Tri-vision signs a re outdoor sig ns made up of ve rtical, thre e-sided slats that can be rotated. 1 Whe n th e slats a

re ro ta te d, the ima g e on

the sig n c ha

ng e s. Thus , tr i- vis ion

sig ns c an a lte rn a te betwee n three differ ent display s at any g iven time. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-06-00356- CV

Lam ar Adv e r ti sing Co m pany , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Transp ortat ion , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-02- 0036 99, H ONO RAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th is c a s e c o n c e r

n s t h e i n t e r

p r e t a t i o nan d

a p p l i c a t i o no f

ana d m i n i s t r a t i v e r

ule regulating outdoor adver

tising si g ns. The question at issue is whether the a dminist rative r ule applied to “tri-vision” sig ns prior to 1999 or whe ther the Depa rtment of Transportation is attempting to a nd 1 may apply the version of the rule a s amende d in 1999 to signs per mitted and exis ting pr ior to 1999. T h e a d mi n is tr a ti v e r

u le in qu e s ti o n w a s a me n d e d in 1 9 9 9
. T h e p arti e s a g r e e th a t the post-1999 version of the rule e x plicitly prohibits the operation of tri-vision signs. See 43 Tex. Admin. C ode § 21.154 (2006) (unchang ed si nce 1999). The disput e concer ns whether the pre-1999 ver sion of the rule prohibited tri-vision sig ns and, if not, whethe r the Depa rtment may apply the post-1999 version of the ru le to L a mar’ s p re -e xistin g sig ns . L a mar a lso c on te nd s that if the pr e -1 99 9 v e rs ion

of the ru leThe re cord r efle cts that Richard L . Sweezy was a prior owner o f t h e t wo sig ns and had 2 or ig ina lly ob ta ine d the pe rm its fo r the sig ns fr om the De pa rtme nt of Tr ans po rt a tio n. At so me po int , Bow lin Outdoor Advertising purcha sed the sig ns from Swee zy , and L amar Adver tising Company purc ha se d th e sig ns fr om B ow lin . F or purp os e s of this a

pp e a l, we re fe r onl y to L a mar an d not to i ts pr e de c e sso rs in i nte re st. I t is un dis pu te d th a t th e tw o s ig ns a t is su e are ill umi nate d s ig ns . 3 2 is found to apply

to tr i-vision sig ns, it is unconstitutionally vag ue. We conclude that the pre- 1999 version of se ction 21.154 prohibited the oper atio n o f t ri -vision signs, ther efor e, L amar was not
su bje c t to an unc on sti tut ion a l r e tr oa c tiv e a pp lic a tio n o f t

he po st- 19 99 ve rs ion

of the ru le . We a lso conclude that the pre -1999 version of t he rule was not unconstitutionally vag ue. Consequently , we
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. L amar owns two outdoor adver tising sig ns that are located in the c ity of Killeen. It

2 applied for

an d rec eived pe rmits from the Texas Depa rtment of Tra

nsportation to construct and maintain the two sig ns in 1989 and 1990, respectively . The sig ns were conver ted to tri-vision signs in 1995 and 1998, respe ctively
. The Depa rtment rene wed L amar ’s per mits for both signs eve ry y ear until 2000.

I n 1 99 9, the De pa

rtme nt a me nd e d s e c tio n 2 1. 154 of the a dmi nis tr a tiv e c od e . T his section had, since 1986, prohibited the illumination of sig ns wi t h “intermittent messag e[s] of 3 any n at u re . ” 11 Tex . Reg . 903 (1986), amende d by 24 Tex. Reg. 3733 ( 1999) (c odified at 43 Tex. Admin. C ode § 21.154). The 1999 amendment to section 21.154 added subse ction (b), whic h states: “[s] igns with intermittent messag es ar e prohibited, including tri-vision signs with rot ating slat messages .” 24 Te x. Re g . 373 3 (19 99 ) (c od if ie d at 43 Te x. Ad

min . Co de § 2 1. 15 4) (e mph a sis
a dd e d) . In A ugus t 2000, the De pa rtme nt i ssu e d a

n il le g a l si g n n oti c e to L a mar s ta tin g that it s tr i-Although the Depa rtment rene wed L amar ’s sig n permits sever al times while the tri-vision 4 signs we re ope rational, L amar is not asserting estoppel as a basis for r elief. 3 vision signs were prohibited by section 21.154 and that “[t] he two locations will not be in violation
as soon as t he dis play s are chang ed to one advertisement per side.” L amar stopped the rotation of the slats on both tri-vision signs in response to this notice. 4

I n 2002, L amar

soug ht a dec laration from the tri al court that the Depar tment’s app li c a ti o n o f th e 1 9 9 9 a me n d e d v e r s io n o f s e c ti o n 2 1
. 1 5 4 to it s tr i- v is io n s ig n s c o nstitut es an unconstitutional retroac tive application of the rule. I t alleg ed that “[a]t the time the permits were iss ue d a nd the bil lbo ard s inst a lle d, sig ns wi th i nte rm itt e nt m e ssa g e s, inc lud ingtr i- vis ion sig ns wi th rotating slat messag es, wer e allowed under Texas la w.” Alternatively , L amar soug ht a decla ration that if the De pa rtme nt o f T ra

ns po rtati on wa s r e lyingon the pr e -1 99 9 v e rs ion

of se c tio n 2 1. 15 4 to prohibit its t ri-vision signs, the pr e-1999 r ule was un co n s t i t utionally vag ue. L amar

reque sted
su mma ry jud g me nt o n it s c la ims fo r d e c larator y re lie f. I n r e sp on se , th e De pa rtme nt f ile d a c ro ssmotion for summary

judgme nt, contending that the pre- 1999 version of se ction 21.154 prohibited the oper ation of tri-vision signs a nd was not unconstitutionally vag ue. The t ri al court g rante d the Depa rtment’s motion for summary judgme nt and denied L amar ’s motion. The pre -1999 ver sion of sectio n 2 1
. 1 5 4 in question was first promulg ated in 1986 and wa s eff

ective until the sec tion’s amendment in 1999. This version of se ction 21.154 was tit le d “ L ig hti ngof

Sig ns ” a nd pr ov ide d in

re le va nt p art : Sig ns may

be ill umi nate d, su

bje c t to the fo llo wi ngre str ic tio ns :4 (1 ) s i gn s wh i ch c o n t a i n , i n cl u d e o r a re i l l u m i n at edb y an y fl as h i n g, intermittent, or moving lig ht or lights or inter mittent message of any nature are prohibited, except those g iving only p u b l i c ser

vice information such a s time, date, t em p erature, we ather , or similar information.
11 Tex. Reg
. 903 (1986), amende d by 24 Tex. Reg . 3733 (1999) ( codified at 43 Tex. Admi n. Code § 21.154). I n 1998, the Department considered an amendment to sec tion 21.154 that “allows the
us e of c ha ng ingte c hn olo g y

by lif tin g the pr oh ibi tio n of int e rm itt e nt me ssa g e s o f a ny natur e ” be c a

us e “[ a] d v an ci n g t ec h n o l o gy

h as p r o mp t edn u m er o u s re qu es t s fo r t ri -v i s i o no r c h an geab l e m es s age signs.” 23 Tex. Reg. 12270 ( 1998) (43 Te x . Admin. Code § 21.154) (propose d Dec ember 4, 1998). Howeve r, instead of

lifting the ba

n on intermittent messag es of a ny nature , the Depa

rtm ent ultimately

added a broade r and more expli cit prohibition ag ainst tri-vision sig ns in ne w subsection (b) of the amende d rule. Thus, the amende d version of the rule that wa s adopted in 1999 provided in r e le va nt p art : (a) L ighting . Signs may

be illuminated except for sig ns that contain, i n c l u d e , o r

ar e i l l u m i n a t e d

b y: (1) any flashing , intermittent, or moving lig ht or lights, including any ty

pe of scr een usinganimated or scrolling display s, such as an L ED (ligh t em itting diode) scr een or

any other ty pe of vide o display , even if the me ssa g e is statio na

ry , e xce pt tho se g ivi ngon ly public information s uch as time, date, temper ature , weather, or similar infor

mation.

