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STATE v. HUSTON

Cite as 302 Neb. 202

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Dallas L. Huston, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed February 8, 2019. No. S-18-145.

1. Postconviction: Evidence: Witnesses: Appeal and Error. In an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief, the trial judge, as 

the trier of fact, resolves conflicts in the evidence and questions of fact. 

An appellate court upholds the trial court’s factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous.

2. Effectiveness of Counsel. A claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact.

3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court reviews 

the factual findings of the lower court for clear error. With regard to 

questions of counsel’s performance or prejudice to the defendant as 

part of the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an appellate court 

reviews such legal determinations independently of the lower court’s 

conclusion.

4. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Words and Phrases: Appeal and 

Error. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 

674 (1984), the defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense. To show prejudice under the prejudice 

component of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his or her counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability does not require that it be more likely than not that 

the deficient performance altered the outcome of the case; rather, the 

defendant must show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

02/22/2019 08:06 AM CST
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5. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. The two prongs of the ineffective 

assistance of counsel test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), may be addressed in 

either order.

6. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact finder into 

declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense 

charged, commonly on an emotional basis.

7. Rules of Evidence: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Statements made by 

law enforcement in the course of interviewing suspects may be admissible for the purpose of providing necessary context to a defendant’s 

statements in the interview which are themselves admissible.

8. ____: ____. In order to determine whether a statement made by law 

enforcement is admissible to provide context, the probative value of the 

statements of both the defendant and the officer must be assessed.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: John

A. Colborn, Judge. Affirmed.

Timothy S. Noerrlinger for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, and

Papik, JJ.

Papik, J.

Dallas L. Huston was convicted by a jury of second degree 

murder and sentenced to 50 years’ to life imprisonment. 

We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 

See State v. Huston, 285 Neb. 11, 824 N.W.2d 724 (2013) 

(Huston I). After Huston’s motion for postconviction relief 

was denied without an evidentiary hearing, we affirmed in 

part. See State v. Huston, 291 Neb. 708, 868 N.W.2d 766 

(2015) (Huston II). However, with respect to claims that 

Huston’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

object to the admission of certain portions of recorded interviews between Huston and police, we reversed, and remanded 
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for an evidentiary hearing. The case returns to us now after the 

district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied Huston’s 

motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

We provided a full recitation of the facts regarding this case 

in Huston I. We summarize facts relevant to this appeal in the 

sections below.

Investigation of Ryan Johnson’s Death.

Huston and Ryan Johnson “were living together as a couple 

in a nonsexual relationship” at the time of Johnson’s death. 

Huston I, 285 Neb. at 12, 824 N.W.2d at 728. In September 

2009, Huston called the 911 emergency dispatch service, claiming that he had walked into the room he and Johnson shared 

and found Johnson wrapped in a blanket with plastic wrap 

covering his face. Paramedics performed lifesaving measures 

but were unable to revive Johnson.

Police later began to investigate whether Huston was responsible for Johnson’s death. Police received information that 

Huston had told Nicholas Berghuis and Christopher Wilson, 

friends of Johnson and Huston, that one of Huston’s “personalities” had played a role in Johnson’s death by wrapping Johnson’s face in plastic wrap and putting a pillow over 

Johnson’s face as Johnson tried to breathe. Id. at 13, 824 

N.W.2d at 728. While Huston purported to make statements 

and to have performed actions as a different personality, he 

later admitted that he did not have multiple personality disorder, that he made up all of the different personalities as part 

of a “‘social experiment,’” and that “he controlled them completely.” Id.

Berghuis and Wilson agreed to cooperate with police in 

an attempt to conduct surveillance on Huston. On October 6 

and 7, 2009, Berghuis and Wilson invited Huston to Wilson’s 

apartment, where a camera was concealed. On the first night, 

Wilson wore a wire, and on the second, Berghuis did. Police 
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monitored the audio and video surveillance in unmarked cars 

near the residence. On the second night, Huston, purporting to 

act as one of his personalities, admitted that on the morning 

of Johnson’s death, he wrapped Johnson in a blanket; wrapped 

plastic wrap around Johnson’s face; and, as Johnson broke 

through the plastic wrap and opened his mouth, held a pillow 

over his head and listened to Johnson’s last heartbeats “‘with 

enjoyment.’” Id. at 14, 824 N.W.2d at 728.

