[Cite as Blevins v. Blevins, 2014-Ohio-3933.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Alex Blevins, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

Zhanee Blevins et al., : No. 14AP-175 

 (C.P.C. No. 07DR-2716) 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

v. : 

Michael Blevins, Sr., : 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 11, 2014 

 

Alex Blevins, pro se. 

Cynthia M. Roy, for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

O'GRADY, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Alex Blevins, appeals from a December 27, 2013 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, 

which adopted the magistrate's decision. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} Appellant and appellee were married in 2002. They have three children 

together. Their daughter has been emancipated and their two sons are minors. Appellant 

filed for divorce in 2007, and the divorce was finalized in 2008. Appellant was named the 

residential parent with custody of the children, and appellee was allotted parenting time. 
No. 14AP-175 2 

At the time of their divorce, both parties lived in Franklin County, Ohio. Appellant 

relocated to Marion, Ohio in 2010. 

{¶ 3} On September 25, 2012, through counsel, appellee filed a motion to modify 

parental rights. Appellee alleged a substantial change in circumstances; namely, 

appellant had relocated several times without notifying appellee or the court, which 

prevented appellee from exercising his parenting time. Appellee requested an order 

reallocating parental rights and responsibilities to align with the best interest of the minor 

children. The record reflects the parties and the court used at least five addresses for 

appellant during the litigation, previous to appellee filing the motion. The motion itself 

was mailed to a new address for appellant: "2230 Mary Lane, Claridon, OH 43302." 

There is no indication in the record that service failed. It is apparent that appellant 

received notice of the motion because she requested a continuance of the corresponding 

hearing. Appellant also signed a waiver of service acknowledging receipt of the motion to 

modify parental rights. 

{¶ 4} Appellant obtained counsel and, on May 8, 2013, filed a motion to dismiss 

appellee's motion to modify parental rights. Appellant alleged appellee did not comply 

with interim orders regarding parenting time. Specifically, appellee did not show up on 

time for child exchanges at the Marion Police Department, and when he did show up, he 

did not leave with the children. Appellant argued appellee's motion should be dismissed 

because his actions evidenced his lack of interest in spending more time with the children. 

Appellant simultaneously filed a motion for an award of attorney fees incurred in 

opposing appellee's motion to modify parental rights. Appellant's counsel withdrew 

shortly after filing the motions. 

{¶ 5} On August 9, 2013, appellee filed a motion for an order finding appellant in 

contempt based on appellant's alleged failure to provide appellee with his court ordered 

parenting time. Appellee also moved the court for an award of attorney fees associated 

with the motion. The motion was mailed to appellant at the "2230 Mary Lane, Claridon, 

OH 43302" address; however, this time service failed. The envelope was returned to the 

clerk of courts marked "not deliverable as addressed-unable to forward." (R. 445.) 

Appellant later signed a waiver of service acknowledging receipt of the motion for 

contempt. 
No. 14AP-175 3 

{¶ 6} On September 24, 2013, the magistrate ordered appellant and appellee to 

take their children to counseling to address issues including, but not limited to, the 

children's relationship with their father and the impact of their parents' negative 

relationship. 

{¶ 7} On December 18, 2013, the magistrate rendered a decision complete with 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, which resolved the above motions. The decision 

indicates a hearing was held on September 19, 20 and 24, 2013, and a court reporter made 

a record of the proceedings. The magistrate noted appellee was represented by counsel 

and appellant chose to proceed without counsel. Both parties testified and presented 

evidence. The magistrate found that appellant's move to Marion, Ohio constituted a 

substantial change of circumstances for the minor children. The magistrate then 

determined the best interest of the children by applying the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).1 

The magistrate granted appellee's motion to modify parental rights in part. Appellant 

remained the residential parent and legal custodian of the children. Appellee was 

allocated additional responsibilities and the terms of his parenting time were modified. 

