In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 1, 2022

S21G1147. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC v. BUCHANAN et al.

 BETHEL, Justice.

In a civil lawsuit in Georgia, the discovery process allows 

litigants to gather information about a case from other litigants and 

third parties in an orderly and defined manner. Georgia, like most 

states, also provides various mechanisms for litigants and third 

parties to seek relief from the demands of discovery. One such 

method is by moving for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 

(c), which provides that upon a showing of “good cause,” a trial court 

“may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or 

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

burden or expense,” including limiting or otherwise prohibiting the 

requested discovery. 

In this wrongful death case in which the plaintiffs allege a 
2

faulty vehicle component caused the deadly accident, the plaintiffs 

have sought to depose the Chief Executive Officer of General Motors, 

LLC, and General Motors has sought a protective order barring that

deposition. General Motors urges us to adopt the so-called “apex 

doctrine,” or some variation thereof, as a means of determining 

whether “good cause” exists for granting the protective order it 

seeks. That doctrine provides courts with a framework for 

determining whether good cause exists to forbid or limit the

deposition of a high-ranking corporate executive1 who lacks 

personal, unique knowledge of facts relevant to the litigation. We 

granted General Motors’ petition for a writ of certiorari to consider 

 1 The apex doctrine can also apply to high-level government officials. See, 

e.g., Sourgoutsis v. United States Capitol Police, 323 FRD 100, 114 (D.D.C. 

2017) (“High-ranking government officials are generally not subject to 

depositions unless they have some personal knowledge about the matter and 

the party seeking the deposition makes a showing that the information cannot 

be obtained elsewhere.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.)); 

K.C.R. v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 13-3806 PSG (SSx), 2014 WL 3434257, 

at *3-*5 (III) (B), (IV) (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (same, and noting that the 

undersheriff qualified as a high-ranking government official); Church of 

Scientology of Boston v. I.R.S., 138 FRD 9, 12 (C) (D. Mass. 1990) (“In general, 

heads of agencies and other top government executives are normally not 

subject to depositions.”). But because this case involves a high-ranking 

corporate executive, we use corporate terminology in our discussion of the 

doctrine in this opinion.
3

“what factors should be considered by a trial court in ruling on a 

motion for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) that seeks to 

prevent the deposition of a high-ranking officer” and “the 

appropriate burden of proof as to those factors.”

We conclude that, to the extent these factors are asserted by a 

party seeking a protective order, a trial court should consider 

whether the executive’s high rank, the executive’s lack of unique 

personal knowledge of relevant facts, and the availability of 

information from other sources demonstrate good cause for a 

protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). However, we decline to 

hold that a trial court must find that good cause is presumptively or

conclusively established in each instance that a movant has 

demonstrated that an executive is “sufficiently high-ranking” and 

lacks unique personal knowledge of discoverable information not 

available through other means.

Additionally, while motions for a protective order relying on 

factors associated with the apex doctrine and any other basis argued 

to constitute good cause are entitled to consideration by the trial 
4

court, the burden of persuasion remains on the party seeking the 

protective order. Applying that standard here, we conclude that the 

trial court did not fully consider all of the reasons asserted by 

General Motors as a basis for the protective order it sought in the 

motion. Thus, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

affirming the trial court’s order and remand this case with direction 

that the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court’s order and remand 

the case for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

1. Background

Robert Randall Buchanan’s wife, Glenda Marie Buchanan, was 

killed in a single-vehicle accident in November 2014 while driving 

her 2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer, which was manufactured by 

General Motors Corporation, the predecessor to General Motors,

LLC (collectively “GM”). Buchanan brought a wrongful death action 

against GM alleging that the fatal accident was caused by a defect 

in the “steering wheel angle sensor,” a component of the car’s 

electronic stability control system, and seeking compensatory and 

punitive damages. 
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As part of that suit, Buchanan noticed the deposition of GM’s 

current CEO, Mary Barra. Buchanan predicated his request on 

previous statements Barra made in testimony before Congress and

other public statements she made about GM’s commitment to safety, 

including the “Speak Up for Safety” program under which the 

Trailblazer steering system angle sensor was investigated by GM. 

At the conclusion of that investigation into the Trailblazer steering 

system, GM decided that no action would be taken.

GM responded to Buchanan’s notice of deposition by moving for 

a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), arguing that good 

cause existed to prohibit Barra’s deposition because she had not 

been identified as a witness having relevant knowledge during 

discovery, did not have “personal, unique, or superior knowledge of 

information” relevant to the case, was not involved in the 

investigation of the alleged defect at issue, and did not have any 

knowledge relevant to the design of the steering wheel angle sensor 

for the car at issue in Buchanan’s suit or the investigation into it. 

GM also argued that any knowledge Barra might have could be 
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obtained through “other, less intrusive means.” In support of its

motion, GM cited cases primarily from federal courts applying the 

framework for assessing good cause commonly known as the “apex 

doctrine.”

