SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3805-15T1

D.M.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.M.,

Defendant-Appellant.

————————————————————————————————

Submitted October 24, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Hoffman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Cape May 

County, Docket No. FM-05-0045-09.

K.M., appellant pro se.

Hankin, Sandman, Palladino & Weintrob, PC, 

attorneys for respondent (Amy R. Weintrob, on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from the February 23, 2016 Family Part 

order denying reconsideration of the court's October 8, 2014 and 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 9, 2017
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December 16, 2014 orders.1 The October 8, 2014 order dismissed 

the remand of defendant's motion seeking college contribution from 

plaintiff. The December 16, 2014 order granted plaintiff the tax 

exemption for both children and terminated child support 

retroactively to May 2, 2014. We affirm. 

In December 2010, plaintiff and defendant divorced after 

seventeen years of marriage. They have two children, a daughter 

born in 1992 and a son born in 1996. The parties signed a property 

settlement agreement (PSA), which the court incorporated into 

their final judgment of divorce. The PSA provided the parties 

would address the issue of contribution toward college expenses 

at the time their children entered college, based on the factors 

set forth in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982). The PSA also 

 

1 While defendant's notice of appeal lists all three orders, only 

the February 23, 2016 order denying reconsideration properly 

appears before us. Defendant filed her notice of appeal and motion 

for leave to appeal out of time on May 9, 2016 seeking to appeal 

all three orders. Ninety-two days expired between the October 8, 

2014 order and defendant's motion for reconsideration. Twentythree days expired between the December 16, 2014 order and 

defendant's motion for reconsideration. The time for appeal tolled 

while the reconsideration motion remained pending. The trial 

court dismissed the reconsideration motion on February 23, 2016, 

but defendant did not file her notice of appeal until May 9, 2016 

— seventy-five days later. We granted defendant's leave to appeal 

out of time for the February 23, 2016 order only. Thus, defendant 

failed to timely appeal from the October 8, 2014 and December 16, 

2014 orders. See R. 2:4-1; see also R. 2:4-3; see also R. 2:4-

4(a). Accordingly, we limit our review to the February 23, 2016 

order denying reconsideration.
3 A-3805-15T1

required plaintiff to pay $100 per week in child support and 

allowed each party to claim a tax exemption for one child. 

Plaintiff owned several businesses during the marriage. 

Defendant alleges plaintiff issued the parties' children payroll 

checks from one of his businesses and deposited that money into a 

college fund for the children. Defendant further alleges plaintiff 

actually used the college fund containing the children's money 

rather than his own money to pay the college expenses. 

When the parties' daughter started college, defendant paid 

the first three semesters, then filed a motion requesting 

reimbursement from plaintiff and contribution for future college 

expenses. The trial court dismissed this motion and defendant 

appealed. On appeal, we found the trial court improperly denied 

college contribution based solely on the fact that defendant 

requested reimbursement after she paid the expenses. D.M. v. 

K.M., No. A-3301-12 (App. Div. May 23, 2014) (slip op. at 8). We 

therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court to perform a 

full Newburgh analysis. Ibid. 

On remand, the trial court dismissed defendant's motion after

she refused to testify at a plenary hearing scheduled to gather 

evidence relating to the Newburgh factors. In addition, the trial 

court ordered the termination of child support and granted 

plaintiff the right to claim the tax exemptions for both children 
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after plaintiff agreed to pay all college expenses for both 

children. 

On this appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in 

considering the children's money from the college fund as 

plaintiff's contribution, and therefore erred in terminating child 

support and granting plaintiff the tax exemptions for both 

children.

When a trial court denies a party's motion for 

reconsideration, we overturn the denial only in the event the

trial court abused its discretion. Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill, 

303 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Cummings v. Bahr, 

295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996)). In determining whether 

such an abuse has taken place, a reviewing court should be mindful 

that a party should not utilize reconsideration just because of 

"dissatisfaction with a decision of the [c]ourt." Capital Fin. 

Co. of Delaware Valley v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 

(App. Div.) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 

(Ch. Div. 1990)), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008).

Courts should only grant reconsideration when "either (1) the 

Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect 

or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the Court either 

did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of 

probative, competent evidence." Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 
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349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.) (quoting D'Atria, supra, 242 

N.J. Super. at 401), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002); see also

R. 4:49-2. Trial courts should grant motions for reconsideration 

"only under very narrow circumstances." Ibid.

The trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration 

because defendant filed the motion at least one day late, even 

accepting defendant's contention that she did not receive the 

underlying orders until December 18, 2014. The court also noted

defendant failed to identify any information that the court failed 

to consider in its original decision.

We agree with the trial court's conclusion that defendant

filed her motion for reconsideration late. See R. 4:49-2. In 

addition, even if the trial court had decided the motion on the 

merits, we conclude the ultimate outcome would have been the same, 

as defendant failed to present any valid basis for the trial court 

to grant reconsideration in her favor. 

Before us, defendant argues the trial court "made an egregious 

error . . . by ruling the payroll [checks] issued to the parties' 

daughter belonged to the [p]laintiff." Defendant alleges 

plaintiff deposited the children's payroll checks into a college 

fund in his name, and therefore the college fund belongs to the 

children rather than plaintiff. However, the record indicates the 
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parties settled this issue as part of the PSA, which distributed

the college fund to plaintiff.

The trial court denies taking any position on the payroll 

checks issued to the children during a September 30, 2014 hearing. 

The trial court scheduled the September 30, 2014 hearing to allow 

the parties to present evidence regarding their respective

contributions, the children's contributions, and the other 

Newburgh factors. However, when defendant refused to testify at 

that hearing, she deprived the court of the ability to garner the 

evidence necessary to determine the Newburgh factors, and then 

address the issue of contribution for college expenses. As a 

result, the trial court dismissed defendant's motion. 

Defendant further argues the trial court based its decision 

to terminate child support and grant plaintiff the tax exemptions

for both children on the determination that the college fund 

belonged to plaintiff. However, we note the trial court's December 

16, 2014 order terminating child support and granting plaintiff 

the tax exemptions for both children explicitly references 

plaintiff's agreement to pay the remainder of his daughter's 

college expenses.

Plaintiff argues the PSA distributed the college fund to him, 

therefore the parties decided the issue of who owned the college 

fund in 2010 when the parties divorced. We agree. While the PSA 
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does not specifically address the college fund by name, it does 

state that each party shall "retain his or her own personal bank 

accounts . . . as their respective separate property." It also 

states any asset not specifically set forth in the agreement shall 

remain the property of that party. 

Defendant asserts the college fund was not a marital asset 

that could have been distributed in the PSA. However, defendant 

identifies account 33-xxxxxx-7 as the college fund, and an 

equitable distribution summary she provided includes that account 

number. The summary states each party was entitled to half of the 

$42,230 in account 33-xxxxxx-7, and distributed the entire account 

to plaintiff. The record clearly demonstrates the parties 

previously decided the issue of ownership of the college fund as 

part of their divorce seven years ago. 

In addition, defendant argues the trial court failed to 

consider the tax issues regarding the children's college fund and 

payroll checks. However, in addressing the motion for 

reconsideration, the trial judge specifically instructed plaintiff 

to submit evidence that defendant knew of the tax issues prior to 

the September 30, 2014 hearing and allowed defendant to respond. 

After reviewing these submissions, the judge determined this was 

not a new issue as the court previously considered it; therefore,

reconsideration was inappropriate on this basis. 
8 A-3805-15T1

Defendant failed to show the trial court committed an 

egregious error or that the trial court failed to consider material 

evidence. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying reconsideration.

Affirm.