alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-10957

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEROME MACK HARDY,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:00-CR-443-ALL-D

--------------------

April 11, 2002

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jerome Mack Hardy appeals his conviction and sentence for

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g). He first argues that the district court erred

in sentencing him to the highest end of the applicable guidelines

range. This argument fails because there is no authority by

which a defendant may challenge where his sentence falls within a

properly calculated guidelines range. See United States v. Pena,

125 F.3d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. O’Banion, 943
No. 01-10957

-2-

** Hardy seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court

review.

F.2d 1422, 1431 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Byrd,

263 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 2001).

Hardy next argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction. Three elements are required to prove an

offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): “(1) that the defendant had

previously been convicted of a felony; (2) that he possessed a

firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected

interstate commerce.” United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258,

265 (5th Cir. 1997). Hardy challenges the third element, arguing

essentially that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally be

construed to cover the intrastate possession of a handgun merely

because it traveled across state lines at some unspecified point

in the past. As he concedes,** however, this argument is

foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th

Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1113 (2002).

Hardy has not demonstrated any error in the district court’s

judgment. Accordingly, that judgment is AFFIRMED.
## Dana DeBeauvoir Travis County Clerk PO Box 149325. Austin TX 78714-9325 Phone: (512) 854-9188 Website: www.traviscountyclerk.org March 20,2015 The Honorable Jeffrey D. Kyle Court ofAppeals Third District ofTexas P.O. Box 12547 Austin, TX 78711-2547 *DELIVERED VIA EMAIL* RE: Court ofAppeals Number: 03-15-00090-CR Trial Court Case Number: C-1-CR-14-100034 Style: Christopher Hayes Leverson v. The State ofTexas DearMr. Jeffrey D. Kyle: I am in receipt oftherequest for a supplemental clerk's record containingthe trial court's certification ofthe defendant'sright to appeal which is to be filed in the Third Court ofAppeals on orbefore 02-20-2015. Unfortunately, we are unable to produce the supplemental clerk's record containing the trial court's certification ofthe defendant's right to appeal as no such Sincerely, DanaDeBeauviour

Recording, Elections, Computer Resources, Accounting, and Administration Divisions 5501 Airport Boulevard. Austin. Texas 78751-1410 Misdemeanor Records, Civil/Probate/CommissionersCourt Minutes, and Records Management Divisions 1000 Guadalupe. Austin. Texas 78701-2328
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 31 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 31

To amend title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act to provide for a 
  definition of short-term limited duration insurance, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2021

  Mr. Biggs introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act to provide for a 
  definition of short-term limited duration insurance, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Health Coverage Choice Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF SHORT-TERM LIMITED DURATION INSURANCE.

    Section 2791(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg-
91(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(6) Short-term limited duration insurance.--The term 
        `short-term limited duration insurance' means health insurance 
        coverage provided under a contract with a health insurance 
        issuer that--
                    ``(A) has an expiration date specified in the 
                contract that is less than 12 months after the original 
                effective date of the contract; and
                    ``(B) has a duration of not more than 3 years 
                (taking into account renewals or extensions) after the 
                original effective date of the contract.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  Certification
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                                   As Adopted
                         Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                                   Sarbanes -
                                Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of American Oriental Bioengineering,
Inc. (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") on the date hereof
(the "Report"), the undersigned officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of his knowledge and belief:


         i.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         ii.  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and results of
              operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and will be furnished to the SEC or its staff
upon request.

/s/ Shujun Liu
------------------------------------
Shujun Liu
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
May 13, 2005




This Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is not "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but is instead furnished as provided by
applicable rules of the Securities Exchange Commission.
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EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-QSB of Bioaccelerate, Inc. (the
"Company") for the three months ended August 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Basil
Parker, President and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





                                        /s/ Basil Parker
                                        ------------------------------------
                                        Basil Parker
                                        President and Director
                                        October 15,2003
No. 898.

#### The Southern Pacific Company, Petitioner, *v.*Viscount De Valle Da Costa, Administrator, etc.

May 31, 1910.

*Mr. Moses Williams*and *Mr. William D. Turner*for the petitioner.

No appearance for the respondent.

Petition for a writ of cer-tiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
#### Nina ROBERTS, Consolidated Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BAYER HEALTHCARE, Bayer AG, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-11598

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 18, 2010.

Jeffrey J. Lowe, The Lowe Law Firm, Corey D. Sullivan, Carey & Danis, St. Louis, MO, Neil Duane Overholtz, Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Steven E. Derringer, Shayna Cook, Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar *&*Scott LLP, Eugene Schoon, Sidley Austin, Chicago, IL, Patricia Lowry, Barbara Bolton Litten, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., Guy E. Motzer, Steel, Hector & Davis, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, Lowell S. Fine, Alembik, Fine & Callner, Seth A. Litma, Alembik, Fine & Callnre, P.A., Atlanta, GA, Alan G. Schwartz, Wiggins & Dana, New Haven, CT, Rebecca K. Wood, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, Washington, DC Catherine Marie Valerio Bar-rad, Sidley & Austin, Los Angeles, CA, Erik W. Legg, Farrell, Farrell *&*Farrell PLLC, Huntington, WV, Brian A. Wahl, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, AL, Christopher Lopalo, Napoli Bern Ripka LLP, Great River, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The summary judgment granted in favor of the appellees is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment entered by the district court on March 5, 2010.