Police questioned Huston later in the evening of October 7, 

2009. Huston initially denied involvement in Johnson’s death. 

He then began to discuss a dream he had been having in which 

one of his personalities sat on top of Johnson, wrapped plastic 

wrap around Johnson’s face, and suffocated Johnson with a 

pillow after Johnson broke through the plastic wrap. Later in 

the same interview, Huston admitted that the events were not a 

dream and that he physically aided in Johnson’s death.

In an interview the next day, Huston first tried to retract these 

statements. Later, however, Huston stated that he was tired of 

fighting and that Johnson’s death had occurred just as Huston 

had told Berghuis: Johnson was wrapped tightly in a blanket 

with his hands in his pockets, Huston wrapped Johnson’s face 

with plastic wrap, and Huston covered Johnson’s face with a 

pillow to make sure he died.

In an October 10, 2009, interview, Huston made additional 

statements about Johnson’s death. Huston said that he has 

a morbid fascination with death, that he has urges to kill 

those to whom he is sexually attracted, and that Johnson and 

Wilson helped him deal with those urges by role playing in 

mock death performances. Huston said that Johnson used 

Huston’s urges against him to convince Huston to help him 

commit suicide. Huston discussed the way he felt after putting a pillow over Johnson’s face as Johnson tried to breathe, 

explaining that it did not provide the feeling he had expected. 

Huston also stated that he had fought his urges for most of 

his life and that he feared he might hurt someone else in 

the future.
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Huston was ultimately arrested and charged with second 

degree murder. Huston pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

Trial.

At trial, Wilson and Berghuis testified about the statements 

Huston made to them concerning his role in Johnson’s death. 

Wilson testified that he and Huston engaged in role playing in 

which Huston, acting as one of his personalities, would pretend 

to kill Wilson. Wilson also testified that Huston, purporting to 

act as one of Huston’s personalities, had told Wilson approximately 6 months prior to Johnson’s death that Johnson might 

die soon and that Huston would need somebody “to be there 

for him.”

In addition, the State introduced the surveillance video and 

recordings of numerous interviews between Huston and police. 

The recordings included the statements from Huston summarized above, as well as several exchanges at issue in this appeal 

that are discussed further in the analysis section below.

The State also introduced a video found on Huston’s computer. The video was filmed several weeks after Johnson had 

attempted suicide in March 2009. In the video, Huston pretends 

to kill Johnson by suffocating him with a pillow. The State also 

called a forensic pathologist who testified to his opinion that 

the cause of Johnson’s death was suffocation.

Huston testified in his own defense. He disavowed his earlier statements admitting to restraining Johnson and suffocating 

him with a pillow. Huston claimed that he did not remember 

having any involvement in Johnson’s death, but that he came to 

believe dreams he had been having to that effect. Huston testified that upon having the opportunity to review police reports 

after his confessions, he determined that he had not done what 

he had previously admitted doing. He testified that he had no 

involvement in Johnson’s death and that Johnson must have 

wrapped himself in a blanket and covered his own face with 

plastic wrap.
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The jury found Huston guilty of second degree murder. 

Huston was sentenced to 50 years’ to life imprisonment.

Direct Appeal.

On direct appeal, Huston, represented by new counsel, 

argued that the court erred in admitting certain evidence and 

that if the issue was not preserved for appeal, Huston’s trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial and thus 

preserve the issue. See Huston I. The evidence at issue was in 

exhibits 38, 81, and 95, each of which were video recordings 

of police interviews with Huston.

We held that Huston’s trial counsel did not preserve his 

evidentiary objections for appeal and that the record was not 

sufficient to adequately review his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. See Huston I. As a result, Huston’s conviction 

and sentence were affirmed.

Postconviction Proceedings.

Huston filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, 

asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in various respects. The district court denied Huston’s 

motion without an evidentiary hearing, and Huston appealed. 

See Huston II. We affirmed in part. However, we also determined that the district court, with respect to the assertion that 

Huston’s trial counsel was ineffective in not properly objecting 

to portions of exhibits 38, 81, and 95, erred by denying relief 

without an evidentiary hearing. We reversed, and remanded 

with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 

See Huston II.

Upon remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court again 

denied Huston’s motion. The district court found that Huston 

had failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice, as 

required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 

S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The district court found 

that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, because 
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both parties and the court believed that trial counsel had preserved the issues for appeal. The district court also found no 

prejudice, because either the statements at issue were admissible at trial or, alternatively, their admission would have 

amounted to only harmless error. Huston appeals.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Huston assigns that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for postconviction relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, resolves 

conflicts in the evidence and questions of fact. An appellate 

court upholds the trial court’s factual findings unless they 

are clearly erroneous. State v. McGuire, 299 Neb. 762, 910 

N.W.2d 144 (2018).

