RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5569-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THERESA MULLEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Argued September 30, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Haas, Mawla, and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal No. 

2017-23.

Theresa Mullen, appellant, argued the cause pro se 

(Russell M. Woods and Susan B. McCrea, on the 

briefs).

Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 14, 2020
2

A-5569-17T4

On February 10, 2017, a parish priest at The Church of Saint Theresa in 

Kenilworth filed a municipal complaint against defendant, charging her with the 

petty disorderly persons offense of defiant trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). The 

Assignment Judge transferred the matter to the Law Division.

Following a two-day bench trial, the judge rendered a detailed written 

decision on February 28, 2018, finding defendant guilty of defiant trespass. At 

sentencing, the judge ordered defendant to pay $558 in fines and court costs. 

On July 12, 2018, the judge denied defendant's motion for a new trial. 

Defendant's subsequent notice of appeal to this court was limited to the 

July 12, 2018 order denying her motion for a new trial. Over sixteen months 

later, defendant filed a motion with this court to set aside the verdict based on 

allegedly new video evidence. On February 24, 2020, we remanded the matter 

to the trial judge to review the evidence and determine whether the guilty verdict 

should be reconsidered. On March 30, 2020, the judge entered an order and 

statement of reasons denying the motion to reconsider the prior verdict. 

Defendant did not file an amended notice of appeal challenging this decision.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
3

A-5569-17T4

POINT I

THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT THIS 

CASE WAS FILED AND PROSECUTED FOR AN 

IMPROPER PURPOSE AND THAT THE TRIAL 

COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE 

ATTORNEY IN THE PENDING CIVIL LITIGATION 

TO HAVE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE CITIZEN[']S 

COMPLAINT WHICH IS AGAINST THE RULES OF 

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 

THEREFORE THE CHARGE MUST BE 

DISMISSED. (Not raised below).

POINT II

THE TRIAL [JUDGE'S] ACTIONS, WORDS, AND 

WRITTEN OPINION PUBLISHED ON THE 

JUDICIARY WEBSITE CLEARLY 

DEMONSTRATE[] THAT: 1) HE WAS BIASED 

AGAINST [DEFENDANT]; 2) HE USED WORDS TO 

DE[S]CRIBE HER CONDUCT THAT ARE 

ENTIRELY UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; 

AND, 3) HE IGNORED EXCULPATORY 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS GUILTY FINDING. 

(Not raised below).

POINT III

THE CLAUSE AT ISSUE IN THE [SAINT THERESA 

SCHOOL (STS)] HANDBOOK IS 

UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW 

BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE, VIOLATIVE 

OF THE EQUAL ACCESS RIGHT UNDER THE 

CONSTITUTION AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY 

AND THEREFORE THE CHARGES AGAINST 

[DEFENDANT] MUST BE DISMISSED.
4

A-5569-17T4

POINT IV

THE STS HANDBOOK CLAUSE FAILS TO 

ADDRESS EXPULSION, THE EXPULSION OF S.P. 

AND K.P. VIOLATES NEW JERSEY LAW AND 

THE SUDDEN EXPULSION OF S.P. AND K.P. AND 

IMMEDIATE THREATS OF TRESPASS VIOLATED 

[DEFENDANT'S] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND 

THE CHARGES MUST BE DISMISSED AS A 

MATTER OF LAW.

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE 

SUBPOENA OF [MONSIGNOR] NYDEGGER WHO 

SUBMITTED A CERTIFICATION IN THE CIVIL 

LAWSUIT THAT THE ARCHDIOCESE AND STS 

WERE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ENTITIES 

WHICH WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED TO THE 

TRIAL COURT THAT THE ARCHDIOCESE DID 

NOT HAVE ANY LEGAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE 

THE EXPULSION DECISION OR TO TELL 

[DEFENDANT] SHE HAD TO LEAVE THE 

PREMISES[.] THEREFORE THE TRESPASS 

CHARGES SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS A 

MATTER OF LAW.

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON STATE V. 

BRENNAN[, 344 N.J. SUPER. 136 (APP. DIV. 2001)]

TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION WAS IN ERROR.

POINT VII

THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED ON 

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 

NECESSITY[,] N.J.S.A. 2C:3-2 (Not raised below).
5

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POINT VIII

THE ELEMENTS OF DEFIANT TRESPASS WERE 

NOT SATISFIED BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT.

