Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65005

CFR part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714,

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or

electronically on the Internet at the NRC

Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/

index.html. If there are problems in

accessing the document, contact the

Public Document Room Reference staff

at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or

by E-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. If a request

for a hearing or petition for leave to

intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the

above date. A copy of the petition

should also be sent to the Office of the

General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, and to General

Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,

ET 11A, 400 West Summit Hill Drive,

Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

Further details with respect to this

action may be found in the application

for amendment dated September 21,

2001, which is available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, located at One White

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first

floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly

available records will be accessible from

the Agencywide Documents Access and

Management Systems (ADAMS) Public

Electronic Reading Room on the Internet

at the NRC Web site, http://

www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html.

Persons who do not have access to

ADAMS, or who encounter problems in

accessing the documents located in

ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public

Document Room Reference staff by

telephone at 1–800–397–4209, 301–

415–4737 or by E-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ronald W. Hernan,

Senior Project Manager, Section 2, Project

Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–30970 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–390]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

is considering issuance of an

amendment to Facility Operating

License No. NPF–90 issued to the

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the

licensee) for operation of the Watts Bar

Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1, located in

Rhea County, Tennessee.

The proposed amendment would

change Technical Specifications (TSs) to

allow WBN to provide incore irradiation

services for the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE). This change would allow

TVA to insert up to 2304 tritiumproducing burnable absorber rods

65006 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

(TPBARs) into the reactor core to

support DOE in maintaining the nation’s

tritium inventory for national defense

purposes. Each WBN core contains 193

fuel assemblies and each fuel assembly

contains 264 fuel rods. In this

amendment request, TVA proposes to

insert up to 24 TPBARs in selected fuel

assemblies (adjacent to but not in place

of the 264 fuel rods). The TPBARS

absorb neutrons and are similar to (and

would replace) normal burnable neutron

absorber rods that serve to shape

neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs

contain no fissile material and will be

installed in fuel assemblies where

burnable absorber rods are normally

placed in selected fuel assemblies.

Therefore, the TPBARs would fill the

same role as burnable absorber rods in

the operation of the reactor. However,

most of the neutron absorber (lithium)

in the TPBARs still remains at the end

of core life as compared to normal

burnable neutron absorbers (boron or

gadolinium). Therefore, the proposed

license amendment involves increasing

the required boron concentration for

both the cold-leg accumulators (TS

3.5.1) and the refueling water storage

tank (TS 3.5.4), removing the Region 2

burnup credit racks in the spent fuel

pool and clarifying fuel storage

restrictions (TSs 3.7.15 and 4.3.3),

adding a limit on the number of

TPBARs that can be irradiated (TS

Section 4.2.1), and implementing a

TPBAR consolidation activity. This

submittal also provides proposed

revisions to the associated TS Bases to

modify the switchover time for

containment sump to hot leg

recirculation (TS B3.5.2) and to modify

the hydrogen recombiner section to

properly describe the possible sources

of hydrogen gas (TS B3.6.7). The

uranium-235 (U–235) enrichment of fuel

assemblies containing TPBARs must be

increased to no more than 4.95 weight

percent to compensate for the higher

neutron absorbing properties of the

lithium-7 in the TPBARs. The NRC has

previously approved maximum U–235

fuel enrichments of 5.0 weight percent

for WBN Unit 1. Five percent

enrichment is the NRC’s upper limit for

reactor licensing. Therefore,

enrichments resulting from the

proposed amendment are bounded by

the current WBN Operating License and

licensing basis.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendments, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration in its application

dated August 20, 2001, which is

presented below:

A. The proposed amendment does not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

1. TS 3.5.1—Cold Leg Accumulator—Boron

Concentration Increase

The accumulator boron concentration does

not affect any initiating event for accidents

currently evaluated in the Updated Final

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The

increased concentrations will not adversely

affect the performance of any system or

component which is placed in contact with

the accumulator water. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the accumulator and affected Nuclear Steam

Supply System (NSSS) components/systems

will be maintained. The decrease in solution

pH is small and will not degrade the stainless

steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E

instrumentation and control equipment will

be maintained since the lower sump pH,

resulting from the increased boron

concentrations, is still within the applicable

equipment qualification limits. These limits

are set to preclude the possibility of

chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking

and assure that there is no significant

degradation of polymer materials. The

design, material and construction standards

of all components which are placed in

contact with the accumulator water remain

unaffected. Therefore, the possibility

[probability] of an accident has not been

[significantly] increased.

The consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not

be [significantly] increased. The change in

the concentrations increase the amount of

boron in the sump during a Loss of Coolant

Accident (LOCA). The increased boron in the

sump is sufficient to maintain the core in a

subcritical condition. Testing has indicated

that TPBARs can experience cladding breach

at Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) conditions if

the cladding temperature and internal

pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting

values. Consequently, the post-LOCA critical

boron calculations account[ed] for the

potential loss of a LiAlO2 [lithium aluminate]

pencil, as well as partial leaching of lithium

from the remaining pencils. Based on

conservative assumptions, the calculations

confirm that the tritium production core will

remain subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a

revised hot leg switchover time has been

calculated and will be implemented in the

plant Emergency Operating Procedures

(EOPs). Thus, there will be no boron

precipitation in the core following a

LBLOCA.

The only non-LOCA event that assumes

accumulator actuation is the Major Rupture

of a Main Steamline event, however, it

assumes a minimum amount of boron.

Furthermore, there is no impact on the SGTR

[steam generator tube rupture] event since

the accumulators are not assumed to be

actuated, and the SLB [steam line break] M&E

[mass and energy] release evaluation relies

on control rods for shutdown margin and

assumes a minimum boron concentration.

In addition, the increase in accumulator

boron concentrations and subsequent slight

decrease in containment sump and spray pH

does not impact the LOCA dose evaluation

since the analysis of record does not credit

sump pH as an input or assumption

regarding volatile iodine removal

efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis

remains bounding. Also, the slight decrease

in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been

evaluated to not significantly impact the

corrosion rate (and subsequent generation of

Hydrogen) of Aluminum and Zinc inside

containment. Further, the decreased sump,

core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated

to not affect the amount of hydrogen

generated from the post-LOCA radiolytic

decomposition of the sump and core

solution. The likelihood of containment

failure due to hydrogen deflagration is

therefore not impacted by pH changes.

In view of the preceding, it is concluded

that the proposed change will not

[significantly] increase the radiological

[probability or] consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the FSAR.

2. TS 3.5.4 and the Associated TS Bases

Page—Refueling Water Storage Tank

(RWST)—Boron Concentration Increase

The RWST boron concentration does not

affect any initiating event for accidents

currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The

increased concentration will not adversely

affect the performance of any system or

component which is placed in contact with

the RWST water. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the RWST and affected NSSS components/

systems will be maintained. The decrease in

solution pH is small and will not degrade the

stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class

1E instrumentation and control equipment

will be maintained since the lower sump pH,

resulting from the increased boron

concentrations, is still within the applicable

equipment qualification limits. These limits

are set to preclude the possibility of

chloride[-induced stress corrosion cracking

and assure that there is no significant

degradation of polymer materials. The

design, material and construction standards

of all components which are placed in

contact with the RWST water remain

unaffected. Therefore, the probability of an

accident has not changed.

The consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not

be [significantly] increased. The change in

the concentrations increases the amount of

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65007

boron in the sump following a LOCA. The

increased boron in the sump is sufficient to

maintain the core in a subcritical condition.

This analysis assumes partial leaching.

Testing has indicated that TPBARs can

experience cladding breach at LBLOCA

conditions if the cladding temperature and

internal pressure of the TPBARs reach

limiting values. Consequently, the postLOCA critical boron calculations accounted

for the potential loss of a LiAlO2 pencil, as

well as partial leaching of lithium from the

remaining pencils. Based on conservative

assumptions, the calculations confirm that

the tritium production core will remain

subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a revised

hot leg switchover time has been calculated

and will be implemented in the plant EOPs.

Thus, there will be no boron precipitation in

the core following a LOCA.

The Inadvertent Operation of Emergency

Core Cooling System (ECCS) event is the only

non-LOCA event which assumes the

maximum RWST boron concentration, and

an evaluation has shown that the proposed

increase does not cause an adverse impact on

this transient.

The Steam Line Break (SLB) mass and

energy (M&E) release evaluation relies on

control rods for shutdown margin and

assumes a minimum boron concentration.

For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture

(SGTR) event, the increased boron

concentration will help maintain adequate

shutdown margin, which will be evaluated as

part of the reload process.

In addition, the increase in RWST boron

concentrations and subsequent slight

decrease in containment sump and spray pH

does not impact the LOCA dose evaluation.

While higher pH helps maintain volatile

iodine in solution and lower pH drives the

equilibrium to favor volatile iodine in a

gaseous state, the change in sump pH is not

sufficient to result in any measurable change

in post LOCA releases.

Furthermore, current radiological analyses

do not take credit for volatile iodine removal

efficiencies based on sump pH. Therefore,

since the change in pH is minimal, and no

credit is taken in release analysis, the present

analysis remains bounding. Also, the slight

decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH

has been evaluated to not significantly

impact the corrosion rate (and subsequent

generation of Hydrogen) of Aluminum and

Zinc inside containment and the present

analysis remains bounding. Further, the

decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has

been evaluated to not affect the amount of

hydrogen generated from the radiolytic

decomposition of the sump and core solution

and therefore will not challenge containment

integrity.

In view of the preceding, it is concluded

that the proposed change will not

[significantly] increase the radiological

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated in the FSAR.

3. TS 3.7.15 and the Associated TS Bases

Pages—Plant Systems/Spent Fuel Assembly

Storage

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in TS section 4.3.3 are not

currently installed in the plant. Since the

time that these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Therefore, since they are not

installed, there is no [significant] increase in

the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

4. TS 4.2.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

The insertion of TPBARs into the WBN

reactor core does not adversely affect reactor

neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance;

therefore, they do not significantly increase

the probability of accidents or equipment

malfunctions while in the reactor. The

neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics

that of standard burnable absorbers with only

slight differences which are accommodated

in the core design. The reload safety analysis

performed for WBN Unit 1 prior to each

refueling cycle will confirm that any minor

effects of TPBARS on the reload core will be

within fuel design limits.

As described in the [Department of

Energy’s] TPC [Tritium Production Core]

Topical [Report, NDP–98–181, Revision 1],

the TPBAR design is robust to all accident

conditions except the large break LOCA

where the rods are susceptible to failure.

However, the failure of TPBARs has been

determined to have an insignificant effect on

the thermal hydraulic response of the core to

this event, and analysis has shown that the

core will remain subcritical following a

LOCA.

The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological

consequences for all evaluated events are

very small, and they remain within [well

below]10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The

additional offsite doses due to tritium are

small with respect to LOCA source terms and

are well within regulatory limits.

The TPBAR could result in an increase in

combustible gas released to the containment

in a large break LOCA. This increase was

found to be approximately 1474 scf [standard

cubic feet] which remains within the

capability of the recombiners.

Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not

expected to fail during Condition I through

IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the

UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation

and operational transients, Condition II being

faults of moderate frequency, Condition III

being infrequent faults, and Condition IV

being limiting faults]. TPBARs may fail

during a LBLOCA or as a result of fuel

handling accident. The radiological

consequences of these events are [well]

within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is

no significant increase in the [probability or]

consequences of these previously evaluated

accidents.

5. TS 4.3.3—Design Features/Fuel Storage/

Capacity

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in this TS section are not currently

installed in the plant. Since the time that

these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Due to the deletion of the

Region 2 racks, the additional detail provided

clarifies existing storage restrictions.

Therefore, since they are not installed, there

is no [significant] increase in the probability

or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

6. TS Bases 3.5.2—Emergency Core Cooling

Systems/ECCS Operating

Due to the increase of the boron

concentration in the RWST and the

accumulators, initial mixed boron

concentrations are higher and the

precipitation concentration is reached

sooner. As a result, the hot leg switchover is

being shortened. However, the time being

shortened does not change the switchover

function. Therefore, this change does not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

7. TS Bases 3.6.7—Hydrogen Recombiners

This change is administrative in nature and

involves only identifying another source of

hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases. The

functions for the hydrogen recombiners

remain the same. Therefore, this change does

not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

TPBAR consolidation and associated

handling activities are designed to be

consistent with the existing fuel handling

and heavy load handling processes and

equipment currently utilized at the facility,

and are designed to preclude increased

probability of an accident previously

evaluated.

Consequences of a fuel handling accident

for fuel containing TPBARs is evaluated and

does not result in exceeding [or even

approaching] 10 CFR Part 100 limits for offsite dose. All consolidation and heavy load

handling activities are designed such that the

current fuel handling accident scenario

remains bounding. Therefore the

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated remains within acceptable limits.

