64994 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

or defense on or before January 16,

2002.

ADDRESSES: The materials will be made

available to the public at the National

Archives at College Park research room,

located at 8601 Adelphi Road, College

Park, Maryland, beginning at 8:45 a.m.

on February 28, 2002.

In accordance with 36 CFR 1275.44,

petitions asserting a legal or

constitutional right or privilege which

would prevent or limit access must be

sent to the Archivist of the United

States, National Archives at College

Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park,

Maryland 20740–6001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl

Weissenbach, Director, Nixon

Presidential Materials Staff, 301–713–

6950.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NARA is

proposing to open approximately 4,125

conversations which were recorded at

the Nixon White House from January

1972 to June 1972. These tape segments

total approximately 425 hours of

listening time. In addition, the National

Archives is proposing to open 360

declassified segments of conversations

recorded in the Cabinet Room at the

Nixon White House from February

1971—July 1973. These segments total

approximately 69 hours of listening

time. These previously restricted

segments were reviewed for release and

declassified in accordance with the

mandatory review provisions of

Executive Order 12958 and 36 CFR

1275.56 (Public Access Regulations.).

This is the ninth opening of Nixon

White House tapes since 1980. Previous

releases included conversations

constituting ‘‘abuses of governmental

power’’ and conversations recorded in

the Cabinet Room of the Nixon White

House. The tapes now being proposed

for opening consist of the third of five

segments comprising the remaining

hours of conversations, processed for

release in chronological order starting

with February 1971.

There are no transcripts for these

tapes. Tape logs, prepared by NARA, are

offered for public access as a finding aid

to the tape segments and a guide for the

listener. There is a separate tape log

entry for each segment of conversation

released. Self-service copying of the

tapes will be permitted. Researchers

must bring their own recording

equipment and blank tapes. Each tape

log entry includes the names of

participants; date, time, and location of

the conversation; and an outline of the

content of the conversation.

The tape recordings will be made

available to the general public in the

research room at 8601 Adelphi Road,

College Park, Maryland, Monday

through Friday between 8:45 a.m. and

4:30 p.m. Researchers must have a

NARA researcher card, which they may

obtain when they arrive at the facility.

Listening stations will be available for

public use on a first come, first served

basis. NARA reserves the right to limit

listening time in response to heavy

demand. Copies of the tape log will be

available for a fee in accordance with 36

CFR 1258.12.

Dated: December 11, 2001.

John W. Carlin,

Archivist of the United States.

[FR Doc. 01–30983 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7515–01–U

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278]

Exelon Generation Company, LLC,

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Peach Bottom

Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3;

Exemption

1.0 Background

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

(Exelon) and PSEG Nuclear LLC (the

licensees) are the holders of Facility

Operating Licenses Nos. DPR–44 and

DPR–56, which authorize operation of

the Peach Bottom Atomic Power

Station, Units 2 and 3 (Peach Bottom or

the facilities). The licenses provide,

among other things, that the facilities

are subject to all rules, regulations, and

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

now or hereafter in effect.

The facilities consist of two boiling

water reactors located at the licensees’

site in York County, Pennsylvania.

2.0 Request/Action

Section III.F of Appendix R to Title 10

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10

CFR), part 50, requires that automatic

fire detection systems (capable of

operating with or without offsite power)

be installed in all areas of the plant that

contain or present an exposure fire

hazard to safety-related or safe

shutdown systems or components. By

letter dated June 15, 2001, Exelon

requested an exemption from Section

III.F of Appendix R regarding the

provisions for an automatic fire

detection capability in room 222, a Unit

2 feedwater heater room in the turbine

building, and room 429, the Unit 2 and

Unit 3 turbine generator hall in the

turbine building.

3.0 Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)

the exemptions are authorized by law,

will not present an undue risk to public

health or safety, and are consistent with

the common defense and security; and

(2) when special circumstances are

present. Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),

special circumstances are present when

application of the regulation in the

particular circumstances would not

serve the underlying purpose of the rule

or is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule. The

underlying purpose of the rule is to

reasonably assure the capability to

achieve and maintain safe shutdown in

the event of a fire.

The NRC staff examined Exelon’s

rationale to support the exemption

request and concluded that

notwithstanding the absence of an

automatic fire detection system in

rooms 222 and 429, given the

circumstances discussed below, the

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix R, section III.F would still be

met with respect to those rooms.

Room 222

Room 222 is a feedwater heater room

located in the Unit 2 turbine building on

elevation 135. Exelon has determined

that the only safe shutdown or safetyrelated systems or components located

in this room susceptible to fire damage

are circuits associated with offsite

power. This room has not been provided

with automatic fire detection in

accordance with the provisions

specified in section III.F of Appendix R.

