Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A04-1608-CR-1852 | January 25, 2018 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew L. Teel

Haller & Colvin, P.C.

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry Allen 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ricky L. Williford,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 25, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

17A04-1608-CR-1852

Appeal from the DeKalb Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

17D01-1504-F2-1 

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Ricky L. Williford (“Williford”) appeals his conviction for Level 2 felony 

possession of a destructive device or explosive with intent to kill, injure, 

intimidate, or to destroy property (“possession of a destructive device”)1 and his 

status as an habitual offender.

2

 On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court 

abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial on his possession 

of a destructive device conviction because, during the habitual offender phase of 

his trial, a juror impeached the possession of a destructive device verdict; (2) the 

trial court erred when it impaneled a new jury to hear the habitual offender 

phase of his trial after the first jury could not reach a determination; and (3) 

there was insufficient evidence to support his possession of a destructive device 

conviction. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

or err and because there was sufficient evidence, we affirm Williford’s 

conviction.

[2] We affirm. 

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

Williford’s motion for a mistrial after the first phase of his trial.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it impaneled a new jury to

hear the habitual offender phase of Williford’s trial.

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-47.5-5-8. 

2

I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
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3. Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to convict

Williford of Level 2 felony possession of a destructive device.

Facts

[3] At some point in 2014, Williford began to believe that Joshua Rupert 

(“Rupert”), whom he had known for “quite a few years,” owed him four 

hundred dollars. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 163). Rupert disputed the debt, so he did not 

pay Williford the money. As a result, Williford began sending Rupert 

threatening text messages and making threatening calls, demanding the money. 

[4] One day in late September or early October 2014, Williford came to the garage 

where Rupert worked on vehicles in Auburn, Indiana and “beat[]” on the door 

demanding to be let in. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 166). When Rupert answered the door, 

Williford pushed him backwards, pulled out a gun, and began “ranting and 

raving” that Rupert owed him money. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 166). He fired a round 

from the gun and threatened to shoot Rupert’s dog if Rupert did not pay him 

back by the end of the week. Williford then tipped over a display case and ran 

out the garage door. Later, Williford sent Rupert a text asking if he “had the 

money yet,” and Rupert told him that he did not. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 168).

[5] On the night of October 13, 2014 and into early morning of October 14, 

Williford spent time hanging out with his friends Doug Bishop (“Bishop”) and 

Ryan Likens (“Likens”). Around 5:00 a.m. on October 14, Bishop and 

Williford drove Likens home so that he could go to work. After dropping off 

Likens, they drove by Rupert’s garage and noticed that his light was on. 
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Williford directed Bishop, who was driving, to “keep going and turn down 

Indiana South.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 107). Bishop continued to drive down a couple 

more streets and then parked in a cul-de-sac. At that point, Williford “jumped 

out and took off,” carrying a bag and heading “north towards Rupert’s 

[house].” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 107). Bishop sat in his van “wondering what [was] 

going on,” and a couple of minutes later he heard a “pretty good size[d]” 

explosion. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 108). After that, Williford came back, running and 

“out of wind.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 108). He told Bishop to take off, so they drove 

away from the cul-de-sac.

[6] Williford told Bishop where to drive, and they eventually turned onto Eighth 

Street in Auburn. There, Williford asked Bishop to pull over. He took off his 

shoes and discarded them in a trash bin on Eighth Street. Bishop asked him 

why he had done that, and Williford said that “he just wanted to get rid of 

them.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 111). Williford then pulled another pair of shoes out of 

the bag he had taken with him when he had left the van and put those shoes on. 

[7] In the meantime, at around 5:45 to 5:50 a.m., an explosion had occurred in 

Rupert’s truck, which was parked outside of his garage. Detective Richard 

Page (“Detective Page”), a detective and bomb technician with the Fort Wayne 

Police Department, responded to the scene. In the truck, he discovered a blue 

cooler with damage indicating that it had contained an explosive device. The

lid of the cooler was gone, and its zipper was torn apart. As a result of the 

explosion, the door and roof of the truck had “buckled outward.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 

216). The windshield and rear window of the truck were missing, and there 
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were “little dents” in the top of the truck and in the seat, which were consistent 

with damage from BBs or fragments that would have been inside of the device 

when it exploded. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 217). There were BBs and debris in the truck 

and on the asphalt next to the truck, and the truck’s windshield was found 

seventy feet to the north. 

[8] Based on the evidence at the scene, Detective Page determined that the 

explosive device had been a “low explosive”— an explosive made from “things 

you can buy off the shelf” that “detonate at a rate slower than thirty-three 

hundred feet per second.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 226). He estimated that the device had 

been made of at least six to ten grams of flash powder, a mix of chemicals used 

mostly in the pyrotechnics industry.

