THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Daniel Hamrick, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002164

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal from Charleston County Deadra L. Jefferson, Trial Court Judge Larry B. Hyman Jr., Post-C onviction Relief Judge

Opinion No. 27886 Heard January 10, 2019 – Filed May 15, 2019

REVERSED

Appellate Defenders Jennife r Ellis Roberts and David Alexander, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW: This is a belated appeal of Daniel Hamrick's conviction for fe lony driving under the influence resulting in great bodily injury. Hamrick argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress test results from blood drawnwithout a search warrant, (2) admitting the blood test results into evidence despite a violation of the three-hour statutory time limit for drawing blood, (3) permitting a police officer to give opinion testimony on accident reconstruction, and (4) excluding from evidence a video re cording of an experiment cond ucted by Hamrick's expert in accident reconstruction. We find the trial court erred in admitting the officer's opinion testimony. We reverse and rema nd to the court of general sessions for a new trial.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Around 3:20 a.m. on November 14, 2011, Daniel Hamrick struck Ah med Garland— a road construction worker—while driving on U.S. Highway 17 in the town of Mount Pleasant. Garland suffered permanent brain injuries as a result. The State

contends Hamrick struck Garla nd while Garland was stepping off of a paving machine located behind a row of cones delineating the construct ion zone from the designated lane of travel. Hamrick concedes he struck Garland, but contends it happened in the lane of travel.

Within five minutes of the incident, Officer Daniel Eckert arri ved at the scene and

administered first aid to Garla nd. Emergency medical service professionals arrived at the scene less than ten minutes later, and Officer Eckert be gan interviewing

Hamrick and other witnesses. Several witnesses claimed to smel l alcohol on Hamrick's breath, and Hamrick admitted he drank one beer earlie r in the morning. Officer Eckert asked Hamrick to perform field sobriety tests, b ut Hamrick refused. At 3:40 a.m., Officer Eckert informed Hamrick he was not free t o leave. He instructed Hamrick to remain by t he front of Officer Eckert's c ar.

At 4:08 a.m., Officer Andrew Harris—the lead investigator—arriv ed. Officer Harris interrogated Hamrick and instructed him to perform sobriety tes ts. Hamrick performed the tests, which indicated to Officer Harris that Ham rick was intoxicated. At 4:40 a.m., Officer Harris formally placed Hamrick under arre st, handcuffed him,

administered Miranda warnings to him, and directed officers to transport Hamrick to the Mount Pleasant police station for a breathalyzer test.

When Hamrick arrived at the police station, the breathalyzer ma chine

malfunctioned. After the machin e became operational, Hamrick refused to take a breathalyzer test. Officers then took Hamrick to East Cooper H ospital, where at 6:55 a.m., they told Hamrick he was required to provide a blood samp le pursuant to the mandatory blood testing provisi on of subsection 56-5-2946(A) of the South CarolinaCode (2018), and the implied consent provision of subsection 56 -5-2950(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The officers did not seek a search warrant before drawing Hamrick's blood. Hamrick's blood alcohol concentration measured .113

percent.

Prior to his 2013 trial, Hamrick filed a written motion to supp ress the results of his blood test. He argued the warr antless search the police conduc ted in drawing his blood violated his Fourth Amendment rights because no exigency existed, and there was no other applicable exception to the warrant requirement. He relied on Missouri

v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), deci ded six months earlier, in which the Supreme Court of the United States held "the natural

metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream [does not] present [] a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing." 569 U.S. at 145, 133 S. Ct. at 1556, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702; see also 569 U.S. at 148, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 704 (res tating that "a blood sample . . . drawn from a defendant suspected of driving while under the

influence of alcohol" is a search under the Fourth Amendment (c iting and quoting Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919 (1966))). The trial court conducted a hearing and considered all of the applicable circumstances, as it was required to do under Schmerber and McNeely . At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the exigent circumst ances exception

excused the warrant requirement on the unique facts presented, and denied the motion to suppress. The court did not address whether the impl ied consent provision of subsection 56-5-2950(A) excus ed the warrant requirement.

