1 Filed 12/4/13 L.W. v. Super. Ct. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

L.W., Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest. A139776
(San Francisco County Super. Ct. Nos. JD10-3166 & JD10-3166A)

L.W. (mother) seeks writ relief from a j uvenile court order terminating family
reunification services for two of her childre n and setting a permanen t plan selection and implementation hearing pursua nt to Welfare and Institu tions Code section 366.26. 1 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Mother claims the court erred in taki ng judicial notice of reports submitted in prior hearings and in find ing a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being were they returned to her. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) We shall deny the writ petition. Factual and Procedural Background
Mother has five children and an extensiv e history with child protective services. At issue here are dependency proceedings co ncerning her youngest children, a son born

1 All further section references ar e to this code except as noted.2 in 2000 and daughter born in 2003. In May 2010, the Sa n Francisco Human Services Agency (the agency) to ok custody of the children and file d a petition alleging that mother has substance abuse and mental health proble ms, that her ability to care for the children
deteriorated after the recent death of the ch ildren’s father, and that her son’s disruptive
behavior at school indicated serious emotiona l damage. (§ 300, subd s. (b), (c).) Mother submitted to the allegations in October 2010. The court decl ared dependenc y and ordered reunification services. In April 2012, the cour t returned the children to mother’s custody with family maintenance services. A few weeks later, the agency resumed cu stody and filed a supplemental petition. (§ 387.) Mother had been in a physical fight with her live-in boyfriend in which she sustained a neck laceration requiring stitches. The children were pr esent during the fight. The petition alleged that mother has a history of being in relations hips characterized by domestic violence, putting the children at subs tantial risk of harm. The court sustained the allegations following a contested hearing in July 2012. The cour t placed the children
with a relative and ordered reunification se rvices addressed to domestic violence,
substance abuse and mental health issues. A six-month review hearing was held in January 2013. The agency reported that mother was attending domestic violence clas ses and visited the children but failed to submit to drug testing over the previous six months. Mother also refused to allow the
social worker to visit her home to determin e its occupants and a ssess its safety. The agency recommended continued reunificatio n services and the court adopted the
recommendation. In August 2013, in advance of a contested 12-month review hearing, the agency reported that mother had not visited her ch ildren for over a month and was discontinued from the domestic violence program in July 2013 for “excessive absenteeism” over the previous two months. Mother also continued to refuse a home visit by the social worker. The agency reported: “During the course of this dependency, the Co urt has provided the mother various opportunities to address the safety issues for herself and the minors,
however she failed to take a dvantage of them. Since the in itial removal of the children3 from her care and home on May 15, 2010, the mother’s behaviors and attitudes have not waivered or changed. She bl amed the Agency fo r removing the children then, and she still blames the Agency [fo r] keeping the children fro m her. The mother was not forthcoming with the Agency then, and she is still not fo rthcoming with the Agency today. The mother was not cooperating and availing herself to wo rk with the Agency then, and she is still not availing herself a nd cooperating with th e Agency today. The
mother has minimized the effe ct that the domestic viol ence has had on her and the children’s safety, and she continues to do so today.” The agency recommended
termination of reunification services.
Mother testified that she had not vis ited her children for a month because her wallet was stolen and, withou t her identification card, coul d not cash the transportation check provided by th e agency. Mother said she did not notify the agency of the situation because “I don’t have any ty pe of communication” or a g ood working relationship with
the social worker. Mother de nied being terminated from th e domestic violence program, which she characterized as strictly an ange r management program that never addressed
domestic violence. Mother said she discusse d domestic violence in individual therapy
sessions. The court adjourned for a week to revi ew materials and resumed the hearing on September 6, 2013 for decisi on. When the hearing resumed, the judge stated that she “spent hours on” the case familiarizing herself with the facts and prior proceedings. The judge stated: “I have read the transcript of the proceedings, I have been through the entire file. I have read every report going back to th e first detention, I am taking judicial notice of those . . . and I will explain that part of the reason I wanted to do that was because this matter largely has not been in front of me, it’ s been in front of other bench officers who were here over the history of the case. And I wanted to have a better sense of how things had progressed and what some of the challenges have been.”
The court found that moth er was provided reasonable reunification services and failed to participate fully. The court determin ed that returning th e children to mother
