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Filed 2/24/21 T.K. v. Super. Ct. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified 

for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE 

 

T.K., 

 

 Petitioner, 

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,

 Respondent,

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES BUREAU, et al., 

Real Parties in Interest.

 A161671

 

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J2000584)

 

 

T.K. (mother)1 seeks extraordinary writ relief from a December 

17, 2020 order that denied her reunification services for her son Z.K. 

(the child) and set a hearing to consider termination of her parental 

rights and the child’s permanent placement under Welfare and 

1 The child’s father is not a party to this writ proceeding. 
2

Institutions Code section 366.26.2 Pending our resolution of the 

petition, mother requests a temporary stay of the section 366.26 

hearing set for April 15, 2021. Real party in interest Contra Costa 

County Children and Family Services Bureau (agency) opposes the 

petition. 

Mother challenges the juvenile court’s denial of reunification 

services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). Under 

this statute, in pertinent part, the court “need not” provide 

reunification services for a child when a parent’s reunification services 

or parental rights have been terminated in an earlier proceeding 

concerning a half-sibling and the parent “has not subsequently made a 

reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal” of the halfsibling. (Id., subs. (b)(10) & (11).) Once a court has found that a parent 

is described in subdivision (b)(10) or subdivision (b)(11) of section 361.5, 

it “shall not order reunification” for the parent unless it further “finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best 

interest of the child.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Here, the juvenile court 

found mother was a person described in subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) 

of section 361.5, but it did not find that reunification would be in the 

best interest of Z.K. Therefore, mother’s request for reunification 

services was denied. We deny the petition for an extraordinary writ on 

the merits and deny as moot the related request for a temporary stay of 

the section 366.26 hearing.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2020 mother gave birth to the child and both tested 

positive for “methamphetamines and opioids.” Due to safety concerns 

and mother’s substance use, the child was placed in protective custody. 

That same month, the agency filed an amended section 300 petition 

asking the court to assume dependency jurisdiction over the child. The 

amended petition alleged mother failed to protect Z.K. by placing him 

at substantial risk of physical harm because she: (1) had a serious and 

chronic substance abuse problem that affected her ability to parent the

child, and (2) had untreated mental health issues (anxiety and bi-polar 

disorder diagnosed in 2011 for which she stopped taking medication 

and which caused constantly changing moods) that impaired her ability 

to provide adequate care for the child. (§ 300, subd. (b)). 

The amended petition further alleged Z.K. was at substantial risk 

of abuse or neglect because mother previously abused or neglected two 

other children (the child’s half-siblings N.K. and D.K.) and failed to 

reunify with them due to her substance abuse problem. (§ 300, subd. 

(j)). Mother’s reunification services concerning N.K. were terminated in 

September 2011, her parental rights were terminated in October 2012, 

and an adoption was finalized in July 2013. During the juvenile 

dependency concerning D.K., mother’s reunification services were 

bypassed in September 2011 and legal and physical custody was 

granted to D.K.’s father in March 2012.

The agency submitted a report for the October 30, 2020 hearing 

to determine detention and jurisdiction over Z.K. The agency social 

worker reported both mother and child tested positive for 

methamphetamines and opioids; the child suffered from fevers that 
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were a symptom of withdrawal; and mother had multiple abrasions and 

scratches on her arms that “appeared to be common symptoms of 

people who abuse [m]ethamphetamine and ‘pick’ at their skin.” Mother 

stated she did not know how she tested positive for methamphetamine 

because she had not used the drug since 2015. She became addicted to 

Norco in 2016 and later took Suboxone in 2017 when she became 

pregnant with Z.K.’s half-sibling L.R. Mother currently used Suboxone 

and no other substances. In regards to her mental health, mother 

stated she had been diagnosed as suffering from “high anxiety” and bipolar disorder in 2011 and had not taken her prescribed medication for 

a long enough period for it to work due to her “ ‘immaturity’ ” (mother’s 

word). Mother felt her bi-polar disorder was adversely affecting her 

daily life due to constantly changing moods, and she wanted mental 

health treatment. 

At the October 30, 2020 hearing, the juvenile court granted the 

agency custody of Z.K. and mother was granted supervised one-hour 

weekly visits. The court initially set a jurisdictional hearing and later 

continued the matter for a contested combined jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing on December 17. On December 3, 2020, the 

agency filed a report prepared for the contested combined jurisdictional 

and dispositional hearing. The agency social worker recommended that 

the court deny mother reunification services based on her failure to 

reunify with the child’s half-siblings N.K. and D.K as alleged in the 

amended petition. 

