J-S29004-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.N.S. A/K/A 

J.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.L.J. A/K/S M.S., 

MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 80 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree November 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000072-2017

 CP-51-DP-0001716-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED AUGUST 24, 2018

Appellant, M.S. (“Mother”), appeals from the decree and order entered 

November 29, 2017, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to J.S.

(born in July 2008) (“Child”) pursuant to § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b) of the Adoption Act and changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption 

under § 6351 of the Juvenile Act. We affirm.

The trial court has set forth the factual background and procedural 

history of this case in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/18, at 2-14. 

We adopt the trial court’s recitation for purposes of this appeal, and we set 

forth herein only those facts, as found by the trial court, that are necessary 

to understand our disposition of the appeal. 
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On June 8, 2015, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received 

a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report, stating that Mother was 

mentally unstable and abusing drugs and alcohol. The report also alleged 

that Mother had an informal custody agreement with a family friend, K.B., 

wherein K.B. would care for Child during the week while Mother attended

drug and alcohol treatment, and Mother would care for Child on weekends. 

The report further alleged that Mother violated the informal custody 

agreement by not returning Child to K.B. because she believed K.B. 

physically abused Child. 

On June 9, 2015, DHS went to Maternal Grandfather’s house to 

investigate the GPS report. DHS spoke with Child about the allegations that 

K.B. abused her. Child admitted she lied, stating that K.B. did not abuse her, 

but disciplined her by hitting her three times on the back of her hand with a 

ruler for forging K.B.’s name on a school document.

DHS then viewed a notarized document signed by Mother on July 31, 

2014, awarding temporary custody of Child to K.B., so that K.B. could enroll 

Child in school in Landsdowne, Pennsylvania. DHS learned that Child has 

been residing with K.B. since about May 2014. 

DHS further learned that Mother attended substance abuse treatment 

for approximately one week, but never completed the program. DHS noted 

that Mother had also undergone two brain surgeries for traumatic brain 

injuries caused by domestic violence with a paramour. DHS ultimately found 
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K.B. to be an appropriate caregiver for Child and K.B.’s home to be suitable 

for Child. On the same day, DHS implemented a Safety Plan, in which 

Mother agreed to allow Child to remain in the home of K.B. 

On June 22, 2015, K.B. informed DHS that she did not feel she could 

continue to care for Child and she wanted Child removed from her home 

because Child pushed K.B.’s ten-month-old niece off the couch, head first. 

On June 24, 2015, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) and 

placed Child in foster care through the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) 

Asociación de Puertorriqueños en March. At the shelter care hearing for Child 

on June 26, 2015, the trial court lifted the OPC, temporarily committed Child 

to DHS, and referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a 

forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and monitoring. On July 

23, 2015, the trial court received a CEU Report, stating Mother did not 

comply with the court order for a drug and alcohol assessment. 

At the adjudicatory hearing on July 24, 2015, the court adjudicated 

Child dependent and fully committed Child to DHS. The court ordered legal 

custody to remain with DHS and placement to continue in foster care. The 

court further ordered Mother to attend supervised weekly visits at the 

agency and to complete an assessment, monitoring and three random drug 

screens at CEU. 

On October 12, 2015, DHS and CUA held a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) 

meeting. Mother’s SCP objectives were: (1) to arrive at the agency at the 
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scheduled date and times for visits with Child; (2) to make herself available 

to attend all meetings as needed; (3) to go to CEU as requested to give 

three random drug screens and attend all required appointments; (4) to 

attend Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) classes and comply with all 

tasks; and (5) to attend all of her appointments at WEDGE in compliance 

with her treatment plan. 

Several permanency hearings were held between 2016 through 2017. 

On November 9, 2017, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child, and to change Child’s permanency goal to 

adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petition on November 29, 

2017. At the hearing, Child was represented by both a guardian ad litem and 

a special child advocate. DHS presented the testimony of Mr. Kyrie 

McChristian, CUA case manager. Mother, represented by counsel, did not 

testify on her own behalf. On the same day, the trial court entered its decree 

and order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, and 

changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption. 

On December 27, 2017, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Mother raises the following issues for our 

review.

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error, when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 
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evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8)?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error, when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without 

giving primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of Child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

3. Did the trial court commit reversible error, when it terminated 

Mother’s parental rights and changed Child’s goal to adoption 

as substantial, sufficient, and credible evidence was 

presented at the time of trial, which would have 

substantiated denying the petition for goal change?

Mother’s Brief, at 4.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of § 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We need only address subsection (a)(2).

Section 2511(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
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Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under subsection (a)(2) as 

follows.

