2023 IL App (4th) 210389-U 

NO. 4-21-0389 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

RANDALL D. ROBERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Macon County 

No. 13CF901 

Honorable 

Jeffrey S. Geisler,

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to 

withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as no issue of 

arguable merit could be raised on appeal.

¶ 2 Defendant, Randall D. Roberson, appeals the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of 

his pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 

et seq. (West 2020)). This court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to 

represent defendant. OSAD moved to withdraw as counsel, arguing defendant’s appeal presents 

no potentially meritorious issues for review. We grant the motion and affirm the trial court’s 

dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On July 9, 2013, law enforcement took defendant into custody on six counts: 

unlawful criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405.1 (West 2012)); armed violence (720 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

February 21, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-3(a) (West 2012)); being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 

5/24-1.7(a) (West 2012)); unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 

with prior unlawful-possession-of-controlled-substance conviction (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(B) 

(West 2012)); and two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 

570/401(c)(2) (West 2012)). On July 26, 2013, defendant asked for a continuance to consult with 

an attorney. 

¶ 5 On August 2, 2013, defendant asked for a public defender. The trial court granted 

the request and continued the cause without objection to August 14, 2013, for a preliminary 

hearing. On August 14, 2013, the court found probable cause to believe defendant had 

committed a felony and continued the cause without objection for a pretrial hearing on 

September 11, 2013. On that date, the parties agreed to continue the matter, with no reason 

given. On October 23, 2013, defense counsel told the court there was a codefendant in the case 

the State might wish to give priority to and agreed to a “one time” continuance. 

¶ 6 On November 20, 2013, citing a lack of communication from counsel, defendant 

filed a motion to remove his defense counsel and be appointed a new public defender. As part of 

his allegations, defendant alleged he had been incarcerated for four months and counsel’s failure 

to communicate left him in limbo regarding his right to a speedy trial.

¶ 7 On November 27, 2013, only the State appeared, and the trial court stated defense 

counsel recently had a surgical procedure and could not physically attend court. The court stated

if there were any delays, they would be for that reason. On December 4, 2013, defense counsel 

told the court the parties were still in discovery, and they were continuing the case by agreement. 

The court advised counsel of defendant’s pleading and stated, “[I]f counsel reviews it and thinks 

he needs a Krankel hearing, I’ll leave it up to you to advise the Court.” Counsel never did so. 
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¶ 8 On January 8, 2014, defense counsel told the trial court defendant wanted to get a 

trial date set but counsel had concerns about issues with codefendants in the case and a conflict 

with another hearing date. On the motion of the defense, the court continued the matter to 

January 23, 2014. On that date, the matter was again continued at the request of defense counsel

because of outstanding issues concerning the status of counsel for codefendants. 

¶ 9 On February 13, 2014, defense counsel told the trial court defendant wanted a 

trial date and “prefers not to sit there another 30 days waiting on counsel for somebody else.” 

Defense counsel asked for a date in April 2014, and the court noted its availability from March 

31, 2014, through April 4, 2014. However, defense counsel stated he was “trying to be out of the 

country” at that time. The court then set trial for May 5, 2014, “[o]n motion of defendant.” 

¶ 10 On April 21, 2014, defendant filed a pro se a written speedy-trial demand, stating 

he asked his counsel to move for a speedy trial and counsel was constantly asking for 

continuances without his consent. Defendant also stated he had seen or talked to counsel only 

twice over nine months. He further wrote he was not allowed to go to pretrial hearings, so when 

counsel appeared, defendant was unable to have any say about the continuances sought by

defense counsel or the State. The trial court struck the pleading because defendant had

representation. 

¶ 11 On May 5, 2014, the State sought a continuance. The trial court noted, “[s]ome of 

this stuff needs to get resolved.” The court continued the matter over defendant’s objection. 

