J. S25032/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Q.L., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER : No. 3238 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000533-2016,

CP-51-DP-0000744-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER : No. 3240 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000532-2016,

CP-51-DP-0000746-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

M.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered September 14, 

2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting the 

petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent 

children, S.Q.L., a male born in August of 2009, and A.L., a female born in 

October of 2007 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

1 2

 Mother further appeals 

the orders entered September 14, 2016, changing the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351. After review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history 

as follows:

The family in this case has been known to DHS since 

2010.[3] Between 2010 and 2014, DHS received 

four General Protective Services (“GPS”) reports 

alleging problems in the home.[4] All four reports 

were substantiated, and DHS offered services. On 

February 6, 2014, DHS received another GPS report 

that the utilities in Mother’s home were turned off. 

DHS visited the home and found it was filled with 

trash, smelled of marijuana and had no heat.[5] The 

Children were truant. By family arrangement, DHS

implemented a Safety Plan and the Children moved 

into the home of their maternal cousin. On 

March 25, 2014, Mother met with DHS and the 

 

1 By separate decrees entered June 27, 2016, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of the Children’s fathers and/or putative 

fathers, also pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Neither 

of the Children’s fathers and/or putative fathers has appealed, nor are they 

parties to this appeal.

2 Mother’s three older children, who are not the subject of this matter, were 

also adjudicated dependent and remained committed and in placement.

3 Upon review of the certified record, DHS’s involvement goes back even 

further, to May of 2008. (See DHS Exhibit 1.)

4 DHS received reports on September 7, 2010, May 28, 2011, February 6, 

2014, and February 9, 2014, with respect to conditions of the home and 

neglect of the Children. (See DHS Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5.)

5 DHS received a similar report as to the conditions of the home, among 

other things, on February 9, 2014. (See DHS Exhibit 5.)
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Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) and stated she 

intended to take the Children back into her care. 

DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody 

(“OPC”) and formally placed the Children with the 

cousin. The following day the cousin stated she 

could not care for the Children, so DHS placed them 

in other foster homes. Following an adjudicatory 

hearing on April 9, 2014, the court adjudicated the 

Children dependent and fully committed them to 

DHS custody. CUA then developed a Single Case 

Plan (“SCP”) with objectives for Mother. Between 

2014 and 2016, Mother failed to complete her 

objectives. . . .

Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).

The trial court held regular permanency review hearings in this matter. 

Throughout these reviews, the trial court maintained the Children’s 

commitment and placement and permanency goal.

On June 10, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights and for a goal change. Thereafter, the trial court conducted 

combined termination and goal change hearings on June 27, 2016 and 

September 14, 2016.6 In support of its petitions, DHS presented the 

testimony of CUA caseworker, Lloyd Guyton. Further, DHS offered DHS 

Exhibits 1 through 17, which were admitted into evidence on June 27, 2016. 

(Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 86.) Counsel stipulated to their content, 

 

6 Mother agreed to sign voluntary relinquishments of her parental rights to 

the Children at the June 27 hearing. Mother signed the necessary 

paperwork subsequent to the submission of evidence and testimony being 

taken on the termination/goal change petitions. The matter was, however, 

listed for September 14, 2016, for the court to issue its decision on the 

termination/goal change petitions should Mother revoke the voluntary 

relinquishments, which she in fact did, in the requisite 30 days. 
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but not their veracity. (Id. at 20-21, 37.) Mother additionally testified on 

her own behalf. Children’s fathers were not present. However, putative 

father for both Children, S.P.B., Jr., a/k/a S.B., a/k/a S.B., who is 

incarcerated and was represented by counsel, was contacted via telephone 

and chose not to participate.7

By decree entered September 14, 2016, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children.8 On October 10, 2016, 

Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along 

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

granting [DHS]’s Petition to Change the Goal 

to Adoption?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

finding that DHS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that [M]other failed to 

rehabilitate herself pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

Section 2511[(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)]?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

finding that DHS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that it would not harm 

A.L. and/or S.Q.L. to be severed from their 

mother and that it was in the best interests of 

 

7 A.L.’s father, D.F., was represented by counsel. S.Q.L.’s father, A.P., was 

not represented by counsel as an address was never obtained. (Notes of 

testimony, 6/27/16 at 19-20.)

