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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.

MARCELLUS CATCHINGS

(AC 36006)

Beach, Sheldon and Lavery, Js.*

Argued September 19, 2016—officially released February 7, 2017

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, White, J.)

Laila Haswell, senior assistant public defender, for

the appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom were Richard Colangelo, state’s attorney, and,

on the brief, Paul J. Ferencek, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

LAVERY, J. The defendant, Marcellus Catchings,

appeals from the judgment of conviction,rendered after

a jury trial, of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2)

and 53a-59 (a) (1).1 On appeal, the defendant claims

that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond

a reasonable doubt his intent to inflict serious physical

injury on another person, as required for a conviction

of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. In the early morning hours of March 18, 2011,

Patricia Beverly was pulling into the driveway of a pool

hall in Stamford when her vehicle was struck by another

vehicle. Beverly exited her car to confront the other

driver, but the other driver drove off. The defendant,

who was friends with the driver whose vehicle had

struck Beverly’s vehicle, pulled into the pool hall a

couple of minutes later. The defendant was heavily

intoxicated,2 and was illegally in possession of a loaded

nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol without a permit.

Prior to getting out of his car, the defendant cocked

his gun, not noticing that there was already a cartridge

in the chamber, which caused the gun to jam and

become temporarily inoperable.3 At some point after

exiting his car, the defendant began ‘‘waving’’ his gun

around and then aimed the gun at Beverly. Beverly

retreated around the corner of the building and called

911. After learning that someone had called the police,

the defendant put his gun back into his waistband and

called a friend to obtain a ride before the police arrived.

Officer William Garay of the Stamford Police Department responded to the scene and spotted the defendant

walking down a nearby street while talking on his cell

phone. Recognizing that the defendant fit the description of the person who reportedly was waving a gun,

Garay exited his marked police cruiser near where the

defendant was walking, shined a spotlight on the defendant, and instructed the defendant to show his hands.

The defendant recognized Garay as a police officer but,

because he was carrying an illegal firearm, ignored Garay’s commands and continued walking. Garay drew his

gun, aimed it at the defendant, and ordered him to stop

and show his hands. The defendant again ignored Garay

and kept walking. Garay began advancing toward the

defendant with his gun drawn and shouted forthe defendant to get on the ground. The defendant then broke

into a run, and Garay chased after him.

At some point during the chase, Officer Luis Vidal of

the Stamford Police Department arrived on the scene

and attempted to block the defendant’s path of escape

by driving his cruiser onto the sidewalk at an angle in

front of where the defendant was running. Garay, who
was positioned behind and to the left of the defendant,

could not see the defendant’s right hand as he ran,

which was ‘‘somewhere in his stomach and waistband

. . . area.’’ Just as Vidal stopped and exited his cruiser,

the defendant, while still running, suddenly removed

his gun from his waistband, ‘‘turned toward his right’’

with the gun in his right hand, and pointed the gun

directly at Garay’s midsection. Garay, who was about

fifteen feet away, thought that the defendant was going

to shoot him, and fired a shot at the defendant that

missed. As Garay fired the shot, the defendant ‘‘[a]lmost

simultaneously’’ ‘‘dropped’’ his gun to the ground.

Garay dropped his gun and tackled the defendant to

the ground. A violent struggle ensued. The defendant

pushed Garay off him and struggled to get away, ignored

Garay’s repeated demands to stop resisting, and evaded

Garay’s attempts to handcuff him by lying on his stomach and clenching his hands beneath his chest. Vidal

‘‘jumped on’’ the defendant to help Garay restrain him.

Officer Faruk Yilmaz of the Stamford Police Department arrived moments later and noticed the defendant’s

handgun, which was in a jammed and temporarily inoperable condition,4

lying about a foot away from where

the struggle was taking place. Yilmaz removed it from

the area before assisting with the defendant. Eventually,

the three officers subdued and arrested the defendant.5

The defendant was subsequently charged with multiple offenses, including attempt to commit assault in the

first degree. See footnote 1 of this opinion. On March

14, 2013, the jury found the defendant guilty on all

counts. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment

in accordance with the verdict, and imposed a total

effective sentence of fifteen years imprisonment and

five years of special parole. This appeal followed.

The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempt to commit assault in

the first degree because no reasonable jury could have

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended

to inflict serious physical injury on Garay. In support

of this claim, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he simple act

of pointing a gun, without any accompanying assertive

behavior that could permit an inference of specific

intent to seriously injure [Garay] by shooting him, is

too equivocal an act to prove intent.’’ In response, the

state contends that it introduced additional evidence,

beyond the defendant’s mere act of pointing the gun at

Garay, to establish the defendant’s intent, including the

defendant’s conduct prior to the encounter with Garay

and the fact that the defendant raised his gun at Garay

while attempting to resist arrest. We agree with the

state.6

‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test.

First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine
whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force

of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is

not required to accept as dispositive those inferences

that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . .

The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to

be reasonable and logical. . . . This does not require

that each subordinate conclusion established by or

inferred from the evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . .

because this court has held that a jury’s factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable. . . .

‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable

doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt

. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require

acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by

the defendant that, had it been found credible by the

trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On

appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable

view of the evidence that would support a reasonable

hypothesis ofinnocence. We ask, instead, whetherthere

is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the

jury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621,

656–57, 1 A.3d 1051 (2010).

Turning to the relevant statutory provisions, § 53a49 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person is guilty

of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind

of mental state required for commission of the crime,

he . . . (2) intentionally does . . . anything which,

under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is

an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a

course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.’’ Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of assault in the first

degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical

injury to another person, he causes such injury to such

person or to a third person by means of a deadly

weapon . . . .’’

Thus, ‘‘[i]n order to sustain a conviction for attempt

to commit assault in the first degree, the state must

have presented evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant did something constituting a substantial

step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his

commission of the crime . . . namely, assault with the

intent to cause serious physical injury to another person

. . . . Regarding the substantial step requirement, we

have held that [a] substantial step must be something

more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the

last act necessary before the actual commission of the
substantive crime . . . . In order for behavior to be

punishable as an attempt, it need not be incompatible

with innocence, yet it must be necessary to the consummation of the crime and be of such a nature that a

reasonable observer, viewing it in context could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken

in accordance with a design to violate the statute. . . .

‘‘Regarding the intent requirement, an individual acts

intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct . . .

when his conscious objective is to cause such result

or to engage in such conduct . . . . Intent may be,

and usually is, inferred from [a] defendant’s verbal or

physical conduct [as well as] the surrounding circumstances. . . . Nonetheless, [t]here is no distinction

between circumstantial and direct evidence so far as

probative force is concerned. . . . Moreover, [i]t is not

one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of

facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . Finally, we underscore that intent [can] be formed instantaneously and

[does] not require any specific period of time for

thought or premeditation for its formation. . . . Intent

is a question of fact, the determination of which should

stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an

unreasonable one.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 317 Conn. 845,

856–57, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015).

Our resolution of the defendant’s sufficiency of the

evidence claim must begin with a review of Carter, in

which our Supreme Court rejected a sufficiency claim

premised on the argument that the mere act of pointing

a gun at someone is insufficient to establish intent.

Id., 857. In Carter, several uniformed police officers

approached the defendant in a bar after learning that

he had threatened to ‘‘ ‘pop this white dude.’ ’’ Id., 848.

The defendant turned, removed a handgun from his

pocket, and pointed it at one of the officers’ midsection.

Id., 849. The officer and the defendant pointed their

guns at each other for a few seconds, with neither

attempting to shoot, until the defendant lowered his

gun and turned the other way. Id., 850. The defendant

began struggling with the officers who attempted to

handcuff him before eventually surrendering at gunpoint. Id.

The defendant was convicted of, inter alia, attempt

to commit assault in the first degree and claimed, on

appeal, that there was insufficient evidence to establish

his intent to inflict serious physical injury on the officer

at whom he pointed his gun. Id., 851–52. In rejecting

that claim, our Supreme Court relied on the fact that

the defendant aimed specifically at the officer’s midsection, an area of her body particularly susceptible to

substantial physical injury; id., 858; that the defendant

placed his finger on the trigger guard, ‘‘one of the last

steps that an individual must take before firing a gun’’;
id.; that the defendant, after aiming the gun, ‘‘positioned

himself in a shooting stance’’ and ‘‘maintained that position for approximately five seconds despite repeated

orders to drop the gun’’; id.; and that the officer was

‘‘so sure the defendant was going to shoot her’’ that

she began to remove the safety mechanism on her own

gun. Id. The court also noted that, after the officers

closed in on the defendant, ‘‘he attempted to maintain

possession of his gun rather than acquiesce,’’ and that

‘‘it would not have been unreasonable [given his earlier

actions] for the jury to infer that he was attempting to

maintain possession of the gun to use it.’’ Id. Finally,

the court observed that, approximately one hour before

the standoff, the defendant ‘‘had expressed an intention

and willingness to use the gun by threatening to shoot

a particular ‘white dude.’ ’’ Id., 859.

