CUSTOMER ENGINEERING SERVICES , ) ) Appellant
, ) )

vs. ) No. SD35638 ) MARK ODOM , ) FILED: March 11, 2019 ) Respondent

. )

APPEAL FROM LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Customer Engineering Services ( CES ) appeals a workers ’ compensation
award to Mark Odom of past and future medical expenses and permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. F or reasons stated herein, we grant in part CES ’ s challenge to past medical expense s , but otherwise affirm the award. Background
Odom , who instal led and serviced photo

- lab equipment for CES, injured his elbow, back, and knee in June 2012 while moving a 25 0

- pound photo printer

. CES provided medical treatment through Dr. Lennard and others
, including surgery to repair Odom ’ s biceps tendon followed by p hysical therapy

. O dom ’ s discomfort continued

. Suspecting c omplex regional pain syndrome (CRPS)
, Dr. Lennard referred Odom for stellate ganglion block treatments and kept him o n physical therapy
, pain management , and work restrictions

. Despite

### 2 these interventions, Odom ’ s arm and shoulder pain, weakness, and loss of function persisted.

In August 2013, Odom ’ s physical therapist recommended discharging
Odom “ due to plateauing of symptoms. ” Dr. Lennard did so on August 26, 2013, stating that Odom had reached ma ximum medical improvement (MMI) and advising Odom to reduce his activity to see if his arm would improve

. Odom reduced his activity . His arm did not get better. He went to his primary

- care physician
, who referred him t o doctors who confirmed CRPS and provided physical therapy and pain management through the September 2017
workers ’ compensation hearing. Odom submitted these medical expenses to his
wife ’ s health insurance.
Due to chronic pain and physical limitations
, Odom has never returned to
work. A vocational rehabilitation consultant testified that Odom was

un employable in the open labor market

. An ALJ, then the Commission by a 2

- 1 vote on application for review, awarded Odom PTD benefits plus past and future medical expens es. CES appeals, charging that no sufficient competent evidence warranted the PTD, past medical, or futur e medical awards (RSMo § 287.495.1(4)). 1

1 Rule 84.04(d)(2) requires CES’s points to include three elements which “shall” be presented substantially as follows : The Commission erred in [ identify the challenged ruling or action ], because [ state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible
error, including the reference to the applicable statute authorizing review ], in that [ explain why, in the context of the case, the legal reasons support the claim of reversible error ]. Although each of CES’s points omit s the third element (“in that ...”), we decl ine to dismiss because we can discern these points challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support the PTD, past medical, and future medical awards respectively. Why then mention the violations? Because we must address CES’s claim that its points are ju st fine as they are. CES ack nowledg es that “the ‘in that’ section of the Rule 84.04 template is missing,” but blithely asserts that its list of “Statutes and Supporting Cases” satisfies that requirement equally well. Needless to say, CES cites no support for this ill

- considered excuse for violating Rule 84.04, compliance with which is mandatory

. Scott v. King , 510 S.W.3d 887, 891

- 92 (Mo.App. 2017).

### 3 Point 1

– PTD Benefits
Point 1 alleges that no sufficient evidence supports the PTD award

. We can overlook the Rule 84.04 (d) violation, but not the supporting argument ’ s failings

. Rule 84.04(e) requires a n argument to support all factual assertions with

“ specific page references ” to the record on appeal. Point 1 ’ s argument , replete with factual assertions, has no such cites

. We would have to do CES ’ s work to know if the record supports its argument s

. Lombardo v. Lombardo , 120 S.W.3d 232, 247 (Mo.App. 2003)

. We cannot sift 2,200 pages for that purpose or to remedy
CES ’ s violation without becoming a de facto advocate , which we cannot do

. Eder

v. Lawson ’ s Hardwood Floors
, 403 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Mo.App. 2012)

. Even with record references, Point 1 would still fail. A successful not

supported

- by

- substantial

- evidence challenge involve s three analytical steps:

1. Identify a factual proposition needed to sustain the result;

2. Identify all favorable evidence in the record supporting that proposition; and

3. Demonstrate , in light of the whole record, that the step 2 evidence and its reasonable inferences are so non

- probative that no reasonable mind could believe the proposition. 2

CES disregards this rubric, effec tively ignoring proof that supports a PTD award and focusing instead on its evidence

. This approach strips CES ’ s argument of any analytical or persuasive value. Jordan , 383 S.W.3d at 95. For all these reasons, Point 1 fails. Point 3

– Future Medical Expenses
We take Point 3 next. It seeks to reduce the award of future medical

expenses , asserting that no substantial evidence supports the inclusion of pain management services

. Again, the supporting argument lacks persuasive or analytical value because it i gnores the t hree step s cited above. Id

. Further, to quote CES ’ s reply brief,

2 See Maryville R

- II Sch. Dist. v. Payton , 516 S.W.3d 874, 881 (Mo.App. 2017); Brune v. Johnson Controls , 457 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Mo.App. 2015); Riley v. City of Liberty , 404 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Mo.App. 2013); Jordan v. USF Holland Motor Freight, Inc. , 383 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Mo.App. 2012).

### 4 [ CES ’ s] point is simply that the future medical award s hould be modified to reflect t he opinion of Dr. Lennard that “ medication management and activity limitations ” are the prefe rred treatment for [Odom ’ s] symptoms, as set out in [ CES ’ s] Brief, rather than “ future pain management services ” suggested by Dr. Paul. Dr. Lennard is better positioned to determine the nature and extent of [Odom ’ s] need for additional care.

“ Because c onflicting medical theories present a credibility determination
for the Commission to make, its decision as to which of the various medical experts to believe is binding on this Court. ” Morris v. Captain D ’ s , 537 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Mo.App. 2018) . The Commission implicitly credited Dr. Paul “ and we must defer to that credibility determination. ” Id . at 425

. T he future

- medical award is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which defeats this point

. Id

. Point 2

– Past Medical Expenses
CES claims the record does not support its liability for $36, 539.99 in medical expenses that Odom incurred after Dr. Lennard released him.
As summarized in Poole v. City of St. Louis : An employer is charged with the duty of providing the injured employee with medical care, but the employer is given control over the selection of a medical provider. It is only when the employer fails to do so that the employee is free to pick his own provider and assess those costs against his employer.
328 S.W. 3d 277, 291 (Mo.App. 2010)(internal citations omitted). If the employee picks his own doctor, the employer must pay “ only when the employer has notice that the employee needs treatment, or a demand is made on the employer to furnish medical treatment, and the employer refuses or fails to provide the needed

treatment. ” Id .; s ee also § 287.140 .1, .10.
CES does not claim Odom ’ s medical s after Dr. Lennard ’ s August 2013 discharge were not fair, reasonable, or causally related to Odom ’ s work accident

. So the narrow question is whether, and if so, when
, CES received notice or demand
that Odom needed such treatment

. Poole
, 328 S.W.3d at 291

. Odom admits that the earliest such notice was his deposition testimony on June 30, 2014, and that any award of earlier

- incurred medical expenses was error. We agree

. The Commission’s award erroneously included 

### $2,510.93 in medical

expenses predating June 30, 2014, so we grant Point 2 in part. Competent

### 5 evidence of record supports an award of $3 4,02 9.06 for Odom ’ s medical expenses
incurred after June 30, 2014 , but not the additional $ 

### 2,510.93 incurred prior to
that date.
Conclusion
We reverse and remand for the Commission to reduce its award of past medical expenses to $3 4,0 2 9.06 , and affirm the award i n all other respects. 3
DANIEL E. SCOTT, J.

– OPINION AUTHOR JEFFREY W. BATES, J.

– CONCURS MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J.

– CONCURS

3 All pending motions and requests are denied.