Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Alton Thomas Davis, Justices

Order 

October 26, 2010 

141212 

LISA A. CHASE, 

Plaintiff, 

and 

JEFFREY M. CHASE, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141212 

 COA: 289680 

Macomb CC: 2007-003979-NI 

SUSAN B. POMILIA and ALYSSA K. 

POMILIA 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

GEORGE M. DEMAR and CARL F. 

DEFILIPPO III, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 18, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court prior to the 

completion of the proceedings ordered by the Court of Appeals. 

 CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 

 I concur in the order denying leave because the conclusion of the Court of Appeals 

majority—that plaintiff’s injuries were sufficient to satisfy the tort threshold in MCL 

500.3135(7)—likely would not constitute clear error under this Court’s subsequent 

opinion in McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich ___ (2010). But I reiterate my disagreement 

with McCormick for the reasons expressed by Justice MARKMAN’s dissent in that case, 

which I joined. Further, I agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals dissent that 

plaintiff’s injuries here clearly do not satisfy the plain language of MCL 500.3135(7), 

which I think was correctly interpreted in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (2004).
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

October 26, 2010 

d1018 

 

2

 The automobile no-fault act permits a person injured in an automobile accident to 

sue in tort only if the injury caused by the accident constitutes a “serious impairment of 

body function,” which means “an objectively manifested impairment of an important 

body function that affects the person’s general ability to live his or her normal life.” 

MCL 500.3135(7). Here plaintiff claimed that the accident aggravated preexisting back 

pain and depression. But, in the words of the dissenting Court of Appeals opinion: 

The record in this case is full of undisputed evidence that the trajectory of 

plaintiff’s normal life has not been affected by the automobile accident. As 

the trial court noted in its opinion, well before the accident in this case, 

plaintiff had been determined disabled by the Social Security 

Administration. In his application for those benefits, which were largely 

based upon a psychological disability, plaintiff indicated that he could not 

do virtually all the things he now claims he could not do because of the 

accident. For instance, for many years before the accident plaintiff had not 

worked, golfed, fished, boated, or even done many household chores. 

Indeed, he admittedly stayed in his bedroom on and off for many days, in 

large part because of his depression. His same life pattern continued after 

the accident, albeit with some more pain. [Chase v Pomilia, unpublished 

opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 18, 2010 (Docket 

No. 289680), dissenting opinion of Murray, J., p 2.]