In addition to the factors bearing on the court’s decision in Carter, this court recognized in State v.

Osbourne, 138 Conn. App. 518, 530–31, 53 A.3d 284,

cert. denied, 307 Conn. 937, 56 A.3d 716 (2012), that a

sudden movement to procure a loaded firearm, when

made in the course of an attempt to arrest, is especially

indicative of an intent to use the firearm to shoot and

cause serious physical injury to the pursuing officer.

The defendant in Osbourne, after attempting to flee

from police officers who approached him on the street,

began violently resisting the officers’ attempts to physically subdue him, prompting one ofthe officers to utilize

his Taser gun. Id., 522–23. After the second tasing cycle,

the defendant quickly reached into his pocket and partially removed a loaded handgun, at which point the

officers immediately intervened, removed the gun from

the defendant’s possession, and handcuffed him. Id.,

523. Rejecting the defendant’s claim on appeal that

there was insufficient evidence of his intent, this court

concluded that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s act of reaching

quickly into his pocket and grabbing a cocked and

loaded gun while struggling with uniformed police officers who were attempting physically and by verbal command to subdue him reasonably could have been found

not only to have been the start of a line of conduct

leading naturally to securing the gun and using it to

shoot and cause serious physical injury to each of the

three officers, but also to have been strongly corroborative of his alleged purpose to engage in such conduct

and cause such results, and thus to commit assault in

the first degree against each officer.’’ Id., 530–31.

In the present case, on the basis of the evidence

adduced at trial, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant intended to shoot and cause

serious physical injury to Garay. Leading up to the

encounter, the defendant, who knew that the police

were searching for him because he had brandished his

gun at Beverly, recognized Garay to be a police officer.

In order to avoid being arrested and prosecuted for

carrying a firearm without a permit, the defendant
ignored Garay’s orders to show his hands. When Garay

raised his gun and ordered the defendant to get on

the ground, the defendant ran. After a brief chase, the

defendant, while running full speed, abruptly removed

his gun from his waistband, turned his body partially

around toward Garay, and pointed his gun directly at

Garay’s midsection from fifteen feet away. Therefore,

contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence at

trial demonstrated not only that the defendant pointed

his gun at Garay, but that he did so in an abrupt and

purposeful manner while engaged in a prolonged effort

to resist being arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. Viewing the defendant’s actions

in context with these surrounding circumstances, the

jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant,

in order to effectuate his escape, pointed his gun at

Garay with the intent to shoot him in the midsection,

‘‘an area of [his] body that would be likely to inflict

physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 858; see Godsey v. State, 719

S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (finding sufficient evidence of intent to kill where defendant deliberately removed handgun from waistband after seeing

police officers, ignored orders to drop gun, and then

pointed gun directly at officers).7

Furthermore, Garay testified that when the defendant

turned and pointed the gun at him, he fired a shot at

the defendant because he thought the defendant was

going to shoot him. As Garay fired, the defendant

‘‘[a]lmost simultaneously’’ ‘‘dropped’’ his gun to the

ground. The defendant was tackled by Garay immediately thereafter, and although he continued to resist,

he was ultimately handcuffed and subdued by the three

officers. The jury reasonably could have inferred from

this evidence that the defendant turned and pointed his

gun at Garay with the intent to shoot him, but was

interrupted from taking a further step toward that

desired result by Garay, who forced the defendant to

drop his weapon by firing at him. See State v. Pinnock,

220 Conn. 765, 775, 601 A.2d 521 (1992) (‘‘[t]he attempt

is complete and punishable, when an act is done with

intent to commit the crime . . . whether the purpose

fails by reason of interruption or for other extrinsic

cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Even if,

however, the defendant relinquished his intention to

shoot Garay when he dropped the gun, ‘‘that change

would not negate his earlier intention, and the brevity

of that intent is irrelevant.’’ State v. Carter, supra, 317

Conn. 858.

The defendant’s conduct prior to the encounter with

Garay further supports the jury’s finding that the defendant harbored the requisite intent to shoot and cause

serious physical injury to Garay. See State v. Commerford, 30 Conn. App. 26, 34, 618 A.2d 574 (intent to

commit assault can be inferred from ‘‘events leading
up to and immediately following the incident’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 225 Conn. 903,

621 A.2d 285 (1993). The defendant admitted at trial

that, prior to his confrontation with Beverly, he cocked

his gun in order to load a cartridge into the chamber

despite the fact that the gun was already loaded. The

jury reasonably could have inferred from this evidence

that the defendant wanted to ensure that the gun was

ready to fire, and therefore that he possessed a willingness, if not a specific intention, to fire the gun. Although

the defendant presumably did not engage in this preparatory act in anticipation of an encounter with police,

it is nevertheless probative of his state of mind. See

State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 859 (relying in part

on fact that ‘‘one hour before the defendant’s standoff

with [the officer], the defendant had expressed an intention and willingness to use the gun by threatening to

shoot a particular ‘[dude],’ ’’ despite fact that threat was

not directed at officer). We conclude that the evidence

of this prior conduct, coupled with the circumstances

surrounding the defendant’s encounter with Garay, provided sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury’s

finding of intent to inflict serious physical injury beyond

a reasonable doubt.

The defendant nevertheless argues that the evidence

was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of intent.

Neither of his two primary arguments in this regard are

availing. First, he argues that there is no evidence that

he placed his finger on the trigger8 or fired the gun

after pointing it at Garay. The absence of those facts,

however, does not preclude the jury’s finding of intent

to inflict serious physical injury. ‘‘Although the actual

firing of a gun provides strong evidence of intent, the

absence of such evidence does not automatically render

the evidence insufficient . . . . As we have previously

noted, [i]t is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of

a multitude of facts which establishes guilt . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 860; see also

State v. Osbourne, supra, 138 Conn. App. 531 (affirming

jury’s finding of intent on basis of evidence that defendant partially removed gun from pocket). Those principles apply with particular force in the present case

because, as previously explained, the jury reasonably

could have concluded that ‘‘it was only the show of

overwhelming force [by police] that persuaded the

defendant to relinquish [his] intent.’’ State v. Carter,

supra, 317 Conn. 859.

In any case, whether or not the defendant discharged

the gun or placed his finger on the trigger misses the

point. To be guilty of criminal attempt, the defendant

need only take a ‘‘substantial step’’ in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the

crime; see General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2); and, in

determining whether the defendant took the necessary

substantial step, the focus is ‘‘on what the [defendant]

has already done and not what remains to be done.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniel B.,

164 Conn. App. 318, 331, 137 A.3d 837, cert. granted,

323 Conn. 910, A.3d (2016). Because the jury

reasonably could have found that the defendant

engaged in the substantial step of pointing his gun at

Garay; see State v. Cox, 293 Conn. 234, 246 n.9, 977

A.2d 614 (2009); and that he did so with the intent to

inflict serious physical injury, he is guilty of attempt to

commit assault in the first degree regardless of whether

he subsequently placed his finger on the trigger or fired

the gun.9 See State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 861

(‘‘defendant’s claim that he did not rack the gun, even

if true, would only support the proposition that he did

not take the next step to complete the crime, which,

of course, is irrelevant to the inquiry whether he took

a prior substantial step to commit the offense’’ [emphasis in original]).

Second, the defendant argues that he could not have

formed the intent to inflict serious physical injury

because, at the time of his confrontation with Garay,

his gun was jammed and thus would not have fired

even if he had pulled the trigger. We disagree. The

attempt statute merely requires the state to prove that

the defendant took a substantial step ‘‘underthe circumstances as he believe[d] them to be . . . .’’ General

Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2). That statutory language

‘‘sweeps aside any consideration of the defense of

impossibility, including the distinction between socalled factual and legal impossibility. Under [§ 53a-49

(a) (2)], the liability of the actor turns on his purpose,

considered in the light of his beliefs, and not on what

is actually possible under existing circumstances. If the

actor attempted to pick an empty pocket of another

person mistakenly thinking it contained money, he

would be guilty of attempted larceny.’’ D. Borden &

L. Orland, 10 Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut

Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2007) p. 115. In view of that

principle, the existence of the jam in the present case

does not bear on the jury’s determination that the defendant was guilty of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree if the defendant believed the gun to be operable

and ready to fire when he pointed it at Garay. See State

v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 861 (fact that gun was not

racked and thus incapable of firing did not negate intent

element because ‘‘it [was] . . . entirely reasonable for

[the jury] to infer that the defendant did not know that

it was necessary to rack the gun’’ in order to fire it).

