FI L ED U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S EL EVENTHCI RCUI T J ULY 7, 2011 J OHN L EY CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 1 0- 12 93 1

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D. C. Dock etNo. 6 :0 6- cv -0 17 03 -PCF -KRS ALAN HO ROWITCH, Pl ai nt iff – Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us DIAMOND AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC., a fo rei gn co rp or at io n, Defen da nt– Ap pe ll an t.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt fo r th e Mi dd le Dis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ (Jul y 7, 2 01 1) Befo re CARNES, ANDERSON, an d F ARRIS , Cir cu itJu dg es . * ANDERSON, Circ ui t J ud ge : Inth is di ve rs ity

cas e, we cert ify fou r qu es ti on s t o t he Flo rid a Supr em e Co urt,

Honora ble J erome Fa

rris, United States Circuit J udg e for the Ninth Circuit, sitt ing * by designation.se ek in g g ui da nc e as to th e ap pl ic at io n o f Fl or id a’s of fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te , Fla
. St at . § 7 68 .79 , Flo rid a Ru le of C iv il Pro cedur e 1 .44 2, an d t he fee- sh ift in g pr ov is io n o f th e Fl or id a Dece pt iv e an d Un fai r Trad e Pra ct ic es Act (“ FDUTPA”), Fl a. St at . § 5 01 .21 05
. Fi rs t, we as k wh ethe r anoff er o f jud gm en t m ay

be vi ab le when itpu rp orts to se tt le “ al l cl ai m s,” e ve n tho ug h i t d oe s n otexpl ic it ly “ st at e whe th er the pro po sa l in cl ud es att orne y s’ fees an d wh ethe r at to rn ey s’ fees are p artof t he leg al cla im ” as requi redby Rul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F) . Seco nd , we askwhet he r th e o fferof ju dg m en t st atut e, whi ch ap pl ie s i n “ an y civ il act io n fo r da m ag es ” b utge ne ral ly doe s n ot ap pl y to a cas e se ek in g b ot h d am ag es an d n on -m on et ary rel ie f, ap pl ie s t o alaws ui t se ek in g d am ag es or, i n t he alt ern at iv e, sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce. Thi rd , we ask whe th er the FDUTPA’ s fe e-s hi fti ng pro vi si on ap pl ie s t o an a ct io n wi th th e fo ll owi ng pro cedur al hi st ory : the pl ai nt iff fil edanact io n a ll eg in g aFDUTPA cla im
an d p ro se cu te d t ha t cl ai m for sev enm on th s; th e d is tri ctco urt ru le d a t s umm ary jud gm en t tha t h e co ul d n otpurs ue th e FDUTPA cl ai m be cau se Flo rid a la w di d n ot ap pl y , bu t al lo wedhi m

to pro se cu te th e act io n u nd er Ari zo na ’s un fai r tr ad e pr act ic es law i ns te ad ; the n h e lo ston th e Ari zo naun fai r tr ad e p ract ic es cla im at tri al . Fin al ly, if t he FDUTPA’ s fe e-s hi fti ng pro vi si on do es ap pl y , we askwhet he r itap pl ie s o nl y

to fees in curreddurin g t he sev enm on th s b efo re the pl ai nt iff’s 2FDUTPA cla im was d efea te d a t s umm ary jud gm en t, o r al so to fees in cu rreddu rin g th e subs eque ntli ti ga ti on . W e certi fy

th es e que st io ns be cau se we are unabl e to fin d d efi ni ti ve an swe rs in cle arl y est ab li sh edFlo rid a la w as s etforth incas e la w or s ta tu te s. “ Whe re the re is do ub t i n t he in te rp ret at io n o f st at e law, a fed eral co urt m ay cert ify the qu es ti onto th e st at e supr em e co urt t o a vo idm ak in g u nn eces sa ry Erie g ue ss es an d t o o fferth e st at e co urt the op po rtu ni ty to i nt erp retor c ha ng e ex is ti ng law.” Au to -Owne rs Ins . Co . v. So ut he as t Fl oa ti ng Dock s, In c., 63 2 F .3d11 95 , 11 97 (11 th Cir . 20 11 ) (quo ti ng Tob in v. Mi ch . Mu t. In s. Co ., 39 8 F .3d12 67 , 12 74 (11 thCir . 20 05 ) (p er cu ria m)). I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Pla in ti ff, Alan Ho ro wit ch , su edth e Defen da nt , Diam on d Ai rcra ft In du strie s (“ Diam on d” ), al le gi ng th athe ha d aco ntractua l ri gh t t o p ur ch as e a D-J et ai rcra ft f or $8 50 ,00 0 b utth atDiam on d re fu se d t o s el l the air craf t fo r le ss th an $1 ,38 0,0 00 . In h is am en de d c om pl ai nt , Horo wit chass ert edfou r sp eci fic cla im s ari si ng ou t o f th is pri ci ng di sp ut e: (1) sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce; an d, i n t he alt ern at iv e, (2 ) br each of c on tra ct ; (3 ) br each of t he co ve nant s o f go odfai th an d fa ir d eal in g;

