Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 76A03-1609-CR-2186 | March 22, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

State Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

Patricia Caress McMath

Indianapolis, Indiana

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Austin J. Huffman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 22, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

76A03-1609-CR-2186

Appeal from the Steuben Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Allen N. Wheat, 

Judge.

Trial Court Cause No. 76C01-1602-

F6-94

Sharpnack, Senior Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 76A03-1609-CR-2186 | March 22, 2017 Page 2 of 7

Statement of the Case

[1] Austin J. Huffman appeals after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a 

precursor by a methamphetamine offender,1

as a Level 6 felony, contending 

that his sentence of two and one half years is inappropriate. We affirm.

Issue

[2] The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Huffman’s sentence of two and 

one half years is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 14, 2016, Huffman possessed pseudoephedrine without a 

prescription. Two years prior, Huffman had been convicted of possession of 

two or more precursors with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance. 

[4] The State charged Huffman with one count of possession of a precursor by a 

methamphetamine offender, and one count of theft. The probable cause 

affidavit for the theft count alleged that Huffman took Sudafed from Walmart, 

returned the stolen items for store credit, and used the store credit to purchase 

precursors to methamphetamine. 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-14.5(h)(1)(D) (2014).
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[5] Huffman pleaded guilty to possession of precursors and admitted to the facts as 

alleged by the State. Per the terms of the plea agreement, the theft count was 

dismissed and Huffman paid $33.90 to Walmart as restitution. Sentencing was 

left open to the trial court. 

[6] The presentence investigation report revealed that Huffman, who was twentysix years old at the time of the offense, had both a juvenile delinquency history 

and an extensive adult criminal history. Huffman’s juvenile history included 

commitments to the Indiana Department of Correction for residential entry, 

operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license, and theft. He also 

had violated the conditions of his probation. 

[7] A juvenile charge of illegal consumption of an alcoholic beverage as a 

misdemeanor offense was waived to adult court, and he was incarcerated for 

twenty days. The remainder of his adult criminal history includes convictions 

for eleven misdemeanor offenses and three felony offenses. He violated the 

terms of his probation on four of those offenses. At the time of his sentencing 

for the current offense, he had three pending cases in DeKalb County: one 

count of driving while suspended, one count of theft, and one count of dealing 

methamphetamine. He also had a pending case in Steuben County for felony 

possession of precursors. 

[8] At the sentencing hearing held on August 15, 2016, the trial court found that 

Huffman’s guilty plea was a mitigating factor. As for aggravating 

circumstances, the trial court found that Huffman had accumulated a juvenile 
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delinquency history and an extensive adult criminal history. Huffman had been 

placed on probation in the past and had his probation revoked. The trial court 

concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances and imposed the maximum sentence of two and one half years. 

[9] The trial court also stated its intention to recommend to the Indiana 

Department of Correction that Huffman be allowed to participate in the 

therapeutic community program. However, Huffman had expressed to the 

probation officer preparing his pre-sentence investigation report that he did not 

want to participate in the therapeutic community program for this offense. He 

believed he could earn a greater reduction in executed time if his participation 

in that program occurred while serving his sentence for a pending DeKalb 

County charge, which would result in a longer sentence. Huffman now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Huffman contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender. He argues that he is not one of the 

worst offenders and that his crime is not one of the worst offenses such that a 

maximum sentence is justified. Huffman received the maximum sentence of 

two and one half years for his Level 6 felony conviction. See Ind. Code § 35-50-

2-7(b) (2016) (sentencing range between six months and two and one half 

years). 
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[11] “Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, ‘[t]he Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.’” Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 

2017). Courts on review have long recognized that the maximum sentence 

permitted by law should be reserved for the very worst offenders. Bacher v. 

State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 802 (Ind. 1997). Appellate review should be focused on 

attempting to leaven the outliers, not achieving a perceived correct result in 

each case. Id. “We recognize the special expertise of the trial court in making 

sentencing decisions, and we will refrain from merely substituting our opinion 

for that of the trial court.” Davis v. State, 851 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006), trans. denied. However, we are authorized by the state constitution to 

conduct independent appellate review of sentences. Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 

20, 22 (Ind. 2010). The appellant bears the burden of persuading the court on 

review that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Shoun, 67 

N.E.3d at 642. Further, the defendant must show that the sentence was 

inappropriate in light of both his character and the nature of the offense. 

Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[12] Turning to the nature of Huffman’s offense, we acknowledge that the advisory 

sentence is the starting point when considering whether a sentence is 

inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony is 

one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Thus, the trial court deviated from the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 76A03-1609-CR-2186 | March 22, 2017 Page 6 of 7

advisory sentence by imposing a sentence that is one and one half years longer 

than the advisory sentence. 

[13] After reviewing the record, we find nothing that distinguishes Huffman’s 

offense from a typical case involving possession of a precursor by a 

methamphetamine offender as a Level 6 felony. There is nothing more or less 

egregious about the offense than was contemplated by the legislature.

[14] Turning to Huffman’s character, however, we find that he has not met his 

burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Huffman’s first 

contact with the criminal justice system occurred when he was nine years old. 

As a juvenile he was adjudicated a delinquent child for what would be the 

felony offenses of residential entry and theft. He also was adjudicated a 

delinquent child for what would be the misdemeanor offenses of operating a 

vehicle without ever having received a license and illegal consumption of 

alcohol. As a juvenile, he had his probation revoked, was placed in a 

residential facility, and was committed to the Indiana Department of 

Correction on two occasions.

[15] As an adult, Huffman was convicted fifteen times. Five of his prior convictions 

involved illegal drugs. His probation was revoked four times. Further, at the 

time of his sentencing hearing, he had a pending case for possession of 

precursors by a methamphetamine offender as a Level 6 felony. The three 

pending cases he had in DeKalb County were for misdemeanor driving while 
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suspended, felony theft, and felony dealing methamphetamine in the presence 

of a minor.

[16] Huffman has had many opportunities to conform his behavior to the 

requirements of the law, yet has persisted in his pattern of criminal activity. 

Indeed, instead of seeking therapeutic help for his issues with substance abuse 

sooner rather than later, he chose to delay the benefits of that program until it 

would maximize the reduction of executed time he would likely have to serve 

as a consequence for the crimes alleged in his pending cases. 

[17] We conclude that Huffman’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of his 

character.

Conclusion

[18] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[19] Affirmed. 

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.