GM supported its response with Barra’s affidavit, in which she 

averred that she was “not personally involved with” and did not have 

“direct personal knowledge regarding[] every aspect of each vehicle 

that is or has been manufactured by GM.” More specifically, Barra 

averred that she “was not involved in the design, development, or 

manufacture” of either the steering wheel angle sensor or the 2006 

to 2009 Trailblazer, did not conduct any Speak Up for Safety 

program investigations, did not receive individual reports about 

each investigation conducted under the program, was not involved 

in any investigation of the steering wheel angle sensor, and did not 

have “any direct, unique, specialized or superior knowledge about 

the design, manufacture, and marketing” of the steering wheel angle 

sensor, the 2007 Trailblazer, or any internal investigations or 

results from investigations into the same. 
7

In response to GM’s motion, Buchanan again pointed to Barra’s 

congressional testimony in relation to a different alleged defect 

across several vehicles in which she stated that she would work with 

GM’s new vice president of global vehicle safety to quickly identify 

and resolve product-safety issues and that she would review all 

future death inquiries in GM vehicle crashes. Buchanan also pointed 

to Barra’s public statements and general knowledge about GM’s 

safety culture and efforts to eliminate safety issues. Buchanan 

further argued that, to the extent Barra lacked knowledge about the 

other subjects, her lack of knowledge itself was properly 

discoverable by deposition.

The trial court denied GM’s motion for a protective order, 

rejecting GM’s argument that the apex doctrine or any similar

framework was a suitable guide to assessing good cause and noting 

Georgia’s liberal discovery rules under the Civil Practice Act.

However, although it plainly rejected the invitation to employ the 

apex doctrine framework, the trial court’s order does not otherwise 

reflect that it actually considered whether GM’s arguments as to 
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apex doctrine factors constituted good cause for granting the motion 

for protective order. The court’s order further declared that “until 

such time as the court is satisfied by substantial evidence that bad 

faith or harassment motivates the discoveror’s action, the court 

should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of pretrial 

discovery” and determined that GM had not shown good cause for 

the protective order it sought. The court further directed that the 

deposition of Barra take place in Detroit, Michigan and that it last 

no longer than three hours.

Following the grant of a certificate of immediate review, GM 

filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which the Court of 

Appeals granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of the motion for protective order and, like the trial court,

rejected GM’s request to apply the apex doctrine. See General 

Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. 412, 417-418 (2) (858 SE2d 

102) (2021). Noting that OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (1) is broader than its 

federal counterpart, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26 (b) (1), the Court of 

Appeals concluded that the parties could “obtain discovery 
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regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 

matter involved,” but that a trial court may prohibit, or impose 

limitations on, discovery requests under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c).

Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. at 414. The Court of Appeals reasoned that 

the trial court could consider whether Barra had unique personal 

knowledge of properly discoverable facts and whether those facts 

could be discovered by other, less burdensome means as among the 

myriad considerations, but that it was not required to do so. See id. 

at 415 (1). The Court of Appeals held that there was evidence to 

support the trial court’s conclusion that GM did not meet its burden 

of showing good cause because its only argument was that Barra 

should not be deposed because she was a high-ranking executive 

without unique knowledge. See id. at 416-417 (1).

We granted GM’s petition for a writ of certiorari and posed the 

questions noted at the outset of this opinion.

2. Analysis

(a) The scope of discovery in Georgia 

The scope of discovery under the Civil Practice Act is broad.
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See Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 

210 (2) (538 SE2d 441) (2000) (“[T]he discovery procedure is to be 

construed liberally in favor of supplying a party with the facts.”). 

OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (1) provides:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 

privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 

involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 

claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the 

claim or defense of any other party . . . . 

Trial courts “should and ordinarily do interpret ‘relevant’ very 

broadly” so as to “remove the potential for secrecy” and to “reduce 

the element of surprise at trial.” (Citations and punctuation 

omitted.) Bowden v. The Medical Center, Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291-292

(2) (a) (773 SE2d 692) (2015). Moreover, “[i]t is not ground for 

objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the 

trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead 

to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. at 290 (2) (a). 

However, trial courts may limit discovery in multiple ways, 

including for “good cause shown” under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). More 

specifically, OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) provides:
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Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 

discovery is sought and for good cause shown, the court in 

which the action is pending or, alternatively, on matters 

relating to a deposition, the court in a county where the 

deposition is to be taken may make any order which 

justice requires to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 

or expense[.]

The trial court has “wide discretion in the entering of orders . . . 

preventing the . . . taking of depositions [under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c).]”

(Citation omitted.) Hampton Island Founders, LLC v. Liberty 

Capital, LLC, 283 Ga. 289, 296 (4) (658 SE2d 619) (2008). And “[t]his 

court has repeatedly held that it will not reverse a trial court’s 

decision on discovery matters absent a clear abuse of discretion.” 

Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 244 Ga. 322, 323 (1) (260 SE2d 27) 

(1979); see also Alexander Properties Grp. Inc. v. Doe, 280 Ga. 306, 

307 (1) (626 SE2d 497) (2006) (“The grant or denial of a motion for 

protective order generally lies within the sound discretion of the 

trial court[], and the exercise of that discretion is reviewed on appeal 

for abuse.” (citation omitted)).