[2,3] A claim that defense counsel provided ineffective 

assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. When 

reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 

appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court 

for clear error. With regard to questions of counsel’s performance or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged 

test articulated in Strickland, an appellate court reviews such 

legal determinations independently of the lower court’s conclusion. McGuire, supra.

ANALYSIS

[4,5] Huston’s postconviction motion alleges that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the defendant 

must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient 

and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the 

defendant’s defense. State v. Taylor, 300 Neb. 629, 915 N.W.2d 

568 (2018). To show prejudice under the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate a 
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reasonable probability that but for his or her counsel’s deficient 

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Taylor, supra. A reasonable probability does not require 

that it be more likely than not that the deficient performance 

altered the outcome of the case; rather, the defendant must 

show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. Id. The two prongs of this test may be addressed in 

either order. See id.

With these principles in mind, we turn to Huston’s specific 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Huston asserts that 

his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve an objection to certain portions of exhibits 38, 81, and 

95, all of which are recorded interviews of Huston conducted 

by police.

“Serial Killer” Conversation.

We begin with Huston’s claim that his counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to properly object to a portion 

of one law enforcement interview of Huston in which Huston 

expressed fear about his future dangerousness and admitted 

that he had wondered in the past if he were a serial killer. 

The portion of the interview at issue was conducted by Sgt. 

Gregory Sorensen and went as follows:

[Huston]: . . . [T]his is what I meant though when I’ve 

told everybody that I want to get help. I never thought 

this could happen and now that this has happened, I am 

so scared that I’m capable of doing it again.

[Sorensen]: Yeah, I think that that’s probably really 

true.

[Huston]: And that scares me to death because, like I 

said, I have never thought of myself as a violent person 

and now I don’t know what to think of myself.

[Sorensen]: Well especially when you consider that . . . 

you have urges to kill the people that you’re attracted to.

[Huston]: And I’ve done everything that I could for the 

last, you know, if . . . you know, the earliest memories 
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I have of this are say 9, 10 years old so . . . 18 years I 

have fought myself.

[Sorensen]: But most serial killers do the same thing at 

some point in time.

[Huston]: Oh wow.

[Sorensen]: At some point in time, they crossed that 

line. I mean when you talk about . . .

[Huston]: [Interrupting.] I’ve asked myself that.

[Sorensen]: Whether you[’re] a serial killer?

[Huston]: Uh-hum (yes). I’ve asked myself that . . . 

you’ve asked me if I have been suicidal in the past.

[Sorensen]: Yeah[.]

[Huston]: To be completely honest I lied to you. 

Because of this, I have been. I have thought about killing 

myself so I wouldn’t hurt anyone.

Later in the same interview, Huston stated, “I am so scared 

now that this could happen again.”

Huston objects to two aspects of the above exchange. He 

contends that the probative value of his own statements in the 

exchange are outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 

and thus inadmissible under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016). Additionally, he contends that 

Sorensen’s reference to “serial killers” was not probative of 

any issue.

With respect to Huston’s claim regarding his own statements 

in the above exchange, we do not believe his counsel performed deficiently. His statements occurred after he had admitted to law enforcement that Johnson died after Huston wrapped 

plastic wrap around his face and held a pillow over Johnson’s 

head until his heart stopped beating. We find Huston’s statement that he was scared he might do this again and his admissions that he has urges to kill people to whom he is attracted 

and that he had wondered whether he is a serial killer to all 

be probative of the central issue in the case—whether Huston 

intentionally caused Johnson’s death.
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[6] And while such evidence was certainly harmful to Huston’s 

case, most, if not all, evidence offered by a party is calculated 

to be prejudicial to the opposing party. State v. Oldson, 293 

Neb. 718, 884 N.W.2d 10 (2016). Rule 403 allows for exclusion only if the probative value of evidence is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice 

speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence 

to lure the fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground different 

from proof specific to the offense charged, commonly on an 

emotional basis. Oldson, supra. Given Huston’s own admissions about his involvement in Johnson’s death and the fact that 

the conversation sheds light on the key issue of whether Huston 

intentionally caused Johnson’s death, we do not consider the 

probative value of this evidence to be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because any objection to Huston’s own 

statements would not have been successful, trial counsel did not 

perform deficiently by not making such an objection. See State 

v. Newman, 300 Neb. 770, 916 N.W.2d 393 (2018).

[7,8] As for Huston’s claim regarding Sorensen’s statements 

in the exchange, we reach the same conclusion. We have recognized that statements made by law enforcement in the course 

of interviewing suspects may be admissible for the purpose of 

“providing necessary context to a defendant’s statements in the 

interview which are themselves admissible.” State v. Rocha, 

295 Neb. 716, 740, 890 N.W.2d 178, 199 (2017). In order to 

determine whether a statement made by law enforcement is 

admissible to provide context, the probative value of the statements of both the defendant and the officer must be assessed. 

See id.

As we have explained, Huston’s admissions were highly 

probative of the issues in the case, certainly more relevant 

than mere denials of criminal activity we found relevant in 

Rocha. Additionally, Sorensen’s statements are highly relevant, 

because Huston’s statements took place in a conversation and 

would make little sense without Sorensen as a conversation 

partner. For similar reasons to those outlined above, we also 
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do not believe the probative value of Sorensen’s statements 

is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because this 

evidence was admissible, Huston’s counsel did not perform 

deficiently by failing to preserve an objection to them. See 

Newman, supra.

Sorensen’s Opinion That Huston 

Committed Murder.

Next, Huston claims he is entitled to postconviction relief 

on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 

preserve an objection to a portion of an interview in which 

Sorensen stated a belief that Huston committed murder and not 

assisted suicide. Huston argues this evidence should have been 

excluded as inadmissible opinion testimony.

Huston’s postconviction motion is not entirely clear as to the 

specific statement of Sorensen to which he claims his counsel 

deficiently failed to preserve an objection. Exhibits 81 and 95 

do contain several exchanges in which Sorensen made statements about the nature of Huston’s involvement with Johnson’s 

death. In an interview conducted on October 7, 2009, the following dialogue took place:

[Sorensen]: . . . [Y]ou or [one of your personalities] 

were the person or persons that killed [Johnson]. And, 

maybe at the time, it started out as a suicide. But it didn’t 

end that way. It just didn’t end that way.

[Huston]: See, I don’t believe that.

[Sorensen]: You don’t believe that it didn’t end in a 

homicide?

[Huston]: No, I don’t.

. . . .

[Huston]: . . . [T]hey asked me that. They asked me 

that. Did he fight? Did he . . .

[Sorensen]: [Interrupting.] He doesn’t have to fight. All 

he had to do was break the seal, all he had to do was try 

to breathe, and . . . that was his intent to stay alive. He 

tried to br[eathe].
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Later, in the same interview, Sorensen stated, “[W]hen you put 

the pillow over his face, you are killing him. He’s not killing 

himself, you’re killing him.”

On October 10, 2009, Huston and Sorensen had the following conversation after Huston asserted that he “didn’t murder 

[Johnson]”:

[Sorensen]: . . . [B]ut I don’t know how else you can 

describe it. . . . This isn’t . . . assisting a suicide. This . . . 

this is just not assisting a suicide. . . . I don’t know if you 

can understand this, but if [Johnson] looks at me right 

now and he says . . . I can’t take it anymore, you got to 

kill me and I pull a gun out and I shoot him dead.

[Huston]: You’ve tried to say that before and I do 

understand what you mean.

[Sorensen]: [Johnson’s] just asked me to kill him and 

I don’t have that right to do that. He can ask me all he 

wants, but I don’t have the right to do it. And this isn’t 

any different . . . I know that you think that it is, but 

it’s not.

Huston argues that Sorensen’s statements that Huston committed murder were inadmissible, because the statements were 

not based on Sorensen’s personal knowledge and constituted 

opinion testimony of Huston’s guilt. However, for reasons 

explained below, even assuming this evidence was inadmissible, we do not believe Huston has demonstrated he was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to properly object to it.

Sorensen’s statements that Huston killed Johnson or committed murder were based on Huston’s admissions. At the 

time Sorensen made them, Huston had admitted to restraining Johnson, wrapping his face in plastic wrap, and covering 

his head with a pillow until he stopped breathing. Huston, 

however, continued to insist that these acts did not amount to 

murder. Sorensen’s statements addressed the question of what 

crime Huston had committed if Huston had, in fact, done what 

he had admitted doing. At trial, however, Huston did not take 

the position that the actions he had admitted taking did not 
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amount to second degree murder. Rather, he changed course 

and denied any involvement in Johnson’s death.

The basic question before the jury was thus whether to believe 

Huston’s numerous admissions that he wrapped Johnson’s face 

with plastic wrap and placed a pillow over Johnson’s head until 

his heart stopped beating or to believe his later claim made at 

trial that he did not actually do what he had previously admitted doing. The jury’s verdict shows it believed Huston’s admissions and not his attempt at trial to disavow them. Huston has 

not offered and neither can we discern a reason why the outcome would have been different if Sorensen’s above statements 

had been excluded from evidence. Because Huston cannot 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any failure to object to 

the statements discussed above, the district court did not err in 

rejecting postconviction relief.

