2000 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-6-2000

Michaels v. State of NJ

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-5486

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Recommended Citation

"Michaels v. State of NJ" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 120.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/120
Filed June 5, 2000 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 99-5486 

MARGARET KELLY MICHAELS 

 Appellant 

v. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 

OFFICE; COUNTY OF ESSEX; ESSEX COUNTY 

PROSECUTOR; GEORGE L. SCHNEIDER, ESQ. ; 

HERBERT TATE, ESQ.; JOHN MASTROANGELO; JOHN 

NOONAN; GLENN GOLDBERG, ESQ.; SARAH SPENCERMCARDLE; EILEEN C. TREACY, M.A.; THE ESSEX 

COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; NEWARK POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY 

SERVICES; LOUIS FONNELARAS; SUSAN ESQUILLAN; 

"JOHN DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); 

"JOSEPH DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS 

PERSONS); "JAMES DOES"; "JANE DOES", 1 THROUGH 

20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); "HARRY DOES", 1 THROUGH 

20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); GEORGE MCGRATH 

SUSAN ESQUILLAN 

 Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff 

v. 

THE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE COMPANY 

 Third-Party Defendant 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civ. No. 96-03557) 

District Judge: Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry 
* The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Argued: March 21, 2000 

Before: MANSMANN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 

and ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge* 

(Filed: June 5, 2000) 

 Louis J. Santore [Argued] 

 Santore & Kenny 

 300 Harmon Meadow Boulevard 

 Secaucus, NJ 07094 

 Attorney for Appellant 

 Juan C. Fernandez 

 Essex County Counsel 

 Steven C. Mannion [Argued] 

 Assistant County Counsel 

 County of Essex 

 Hall of Records, Room 530 

 Newark, NJ 07102 

 Attorneys for Appellees George 

 McGrath and Richard 

 Mastroangelo 

 Jacqueline A. DeGregorio [Argued] 

 Robert D. Laurino 

 Weiner Lesniak 

 629 Parsippany Road 

 Parsippany, NJ 07054-0438 

 Attorneys for Sara Sencer-McArdle 

 John J. Farmer, Jr. 

 Attorney General of New Jersey 

 2 
 Mary C. Jacobson 

 Assistant Attorney General of 

 Counsel 

 Valerie L. Egar [Argued] 

 Deputy Attorney General 

 Office of Attorney General of 

 New Jersey 

 Department of Law & Public Safety 

 Division of Law 

 Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 

 Trenton, NJ 08625 

 Attorneys for Louis Fonnelaras 

 Terri A. Smith [Argued] 

 Stevens & Minter 

 300 Lighting Way 

 2nd Floor 

 Secaucus, NJ 07096 

 Attorney for Susan Esquilin 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Margaret Kelly Michaels ("Michaels") appeals from the 

order granting the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment and dismissing her S 1983 claims against them. 

Michaels alleged that the defendants violated her 

constitutional rights by employing coercive interview 

techniques with child witnesses while investigating

allegations of child abuse made against her. The district 

court granted the defendants' motions for summary 

judgment on three alternative grounds. First, the district 

court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity because Michaels's allegations that the 

defendants engaged in an improper investigation did not 

allege a violation of her constitutional rights. The district 

court then ruled that even if the improper investigation did 

violate her constitutional rights, the defendants would 

nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity because those 

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rights were not clearly established at the time of the 

investigation such that a reasonable person in the 

defendants' position would have known that they were 

violating her rights. Finally, the district court concluded 

that, putting the issue of qualified immunity aside, 
Michaels's S 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Michaels contends 

that each one of the district court's conclusions was 

erroneous. We agree with the district court that the use of 

improper interview techniques in questioning the children 

did not violate any of Michaels's constitutional rights. We 

conclude that the district court correctly determined that 

Michaels failed to demonstrate that her constitutional 

rights were violated. We do not consider its alternative 

grounds for granting summary judgment. 

I 

A child who attended the Wee Care Nursery School in

Maplewood, New Jersey, reported to a nurse at his 

pediatrician's office that he had been sexually abused by 

Michaels. Michaels was employed at the nursery school as 

a teacher. On April 30, 1985, Louis Fonnelaras, an 

investigator with the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit 

of the Division of Youth and Family Services, was assigned 

to investigate the merits of the child's allegation. Mr. 

Fonnelaras informed John Mastroangelo, an investigator 

with the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, of the child's 

accusation. Mr. Mastroangelo notified Sarah SencerMcArdle, the director of the Child Abuse Unit of the 

Prosecutor's Office, of the sexual abuse report. Shortly 

thereafter, four other children made similar allegations 

regarding Michaels's conduct. Ms. Sencer-McArdle 

interviewed each of the children. The evidence she 

discovered induced a grand jury to return an indictment 

against Michaels. 