However, defendant did not demand trial. On May 13, 2014, the case was continued by 

agreement because defense counsel had yet to obtain “some video.” Defense counsel asked for a 

trial date the first week in June, stating he would be away the rest of June. The State responded it

had eight trials in June, one of which both the State and the court noted “has to go.” Defense 
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counsel then conferred with defendant and told the court defendant would waive a jury trial and 

ask for a bench trial. After a discussion of the wisdom of seeking a bench trial when video 

evidence had not yet been turned over from the State and based on the court’s availability, 

defense counsel asked for a new status date to view the video and decide. The court continued 

the matter to May 20, 2014, by agreement. On that date, defendant told the court he wanted a 

jury trial. The court set a pretrial date for May 28, 2014. On that date, defense counsel stated, 

“We need a trial date,” and trial was set for July 22, 2014, without objection. 

¶ 12 On July 22, 2014, the State sought to continue the matter. When asked if there 

was an objection, defense counsel stated: “Normally I would, but in this case—I got the other 

one. It’s much older. It’s set for tomorrow. This is much longer than a one-day trial. However,

my client just informed me that he would like to waive jury and get a bench trial date.” 

Defendant then waived his right to a jury, and the trial court transferred the case to another judge 

for a bench trial. 

¶ 13 On September 12, 2014, the State filed a motion to continue because it had not 

received all the lab results. Defense counsel objected but did not demand trial. The parties 

indicated a date in November would not violate the statutory speedy-trial provisions, and the trial 

court set trial for November 13, 2014. On November 12, 2014, the court continued the trial at 

defense counsel’s request so he could file a motion to suppress.

¶ 14 On December 3, 2014, defendant filed a motion challenging the search warrant

and seeking a hearing under Franks v Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He argued the complaint 

used to secure the warrant contained falsehoods or a reckless disregard for the truth. Defendant 

challenged various allegations in the complaint, including asserting the recordings showed a 

codefendant, Matthew Anderson, obtained items, including cocaine, from defendant’s residence, 
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and a cellular phone call was placed to defendant when no recording substantiated the claim. He 

also argued a witness denied buying cocaine from defendant, while another would plead her fifth

-amendment rights if she was called to testify. On January 8, 2015, the trial court denied 

defendant’s motion. The court found defendant failed to meet his burden of making a substantial 

preliminary showing law enforcement included statements known to be false or statements made 

with reckless disregard for the truth. The court set the trial for February 20, 2015. 

¶ 15 On January 15, 2015, the State requested a different date because of a witness’s 

unavailability. Defense counsel objected. The trial was rescheduled for March 25, 2015. On 

January 16, 2015, the State moved to release defendant on a recognizance bond because it 

discovered there would be a statutory speedy-trial issue with the March trial date. The trial court 

granted the motion.

¶ 16 On March 25, 2015, the trial was continued to April 29, 2015, at defense 

counsel’s request. Counsel stated, “It took a little bit to track [defendant] down” and there was “a 

little bit” counsel needed to get ready for trial. After additional delays, all either on motion of 

defendant or by agreement, trial was set for July 15, 2015. On that date, a new public defender 

appeared and sought a new trial date because counsel had met defendant for the first time that 

day. The cause was continued on defendant’s motion for an August 19, 2015, trial. Between that 

date and February 1, 2016, the cause was again continued multiple times by agreement or at 

defense counsel’s request. On February 1, 2016, a bench trial was held.

¶ 17 On the first day of trial, the State amended count III to a charge of unlawful 

possession of a weapon by a felon, alleging defendant, who had been convicted of a felony, 

knowingly possessed on or about his person or in his own abode a firearm, a .22-caliber revolver. 

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2012). The State explained it was amending the charge because the 
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prosecutor realized the current armed habitual criminal charge listed a prior conviction as being 

from Macon County, when in fact, the prior conviction was from Sangamon County. Defense

counsel did not object. The next day, the State informed the trial court it had received the correct 

certified copy of conviction for the Sangamon County case and was ready to proceed on the 

original count, which was never dismissed but just amended. The State moved to withdraw the 

amended count III and proceed on the original armed habitual criminal charge. The court 

allowed the State to reinstate the original charge. Defense counsel objected but conceded there 

was no impact on his defense of the case. 