B. The proposed amendment does not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

1. TS 3.5.1—Cold Leg Accumulator—Boron

Concentration Increase

The change to the accumulator

concentration does not cause the initiation of

any accident nor create any new credible

limiting single failure. The change does not

result in a condition where the design,

material, and construction standards of the

accumulators and other potentially affected

NSSS components, that were applicable prior

to the changes, are altered. The integrity and

operability of the stainless steel surfaces in

the accumulator and affected NSSS

components/systems will be maintained. The

decrease in solution pH is small and will not

degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity

of the Class 1E instrumentation and control

equipment will be maintained during a

LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting

from the increased boron concentrations, is

still within the applicable equipment

qualification limits. These limits are set to

preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced

stress corrosion cracking and assure that

there is no significant degradation of polymer

materials.

The changes in the concentrations increase

the amount of boron in the sump following

65008 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is

sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical

condition. Also, a revised hot leg switchover

time has been calculated and will be

implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there

will be no boron precipitation in the core

following a LOCA.

All systems, structures, and components

previously required for the mitigation of an

event remain capable of fulfilling their

intended design function. The proposed

change has no adverse affect on any safetyrelated system or component and does not

challenge the performance or integrity of any

safety related system. Therefore, the

proposed change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page—

RWST—Boron Concentration Increase

The change to the RWST concentration

does not cause the initiation of any accident

nor create any new credible limiting single

failure. The change does not result in a

condition where the design, material, and

construction standards of the RWST and

other potentially affected NSSS components,

that were applicable prior to the changes, are

altered. The integrity and operability of the

stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and

affected NSSS components/systems will be

maintained. The decrease in solution pH is

small and will not degrade the stainless steel.

Also, the integrity of the Class 1E

instrumentation and control equipment will

be maintained during a LOCA since the

lower sump pH, resulting from the increased

boron concentrations, is still within the

applicable equipment qualification limits.

These limits are set to preclude the

possibility of chloride-induced stress

corrosion cracking and assure that there is no

significant degradation of polymer materials.

The changes in the concentrations increase

the amount of boron in the sump following

a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is

sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical

condition. Also, a revised hot leg switchover

time has been calculated and will be

implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there

will be no boron precipitation in the core

following a LOCA.

All systems, structures, and components

previously required for the mitigation of an

event remain capable of fulfilling their

intended design function. The proposed

change has no adverse affect on any safetyrelated system or component and does not

challenge the performance or integrity of any

safety[-]related system. Therefore, the

proposed change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages—

Plant Systems/Spent Fuel Assembly Storage

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in section 4.3.3 are not currently

installed in the plant. Since the time that

these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Therefore, since they are not

installed, this change would not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

4. TS 4.2.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

TPBARS have been designed to be

compatible with existing Westinghouse

17x17 fuel assemblies and conventional

Burnable Poison Rod Assembly (BPRA)

handling tools, equipment, and procedures,

and therefore, no new [or different kind of]

accidents or equipment malfunctions are

created by the handling of TPBARs * * *

TPBARs use materials with known and

predictable performance characteristics and

are compatible with pressurized water

reactor (PWR) coolant. The TPBAR design

has specifically included material similar to

those used in standard burnable absorber

rods with the exception of internal

assemblies used in the production and

retention of tritium. As described in the TPC

Topical Report, these materials are

compatible with the reactor coolant system

(RCS) and core design. Therefore, no new [or

different kind of] accidents or equipment

malfunctions are created by the presence of

the TPBARs in the RCS.

Mechanical design criteria have been

established to ensure that TPBARs will not

fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis

has shown that TPBARs, appropriately

positioned in the core operate within the

established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to

the expected high reliability of TPBAR

components the frequency of TPBAR

cladding failures is very small, such that

multiple adjacent TPBAR failures in limiting

locations is not considered credible. In

addition, analysis has shown that if a single

TPBAR fails catastrophically in a high power

location during normal operation and the

lithium is leached out, the global reactivity

increase is negligible and the local power

peaking is small enough that DNBR

[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits

and fuel rod integrity are not challenged.

Therefore, no new [or different kind of]

accidents or equipment malfunctions are

created by the presence of the TPBARs in the

reactor.

Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not

fail during Condition III and IV events.

TPBARs may fail during a cold leg large

break loss-of-coolant-accident or as a result of

a fuel handling accident. The radiological

consequences of these events are within 10

CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no

significant increase in consequences of these

previously evaluated accidents.

TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor

neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance;

therefore they do not create the possibility of

accidents or equipment malfunctions of a

[new or] different type than previously

evaluated while in the reactor.

