alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-2043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus HERMAN E. GREER; HERMAN E. GREER, Trustee of Greer Farm Trust, Defendants - Appellants, and HELEN G. MCKINNEY; HELEN G. MCKINNEY, Executrix of the Estate of Elise Greer; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY; LISA GREER WHITMIRE; TIMOTHY C. WHITMIRE, Trustee of Greer Farm Trust, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CA-03-223-1) Submitted: April 21, 2006 Decided: May 24, 2006 Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.- 2 - Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Herman E. Greer, Appellant Pro Se. Teresa Ellen McLaughlin; Patricia McDonald Bowman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: Herman E. Greer appeals the district court’s orders holding that Transylvania County, North Carolina, and the State of North Carolina have valid tax liens against a one-acre tract of land in Transylvania County; reducing a tax assessment against Greer to judgment and entering judgment for the United States in the amount of $320,544 plus interest; ordering foreclosure on and sale of the one-acre tract; and finding, after trial, that a twenty-acre tract of land conveyed to the Greer Farm Trust cannot be used to satisfy Greer’s tax liabilities. We have considered the arguments raised by Greer and find them to be without merit. Because the assessment against Greer for tax year 1989 erroneously included $67,000 used to purchase the twenty-acre tract, the matter is remanded for the sole purpose of recalculating the income ascribed to Greer for the year 1989, recomputing the tax assessment for that year, and recomputing the total judgment against Greer. We accordingly affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
Exhibit 32.2 - Certification of CF0 Section 906

AMENDED CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amended Annual Report of DEFAULT PROOF CREDIT CARD
SYSTEM, INC. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending December 31,
2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Charles A. Menendez, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
10th day of May, 2005.

/s/ Charles A. Menendez,
-----------------
Charles A. Menendez,
Chief Financial Officer
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.fmcs.gov","title":"Learn about the podcast - Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"sPa3eOXSMA\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.fmcs.gov\/resources\/multi-media\/crpodcast\/learn-about-the-podcast\/\">Learn about the podcast<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.fmcs.gov\/resources\/multi-media\/crpodcast\/learn-about-the-podcast\/embed\/#?secret=sPa3eOXSMA\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Learn about the podcast” — Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service\" data-secret=\"sPa3eOXSMA\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"Learn about the podcast Conflict “Resolutionary” is the first agency-wide podcast produced by the FMCS.\u00a0 The podcast takes an inside look at difficult conversations in the realm of conflict resolution and how FMCS and its partners promote dialogue, engagement, and awareness around conflict in the workplace. The intended audience includes government employees, the labor-management relations […]","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/www.fmcs.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/10\/Cover-scaled.jpg"}
**EXHIBIT32(a)**

 

**AssistedHousing Fund  L.P. I**

 

**Certificationof the President of the General Partner**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Robert K. Stump, thePresident of Murphey Favre Properties, Inc., General Partner of  AssistedHousing Fund L.P. I,  does herebycertify that this report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that theinformation contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and the results of operations of the InvestorPartnership.

 

 
| By:    | Murphey Favre Properties, Inc. |   |
|--------|--------------------------------|--------|
|   | *General Partner*              |   |
|   |                           |
|   |                           |
| By:    | /s/ Robert K.  Stump      |   | Date:   | November  12, 2003 |   |
|   | Robert K.  Stump          |   |
|   | *President*                    |   |
|        |                                |        |  |  |  |  |

 

1

----
IIB 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3261 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 12, 2021 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

AN ACT 

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force 

Against Iraq Resolution. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 3261 RFS

1 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILI2 TARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION. 

3 The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 

4 Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) 

5 is hereby repealed. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 29, 2021. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q (the "Report") of ARC
Wireless Solutions, Inc. (the "Company") for the nine months ended September 30,
2004, each of the undersigned Randall P. Marx, the Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, and Monty R. Lamirato, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of the
undersigneds'knowledge and belief:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated:  November 12, 2004                 /s/ Randall P. Marx
                                          --------------------------------------
                                              Randall P. Marx
                                              Chief Executive Officer


Dated:  November 12, 2004                 /s/ Monty R. Lamirato
                                          --------------------------------------
                                              Monty R. Lamirato
                                              Chief Financial Officer
```

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 219 (Wednesday, November 15, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 52926]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-24740]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies

    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for 
approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 
1841 et seq.) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR part 225), and all other 
applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company 
and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the 
power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the 
banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, 
including the companies listed below.
    The applications listed below, as well as other related filings 
required by the Board, are available for immediate inspection at the 
Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The applications will also be available 
for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested 
persons may express their views in writing on the standards enumerated 
in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the proposal also involves the 
acquisition of a nonbanking company, the review also includes whether 
the acquisition of the nonbanking company complies with the standards 
in section 4 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise noted, 
nonbanking activities will be conducted throughout the United States.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding each of these 
applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the 
offices of the Board of Governors not later than December 12, 2017.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Gerald C. Tsai, Director, 
Applications and Enforcement) 101 Market Street, San Francisco, 
California 94105-1579:
    1. Savi Financial Corporation, Inc.; to become a bank holding 
company by acquiring 100 percent of the voting shares of SaviBank, both 
of Burlington, Washington.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 9, 
2017.
Yao-Chin Chao,
Assistant Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2017-24740 Filed 11-14-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P
```
#### Byron Monroe STEWART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert KOPPEL, Warden; State of Maryland, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-7655.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 22, 2008.