¶ 18 At trial, several detectives testified as to their roles in the investigation and 

surveillance of defendant’s distribution of cocaine with codefendant Anderson and evidence 

defendant possessed a weapon. Further recitation of the facts of the bench trial are unnecessary 

for resolution of OSAD’s motion to withdraw. The trial court found defendant guilty of five 

charges and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 30 years’ incarceration. 

¶ 19 Defendant appealed, arguing multiple errors, including: (1) the State failed to 

prove defendant guilty of criminal drug conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court 

erred in denying defendant’s motion challenging the search warrant, (3) the court erred in 

allowing the State to proceed on the original charge of being an armed habitual criminal after it 

was amended to unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and (4) defendant was denied his 

right to a speedy trial. We affirmed in part and vacated in part. Roberson, 2020 IL App (4th) 

160830-U, ¶ 133. 

¶ 20 On the sufficiency of the evidence argument concerning the criminal drug 

conspiracy charge, this court held, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the circumstantial evidence established more than a simple buyer-seller arrangement 
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between defendant and Anderson. Instead, it established an agreement or conspiracy to possess 

and sell cocaine. Thus, defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Roberson, 2020 

IL App (4th) 160830-U, ¶ 91. 

¶ 21 Addressing whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion

challenging the search warrant, this court found the issue forfeited because defense counsel did 

not raise the error in a posttrial motion. Further, appellate counsel forfeited any plain-error 

argument because his argument was simply a bare assertion error had occurred. Roberson, 2020 

IL App (4th) 160830-U, ¶ 110. The issue of whether the court erred in allowing the State to 

reinstate the original armed habitual criminal charge after it was amended to an unlawful 

possession of a weapon by a felon was also forfeited because appellate counsel cited to no 

authority in support of his general assertion of error. Roberson, 2020 IL App (4th) 160830-U, 

¶ 114. 

¶ 22 Regarding defendant’s speedy-trial claim, this court noted appellate counsel 

simply asserted defendant was in custody more than 120 days and “ ‘no exceptions’ ” were

noted. Appellate counsel did not develop the argument and failed to provide record citations, 

authority, or argument in support of the speedy-trial claim. Accordingly, this court held the 

argument was forfeited for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. 

May 25, 2018). Roberson, 2020 IL App (4th) 160830-U, ¶ 112. 

¶ 23 On March 29, 2021, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging: 

(1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal drug conspiracy, 

denying him due process and equal protection when, after his trial, a codefendant was acquitted 

of the conspiracy charge by a different judge; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

violations of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial; and (3) ineffective assistance 
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of appellate counsel for forfeiting his claims. Defendant included as an exhibit a notarized letter 

addressed to the trial court, dated October 21, 2014, expressing concerns his counsel was 

neglecting the case, requesting unnecessary continuances, and refusing to seek a speedy trial as 

requested by defendant. He included a notarized affidavit stating the allegations in his petition 

were true to the best of his knowledge. 

¶ 24 On June 7, 2021, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and 

patently without merit. Defendant appealed. OSAD moved to withdraw as counsel. We denied the 

motion without prejudice because counsel did not address defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial 

claim or ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to that claim. People v. Roberson, 2022 IL 

App (4th) 210389-U. On November 29, 2022, OSAD filed a new motion to withdraw, including 

the constitutional speedy-trial claim.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 OSAD again moves to withdraw. Counsel for OSAD asserts he (1) read the record 

on appeal, (2) reviewed the facts and applicable law, and (3) discussed the case with another 

attorney. OSAD concludes an appeal in this case would be without arguable merit. We granted 

defendant leave to file additional points and authorities, and he has responded. The State has 

declined to file a brief. 

