UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Michael R. LIGHTSEY

Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

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On Remand from

the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Decided 30 April 2018

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Military Judge: Marvin W. Tubbs II.

Approved sentence: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 30 months, 

and reduction to E-1. Sentence adjudged 7 January 2015 by GCM convened at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. 

For Appellant: Major Patricia Encarnación Miranda, USAF; Philip D. 

Cave, Esquire.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Kubler, USAF; Lieutenant 

Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before HARDING, SPERANZA, and HUYGEN, Appellate Military 

Judges.

Senior Judge HARDING delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

Judges SPERANZA and HUYGEN joined.

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This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

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United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

2

HARDING, Senior Judge:

Appellant was charged with abusive sexual contact of three patients under 

his care when he worked as a medical technician at Joint Base San AntonioLackland, Texas. Appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a military 

judge sitting alone as a general court-martial of two specifications of abusive 

sexual contact involving a single victim in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. § 920. The military judge acquitted Appellant of the specifications of 

abusive sexual contact involving the two other patients. The approved sentence 

consisted of a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 30 months, and reduction to E-1.

In Appellant’s initial appeal to this court, we affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851, 2017 CCA LEXIS 17 (A.F. 

Ct. Crim. App. 10 Jan. 2017) (unpub. op.) (Lightsey I). The United States Court 

of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) granted review on the issue of whether 

this court erred when we held: (1) that the military judge’s use of charged conduct for propensity purposes was not constitutional error; and (2) even if it was 

constitutional error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In United 

States v. Lightsey, 76 M.J. 439 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (mem.) (Lightsey II), CAAF 

granted the petition, set aside our prior decision, and remanded the case to this 

court for further consideration in light of United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 

(C.A.A.F. 2017). Following our superior court’s holdings in United States v. 

Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016), Hukill, and United States v. Guardado, 77 

M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2017), we conclude the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and we thus set aside the convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND 

Appellant was a medical technician who worked in the Wilford Hall Post 

Anesthesia Care Unit (PACU), Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. Captain (Capt) KH, the victim for the specifications of which Appellant was convicted, had dental surgery at Wilford Hall. Capt KH was sedated for the surgery and, after the operation, she awoke in the PACU wearing only a loosefitting hospital gown that tied in the back. In order to monitor her recovery 

from anesthesia, electrocardiogram (EKG) leads had been placed above and 

below her breasts as well as on her hips. Appellant was one of the medical 

technicians attending to Capt KH in the PACU. 

Once Capt KH had recovered to a sufficient level of alertness, the attending 

staff prepared her for transfer to the same-day surgery ward. Although she 

was conscious, Capt KH’s eyes remained closed. As Appellant removed her 

EKG leads, he grazed her left breast in a way that Capt KH—who had five 

prior dental surgeries for which she was sedated and had EKG leads attached 
United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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near her breasts—described as “not normal for when you take a lead off.” Appellant then grabbed her left breast with his entire hand, pinched her nipple 

for a few seconds, and then did the same to her right breast. 

After Capt KH’s left breast was touched, she opened her eyes and saw about 

half of Appellant’s face. She described him as a Caucasian male with bushy 

eyebrows and brown hair who was wearing royal blue scrubs. He also wore a 

name tag with “A1C” rank and the name “Steigh or Stie” on it. Appellant then 

slid his two fingers towards Capt KH’s crotch, but she lifted her right side off 

the bed to get his hand off her. Appellant then wheeled her out of the PACU 

on a gurney to transport her to a room in the same-day surgery ward. While in 

the hallway, Appellant stopped the gurney and placed his hand under the blanket and penetrated her labia with one finger. 

When Capt KH arrived at the next room, her husband met her there, but 

she did not report the incident to him because she did not know how he would 

react. Approximately 20 minutes later, when her husband left for the pharmacy, Capt KH reported the incident to a civilian nurse and her doctor. Capt 

KH was not able to identify Appellant by name other than the partial description of his nametag. Based on the information provided by Capt KH, the nurse 

and doctor quickly deduced that Capt KH was describing Appellant. At trial, 

other witnesses testified that Appellant was an attending medical technician 

for Capt KH. This fact was further confirmed by the PACU logbook and a video 

depicting Appellant transferring Capt KH on a gurney from the PACU to the 

same-day surgery ward. 