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . . 

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, 

can seldom be more difficult than when termination is 

based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, 

in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a 

parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is 

just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the 

duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted).

With respect to subsection (a)(2), the trial court found that Mother 

failed to address the conditions which brought Child into placement. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/18, at 21. The trial court relied on the credible 

testimony of Mr. McChristian. See id. The trial court noted that Mother was 
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referred and re-referred to various drug and alcohol treatment programs 

throughout the history of this case; however, she did not successfully 

complete the programs. See id., at 23. The trial court further found that 

Mother was also inconsistent with visitation, which led to a suspension of her 

visits with Child. See id. Additionally Mother did not comply with CEU for 

drug testing. The trial court determined that Mother failed to perform her 

parental duties in order to reunite with Child. See id. The trial court opined 

that Mother will not be able to fulfill her parental responsibilities to Child in 

the future. See id. Thus, the trial court concluded that DHS presented clear 

and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s rights pursuant to subsection 

(a)(2). 

Mother, however, argues that the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights under this subsection. Mother contends that she has 

cooperated with DHS/CUA, and has substantially complied with her SCP 

goals so that she could parent and reunite with Child. Mother maintains that 

she has successfully completed housing, financial, and parenting classes 

through ARC, and she has completed an inpatient drug and alcohol 

rehabilitation program at Valley Forge Medical Center. Mother points out 

that, at the time of the termination hearing, she was enrolled in a treatment 

program through WEDGE. Mother claims that if she was given some 

additional time, she would have completed her SCP goals to reunite with 
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Child. Mother, thus, contends that termination of her parental rights under 

subsection (a)(2) is against the weight of the evidence. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. During the termination hearing, Mr. 

McChristian testified that he has been the CUA case manager since July 27, 

2017, and has reviewed the full history of the case. See N.T., 11/29/17, at

8. Mr. McChristian stated that, prior to Child entering foster care, Mother 

signed an informal custody agreement, entrusting Child into someone else’s 

care due to her issues with drugs and alcohol. See id., at 8-9. Mr. 

McChristian testified that Child has been in foster care since July 2015. See 

id., at 11. Mr. McChristian testified that, at the time that he inherited the 

case, Mother’s SCP objectives were: (1) to avail herself to CUA; (2) to

address drug and alcohol concerns by attending treatment program; (3) and 

to undergo CEU screenings and assessments. See id., at 10. Mr. McChristian

informed the court that Mother has not been in compliance with her current 

SCP objectives. See id., at 15. 

Mr. McChristian testified that, when the case was transferred to him, 

he did not have Mother’s contact information and had to reach out to her 

inpatient counselor, who was able to help him connect with Mother about her 

SCP goals. See id., at 14. Mr. McChristian further testified that Mother was 
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given his contact information about two months ago; however, Mother has 

not tried to get in contact with him since then. See id., at 15. 

Mr. McChristian stated that Mother has not successfully completed any 

sort of drug and alcohol treatment while Child has been in foster care. See 

id. Mr. McChristian testified that Mother is currently at an inpatient drug and 

alcohol treatment program at Valley Forge Medical Center. See id., at 12. 

Mr. McChristian stated that Mother has not provided any documentation to 

him regarding the program. See id. Mr. McChristian testified that Mother 

failed to inform him that she was discharged from inpatient treatment in 

October 2017 and that she was enrolled in another drug treatment program. 

See id., at 28. 

Mr. McChristian acknowledged that Mother attended ARC and 

completed programs for housing, parenting, and financial counseling in 

2016, prior to him receiving the case. See id., at 35. Mr. McChristian, 

however, stated that Mother has not demonstrated that she has appropriate 

and safe housing to reunify with Child. See id., at 37. Regarding visitation, 

Mr. McChristian testified that the court ordered that Mother’s visitations 

would be suspended if she missed three visits with Child in May 2016. See 

id., at 12-13. Mother subsequently missed three visits and her visits were 

officially suspended by the court. See id., at 13. Mr. McChristian testified 

that he cannot recall the last time Mother saw Child. See id., at 12. 
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DHS presented a CEU Report dated November 28, 2017, which showed 

Mother failed to attend both assessments scheduled on August 30, 2017, 

and rescheduled on September 26, 2017. See id., at 15. It further showed 

that Mother had a drug screen on August 9, 2017, the date of the last court 

listing, in which she tested positive for alcohol. See id. 