In exercising its discretion under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), the court 
12

can order, among other things, that discovery not be had, allow it 

“only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of 

the time or place,” change the method of discovery, seal a deposition, 

restrict disclosure of trade secrets and other sensitive commercial 

information, or require that the discovery be filed under seal. See 

OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) (1) - (8). The movant bears the burden of showing 

her entitlement to a protective order under this rule. See OCGA § 9-

11-26 (c) (authorizing issuance of protective orders “[u]pon motion 

by a party . . . and for good cause shown”). See also Hill, Kertscher 

& Wharton, LLP v. Moody, 308 Ga. 74, 80 (2) (839 SE2d 535) (2020)

(“Plaintiffs bore the burden of showing their entitlement to a 

protective order.”). To meet this burden, the movant must establish 

good cause for the issuance of a protective order. See OCGA § 9-11-

26 (c); Moody, 308 Ga. at 80 (2). The rule does not specify or limit 

the grounds a party may assert as good cause for a protective order. 

(b) The “apex doctrine”

GM and several amici curiae argue that, in determining 

whether good cause exists for the issuance of a protective order of a 
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high-ranking corporate executive under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c), a court 

should employ the framework of the apex doctrine. But before we 

can address whether a court should consider the apex doctrine in 

assessing good cause for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 

(c), we first review the factors typically associated with the apex 

doctrine and the burden associated with seeking such an order. 

(i) Apex doctrine factors 

GM and several amici point to the considerable body of 

jurisprudence addressing the circumstances in which it is 

appropriate to depose corporate executives and many cases from 

other jurisdictions – primarily federal district courts – purporting to 

apply some iteration of the apex doctrine.2 Though the case law is 

 2 It bears noting that many jurisdictions have rejected or opted not to 

adopt the apex doctrine, including the only federal appellate court to address 

the doctrine by name. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F3d 884, 901-902 

(II) (C) (3) (6th Cir. 2012) (holding instead that to justify a protective order 

under Federal Rule 26 (c), one of the enumerated harms “must be illustrated 

with a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from 

stereotyped and conclusory statements” (citation and punctuation omitted)); 

BlueMountain Credit Alt. Master Fund L.P. v. Regal Ent. Grp., 465 P3d 122, 

131-132 (37-41) (Colo. 2020) (concluding that the apex doctrine “is inconsistent 

with Colorado law”); Bradshaw v. Maiden, No. 14 CVS 14445, 2017 WL 

1238823, at *5 (II) (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2017) (holding that “adoption of 
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not always uniform in its application of the apex doctrine, GM 

argues that the case law reflects a consensus as to the following four

factors it suggests a trial court should generally consider when 

determining whether good cause exists for granting a protective 

order against a deposition of a high-ranking corporate executive: (1) 

whether the deponent is a sufficiently high-ranking executive

considering her role and responsibilities in the organization; (2) the 

extent to which the facts sought to be discovered in the deposition 

are properly discoverable; (3) whether the executive has unique

personal knowledge of relevant facts; and (4) whether there are 

alternative means, including written discovery or depositions of 

other witnesses (including a deposition of an organizational 

 

the apex doctrine is not necessary and that [North Carolina] Rule 26 is entirely 

adequate” to resolve the dispute over the deposition); Netscout Sys., Inc. v. 

Gartner, Inc., No. (FS1) TCV146022988S, 2016 WL 5339454, at *6 (Conn. 

Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (holding that the apex doctrine was incompatible 

with Connecticut law to the extent that it shifted the burden of showing good 

cause); Crest Infiniti, II, LP v. Swinton, 174 P3d 996, 1004 (17) (Okla. 2007) 

(“We decline to adopt a form of the apex doctrine that shifts a burden to the 

party seeking discovery. In Oklahoma, the burden of showing ‘good cause’ is 

statutorily placed on the party objecting to discovery and is part of that party’s 

motion for a protective order.”); State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Messina, 71 

SW3d 602, 607 (II) (Mo. 2002) (“This Court declines to adopt an ‘apex’ rule.”).
15

representative pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6)) by which the 

same facts could be discovered. We focus here on these factors most 

commonly associated with the apex doctrine, as argued by GM and 

explained in more detail below.

In the corporate context, the apex doctrine generally is 

intended to apply only to “high-level” executives. See Minter v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 258 FRD 118, 126 (I) (A) (D. Md. 2009) (“[T]he 

apex deposition rule is intended to protect busy, high-level 

executives.”). Whether an executive is considered sufficiently “highranking” in a particular organization such that the doctrine should 

apply to her is less clear, however. Some jurisdictions have 

attempted to provide some sort of guidance in making this 

determination. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 282 

FRD 259, 263 (III) (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“In order that the ‘apex’

designation as applied to multiple executives does not itself become 

a tool for evading otherwise relevant and permissible discovery, the 

court must assess . . . with apologies – the person’s degree of ‘apexness’ in relation to [the other] factors.”); see also Estate of Levingston 
16

v. Cnty. of Kern, 320 FRD 520, 526 (V) (A) (E.D. Cal. 2017) 

(considering how highly official is ranked in the county); K.C.R. v. 

Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 13-3806 PSG (SSx), 2014 WL 3434257, 

at *6 (IV) (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (considering hierarchical 

structure of department, official’s key role in setting and enforcing 

policies and practices, and “significant risk” of being “called to testify 

in innumerable suits” in concluding that official was sufficiently 

high-ranking); Alexander v. F.B.I., 186 FRD 1, 3-4 (II) (A) (D.D.C. 

1998) (evaluating seniority and level of compensation in 

determining if official was sufficiently high-ranking). Further, as 

one court described this doctrine,

[o]n the proverbial sliding scale, the closer that a proposed 

witness is to the apex of some particular peak in the 

corporate mountain range, and the less directly relevant 

that person is to the evidence proffered in support of his 

deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the 

apex doctrine become.

Apple Inc., 282 FRD at 263 (III).

“The rationale for barring such depositions is that high level 

executives are vulnerable to numerous, repetitive, harassing, and 
17

abusive depositions, and therefore need some measure of protection 

from the courts.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re Mentor 

Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD2004(CDL), 2009 WL 4730321, *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009); see also 

In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liab. Litig., 205 

FRD 535, 536 (S.D. Ind. 2002). These cases establish that the apex 

doctrine “is aimed to prevent the high level official deposition that 

is sought simply because [s]he is the CEO or agency head – the top 

official, not because of any special knowledge of, or involvement in, 

the matter in dispute.” Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 258 FRD 

118, 126 (I) (A) (D. Md. 2009). 

Other courts have also determined that, in order for the 

deposition of a high-ranking executive to move forward, that person

must have some knowledge of facts that are properly discoverable –

that is, facts that are relevant to the litigation. See, e.g., Simms v. 

Nat. Football League, No. 3:11-CV-0248-M-BK, 2013 WL 9792709, 

at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2013); Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Longyear 

Holding, Inc., No. 08CV490S, 2010 WL 4323071, *4 (III) (A) 
18

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010). And, as applied by a number of federal 

district courts, this knowledge must be personal and unique or 

superior to that of other persons from the organization who might 

be deposed in the litigation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Intl. Bus. Machines, 

48 F3d 478, 483 (II) (A) (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s 

grant of protective order prohibiting deposition of chairman of 

defendant’s board of directors where chairman had no personal 

knowledge of plaintiff’s claim and other employees had direct 

knowledge); Chick-Fil-A, Inc. v. CFT Dev., LLC, No. 5:07-cv-501-Oc10GRJ, 2009 WL 928226, *3 (II) (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2009) (denying 

motion to compel deposition of president where moving party failed 

to convince the court that he possessed any “unique or superior 

knowledge concerning any information which is relevant and 

material to the issues in this case” or that the defendants had “been 

unable to obtain full and complete discovery” from the other 

company representatives already deposed in the case); Burns v. 

Bank of America, No. 03 Civ. 1685 RMB JCF, 2007 WL 1589437, *3 

(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (holding that “[u]nless it can be 
19

demonstrated that a corporate official has ‘some unique knowledge’

of the issues in the case, ‘it may be appropriate to preclude a 

deposition of a highly-placed executive’ while allowing other 

witnesses with the same knowledge to be questioned.”). 

Further, courts should consider whether the high-ranking 

executive’s “unique or superior knowledge” is available through

other means. See Cuyler v. Kroger Co., No.1:14-CV-1287-WBH-AJB,

2014 WL 12547267, *6 (B) (N.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2014); see also Brown v. 

Branch Banking and Trust Co., No. 13-81192-CIV, 2014 WL 235455, 

*3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2014) (plaintiffs must show that “no less 

intrusive means (such as serving interrogatories, deposing a Rule 30 

(b) (6) corporate representative and/or lower level employees) exist”).

Exhaustion of less intrusive means of discovery is not necessarily 

“an absolute requirement; instead, exhaustion of other discovery 

methods is an important, but not dispositive, consideration for a 

court to take into account in deciding how to exercise its discretion.” 

Reilly v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 15-Civ-23425-

COOKE/TORRES, 2016 WL 10644064, *7 (II) (B) (2) (c) (S.D. Fla. 
20

Sept. 26, 2016). See also In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. 

Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-05634 CRB (DMR), 2014 WL 939287, at *5

(III) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014) (noting that exhaustion of other 

discovery routes is an “important consideration” but not a necessary 

precondition to the taking of an apex deposition).

(ii) The parties’ respective burdens under the apex doctrine

When it comes to determining who bears the burden to prove 

or defeat a protective order under the apex doctrine, federal courts 

have adopted varying approaches. In some courts, application of the 

doctrine results in shifting the burden of proof to the party 

requesting the discovery. See, e.g., Degenhart v. Arthur State Bank, 

No. CV411-041, 2011 WL 3651312, *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2011) (“As 

the party seeking to compel the deposition of a high-ranking 

executive, the deposing party has the burden of showing that the 

target’s deposition is necessary.” (citation and punctuation 

omitted)); Hickey v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., No. 14-CV-60542, 

2014 WL 7495780, *2 (A) (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2014) (same); 

Performance Sales & Marketing LLC v. Lowe’s Companies, Inc., No. 
21

5:07-CV-00140-RLV, 2012 WL 4061680, at *4 (II) (C) (W.D.N.C. 