As an alternative ground for excluding the blood test results f rom trial, Hamrick argued his blood was not drawn with in three hours of Hamrick's arrest as mandated by subsection 56-5-2950(A), which states blood samples "must be collected within

three hours of the arrest." Hamrick maintained he was under ar rest by 3:40 a.m., when he refused to perform field sobriety tests and Officer Eckert informed him he

was not free to leave. The trial court rejected this argument and ruled Hamrick was

not under arrest until Officer Ha rris placed Hamrick in handcuf fs and administered

Miranda warnings at 4:40 a.m.

During trial, Officer Harris tes tified he documented the point of impact inside the construction zone, as opposed to inside the designated lane of travel. Woodrow Poplin, a mechanical and civil engineer, testified as an expert witness for Hamrick. Poplin testified Officer Harris's reported point of impact was incorrect because

Hamrick's car could not have reached that point without knockin g over the conesseparating the lane of travel fro m the construction zone, or wi thout hitting the paving machine. Poplin testified, in his opinion, the collision occur red inside the designated

lane of travel. Hamrick offered into evidence a video of an ex periment Poplin conducted to determine whether it was possible for Hamrick's ca r to hit Garland

where Officer Harris testified the collision occurred without a lso hitting the cones or the paving machine. The trial court permitted Poplin to tes tify about the experiment, but excluded th e video from evidence.

The jury found Hamrick guilty of felony driving under the influ ence resulting in great bodily injury. 1 The trial court sentenced Hamrick to fifteen years in prison.

Hamrick's trial counsel failed to appeal, and Hamrick filed a p ost-conviction relief application alleging counsel was ineffective for not doing so. The post-conviction relief court agreed, and granted Hamrick a belated direct appea l pursuant to White v.

State , 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). As White requires, 2 Hamrick filed a petition for a writ of certiorari asking this Court to consider the belated appeal. We transferred the petition to the court of appeals pursuant to Ru le 243(l) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. T he court of appeals granted c ertiorari to consider Hamrick's appeal. The court of appeals then transferred the ap peal to this Court pursuant to Rules 203(d)(l)(A)(ii) and 204(a) of the South Caro lina Appellate Court

Rules. 3

II. Analysis

We begin with the trial court's error in permitting Officer Har ris to give opinion testimony on the subject of accident reconstruction. This erro r requires a new trial. We will then address the admissibility of the video of Poplin's experiment and

1 S.C. Code Ann. § 56- 5-2945(A)(1) (2018).

2 In Davis v. State , 288 S.C. 290, 342 S.E.2d 60 (1986), we set forth specific procedures litigants should follow pursuing a belated direct ap peal, which has now

become known as a White appeal. 288 S.C. at 291, 342 S.E.2d at 60; see also Rule 243(i), SCACR (entitled, "Special Procedures Where a White v. State Review Is Sought").

3 The court of appeals determined Hamrick's suppression argument raised issues regarding the constitutionality of the mandatory testing requir ement in subsection 56-5-2946(A), and thus the appeal must be heard by this Court p ursuant to Rule 203(d)(l)(A)(ii).Hamrick's challenges to the adm issibility of his blood test res ults, as those issues will necessarily arise on remand.

A. Officer Harris's Testimony

To prove Hamrick guilty of fel ony driving under the influence, in addition to proving

he was "under the influence of a lcohol," the State must prove h e committed "any act forbidden by law or neglect[ed] any duty imposed by law in the driving of the motor vehicle, which . . . proximately cause[d] great bodily injury .

. . to another person." § 56-5-2945(A). The State sought to meet this requirement by p roving three acts: Hamrick was speeding, he failed to keep a proper lookout, and h e struck Garland outside the designated lane of tr avel. The State put significa nt—if not primary— emphasis on proving Garland was located outside the designated lane of travel when

Hamrick struck him.

