J-S41007-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: T.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1953 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000004-2018.

IN THE INT. OF: A.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1954 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000005-2018.

IN THE INT. OF: A.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1955 MDA 2019
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Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000006-2018.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2020

In this consolidated matter, Appellant T.L. (Mother) appeals from her 

dependent children’s respective permanency review orders issued by the York 

County Court of Common Pleas – Juvenile Division. At issue is one of the 16

requisite findings a dependency court must render during each permanency 

review hearing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1-12); (f.2). Specifically, the

Juvenile Act requires the court to determine the extent to which the parent 

has progressed toward alleviating the conditions which necessitated the 

original placement of her children. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(3). Following 

a November 4, 2019 permanency review hearing, the court determined 

Mother made minimal progress and recorded this finding in the children’s 

respective orders; Mother appealed. After review, we conclude that the 

issuance of the ensuing termination decrees and our affirmance of the decrees 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) rendered moot the specific issue of 

Mother’s progress. Consequently, we dismiss.

This consolidated appeal concerns three of Mother’s four children: 5-

year-old T.L (born 2014); 6-year-old A.L. (born 2013); and 9-year-old A.L. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(born 2010).1 We briefly note the procedural history of the dependency cases, 

as discussed in the dependency court’s opinion:

On January 4, 2018, an application for emergency protective 

custody was filed by [the] York County Office of Children, 

Youth and Families after receiving a referral due to 

allegations of sexual abuse. On January 29, 2018, a 

dependency hearing was held, at which time the children 

were placed in foster care placement together. In April 

2018, another hearing was held and it was agreed that the 

children would all be moved to a different foster care home. 

In October 2018, the children’s foster parents were no[t] 

able to be a resource, so the children were moved to 

alternative placements. These alternative placements of the 

children took place between the months of November 2018 

and January 2019.

A permanency review hearing was held on May 7, 2019, and 

a status review hearing was held on August 12, 2019. 

Another permanency review hearing, and the hearing in 

question, was held on November 4, 2019. At this hearing, 

both Mother and Father were present, and testimony was 

taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an 

order with findings that there has been minimal progress 

and compliance by Mother. Mother filed [timely] notice[s] 

of appeal.

See Trial Court Opinion, dated 1/6/20, at 2 (some superfluous capitalization 

omitted).

After Mother filed this consolidated appeal, the lower court proceeded 

with termination hearings in February 2020 concerning all four children and 

their three respective parents. The court subsequently terminated the 

parents’ rights. T.L. (Mother) and T.L. (Father) appealed their terminations; 

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1 These children were born to T.L. (Father), who does not appeal. Mother has 

another child, 11-year-old A.L. (born 2008), who is not a part of this appeal. 

The father of A.L. is R.V., who is also not party to the instant matter.
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R.V. (Father of A.L.) did not. Those appeals are separately listed before this 

panel. See 436, 437, 438, 439 MDA 2020 (relating to Mother); see also 545, 

546, 547 MDA 2020 (relating to Father).

Mother presents one issue for our review:

Did the lower court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in finding [Mother] had made minimal progress 

and there was minimal compliance?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

Before we may address any substantive issue, we must determine 

whether the issue is appealable, because appealability implicates our 

jurisdiction. See In Interest of N.M., 186 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(quoting Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[Since we] 

lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order, it is incumbent on us to 

determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an 

appealable order.”)). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate 

standard of review is de novo and the scope of review plenary.” Barak v. 

Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

In order to be appealable, the order must be: (1) a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 

341-342; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a)-(b); Pa.R.A.P. 311-312; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 

313. Mother seems to suggest that her appeal fits neatly into the second 

category. Though she wholly sidesteps any real discussion of appealability, 

she does cite Pa.R.A.P. 311 in the Statement of Jurisdiction section in her 
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Brief. See Mother’s Brief at 1. Our Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 provides 

that an interlocutory appeal as of right may be taken if “an order that is made 

final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not 

dispose of all claims and of all parties.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8). This Rule 

does not provide us with jurisdiction, however. Mother has not sought 

permission, nor are these orders appealable as of right by law. See Interest 

of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that Rule 311 

did not convey by right of law the ability of a mother to appeal from a 

permanency review order). Thus, whether the order is appealable would 

depend on either the final order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 341 or the collateral 

order doctrine under Pa.R.A.P. 313.2

But in this case, we need not decide whether the issues involved render 

the permanency review orders appealable. Even if the issue of Mother’s 

progress were appealable, we conclude the effect of the subsequent 

termination decrees renders the issue moot.

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2 Determining if a permanency review order is a final or interlocutory order 

has been a question of considerable perplexity. In the context of dependency 

proceedings, appealability often depends on the precise issue. On one hand, 

the order could be final and appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). See 

also In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908 (Pa. 2003). If not, the order is likely 

interlocutory, which is generally not appealable. But even if the permanency 

review order is interlocutory, it might still otherwise be appealable under the 

collateral order doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313. This dichotomy was thoroughly 

addressed in our recent decision of Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645 (Pa. 

Super. 2019).
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“[A]n actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial 

process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” Interest of J.L., 216 A.3d 233, 

237 (Pa. Super. 2019). “The concept of mootness focuses on a change that 

has occurred during the length of the legal proceedings.” Id. (quoting In re 

Cain, 590 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. 1991)). “If an event occurs that renders 

impossible the grant of the requested relief, the issue is moot and the appeal 

is subject to dismissal.” Id. (quoting Delaware Ricer Preservation Co., Inc. 

v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 1177, 1183 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

Here, there is no longer an actual case or controversy, by virtue of the 

termination order and subsequent appeal. The question presented in this 

appeal is the extent Mother progressed toward her reunification goal at the 

time of the November 2019 permanency review hearing. Because this Court 

has determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that the agency put forth sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, the 

question of Mother’s progress circa November 2019 is no longer relevant. 

Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot, because the relief Mother requests 

would not have any legal force or effect. 
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Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2020