J-S15005-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

TERRIC GARNER, 

 Appellant 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1922 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 10, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000515-2022 

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2024 

Appellant, Terric Garner, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on February 10, 2023, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion on June 14, 2023. We affirm. 

The trial court thoroughly summarized the underlying facts of this case: 

During the evening of June 13, 2021, [Appellant’s] friend, 

Marc Lippi, told [Appellant] that Lippi was going to fight 

another friend of theirs, Dominic Iezzi [(“the Victim”)]. Lippi 

had been upset at [the Victim] because [the Victim] had been 

spending time with Lippi’s girlfriend. When Lippi found out 

that [the Victim] and Lippi's girlfriend were at a mutual 

friend's house for a dinner party in Philadelphia, Lippi went 

over to the house. [Appellant] was not with Lippi at the time. 

Soon after [the Victim] and Lippi’s girlfriend came out of the 

house, Lippi and [the Victim] got into a fistfight, which was 

recorded by Lippi's girlfriend. [The Victim] beat Lippi in the 

fight, leaving Lippi with a black eye. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S15005-24 

- 2 - 

After the fight, Lippi remained in the area and eventually 

attempted to get [the Victim] and Lippi's girlfriend to come 

back out of the house. While Lippi was banging on the 

house's door and window, [Appellant] stood down the street 

about five houses down. [Appellant] had left his home even 

though he was on house arrest for an unrelated matter. 

Eventually, [the Victim] came back out of the house and 

began to speak with Lippi on the sidewalk. Before long, 

[Appellant] approached [the Victim] and Lippi. Surveillance 

video from a nearby pizza store shows [Appellant] 

withdrawing a gun from his waistband and pointing it at [the 

Victim]. Upon seeing [Appellant] with the gun, [the Victim] 

ran away, and [Appellant] and Lippi chased him. Soon after, 

at approximately 12:40 a.m., [Appellant] shot [the Victim] in 

the right knee. As a result of the shooting, [the Victim’s] 

kneecap was broken in at least three places. After the 

shooting, [Appellant] returned home, removed a house arrest 

monitor from his ankle, and fled to Puerto Rico. Police 

eventually arrested [Appellant] and Lippi.[fn.1] At the time of 

the shooting, [Appellant] did not have a permit to carry a 

firearm. 

[fn.1] Lippi later pled guilty to aggravated assault, 

criminal conspiracy, and recklessly endangering another 

person. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/23, at 2-3 (citations omitted). 

Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault, 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, 

and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia.1 On February 10, 2023, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of eight to 16 

years in prison, followed by four years of probation. N.T. Sentencing, 2/10/23, 

at 59. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 903(a), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively. 
J-S15005-24 

- 3 - 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, where he raised the 

following claim: 

[Appellant] alleges that the sentencing court violated the 

requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) of the Sentencing 

Code, which states that the sentence imposed should call for 

confinement that is consistent with protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact of the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

[Appellant] alleges that sentence imposed is unreasonable, 

excessive, and grossly disproportionate to the offense. 

[Appellant] further alleges that the sentence does not 

properly reflect the weight of the mitigation presented at the 

sentencing hearing. 

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 2/20/23, at 1-2. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on June 14, 

2023 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises two claims 

on this appeal: 

1. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by failing to give 

proper consideration to [Appellant’s] personal needs and 

mitigating factors, and as a result is the sentence contrary to 

the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process 

and manifestly unreasonable and excessive? 

2. Did not the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing 

[Appellant] to a sentence that is higher than the aggravated 

range of the sentencing guidelines without giving adequate 

reasons, on the basis of considerations, Appellant’s criminal 

history, including arrests that resulted in dismissal of 

charges, and the seriousness of the charged offenses, factors 

which are already accounted for by the prior record and 

offense gravity scores of the sentencing guidelines? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

Appellant's claims on appeal challenge the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. “[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 
J-S15005-24 

- 4 - 

sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 

2001). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to 

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

As this Court explained: 

[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 

903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.] 

§ 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Appellant first claims that his sentence is manifestly excessive, as the 

trial court “fail[ed] to give proper consideration to [Appellant’s] personal 

needs and mitigating factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. As to this claim, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, raised the claim in his post-sentence 

motion, and properly included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. 

Therefore, we turn to the issue of whether Appellant’s first claim raises a 

substantial question. 

Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must “advance 

a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with 
J-S15005-24 

- 5 - 

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel, 

629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 

A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). Additionally, in determining 

whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, we must limit our 

review to Appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement. Goggins, 748 A.2d at 726. 

This limitation ensures that our inquiry remains “focus[ed] on the reasons for 

which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, 

which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. at 727 

(emphasis omitted). 

Appellant’s first subclaim contends that his sentence is excessive 

because the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating 

circumstances. Under our precedent, Appellant's claim presents a substantial 

question, thus permitting our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 

A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[a]ppellant’s claim that the sentencing 

court disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the 

offense in handing down its sentence presents a substantial question for our 

review”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(“an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction with an assertion that the court 

failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a substantial question”); 

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding: 

a claim that the appellant’s sentence was unduly excessive, “together with his 
J-S15005-24 

- 6 - 

claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating 

factors upon fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial question”).2 

We have explained: 

sentencing is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and 

will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that 

discretion. An abuse of discretion involves a sentence which 

was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just an 

error in judgment. 

Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

Appellant claims that the trial court failed to adequately consider the 

following factors: 1) “Appellant may have had brain damage at the age of 

one;” 2) “Appellant suffered from mental health problems dealing with feelings 

of severe anxiety, depression, and insecurities;” 3) Appellant suffered from an 

alcohol addiction; and, 4) Appellant was subjected to “racist bullying in his 

neighbor[hood] over the course of [his life, which] led him to cope by 

attempting to fit in with his abusers and please his peers.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 18. According to Appellant, these factors demonstrate that he was not 

some “cold-blooded assailant, but rather was a self-induced dupe who 

____________________________________________ 

2

 We note that we have also “held on numerous occasions that a claim of 

inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial 

question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Eline, 940 A.2d 421, 435 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (quotations, citations, and corrections omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(collecting cases). Nevertheless, in light of our conflicting precedent, we will 

review the merits of Appellant's discretionary aspects of sentencing claim. 
J-S15005-24 

- 7 - 

misguidedly injected himself into a fight between mutual friends over a 

woman, in order not to be such an outcast.” Id. at 18-19. Further, Appellant 

argues that these factors demonstrate that, if given the proper treatment, he 

“has the potential to become an upstanding member of society.” Id. at 21. 

Appellant’s discretionary aspect of sentencing claim fails because, 

during Appellant's sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly stated that it 

considered the pre-sentence investigation report. See N.T. Sentencing, 

2/10/23, at 4 and 50. Given this fact, we must “presume that the sentencing 

judge was aware of relevant information regarding [Appellant's] character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). To be sure, our 

Supreme Court has held: 

A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for 

itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our 

intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we 

state clearly that [sentencing courts] are under no 

compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or 

systematic definitions of their punishment procedure. Having 

been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the 

sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. This is 

particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it 

can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will 

presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the 

position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail 

to apply them to the case at hand. 

Id. 
J-S15005-24 

- 8 - 

Further, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly stated 

that it considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and the mitigating factors 

Appellant emphasizes on appeal, but that a sentence of eight to 16 years in 

prison was appropriate in this case. See N.T. Sentencing, 2/10/23, at 50-60. 

As the trial court later summarized in its opinion: 

Here, the record demonstrates that the [trial court] explicitly 

considered and discussed each of the statutory factors set 

forth in Section 9721(b) before imposing [Appellant’s] 

sentence. Regarding the protection of the public, the [trial 

court] explained that “the facts and circumstance of the 

crime[s] here demonstrate a major risk to the public posed 

by [Appellant] in the future.” The [trial court] noted that not 

only were [Appellant’s] crimes serious and violent, but that 

[Appellant] committed them while on house arrest. The [trial 

court] also observed that [Appellant] expressed no remorse 

and accepted no responsibility for his criminal behavior, 

including during his allocution at his sentencing hearing. The 

[trial court] further explained that [Appellant] attempted to 

evade responsibility by “[cutting] his ankle monitor and 

[fleeing] to Puerto Rico.” . . . 

Concerning the gravity of the offense as it relates to the 

impact on the life of the victim and the community, the [trial 

court] stated that “[c]learly, the shooting of [the Victim] had 

a strong impact on him,” resulting in him “leaving the hospital 

on crutches and [having] suffered substantial bodily injury.” 

As to the community, the [trial court] observed that “[t]he 

community also suffers from crimes such as those committed 

by [Appellant],” and that such crimes “cause the community 

to be in fear for their safety, for the safety of their family and 

friends.” . . . 

Finally, with respect to the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant], 

the [trial court] stated that [Appellant] “clearly has 

rehabilitative needs, substance abuse, [and] mental health 

needs” and, in imposing sentence, sought to address those 

needs by including conditions that required [Appellant] to 
J-S15005-24 

- 9 - 

receive anger management counseling, substance abuse 

testing and treatment, and mental health services. 

[Appellant’s] assertions that [the trial court] failed to 

consider evidence of mitigation and [his] background and 

character are [] contrary to the record. In imposing 

sentence, the [trial court] stated: 

In determining what I believe to be an appropriate 

sentence, I have considered all of the evidence presented 

during the history of this case, including the evidence 

produced during the jury trial over which I presided. 

I have considered all of the information in the 

presentence investigation report, the investigation of 

prior record score, and the mental health evaluation, all 

of which I carefully reviewed. I have considered all of the 

information presented during today's sentencing hearing. 

I have considered as part of that[] the mitigation evidence 

presented by the defense. I will note that I considered 

for example[] the age of [Appellant], the fact that he is 

educated and has his GED, the fact that he did attend 

some college, and has four children, and has support from 

his family members, as shown by the letters that were 

read into the record by [Appellant’s counsel]. And I have 

considered all of those letters and the content of those 

letters. 

And I have considered the fact that [Appellant] has a 

history of some mental health issues, as well as substance 

abuse issues. And I have also considered that fact that 

he has no prior felony convictions, and his claim that he 

was intoxicated during the incident here. 

And I have considered all of the positive things that the 

individuals who wrote the letters had to say on his behalf. 

I have also considered [Appellant’s] allocution and his 

statements made here today. 

[N.T. Sentencing, 2/10/23, at 50-51]. 

The [trial court] further explained “the substance of the 

aggravating factors . . . outweigh[ed] the mitigation that 

been presented on behalf of the [Appellant].” 
J-S15005-24 

- 10 - 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/23, at 5-6 (some citations omitted). 

The record thus belies Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to 

consider his rehabilitative needs and the mitigating circumstances of this case. 

As such, Appellant’s first claim on appeal fails. 

Next, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 

sentencing Appellant “to a sentence that is higher than the aggravated range 

of the sentencing guidelines without giving adequate reasons.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 26. This claim is waived, as Appellant did not raise the claim at 

sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal”); Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 

1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (“issues challenging the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by 

presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. 

Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is 

waived”). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 6/20/2024