The State called several eyewitnesses who were on the scene whe n it happened. However, none of them testified with specificity to where the i mpact occurred. The

State also called Officer Harris. From the outset of his testi mony, the State attempted to demonstrate Officer Harris's qualifications as an expert in accident reconstruction. Throughout his testimony, the State pursued opinion testimony a s to whether

Hamrick struck Garland in the des ignated lane of travel or with in the construction

zone. The State asked, "Thr ough your investigation and documen tation of the scene did you develop an approximate point of impact?" Before Officer Harris could complete his answer, Hamrick objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.

The State then asked Officer Ha rris whether he "ma[de] any meas urements." Officer Harris's answer was not responsive, and conveyed his opinion on accident

reconstruction. He testified, "I marked a possible point of im pact based on what information I had been given." Hamrick objected, and the trial court again sustained the objection. The solicitor changed the subject and finished Officer Harris's direct examination on the question of wh ether Hamrick was intoxicated.

On cross-examination, Hamrick's counsel highlighted many of the deficiencies in Officer Harris's qualifications in accident reconstruction and in the information

available to him regarding a sp ecific point of impact. At seve ral points, counsel got Officer Harris to concede he wasn't sure of a point of impact. For example, as to a specific point of impact, Officer Harris testified, "I'm not sure; you are right. I don't have a point of impact."On re-direct examination, the State resumed asking Officer Harr is about his training

in accident reconstruction, including the reconstruction of "au tomobile pedestrian collisions." As a part of his answer to questions about his qu alifications, Officer Harris began to explain his opinion on the trajectory of Garlan d's body after impact. Hamrick objected on the basis of his qualifications. Then, for the first time, the State requested the trial court find Officer Harris met the Rule 702, SCRE, qualification requirement as an expert in acci dent reconstruction. After Ham rick pointed out Officer Harris had never been found qualified as an expert befo re, the trial court held

an off-the-record conference. The trial court did not rule on the record whether Officer Harris met the qualification requirement. The court st ated only, "You may proceed." As we held in State v. Council , 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), "When admitting [expert testimony 4 ] under Rule 702, SCRE, the trial judge must find

. . . the expert witness is qualified . . . ." 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S .E.2d at 518 (emphasis added).

The State continued attempting to elicit Officer Harris's opini on, asking, "Is there enough evidence . . . to determine the point of impact," and "c ould you reach a conclusion about point of impact." Even after Officer Harris answered "no" to those questions, the State continued, "Combined with witness testimon y and witness

statements taken from the scene, does that help you in making t hat sort of conclusion," referring to Officer Harris's conclusion regarding the point of impact. Hamrick continued to object, in an obvious effort to keep Officer Harris from giving opinion testimony that the impact occurred in the construction zone.

The State then asked Officer Harris whether it was "possible" f or Hamrick to have

swerved into the construction z one from the designated lane of travel and hit Garland without hitting any cones or the p aving machine. Hamrick's cou nsel immediately stated, "Objection, Judge. . . . He's not been qualified to re nder such an opinion." Finally, the trial court ruled, stating, "He investigated the a ccident. He has training and experience. He does not have to be qualified as an expert to render a lay opinion based on his rational perception. " After another off-the-recor d discussion, the court

4 In Council , we used the term "scientific evidence." Id. In subsequent decisions, however, we made it clear the trial court's gatekeeping respons ibility to make findings as to the foundational elements of Rule 702—including whether the expert meets the qualification requirement—applies to all expert testi mony. See, e.g.

, State

v. White , 382 S.C. 265, 269, 676 S.E.2d 6 84, 686 (2009) (discussing the "Rule 702, SCRE, qualifications" requirement in the context of non-scientific evidence).again stated only, "You may proceed." In the testimony that fo llowed, Officer Harris never specifically identified a point of impact. He did, however, give his opinion that the impact did not occur in the designated lane of travel, but occurred behind

the cones in the c onstruction zone.