. . . (b ) M o ving pa

rts. Signs with intermittent messag es ar e prohibited, inc lud ingtr i- vis ion

sig ns wi th r otatin g slat me ssa g e s.I t is undis p u t ed t h at the two tri-vision signs in this case do not provide public ser vice 5 information. 5 24 Tex. Reg. 3733 ( 1999) (c odified at 43 Te x . Admin. Code § 21.154).

L amar contends that the Department’s il leg al s ign notice t o L amar in Aug ust 2000
a pp lie d the 19 99 a me nd e d ve rs ion of se c tio n 21 .1 54 to its tr i- vis ion sig ns in a n unc on sti tut ion a lly retroa ctive manne r. The D epar tment r es p o n d s that while the 1999 ame ndment to section 21.154 made the pr ohibition aga inst the opera tion of tri-vision signs broa der a nd more e x plicit, the 1986
v e r s i o no f s e c t i o n2 1
. 1 5 4 a l s o p r o h i b i t e d t h e o p e r a t i o no f

i l l u m i n a t e d , t r i

- v i s i o ns i g n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Depa rtment argues that the 1986 version’s prohibiti on ag ainst “intermittent messag e[s] of any nature ” included r otating slat messag es on illuminated, tri -v ision signs. We defe r to an a g ency ’s int e rp re ta tio n o f a

va lid ru le it is c ha

rg e d w itha dmi nis te ri ngun le ss t he int e rp re ta tio n is pla inl y
err oneous or inconsistent with the lang uag e of the rule. BFI W aste Sys. of N. Am., Inc . v. Martinez Envtl. Group , 9 3 S. W.3 d 5 70 , 5 75 -7 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) ; H.G. Sledge, Inc. v. Prospec tive Inv . & Trading Co. , 36 S.W .3d 597, 604 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied).

We are of the opinion that the De partment’s inter pretation of the 1 9 86 version of
se c tio n 2 1. 15 4 is no t pl a inl y e rr on e ou s o r i nc on sisten t wi th t he langua g e of

the ru le . T he pla in langua g e of

the 19 86 ve rs ion of the ru le pr oh ibi te d “in te rm itt e nt me ssa g e s of any natur e .” Th e on ly exclusion from this broad prohibition aga inst int ermittent messag es wa s for “ those [int ermit tent messag es] giving only

public service information such a s time, date, temper ature , weather, or similar information.” Sign dis p l ay s m ade up of rotating vertica l slats that allow differ ent imag es or 5 messag es to appe ar w hen the slats turn a re c apable of p rovi ding “ intermittent messag es.” SuchThere may be a que stion under the pre-1999 version of t he rule as t o what constitutes an 6
“ int e rm itt e nt” me ssa g e wh e n d e a lin g wi th t ri -vi sio n s ig ns . F or

e xamp le , if

a tr i- vis ion sig n o nly rotates a nd chang es i t s m essag e on the same sche dule as the r eplac ement of me ssag es on a no nm ov in g s ign, w ou ld t his be an “ int e rm itt e nt” me ssa g e ? Simp ly be c a us e a tr i- vis ion

sig n is capa ble of displaying inter

mittent message s does not mean that it, in fact, does so. This is illus trated by the fa ct that L amar

stopped the rotation mec hanism o n t h e si g ns at issue in this case a nd the De pa rtme nt d oe s n ot c on sid e r t he sig ns in vio la tio n of the ru le if the y fu nc tio n li ke no nmo vin g sig ns . Howeve r, the issue of when a chang ing messag e becomes an “intermittent” messa g e is not prese nted in this case. 6 intermittent display s, if illumi nated a nd with the rotation s y s t em operating , are prohibited by the pla in l angua g e of