In support of its recommendation, the agency social worker 

described the family circumstances and portions of the records 

concerning the earlier dependency proceedings regarding D.K. and N.K. 
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The agency social worker also reported on mother’s substance abuse. 

Mother stated she had a history of substance abuse with 

methamphetamine and Norco, she had participated in drug treatment 

in 2010, her longest period of sobriety was between 2014-2016, and she 

last used drugs on November 11, 2020. The next day, November 12, 

mother entered a residential drug treatment program, which included 

classes on domestic violence and relapse prevention. She planned on 

moving into a Sober Living Environment after she completed the inpatient program. On November 25, mother reported a “ ‘slip up’ ” at 

the program but she and her counselor were working to get her back on 

track. Mother was scheduled for a mental health assessment on 

December 1. The agency social worker also reported on Z.K.’s situation. 

He was physically well and developmentally on target, and he had been 

placed in the same foster care home as his half-sibling three-year-old 

L.R. Mother had attended two (of four) supervised visits with Z.K., had 

engaged with the child, and there were no reported issues regarding 

the visits. 

The December 17, 2020 contested combined jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing concerned the dependencies filed on behalf of Z.K. 

and his half-sibling L.R. With regard to Z.K., the court considered the 

agency’s reports prepared for the October 30 and December 17 

hearings; the testimony of the agency social worker and mother; and 

counsels’ arguments. The court also took judicial notice of portions of 

the records in the earlier dependencies regarding N.K. and D.K. 

The agency social worker testified concerning the mother’s 

participation in services, noting she was participating in residential 

drug treatment including drug testing; the program would be 
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completed in January 2021 and thereafter mother planned to enter a 

sober living environment. Mother had also completed a therapy 

assessment and was waiting to start therapy. Mother testified 

concerning her efforts to address her substance abuse problem since the 

end of the earlier dependencies, noting that she had not been in any 

type of treatment program between 2012 and 2020 when she entered 

residential drug treatment in this case. 

At the conclusion of the hearing’s evidentiary phase, the juvenile 

court, focusing on bypassing reunification services, specifically asked 

counsel to address whether mother had made reasonable efforts to 

treat her problems and whether it would be in the children’s best 

interests to offer mother reunification services. Mother’s counsel made 

no argument that mother was not a person described in section 361.5, 

but argued the court should nonetheless grant reunification services for 

L.R. for the following reasons: (1) L.R.’s father was being granted 

reunification services so granting mother services would not delay the 

proceeding; (2) mother was making efforts to address her substance 

abuse, having entered an in-patient drug treatment program; and (3) 

both mother and L.R. would benefit from services as mother was 

connected to L.R. and visits were going well. As to Z.K., counsel added 

that mother was committed to doing all that was necessary to maintain 

her sobriety and after completing her in-patient treatment program she 

planned to move to a sober living place. 

The juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition 

to be true and declared Z.K. a dependent of the court after finding he 

was a person described in section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The 

court granted the agency custody of Z.K. for out of home placement,
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denied mother’s request for reunification services, and set a section 

366.26 hearing to consider termination of mother’s parental rights and

permanent placement for Z.K.

The juvenile court also found that denial (bypass) of reunification 

services was required under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11),

and (c)(2). The court stated this finding was made based on clear and 

convincing evidence that mother had not made reasonable efforts to 

address her substance abuse problem plus she had failed to show, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that reunification services would be in 

Z.K.’s best interest. In so finding, the court relied on the following 

evidence. For many years mother had been addicted to 

methamphetamine and opiates. Her last participation in drug 

treatment was in February 2011 and she had no drug treatment 

between October 2012 (termination of parental rights over N.K. for 

failure to reunify despite services) and her entry into drug treatment in 

November 2020. Immediately following Z.K.’s birth in October 2020,

both mother and child tested positive for methamphetamines and 

opioids. Mother entered a residential drug treatment program on 

November 12, in response to agency and court intervention, and 

thereafter she tested positive for methamphetamine at a level showing 

she was still using shortly before November 23. Thus, she had “just 

less than 30 days of sobriety” at the time of the December 17 hearing. 

