In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-2437 

MARTIN JARANOWSKI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

INDIANA HARBOR BELT RAILROAD COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 2:20-cv-00484-APR — Andrew P. Rodovich, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 5, 2023 

____________________ 

Before HAMILTON, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit 

Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Martin 

Jaranowski worked as a conductor for defendant-appellee Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company for twenty-two years. 

While operating a railroad switch in October 2020, plaintiff 

seriously injured his neck. He sued the railroad under the 

Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., 

alleging that he was injured because the railroad failed to 
2 No. 22-2437 

maintain the switch properly. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and negligence per se based on alleged violations of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Track 

Safety Standards. See 49 C.F.R. Part 213. 

The district court concluded that Jaranowski had failed to 

present evidence that would support a finding that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the 

switch before plaintiff was injured. The court granted summary judgment to the railroad on Jaranowski’s claim for ordinary negligence and his claim for negligence per se, finding 

that the federal Track Safety Standards are violated only 

when a railroad has actual or constructive notice of track defects. We reverse. We agree with the district court that actual 

or constructive notice is required to violate the federal Track 

Safety Standards. We also find, however, that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to 

whether the railroad at least should have known that the 

switch was defective before plaintiff was injured.

I. Factual and Procedural History

A. Facts Relevant to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Jaranowski was employed as a conductor at Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad’s Michigan Avenue Yard in East 

Chicago, Indiana. His duties included operating or “throwing” manually operated railroad switches. On October 26, 

2020, while moving switch MA 27 from left to right, 

Jaranowski felt unexpected resistance in the switch followed 

by a strong pain in his neck and arm and tingling in his fingers. He was diagnosed with a spinal cord injury, and two 

months later, he underwent neck surgery. Jaranowski’s injury 
No. 22-2437 3

left him permanently unable to lift more than 20 pounds or to 

perform overhead work.

At the heart of a railroad switch is a lever about three feet 

long. By moving this lever, the operator is able to move short 

lengths of rail, which switch trains from one track to another. 

Switch MA 27 has such a lever with a handle at the end. The 

lever rests in a “switch keeper” when the switch is in a fixed 

and latched position. To operate the switch, the conductor 

disengages the latch with his foot, which releases tension and 

causes the lever to rise a few inches. Applying steady force, 

the conductor then walks the switch over to the opposite side 

and engages the latch to keep the switch in a fixed position. 

As the operator walks the switch from one side to the other, 

“switch points” in the rails are shifted into the desired position to switch trains from one track to another.

The railroad has a qualified track inspector inspect switch 

MA 27 monthly, as federal regulations require. See 49 C.F.R. 

§ 213.235. Switch MA 27 was inspected on October 15, 2020, 

eleven days before Jaranowski was injured. The inspection report for that date noted no defect. Previous inspection reports 

of MA 27, going back to April 30, 2019, likewise showed no 

defect or issue with the switch. Jaranowski himself operated 

MA 27 without incident on October 22, four days before he 

was injured. Before throwing the switch on October 26, 2020, 

he looked at the switch points and saw no large debris in the 

points.

The day Jaranowski was injured, the railroad’s director of 

safety, Eric Ritter, inspected switch MA 27. Ritter found that 

the switch was in good working condition, but his report 

noted that the amount of force required to operate the switch 

lessened substantially after he lubricated the switch as part of 
4 No. 22-2437 

his inspection. Pushing the handle down, for example, required 126 pounds of force before lubrication but only 55 

pounds of force afterwards.

Plaintiff retained Alan Blackwell, a qualified track inspector, as an expert witness. Blackwell submitted a report and 

testified by affidavit in opposition to the railroad’s motion for 

summary judgment. Blackwell identified several possible 

causes of Jaranowski’s injury. He noted that photographs of 

switch MA 27 taken by the railroad shortly after plaintiff’s injury show debris, dirt, mud, ballast, and vegetation in the “tie 

cribs,” which is where the connecting rod and switch rods are 

located. According to Blackwell, debris and vegetation in this 

location can interfere with the operation of the switch. The 

railroad’s Ritter agreed that debris in the tie crib could affect 

the switch, and he testified that if he were to see a switch in 

the condition depicted in the photographs, he would order his 

crew to clean it up. Blackwell also noted that the photographs 

showed that the switch points were skewed and that fastenings that should keep the switch components in place were 

missing.

Blackwell personally inspected switch MA 27 on July 16, 

2021, nine months after Jaranowski’s injury. The day before 

his scheduled inspection, three maintenance workers for the 

railroad spent roughly 40 minutes cleaning and maintaining 

the switch. Ritter later explained that the railroad’s crew knew 

the switch was going to be inspected and that they wanted to 

make sure it was in “good order.” During his inspection, 

Blackwell noted that the switch appeared to have been recently lubricated and that there was no debris or vegetation 

in the tie cribs. Yet even after the clean-up and maintenance, 

and consistent with photographs taken after Jaranowski was 
No. 22-2437 5

injured, Blackwell observed that the switch points were 

skewed and that several fastenings were loose or missing.

