### No. 96-518 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RE THEMARRIAGE OF DEBRAANN HARSELL, Petitionerand Respondent, and DENNIS MIRL HARSELL, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin,Judge presiding

COUNSEL OF RECORD: ForAppellant: Dennis Mirl Harsell, Pro Se,San Lorenzo, California For Respondent: Byron W. 

### Boggs,Attorney at Law,Missoula, Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: December 19, 1996 

### Decided: 

### February 6, 1997

### Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court

Pursuant to Section 

### I, Paragraph 3(c),Montana Supreme Court 1995 

### Internal Operating Rules, the followingdecision shall not be cited asprecedent and shallbe published by its filing as apublic document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. DennisMirl Harsell,appearing pro se,appeals from the denial by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, of his motion to reconsider. We affirm. The issue on appeal iswhether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Dennis'motion to reconsider. BACKGROUND The marriage of Dennis Mirl Harsell (Dennis)and Debra Ann Harsell (Debra) was dissolved by the District Court on May 11, 1987. The decree incorporated the parties'Marital and Property SettlementAgreement which provided, inpertinent part, that Debra be awarded sole custody of the minor child Jaime Nichole Harsell

(Jaime),subject to liberalvisitationby Dennis,and that Dennis pay child support in the amount of $100 per month and maintain major medical and hospital insurance covering Jaime. Dennis and Debra were each to be responsible for one-half of any medical expenses incurred on Jaime's behalf which were not covered by insurance. Dennis was to receive the income tax exemption for Jaime as long as his child support payments remained current. In 1989, the parties filed a stipulation in the District Court 2

### increasing the child support payments to $175. On February 8, 

### 1996, Debra filed a motion to modify child support. She alleged that the costsof raising Jaimehad increased substantially, that Dennis' income had increased substantially, that Dennis had been receiving the benefit of the income tax exemption for Jaime even though he was paying substantially less than 50% of her support, and that Dennis had neither provided medical insurance for Jaime nor paid uncovered medical bills. Debra requested that the amount of child supportdue fromDennisbe increased to the amount required by the Montana Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines),that she be granted the right to claim Jaime as an income tax exemption,and that Dennis againbe required to provide medical insurance and pay one-halfof uncovered medical expenses. On May 31, 1996, Debra moved for a default ruling on her motion on the basis of Dennis' failure to respond; absent a financial affidavit fromDennis uponwhich child support due under the Guidelines couldbe calculated,she requested that theDistrict Court set Dennis' support obligation at $250 

### per month. On June 4,

### 1996,the District Court granted Debra'smotion to modify child support by default and awarded her the relief requested. On June 10, 

### 1996,Dennis filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Debra'smotion to modify child support. He recounted therein that he had attempted to respond earlier via certified letter to the presiding judge and only later learned that judgesdo not accept such certified mail; according to Dennis, he thenattempted to file his letter as his formal response to Debra's motion, but the letterwas returned onMarch 11, 1996, for lack of conformance to applicable rules of practice. While he sought a 10- day extension of time, to and includingJune 20, 1996,within which to respond to Debra'smotion either through counsel or pro se, in

essence he was requesting that his default be vacated. The District Court denied Dennis'motion for extensionof time the same day it was filed. On June 7.1, 1996, Dennis moved the District Court to reconsider its denial of his June 10 motion. He reasserted the matters mentioned in his earlier motion and that he had not been told " [ilnall this time" that a response to Debra'smotion was required within a specified time period. He also stated that he had "vital information" about the motion to modify of which the court should be aware; none of the "vital information" was set forth in the motion or in a sworn affidavit. The District Court denied Dennis'motion for reconsiderationon June 24, 1996. On July 1,1996,Dennis filed al'Response to Motion to Modify Child Support." On July 16,he filed a notice of appeal from the District Court'sdenial of his motion requesting reconsiderationof the court'searlier denial of his motion to set aside the default and for extension of time to respond. On August 12, 1996, Dennis moved the District Court for 

### a "stayof execution of judgment"pending his appeal. OnAugust 15, 1996,the District Court granted a stay conditioned 

### on payment by Dennis to the Clerk of the District Court of all sums owed, to be

### held by the Clerk and not disbursed to Debra until furtherorder of the court. The sameday,but apparentlyafter the District Court's grant of the conditional stay, Debra filed her opposition to Dennis' motion for a stay; she also requested that Dennis be required to post a supersedeasbond pending appeal On August 20, 

