Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Benjamin J. Church

Church Law Office

Monticello, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Justin A. Hines,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-3136

Appeal from the White Superior 

Court

The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

91D01-1711-F6-204

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 2 of 5

Statement of the Case

[1] Justin Hines (“Hines”) appeals his conviction following a jury trial for Level 6 

felony residential entry.1 Hines specifically argues that there is insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that there is sufficient evidence, 

we affirm Hines’ conviction.

[2] We affirm. 

Issues

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hines’ conviction 

for Level 6 felony residential entry.

Facts

[3] In November 2017, the State charged Hines with Level 6 felony domestic 

battery, Level 6 felony residential entry, and Class A misdemeanor criminal 

trespass. At trial, Hillary Likens (“Likens”) testified that she was in her living 

room when Hines opened the door to her apartment and walked through the 

front door. Hines pushed Likens into a wall and grabbed her cell phone out of 

her pocket. Likens told Hines to leave her apartment. Hines got into a gold car 

and threw Likens’ cell phone out of the window as he drove away. Likens also 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1.5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 3 of 5

testified that Hines had asked her to write a letter explaining that she had 

invited him into her apartment. Likens never wrote such a letter.

[4] Also at trial, the property manager at Likens’ apartment complex (“the property 

manager”) testified that she had heard Likens scream and had watched a gold 

vehicle leave the complex. When the property manager arrived at Likens’

apartment, Likens, who was crying, was in the process of contacting the police.

[5] Monticello Police Department Patrolman Nathan Miller (“Patrolman Miller”)

testified that he was dispatched to Likens’ apartment with information that 

there had been an uninvited guest in the apartment. When Patrolman Miller

arrived at the apartment, Likens was crying and upset. 

[6] Also at trial, Hines and his friend, the driver of the gold car, testified that Likens

had opened the door to her apartment and invited Hines into her home. A jury 

convicted Hines of residential entry and criminal trespass. Hines now appeals 

his residential entry conviction.

Decision

[7] Hines’s sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support his Level 6 

felony residential entry conviction. Our standard of review for sufficiency of 

the evidence claims is well-settled. We consider only the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 

144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 

credibility. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact finder 

could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 4 of 5

The evidence is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to 

support the verdict. Id. at 147. 

[8] Here, Hines specifically argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction because Likens’ testimony about Hines breaking and entering into 

her apartment without her permission was “equivocal” and “contradictory.” 

(Hines’ Br. 9). Hines therefore asks us to apply the incredible dubiosity rule. 

According to Hines, if this Court applies the incredible dubiosity rule, “there 

would be no evidence to sustain a Residential Entry conviction.” (Hines’ Br.

9). 

[9] The incredible dubiosity rule provides that a court may impinge on the jury’s 

responsibility to judge witness credibility only when confronted with inherently 

improbable testimony. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind. 2015). This 

rule is applied in limited circumstances, namely where there is “1) a sole 

testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or 

the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” 

Id. at 756. 

[10] Our review of the evidence makes it clear that the incredible dubiosity rule 

simply does not apply in this case for three reasons. First, there were multiple 

testifying witnesses in this case. See Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756. Second, Likens’ 

testimony was not internally inconsistent. See Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 

1221 (Ind. 2015) (explaining that the second prong of the test is satisfied “only 

when the witness’s trial testimony was inconsistent within itself, not that it was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3136 | July 30, 2019 Page 5 of 5

inconsistent with other evidence or prior testimony”). Third, the testimony 

from the other witnesses provided circumstantial evidence of the crime. 

Specifically, the property manager, who had heard Likens scream, testified that 

she had found Likens in her apartment crying and in the process of contacting 

the police. In addition, Patrolman Miller testified that he had been dispatched 

to Likens’ apartment with information that there had been an uninvited guest in 

the apartment. When the patrolman arrived at the apartment, Likens was 

crying and upset. The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Hines of 

Level 6 felony residential entry.

[11] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.