1 Atthe same time, the court termin ated the possessor y conserv

atorship ri ghts of Chris’s mother. The propr iety of that determination isnot before us; ther efore, we limit our analysis to those facts pertaining to the termination of Chris’s rights. NO. 07-03-0530-CV IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL A OCTOBER 19, 2004

______________________________ IN THE INTEREST O F K.N.L., J. H., C.J.L., S.F.L., AND I.J.L., CHIL DREN

_________________________________ FROM THE 242 ND DISTRIC T COURT O F HALE COUN TY; NO. B29927-9809; H ONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION
Followi ng a bench trial on El izabeth Hernandez’ s petition to terminate the par ental rightsof her ex-husband Chris Lopez in their five child ren, the t rial court granted the petition and appointed Eli zabeth managi ng conservator of the children

. 1 With one issue,2 All references to s ections are to the T exas Fam ily Code unless otherwise

designated. 2 Chris contends the evidence is legal ly and factual ly insuffici ent to support the ter mination order . We affirm.
In February

of 2003, Eliza beth filed the petit ion allegi ng as gr ounds for the termination that Chris : (1) knowingly placed or al lowed the c hildren to r emain in conditi ons or surrounding s which endangered their physical or emot ional wel l-being; (2) engag ed in conduct or knowi ngly pl aced the childr en with per

sons who eng aged in c onduct whic h endangered their ph ysical or emotional well-being; (3) failed to support the children in accordance with hi s ability for one year ending w ithin six months of the date of

the filing of the petition; and (4) knowi ngly eng aged in cri minal conduct tha t resulted in his convicti on of an offense and confinement and inabi lity to care for the chi ldren for not le ss than t w o years from the date of the fili ng of the petiti on. Tex. Fam. C ode Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (F), and ( Q) (Vernon 2002). 2 Wh en the court conducted a hearing on the petition in October of 2003, the c hildren rang ed in age from si x to 14.
With his sole issue, Chris queries “[w]hether the evidence received by the court discharged [Elizabet h’s] burden to provide thecourt wi th evide nce that w as of such character

that the court could find that it unquestionably satisfied the legal r equirement that the evidence be clear a nd convin cing.” W e percei ve Chris’s co ntenti on as a ch allenge to the legal and factu al sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s termi nation order.3

Spec ific ally, Chris seems to chall enge only the grounds upo n which th e trial court relied in reaching its decisi on to terminate hi s parental r ights. Because the trial court did not s peci fy those grounds, and since Chr is neglected to obtain finding s of fact and conclusi ons of law detailing them, we w ill affirm th e decision if the evidence sup ports the ex istence of even
one ground. See In re S.F., 32 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
Aparent-chi ld relationshi p may be termi nated if the court finds by cle ar and convinci ng evidence th at: (1) the p arent has engag ed in any of thespecif ic conduct enumerated in the F amily Code as groundsfor termination; and (2) termi nation is in the best interest of the c hild. See § 161.001(1) & (2); Tex. Dept. of Human Services. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). In a legal sufficiency review of the evidence to support
an order terminating parental rights, we look at all the evidenc e in the lig htmost favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fa ct could have formed a f irm belief or convicti on that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W .3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002 ). To give ap propriate deference to the factfind er's conclusions and the role ofa court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment meansthat a rev iewing cour t m ust assume the factfinder resolved disput ed facts in favor

of its finding if a reasonable factfinde r could do so. Id . Thus, w e disregard all evi dence that a reas onable factfinder coul d have disbel ieved or found to ha ve been incredibl e. Id

.4

The standard for rev iewing the factual suff iciency of termina tion f indings is whethe r the evidence i s such that a factfind er could reas onably form a f irm belief or conviction aboutthe truth of the peti tioner’s al legations. See In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex 2002). Under that standard, we consider whether the dispute d evidence is s uc h that a reasonable factfinder could not have resol ved the disputed ev idence in favor of its f inding. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. If, in light of the entire reco rd, the dispute d evidence t hat
a reasonable factf inder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so sig nificant that
a factfinder

could not

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually

insufficient. Id

. Concluding the evidence establishes that Chris engaged in conduct that endangere d his child ren’ s phys ical o r emo tion al well -bei ng, we confine our analy sis to the law and facts demo nstrating that ground. First, enda ngerment means to expose to lo ss or injur y, t o jeopardiz e. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex.App.–For t Worth 2003, no pet.). It is notnecessary that the parent’s conduct b e directed at the child or that th e child actually suffer injury

. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533. Next, we acknow ledge that sec tion 161.001(1)( E) requiresus to look at the parent’s conduct alone, includ ing acts or omissions or

failures to act. In re J.B.W., 99 S. W.3d 218, 226 ( Tex.A pp.–Fo rt Worth 200 3, pet. denied ). To determine whether te rmination isappropriate courts look to parental co nduct both before and after the child’s birth. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex .App.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Additionall y, terminat ion under section 161.001( 1)(E) must bebased on more than a single ac

t or omission; a v

oluntary, deliberate, and conscious cour se of conduct by

the5

parent is requi red. In r

e J. B.W. , 99 S.W.3d at 226. For example, imprisonment, s tanding alone, does not constitute “engaging in conduct which endangers the emotional or physical well-be ing of the chil d.” § 161.001(1) (E); Boyd , 727 S.W .3d at 533. However, it is a fact properlyconsidered on the issue of endang erment. Id . at 534. If the impr isonment of the parent displays a voluntary , delibe rate, and consc ious course o f conduct, it q ualifies as conduct that endangers the emotional w