“would create a substantial risk of detrimen t to their safety, protection, or physical or4 emotional well-being.” The court terminated reunification services and set a hearing to determine a permanent plan fo r the children’s placement. Mother filed a timely petition seeking writ relief from the court’s order.
Discussion Mother claims the court improperly took judicial notice of the truth of hearsay allegations contained in agen cy and child advocate reports submitted in prior hearings and relied upon that information at the 12-mo nth review hearing to find detriment to the children. Mother’s argument rests upon the court’s opening remarks at the review hearing, in which the court explained that it had reviewed the case file “to have a better sense of how things had progressed and what some of the challenges have been.” The
court said: “I have been thro ugh the entire file. I have read every report going back to the first detention, I am taking judicial notice of those” reports. A judge’s review of the case file is prope r procedure and a court is authorized to take judicial notice of court records. (Evid. Co de, § 452, subd. (d).) In fact, “[e]very court takes judicial notice of its own records in the same case.” ( The Golden Gate (9th Cir. 1923) 286 F. 105, 106.) In taki ng judicial notice, a court may “ ‘take judicial notice of the
existence of judicial opinions and court document s, along with the truth of the results
reached – in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments – but cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hear say statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, tes timony, or statements of fact.’ ” ( People v. Harbolt (1997) 61 Cal.App.4th 123, 126-127.) “[A] cour t cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file.” ( In re David
C. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1189 , 1205, italics omitted.) While the court here spoke broadly about taking judicial notice of “every report going back to the first detentio n,” we do not understand th is to mean that the court improperly took judicial notice of the truth of facts alleged in those reports. Mother points to the court’s mention of child advoca te reports describing the children’s improved behavior when living with th e caretaker as proof the court relied on hearsay allegations. The same matter was the subject of testim ony at the hearing and the admitted agency5 report. The court was entitled to take judicial notice of the existence of prior reports of behavioral problems with the children when in mother’s care in order to have, as it put it, “a better sense of how things had progresse d and what some of the challenges have been.” Even if, as mother c ontends, the court accepted the truth of statements made in the prior reports, those statements were cumulativ e to other evidence pr operly considered by
the court and thus harmless. 2 Mother disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s finding that returning the children to her would be detrimen tal to them. At a child dependency review hearing, “a juvenile court must ‘order the retu rn of the minor to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian unless, by a pr eponderance of the ev idence, it finds that
return of the child would create a substan tial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor.’ ” ( In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1211.) “When an appellate court reviews a sufficien cy of the evidence ch allenge, we may look only at whether there is any evidence, cont radicted or uncontradicted, which would support the trier of fact’s conclusion. We must resolve all conflicts in favor of the court’s determination, and indulge all legitimate in ferences to uphold the court’s order.” ( Id. at p. 1212.) The agency presented evid ence that mother “has mini mized the effect that the
domestic violence has had on he r and the children’s safety” and failed to “mitigate the safety concerns that necessitated . . . re moval of the children from her home.” Mother refused to allow the agency acce ss to her home to confirm th at she no longer lived with
the man who abused her and to assess the sa fety of the home for the children. Mother “instructed [the social] worker not to vis it her home, despite being informed about the purpose of the home visit.” In the months le ading up to the review hearing, mother

2 Mother claims improper judicial notice is a structural error in the proceedings that mandates reversal without regard to prejudice. We disagree. Very few errors have been “categorized as structural.” ( In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 917.) “Errors that can ‘be quantitatively assessed in the context of other eviden ce presented in order to determine whether [they were] harmless be yond a reasonable doubt’ [citation] generally are not structural defects.” ( Ibid. )6 stopped attending domestic violence classes a nd stopped visiting her children. Mother points to her testimony disputing several aspe cts of the agency’s evidence, including her claim that the classes were directed to ange r management rather than domestic violence. But we do not reweigh the evidence or th e credibility of witn esses on appeal. The agency’s evidence, which the court was entitled to cred it, fully supports the finding that returning the children to mother would be detrimental to their well-being. Disposition The petition for extraordinary re lief is denied on the merits. ( Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) Our decision is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3).)7 _ ____________ ____________ Pollak, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Jenkins, J.

A139776