Field 11/12/13 Raymond C. v. Super. Ct. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RAYMOND C. et al.,
Petitioners,

v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent;
JOHN C. et al.,

Real Parties in Interest. G046836 (Super. Ct. Nos. A169785 & 30-2011-00530355)

O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Caryl Lee, Judge. Petition granted; writ issued. Locke Lord, Jon L. Rewinski, Stephe n A. Tuggy and Matthew B. Nazareth
for Petitioners.2 Farella Braum + Martel, Mark D. Pete rsen and Alex Rees e for California Association of State Hospital Parent Counc ils for the Retarded as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Petitioners.
Law Offices of Brian D. Rondon and Brian D. Rondon for Parent Hospital Association of Sonoma Developmental Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. Law Offices of Christopher A. Poul os and Christopher A. Poulos for Parents Coordinating Council of Lanterman Developmental Ce nter as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Petitioners. No appearance for Respondent. Frank Ospino, Public Defe nder, Mark S. Brown, Assi stant Public Defender, and Kira Rubin, Deputy Public Defender, for Real Party in Interest John C. Enright & Ocheltree, Judith A. Enri ght and Julie A. Ocheltree for Real Party in Interest Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation, doing business as Harbor Regional Center. William Leiner, Dara Schur, Connie Chu and Monisha Coelho for Disability Rights California and National Disa bility Rights Network as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest John C. Michelman & Robinson, Mona Z. Ha nna, Jeffrey D. Farrow and Robin James for Association of Regional Center Agen cies, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Har bor Developmental Di sabilities Foundation, doing business as Harbor Regional Center.
* * * Petitioners Raymond C., Caro l C., and Andrea C. (collectively, Petitioners),
who are coconservators for real party in interest John C., 1 seek writ relief to prevent the

1 We abbreviate the last name of J ohn and his family members, and will use only their first names, to protect John’s pr ivacy. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4502,3 trial court from conducting an evidentiary hearing on a habe as corpus petition the Orange County Public Defender (Pub lic Defender) filed on John’s be half to obtain his release from Fairview Developmental Center (Fairvie w). John is a 57-year-old, developmentally
disabled adult who has resided at Fairview for more than 47 years due to a series of placements made under the Lanterman De velopmental Disabilities Services Act (Lanterman Act; Welf. & Inst . Code, § 4500 et seq.). 2 The Public Defender brought the habeas corpus petition under s ection 4800 because it conte nds less restrictive facilities can provide similar care for John and the Lanterman Act mandates placement of developmentally disabled persons in the leas t restrictive environmen t capable of meeting
their needs. Petitioners contend the Public De fender lacks authority to pursue the habeas corpus petition because they, as John’s legal re presentatives, believe Fairview is the best placement for John. We agree the Public Defender lacks auth ority to pursue th e habeas corpus petition on John’s behalf. Supreme Court preced ent establishes that the Public Defender may not pursue a section 4800 habeas corpus petition on a developmentally disabled person’s behalf without establishing “‘ very exceptional circumstances ’” ( In re Hop (1981) 29 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 ( Hop ), original italics) and that other available remedies for challenging the placement are inadequate ( In re Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 897-900 ( Gandolfo )). We conclude very exceptional circ umstances are not present in this case and the existing remedies are adequate be cause John’s Fairview placement has been subject to periodic judicial review for nearly 20 years, a hearing on the next periodic

subd. (b); Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008, fn. 1 ( Susan T. ).) No disrespect is intended.

2 All further statutory references ar e to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.4 review already was scheduled when the Public Defender file d the habeas corpus petition,
and the Public Defender failed to show Petitioners are not acting in John’s best interest. Although we agree with Petitioners the Public Defender may not pursue its habeas corpus petition, we do not agree with their cont ention the Lanterman Act’s administrative fair hearing procedures de prive the trial court of jurisdiction to periodically review John’s placement. The fa ir hearing procedures provide the exclusive means for challenging a specific decision to change John’s placement or the other services he receives, but thos e procedures do not prevent th e trial court from periodically reviewing whether his developmental cente r placement is still warranted. In Hop , the Supreme Court held that a de velopmentally disabled pers on could not be placed in a developmental center under the Lanterman Act without a judicial hearing on whether the person’s disabilities warrant placement in the most restrictive environment available. Because placement in a develo pmental center constitutes a si gnificant restraint on the developmentally disabled person’s fundamental liberty interests, the Hop court concluded the person’s due process and equal protectio n rights require a judicial determination regarding the suitability of the placement . As explained below, we conclude Hop ’s rationale also requires periodic independent reviews to ensure the developmentally disabled person’s disability continues to wa rrant placement in a developmental center. Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to (1) enter an order dismissing the habeas corpus petition the Public De fender filed on John’s behalf, and (2) proceed with the Hop review hearing on John’s Fairview placement.

I

L EGAL B ACKGROUND To explain the roles performed by th e various persons and entities involved in John’s Fairview placement, and to put the parties’ contentions in the proper context, we begin by providing an overview of the principal statutory scheme at issue, the5 Lanterman Act, and two related statutory schemes, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; § 5000 et seq.) and section 6500 et seq. These acts authorize confinement of developmentally disabled or mentally ill pers ons in a state developmental center (also referred to as a state hospital in some statutes ) when certain conditions are satisfied. We also summarize the Supreme Court’s Hop decision and the limits it places on a developmentally disabled person’s commitm ent to a developmental center under the
Lanterman Act.
A. The Lanterman Act “Enacted in 1977, the Lanterman Act establishes a comprehensive scheme for providing services to people with developmental disabilities.” ( Capitol People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services (2007) 155 Cal.Ap p.4th 676, 682 ( Capitol People ).) The Act’s stated purpose is to establis h “[a]n array of servi ces and supports . . . which is sufficiently comple te to meet the needs and choices of each person with developmental disabilities, regardless of age or degree of disability, and at each stage of life and to support their integra tion into the mainstreamlife of the commun ity.” (§ 4501.) A “‘[d]evelopmental disability’” is “a di sability that orig inates before an individual attains age 18 years, continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial disability for that individual.” (§ 4512, subd. (a).) The term includes “mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism,” but does not include “other handicapping conditions that ar e solely physical in nature.” ( Ibid .) The state contracts with private nonpr ofit corporations to establish and operate a network of 21 regional centers th at are responsible for determining eligibility, assessing needs, and coordina ting and delivering direct se rvices to developmentally disabled persons and their families. ( Capitol People , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683.) The regional centers’ purpose is to “assist persons with developmental
disabilities and their families in securing those services and supports which maximize6 opportunities and choices fo r living, working, learni ng, and recreating in the community.” (§ 4640.7, subd. (a).) The state “allocates funds to the centers for operations and the purchasing of serv ices, including funding to purchase community-based services and supports. [Citations.]” ( Capitol People , at p. 683.) “The specific rights of persons with developmental disabilities and the corresponding obligations of the state are determined through an individual program plan (IPP) procedure that meets common statutory requirements. (§§ 46 46-4648.) The IPP is developed by a planning team th at includes the [developmentally disabled person], his or her legally authorized represen tative, and one or more region al center representatives. (§ 4512, subd. (j).) The goals and objectives developed through th e IPP process should maximize opportunities for the individual to be part of community life; enjoy increased control over his or her life; acquire positive roles in community life; and develop the skills to accomplish the same. (§ 4646.5, subd. (a)(2).)” ( Capitol People , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 683.) Before July 1, 2012, a nondangero us, developmentally disabled person
could be admitted to a state developmental center in two wa ys. First, the person could submit a written admission application if he or she “is in such co ndition of mind as to render him competent to make [the applica tion].” (§ 6000, subd. (a)(1).) Second, section 4825 authorized admission “upon th e application of the person’s parent or
conservator in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4653 and 4803.” (See also § 6000.5.) Section 4653 states “no developmentally disabled person shall be admitted to a state hospital except upon the referral of a re gional center.” Section 4803 provides that a regional center may not recommend admission of a developmentally disabled person to a community care or health facility unless th e regional center certifies the person to be admitted or the person’s parent or conservator does not obje ct. Section 4825 does not limit the length of a developmentally disabled person’s commitment, nor does it require judicial review of the placement.7 Effective July 1, 20 12, the Legislature amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to prohibit nondangerous, developmentally disabled persons from being admitted to state developmental centers. (§§ 4507, 7505.) Section 7505 now provides that a person shall not be admitted to a state developm ental center unless the person is developmentally disabled and the person is: (1) committed by a court to Fairview Developmental Center because the person is a da nger to self or others under section 6500 and is suffering an acute crisis as defined in section 4418.7; (2) committed by a court to the Porterville Developmental Center’s secu re treatment program through the criminal justice system or juvenile court system; or (3) a prior resident of a developmental center who was provisionally released no more than 12 months earlier.
These recent Welfare and Institution Code amendments do not require moving nondangerous, developmentally disabl ed persons living in a state developmental center on July 1, 2012, to a different fac ility. Instead, the amendments require the regional center responsible for the committee to conduct a compre hensive assessment and “identify the types of community-based services and supports available to the [person].” (§ 4418.25, subd. (c)(2)(A) & (B ).) The regional center must then provide the assessment to the individual program planning team to a ssist it in determining the least restrictive
environment for the committee. (§ 4418.25, subd. (c)(2)(D).) “[T]he Lanterman Act guarantees an appli cant for or recipient of services or his or her representative ‘who is dissatisfied with any decision or action of [a regional center or developmental center]’ the right to an administrative fair hearing. [Citation.]” ( Conservatorship of Whitley (2007) 155 Cal.Ap p.4th 1447, 1459 ( Whitley ); § 4704.) The fair hearing procedures are designed to decide “all issues concerning the rights of persons with developmental disabilities to receive services under [the Act].” (§ 4706, subd. (a).) The fair hearing procedures include “detailed provisions for claimants who wish to attempt to resolve the issue through a voluntary informal meeting or through voluntary mediation before proceeding to an admini strative fair hearing. [Citations.]” ( Whitley , at8 pp. 1459-1460.) If the claimantchooses to proceed to an ad ministrative fair hearing, the Lanterman Act guarantees the claimant a preh earing exchange of potential witnesses and documentary evidence, the opportunity to present w itnesses and evidence, the opportunity to cross-ex amine all opposing witnesses, the right to appear through counsel or other representatives, and a written decision by the hearing officer. ( Id . at pp. 1460-1461.) Either side may seek judi cial review of the administrative decision through a writ of administrative mandamus. 3 (See In re Michael K. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126 ( Michael K. ).)

B. The LPS Act The LPS Act “governs the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California.” ( Susan T. , supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) It “is intended to provide prompt, short-term, community-based intensive treatme nt, without stigma or loss of liberty, to
individuals with mental disorders who are e ither dangerous or gravely disabled.” ( Ford
v. Norton (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 974, 977.) A pers on is “‘gravely disabled’” under the LPS Act if the “person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or sh elter.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The term

3 Amici Curiae Disability Rights Ca lifornia and National Disability Rights Network requested that we judicially noti ce (1) a Web site printout providing the historical populations of California’s stat e developmental centers; (2) the California Department of Developmental Services’ Qu arterly Client Characteristics Report from December 2012; and (3) testimony by the moth er of a developmentally disabled adult from an April 27, 2010 Joint Oversight H earing before the Assembly Committee on Human Services and the Assembly Select Co mmittee on Disabilities regarding the “Final Report on Closure of Agnews Developmen tal Center: Keeping the Promise of the Lanterman Act.” We deny the request because these documents are irrelevant to whether the Public Defender is authorized to bring a habeas corpus petiti on under section 4800 and whether Hop authorizes the trial court to peri odically review developmental center placements under the Lanterman Act. ( Mangini v. R. J. R eynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 ( Mangini ) [“Although a court may judi cially notice a variety of matters [citation], only relevant material may be noticed” (o riginal italics)], overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)9 “does not include mentally retarded persons by reason of being mentally retarded alone.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(3).) When probable cause exists to believe a mental disorder makes a person “a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled,” the LPS Act authorizes a peace officer or certain mental health profe ssionals to detain the person for a 72-hour treatment and evaluation period. (§ 5150.) Following that period, the person may be detained for increasingly longer periods depe nding on the results of the initial evaluation and treatment. (See, e.g., § 5250 [additional intensive 14-day treatment period if person remains “a danger to others, or to himsel f or herself, or grav ely disabled”]; § 5260 [second intensive 14-day treatment period if th e person is suicidal]; § 5270.15 [additional 30-day treatment period if person remains gravely disabl ed, he or she is unwilling to voluntarily accept treatment, and the county board of superv isors authorized 30-day treatment periods]; § 5300 [additional 180-d ay commitment if person is imminently dangerous]; § 5304, subd. (b) [second 180-day commitment if person remains imminently dangerous].) The 14-day and 30-day confinements re quire a certification hearing before a court-appointed commissioner or hearing o fficer to determine whether probable cause exists for the detention unless the person has filed a habeas co rpus petition seeking judicial review of the confinement. ( §§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276;
Susan T. , supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) The confin ed person has a right to appointed counsel at any hearing on a habeas corpus petition. (§§ 5275, 5276.) The 180-day commitments require a trial court order following a judicial hearing at which the confined person is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
a unanimous verdict on whether he or she is imminently dangerou s. (§§ 5301-5303;
Susan T. , at p. 1009; Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 230-233 ( Roulet ).)
The LPS Act also authorizes the trial court to appoint a conservator for a gravely disabled person (§ 5350) so that she may receiv e individualized treatment,10 supervision, and placement (§ 5350.1). The proposed conser vatee is entitled to appointed counsel, a jury trial, proof beyond a reas onable doubt, and a unanimous verdict on the question of whether the person is gravely disabled. (§§ 5350, subd. (d); 5365; Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4t h 604, 611.) Before July 1, 2012, an LPS conservator had the power to place the conservatee in a state developmental center or other locked treatment facility if the conservator determined it was the least restrictive placement. 4 (§§ 5353, 5358, 6000, subd. (a)(1); In re Violet C. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 86, 91 ( Violet C. ).) Following the recentamendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code, an LPS conser vator no longer has authority to place a conservatee in a state developmental center, but the conservator retains all other powers regarding the conservatee’s placement. ( §§ 6000, subds. (a) & (c); 7505.) An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates after one year unless the conservator successfully petitions the court to reestablis h the conservatorship. (§§ 5361-5362.)
C. Judicial Commitments Under Section 6500 et seq.
Section 6500 authorizes the district attorney, or co unty counsel if designated by the board of su pervisors, to petition the trial court for an order involuntarily committing a develo pmentally disabled person wh o is a danger to self or others. (§ 6500, subd . (b)(5).) The petition may be brough t at the request of the parent, guardian, conservator, or other person charge d with the support of the developmentally disabled person, the regional center director or his or her designee, or several other statutorily designated individuals. 5 (§ 6502.) The person wh o may be committed has a

4 A conservator appointed under the Probate Code lacks the authority to place the conservatee in a locked facility. ( People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 780 ( Karriker ) [“‘The primary difference between a Probate Code conservator and an LPS conservator is the LPS conservator’s power to place the cons ervatee in a locked facility, an action that a Probate C ode conservator cannot take’”].)