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

As a general matter, when a child is removed from the custody of 

his parents, reunification services must be offered unless a statutory 

exception applies. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Under section 361.5, subdivision 
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(b), the juvenile court “need not” provide reunification services when 

the parent has previously failed to reunify with a child’s sibling or halfsibling and the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, either of 

the following: (1) a parent’s court-ordered reunification services were 

terminated after the parent failed to reunify with the sibling or halfsibling and the parent subsequently did not make reasonable efforts to 

treat the problem that led to removal (id., subd. (b)(10)); or (2) a

parent’s parental rights over a child’s sibling or half-sibling were 

terminated and the parent subsequently did not make reasonable 

efforts to treat the problem that led to removal (id., subd. (b)(11)). 

If a parent is found to be described by subdivision (b)(10) or 

subdivision (b)(11) of section 361.5, the juvenile court “shall not” order 

reunification services “unless the court finds, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” 

(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) In other words, once the court determines a 

parent is one described in subdivision (b)(10) or subdivision (b)(11) of 

section 361.5, “ ‘ “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by 

a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use 

of governmental resources,” ’ ” and “the burden is on the parent to 

change that assumption and show that reunification would serve the 

best interests of the child.” (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 

1220, 1227.)

While a parent’s reasonable efforts necessary to avoid the denial 

of reunification services “are not synonymous with ‘ “ ‘cure,’ ” ’ . . . not 

every ‘effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the 

problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as 

such render [section 361.5, subdivision (b)] inapplicable. It is certainly 
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appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and

context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating to 

the quality and quantity of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for 

reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the focus of the 

inquiry, a parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and 

long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the 

reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court 

(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121; italics in original (Jennifer S.).) 

In reviewing the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable efforts, we 

“determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the 

finding of high probability demanded by” the clear and convincing 

standard of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005, 

fn. omitted.) We do not “reweigh the evidence itself,” or “insert [our]

views regarding the credibility of witnesses” for those of the juvenile 

court; rather we “view the record in the light most favorable” to the 

juvenile court’s order, indulging all “reasonable inferences” that the 

juvenile court may have drawn from the evidence and accepting the 

juvenile court’s resolution of conflicting evidence. (Id. at p. 1008.)

When making the best interest determination under section 

361.5, subdivision (c)(2), the juvenile court must decide whether a 

parent has showed that the child would benefit from court-ordered 

reunification services, after a consideration of “ ‘the parent’s current 

efforts, fitness, and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to 

the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child 

bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity.’ ” (Jennifer S., 

supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.) “We review a juvenile court’s best 
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interest determination in this context for an abuse of discretion.” (Id.

at pp. 1124-1125.) 

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding that Mother

Had Not Made Reasonable Efforts to Address Her 

Problems that Led to Removal of Child’s Half-Siblings

Relying on isolated portions of the record, mother contends the

juvenile court should have found she made reasonable efforts to treat 

her substance abuse problems that caused removal of the child’s halfsiblings. She asks us to consider, among other things, that at the time 

of the December 17 hearing she was engaged in a residential drug 

treatment program (that included group sessions in domestic violence 

and drug testing) and was in the process of being assessed for therapy 

and a program in domestic violence. In addition her visits with Z.K. 

were going well. 

Our authority is limited to determining whether there is 

substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding in favor of 

the agency. Whether mother’s circumstances at the time of the 

December 17 hearing demonstrated she had made reasonable efforts to 

address her substance abuse problems was a question “addressed 

peculiarly to [the juvenile] court, which heard [mother’s] testimony and 

observed [her] demeanor at [the hearing],” together with the other 

evidence admitted at the hearing. (In re Marriage of Sheridan (1983) 

140 Cal.App.3d 742, 749.) Mother makes no argument, and we see no 

reason to otherwise conclude, that the juvenile court did not fully and 

fairly consider the evidence regarding the reasonableness of her efforts 

to address her substance abuse problems. We therefore reject mother’s 

claim of error on this basis.
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III. Mother’s Argument that the Juvenile Court Should Have 

Granted Her Mental Health Services as a Component of

Reunification Services Is Unavailing

Mother also seeks reversal based on a claim that the juvenile 

court should have granted reunification services to address her mental 

health issues, instead of treating this case “as an everyday drug case.” 