3an d (4 ) de cep ti ve tra de pra ct ic es . Not ab ly, al l the se cla im s s eekda m ag es ; ev en 1 th e sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce co un t i nc lu de s a d em an d fo r no t o nl y sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce, b utals o “ da m ag es , cos ts of t hi s ac ti on , in te res t, an d s uc h o th er re li ef
as th is Co urt d eem s ju stan d p ro pe r.” Am en de d C om pl ai ntat 8 , Horo wit ch v. Diam on d Ai rcra ft I ndus ., Inc ., No. 6: 06 -cv -0 17 03 -PCF -KRS (M .D. Fla. May 27 , 20 10 ). Whi le th e d ecep ti ve tra de pra ct ic es cla im was n otcap ti on edas aFDUTPA cl ai m , itis cle ar tha t Ho ro wit ch pu rs ue d i t as a FDUTPA cla im forth e fo ll owi ng reas on s: (1) th e co un t i ts el f in vo ke d, b y sec ti on nu m

be r of th e Fl or id a St atut es , th e de fin it io ns for“ co ns um er” and“ co ns um er tran sa ct io n” fro m th e FDUTPA; (2 ) th e co un t d em an de d a tt orne y ’s fees , as a ll owe d u nd er the FDUTPA bu t n otun de r Ariz on a law, where as no othe r co un t d em an de d a tt orne y ’s fees ; an d (3 ) Hor owi tc h de sc rib edhi s o wn cl ai m

as aFDUTPA cla im

inhi s re sp on se to Diam on d’s m ot io n to di sm is s. Diam on d m ov edto di sm is s t he FDUTPA cla im , arg ui ng th atth e FDUTPA
We construe the a

mended c omplaint to have alleg ed the spe cific pe rfor mance 1 claim as be ing in the a lternative to the thre e cla ims for money damag es. Even though the complaint is more explicit i n this reg ard w ith respec t to the brea ch of c ontrac t claim, the same intent is amply

evident in light of

the same da

mag e alleg ations in the other two cla ims. Moreove r, this rea ding is c onfirmed be cause Diamond asser ts it on appeal, and H orowitch doe s not contest it. Thus, for purpose s of this case, it is established that Plaintiff’s spec ific perf ormanc e cla im is onl y

in the alternative to the damag es cla im, not in additi on there to.

4di d n otap pl y , andth atAriz on a unf ai r tr ad e p ract ic es law ap pl ie d i ns te ad , bec au se Hor owi tc h was anAriz on a res id en t, Di am on d was a co rp or at io n wi th it s p rin ci pa l pl ace o f bu si ne ss inOnt ari o, Ca na da , andth e tr an sa ct io ns inqu es ti on to okpl ace ou ts id e Fl or id a. Horo wit ch res is te d t hi s m ot io n a ndth e co urt u lt im at el y de ni edth e m ot io n, s ta ti ng th atitco ul d n otm ak e a ru li ng be fo re re cei vi ng ev id en ce t o es tabl is h wh ere t he ev en ts inth e co m pl ai ntha d t ak enpl ace. Atth e sa m e ti m e, Hor owi tc h re qu es te d t ha t h e b e al lo wedto pu rs ue th e u nf ai r tr ad e p ract ic es cla im
un de r th e Ari zo naCo ns um er FraudAct i f he co ul d n otpro ceedun de r th e FDUTPA. Bo th pa rti es th enfil edforsu m m ary jud gm en t an d t he co urt en te redsu m m ary jud gm en t ag ai ns t Ho ro wit ch on all cla im s ex cep t o n the un fai r tr ad e p ract ic es cl ai m . W it h re sp ectto th e unf ai r tr ad e p ract ic es cla im , th e co urt h el d t ha t Ari zo na la w app li edan d t ha t Ho ro wit ch no lo ng er co ul d p ur su e th e FDUTPA cl ai m . It al lo wedhi m

to pro ceed , in st ead , with t he Ariz on a Co ns um er FraudAct cl ai m as h e ha d re qu es te d. Aft er a b en chtri al , th e co urt u lt im at el y en te redjud gm en t i n fa vo r of Diam on d. Diam on d the n m ov edto reco ve r it s at to rn ey ’s fees an d c os ts on th e b as is of ei th er o f two Flo rid a st atut es . Firs t, i t cl ai m edatt orne y ’s fees un de r th e FDUTPA, arg ui ng th ata pr ev ai li ng pa rty in aFDUTPA su itis en ti tl edto fees reg ard le ss of 5th e rea so n t ha t the FDUTPA is fou ndno t t o app ly. Seco nd , itcla im edatt orne y ’s

fees un de r Fl or id a’s of

fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te aft er fi li ng with t he co urt an off er o f jud gm en t tha t Ho ro wit ch ha d re fu se d. Di am on d h adoff ered$4 0,0 00 “ to res ol ve al l cl ai m s t ha t wer e o r co ul d h av e b een ass ert edby Plai nt iff ag ai ns t Di am on d Airc raftinth e Am en de d C om pl ai nt .” It i s i m

po rta ntto no te , forpu rp os es of t he requi rem en ts of t he off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te , di sc us se d i n g reat er d et ai l b el ow, tha t Diam on d h adm ad e th is off er o f jud gm en t wh il e th e sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce cl ai m was st il l p en di ng , andth atth e o fferin cl ud edne it he r a certi fic at e o f se rv ic e, a sp eci fic st at em en t tha t at to rn ey ’s fees were i nc lu de d, n ora sp eci fic at io n o f whe th er at to rn ey ’s fees were p artof Ho ro wit ch ’s leg al cla im
. The di stric t co urt awa rd edno fees un de r ei th er s ta tu te . It awar de d n o fe es un de r th e FDUTPA be cau se itfou ndth atth e FDUTPA di d n otap pl y an d,
m or eo ve r, be cau se th e ap pl ic ab le Ariz on a u nf ai r tr ad e p ract ic es law p ro vi de d n o at to rn ey ’s fees . It awar de d n o fe es un de r th e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te be cau se it fo un d tha t a s ui t fo r bo th da m ag es an d n on -m on et ary rel ie f—s uc h a s s pe ci fic pe rfo rm an ce— di d n otfal l u nd er the st atut e. Diam on d n ow ap pe al s b oth t he FDUTPA andoff