We find the trial court erred in two respects. First, the cour t incorrectly characterized Officer Harris's testimony as "lay" opinion. Under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, lay opinion is "limited to those opinions . . . rationally based on the perception of the witness." Officer Harris arrived on the scene forty-eight minutes after the incident occurred, and thus, he clearly did n ot perceive the location of the impact. 5 In addition, Rule 701 provides lay opinion is not admissible unless "the witness is not testifying as an expert." See also Rule 701, SCRE (providing lay opinion is "limited to those opinions . . . which . . . do not require special knowledge, skill, experience or training"). Accident reconstruction requi res expertise, 6 and from the outset, the State sought to establish Officer Harris's qual ifications as an expert in

accident reconstruction. Officer Harris's testimony was not "l ay" opinion, and the trial court erred by char acterizing it as such.

Second, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings t hat the State established the foundation required by Rule 702. See Council , 335 S.C. at 20, 515 S.E.2d at

518. The State attempted to do this, but Hamrick repeatedly ob jected. The specific

issue Hamrick raised was whether Officer Harris met the require ment of "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educ ation." Rule 702, SCRE. When Hamrick objected to the testimony on this basis, th e trial court

5 See Jackson v. Price , 288 S.C. 377, 379-80, 342 S. E.2d 628, 629-30 (Ct. App. 1986) (error to permit highway pat rolman—who arrived after the accident—to testify as to point of impact (citing State v. Kelly , 285 S.C. 373, 374, 329 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1985) ("A police officer may not give his opinions as to t he cause of an accident. He may only testify regarding his direct observations unless he is qualified as an expert."))). While Kelly and Jackson were decided before our Rules of Evidence, the Note to Rule 701, SCRE, indicates the rule is con sistent with prior law. Rule 701, SCRE Note.

6 See generally 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 255 (2012) ("Accident reconstruction experts . . . rely on knowledge and t he application of the principles of physics, engineering, or other sciences which are beyond the understanding of the average j uror." (footnotes omitted)).conducted off-the-record discussi ons. Without putting any find ing on the record, the trial court permitted the State to proceed asking Officer H arris questions to elicit his opinion as to the point of impact. The trial court's failu re to make any finding on

the record was error.

Our review of the record convinces us Officer Harris did not po ssess the necessary qualifications to give an opini on in accident reconstruction. His training in the field

was limited to a few courses he took over a period of several y ears. He had no other training or education that would otherwise demonstrate he was qualified as an expert to give an opinion on accident reconstruction. Accident recons truction is a highly

technical and specialized field i n which experts employ princip les of engineering, physics, and other knowledge to for mulate opinions as to the mo vements and interactions of vehicles and people, under circumstances lay pe ople—even trained officers—simply cannot understand. A law enforcement officer who attended several classes on the subject d oes not possess the necessary q ualifications to satisfy the "qualified as an expert" element of the Rule 702 foundation

. See State v. Ellis

, 345 S.C. 175, 177-78, 547 S.E.2d 490, 491 (2001) (officer quali fied as an expert in crime scene processing and fingerprint identification was quali fied to testify to measurements taken at the scene, recovery of shell casings, and identification of blood stains, but was not qualified to testify regarding the lo cation and position of the victim's body based on crime scene reconstruction); Kelly , 285 S.C. at 374, 329 S.E.2d at 443 ("A police officer may not give his opinions as t o the cause of an accident.").

Because Officer Harris gave opinion testimony on the subject of accident reconstruction, and the State failed to lay the Rule 702 founda tion for his testimony,

we find the trial court erre d in admitting the testimony.

B. Harmless Error

We quickly dispense with any sugge stion the trial court's error was harmless. Officer Harris's opinion testimony was critical to the State's ability to prove an "act forbidden by law" or that Hamrick "neglec t[ed] any duty imposed by law in the driving of the motor vehicle," and on that basis prove Hamrick "proximately ca use[d] great bodily injury" to Garland. § 56-5-2945(A). While the State also pres ented evidence Hamrick was driving five miles per hour over the speed limit an d failed to keep a proper lookout, the burden of pr oving proximate cause would hav e been much more

difficult for the State to meet if the point of impact was in t he lane of travel.Therefore, we find the error in admitting Officer Harris's opin ion testimony regarding the point of impact c ould not have been harmless.