¶ 27 We agree this appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues. First, OSAD submits it 

would be frivolous to argue the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of 

the Act when it dismissed the petition. OSAD then submits the underlying claims in the petition 

are frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 28 The Act provides a remedy to criminal defendants who demonstrate a violation of 

their constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). At the first stage of a 
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postconviction proceeding, the trial court must determine whether the petition is frivolous or 

patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). “[A] pro se petition seeking 

postconviction relief under the Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be summarily 

dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either 

in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (2009). A 

petition lacks an arguable factual basis when it is based on a fanciful factual allegation, such as 

one that is clearly baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16-17. A petition lacks 

an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as one 

that is completely contradicted by the record. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. 

¶ 29 At the first stage, the allegations in the petition, when taken as true and liberally 

construed, must present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, 

¶ 24, 183 N.E.3d 136. “Thus, to survive summary dismissal, a petitioner is only required to 

include a limited amount of detail and need not present formal legal arguments or citations to 

legal authority.” Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 24. “An allegation in a postconviction petition must 

be based on factual allegations and not mere conclusory statements.” People v. Ivy, 313 Ill. App. 

3d 1011, 1019, 730 N.E.2d 628, 637 (2000). The petition must be both (1) verified by affidavit 

and (2) supported by “affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations,” or, if not 

available, the petition must explain why. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020); People v. Collins, 202

Ill. 2d 59, 65, 782 N.E.2d 195, 198 (2002). If a postconviction petition is found to be frivolous or 

patently without merit, a trial court may summarily dismiss it within 90 days of its filing. People 

v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001). Our review of the first-stage 

dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Dunlap, 2011 IL App (4th) 100595, 

¶ 20, 963 N.E.2d 394. 
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¶ 30 Here, OSAD correctly notes the trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and 

patently without merit within the 90-day period. OSAD next submits all underlying claims in the 

pro se postconviction petition are frivolous and patently without merit. We agree.

¶ 31 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 32 We agree it would be frivolous for OSAD to argue defendant was denied due 

process and equal protection based on insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy. As 

OSAD correctly notes, this claim is nothing more than a reasonable doubt argument couched as a 

constitutional issue in defendant’s petition. Sufficiency of the evidence claims are not cognizable 

in postconviction petitions. See People v. Franzen, 251 Ill. App. 3d 813, 822, 622 N.E.2d 877, 

886 (1993). Further, the issue is res judicata as it was already decided on direct appeal. People v. 

Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443, 831 N.E.2d 604, 614-15 (2005). 

¶ 33 Defendant’s allegation concerning Anderson’s acquittal does not change the 

determination he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The acquittal of one codefendant 

has no bearing on the guilt of a codefendant, regardless of the nature of the evidence presented. 

See People v. Gharst, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 460 N.E.2d 813, 816 (1984). The criminal drug 

conspiracy statute also provides that it shall not be a defense to criminal drug conspiracy that the 

person with whom the defendant had conspired was ultimately acquitted. 720 ILCS 

570/405.1(b)(4) (West 2012). Thus, the fact codefendant Anderson was acquitted of his criminal 

drug conspiracy charge by a different judge does not entitle defendant to an acquittal on the same 

charge.

¶ 34 B. Speedy Trial

¶ 35 OSAD next submits defendant’s speedy-trial claims lack merit. Defendant 

asserted multiple claims, including the question of whether he was denied his constitutional right 
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to a speedy trial. Although labeled as a constitutional speedy-trial claim, defendant first argued 

he was not brought to trial within 120 days, thus presenting a statutory claim. See 725 ILCS 

5/103-5(a) (West 2012). As, such, he argued counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to discharge and appellate counsel was ineffective for forfeiting the issue. Specifically, he 

initially alleged the total number of continuances or delays attributable to the State amounted to 

139 days. He also noted he made multiple complaints about trial counsel, attempted to demand 

trial pro se, and asserted counsel refused to move for a speedy trial when defendant requested it. 

He also alleged his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because the State’s delay in 

bringing him to trial was unjustified and presumptively prejudicial where the charges in this case 

were not complicated and the evidence against him was readily available to the State.