ell-being of the child. See In re J.N.R. , 982 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex.A pp.–Hou st on [1 stDist.] 1998, no pet.), disapproved on ot her grounds , In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) . That is to say , if the evide nce, includi ng imprisonment, proves a course of conduc t that has the effect of endangering the child, th e requirement

of section 161.001( 1)(E) ismet. Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 53 4. Likewi se, drug addiction and i ts e ffect

on a pare nt’s

lifeand ability

to parent may es tablish an endang ering course of conduct. In re J.T.G. , 121 S.W.3d at 125-26.
Chris acknowled ges that he “ has engaged in questionable conduct in two r espects consisting of: 1. his past drug use; and 2. his somewhat len gthy re cord of invol vement wi th the l a w . ” We conclude the r ecord demonstrate s, however, that Chr is indulg ed in more than just a passing fancy with illicit drug use and illeg al behavior . Indeed, the ev idence adduced attrial rev

eals the follow ing: (1)

Chris’s children were born in 1989, 1990 , 1993, 1996, and 1997; (2) beginning in 1989, Chris amassed 15 convictions f or misdem eanor offenses ranging from possession o f marijuana and dri ving w hile lice nse suspended to evading arrest and f

ail ure to i dent ify ; (3 ) he rec eiv ed fe lony convicti ons for “theft and del ivery of metha mpheta mines”; (4) in 1993 h e receive d a felony conv iction for poss ession of3 Chris admitted injec ting cocai ne “off and on at times” duri ng 1995 and 1996. He also tes ted positiv e for cocaine in June of 2002. His convicti on for delive ry of methamphetamine raises some concern about

his dependency

on that drug as well. 6 marijuana; (5) in 1997, he was conv icted in Lubbock Count y of felony pos session of marijuana and sentenced tofive year s confinement; (6)

he receiv ed two felony

convicti ons in Hale County , one for possessi on of marijuana and theother for eva ding detention w ith
a vehicle; (7) he was serving a tw o year senten ce for h is mos t rece nt conv icti on at th e time of trial; ( 8) by his

own admiss ion, he has, ess entially , been in pris on “off and on” for most of his adult l ife; (9) thoug h his crimi nal history suggests

he has a problem with mari juana, ata mini mum, 3 he sought no treatment f or that addiction while he was on the “outside”; (10) he believes

marijuana has “ only been a problem because it’sagainst the law”; ( 11) he has been under

the influence of drug s around his c hildren; (12) in M ay of 2002, w hile on parole, he te sted posi tive for marijuana; (13) in June of 2002, he tested positive for cocaine and marijuana; and ( 14) accordin g to his par ole officer, he has ahistory of not complyi ng with any type of superv ision.
Chris clai ms thathe no longer uses drugs

and that “the r

ecord is uncl ear concerni ng the exactdate” he stopped u sing drug s; therefore, the“drug i ssue” should not have been consider ed by th e trial court in determining whether there were grounds to support termination of his parental rights. He further maintains that “his par

ole was nev

er revoked and his testimony

was cor roborate d by. . . his par ole officer whostated that he w as discharged while in custody o n March 13 , 2003. ” Assumin g arguendothat such dis putes7

actually existed, we conclud e they did not rise to the level that

a reasonable f

actfinde r could not have res olved them in favor of its ruling

. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. The onlyevidence suggesting that Chris no longer abused drugs was his o wn self-serv ing testimony

to that effect. In fact, Chris’s parole off icer averred that Chris tested positi ve for cocaine and marijuana asrecently as June of 2002. The trial court was free to discredit Chris’s explanation that “it w as secondhand smoke”thatcontaminated histesting s ample. See id . (emphasiz ing the deferencegiven to the factfinde r’s conclusions). Moreover, while the parole board al lowed Chr is to “dis charge” from his most recent parol e, his superv ising officer opined that it did so because he already w as in custody for a new felony offense. And tho ugh Chris escaped having his most recent parole rev oked, h e vio lated t he ter ms of every other parole on which he was placed resulting in their revoca tions. Appa rent ly, the trial court, in assessi ng wheth er Chris engaged in conduct that endang ered the physical or emotional well-being of his children, attributed little significance to Chris’s relativ e success on hi s most recent pe riod of superv ision. This it was ent itled to do. Thus, having carefully r eviewe d the reco rd, we conclude the ev idence wassufficient to produce in the mind of the trial court, as factfinder, a firm belief or conviction that Chris engaged in a course of conduct that endang ered his chi ldren’s emoti onal or physical wellbeing. Furthermore , without looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the ver dict,
we conclude that bot h the disputed and undisputed evidence favoring and disfavori ng the trial court’s r uling permi t a reasona b le factfinder to form a firm convicti on and belief that Chris engaged in such conduct. I ndeed, both bef ore an d after the births ofeach of his8

children, Chris seemingly chose a life of crime and drug use over his responsibilities as a father. And, contrar

y to Chri s’s assert ion , the absenc e of “psychol ogical st udies of the children or any test s . . . [dem onstrat ing] that childr en [sic] had ever or

were ever likely

to suffer physi cal o r emo tion al inj ury as a resu lt ofthei r rela tion ship , howe ver lim ited, wi th their father,” gi ves us nocause for concer n. Indeed, it di d not take a child psychiatrist to illustrate for the trial court the detriment al effect Chris’s lifestyle must ha ve had upon his children’s spirits. In short, theevidence bei ng legally and factually

sufficient to suppor

t the termination or

der, Chris ’s sole is sue is ove rruled. Accordingl y, the judg ment of the trial court is affirmed.

Per Curiam