IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11624

ERIC C. DARDEN, as Administrator of the Estate of Jermaine Darden and 

on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries of the Estate of Jermaine Darden 

(which are Donneika Goodacre-Darden, surviving mother of Jermaine 

Darden, Charles H. Darden, surviving father of Jermaine Darden, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:15-CV-221

Before SOUTHWICK, GRAVES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case arises from the death of Jermaine Darden, who suffered a heart 

attack and died while being arrested by police officers employed by the City of 

Fort Worth. Mr. Darden’s estate sued, alleging that the officers used excessive 

force and that the City was liable for failing to adequately train the officers. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 24, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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With respect to the failure-to-train claim, the district court granted summary 

judgment in the City’s favor. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2013, a large team of heavily armed police officers executed 

a no-knock warrant on a private residence in Fort Worth, Texas. Darden v. City 

of Fort Worth, Tex., 880 F.3d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 2018). Officer W. F. Snow was 

assigned to the entry team, which was tasked with breaking down the front 

door, entering the residence, and securing the premises. Id. Officer Javier 

Romero drove the van that transported the team to the residence, but was also 

assigned to stand guard near the front door while other officers entered the 

residence and arrested the people inside. Id. Two other members of the team 

wore cameras on their helmets, which captured on video some, but not all, of 

the events that transpired as the warrant was executed. Id. 

When the police first arrived at the house, the entry team broke down 

the front door with a battering ram, yelled that they were police, and ordered 

everyone to get down. Id. A man, later identified as Jermaine Darden (“Mr. 

Darden”), was kneeling on the seat of a couch near the door when the officers 

entered, and he immediately raised his hands in the air. Id. Mr. Darden 

weighed approximately 340 pounds. Id. As Officer Snow entered the residence, 

he reached out and ripped the shirt off Mr. Darden’s back, apparently in an 

attempt to get Mr. Darden from the couch to the ground. Id. The videos do not 

show what happened during the twenty-five seconds that followed, and there 

is conflicting testimony about what transpired. Id. at 725–26. Officer Snow 

twice used a Taser on Mr. Darden, who at one point appeared to push himself 

up on his hands. Id. at 726. Other people in the house repeatedly yelled, “He’s 

got asthma,” and, “He can’t breathe.” Eyewitnesses also testified that Mr. 

Darden told the officers he could not breathe and that he pushed himself up on 

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his hands because he was trying to get into a position where he could breathe.

Id.; id. at 726 n.3. 

As Officer Romero finished placing handcuffs on Mr. Darden, Mr. 

Darden’s body went limp. Id. at 726. The officers then pulled Mr. Darden’s 

debilitated body up into a sitting position and left him there. Id. Mr. Darden 

appeared to be unconscious, and his head hung down on his chest. Id. It was 

subsequently determined that Mr. Darden had suffered a heart attack and 

died. Id. 

The administrator of Mr. Darden’s estate (“Plaintiff-Appellant”) brought 

suit under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming (1) that Officers Snow and Romero 

used excessive force in arresting Mr. Darden; (2) that the City of Fort Worth 

(“the City”) was liable for failing to adequately train the officers; and (3) that 

various defendants were liable for state-law torts. Id. at 727. All of the 

defendants filed motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted 

those motions and dismissed the case. Darden, 880 F.3d at 727. The district 

court determined that the officers had not violated clearly established law and 

were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Because it held that the officers 

had not violated Mr. Darden’s constitutional rights, the district court also 

granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the municipal liability 

claims. Id. 

The administrator of Mr. Darden’s estate appealed to this court, which

reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Officers Snow and 

Romero. Id. at 734. The panel also vacated the dismissal of the claims against 

the City, remanding the case for further proceedings. Id. On remand, the 

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district court again granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the 

estate’s municipal liability claims.1 This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a summary judgment de novo, ‘using the same standard as 

that employed by the district court under Rule 56.’” Newman v. Guedry, 703 

F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kerstetter v. Pac. Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 

435 (5th Cir. 2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. DISCUSSION

Only one question is before this court: did the district court err in 

granting the City summary judgment on Plaintiff-Appellant’s municipal 

liability claim? We conclude that it did not.

A municipality may be liable under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 

1983”) if the municipality itself “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or 

‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 

563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monnell v. New York City Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). But local governments are only responsible for “their 

own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665–83). “In limited circumstances, a local government’s 

decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating 

citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government policy” for 

purposes of Section 1983. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. However, “[a] municipality’s 

1 The district court also found that the City was entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff-Appellant’s state law claims. Plaintiff-Appellant did not address those claims in his 

appellate briefing. They are therefore forfeited. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (“An appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on 

appeal.”); Davis v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“Claims not 

pressed on appeal are deemed abandoned.”)

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culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns 

on a failure to train.” Id. (citing Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–23 

(1985)). When such a claim is made, “the focus must be on adequacy of the 

training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform.” 

Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting City of Canton, 

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). 

Here, Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the City provided inadequate 

training regarding the proper use of no-knock warrants, Tasers, and excessive 

and deadly force. In order to succeed at this stage, the City must show that 

there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact regarding (1) whether there 

was an inadequacy in the City’s training policy; (2) whether the City was 

deliberately indifferent in its adoption of that policy; or (3) whether the 

inadequate training policy directly caused the constitutional violation 

allegedly suffered by Mr. Darden. See, e.g., Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 

F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010); Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161,

170 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Plaintiff-Appellant does not argue a pattern of similar constitutional 

violations. Instead, it relies on the single-incident exception to that rule. As 

such, the City must show that there is no genuine dispute as to whether the 

constitutional violation allegedly suffered by Mr. Darden was the “highly 

predictable” consequence of the City’s failure to train the officers in its ZeroTolerance Unit. See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010). 

It has met that burden. 

The City proffered, and the district court relied on, several “General 

Orders” governing police practices that were in place on the day of Mr. 

Darden’s death. Those orders largely restate applicable law regarding the use 

of force. While the existence of such policies is not dispositive, “[w]e consider 

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compliance with state requirements as a factor counseling against a ‘failure to 

train’ finding.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 171. 

Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to evade the import of the City’s existing 

policies by emphasizing that its allegations are specific to the City’s ZeroTolerance Unit, which specializes in serving search warrants and conducting 

searches of residences, including “dynamic entries” and no-knock warrants. 

Plaintiff-Appellant offered evidence, in the form of an affidavit by Dallas 

Independent School District Police Chief Craig Miller,2 that “[n]othing can 

potentially be more dangerous than making a Dynamic Entry into a location” 

about which officers have “very little information.” The City, PlaintiffAppellant emphasizes, offered no evidence that members of the Unit receive 

training on the use of excessive force and Tasers in the context of dynamic 

entries. 

However, “a plaintiff must allege with specificity how a particular 

training program is defective.” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 

(5th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff-Appellant’s general position is that the City failed to 

provide any training specific to the use of excessive force and Tasers in the 

context of no-knock entries. But it has not identified—in its briefing, at oral 

argument, or in post-argument supplemental briefing—how such training 

would differ from the existing training on using excessive force and Tasers.3

Even Chief Miller, in his affidavit, neglected to address this issue. Indeed, he 

offered the conclusory statement that “a lack of adequate training [was] a 

2 Prior to being employed by the Dallas Independent School District, Mr. Miller served 

as the Deputy Chief of the Crimes Against Persons Division of the Dallas Police Department. 

Mr. Miller also served as the Homicide Unit Commander. 

3 Plaintiff-Appellant emphasizes that the City “was supposed to provide the members 

of this unit with a ‘briefing sheet’ in order to ‘make sure that all of the pertinent information 

is communicated to everybody that’s involved,’” but that no such information was provided. 

This argument is unhelpful to Plaintiff-Appellant, as it suggests that the City did have an 

official policy of providing briefing sheets before no-knock entries.

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significant part of the reason [the officers] utilized more force than the 

situation required” and opined that (1) “there were alternatives to conducting 

a dynamic entry search warrant,” (2) the Zero Tolerance Unit “made entry into 

a location without proper intelligence and ultimately caused the death of 

Jermaine Darden,” and (3) “nothing can potentially be more dangerous than 

making a dynamic entry into a location where, according to the briefing sheet, 

they had very little information.” 

Given this gap in Plaintiff-Appellant’s allegations and summary 

judgment evidence, we conclude that the City is entitled to summary judgment. 

It has shown that—in this case, given the evidence now before the court—there

is no genuine dispute as to a material fact regarding whether there was an 

inadequacy in the City’s training policy.4

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the 

City on Plaintiff-Appellant’s municipal liability claims is AFFIRMED.

4 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff-Appellant’s failure-to-train claim includes not 

just a failure-to-train on the use of excessive force and Tasers, but also a failure-to train-on 

rendering medical aid. That claim was largely ignored by the district court, and it is unclear 

whether or not it was adequately pled. (The operative complaint alleges only that the City 

“failed to implement and/or enforce policies, practices, and procedures for the Fort Worth 

Police Department that respected Jermaine Darden’s constitutional rights to assistance, 

protection, and equal treatment under the law”; that the City is responsible for “assuring 

safety for all citizens of the City of Fort Worth”; that Mr. Darden told Officers Snow and 

Romero that he could not breathe but that his pleas were ignored; that Mr. Darden “was not 

provided with medical attention and sat unresponsive for at least 15 minutes before Medstar 

arrived”; and that the City “failed to implement and/or enforce the policies, procedures, and 

practices necessary to provide constitutionally adequate protection and assistance to [Mr.] 

Darden during his struggle to survive and implemented policies, procedures and practices 

which actually interfered with or prevented [Mr.] Darden from receiving the protection, 

assistance, and care he deserved.”) But resolving that question is unnecessary. At no point 

did Plaintiff-Appellant offer any evidence regarding how the City’s training on rendering 

medical aid is defective. That claim, like the others, therefore fails.

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