er o f jud gm en t ru li ng s. II. THE E RIE FRAM EW ORK As a fe de ral co urt s it ti ng in di ve rs it y juri sd ic ti on , we app ly the subs ta nt iv e 6la w of t he forum st at e, inth is cas e Fl or id a, al on gs id e fed eral pro cedur al law. Eri e R.R. Co . v. Tompki ns , 30 4 U.S. 6 4, 5 8 S . Ct. 8 17 , 82 L. Ed. 11 88 (19 38 ); B ur ge r Kin g C or p. v . E-Z Eatin g, 4 1 C or

p., 5 72 F.3d13 06 , 13 13 n.9 (11 th Cir . 20 09 ). Und er thi s fr am ewo rk , th e d is pu te d p ro vi si on s o f Fl or id a law—Fl or id a’s of fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te ; Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F); Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (G); an d t he FDUTPA and it s fe e-s hi fti ng pro vi si on—ap pl y on ly if th ey

are s ub st an ti ve forErie p ur po se s. Acco rd in gl y , we m

us t d et erm in e th e Erie st atus of the se pro vi si on s b efo re ap pl y in g th em to th e cas e atha nd
. W e m ak e th is de te rm in at io n u si ng two tes ts . If th e Fl or id a la w is inco nf li ct with aFed eral Ru le of C iv il Pro cedur e, th enwe ap pl y th e te stsetforth by H an nav. Pl um er, 3 80 U.S. 46 0, 8 5 S . Ct. 1 13 6, 1 4 L. Ed. 2 d 8 (19 65 ), un de r whi ch we fo ll ow t he fed eral rul e so lo ng as i t i s v al idun de r th e Co ns ti tu ti on an d t he Ru le s Enabl in g Act . Id., 3 80 U.S. at 4 72 -7 4, 8 5 S . Ct. at11 44 -4 5. If n o fe de ral st atut e o r Fed eral Ru le is on po in t, the n we i ns te adap pl y th e “ ou tc om e d et erm in at iv e te st ”
se t fo rth by E rie an d i ts pro ge ny, und er wh ic h we app ly the Flo rid a la w if i ts ap pl ic at io n wo ul d b e so im po rtantto th e o ut co m e “ th atfai lu re t o app ly it wo ul d
un fai rly dis cri m in at e ag ai ns t ci ti zen s o f th e fo ru m Sta te , or b e li ke ly to caus e a pl ai nt iff to ch oo se th e fed eral co urt.” Es fel d v . Cos taCro ci ere, S.P.A., 2 89 F.3d 13 00 , 13 07 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ) (quo ti ng Gasp eri ni v. Ct r. fo r Hum an it ie s, In c., 51 8 7U.S. 41 5, 4 28 , 11 6 S . Ct. 2 21 1, 2 22 0, 1 35 L. Ed. 2d65 9 (1 99 6) ).

“ Thi s ci rcu itha s fo un d [F la . Sta t.] § 7 68 .79 ”—wh ic h i s t he off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te —“ to be subs ta nt iv e la w forErie p ur po se s.” J on es v. Un it ed Sp ace Al li an ce, L.L.C., 49 4 F .3d13 06 , 13 09 (11 thCir . 20 07 ). “ Und er the pri or pa ne l p rece de ntrul e, we are b ou ndby earli er p an el ho ld in gs . . . un le ss an d u nt il th ey are o ve rru le d e n b an c o r by the Supr em e Co urt.” Un it edSta te s v . Sm it h, 1 22 F.3 d 1 35 5, 1 35 9 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 7) . Accor di ng ly, we co nc lu de th atth e o fferof jud gm en t s ta tu te is subs tant iv e as a m at te r of th is Co urt’s p rece de nt . W e al so co nc lu de th atFlo rid a Ru le of C iv il Pro cedur e 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F)—whi ch requi res anoff er o f jud gm en t t o “ st at e whe th er the pro po sa l in cl ud es att orne y ’s fees an d wh ethe r at to rn ey ’s fees are p artof t he leg al cla im ”—i s subs ta nt iv e as a m at te r of pre ced en t. “ [T]he h ol di ng of acas e is
. . . co m pr is ed bo th of t he res ul t o f th e cas e an d ‘th os e p orti on s o f th e o pi ni on ne ces sa ry to th at res ul t b y whi ch we are b ou nd .’ ” Uni te d S ta te s v . Kaley, 579 F.3d12 46 , 12 53 n.1 0 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 9) (qu ot in g S em in ol e Trib e o f Fl a. v. Fl or id a, 51 7 U.S. 4 4, 6 7, 1 16 S. Ct . 11 14 , 11 29 , 13 4 L. Ed. 2 d. 2 52 (19 96 )). Ina pr io r di ve rs ity cas e, McM ah anv. Tot o, 3 11 F.3d10 77 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ), th is Co urt’s ap pl ic at io n o f Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) was ne ces sa ry to th e res ul t o f th e cas e: th e Co urt awa rd edatt orne y ’s fees onth e b as is of t he off ero r’s co m

pl ia nc e with R

ul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F) as we ll as 8ot he r requi rem en ts of Rul e 1 .44 2 a ndth e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te . Id. at10 82 -8 3.

The Co urt co ul d app ly Rul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F) inth is m anne r on ly by im pl ic it ly ho ld in g t ha t thi s p ro vi si on ap pl ie d i n fe de ral co urt. Acco rd in gl y , Rul e 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) ap pl ie s i n fe de ral co urt as a m at te r of pre ced en t. Mo reo ve r, we wou ldco nc lu de th atRu le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) was subs ta nt iv e ev en if p rece de ntdi d n otrequi re thi s re su lt . W e wou ldap pl y th e o ut co m e d et erm in at iv e te st , des cri be d abo ve , bec au se th ere i s n o fe de ral st atut e o r Fed eral Ru le on po in t. Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) p res cri be s s pe ci fic , subs ta nt iv e te rm s t ha t an off er o f jud gm en t
m us t i nc lu de , andth es e te rm s m at te r to th e p art ie s b ecau se th e in cl us io n o r ex cl us io n o f at to rn ey ’s fees is m at eri al to anoff eree ’s abi li ty to ev al ua te anoff er. The ou tc om e d et erm in at iv e te sty ie ld s t he co nc lu si on th atitwou ldbe un fai r no t t o ap pl y th e ru le infed eral co urt, an d t ha t i t i s t he refo re s ub st an ti ve forErie p ur po se s. Howev er, we co nc lu de th atRu le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (G)—wh ic h re qu ire s an off er t o

“ in cl ud e a ce rti fic at e o f se rv ic e inth e fo rm requi redby rule 1.0 80 (f)” —i s pr oc edur al for

Erie p ur po se s an d t he refo re d oe s n otap pl y infed eral co urt. At t he
ou ts et , we no te th atFed eral Ru le of C iv il Pro cedur e 5 (d )(1 ) sp eci fie s t ha t “ [a]ny pape r aft er the co m

pl ai ntth atis requi redto be serve d—to ge th er wi th a cert ifi cat e of servi ce—m

us t b e fi le d wi th in a reas on ab le ti m e aft er s erv ic e.” Und er the Fed eral Ru le , a party needno t ce rti fy servi ce u nt il th e ti m e o f fi li ng , whi ch oc cu rs 9aft er s erv ic e to th e o th er p art ie s. By con tra st , Flo rid a co urts ha ve requi redst ric t,

te ch ni cal co m

pl ianc e wit h R

ul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(G), i nv al id at in g a n o fferun le ss it in cl ud es a cert ifi cat e o f se rv ic e atth e ti m e itis serve d o n a n o ffer ee. See Mi lt on v. Reyes, 22 So . 3d62 4 (F la . 3dDCA 20 09 ). Acco rd in gl y , th e Fl or id a ru le s re qu ire cert ifi cat io n a t the ti m e th e o ffer is ten de redev enth ou gh Flo rid a Ru le 1.4 42 (d ) sp eci fie s tha t the off

er “ sh al l n otbe fil ed ” atth atti m e. Inli gh t o f th e fo reg oi ng , we ap pl y th e Han nates t b ecau se a co nf li ctis ap pa ren t b etweenth e Fed eral Ru le s an d th e Fl or id a ru le : an off

er wo ul d b e v al idun de r th e Fed eral Ru le s ev enif i t d idno t in cl ud e a ce rti fic at e o f se rv ic e atth e ti m e o f se rv ic e o n t he op po si ng pa rty, whil e th e sa m e o fferwou ldbe in va li d u nd er Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (G). Cf. Han na , 38 0 U.S. 2 at47 0, 8 5 S . Ct. at11 43 (“ Here, o f co ur se , th e cl as h i s u na vo id ab le ; Ru le 4(d ) (1 )
sa y s— im pl ic it ly, bu t wi thun m is ta kabl e cl ari ty—th atin -h an d s erv ic e is no t requi redinfed eral co urts .”). Und er Han na , bec au se Fed eral Ru le 5(d )(1 ) co nf li ct s wi th Flo rid a Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (G), th e Fl or id a Ru le do es no t ap pl y infed eral co urt s o l on g a s t he Fed eral Ru le is va li d. We read il y co nc lu de th atRu le 5(d )(1 ) is va li d u nd er the Rule 68, which sets for

th a fe dera l mechanism for tendering a

n offe r of judgment, 2 further illustrate s the conflict be tween the two sets of proc edure s. L ike Rule 1.442, Rule 68 instructs the parties not to file a n offe r of judgment with the court at the time of servic e. B eca use Rule 68 does not require filing of the offe r at the time of se rvice , howeve r, neither Rule 5(d)(1) nor Rule 68 re quires the of fering pa rty to complete a c ertificate of ser vice at that time. 10Ru le s En ab li ng Act an d t he Co ns ti tu ti on , andwe th eref or e h ol d tha t Di am on d n eed
no t co m pl y with R ul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(G). Mo reo ve r, Horo wit ch ass ert s n o l ackof
co m pl ianc e wit h t he Fed eral Ru le s, an d n on e is ap pa ren t t o u s. Acco rd in gl y , Rul e 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (G) is no t ap pl ic ab le in th is cas e an d we c ert ify no qu es ti on s re la ti ng to th is pro vi si on to th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt. Fi na ll y , we con cl ud e th atth e FDUTPA an d i ts fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on are subs ta nt iv e fo r Erie pu rp os es . It i s p la in th atth e FDUTPA it se lf app li es infed eral
co urt, as subs ta nt iv e la w, bec au se itcrea te s a c au se of a ct io n. Fu rth erm or e, a st atut e al lo win g fo r th e rec ov ery of att orne y ’s fees , li ke th e FDUTPA fee- sh ift in g pr ov is io n a t i ss ue inth is cas e, ge ne ral ly app li es infed eral co urt s o l on g a s i t d oe s no t co nf li ctwith ava li d fe de ral st atut e o r ru le . See Alyesk a Pi pe li ne Serv . Co. v
. W il de rn es s So c’y , 42 1 U.S. 2 40 , 25 9 n .31 , 95 S. Ct. 1 61 2, 1 62 2 n .31 , 44 L. Ed. 2d 14 1 (1 97 5) (“ [I]n an ord in ary di ve rs it y cas e whe re the st at e la w do es no t ru n co un te r to a va li d fe de ral st atut e o r ru le of c ou rt, andus ua ll y itwil l n ot , st at e la w de nyin g t he rig htto att orne y ’s fees or g iv in g arig htth eret o, wh ic h re fle ct s a subs ta nt ia l p ol ic y

of t he st at e, sh ou ldbe fol lo wed .”) (al te rat io n i n o rig in al ); Sch il li ng v. Be lc he r, 58 2 F .2d99 5, 1 00 3 (5 th Cir . 19 78 ) (“ Bec au se th is is a di ve rs it y cas e, th e v al id ity

of t he fee awa rdm

us t b e te st edun de r Fl or id a la w.”). W e fi ndno co nf

li ctbe twee n t hi s fe e-s hi fti ng pro vi si on an d a ny fede ral law. 11Acco rd in gl y , we con cl ud e th atbo th th e FDUTPA an d i ts fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on are

subs ta nt iv e fo r Erie pu rp os es . III. QUESTIONS FOR CERTIF ICATION A. W as Diam on d’s o fferof ju dg m en t re nd eredno n- vi ab le by Rul e 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F)’s re qu ire m en t tha t an off er o f jud gm en t s pe ci fy

whet he r at to rn ey ’s fees are i nc lu de d a ndwhet he r at to rn ey ’s fees are p artof t he leg al cla im ? The is su e h ere i s wh ethe r Dia m on d’s o ffer of ju dg m en t, wh ic h was in te nd ed to “ res ol ve all cla im s” bu t m ad e n o m en ti on of a tt orne y ’s fees , was n on ethe le ss vi ab le . Rul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F) requi res anoff er o f jud gm en t t o st at e whe th er the pro po sa l i nc lu de s at to rn ey ’s fees an d wh ethe r at to rn ey ’s fees are p artof t he leg al cla im
. Fl a. R. Ci v. P. 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F)
. W e fac edth e sa m e is su e whe n we d eci de d M cMa ha n v . Tot o, 3 11 F.3d10 77 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 2) . In M cMa ha n, we h el d t ha t, wh enanoff er was m ad e to res ol ve

“ al l cl ai m s,” i t en co m

pa ss edth e p la in ti ffs ’ de m an d fo r at to rn ey ’s fees , des pi te th e factth atth e o fferdi d n otex pl ic it ly stat e whe th er the pro po sa l i nc lu de d a tt orne y ’s fees . Id. at10 82 . W e th eref or e reject edth e p la in ti ffs ’ cl ai m th atRu le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) b arre d t he ap pl ic at io n o f th e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te . Id. We fo un d s up po rt f

orth is co nc lu si on intwo earl ie r Fl or id a Ru le 1.4 42 cas es . Firs t,

12Uni care Heal th Faci li ti es Inc . v. Mo rt, 5 53 So . 2d15 9, 1 61 (Fl a. 19 89 ), he ldth ata

pl ai nt iff’s acce pt an ce o f anoff er o f jud gm en t m ad e p ur su an t t o R ul e 1 .44 2 t ha t
m ad e n o s pe ci fic m en ti on of a tt orne y ’s fees no ne th el es s p recl ud edth atpl ai nt iff fro m m ov in g fo r po st

jud gm en t at to rn ey ’s fees be cau se th os e cl ai m s wer e te rm in at ed . Seco nd , Geor ge v. No rth craf t 4 76 So . 2d75 8, 7 59 (Fl a. 5th DCA 19 85 ), he ldth atatt orne y ’s fees are “ en co m pa ss edinanoff

er o f jud gm en t m ad e pu rs ua ntto Ru le 1.4 42 whi ch fai ls to m en ti on th em sp eci fic al ly or res erv e th e ri gh t to see k t he m

lat er.” 3 W e al so fou ndsupp ort i n a n e arl ie r Fl or id a o pi ni on is su edou ts id e th e co nt ex t o f Ru le 1.4 42 . Libe rty Mutua l Fi re In su ran ce Co . v. Ramos, 5 65 So . 2d 79 8 (F la . 4th DCA 1 99 0) , hel d t ha t wh ere a n o fferdo es no t s pe ci fic al ly m en ti on at to rn ey ’s fees , itwil l b e rea d t o i nc lu de att orne y ’s fees be cau se to ho ldot he rwis e wou ldth wartth e p ol ic y

pu rp os es be hi nda se tt le m en t s ta tu te by notterm in at in g t he li ti ga ti on . Ourco nc lu si on inMcM ah anals o fi nd s s om e co nf irmatio n i n aFlo rid a cas e