C. Video of Poplin's Experiment

To combat the State's theory the collision occurred inside the construction zone, Hamrick called Poplin to testif y about Poplin's investigation o f the incident and his opinion the point of impact was in Hamrick's designated travel lane. To test his opinion, Poplin conducted an experiment to determine whether it was possible for Hamrick to have struck Garland in the construction zone as repo rted by Officer

Harris. Poplin videotaped his e xperiment, and Hamrick's counse l sought to

introduce the video into evidence.

The trial court expressed concer n over Hamrick offering the vid eo into evidence as

an attempt to re-create the inc ident. The trial court stated, "[T]here's no concrete evidence in the record as to what the point of contact would ha ve been or was, and . . . I cannot be assured of the accuracy of any re-enactment." The trial court stated, "You normally have video animations if you're re-creating accidents . . . . But the things that were problematic for me . . . [dealt] with the . . . human element in driving . . . and just the subjec tive nature of it." The court also expressed concern the video would mislead the jury. The court stated, "It is a re-creation. You want the jury to believe that this is how it happened that night, and that is what becomes problematic about it. Otherwise you wouldn't be seeking to put it in." The court allowed Poplin to testify about the details of his experiment, but excluded the video

from evidence.

We find the trial court conducte d an erroneous analysis of the admissibility of the

video. The proper analysis begins with the question of whether the evidence is

relevant. See Rule 402, SCRE ("All relevant evidence is admissible . . . .")

. Rule 401 provides evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to ma ke the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the act ion more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401 , SCRE. The video of Poplin's experiment was clearly relevant because the video t ended to prove

Hamrick could not have struck Garland in the construction zone as the State claimed

he did. Rule 402 also provides re levant evidence may be exclud ed "as otherwise provided by . . . these rules" or another provision of law. Ho wever, we do not see that any of the trial court's concerns justify excluding the video from evidence under the rules or any other provision of law.First, we disagree with the trial court's characterization of the video as a re-creation or demonstration of how the incident happened. Certainly, Hamr ick offered Poplin's opinion testimony generally to demonstrate how the incident did happen. But the video was offered to prove how t he incident did not happen. It was substantive evidence—not demonstrative—offered to prove Hamrick's car could not have struck

Garland inside the construction zone—as Officer Harris testifie d it had—without also knocking over the cones or striking the paving machine. See 2 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 401:10 (8th ed. 2018) ("The results of experiments are substantive ev idence, . . . . Sometimes the pu rpose of the experiment is to determine how a particular event .

. . did not occur." (footnote omitted)). As substantive, relevant evidence, the trial court did not have the

discretion to exclude the video except in reliance upon a speci fic, applicable rule or other provision of law.

Further, if the trial court was concerned the video would misle ad the jury, it was required to conduct an on-the-record Rule 403 analysis. See Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence ma y be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ."); State v. Spears , 403 S.C. 247, 254, 742 S.E.2d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding "the trial court erred by failing to conduct an on-the-record Rule 403 balancing test"). The State mad e the "possibility" of Hamrick hitting Garland in the construction zone an issue through the testimony of Officer Har ris. Poplin testified the experiment showed it was not possible for the impact to hav e occurred in the construction zone. The probative value of Poplin's video included showing the jury whether Poplin aggressively attem pted to make the vehicle do wh at Officer Harris testified it did, and whether Po plin placed the cones and paver to accurately represent their location on the night of the incident. The trial court d id not analyze this or any other probative value.

Because we reverse on the error of the admission of Officer Har ris's opinion testimony, and because the probative value of Poplin's video ma y be different in the absence of that testimony, it is not necessary for us to rule whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the video. On remand, however, the trial court

should consider the State's objections to the video under the p roper legal framework.

D. Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results

The State offered the results of Hamrick's blood test as part o f its effort to prove

Hamrick was "under the influenc e of alcohol" as required by sub section 56-5

-2945(A). Hamrick moved to exclude the results for a statutory violation, and to suppress the results for a constitutional violation. We addres s each argument in turn.

i. Three-Hour Statutory Requirement

We first discuss Hamrick's motion to exclude the test results b ased on the timing requirement in subsection 56-5-2950(A), which provides samples other than breath samples "must be collected within three hours of the arrest." We find the trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the test results on this gro und. Even if Hamrick's arrest occurred outside of the three-hour statutory timeframe, the only exclusionary provision that could apply is set forth in subsection 56-5-2950 (J) of the South Carolina Code (2018), which provides,

The failure to follow policies, procedures, and regulations, or the provisions of this section, shall result in the exclusion from evidence of any test results, if the trial judge or hearing officer finds that this failure materially

affected the accuracy or reliability of the test results or the fairness of the testing procedure . . . .

§ 56-5-2950(J). It is not clear to us how the failure to draw Hamrick's blood within three hours of his arrest "materially affected the accuracy or reliability of the test results or the fairness of the testing procedure." There is no evidence the delay in drawing Hamrick's blood resulted in anything but a test result showing a lower blood

alcohol concentration than would have been shown if the test we re timely conducted. See generally McNeely , 569 U.S. at 145, 133 S. Ct. a t 1556, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702 (discussing "the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream"). There is no suggestion of any other problem with the testing procedures. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the blood test results on this basis.

ii. Fourth Amendment Gr ound for Suppression

Hamrick argued the test results should be suppressed because hi s blood was drawn

without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We find that even if there

was a Fourth Amendment violati on, the good-faith exception to t he exclusionary rule applies, and therefore, t he test results will not be suppr essed.

The "compulsory administration of a blood test .

. . plainly involves the broadly

conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendm ent." Schmerber

,384 U.S. at 767, 86 S. Ct. at 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918. "In t he absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific excep tion to the warrant requirement." Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430, 439 (2014); see also State v. Weaver , 374 S.C. 313, 319, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007) ("[A] warrantle ss search will withstand constit utional scrutiny where the search falls within one of several well-recognized ex ceptions to the warrant requirement.").

There are two exceptions to the warrant requirement that could be applicable in this case—consent and exigent circumstances. See generally State v. Counts , 413 S.C. 153, 163, 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2015) (providing "consent" and "ex igent circumstances" are recognized ex ceptions to the warrant require ment). The exigent circumstances exception "'applies when the exigencies of the si tuation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless searc h is objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" McNeely , 569 U.S. at 148-49, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 704 (quoting Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, 874-75 (2011)). As to conse nt, pursuant to South Carolina's implied consent stat ute, subsection 56-5-2950(A), Ha mrick is deemed by law to have consented to have his blood drawn by virtue of driv ing a motor vehicle in South Carolina, unless he withdraws his consent as contempla ted in subsection 56-5-2950(H).

The exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy" for a Fo urth Amendment

violation. Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 238, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285, 294 (2011). "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." 564 U.S. at 246, 131 S. Ct. at 2432, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 300. The rule does not apply "when the police act with a n objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' tha t their conduct is lawful." 564 U.S. at 238, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 295. "Where there is no miscondu ct, and thus no deterrent purpose to be served, suppression of the evidence is an unduly harsh

sanction." State v. Adams , 409 S.C. 641, 653, 763 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2014).

When the officers made the decision to draw Hamrick's blood wit hout a warrant, the law appeared to support the existence of exigent circumstances and the validity of statutory implied consent. There is nothing in this record tha t in any way suggests the officers did not "act with an objectively 'reasonable good- faith belief' that their

conduct is lawful." Therefore, we decline to address whether t he exigent circumstances or consent exceptions to the warrant requirement applied on the factsof this case, because even if we found no exception applied, we would find the goodfaith exception to the exclusion ary rule forecloses suppression

.

III. Conclusion

We REVERSE Hamrick's conviction for felony driving under the influence resulting in great bodily injury and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Thomas E. Huff, concur.