After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, 

we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

I.

Defendant and her husband, Scott Phillips, are the parents of two

daughters, S.P. and K.P.,1 who attended STS in the Archdiocese of Newark 

(Archdiocese).2 In December 2016, Phillips filed a complaint seeking injunctive 

relief on behalf of S.P. and B.P. against STS and the Archdiocese. Phillips 

alleged that STS improperly addressed S.P.'s complaints concerning bullying by 

other students, wrongfully prevented B.P. from being named the eighth grade 

class valedictorian when he attended the school,

3

and refused to allow S.P. to 

play on the boys' basketball team after the girls' team was unable to field a squad.

1

 We use initials to identify the children in order to protect their privacy.

2

 Defendant and Phillips' son, B.P., previously attended the school.

3

 When the complaint was filed, B.P. was already attending high school.
6

A-5569-17T4

By filing this complaint against STS, Phillips violated a provision in the 

school's handbook, which stated that "[i]f a parent implicates [STS] in a legal 

matter, or names [STS] as a defendant in a civil matter, the parent/guardian will 

be requested to remove their children immediately from the school." Phillips 

previously signed a receipt for the STS handbook in which he acknowledged 

that he had read and understood all of its provisions and that it was "binding on 

the students and parents during the current academic year."

On February 1, 2017, the Archdiocese Superintendent of Schools sent a 

letter to defendant and Phillips citing the provision of the handbook permitting 

the removal of the children from the school based on Phillips' lawsuit. The letter 

advised defendant and Phillips that "[b]ased upon your ongoing lawsuit against 

[STS], pursuant to this provision of the [h]andbook[,] you are hereby requested 

to remove [S.P. and K.P.] from the school immediately." Defendant received 

the letter at her home on the evening of February 1, 2017.

"[T]o avoid any confusion" as to the intent of the letter, the attorney for 

the Archdiocese and STS also emailed the letter to Phillips' attorney, who 

forwarded the email to defendant and her husband. Defendant reviewed the 

email on the evening of February 1. The email plainly stated that "neither [S.P. 

nor K.P.] should be coming to [STS] tomorrow morning or any day thereafter."
7

A-5569-17T4

That same night, the principal of STS, Deacon Joseph Caparoso, notified 

the parish priest, Father Joseph Bejgrowicz, that he should come to the school 

on February 2, 2017 to lend support in the event that defendant and her husband 

ignored the Superintendent's directive. In turn, Father Bejgrowicz reached out 

to Police Chief John Zimmerman to apprise him of the situation. Chief 

Zimmerman assigned Detective James Grady and the school's resource officer, 

Brian Piktin, to go to the school when it opened on February 2.

On February 2, Detective Grady and Officer Piktin met with Deacon

Caparoso and Father Bejgrowicz, who advised the officers that defendant, her 

husband, and the children were not permitted on the property. At approximately 

8:00 a.m., the group observed defendant, Phillips, and their two children 

approaching the rear-door of the school from the parking lot. The principal and 

the priest returned to the office.

Detective Grady spoke to defendant. Defendant stated that she wanted to 

speak with the administration about the situation. The detective conveyed that 

message to Deacon Caparoso, who stated that defendant could come to the 

office. By that time, Phillips had left STS because he had to take B.P. to his 

high school.
8

A-5569-17T4

Defendant went into the office with Deacon Caparoso, Father Bejgrowicz, 

and the assistant parish priest, Father Vincent D'Agostino. By that time, Chief 

Zimmerman had also arrived at the school office to "try[] to keep the peace." 

Detective Grady and Officer Piktin remained outside the office with the two 

children.

Shortly before the meeting in the office started, defendant began videorecording the individuals she encountered with her cell phone. This recording 

began at 8:09 a.m.

Once defendant entered the office, Deacon Caparoso read her the 

following statement that had been drafted by the Archdiocese's and the school's 

attorney:

After consulting with the counsel for the 

Archdiocese, we understand that you refuse to 

withdraw the children from the school as you've been 

requested to do pursuant to the student handbook that 

you signed on August the 16th, 2016. Therefore, the 

children are expelled. You must leave the premises 

immediately. If you refuse to comply, then you'll be 

considered trespassing.

Instead of leaving as she had been directed, defendant responded:

Then you guys can bring criminal charges against 

us, because . . . I didn't sign that, but [Phillips] had to 

take my son to school, so . . . . I want to be clear, this is 

being recorded. So everything that everybody says is 

recorded. That's fine. I will not -- the handbook says 
9

A-5569-17T4

that we can be requested to leave the school. We're 

denying that request. So if the police want to arrest me 

and my children for trespassing, they can go ahead and 

do that. Without a court order, I'm not leaving these 

premises and my children are not leaving the premises.

Defendant continued to refuse to leave the school, and stated:

So if the Archdiocese wants to say that we're 

trespassing, they are in their rights. If St. Theresa's 

wants to sign a complaint that I'm trespassing and my 

children are trespassing and my husband is trespassing, 

then I guess St. Theresa's can do that. But I'm not 

leaving here, and my children aren't leaving here. So if 

that's the way St. Theresa's wants to go, then that's the 

way St. Theresa's wants to go.

Father D'Agostino attempted to reason with defendant by stating that she 

should permit the attorneys for the two parties to discuss the matter or let Phillips 

address it after defendant replied she did not have her own attorney because she 

was not a party to the civil lawsuit her husband had brought against the 

Archdiocese and STS. Defendant rejected these overtures.

At that point, Father D'Agostino asked defendant to leave the office so 

that he and the other school and parish officials could contact their attorney. 

Defendant went into the hallway outside the office. She stopped videorecording her interactions. It was then 8:33 a.m.

After contacting their attorney, the school and parish administrators again 

advised defendant that she had to leave the building. She refused. When Chief 
10 A-5569-17T4

Zimmerman told defendant that Deacon Caparoso and Father Bejgrowicz said 

she was not welcome at the school, defendant replied that "she would not leave 

unless she was handcuffed and forced to leave the premises." Defendant also 

stated "that she wouldn't leave unless a criminal complaint was signed." Chief 

Zimmerman spoke to Father Bejgrowicz, who agreed to file a written complaint 

against defendant for defiant trespass. Chief Zimmerman's account was 

corroborated by Deacon Caparoso, Father Bejgrowicz, Father D'Agostino, and 

Detective Grady. 

Chief Zimmerman told defendant he was reluctant to arrest and handcuff 

her in front of her children. Chief Zimmerman explained:

[W]e were kind of handling everybody with ki[d] 

gloves, because we know everybody personally. I 

wouldn't have been there for an hour and ten minutes, 

or an hour. Somebody else would probably, 

unfortunately would have been arrested much sooner 

and dragged out of there. But I didn't think that was the 

right thing to do and I was trying to keep the peace.

However, because defendant was not leaving voluntarily, Chief Zimmerman 

called for an uniformed officer to come to the school to remove defendant. It 

was now 8:47 a.m.

Officer Sean Kaverick arrived at the school a few minutes later. He briefly 

conferred with Chief Zimmerman and the two other officers in the lobby, and 
11 A-5569-17T4

then went to speak to defendant who was in the hallway between the office and 

the gym. Officer Kaverick told defendant that she had to leave the premises. 

Defendant "didn't want to leave" and asked Officer Kaverick to "basically put 

the handcuffs on her if you're going to take me out."

Officer Kaverick did not want to handcuff defendant in front of the 

children, and continued to ask her to walk outside with him. Defendant 

remained in the hallway for approximately five more minutes. Finally, 

defendant accompanied the officer to the front door stairs outside the school, but 

she refused to leave the property.

 At that point, Phillips returned to the school. Officer Kaverick went out 

to meet him as he approached the school, and asked for his assistance in getting 

he and his wife "to leave peacefully." Officer Kaverick told Phillips that he did 

not want to handcuff defendant in front of the children, and Phillips "agreed with 

[him]."

By that time, defendant had begun video-recording again, but this 

recording only lasted approximately one minute. The recording reveals that one 

of the parish officials told Phillips that he was trespassing and had to leave. As 

Phillips began to argue with Father D'Agostino, defendant told him to "[s]top it" 
12 A-5569-17T4

and the recording ended. Defendant left the school with Phillips shortly after 

9:00 a.m., over an hour after she arrived there.4

Defendant testified on her own behalf and her account differed greatly 

from the other witnesses. Defendant asserted that she was not bound by the 

handbook because only Phillips had signed the receipt for it. She also claimed 

that because the handbook stated that parents would be "requested to remove 

their children immediately from the school" in the event of violation, she was 

free to "deny" the request and bring the children to the school.