Evidence Regarding Huston’s 

Relationships.

Finally, Huston contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve objections to a part of 

exhibit 38, an interview between Huston and police in which 

Huston discussed the nature of his relationship with Johnson 

and what Huston terms a “homosexual encounter” with Wilson. 

Brief for appellant at 40. In that part of the interview, Huston 

and an officer had the following discussion:

[Huston]: Okay. To be completely honest, me and 

[Wilson] were together once. Only once uhm, it’s how it 

came out to [Johnson] that we might have been interested 

in each other, but [Wilson] decided he didn’t want to 

do that.

[Police officer]: Okay. And was this early in your relationship with [Johnson]? Or . . .

[Huston]: [Interrupting.] Oh, no no. [Wilson] is only 

been back around, see [Wilson] has only been back in the 

picture as a friend of ours for like a month. . . . I believe 

in being up front, yes, one time and only one time me 
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and [Wilson] were together and we, well we went to bed 

together, and

[Police officer]: [Interrupting.] How long ago was that?

. . . .

[Huston]: . . . Three weeks ago.

[Police officer]: So, it was pretty recent then.

[Huston]: Yep. . . . [Y]ou probably don’t want to hear 

this, but me and [Johnson] had kind of a . . . unique relationship. . . . I know it’s kind of a weird situation to be in 

[be]cause in the four years of our relationship, there was 

never anything sexual uhm, and we allowed ourselves . . . 

an “open relationship.” We allowed ourselves what he’d 

call “[expletive] buddies.” . . . That one and only one 

time that me and [Wilson] ended up . . . was kind of a 

heat of the moment, uhm, you know, spur of the moment 

type thing. . . . [W]e ended up in bed together, we kissed, 

we, we made out, but it never went anywhere further 

than that.

Huston argues that the discussion quoted above was not relevant to any issues at trial. He contends that his encounter with 

Wilson and the open nature of his relationship with Johnson 

could only have prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. He 

argues that evidence of his encounter with Wilson was particularly prejudicial, because the jury also heard that Huston served 

as Wilson’s mentor in a mentoring program several years 

before. Even though Wilson was 19 years old at the time of 

the encounter, Huston asserts that the fact that he was formerly 

Wilson’s mentor “feels unsavory.” Id. at 41.

We are not persuaded that Huston was prejudiced by his 

counsel’s failure to properly object to the evidence at issue. 

Huston’s statements about his encounter with Wilson were 

a very small part of lengthy interviews between Huston and 

law enforcement, and the recordings were just a portion of 

the State’s overall case. Furthermore, while Huston may have 

served as a mentor to Wilson when Wilson was younger, 

Wilson was 19 years old at the time of the encounter and there 
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was no suggestion that Huston coerced Wilson at any point to 

engage in intimate activity with him.

In addition, the jury heard other evidence regarding Huston’s 

relationship with Wilson. In particular, in one interview with 

police in which Huston was explaining that he engaged in role 

playing in which he would pretend to kill people to placate his 

urges to kill, he admitted that Johnson and Wilson were “prime 

targets for this stuff,” because he had urges to kill those to 

whom he is physically attracted. At trial, Huston also admitted 

that Wilson helped him placate his urges by pretending to allow 

Huston to kill him because Huston was attracted to Wilson. 

The jury also heard another recording in which Huston told 

an officer, “If there was anyone who [Johnson] intended me to 

have a relationship with after all this, it would be [Wilson].” 

Given the other evidence in the record about Huston’s attraction to Wilson and about Wilson and Huston’s role playing in 

which Huston would pretend to kill Wilson because of that 

attraction, evidence of the specific encounter to which Huston 

claims his counsel should have objected did little to “alter[] the 

evidentiary picture.” See State v. Newman, 300 Neb. 770, 783, 

916 N.W.2d 393, 407 (2018).

In light of the nature of the evidence at issue, the other 

evidence in the record regarding Huston’s relationship with 

Wilson, and the overall evidence of Huston’s guilt, we find 

no reasonable probability that the statements noted by Huston 

altered the outcome. We thus reject this claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failure to demonstrate prejudice.

CONCLUSION

We find no merit to Huston’s claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve objections 

to certain evidence introduced at trial. Accordingly, we affirm 

the order of the district court denying Huston postconviction relief.

Affirmed.

Freudenberg, J., not participating.