Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 19, 2001 / Notices 65521

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[Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251]

Florida Power and Light Company

Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4;

Exemption

1.0 Background

The Florida Power and Light

Company (the licensee) is the holder of

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–31

and DPR–41, which authorize operation

of the Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and

4. The licenses provide, among other

things, that the facilities are subject to

all rules, regulations, and orders of the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter

in effect.

The facility consists of two

pressurized water reactors located in

Miami-Dade County in Florida.

2.0 Request/Action

By letter dated October 23, 2000,

Florida Power and Light, the licensee

for Turkey Point Plant, requested,

among other things, an exemption from

certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.44;

10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, General

Design Criterion 41, 42, and 43; and 10

CFR part 50, Appendix E, section VI;

related to the hydrogen control system

(i.e., recombiners, hydrogen monitors,

and post-accident containment vent

system). The proposed exemption

would remove the above requirements

from the Turkey Point Plant design

basis. The staff has reviewed the

information provided and concludes

that the requested exemption for the

hydrogen recombiners and the postaccident containment vent system are

justified. The staff will act on the

exemption request for the containment

hydrogen monitors, the requested

modification to the revised

Confirmatory Order issued on October

5, 2000, and the revision to the

Technical Specifications related to the

post-accident containment vent system

and the hydrogen monitors by separate

correspondence.

The post-accident containment vent

system is provided to facilitate

controlled venting through adding air

(Service Air backed by Instrument Air)

to the reactor containment and venting

air from the containment to effectively

maintain hydrogen concentration below

4.0 volume percent. Regulatory

requirements for the hydrogen control

system are specified in 10 CFR 50.44

and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A,

(General Design Criteria 41, 42, and 43).

Additional staff guidance is provided in

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.7. Staff review

and acceptance criteria are specified in

Section 6.2.5 of the Standard Review

Plan.

3.0 Discussion

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the

Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when

(1) the exemptions are authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

public health or safety, and are

consistent with the common defense

and security; and (2) when special

circumstances are present.

For this exemption, these special

circumstances include consideration

that the quantity of hydrogen prescribed

by 10 CFR 50.44(d) and RG 1.7 which

necessitated the need for hydrogen

recombiners and the post-accident

containment vent system would be

bounded by the hydrogen generated

during a severe accident. As shown in

the attached safety evaluation, the staff

has found that the relative importance

of hydrogen combustion for large, dry

containments with respect to

containment failure is quite low. This

finding supports the argument that the

hydrogen recombiners are not risk

significant from a containment integrity

perspective and that the risk associated

with hydrogen combustion is not from

design basis accidents but from severe

accidents. Studies have shown that the

majority of risk to the public is from

accident sequences that lead to

containment failure or bypass, and that

the contribution to risk from accident

sequences involving hydrogen

combustion is actually quite small for

large, dry containments such as Turkey

Point’s. This is true despite the fact that

the hydrogen produced in these events

is substantially larger than the hydrogen

production postulated by 10 CFR

50.44(d) and RG 1.7. Hydrogen

combustion sequences that could lead to

early containment failure typically

involve up to 75 percent core metalwater reaction. Hydrogen combustion

sequences that could lead to late

containment failure involve additional

sources of hydrogen due to the

interaction of corium and the concrete

basemat after vessel breach. Although

the recombiners and the post-accident

containment vent system are effective in

maintaining the RG 1.7 hydrogen

concentration below the lower

flammability limit of 4.0 volume percent

(for a design basis loss-of-coolant

accident (LOCA)), they are

overwhelmed by the larger quantities of

hydrogen associated with severe

accidents that would typically be

released over a much shorter time

period (e.g., 2 hours). However, NUREG/

CR–4551 states that hydrogen

combustion in the period before

containment failure is considered to

present no threat to large, dry

containments. Table A.4–5 of NUREG/

CR–4551 shows that the contribution of

hydrogen combustion to late

containment failure is also very small.

Therefore, the relative importance of

hydrogen combustion for large, dry

containments with respect to

containment failure has been shown to

be quite low.

The recombiners can, however,

prevent a subsequent hydrogen burn, if

needed, due to radiolytic decomposition

of water and corrosion in the long term.

Analysis performed in accordance with

the methodology of RG 1.7 shows that

the hydrogen concentration will not

reach 4.0 volume percent for 15 days

after initiation of a design basis LOCA.

Additionally, as described in the

attached safety evaluation, hydrogen

concentrations on the order of 6.0

volume percent or less are bounded by

hydrogen generated during a severe

accident and would not be a threat to

containment integrity since there is

ample time between burns to reduce

elevated containment temperatures

using the installed containment heat

removal systems. The Turkey Point

Individual Plant Examination (IPE)

concluded that containment survival is

almost certain following hydrogen

combustion when the Reactor Building

Cooling Units and the Reactor Building

Spray System are operating.

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR

50.44 is to show that, following a LOCA,

an uncontrolled hydrogen-oxygen

recombination would not take place, or

that the plant could withstand the

consequences of uncontrolled hydrogenoxygen recombination without loss of

safety function. Based on the analysis,

which includes the staff’s evaluation of

the risk from hydrogen combustion,

resolution of Generic Issue 121,

‘‘Hydrogen Control for PWR

[pressurized-water reactor] Dry

Containments,’’ and the Turkey Point

IPE, the plant could withstand the

consequences of uncontrolled hydrogenoxygen recombination without loss of

safety function and without credit for

the hydrogen recombiners for not only

the design basis case, but the more

limiting severe accident with up to 100

percent metal-water reaction. Therefore,

the requirements for hydrogen

recombiners as part of the Turkey Point

design basis are unnecessary and their

removal from the design basis is

justified. Additionally, elimination of

the hydrogen recombiners from the

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)

65522 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 19, 2001 / Notices

would simplify operator actions in the

event of an accident and, therefore,

would be a safety benefit.

The staff examined the licensee’s

rationale that supports the exemption

request and concluded that the

exemption requested for the

recombiners and the post-accident

containment vent system is justified as

stated in the supporting safety

evaluation. Additionally, elimination of

the hydrogen recombiners and the postaccident containment vent system from

the EOPs would be a simplification and

a safety benefit. Consequently, pursuant

to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), application of

the regulation is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule.

The safety evaluation may be

examined, and/or copied for a fee at the

NRC’s Public Document Room, located

at One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,

Maryland. Publicly available records

will be accessible electronically from

the ADAMS Public Library component

on the NRC Web site, http://

www.nrc.gov (the Public Reading

Room).

4.0 Conclusion

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), the exemption pertaining to

the recombiners and the post-accident

containment vent system is authorized

by law, will not present an undue risk

to the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. Also, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are

present. Therefore, the Commission

hereby grants Florida Power and Light

Company an exemption from the

requirements for the recombiners and

the post-accident containment vent

system as stated in 10 CFR 50.44 and 10

CFR part 50, Appendix A, General

Design Criteria 41, 42 and 43 for the

Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (66 FR 59266).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day

of December, 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John A. Zwolinski,

Director, Division of Licensing Project

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulations.

[FR Doc. 01–31216 Filed 12–18–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

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Advisory Committee on Nuclear

Waste; Notice of Meeting

The Advisory Committee on Nuclear

Waste (ACNW) will hold its 131st

meeting on January 8–10, 2002, at 11545

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,

Room T–2B3.

The entire meeting will be open to

public attendance.

The schedule for this meeting is as

follows:

Tuesday, January 8, 2002

A. 8:30–10:15 A.M.: Opening

Statement/Planning and Procedures

(Open)—The Chairman will open the

meeting with brief opening remarks.

The Committee will then review items

under consideration at this meeting and

consider topics proposed for future

ACNW meetings.

B. 10:30–11:30 A.M.: Proposed Rule

on Probability of an Unlikely Event

(Open)—The staff will provide an

information briefing on the proposed

rule: 10 CFR Part 63, ‘‘Specification of

a Probability for Unlikely Features,

Events and Processes’’.

C. 1–3 P.M.: Preparation of ACNW

Reports (Open)—The Committee will

discuss proposed reports on the

following topics:

• ACRS/ACNW November 14, 2001

Joint Subcommittee Meeting on RiskInformed Regulation in NMSS

• Annual Research Report to the

Commission

• Proposed Rule on Probability of an

Unlikely Event

D. 3:15–6 p.m.: Discussion of Topics

for Meeting with the NRC

Commissioners (Open)—The Committee

will discuss topics scheduled for its

January 9, 2002 meeting with the

Commission.

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

E. 8:30–8:35 A.M.: Opening Remarks

by the ACNW Chairman (Open)—The

ACNW Chairman will make opening

remarks regarding the conduct of the

meeting.

F. 8:35–9:30 A.M.: Final Preparation

for Committee Meeting with the NRC

Commissioners (Open)—The Committee

will finalize preparations for meeting

with the NRC Commission.

G. 9:40–11:30 A.M.: Meeting with the

NRC Commissioners (Open)—The

Committee will meet with the NRC

Commissioners in the Commissioners’

Conference Room, One White Flint

North, to discuss: Issue Resolution and

Sufficiency Review, Total Systems

Performance Assessment for Site

Recommendation, High-Level Waste

Chemistry Issues, Research Program in

Radioactive Waste, and related matters.

H. 1–2 P.M.: ACNW Planning Retreat

(Open)—The Committee will finalize

plans for its February 27–28—March 1,

2002 retreat.

Thursday, January 10, 2002

I. 8:30–8:35 A.M.: Opening Remarks

by the ACNW Chairman (Open)—The

ACNW Chairman will make opening

remarks regarding the conduct of the

meeting.

J. 8:35–11:30 A.M.: Preparation of

ACNW Reports (Open)—The Committee

will continue its discussion of proposed

ACNW reports.

K. 12:30–1:30 P.M.: Miscellaneous

(Open)—The Committee will discuss

matters related to the conduct of

Committee activities and matters and

specific issues that were not completed

during previous meetings, as time and

availability of information permit.

Procedures for the conduct of and

participation in ACNW meetings were

published in the Federal Register on

October 3, 2001 (66 FR 50461). In

accordance with these procedures, oral

or written statements may be presented

by members of the public, electronic

recordings will be permitted only

during those portions of the meeting

that are open to the public, and

questions may be asked only by

members of the Committee, its

consultants, and staff. Persons desiring

to make oral statements should notify

Mr. Howard J. Larson, ACNW

(Telephone 301/415–6805), between 8

A.M. and 4 P.M. EST, as far in advance

as practicable so that appropriate

arrangements can be made to schedule

the necessary time during the meeting

for such statements. Use of still, motion

picture, and television cameras during

this meeting will be limited to selected

portions of the meeting as determined

by the ACNW Chairman. Information

regarding the time to be set aside for

taking pictures may be obtained by

contacting the ACNW office, prior to the

meeting. In view of the possibility that

the schedule for ACNW meetings may

be adjusted by the Chairman as

necessary to facilitate the conduct of the

meeting, persons planning to attend

should notify Mr. Howard J. Larson as

to their particular needs.

Further information regarding topics

to be discussed, whether the meeting

has been canceled or rescheduled, the

Chairman’s ruling on requests for the

opportunity to present oral statements

and the time allotted therefore can be

obtained by contacting Mr. Howard J.

Larson.