Affirm and Opinion Filed August 16, 2013 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-00518-CR 

CHRISTOPHER THOMAS BASINGER, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court 

Rockwall County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2-11-386 

OPINION ON REHEARING 

Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Myers 

Opinion by Justice FitzGerald 

 Appellant filed a motion for rehearing. The Court overrules appellant’s motion for 

rehearing. On the Court’s own motion, we withdraw our opinion issued July 3, 2013 and vacate 

our judgment of that date. The following is now the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance — cocaine, and the trial 

court assessed punishment at three years’ deferred adjudication. In a single issue on appeal, 

appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his admission 

that there was cocaine in his vehicle and the cocaine that was seized were tainted fruits of an 

illegal detention. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s 

motion to suppress. 
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BACKGROUND 

 On March 30, 2011, Officer Bruce Richardson with the Rowlett Police Department was 

on bicycle patrol in a residential neighborhood. Officer Richardson testified that there had been 

several arsons in the area that were being investigated and frequent burglaries of vehicles that 

occurred late at night. Conducting his patrol of the neighborhood on a bike allowed Officer 

Richardson to patrol more effectively because a bike is more “stealthy” than a car. 

 At around 2:00 a.m., Officer Richardson was patrolling a residential alleyway and 

noticed a red pickup truck parked in the “rear entry drive of a residence.” Officer Richardson 

observed someone moving around in the cab of the truck. The individual, who was later 

identified as appellant, was leaning over into the passenger compartment and reaching behind the 

passenger side front seat. The garage door of the residence and the doors to the truck were 

closed. Because of the time of day and his knowledge of the fact that most of the neighborhood 

residents tended to be asleep at that time, the officer suspected criminal activity. Officer 

Richardson monitored the truck for about ninety seconds. He either contacted dispatch to begin 

checking the license plate as he observed the truck or as he approached the truck. Then, appellant 

exited the vehicle and the officer made contact with him at the door of the truck, or the officer 

made contact with appellant while he was still seated in the truck.1

 When appellant exited, the 

officer made contact with appellant and identified himself as a police officer. Almost 

immediately upon contact with appellant, the officer detected an odor of alcohol on appellant’s 

breath and person. Officer Richardson asked appellant his name and if he had consumed alcohol. 

Appellant stated that he had consumed two drinks and volunteered that there were additional 

containers of alcohol in the vehicle that belonged to a friend of his. Appellant had a “youthful 

 1

 There is some discrepancy in the record as to these particular facts. 
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appearance,” and a computer check verified that he was a minor. The officer then inquired as to 

whether appellant had anything else in the vehicle the officer needed to know about. Appellant 

initially responded in the negative. 

 After conversing with appellant at the door of the truck, the officer requested that 

appellant sit on the tailgate. The officer asked appellant if he could search the vehicle and 

appellant consented. Then, before the officer conducted the search, appellant told the officer that 

there was a small bag of cocaine in the truck. Officer Richardson searched the truck and 

retrieved a small bag of what was later identified as cocaine. Appellant was arrested for 

possession of a controlled substance, and Officer Richardson made arrangements for him to be 

transported to the police station. 

 Defense counsel moved to suppress evidence of the controlled substance discovered in 

appellant’s vehicle. Specifically, counsel argued that the arrest, search, and seizure were without 

probable cause and therefore all of the evidence seized should be excluded. At the hearing on the 

motion to suppress, the State did not dispute that appellant’s arrest was made without a warrant. 

When the hearing concluded, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and made written 

findings of fact and conclusion of law, including an express finding that Officer Richardson was 

credible. It is from the denial of the motion to suppress that appellant now appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

 In a single issue on appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress. The essence of appellant’s argument is that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to 

detain him. Therefore, according to appellant, his consent to search is the tainted fruit of an 

illegal detention. Appellant further asserts that his admission that there was cocaine in the car is 

the “tainted fruit of the tainted consent.” We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument. 
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In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard 

of review. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v.

State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although we give almost total deference to 

the trial court’s determination of historical facts, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s 

application of the law to those facts. Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. 

All purely legal questions are reviewed de novo, including the application of the law of search 

and seizure. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

At the suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and exclusive judge of 

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. St. George v. State, 

237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997). Unless the trial court abuses its discretion by making a finding unsupported by the 

record, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and will not disturb them on appeal. State v. 

