United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-2895

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In re: Evette Nicole Reed

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor

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Ross H. Briggs

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant

v.

Honorable Charles E. Rendlen, III

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellee

Office of U.S. Trustee

lllllllllllllllllllllU.S. Trustee

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: September 25, 2019

Filed: December 3, 2019

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Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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 GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

Ross Briggs attempted to appeal two bankruptcy court orders to the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri by filing a single notice of

appeal. According to the district court, this violated a local bankruptcy court rule. 

The district court struck the notice of appeal without allowing Briggs an opportunity

to cure the defect by filing separate notices of appeal for each order. For the reasons

set forth below, we reverse the district court’s order striking the notice of appeal to

the extent it denied Briggs an opportunity to cure.

I. Background

In 2016, United States Bankruptcy Judge Charles E. Rendlen sanctioned

Briggs, an attorney in the State of Missouri, and banned him from practicing before

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for six

months. We previously affirmed that decision on appeal. See In re Reed, 888 F.3d

930 (8th Cir. 2018). In June 2018, Briggs filed a motion before Judge Rendlen for

reinstatement of his full practice privileges as well as a motion to disqualify Judge

Rendlen from presiding over matters related to Briggs’s request for reinstatement.

Judge Rendlen denied both motions.

On July 24, 2018, Briggs filed a single notice of appeal challenging the orders

denying both motions. Briggs attached the two orders and paid a single filing fee. 

The district court entered an order striking Briggs’s notice of appeal because he

appealed two separate orders using one notice and paid only one filing fee in

violation of Local Bankruptcy Rule 8001(A).

Briggs filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the order. On August 23, 2018,

the district court denied Briggs’s motion for reconsideration. Briggs filed a timely

notice of appeal from the district court’s order, arguing Local Bankruptcy Rule

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8001(A) is invalid and, alternatively, that the district court erred in treating the rule

as if it were a jurisdictional requirement.

II. Analysis

We first consider our jurisdiction over the appeal. This court has jurisdiction

to review final orders of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). The district court’s

decision to strike Briggs’s notice of appeal of two bankruptcy orders was the

functional equivalent of a dismissal, ending his ability to challenge those orders.

Because there was nothing more to do after striking the motion and closing the case,

we conclude the district court’s order was a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Cf.

In re Apex Oil Co., 884 F.2d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1989) (listing factors to determine the

finality of a bankruptcy order).

 

We now turn to Briggs’s argument contesting the validity of Local Bankruptcy

Rule 8001(A), which states “[a] separate notice of appeal and filing fee is required

for each order being appealed.” Bankr. E.D. Mo. R. 8001(A). We review de novo

the district court’s interpretation of thisrule. See Keil v. Lopez, 862 F.3d 685, 703–04

(8th Cir. 2017) (interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure expressly allow courts to adopt

local rules of practice and procedure as long as they are consistent with the federal

rules. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9029(a)(1). 

The federal bankruptcy rule governing appeals provides only that a notice of

appeal must “(A) conform substantially to the appropriate Official Form; (B) be

accompanied by the judgment, order, or decree, or the part of it, being appealed; and

(C) be accompanied by the prescribed fee.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(3). The

bankruptcy rules are otherwise silent as to a party’s right to appeal multiple orders

with a single notice of appeal. Although Local Bankruptcy Rule 8001(A) is more

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specific than the related federal rules, it is not inconsistent with any of them. 

Therefore, we reject Briggs’s argument that it is invalid.

This does not end our inquiry. Briggs alternatively argues that even if Local

Bankruptcy Rule 8001(A) is valid, the district court should have permitted him to

amend his notice of appeal to cure any deficiency under the local rules. Without

expressing any opinion as to the merits of his underlying appeal, we agree. The

district court erred in striking the notice of appeal without allowing Briggs an

opportunity to cure the defect because doing so wrongly treated the defect as

jurisdictional.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed courts to liberally construe

rules governing notices of appeal and avoid treating imperfections in notices of

appeal as fatal so long as certain requirements are met. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S.

244, 247–48 (1992) (explaining courts must liberally construe the requirements of

Fed. R. App. P. 3 so that papers technically at variance may be considered the

“functional equivalent.”). “[I]mperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal

where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, fromwhat judgment, to which

appellate court.” Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 759 (2001). 

Briggs’s notice of appeal undoubtedlyprovided the necessaryinformation: who

was appealing, from what judgment, and to which appellate court the appeal was

directed. As such, the district court should not have treated the imperfection as fatal. 

This is not to say the district court cannot enforce the bankruptcy rules. It may be

appropriate in certain circumstances for the district court to strike a notice of appeal,

including, for example, when sanctioning a party’s willful failure to comply with the

local rule. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9029(a)(2) (“A local rule imposing a requirement

of form shall not be enforced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights because

of a nonwillful failure to comply with the requirement.”). However, the district court

made no such finding here.

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Moreover, Briggs’sfailure to pay the required fee should not have been treated

as a jurisdictional requirement that rendered the notice of appeal ineffective. See

Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46, 46–47 (1955) (holding untimely payment of

a filing fee did not invalidate a notice of appeal); B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. I.C.C., 551

F.2d 1112, 1115 n.3 (8thCir. 1977) (holding the failure to enclose a docketing fee did

not render ineffective a petition for review). Instead, the district court should have

given Briggs an opportunity to cure this defect.

The Appellee argues the cases discussed above do not control because they

interpret the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and do not involve a bankruptcy

appeal to a district court. We do not find this distinction material to our analysis. An

appeal made from a bankruptcy order to a federal district court “shall be taken in the

same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of

appeals from the district courts and in the time provided by Rule 8002 of the

Bankruptcy Rules.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2). Thus, we apply the same liberal

construction of the notice requirements in civil proceedings to bankruptcy appeals.

Although Local Bankruptcy Rule 8001(A) is valid, the district court erred by

treating the rule as a jurisdictional requirement without providing Briggs an

opportunity to cure the defect by filing separate notices of appeal for each order and

paying the accompanying fees.

1

1The Appellee argues alternative grounds exist justifying the district court’s

decision to dismiss Briggs’s appeal, explaining the notice of appeal was filed more

than 14 days after the bankruptcy court denied the motion to disqualify the

bankruptcy judge, which he claims violated Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). We offer no

opinion as to the merits of this argument. The district court may consider the

Appellee’s timeliness argument in the first instance. See Loftness Specialized Farm

Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Although we may

affirm the district court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record, we are not

required to do so[,]” and will remand when “it would be beneficial for the district

court to consider th[e] issue in the first instance.”). 

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order striking the

notice of appeal and remand the case to the district court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

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