### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 30238 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
ANTHONY JOSEPH MEAUX , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:17

- CR

- 179

- 1

Before WIENER, COSTA, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Defendant

- Appellant Anthony Joseph Meaux appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He c halleng es the denial of a motion to suppress, contend ing that the warrantless search of his girlfriend’s car, where the gun was found in the trunk, violated the Fourth Amendment. The search was conducted by his parole officer , Brad Poole, pursuant to a

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 18, 2020 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/18/2020No. 19

- 30238

2 condition of Meaux’s parole which allowed vehicle searches on reasonable suspicion that he was engaging or had engaged in criminal activity. We review the dist rict court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions on the constitutionality of the search de novo. United States v. Powell , 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here t he Government. See i d

. We may affirm the ruling “on any basis established by the record.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Meaux’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the car , which he drove by himself to a meeting with Poole , was significantly diminished by his knowing agreement to the parole condition imposed in accordance with state law. S ee L A

. R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i) (2015) ; Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 843 , 852 (20 06) ; United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119

- 20 (2001). Given his diminished privacy interest , the likelihood that he would recidivate as a parolee, the State’s overwhelming interest in ensuring that he was apprehended for any crimes committed wh ile on parole , and its interest promoting his reintegration into society through reduced recidivism , the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion that Meaux was engaging or had engaged in criminal activity. S ee Samson , 547 U.S. at 852

- 5 5, 857; Knights , 534 U.S. at 119

- 21. We conclude that reasonable suspicion support ed the search based on the following: Poole’s possession of an active warrant for Meaux’s arrest on a charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle; a ti p Poole received from detectives with the Crowley Police Department that Meaux was the suspect in a recent armed robbery; Poole’s knowledge of Meaux’s history of armed robbery charges and simple robbery convictions ; Poole’s long relationship with Meaux and 15 years of experience as a parole officer; and Poole’s observation that Meaux was Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/18/2020No. 19

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3 uncharacteristically nervous and unusually insistent that his girlfriend pick up her car immediately from the parole office when Poole arrested him on the warrant, which ca used Poole to suspect that there was evidence of a crime in the car. See Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) ; United States v. Taylor , 482 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Keith , 375 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2004). Contrary to Mea ux’s contentions , Poole’s authority to conduct the parole search was not limited to the passenger compartment of the vehicle . T he relevant condition of parole authorized a search of the “vehicle” on reasonable suspicion that Meaux was engaging or had enga ged in criminal activity. The condition itself is a “salient circumstance” in determining the reasonableness of the search. Knights , 534 U.S. at 118

- 20; see also Samson , 547 U.S. at 852 (assessing reasonableness of the search according to terms of parole search condition).
N either was Poole prohibited from relying on a secondhand tip from the Crowley detectives that Meaux was involved in a recent armed robbery. See Griffin , 483 U.S. at 879

- 80 (determining that it is reasonable for a probation offi cer to rely on “information provided by a police officer, whether or not on the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search”) (footnote omitted); United States v. Williams , 880 F.3d 713, 720 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 2590 (2018 ) (noting that tips from other law enforcement officers are sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a probation search). Poole’s

purpose for conducting the search was irrelevant. See Knights , 534 U.S. at 122; United States v. Causey , 834 F.2d 1179 , 1184

- 85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
W e conclude that the search of the car’s trunk was a lawful parole search,

so we need not consider the reasonableness of the search on any other ground Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/18/2020No. 19

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4 raised by the Government or implicated by the facts. See Powell , 732 F.3d at
369

. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/18/2020