07/10/2017

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 17, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. XAVIER SANCHEZ SKAGGS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sullivan County

No. S55353 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2016-01861-CCA-R3-CD

_____________________________

In 2008, the Defendant, Xavier Sanchez Skaggs, pleaded guilty to possession of 

contraband in a penal institution, and the trial court sentenced him to a suspended 

sentence of eight years, as a Range II offender. The trial court ordered this sentence to be

served consecutively to other sentences being served by the Defendant. In 2016, the 

Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had failed to 

regularly attend relapse prevention classes and that he also failed two drug screens. The 

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating his probation, and the trial court revoked his 

probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On 

appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his 

sentence in confinement because the trial court failed to address the Defendant’s 

underlying problem of persistent drug use. After review, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J. and JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., joined.

Stephen M. Wallace, Public Defender, and M. Tyler Harrison, Assistant Public Defender, 

Blountville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Xavier Sanchez Skaggs.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel; 

Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General; and Joseph Eugene Perrin, Deputy District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts
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This case arises from the Defendant possessing contraband while incarcerated in 

2007. The indictment alleged that the Defendant took marijuana into a penal institution 

on October 7, 2007. For this offense, the Defendant pleaded guilty, and the trial court 

sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to eight years of probation. The trial 

court ordered that the Defendant’s sentence run consecutively to the Defendant’s prior 

sentences. 

On July 14, 2016, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit swearing 

that the Defendant had violated his probation. The probation officer alleged that the 

Defendant had failed a drug screen on May 16, 2016, for “oxy,” cocaine, and marijuana, 

all of which the Defendant denied using. The probation officer further alleged that the 

Defendant had failed a second drug screen on June 29, 2016, for “oxy,” cocaine, and 

marijuana, all of which the Defendant again denied using. The probation officer further

alleged that the Defendant had failed to attend relapse prevention classes and had not 

taken required counseling classes. The trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s 

arrest and appointed him legal counsel.

The trial court held a hearing on the Defendant’s probation violation. At the 

hearing, the Defendant pleaded guilty to violating his probation. The Defendant 

stipulated that the facts contained in the affidavit were true. The Defendant testified that 

he was twenty-eight years old at the time of the hearing and lived with his grandmother. 

He had a two-year-old child whom he helped to support through his employment at 

Longhorn Restaurant. The Defendant said that, before being incarcerated, he worked 

approximately thirty hours a week. The Defendant admitted that he had failed two drug 

screens, explaining that it was “stressful out there.” He said, however, that he took full 

responsibility for what he had done, had no new charges, and did not abscond. 

The Defendant testified that, if returned to probation, he could pass a drug screen

because he had not recently used drugs. He agreed that he had previously been convicted 

of introducing contraband into a penal institution and that he had been convicted of two

other felonies: selling cocaine and reckless endangerment. The Defendant said he had 

several other misdemeanor convictions. He asked the trial court to reinstate his 

probation, saying that he had since learned that using drugs was not worth it.

During cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that he gave a statement to the 

trial court in 2007 in which he acknowledged that his drug use was a problem. In that 

statement, he asked the trial court for an alternative sentence. The Defendant agreed that, 

nine years later, he was again before the trial court acknowledging a drug problem and 

seeking leniency. The Defendant remembered he had also been convicted of evading 

arrest. 
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The Defendant agreed that the trial court had placed him at the John R. Hay House

(“Hay House”) to address his drug problems, but he said that there were “more drugs in 

the Hay House than on the street.” He agreed that he left the Hay House without 

permission.

The State went through the Defendant’s history of drug use while on probation, 

including that he had tested positive for marijuana, oxycodone, and opiates in 2012. The 

Defendant’s probation officer did not file a probation violation affidavit at that time. In 

July 2013, he again tested positive for oxycodone. The Defendant’s probation officer 

again did not file a probation violation affidavit. Instead, the probation officer referred 

him to a drug treatment program. In December 2013, the Defendant tested positive for 

benzodiazepine, oxycodone, and suboxone. At this point, the Defendant was found to 

have violated his parole and was sent to the Tennessee Department of Correction. He 

was released in April 2016 and in May 2016 he tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, 

and oxycodone.

The Defendant asserted that the drug treatment at the Hay House had “worked” 

but said that “everybody has down moments.” When he had such a moment, he returned 

to using drugs. 

After reviewing his criminal history, the Defendant agreed that in April 2007, he 

was convicted of possession of marijuana, and in July 2007, he was convicted of the sale 

of over .5 grams of cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession 

of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Also in July 2007, he was 

convicted of felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, possession of marijuana, and 

driving without a driver’s license. 

The Defendant said that he met the people with whom he used drugs at his drug 

rehabilitation class. He said that their names were “Joshua” and “David” but that he did 

not know their last names. He testified that they both gave him drugs for free. 

Upon this basis, the trial court held:

The Defendant has a long history of convictions of criminal 

offenses, some felonies, some very serious felonies. The Defendant has, on 

previous to this particular offense, been violated for drug use both on 

probation and parole as I understand it. Then this one popped upon July the 

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th, 2016, this warrant.

The Court is aware that the law favors rehabilitation over 
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incarceration where possible or where results are likely to result in progress 

with the Defendant.

At this point, considering the history developed during the course of 

this hearing, [the Defendant] will be required to serve his sentence. And I 

believe it’s eight years at . . . Range 2. He will receive credit for time 

served.

It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement because “[s]ound discretion would have 

been to attempt to address the underlying problem of persistent drug use.” The State 

counters that the trial court acted within its authority when it ordered the Defendant to 

serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. We agree with the State. 

A trial court’s authority to revoke a suspended sentence is derived from Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-35-310 (2014), which provides that the trial court possesses 

the power “at any time within the maximum time which was directed and ordered by the 

court for such suspension, . . . to revoke . . . such suspension” and cause the original 

judgment to be put into effect. A trial court may revoke probation upon its finding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a violation of the conditions of probation has 

occurred. T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e) (2014). “In probation revocation hearings, the

credibility of witnesses is to be determined by the trial judge.” State v. Mitchell, 810 

S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). If a trial court revokes a defendant’s 

probation, options include ordering confinement, ordering the sentence into execution as 

originally entered, returning the defendant to probation on modified conditions as 

appropriate, or extending the defendant’s period of probation by up to two years. T.C.A. 

§§ 40-35-308(a), (c), -310 (2014); see State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999).

The judgment of the trial court in a revocation proceeding will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. See State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 

554 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Smith, 909 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In 

order for this Court to find an abuse of discretion, “there must be no substantial evidence 

to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation 

has occurred.” Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d at 554. Further, a finding of abuse of discretion 

“‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of 

the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” Id.

at 555 (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 1999)).
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In this case, the Defendant admits that he violated his probation but suggests that 

the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The 

determination of the proper consequence of a probation violation embodies a separate 

exercise of discretion. State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tenn. 1999). Case law 

establishes that “an accused, already on probation, is not entitled to a second grant of 

probation or another form of alternative sentencing.” State v. Jeffrey A. Warfield, No.

01C01-9711-CC-00504, 1999 WL 61065, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 10, 

1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 28, 1999).

The record clearly reflects that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation. 

The Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of his probation by not going to 

rehabilitation classes and by failing multiple drug screens. The Defendant has previously 

violated parole on multiple occasions. The trial court acted within its authority when it 

ordered the incarceration of the Defendant for the remainder of the original sentence. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE