Opinion issued January 12, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00135-CR

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PETE RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1389063

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Pete Rodriguez guilty of the offense of indecency with a child 

and the trial court assessed his punishment at 10 years’ confinement. Rodriguez

seeks reversal of his conviction, contending that his lawyer provided ineffective 

assistance by incorrectly advising him that he was not eligible for community 
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supervision in lieu of confinement and that the trial court also erred in incorrectly 

admonishing him that he was not eligible for community supervision. Because we 

conclude that his lawyer and the trial court correctly informed Rodriguez that he was 

not eligible for community supervision, we affirm.

Background

A grand jury indicted Rodriguez for one count of indecency with a child, his 

daughter. The indictment stated that the offense occurred in November 2012. The 

trial court admonished him that he would not be eligible for community supervision

if convicted, because the child was younger than 14 at the time of the alleged offense. 

Rodriguez pleaded not guilty.

At trial, the uncontroverted evidence showed that the complainant was born 

in May 1999. But proof of the date on which the offense allegedly occurred was less 

precise. The complainant testified that Rodriguez repeatedly touched her in a sexual 

manner over several years’ time. She said that the last incident, the one for which 

Rodriguez was indicted, occurred during her final visit with him in November 2012.

However, other evidence at trial indicated that the complainant may have visited 

Rodriguez in December 2012. In particular, the complainant’s medical records 

reflect that the date of the suspected abuse was the weekend of December 1, 2012, 

and the last possible occurrence was on December 2, 2012. Regardless of whether 
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the child last visited Rodriguez in November or December of 2012, the undisputed 

evidence at trial was that the complainant did not see Rodriguez again until the trial.

In closing, Rodriguez’s lawyer argued that the complainant’s uncertainty 

about the date on which the offense allegedly took place and other inconsistencies 

created reasonable doubt. But the defense did not contend that there was any 

question as to the complainant’s age on the date of the alleged offense. Nor did the 

defense request that the jury be instructed to make a finding as to whether she was 

younger than 14 at the time.

In accord with the indictment, the jury instructions stated that the charged 

offense allegedly occurred on or about a particular date in November 2012. But the 

instructions went on to advise that the State was not bound by the date specified in 

the indictment. After the jury rendered a verdict of guilty, Rodriguez elected to have 

the court assess his punishment. The court assessed his punishment at 10 years’ 

confinement.

Rodriguez moved for a new trial. In relevant part, he asserted that his trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by incorrectly advising him that he was not 

eligible for community supervision, failing to file a motion for community 

supervision in lieu of confinement, and not requesting a jury finding on whether the 

complainant was younger than 14 on the date of the offense. The trial court denied 

the motion.
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Discussion

On appeal, Rodriguez contends that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance 

by incorrectly advising him that he was not eligible for community supervision. He 

likewise contends that the trial court committed reversible error by incorrectly 

admonishing him that he was not eligible for community supervision. He maintains 

he would have been eligible for community supervision if the jury believed the 

complainant was not younger than 14 on the date of the offense, but elected to go to 

the court—which could not place him on community supervision—for punishment 

based on the mistaken information he received from the trial court and counsel.

The State disagrees. It maintains that the uncontroverted evidence at trial 

established that the offense charged in the indictment took place before the 

complainant’s fourteenth birthday. Therefore, the State contends, the evidence 

conclusively establishes that Rodriguez was not eligible for community supervision.

A. Eligibility for Community Supervision

Indecency with a child younger than 17 years old is a felony. TEX. PENAL 

CODE § 21.11 (West 2011). If the child is younger than 14 years old, a defendant 

who is guilty of this offense is categorically ineligible for community supervision.

TEX.CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42.12(3g)(a)(C), (4)(d)(5) (West Supp. 2015). If the child 

is 14 years old or older, the defendant is eligible for community supervision. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42.12(4)(d)(5) (West Supp. 2015). But a trial court can assess 
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community supervision in lieu of confinement as punishment for this offense only 

upon the recommendation of a jury. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42.12(3g)(a)(C), (4)

(West Supp. 2015). Thus, a defendant guilty of indecency with a child who may be 

eligible for community supervision based on the age of the child must elect to have 

a jury assess his punishment to pursue this possibility. See id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must establish two 

things. First, he must show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient by proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence that it objectively fell below professional 

standards. Starz v. State, 309 S.W.3d 110, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2009, pet. ref’d) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984)). Second, 

the defendant must show that in reasonable probability the result of the proceeding

would have differed but for this deficiency. Id.

When, as here, the defendant moved for new trial on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and the trial court denied the motion, we analyze the 

ineffective-assistance claim as a challenge to the denial of the motion for new trial.

Starz, 309 S.W.3d at 118. Thus, we review it for abuse of discretion, and reverse 

only if the trial court’s decision is arbitrary or unreasonable when viewed in the light 

most favorable to its ruling. Id.
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The success of Rodriguez’s ineffective-assistance claim depends on whether 

the evidence at trial would have allowed the jury to rationally conclude that the 

charged offense occurred on or after the complainant’s fourteenth birthday. If so, 

then contrary to his counsel’s advice, the jury could have recommended that 

confinement be suspended in favor of community supervision. See TEX.CODE CRIM.

PRO. art. 42.12(4)(d)(5) (West Supp. 2015). If not, then Rodriguez was not eligible 

for community supervision. Id. And, if he was not in fact eligible for community 

supervision, his counsel’s advice to this effect was not deficient.

At trial, the parties disputed the last date on which Rodriguez had contact with 

the complainant. But this dispute concerned whether their last date of contact was

in November or December of 2012. Whichever may have been the case, it is 

undisputed that they did not see one another again until trial. It likewise is

undisputed that the complainant was born in May 1999. Therefore, regardless of 

whether the complainant last saw Rodriguez in November or December of 2012, any 

alleged criminal conduct necessarily took place before her fourteenth birthday, 

which was in May 2013.

Because the evidence the jury heard established without contradiction that 

Rodriguez last saw the complainant when she was 13 years old and had no contact 

with her afterward, the jury could not have concluded that the charged offense 

occurred after the complainant’s fourteenth birthday. It therefore could not have 
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recommended that Rodriguez be placed on community supervision in lieu of 

confinement. Rodriguez’s counsel, therefore, was not deficient in failing to advise 

Rodriguez of the possibility of community supervision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 

42.12(4)(d)(5) (West Supp. 2015). Because Rodriguez failed to satisfy Strickland’s 

first prong, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion 

for new trial premised on ineffective assistance.

C. Trial Court’s Admonishment

Rodriguez’s second issue, in which he contends the trial court made a 

structural error in incorrectly admonishing him that he was not eligible for 

community supervision, rests on the same premises as his ineffective-assistance 

claim. Our conclusion that the evidence at trial conclusively proved that the 

complainant was less than fourteen years old years old at the time of the charged 

offense establishes that the trial court’s admonishment was correct and, therefore, 

disposes of Rodriguez’s second issue. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 189 S.W.3d 822, 

824 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (overruling point of error that 

was based on mistaken premise).

Conclusion

We conclude that Rodriguez’s trial counsel and the trial court correctly 

informed Rodriguez that he was not eligible for community supervision. We 

therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
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Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).