Of note, the magistrate ordered: 

[Appellant] shall deliver the children to [appellee's] home at 

the commencement of [appellee's] parenting time and 

[appellee] shall return the children to [appellant's] home at 

the end of his parenting time. All exchanges shall be "curb 

side," such that the parties shall not exit his/her vehicle when 

delivering the children to the other party's home. 

(Magistrate's Decision, 12.) The magistrate reduced appellee's child support obligation 

finding it "appropriate to impute minimum wage to [appellant]." (Magistrate's Decision, 

8.) The magistrate noted appellant worked part-time as a home health aide, she was 

articulate and intelligent, and there was no indication appellant could not earn minimum 

wage. By granting appellee's motion to modify parental rights in part, the magistrate 

implicitly denied appellant's motion to dismiss. The magistrate denied appellant's 

corresponding motion for an award of attorney fees because appellant did not present any 

evidence to substantiate the fees. The magistrate granted appellee's motion to find 

 

1 The magistrate noted, among other things, that neither party requested a psychological evaluation of the 

children. 
No. 14AP-175 4 

appellant in contempt based on her admissions that she denied appellee his parenting 

time in violation of the court's orders. Finally, the magistrate granted appellee's motion 

for an award of attorney fees associated with filing the motion for contempt. The 

magistrate's decision concluded with a notification in bold type stating: 

A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's 

adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or 

not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of 

law under Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii) or Juv. R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), 

unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual 

finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(b) 

or Juv. R. 40(D)(3)(b). 

(Emphasis omitted.) (Magistrate's Decision, 15.) 

{¶ 8} On December 27, 2013, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision as 

the judgment of the court. The trial court recognized that a three-day hearing was held on 

the matter, and found "no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's 

decision." (R. 456.) The court's judgment entry references Civ.R. 53 and indicates timely 

objections would be considered. 

{¶ 9} The magistrate's decision and the judgment entry adopting the decision 

were mailed to appellant at "PO Box 2482, Marion, OH 43301-2482." (R. 458.) On 

February 3, 2014, the envelope was returned to the clerk of courts marked "undeliverable 

as addressed-no forwarding order on file" and "box closed-unable to forward." (R. 458.) 

The clerk attempted service a second time on February 4, 2014 by mailing the orders to 

appellant at "2230 Mary Lane, Claridon, OH 43302." There is no indication service at 

that address failed. No objections to the magistrate's decision were filed. 

{¶ 10} On March 3, 2014, appellant filed a notice of appeal referencing the 

December 27, 2013 judgment entry. At the same time, appellant filed an affidavit of 

indigency and a financial disclosure form indicating her address was "2230 Mary Lane, 

Marion, OH 43302." Appellant also requested that a transcript of the hearing before the 

magistrate be prepared and filed. The transcript was filed with the trial court on 

March 28, 2014. 
No. 14AP-175 5 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 11} Appellant presents us with the following six assignments of error to review: 

I. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE['S] MOTION FOR 

REALLOCATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND 

RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO ORDER SANCTIONS 

AWARDING TO PLAINTIFF HER ATTORNEY FEE[']S. 

II. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN NOT OBTAINING THE 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE MINOR 

CHILDREN'S COUNSELING AND IN NOT CONSIDERING 

ALL RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING THE BEST 

INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN. 

III. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED BY REDUCING 

RETROACTIVELY DEFENDANT[']S CHILD SUPPORT 

WITHOUT CAUSE, WHICH IS NOT IN THE BEST 

INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILDREN. 

IV. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 

DEFENDANT ACCESS TO PLAINTIFF'S HOME DURING 

VISITATION, WHEN [TRIAL] COURT WAS AWARE OF 

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STALKING ISSUES 

WHICH CREATED FEAR AND CONCERNS OF SAFETY 

FOR PLAINTIFF. 

V. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED BY FINDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT IN CONTEMPT WHEN NO EVIDENCE WAS 

PRESENTED SHOWING APPELLANT OBSTRUCTED 

VISITATION, EXCEPT UNSUPPORTED ORAL TESTIMONY 

BY THE APPELLEE-DEFENDANT. 