[9] Investigators interviewed Bishop several times after the explosion and learned 

about his activities with Williford on the morning of October 14, although 

Bishop gave differing accounts about their activities. The investigators also 

found shoes matching the description of Williford’s shoes in a trash bin on 

Eighth Street. 

[10] On April 7, 2015, the State charged Williford with Level 2 felony possession of 

a destructive device and with being an habitual offender.3 The trial court held a 

jury trial from May 10-12, 2016. At trial, Bishop testified to his activities with 

 

3 The State also charged Williford with a second count of Class A felony possession of a destructive device 

based on a separate incident regarding an explosive device. However, because the jury found Williford not 

guilty of that charge, we have not included the facts or charging information for that incident here.
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Williford, as described above, on the morning that Rupert’s truck had exploded. 

On cross-examination, he admitted that this account of events did not match 

previous accounts he had given to the police. Bishop explained that he had 

previously “not wanted to say anything at first” because he had been “freaked 

out” and “trying to protect [himself]” and “everybody else involved.” (Tr. Vol. 

1 at 125-26). 

[11] Also during Bishop’s testimony, the State admitted a recording and transcript of 

a phone call that Williford had made from jail to Bishop. During the call, the 

following exchange occurred:

Williford: Hey, did they ahh get ahold of you and harass you a 

bit?

Bishop: Yeh.

Williford: Yeh. What ja tell them? What’d they say?

Bishop: Aw they were just – I don’t know man. They already 

knew everything.

Williford: Like what?

Bishop: About me and, it was strange.

Williford: About what?

Bishop: About me.

Williford: What do you mean about you?

Bish[op]: They were just – I don’t know – they were really 

strange about what they were saying.

Williford: They were trying to lead you on bro.
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Bishop: Yep.

Williford: They were fishing.

Bishop: That’s what I figured.

Williford: [T]hey were fishing.

Bishop: Ri-right.

Williford: Hey remember that day in the van? I told – hey – You 

said, uh – you said “To the grave, beserk?”

Bishop: Right.

Williford: Hey, tha-that’s how it is bro. There ain’t nothing but 

you and me.

Bishop: Right.

(State’s Ex. 11) (Misspellings and improper grammar in original). Bishop 

testified that Bezerk had been a best friend of his. He explained that, during the 

conversation in the van mentioned in the phone call, he had told Williford that

“they could take it to the grave like [he] and Bezerk did.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 122). 

However, he did not clarify what he had told Williford that they could take to 

the grave.

[12] Cari Ann Day (“Day”), a woman who lived on Seventh Street in Auburn, also 

testified. She said that the back of her house was on Eighth Street and that, on 

October 14, 2014, she had seen a suspicious van drive “really slow[ly]” up 

Eighth Street sometime between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. (Tr. Vol. 1 at 155). The 

van had stopped at the trash bins on the street, and the passenger had thrown a 

pair of shoes into the trash. Day testified that she had reported the incident 
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because, when she told her mother about it, her mother had told her it might be 

connected to the truck explosion. When Williford asked Day on crossexamination whether she could narrow down the time frame for when she saw 

the van, she responded that her mother had been at work when she called her, 

so it must have been after 7:00 a.m. However, Day did not clarify how much 

time had elapsed after seeing the van before she had called her mom. 

[13] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Williford guilty of Level 2 felony 

possession of a destructive device. The trial court asked whether the State or 

Defense “wish[ed] to have the Jurors individually polled regarding the verdict,” 

and Williford’s counsel responded “No your Honor.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 85). 

[14] After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court proceeded to the second phase 

of the trial regarding Williford’s habitual offender allegation. During the jury 

deliberations on the habitual offender charge, the trial court received a note 

from a juror that said “I am feeling sicker and sicker. I cannot [] give him the 

Habitual Offender vote[,] so I need you to excuse me and use one of the 

alternates.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 94). The trial court questioned the juror outside of 

the presence of the rest of the jury, and she said that her blood pressure was 

“going higher” because she did not “like being the only one who d[id not] agree 

with everybody else.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 98). She further explained that she had 

gone along with the other jurors in finding Williford guilty of possession of a 

destructive device but could not “put him in the Habitual Offender class” 

because she did not “believe he was that bad.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 98, 99). She said 

she had had “some reasonable doubts” as to his guilt of the possession of a 
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destructive device but had concluded, after hearing Williford’s “intimidation”

in the jail phone call, that Williford “could be guilty of all the rest of it.” (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 99, 101). 

[15] After the trial court talked to the juror, Williford moved for a mistrial on the 

grounds that the juror had been coerced into agreeing to a guilty verdict on the 

underlying offense. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial as to phase 

one, but it found that there was a mistrial as a result of a hung jury with respect 

to the habitual offender phase. 

[16] Thereafter, on June 28, 2016, the trial court convened a second jury to hear the 

evidence regarding the habitual offender charge. During this second phase of 

the trial, the State introduced Williford’s judgment of conviction for his 2002 

Class B felony dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug conviction and the 

sentencing order for his 2007 Class C felony attempted robbery conviction. 

Detective John Phillip Snover of the Auburn Police Department also testified 

that Williford had been convicted of Level 2 felony possession of a destructive 

device in the instant cause on May 12, 2016. At the conclusion of the 

presentation of evidence, the jury found Williford to be an habitual offender.

[17] The trial court sentenced Williford to an executed term of twenty-five (25) years 

for his possession of a destructive device conviction. This sentence was 

enhanced by an additional ten (10) years for his habitual offender finding. The 

trial court also ordered Williford to serve this sentence consecutively to any 
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previously imposed sentences, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-five (35) 

years. Williford now appeals. 

Decision

[18] On appeal, Williford argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when 

it denied his motion for a mistrial; (2) the trial court erred when it impaneled a 

second jury to try his habitual offender allegation; and (3) there was insufficient 

evidence to prove that he possessed a destructive device. We will address each 

of these arguments in turn.

1. Motion for Mistrial

[19] As stated above, Williford moved for a mistrial during the second phase of his 

trial after a juror came forward and said that she had had “some reasonable 

doubts” as to his guilt of possession of a destructive device. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 99). 

He argued that the juror had impeached the jury’s verdict and that, accordingly, 

the trial court should have declared a mistrial as to the first phase of the trial. 

Because the trial court denied his motion, Williford now argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion.

[20] First, we note that “‘a mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when 

other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation.’” Isom v. State, 

31 N.E.3d 469, 481 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 

(Ind. 2001)), reh’g denied, cert. denied. Whether to grant or deny a motion for a 

mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will review the 

trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 480. “‘We accord great 
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deference to the trial court’s decision, as it is in the best position to gauge the 

circumstances and the probable impact on the jury.’” Phillips v. State, 22 N.E.3d 

749, 757-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Evans v. State, 855 N.E.2d 378, 386 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quote omitted)), trans. denied. In determining 

whether a mistrial is warranted, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant 

was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been 

subjected; the gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect 

on the jury’s decision. Id. at 758.

[21] It is a well-established rule in Indiana that a jury’s verdict may not be 

impeached by jurors who subsequently submit a contradictory affidavit or 

testimony. See Shaw v. State, 82 N.E.3d 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Our Indiana 

Supreme Court has explained the policy concerns behind this rule as follows:

If this Court were to permit individual jurors to make affidavits 

or give testimony disclosing the manner of deliberation in the 

jury room and their version of the reasons for rendering a 

particular verdict, there would be no reasonable end to litigation. 

Jurors would be harassed by both sides of litigation and find 

themselves in a contest of affidavits and counter-affidavits and 

arguments and rearguments as to why and how a certain verdict 

was reached. Such an unsettled state of affairs would be a 

disservice to the parties litigant and an unconscionable burden 

upon citizens who serve on juries.

Stinson v. State, 313 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 1974). 

[22] While Williford recognizes this precedent, he argues that the instant case is 

different because the juror in this case volunteered information impeaching her 
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verdict while the jury was still impaneled. He claims that “[p]ermitting a juror 

to change her mind while still empaneled [sic] is not meaningfully different 

from permitting a juror to change her mind during polling.” (Williford’s Br. 

27). We disagree. 

[23] In Ward v. St. Mary Medical Ctr. of Gary, 658 N.E.2d 893, 895 (Ind. 1995), our 

supreme court held that a jury’s verdict may not be impeached by the testimony 

of a juror, even when the testimony is voluntary and the jury is still impaneled. 

Williford asserts that this precedent does not apply because Ward was a civil 

case rather than a criminal case. However, in support of its determination that 

testimony while the jury is still impaneled may not impeach the verdict, the 

Ward Court cited Karlos v. State, 476 N.E.2d 819, 824 (Ind. 1985), a criminal 

case. Id. As a result, whether the case is criminal or civil, the general rule 

remains the same: a jury’s verdict cannot be impeached by the voluntary 

testimony of a juror, even when the jury is still impaneled. To create even a 

limited exception “would perpetuate unending litigation ‘where no jury verdict 

would ever be lasting or conclusive.’” Ward, 658 N.E.2d at 895 (internal 

quotation omitted). Accordingly, we decline to deviate from Ward based on the 

criminal context of the jury’s verdict. 

[24] Further, “permitting a juror to change her mind while still impaneled” here 

would not be, as Williford argues, equivalent to “permitting a juror to change 

her mind during polling.” (Williford’s Br. 27). The object of polling the jury is 

to “give the parties an opportunity to ascertain with certainty that a unanimous 

verdict has been reached before the verdict is recorded and the jury discharged.” 
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Jelks v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1171, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). If, during polling, 

any juror dissents from the verdict, the remedy is that “the jury shall be sent out 

to deliberate” again. I.C. § 34-36-1-9. See Jelks, 720 N.E.2d at 1173, 1174 

(noting that INDIANA CODE § 34-36-1-9 applies to criminal cases through 

INDIANA CODE § 35-35-2-2 and that “[t]he statute clearly provides that the 

remedy for juror dissent that arises during the polling procedure is to return the 

jury for deliberations . . .”). 

[25] Here, Williford rejected the opportunity to poll the jury, so the trial court 

moved on to the second phase of the trial. We have previously noted that 

“[o]ne of the purposes of bifurcation is to keep convictions away from the jury 

in their initial determination of guilt for the substantive crime charged.” Russell 

v. State, 997 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 2013). Accordingly, during the habitual 

offender phase of the trial, the jury members learned additional information 

about Williford’s past convictions that they did not know during their 

deliberation of his possession of a destructive device charge. Therefore, they 

could no longer be sent back to deliberate on the possession of a destructive 

device charge based on the same evidence that they had originally considered. 

[26] In light of these factors, we conclude that the juror could not later impeach the 

jury’s verdict, even though the jury was still impaneled. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williford’s motion for a mistrial. 

2. Habitual Offender Adjudication
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[27] Williford next argues that the trial court erred when it impaneled a second jury 

to try the habitual offender charge after the second phase of the first trial ended 

in a mistrial due to a hung jury. He asks us to interpret the relevant statutory 

provision, INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8(h), as requiring the same jury who heard 

the underlying offense phase of a trial to also hear the habitual offender phase. 

However, this argument directly contradicts our supreme court’s holding that 

INDIANA CODE § 35-50-2-8(h) permits the retrial by a second jury on a habitual 

offender charge when the first jury cannot reach a verdict. See Stewart v. State, 

688 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 1997). We decline Williford’s request to reevaluate this precedent.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[28] Finally, Williford argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for possession of a destructive device. Our standard of review for 

sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled. We consider only the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. 

State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or 

judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no 

reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may be 

reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.

[29] In order to convict Williford of possession of a destructive device, the State had 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he: “possesse[d]” a “destructive device 
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or explosive with the knowledge or intent that it [would] be used to kill, injure, 

or intimidate an individual or to destroy property.” I.C. § 35-47.5-5-8.

[30] Williford claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

because his conviction was based on Bishop’s testimony at trial, which was, 

according to Williford, incredibly dubious. In general, the uncorroborated 

testimony of one victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Holeton v. State, 853 

N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, the incredible dubiosity rule 

allows the appellate court to impinge upon the fact-finder’s assessment of 

witness credibility when the testimony at trial was “so contradictory that the 

verdict reached would be inherently improbable.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 

749, 751 (Ind. 2015). “For the incredible dubiosity rule to apply, the evidence 

presented must be so unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable 

person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.” Id. A 

court will impinge upon the jury’s duty to judge witness credibility only “‘where 

a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or 

the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the 

appellant’s guilt.’” Id. (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 

1994)) (emphasis added in Moore). 

[31] We conclude that the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here because 

Bishop was not the sole witness, and there was circumstantial evidence of 

Williford’s guilt. In addition to Bishop’s testimony, Rupert testified that 

Williford had previously threatened him in his garage, and there was evidence 

of a jail phone call in which Williford told Bishop to take it “[t]o the grave, 
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beserk.” (State’s Ex. 11). Day also corroborated Bishop’s testimony that 

Williford had dumped his shoes in the garbage can on Eighth Street after the 

explosion, and shoes matching the description of Williford’s shoes were found 

in the garbage bin.

4

 

[32] Based on these additional witnesses and evidence supporting Williford’s guilt, 

we conclude that the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply. As Williford 

does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we find that there 

was sufficient evidence to support Williford’s conviction.

[33] Affirmed. 

May, J., and Brown, J., concur. 

 

4 Williford claims that Day’s testimony did not corroborate Bishop’s testimony because too much time 

passed between the time when the explosion happened and the time when Day said Williford abandoned the 

shoes. However, Williford bases this argument on Day’s testimony that she called her mother to tell her 

about the van and that her mother was at work, which would have been after 7:00 a.m. This argument fails 

to account for the fact that Day did not clarify during her testimony how much time had passed after she saw 

the van on Eighth Street before she called her mother. Moreover, she testified that she saw the van between 

6:00 and 8:00 a.m., which was consistent with the timeline to which Bishop testified. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Day’s testimony did corroborate Bishop’s testimony.