[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65005-65010]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30971]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-390]


Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance 
of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-90 issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) 
for operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1, located in 
Rhea County, Tennessee.
    The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications (TSs) 
to allow WBN to provide incore irradiation services for the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE). This change would allow TVA to insert up to 
2304 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods

[[Page 65006]]

(TPBARs) into the reactor core to support DOE in maintaining the 
nation's tritium inventory for national defense purposes. Each WBN core 
contains 193 fuel assemblies and each fuel assembly contains 264 fuel 
rods. In this amendment request, TVA proposes to insert up to 24 TPBARs 
in selected fuel assemblies (adjacent to but not in place of the 264 
fuel rods). The TPBARS absorb neutrons and are similar to (and would 
replace) normal burnable neutron absorber rods that serve to shape 
neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs contain no fissile material and 
will be installed in fuel assemblies where burnable absorber rods are 
normally placed in selected fuel assemblies. Therefore, the TPBARs 
would fill the same role as burnable absorber rods in the operation of 
the reactor. However, most of the neutron absorber (lithium) in the 
TPBARs still remains at the end of core life as compared to normal 
burnable neutron absorbers (boron or gadolinium). Therefore, the 
proposed license amendment involves increasing the required boron 
concentration for both the cold-leg accumulators (TS 3.5.1) and the 
refueling water storage tank (TS 3.5.4), removing the Region 2 burnup 
credit racks in the spent fuel pool and clarifying fuel storage 
restrictions (TSs 3.7.15 and 4.3.3), adding a limit on the number of 
TPBARs that can be irradiated (TS Section 4.2.1), and implementing a 
TPBAR consolidation activity. This submittal also provides proposed 
revisions to the associated TS Bases to modify the switchover time for 
containment sump to hot leg recirculation (TS B3.5.2) and to modify the 
hydrogen recombiner section to properly describe the possible sources 
of hydrogen gas (TS B3.6.7). The uranium-235 (U-235) enrichment of fuel 
assemblies containing TPBARs must be increased to no more than 4.95 
weight percent to compensate for the higher neutron absorbing 
properties of the lithium-7 in the TPBARs. The NRC has previously 
approved maximum U-235 fuel enrichments of 5.0 weight percent for WBN 
Unit 1. Five percent enrichment is the NRC's upper limit for reactor 
licensing. Therefore, enrichments resulting from the proposed amendment 
are bounded by the current WBN Operating License and licensing basis.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration in its application 
dated August 20, 2001, which is presented below:

    A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase

    The accumulator boron concentration does not affect any 
initiating event for accidents currently evaluated in the Updated 
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The increased concentrations 
will not adversely affect the performance of any system or component 
which is placed in contact with the accumulator water. The integrity 
and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator 
and affected Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components/systems 
will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and will 
not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E 
instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained since the 
lower sump pH, resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is 
still within the applicable equipment qualification limits. These 
limits are set to preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced 
stress corrosion cracking and assure that there is no significant 
degradation of polymer materials. The design, material and 
construction standards of all components which are placed in contact 
with the accumulator water remain unaffected. Therefore, the 
possibility [probability] of an accident has not been 
[significantly] increased.
    The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the 
UFSAR will not be [significantly] increased. The change in the 
concentrations increase the amount of boron in the sump during a 
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The increased boron in the sump is 
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Testing 
has indicated that TPBARs can experience cladding breach at Large 
Break LOCA (LBLOCA) conditions if the cladding temperature and 
internal pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently, 
the post-LOCA critical boron calculations account[ed] for the 
potential loss of a LiAlO<INF>2</INF> [lithium aluminate] pencil, as 
well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils. 
Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the 
tritium production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA. 
Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will 
be implemented in the plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). 
Thus, there will be no boron precipitation in the core following a 
LBLOCA.
    The only non-LOCA event that assumes accumulator actuation is 
the Major Rupture of a Main Steamline event, however, it assumes a 
minimum amount of boron. Furthermore, there is no impact on the SGTR 
[steam generator tube rupture] event since the accumulators are not 
assumed to be actuated, and the SLB [steam line break] M&E [mass and 
energy] release evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown 
margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration.
    In addition, the increase in accumulator boron concentrations 
and subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does 
not impact the LOCA dose evaluation since the analysis of record 
does not credit sump pH as an input or assumption regarding volatile 
iodine removal efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis remains 
bounding. Also, the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH 
has been evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate 
(and subsequent generation of Hydrogen) of Aluminum and Zinc inside 
containment. Further, the decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH 
has been evaluated to not affect the amount of hydrogen generated 
from the post-LOCA radiolytic decomposition of the sump and core 
solution. The likelihood of containment failure due to hydrogen 
deflagration is therefore not impacted by pH changes.
    In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed 
change will not [significantly] increase the radiological 
[probability or] consequences of an accident previously evaluated in 
the FSAR.