Sept. 14, 2012) (“[T]he apex doctrine is the application of the 

rebuttable presumption that the deposition of a high-ranking 

corporate executive either violates Rule 26 (b) (2) (C)’s 

proportionality standard or, on a party’s motion for a protective 

order, constitutes ‘good cause’ for such an order as an ‘annoyance’ or 

‘undue burden’ within the meaning of Rule 26 (c) (1).”). 

In other federal courts, however, the party seeking relief from 

discovery bears the burden of establishing that good cause exists for 

a protective order through application of the apex factors. See, e.g., 

Dyson, Inc. v. Sharkninja Operating LLC, No. 1:14-cv-0779, 2016 

WL 1613489, *1 (II) (A) (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2016) (“Plaintiffs[’] 

contention that Defendants bear the burden of proving that their 

discovery is appropriate misstates and inverts the burden of proof in 

this case. The burden under the apex principle is supplied by the 

general rule [that] a party that seeks to avoid discovery in general 

bears the burden of showing that good cause exists to prevent the 

discovery.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Scott v. Chipotle 
22

Mexican Grill, Inc., 306 FRD 120, 122 (I) (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating 

that even in apex doctrine scenarios, the plaintiff bears no burden 

to show that the deponent has special knowledge).

Finally, other federal courts have developed a hybrid, burdenshifting version of the doctrine. See, e.g., Naylor Farms, Inc. v. 

Anadarko OGC Co., No. 11-cv-01528-REB-KLM, 2011 WL 2535067, 

at *2 (D. Colo. June 27, 2011) (party seeking to depose an executive 

“bears an initial burden of making some showing that the executive 

has ‘unique personal knowledge’ of some relevant issues,” and then 

“the burden shifts to the executive to demonstrate by evidence that 

he in fact has no personal knowledge or that there exists one of the 

other three circumstances under which requiring him to sit for a 

deposition is inappropriate,” though “the ultimate burden of 

persuasion lies with the executive invoking the apex doctrine”); 

Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Longyear Holding, Inc., No. 08CV490S, 2010 

WL 4323071, at *4 (III) (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (noting that the 

party seeking discovery must first establish the relevance of the 

material sought from the executive, and once that burden has been 
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met, it then shifts to the party opposing disclosure to show good 

cause for not producing its executive); Tierra Blanca Ranch High 

Country Youth Program v. Gonzales, 329 FRD 694, 697-698 (II) 

(D.N.M. 2019) (applying this same burden-shifting test). Thus, 

federal courts that recognize some version of the apex doctrine are 

split on which party bears the ultimate burden.

(c) Consideration of apex doctrine factors under Georgia law

and the associated burden as to those factors

GM argues that federal cases interpreting Federal Rule 26 and 

applying apex doctrine factors should be considered by Georgia 

courts as persuasive authority in evaluating whether good cause for 

a protective order exists. However, the text of Federal Rule 26 shows 

that the scope of discovery is narrower than that contemplated by 

OCGA § 9-11-26 (b). Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (1) (providing 

that parties may obtain discovery on matters that are “relevant to 

any party’s claim . . . and proportional to the needs of the case,

considering [a number of factors, including] whether the burden or 

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”) with 
24

OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (providing that “[p]arties may obtain discovery 

regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 

matter involved in the pending action”); see also City of Huntington 

v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-01362, 3:17-01665, 2020 

WL 3520314, at *2 (III) (S.D.W.V. June 29, 2020) (noting the 

proportionality standard in the federal rule, which considers “the 

importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 

parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 

issues, and whether the burden or expense of discovery outweighs 

its likely benefit”); Bowden, 297 Ga. at 291 n.5 (noting that, unlike 

OCGA § 9-11-26, Federal Rule 26 has had “several amendments to 

narrow the scope of discovery”). Moreover, the text of OCGA § 9-11-

26 (c) makes it clear that the movant bears the burden of 

establishing that a protective order is necessary. See OCGA § 9-11-

26 (c); Moody, 308 Ga. at 80 (2). Thus, to the extent federal courts 

have interpreted Federal Rule 26, those interpretations are relevant 

to Georgia only insofar as they comport with the text of our 
25

analogous rule. More specifically, to the extent that federal courts 

interpret the apex doctrine as establishing a burden-shifting scheme 

or a rebuttable presumption that the deposition of a high-ranking 

corporate executive violates Federal Rule 26 (b) (2) (C)’s 

proportionality standard, no such equivalent consideration exists 

under Georgia’s Rule 26 (c). And although we acknowledge as a 

general principle that we look to federal case law interpreting the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as persuasive authority, see 

Bowden, 297 Ga. at 291 n.5, where the language of a Georgia statute 

deviates from the federal rules, the persuasive value of the authority

interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished. See, e.g.,

Blanton v. Blanton, 259 Ga. 622, 622 (1) (385 SE2d 672) (1989) 

(noting textual differences between Federal Rule 45 and OCGA § 9-

11-45 pertaining to subpoenas and declining to follow the federal 

approach). Accordingly, we decline to adopt any version of the apex 

doctrine that shifts the burden to the party seeking discovery.