¶ 36 This court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard 

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, the defendant must 

show (1) the conduct of trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

(2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant such that a “reasonable probability” exists the 

result would have been different but for the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-

88, 694. The defendant must satisfy both prongs, and “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, *** that course should be 

followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

¶ 37 Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are judged under the same 

standard. See People v. Salazar, 162 Ill. 2d 513, 521, 643 N.E.2d 698, 702-03 (1994). To 

establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defendant must demonstrate (1) the failure 

to raise an issue was objectively unreasonable and (2) but for the failure to raise the issue, the 
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trial court’s ruling would have been reversed. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283, 606 N.E.2d 

1078, 1087 (1992). 

¶ 38 In Illinois, a criminal defendant has both a constitutional and statutory right to a 

speedy trial. See U.S. Const., amends VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art I., § 8; 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) 

(West 2012). Although section 103-5(a) implements the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the 

statutory and the constitutional rights “are not coextensive.” People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 65, 

933 N.E.2d 1186, 1193 (2010). 

¶ 39 Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, commonly referred 

to as the Speedy Trial Act, provides, in pertinent part:

“Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the 

court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody 

unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***. Delay shall be considered to be 

agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a 

written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 

5/103-5(a) (West 2012).

¶ 40 The 120-day speedy-trial period begins to run automatically if a defendant 

remains in custody pending trial. People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 174, 847 N.E.2d 117, 122 

(2006). “The speedy trial term is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, 

unless the last day is a Sunday or a holiday, in which case it is also excluded.” People v. 

LaFaire, 374 Ill. App. 3d 461, 463, 870 N.E.2d 862, 864 (2007). Any delay occasioned by the 

defendant within this term will suspend or toll the term for the time for the delay. 725 ILCS 

5/103-5(f) (West 2012).
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¶ 41 Section 103-5(a) explicitly “places the onus on [the] defendant to take affirmative 

action when he becomes aware that his trial is being delayed.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 

391, 860 N.E.2d 323, 331 (2006). “A simple request for trial, before any ‘delay’ is proposed, is 

not equivalent to an objection for purposes of section 103-5(a).” Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391. 

Instead, to prevent the speedy-trial clock from tolling, section 103-5(a) requires that the 

defendant object to any attempt to place the trial date outside the 120-day period. Cordell, 223 

Ill. 2d at 390-91. The defendant can do so by “ ‘making a written demand for trial or an oral 

demand for trial on the record.’ ” Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 

2002)). While the statute does not mandate the use of any “magic words,” it requires some 

affirmative statement in the record requesting a speedy trial. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d at 391.

¶ 42 If a person is not tried within the statutory speedy-trial term, the person shall be 

discharged from custody and the charges must be dismissed. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) (West 2012); 

People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286, 299, 860 N.E.2d 259, 269 (2006). Subsection (b) of the 

Speedy Trial Act in turn, creates a 160-day speedy-trial right for persons released on bond or 

recognizance, and this period begins to run only when the accused files a speedy-trial demand. A 

defendant who is subject to subsection (b) retains his or her liberty. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 174. 

Accordingly, the State is given a longer time in which to try the charges than would be available 

if the defendant were in custody awaiting trial. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 174. To invoke the 160-

day period of subsection (b), defendants who are on bail or recognizance must serve the State 

with a formal demand. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 175. 

¶ 43 Here, defendant initially focused on continuances pertinent to the 120-day 

requirement in his petition. In his response, he argues 161 days passed before he was brought to 

trial. But, as counsel notes, when continuances requested or agreed to by trial counsel without 
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any demands for a speedy trial are considered, defendant was released from custody well under 

the 120-day limit, at 80 days. Once defendant was released, the State had 160 days from the date 

he demanded trial, unless defendant occasioned the delay. The State calculates 148 days accrued 

as of March 25, 2015. After examining the record, we agree with the State’s calculation. After 

that date, all continuances were requested by or agreed to by trial counsel, and counsel never 

specifically demanded a speedy trial. 

¶ 44 Defendant attributes to the State time periods after he expressed disagreement 

with the delays in pro se statements or in writing to the trial court. But the decision to seek a 

continuance is generally a strategic decision asserted by counsel. See People v. Ramey, 151 Ill.