### Dennis filed a "Motion to Find Respondent in Contempt of Court,"in whichhe asserted that Debrawas denyinghis telephonic visitation with Jaime. Five days later, Dennis filed another motion for contempt,which was identical to the earlier motion except that he changed an incorrect designation of Debra as

"Respondentw in the earlier motion. On August 27, 1996, 

### the District Court vacated its order granting a conditional stay. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Dennis'motion to reconsider? We observe at the outset that Dennis' brief on appeal is approximately three pages long and contains neither a statement of the case, a statement of the facts, a statement of the issues on appeal, citation to legal authority in support of arguments asserting legal error by the District Court, nor legal analysis. All of these are requirements for a brief on appeal to this Court, as set forth in Rule 23,

### M.R.App.P.;none has been met here. We understand that Dennis is appearing pro se and that his understanding of legal procedures and requirements is less than adequate. We alsounderstand the importance to Dennis of the child support issue raised by Debra'smotion to modify and that he feels that he has been wronged by the actions of the District Court in this case. Moreover,we attempt to make reasonable accommodations 5for persons appearing pro se. We are, however, a court of law whose obligation is to determine the legal issues presented by the parties to an appeal under controlling legalprinciples. We cannot frame the issues for the appealing party, cite to the legal authorities which arguably might support that party's position, and construct the legal analysis--pursuantto those authorities--whichwe might then find persuasive on behalf of that party. To do so would convert this Court into an advocate for one party, in total derogation of our role as the interpreterand applierof the law. Furthermore,while such actionsmight appear entirely fair to--andfrom the standpoint of--a pro se litigant, they would nullify the rights of the opposing party to a decision by an objective and impartial appellate tribunal. The only issue before us is whether the District Court erred in denying Dennistmotion for reconsiderationof its denial of his motion for extension of time to respond. Our standard in reviewing

a district court'sruling on suchposttrial orpostjudgment motions is whether the court abused its discretion. See Larsonv. K-Mart Corp. (1990),241 Mont. 428, 430-31, 787 P.2d 361, 362 (citation omitted). Moreover, under Rule 2(b) of the Uniform District Court Rules, failure to respond to a motion may subject the motion to a summary ruling. The language of Rule 2(b) clearly vests discretion in a district court with regard to whether an unanswered motion will be subject to a summary ruling, and we also review a trial court'sRule 2(b) ruling under an abuse of discretion standard.Maberry v. Gueths (1989),238 Mont. 304, 309, 777 P.2d 1285, 1289. Here, Dennis did not file a response to Debra'smotion to modify child support for fourmonths and, indeed,until after that motion had been granted by default. He not only does not contend that he was unaware of her motion,he concedes that he received it

on February 8, 1996. It was his obligation to file a timely and appropriate response,eitherpro se or through an attorney. He did not do so over an extended period of time andhis complaint that no

one advised him of the necessity of responding within a specified period of time is to no avail. Neither district court personnel nor opposing counsel are obligated to provide such guidance to a party to 

### a legal matter. "Thelawhelps the vigilant before those who sleep on their rights." Section 1-3-218,MCA. Moreover,Dennis' "responses," when ultimately filed via his motion for extension of time and his later motion for reconsideration, contain no substantive basis requiring or even suggesting that reopening Debra'smotion would be appropriate. He neither contends, nor makes a showing,that the $250 child support ordered by the District Court exceeds that required by the Guidelines. Furthermore,while he contends that it would be a "great hardship"to carry the medical insurance for Jaime whichwas ordered by the District Court in 1987, this implicit concession that he has not complied with the decree incorporating this provision of theMarital and Property Settlement Agreement towhich he agreed a decade ago rings hollow at this point in the proceedings and is hardly apersuasive argument in favorof bendingapplicable rules and procedures in order to give him his day in court. Nor does the statement in Dennis' motion for reconsideration that he has "vital information" relating to the motion to modify custodyprovide 

### a basis for determining that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider. None of the supposedly vital informationwas disclosed via affidavit or otherwise, and courts are not required to reopen matters based on such conclusoryand unsupported statements. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis'motion for reconsideration. Affirmed.

We concur: