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*********************************************** 
AMMAR A. IDLIBI v. JEREMIAH

NII AMAA OLLENNU

(AC 42697)

Elgo, Alexander and Devlin, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant attorney for abuse of

process, legal malpractice, malicious prosecution, and negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising out of his conduct

during his representation of the plaintiff’s former spouse, C, in her

marital dissolution action against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that

the defendant knowingly notarized a fraudulent interrogatory response

by C, counseled C to provide false testimony to a police detective that

the plaintiff had assaulted her, and failed at any time to correct C’s

false testimony under oath regarding the alleged assault. The trial court

granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff did

not have an attorney-client relationship with the defendant and that the

defendant’s conduct was protected by the doctrine of litigation privilege.

On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim

on the ground of the litigation privilege, as the claim was not within

the scope of the privilege.

2. The trial court properly found that, as the plaintiff at no time had an

attorney-client relationship with the defendant, the plaintiff lacked

standing to bring a legal malpractice claim against him.

3. The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution

claim on the ground of the litigation privilege, as the claim was not

within the scope of the privilege.

4. The trial court properly found that the plaintiff’s claims of negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the litigation

privilege, as the defendant’s conduct was privileged pursuant to Simms

v. Seamen (308 Conn. 523) and Stone v. Pattis (144 Conn. App. 79).

Submitted on briefs May 10—officially released July 6, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, abuse of

process, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the

court, Aurigemma, J., granted the defendant’s motion

to dismiss; thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff’s

motion to reargue, and the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; further proceedings.

Ammar A. Idlibi, the appellant, submitted a brief

(plaintiff).
Opinion

DEVLIN, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Ammar A.

Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Jeremiah

Nii Amaa Ollennu, in its entirety. On appeal, Idlibi

claims that the court erred by granting Ollennu’s motion

to dismiss. We reverse, in part, the judgment of the

trial court.

The present case is Idlibi’s third appeal to this court

arising from the dissolution of his marriage to his former

wife, Katie N. Conroy. Conroy commenced a marital

dissolution action on May 26, 2015. Ollenu represented

Conroy in the dissolution proceedings. On August 15,

2016, following a trial, the trial court, Carbonneau, J.,

rendered judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and

issuing financial orders. Conroy v. Idlibi, Superior

Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. FA15-6029313-S (August 15, 2016), aff’d, 183 Conn. App.

460, 193 A.3d 663, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 921, 194 A.3d

289 (2018). Idlibi appealed from the dissolution judgment, claiming that ‘‘the court erred (1) by finding that

neither party bore greater responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage and (2) in making financial awards

that were favorable to [Conroy].’’ Conroy v. Idlibi, 183

Conn. App. 460, 461, 193 A.3d 663, cert. denied, 330

Conn. 921, 194 A.3d 289 (2018). This court affirmed the

judgment of the trial court.1

Id. Our Supreme Court

then denied Idlibi’s petition for certification to appeal.

Conroy v. Idlibi, 330 Conn. 921, 194 A.3d 289 (2018).

Thereafter, Idlibi moved to open the dissolution judgment, alleging that Conroy committed fraud in (1) denying, in an interrogatory, that during the marriage, she

had sexual relations with someone other than her

spouse, and (2) falsely testifying that Idlibi had

assaulted her. Conroy v. Idlibi, 204 Conn. App. 265,

266, A.3d (2021). Idlibi alleged that Conroy had

told Ollennu, her attorney, that she was having sexual

relations with another man, and that, despite having

this knowledge, Ollennu notarized the interrogatory

response denying the same. Id., 291 n.2. (Flynn, J.,

dissenting). The trial court denied the motion to open

and, in a divided opinion, this court affirmed. Id., 266.

Idlibi’s petition for certification to appeal was granted

in part by our Supreme Court. Conroy v. Idlibi,

Conn. , A.3d (2021).

On December 21, 2018, Idlibi instituted the present

action against Ollennu, alleging various legal claims

arising from his alleged role in Conroy’s purportedly

false interrogatory response and false testimony that

Idlibi had assaulted her. Specifically, Idlibi alleges that

Ollennu committed (1) abuse of process, (2) legal malpractice, (3) malicious prosecution, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (5) intentional infliction

of emotional distress. On February 19, 2019, Ollennu,

pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, filed a motion to
dismiss Idlibi’s complaint.2 On February 27, 2019, the

court granted Ollennu’s motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety on the grounds that (1) Idlibi did

not have an attorney-client relationship with Ollennu,

and (2) the doctrine of absolute immunity applies to

Ollennu’s conduct. On March 7, 2019, Idlibi, pursuant

to Practice Book § 11-12, filed a motion to reargue. That

motion was denied by the court. Idlibi then appealed to

this court, claiming that the trial court erred by granting

Ollennu’s motion to dismiss.3 Additional facts will be

set forth as necessary.