Defendant testified that she stopped video-recording the events when she 

left the office at 8:33 a.m. Contrary to the testimony of the other witnesses, 

defendant stated she went outside of the school at that time to call Phillips, and 

remained outside of the school until Phillips returned. She did not testify that 

she spoke again with Chief Zimmerman, Father Bejgrowicz, or anyone else after 

4

 In the afternoon of February 2, 2017, Phillips filed an emergent motion in his 

civil action against the Archdiocese and STS seeking to have S.P. and K.P. 

returned to the school. The trial court denied this motion but, the next day, we 

granted Phillips' emergent motion for a stay of the expulsion. While the stay 

was still in place, the Archdiocese and STS rescinded the expulsion on February 

15, 2017.

 
13 A-5569-17T4

she left the building. Defendant also testified that she "never had any 

conversation with Officer Kaverick."5

In his thorough written decision, the judge found that defendant's 

testimony at trial was "incredible." Instead, he credited the testimony of the 

State's witnesses that defendant steadfastly refused to leave the school after 

being told by three police officers, the school principal, and two parish priests 

to do so. The judge found that the accounts of these witnesses was fully 

corroborated by the video-recording that defendant made of the first part of their 

meeting in the school office, which bolstered their credibility as to what 

transpired after the parish officials contacted their attorney.

The judge was particularly impressed with the credibility of Officer 

Kaverick, who testified that he encountered defendant in the hallway and asked 

her to leave. Defendant refused to do so unless she was handcuffed. She 

remained inside the school for another five minutes before reluctantly exiting.

Defendant was not able to overcome the "chasm" that existed between her 

testimony and that provided by Officer Kaverick. The judge found that 

defendant "was combative and evasive on the stand, and her statements about 

her understanding of the letter and the import of the signed acknowledgment 

5

 Defendant did not call any other witnesses at the trial.
14 A-5569-17T4

further undermine[d] her credibility." In this regard, the judge found that by 

claiming she could "deny" the school's "request" to withdraw the children from 

the school, defendant had "engaged in grammatical and linguistic gymnastics in 

an attempt to minimize and disregard the clear import and language of the 

communication[s]" made to her by the Archdiocese and its attorney. The judge 

also ruled that Phillips' signature on the handbook receipt plainly bound both 

parents to follow its directives. 

Citing N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b), the judge noted that in order to sustain a 

conviction for defiant trespass, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that defendant knew she was "not licensed or privileged" to enter or remain at 

the school in the face of the "[a]ctual communication" given to her. After 

reviewing all of the evidence, the judge concluded that the State met this burden 

based upon the Archdiocese's February 1, 2017 letter; the email the 

Archdiocese's attorney sent to Phillips' lawyer that was forwarded to defendant 

and Phillips on that same date; and the repeated demands of the principal, the 

two priests, and the three police officers that defendant leave the school. When 

defendant failed to accede to these requests, she violated N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b).

Defendant thereafter filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 7:10-1. She 

raised three issues as a basis for a new trial: vindictive prosecution, entrapment, 
15 A-5569-17T4

and a failure to establish the elements of trespass. After hearing oral argument, 

the judge considered and rejected each of these contentions in a concise oral 

opinion. 

The judge reiterated his conclusion that defendant "was not credible at all" 

during her trial testimony, and noted that she presented no evidence to support 

her claim that Father Bejgrowicz filed the complaint against her in an attempt to 

gain leverage over Phillips in the civil lawsuit, or that the Archdiocese's lawyer 

had improperly participated in the criminal proceedings. The judge also found 

that defendant had not been entrapped into going to the school on February 2, 

2017, and then remaining there after being repeatedly told she was trespassing. 

Instead, defendant made the decision to go to, and remain at, the school in 

defiance of the Archdiocese's and the school's directives. Finally, the judge 

again found that the credible evidence presented at the trial fully supported his 

conclusion that defendant committed defiant trespass in violation of N.J.S.A. 

2C:18-3(b).

