* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text, we continue to refer to the

Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying

decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

*** Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 12/3/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL O. ABEYTA, a child,

through his mother, GERALDINE 

ABEYTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner

of Social Security,*

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-2260

(D.C. No. CIV-93-1082-JP)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT**

Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUNGSTRUM,*** District

Judge.
-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Michael Abeyta, through his mother, Geraldine Abeyta, appeals

from an order of the district court affirming the final decision of the Secretary of

Health and Human Services denying his application for child’s supplemental

security income benefits. Michael was born on September 15, 1983, and was nine

years old at the time of the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ). He

contends that he has been disabled from birth due to prune-belly syndrome and an

enlarged kidney. In an opinion that now stands as the final decision of the

Secretary, the ALJ determined that Michael did have a severe impairment, but that

the severity of the impairment did not meet the Listing of Impairments, see

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, nor was it of comparable severity to an

impairment that would cause an adult to be disabled, see id. § 416.924(e) and (f). 

We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial

evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Washington v.
-3-

Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is adequate

relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

On appeal, Michael essentially contends that the Secretary’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence and that the Secretary failed to consider certain

evidence. We have fully considered his arguments and reviewed the record, and

we conclude that the Secretary considered all relevant evidence, that her decision

is adequately supported by the evidence, and that she applied the correct legal

standards. The evidence showed that while Michael’s impairments caused some

bladder infections and fevers and limited his ability to participate fully in all

sports activities, they did not limit his ability to function independently,

appropriately, and effectively for his age. He attended school regularly, did well

academically, and got along well with others. The evidence supports the decision

that Michael is not disabled, and we therefore affirm the denial of benefits. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue

forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge