UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. TERRY WAYNE GLENN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 21-5010 (D.C. No. 4:96-CR -00151-CVE-2) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , PHILLIPS , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Terry Wayne Glenn, a federal prisoner pr oceeding pro se, app eals the district court’s decision to transfer most of his inmate trust account to the government in partial payment of a fine. We have ju risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 13, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 12 I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY In March 1997, a grand jury indicted Glenn and others on various counts relating to drugs and guns, in cluding a drug-distribution c onspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The grand jury charged that the relevant conspiracy existed from sometime in 1992, the first overt acts t ook place in 1993, and the conspiracy continued through early 1997. In June 1997, Glenn pleaded guilty to th e conspiracy count, among others. By judgment filed November 3, 1997, the di strict court sentenced him to life imprisonment and imposed a $25,000 fine , both as punishment on the conspiracy count. The court specified that the fine was to be “paid in full immediately,” but “[a]ny amount not paid immediately shall be paid while in custody through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Re sponsibility Program.” R. vol. I at 37. As of October 2020, Glenn had paid $3,717.57 toward his fine, mostly through fixed, regular deductions from his inmate trust account. That month, Glenn filed a motion with the sentencing court titled “M otion To Cease and Desist Order.” Id. at 39. Glenn informed the court that prison officials had placed an encumbrance on his trust account, which at that time held about $9,100. Id. He argued that encumbering his account without notice violated his due process rights, and he requested an order that the government cease and desist “until such a time as Mr. Glenn has been properly served and informed of the purpose for such actions.” Id. The following month, the government m oved for an order authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to turn over the ba lance of Glenn’s trust account to the Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 23 government, to be applied to ward his fine. According to the government, the account held about $9,400. The district court soon i ssued an order resolving bot h motions. The district court apparently had access to Glenn’s acc ount information, and it found that his trust account held $9,269.81 as of the date of the order. The district court held that the government had properly encumbered the funds pending the motion it eventually filed, and that a federal statute entitled th e government to seiz e the funds and apply them toward Glenn’s fine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (“If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives substa ntial resources from a ny source . . . during a period of incarceration, such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still ow ed.”). The court therefore denied Glenn’s motion and granted the government’s moti on, except it awarded the government only $8,769 ( i.e. , $500.81 less than the full accoun t balance) “to a void defendant’s complete indigence.” R. vol. I at 57. Glenn then filed a document titled “Civil Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” R. vol. I at 71 (capitalization normalized). Despite the title, he filed the document with the sentencing court under his criminal case number. Glenn argued: (i) he had not received timely and proper notice before being deprived of his money, in violation of due process; a nd (ii) the government ’s opportunity to collect his fine ended in 2017, twenty years from judgment. The district court construed Glenn’s filing as a “second motion to discharge fines and fees,” id. at 79, and addressed only the tw enty-year argument, which Glenn Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 34 derived from the pre-1996 version of 18 U. S.C. § 3613. At the time, the statute stated, in relevant part, “[L] iability to pay a fine expire s—(1) twenty y ears after the entry of the judgment; or (2) upon the deat h of the individual fined.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (1994). The district court noted, however, that Congress amended the statute effective April 24, 1996, to state (as it does today), “T he liability to pay a fine shall terminate the later of 20 years from the entry of ju dgment or 20 years after the release from imprisonment of the person fine d, or upon the death of the individual fined.” See Mandatory Victims Restitution Ac t of 1996 (“MVRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 207(c)(3), 110 St at. 1214 (emphasis added); see also id. § 211 (“The amendments made by this sub title shall, to the extent c onstitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing proceed ings in cases in which th e defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment of this Act.”). The distri ct court found this amended version of the statute appli cable because Glenn was convicted in 1997. It further found that, under the amendment, the twen ty-year period had not yet begun to run because Glenn was still in prison. The district court accord ingly denied the motion, and Glenn timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS Glenn argues the district court wrongly applied § 3613 (b) as amended by the MVRA. Glenn says the district cour t should have judged the amendment’s applicability not by the date of his convicti on (1997), but by the date of the first overt acts charged in the indictment (1 993). In support, he cites United States v. Owens , 70 F.3d 1118, 1130 (10th Cir. 1995), where th e government argued one of the district Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 45 court’s sentencing decisions was harmless error based on a Sentencing Guidelines amendment. The amendment in question became effective in between the charged conduct and the defendant’s se ntencing, so the government’s argument required us to examine whether the defendant’s ex post f acto rights would have been violated had the district court sentenced hi m under the amended guideline. See id. ; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex pos t facto Law sha ll be passed.”). Although Glenn nowhere us es the phrase “ex post fa cto,” his citation to Owens and the general character of his arguments c onvince us that he m eans to bring such a challenge. 1 “We review a challenge to a statut e under the Ex Post Facto Clause de
novo.” Femedeer v. Haun , 227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000). Glenn provides no authority for the id ea that his ex post facto rights crystallized with the first ove rt acts charged in the indi ctment. Even assuming as much for argument’s sake, Glenn also pr ovides no support for the notion that an extension of the amount of tim e after judgment in which the government can collect a criminal fine creates an ex post facto issue. In the statute-of-limitations context, a law violates the ex post fact o clause if it revives an expired limitations period for prosecuting the crime. See Stogner v. California , 539 U.S. 607, 610–21 (2003). The briefing before us does not adequately a ddress whether the prescribed time after judgment to collect a criminal fine may be considered a st atute of limitations in the

same sense.

1 “[P]risoners who proceed pro se . . . are entitled to liberal construction of their filings.” Toevs v. Reid , 685 F.3d 903, 911 (10th Cir. 2012). Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 56 Even if the answer is ye s, the statutory term had not expired when Congress extended it through the MVRA. Again, accepting Glenn’s proposition that the twenty-year clock began to run in 1993, about seventeen years remained when Congress enacted the MV RA in 1996. In United States v. Taliaferro , 979 F.2d 1399, 1402 (10th Cir. 1992), we held that “the application of an extended statute of limitations to offenses occurring prior to th e legislative extension, where the prior and shorter statute of limitati ons has not run as of the da te of such extension, does not violate the ex post facto clause.” The Supreme Court’s Stogner decision expressly avoided opining on this scenario. See 539 U.S. at 618 (“Even where courts have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of limitations (extensions that our holding today does not affect), they have c onsistently distinguish ed situations where limitations periods have expired .” (citation omitted)). Taliaferro therefore remains good law. In sum, even if

 § 3613(b) creates a stat ute of limitations, the extension of which is potentially challengeable under th e ex post facto clause; and

 Glenn’s ex post facto rights arose with his first overt act in 1993, there was no ex post facto violation here because Congress exte nded the twenty-year limitation before it expired in Glenn’s case. So the dist rict court properly rejected Glenn’s argument that it should have applie d the pre-MVRA version of the statute. Glenn also asserts that the government ’s decision to seize his money “after years of inactivity . . . violat e[s] [his] rights to due proce ss.” Opening Br. at 7. In Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 67 the district court, however, Glenn argue d that the government violated his due process rights because it faile d to give him timely notice of the encumbrance. He did not argue that due process eventually cuts off the government’s ri ght to collect after “years of inactivity.” We theref ore do not reach this argument. See Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. , 727 F.3d 1273, 1284 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Arguments that were not raised below are waived for purposes of appeal .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION We affirm the district cour t orders at issue here. We also grant Glenn’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 21-5010 Document: 010110617911 Date Filed: 12/13/2021 Page: 7