It is important to note, howe ver, that Rule 1.442(c)( 2)(F ) wa s not introduced until 3 the Florida Supreme Court’s or der in In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedur e, 682 So. 2d 105, 124-26 (Fla . 1996), mea ning that Unicar e and G eorg e we re de cided unde r a diff ere nt version of Rule 1.442 with no explicit requirement that a party state whe ther attorney ’s fe es we re included. 13de ci de d a fte r McM ah an , Ben ne ttv. Am eri can Learn in g S y st em s o f Bo ca Del ray,

In c., 85 7 S o. 2 d 9 86 (Fl a. 4t h DCA 2 00 3) , whi ch sp eci fic al ly hel d tha t a s et tl em en t of fer n eedno t m en ti on att orne y ’s fees un de r Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F) i f no att orne y ’s fees are cl ai m edinth e co m pl ai nt . Howev er, Ben ne ttis di st in gu is habl e b ecau se th e pl ai nt iff s i n b ot h M cMa ha n a ndth e in st an t ca se ex pl ic it ly dem an de d a tt orne y ’s fees
. W e se ekgu id an ce fr om th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt o n t hi s i ss ue be cau se it
m ay be th at , des pi te ou r McM ah ande ci si on , a di ffer en t re su ltis in di cat edby Cam pb el l v . Gol dm an , 95 9 S o. 2 d 2 23 (Fl a. 20 07 ), whi ch stric tl y co ns tru edth e of fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te an d R ul e 1 .44 2 e ve n wi th res pe ctto purel y tec hn ic al
erro r. The C am

pb el l co urt was pre se nt edwith t he arg um en t tha t an off er o f jud gm en t was in va li d fo r fai lu re t o s pe ci fy th atth e o ffer

was b ei ng m ad e und er the of fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te . The Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt n ot edth atth e o fferof jud gm en t s ta tu te it se lf r equi res th ata se tt le m en t o ffer“ st at e th atitis be in g m ad e pu rs ua ntto th is sec ti on ,” Fl a. St at . § 7 68 .79 (2 )(c) , andth atRu le 1.4 42 (c)( 1) als o requi res th ata se tt le m en t o ffer“ sh al l i de nt ify the ap pl ic ab le Flo rid a la w un de r whi chitis be in g m ad e.” Cam pb el l, 9 59 So . 2dat 2 26 . Sig ni fic an tl y , th e fai lu re t o id en ti fy § 7 68 .79 was apu rel y

tec hn ic al erro r: a t the ti m e o f Cam pb el l, § 76 8.7 9

14was th e o nl y ap pl ic ab le off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te im pl em en te d b y

Ru le 1.4 42 , Cam pb el l, 9 59 So . 2dat 2 27 (Pari en te , J., co nc urrin g) ; the off er o f jud gm en t cl earl y st at edth atitwas b ei ng m ad e p ur su an t t o R ul e 1 .44 2, i d. at22 4 (maj
. op in io n) ; an d t he om is si oncrea te d n o a m bi gu it ie s, s ee i d. at22 7 (P ari en te , J.,
co nc urrin g) . It was cle ar tha t a t ech ni cal erro r of th is type wou ldno t p reju di ce the ot he r pa rty with res pe ctto it s ab il it y to ev al ua te th e te rm s o f th e o ffer . The Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt n on ethe le ss he ldth atfee-s hi fti ng was i n d ero ga ti on of the co m m on la w, th atbo th th e ru le an d s ta tu te m us t b e st ric tl y

co ns tru ed , andth atth e fai lu re o f th e o fferto id en ti fy

§ 7 68 .79 th eref

or e in va li da te d t he off

er. Id . at 2 27
. Cam pb el l d eal t wi th a requi rem en t tha t was pre se ntinbo th th e st atut e an d th e ru le . Accor di ng ly, itdo es no t d ire ct ly con tro l a s itua ti on li ke th e o ne inth e in st an t ca se , inwhi chth e requi rem en t i s p res en t o nl y inth e ru le . Howev er, Cam pb el l re li edup on two cas es th atrequi redst ric t co ns tru ct io n o f a requi rem en t pr es en t o nl y

inth e ru le ; the se cas es were al so de ci de d s ub se qu en t t o o urMcM ah an de ci si on . See Lam