5.TS 4.3.3—Design Features/Fuel Storage/

Capacity

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in this section are not currently

installed in the plant. Since the time that

these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Due to the deletion of the

Region 2 racks, the additional detail provided

clarifies existing storage restrictions.

Therefore, since they are not installed, this

change would not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any

accident previously evaluated.

6. Bases 3.5.2—Emergency Core Cooling

Systems/ECCS Operating

Due to the increase of the boron

concentration in the RWST and the

accumulators, initial mixed boron

concentrations are higher and the

precipitation concentration is reached

sooner. As a result, the hot leg switchover

value is being shortened. This time being

shortened does not change the switchover

function. Therefore, this change does not

create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

7. Bases 3.6.7—Hydrogen Recombiners

This change is administrative in nature and

only involves only identifying another source

of hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases. The

functions for the hydrogen recombiners

remain the same. Therefore, this change does

not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity—

The consolidation and handling activities

are bounded by current fuel handling

evaluations. Therefore, this proposed

amendment does not create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from any

previously evaluated.

C. The proposed amendment does not

involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

1. TS 3.5.1—Cold Leg Accumulator—Boron

Concentration Increase

The change does not invalidate any of the

non-LOCA safety analysis results or

conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety

analysis acceptance criteria continue to be

met. The licensing basis SBLOCA analyses

does not credit the accumulator boron and is

not affected by the proposed change.

Therefore, there is no reduction in the

margin to the Peak clad temperature (PCT)

limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase

in the Best Estimate LBLOCA PCT; therefore,

there continues to be a high level of

probability that the ECCS acceptance criteria

limit is not exceeded with regard to the

LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron

concentration is sufficient to maintain

subcriticality during the LBLOCA, and a

post-LOCA long term core cooling analysis

demonstrated that the post-LOCA sump

boron concentration is sufficient to prevent

recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover

time, which will be implemented in the

EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The

licensing basis containment and SLB M&E

releases remain bounding, and the SGTR

event acceptance criteria continue to be met.

Furthermore, the changes do not affect the

safety[-]related performance of the

accumulator or related NSSS components.

Therefore, there is no significant reduction in

the margin of safety.

2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page—

RWST—Boron Concentration Increase

The change does not invalidate any of the

non-LOCA safety analysis results or

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices 65009

conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety

analysis acceptance criteria continue to be

met. The licensing basis SBLOCA analyses

does not credit the RWST boron and is not

affected by the proposed change. Therefore,

there is no reduction in the margin to the

PCT limit for the SBLOCA. There is no

increase in the Best Estimate LBLOCA PCT;

therefore, there continues to be a high level

of probability that the ECCS acceptance

criteria limit is not exceeded with regard to

the LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron

concentration is sufficient to prevent

recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover

time, which will be implemented in the

EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The

licensing basis containment and SLB M&E

releases remain bounding, and the SGTR

event acceptance criteria continue to be met.

Furthermore, the changes do not affect the

safety[-]related performance of the RWST or

related NSSS components. Therefore, there is

no significant reduction in the margin of

safety.

3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages—

Plant Systems/Spent Fuel Assembly Storage

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in section 4.3.3 are not currently

installed in the plant. Since the time that

these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Therefore, since they are not

installed, this change would not involve a

[significant] reduction in a margin of safety.

4. TS 4.2.1—Design Features/Reactor Core/

Fuel Assemblies

TPBARs have been designed to be

compatible with existing fuel assemblies.

TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor

neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance.

Analysis indicates that reactor core behavior

and offsite doses remain relatively

unchanged. For these reasons, the proposed

amendment does not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

5. TS 4.3.3—Design Features/Fuel Storage/

Capacity

The Region 2 burnup credit racks

described in section 4.3.3 are not currently

installed in the plant. Since the time that

these racks were licensed, TVA has

determined not to install or utilize this

storage option. Due to the deletion of the

Region 2 racks, the additional detail provided

clarifies existing storage restrictions and does

not reduce the margin of safety in existing

storage requirements. Therefore, since they

are not installed, this change would not

involve a [significant] reduction in a margin

of safety.

6. Bases 3.5.2—Emergency Core Cooling

Systems/ECCS Operating

Due to the increase of the boron

concentration in the RWST and the

accumulators, initial mixed boron

concentrations are higher and the

precipitation concentration is reached

sooner. As a result, the hot leg switchover

value is being shortened. This time being

shortened does not change the switchover

function. Therefore, this change does not

involve a [significant] reduction in the

margin of safety.

