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TERRELL STATON v. COMMISSIONER OF

CORRECTION

(SC 19309)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued September 9—officially released October 6, 2015

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky

III, state’s attorney, and Angela Macchiarulo, senior

assistant state’s attorney, forthe appellee (respondent).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. This case raises the question of

whether counsel delivered ineffective assistance by failing to request a continuance or obtain a capias to secure

the testimony of a witness. The petitioner, Terrell Staton, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court

dismissing his appeal from the habeas court’s denial

of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 Staton v.

Commissioner of Correction, 148 Conn. App. 427, 435,

84 A.3d 947 (2014). The petitioner claims that his trial

counsel, Jennifer Tunnard, rendered ineffective assistance at his criminal trial because she chose not to

pursue questioning of a potential exculpatory witness,

Warren Battle. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural background are

relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was convicted

of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64, interfering with a

police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a167a, operating an unregistered vehicle in violation of

General Statutes § 14-12 (a), improper use of a marker

in violation of General Statutes § 14-147 (c), and failing

to obey a traffic signal in violation of General Statutes

§ 14-301. Id., 429. In his habeas petition, the petitioner

claimed that Tunnard had rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to request a continuance or

to obtain a capias to secure the testimony of Battle,

who would have testified that he, instead of the petitioner, was the driver of the car involved in the incident.

Id. At the habeas trial, the court heard testimony from

the petitioner, Tunnard, Battle, and Officer Michael Pederson of the Danbury Police Department, who initially

observed and followed the petitioner after the events

in question. Id., 433–34. Subsequently, the court denied

the petition, concluding that Tunnard’s decision to do

without Battle’s testimony was reasonable and that the

petitioner had not been prejudiced by the lack of Battle’s testimony at the criminal trial. Id., 430.

On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish the

prejudice prong for ineffective assistance of counsel

under the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984). Staton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

148 Conn. App. 433. The Appellate Court stated that,

as the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, the

habeas court could have found that Battle’s inconsistent

testimony and lack of recall would not have changed

the outcome of the proceeding in light of Pederson’s

testimony. Id., 433–34. Consequently, the Appellate

Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. Id., 435.

Thereafter, this court granted certification to appeal,
limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court

properly dismiss the petitioner’s habeas appeal on the

ground that he had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong

of Strickland v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687]?’’

Staton v. Commissioner of Correction, 311 Conn. 942,

89 A.3d 352 (2014). ‘‘Our examination of the record and

briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the

parties persuade us that the judgment of the Appellate

Court should be affirmed. Because the Appellate

Court’s well reasoned opinion fully addresses the certified issue, it would serve no purpose for us to repeat

the discussion contained therein. We therefore adopt

the Appellate Court’s opinion as the proper statement

of the issue and the applicable law concerning that

issue.’’ Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v.

Federal Ins. Co., 317 Conn. 46, 51, 115 A.3d 458 (2015).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

1 The habeas court also denied the petitioner’s request for certification

to appeal.