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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JARROD BECK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TEST MASTERS EDUCATIONAL

SERVICES INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 1:04-CV-01391 (RCL)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is the defendant’s renewed motion to vacate or reconsider orders on 

plaintiffs’ motion to compel and for sanctions. For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion for 

sanctions will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are as follows: hoping to attend law school beginning in the fall of 2004, 

plaintiffs Jarrod Beck, Keerthi Reddy, and Erin Galloway signed up for an LSAT prep course with 

defendant, Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. (“TES”). Plaintiffs claim that they believed they 

were signing up with TestMasters, a company known as Robin Singh Educational Services, Inc. 

(“Singh”). Both companies offer test preparation classes for standardized tests such as the LSAT.

Plaintiffs brought claims of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation, as well as claims 

under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), 28 D.C. Code § 28-3904(e), (f), (s), 

arising out of plaintiffs’ purported confusion between the LSAT preparation courses offered by 

Singh and those offered by TES. Docket No. 30, Exh. 21, pp. 10–12. 
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This case comes before the Court after a tortured history, having been before two other 

judges before ending up here, on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and on 

transfer from Judge John Bates of this Court. Even before that, there is a documented history of

Singh filing lawsuits against TES alleging trademark violations in order to prevent TES from doing 

business under that name. Singh’s previous suits have been unsuccessful. TES claims that this 

losing history is driving the current, allegedly meritless suit brought by plaintiffs, which is why TES 

moved for sanctions based on alleged impropriety. 

This action began in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, and was removed to

this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. After being transferred to Judge Gilmore for Multi 

District Litigation proceedings, it came back to this Court where Judge Robertson granted summary 

judgment in TES’s favor on all counts brought by the plaintiff. Further, Judge Robertson denied 

TES’s sanctions motions—one based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and one based on 28 

U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent power—“without prejudice.” Plaintiffs appealed the ruling 

granting summary judgment against them, and TES appealed the rulings denying without prejudice 

their motions for sanctions against plaintiffs and their counsel. 

On the appeal of Judge Robertson’s summary judgment decisions, the D.C. Circuit affirmed 

the grant of summary judgment on the common law fraud and negligence claims, but reversed as to 

the D.C. CPPA claims for statutory damages. Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 407 Fed. 

Appx. 491, 2011 WL 318403 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2011). The D.C. Circuit stated that plaintiffs’ 

statutory claims could continue and granted limited discovery as to those claims. 

As to the present motion, TES asks this Court to vacate or reconsider the Court’s discoveryrelated orders and opinions from (1) June 27, 2011 [93], (2) September 25, 2012 [121, 122], (3) 

March 1, 2013 [138], and (4) March 28, 2013 [140].
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II. DISCUSSION

A. RECONSIDERATION REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT SATISFIED BY TES

1. Legal Standard

Reconsideration of a prior court order may be appropriate if: (1) the court had a “patent 

misunderstanding of the parties;” (2) the court made a decision that “exceeded the issues 

presented;” (3) the court failed to consider controlling law; or (4) there was a “significant change in 

the law . . . after the decision was rendered.” Pueschel v. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers’ Ass’n, 606 F. 

Supp. 2d 82, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Zalduonodo v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 

146, 157 (D.D.C. 2012). The burden is on the movant, here TES, to “show[] that reconsideration is 

warranted, and that some harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were to be denied.” 

Pueschel, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 85. These grounds are quite narrow and must be assessed here due to 

the procedural posture of TES’s motion to vacate or to reconsider. 

2. Discussion

Here, TES does not even make mention of this standard in its motion. Instead, TES argues 

that this Court should reverse Judge Bates’ decisions because plaintiffs’ discovery motions were—

allegedly—untimely, waived, and previously rejected by the previous district court judges presiding 

over this case. In support of its argument, TES recycles failed arguments that both misstate the 

history of this case and lack sufficient legal support. As Judge Bates stated:

TES opposed [Plaintiffs’ post-remand discovery] requests on the grounds that 

(1) the prior judges assigned to this case had already denied the discovery 

requests, and (2) plaintiffs had waived both arguments by not raising them 

during an appeal to the D.C. Circuit. TES’s opposition contained only 

minimal responses to the substance of the requests; TES claimed that it would 

need more time to draft such a motion for extension of time and even to 

prepare the motion. The Court rejected both of TES’s arguments in its June 

27, 2011 Order as obvious mischaracterizations of the record and the law.

[Docket No. 122, at 25 (citations omitted)]. Additionally, Judge Bates properly granted sanctions 

against TES for its improper discovery conduct in this case, due to its failure to preserve documents. 
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In the opinion of this Court, Judge Bates properly considered and decided plaintiffs’ discovery 

motions and, as such, this Court will not vacate those decisions.

Nor will this Court reconsider Judge Bates’ orders. Since Judge Bates made his decisions on 

the four motions at issue, there has been no significant change in law either that the Court is aware 

of or that defendant has argued. Further, there is no evidence that the court had a “patent 

misunderstanding of the parties,” or that the court’s decision exceeded the issues in front of it. And 

last, there is certainly no evidence that Judge Bates failed to consider controlling law in ruling on 

the four motions. The only change in this litigation is that the matter is now in front of a different 

judge. Given the nature of Judge Bates’ findings and the failure to satisfy—or even argue—the 

requirements for reconsideration, this Court will not vacate or reconsider the previous four 

decisions, which bear every mark of propriety. 

III. CONCLUSION

Thus, because of (1) the Judge Bates’ findings in the previous four motions at issue, (2) 

TES’s improper discovery conduct in this case, and (3) TES’s failure to meet the requirements for 

reconsideration, the Court holds that TES’s motion to vacate or reconsider is denied. TES’s

requested relief is denied. 

A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, U.S. District Judge, on December 18, 2013.