As noted above, defendant more recently filed a motion to vacate the 

conviction based on new video evidence. We remanded the matter to the trial 

judge who, after reviewing the evidence, found there was no basis to alter his 

prior conclusions. 
16 A-5569-17T4

In a detailed statement of reasons, the judge found that the allegedly new 

evidence consisted of five items: (1) "a video showing the Mullen family 

arriving at the school on the day in question" in which "you can see the defendant 

asserting the position that she would not accede to the Diocese's 'request' that 

her children not attend the school"; (2) "a series of photographs"; (3) "a very 

short video that is unintelligible"; (4) "a video discussing the defendant's son's 

potential for being late to his school"; and (5) "a conversation between the 

defendant and her husband [that] shows the husband entering his vehicle." The 

videos were taken by Phillips on February 2, 2017 at the school. 

Although "these videos were available to the defendant at the time of the 

trial and not presented," the judge ruled "that none of the newly proffered 

material warrants a reconsideration of the court's initial decision." The judge 

further explained that he based his findings on the conversations that occurred 

between defendant and the school and parish officials, and that the recordings 

"shed no light on what transpired therein." This evidence also did not contradict 

Officer Kaverick's "clear and unequivocal testimony." Therefore, the judge 

denied defendant's motion to reconsider the verdict.
17 A-5569-17T4

II.

We begin by addressing defendant's argument in Point VIII that the State 

failed to prove the elements of defiant trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. Our 

review of a judge's verdict following a bench trial is limited. The standard is 

not whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, but rather 

"whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's 

determination." State in the Interest of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. 

Div. 1995). 

Moreover, we are obliged to "give deference to those findings of the trial 

judge which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the 

witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 

42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. 

v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of 

N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).
18 A-5569-17T4

Similarly, the judge's decision to deny defendant's motion for a new trial 

is subject to a deferential standard of review. Rule 7:10-1 provides that 

municipal courts may "grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest 

of justice."6 "[A] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of 

the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on 

appeal unless a clear abuse has been shown." State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 

295, 306 (App. Div. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russo, 333 

N.J. Super. 119, 137 (App. Div. 2000)). Appellate courts "are restricted to the 

test of 'whether the findings made [by the trial court] could reasonably have been 

reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" Russo, 333 N.J. 

Super. at 140 (alteration in original) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 472).

Applying these standards, we are satisfied there is ample evidence in the 

record to support the judge's conclusion that defendant was guilty of defiant 

trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). As the judge found, defendant knew she 

was not welcome at the school when she received the Archdiocese's letter and 

the email from her attorney on February 1. As soon as she entered the meeting 

6

 It is undisputed that the motion was governed by Rule 7:10-1, because the 

petty disorderly defiant trespass charge had been transferred to the Law Division 

due to a conflict of interest.
19 A-5569-17T4

with Deacon Caparoso in the school office, he clearly told her that she had to 

leave or she would be "considered trespassing." 

At that point, defendant's own video-recording confirms that she 

immediately told the officials that they could "bring criminal charges against" 

her, but she was not going to leave the premises. After the officials spoke to 

their attorney, they again repeatedly directed defendant to exit the property, and 

she consistently refused. Finally, Officer Kaverick was able to persuade 

defendant to go outside rather than be arrested and handcuffed in front of her 

children. 

Thus, the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew 

she had no right to be at the school, yet she remained there without any license 

or privilege to do so. That is all that is required to support a conviction under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). State v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 136, 143-44 (App. Div. 

2001). Therefore, we reject defendant's contention on this point.

III.

In Point VI, defendant argues that the judge erred by relying upon our 

decision in Brennan in his written decision. This argument also lacks merit. 

The judge cited Brennan at the beginning of his opinion and stated that it 

"establishe[d] the parameters in evaluating the evidence in this case to determine 
20 A-5569-17T4

whether [defendant] was guilty of violating the law." In Brennan, the defendant 

attended a public town council meeting and was allotted three minutes of 

speaking time to address his concerns. Id. at 139. However, he refused to sit 

down when his time expired. Ibid. The mayor warned the defendant that if he 

did not sit down, the police would be called. Ibid. The defendant again refused 

to leave, and the mayor summoned the police. Id. at 139-40. The police arrested 

the defendant after he declined to leave when they directed him to do so. Id. at 

146. Under these circumstances, the defendant was convicted of defiant 

trespass. Id. at 138.

