IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 55500-0-II

L.N.,

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent,

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

v.

L.N.,

Appellant

PRICE, J. — L.N. appeals the superior court’s order committing him for 180 days of 

involuntary treatment. L.N. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the superior 

court’s finding that L.N. committed acts constituting third degree assault. We affirm. 

FACTS

On June 30, 2020, the State filed a petition for 180 days of involuntary treatment. The 

petition alleged L.N. was gravely disabled. The petition also alleged that criminal charges were 

dismissed based on a finding of incompetence, L.N. committed acts constituting a felony, and L.N. 

presented a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts. 

Jane Davis testified at the hearing on the State’s petition. Davis testified that she was a 

registered nurse at the Auburn Medical Center working in the Adult Psychology Unit and that she 

was working on November 30, 2019. While Davis was talking to another patient in the ward, L.N. 

hit her in the head. L.N. struck Davis repeatedly in the head and she lost consciousness. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

January 4, 2022
No. 55500-0-II

2

Dr. Mallory McBride, a psychologist at Western State Hospital (WSH), also testified at the 

hearing. Dr. McBride testified that L.N. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. She also 

testified that L.N. was gravely disabled. And Dr. McBride opined that L.N. was likely to commit 

similar acts to his assault of Davis. Dr. McBride explained that L.N. had several assaultive 

incidents after his admission to WSH. 

The superior court found that L.N. had felony charges dismissed because he was found 

incompetent. The court also found that L.N. committed acts constituting third degree assault by 

assaulting Davis, a registered nurse. And the superior court found that as a result of a behavioral 

health disorder, L.N. presented a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts. Additionally, the 

superior court found that L.N. was gravely disabled.1 

The superior court ordered 180 days of involuntary treatment. L.N. filed a motion to 

reconsider arguing that the State failed to prove Davis was a registered nurse. The superior court 

denied L.N.’s motion to reconsider, finding that Davis’s testimony was credible. 

L.N. appeals. 

ANALYSIS

L.N. argues that the State failed to present proof that Davis was a registered nurse because, 

in part, the State did not present an admissible copy of her nursing license. Therefore, L.N. argues 

 

1 L.N. does not appeal the superior court’s finding that he was gravely disabled. Therefore, the 

superior court’s order would be affirmed regardless of whether the superior court erred in 

determining that L.N. committed acts constituting a felony. However, because prior involuntary 

commitment orders may be considered in future commitment proceedings, this appeal is not moot. 

In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 629-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012).
No. 55500-0-II

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that the superior court erred by finding that L.N. committed acts constituting a felony. We 

disagree.

The State must prove the elements required for commitment by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence. RCW 71.05.310. We will not “disturb the superior court’s findings ‘if 

supported by substantial evidence which the lower court could reasonably have found to be clear, 

cogent[,] and convincing.’” In re Det. of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 85, 432 P.3d 459, review denied, 

193 Wn.2d 1017 (2019) (quoting In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)). 

Evidence is substantial if the trier of fact could determine that the ultimate issue is “highly 

probable.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209. 

Under RCW 71.05.280(3) a person may be committed for 180 days of involuntary 

treatment if the person is determined to be incompetent and criminal charges have been dismissed, 

has committed acts constituting a felony, and presents a substantial likelihood of repeating similar 

acts as a result of a mental disorder. A person commits third degree assault if he assaults a nurse 

who was performing his or her nursing duties at the time of the assault. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(i). 

For the purposes of RCW 9A.36.031(1)(i), a nurse is a person licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW. 

Under RCW 18.79.030(1), it is unlawful for a person to practice as a registered nurse without being 

licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW. 

Here, Davis testified that she was a registered nurse and that she was working at the time 

L.N. assaulted her. Davis’s testimony, which the superior court found to be credible, makes it 

highly probable that Davis was a registered nurse. And Davis could not be a registered nurse 

without being licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW. Therefore, Davis’s testimony is sufficient 

evidence to establish that she was working as a nurse at the time L.N. assaulted her.
No. 55500-0-II

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Because there was sufficient evidence establishing that Davis was working as a nurse, there 

was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s finding that L.N. committed acts 

constituting a felony. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in its order committing L.N. for 

180 days of involuntary treatment or by denying L.N.’s motion for reconsideration.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

PRICE, J.

We concur:

LEE, C.J.

CRUSER, J.