Following the return of the first indictment, other

children reported additional allegations of sexual 

misconduct by Michaels at the nursery school. After

interviewing the children, Ms. Sencer-McArdle presented 

the results of her investigation to a second grand jury. The 

Essex County Prosecutor's Office continued to receive 

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reports of sexual misconduct committed against children at 

the Wee Care Nursery School. Ms. Sencer-McArdle 

presented this evidence to a third grand jury after

conducting additional interviews. During the course of 

these investigations, Mr. Mastroangelo and George 

McGrath, another investigator with the Essex County

Prosecutor's Office, Susan Esquilin, a psychologist, and Mr. 

Fonnelaras also participated in questioning the children. A 

total of one hundred and sixty-three charges werefiled 

against Michaels in three separate indictments. 

On June 22, 1987, the trial regarding these charges was 
commenced in the Superior Court of New Jersey. On April 

15, 1988, the jury convicted Michaels of 115 counts of 

aggravated assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare 

of children, and terroristic threats. On March 26, 1993, the 

Appellate Division reversed the convictions and remanded 

for a new trial. The court questioned the reliability of the 

methods used to interview the children. The court held 

that, "courts must provide a remedy where the record 

demonstrates that an accuser's testimony is founded upon 

unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper 

investigative procedures if it results in a defendant's right 

to a fair trial being irretrievably lost. . . .[and that a] 

factual hearing would be required for this purpose." See 

State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 631-32 (App. Div. 

1993). The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the

reversal of the judgment of conviction. See State v. 

Michaels, 136 N.J. 299 (1994). On December 1, 1994, the 

Essex County Prosecutor's Office dismissed all charges 

against Michaels. 

On June 13, 1996, Michaels filed a complaint in the

Superior Court of New Jersey. On July 25, 1996, the

defendants removed the action to the United States District 

Court, District of New Jersey. Numerous claims and 

defendants were dismissed, either voluntarily or by court 

order, leaving only the claims of malicious prosecution and 

violation of S 1983 against five defendants: Louis 

Fonnelaras, John Mastroangelo, Sarah Sencer-McArdle, 

George McGrath, and Susan Esquilin (collectively"the 

defendants"). The defendants filed motions for summary 

judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. In 

 5 

May, 26, 1999, the district court granted the motions and 

dismissed the S 1983 claims. The district court remanded 

the common law malicious prosecution claim to the 

Superior Court of New Jersey. Michaels timely filed this 

appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 

II 

We review a district court's grant of a motion for 

summary judgment de novo. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 

F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is 

appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Jones v. School Dist. of 

Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). 

In analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to the

dismissal of an action based on the defense of qualified 
immunity, we must first determine "whether the plaintiff's 

claims make out a violation of a constitutional right." Assaf 

v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Siegert v. 

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). If we conclude that the 

plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, we 

must then determine whether the defendant violated a 

clearly established right such that a reasonable official in 

the defendant's position would know that his conduct was 

unlawful. See id.; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 

826 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Government officials performing 

discretionary functions are `shielded from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.' ") (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). These inquiries are 

questions of law that the court must resolve. See Sharrar, 

128 F.3d at 828. 

Michaels contends that the district court erred in 

concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity because the interview techniques they employed 

did not violate her constitutional right to due process under 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Michaels argues that the 

rationale of the district court, adopted from the Seventh 

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Circuit's holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 

(7th Cir. 1994), is flawed because it "leaves a Section 1983 

Plaintiff, such as Michaels, without recourse." 

In Buckley, the plaintiff brought S 1983 claims against 

police officers for allegedly coercing witnesses, and paying 

them money to make false statements against him, in order 

to implicate him in the crime for which he was tried. Id. at 

794. The court held in Buckley that "[c]oercing witnesses to 

speak . . . is a genuine constitutional wrong" that violates 

"the right of the person being interrogated to be free from 

coercion." Id. The court further held, however, that the 

plaintiff could not "complain that the prosecutors may have 

twisted [the witness's] arm" because "[r]ights personal to 

their holders may not be enforced by third parties." Id. at 

794-95 (citations omitted). The court in Buckley ruled that 

"using one person's coerced confession at another's trial 

violates his rights under the due process clause," but that 

"[p]rosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions 

as advocates before the grand jury and at trial even if they 

present unreliable or wholly fictitious proofs." Id. at 795; 

see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) 

(holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity 

from a civil suit for damages under S 1983 in initiating a 

prosecution and in presenting the state's case, including 

deciding which evidence to present). 
Consistent with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in 

Buckley, the district court in this matter held that the 

techniques used to interview the children during the course 

of the investigation did not violate Michaels's constitutional 

rights. The district court decided that Ms. Sencer-McArdle 

was entitled to absolute immunity in offering the unreliable 

evidence. 