The fire hazards in this room consist

solely of electrical cables located in

three cable trays that are, or will be

provided with metal covers. There are

no transient combustibles stored in this

area during plant operation. When hot

work is performed in this room, a

continuous fire watch is stationed in the

room. The cables located in the trays are

either qualified in accordance with the

flame test provisions specified in

Institute of Electrical and Electronics

Engineers (IEEE) Standard 383,

‘‘Standard for Type Test of Class 1E

Electric Cables, Field Splices, and

Connections for Nuclear Power

Generating Stations,’’ or qualified to a

flame test equivalent to the one adopted

by IEEE–383. There are no fire

protection systems or features provided

in this room. Due to the high radiation

field present in this area during plant

operation, this room is normally locked

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 64995

with restricted personnel access. The

cable associated with offsite power is

routed in a cable tray which passes

vertically through the room along the

north wall. This cable tray (2BV080) is

separated from the other cable trays

(2BV070 & 2BV090) by a minimum

horizontal distance of 24 inches. Exelon

has determined that the failure of the

cables in this room will not adversely

impact the availability of offsite power

to the 4kV safeguard switchgear

required to achieve and maintain safe

shutdown following a fire event. Exelon

has determined that the only

combustibles located in this room

consist of a limited quantity of cables

qualified in accordance with the criteria

specified in IEEE 383 or a test

equivalent to that specified in IEEE 383.

Cables qualified in accordance with the

provisions specified in IEEE–383 are

less susceptible to self-ignition or

ignition from an external source and

have a lower flame spread than nonqualified cables. These qualified cables

also remain operable at a higher

temperature than non-qualified cables.

In the event of a fire involving the

adjacent cable trays (2BV070 & 2BV090),

the spatial separation of the trays (24

inches to 96 inches) and the metal

covers provided on all the trays reduces

the potential for damage to the cables

located in tray 2BV080. The addition of

fire detection in this room would

provide little benefit for a self-ignited

cable fire in tray 2BV080, as damage

would likely occur prior to the response

of the plant fire brigade. In the event

that damage does occur, either due to a

self-ignited cable fire in tray 2BV080 or

an exposure fire from the other trays

due to hot work, Exelon has determined

that an alternate offsite power supply to

the 4kV safeguard switchgear is

available and will remain free of fire

damage. The transfer from the #343–SU

offsite power located in room 222 to the

#2–SU offsite power is automatic;

therefore the transfer does not require

any additional operator actions. Hot

work performed in this area requires a

continuous fire watch, in accordance

with plant procedures, which can

provide for rapid detection of a fire in

this room and the prompt notification of

the plant fire brigade. Based on the lack

of significant fire hazards in this room

(IEEE–383 qualified cables only), the

separation of the cable trays in the

room, the enclosure of the cables in the

tray with metal covers, and the

restricted access during plant operation,

the NRC staff concludes that the lack of

fire detection in room 222 does not

present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, fire detection

specified by the rule is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of

Section III.F of Appendix R, and that the

NRC’s principles of defense-in-depth are

satisfied without the addition of fire

detection capability.

Room 429

Room 429 is located in the common

area of the Peach Bottom turbine

building, elevation 165, and Exelon has

determined that the only safe shutdown

and/or safety-related systems or

components located in this room

susceptible to fire damage are circuits

associated with the #343–SU offsite

power to the 4kV safeguard switchgear,

and reactor vessel pressure and level

instrumentation. This room has not

been provided with full area automatic

fire detection in accordance with the

provisions specified in Section III.F of

Appendix R. The fire hazards in this

area consist of turbine lube oil,

hydrogen used for generator cooling,

two maintenance office/shop structures,

electrical cabinets and cable trays. The

circuits associated with offsite power

are located in three conduits routed

along the west wall of room 429. Exelon

has determined that the circuits in this

room related to reactor vessel pressure

and level instrumentation identified in

a previous submittal dated December

31, 1998, as supplemented on January

14 and April 14, 2000, are ‘‘associated

circuits’’ as defined in Generic Letter

81–12, ‘‘Fire Protection Rule,’’ dated

February 20, 1981, and Exelon has

committed to perform an analysis to

ensure that the failure of these circuits

(i.e. hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts

to ground) will not adversely impact the

operation of the instrumentation

required to achieve and maintain safe

shutdown following a fire event. Exelon

has committed to make a physical plant

change if necessary to assure safe

shutdown capability following the

completion of the analysis. However,

the instrumentation circuits are not

within the scope of Section III.F of

Appendix R and thus are not being

assessed by the NRC staff in this

exemption request. Fire protection

systems and features in this room

include sprinkler protection on the

turbine bearings, smoke detection over

each turbine bearing lift pump,

hydrogen pressure monitoring, and

sprinkler systems in the maintenance

office and shops. The conduits

containing the offsite power cables are

located at least 30 feet horizontally from

the significant fire hazards in this room.

Exelon has determined that in the event

that fire damages the conduits located in

this room, a separate offsite power

source is available to achieve and

maintain safe shutdown. The conduits

of interest in this area are adjacent to the

entrance to the main control room and

this is a high-traffic area for plant

personnel. Due to the personnel passing

through, a fire would not go undetected

for very long. The spatial separation of

over 30 feet from the conduits to the

significant fire hazards present in this

room, the high ceilings and large

volume above the turbine operating

floor, the fire protection provided on the

significant hazards present in this room

(i.e. turbine bearings, lift pumps,

offices/shops and hydrogen system),

and the high-personnel traffic through

the area provide reasonable assurance

that a fire that has the potential to

damage the conduits associated with

offsite power located on the west wall

will be detected by the existing fire

protection systems, or plant personnel

prior to damaging the offsite power

cables. The existing fire suppression

systems in conjunction with the plant

fire brigade should be effective in

controlling and extinguishing fires prior

to damage occurring to the conduits

located on the west wall of room 429.

