COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

April 30, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP1633-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF5308

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

KENNETH SHELDON HILL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: PEDRO A. COLÓN, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before White, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Kenneth Sheldon Hill appeals from a judgment of 

conviction for first-degree reckless injury and physical abuse of a child. He also 

appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion without a hearing. Hill 

argues that he was sentenced on inaccurate information concerning the severity of 

the victim’s injuries. He also argues that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because counsel failed to correct the misrepresentations of the victim’s 

injuries during the trial and sentencing. Upon review, we reject his arguments and 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Hill was charged with first-degree reckless injury and physical abuse 

of a child–intentional causation of bodily harm arising out of an incident on 

November 11, 2017. According to the criminal complaint, Milwaukee Police 

Department (MPD) officers were dispatched for a battery complaint. Sixteenyear-old Z.V. reported that when she went upstairs after hearing a noise, she saw 

Hill standing over her mother, W.V., and repeatedly punching W.V. in the head 

and face. Hill grabbed Z.V. by the throat and pushed her against a wall when she 

threatened to call the police. Z.V. ran downstairs to call the police. Hill then went 

downstairs and ransacked the living room looking for his keys. Hill then attacked 

Z.V. and threw her phone. A responding officer reported noticeable scratches on 

Z.V.’s face. 

¶3 The complaint continued that an officer found W.V. unresponsive on 

the floor upstairs and observed a significant amount of blood on the walls and 

mattress. W.V. was transported to the hospital; she suffered a subdural hematoma, 

nasal bone fractures, neck pain, and received stitches for several facial lacerations. 

When questioned, W.V. could not remember specific facts about the beating, but 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

3

she knew Hill, she knew he had been over the night before, and she identified him 

in a photograph lineup as her attacker. 

¶4 The case proceeded to trial in April 2018. The State called Z.V., 

W.V., two Milwaukee Police officers who responded to the 911 call, and an 

administrative assistant for the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office 

witness protection unit.1 Hill testified in his own defense. We recite the relevant 

trial testimony. First, Z.V. testified, in accord with the criminal complaint, that 

Hill grabbed her by the throat and slammed her into a closet door when she 

threatened to call police when she saw him beating her mother on November 11, 

2017. The State played for the jury the 911 call that Z.V. made during the 

incident. 

¶5 An MPD officer testified while video footage from his body camera 

was shown to the jury. The officer testified that he saw blood and blood spatter on 

the walls, ceiling, floor, and on W.V., who was semi-conscious and not responsive 

to the officer’s questions. The officer then called for a medical unit to treat her. 

The officer identified two photographs of W.V. that were taken while she was on 

an ambulance gurney; the photographs were admitted as exhibits and published to 

the jury. W.V. was transported to St. Luke’s Hospital, and was later transferred to 

Froedtert Hospital. 

¶6 The officer testified that he met with W.V. at Froedtert Hospital two 

days after the incident. He reviewed certified medical records regarding W.V.’s 

 

1

 One MPD officer testified about Z.V.’s identification of Hill by photograph array. The 

administrative assistant testified about transcribing a jail call that Hill made. We do not discuss 

this testimony further.
No. 2022AP1633-CR

4

injuries and treatment. The officer testified that according to the medical records, 

W.V. had the following injuries:

Broken nose, different bones in the nose. Laceration, large 

laceration of the forehead, laceration to the nose. I believe 

three missing or three broken teeth and a missing tooth 

which you see in the photo actually sitting on her lip. A 

mid line shift of her brain within her skull which basically 

means it’s moved off center and a subdural hematoma 

inside the skull which is a large blood clot essentially. Also 

an ankle injury, I believe, a fracture in the leg/ankle area of 

the leg. 

The officer presented a summary of the reasons for W.V.’s hospitalization, which 

included: a traumatic brain injury (TBI); left convexity subdural hematoma; 

cerebral edema and brain compression upon admission; assault; left ear drainage 

consistent with cerebrospinal fluid (CSF); neck pain; fractures to the nasal and 

maxillary frontal process bones; lacerations on the bridge of the nose; and an ankle 

fracture. The date of discharge in the report was November 22, 2017, eleven days 

after the incident. 

