Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30207

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EARNEST MCCRAY, JR., also known as Ernest McCray,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:06-CR-50126-1

Before BENAVIDES, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Earnest McCray, Jr., appeals his conditional guilty-plea conviction for

possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base and

possession of a short-barreled shotgun during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime. McCray argues that the district court erred when it denied his

motion to suppress because the affidavit supporting the warrant that enabled

the collection of inculpatory evidence and the effectuation of his arrest was a

“bare bones” affidavit. He contends that the issuing judge was not presented

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 23, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-30207

2

with sufficient information to make a probable cause determination because the

affidavit contains conclusory and uncorroborated assertions made by a

confidential informant of dubious reliability. He argues that the insufficiencies

of the allegations in the warrant affidavit render inapplicable the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule.

In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this court

first determines whether the evidence at issue was obtained by law enforcement

officials acting in “objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search

warrant.” United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1997). We

review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo. United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir.

2001). If the good-faith exception applies, our inquiry ends, and the district

court’s judgment must be affirmed. United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 888

(5th Cir. 2004). However, if the exception does not apply, we must determine

whether there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. An officer’s

reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable and therefore not entitled to

the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule if the underlying affidavit is

“bare bones,” i.e., so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. See United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d

335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006).

If an affidavit is based on information supplied by a confidential

informant, this court examines the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge

to determine if his information is credible under the “totality of the

circumstances.” See id.; United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th

Cir. 1992). Detective Murphy’s assertion that the informant had provided

information in the past that proved to be true, reliable, and correct sufficiently

established the informant’s veracity. See McKnight, 953 F.2d at 904-05; see also

Christian v. McKaskle, 731 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984). Moreover, Detective

Murphy’s averments that the informant personally observed cocaine at McCray’s
No. 09-30207

3

residence 48 hours before the execution of the affidavit and that the informant

had prior experience with the packaging and distribution of narcotics established

that the informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge. See Mack v. City of

Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2006). The affidavit further stated that the

disclosures made by the confidential informant were consistent with information

that Detective Murphy had received from other sources concerning unlawful

drug activity at McCray’s home.

Thus, the information contained in the affidavit was sufficient to support

a good-faith conclusion by an objectively reasonable officer that the affidavit on

which the warrant was based was adequate to establish probable cause. See

United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the

district court did not err when it denied McCray’s motion to suppress the

evidence.

AFFIRMED.