Blackwell also found excessive “lost motion” when the 

switch was moved from left to right, the same direction 

Jaranowski moved the switch when he was injured. “Lost motion” refers to a lag between movement of the switch handle 

and movement of the switch points in the rails. With lost motion, when the operator walks the switch handle from one 

side to the other, the switch points do not move right away. 

During his inspection, Blackwell discovered that the switch 

points on MA 27 did not move during the first half of the handle’s journey. The switch points started to move only when

the handle was at roughly a 90-degree angle. They completed 

their entire movement during the second half of the handle’s 

journey. Blackwell explained that when switches are not 

properly maintained, they become difficult to operate, which 

means that the conductor must apply additional force to 

throw the switch, which in turn can lead to musculoskeletal 

injuries.

Blackwell concluded that the railroad had failed to provide a safe place for Jaranowski to work. He found that the 

railroad had failed to maintain switch MA 27 properly so that 

it could be operated without undue force and excessive lost 

motion. He also concluded that the railroad had failed to remove debris and vegetation from the tie cribs and that it failed 

to ensure fastenings were in place and secure. Blackwell further opined that the railroad had failed to perform detailed, 

monthly inspections “in a manner that ensured the switch 

was safe for operation.” Finally, he concluded that the railroad had violated several federal Track Safety Standards.
6 No. 22-2437 

B. Proceedings in the District Court

Jaranowski sued Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad under the 

FELA, alleging that the railroad’s negligence caused his injury. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and of 

negligence per se for its alleged violations of the federal Track 

Safety Standards. 

The railroad moved for summary judgment, arguing that 

Jaranowski could not establish that the railroad had actual or 

constructive notice of any defect in switch MA 27. Under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to adjudication by a 

magistrate judge, who first granted the railroad’s motion in 

part and denied it in part. Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. 

Co., No. 2:20-cv-484, 2022 WL 2065022, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 

2022). In that decision, the magistrate judge found that 

Jaranowski had not shown a genuine dispute of fact as to 

whether the railroad had actual or constructive notice that the 

switch was defective. The judge therefore concluded that the 

railroad was entitled to summary judgment on Jaranowski’s 

claim of ordinary negligence. Id. at *4. Because the railroad’s 

opening brief on summary judgment had not addressed 

Jaranowski’s claim of negligence per se, the court took no action on that claim. Id. at *1 & n.2, and *4.

The railroad then moved for reconsideration of the district 

court’s order. It argued that the federal Track Safety Standards are violated only when the railroad has actual or constructive notice of the violation. Because the court had already 

determined that Jaranowski could not establish that the railroad had such notice that MA 27 was defective, the railroad 

argued that it was also entitled to summary judgment on the 

claim for negligence per se. The magistrate judge agreed that 

notice is required to violate the federal Track Safety 
No. 22-2437 7

Standards, and he granted summary judgment to the railroad 

on Jaranowski’s remaining claim and entered final judgment 

for the railroad. Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., No. 

2:20-cv-484, 2022 WL 3042236, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2022). 

Jaranowski has appealed on both claims.

II. Analysis

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in Jaranowski’s favor. Khungar v. Access Community 

Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2021). Summary 

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). Substantive law determines which facts are material. 

Id.

Jaranowski makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence establishes a genuine dispute as to 

whether the railroad had actual or constructive notice that 

switch MA 27 was defective. Second, he contends that notice 

of a purported defect is not necessary to establish a violation 

of the federal Track Safety Standards that would establish 

negligence per se.

A. Genuine Dispute as to Notice

The FELA provides: “Every common carrier by railroad ... 

shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while 

he is employed ... for such injury or death resulting in whole 

or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
8 No. 22-2437 

employees of such carrier.” 45 U.S.C. § 51. To prevail on his 

FELA claim, the plaintiff must prove “the traditional common 

law elements of negligence, including foreseeability, duty, 

breach, and causation.” Abernathy v. Eastern Illinois R.R. Co., 

940 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 2019), quoting Fulk v. Illinois Central 

R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1994). To establish that his 

injury was foreseeable, the plaintiff “must show that the employer had actual or constructive notice” of the conditions he 

alleges were dangerous. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 

414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Because the Act was written “to offer broad remedial relief 

to railroad workers,” the plaintiff’s burden under the FELA is 

“significantly lighter than in an ordinary negligence case.” 