Instead, courts applying Georgia law should rely on the 

overarching dictates of OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) in determining whether 
26

to grant a protective order. Under that statutory provision, to justify 

a protective order, one or more of the statutorily enumerated harms 

must be established through a specific demonstration of fact, as 

opposed to stereotyped and conclusory statements about, for 

example, the position in the corporate hierarchy held by the 

prospective deponent or the size and complexity of the organization. 

See Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 861 (4) (802 SE2d 835) 

(2017) (“[M]ere conclusory statements, bereft of facts[,] will not 

support the imposition of limitations on civil discovery.” (citation 

and punctuation omitted)); Young v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 819, 824 

(256 SE2d 58) (1979) (“Good cause for the issuance of a protective 

order designed to frustrate discovery . . . necessarily is not 

established by stereotyped or conclusional statements, bereft of 

facts.”). And as the Court of Appeals rightly noted, “‘[w]hat 

constitutes ‘good cause’ must be left largely to the trial judge who 

has a latitude of discretion in determining whether the showing has 

been made.’” Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. at 417 (1) (quoting Harris v. 

Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 894, 901 (3) (746 
27

SE2d 618) (2013)). Adopting the apex doctrine would necessarily 

restrict the trial court’s discretion by placing a thumb on the scale 

so as to suggest a special rule for high-ranking executives of large 

companies that exists nowhere in the Civil Practice Act, and would 

contravene the principle of broadly available discovery under 

Georgia law. See Tenet Healthcare Corp., 273 Ga. at 210; OCGA § 9-

11-26 (b) (1).3

Moreover, we reject GM’s assertion that leaving the 

determination of good cause to a trial court’s discretion will result in 

inconsistent outcomes that will make meaningful appellate review 

difficult, if not impossible. Trial courts are regularly called upon to 

exercise their discretion in considering whether good cause exists in 

 3 The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

in Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979) does not support a different 

result. In Salter, the Fifth Circuit recognized the trial court’s “broad discretion” 

in controlling the timing of discovery when it affirmed the trial court’s issuance 

of a protective order requiring the discovering party to depose employees with 

the most direct knowledge of relevant facts. See id. at 651. However, the court 

did not formalize the application of the underlying principles of the apex 

doctrine into a generally applicable doctrine or rule, and indeed noted that “[i]t 

is very unusual for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether and 

absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in error.” 

Id. 
28

other circumstances, and appellate courts are able to review the 

reasonableness of those decisions under the specific circumstances 

of the case based upon the evidence and arguments presented to the 

trial court.4 There is no reason that the same cannot be true here. 

For these reasons, we see no need to employ a special test or

framework different than that which generally applies to any claim 

of good cause made in support of a motion for protective order under 

 4 See, e.g., Moody, 308 Ga. at 80 (2) (upholding trial court’s finding that 

plaintiffs did not establish good cause entitling it to a protective order because, 

among other things, the finding was supported by discovery responses); 

DeVaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475, 478 (3) (769 SE2d 70) (2015) (trial court “did 

not abuse its discretion in ruling that the State had established good cause for 

allowing an exception to the ten-day rule” in OCGA § 17-16-8 (a) that requires 

disclosure of a witness at least ten days before trial where, after substantial 

efforts to find the witness, the State “was able to identify and speak with [him] 

for the first time as the jury was being selected”); Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 596, 

597 (1) (604 SE2d 788) (2004) (based on facts in the record, trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that good cause existed to seat alternate 

juror under OCGA § 15-12-172); Yates v. State, 274 Ga. 312, 315 (2) (553 SE2d 

563) (2001) (reversing and noting, among other things, that while a trial court 

has “broad discretion” in determining whether good cause exists to excuse a 

juror for service, “that discretion is abused when the trial court fails to make 

any inquiry into whether the proffered excuse constitutes ‘good cause’” under 

OCGA § 51-12-1 (a)); Crider v. Sneider, 243 Ga. 642, 645-646 (1) (256 SE2d 

335) (1979) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court, in determining 

whether good cause had been shown for a mental and physical examination of 

the defendant under predecessor to OCGA § 9-11-35, considered whether the 

facts and circumstances of the collision could be established by other sources 

of evidence).
29

OCGA § 9-11-26 (c).

Despite many federal cases it cites holding otherwise, GM

concedes that, as the party seeking a protective order in this case, it 

has the initial burden of establishing good cause for such relief.

However, it argues that this burden is met when it shows that the 

deponent is a high-ranking executive, that she has no unique

personal knowledge that is properly discoverable, and that the 

discoverable information is available through other means –

essentially, when it demonstrates that it has satisfied apex doctrine 

factors. But GM’s view effectively builds in a presumption of good 

cause in favor of protection from discovery once apex doctrine factors 

are established. And, as noted above, the text of OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) 

places the burden on the party seeking protection from discovery to 

establish good cause. GM’s formulation would impermissibly shift 

that burden to the party seeking discovery.

