*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-20237

Summary Calendar

 

LOWELL L. EAVES; JACQUELINE R. EAVES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

GARY M. DONIGER; A.N. RUSCHE; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CV-1255

 

November 7, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lowell and Jacqueline Eaves appeal the district court's

dismissal based on re judicata and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted of their lawsuit against various

defendants arising from a federal income tax levy issued upon

Jacqueline Eaves's wages. They also appeal the district court's

order enjoining them from filing additional suits in the United
1 Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark

Corp.), 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1999) (footnote omitted).

2 See Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th

Cir. 2000).

3 See id.; Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County,

836 F.2d 921, 940 (5th Cir. 1988); Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co.,

512 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1975).

4 See Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.

1999) (per curiam).

5 Id.

2

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas without

first obtaining written leave from the district's Chief Judge.

"Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of

claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised

in an earlier suit."1 The district court did not err in dismissing

this case based on res judicata.

2 The parties to this action and

the previous action that concluded with a final judgment on its

merits--specifically dismissal for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted--are identical, the prior judgment was

rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the same claims

are involved in both suits.3

Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

enjoining further litigation of these issues.4 We note that "[w]e

have affirmed a district court's sanction barring a litigant from

filing future civil rights complaints without the prior consent of

a district court or magistrate judge."5 Although the sanction here
6 See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 196-97 (5th Cir.

1993). 

7 See Balawajder, 160 F.3d at 1067; Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 195-

97.

8 Mendoza, 989 F.2d at 196.

3

is not the least severe sanction possible, and although the Eaves

have not filed as many lawsuits as other "recreational litigants"

against whom we have previously affirmed sanctions, we are not

persuaded that the district court's sanction exceeds the bounds of

discretion under Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.6 The Eaves were

warned more than once that sanctions might follow if they continued

to pursue the claims that had already been decided against them.7

Given the Eaves' disregard of these warnings by filing additional

lawsuits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the injunction entered was the least severe

sanction that was adequate.8

AFFIRMED.