Holbrook, 414 F.3d at 741–42. Under the FELA, “a railroad will 

be held liable where ‘employer negligence played any part, 

even the slightest, in producing the injury.’” Id. at 742, quoting 

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). Consequently, “a trial judge must submit an FELA case to the jury 

when there is even slight evidence of negligence.” Harbin v. 

Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Viewed through the summary judgment lens, plaintiff’s 

evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that the railroad at least should have known that switch MA 27 was defective in one or more ways before plaintiff was injured. First, 

Blackwell, a certified track inspector with decades of experience, studied photographs of the switch taken soon after 

Jaranowski was injured and concluded that vegetation and 

debris in the tie cribs could have interfered with the switch’s 

operation. The photographs show two plants, each roughly 

the height of the rail, as well as several water bottles, a cup, 

and other debris in the tie cribs. The railroad’s own safety 
No. 22-2437 9

director testified that if he had seen the switch in the condition 

depicted in the photographs, he would have ordered a crew 

to clean it up.

The railroad argues, however, that even if the vegetation 

interfered with the switch’s operation, there is no evidence 

that the railroad knew or should have known of its presence. 

The switch was inspected eleven days before Jaranowski was 

injured, and that inspection report indicated no defects in the 

switch. The parties draw different conclusions from this fact. 

The railroad asks us to take the inspection report at face value, 

inferring that the switch was actually in good condition on the 

date of inspection, so that any defect in the switch must have 

arisen in the eleven days between the inspection and plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff argues, however, that a jury could conclude that the vegetation shown in the photographs could not 

possibly have grown in just eleven days. He insists that the 

only reasonable explanation, and certainly one reasonable explanation, is that the railroad’s October 15th inspection just 

missed the problems because it was not performed with reasonable care. 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court 

does “not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; 

these are jobs for a factfinder.” Johnson v. Advocate Health & 

Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting 

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). Our only task 

is to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material 

fact requiring a trial. Id. We conclude that a reasonable jury 

could accept Jaranowski’s account of the facts and conclude 

that the railroad’s prior inspection was performed without 

due care.
10 No. 22-2437 

The district court reasoned that vegetation in the tie cribs 

could not have provided notice to the railroad because, before 

operating the switch, Jaranowski checked to ensure that there 

was no large debris in the switch points. Jaranowski, 2022 WL 

2065022, at *3. The court reasoned that if the vegetation did 

not put Jaranowski himself on notice before he operated the 

switch, the same vegetation could not have put the railroad 

on notice a few days earlier. Id. Keeping our focus on the 

standard for summary judgment, we respectfully disagree. 

Jaranowski was a conductor in the railroad’s Transportation 

department. He was not a qualified track inspector, and he 

was not trained to identify track defects. A reasonable jury 

could conclude that a trained inspector acting with reasonable 

care would discover defects that a conductor performing a 

brief scan might not.

Second, in addition to vegetation and debris in the tie 

cribs, plaintiff’s expert Blackwell identified other defects in 

switch MA 27. The switch points were skewed, switch fastenings were loose or missing, and the switch operated with excessive lost motion. Again, the railroad argues that even if the 

switch was defective in the ways Blackwell describes, plaintiff 

has not presented evidence suggesting that the railroad knew 

or should have known of those defects. Plaintiff insists that 

the railroad should have discovered these defects during its 

regular inspections, and he argues a jury could infer that the 

inspections were performed negligently. It is true that inferences “that are supported by only speculation or conjecture 

will not defeat a summary judgment motion,” Carmody v. 

Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th 

Cir. 2018), quoting Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 

858 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2017), but plaintiff here offers 

more. 
No. 22-2437 11

Plaintiff’s expert Blackwell personally inspected switch 

MA 27 on July 16, 2021, one day after a three-person crew 

spent 40 minutes cleaning and maintaining the switch. The 

railroad’s Ritter admitted that the crew was there to ensure 

the switch was in good condition before Blackwell’s inspection, and the crew left the switch well lubricated and entirely 

free of debris and vegetation. Given Ritter’s testimony, a reasonable jury could infer that the crew spent more time and 

effort cleaning and maintaining the switch before Blackwell’s 

inspection than is spent on an ordinary switch inspection. Yet, 

even despite those unusual efforts, Blackwell still discovered 

missing fastenings, skewed switch points, and excessive lost 

motion. A jury could reasonably conclude that the railroad’s 

October 15th inspection likewise should have discovered defects in the switch but did not. We thus find sufficient evidence to submit to a jury the question whether the railroad at 

least should have known before plaintiff’s injury that switch 

MA 27 was defective. 