Accordingly, when factors commonly associated with the apex 

doctrine are raised and adequately shown by a party seeking a 

protective order, a court should consider those factors – as well as 
30

any other factors raised – and decisions applying those factors in

determining whether the party seeking relief has shown good cause 

for a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). That is, a court 

must consider whether the deposition of a particular individual 

would cause “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

burden or expense” based on, for example, that person’s scheduling 

demands or responsibilities and lack of relevant or unique personal 

knowledge that is not available from other sources. OCGA § 9-11-26 

(c).

Such consideration is not solely a product of the relative

organizational “importance” of a prospective deponent. Rather, 

courts should consider on a case-by-case basis whether the evidence 

demonstrates good cause such as an undue burden or expense. Highranking corporate executives are not immune from discovery and 

are not automatically given special treatment excusing them from 

being deposed simply by virtue of the positions they hold or the size 
31

of the organizations they lead.5 And large multinational companies 

are subject to the same Georgia discovery rules as smaller ones. 

With respect to the discovery rules, we have said that “[t]he 

availability of one form of proof does not make other forms of proof 

irrelevant[.]” Bowden, 297 Ga. at 296 (2) (b). Thus, discovery is not 

usually limited to “unique” knowledge. Very often, discovery is 

sought to uncover what witnesses do or do not know and to reveal 

inconsistencies between witnesses. See, e.g., Flower v. T.B.A. Indus., 

 5 It is not high rank alone that warrants consideration for good cause, 

but rather the significant responsibilities – and thus the burden on the 

executive imposed by the distraction of a deposition – that generally 

accompany that rank. Of course, significant responsibilities and the 

accompanying burden of disruption are not limited to high-ranking corporate 

executives. For example, a single parent who works full-time outside the home, 

an individual who runs the whole “back office” or who serves as the sole outside 

sales presence of a small business, or an administrator who supervises the 

person who actually handled the records at issue in a case also might be able 

to claim that their situation warrants a finding that they would be 

unnecessarily burdened by being compelled to participate in a deposition, 

especially if they lack unique personal knowledge of relevant information 

readily available from another source. But they, like the CEO, would need to 

demonstrate the actual facts of their circumstances to support a finding of good 

cause for a protective order. Moreover, it is not mere “busyness” that warrants 

a protective order. We live in a busy world. Rather, as required by the text of 

the rule, a protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) is warranted only where 

the movant demonstrates to the trial court that the sitting for a deposition 

would result in “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 

expense.” 
32

Inc., 111 P3d 1192, 1206 (Wisc. App. 2005) (“[C]laimed lack of 

knowledge does not provide sufficient grounds for a protective order 

[as] the other side is allowed to test this claim by deposing the 

witness.”); Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Am. Sec. Bank, N. A., No. 86-

CV-2542, 1987 WL 11994, at *2 (D.D.C. May 26, 1987) (“The reason 

why [the Chairman’s] alleged lack of knowledge is not a sufficient 

ground to prevent a deposition is obvious. The very purpose of the 

deposition discovery is to test the extent of the deponent’s knowledge 

and claims of ignorance.”); Travelers Rental Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 

116 FRD 140, 143 (D. Mass. 1987) (“The plaintiff is entitled to ‘test’ 

the claim of lack of knowledge or lack of recollection by deposing the 

witness.”).

Thus, a court considering whether factors commonly associated 

with the apex doctrine should limit or bar a plaintiff from deposing 

a high-ranking executive need not interpret the factors as a firmly 

established basis for an order prohibiting an executive’s deposition. 

It is possible for a court to act within its discretion to conclude, based 

on the facts of the case before it, that a protective order prohibiting 
33

the deposition of an executive need not be issued even where the 

executive is high-ranking, has no unique personal knowledge, and

the discoverable information is available through other means.

Likewise, the absence of factors commonly associated with the apex 

doctrine does not mean that a protective order for a high-ranking 

official’s deposition cannot be granted if other factors presented 

show good cause for such a conclusion. In making these 

determinations, courts must balance the interests of the parties in 

securing permissible discovery with the clear directive of OCGA § 9-

11-26 (c) to protect against “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 

or undue burden or expense,” as this determination is directed to be 

made in the interest of “justice,” which must include consideration 

of all concerned parties. Further, when a protective order is denied 

“in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as 

are just,” regulate the terms and conditions for discovery and can 

otherwise control the sequence and timing of discovery. OCGA § 9-

11-26 (c) & (d).

Finally, GM and several amici raise policy concerns about 
34

inefficiencies in discovery involving corporate defendants absent 

mandatory application of the apex doctrine, like the collective 

impact of discovery on corporate executives (such as an 

overwhelming influx of deposition requests that will expose them to 

harassment and abusive, unduly burdensome discovery practices

that will prevent them from fulfilling their professional duties), the 

potential for abuse by plaintiff’s counsel, and the creation of a 

double-standard between Georgia’s state and federal courts. But

these policy concerns are properly addressed not by this Court but 

by petitioning the General Assembly and advocating for a change in 

the law. See McEntyre v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. S21Q0909, 2022 WL 

677417, at *3 (2) (a) (Ga. Mar. 8, 2022) (“[I]t is not for this Court to 

expand or contract the scope of the General Assembly’s legislative 

enactments, unless the policy choices it makes by enacting statutes 

exceed its constitutional authority.”).