Decided: May 27, 2008.

Byron Monroe Stewart, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*282PER CURIAM:

Byron Monroe Stewart seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ.P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Stewart has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Stewart’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir.2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000). Stewart’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Julio Everardo POSSO-LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-70158.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 2008.*

Filed May 16, 2008.

Julio Everardo Posso-Lopez, Florence, AZ, pro se.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, District Counsel, Office of the District Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, THOMAS and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

The court sua sponte grants petitioner in forma pauperis status for this petition.

In 1986, an immigration judge found petitioner Julio Everardo Posso-Lopez’s 1980 conviction of possession for sale of cocaine rendered him deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(ll) (transferred to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 by Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-598, § 305(a)(2) (Sept. 30, 1996)). Posso-Lopez petitions for review of the agency’s 2007 reinstatement of that 1986 order.

Posso-Lopez disputes that his 1980 drug conviction was a proper basis for a finding of removeability underlying the 1986 order. However, Congress has eliminated judicial review of an underlying removal order in a petition for review of the reinstatement of an order of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); *Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales,*486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc). Rather, the scope of a reinstatement inquiry involves only whether the alien (1) has illegally reentered (2) after having left the country while subject to any removal order. *See id.*at 491. Because Posso-Lopez has admitted both of these critical facts, this case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See United States v. Hooton,*693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).

We therefore construe respondent’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary disposition of the petition for review and grant the motion.

All other pending motions are denied as moot. The temporary stay of removal confirmed by Ninth Circuit General Order *4286.4(c) shall continue in effect until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
##### 



Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Certified Public Accountants



| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | We consent to the incorporation by reference in the
Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 333-16801 and
333-43231) of Continucare Corporation and in the related
Prospectuses, and the Registration Statements (Form S-8
Nos. 333-44431and 333-61246) pertaining to the Continucare
Corporation Amended and Restated 1995 Stock Option Plan, of
our report dated September 6, 2002 (except Note 12, as to
which the date is September 23, 2002) with respect to the
consolidated financial statements of Continucare
Corporation included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for
the year ended June 30, 2002.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Miami, Florida
September 25, 2002

1
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Diversified Industries, Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I , Phil Hamilton, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/ Phil Hamilton


Phil Hamilton


Chief Executive Officer





September 20, 2010
#### Kenneth E. DEAN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MERRILL LYNCH; UBS Financial Services Inc., also known as UBS Painewebber Inc.; Davis Denny, II; Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-20058

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 22, 2010.

Kenneth E. Dean, Pasadena, TX, pro se.

*891Paul Dee Flack, Solace Kirkland South-wick, Esq., Nickens, Keeton, Lawless, Farrell *&*Flack, Jack D. Ballard, Susan Alexander Logsdon, Ballard *&*Littlefield, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before DAVIS, SMITH and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Kenneth E. Dean (Dean), appearing pro se, filed a complaint against Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch), UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS), and Davis Denny II (Denny), alleging that the defendants committed fraud, which resulted in the loss of his savings, and that he should not have to arbitrate his claims. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, contending, inter alia, that Dean had agreed to arbitrate any claims against them and had previously instituted arbitration proceedings. The district court dismissed Dean’s claims after determining, inter alia, that Dean had agreed to arbitrate his claims against the defendants and that Dean had previously instituted arbitration proceedings that raised the same claims that Dean was raising in federal court.

While Dean’s appeal indicates an intent to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims, Dean’s briefs consist of poorly drafted, conclusional allegations that fail to adequately challenge the basis of the district court’s dismissal. Dean does not provide record references to documents that support his claims, nor does he provide legal authority to support his assertions. Although this court liberally construes pro se briefs, arguments must be briefed to be preserved. *Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.1993). Pro se parties must brief the issues and reasonably comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires, inter alia, citations to authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies. *Grant v. Cuellar,*59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir.1995); Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). By failing to present argument that challenges the basis of the district court’s dismissal, Dean has abandoned his challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his claims. *See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987) (explaining that the failure to identify an error in the district court’s analysis is the same as if the appellant had not appealed the judgment).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Christie G. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOP GUARD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-2054.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 14, 2016.

Decided: Jan. 19, 2016.

Christie G. Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Childers North, Leclair Ryan, PC, Williamsburg, Virginia; Gabriel Alexander Walker, Leclair Ryan, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before AGEE, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christie G. Brown appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on her employment discrimination claim and denying *202her motion to amend the complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Brown v. Top Guard,*No. 2:14-cv-00470-MSD-LRL (E.D.Va. May 29, 2015; Aug. 27, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*