AFFIRMED.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Tim C. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-41134

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 23, 2010.

See also, 84 Fed.Appx. 425

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Tim C. Williams, Lompoc, CA, pro se.

Before JOLLY, GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Tim C. Williams, federal prisoner #84106-012, appeals the district court’s dismissal as untimely of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, challenging his conviction for conspiracy to launder money. *See*18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), (h). The district court granted Williams a certificate of ap-pealability on the issue “whether [the district court] can determine that *[United States v. Santos,*553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) ] is retroac*944tively applicable for purposes of [ ] § 2255(f)(3), and, if so, whether *Santos*is retroactively applicable such that Williams’ motion [was] timely filed under § 2255(f)(3).”

This court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. *United States v. Redd,*562 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 308, 175 L.Ed.2d 204 (2009). The limitation period for filing a § 2255 motion runs from, inter alia, “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” § 2255(f)(3). As the Government concedes, for purposes of retroactivity concerning the limitations period, any court can hold that a new rule applies retroactively; it need not be the Supreme Court. *See United States v. Lopez,*248 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir.2001).

Williams argues that in light of *Santos,*the conduct underlying his conviction for conspiracy to launder money was not criminal because the money at issue did not constitute “profits.” In *Garland v. Roy,*615 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir.2010), we recently held that *Santos*applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. As the Government concedes, Williams’s § 2255 motion was timely filed for purposes of § 2255(f)(3) because his § 2255 motion, filed in May 2009, was filed within one year of the June 2, 2008, *Santos*decision. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Williams’s § 2255 motion as barred by the statute of limitations, and we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings. We express no opinion on the issue of procedural bar, raised by the Government for the first time on appeal, or on the merits of Williams’s § 2255 motion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.
#### Sera FAKALAWA, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-72975.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*574Submitted May 20, 2008.*

Filed May 27, 2008.

Jenny Tsai, Esq., Green *&*Tsai, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, James A. Hunolt, Esq., Lindsay L. Chichester, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: PREGERSON, TASHIMA, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sera Fakalawa, a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *see INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), and we deny the petition.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Fakalawa has shown extraordinary circumstances to excuse the untimely filing of her asylum application. *See Ramadan v. Gonzales,*479 F.3d 646, 656-58 (9th Cir.2007); *see also*8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). Accordingly, we deny the petition as to Fakalawa’s asylum claim.

Because Fakalawa testified that she only fears a life of poverty if she were to return to Fiji, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion that *575Fakalawa did not establish a clear probability of persecution. *See Hoxha v. Ashcroft,*319 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir.2003). Accordingly, Fakalawa’s withholding of removal claim is denied.

Finally, because Fakalawa has not shown that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if she returned to Fiji, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s denial of CAT relief. *See Malhi v. INS,*336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Billy R. DICKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-30191

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 8, 2010.

Josette Louise Cassiere, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, James G. Cowles, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Billy R. Dickson, pro se.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Billy R. Dickson, federal prisoner # 10265-079, appeals the denial of his attempt to have his sentence reduced on the ground that the Government violated his plea agreement by allowing his sentence to be enhanced pursuant to the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines after promising to dismiss count two of the indictment.

Following his conviction in 2003, Dickson did not file a direct appeal or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He filed his first motion to reduce his sentence in 2009 and followed it with several other motions citing different provisions of federal law in an attempt to reduce his sentence.

Federal pleadings are construed “liberally according to ... substance rather than ... form or label.” *Hussain v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co.,*311 F.3d 623, 633 n. 39 (5th Cir.2002); *see also Andrade v. Gonzales,*459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir.2006) (construing pro se pleadings liberally). *932However, if a motion cannot be construed in such a way that relief is possible, it is a “meaningless, unauthorized motion” properly denied by the district court. *United States v. Early,*27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir.1994).

The district court correctly determined that Dickson was not entitled to relief under any of the exceptions to the rule of finality in 18 U.S.C. § 3582. He did not file a direct appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. *See*§ 3582(b). The Bureau of Prisons did not move to reduce his sentence. *See*§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Dickson did not file the motion to modify his sentence within 14 days of being sentenced. *See*§ 3582(c)(1)(B); Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). The Government did not move for a sentence reduction for substantial assistance. *See*§ 3582(c)(1)(B); Fed.R.CrimP. 35(b). Finally, the relevant guideline was not lowered after Dickson was sentenced. *See*§ 3582(c)(2). With respect to Dickson’s recent argument that he was entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the scope of the rules of civil procedure is limited to civil actions. Fed. R.CivP. 1.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.