5 Section 6500 et seq. addresses not only developmentally disabled persons who are dangerous to themselves or others, but also developmenta lly disabled persons11 right to appointed counsel, a ju ry trial, proof beyond a reas onable doubt, and a unanimous verdict regarding the petition. (§ 6500, subd. (b)(5); Roulet , supra , 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.) Before July 1, 2012, if the tr ial court found the person to be developmentally disabled and a danger to himself, herself, or others, the court could order the person committed to the State Department of Developmental Services for suitable treatment and habilitation services. (Former § 6509; see Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 8.5, p. 7268.) Former secti on 6509, subdivision (a), defi ned suitable treatment and
habilitation services as the leas t restrictive residential placem ent necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment, and included any state hospital, state developmental center, community care facility, or health facility th e court found to be the most appropriate alternative following a hearing on the subj ect. The commitment order automatically expired one year after it was made. (Former § 6500; Stats. 1996, ch. 1076, § 5, p. 7265.) Effective July 1, 2012, the trial court may not commit a dangerous, developmentally disabled person to the St ate Department of Developmental Services unless it also finds the person is dangerous due to an acute crisis as defined in
section 4418.7. 6 (§§ 6500, subd. (b)(1) & (2), 6509 , subd. (a)(2), 7505, subd. (a)(2).)

who have been committed because they are in competent to stand trial for a crime with which they are charged. ( §§ 6500, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1), 650 2, 6509, subds. (a) & (b), 7505, subd. (a)(3).) We focu s on the statutory provisions relating to committing developmentally disabled persons who, like Jo hn, have not been charged with a crime or committed because they are in competent to stand trial.

6 Section 4418.7, subdivisi on (d)(1) defines an “‘acute crises’” as “a situation in which the consumer meets the criteria of Section 6500 and, as a result of the consumer’s behavior, all of the following are met: [¶] (A) There is imminent risk for substantial harm to self or others. [¶] (B) The service and support needs of the consumer cannot be met in the community, in cluding with supplement al services as set forth in subparagraph (E) of paragraph (9 ) of subdivision (a) of Section 4648 and emergency and crisis intervention servic es as set forth in paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 4648 . [¶] (C) Due to serious and potentially life-threatening conditions, the consumer requires a more restri ctive environment for crisis stabilization.”12 Under the current statutory scheme, the co mmitment order automatically expires six
months after it was made unless the trial court grants the regional center’s written request
to extend the commitment. The total commitment period, however, may not exceed one year. (§ 6500, subd. (c)(2).)

D. The Hop Decision
In Hop , the California Supreme Court ex amined the constitutionality of section 4825 of the Lanterman Act, which, as explained above, allows the indefinite confinement of a developmentally disabled person in a developmental center based on a request by the person’s parent or cons ervator, a recommendation by a regional center, and the absence of any objection from th e person or her representative. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 87-88.) Irene Hop was a developmentally disabled adult without a guardian or conservator. For several years, she lived in a commun ity-based home that met all of her needs. Hop’s mother, howeve r, transferred her to a developmental center based solely on Hop’s failure to object to th e transfer and the concurrence of the regional center and developmental center staff. A public defender challenged the transfer by filing a habeas corpus petition on Hop’s behalf, a lleging her disability prevented her from objecting and therefore the developmental cente r could not rely on he r failure to contest
the transfer. The trial court denied th e petition without conducting a hearing. ( Id . at pp. 85-86.) The Supreme Court found the tr ial court’s refusal to hear the petition improper. The high court no netheless denied the petition because it could not conduct the evidentiary hearing required to determine whether Hop’s transfer was appropriate, but instructed the public defender to rene w Hop’s petition in the trial court. ( Id . at pp. 94-95.)
The Hop court first examined whether a section 4825 placement in a developmental center violated a developmenta lly disabled person’s due process rights because that provision did not require a judici al hearing on the need for the placement.13 The court explained that personal liberty is a fundamental right the United States and California Constitutions guarantee to all individuals, includi ng individuals with developmental disabilities, and placing a pers on in a developmental center constituted a significant restraint on the person’s liber ty interests. Accordingly, the Hop court concluded that confinement in a developmen tal center required application of criminal due process standards to testits validity, including a judicial hearing to determine whether the person’s disabilities wa rranted the confinement. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 89, 92.) The state hospital opposed a judicial hearing because persons placed in a developmental center under section 4825 are voluntary admittees who have the right to either prevent their confinement by objecting to it or terminate it by requesting to leave the center once they are admitted. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 90.) The Hop court rejected this argument, pointing out that it only highlighted the need for a judicial hearing to test the grounds for the placement. Under the statutory scheme, developmentally disabled persons could voluntarily admit th emselves to a develo pmental center under section 6000, subdivision (a), on ly if they were competent to make that decision, but developmentally disabled persons who were not competent to make that decision were
nonetheless deemed to cons ent to placement in a developmental center under section 4825 because they faile d to object and had the right to terminate the placement. ( Hop , at pp. 90-91.) Because a person lacking competency to decide whether to seek admission also lacks competency to consent to placement in a developmental center, the Hop court concluded a developmentally disabled person placed in a developmental center under section 4825 “may not be deemed a ‘voluntary’ admittee” and therefore due process required a judicial hearing to test whether the placement was appropriate. ( Hop , at p. 92.)
The Hop court also considered whether equal protection rights required a judicial hearing before a developmentally disabled person could be placed in a14 developmental center under section 4825. Th e court explained that no other group of similarly situated adults in need of protec tive custody could be la wfully placed in a developmental center without a knowing and in telligent waiver of rights or a judicial determination that placement wa s appropriate, and th e developmental center failed to offer any rational basis for that disparate treatment. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 92.) Consequently, the Hop court held that a developmentally disabled person “is entitled to a judicial hearing on the questio n of whether, becaus e of developmental disability she is gravely disabled or a danger to herself or others and whethe r placement in a state hospital [under section 4825] is warranted.” ( Hop , at p. 93.) After comparing a proposed deve lopmental center admittee under section 4825 to a proposed LPS cons ervatee and a proposed committee under section 6500 et seq., the Hop court concluded the proposed developmental center
admittee “is entitled to the same congeries of rights” as th e proposed conservatee and proposed committee. Those rights include the ri ght to a jury trial on demand, application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, and appointed counsel. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 93-94.) Hop did not create a new nonstatutory means of involuntary judicial commitment or provide authority for confinement in a state developmental center not otherwise authorized by statute. ( Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 94.) Rather, Hop applied constitutional safeguards to an otherwise constitutionally infirm statutory scheme and held a person placed in a state developmental center unde r section 4825 must receive the same constitutional safeguards as a gravel y disabled person conf ined under the LPS Act or as a danger to herself or ot hers under section 6500 et seq. ( Violet C. , at pp. 94-95; Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 92-94.) Although Hop involved a developmentally disabled adult placed in a developmental center by a parent who was neither her guardian nor conservator, subsequent cases have found Hop ’s analysis and judicial hearing requirement equally15 applicable to state hospital placements initia ted by a developmenta lly disabled adult’s conservator. For example, in North Bay Regional Center v. Sherry S. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 449 ( Sherry S. ), the Court of Appeal explained: “The rationale of Hop is that a developmentally disabled adult wh o is putatively unable to consent to the deprivation of liberty entailed in state hosp italization cannot be so deprived without a hearing. For purposes of this rationale , we see no reason to distinguish between hospitalizations initiated by parents and those initiated by conservators.” 7 ( Id . at p. 461;
see also Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 96.)