‘‘[Our] review of the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [decision to] grant [a] motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . In any consideration of the

trial court’s dismissal, we take the facts as alleged in

the complaint as true and [construe] them in a manner

most favorable to the pleader.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 395, 21 A.3d 451 (2011). ‘‘As the

doctrine of absolute immunity concerns a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . we are mindful of the well

established notion that, in determining whether a court

has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption

favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . . The

question . . . is whether the facts as alleged in the

pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, are sufficient to survive dismissal on the

grounds of absolute immunity. . . . Our case law differentiates between actions based on alleged misconduct by an attorney in his role as advocate, such as

defamation and fraud, and actions that challenge the

underlying purpose of the litigation itself, such as vexatious litigation and abuse of process. . . . For the former category, the law protects attorneys from suit in

order to encourage zealous advocacy on behalf of their

clients, unrestrained by the fear of exposure to tort

liability.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Perugini v. Giuliano, 148 Conn. App. 861,

873, 89 A.3d 358 (2014). With these principles in mind,

we review each count of Idlibi’s complaint in turn.

I

ABUSE OF PROCESS

In the first count of his complaint, Idlibi alleges that

Ollennu ‘‘misused the legal process . . . to accomplish

the unlawful ulterior purpose of misleading the [trial]

court and winning the [dissolution] case.’’ Specifically,

Idlibi claims that Ollennu ‘‘abus[ed] the legal process

of sworn [i]nterrogatories . . . in an improper manner

for the ulterior purpose of presenting false evidence

[to] the court.’’ The court dismissed this claim, finding

that it was ‘‘barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity/litigation privilege.’’4

‘‘Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege. . . . The general rule is that defamatory words
spoken [on] an occasion absolutely privileged, though

spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice,

impose no liability for damages recoverable in an action

in slander . . . . [T]he privilege extends to judges,

counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings . . . and acts of [s]tate. . . . [T]he privilege was

founded [on] the principle that in certain cases it is

advantageous for the public interest that persons should

not be in any way fettered in their statements, but

should speak out the whole truth, freely and fearlessly.

. . . [Our Supreme] [C]ourt described the privilege as

being rooted in the public policy that a judge in dealing

with the matter before him, a party in preparing or

resisting a legal proceeding, [or] a witness in giving

evidence in a court of justice, shall do so with his mind

uninfluenced by the fear of an action for defamation

or a prosecution for libel. . . . This jurisdiction also

has recognized the importance of access to the courts

and the existence of remedies other than lawsuits as

reasons for granting absolute immunity to attorneys for

making allegedly defamatory statements.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v.

Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 536–40, 69 A.3d 880 (2013).

The coverage afforded by the litigation privilege,

however, is not without its limits. Our Supreme Court

has held that in ‘‘an abuse of process case . . . attorneys are not protected by absolute immunity against

claims alleging the pursuit of litigation for the unlawful,

ulterior purpose of inflicting injury on the plaintiff and

enriching themselves and their client, despite knowledge that their client’s claim lacked merit, because such

conduct constituted the use of legal process in an

improper manner or primarily to accomplish a purpose

for which it was not designed.’’ Id., 540–41. In an abuse

of process action, ‘‘the exigencies of the adversary system have not been deemed to require absolute immunity

for attorneys.’’ Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 495,

529 A.2d 171 (1987). Accordingly, ‘‘an attorney may be

sued for misconduct by those who have sustained a

special injury because of an unauthorized use of legal

process.’’ Id.

In the present case, taking the facts as alleged in the

first count of the complaint as true and construing them

in a manner favorable to the pleader, we conclude that

Idlibi alleges a claim of abuse of process against

Ollennu.5 Because such a claim is not within the scope

of the litigation privilege, we conclude that the court

erred in dismissing the claim on this ground. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court as to the

abuse of process claim in count one.