On appeal, we found that the State satisfied all of the elements of N.J.S.A. 

2C:18-3(b), and we affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 146. We held 

that once the defendant was ordered to leave the premises by the police, he "had 

no discretion to disobey that direction." Ibid. We found that although the 

defendant was lawfully on the premises at first, his privilege to remain was later 

revoked. Ibid.

Defendant asserts that the court's reasoning in Brennan does not apply in 

this case because, unlike the defendant in Brennan, she was not arrested on the

property, but rather left "voluntarily." However, this is a distinction without a 

difference. 
21 A-5569-17T4

Nothing in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b) or in Brennan requires that the defendant 

be arrested in order to sustain a conviction. Moreover, the police were poised 

to arrest defendant when she continually refused to leave the school, but they 

were hesitant to do so in front of her children. After Father Bejgrowicz stated 

that he would file a written complaint against defendant, the police no longer 

needed to arrest her on the scene. Although defendant again demanded that she 

be handcuffed, Officer Kaverick was ultimately able to persuade her to go 

outside and later exit the property. Under these circumstances, the judge 

correctly found defendant guilty of defiant trespass. 

IV.

In Point VII, defendant alleges for the first time on appeal that her actions 

were justified by the "doctrine of necessity." We disagree.

"The 'necessity' defense is based on public policy." State v. Romano, 355 

N.J. Super. 21, 29 (App. Div. 2002). "Conduct that would otherwise be criminal 

is justified if the evil avoided is greater than that sought to be avoided by the 

law defining the offense committed, or, conversely, if the conduct promotes 

some value higher than the value of compliance with the law." State v. Tate, 

102 N.J. 64, 73 (1986).
22 A-5569-17T4

This doctrine cannot be applied under the circumstances presented in the 

case at hand. Here, defendant baldly asserts that she had a "legal" and "moral 

obligation" to ensure that S.P. and K.P. attended school and, therefore, she was 

obligated to go to the school and remain there until the children were readmitted. 

However, it was certainly not necessary for defendant to trespass on 

school property in order to achieve that goal. Defendant's husband already had 

a pending lawsuit against the Archdiocese and the school, and his attorney was 

therefore able to file an application on February 2 to require the Archdiocese 

and STS to allow the children to return to class. While that application was

unsuccessful, we granted Phillips' emergent application for a stay of the 

expulsion order the very next day. Thus, defendant's conduct was not justified 

by the defense of necessity.

V.

Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

extended discussion in a written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the 

following brief comments.

In Points III and IV, defendant claims that the provisions of the STS 

handbook that led to the expulsion of the children from the school were 

unenforceable and "violated [her] due process rights." However, the handbook 
23 A-5569-17T4

was not the basis for the criminal trespass charge in this case. Rather, defendant 

violated N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b) when she refused to leave the school premises after 

the school principal, the parish administrators, and three police officers directed 

her to do so. Because defendant had no license or privilege to remain on the 

property under those circumstances, the judge properly convicted her of defiant 

trespass under the statute.

In Point V, defendant argues that the judge erred by quashing a subpoena 

she sought to serve on Monsignor Thomas Nydegger, the Vicar General of the 

Archdiocese. Again, we disagree. 

Monsignor Nydegger was not present at STS on February 2, 2017, and he 

had no personal knowledge of what transpired there on that date. Nevertheless, 

defendant alleged that the monsignor would be able to provide testimony on the 

issue of whether the Archdiocese, rather than STS, had the authority to expel 

the children. 

However, as the judge found in quashing the subpoena, that issue was not 

germane to the criminal proceedings, especially since the school's principal, 

Deacon Caparoso, told defendant that she was not welcome on the school 

premises as soon as she entered the office that day. Therefore, we discern no 

basis for disturbing the judge's decision.
24 A-5569-17T4

In Point I, defendant argues for the first time that the Archdiocese's and 

STS's attorney (the civil attorney) unethically took "an active role" in the 

criminal case. This argument is groundless.

On July 20, 2017, the civil attorney appeared at a public pre-trial hearing 

as an observer in the audience. The judge invited him to participate after 

defendant's attorney indicated that he would like to attempt to pursue an out-ofcourt resolution of the matter. After a brief on-the-record discussion between 

the attorneys, the prosecutor, and the judge, no agreement was reached. 