Mother did not testify. Mother submitted a report that she was 

admitted to Valley Forge Medical Center on September 14, 2017 and was 

discharged in October 2017. See id., at 37. Mother further presented a 

document showing she has been enrolled at WEDGE medical center since 

October of 2017. See id.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court determined 

that Child has been in foster care for twenty-eight months and Mother has 

not become “one iota closer” to being a parent to Child than at the time 

Child was brought into care. Id., at 51. The trial court noted that, prior to 

Child being placed into foster care, Mother agreed to place Child into the 

physical custody of a third party. See id., at 50-51. The trial court found 

that Mother has failed to put herself in a position to parent Child, has not 

parented Child for at least two years, and remains on the outskirts of the 

Child’s life. See id., at 51. The trial court noted that Mother’s visits with 

Child were inconsistent as there were more missed visits than there were 

actual visits, which led to the suspension of her visits. See id. The trial court 

opined that, although Mother has taken some steps to enter a drug and 
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alcohol program here and there, and some belated attempts to enter some 

mental health programs throughout the life of this case, whatever Mother 

has done has been unsuccessful, as it has not led to any enhanced ability to 

parent Child. See id., at 49. The trial court reasoned that throughout the 

history of the case, Mother enters a drug and alcohol program, partially 

completes a program, and/or drops out of others. See id. The trial court 

opined that Mother’s unresolved issues with drugs and alcohol are further

evidenced by positive drug screens. See id. The trial court concluded, that 

based on the evidence, there was sufficient evidence pursuant to subsection 

(a)(2) that Mother has failed to remedy the issues which brought Child into 

foster care. See id., at 51. 

We conclude that Mother’s arguments regarding subsection (a)(2) 

essentially seek for this Court to make credibility and weight determinations 

different from those of the trial court. The record clearly reveals that Mother 

did not make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of 

full parental responsibilities. The record demonstrates that Child has been in 

foster placement since approximately June 2015, at which time Child was 

one month shy of seven years old. By the time of the termination hearing, 

Child had been in foster placement approximately two years and five

months. Child is now nine years old. The testimony presented at the 

termination hearing establishes that Mother was aware of her SCP goals, but 

failed to comply despite an ample amount of time given to do so. 
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Accordingly, Mother did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunify with 

Child. 

“[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to 

attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court 

cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence 

and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Hence, the 

record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued 

incapacity, neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be without essential 

parental control or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental wellbeing. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation. Thus, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights 

under subsection (a)(2). 

Next, we address § 2511(b). 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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The focus in terminating parental rights under subsection (a) is on the 

parent, but it is on the child pursuant to subsection (b). See In re 

Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In 

reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our 

Supreme Court has stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of 

the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability. ... [T]he 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted; brackets added and deleted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court concluded that DHS presented clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

best interest of Child. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/18, at 24. The trial 

court found that Mother failed to parent Child even before Child was placed 

into foster care by DHS, as she allowed others to care for Child, and would 
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abandon Child for periods of time. See id., at 25. The trial court opined that 

Child’s relationship with Mother has not progressed, as Mother has not

served as a parental figure since her removal. See id. The trial court heard 

reliable bonding testimony from Mr. McChristian, who opined that Child was 

not bonded to Mother, and referred to Foster Mother as “Mom.” Id. The trial 

court noted that Foster Mother provides Child with safety, comfort and 

meets all of her daily needs. See id.The trial court concluded that Child 

would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated as

termination meets the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of Child. See id. 

Mother, however, contends that DHS did not satisfy the requirements 

of subsection (b) by proving beyond clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of Child. 

Mother argues that Mr. McChristian testified that Child stated she misses

Mother and wishes to see her. Mother claims that she and Child share a 

beneficial bond that should not be destroyed though termination of her

parental rights. Mother asserts that there was no testimony or evidence 

presented to show that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if the bond 

Child shares with Mother was severed. Mother argues that DHS failed to 

establish that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental 

rights were terminated. 
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Mr. McChristian stated that Child initially told him that she misses 

Mother and wants to see her. See N.T., 11/29/17, at 16. Mr. McChristian 

informed the court that Child has not seen Mother for about a year. See id., 

at 25. Mr. McChristian stated that lately Child has not mentioned Mother, 

and when Mother cancelled her visits with Child, Child was not upset and

displayed no behavior issues. See id., at 24. Mr. McChristian opined that 

Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. See id.

Mr. McChristian testified that Child has been with Foster Mother at her 

current foster placement since April 2017, which is a pre-adoptive home. 

See id., at 21-22. Mr. McChristian stated that he observed the interactions 

between Child and Foster Mother. See id., at 21. Mr. McChristian testified 

that Child calls Foster Mother, “Mom.” Id. Mr. McChristian stated that Child 

runs up to Foster Mother and sits on her lap when they talk. See id., at 22. 