¶7 W.V. testified that on November 10, 2017, she hosted friends at her 

home—about six people, not including Hill—and Hill came and left three times 

over the evening. She woke up the next day at the hospital with no memory of 

what happened or how she was injured. W.V. testified that she was treated in the 

hospital for five days because CSF was leaking from her ear. She had a crack in 

her skull, a broken nose, a broken jaw, and she had to wear a neck brace for five 

weeks. She continues to suffer from memory issues, severe pain, and daily 

headaches. 

¶8 Hill then took the stand in his defense. He testified that he was 

invited to W.V.’s house after drinking at a bar, she was having a party, and he 

drank even more at her house. He testified that W.V. and another person helped 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

5

him upstairs when he was completely drunk. He passed out drunk in an upstairs 

bedroom and woke up to people rummaging through his clothing, resulting in the 

theft of $1,550 in cash and a gold necklace. He testified that he began swinging in 

the dark room and did not know who he was hitting. He then realized he was 

hitting Z.V., stopped and apologized, and Z.V. told him that he better leave 

because she was calling 911. He testified that he did not intend to cause injuries to 

W.V. or Z.V. and he did not have total disregard for human life in his actions 

because no one died.2 

¶9 The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. The circuit court 

sentenced Hill the same day. We discuss the court’s sentencing decision in detail 

below. The court imposed a sentence of ten years of initial confinement and five 

years of extended supervision on the reckless injury offense, and eighteen months 

of initial confinement and eighteen months of extended supervision on the 

physical abuse of a child offense, to run consecutively. 

¶10 Hill filed a WIS. STAT. RULE 809.30 (2021-22)3 motion for

postconviction relief requesting resentencing because his due process rights were 

violated when he was sentenced based on inaccurate information. Hill contended 

that W.V. was not unconscious or in a coma while treated at Froedtert Hospital; 

that W.V. did not lose any teeth in the assault; that W.V. did not have a broken 

ankle; that the records did not indicate that the fluid drainage from W.V.’s ear 

 

2

 We note that Hill was charged with first-degree reckless injury, which requires the 

State to prove that the injury was made “under circumstances which showed utter disregard for 

human life.”

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2022AP1633-CR

6

resulted from the assault; and that while W.V. suffered serious injuries and 

considerable pain, she was not close to death. He also asserted that he was denied 

the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing for counsel’s failure to object to 

the alleged inaccuracies. 

¶11 The circuit court denied Hill’s motion without a hearing in January 

2022. The court concluded that Hill did not satisfy his burden to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the court relied upon inaccurate information at 

sentencing “merely by reviewing the medical records and rendering [trial 

counsel’s] own opinion as to what the records do or do not support.”4 Moreover, 

the court concluded that the remarks to which Hill objected were not the basis of 

the court’s sentencing. The court clarified that it misspoke when it characterized 

W.V. as unconscious for five days, as later remarks in the sentencing hearing show 

that the court understood W.V. was awake for the duration of her hospital stay. 

The court also noted that it made no mention of the victim’s ankle injury, cracked 

skull, or broken or missing teeth and did not rely on this specific information 

either. The court concluded that even if trial counsel had sought to correct the 

record about particular facts about W.V.’s injuries, the court “would have imposed 

the exact same sentence that it did.” 

 

4

 In its postconviction decision, the circuit court found that Hill did not present expert 

opinion to dispute that W.V. was near death, that the ankle injury was pre-existing, or that the 

CSF fluid leak was unrelated and concluded that expert testimony would be necessary for Hill to 

meet his burden. Hill then received permission from this court for a supplemental postconviction 

motion, in which he presented a potential expert witness who could discuss W.V.’s injuries and 

inaccurate information about those injuries. The circuit court again denied Hill’s supplemental 

postconviction motion, concluding that it stood by its previous decision and view that even if the 

alleged inaccuracies had been corrected, it would not have affected the court’s sentencing. 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

7

¶12 This appeal follows. Additional relevant facts will be discussed 

below. 

DISCUSSION

¶13 Hill asserts that there were five instances of inaccurate information

that the circuit court considered that violated his constitutional right to due 

process: (1) that W.V. was in a coma for five days, (2) that she lost three teeth in 

the assault, (3) that her ankle was broken in the assault, (4) that the CSF leak 

resulted from the assault, and (5) that the assault left her near death. The State 

argues that W.V.’s medical records support all five issues; therefore, no inaccurate 

information was presented. 

¶14 “A defendant has a constitutionally protected due process right to be 

sentenced upon accurate information.” State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 

Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. Whether a defendant has been denied due process is 

a question of law that we review independently. Id. 