7. Bases 3.6.7—Hydrogen Recombiners

This change is administrative in nature and

only involves only identifying another source

of hydrogen gas (tritium) in the bases. The

functions for the hydrogen recombiners

remain the same. Therefore, this change does

not involve a [significant] reduction in the

margin of safety.

8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

The changes do not significantly affect the

safety[-]related performance of any plant

operations, system, structures, or

components. The consolidation activity is

bounded by current fuel handling

evaluations. Therefore, there is no [does not

involve a] significant reduction in the margin

of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the no

significant hazards consideration

analysis provided by TVA with respect

to the three criteria listed in 10 CFR

50.92(c). The staff’s safety evaluation is

in its early stages and will require

several months to complete. However,

in terms of 10 CFR 50.92(c), the staff

finds that the TVA application

addresses all applicable accidents

discussed in the UFSAR, including

LOCAs, SGTRs, and fuel handling

considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS

for the purpose of producing tritium

(which is sealed inside the TPBARs)

requires a higher degree of fuel

enrichment with U–235. Because the

TPBARs neither contain fissile material

nor replace normal reactor fuel, and

because the TPBARs will not adversely

affect reactor neutronic or thermalhydraulic performance, their presence

in the core should have no effect upon

the probability or consequences of

previously analyzed accidents,

including fuel handling accidents. For

the same reasons, the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident would

not be expected to result from

irradiation of the TPBARS in the WBN

reactor core. TVA’s analysis of a

possible reduction in safety margins

addressed PCT limits resulting from an

SBLOCA and the increased boron

concentration to maintain subcriticality.

Based on the NRC staff’s review of the

analysis provided by the licensee, it

appears that the three standards of 10

CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the

NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, and should cite the publication

date and page number of this Federal

Register notice. Written comments may

also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two

White Flint North, 11545 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30

a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Documents may be examined, and/or

copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public

Document Room, located at One White

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first

floor), Rockville, Maryland.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By January 16, 2002, the licensee may

file a request for a hearing with respect

to issuance of the amendment to the

subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

CFR part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714,

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or

electronically on the Internet at the NRC

Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/

index.html. If there are problems in

accessing the document, contact the

Public Document Room Reference staff

at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or

by E-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. If a request

for a hearing or petition for leave to

intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

65010 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 242 / Monday, December 17, 2001 / Notices

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, located at One

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the

above date. A copy of the petition

should also be sent to the Office of the

General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, and to General

Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,

ET 11A, 400 West Summit Hill Drive,

Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

Further details with respect to this

action may be found in the application

for amendment dated August 20, 2001,

which is available for public inspection

at the Commission’s Public Document

Room, located at One White Flint North,

11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),

Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available

records will be accessible from the

Agencywide Documents Access and

Management Systems (ADAMS) Public

Electronic Reading Room, or

electronically on the Internet at the NRC

Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/

index.html. Persons who do not have

access to ADAMS, or who encounter

problems in accessing the documents

located in ADAMS, should contact the

NRC Public Document Room Reference

staff by telephone at 1–800–397–4209,

301–415–4737 or by E-mail to

pdr@nrc.gov.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of December 2001.

L. Mark Padovan,

Project Manager, Section 2, Project

Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 01–30971 Filed 12–14–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Sunshine Federal Register Notice

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.

DATES: Weeks of December 17, 24, 31,

2001, January 7, 14, 21, 2002.

PLACE: Commissioners’ Conference

Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland.

STATUS: Public and Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Week of December 17, 2001

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of December 17, 2001.

Week of December 24, 2001—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of December 24, 2001.

Week of December 31, 2001—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of December 31, 2001.

Week of January 7, 2002—Tentative

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

9:30 a.m. Meeting with Advisory

Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW)

(Public Meeting) (Contact: John Larkins,

301–415–7360).

This meeting will be webcast live at

the Web address—www.nrc.gov.

Week of January 14, 2002—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of Janaury 14, 2002.

Week of January 21, 2002—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of January 21, 2002.

* The schedule for Commission

meetings is subject to change on short

notice. To verify the status of meetings

call (recording)—(301) 415–1292.

Contact person for more information:

David Louis Gamberoni (301) 415–1651.

* * * * *

The NRC Commission Meeting

Schedule can be found on the Internet

at: www.nrc.gov

* * * * *

This notice is distributed by mail to

several hundred subscribers; if you no

longer wish to receive it, or would like