the ru le bo th b e fo re and

a ft e r t he 19 99 a me ndme nt. 6 As we ha ve noted, the pr e-1999 r

ule prohibited illumin at ed , intermittent messag es of any natur e by

its e xpre ss t e rm s. Sig ni fi cant ly , th e De pa rtme nt c on sid e re d a

19 98 pr op os a l to amend the r

ule to lift the prohibition a g ainst intermittent me ssag e of a ny nature and per

mit tri-visi on signs. The Depa

rtment consider ed this rule chang e and, instead of adopting a more lenient treatment of tr i- v is io n s ig n s , a d o p te d an a me n d me n t to th e r u le th a t ma d e th e p r o h ib it io n o f tr i- v ision signs br oa de r a nd mor e e xplic it. Th is is con sis te nt wit h the De pa

rtme nt’ s p os iti on

that il lum inate d, tr ivision signs are capa

ble of providin g intermittent messag es and, thus, we re subjec t to reg ulation
un de r t he pr e -1 99 9 v e rs ion

of the ru le if

the y , in fa c t, d isp lay e d in te rm itt e nt m e ssa g e s. The De partment’s inter

pretation that the 1986 version of section 21.154 prohibited the oper ation of illuminated, tri-vision signs does not conf lict w ith the plain lang uag e of the rule a nd is consistent with the comments to the Depa rtment’s propose d amendment to the r ule in 1998. The 1999 amendment of

section 21.154 par

tly co d i fi ed and partly

broade ned the De partment’s interpre tation of the 1986 reg ulation. After the 1999 amendment, se ction 21.154 plainly prohibited the oper ation of movingtri-vision sig ns whether illumi nated or not. B eca use sec tion 21.154 has, at7

a l l t i m e s r e l e v an t t o t h i s a p p e a l , p r o h i b i t e d t h e o p e r a t i o n o f i l l u m i n a t e d , t r i

- v i s i o nsig ns wi th intermittent messag es, the De partment’s illeg al sig n notice to L amar in Aug ust 2000 wa s n o t an unconstitutional retroac tive application of la w. I n light of our

holding that the 1986 ve r s io n o f s e c ti on 21.154 prohibited the oper ation of tr i- vi si on si gns, we rej ectL ama r’s argum ent th at i ts tr i- vi si on si gns ar e le gal no nco nfo rm in g sign s. Since the oper ation of illuminated, tri-vision signs with intermittent messag es wa s prohibited under the 1986 ver sion of the rule, the signs at issue wer e never leg al sig ns beca

use they wer e conve rted to t ri -v isi on sig ns in 1 99 5 a

nd 19 98 . T hu s, the sig ns c ann ot b e le g a l no nc on fo rm ingsig ns . L amar contends in the a lter

n a ti v e that if the 1986 version of se ction 21.154 prohibited the operation of t ri-vision signs, it was unconstitut ionally vag ue. To survive a vag ueness c halleng e, a statute ne ed not spell out with perfe ct pre cision what conduct it forbids. Commission for L awyer Discipline v. Be nton , 980 S.W .2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998). Due proce ss is satisfied if the prohibition is “ se t out in

te rm s th a t th e or din ary

pe rs on e xer c isi ngor din ary

c omm on se ns e c an s uf

fi c ie ntl y understand a

nd comply

with.” Id. (c i t i n g United S t a t es C i vi l Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Le tte r Ca rri e rs , 4 13 U. S. 5 48 , 5 79 (1 97 3) ). Mo re ov e r, statut e s mu st g ive fa ir no tic e to t

ho se to whom the statute is direc ted. Id. (c i t i n g Gray ne d v . Ci ty of R oc k for d , 4 0 8 U
. S. 1 0 4 , 112 (1972))
. L amar contends that, be cause the application of section 2 1
. 1 5 4 could result in t he
revoc ation of its sig n permits, a more heig htened standard of revie w applies. Unde r this more strict standard of

revie w, which is reserve d for c riminal statutes and civil statutes or re g ulations with quasi-cr iminal penalties, a rule is unconstituti onally vag ue only if it (1) does not g ive fa ir notice of wh a t c on du c t ma

y be pu ni sh ed, and

(2 ) i nv ite s a

rb itr ary and dis c ri min ator

y e nf or c e me nt b y

its8

lack of g uidance for those c harg ed with its enforc ement. TXU Ge ner ati on Co. v . P ub lic Ut il. Comm’n , 165 S .W. 3d

82 1, 83 8- 39 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 05 , n o p e t.) ; Rooms with a View, Inc. v. Private Nat’l Mortgage A ss’n , Inc ., 7 S.W .3d 840, 845 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1999, pe t. denied);

se e Fo rd Mo tor Co. v . Te x as De p’ t of Tra ns p ., 264 F.3d 493, 508 ( 5th Cir. 2001). The Depa rtment responds that L amar is not entitled to r ely on the mor e s t ri ng ent standard be cause L amar d i d n o t have its sig n permits revoke d under the rule. Instead, a s the De pa rtme nt p oin ts o ut, L a mar h a s b e e n a ll owe d to ma int a in t he sig ns a s th e y

we re or ig ina lly pe rm itt e d a

nd annua lly re ne we d, a s o ne -f

a c e d s ig ns wi th n o r otatin g slats o r i nte rm itt e nt m e ssa g e s. Moreove r, L amar voluntarily stopped the rotation of the slats in response to the Depa rtment’s illeg al sign notice in 2000, approxim ately two y ear s befor e the commence ment of t his lawsuit. We ag ree with the Depa

rtment that L amar ’s vagueness c halleng e should not rec eive the mor e strict standa rd of re view re serve d for c riminal statutes and civil s t atut es and r eg ulations with quasi-criminal p enalties. Thus, we examine whether the ordinar

y outdoor adve rtising sig n owner exercising ordinary common sense c ould understand a nd comply

with the rule. Benton , 980 S.W .2d at 437. We conclude that an ordinary sign owner ex erc ising c ommon sense could under stand that the 1986 ver sion of 21.154 prohibited th e o p er at ion of illumi nated sig ns with intermittent messag es, including illumi nated, tri-v i s i on signs with the c apability of displaying inter

mittent
m es s age s . T h e p l ai nl an gu age o f t h e r u l e p ro h i b i t edi l l u m i n at eds i gn s co n t ai n i n g “f l as h i n g, i n t er m i t t en t , o r m o v i n g l i gh t o r l i gh t s o r i n t er m i t t en tm es s age [ s ] o f a n y n at u re . ” 1 1 T ex . R eg. 90 3 (1 98 6)
. Al tho ug h thi s p ro hib iti on did no t e xplic itl y

inc lud e ro ta tin g slats c on ta ini ngme ssa g e s, the rule is not re qui re d “to spell out with perfe ct pre cision what conduc t it forbids.” Benton ,9

980 S.W .2d at 437. C ommon sense sug g ests that the prohibition ag ainst intermittent messag es of
an y n at u r e i n cl u d edan y

k i n d o f f re qu en tm o v em en to r c h an gi n g m es s age o nt h e f ac e o f t h e s i gn (pre sumably

to preve nt drivers fr om being overly distracted)
. The only exception from this g ener al ban ag ainst intermittent messag es wa s for sig ns display ing public se rvice information. S uch a
narr ow exception sug g ests that any other ty pe of inter mittent or fre quently

chang ing me ssag e on the fac e of the sign w as prohibited by the rule. Thus, a

n ordinary sign owner c ould understand that the operation of tri-vision signs, which a re d es i gn ed to present f

reque ntly chang ing me ssag es fr om differ ent adve rtisers to individuals driving by the sig ns, were prohibited by the rule. We c onclude that the 1986 ver sion of section 21.154 wa s not unconstituti onally vag ue. Affir med.

_______________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: June 20, 2007