Mr. McChristian testified that Foster Mother meets Child’s needs and Child 

turns to Foster Mother to have her needs met. See id.

Mr. McChristian also testified that Child has a loving relationship with 

Foster Mother. See id., at 29. Mr. McChristian stated that Child is definitely 

bonded with Foster Mother. See id., at 22. Mr. McChristian stated that he 

spoke to Child about the process of being adopted by Foster Mother. See 

id., at 30. Mr. McChristian informed the court that Child would like to stay 

with Foster Mother. See id. Mr. McChristian testified that it is in Child’s best 
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interest to be adopted by Foster Mother where she has stability and her 

educational, developmental and medical needs are being met. See id., at 

23. 

Mother did not testify at the hearing. At the conclusion of termination 

hearing, the trial court noted that Child has found a family that is willing to 

provide all the love and care that Mother has decided not to provide. See 

id., at 51. The trial court found that Child’s life cannot be put on hold until 

Mother remedies her drug and alcohol issues and Mother decides to be a 

parent. See id., at 52. The trial court determined that it is unlikely that 

Mother will decide to step up and place herself in a position to parent Child 

in the near future. See id., at 51. The trial court opined that Child’s future is 

with her new pre-adoptive family. See id., at 53. The trial court concluded 

that it is in the best interest of Child to be adopted by Foster Mother 

pursuant to subsection (b). See id., at 51-52.

Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence and the totality of the 

record evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion or legal error by the trial 

court in concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve Child’s needs and welfare. The trial court thoroughly considered Child’s 

bond with Mother, and the effect of severing that bond. The trial court 

properly relied on Mr. McChristian’s testimony, and determined that there is 

no bond or substantial relationship between Child and Mother that, if 

severed, would cause a detrimental effect on Child. The evidence also 
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establishes that Child receives consistency and permanency by having her 

emotional and developmental needs met by Foster Mother. As such, the trial 

court correctly prioritized Child’s emotional well-being and need for safety, 

permanency and stability over Mother’s wishes. 

While Mother may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental 

rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. A child’s life “simply cannot be put 

on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d at 726, 732 (Pa. Super 

2008) (citations omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his ... child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his 

or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at at 1120 (citation omitted). 

Thus, the failure to terminate Mother’s parental rights would condemn 

Child to a life in foster care with no possibility of obtaining a permanent and 

stable home. As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the 

trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, we find no abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child under 

subsection (b). 

Next, we consider Mother’s third issue, in which she contends that the 

trial court erred in changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to 
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adoption as it is not in the best interest of Child when she and Child share a 

beneficial bond that should not be destroyed. Mother points out that Mr. 

McChristian testified that she stated she misses Mother and wishes to see 

her. 

Our standard of review in a dependency case is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. We review for

abuse of discretion....

In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted).

Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, § 6351(e), (f), (f.1), 

and (g) of the Juvenile Act provide the trial court with the criteria for its 

permanency plan for the subject child. Pursuant to those subsections, the 

trial court is to determine the disposition that is best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

When considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the 

trial court considers:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal 

for the child might be achieved.
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In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6351(f)).

Additionally, the law requires the trial court to make a determination 

regarding the child’s placement goal: 

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

* * *

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and 

the county agency will file for termination of parental 

rights in cases where return to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety, 

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child.

* * *

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1).

On the issue of a placement goal change, this Court has stated:

When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on 

what the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. 

Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family is a 

purpose of [the Juvenile Act], another purpose is to “provide for 

the care, protection, safety, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of children coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, the relationship of 

parent and child is a status and not a property right, and one in 

which the state has an interest to protect the best interest of the 

child. 

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some internal citations, 

brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
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With regard to the goal change, the trial court found that competent 

and persuasive evidence was presented by DHS that reasonable efforts were 

made to give Mother the opportunity and means for reunification with Child. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/18, at 26. The trial court determined that 

Mother failed to use the referrals and resources provided by DHS. See id. 

The trial court specifically found that Mother failed to appear at CEU for drug 

testing, and failed to appear for supervised visits with Child, which led to her 

visitations being suspended. See id. The trial court opined that the record 

clearly and convincingly demonstrates that reunification was not feasible and 

that adoption was inevitable. See id., at 27. The trial court, thus, concluded 

that there was sufficient competent evidence in the record to change the 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption. See id. 

After our careful review of the record, we have determined that the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court are supported 

by competent evidence in the record. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s 

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, and its order changing 

the Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Decree and order affirmed.
J-S29004-18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/18