UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4829

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SAID OMARI,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:08-cr-01254-TLW-1)

Submitted: August 4, 2010 Decided: August 16, 2010

Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William I. Diggs, THE LAW FIRM OF WILLIAM I. DIGGS, Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Said Omari pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, ecstasy, 

and 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846 (2006) (“Count One”), and possession of a firearm during 

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (“Count Three”). The district 

court sentenced Omari to seventy-two months’ imprisonment on 

Count One and sixty months’ imprisonment on Count Three, to be 

served consecutively. Omari’s sentence fell within his advisory 

guidelines range. Omari timely noted his appeal. 

On appeal, counsel for Omari has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In his 

Anders brief, counsel suggests that the district court erred in 

denying his request for a variance sentence.*

This court reviews a sentence imposed by a district 

court under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Evans, 

526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a sentence, we

must first ensure that the district court committed no 

procedural error. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If we find no 

 We affirm. 

 * Omari, informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental 

brief, has not done so.
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procedural error, we then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. We presume that a sentence 

within a properly calculated guidelines range is reasonable. 

See United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).

“When rendering a sentence, the district court must 

make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, a 

sentencing court must apply the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors to the particular facts presented and must 

“‘state in open court’” the particular reasons that support its 

chosen sentence. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006)). 

To meet this requirement, the district court must set forth 

enough to show a reasoned basis for its decision and 

consideration of the parties’ arguments. Id. “‘Where the 

defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for 

imposing a different sentence’ than that set forth in the 

advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s 

arguments and ‘explain why he has rejected those arguments.’” 

Id. (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)). 

Failure to do so constitutes procedural error. United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010). 

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court did not commit procedural error in sentencing 
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Omari. Additionally, Omari’s sentence is substantively 

reasonable, as it falls within his advisory guidelines range, 

and the record does not rebut the presumption of reasonableness 

that this court applies to such a sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Omari’s conviction and sentence. This court 

requires that counsel inform Omari, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Omari requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Omari.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED