NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0294n.06

No. 23-5997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER GREEN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: GIBBONS, KETHLEDGE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Christopher Green pled guilty to being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). He now appeals his sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred when it applied a four-level enhancement for unlawfully possessing a firearm 

in connection with another felony offense under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We reject his 

arguments and affirm.

On May 12, 2021, Chattanooga police officers observed Green sitting in a Ford Focus in a 

gas-station parking lot. Green eventually got out of the car and started smoking a blunt with 

another man, during which time the officers saw that Green had a pistol tucked into his waistband. 

The officers eventually detained Green and recovered a 9-millimeter, Glock Model 48. The 

officers then searched his car, where they found two bags containing a total of 109.4 grams of 

marijuana, a one-gram marijuana blunt, a digital scale, and 11 empty plastic baggies. A records 

search revealed that Green was a convicted felon and that the firearm was stolen.
No. 23-5997, United States v. Green

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A federal grand jury later indicted Green for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Green

pled guilty. His presentence report recommended a four-level increase under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a handgun “in connection with” another felony offense, namely, 

“possession of marijuana for resale.” See Tenn. Code. Ann § 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(1). Green 

objected to that enhancement, arguing that he possessed only a personal-use quantity of marijuana, 

which (he says) was unrelated to his firearm possession.

At sentencing, the district court overruled Green’s objection, finding that the evidence 

indicated that Green intended to sell the drugs and that the enhancement applied because police 

found the gun “in conjunction” with the drugs. The court calculated Green’s resulting advisory 

Guidelines range as 102 to 115 months’ imprisonment. (The district court adopted the presentence 

report, but misstated the Guidelines range, which the presentence report accurately calculated as 

92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Green did not object to the misstated range at sentencing, nor 

does he mention it here.) The court then varied downward to impose a sentence of 84 months’ 

imprisonment.

Green now argues that the district court erred when it applied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That 

enhancement increases a defendant’s base offense level by four levels if the government proves 

by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition 

in connection with another felony offense[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); United States v. Mukes, 

980 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2020). When, as here, the other offense is drug trafficking, the 

enhancement may apply if the “firearm is found in close proximity” to a distribution quantity of 

drugs, because “the presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating” the offense. United 

States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B)(ii)). 

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and give deference to its 
No. 23-5997, United States v. Green

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determination that the firearm “was used or possessed in connection with” the other felony. United 

States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 432 (6th Cir. 2011).

Green first argues that the government failed to prove that he committed “another felony 

offense.” As relevant here, the Guidelines define “another felony offense” as any offense 

“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal 

charge was brought, or a conviction obtained.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C). Under Tennessee 

law, a person commits a Class E felony when he knowingly possesses more than 14.175 grams of 

marijuana with the intent to deliver it. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(1). Green 

possessed almost eight times that felony amount here. Yet he contends that, as a daily user of 

marijuana, he possessed the entire 109 grams of marijuana for personal use and thus lacked the 

requisite intent to deliver it. He also argues that the digital scale, empty baggies, and separate 

packaging each “align with” his personal use.

But that argument “views each piece of evidence in artificial isolation.” United States v. 

Lester, 98 F.4th 768, 778 (6th Cir. 2024). When reviewing evidence for a sentencing enhancement,

courts instead consider the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Burns, 498 F.3d 578, 

581 (6th Cir. 2007). And here—as the district court explained at sentencing—the evidence viewed 

in the aggregate provided an ample basis to infer that Green possessed the marijuana with the intent 

to distribute it. See Lester, 98 F.4th at 778-79.

Green also argues that the district court imposed this enhancement without first finding 

that he possessed the gun “in connection with” drug trafficking. But the court stated that Green 

possessed the gun “in conjunction with” with a substantial quantity of marijuana that he evidently 

intended to sell. And the sentencing transcript shows that the court thought the enhancement was 

applicable under this court’s caselaw because police undisputedly found the gun and drugs in 
No. 23-5997, United States v. Green

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“close proximity” to one another. United States v. Crump, 65 F.4th 287, 300 (6th Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted). An enhancement this “conceptually straightforward” does not require much in 

the way of explanation. United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 361 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). The district court properly applied the enhancement.

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.