II

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

In the second count of his complaint, Idlibi alleges

that Ollennu engaged in legal malpractice by ‘‘deviat[-
ing] from the [requisite] standard of care by violating

the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .’’ In dismissing

the claim of legal malpractice, the court found that

Idlibi lacked standing because he never had an attorneyclient relationship with Ollennu. Lack of standing implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Thompson, 163

Conn. App. 827, 831–32, 136 A.3d 1277 (2016).

It is well established that a plaintiff lacks standing

to bring a legal practice action unless he or she can

‘‘establish . . . the existence of an attorney-client relationship . . . .’’ Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245

Conn. 88, 92, 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). Because it is clear

that an attorney-client relationship at no time existed

between Idlibi and Ollennu, we conclude that the court

properly found that Idlibi lacked standing to bring a

legal malpractice claim against Ollennu. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the court dismissing Idlibi’s

claim of legal malpractice.

III

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

In the third count of his complaint, Idlibi alleges that

Ollennu engaged in malicious prosecution. Specifically,

he claims that Ollennu ‘‘counseled his client to mislead

[a] police detective for the purpose of procuring the

institution of criminal proceedings against [Idlibi],’’ and

that ‘‘[b]y counseling his client to continue asserting an

accusation of assault against [Idlibi], Ollennu procured

the institution of criminal proceedings against [him].’’

The court dismissed this claim after finding that it was

barred by the doctrine of litigation privilege.

As discussed previously, the coverage afforded by

the litigation privilege is not limitless. In addressing the

limits of the litigation privilege, our Supreme Court has

specifically held ‘‘that absolute immunity does not bar

claims against attorneys for . . . malicious prosecution.’’ Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 541. ‘‘Both

[malicious prosecution and abuse of process] deal with

the same problem—the perversion of the legal system.’’

1 F. Harper et al., Harper, James and Gray on Torts (3d

Ed. 2006) § 4.9, p. 561. The policy considerations that

counsel in favor of extending absolute immunity to

attorneys for claims of defamation or fraud do not support extending such immunity to abuse of process or

malicious prosecution.

In the present case, taking the alleged facts as true

and construing them in favor of the pleader, we conclude that Idlibi has alleged a claim of malicious prosecution against Ollennu.6 Because a claim of malicious

prosecution is not within the scope of the litigation

privilege, the court erred in dismissing the malicious

prosecution claim in count three on this ground.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court in

this regard.
IV

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In the fourth and fifth counts of his complaint, Idlibi

alleges that Ollennu, through his conduct, either negligently or intentionally, inflicted emotional distress on

him. Specifically, Idlibi claims that ‘‘[Ollennu’s] conduct

during [the meeting he and Conroy had with a police

detective] not only procured the institution of criminal

charges against [him], but also directly inflicted severe

emotional distress and mental anguish on [him] . . . .’’

The court dismissed these claims after finding that they

were barred by the doctrine of litigation privilege.

Our Supreme Court has held that claims alleging

infliction of emotional distress that arise from the privileged conduct of an attorney are barred by the litigation

privilege. See Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn.

569–70; see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 246,

510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (holding that litigation privilege

applies to claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress); Stone v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79, 98, 72 A.3d

1138 (2013) (holding that litigation privilege applies to

claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress).

In the present case, Ollennu’s conduct on which Idlibi

relies for these claims was privileged, as Ollennu was

acting in his capacity as counsel for Conroy. Because

Ollennu’s conduct at issue here was privileged, we conclude that the court properly found that these claims

were barred by the litigation privilege. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the court as to its dismissal of

Idlibi’s claims of negligent and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

dismissal of the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims in counts one and three and the case is

remanded for further proceedings according to law; the

judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 This court dismissed as moot that portion of the appeal challenging the

trial court’s finding that if Idlibi obtained a monetary judgment against

Conroy in a separate proceeding, that would be considered a significant

change in circumstances warranting review of Idlibi’s alimony obligation.

Conroy v. Idlibi, supra, 183 Conn. App. 461 n.2.

2 Practice Book § 10-30 provides in relevant part that ‘‘lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter’’ is a ground for dismissal.

3 Ollennu did not file an appellate brief. Therefore, this appeal will be

considered on the basis of Idlibi’s brief and the record only.

4 We note that the terms ‘‘absolute immunity’’ and ‘‘litigation privilege’’

historically have been used interchangeably by the courts. See Simms v.

Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 525 n.1, 69 A.3d 880 (2013).

5 We express no view as to the legal sufficiency of this allegation.

6 Again, we express no view as to the legal sufficiency of this allegation.