According to mother, the court should have had a “more expanded 

view” of her mental illness, noting that her “mental illness” should 

have been the “ ‘starting’ ” point for reunification services, and that 

Z.K.’s dependency would have been the first opportunity for the court to

grant her mental health services. She also contends her untreated 

mental health issues may have prevented her from engaging in 

programs between 2011 and 2020, but she had “a lot of insight” into her 

problems and was amenable to treatment that the juvenile court should 

have offered her in this case. We conclude mother’s arguments are 

unavailing. 

We begin by noting that, at the December 17 hearing, mother 

made no assertion, as she does in her writ petition for the first time, 

that her mental health issues may have prevented her from engaging 

in programs between 2011 and 2020. She also did not proffer any

additional evidence directed at her mental health issues.

While the juvenile court, in denying reunification services, did 

not mention mother’s mental health issues, it read and considered the 

agency reports that contained the only information regarding those 

issues. Additionally, the court took judicial notice of portions of the 

records in the earlier dependencies concerning the child’s half-siblings. 

Those records showed that mother received reunification services for 

N.K. between January 10, 2011 and September 11, 2011 and family 
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maintenance services for D.K. between January 10, 2011 and March 1, 

2012. While those records did not show the nature of the services, 

there is no question that mother was offered services during 2011 when 

she contends she was diagnosed with mental health issues and 

prescribed medication. These records do not, however, support 

mother’s argument that Z.K.’s dependency would have been the first 

opportunity for her to receive court-ordered mental health services.

We decline to “infer from the limited record a lack of services. 

Notably, [mother] cites no authority for such an approach.” (Steve J. v. 

Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 812.) “The rule is well 

settled that in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

questioned finding, the appellate court must accept as true all evidence 

tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into 

account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been 

thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion. [Citation.] 

There is no corollary to this rule which authorizes a reviewing court to 

draw inferences from the absence of evidence to overturn the 

questioned finding.” (Id. at p. 813.) If it was mother’s position that she 

should have been granted reunification services for Z.K. due to a 

previous lack of court-ordered mental health services in the earlier 

dependencies for the child’s half siblings, she “should have crossexamined the social worker” or “introduced [her] own evidence on the 

issue. . . . [F]or [her] to now make this argument amounts to no more 

than an attempted sandbagging of the [juvenile] court. This we cannot 

tolerate.” (Ibid.) 

Finally, the cases cited by mother to support her argument that 

the juvenile court should have considered her “mental illness” as the 
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“ ‘starting point’ ” for reunification services, In re K.C. (2012) 212 

Cal.App.4th 323 (K.C.) and Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 

Cal.App.4th 397 (Patricia W.), are factually inapposite as they concern

whether an agency made reasonable efforts to provide reunification 

services for a parent with mental health issues. (See K.C., supra, at p. 

329; Patricia W., supra, at p. 425.) Here, we are concerned with 

whether mother is entitled to reunification services in the first 

instance. Given mother’s report that her mental health issues were 

diagnosed in 2011, her admitted failure to take prescribed medication,

and her lack of explanation for not seeking treatment between 2012

and 2020 despite her belief her bi-polar disorder was adversely 

affecting her daily life, the juvenile court could have impliedly found

there was no clear and convincing evidence that it would be in Z.K’s 

best interest to provide mother with mental health services as a 

component of reunification services. We therefore reject mother’s claim 

of error on this basis.

IV. Conclusion

We deny mother’s petition for writ relief as she has failed to meet 

her appellate burden of demonstrating error or an abuse of discretion 

in the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services. Our refusal to 

grant mother affirmative relief is buttressed by “[t]he intent of the 

Legislature, [as expressed in legislation] especially with regard to 

young children,” that the dependency process should proceed “with 

deliberate speed and without undue delay.” (Marlene M. v. Superior 

Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151 (Marlene M.).) “Section 361.5, 

subdivision (b) is part and parcel of the legislative scheme and 

recognizes that there are cases where delay attributed to reunification 
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services is more detrimental to the [child] than the competing policy of 

reunification.” (Marlene M., supra, at p. 1151.) Here, the Legislature’s 

goal that “dependency actions be resolved expeditiously . . . would be 

thwarted if the [December 17 hearing] had to be redone.” (In re Jesusa 

V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 625.) 

DISPOSITION

The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.452(h).) The request for a temporary stay is denied as moot. Our 

decision is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i) & 

8.490(b).)
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_________________________

Petrou, J., Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Jackson, J.

_________________________

Wiseman, J.*

A161671

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 

of the California Constitution.