2. TS 3.5.4 and the Associated TS Bases Page--Refueling Water Storage 
Tank (RWST)--Boron Concentration Increase

    The RWST boron concentration does not affect any initiating 
event for accidents currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The increased 
concentration will not adversely affect the performance of any 
system or component which is placed in contact with the RWST water. 
The integrity and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the 
RWST and affected NSSS components/systems will be maintained. The 
decrease in solution pH is small and will not degrade the stainless 
steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and 
control equipment will be maintained since the lower sump pH, 
resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is still within 
the applicable equipment qualification limits. These limits are set 
to preclude the possibility of chloride[-induced stress corrosion 
cracking and assure that there is no significant degradation of 
polymer materials. The design, material and construction standards 
of all components which are placed in contact with the RWST water 
remain unaffected. Therefore, the probability of an accident has not 
changed.
    The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the 
UFSAR will not be [significantly] increased. The change in the 
concentrations increases the amount of

[[Page 65007]]

boron in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump 
is sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. This 
analysis assumes partial leaching. Testing has indicated that TPBARs 
can experience cladding breach at LBLOCA conditions if the cladding 
temperature and internal pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting 
values. Consequently, the post-LOCA critical boron calculations 
accounted for the potential loss of a LiAlO<SUP>2</SUP> pencil, as 
well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils. 
Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the 
tritium production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA. 
Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will 
be implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron 
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
    The Inadvertent Operation of Emergency Core Cooling System 
(ECCS) event is the only non-LOCA event which assumes the maximum 
RWST boron concentration, and an evaluation has shown that the 
proposed increase does not cause an adverse impact on this 
transient.
    The Steam Line Break (SLB) mass and energy (M&E) release 
evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown margin and assumes a 
minimum boron concentration. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
(SGTR) event, the increased boron concentration will help maintain 
adequate shutdown margin, which will be evaluated as part of the 
reload process.
    In addition, the increase in RWST boron concentrations and 
subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does not 
impact the LOCA dose evaluation. While higher pH helps maintain 
volatile iodine in solution and lower pH drives the equilibrium to 
favor volatile iodine in a gaseous state, the change in sump pH is 
not sufficient to result in any measurable change in post LOCA 
releases.
    Furthermore, current radiological analyses do not take credit 
for volatile iodine removal efficiencies based on sump pH. 
Therefore, since the change in pH is minimal, and no credit is taken 
in release analysis, the present analysis remains bounding. Also, 
the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been 
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and 
subsequent generation of Hydrogen) of Aluminum and Zinc inside 
containment and the present analysis remains bounding. Further, the 
decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated to not 
affect the amount of hydrogen generated from the radiolytic 
decomposition of the sump and core solution and therefore will not 
challenge containment integrity.
    In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed 
change will not [significantly] increase the radiological 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in 
the FSAR.

3. TS 3.7.15 and the Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent 
Fuel Assembly Storage

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in TS section 4.3.3 
are not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, there 
is no [significant] increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.

4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    The insertion of TPBARs into the WBN reactor core does not 
adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance; 
therefore, they do not significantly increase the probability of 
accidents or equipment malfunctions while in the reactor. The 
neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics that of standard burnable 
absorbers with only slight differences which are accommodated in the 
core design. The reload safety analysis performed for WBN Unit 1 
prior to each refueling cycle will confirm that any minor effects of 
TPBARS on the reload core will be within fuel design limits.
    As described in the [Department of Energy's] TPC [Tritium 
Production Core] Topical [Report, NDP-98-181, Revision 1], the TPBAR 
design is robust to all accident conditions except the large break 
LOCA where the rods are susceptible to failure. However, the failure 
of TPBARs has been determined to have an insignificant effect on the 
thermal hydraulic response of the core to this event, and analysis 
has shown that the core will remain subcritical following a LOCA.
    The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological consequences for all 
evaluated events are very small, and they remain within [well 
below]10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The additional offsite doses due 
to tritium are small with respect to LOCA source terms and are well 
within regulatory limits.
    The TPBAR could result in an increase in combustible gas 
released to the containment in a large break LOCA. This increase was 
found to be approximately 1474 scf [standard cubic feet] which 
remains within the capability of the recombiners.
    Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not expected to fail during 
Condition I through IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the 
UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation and operational 
transients, Condition II being faults of moderate frequency, 
Condition III being infrequent faults, and Condition IV being 
limiting faults]. TPBARs may fail during a LBLOCA or as a result of 
fuel handling accident. The radiological consequences of these 
events are [well] within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no 
significant increase in the [probability or] consequences of these 
previously evaluated accidents.

5. TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in this TS section 
are not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the 
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions. 
Therefore, since they are not installed, there is no [significant] 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

6. TS Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating

    Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and 
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and 
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the 
hot leg switchover is being shortened. However, the time being 
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

7. TS Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners

    This change is administrative in nature and involves only 
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases. 
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

    TPBAR consolidation and associated handling activities are 
designed to be consistent with the existing fuel handling and heavy 
load handling processes and equipment currently utilized at the 
facility, and are designed to preclude increased probability of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    Consequences of a fuel handling accident for fuel containing 
TPBARs is evaluated and does not result in exceeding [or even 
approaching] 10 CFR Part 100 limits for off-site dose. All 
consolidation and heavy load handling activities are designed such 
that the current fuel handling accident scenario remains bounding. 
Therefore the consequences of an accident previously evaluated 
remains within acceptable limits.
    B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.

1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase

    The change to the accumulator concentration does not cause the 
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting 
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the 
design, material, and construction standards of the accumulators and 
other potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable 
prior to the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of 
the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator and affected NSSS 
components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH 
is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the 
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will 
be maintained during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from 
the increased boron concentrations, is still within the applicable 
equipment qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the 
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and 
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer 
materials.
    The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron 
in the sump following

[[Page 65008]]

a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to maintain 
the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a revised hot leg 
switchover time has been calculated and will be implemented in the 
plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron precipitation in the core 
following a LOCA.
    All systems, structures, and components previously required for 
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their 
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect 
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the 
performance or integrity of any safety related system. Therefore, 
the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page--RWST--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change to the RWST concentration does not cause the 
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting 
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the 
design, material, and construction standards of the RWST and other 
potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable prior to 
the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of the 
stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected NSSS components/
systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and 
will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the 
Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained 
during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased 
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment 
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the 
possibility of chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking and assure 
that there is no significant degradation of polymer materials.
    The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron 
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is 
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a 
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be 
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron 
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
    All systems, structures, and components previously required for 
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their 
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect 
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the 
performance or integrity of any safety[-]related system. Therefore, 
the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent Fuel 
Assembly Storage

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are 
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, this 
change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind 
of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    TPBARS have been designed to be compatible with existing 
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel assemblies and conventional Burnable Poison 
Rod Assembly (BPRA) handling tools, equipment, and procedures, and 
therefore, no new [or different kind of] accidents or equipment 
malfunctions are created by the handling of TPBARs * * *
    TPBARs use materials with known and predictable performance 
characteristics and are compatible with pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) coolant. The TPBAR design has specifically included material 
similar to those used in standard burnable absorber rods with the 
exception of internal assemblies used in the production and 
retention of tritium. As described in the TPC Topical Report, these 
materials are compatible with the reactor coolant system (RCS) and 
core design. Therefore, no new [or different kind of] accidents or 
equipment malfunctions are created by the presence of the TPBARs in 
the RCS.
    Mechanical design criteria have been established to ensure that 
TPBARs will not fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis has 
shown that TPBARs, appropriately positioned in the core operate 
within the established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to the 
expected high reliability of TPBAR components the frequency of TPBAR 
cladding failures is very small, such that multiple adjacent TPBAR 
failures in limiting locations is not considered credible. In 
addition, analysis has shown that if a single TPBAR fails 
catastrophically in a high power location during normal operation 
and the lithium is leached out, the global reactivity increase is 
negligible and the local power peaking is small enough that DNBR 
[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits and fuel rod 
integrity are not challenged. Therefore, no new [or different kind 
of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by the presence 
of the TPBARs in the reactor.
    Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not fail during Condition 
III and IV events. TPBARs may fail during a cold leg large break 
loss-of-coolant-accident or as a result of a fuel handling accident. 
The radiological consequences of these events are within 10 CFR 100 
limits. Therefore, there is no significant increase in consequences 
of these previously evaluated accidents.
    TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-
hydraulic performance; therefore they do not create the possibility 
of accidents or equipment malfunctions of a [new or] different type 
than previously evaluated while in the reactor.

5.TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in this section are 
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the 
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions. 
Therefore, since they are not installed, this change would not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.

6. Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating

    Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and 
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and 
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the 
hot leg switchover value is being shortened. This time being 
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

7. Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners

    This change is administrative in nature and only involves only 
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases. 
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same. 
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity--

    The consolidation and handling activities are bounded by current 
fuel handling evaluations. Therefore, this proposed amendment does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated.
    C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase

    The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis 
SBLOCA analyses does not credit the accumulator boron and is not 
affected by the proposed change.
    Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin to the Peak clad 
temperature (PCT) limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the 
Best Estimate LBLOCA PCT; therefore, there continues to be a high 
level of probability that the ECCS acceptance criteria limit is not 
exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron 
concentration is sufficient to maintain subcriticality during the 
LBLOCA, and a post-LOCA long term core cooling analysis demonstrated 
that the post-LOCA sump boron concentration is sufficient to prevent 
recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover time, which will be 
implemented in the EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The 
licensing basis containment and SLB M&E releases remain bounding, 
and the SGTR event acceptance criteria continue to be met. 
Furthermore, the changes do not affect the safety[-]related 
performance of the accumulator or related NSSS components. 
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of 
safety.

2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page--RWST--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis results or

[[Page 65009]]

conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety analysis acceptance 
criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis SBLOCA analyses 
does not credit the RWST boron and is not affected by the proposed 
change. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin to the PCT 
limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the Best Estimate 
LBLOCA PCT; therefore, there continues to be a high level of 
probability that the ECCS acceptance criteria limit is not exceeded 
with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron 
concentration is sufficient to prevent recriticality. The revised 
hot leg switchover time, which will be implemented in the EOPs, will 
prevent boron precipitation. The licensing basis containment and SLB 
M&E releases remain bounding, and the SGTR event acceptance criteria 
continue to be met. Furthermore, the changes do not affect the 
safety[-]related performance of the RWST or related NSSS components. 
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of 
safety.

3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent Fuel 
Assembly Storage

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are 
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, this 
change would not involve a [significant] reduction in a margin of 
safety.

4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    TPBARs have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel 
assemblies. TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or 
thermal-hydraulic performance. Analysis indicates that reactor core 
behavior and offsite doses remain relatively unchanged. For these 
reasons, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

5. TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity

    The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are 
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these 
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize 
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the 
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions 
and does not reduce the margin of safety in existing storage 
requirements. Therefore, since they are not installed, this change 
would not involve a [significant] reduction in a margin of safety.

6. Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating

    Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and 
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and 
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the 
hot leg switchover value is being shortened. This time being 
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a [significant] reduction in the margin of 
safety.

7. Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners

    This change is administrative in nature and only involves only 
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) in the bases. 
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same. 
Therefore, this change does not involve a [significant] reduction in 
the margin of safety.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

    The changes do not significantly affect the safety[-]related 
performance of any plant operations, system, structures, or 
components. The consolidation activity is bounded by current fuel 
handling evaluations. Therefore, there is no [does not involve a] 
significant reduction in the margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the no significant hazards consideration 
analysis provided by TVA with respect to the three criteria listed in 
10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's safety evaluation is in its early stages 
and will require several months to complete. However, in terms of 10 
CFR 50.92(c), the staff finds that the TVA application addresses all 
applicable accidents discussed in the UFSAR, including LOCAs, SGTRs, 
and fuel handling considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS for the 
purpose of producing tritium (which is sealed inside the TPBARs) 
requires a higher degree of fuel enrichment with U-235. Because the 
TPBARs neither contain fissile material nor replace normal reactor 
fuel, and because the TPBARs will not adversely affect reactor 
neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance, their presence in the core 
should have no effect upon the probability or consequences of 
previously analyzed accidents, including fuel handling accidents. For 
the same reasons, the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident would not be expected to result from irradiation of the TPBARS 
in the WBN reactor core. TVA's analysis of a possible reduction in 
safety margins addressed PCT limits resulting from an SBLOCA and the 
increased boron concentration to maintain subcriticality.
    Based on the NRC staff's review of the analysis provided by the 
licensee, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 16, 2002, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. If there are problems in accessing the 
document, contact the Public Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by E-mail to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#28584c5a68465a4b064f475e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="01716573416f73622f666e77">[email protected]</span></a>. If a request for a 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, 
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by 
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will 
issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's

[[Page 65010]]

property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the 
possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on 
the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the 
specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which 
petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for 
leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the 
petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to 
the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such 
an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described 
above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. A copy of the 
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to 
General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, ET 11A, 400 West Summit 
Hill Drive, Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    Further details with respect to this action may be found in the 
application for amendment dated August 20, 2001, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC 
Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. Persons who do not have 
access to ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents 
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference 
staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by E-mail to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#54243026143a26377a333b22"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="f2829680b29c8091dc959d84">[email protected]</span></a>.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 2001.
L. Mark Padovan,
Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30971 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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