B. Notice and the Federal Track Safety Standards

As an alternative theory of liability, Jaranowski argues 

that even if the railroad did not have actual or constructive 

notice of the defective switch, the defective switch established 

negligence per se because the track violated federal Track 

Safety Standards. In an FELA action, “the violation of a statute or regulation ... automatically constitutes a breach of the 

employer’s duty and negligence per se and will result in liability if the violation contributed in fact to the plaintiff’s injury.” 

Schmitz v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 454 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 

2006), quoting Walden v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 975 F.2d 361, 

364 (7th Cir. 1992). Although we have found a genuine factual 

dispute for trial on the issue of actual or constructive notice, 
12 No. 22-2437 

the negligence per se theory would, according to Jaranowski, 

call for jury instructions that do not require him to prove actual or constructive notice of the defective switch. 

Jaranowski contends he can show negligence per se by 

showing violations of various Track Safety Standards that 

caused his injury. Specifically, he argues the evidence can 

show violations of 49 C.F.R. § 213.5(a) (requiring track owners 

to comply with Track Safety Standards or to halt operations 

on noncompliant track); § 213.37(c) (requiring that vegetation 

on or near track be controlled so as not to interfere with rail 

workers’ duties); § 213.133(a) (requiring that switch fastenings be intact and maintained so that components stay in 

place); § 213.135(e) (requiring that each switch be operable 

“without excessive lost motion”); and § 213.233(b) and (d) (requiring visual track inspections and immediate remedy of all 

defects).

The railroad contends that the federal Track Safety Standards are violated only when the owner of the track has actual 

or constructive notice of the alleged violation. We agree. Section 213.5(a) provides that any track owner who “knows or

has notice that that track does not comply with the requirements of this part” shall bring the track into compliance or 

halt operations on the track. 49 C.F.R. § 213.5(a). Failure to do 

so may result in civil penalties imposed by the Federal Railroad Administrator. §§ 213.15(a) and 213.5(d). 

In its final rule adopting the Track Safety Standards in 

1998, the FRA explained that the Track Safety Standards are 

enforced only against a track owner “‘who knows or has notice’ that the track does not meet compliance standards.” 

Track Safety Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,995 (June 22, 

1998). Compared to other railroad safety regulations, this 
No. 22-2437 13

knowledge element is “unique to the track regulations.” Id.

Generally, railroads are strictly liable if they fail to comply 

with FRA regulations. The final rule for the Track Safety 

Standards explained, however, that the FRA included a notice 

requirement for the track regulations because it recognized 

that railroads, even when exercising reasonable care, cannot 

prevent all track defects, which may occur suddenly due to 

changing traffic patterns or weather and may arise in remote 

areas. The regulation therefore provides that railroads “are 

held liable for non-compliance or civil penalties for only those 

defects that they knew about or those that are so evident the 

railroad is deemed to have known about them.” Id. 

Jaranowski acknowledges that the notice requirement in 

§ 213.5 must be satisfied before the Federal Railroad Administrator may impose civil penalties, but he insists that a railroad’s failure to comply with Track Safety Standards, when it 

results in employee injury, is actionable under the FELA even 

if the railroad lacked notice of the defect. He argues that the 

text of the track regulations at issue in this case, for example, 

49 C.F.R. § 213.135(e), includes no notice requirement. That 

provision states: “Each switch stand and connecting rod shall 

be securely fastened and operable without excessive lost motion.” 49 C.F.R. § 213.135(e). The final rule, however, distinguishes between track defects and violations of the Track 

Safety Standards. The rule explains that without the “knows 

or has notice” language found in § 213.5, “any defect found 

by an FRA inspector could be written as a violation,” regardless of whether the railroad knew or should have known of 

the defect. 63 Fed. Reg. at 33,996. It is therefore a track defect 

if a switch operates with excessive lost motion, see 49 C.F.R. 

§ 213.135(e), but it is not a violation of the Track Safety 
14 No. 22-2437 

Standards unless the railroad knew or should have known of 

that defect and failed to correct it.1

A railroad does not violate the federal Track Safety Standards unless it has actual or constructive notice of the alleged 

defect. To prevail on his claim of negligence per se, 

Jaranowski must establish that the railroad violated a track 

regulation, which in turn requires him to show that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect. As 

we found above, however, there is sufficient evidence in the 

record for a reasonable jury to find that the railroad knew or 

should have known of defects in switch MA 27. Summary 

judgment should not have been granted to defendant on this 

claim.

Conclusion

Because the record shows a genuine dispute as to whether 

the railroad at least should have known that switch MA 27 

was defective at the time plaintiff was injured, the judgment 

of the district court is REVERSED and the case is 

REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

1 The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in a non-precedential decision. Swoope v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 666 F. App’x 820, 823–

24 (11th Cir. 2016).