The evidence that Appellant provided care to Capt KH in the PACU was 

overwhelming in both quantity and quality and unrebutted at trial. In sharp 

contrast, the evidence of the abusive sexual contact of Capt KH’s breasts and 

labia by Appellant consisted of the in-court testimony of Capt KH and her report of the sexual abuse within a half hour of its occurrence. Given that the 

reported sexual abuse took place as Capt KH was recovering from the effects 

of anesthesia and surgery, Appellant challenged both the reliability and accuracy of Capt KH’s account.

Based on Capt KH’s report of sexual abuse, the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations opened an investigation and contacted previous PACU patients 

to determine if they had experienced any inappropriate touching while being 

cared for in the PACU. The investigation led to the discovery of two additional 

patients, both civilians. One, Ms. MF, alleged Appellant caused her hand to 

touch his penis over his clothing and the other, Ms. DM, alleged Appellant 

grabbed her breasts while taking off her EKG leads.1

 

1 Appellant was acquitted of the offenses involving Ms. MF and Ms. DM.
United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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Prior to closing arguments in the judge-alone trial, the Defense moved under Military Rule of Evidence 413 to preclude the Government from arguing 

the evidence of one charged offense to prove another charged offense. When 

trial counsel was asked if he planned to make a propensity argument, he indicated he would.

So, under 413, I mean obviously what the rule is for is that [Appellant] has a propensity to sexually assault or to grab the 

[breasts] or touch the labia of women under his care in the 

PACU. That would be the first and foremost goal of arguing this 

and that fits squarely within the rule is he has a propensity to 

do this. Now, the other things that we’re going to offer it for, . . . 

the propensity to assault people when they are in the PACU, but 

it’s also to show the type of victim that he does go for.

The military judge, without benefit of the CAAF’s decisions in Hills and 

Hukill, analyzed all of the proffered evidence and concluded that a “jury could 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses occurred.” After employing the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test, he ultimately ruled that all evidence that had been challenged under Mil. R. Evid. 413 was admissible for 

“general propensity purposes and permissible for the trial counsel to argue as 

such.”2

Near the beginning of trial counsel’s closing argument, he asserted Appellant had a propensity to commit the charged offenses. When making this statement, trial counsel used a presentation slide including the words “Three instances = Propensity” projected on a screen in the courtroom. 

Let’s talk about something, what is this notion of propensity? 

What does that mean? The tendency or natural inclination to 

behave a certain way, which is not always negative, right, one 

can have a proclivity, a propensity to do something good. But, 

the issue here, Your Honor, is that’s not what we have. This accused has a propensity to satisfy his own personal perverted sexual desires by robbing his victims of their dignity and intruding 

on their personal privacy. This goes to the core of who he is and 

what he’s made of.

 

2 We note that the Government did not articulate limited non-propensity purposes for 

the evidence of the other charged offenses to prove identity, absence of mistake, or 

intent under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), nor did the military judge rule or otherwise indicate 

on the record that he would consider the evidence for those or other limited non-propensity purposes.
United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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Now, I discussed a moment ago, not one, not two, but three instances. One would be just chance, all right. Two, may be coincidence. But three, that is a pattern. That is propensity.

Trial counsel returned to the propensity argument as he addressed each of the 

charged offenses and again at the conclusion of his argument.

And, notwithstanding that, if we are talking about this propensity, this pattern, it is completely consistent with what you’ve 

heard throughout this case, this sort of perverted sexual desire 

with women who can’t react. Offensive touching, however slight, 

it is the same for essentially all of these specifications, Your 

Honor. But, it is offensive. Captain [KH] did not want this touching either, and there is no medical reason for that touch to be 

there. There is just no excuse.

This is about a picture, a three-dimensional picture of criminal 

propensity to do the same thing in the same way to women under 

his care. This picture is clear. This accused sexually assaulted 

these three women and is guilty of the charge and all four specifications.

II. DISCUSSION

In Lightsey I, unpub. op at *15, we concluded that the military judge committed evidentiary error by considering evidence of charged offenses for propensity. However, in reliance on the presumption that military judges know 

the law and follow it,3 we found no reason to believe that the military judge 

misapplied either the presumption of innocence or the burden of proof in assessing Appellant’s guilt. We thus assessed non-constitutional evidentiary error. We found the “case for the allegations involving Capt [KH] was very 

strong, especially considering the victim’s contemporaneous report of abuse.” 