In the event that the existing fire

suppression systems, or the plant fire

brigade is not able to prevent damage to

the conduits containing the cables

related to offsite power, Exelon has

determined that an alternate offsite

power supply to the 4kV safeguard

switchgear is available and will remain

free of fire damage. The transfer from

the #343–SU offsite power located in

room 429, to the #2–SU offsite power is

automatic; therefore the transfer does

not require any additional operator

actions. Therefore, based on the

information provided by Exelon, the

NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) additional fire

detection in room 429 is not necessary

to achieve the underlying purpose of

section III.F of Appendix R, the NRC’s

principles of defense-in-depth are

satisfied without the addition of full

area fire detection capability, and the

lack of full area fire detection in room

429 does not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety.

4.0 Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12, the exemption is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. Also, special

circumstances are present in that

application of the regulation in the

particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. Therefore, the

64996 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

Commission hereby grants Exelon an

exemption from the requirements of 10

CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.F,

for rooms 222 and 429, for Peach

Bottom Units 2 and 3, with the

provision that metal covers are installed

on all cable trays in room 222.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (66 FR 50696).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John A. Zwolinski,

Director, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–30968 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–272]

PSEG Nuclear LLC; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. DPR–

70, issued to PSEG Nuclear LLC (the

licensee), for operation of the Salem

Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1

(Salem Unit 1), located in Salem

County, New Jersey.

The proposed amendment would

allow a one-time change to the

Technical Specification (TS) Action

Statement for the Service Water System

(SWS). The proposed change would

revise TS 3/4.7.4, ‘‘Service Water

System,’’ by increasing the allowed

outage time for one nuclear header out

of service from 72 hours to 10 days. The

proposed amendment would modify the

present Action Statement for TS 3.7.4.1,

to include a note that would allow

operation with only the 11 SWS loop for

up to 10 days. This note would be

applicable for one-time use during

Salem Unit 1, Cycle 15.

The licensee has requested that this

amendment be approved under exigent

circumstances. On November 30, 2001,

PSEG operations personnel noted water

rising up through the gravel in front of

the Service Water intake structure. The

water was located approximately 5 feet

from the building. The 12 SWS nuclear

header is located below the location

where the water was observed, and was

considered to be a likely source of the

leak.

The licensee subsequently determined

that the leak is associated with the 12

SWS nuclear supply header. PSEG is

currently postulating that the leak is

coming from an underground

mechanical joint or mechanical

connection associated with the buried

portion of the 12 SWS nuclear supply

header located near the service water

structure. In the area where the leak is

suspected, the service water nuclear

supply header is 24’’ nominal diameter

buried piping. This piping design is prestressed concrete cylindrical water pipe,

which uses either standard flanged

fittings, or flexible tied extensible bell

bolt type joints for the major

connections.

While the 12 SWS nuclear supply

header is currently considered operable,

PSEG believes that repairs will be

required before the next scheduled

refueling outage. Approval of this

license amendment request under

exigent circumstances would allow the

licensee to repair the leaking header

during more advantageous weather and

river water temperature conditions.

This, in turn, would likely minimize the

duration that the 12 SWS header would

be inoperable.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for

amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff

must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards

consideration. Under the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means

that operation of the facility in

accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated?

Response: No.

The Service Water System (SWS) will

remain capable of performing its required

safety function. The proposed change results

in an insignificant increase in the

incremental conditional core damage

probability and so does not involve a

significant increase in the probability of an

accident. The proposed change to extend the

allowed outage time from 72 hours to 10 days

does not significantly increase consequences

of an accident previously evaluated, since the

capability of SWS is maintained.

Therefore, the proposed change will not

significantly increase the probability or

consequences of any accident previously

evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

analyzed?

Response: No.

The completion of the maintenance

activity, the post maintenance testing, and

the surveillance testing associated with

demonstrating OPERABILITY of 12 service

water nuclear header will not result in the

plant being operated in a manner that will

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any previously

evaluated. While repair to the buried portion

of the 12 service water nuclear header is in

progress, the service water system will be

operated as described in the Updated Final

Safety Analysis Report. This configuration

does not create a new failure mechanism,

malfunction or accident initiator.

Therefore, the proposed change will not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any previously

evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The 11 service water nuclear header will

remain operational and capable of

performing its required safety functions.

Sufficient safety-related equipment and

systems will remain available to ensure that

the consequences of design basis transients

and accidents are mitigated as assumed in

the Salem UFSAR. Preventive maintenance

activities that could adversely affect the

reliability of the Unit 1 service water system,

Emergency Diesel Generators, 4kv vital buses

or offsite A.C. electrical power sources will

be controlled during the extended allowed

outage time.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 14 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the