Our review of the record discloses ample evidence

from which the jury reasonably could have concluded

that the defendant was unaware that his gun was inoperable when he raised it at Garay. First, the state presented evidence that the defendant was intoxicated

around the time of the events in question; see footnote

2 of this opinion; from which the jury reasonably could

have inferred that the defendant failed to notice that

he had caused the gun to jam by cocking it when there
was already a cartridge in the chamber. Although the

defendant argues that the jam was readily apparent

because it caused the barrel of the gun to protrude

outward, it was not unreasonable for the jury to have

concluded that, given his intoxication, the defendant

failed to notice the jam. Moreover, the defendant did

not mention the jam in the sworn, written statement

that he provided to the police the day after his arrest.10

In the statement, the defendant claimed, untruthfully,

that prior to confronting Beverly he ‘‘made sure that

[his gun] was on safety and that there [were] no bullets

in the chamber.’’ The defendant further claimed that

while running from the scene he attempted to throw

his gun over an adjacent fence and, contrary to his

testimony at trial, that he did not realize that a police

officer was chasing him. Despite the defendant’s apparent willingness to downplay certain facts to the police

in order to portray himself in a more favorable light,

he did not mention the fact that the gun was jammed

or make any suggestion that he believed that the gun

was inoperable. On the basis of this evidence, it was

entirely reasonable for the jury to have discounted the

defendant’s testimony at trial that he was aware of the

jam prior to his encounter with Garay. See State v.

Gary, 273 Conn. 393, 406, 869 A.2d 1236 (2005) (‘‘[T]he

[finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive

those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence . . . . [P]roof beyond a reasonable

doubt [does not]require acceptance of every hypothesis

of innocence posed by the defendant . . . .’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]). The jury reasonably could

have determined that the defendant was unaware of

the jam, and therefore believed the gun to be fully operable and ready to fire when he pointed it at Garay.

Accordingly, the existence of the jam does not negate

the jury’s finding of intent to inflict serious physical

injury.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The defendant also was convicted of assault of a peace officerin violation

of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1), and carrying a pistol or revolver

without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). Those convictions are not at issue in this appeal.

2 Sometime later, after the defendant was arrested, he submitted to a

blood test that determined his blood alcohol content to be 0.272, a ‘‘high’’

alcohol content, albeit ‘‘not lethally so.’’ At trial, the defendant, who testified

in his own defense, admitted that he drank a pint of Hennessy about thirty

minutes prior to the events in question.

3 By cocking the gun while there was already a cartridge in the chamber,

the defendant forced a second cartridge into the chamber which caused

the jam. Although the gun could not be fired in that condition, the defendant

could have fixed the jam in a matter of seconds simply by pulling back on

the slide and releasing the two cartridges from the chamber.

4 The state conceded at trial that when the defendant pointed the gun at

Garay, the gun ‘‘was jammed’’ and ‘‘was not going to fire.’’

5 The defendant, Garay, and Vidal all sustained injuries in the struggle.

Immediately afterthe incident, the defendant was taken to Stamford Hospital

for treatment where he presented with abrasions on his hand, swollen lips,
and a laceration in his mouth. Garay sprained his left shoulder and sustained

bruises and cuts on his right hand. Vidal sustained a contusion to his

right hand.

6

It remains an open question in Connecticut ‘‘whether the mere act of

pointing a gun at someone is sufficient to establish intent to inflict serious

physical injury beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’ State v. Carter, 317 Conn.

845, 857, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015). Because, contrary to the defendant’s argument, this case does not merely involve the isolated act of pointing a gun

at someone, we need not resolve that issue in the present case.