Lightsey I, unpub. op at *13. Further, noting that the military judge acquitted 

Appellant of two of the specifications and acknowledged a clear understanding 

of spillover and its associated principles, we concluded the “propensity evidence was of marginal value and that the error did not have a substantial influence on the findings.” Id. at *15. Additionally we stated “even if we were to 

apply the stricter constitutional standard in the case, we would find the error 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

The use of charged-conduct evidence as Mil. R. Evid. 413 propensity evidence for other charged offenses creates constitutional concerns regardless of 

 

3 United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (citing United States v. 

Prevatte, 40 M.J. 396, 398 (C.M.A. 1994)).
United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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the forum. Hukill, 76 M.J. at 222. As such, the erroneous use of evidence in 

this case must be tested for prejudice under the standard of harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Id. The error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when 

the error did not contribute to the appellant’s conviction or sentence. Hills, 75 

M.J. at 357 (citation omitted). An error is not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt when there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction. Id. (citation omitted).

“There are circumstances where the evidence is overwhelming, so we can 

rest assured that an erroneous propensity instruction did not contribute to the 

verdict by “tipp[ing] the balance in the members’ ultimate determination.” 

Guardado, 77 M.J. at 94 (alteration in original) (quoting Hills, 75 M.J. at 358). 

In Guardado, the CAAF was “not convinced that the erroneous propensity instruction played no role” in the conviction. Id. at 95. The appellant in Guardado

was convicted, inter alia, of aggravated sexual contact of a child (his daughter),

but acquitted of wrongful sexual contact with an adult friend and the rape of a 

fellow soldier. The panel had been instructed by the military judge that they 

could use evidence of each offense to prove propensity to commit the other offenses. Even accepting the lower court’s finding that the child victim’s testimony was credible, the CAAF found that the lack of “supporting evidence” 

made it difficult to be certain the conviction rested on the strength of the evidence alone. Id at 94; cf. United States v. Moore, ___ M.J. ___, No. 17-0323/AR., 

2018 CAAF LEXIS 63 (C.A.A.F. 10 Jan. 2018) (mem.) (in Government’s case, 

which included compelling victim and eyewitness testimony, the evidence of 

Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming); United States v. Luna, No. 17-0495/MC., 

2018 CAAF LEXIS 65 (C.A.A.F. 10 Jan. 2018) (mem.) (evidence overwhelming 

where victim’s testimony was corroborated by witness testimony and incriminating text messages written by Appellant that implied he was at fault and 

could be jailed for his actions).

Additionally in Guardado, the CAAF explicitly rejected the argument that 

an acquittal of a charged offense necessarily means the evidence of that offense 

was not used for propensity.

It simply does not follow that because an individual was acquitted of a specification that evidence of that specification was not 

used as improper propensity evidence and therefore had no effect on the verdict. It is conceivable that the panel found that 

Appellant committed the other three charged offenses by a preponderance of the evidence but not beyond a reasonable doubt. 

While not persuaded of Appellant’s guilt to the point of convicting him, members could still have believed that it was more 

likely than not that Appellant sexually assaulted SW and CH 
United States v. Lightsey, No. ACM 38851 (rem)

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and used that evidence for propensity purposes, thus violating 

Appellant’s presumption of innocence.

77 M.J. at 94.

The holdings in Hukill and Guardado compel us to test Appellant’s case for 

constitutional error—whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt—and to do so regardless of the forum and without considering a partial 

acquittal as mitigating against the possible contribution of propensity evidence 

to the findings of guilty. In doing so we must also consider, especially in light 

of the trial counsel’s repeated reliance during closing argument on Appellant’s 

propensity to commit the offenses, whether Capt KH’s testimony and prior 

statement, however credible, constituted evidence so overwhelming that it removed any reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 

It did not. Even though we find Capt KH credible, her account about the sexual 

abuse described in her testimony and report lacked supporting evidence of the 

criminal sexual contact. Recognizing that the evidence of the other charged 

offenses provided independent corroboration of Capt KH’s account and readymade rebuttal to Appellant’s claim that she imagined the sexual abuse, we are 

“not convinced that the erroneous propensity instruction played no role in the 

conviction.” Guardado, 77 M.J. at 95. In such a case, we cannot be confident 

there is “no reasonable possibility” that propensity contributed to the verdict. 

Hukill, 76 M.J. at 222. 

III. CONCLUSION

The findings of guilt and the sentence are SET ASIDE. A rehearing is authorized. Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court