[Cite as Knott v. Knott, 2018-Ohio-4198.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

WILLIAM KNOTT 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ARIELLE KNOTT 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 28895 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. DR-2015-04-1211 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: October 17, 2018 

 

TEODOSIO, Judge. 

{¶1} Arielle Knott appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common 

Pleas Domestic Relations Division overruling her objections to the August 2, 2017, magistrate’s 

decision and finding her in contempt. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part. 

I. 

{¶2} William Knott filed a complaint for divorce against Arielle Knott in April 2015, 

with a divorce decree having been entered in December 2015. Ms. Knott was designated as the 

residential parent and legal custodian of the parties’ two minor children. Also pursuant to the 

divorce decree, Mr. Knott was entitled to claim the two children as dependents for the 2015 tax 

year, and beginning in the 2016 tax year, each parent was to claim one of the children as a 

dependent for tax purposes. 

{¶3} In 2015, Ms. Knott and her children moved in with her grandfather, who provided 

for their support while Ms. Knott was unemployed. The grandfather claimed both children as 
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dependents for the 2015 tax year. Mr. Knott also claimed both children as dependents for his 

2015 taxes. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) requested proof of support from each of the 

parties. After providing proof of support, the grandfather was given the tax exemption for both 

children and Mr. Knott was assessed a penalty by the IRS. Subsequently, for the 2016 tax year, 

Mr. Knott again claimed both children as dependents for tax purposes. 

{¶4} In 2017, Mr. Knott filed a contempt motion alleging Ms. Knott had failed to 

comply with the trial court’s order with regard to the 2015 tax exemptions and Ms. Knott filed a 

contempt motion with regard to the 2016 tax exemptions taken by Mr. Knott. Hearings before 

the magistrate were conducted and on August 2, 2017, the magistrate issued a decision finding 

Ms. Knott in contempt and Mr. Knott not in contempt. On November 17, 2017, the trial court 

overruled objections filed by Ms. Knott and issued an order: (1) finding Ms. Knott in contempt; 

(2) reallocating the tax exemptions for 2016 to Mr. Knott; (3) ordering that Mr. Knott claim both 

tax exemptions in future years as compensation for penalties assessed to him by the IRS; (4) 

finding Mr. Knott not in contempt; and (5) stating that Ms. Knott was not permitted to claim the 

children as tax dependents or allow her [grand]father or any other person to claim them for tax 

exemptions. 

{¶5} Ms. Knott now appeals, raising five assignments of error. Mr. Knott has not filed 

an appellate brief in this matter and thus, this Court may, “in determining the appeal, * * * accept 

[Ms. Knott’s] statement of the facts and issues as correct and reverse the judgment if [Ms. 

Knott’s] brief reasonably appears to sustain such action.” Phillips v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Medina 

No. 12CA0038-M, 2012-Ohio-6108, ¶ 6, quoting App.R. 18(C). 
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II. 

{¶6} We note that Ms. Knott’s statement of the assignments of error on page one of her 

brief to this Court do not reflect the headings and divisions contained within the body of the 

brief. For the purposes of our review, we will use the headings as they appear in the body of the 

brief as they more accurately reflect the arguments contained therein. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT “CONTRARY TO THE DIVORCE 

DECREE MOTHER TOOK BOTH EXEMPTIONS IN 2015 BY ALLOWING 

HER FATHER [SIC] TO CLAIM BOTH CHILDREN AS DEPENDENTS ON 

HIS TAX RETURN” IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

{¶7} “Generally, the decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision lies 

within the discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Barlow v. Barlow, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5. 

However, “[i]n so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference to the nature of the 

underlying matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio3139, ¶ 18. 

{¶8} “This Court reviews contempt proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” Zemla v. 

Zemla, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0010, 2012-Ohio-2829, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion is more 

than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When 

applying this standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment 

for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). 

{¶9} “To establish contempt, the moving party must ‘establish a valid court order, 

knowledge of the order by the defendant, and a violation of the order.’” Henry v. Henry, 9th 
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Dist. Summit No. 27696, 2015-Ohio-4350, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Komadina, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 

03CA008325, 2004-Ohio-4962, ¶ 11. Civil contempt requires proof by clear and convincing 

evidence. Zemla v. Zemla, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0010, 2012-Ohio-2829, ¶ 11. “Clear and 

convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more certain than a mere 

‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a 

firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 

469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶10} In holding Ms. Knott in contempt, the trial court stated that “[c]ontrary to the 

Divorce Decree, Mother took both exemptions in 2015 by allowing her [grand]father to claim 

both children as dependents on his tax return.” It is not in dispute that Ms. Knott’s grandfather 

claimed the children as dependents on his tax return for 2015. 

{¶11} The transcript of the hearing held on June 22, 2018, presents the following 

exchange between the magistrate and counsel for Ms. Knott: 

THE COURT: The only issue before me is whether or not she was permitted to 

allow her grandfather. 

MR. UFHOLZ: She did not allow her grandfather. She had nothing to do with 

him filing. 

THE COURT: How did the grandfather get access to the Social Security 

numbers? 

MR. UFHOLZ: He may have had Social Security numbers for her and the 

grandchildren, but she didn’t authorize him to file a return. She didn’t join in a 

return. She had nothing to do with that. 

* * * 

MRS. KNOTT: My grandfather has had my kids’ Social Securities because 

William used to take them and he would – 
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{¶12} At the July 31, 2017, hearing, the magistrate again inquired as to how the 

grandfather was able to get the children’s social security numbers. In response, counsel for Ms. 

Knott responded: “He had filed in previous years. This was not the first year that he had taken 

she and the children as dependents * * * so he already had all of that information.” 

{¶13} These exchanges, although not witness testimony, were the only discussions 

relating to Ms. Knott’s knowledge of, or acquiescence to, her grandfather having claimed the 

children as dependents. No evidence or testimony was presented to support the notion that Ms. 

Knott “allowed” her grandfather to claim the children as dependents. We conclude that the mere 

fact that Ms. Knott’s grandfather did so does not constitute the clear and convincing evidence 

required to support a finding of contempt on the basis that Ms. Knott allowed him to claim her 

children as dependents. The trial court thereby abused its discretion in finding Ms. Knott in 

contempt. 

{¶14} Ms. Knott’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO 

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT “CONTRARY TO THE DIVORCE 

DECREE MOTHER TOOK BOTH EXEMPTIONS IN 2015 BY ALLOWING 

HER FATHER [SIC] TO CLAIM BOTH CHILDREN AS DEPENDENTS ON 

THIS TAX RETURN” IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW. 

{¶15} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Knott argues the trial court’s finding that 

she allowed her grandfather to claim both children as dependents was contrary to law. We do 

not reach the merits of this argument because our resolution of the first assignment of error has 

rendered this assignment moot. Accordingly, we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE 

THE TRIAL COURT’S REALLOCATION OF BOTH CHILD TAX 

EXEMPTIONS TO FATHER WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
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{¶16} In her third assignment of error, Ms. Knott argues the trial court erred in 

reallocating the child tax exemptions for both children to Mr. Knott. We agree. 

{¶17} The trial court’s order overruling objections to the magistrate’s decision found 

Ms. Knott in contempt, retroactively reallocated both child tax exemptions to Mr. Knott for the 

2016 tax year, reallocated both child tax exemptions to Mr. Knott for subsequent years, and 

found that Mr. Knott was not in contempt. The trial court further stated: “Henceforth, [Mr. 

Knott] shall claim both children each year as tax exemptions on his tax return to compensate the 

penalty assessed to him by the IRS.” 

{¶18} The reallocation of the child tax exemptions is a modification of the income tax 

dependency exemptions. “[T]he trial court may modify the dependency exemption, just as any 

other portion of a support order, only after finding a substantial change in circumstances.” 

Hoban v. Hoban, 64 Ohio App.3d 257, 261 (9th Dist.1990). “The determination of the tax 

exemption is directly related to the support of the child; therefore, the trial court’s decision must 

be in the best interest of the child in order to be upheld.” Bender v. Bender, 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 20157, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3212, *19 (July 18, 2001). “[A] trial court’s decision 

regarding child support obligations falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be 

disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 

(1997). An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court 

was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶19} In the case before us for review, the trial court made no findings of a substantial 

change in circumstances. Likewise, there is no indication the trial court contemplated the best 

interest of the children. We therefore conclude the trial court abused its discretion in reallocating 
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the child tax exemptions for both children to Mr. Knott for the 2016 tax year and for the 

subsequent years. 

{¶20} Ms. Knott’s third assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR 

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT FATHER WAS NOT IN CONTEMPT 

FOR CLAIMING BOTH CHILDREN AS DEPENDENTS ON HIS 2016 TAX 

RETURN IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶21} In her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Knott argues the trial court erred in finding 

that Mr. Knott was not in contempt for claiming both children as dependents on his 2016 tax 

return. We disagree. 

{¶22} “This Court reviews contempt proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” Zemla v. 

Zemla, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 11CA0010, 2012-Ohio-2829, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion is more 

than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When 

applying this standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply substituting its own judgment 

for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). 

{¶23} Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Knott was entitled to claim both children as 

dependents for the 2015 tax year, and beginning with the 2016 tax year, Mr. Knott and Ms. Knott 

would each claim one of the children as a dependent for tax purposes. As we have noted, the 

trial court’s order overruling objections to the magistrate’s decision found Ms. Knott in 

contempt, retroactively reallocated both child tax exemptions to Mr. Knott for the 2016 tax year, 

reallocated both child tax exemptions to Mr. Knott for subsequent years, and found that Mr. 

Knott was not in contempt. Neither the magistrate’s decision nor the trial court’s order 
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overruling objections provided any basis or analysis for concluding that Mr. Knott was not in 

contempt. 

{¶24} The refusal to punish disobedience of the court’s order, given the context of the 

trial court’s rulings, namely the retroactive reallocation of the child tax exemption, appears to be 

an attempt to remedy the fact that Mr. Knott was unable to claim both children as dependents for 

the 2015 tax year. As such, we cannot say the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable in its ruling. “This Court has held that, ‘[if] contempt proceedings are invoked 

solely by the person aggrieved by disobedience of the court’s order, a refusal to punish for 

contempt is largely within the discretion of the trial court * * *.’” Akin v. Akin, 9th Dist. Summit 

Nos. 25524 and 25543, 2011-Ohio-2765, ¶ 44, quoting Thomarios v. Thomarios, 9th Dist. 

Summit No. 14232, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 59, *4 (Jan. 10, 1990). We conclude the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold Mr. Knott in contempt. 

{¶25} Ms. Knott’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE 

THE TRIAL COURT, IN RULING ON MOTHER’S OBJECTIONS, FAILED 

TO UNDERTAKE AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW TO ASCERTAIN THAT 

THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DETERMINED FACTUAL ISSUES AND 

APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE LAW. 

{¶26} In her fifth assignment of error, Ms. Knott argues the trial court erred because it 

failed to undertake an independent review of the magistrate’s decision. We disagree. 

{¶27} “[T]he decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision lies within the 

discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Barlow v. Barlow, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5. An abuse of 

discretion implies that a trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable in its 

judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). As a reviewing court 
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applying the abuse of discretion standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). 

{¶28} Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides: “In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an 

independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly 

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” “The independent review that 

is required of the trial court has two components: (1) whether, with respect to the objected 

matters, the magistrate properly determined the factual issues before it, and (2) whether the 

magistrate appropriately applied the law to those factual determinations.” Lakota v. Lakota, 9th 

Dist. Medina No. 10CA0122-M, 2012-Ohio-2555, ¶ 14. 

{¶29} “An appellate court reviewing a lower court’s judgment indulges in a presumption 

of regularity of the proceedings below.” Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). “Appellate 

courts thus presume that a trial court conducted an independent analysis in reviewing a 

magistrate’s decision in accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) * * *.” Faulks v. Flynn, 4th Dist. 

Scioto No. 13CA3568, 2014-Ohio-1610, ¶ 27. “Accordingly, a party asserting error bears the 

burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s failure to perform its * * * duty of 

independent analysis.” Freeman v. Freeman, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0036, 2007-Ohio-6400, 

¶ 53. “An affirmative duty requires more than a mere inference, it requires appellant to provide 

the reviewing court with facts to rebut our general presumption.” In re Taylor G., 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-05-1197, 2006-Ohio-1992, ¶ 21. 

{¶30} “[T]he mere fact the trial court did not cite any specific portion of a transcript or 

exhibit does not demonstrate the court failed to conduct an independent review of the objected 

matters as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d).” In re G.C., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2016-12-237, 

CA2016-12-238, CA2016-12-239, and CA2016-12-240, 2017-Ohio-4226, ¶ 18. “While citing 
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such material would tend to demonstrate that the trial court conducted the requisite independent 

review, there is no requirement in Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) that the trial court do so.” Hampton v. 

Hampton, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2007-03-033, 2008-Ohio-868, ¶ 17. Likewise, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court did not conduct an independent review simply because it did not 

discuss every conceivable characterization of the evidence. See Brandon v. Brandon, 3d Dist. 

Mercer No. 10-08-13, 2009-Ohio-3818, ¶ 35. 

{¶31} Ms. Knott contends that the trial court’s finding that she “took both exemptions in 

2015 by allowing her [grand]father to claim both children as dependents on his tax return” 

supports her theory that the trial court failed to engage in an independent analysis because the 

finding of fact is unsupported by the evidence. In our analysis of Ms. Knott’s first assignment of 

error, we concluded there was no evidence or testimony presented to support the notion that Ms. 

Knott “allowed” her grandfather to claim the children as dependents. We do not conclude, 

however, that the trial court’s characterization of Ms. Knott’s role in these events overcomes the 

presumption of regularity or leads to the conclusion that the trial court failed to engage in an 

independent analysis. 

{¶32} Because Ms. Knott has not affirmatively demonstrated the trial court’s failure to 

perform its duty of independent analysis, her fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶33} Ms. Knott’s first and third assignments of error are sustained. Her fourth and fifth 

assignments of error are overruled. We decline to address the second assignment of error. The 

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is 

affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. 
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Judgment affirmed in part, 

and judgment reversed 

and remanded in part. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

SCHAFER, P. J. 

CALLAHAN, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

L. TERRENCE UFHOLZ, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

WILLIAM KNOTT, pro se, Appellee.