Johnson, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

We begin our inquiry by examining whether the record supports the conclusion that 

Officer Richardson had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant. The Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution protect individuals 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; 

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008). An officer may conduct a brief investigative detention, or Terry stop, when he has 

reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is involved in criminal activity. Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Ford v. State, 158 

S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An investigative detention allows a law enforcement 

officer to detain a person for a period of time only long enough for the law enforcement officer 
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to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 

227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

Because an investigative detention is a seizure that implicates the United States and 

Texas constitutions, the detention must be reasonable. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 9. To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we conduct the inquiry 

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio: (1) whether the officer’s action 

was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that initially justified the interference. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20; Davis v. State, 47 

S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

Under the first part of the inquiry, an officer’s reasonable suspicion justifies an 

investigative detention. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242–43. Specifically, the officer must have a 

reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary is occurring or has occurred. Id. at 

244 (citing Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). An officer has 

reasonable suspicion to detain a person if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude the person detained 

is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 674 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This is an objective standard. Id. A detention that is not based on 

reasonable suspicion is not reasonable, and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment. See Davis, 

977 S.W.2d at 243. 

 Under the second part of the inquiry, the “investigative stop can last no longer than 

necessary to effect the purpose of the stop.” Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). The issue is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 

likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 

the defendant.” Id. at 64–65 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1985)). 
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The reasonableness of the temporary detention is examined based on the totality of the 

circumstances, and an officer must point to specific articulable facts that, when combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, lead him to reasonably suspect that a specific person has 

engaged, or soon would engage, in criminal activity. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2001). 

Here, it is important to note at the outset that the officer did not initiate a stop of 

appellant’s vehicle. Regardless of whether the officer requested that appellant exit the vehicle or 

he exited of his own accord, it is undisputed that the vehicle was parked in the driveway and the 

engine was not running. A police officer approaching a parked vehicle does not constitute a 

seizure and need not be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Merideth v. State, 

603 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Priddy, 321 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d). Moreover, law enforcement officers are permitted to approach 

individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to ask questions or even to request a 

search. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983); State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 

678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

Appellant insists that after the officer initially approached him to investigate a potential 

burglary of a motor vehicle, continued detention was unlawful because it exceeded the time 

necessary to verify the ownership of the motor vehicle. But it is well established that further 

detention is permissible if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See James v. State, 

102 S.W.3d 162, 173 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). 

Although the officer’s suspicions were initially aroused because of the lateness of the 

hour, recent crime in the area, and appellant’s movements in the parked truck, when the officer 

made contact with appellant he immediately detected the odor of alcohol on appellant’s breath 

and person and observed that appellant had a youthful appearance. Appellant admitted he had 
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consumed alcohol and that there was alcohol in the vehicle. At that point, the officer had 

reasonable suspicion to detain appellant to investigate the possession and consumption of alcohol 

by a minor. See Elias, 339 S.W.3d at 667 (stating reasonable suspicion consists of specific 

articulable facts combined with inferences about those facts). A computer search confirmed that 

appellant was a minor. Based on these facts, the trial court found that the officer’s further 

detention of appellant was reasonable. We agree. 

 Appellant also argues “to the extent the initial detention . . . was illegal,” the State was 

also required to demonstrate that the “taint” of the illegal stop had dissipated by the time 

appellant consented to the search. Because we have concluded that the initial detention was not 

illegal, there is no taint to be considered.2

 And there is nothing in the record to suggest that 

appellant’s consent to search was not voluntary. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, a search is unreasonable when conducted without a 

warrant or probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, (1973). A search 

conducted pursuant to consent, however, is specifically excepted from this general rule. Id.

Whether a person’s consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined in each 

case from the totality of the circumstances of the particular situation. Meekins v. State, 340 

S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000). The ultimate question to be determined is whether the individual’s will has been 

overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, such that his consent to 

search must have been involuntary. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976), (quoting 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). 

 2

 For the same reason, we reject appellant’s argument that his admission that there was cocaine in the vehicle was “tainted fruit of the 

tainted consent.” 
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In the present case, the record reflects only that the officer requested consent to search the 

truck and appellant agreed. There is nothing to suggest that appellant’s capacity for selfdetermination was impaired or that the consent was not voluntary. 

 Because the record reflects that the investigative detention was based on specific and 

articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warranted the intrusion, and because appellant’s consent to search was freely and voluntarily 

given, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s issues are 

overruled. 

CONCLUSION 

Having resolved all of appellant’s issues against him, we affirm the trial court’s order 

denying appellant’s motion to suppress. 

 

DO NOT PUBLISH 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

120518HF.U05 

 

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/ 

KERRY P. FITZGERALD 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CHRISTOPHER THOMAS BASINGER, 

Appellant 

No. 05-12-00518-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District 

Court, Rockwall County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2-11-386. 

Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald. 

Justices Bridges and Myers participating. 

 The Court overrules appellant’s motion for rehearing. On the Court’s own motion, we 

withdraw the opinion and vacate the judgment of July 3, 2013. This is now the judgment of the 

Court. 

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered August 16, 2013 

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/ 

KERRY P. FITZGERALD 

JUSTICE