At a subsequent hearing on August 14, 2017, the civil attorney was again 

present to observe, and the judge again invited him to discuss a possible 

resolution of the case. The civil attorney could not commit to anything because 

the parties were scheduled to receive the judge's verdict in the civil case later 

that day, and the attorney stated he was just there "to listen." On August 14, 

defendant's attorney also confirmed on the record that he had no objection to the 

civil attorney speaking at the hearing.7 As the prosecutor made clear throughout 

7

 Defendant's appellate appendix contains a copy of a draft of a "general release" 

under which defendant and Phillips would release any claims they might have 

against the Archdiocese and STS in the civil action in return for Father 

Bejgrowicz withdrawing his criminal complaint. This unsigned document was 

not introduced as an exhibit at trial, and there is nothing in the appellate record 

that explains the circumstances under which it was drafted or circulated. 
25 A-5569-17T4

the two conferences, he was solely responsible for the prosecution of the 

complaint against defendant. Under those circumstances, we reject defendant's 

newly minted assertions.

We also reject the arguments defendant improperly raises for the first time 

in her reply brief8that the video recordings she submitted in support of her 

motion to vacate her conviction proved that the judge's verdict was incorrect. 

Although we granted defendant's motion to supplement the record on appeal to 

include the videos and the trial judge's order and opinion, defendant did not 

amend her notice of appeal to challenge the judge's denial of her motion to set 

aside the verdict. "It is a fundamental [principle] of appellate practice that we 

only have jurisdiction to review orders that have been appealed to us." State v. 

Rambo, 401 N.J. Super. 506, 520 (App. Div. 2008). "[O]nly the judgment or 

orders designated in the notice of appeal . . . are subject to the appeal process 

and review." 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 

456, 459 (App. Div. 2004). Therefore, this order is not properly before us. 

Therefore, to the extent defendant attempts to rely on this document in support 

of her claims, those arguments plainly lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

8

 See L.J. Zucca, Inc. v. Allen Bros. Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 434 N.J. Super. 

60, 87 (App. Div. 2014) (holding that "[a]n appellant may not raise new 

contentions for the first time in a reply brief"). 
26 A-5569-17T4

In any event, we discern no basis for disturbing the judge's March 30, 

2020 order and accompanying statement of reasons. Contrary to defendant's 

claim in her reply brief, these videos were not "newly discovered." Indeed, 

defendant's attorney submitted a brief to the trial judge on March 17, 2020, that 

confirmed that "[t]hese recordings were made by Scott Phillips, [defendant's] 

husband, on the date [i]n question, February 2, 2017." And, as the judge found, 

the videos provided nothing that contradicted the credible testimony presented 

by the State's witnesses, or rehabilitated the "incredible" account provided by 

defendant.

Finally, defendant argues for the first time on appeal in Point II that the 

trial judge was "biased against" her because he told the civil attorney to "send 

his regards" to a partner at the attorney's law firm, advised the parties that he 

was familiar with the civil proceedings between Phillips and the school from 

reading a newspaper, and posted his decision on the Judiciary's website in order 

"to embarrass" her. Defendant also asserts that the judge had to be biased 

against her because he allegedly ignored exculpatory evidence in order to 

convict her.

We have canvassed the entire record in reviewing defendant's contentions 

on this point. Based upon this review, we conclude that the judge accorded 
27 A-5569-17T4

defendant a full opportunity to present evidence and arguments in support of her 

claims and explained the basis for each of his rulings in extensive detail. The 

judge treated defendant and her attorney in a respectful manner throughout the 

proceedings before him.

Appellate courts review legal arguments addressed to claimed errors by 

trial judges. Criticism of trial judges who made rulings adverse to the party 

filing an appeal do not constitute proper appellate argument. A party's 

contention that a trial judge was unfair or biased "cannot be inferred from 

adverse rulings against a party." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 

(App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted). Defendant lodged no complaint concerning 

the judge's handling of this matter until after she was unsuccessful at trial. 

Under these circumstances, we reject defendant's unsupported contentions of 

bias on the part of the judge.

To the extent that any of defendant's remaining contentions are not 

specifically addressed herein, we have concluded that they lack sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.