7

In Godsey v. State, supra, 719 S.W.2d 578, a decision our Supreme Court

has cited with approval; see State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 860; the

defendant, after seeing multiple uniformed officers with their guns pointed

at him, deliberately removed a loaded handgun from his waistband, ignored

the officers’ commands to drop the gun and put his hands on his head, and

pointed the gun at the officers as if he were aiming. Godsey v. State, supra,

583. In finding that there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s intent

to kill, the court observed that ‘‘[w]e are not holding that the pointing of

the loaded gun, in and of itself, is sufficient. Rather, the context of the

offense, the way in which the pointing came about [and] the facts and

circumstances of the offense, prove the intent.’’ Id. The court noted the

specific manner in which the defendant exhibited the gun, explaining that

the defendant ‘‘was not merely waving the gun around,’’ but ‘‘deliberately

pulled it out . . . after seeing the armed officers with their guns pointed

at him’’ and proceeded to ‘‘point the gun in such a way that it was almost

as if he were ‘drawing a bead’ on [two of the officers].’’ Id. Finally, the

court relied on the evidence of the defendant’s ‘‘suicide wishes,’’ which, it

reasoned, supported the inference that the defendant ‘‘could have decided

to shoot the officers so that they would then shoot him.’’ Id.

8 After the defendant’s arrest, police examined his gun and discovered

his fingerprints on the magazine and his DNA on the slide. Trace evidence

on the trigger, however, was insufficient for a DNA comparison.

9 The defendant relies on State v. Dunn, 26 Conn. App. 114, 124, 598 A.2d

658 (1991), in which this court stated that ‘‘it would have been permissible

to infer that the defendant did not intend to cause serious injury to [the

victim] from the factthat he did not shoot[the victim] despite the opportunity

and means to do so . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 124. That observation,

however, was made in the context of whether there was evidence of the

defendant’s intent to inflict an injury that was serious in nature, and is

therefore inapposite in the present case, which concerns the distinct issue

of whether there was evidence of the defendant’s intent to shoot Garay. See

State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 861–62 (distinguishing Dunn). Moreover,

although it may in theory be permissible for a jury to infer a lack of intent

where the defendant does not fire the gun, the jury was not required to

draw that inference under the circumstances of the present case. To suggest

otherwise misunderstands our standard of review for sufficiency of the

evidence claims. See State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 657 (‘‘On appeal, we

do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would

support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict

of guilty.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

10 The entirety of the defendant’s statement, which he provided to multiple

officers of the Stamford Police Department after executing a written waiver

of his rights, reads as follows: ‘‘My name is Marcellus D. Catchings and I’m

24 years old. My date of birth is 8/6/86. I live at 47 Hastings St, Bridgeport,

CT and I have lived there for about five to six months. I’m currently unemployed. I give this voluntary sworn statement to Officer A. Gonzalez and

Officer Rodriguez.

‘‘On Thursday, March 17, 2011 at about 7:30 PM I was at a basketball game

at AIT, (High Ridge Road), and after the game I went to my grandmother’s,

(Jeanette Catchings), house at 46 Durant Street. I left my grandmothers

house with Tamika Collighan who picked me up in her car and we went to

[Banks] Pool Hall in the south end. We got there around eleven something.

‘‘In the parking lot of [Banks] someone gave me a drink of Vodka with

juice. I then got a pint of Hennessey from [Banks] and went outside and

started talking with everyone. There was about nine or more people outside.

It took me about 20-30 minutes to finish the Hennessy. I saw some girls

who came there and started fighting with a girl that I was talking with,

(Danielle), and I was supposed to leave with on that night.

‘‘I pulled a gun out from my waist and I made sure that it was on safety

and that there was no bullets in the chamber. I was telling everyone to stop
fighting. The gun I had I was pointing it towards the sky. It was a 9MM.

People started running and I guess someone had called the cops. I [saw]

one cop car coming so I ran.

‘‘While I was running I saw a cop car in front of me and I threw the gun

which I had [in] my hand. I tried to throw it over the fence but I heard it

hit the fence and fall on the ground. I ended up on the ground and then the

cops started kicking me and all I remember is being in the car after that.

‘‘I didn’t point the gun at a cop because I didn’t know there was a cop

on foot running behind me. I thought that he was still in the car. The whole

day the gun was on safety and there were no bullets in the chamber. On

this date I only had those drinks I didn’t do any drugs.’’