Michaels is correct in noting that such a rule leaves a 

plaintiff like herself without recourse. Indeed, the court in 

Buckley recognized this dilemma. 20 F.3d at 795 ("[T]he 

only way Buckley can establish a violation of the 

Constitution is to plead himself out of court."). The United 

States Supreme Court, in upholding absolute prosecutorial 

immunity, also noted that absolute prosecutorial immunity 

may "leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil 

redress," but concluded that the policies served by granting 

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absolute prosecutorial immunity outweighed any gap in a 

plaintiff's recovery. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. This court 

has acknowledged that a person harmed by the actions of 

a prosecutor would not be without any redress, because 

"[h]arm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by 

safeguards built into the judicial system - probable cause 

hearings, dismissal of the charges - and into the state 

codes of professional responsibility." Kulwicki v. Dawson, 

969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Michaels suggests that a but for causation analysis

would be more appropriate to resolving the issue of

qualified immunity in this instance. To support this 

proposition, Michaels cites to the dissenting opinion in 

Buckley. The dissent in Buckley suggested that prosecutors 

are not immune from liability for their non-advocacy 

wrongful conduct if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 

indictment and trial would not have occurred but for the 

wrongful conduct. 20 F.3d at 800 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). 

Judge Fairchild reasoned that the investigation techniques 

employed by the officers in Buckley were the same as 

manufacturing evidence and suborning perjury, actions 

that would be non-advocacy wrongful conduct. See id. 

We are persuaded by the reasoning set forth in the 

majority opinion of Buckley. While we recognize that this 

rule may seem harsh to plaintiffs, we are satisfied that the 

remedies set forth in Kulwicki for a falsely-charged 

defendant are sufficient to discourage prosecutors from 

coercing witnesses to make unreliable statements against a 

defendant. Here, for example, Michaels's conviction was 

reversed and the serious charges against her were 
dismissed because the children's testimony was unreliable. 

Michaels also attempts to support her argument that her 

constitutional rights were violated by the improper

techniques used to interview the children by relying on the 

decision in Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 

1997). Michaels asserts that the court in Clanton held that 

the plaintiff had standing to assert a constitutional 

violation of his rights based upon a witness's coerced 

confession. Citing Buckley, the court in Clanton held that "a 

person may challenge the government's use against him or 

her of a coerced confession given by another person." Id. at 

 8 

1157-58 (emphasis added). It recognized a plaintiff's 

constitutional right not to have another person's coerced 

statement used against him in an affidavit for an arrest 

warrant. See id. 

The distinction between Buckley and Clanton is the use 

of the improperly obtained statements. In Buckley, the 

witness's coerced testimony was presented at trial. The 

court held that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from 

an action for damages under S 1983 under Imbler. See 20 

F.3d at 795. In Clanton, on the other hand, the police used 

another person's coerced confession in an affidavit to 

obtain an arrest warrant for Clanton. 129 F.3d at 1151. In 

using a coerced statement in this manner, the court held in 

Clanton that the officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity. See id. at 1159; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 

U.S. 335, 343 (1986) (holding that an officer applying for a 

warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified 

immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity). Here, 

the only use of the improperly obtained statements against 

Michaels was the presentation of the children's testimony 

before the grand jury and at the criminal trial. Until the 

children testified against her, Michaels's constitutional right 

to due process was not violated by the techniques used to 

interview the children. 

The district court did not err in concluding that Michaels 

did not demonstrate a violation of her constitutional rights 

when the defendants employed improper interview 

techniques with the children. Thus, all of the defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity for those acts. 

Furthermore, Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute 

immunity for offering the testimony of the children against 

Michaels before the grand jury in that trial. 

III 

Michaels also contends that she was denied the 
opportunity to discover evidence as to the proper interview 

techniques for interviewing children regarding allegations of 

sexual abuse in order to demonstrate that the defendants 

violated her clearly established constitutional rights. 

Because we conclude that the questioning of the children 

 9 

did not violate Michaels's constitutional rights, we need not 

consider this question. Furthermore, Michaels'sfinal 

contention, that the district court erred in dismissing her 

malicious prosecution S 1983 claim for failure to state a 

claim, is also unavailing. The district court properly 

dismissed her claims on the basis that the remaining 

defendants were entitled to immunity. Any discussion in 

the district court's order as to whether Michaels stated a 

S 1983 malicious prosecution claim was superfluous. The 

order granting summary judgment can be upheld without 

reaching the court's alternative basis for dismissing the 

action. 

IV 

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for 

their acts in interviewing the children because Michaels did 

not demonstrate a violation of her own constitutional 

rights. Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute immunity 

for presenting the children's testimony against Michaels 

before the grand jury and at trial. We therefore AFFIRM the 

order granting the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment and dismissing Michaels's federal claims. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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