VI. THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE 

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION BEFORE SUBMITTING IT TO 

JUDGE FOR FINAL ORDER. 

III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS 

{¶ 12} We first note appellant makes allegations in her briefs that fall outside the 

parameters of her assignments of error. For instance, appellant alleges, without 

explanation, that she was denied legal representation at the hearing before the magistrate 

and that her civil rights were violated. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(b), an appellate court 
No. 14AP-175 6 

must " 'determine [an] appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the 

briefs under App.R. 16.' Thus, this court rules on assignments of error only, and will not 

address mere arguments." Ellinger v. Ho, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1079, 2010-Ohio-553, 

¶ 70, quoting In re Estate of Taris, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1264, 2005-Ohio-1516, ¶ 5. 

Accordingly, we will address appellant's assignments of error only and disregard her 

extraneous allegations, which we note are not supported by the record properly before 

this court. See Bonn v. Bonn, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1047, 2013-Ohio-2313, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 13} Also, appellant did not file objections to the magistrate's decision. Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b)(iv) states: "[e]xcept for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error 

on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the 

party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)." 

Accordingly, we are limited to plain error review in this appeal. PHH Mtge. Corp. v. 

Santiago, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-562, 2012-Ohio-942, ¶ 8, citing In re G.S., 10th Dist. No. 

10AP-734, 2011-Ohio-2487, ¶ 6, and Nyamusevya v. Nkurunziza, 10th Dist. No. 11AP137, 2011-Ohio-5287, ¶ 9. The plain error doctrine only applies in the "extremely rare 

case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at 

the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 

judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process 

itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997), syllabus. 

{¶ 14} Finally, a transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate is part of the 

record on appeal; however, the transcript was not before the trial court when it adopted 

the magistrate's decision. "Appellate review is limited to the record as it existed at the 

time the trial court rendered its judgment." Franks v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-934, 

2012-Ohio-1920, ¶ 73, citing Wiltz v. Clark Schaefer Hackett & Co., 10th Dist. No. 11AP64, 2011-Ohio-5616, ¶ 13; Wallace v. Mantych Metalworking, 189 Ohio App.3d 25, 2010-

Ohio-3765, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). " 'A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, 

which was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the 

basis of the new matter.' " Id., quoting State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, we will not consider the transcript in ruling on 

appellant's assignments of error. " ' "When portions of the transcript necessary for 

resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing 
No. 14AP-175 7 

to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no choice but to presume 

the validity of the lower court's proceedings, and affirm." ' " Black v. Columbus Sports 

Network, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1025, 2014-Ohio-3607, ¶ 39, quoting Estate of 

Stepien v. Robinson, 11th Dist. No. 2013-L-001, 2013-Ohio-4306, ¶ 29, quoting Knapp v. 

Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

{¶ 15} We will address appellant's assignments of error out of order. Under 

appellant's sixth assignment of error, she argues the trial court erred by denying her an 

opportunity to object to the magistrate's decision before the trial court rendered judgment 

adopting the decision. We disagree. 

{¶ 16} Appellant does not put forth a structured argument in support of this 

assignment of error. She simply discusses the confusion regarding her mailing address, 

for which she blames appellee and, to a lesser degree, the trial court. Our review of the 

record indicates the trial court used at least eight different addresses for appellant 

throughout the life of this case, with varying results, and appellant never attempted to 

keep the trial court abreast of her correct mailing address. Appellant "bears the burden of 

formally notifying the court of a change of address; the clerk is not charged with the duty 

of perusing the record to ensure that a party's mailing address has not changed. This 

obligation applies equally to pro se litigants * * *. Given that informing the trial court of a 

new address is relatively simple, it follows that the burden of satisfying this requirement 

cannot be shifted to the opposing party or the trial court." (Internal quotations and 

citations omitted.) State ex rel. Halder v. Fuerst, 118 Ohio St.3d 142, 2008-Ohio-1968, 

¶ 6; Leader Ins. Co. v. Moncrief, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1289, 2006-Ohio-4232, ¶ 39. 

Appellant failed to keep the trial court informed of her correct address. Indeed, the 

address appellant used on the financial disclosure form she filed along with her notice of 

appeal is different than any address used in the other filings pertinent to this appeal. The 

burden of notifying the court of a change in address was appellant's alone. Thus, we 

observe no error stemming from the confusion regarding appellant's address. 

{¶ 17} Appellant also complains she was prevented from objecting since the trial 

court adopted the magistrate's decision the same day it was issued. Appellant is 

mistaken; the trial court's decision was rendered nine days later. Regardless, the trial 
No. 14AP-175 8 

court's orders directed appellant's attention to Civ.R. 53, her opportunity to object to the 

magistrate's decision, and the consequences of a failure to object. Additionally, the trial 

court's Loc.R. 9, which appellant cites in her assignment of error, directs appellant to 

Civ.R. 53 and her opportunity to object. See Loc.R. 9 of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations ("A decision of a Domestic Magistrate 

may be reviewed by the assigned Judge of this Court by filing an objection in accordance 

with Rule 53 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure."). Civ.R. 53 clearly communicates that 

objections are required in order to preserve issues for appeal (except for claims of plain 

error), and the rule does not require objections to be filed before the magistrate's decision 

is adopted by the trial court. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), (a)(iii), and (b)(i) ("A party may file 

written objections to a magistrate's decision within fourteen days of the filing of the 

decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day 

period.").

{¶ 18} We note, due to an initial failure of service, appellant did not receive the 

magistrate's decision and the trial court's judgment entry in a timely manner. Appellant 

does not dispute that she received the orders pursuant to the subsequent attempt at 

service. We have recognized, in the unusual circumstance that a magistrate's decision is 

served in an untimely manner, "Civ.R. 53(D)(5) provides that either party may, 'for good 

cause shown,' move the trial court to set aside the magistrate's decision or to extend the 

time for filing objections to the report." Watley v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 

06AP-1128, 2007-Ohio-1841, ¶ 10, citing the Staff Notes to Civ.R. 53(D)(5) (" ' "Good 

cause" would include the failure of a party to receive timely service of the magistrate's 

order or decision.' "). Appellant should have filed objections or moved the trial court for 

an extension of time to do so, pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(5), after receiving the magistrate's 

decision and the judgment entry adopting the decision. Id. at ¶ 12. Appellant was not 

denied her opportunity to object. Accordingly, appellant's sixth assignment of error is 

overruled.

{¶ 19} Under appellant's first assignment of error, she argues the trial court erred 

by denying her motion to dismiss appellee's motion to modify parental rights, and by 

denying her corresponding motion for an award of attorney fees. We disagree.
No. 14AP-175 9 

{¶ 20} Appellant's motion to dismiss was essentially a memorandum in opposition 

to appellee's motion to modify the parties' parental rights. Appellant's motion contains 

her version of the facts relating parenting time between appellee and their children. The 

magistrate held a three-day hearing on matters, including the motions at issue in this 

assignment of error, during which appellant and appellee both testified and presented 

evidence. The magistrate was in the best position to assess the credibility of both parties 

with regard to their version of the facts. Without the benefit of a transcript of the hearing, 

we must presume the validity of the proceedings below. Black at ¶ 39, citing Knapp at 

199. We can only review the magistrate's decision for plain error. In the decision, the 

magistrate commented, "[appellant's] testimony was less than credible." (Magistrate's 

Decision, 6.) Regarding appellant's motion for an award of attorney fees, the magistrate 

noted, "[appellant] did not present any evidence to support her motion." (Magistrate's 

Decision, 9.) Under these circumstances, we find appellant's motions were properly 

denied. There is no plain error. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶ 21} Under appellant's second assignment of error, she argues the trial court 

erred by "not obtaining the recommendation regarding the minor children's counseling," 

and by not considering all the relevant factors in determining the best interest of the 

children. We disagree. 