¶15 A defendant seeking resentencing “must show by clear and 

convincing evidence that: (1) some information at the original sentencing was 

inaccurate, and (2) the circuit court actually relied on the inaccurate information at 

sentencing.” State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1, ¶38, 389 Wis. 2d 627, 937 N.W.2d 579. 

If “the defendant shows actual reliance on inaccurate information, the burden then 

shifts to the State to prove the error was harmless.” State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, 

¶23, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491. “A reviewing court must independently 

review the record of the sentencing hearing to determine the existence of any 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

8

actual reliance on inaccurate information.”5Id., ¶48. “We review the circuit 

court’s articulation of its basis for sentencing in the context of the entire 

sentencing transcript[.]” State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶25, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 

858 N.W.2d 662. 

¶16 We begin by turning to the record on the circuit court’s sentencing 

remarks. The circuit court stated that it considered the three required sentencing 

objectives: “seriousness of the offense, [Hill’s] character, and the need to ... 

protect the public.” The court concluded that the seriousness of the offense was 

prescribed by the legislature’s enactment of the offense as a D class felony, with a 

maximum possible penalty of twenty-five years in prison, noting that few offenses 

are “as serious as this one.”

¶17 The circuit court discussed that when it heard the evidence, it was 

“taken aback by the gravity of the injury. This was not being roughed up. This 

wasn’t being hit hard. This was coming close to death. Hit the way she was hit 

she came close to death.” The court further commented that “nobody sits 

unconscious for five days in the hospital unless they are severely severely injured.

This is the most dramatic beating I’ve ever seen anybody take out on someone 

else.” 

 

5

 Although the circuit court’s postconviction decision affirmatively declares that these 

issues were not the basis of the court’s decision, “[a] circuit court’s after-the-fact assertion of 

non-reliance on allegedly inaccurate information is not dispositive of the issue of actual reliance.” 

State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶48, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491. For the record, the court 

stated that the reference to being unconscious for five days was a mistake and that the remainder 

of the court’s decision showed the court understood W.V. was conscious; the court did not 

mention W.V.’s ankle or teeth in its sentencing remarks; that the CSF leak and treatment was 

established in the records; and that W.V.’s medical records showed she was in critical condition 

and relied upon a dictionary definition to show that critical condition was comparable to being 

near death. 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

9

¶18 The circuit court considered the medical records and relied upon 

medical practitioners for an objective assessment of the injuries, noting a CT scan 

and discharge summaries in the medical records. The court referenced that W.V. 

testified about her “memory loss.” The court stated that it could not “begin to 

understand the pain that [W.V.] must’ve gone through for five days in the 

hospital,” and that “[e]verything about this suggests that this person was in 

incredibly horrific pain.” The court referenced W.V.’s testimony that she had a 

spinal drip and that“[s]pinal fluid [was] coming out of a human being’s ear.” 

¶19 As far as considering Hill’s character, the court addressed several 

concerns. The court stated that the evidence showed that Hill had known W.V.

since they were children, and he visited because of their “long [non-romantic] 

relationship.” The court stated it considered Hill’s version of events because it 

allowed Hill to present a self defense theory. Hill described himself as 

“completely drunk” that night and that W.V. and a friend helped him upstairs. 

The court stated it was “completely and absolutely unbelievable” that Hill claimed 

he knew he was being robbed, but he did not “recognize the pain and the groan” of 

W.V., someone he had known for so many years. The court stated that even trying 

to give him the benefit of the doubt for being startled or afraid of being attacked, 

Hill’s actions showed he did not stop, he just repeatedly beat W.V. and then turned 

on Z.V. when she arrived.

¶20 The court discussed Hill’s attitude and anger, referencing the 

prosecutor’s remarks about Hill’s aggressive attitude and behavior with police 

before charges were filed. The court then compared that to Hill’s behavior during 

the trial, when he did not want to appear at trial and he was angry. The record 

reflects that Hill refused to attend a half day of the trial. The court stated that it 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

10

understood Hill being unhappy with his actions and the systems; however, the 

court concluded that Hill lacked introspection.

¶21 The circuit court considered Hill’s prior record in the context of his 

character, but noted that Hill was not being punished for previous offenses. The 

court was concerned that despite Hill having previously served a five-year prison 

term for reckless endangerment at the prime of his life, he had not grown out of 

petty conflicts.

