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16-2636, 

United States v. Chase

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER 

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

5th day of June, two thousand Seventeen. 

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 

 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

Circuit Judges. 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

 -v.- 16-2636 

BROK JAMES CHASE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FOR APPELLANT: MELISSA A. TUOHEY, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, for 

Lisa A. Peebles, Federal 

Public Defender, Syracuse, 

NY. 
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FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL GADARIAN (Rajit S. 

Dosanjh, Lisa M. Fletcher, on 

the brief), Assistant United 

States Attorney, for Richard 

S. Hartunian, United States 

Attorney for the Northern 

District of New York, 

Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of New York (Sannes, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-appellant Brok James Chase pleaded guilty to 

four counts of sexual exploitation of a child for the purpose 

of producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2251(a). The exploitation counts are based on repeated and 

horrific sexual abuse of his young stepdaughter. The United 

States District Court for the Northern District of New York 

(Sannes, J.) sentenced Chase principally to fifty years’ 

imprisonment. Chase appeals his sentence, asserting that it 

was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 

We review a district court’s sentence for procedural and 

substantive reasonableness, which amounts to review for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (en banc). “A district court commits procedural 

error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range . . . , 

makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation, or treats the 

Guidelines as mandatory.” Id. at 190. It also errs 

procedurally if it does not consider the factors set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous 

finding of fact, or fails to adequately explain its chosen 

sentence. Id. 

A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “cannot be 

located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. at 
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189. “[O]nly those sentences that are so ‘shockingly high, 

shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law’ 

that allowing them to stand would ‘damage the administration 

of justice’” are substantively unreasonable. United States v. 

Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 

States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)). 

1. Chase argues procedural error on two grounds. First, 

he contends that the court abused its discretion by refusing 

to depart downward due to his mental and emotional conditions 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3. 

“Claims that the district court erred in refusing to depart 

are not cognizable on appeal in the absence of substantial 

indication that the district judge believed she lacked 

authority to depart or an indication that a violation of the 

law occurred.” United States v. Jackson, 658 F.3d 145, 153-54 

(2d Cir. 2011); see United States v. Robinson, 799 F.3d 196, 

201 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] district court’s decision not to depart 

from the Guidelines is generally unreviewable, unless it 

misunderstood its authority to do so.”). 

Nothing in this record suggests that the district court 

misunderstood its authority to depart or that the sentence was 

otherwise illegal. In fact, the district court explicitly 

acknowledged its authority to depart downward based on Chase’s 

mental and emotional conditions and declined to exercise this 

authority after carefully considering the circumstances of 

Chase’s case. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review this 

decision. See United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d 

Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[I]n the post-Booker sentencing 

regime . . . review of [the denial of a downward departure] will 

be available only when a sentencing court misapprehended the 

scope of its authority to depart or the sentence was otherwise 

illegal.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

2. Chase’s second procedural challenge is that the 

district court failed to satisfy its stated objective of 

imposing a below-Guidelines sentence. 

The Guidelines offense level for Chase’s criminal conduct 

yielded a recommended -- and here undisputed -- sentence of life 
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imprisonment. However, because the statutory maximum for each 

of the four counts of conviction was thirty years, the 

Presentence Investigation Report, adopted by the district 

court, stacked the statutory maximums to arrive at a recommended 

Guidelines sentence of 120 years’ imprisonment. After 

analyzing the factors set forth in § 3553(a), the district court 

rejected the Guidelines sentence as excessive and imposed a 

sentence of fifty years. 

Chase argues that this fifty-year term (at the conclusion 

of which he will be in his seventies) is effectively a life 

sentence, and, therefore, does not achieve the district court’s 

desired below-Guidelines result. Because he failed to raise 

this objection in the district court, we review for plain error.1

 

See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir. 

2007). We identify no error, plain or otherwise. 

Chase’s sentence is below the Guidelines, which the 

district court properly calculated to be 120 years’ 

imprisonment. Section 5G1.2(d) of the Guidelines authorizes 

courts to stack statutory maximums, as the district court did, 

to reach a term of years equivalent to a life sentence. See 

United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding 

that the district court correctly applied § 5G1.2(d) by stacking 

statutory maximums for 110-year sentence). Specifically, § 

5G1.2(d) states that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the count 

carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total 

punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other 

counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary 

to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.” 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). Chase submits that because the “total 

punishment” of life in prison could be achieved by a sentence 

less than 120 years, the district court should have calculated 

his Guidelines sentence using average life expectancy data. He 

 

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 Under plain error review, a defendant must “demonstrate that 

(1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error 

prejudicially affected his substantial rights, and (4) the 

error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cook, 

722 F.3d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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cites no authority supporting such an approach, and we see no 

reason to adopt it. 

In any event, fifty years is not the same as life. With 

his release expected at the age of seventy-two, Chase’s sentence 

allows for the real possibility that he will outlive his prison 

term. Thus, regardless of whether the measure is 120 years or 

life, Chase received the below-Guidelines sentence intended by 

the district court. 

3. Chase claims that the sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because it fails to properly account for the need 

to provide him with mental health and sex offender treatment 

in the most effective manner, as prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(D). He contends that such treatment is best 

provided outside of prison. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Chase to fifty years’ imprisonment. This sentence 

was the result of careful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors 

and the circumstances of Chase’s case. The court imposed a long 

period of incarceration not because it was oblivious to the need 

to provide appropriate treatment -- that need was explicitly 

recognized -- but because it concluded that other 

considerations militated in favor of significant 

incapacitation, deterrence, and punishment. Those 

considerations included: the extreme and heinous nature of the 

sexual abuse; the prolonged period of abuse; the victim’s age 

(four to six years old during that period); Chase’s efforts to 

opt the victim out of child abuse programming at school; his 

deletion of evidence stored on his computer when agents arrived 

at his home; his large collection of child pornography; and his 

sharing of child pornography over a peer-to-peer network. See 

Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191 (“[W]e do not consider what weight we 

would ourselves have given a particular factor. Rather, we 

consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court, 

can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of 

circumstances in the case.” (citation omitted)). 

Given the seriousness of Chase’s crimes and the broad range 

of permissible decisions available to the district court, we 
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cannot conclude that his sentence was unreasonable.2 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby 

AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 

 

2

 We note that fifty years’ incarceration is in line with other 

cases involving severe sexual abuse of children. See, e.g., 

Brown, 843 F.3d 74 (sixty years); United States v. Hamilton, 

548 F. App’x 728 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (150 years); 

United States v. Ketcham, 507 F. App’x. 42 (2d Cir. 2013) 

(summary order) (sixty years).