{¶ 22} Appellant references the magistrate's September 24, 2013 order regarding 

counseling in support of this assignment of error. That order was issued on the final day 

of the hearing before the magistrate; therefore, the magistrate could not have considered 

a report or recommendation from a counselor the children may have seen pursuant to 

that order. Nothing in the record indicates that the parties complied with the order and 

took the children to counseling. Furthermore, the magistrate noted in her decision that 

neither party requested a psychological evaluation, and our review of the magistrate's 

decision does not reveal any unaddressed psychological concerns. This portion of 

appellant's assignment of error is without merit. Appellant's subsequent contention that 

the trial court erred in determining the best interest of the children is based on appellant's 

personal assessment of what is in the best interest of the children. She supports her 

position by referencing testimony allegedly given during the hearing before the 
No. 14AP-175 10 

magistrate; however, as we explained above, we cannot consider the transcript of the 

hearing. Our review of the magistrate's decision reveals the magistrate complied with the 

law in identifying and evaluating the factors pertinent to determining the children's best 

interest. We find no plain error. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶ 23} Under appellant's third assignment of error, she argues the trial court erred 

by reducing appellee's child support obligation without cause and against the best interest 

of the children. We disagree. 

{¶ 24} Appellant does not present any argument specific to the magistrate's 

modification of child support. Appellant certainly has not identified plain error on the 

face of the magistrate's decision that undermines the "basic fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial process." Goldfuss at syllabus; see PHH Mtge. Corp. at ¶ 10. 

Our review of the magistrate's decision reveals an analysis of the parties' financial 

situations as reflected on a child support worksheet. The magistrate found the "child 

support per the worksheet is appropriate and in the best interests of the minor children." 

(Magistrate's Decision, 9.) We cannot review the worksheet itself because it is an exhibit 

filed along with the transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate. We find no plain 

error in the magistrate's decision regarding child support. Accordingly, appellant's third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 25} Under appellant's fourth assignment of error, she argues the trial court 

erred by granting appellee access to her home during visitation, although the court was 

aware of domestic violence and stalking issues that created fear and concern for 

appellant's safety. We disagree. 

{¶ 26} The trial court did not grant appellee access to appellant's home. The 

magistrate's decision mandates that all child exchanges are to be "curb side," and neither 

party is to exit his or her vehicle during the exchanges. (Magistrate's Decision, 12.) 

Although appellant alleges the trial court was aware of domestic violence and stalking 

issues, the magistrate's decision does not reflect that appellant brought concerns about 

her safety to the magistrate's attention, and without the benefit of a transcript, we must 

presume the validity of the magistrate's proceedings. We find no plain error. Accordingly, 

appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled. 
No. 14AP-175 11 

{¶ 27} Under appellant's fifth assignment of error, she argues the trial court erred 

by finding her in contempt "when no evidence was presented showing appellant 

obstructed visitation, except unsupported oral testimony by the appellee." We disagree. 

{¶ 28} Appellant's assertion is contradicted by the record. The magistrate found 

appellant in contempt based on her own admissions that she withheld parenting time, 

and her failure to establish a viable defense to her actions. Appellant places blame on 

appellee, claiming he did not fulfill his obligations with regard to parenting time. 

However, to the extent there was competing testimony on the issue at the hearing, the 

magistrate was in the best position to assess the parties' credibility. We cannot review the 

transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate, and we presume the validity of those 

proceedings. Black at ¶ 39, citing Knapp at 199. Appellant has not identified plain error 

in the magistrate's decision, and we find none. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment 

of error is overruled. 

V. APPELLANT'S PENDING MOTION TO STAY 

{¶ 29} On August 6, 2014, appellant moved this court to stay the trial court's 

orders underlying this appeal. In her motion, appellant alleges a number of errors by the 

trial court, which have either been considered above, or should have been included in 

appellant's assignments of error in order to be properly considered. Having overruled all 

of appellant's assignments of error, the basis for appellant's motion is eliminated. 

Accordingly, the motion is denied. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's six assignments of error are 

overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of 

Domestic Relations, is affirmed. 

Motion denied; 

judgment affirmed. 

SADLER, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.