State, 127 Nev. „ 262 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (the remedy for errors 

unrelated to sufficiency of the evidence is reversal and remand for a new 

trial, not an acquittal). 

Second, O'Keefe argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing him to represent himself at trial because his 

decision to do so was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Before 

granting O'Keefe's request, the district court conducted an appropriate 

canvass pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), during 

which O'Keefe stated that he spent several years studying the law and 

understood the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties 

he faced, and the dangers of self-representation. Although O'Keefe asserts 

that his poor performance at trial demonstrates his decision was 

unknowing, "a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no 

bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation," Vanisi v. 

State, 117 Nev. 330, 341, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001) (quoting Godinez v. 

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993)), and the record reflects that O'Keefe 

voluntarily chose to represent himself despite full knowledge of the risks. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting 

O'Keefe's request for self-representation. See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 

55, 176 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2008) (reviewing the record as a whole and giving 

deference to a district court's decision to allow a defendant to waive his 

right to counsel). 

Third, O'Keefe argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his request to stay or continue trial for 

approximately nine months because he had pending proceedings in federal 

court and was unprepared for trial. The district court rejected O'Keefe's 

assertion that his federal proceedings in any way limited his ability to 

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prepare for trial and noted that O'Keefe asked to represent himself and 

was given ample time to do so effectively. We conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying O'Keefe's request for an 

extended continuance where the delay was his fault. See Rose v. State, 

123 Nev. 194, 206, 163 P.3d 408, 416 (2007). 

Fourth, O'Keefe argues that the district court erred by 

allowing a substitute judge to preside over his trial because the original 

judge was more familiar with the case and its complex procedural posture. 

O'Keefe does not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the substitution 

of a different judge. See generally United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 

1398 (9th Cir. 1983) (error involving substitution of judges is harmless if 

the defendant has not been prejudiced). We conclude that O'Keefe fails to 

demonstrate that the district court erred. 

Fifth, O'Keefe argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by rejecting his proposed instructions and by giving instructions 

over his objection. "The district court has broad discretion to settle jury 

instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an 

abuse of that discretion or judicial error." Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 

744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). Because O'Keefe has not provided this 

court with the instructions given at trial, he fails to demonstrate that the 

district court abused its discretion by rejecting his proposed instruction. 

See generally Vallery v. State,118 Nev. 357, 372, 46 P.3d 66, 77 (2002) 

(noting that a district court does not err by refusing an accurate 

instruction related to the defendant's theory of the case if it is 

substantially covered by other instructions); see also Greene v. State, 96 

Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980) ("The burden to make a proper 

appellate record rests on appellant."). O'Keefe also does not identify which 

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instructions he contends were erroneously given. We conclude that he 

fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 

Having considered O'Keefe's contentions and concluded that 

no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.' 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Bellon & Maningo, Ltd. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

1 0'Keefe's fast track statement does not comply with NRAP 3C(h)(1) 

and 32(a)(4) because it does not have 1-inch margins on all four sides. We 

caution counsel that future failure to comply with formatting 

requirements when filing briefs with this court may result in the 

imposition of sanctions. NRAP 3C(n). 

We deny O'Keefe's request for full briefing because it does not 

comply with NRAP 3C(k)(2), as it was not filed separate from the fast 

track statement. Further, although O'Keefe explains that full briefing is 

requested so that each issue may be adequately set forth and appropriate 

legal authority cited, we note that he did not file a motion for excess pages. 

SeeNRAP 3C(k)(2)(C). 

4