8 The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent 

decrees and orders, on the record on September 14, 2016.
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the children to be adopted pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(b)?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to consider that [M]other completed all 

her family service plan goals in 2015, and that 

after the additional goal of “mental health” was 

added in 2015, [M]other had made substantial 

progress with this goal despite the fact that 

DHS made no referral and provided no 

assistance to her.

Mother’s brief at 4.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, 

should not be reversed merely because the record 

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 
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competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
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With regard to Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues, which we 

address first, Mother essentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 

terminating her parental rights. (Mother’s brief at 13-18.) In this case, the 

trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long held that, in 

order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the 

trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under 

Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 
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the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002).
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Instantly, in finding sufficient evidence supporting termination of 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the court stated as 

follows: 

The Children have been in care since April 9, 2014. 

Mother’s original objectives were to visit the 

Children, obtain housing and a job, complete 

parenting classes and a PCE [(“parenting capacity 

evaluation”)]. Mother obtained appropriate housing. 

Mother has never provided documentation of her 

income. While Mother completed parenting classes, 

she was completely unable to demonstrate that she 

learned anything from them. Even after the classes, 

she did not have the capacity to provide the Children 

with a safe and permanent home. During the PCE, 

Mother minimized and denied the issues that brought 

the Children into care. The PCE recommended 

Mother engage in therapy, and this became an 

objective in her SCP and in court orders. CUA 

referred Mother for mental health therapy in October 

2015. Mother has never attended therapy. Mother 

testified that therapy was never one of her 

objectives, though it had been discussed at SCP 

meetings and court hearings where Mother was 

present. Mother testified that she attended family 

therapy with the Children, but was actually referring 

to another child who is not the subject of this case. 

At the beginning of the case, Mother consistently 

attended visits, and was given unsupervised visits. 

She began coaching the Children to withhold 

information from the foster parents, and her visits 

were changed to supervised. The Children had 

originally been placed with relatives, but had been 

removed and placed with unrelated foster parents at 

Mother’s request. Mother testified falsely about her 

request, originally testifying that the relatives had 

failed FBI clearances. When asked about this 

contradictory testimony, Mother admitted that her 

original testimony had been untrue. The Children 

need permanency, which Mother cannot provide. 

Mother has demonstrated that she is unwilling to 

remedy the causes of her incapacity to parent in 
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order to provide the Children with essential parental 

care, control, or subsistence necessary for their 

physical and mental well-being. Termination under 

this section was also proper.

Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 6-7.

Mother, however, argues that the record “does not support the finding 

that she failed to take affirmative action to rectify the circumstances that led 

to the removal of the children.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Mother argues the 

evidence was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard. (Id. at 

16-17.) Specifically, she indicates the only evidence offered was the 

testimony of the caseworker as to a lack of documentation regarding 

individual therapy, income or results of a medication evaluation. (Id. at 

16.) Mother further challenges the court’s evidentiary rulings during her 

cross-examination of the caseworker, which she contends prevented her 

“from eliciting any further information that the witness should have gleaned 

from his review of the case documents. (Id. at 17.) We disagree.

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). CUA caseworker Lloyd Guyton 

testified that Mother’s objectives were “to sustain housing, to maintain a 

source of income, to attend therapy and to attend parenting classes.” 

(Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43.) Mr. Guyton also verified a parenting 

capacity evaluation. (Id. at 43.) Critically, he indicated that Mother failed 

to provide documentation as to mental health treatment, although 

acknowledging that she stated she had completed therapy, or a psychiatric 
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evaluation, as recommended by the parenting capacity evaluation,9as well 

as to income. (Id. at 43-44.) Further, as confirmed by Mr. Guyton, a 

parenting capacity evaluation conducted by William Russell, Ph.D., and 

Sheetal A. Duggal, Psy.D., dated December 2, 2014, opined that Mother 

lacked the “capacity to provide safety and permanency” for the Children. 

(Id. at 49. See also DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.) Notably, the evaluators 

highlighted Mother’s potential inability to provide for the Children financially, 

noting, “[Mother] presented no secure plan of how she intends to financially 

support her children with a limited income.” (DHS Exhibit 14 at 9.) In 

addition, the evaluators recognized Mother’s lack of insight as to issues for 

which the Children were brought into care and her inability to accept 

responsibility. 

Additional barriers include [Mother’s] continued 

denial and minimization of events that led to her 

children’s removal (including keeping them in unsafe 

housing, failure to meet their medical and dental 

needs, and concerns regarding substance use) and 

she continues to project blame and responsibility 

onto others for DHS involvement. [Mother] was 

unable to make any connection between her 

behavior and parenting and the fact that all of the 

children have emotional/behavioral problems.

 

9 Mr. Guyton testified that Mother was referred for therapy in October of 

2015. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 50.) Mother denied the inclusion of 

any additional objectives and disputed any meetings as to her objectives 

following completion of the parenting capacity evaluation. (Id. at 76, 82.) 

However, Mother testified to her presence in court on numerous occasions 

since that time where there was testimony presented regarding her 

objectives. (Id. at 84.) 
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Id. See also notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 49. The evaluators also 

recognized concerns as to the Children’s putative father, who is a registered 

sex offender, which Mother minimized. (Id. at 5, 7, 9.) Similarly, the 

evaluators further observed that, despite completion of parenting classes, 

Mother, who admitted to the prior use of corporal punishment, “was unable 

to identify methods of appropriate discipline.” (Id. at 9. See also notes of 

testimony, 6/27/16 at 49.) Therefore, as suggested above, among other 

things, the evaluators recommended Mother participate in individual therapy 

“with the focus to include identifying the role she played in her children’s 

removal and for DHS’s ongoing involvement with her family, [sic] monitoring 

possible substance use.” (Id. at 10.) 

Further, we note, the decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence 

is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Buchhalter v. 

Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted). 

See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-101 (Pa.Super. 

2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2007). This court 

may only reverse upon a finding of a clear abuse of discretion. Id. After 

review of the record, we do not discern any abuse of discretion with respect 

to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Hence, the record substantiates the 

conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, 

or refusal has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or 

subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re 
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Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not 

remedy this situation. See id. As the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result 

of an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s 

decrees with regard to Section 2511(a)(2). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 

(Pa. 2013).

We next determine whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated as 

follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) 

does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case 

law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors 

to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child 
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bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored 

Children’s needs and welfare, the court concluded:

Mother has consistently visited with the Children 

over the life of this case, but has not maintained a 

bond with them. She does not have a healthy 

maternal relationship with [A.L.] Mother has 

coached the Children improperly, whereby visits 

were changed to supervised. Mother appeared to 

confuse these Children with her other Children. 

Mother planned to have the Children adopted by a 

sex offender who is currently in prison. Mother 

interfered with the Children’s placement and 

permanency to prevent them from being placed with 

relatives, in contravention of the purpose of the 

Juvenile Act. It is in the Children’s best interest to 

terminate Mother’s rights, as they will not suffer 

irreparable harm. Mother does not have a healthy 

parental relationship with [A.L.] [S.Q.L.] is 

hospitalized at the time of trial. CUA is exploring 

potential family resources. Although Mother visits 

with [S.Q.L.], the trial court did not hear any 

evidence of a bond between Mother and [S.Q.L.] 

Consequently, the trial court properly inferred that 

no parental bond exists with Mother. The court did 

not abuse its discretion when it found that it was 

clearly and convincingly established that there was 

no parental bond, and that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would not destroy an existing 

beneficial relationship.

Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).
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Despite acknowledging Section 2511(b) in her brief, Mother fails to 

offer any discussion and/or analysis as to this subsection. Mother, therefore, 

waived any claim relating to Section 2511(b). See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 

330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011), 

quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[W]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”). See also In re 

Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 76 A.3d 540 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 2511(b) 

where not challenged on appeal).

Nevertheless, in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we observe 

that, had Mother preserved this issue, we would have found it lacked merit. 

There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to make a 

determination of the Children’s needs and welfare, and as to the existence of 

a bond between Mother and Children that, if severed, would not have a 

detrimental impact on them. Mother’s visitation with the Children, while 

unsupervised for a time, was modified to supervised.10 (Notes of testimony, 

6/27/16 at 73-75.) Further, Mr. Guyton testified as to the unhealthy 

relationship between Mother and A.L. and no irreparable harm to either child 

 

10 Although disputing the truth, Mother acknowledged being advised that the 

change in visitation was due to coaching the Children not to disclose certain 

information to their foster parents. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 82-83.)
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if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at 44.) Of significance, we 

also again recognize the parenting capacity evaluation, which concluded 

Mother’s inability to provide safety and permanency for the Children, noting 

her lack of insight and acceptance of responsibility as to issues for which the 

Children were brought into care. (Id. at 49; DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.) As this 

court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent 

attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a 

child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress 

and hope for the future.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Lastly, we turn to Mother’s first issue, the question of whether the trial 

court appropriately changed the permanency goal to adoption. In so doing, 

our standard of review is the same abuse of discretion standard as noted 

above. See In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015), 

citing In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010), for the proposition that 

the abuse of discretion standard applies in a dependency matter. Further, 

following an examination and findings of factors provided in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351(f) and (f.1), regarding matters to be determined at the permanency 

hearing, the trial court must also find that a goal change is in Children’s best 
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interests. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g); In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 

2010).

