injury under the Lanham Act and CCPA. 

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devoting merely a single sentence in its opening brief to this issue, only to quote

Beer Nuts, however, ISR has failed to advance evidence on whether there was so

much as a likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendants’ false

representations—a showing necessary to prevail on its Lanham Act misleadingtrade-practices claim.16

As for injury—a further required element under the Lanham Act as well as 

the CCPA—ISR fails on two counts: it does not develop its argument and it

advances no evidence whatsoever of loss of business or loss of profits. It merely

makes an argument about the appropriate measure of damages.17 In the absence of

an adequately developed argument, and in the absence of any evidence of injury,

we must affirm the district court. “Conclusory allegations that are unsubstantiated

do not create an issue of fact and are insufficient to oppose summary judgment.” 

Elsken v. Network Multi-Family Sec. Corp., 49 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).

We conclude that ISR has failed to show a genuine issue for trial as to whether it

suffered an injury in fact as a result of the defendants’ misleading advertisements. 
18 In its complaint, ISR also alleged trademark infringement in violation of

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). ISR’s trademark infringement claim is based on the

defendants’ use of the phrase “Infant Aquatic Survival” as the name of its

program. In dismissing this claim, the district court found that defendants’ use of

the phrase “Infant Aquatic Survival” was merely descriptive and used in good

faith to describe its services, which is a defense under the relevant statute. See 15

U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (listing as a defense to a charge of trademark infringement

that the “use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,

otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used

fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party”). 

ISR has not challenged this decision by the district court on appeal and thus we

affirm on this ground the district court’s ruling.

19 We do so notwithstanding appellants’ counsel’s failure to meet basic

standards relating to the record on appeal. Appellants inexcusably failed to

include in the record, among other things, the complaint and defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. See 10th Cir. R. 10.3(C). In many instances, appellants’

record-designation deficiencies were bailed out by the appellees themselves. 

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See, e.g., Hall, 969 P.2d at 235 (holding that a CCPA plaintiff “must be able to

show that the defendant’s actions in violation of the CCPA caused the plaintiff’s

injury” (emphasis added)). We affirm the district court on these remaining

claims.18

III

In sum, we REVERSE the district court’s decision granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants on ISR’s claim of misappropriation of trade

secrets, and on its claim of breach of contract, and we REMAND for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.19 We AFFIRM the district court’s

decision in all other respects.