b v . Mat et zs ch k, 9 06 So . 2d10 37 (Fl a. 20 05 ); Wil li s Sh aw Exp res s, In c. v. Hi lyer Sod , Inc ., 84 9 S o. 2 d 2 76 (Fl a. 20 03 ). Bo th Lam b and W il li s Sh aw he ldth atanoff er o f jud gm en t was in va li d fo r fai lu re t o s tri ct ly com pl y with R ul e 1 .44 2’s re qu ire m en t tha t a jo in t p ro po sa l “ st at e th e am ou ntan d t erm s
15at tri bu tabl e to each pa rty.” There i s n o c om pa rab le requi rem en t i n t he st atut e. The se cas es ap pe ar t o b e d is ti ng ui sh ab le fro m Cam pb el l an d t he in st an t ap pe al be cau se th e o m is si on inth es e cas es was n ota pu rel y tec hn ic al fai li ng —the at tri bu ti on of t he set tl em en t fu nd s m ay be m at eri al to th e p art ie s’ eva lu at io n o f th e se tt le m en t o ffer . See Lam b, 9 06 So . 2dat 1 04 0 (“ Each de fen dantsh ou ldbe ab le to se tt le th e su itkn owi ng th e ex te ntof h is or h er fi na nc ia l re sp on si bi li ty.”). Howev er, itis po ss ib le to readLam b a ndW il li s Sh aw as est ab li sh in g s tri ctco ns tru ct io n e ve n fo r requi rem en ts pre se nton ly in the rul e, an d t o re adCam pb el l as clarif

y in g t ha t th e st ric t co ns tru ct io n p rin ci pa l ex te nd s ev ento pu rel y tec hn ic al m at te rs . This read in g c as ts so m e d oubtonou r ear li er Mc Mah ande ci si on . The for eg oi ng di sc us si on ha s fo cu se d p rin ci pa ll y on Ru le 1.4 42 (c)( 2) (F)’s fir strequi rem en t, tha t a p arty “ st at e whe th er the pro po sa l i nc lu de s at to rn ey ’s fees .” W e n ow turn b rie fly to Rul e 1 .44 2( c)(2 )(F) ’s sec on d re qu ire m en t, tha t a p arty st at e

“ whe th er at to rn ey s’ fees are p artof t he leg al cla im .” As Ho ro wit ch po in ts ou t i n hi s b rie f—a lb ei t wi th m in im al di sc us si on—Di am on d’s fa il ur e to co m pl y with t he
se co ndrequi rem en t m ay

be anad di ti on al reas on to refu se anawardun de r th e o ffer of jud gm en t s ta tu te . W e h av e fo un d n o c as es di sc us si ng th is po in t, an d t he pa rti es m ak e n o re le va ntarg um en ts . Furt he rm or e, th e fu nc ti on of t hi s re qu ire m en t i s n ot

16cl ear t o u s.

W e b el ie ve itwas c le ar t o Ho ro wit ch th atacce pt an ce o f Dia m on d’s o ffer
wou ldex ti ng ui sh an y

cla im to att orne y ’s fees , andth atDiam on d’s fa il ur e to di sc us s at to rn ey ’s fees inth e o fferwas t he refo re n otpre jud ic ia l. Ho wev er, the re ap pe ars to be a co nf

li ctbe twee n e arl ie r Fl or id a cas es , whi ch ho ldth atanoff er o f jud gm en t tha t d oe s n otex pl ic it ly referen ce at to rn ey ’s fees is vi ab le , andm or e rece ntcas es , whi ch ho ldth atth e st atut e an d t he rul e m us t b e st ric tl y

co ns tru edev en in th e fac e o f pu rel y

tec hn ic al requi rem en ts . Eventh ou gh we ha ve fou ndno Fl or id a cas es th atco nc lu si ve ly stat e h ow t he off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te an d R ul e 1.4 42 sh ou ldbe ap pl ie d i n t hi s s itua ti on , th e rec en t Ca m pb el l d eci si on ha s ca st do ub t o n o urearl ie r McM ah ande ci si on . Accor di ng ly, we res pe ct fu ll y cert ify to th e Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt the fol lo win g que st io n: UNDER FLA. STAT . § 7 68 .79 AND RULE 1.4 42 , IS A DEFENDAN T’ S OFFER OF JUDGMENT VALID IF, IN A CASE IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS ATTORNEY’ S FEES, THE OFFER PURPORTS TO SATISFY ALL CLAIMS BUT FAILS TO SPECIFY WHE THER ATTO RNEY’ S FEES ARE INCLUDED AND FAILS TO SPECIFY WHET HER ATTORNEY’ S FEES ARE PART OF THE LE GAL CLAIM?

17B. W as Diam on d’s o fferof ju dg m en t re nd eredno n- vi ab le be cau se Horo wit ch

cl ai m edsp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce— a n on -m on et ary rem edy —i n t he alt ern at iv e to da m ag es ? The off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te ap pl ie s o nl y “ [i]n a ny civ il act io n fo r da m ag es .” Fla . Sta t. § 76 9.7 9( 1) . App lying th is requi rem en t, Fl or id a in te rm ed ia te co urts ha ve refu se d t o app ly the st atut e in cas es inwhi ch bo th m on ey da m ag es an d
no n- m on et ary rel ie f were s ou gh t. InPal m Beac h P ol o Ho ld in gs , Inc . v. Equ es tri an Cl ub Est at es Pro pe rty Owners Ass oc ia ti on , Inc ., 22 So . 3d14 0 (F la . 4th DCA 20 09 ), a la nd lo ck edpl ai nt iff su edforbo th no n- m on et ary rel ie f, inth e fo rm of de cl arat ory

an d i nju nc ti ve rel ie f to ga in us e o f a p riv at e ro adby “way of n eces si ty,”
an d m on et ary rel ie f, inth e fo rm of t orti ou s i nt erfe ren ce d am ag es du e to th e p rio r de ni al of a cces s t o t he roa d. Th e co urt ch arac te riz edth is cas e as on e th at