(d) The trial court’s order 

Turning to the application of these principles to this case, GM 

asked the trial court to consider Barra’s alleged lack of “unique or 
35

superior knowledge of issues relevant to the case” and the allegation 

that Buchanan could obtain relevant information by other, less 

intrusive means (such as through the testimony of lower-level 

corporate agents or employees with personal knowledge about the 

alleged defects). GM also argued that the deposition was intended to 

harass Barra and GM. 

The trial court’s order reflects that it generally concluded that

“there is no express or implied law in Georgia for the ‘apex doctrine’ 

or other framework that imposes presumptive hurdles to seeking 

discovery (or deposition testimony) from certain corporate 

individuals.” This conclusion about the apex doctrine as 

presumptive or burden-shifting was correct, as we explained above. 

However, the court’s order does not otherwise indicate that the court 

considered whether the substantive merits of GM’s arguments 

constituted good cause for granting GM’s motion for a protective 

order. As noted above, independent of the apex doctrine, the 

asserted factors are entitled to consideration as to whether they 

constitute “good cause” if established, whether in isolation or in 
36

concert.

The trial court further concluded, relying on identical language 

in Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 291 (279 SE2d 737) (1981),

that “until such time as the court is satisfied by substantial evidence

that bad faith or harassment motivates the discoveror’s action, the 

court should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of pretrial 

discovery” and ruled that GM had not shown good cause for the 

protective order. (Emphasis in original.) However, OCGA § 9-11-26 

(c) makes clear that a court’s decision whether to issue a protective 

order is to be based on the effect the proposed discovery would have 

on the party from whom the discovery is sought, not the intent or 

motivations of the requesting party. See OCGA § 9-11-26 (c) 

(providing that a court may issue a protective order “to protect a 

party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 

undue burden or expense”). The trial court’s apparent construction 

of this rule based on the language found in Bullard would require 

substantial evidence of bad faith or a purpose of harassment on the 

part of the party seeking discovery as a predicate to the issuance of 
37

a protective order. That interpretation is incorrect and has no basis 

in the text of OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). For this reason, we overrule 

Bullard to the extent it held otherwise.6

Finally, we note that the Court of Appeals’ opinion suggests 

that the trial court needed only to determine that the requested 

discovery was relevant and was not required to consider GM’s 

arguments that apex doctrine factors constituted good cause for a 

 6 Bullard, in turn, relied on Bridges v. 20th Century Travel, 149 Ga. App. 

837, 838-839 (256 SE2d 102) (1970), and Intl. Ser. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ga. 

App. 140, 144 (202 SE2d 540) (1973). These cases both quote language from 

Travis Meat & Seafood Co., Inc. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 288 (193 SE2d 

166) (1972), which cited Stonybrook Tenants Assn., Inc. v. Alpert, 29 FRD 165, 

167 (D. Conn. 1961). In Stonybrook, the federal District Court for Connecticut, 

citing no authority, stated that “[u]ntil such time as the court is satisfied that 

bad faith or harassment motivates the movers’ action, the court will not 

intervene to limit the scope of pre-trial discovery.” Id. at 167. Similar language 

has appeared in other opinions from Georgia’s Court of Appeals. See, e.g., 

Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 861 (4) (802 SE2d 835) (2017); Ewing v. 

Ewing, 333 Ga. App. 766, 768 (1) (777 SE2d 56) (2015); Galbreath v. Braley, 

318 Ga. App. 111, 113 (733 SE2d 412) (2012); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 

254 Ga. App. 500, 505 (3) (562 SE2d 809) (2002); Parks v. Multimedia 

Technologies, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 296 (6) (520 SE2d 517) (1999); Clayton 

Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Lake Spivey Golf Club, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 693, 

695 (2) (428 SE2d 687) (1993); Deloitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 

376, 379 (2) (370 SE2d 194) (1988); Osborne v. Bank of Delight, 173 Ga. App. 

322, 324 (2) (326 SE2d 523) (1985); Armstrong v. Strand, 167 Ga. App. 723, 

724 (307 SE2d 528) (1983). These cases from Georgia’s Court of Appeals are 

also disapproved to the extent they rely on such language, which has no basis 

in the text of OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). 
38

protective order under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). See Buchanan, 359 Ga. 

App. at 415 (1) (noting that “the court may consider a myriad of 

factors to determine whether GM showed good cause to protect 

Barra from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

burden or expense,” but that it was not required to). But, as noted 

above, to the extent a party seeking a protective order argues that a 

proposed deponent should be protected “from annoyance, 

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” based on 

apex doctrine (or any other) factors, a trial court must consider 

whether the movant’s arguments (and evidence presented in 

support of such arguments) constitute good cause for protection from 

discovery under OCGA § 9-11-26 (c). The discretion conferred upon 

the trial court, while broad, requires the trial court to actually 

consider the evidence and arguments presented and exercise that 

discretion. 

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and remand the case with direction to vacate the trial 

court’s order and remand the case for reconsideration consistent 
39

with this opinion.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the 

Justices concur, except Colvin, J., disqualified.