II

F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY John is a 57-year-old, developmentally disabled adult with an estimated IQ of 14. He suffers a wide variety of medica l conditions that require around-the-clock care, including generalized nonintractable epile psy, lipoma, osteopenia, hypothyroidism, hypertension, and coronary arteriosclerosis. John cannot communicate verbally, nor can
he tell others when he is e xperiencing pain or needs medical attention. He is fully ambulatory, but he cannot self-administer th e many daily medications he requires, nor can he provide for his basic personal needs su ch as food, shelter, and clothing. For his own safety, John requires close supervision because he cannot appreciate basic safety
hazards. John is the oldest of Raymond and Caro l’s five children. In October 1965, Raymond and Carol volunt arily admitted John to Fairview because they could not safely
care for him at their home. John has continued to live at Fairview for the past 47 years.

7 These cases refer to conservators ap pointed under the Probate Code. (See, e.g., Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 96.) They do not apply to conservators appointed under the LPS Act be cause, as explained above, LPS conservators have the authority to place gravely disabled conservate es in a developmental center, but a Probate Code conservator lacks that power. ( Karriker , supra , 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)16 Throughout John’s stay at Fairview, Raym ond, Carol, and their other children have remained active in his life. Raymond and Caro l visit him regularly, participate in events and activities at Fairview with him, bring hi m to their home for visits every few weeks, and include him in all family events and gatherings. In 1996, the trial court appointed Raymond, Caro l, and John’s sister, Andrea, as limited conservators for John under the Probate Code. 8 The court granted Petitioners the power “[t]o fix the residence or specific dw elling of [John] to include
request for placement at a State Developmental Center,” give or withhold medical consent, and contract on John’s behalf. (Ital ics added.) The court has investigated and reviewed this limited conservatorship every two years, but has not found any grounds to modify or terminate it.
Since 1993 the trial court has annua lly reviewed John’s placement at
Fairview under Hop and section 4825. The Harbor Regional Center initiated each of
these annual “ Hop reviews” by requesting court approval for John to remain at Fairview.
Each time the court conducted a Hop review, it appointed the Public Defender to serve as John’s attorney and ultimatel y approved John’s c ontinued Fairview placement subject to “further judicial review within one (1) year.” The Harbor Regional Center filed its most recent “ Hop petition” in September 2010, explaining “there is no know n suitable, legally available placement [for John] that is less rest rictive than the proposed state de velopmental center placement.” In response, the court again appointed the Public Defender to serve as John’s attorney and temporarily approved his continued placement at Fairview pending a hearing on the Hop petition.

8 Raymond, Carol, and Andrea were not appointed as LPS conservators for John.17 In December 2011, while the most recent Hop petition remained pending, the Public Defender filed a habeas corpus petition on John’s behalf under section 4800, which provides every a dult admitted to a state developmen tal center with the right to petition for a hearing on whet her the committee should be re leased. The petition alleged Fairview unlawfully restrain ed John’s liberty because it is not the least restrictive placement for him. The petition sought John’s release from Fairview, but provided no information explaining why Fairview was not the least restrictive placement or where John should be placed. Petiti oners opposed the petition on several grounds, including (1) the petition failed to allege any facts to su pport its request for relief; (2) the Public Defender lacked standing to file the petition without approval from John’s conservators; (3) Fairview is the least restrictive placem ent for John; and (4) John’s placement at Fairview should be reviewed through the Hop review process, not a habeas corpus petition. In April 2012, the trial court conduc ted a hearing on Petitioners’ challenges to the Public Defender’s habeas corpus petiti on. At the hearing, the Harbor Regional
Center informed the court it had not been “a ctively” pursuing an alternative placement for John, but it “believed” it could find a “suitable” placement for him if the Court ordered it to do so. The Harbor Regional Center, however, did not identify any facility
other than Fairview that coul d properly care for John. The trial court rejected all of Petitioners’ challenges and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the habeas corpus petition to be followed immediately by a Hop hearing if it remained necessary. Petitioners promptly filed the current petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in this court, se eking (1) an immediate stay of trial court proceedings that would determine John’s pla cement, and (2) a writ directing the trial
court to dismiss the Public Defender’s secti on 4800 habeas corpus petition. We ordered
the Public Defender and Harbor Regional Center to show cause why mandate should not issue, and stayed all trial court pr oceedings on the habeas corpus and Hop petitions.18 III

D ISCUSSION
A. The Public Defender May Not Pursue the Habeas Co rpus Petition on John’s Behalf
The Public Defender filed the habeas corpus petition on John’s behalf under section 4800, which prov ides: “Every adult who is or has been admitted or committed to a . . . developmental center . . . as a developmentally disabled patient shall have a right to a hearing by writ of habeas corpus for his or her release from the . . . developmental center . . . after he or she or an y person acting on his or her behalf makes a request for release to any member of the staff of the . . . developmental center . . . or to any employee of a regional center.” (§ 4800, subd. (a).) The Public Defender contends it properly filed the habeas corpus petition as a “person acting on [J ohn’s] behalf.” We disagree because the Public Defender failed to establish an appropriate basis for pursuing the petition and failed to follow sec tion 4800’s statut ory procedures.
In Hop , the Supreme Court addressed sec tion 4800 and a public defender’s standing to bring a habeas co rpus petition on behalf of a developmentally disabled person who is unable to object to a developmental center placement. The Hop court acknowledged section 4800 authorizes a habeas corpus petition by anyone acting on a developmentally disabled person’s behalf, but the court also pointed out its habeas corpus jurisprudence allows someone other than the detained pers on to bring a habeas corpus petition “‘[o]nly in very exceptional circumstances ,’” and the petition must “‘“set forth some reason or explanation . . . showing why the detained person [did] not sign [the petition] . . . .”’ [Citation.]” ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 86-8 7, original italics.) Accordingly, although section 4800 authorizes a habeas corpus hearing, a person other than the developmentally disabled person mu st establish exceptional circumstances to justify pursuing a habeas corpus petition on th e developmentally disa bled person’s behalf because “‘“[i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as a19 matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddler s . . . . [Citation.] . . . .”’ [Citation.]” ( Hop , at p. 87.)
The Hop court found exceptional circ umstances supported the public defender’s section 4800 habeas corpus petitio n. Those circumstances described in the petition alleged (1) Hop’s disabil ity deprived her of the “‘ability to protest her transfer to a more restrictive placement’”; (2) Hop’s mother initiated the developmental center placement with the concurrence of the regional center and developmental center staff,
and therefore none of them re asonably could be expected to file a habeas corpus petition challenging their own actions; and (3) Hop appeared incompet ent to initiate or file a habeas corpus proceeding on her own behalf. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 87.) In essence, no means existed for Hop to challenge her transfer to the state hospital other than the public defender’s habeas corpus petition filed on her behalf. The Supreme Court also has long r ecognized “habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that ‘was not created for the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice, but to promote it’ [citation.] . . . .” ( In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 777-778.) Indeed, habeas corpus is not a proper remedy where other adequate remedies exist, such as an appeal or other availabl e procedures for challenging the confinement. ( Gandolfo , supra , 36 Cal.3d at pp. 898-899.) In Gandolfo , the Supreme Court held a habeas corpus petition was not an appropriate means to cha llenge an LPS conservatee’s confinement in a developmental center beca use the LPS Act provid ed ample means for the conservatee to challenge both the cons ervatorship and his developmental center confinement, and the habeas corpus pe tition did not allege any extraordinary circumstances rendering those procedures inadequate. ( Id . at pp. 897-900.) Here, the record shows there are no ex ceptional circumstances that justify the Public Defender filing th e habeas corpus petition on Jo hn’s behalf or show the
remedies otherwise available to address John’s Fairview placement are inadequate.
Unlike the situation in Hop , we are not concerned with John’s initial placement at20 Fairview for an indefinite period of time without a judicial hearing. John has lived at Fairview for more than 47 years. Since at least 1993, John has been placed at Fairview under a series of one-year placements subject to annual judicial review s. The most recent
of these Hop reviews was pending and set for heari ng when the Public Defender filed the habeas corpus petition. As explained above, the Hop review process assures John not only representation by counsel but also a ju ry trial and application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof on the scope of his disab ilities and whether his disabilities warrant his developmental center placement. The Pub lic Defender provides no explanation why the pending Hop review is an inadequate means for evaluating John’s Fairview placement. To the contrary, the Public Defender suggested a habeas corpus petition under section 4800 provides a means to circumvent the Hop review process. The Public Defender argued in the trial cour t that section 4800 authorized it to file the habeas corpus petition and allow the trial court to decide wh ether John’s Fairview placement remained appropriate, rather th an go through the Hop review process and present that issue to a jury. This argument turns the function and pur pose of habeas corpus on its head. As explained above, habeas corpus is appropria te only when there are no other available and adequate remedies; it may not be used to avoid otherwise available and adequate
remedies. 9 ( Gandolfo , supra , 36 Cal.3d at pp. 898-899.) Moreover, unlike Hop , John has court-appointed conservators who are authorized to act on his behalf in selecting his residence. (See Michael K. , supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1128, fn. 14 [excep tional circumstances did not exist to allow

9 We do not suggest that a developmen tally disabled pers on or anyone acting on his or her behalf must always await the next Hop review to challenge the person’s placement in a state developmental center or ot her facility. Rather, we simply conclude a section 4800 habeas corpus petition may not be used when there are other adequate and available remedies for challengi ng the placement. Here, the Hop review process was adequate because it was already underw ay and a hearing was scheduled.21 public defender to pursue section 4800 habeas corpus petition because developmentally disabled person had court-appointed conservato rs who were competent and authorized to decide whether the person should remain in a state developmental center].) The Public Defender and Harbor Regional Center contend there is evid ence that John’s conservators are preventing the Harbor Re gional Center from determining whether there is a less restrictive placement that would meet John’s n eeds, and therefore we may not rely on the
conservators’ involvement to conclude the P ublic Defender lacks au thority to pursue the habeas corpus petition. We disagree.
Neither the Public Defender nor Harbor Regional Center cites any evidence in the record showing John’s conservato rs prevented the regi onal center from fully assessing John and his needs or otherwise identifying any less restrictive placements. The Harbor Regional Center argues it cannot identify other possible placements for John without his conservators’ cooperation b ecause it may not disclose confidential information about John to pot ential service providers with out their consent. (See generally § 4514.) But section 4514 includ es numerous exceptions to the consent requirement, including disclosure to “qualified professional persons . . . in the provision of intake, assessment, and servic es or appropriate referrals.” (§ 4514, subd. (a).) Consent is required only when disclosure is made to “a program not vendored by a regional center or developmental center.” ( Ibid .) The Harbor Regional Center cites no evidence showing John’s conservators can or have thwa rted the placement process through lack of cooperation. We do not suggest that a Probate Co de conservator’s involvement in a developmentally disabled person’s placem ent bars a public defender from pursuing a habeas corpus petition on the pe rson’s behalf whenever the conservator objects. Rather, we merely conclude the conservator’s involvement is a factor the court may consider in determining whether exceptional circumst ances justified the public defender’s section 4800 habeas corpus petition. (See Michael K. , supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123,22 fn. 8 [public defender may act contrary to co nservator’s instructions in extraordinary circumstances].) For example, if there was evidence show ing the conservator failed to act in the developmentally disabled person ’s best interests or prevented a proper
assessment or identificati on of possible community-based services, the court could
consider those circumstances in deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist. Here,
the Public Defender failed to show either extraordinary circumst ances or that other remedies were inadequate.
The Public Defender also may not pursue the current habeas corpus petition
because he failed to follow th e procedures mandated for a section 4800 habeas corpus petition. Section 4800, subdivision (a), grants every adult admitted or confined in a state developmental center or other identified facil ity the right to a habeas corpus hearing after the adult or someone acting on his or her beha lf makes a request for release to a facility staff member or a regional center employee. Upon receiving the request, the staff member or regional center employee must pr omptly (1) provide th e person making the request a written request for release form for the person to sign, 10 and (2) deliver a copy of the signed request to the director or admini strator of the facility from which release is sought. (§ 4800, subd. (b).) The director or administrator must th en notify the trial court of the request and transmit a copy to the adult’s parent or conservator. ( Ibid .) The adult or person acting on his or her behalf must then prepare and file a habeas corpus petition with the court, and counsel must be appointed to assist the adult if he does not already have counsel. (§ 4801, subds. (a) & (b).) Here, the Public Defender failed to request John’s release to any Fairvi ew staff member or regional center employee and no written request was submitted to anyone at Fairview orthe regional center. Instead, the Public Defender bypassed the statute’s preliminary st eps and simply filed the habeas corpus

10 The written request for release must be substantially in the form described in section 4800, subdivision (d).23 petition with the trial court. The Public Defender provides no authority or excuse justifying its failure to follow th e statutory procedures. (See Sherry S. , supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 461 [statutory pr ocedures regarding developmental center placements under section 48 25 must be followed].)
The Public Defender ar gues section 4800 and Hop authorize it to file a habeas corpus petition any tim e a developmentally disabled person placed in a state developmental center or other facility is inca pable of filing a petition on her own behalf.
The Public Defender reads these authoritie s too broadly. As explained above, Hop authorized a public defender to pursue a ha beas corpus petition on Hop’s behalf because
there was no one else to do so and no other means to obtain an in dependent review of Hop’s state hospital placement. At the time, th e right to a judicial hearing or any other remedy did not exist. Hop nonetheless requires “‘ very exceptiona l circumstances ’” for a public defender or any one other than the detained person to file a section 4800 habeas corpus petition, and the writ petition must allege facts establishing those circumstances. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 86-87, original italics.) A public defender simply may not pursue a section 4800 habe as corpus petition as a matter of course.
The Public Defender contends In re Borgogna (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 937, supports its interpreta tion of section 4800 and Hop

. Borgogna declared a public defender has standing to pursue a habeas corpus pe tition on a developmenta lly disabled person’s behalf if the person is not competent to do so. ( Borgogna , at p. 945.) This statement, however, is dicta. ( Ibid .) In Borgogna , the public defender jo ined with the regional center in bringing an earlier habeas corpus pe tition, but the trial court denied the petition because it was not filed by the developmenta lly disabled person, who was competent and opposed the petition. The issue in Borgogna concerned a later petition the regional center filed on its own in the Court of Appeal. ( Borgogna , at p. 940.) The Borgogna court found the regional center could pursue the petition because the statutory scheme vested it with authority to decide the disabl ed person’s placement and therefore the center24 could defend its own pl acement decision. The Borgogna court did not analyze or consider the public defender’s authority to pursue a habeas corpus petition nor did it
discuss Hop ’s very exceptional circumstances requirement. ( Id . at p. 946.) An opinion is not authority for issues it did not consider or decide. ( People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155; People v. Dunbar (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 114, 118.) We
therefore find Borgogna inapplicable. We note the trial court appointed th e Public Defender to serve as John’s counsel for the pending Hop review. Assuming that appointment would otherwise
authorize the Public Defender to file a habeas corpus petition on John’s behalf, it does not authorize the Public Defender to pursue the current petition. As explained above, the record does not show the pending Hop review is an inadequate remedy for testing the validity of John’s placement atFairview and the Public Defender failed to follow the appropriate procedures for pursuing a habeas corpus pe tition under section 4800. Accordingly, the Public Defender may not pur sue the current habeas corpus petition on
John’s behalf.

B. The Trial Court Retains Jurisdiction to Review John’s Fairview Placement Petitioners contend the trial court lacks jurisdiction to conduct Hop hearings to review Jo hn’s ongoing Fairview placement because the Hop decision did not create ongoing jurisdiction for the trial court to hear challenges to placement decisions or otherwise review existing placem ents. According to Petitioners, the Lanterman Act’s fair hearing process is the excl usive means for deciding challenges concerning John’s Fairview placement. This argument fails beca use it ignores the terms of the court orders approving John’s placement at Fairview and the limited purpose of periodic Hop
reviews. 11

11 Although Petitioners argue the tria l court lacks authority to conduct periodic Hop reviews regarding John’s Fairview pl acement, they do not seek any relief25 Hop held a developmentally disabled person’s due process and equal protection rights prohibit the person from being confined in a state developmental center
under section 4825 without an initial judicial determination regarding the person’s disability and whether the pl acement was warranted. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 92-93.) The fact John was placed in Fairview several years before the Supreme Court
announced its Hop decision in no way affects his right to have his Fairview placement
reviewed under the standards Hop established. As the Hop court pointed out, its requirement of a hearing and other proc edural rights it established to make a developmental center placement under secti on 4825 constitutional applied not only to Hop and all developmentally disabled persons placed in a developmental center after the Hop decision, but also to all persons who re sided in a developmental center under a section 4825 placement when the Suprem e Court announced its decision. ( Hop , at p. 94 [“Our holding does not require the immediate release eitherof Hop or of those presently held in state hospitals under th e authority of section 4825”].) Here, the initial judicial determination regarding John’s Fairview placement occurred in 1993. At that time, the trial court approved John’s placement subject to “further judicial review within one (1) year.” Since then, Jo hn has remained at Fairview
under a series of court orders approving his placement subject to annual judicial reviews. Every court order approving the placement rese rved jurisdiction for the court to do so. Indeed, each time John’s Fairview placemen t came up for review, it was essentially a new placement requiring judicial review under Hop regardless of whether the trial court had continuing jurisdiction because the aut horization for the previous placement had expired. No one disputes the trial court’s au thority to approve John’s Fairview placement

on the pending Hop petition nor do they ask us to pr event the trial court from reviewing John’s Fairview placement.26 for a limited time subject to further judicial review, and therefore this challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction to review the placement fails.
We nonetheless consider whether Hop itself provides the trial court with authority to periodically review John’s plac ement to determine whether his disabilities continue to justify placement in a developmental center. Although Hop addressed only a developmentally disabled person’s initial pla cement, we find its rationale for requiring judicial review equally applicable to th e committee’s ongoing placem ent. As explained above, Hop found a developmentally disabled person’s initial placement without a judicial hearing violated the person’s due process and equal protection rights because it significantly impairs the person ’s fundamental right to pers onal liberty, and no other class of similarly situated adults may be placed in a developmental center without a judicial determination that the placement is appropriate. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 89-92.) The impairment of the committee’s pers onal liberty is not diminished by residing in the developmental center for an extended period of time, especially when there are continuing advancements in both th e treatment of numerous disabilities and the availability of less restrictive services in community-based an d other facilities. No other class of similarly situated adults may lawfu lly remain in a state developmental center indefinitely without further judicial review of their ongoing placement. For example, the LPS Act and section 6500 et seq. place limit s on the length of confinement for a gravely disabled person or a person believed to be a danger to self or othe rs, and both statutory schemes also require judicial review to recommit the person or extend the initial confinement. (See, e.g., §§ 5150, 5250, 52 60, 5270.15, 5300, 5304, subd. (b) [limiting LPS confinements to 72 hours, 14 days, 30 days, or 180 days depending on person’s condition]; §§ 5256, 5256 .1, 5262, 5270.15, 5 275, 5276, 5301, 5302, 5303 [requiring a court or certified hearing officer to review all LPS confinements except initial 72-hour
confinement and all extensions or recommi tments]; §§ 6500, subd. (c)(2), 6502, 650327 [limiting commitments to six months a nd requiring judicial hearing for initial commitment and any extensio n or recommitment].)
The Lanterman Act does not limit the length of a section 4825 placement or require judicial review of the placement. Accordingly, unless Hop requires a further judicial review of a section 4825 placement, John an d others similarly situated could face a lifetime placement in a developmental cent er based solely on an initial judicial determination regarding the placement’s suitability. We see no basis to justify the lifetime placement of a nondangerous developmentally disabled person under section 4825 based solely on an initial judi cial review. Petitioners do not adequately explain why the Legislature un der the LPS Act and section 6500 et seq. limited the commitment time of a dangerous developmentally disabled person or a gravely disabled person placed in a developmenta l center and also guarantee d those individuals further judicial review, but omitted thos e protections for section 4825 placements. That result is simply inconsistent with the cons titutional principles articulated in Hop

. 12
Petitioners contend John and other develo pmentally disabled persons placed in a developmental center are not simila rly situated to other developmental center
residents because section 4825 admittees voluntarily agree to the placement. According to Petitioners, persons placed under section 48 25 are free to leave the developmental center any time they or their legal represen tatives choose, unlike those persons placed under the LPS Act, section 6500 et se q., or other statutory provisions. Hop , however, rejected this identical argum ent. As explained above, Hop found developmentally disabled persons are incapable of objecting to their placemen t because of their disability

12 The Public Defender requests thatwe judicially notice a document published by the Office of the Legislative Analyst in November 19 88 entitled, “Judicial Reviews of State Developm ental Center Placements; Implementation of the In re Hop Decision .” We deny the request because a 25-year-old document on how various counties implemented Hop is not relevant to our current inquiry. ( Mangini , supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 1063.)28 and therefore are not voluntary admittees. A person may not be considered a voluntary
admittee under section 4825 unless he or she is competent to request or consent to the placement. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 90-92.) Ap pointing a conservator for the developmentally disabled person does not ch ange that conclusion; the placement remains involuntary and a judicial hearing is required. ( Sherry S. , supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 461; Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 96.) As Hop explained, the well intentioned efforts of a person’s representativ e to act in the person’s best interests “‘cannot . . . detract in any way from [the pers on’s] right to procedures that will protect him from arbitrary curtailment of his liber ty interest . . . .’ [Citations.]” ( Hop , at p. 93;
see also Capitol People , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 699 [“under the Lanterman Act it is the individual with a developmental disa bility—not his or her family, friends, or conservator—who is afforded all the legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed by the
United States and California Constitutions. [Citation.] No matter how well intentioned parents and conservators may be, they cannot exert their influence to curtail or deny the due process rights of persons w ith developmental disabilities”].) We acknowledge Michael K. and Whitley concluded Hop did not provide “ongoing jurisdiction in the superior court to hear challenges to placement decisions or simply review existing placements,” explaini ng that “‘[t]he due process concerns for retention in a development[al] center are not the same due process concerns that are present when a developmentally disabled indi vidual is first involuntarily committed.’” ( Michael K. , supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1127-1129; Whitley , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1466.) As authority for that proposition, Michael K. and Whitley cite Cramer
v. Gillermina R. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 380, 393 ( Cramer ), without any analysis of that decision. Upon examination, Cramer does not support their conclusion.
Cramer involved petitions to recommit several individuals to a state developmental center because the original orders committi ng them under section 6500 et seq. were expiring. Following ex part e hearings on each petition, the trial court29 temporarily extended the commitment orders pending full recommitment hearings. The committees challenged these temporary exte nsions, arguing they were constitutionally entitled to adversarial probable cause hearings before they could be temporarily held beyond their original commitments. ( Cramer , supra , 125 Cal.App.3d at pp. 384-385, 392.) The committees cited Hop to support their position, but Cramer found Hop inapplicable because it did not addre ss due process concerns arising from a recommitment under section 6500 et seq. ( Cramer , at p. 393.)
Cramer is inapplicable here for the sa me reason—it addresses a different type of confinement based on different author ity. At the time, se ction 6500 et seq. authorized a one-year judicial commitment for developmentally disabled persons who were a danger to themselves or others . After one year, the commitment order automatically expired and the committee woul d be freed unless the district attorney petitioned for a recommitment order. Without periodic Hop reviews a developmentally disabled person could be pl aced in a developmental center under section 4825 for the remainder of her life based only on an initial judicial review. Consequently, Cramer does not support the conclusion that the due proce ss concerns regarding retention in a state developmental center under section 4825 are different than the due process concerns regarding the initial section 4825 placement. Moreover, in Cramer , the individuals received judicial hearings before the court made the temporary hold orders and the individuals were entitled to appear at those hearings and oppose the orders. Those hearin gs were not full adversarial hearings with the right of cross-examination and other form al hearing rights, but they were judicial hearings addressing the suitability of the temporary hold orders. ( Cramer , supra , 125 Cal.App.3d at pp. 392-393.) The Cramer court also emphasized that the challenged orders were merely temporary pending a full judicial hearing where the committee would receive all formal hearing rights: “Undoubtedl y, our holding would be different if there were no available subsequent judicial hearing to test the recommitment.” ( Id . at p. 392.)30 Accordingly, Cramer held due process requires a judici al hearing before a recommitment and therefore does not support the conclusion the trial court has no ongoing jurisdiction to review a section 4825 placement after the court initially approves the placement. We note two additional reasons why Michael K. and Whitley do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct periodic Hop reviews. First, neither decision
addressed Hop ’s equal protection rationale for requi ring ongoing jurisdiction to review a developmental center placement. Second , neither decision involved a periodic Hop review regarding an ongoing developmental center placement. Instead, both Michael K.
and Whitley involved attempts to circumvent the Lanterman Act’s administrative fair hearing procedures by arguing Hop created ongoing jurisdiction for courts to hear challenges to specific placement decisions or otherwise review all aspects of any Lanterman Act placement. ( Michael K. , supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1116-1117, 1127; Whitley , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465.) Our reading of Hop is not inconsistent with Michael K. ’s and Whitley ’s
conclusion that Hop does not provide the trial court w ith ongoing jurisd iction to hear challenges to specific placem ent decisions and review all aspects of existing placements.
We read Hop simply to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to (1) conduct a hearing regarding the basis for initially placing a developmentally disabled person in a developmental center, and (2) periodically review whether the person’s disabilities continue to support the significant restric tions the placement imposes on the committee’s liberty interests. This juri sdiction to periodically review the basis for a developmental center placement is not jurisdiction to monito r the ongoing placement or make decisions regarding the details of the services the developmentally disabled person receives. 13

13 Neither the parties nor the amic i curiae briefed what constitutes the appropriate interval between Hop reviews and that issue is not presented here because each order approving John’s Fa irview placement specifically required the next review to occur within one year. Accordingly, we do not address the issue. We also note the recent amendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code will reduce and ev entually eliminate31 Indeed, we emphasize Hop did not create a new procedure for placing a developmentally disabled person in a developmental center, nor did it create a nonstatutory procedure for challenging decisi ons regarding a developmentally disabled person’s placement or other specific services. ( Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 94.) Instead, Hop imposed limits on an existing st atutory procedure for placing a developmentally disabled person in a deve lopmental center to ensure the restraint imposed on the disabled person’s liberty interests did not violate the person’s due process and equal protection rights. ( Sherry S. , supra , 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 460, fn. 11;
Violet C. , supra , 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 94-95.) Accordingly, a Hop review only examines the level of confinement by aski ng whether the developmentally disabled person’s disabilities warrant placement in the mo st restrictive type of facility available
under the Lanterman Act. Hop does not apply to placement in a developmental center under any statutory prov ision other than section 4825, no r does it apply to placement in any facility other than a developmental center. 14

the need for Hop reviews for two reasons. First, a developmentally disabled person may no longer be placed in a developmental cente r under section 4825 and that is the only type of placement to which Hop applies. (§ 7505.) Second, the recent amendments require regional centers to conduct regular, comprehensive reviews of developmentally disabled persons who resided in developmenta l centers before the amendments to identify community-based services that could meet the developmentally disabled person’s needs. (§ 4418.25, subd. (c)(2).)

14 The Public Defender argues the rece nt amendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code codified Hop hearings and therefore it is irrelevant whether Hop itself provided the superior court with ongoing jurisdiction to review state developmental center placements. The Public Defender relie s on section 6500, subdivision (b)(4), which states, “In the event subsequent petitions are f iled with respect to a resident of a state developmental center or a state-operated comm unity facility committed prior to July 1, 2012, the procedures followed and criteria fo r recommitment shall be the same as with the initial petition for commitment.” The Pu blic Defender misreads this statute. Section 6500 is part of the statutory scheme for committing developmentally disabled persons who are danger ous to themselves or others. It is not part of the Lanterman Act a nd does not address a developm ental center placement under32 The Lanterman Act’s administrative fair hearing procedures allow a developmentally disabled person to challeng e any specific decision a regional center or developmental center makes to reduce, terminate, change, or deny that person services. (§§ 4706, 4710.) To challenge a decision the developmenta lly disabled person must invoke the fair hearing proced ures within 30 days of rece iving notice of the challenged decision. (§4710.5, subd. (a); Whitley , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1460.) The fair hearing procedure’s final outcome may be judicially reviewed through a writ of administrative mandamus. (See Michael K. , supra , 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126.)
In Whitley , the Court of Appeal held the fa ir hearing procedures provide the exclusive remedy for a developmentally disabled person’s legal representative to object to a community placement decision. 15 ( Whitley , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1463, 1465.) The Whitley court reached that conclusion based on the
exhaustion of administrativ e remedies doctrine. ( Id . at pp. 1463-1464.) That doctrine provides that when the Legislature creates an administrative tribunal to adjudicate an issue before presenting it to the trial court, the party must first pursue its remedies with
that tribunal because the issue falls within the administrative tribunal’s special jurisdiction. Consequently , the courts may only “‘ review ’” the tribunal’s final determination. ( Id . at p. 1464, original italics.)

section 4825, which is the only develo pmental center placement to which Hop applies. Moreover, following the recent amendments, de velopmentally disabled persons no longer may be placed in a developmental center under section 4825 (see § 7505), and therefore there are no statutory procedures and crite ria for initially placing a developmentally disabled person in a developmental center under section 4825, in contrast to a placement under section 6500 et seq.

15 Whitley ’s holding, however, must be qualified because, as Hop explained, section 4800 allows a developmentally disabl ed person or someone acting on his or her behalf to challenge the person’s placement in exceptional circumstances and when the fair hearing procedure’s re medies are inadequate. ( Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at pp. 86-87; see also Gandolfo , supra , 36 Cal.3d at p. 898-900.) Whitley did not address section 4800.33 Contrary to Petitioners’ contention, the administrative fair hearing procedures do not deprive the trial cour t of jurisdiction to conduct periodic Hop reviews
because the reviews serve a di fferent purpose and are not within an administrative tribunal’s special jurisdiction. Hop requires periodic independent reviews to ensure a section 4825 developmental center placem ent does not violate a developmentally disabled person’s constitutional rights. Th e reviews ensure the person’s disabilities continue to warrant placemen t in the most restrictive environment available under the Lanterman Act. In contrast, the fair hearing procedures provide an administrative process for a developmentally disabled person or her representative to challenge a regional center’s or developmental center’s decision to change the person’s placement or other services. Through the process, a mediator or hearing officer with subject matter expertise resolves specific challenges to a decision changing the services the developmentally disabled person receives. Moreover, the administrative procedures do not provide the same due process and equal protection safeguards as periodic Hop reviews. To protect a developmentally disabled person ’s personal liberty interests, Hop requires periodic independent reviews to ensure the person’s di sabilities continue to warrant developmental center placement even if there has been no change in the person’ s placement or other
services since the last review. Hop requires these reviews to prevent the developmentally disabled person’s representative, the region al center, and the developmental center from maintaining the placement indefinitely without any independent review. The administrative hearing proce dures, however, provide for an independent administrative review only if a developmentally disabled person or her representative requests a hearing within 30 days after receiving notice of the regional center’s or developmental center’s decision to change the person’s placement or other services. Even after the fair hearing procedures have been invoked, the developmen tally disabled person’s representative, the regional center, and developmental center may avoid a hearing by invoking the informal34 meeting and voluntary mediati on provisions of the administ rative hearing procedures to reach an agreement to maintain the developmental center placement. That is precisely
the situation Hop sought to avoid by imposing its judi cial hearing requirement. Here, the fair hearing procedures did not provide John the due process and equal protection safeguards Hop requires because neither the regional center nor the developmental center changed John’s placement or any of his othe r services, and theref ore neither John nor Petitioners had the right to request a heari ng under the administrative fair hearing procedures. 16 Accordingly, the trial court may proceed with the pending Hop review hearing to determine whether John’s disabilitie s continue to justify his placement in a developmental center. If the trial court dete rmines John’s Fairview placement is no longer warranted because a le ss restrictive facility can meet his needs, Petitioners may request John’s transfer to a sp ecific facility of their choosi ng and urge the adoption of the services they believe are nece ssary. The administrative fair hearing procedures should be used to resolve any challenges Petitioners ha ve to the facility the regional center ultimately may select for John and the services to be provid ed at that facility. The trial court should not resolve any such disp utes in the first instance during the Hop review.
The Hop review should be limited to deciding whether appropriate efforts have been made to identify a less restrictiv e facility that satisfies all of John’s needs and whether at least one such facility exists. Assuming the trial court concl udes John should be transferred, he should not be transferred un til all issues regarding his new placement are resolved. (See Hop , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 94 [“‘A precip itous release of these [adults] to families and community facilities unprepared to care for them could be both disruptive to

16 Because neither the Harbor Region al Center nor Fairview made any decision that would have allowed John or Pe titioners to invoke the administrative fair hearing procedures, we need not decide whet her these administrative procedures would satisfy Hop if there was an administrative hearing before an independent hearing officer.35 the treatment program and potentially harmfu l to the [patient] a nd the community’”];
see also Sherry S. , supra , 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 463.) Our decision solely addresses th e procedures relating to the Hop review of John’s Fairview placement. We express no opinion on the appropriate placement for
John. We also do not deci de what role the Public Defender may play in the Hop review of John’s placement, nor do we decide wh ether the Public Defender has adequately represented John’s intere sts. Our decision in Michelle K. v. Superior Court (Nov. 8, 2013, G048018) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ <http: www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions>, however,
addresses those issues.

IV
D ISPOSITION The petition is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to (1) enter an order dismissing the habeas corpus petition, and (2 ) conduct a hearing on
the Hop petition. Our order staying all trial court proceedings on the habeas corpus and Hop petitions is hereby dissolved. In the interest of justice, all parties shall bear their own costs on this writ proceeding.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

FYBEL, J.