NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 21-1102

______

ISAIAS BELTRE MATOS,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

___________

On Petition for Review of a

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A079-739-512)

Immigration Judge: Matthew Watters

___________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 15, 2021

___________

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 27, 2022)

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OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

While he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, Isaias Beltre 

Matos, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, worked with others to buy and 

sell personally identifiable information belonging to United States citizens. That 

information was sold in sets consisting of Puerto Rican birth certificates and 

corresponding social security cards, as well as other identification documents, including 

driver’s licenses and voter registration cards. With those documents, a non-citizen could 

assume the identity of a United States citizen, and over 100 non-citizens within the 

United States bought those document sets. For his role in that scheme, Beltre Matos 

pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, conspiracy to encourage an alien to reside in the 

United States for financial gain, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), among other related 

crimes, and he was sentenced to fifty-one months’ imprisonment. 

Due to that conviction, the Department of Homeland Security commenced 

removal proceedings against Beltre Matos. An Immigration Judge determined that Beltre 

Matos’s crime constituted an aggravated felony and, on that basis, ordered his removal. 

That order also caused Beltre Matos to lose his status as a lawful permanent resident. In 

addition, the Immigration Judge ruled that Beltre Matos’s conduct constituted alien 

smuggling, and that rendered Beltre Matos ineligible to regain his status as a lawful 

permanent resident. Beltre Matos administratively appealed that order, and the Board of 

Immigration Appeals adopted the Immigration Judge’s conclusions. 
3

Through a timely petition, Beltre Matos invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to review 

two legal conclusions in the final order: that his conviction constitutes an aggravated 

felony and that his underlying conduct qualifies as alien smuggling. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (preserving jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims” and “questions 

of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals”). In 

reviewing those conclusions de novo, see Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 

2010), the first is correct (because Beltre Matos’s crime constitutes an aggravated 

felony), but the second is not (because his conduct falls outside of the statutory definition 

of “alien smuggling,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i)). Accordingly, we will deny the 

petition in part, grant the petition in part, and remand to the agency so that it may 

consider Beltre Matos’s adjustment-of-status application. 

I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

Non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents, who are convicted of a 

statutorily defined “aggravated felony”1are subject to a string of cascading deportation 

consequences. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (noting that 

aggravated felons are “singled out for the harshest deportation consequences”). Such a 

person not only becomes deportable2 but also loses the ability to seek several forms of 

relief from deportation, such as asylum, cancellation of removal, and depending on the 

1 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (specifying certain crimes as aggravated felonies).

2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony 

at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
4

length of the sentence, statutory withholding of removal.3 See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 

839 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016). And a non-citizen with lawful-permanent-resident 

status loses that status if ordered deported or removed.

4

 

But not every aggravated-felony conviction affects a non-citizen’s admissibility. 

See Parra-Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 747 F.3d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2014). Rather, a non-citizen 

becomes inadmissible as a result of committing certain criminal offenses5 or violating 

certain immigration laws, including the prohibition on alien smuggling.

6 An inadmissible 

non-citizen is ineligible for adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent resident.7

Critically, however, a non-citizen who has committed an aggravated felony but who 

remains admissible and otherwise meets the eligibility requirements for an adjustment of 

status8 may apply to adjust his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident – even 

3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (precluding asylum for aliens who have been 

convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” which includes aggravated felonies); id.

§ 1229b(a)(3) (providing that conviction for “any aggravated felony” renders aliens 

ineligible for cancellation of removal); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that an alien 

convicted of one or more aggravated felonies with an aggregate prison sentence of at 

least five years is barred from seeking withholding of removal). 

4 See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p) (providing that a lawful-permanent-resident status “terminates 

upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, removal, or 

recission”).

5 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes of moral turpitude), (II) (drug crimes).

6 See id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). 

7 See id. § 1255(a) (providing that any inadmissible alien is ineligible for an adjustment 

of status). 

8 See id. (providing that an adjustment of status may be granted in the discretion of the 

Attorney General to aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant visa and are 

“admissible to the United States for permanent residence”). 
5

if he or she is subject to a final order of removal. See Parra-Rojas, 747 F.3d at 166, 172. 

The ultimate decision to grant an adjustment of status rests in the exercise of the Attorney 

General’s discretion.

9

II. DISCUSSION

During his removal proceedings, Beltre Matos, who proceeded pro se, addressed 

the consequences that his conviction had on his removability and admissibility. He 

argued that his crime did not constitute an aggravated felony. He also indicated an 

intention to apply for an adjustment of status in case he was ordered removed and lost 

status as a lawful permanent resident as a result. He further explained that his wife – who 

is a U.S. citizen – began that adjustment-of-status process by filing an I-130 Form on his 

behalf. The Immigration Judge, and later the BIA, rejected both of Beltre Matos’s efforts 

by concluding that (i) his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and (ii) he was

ineligible for adjustment of status because his conduct constituted alien smuggling, which 

rendered him inadmissible. 

A. Beltre Matos’s Conviction Qualifies as an Aggravated Felony.

In general, the crime of conspiring to encourage a non-citizen to reside in the 

United States for financial gain under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) constitutes an aggravated

felony. As statutorily defined, the term “aggravated felony” expressly cross-references 

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A): 

9 See id.; Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 109 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the final 

decision to adjust status is left to the discretion of the Attorney General”). 
6

[A]n offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this 

title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for 

which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the 

offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s 

spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of 

this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). The term “aggravated felony” also includes a “conspiracy to 

commit an offense described in this paragraph.” See id. § 1101(a)(43)(U). Thus, the 

general rule is that the crime of conspiring to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) constitutes 

an aggravated felony, subject to a limited exception for first-time offenders who conspire 

to sell identity documents to a spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual). See id.

§ 1101(a)(43)(N), (U). Applying those principles here, because Beltre Matos offers no 

proof that the exception applies, his conviction for conspiracy to violate § 1324(a)(1)(A) 

qualifies as an aggravated felony.

Beltre Matos challenges that outcome and offers an alternative reading of the 

immigration statute. He contends that the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N), “relating to 

alien smuggling,” means that only violations of § 1324(a)(1)(A) related to alien 

smuggling constitute aggravated felonies. And because he did not smuggle aliens, Beltre 

Matos submits that his § 1324(a)(1)(A) conviction cannot be for an aggravated felony. 

But this Court has already considered and precedentially rejected that construction. In 

response to the same argument, this Court held that the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N) 

does not narrow the qualifying offenses in § 1324(a)(1)(A) but rather “is descriptive of all

of the offenses contained in” § 1324(a)(1)(A). Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 473 (3d 

Cir. 2002).
7

Thus, due to his conviction, Beltre Matos is removable as an aggravated felon. 

And by regulation, the final order subjecting him to removal strips him of his status as a 

lawful permanent resident. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p).

B. Beltre Matos’s Underlying Conduct Does Not Constitute Alien Smuggling.

The so-called ‘smuggling bar’ prevents a non-citizen from adjusting his status.

A non-citizen becomes inadmissible by knowingly encouraging, inducing, assisting, 

abetting, or aiding any other non-citizen “to enter or to try to enter the United States in 

violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (emphasis added). And an inadmissible 

non-citizen is ineligible for a discretionary adjustment of status. See id. § 1255(a). The 

application of the smuggling bar depends on the non-citizen’s “underlying conduct,” not 

any specific conviction. Parra-Rojas, 747 F.3d at 168–69.

The Immigration Judge misapplied the smuggling bar to Beltre Matos. The 

smuggling bar applies to aliens who knowingly assist, induce, or encourage another alien 

to cross the border into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). But Beltre 

Matos’s underlying conduct involved providing identity documents to aliens already 

residing in the United States – not to those outside of the United States. Because his 

underlying conduct does not constitute alien smuggling, the smuggling bar does not 

preclude his application for an adjustment of status. 

* * *

In sum, we will (i) partially deny Beltre Matos’s petition (because the order to 

remove Beltre Matos was correct as a matter of law), and (ii) partially grant his petition 

to vacate the order’s improper application of the smuggling bar and remand this matter to 
8

the agency to consider Beltre Matos’s adjustment-of-status application, the resolution of 

which rests in the discretion of the Attorney General.