[Cite as State v. Davison, 2021-Ohio-3941.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JAMES A. DAVISON 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 29120 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-1560 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 5th day of November, 2021. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

CHARLES W. SLICER, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0059927, 426 Patterson Road, Dayton, Ohio 

45419 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

TUCKER, P.J. 
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{¶ 1} James A. Davison appeals from the trial court’s resentencing entry imposing 

separate sentences on two three-year firearm specifications pursuant to a mandate from 

this court. Davison asks us to “revisit” our prior mandate regarding separate sentences 

and to reverse the trial court’s imposition of such sentences. For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

 

Factual and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Davison was found guilty and sentenced on charges of aggravated murder, 

murder, evidence tampering, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and 

various specifications. Davison appealed, and the State cross-appealed. On review, we 

overruled Davison’s assignments of error. On the cross-appeal, we reversed the trial 

court’s judgment insofar as it had merged two substantive offenses. We also reversed the 

trial court’s merger of multiple three-year firearm specifications into one. See State v. 

Davison, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28579, 2021-Ohio-728 (“Davison I”). The Ohio 

Supreme Court denied review in State v. Davison, 164 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2021-Ohio-3336. 

{¶ 3} Consistent with our mandate, the trial court resentenced Davison and 

imposed separate prison terms on three-year firearm specifications attendant to his 

aggravated murder and murder convictions. This appeal followed.

Analysis 

{¶ 4} Davison’s sole assignment of error states: 

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE APPELLANT’S FIREARM 
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SPECIFICATIONS. 

{¶ 5} Davison asks us to “revisit” our mandate in Davison I directing the trial court 

to impose separate sentences on the two three-year firearm specifications referenced 

above. His appellate brief effectively functions as a motion for reconsideration of Davison 

I. He contends the trial court did not err when it originally merged all of the three-year 

firearm specifications into one and that we erred in holding otherwise. 

{¶ 6} Upon review, we conclude that Davison’s assignment of error lacks merit. 

The law-of-the-case doctrine precludes him from challenging our holding in Davison I. 

“[T]he doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law 

of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at 

both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 

(1984). Therefore, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision 

by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a 

superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Id. at syllabus. 

{¶ 7} Our mandate in Davison I directed the trial court to impose separate 

sentences on three-year firearm specifications accompanying the appellant’s aggravated 

murder and murder convictions. The trial court had no liberty to disregard our mandate, 

and the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes Davison from challenging our prior 

determination that separate sentences were required. 

{¶ 8} Finally, even if the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply, we would find 

Davison’s assignment of error to be unpersuasive. He raises no new issue or argument 

that we failed to address in Davison I. He simply disagrees with our holding and asks us 

to “revisit” it. 
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{¶ 9} In Davison I, we addressed the firearm specifications and reasoned as 

follows: 

Under R.C. 2941.145, Davison was found guilty of multiple threeyear firearm specifications for having a firearm on or about his person while 

committing his offenses and displaying, brandishing, indicating that he 

possessed, or using it to facilitate the offenses. Davison also was found 

guilty of multiple five-year firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.146 for 

purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or 

physical harm to another by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. 

In [State v. Howard, 2020-Ohio-3819, 156 N.E.3d 433 (2d Dist.)], we 

recognized that when a defendant is found guilty of a three-year and a fiveyear firearm specification accompanying the same offense, a trial court is 

required to impose both a three-year prison term and a five-year prison 

term. Howard at ¶ 96-97. The trial court correctly did so in the present case. 

The issue raised by the State’s appeal is whether the trial court should have 

merged the multiple three-year firearm specifications into one. Howard

answers that question in the negative. 

Although a trial court ordinarily may impose only one additional threeyear prison term for multiple firearm specifications committed as part of the 

same act or transaction (see R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b)), an exception is 

created by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which provides: 

If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, 

if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder,
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attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated 

robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of 

or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under division 

(B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the felonies, 

the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term 

specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two 

most serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to 

which the offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may 

impose on the offender the prison term specified under that division 

for any or all of the remaining specifications. 

Here, Davison was convicted of, among other things, aggravated 

murder and murder, and he was convicted of three-year firearm 

specifications of the type described under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) in 

connection with both of those felonies. Therefore, the trial court was 

required to impose the three-year prison term specified under R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(a) “for each of the two most serious specifications” of which 

Davison was convicted. In short, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) obligated the trial 

court to impose separate prison terms for the three-year firearm 

specifications accompanying Davison’s aggravated murder and murder 

convictions. 

The foregoing sentencing obligation was not satisfied by merging the 

three-year firearm specifications into one, merging the five-year firearm 

specifications into one, and imposing a three-year prison sentence and a 
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five-year prison sentence. Howard at ¶ 94. This is so because R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(g)’s requirements apply to convictions for firearm 

specifications under R.C. 2929.145, which includes Davison’s three-year 

firearm specifications. It does not apply to convictions for five-year firearm 

specifications under R.C. 2929.146.3. Id. 

* * * 

* * * Although the trial court correctly imposed three-year and fiveyear prison terms on Davison’s firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145 

and R.C. 2941.146, it was obligated by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) to sentence 

Davison on a three-year firearm specification for the aggravated murder of 

Darion Harris and on a second three-year firearm specification for the 

murder of Ashley James. * * * 

(Footnote omitted.) Davison I at ¶ 38-44. 

{¶ 10} In his present appeal, Davison continues to argue that the trial court 

complied with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) by imposing a three-year prison term and a five-year 

prison term for his firearm specifications. In Davison I, we explained why that is incorrect 

and why the trial court was obligated to impose two separate three-year prison terms in 

addition to a five-year term. We see no error in our resolution of the issue. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 11} Davison’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the 

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

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WELBAUM, J. and EPLEY, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Andrew T. French 

Charles W. Slicer, III 

Hon. Mary Lynn Wiseman