6

 The court concluded that imprisonment did not appear to have led 

to the insight or maturity Hill was supposed to have gotten. 

¶22 The court directly addressed Hill, stating that he had to “respect 

human beings” and “to respect human life” despite how much he had to drink or 

how much money he lost. The court stressed that despite everything, “we still 

have to respect human beings” especially those we know, those that have cared for 

us, and those that have been in our lives for a long time.

¶23 We now turn to each of Hill’s claims.7 First, he argues that the court 

imposed a sentence based on the inaccurate information that W.V. was 

unconscious for five days. The record reflects that the court referred to W.V. as 

being unconscious for five days. The State argues this was merely a mistaken 

phrasing. Although within the court’s discussion of the extent of W.V.’s injuries, 

 

6

 We note that Hill was almost forty years old at the time of sentencing. The record 

reflects that the court considered Hill’s prior record in recent years and when he was younger. 

7

 For our analysis, we note that the postconviction briefing and decision showed a 

dispute about the meaning of parts of the 132-page certified medical records for W.V.’s 

hospitalization. This court does not conduct fact finding, nor do we have specialized medical 

knowledge that would render our review of the facts within the medical records to be a stronger 

analysis than that proposed by the State or Hill. However, Hill does not challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence or directly challenge his conviction, and our inquiry focuses only on sentencing.
No. 2022AP1633-CR

11

it incorrectly stated that “nobody sits unconscious for five days in the hospital 

unless they are severely severely injured,” Hill fails to show that the court had an 

actual reliance on that inaccurate information. The sentencing remarks in full 

show that the court understood W.V. was conscious during her hospital stay. We 

conclude that this claim fails.

¶24 Second, Hill argues that the court sentenced him based on inaccurate 

information about injuries to W.V.’s teeth. At trial, an MPD officer reviewed 

W.V.’s medical records including information about dental injuries and broken 

teeth. Even if we assumed that inaccurate information about dental injuries was 

presented at the trial, we will not attempt to parse the factual basis for W.V.’s 

dental injuries or causation in discussing whether the information at sentencing 

was inaccurate. Instead, the record reflects that the State did not present 

information about W.V.’s teeth during its sentencing recommendation and the 

circuit court did not reference or rely upon information about W.V.’s dental 

injuries in its sentencing remarks. We conclude that Hill has failed to show that 

the circuit court had actual reliance on inaccurate information about W.V.’s dental 

injuries for sentencing purposes and this claim fails. 

¶25 Third, Hill argues that information about injuries to W.V.’s ankle 

was inaccurate. Similar to the teeth claim, the factual basis of any ankle injury is 

not before us. While there was trial testimony about an ankle injury, neither the 

State nor the circuit court referenced W.V.’s ankle in the sentencing hearing. 

Even if we assume that inaccurate information was presented at trial, we conclude 

that Hill has failed to show that the circuit court had actual reliance on inaccurate 

information about W.V.’s ankle when it sentenced him. This claim fails.
No. 2022AP1633-CR

12

¶26 Fourth, Hill argues that the circuit court relied on inaccurate 

information that the CSF leak was caused by the assault. Unlike the teeth or ankle

injuries, the circuit court did consider the CSF leak and expressed concern that

“[s]pinal fluid is coming out of a human being’s ear.” The court’s remarks were in 

the context of the seriousness of the offense and the five days that W.V. spent in 

the hospital having spinal fluid drained. The trial testimony referenced W.V. 

having injuries including a TBI, facial lacerations, a broken nose, a broken jaw, 

and a misaligned skull. There was no testimony about how serious a CSF leak is, 

but there is ample support in the record that W.V. was treated for the CSF leak 

while hospitalized after the assault, and there were no objections or contrary 

testimony presented indicating that the treatment was coincidental. Hill did not 

object to the assault as the cause of injuries to W.V.’s head and it is disingenuous 

to attempt to differentiate or challenge the CSF leak and treatment for sentencing 

only. We conclude that Hill has failed to prove an actual reliance on inaccurate 

information about the CSF leak at sentencing. This claim fails. 

¶27 Finally, Hill asserts that the court relied upon inaccurate information 

that W.V. was “near death.” The court’s sentencing comments showed that it 

considered this assault to have been extreme—it stated that W.V. had not been 

“roughed up” or “hit hard,” but she was hit so hard “she came close to death.” 

