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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-15-00130-CV

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IN RE COMMITMENT OF ASA GEORGE MAYFIELD

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court 

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 14-08-09190-CV

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Asa George Mayfield appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict that resulted 

in his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety 

Code Ann. § 841.081(a) (West Supp. 2016).1 During jury selection, the trial court 

overruled challenges for cause brought by Mayfield against four veniremembers. 

Mayfield used peremptory challenges on the four veniremembers, exhausted his 

peremptory challenges, requested additional peremptory challenges, and notified

 1 Amendments to the statute became effective after the date the commitment 

order was signed, but because the amendments do not affect our analysis in this 

case, we refer to the current version of the statute.
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the trial court that four specific objectionable veniremembers remained on the jury 

list. In one issue brought on appeal, Mayfield argues that the trial court erred in 

overruling his challenges for cause. We overrule Mayfield’s issue and affirm the 

trial court’s judgment and order of civil commitment.

“[T]rial courts exercise discretion in deciding whether to strike 

veniremembers for cause when bias or prejudice is not established as a matter of 

law, and there is error only if that discretion is abused.” Cortez ex rel. Estate of 

Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. 2005). When 

reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we consider the entire examination. Id.

Mayfield contends Juror Eight and Juror Forty-Four agreed that they would 

not be able to “listen to the evidence and follow the law in this case[.]” He argues 

that in subsequent individual questioning, these two members of the venire 

revealed that they could not set aside personal bias and approach the case with an 

open mind. 

Juror Eight indicated that due to having nine grandchildren, it was 

“challenging” to her not knowing the impact of the decision in the case considering 

Mayfield was already incarcerated and she was feeling “very biased about that

behavior.” The judge explained that the question to be determined by the jury was 

not Mayfield’s incarceration, but whether he meets the definition of behavioral
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abnormality. Juror Eight replied, “I don’t have enough information to know that.” 

She added that she would not find Mayfield less credible due to his incarceration. 

Juror Forty-Four stated that because a friend of his had been sexually abused 

by a man who was not tried for the crime, he “probably [would not] be able to

decide one way or the other correctly because of the strong feelings.” When asked 

whether he would be able to follow the judge’s instructions and base a verdict only 

upon the evidence presented during the trial, Juror Forty-Four responded, “It’s hard 

to say because I haven’t heard anything about the case. But it’s my opinion that it’s 

going to be hard for me to listen and decide at the end whether or not he’s that 

person or not.” He added that he was “willing to try” to listen to all of the evidence 

before making up his mind. 

Juror Eight’s experience as a grandmother and Juror Forty-Four’s friendship 

with a victim of sexual abuse impacted their view of the case, but each expressed 

an open mind with regard to approaching the evidence. The record as a whole 

supports a finding that neither veniremember had a disqualifying unequivocal bias. 

It was within the trial court’s discretion to deny Mayfield’s challenges for cause. 

See Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 93. 

Mayfield contends Jurors Thirty-Eight and Sixty-Three revealed that if they 

determined Mayfield was a repeat sexually violent offender, they would not 
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require that the State prove that he has a behavioral abnormality that makes him 

likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Juror Thirty-Eight and Juror 

Sixty-Three responded affirmatively to a general question to the venire panel 

asking if they would not require the “second” (proof of a behavioral abnormality) 

if the State proved he was a repeat sexual offender. Further individual questioning 

explored whether Juror Thirty-Eight and Juror Sixty-Three would require that the 

State prove its case.

When questioned, Juror Thirty-Eight stated, “I don’t see a lot of difference 

between the two up here that if you -- if you prove beyond all doubt that he is a 

repeat sexual violent offender, that he’s been sentence for, there is a behavioral 

problem.” He denied that he would not require the State to prove the behavioral 

abnormality, but added, “I believe in my heart there is a behavioral abnormality if 

you prove No. 1.” Juror Thirty-Eight conceded that he is unfamiliar with the phrase 

“behavioral abnormality” and he did not know how it was defined by law. Juror 

Thirty-Eight asserted that he would be willing to listen to the expert witnesses

before making up his mind, adding, “I’m an engineer. We like to know the facts.” 

Juror Sixty-Three stated she thought that if the State proved Mayfield is a 

repeat sex offender, that would be enough to show that he has a behavioral 

abnormality and she would not require the State to prove “the second one.” The 
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judge explained that the instructions would say that to find a person is a sexually 

violent predator, they must find “[b]oth of them[,]” that is, that they must find both 

that the person is a repeat sexual offender and that he has a behavioral abnormality. 

Juror Sixty-Three stated that the question confused her and that she would be able 

to listen to the evidence and follow the law. Juror Sixty-Three added that she has 

two girls at home and she works with children who have behavioral issues in her 

profession as a school district’s speech therapist, but she assured the trial court that 

she would base her decision on the evidence she heard in the courtroom “and be 

fair about it.” 

A veniremember may be “statutorily disqualified” because of “a general 

inability to follow the court’s instructions regarding the law[.]” Hyundai Motor Co. 

v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. 2006). Mayfield contends the bulk of Juror 

Thirty-Eight’s examination revealed an unshakeable conviction that behavioral 

abnormality would be proven by proof of repeat sexually violent offenses, and he 

argues that that Juror Sixty-Three’s understanding that there were two separate 

elements did not clarify whether she intended to hold the State to only one of them. 

These veniremembers gave some conflicting answers, which were attributable to 

obvious confusion about the issues the jury would be called upon to decide and an 

unremarkable supposition that repeated convictions for sexually abusing children 
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indicate a problem with behavior. But, Juror Thirty-Eight and Juror Sixty-Three 

articulated an understanding that the State was required to prove that Mayfield had 

a behavioral abnormality as that term is used in law and would be defined in the 

charge. Viewing the examinations as a whole, it was within the trial court’s 

discretion to deny Mayfield’s challenges for cause. See Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 93. 

We overrule Mayfield’s issue and we affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of 

civil commitment.

AFFIRMED.

 ________________________________

 CHARLES KREGER

 Justice

Submitted on January 12, 2016

Opinion Delivered October 20, 2016

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.