The primary purpose of the disposition of a dependent child is to 

examine what is in the best interest of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a); 

In the Interest of Z.W., et al., 710 A.2d 1176, 1178 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

See also In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 1990) (stating, “In 

ordering a disposition under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, the court acts 

not in the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative 

agency, . . . rather the court acts pursuant to a separate discretionary role 

with the purpose of meeting the child’s best interests.”), quoting In re 

Lowry, 484 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. 1984).

In the case at bar, Mother posits that the trial court should not have 

changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption, as the court failed to 

consider the “totality of the circumstances” pursuant to Section 6351(f). 

(Mother’s brief at 9-10.) Again, Mother challenges the court’s evidentiary 

rulings as to the testimony of the caseworker. (Id. at 10-12.) Mother 

argues, “It is this pattern of biased [sic] against Mother that accentuates the 

[c]ourt’s unwillingness to comply with the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 

outlined in 6351(f) and which is proof that the court abused its discretion in 

terminating [M]other[’s] parental rights.” (Id. at 12.) Mother further 

asserts that she accomplished all goals for which she received referrals in 

2015, and the remaining obstacle of therapy “was in progress and could 
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have rectified Mother’s parenting deficits within a reasonable time.” (Id. at 

12-13.)

However, supporting the goal change to adoption, the court reasoned:

Mother expressed an interest in signing voluntary 

relinquishments of her parental rights to the 

Children, but only if her conditions for placement 

were met. Mother has interfered with the 

permanency of the Children before, asking that they 

be removed from relatives and have less contact 

with family. This conduct was clearly against the 

purposes of the Juvenile Act. Mother then lied in 

court, testifying that she had never asked for the 

Children to be removed. Mother intended to have 

the Children adopted by a sex offender. Mother 

improperly coached the Children and her visits had 

to be changed to supervised. Mother has not 

provided proof of her employment or income. 

Mother has not engaged in mental health treatment, 

despite it being an objective routinely discussed at 

SCP meetings and court hearings. Mother completed 

parenting classes but did not learn anything at all. 

Mother denied that there had ever been any issues in 

her house, and that her Children’s teeth had rotted 

because they ate too much candy. Mother did not 

present the capacity to provide the Children with a 

safe and permanent home. Mother confused these 

Children with another one of her children. Mother 

does not have a healthy parental relationship with 

the Children. Adoption is in the best interest of the 

Children. Because of these facts, and the stipulated 

facts in the termination petition, it was clearly and 

convincingly established by credible testimony of 

DHS’s witness that the court’s change of permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption was proper.

Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 11-12 (citations to record omitted). With 

this, we agree.
J. S25032/17

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Upon review of the record, Mother’s claim lacks merit. The record 

reveals that a change of the permanency goal to adoption was in Children’s 

best interests. Again, Mother failed to provide CUA with documentation as 

to completion with respect to all of her objectives, notably therapy and 

income. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43-44.) Moreover, and more 

importantly, a parenting capacity evaluation revealed Mother’s inability to 

provide for the Children’s safety and permanency, noting her denial and 

minimization of issues related to the Children’s placement in care, as well as 

her financial instability and inability to name appropriate forms of discipline. 

(DHS Exhibit 14 at 9-10.) In addition, Mother’s visitation with the Children 

was changed to and remained supervised, and the caseworker testified as to 

no irreparable harm to either child if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 44, 73-75.) Further, as we 

find no abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s evidentiary determinations, 

we do not disturb them. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz, 

LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-101 (Pa.Super. 2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 

A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2007). Therefore, the record supports that a goal 

change was in the best interests of Children. Accordingly, after review of 

the record, we again discern no abuse of discretion, and conclude that the 

trial court properly changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption.
J. S25032/17

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Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights and change of the Children’s permanency goal, we 

affirm the decrees and orders of the trial court.

Decrees and orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017