Although Hill argues that it was not accurate to consider W.V. near death, we 

understand the court’s remarks to express how severe this beating appeared based 

on the evidence at trial, which included the body camera footage of the blood on 

the walls and floor where W.V. was found, the officer’s testimony that W.V. was 

not responsive when police arrived, the medical records that detailed numerous, 

painful injuries, and W.V.’s testimony of memory loss. “Near death” was not a 

diagnosis in the medical records; rather, it was the circuit court’s inference from 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

13

the facts presented and the court’s opinion on how severe this assault was. Hill 

has failed to show this opinion was based on inaccurate information.

¶28 Moreover, the circuit court instructed the jury on the elements of 

first-degree reckless injury, for which the jury rendered a guilty verdict. One 

element was that Hill caused “[g]reat bodily harm” to W.V, which was defined as 

“injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious 

permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or other serious bodily 

injury.” Although Hill testified that he thought he “must have did [sic] something 

right because nobody died” and argued that someone would have to die for him to 

have “total disregard for human life,” the jury’s verdict shows it found he caused 

great bodily harm to W.V. As Hill has not challenged the sufficiency of the 

evidence for his conviction, Hill now makes a distinction without a difference to 

claim that W.V. was injured by this assault, but not “near death.” In light of the 

entire record, we conclude that the circuit court did not actually rely on inaccurate 

information about the severity of W.V.’s injuries. 

¶29 Our examination of the record shows that the circuit court was 

seriously disturbed by the violence of this beating and relied on the medical 

records to show that W.V. suffered extreme pain and several head injuries. The 

court’s sentencing objectives reflected first the seriousness of the offense and the 

gravity of W.V.’s injuries. The court considered Hill’s character, expressing 

concerns for Hill attacking a person he had known for decades; for hurting Z.V., 

who was by all accounts an innocent bystander even in Hill’s defense theory; his 

lack of maturity and insight into his own behavior; his anger; and his lack of 

improvement despite a previous five-year prison term. The court was concerned 

about protecting society and wanted Hill to understand the importance of 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

14

respecting human life. The record reflects that the court considered the 

appropriate objectives and assigned the weight of each objective within its 

discretion. State v. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 

76.

¶30 We conclude that Hill fails to satisfy his burden to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that inaccurate information was presented to the circuit court 

at sentencing and that the court relied upon this information. Coffee, 389 Wis. 2d 

627, ¶38. Accordingly, Hill’s constitutional right to due process was not violated. 

Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶9. He is not entitled to resentencing and his 

postconviction claim fails. 

¶31 For similar reasons, we reject Hill’s claim that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance for failing to object to inaccurate information at trial.8 To 

succeed on his ineffectiveness claim, Hill’s motion for postconviction relief must 

satisfy the familiar two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): deficient performance and 

prejudice to the defense from that performance. This court does not need to 

address both prongs if the defendant fails to make a showing on one of them. Id.

at 697. 

¶32 To make a showing of prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Therefore, for 

 

8

 Hill offers the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to pre-emptively respond to the 

idea that Hill waived his inaccurate information at sentencing claim by not objecting 

contemporaneously. We do not interpret the State as arguing waiver, and we addressed the 

sentencing claim on the merits above. 
No. 2022AP1633-CR

15

Hill’s claim to succeed, he would need to show that if counsel had objected to the 

allegedly inaccurate information, there would be a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome. 

¶33 Here, the prejudice inquiry is intertwined with the inaccurate 

sentencing claim. See Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶¶38-39. As we concluded 

above, Hill’s claims were either not based on inaccurate information or the circuit 

court did not rely on that information. We conclude that Hill has failed to make a 

showing of prejudice because he cannot show the resulting sentence would likely 

have been different. Without a showing of prejudice, we need not address whether 

trial counsel’s performance was deficient and Hill’s ineffectiveness claim fails. 

Id., ¶40.

¶34 Finally, we conclude that the circuit court acted within its discretion 

to deny Hill’s postconviction motion without a hearing. See State v. Ruffin, 2022 

WI 34, ¶28, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432. The record conclusively 

demonstrates that Hill was not entitled to postconviction relief. State v. Jackson, 

2023 WI 3, ¶8, 405 Wis. 2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608. 

CONCLUSION

¶35 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Hill’s resentencing 

claim fails. We affirm the judgment and postconviction order. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.