UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6534

DMITRY PRONIN,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LIEUTENANT TROY JOHNSON; OFFICER FLOURNOY; OFFICER 

MIDDLEBROOK; OFFICER WILSON; OFFICER CRAWFORD; KENNETH 

ATKINSON; DANIEL FALLEN; REX BLOCKER; LOUISA 

FUERTES-ROSARIO; SANDRA K. LATHROP; BRANDON BURKETT; JAKE 

BURKETT; JOHN BRYANT; PATINA WALTON-GRIER; HENRI WALL; 

EDWARD HAMPTON; WILLIAM JOHNSON; LIEUTENANT EDA 

OLIVERA-NEGRON, Operations,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

SHU STAFF MEMBERS,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Orangeburg. David C. Norton, District Judge. 

(5:12-cv-03416-DCN)

Submitted: August 20, 2015 Decided: October 7, 2015

Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.
2

Dmitry Pronin, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Murcier Bowens, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Dmitry Pronin appeals from the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment to Defendants in Pronin’s 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (2012) action. We have reviewed the record and Pronin’s 

arguments on appeal, and we agree with the district court’s 

disposition of the vast majority of Pronin’s claims. However, 

for the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand Pronin’s claim 

that he was denied access to courts for further proceedings.

I.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary 

judgment shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A district court should 

grant summary judgment unless a “reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An 

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment will 

not be defeated by the existence of some factual dispute; 

“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of 

summary judgment.” Id. Mere conclusory allegations and bare 
4

denials are insufficient to support the nonmoving party’s case. 

Erwin v. United States, 591 F.3d 313, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2010). 

While a party cannot withstand summary judgment by relying 

solely on his own self-serving allegations unsupported by any 

corroborating evidence, Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 

423, 433 (4th Cir. 2004), summary judgment should not be made on 

the basis of conflicting affidavits. See Gray v. Spillman, 925 

F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (not the province of trial court to 

make credibility determinations in a summary judgment setting).

II.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to “adequate, 

effective, and meaningful” access to the courts. Bounds v. 

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 351 (1996). To prevail on a claim that he was denied 

access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate that he 

suffered an actual injury, such as missing a court-imposed 

deadline or being unable to file a complaint because of the 

Defendants’ actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52.

Pronin’s claim of denial of access to courts revolves 

around the loss of his legal papers, which he alleges resulted 

from Officer J. Burkett’s failure to secure his papers when 

Pronin was removed from his cell and Officer Troy Johnson’s 

disposal of a portion of the documents. The district court 

ruled that it was undisputed that J. Burkett did not intend to 
5

damage Pronin’s documents and that Pronin had failed to show an 

injury as he was able to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion 

which was still pending. 

On appeal, Pronin raises two claims of error regarding the 

district court’s rejection of his claim. First, he asserts that 

the district court erred in concluding that J. Burkett’s 

affidavit was uncontested. Pronin claims that he provided 

declarations showing that J. Burkett was retaliating for 

Pronin’s complaints against his brother, Officer B. Burkett. 

Second, Pronin claims that, while his § 2255 motion is still 

pending, the loss of his medical records have so hampered his 

ability to seek relief that he has satisfied his requirement to 

show an actual injury.

In his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, Pronin asserted as follows: On September 25, 

2012, J. Burkett told Pronin that Burkett was aware that he was 

complaining about his brother. In October 2012, both brothers 

filed incident reports against him that were dismissed. On 

November 11, J. Burkett left Pronin’s legal documents with his 

cellmate, and they were partially destroyed. On November 13, 

Johnson threw out the remaining documents. These documents were 

medical records from Russia allegedly showing that Pronin was a 

vulnerable adult, that he suffered from bipolar disorder and 
6

borderline personality, and that he had been diagnosed with a 

nervous neck tick and epilepsy. 

In direct contradiction, Johnson’s declaration states that 

he did not throw out any of Pronin’s paperwork, but that it was 

instead returned to him. J. Burkett’s declaration similarly 

avers that, when Pronin was moved, his property was secured and 

given to him. We find that the affidavits are clearly in 

conflict. Pronin has provided dates and details, and the 

Defendants dispute the veracity of Pronin’s allegations. 

Accordingly, it was error for the district court to conclude 

that J. Burkett’s declaration was uncontested.

Turning to the injury requirement, the Defendants alleged 

in their motion for summary judgment that Pronin was able to 

file his § 2255 motion which is currently pending in the 

District Court of Delaware. However, the right of access to the 

courts includes “the opportunity to prepare, serve and file

whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or 

appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court proceedings 

affecting one’s personal liberty, or to assert and sustain a 

defense therein.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners have a right under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims challenging their 

sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion 

without active interference by prison officials. Id. To show 
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injury, the plaintiff must show that he lost or will lose the 

opportunity to pursue a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim. 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

We have reviewed the filings in Pronin’s pending § 2255 

motion. In the relevant claims, Pronin avers that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when he asked his attorney to 

pursue a “neuropsychiatric” evaluation but his attorney refused. 

He also seeks a downward departure based upon his mental 

condition. In support, he submitted two neuropsychiatric 

evaluation reports from 2015 that conclude that he suffers from 

post traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder. (See

United States v. Pronin, No. 1:11-cr-00033-LPS-1 (D. Del.) at 

Docket Nos. 27, 35).

In his sentencing memorandum, Pronin’s counsel argued for a 

variance sentence based upon Pronin’s depression, without 

providing any supporting documentation. The district court 

rejected this request, and Pronin was sentenced near the high 

end of his Guidelines range. The Government’s sentencing 

memorandum painted Pronin as a particularly dangerous criminal. 

In light of these circumstances, we find that evidence of 

serious mental illness, including bipolar and borderline 

disorders, would have supported Pronin’s case at sentencing. 

Pronin need only show a “reasonable probability” that, absent 

ineffective assistance, his sentence might have been different. 
8

See Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 236-38 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(finding that counsel’s failure to provide mental health 

evidence at capital sentencing was ineffective where evidence 

would have provided a “significant boost” to mitigation evidence 

and would not have conflicted with mitigation strategy). While 

Pronin is able to submit mental health evidence from 2015 in his 

§ 2255 proceeding to show that he currently suffers from mental 

illnesses, the Defendants’ alleged destruction of his legal 

materials prevents him from providing the court with his medical 

history showing that these illnesses had been diagnosed prior to 

his criminal activity. This evidence could be helpful in 

showing that his attorney should have investigated his mental 

health. Without expressing an opinion as to Pronin’s likelihood 

of success in his § 2255 proceeding, we find that Pronin has 

raised a material question of fact as to whether he can show a 

nonfrivolous and arguable question regarding whether such 

materials would result in a successful § 2255 motion.

The district court did not analyze these issues. The court 

instead decided that (1) J. Burkett’s affidavit of intent was 

uncontested and (2) Pronin’s allegations of injury were vague. 

We find that both of these conclusions were error and that both 

the intent and injury issues involved disputed issues of 

material fact. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s 
9

order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

III.

Pronin contends that the district court erred in rejecting 

his claim that Doctor Rex Blocker’s delay of more than a year 

before prescribing medication for Pronin’s epilepsy was 

sufficient to show deliberate indifference. Pronin claimed that 

the delay resulted in a seizure. The district court ruled that 

delayed prescription of medication does not constitute a 

constitutional deprivation. 

To succeed on his claims of constitutionally inadequate 

medical care, Pronin was required to show acts or omissions on 

Blocker’s part harmful enough to constitute deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Meeting this high standard requires a 

showing that Blocker actually knew of and disregarded a 

substantial risk of serious injury or that he actually knew of 

and ignored a serious need for medical care. Young v. City of 

Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). A prisoner’s 

accusation that the care he is receiving is not adequate to 

treat his medical needs may support a claim of deliberate 

indifference. De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 

2013) (“[While] a prisoner does not enjoy a constitutional right 

to the treatment of his or her choice, the treatment a prison 
10

facility does provide must nevertheless be adequate to address 

the prisoner’s serious medical need.”). Although such claims 

may, on closer inspection, amount to nothing more than a 

prisoner’s disagreement with his diagnosis or prescribed 

treatment, prison doctors violate the Eighth Amendment if they 

decline to provide the level of care they deem medically 

necessary or fail to adequately address a prisoner’s complaints 

that the care he is receiving is not effective. See Sosebee v. 

Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to respond to 

an inmate’s known medical needs raises an inference of 

deliberate indifference to those needs).

We conclude summary judgment was properly granted to 

Blocker. It is undisputed that, when Pronin arrived at the 

institution, he was not on any seizure medication, and he gave 

conflicting accounts as to his seizure history. Pronin 

submitted no evidence to support his allegations that he 

suffered and complained of seizure-like activity after his 

arrival at the institution and prior to his alleged seizure in 

February 2013, and he presents only conclusory statements and no 

details regarding his alleged attempts to obtain medical 

treatment for his seizure symptoms prior to this date. 

Moreover, his grievances and medical records do not support his 

allegations, and while he requested seizure medication, there is 

no evidence that he complained of seizure-like activity prior to 
11

the actual seizure. Further, Pronin’s assertions that he 

suffered grave injury from his seizure are not supported by the 

record. Finally, Pronin does not dispute Blocker’s statements 

that, for a substantial portion of the time Pronin contends he 

was being deliberately indifferent, Blocker was actually either 

on medical leave or not the first line of medical treatment for 

Pronin. Based on the foregoing, we find that Pronin has failed 

to raise a material issue of fact as to whether Blocker was 

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.

IV.

Pronin next alleges that Officer Olivera-Negron violated 

his equal protection rights when, after Pronin had an 

altercation with his cellmate, Olivera-Negron removed Pronin, 

who is Jewish, from his cell but allowed his cellmate, who is

Hispanic, to remain. Pronin contend that the district court 

erred in crediting Olivera-Negron’s assertions that she was not 

the one who moved Pronin from his cell in the face of Pronin’s 

affidavit that she questioned his cellmate and not him and then 

gave the order to move Pronin. Setting aside the issue of the 

conflicting affidavits, we find that Pronin’s claim is 

insufficient in any event to survive summary judgment. 

“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must 

first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from 

others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal 
12

treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful 

discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th 

Cir. 2001). Though a valid claim for a violation of equal 

protection need not allege discrimination as the defendant’s 

sole motive, it must allege the requisite discriminatory intent 

with more than mere conclusory assertions. Thus, to state valid 

claims for violation of equal protection and thereby to survive 

a motion for summary judgment, Pronin must put forward specific, 

non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper 

motive. Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003).

In delving into the minds of prison officials, we may look 

to circumstantial and direct evidence of intent. Invidious 

discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality 

of the circumstances. Courts should look to the direct impact 

of the challenged official action; the historical background of 

the decision, which may take into account any history of 

discrimination by the Defendant; the specific sequence of events 

leading up to the particular decision being challenged, 

including any significant departures from normal procedures; and 

contemporary statements by the decisionmaker. Id. at 584-85.

We find that Pronin has failed to put forth any evidence of 

discriminatory intent, aside from the bare fact that he is 

Jewish and his cellmate and the officer are Hispanic. Pronin 

cites no relevant statements or similar history on the part of 
13

Olivera-Negron. Finally, Pronin has provided no details from 

which to determine whether he and his cellmate were similarly 

situated. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that 

Pronin’s claim could not survive summary judgment.

V.

We have reviewed the remainder of Pronin’s claims, and we 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the remainder 

of the district court’s order for the reasons stated by the 

district court. Pronin v. Johnson, No. 5:12-cv-03416-DCN 

(D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2015). Based on the foregoing reasoning, we 

vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

Pronin’s denial of access to courts claim and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. The rest of the 

district’s order is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART