Th e Court c on sid e re d Pl a int if

f’ s Mo tio n to Am e nd

the Com pla int ; D e fe nd ants ’ 1 Opposition to P laintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint; R eply on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint; Defenda

nts’ Motion for J udg ment on the Pleading s (“Mot. for J udg .”); a

nd Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defenda nts’ Motion for J udg ment on the Pleading s. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) CHRI STOPHER S ANDERS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 06-1411 ) DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) De fe nd ants . ) __________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON This matter is befor e the Court on plaintiff’ s motion t o amend his complaint and defe ndants’ motion for judg ment on the pleading s pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the F eder al Rules of Civil Procedur e. Upon c are ful consider ation of the pa rties’ pa pers a nd the entire rec ord in the
case , the Court will gr ant plaintiff’s motion to amend and w ill deny defe ndants’ motion for jud g me nt o n th e ple a din g s. 1
I . BA CKGROUND

The Court’s Opinion of Nove mber 8, 2007, Sande rs v. District of Columbia, 522 F . Su pp . 2 d 8 3 ( D. D. C. 2 00 7) , d e sc ri be s th e fa c tua l and pr oc e dura l ba c kg ro un d in thi s c a se in
so me de ta il. B ri e fl y , p la int if f C hr ist op he r S and e rs wa s a Se rg e ant i n th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt ( “ MPD ” ). Pla int if f h a d r e signe d f

ro m th e MPD , b ut s ho rt ly2

the re a ft e r s ou g ht t o r e sc ind his re signatio n. Pla int if

f a lle g e d th at th e MPD ’s de nia l of his re qu e st to r e sc ind his re signatio n w a s r e ta liatio n f or e arl ie r whis tle blo we r a c tiv ity in v iol atio n o f h is F ir st Amendment rig hts and his proce dural a nd substantive due proc ess rig hts. See Sanders v. D istrict of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87. He broug ht suit aga inst the District of Columbi a, for mer Chief of Police Char les H. Ramsey in his indi vidual and off

icial ca pacities, a nd Captain J eff

rey Her rold and a “John Doe” in their individual capa cities. In it s N ov e mbe r 8 , 2 00 7 O pin ion , th e Court g ra nte d d e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to dismiss plaintiff’s municipal liability claims ag ainst the District of Columbia, including the
c la ims a g a ins t Ch ie f R amse y in h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity , a s w e ll a s p la int if

f’ s su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss claims. See Sande rs v. District of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 88, 91-92. The Court denied de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss a s to pla int if

f’ s F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss claims ag ainst the individual defenda nts. See id. at 88-91.
I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Plaintiff ’s Motion for Leave Am end the Complaint Plaintiff initi ally

named a s defe ndants the District of Columbia, then Chief of Police Ramsey , and plaintiff’ s former superior L ieutenant Jeffre y Har old, as well as a

“John Doe” . Plaintiff now seeks to re place the J ohn Doe with Chief of Police Cathy

L anier and As sis tant C hie f A lf

re d B ro a db e nt, in t

he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s, on

the g ro un ds that on ly
rec ently , duringthe cour se of discove ry in this case, did plaintiff lea rn of their alleg ed unconstitutional actions toward him. Def endant objec ts to the amendment on the g rounds of futility , arguing that both Chi ef ( then Commanding O ffice r) L anier and Assistant Chief (then3

Spe c ia l Se rv ic e s O ff

ic e r) B ro a db e nt h ave qu a lif ie d immun ity , a

nd that th e c la ims a g a ins t bo th
are barr ed by

the statute of limitations. Rule 15(a) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a llows for libera l amendment of plea dings, “ when justice so r equire s.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 1 5 ( a ) ; s e e , e . g . , H o w ar d v . G u ti e r r e z, 237 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D .D.C. 2006) (quotingDavis v. L iberty Mutual Insurac e Co., 871 F.2d 11 34 , 1 13 6- 37 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 9) (“ I t is c omm on g ro un d th at Ru le 15 e mbo die s a g e ne ra lly favor able policy

toward a mendments.”) ( citations omitt ed)) . The pre sumption runs in t he plaintiff’s fa

vor that he ma

y amend his complaint “[i] n the abse nce of any appar ent or de clar ed
rea son — such as undue delay , bad fa ith or dilatory motive on the part of the [pl aintiff], repea ted failure to cure defic iencies by amendments pre viously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing pa rt y by vir tue of a llo wa nc e of the ame ndme nt, futil ity

of the ame ndme nt, e tc .” F oma n v . D avis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

The Court finds that per

mitti ngthe amendme nt of the complaint to add Chief L anier and Assistant Chief B roadbe nt as additional defe ndants is not futile and that the de fe nd ants have no t art ic ulate d a ny pr e jud ic e fr om d oin gso . D e fe nd ants ’ a rgume nt a s to futil ity
on the qu a lif

ie d immun ity

qu e sti on is d ou btf ul i n li g ht o f t

he Court ’s e arl ie r d e nia l of de fe nd ants ’ motion to di smiss on t he g rounds of qua lified immunit y . See Sander s v. District of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 89-91. D efe ndants’ statute of limitations argument depends on disputed fac tual questions of when pla intiff knew, or should have known, of

the alleg ed unconstitutional acts by Chief L anier

and Assistant Chief B roadbe nt. Both of these arguments are more
a pp ro pr iate ly

a dd re sse d in a mot ion to d ism iss or , mo re lik e ly , a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, than on a motion to amend a c omplaint. Pl aintiff’s c omplaint will be amended to include Chief4

L anie r a nd As sis tant C hie f B ro a db e nt a s d e fe nd ants in t he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s f or the sti ll pendingFirst Amendme nt and proc edura l due proc ess claims.

B. De fe nd an ts’ Mo tio n fo r J

ud gm e nt o n th e Ple ad

ing s 1. L eg al Standard Rule 12(c) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure state s that “[a]fter the pleading s are closed — but ea rly enoug h not to delay

trial — a pa

rty may move for judg ment on the pleading s.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(c). The standard of revie w for motions for judg ment on the ple a din g s und e r R

ule 12 (c ) o f t

he F e de ra l Ru le s is e sse nti a lly the same a s th at f

or mot ion s to dismiss under Rule 12( b)(6) . See Schucha rt v. L a Ta

berna Del Alaba

rder o, Inc., 365 F .3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ramirez v. Dep’t of Correc tions, 222 F.3d 1238, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2000); Hay nesworth v. Miller, 820 F .2d 1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Does I throug h I I Iv. District of Columbi a, 238 F . Supp. 2d 212, 216 (D.D.C. 2002) (c itations omi tted). On e ither motion, the Court may

not rely on fac ts outside the pleading s and must construe the c omplaint in the light most favora

ble to the non-movingparty . See Kowa l v. MCICommuni cations Corp., 16 F .3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As with a motion to dismi ss under Rule 12(b) (6), a court may

g rant judgme nt on the pleading s only if the fa cts alleg ed in the complaint do not “r aise a rig ht to relief
a bo ve the sp e c ulativ e le ve l,” B e ll A tla nti c Cor p. v. Tw omb ly , 5 50 U. S. 5 44 , 5 55 (2 00 7) , o r f a il to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” I d. at 570; see a lso Nat’l Shopmen Pension Fund v. Disa, 583 F . Supp. 2d 95, 99 (dismis sal is appropriate under Rule 12(c) “if the plaintiff fa ils to pl ead ‘ enoug h fac ts to state a claim [to] relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” (citingBe ll Atlantic Corp v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570)).5 Pla int if f f ile d h is m oti on

to a me nd the c omp la int

be fo re de fe nd ants fi le d th e ir motion for judgme nt on the pleading s. As discussed above , the Court is gr antingplaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint. The Court theref ore ha s treate d the motion for judg ment on the ple a din g s a s o ne a dd

re sse d to the ame nd e d c omp la int
.

2. F ir st A me ndme nt C la im Th e Court

c on sid e re d in

de ta il whe the r p la int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns a s to F ir st Amendment violations stated a c laim under the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure in its ear lier Opinion, finding that it had. See Sander s v. District of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 88-90. De fe nd ants no w a

rgue that th e Court

sh ou ld gra

nt j ud g me nt i n th e ir

fa vo r o n p la int if

f’ s F ir st Am e ndme nt c la im o n th e the or y that pl a int if

f’ s sp e e c h w a s ma de purs ua nt t o h is o ff

ic ia l dutie s, and thus is unprotecte d speec h under G arc etti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Plaintiff po int s o ut, a c c ur ate ly , th at th is a rgume nt i s a

dir e c t r e ve rs a l f

ro m th e po sit ion

de fe nd ants too k in their motion to dism iss. As the Court then noted:

In Gar cetti, the Supreme Court disti nguished expressions made at wo rk purs ua nt t o o ff ic ia l dutie s f

ro m th os e that are no t, a

nd he ld that “ wh e n p ub lic e mpl oye e s ma ke state me nts purs ua

nt t o th e ir of fi c ia l dutie s, the e mpl oye e s a re no t sp e akin ga s c iti zen s f or F ir st Am e ndme nt p ur

po se s, and

the Con sti tut ion

do e s n ot i ns ulate the ir c omm un ic atio ns fr om e mpl oye r d isc ipl ine .” Ga rc e tti v. Ce ba llo s, [547 U.S . at 421]. The Court notes that it does not appear that Sand e rs ma de the se state me nts at is su e in t his c a se “ purs ua

nt t o h is officia l duties,” nor have defe ndants argued that he did. Sand e rs v. Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , 5 22 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 89 , n . 3 . Pl a int if f a rgue s th at de fe nd ants have w aived the G arc etti argument by not raisingit earlier . Whether this theory of liability , or lack ther eof, is an a ffirmative defe nse that must be ra ised or be f oreve r wa ived, def

endants have6

no t g ive n th e Court

su ff ic ie nt b a sis to a do pt t

he ir ne w r e a so nin gand

to gra nt j ud g me nt a g a ins t plaintiff. Def

endants point to “a public r ecor d reve lation” of plaintiff’ s testimony befor e the Council of the District of Columbia as the ba sis for their a rgument that plaintiff spoke pursua nt to his official duties, and thus is not protecte d by the Fir st Amendment. See Mot. for Judg. at 2. T h ey ar gu e t h ata r ec en td ec i s i o nb y J u d ge K o l l ar -K o t el l y

m ak es j u d gm en to nth e p l ea d i n gs appropr iate bec ause he r dec ision established that statements made by a public employ ee to the Council of the District of Columbia wer e not protec ted spee ch bec ause the y wer e made pursuant to t he pla int if

f’ s o ff ic ia l dutie s. Se e Willi ams v . Johns on , 5 37 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 41 , 1 51 -5 2 ( D. D. C. 2 0 0 8 ). InW i l l i am s , h o we v er , th e p l ai n t i ff ’s j o b d es cr i p t i o n“r equ i re d h er t o p ro v i d e h er

fi n d i n gs to s e nio r e xec uti ve pe rs onne l in Di str ic t g ov e rnme nt, ” and sh e atte nd e d th e Counc il m e e tin gwi th her supe rvisor to assist him in answeringquestions as a pa rt of her job. I d. at 151. The alleg ations in the complaint befor e the Court in this case do not lea d to a similar conclusion. Whil e ther e may

be a f actua l dispute betwee n the par ties, plaintiff asser

ts in his amended complaint that he “did not make this speech pur suant to his official duties.” See Amended Complaint ¶ 11. At this stag e in the ca se, the Court ca nnot determine a s a matter of law that plaintiff’s spee ch wa s made pursua nt to his official duties, and the de fenda nts are no mor e entitled to judgment on the ple ading s than they wer e to a dismissal for fa ilure to state a c laim. See Sander s v. District of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 88-90. The Court finds no other re ason to rec onsider its ear lier dete rmination that plaintiff had stated a claim as to Count One, and thus will not gra

nt judgment a g ainst plaintiff on this Count
.7 3. Pr oc e dura l D ue Pr oc e ss C la im In its earlier

Opinion, the Court denied def endants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s proce dural due proce ss claims, concludingthat plaintiff had state d a cla im, in that he had alleg ed a prope rty

interest and de privation of notice a nd the opportunity

for a hear ing, a

nd further concludingthat defe ndants wer e not entitled to qualified immunity . See Sander s v. District of Columbi a, 522 F . Supp. 2d at 90-91. Def endants’ motion is essentially a motion for
rec onsideration of this dec ision. Defenda nts have g iven the Court no basis on which to conc lude that its earlier

decision wa s incorre ct. Withre sp e c t to the qu e sti on wh e the r p la int if

f h a d a pr op e rt y int e re st i n h is reinstateme nt, defe ndants cite to D.C. Municipal Regulation 6-807.1(e) , which uses pe rmissive rathe r than mandatory

languag e with re g ard to the MPD’s oblig ation to reinstate f ormer members. This re g ulation is irreleva nt to the issue before the Court. Section 6-807.1 addr esses only the ag e re quirements for

various ca

ree r ser vice positions. Furthe rmore, de fenda nts’ rea ding of the languag e of the regulation does not aff ect the Court’ s previous dete rmination that plaintiff ha d s tate d a

c la im f or vio latio n o f p ro c e dura l du e pr oc e ss r ig hts un de r t he Com pr e he ns ive Me ri t Protection Act (“ CMPA”). See Sande rs v. District of Columbia, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 90-91.

Nor doe s defe ndants’ ar g ument that plaintiff’s re signation was voluntary g ive the Court a basis to rec onsider its prior dete rmination. The fa ct of plaintiff’ s resig nation was be fore the Court when it consider ed plaintiff’ s motion t o dismiss . See Sander s v. District of Columbia, 52 2 F . Su pp . 2 d at 86 . F ur

the rm or e , p la int if

f d isp ute s d e fe nd ants ’ a sse rt ion that he vo luntari ly g ave up his pr op e rt

y ri g hts thr ou g h h is r e signatio n — he a lle g e s th at he wa s a dv ise d th at e ve n if he re signe d, he would be f ree to return to the MPD within one y ear . See Amende d Complaint8

¶ 19. This is a fa ctual question that ca nnot be re solved on a motion for judg ment on the pleading s. The Court finds that def endants have ra ised no argument that would justify altering its original de cision not to dism iss the proce dural due proce ss claims.
I I I . CONCLUSI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court will g rant plaintiff’ s motion t o amend a nd wi ll d e ny de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r j ud g me nt o n th e ple a din g s. An Or de r c on sis te nt w iththi s Opinion will is sue this same day
.

SO ORDERED. _/s/________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: F ebrua

ry 27, 2009