2d 498, 523-26, 603 N.E.2d 519, 529-30 (1992). A defendant is bound by his trial counsel’s 

request for a continuance unless the defendant clearly and convincingly objects and asserts his or 

her right to discharge counsel and proceed to an immediate trial. People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill.

2d 288, 297, 798 N.E.2d 713, 719 (2003). Defendant here did not do so. Thus, we agree it would 

be frivolous for OSAD to argue defendant was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial or that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to discharge. 

¶ 45 We also agree it would be frivolous for OSAD to argue there is merit to 

defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial claim. There are four factors to be balanced to determine 

whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the 

delay; (2) the defendant’s assertion of the right; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) the 

prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); People v. Bazzell, 68 Ill.

2d 177, 182, 369 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1977). “Once the [Barker] factors have been considered, ‘courts 

must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.’ ” People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 

60, 743 N.E.2d 555, 566 (2001) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). Each factor must be weighed 
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and considered in light of the circumstances of the case as reflected in the record. Bazzell, 68 Ill.

2d at 182-83. However, “[a]ll four factors are closely related” and no one factor is dispositive. 

Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52. Because “a certain amount of delay is ‘inevitable and wholly justifiable’ 

[citation], a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered unless the complained-of delay crosses the 

threshold from ordinary to ‘ “presumptively prejudicial.” ’ [Citations.]” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52.

Thus, the first factor considered is the length of the delay. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52. 

¶ 46 “In general, courts have recognized a delay approaching one year to be

‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 52-53 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31). 

A finding of presumptive prejudice, however, does not imply the delay will be found to have 

actually prejudiced the defendant. Rather, it simply marks the point at which courts deem the 

delay unreasonable enough to trigger the full Barker inquiry. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 53; People v. 

Prince, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1008, 611 N.E.2d 105, 109 (1993). The weight accorded the 

reasons cited by the State for the delay is dependent on the particular circumstances of the case, 

such that deliberate delays are weighted heavily and negligence is weighted less heavily. Barker, 

407 U.S. at 531; Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 55. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is also a 

factor. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Finally, in assessing the prejudice factor, courts consider the 

interests of defendants the speedy-trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing undue and 

oppressive incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern that accompanies public 

accusations; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at

532. 

¶ 47 Here, OSAD agrees the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial. OSAD 

does not specifically address the effect of a presumptively prejudicial delay on the procedural 

posture of a first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition, which requires the 
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defendant to state only the “gist” of a claim. We also recognize the trial court did not discuss the 

factors pertinent to a constitutional speedy-trial claim. However, as OSAD notes, a significant 

portion of the delays were attributable to defendant for valid reasons. Most of the continuances 

were by agreement or on defense motions as the case was prepared for trial. During that time, 

new defense counsel took over the case. Moreover, the case involved a large-scale criminal drug 

conspiracy and cocaine distribution operation involving multiple unnamed people, the recovery 

of drugs from multiple homes, multiple defendants, potential conflict issues, and multiple 

electronic recordings and video evidence. While defense counsel objected to some of the 

continuances and defendant filed a pro se demand, most of the continuances were without 

objection, and there were no written trial demands filed by counsel. As previously noted, 

defendant never sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se to an immediate trial. Most 

important, there is a lack of evidence in the record of prejudice caused by the delays considering 

the complicated nature of the case, and defendant did not articulate in his petition or in his 

response how his defense was impaired by the delay. Indeed, defendant does not address the 

constitutional speedy-trial claim in his new response at all. Thus, we are unable to give any 

weight to the prejudice factor. 

¶ 48 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the delays in bringing the 

case to trial were mostly occasioned by defendant and were excused by the complexity of the

ongoing proceedings. Defendant has not asserted facts to show the delays prejudiced his rights. 

Accordingly, although the delay was presumptively prejudicial, we conclude the lack of merit to 

the overall claim is apparent, such that the trial court did not err in concluding defendant failed to 

establish the gist of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, we agree with OSAD 

there is no arguable merit to a claim defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
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violated. Accordingly appellate counsel also did not render ineffective assistance by forfeiting 

the issue. 

¶ 49 C. Challenge to the Search Warrant

¶ 50 We also agree there is no substantive merit to the claim the trial court erred in 

denying defendant a Franks hearing. To establish probable cause for a search warrant, the 

entirety of the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge when the warrant was 

sought must be “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the law was 

violated and evidence of it is on the premises to be searched.” People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 

77, 687 N.E.2d 820, 829 (1997). In determining whether the necessary probable cause existed 

when the search warrant was issued, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of 

the magistrate. People v. Kornegay, 2014 IL App (1st) 122573, ¶ 23, 12 N.E.3d 747. Instead, the 

court may look at commonsense considerations that are factual and practical. Kornegay, 2014 IL 

App (1st) 122573, ¶ 21. To warrant a hearing under Franks, a defendant must make a substantial 

preliminary showing a knowingly and intentionally false statement was included by the affiant in 

the warrant affidavit, and show the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable 

cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. In addition, when an informant is involved, it is the veracity 

of the affiant, not the informant, which is at issue and may be impeached. People v. Martin, 148 

Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1066, 500 N.E.2d 528, 532 (1986). The defendant’s attack must “be more than 

conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine; there must be 

allegations of deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must 

be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Martin, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1065. Moreover, the 

“substantial preliminary showing” necessary to warrant a Franks hearing requires proof 
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“somewhere between mere denials on the one hand and proof by a preponderance on the other.” 

People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 152, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 (1987). 

¶ 51 Here, defendant presented various allegations of deliberate falsehoods or

statements showing a reckless disregard for the truth because the video and audio recordings did 

not conclusively corroborate the events described in the complaint, a witness denied buying 

cocaine from defendant, and another would plead her fifth amendment rights if she was called to 

testify. However, as the State argued, even if the points of concern were redacted from the search 

warrant complaint, it still supported probable cause to search. For example, the complaint 

included evidence additional law enforcement officers made purchases from defendant and

provided information about what they knew about the drug operation allegedly run by defendant 

and codefendant Anderson. Observations from surveillance during the investigation showed 

police gave two individuals funds to make purchases of cocaine from defendant, and those 

individuals returned with cocaine purchased with police funds. In another instance, individuals 

passed information to the police about cocaine purchases made from the operation and their 

observations of a large amount of currency and a handgun present at the location. Thus, the 

defense failed to make a substantial preliminary showing to warrant a Franks hearing and 

defendant suffered no prejudice from appellate counsel’s failure to properly preserve a plainerror argument on the issue, as there was no error in the first place.

¶ 52 D. Reinstatement of Armed Habitual Criminal Charge 

¶ 53 Finally, we agree with OSAD there is no substantive merit to the claim the trial 

court erred in allowing the State to reinstate the original armed habitual criminal charge. After

the grand jury has returned an indictment, it may not be broadened through amendment except 

by the grand jury itself. People v. Ross, 395 Ill. App. 3d 660, 667, 917 N.E.2d 1111, 1119
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(2009). However, amendments to the indictment are permissible “where there is no resulting 

surprise or prejudice to the defendant or where the record clearly shows that he was otherwise 

aware of the charge against him.” Ross, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 667. Indeed, the State may amend 

even an essential allegation of an indictment when there is no hint of surprise or prejudice to the 

defendant. People v. Jones, 53 Ill. 2d 460, 463-65, 292 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1973). Here, the 

amendment did not broaden the original charge, and counsel did not object to the amendment. 

When the State was allowed to reinstate the original charge, which was never dismissed, counsel 

objected but also admitted the reinstatement had no impact on the defense. Thus, defendant was 

not surprised or prejudiced by the reinstatement of the original charge, since it was never

dismissed and never impacted counsel’s defense case. Therefore, we agree with OSAD there is 

no meritorious argument defendant was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s forfeiture of this issue 

on direct appeal.

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 56 Affirmed.