“ co nt ai ne d t wo i nd ep en de nt , si gn ifi can t cl ai m s, s uc h t ha t i t co ul d b e ch arac te riz ed
on ly as anact io n fo r bo th da m ag es an d n on -m on et ary, de cl arat ory rel ie f.” Id . at 14 3. The de fen da ntinPal m Beac h P ol o m ad e anoff

er o f jud gm en t i n t he am ou nt of $1 00 1 “ as co m

pl et e an d fi na l re so lu ti on an d s et tl em en t o f al l cl ai m s.” Ho wev er, th e co urt h el d t ha t the off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te di d n otap pl y to th is off

er. As a

18pr in ci pl e o f la w, itst at edth atst ric t co ns tru ct io n, as requi redby Cam pb el l, “ sh ou ld
no t al lo w app li cat io n o f a g en eral off er o f se tt le m en t, s ou gh t t o b e ap pl ie d t o c la im s se ek in g n on -m on et ary rel ie f as well as a ct io ns forda m ag es .” Id . at 1 44 . App lying th is pri nc ip le to th e fac ts of t he cas e, th e co urt fo un d t ha t: Inth is cas e, eac h o fferof s et tl em en t fi le d was ge ne ral , su ch th atit ap pl ie d t o a ll cla im s co nt ai ne d wi th in th e co m pl ai ntwhi ch , of c ou rs e, in cl ud edbo th a cl ai m

forda m ag es an d n on -eco no m ic cla im s. Stric t co ns tru ct io n o f th e st atut e le ad s t o the co nc lu si on th atwhen anact io n se ek s n on -m on et ary rel ie f, su ch as apu re d ecl arat io n o f ri gh ts or in jun ct iv e rel ie f, th enth e fac t tha t i t al so see ks dam ag es do es no t b rin g itwithi n t he off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te . Id
. Pal m

Beac h P ol o fu rth er ex pl ai ns it s ra ti on al e th ro ug h i ts di sc us si on of a
se co ndrel ev an t ca se , Di Pao laBeac h Terrace Ass oc ia ti on , Inc ., 71 8 S o. 2 d 1 27 5 (Fl a. 2dDCA 19 98 ). Di Pao lareject edanoff er o f jud gm en t i n acas e in whi ch bo th in jun ct iv e rel ie f an d d am ag es were s ou gh t b ecau se “ th e o fferwas am bi gu ou s in th atitfai le d t o s ta te whet he r th e d efen da nt. . . was ag reei ng to th e en try of in jun ct io ns inad di ti on to th e se tt le m en t o f th e p la in ti ffs ’ dam ag es cla im .” Pal m Bea chPo lo , 22 So . 3dat 1 44 (di sc us si ng Di Pao la ); s ee Di Pao la , 71 8 S o. 2 d a t 12 77 . The Pa lm

Beac h P ol o c ou rt f

ou ndth e se tt le m en t b efo re i t s im il arl y lac ki ng be cau se “ th e p ro po sa ls forset tl em en t d idno t s ta te whet he r th e as so ci at io n was
19ag reei ng to en try of an y in jun ct io ns .” Pal m

Beac h P ol o, 2 2 S o. 3 d a t 1 45 . It wen t fu rth er t o s ay

th at : If the st atut e were r eadto pe rm ita pr op os al forset tl em en t t o app ly to a cas e in whi chth ere wer e cl ai m s fo r no n- eco no m ic rel ie f as well as f or da m ag es , th e o ffer ee wo ul d b e fo rcedeithe r to acce ptth e p ro po sa l an d co nt inue to li ti ga te th e reque stforin jun ct iv e an d n on -eco no m ic rel ie f orto gi ve up th ei r no n- da m ag e cl ai m s. Th e p ur po se s o f se ct io n 76 8.7 9 i nc lu de th e ear ly term in at io n o f li ti ga ti on . A pro po sa l fo r se tt le m en t i n acas e su ch as t hi s o ne do es no t s at is fy th atpu rp os e, as it s ac cep ta nc e wou ldno t t erm in at e th e li ti ga ti on no r res ol ve th os e cl ai m s n otsee ki ng da m ag es . Id
. Hor owi tc h a rg ue s t ha t Pa lm Beac h P ol o an d Di Pao last an d fo r th e pr op os it io n t ha t, u nd er the st ric t co ns tru ct io n re qu ire d b y Cam pb el l, the off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te can no t ap pl y when a co m

pl ai ntsee ks bo th da m ag es an d e qu it ab le rel ie f. By

th is lo gi c, Hor owi tc h u rg es , hi s cl ai m forsp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce, o r al te rn at iv el y

da m ag es , wou ldbe be y on d t he sco pe of t he off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te . To jus ti fy th is ou tc om e, Hor owi tc h fu rth er re as on s t ha t i t wo ul d b e im po ss ib le to cal cu la te th e m on et ary va lu e o f anequi tabl e rem edy won at ju dg m en t fo r pu rp os es of de te rm in in g wh ethe r th e awardwas 2 5% l es s tha n t he jud gm en t o ffer ed , as requi redto tri gg er the off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te ’s fee-s hi fti ng pro vi si on . Diam on d a rg ue s t ha t Pa lm Beac h P ol o a ndDi Pao laare d is ti ng ui sh ab le

20be cau se th ey in vo lv edcla im s fo r bo th equi tabl e rel ie f an d m on ey da m ag es . For
ex am pl e, in Pal m

Beac h P ol o, the pl ai nt iff so ug htanin

jun ct io n t o p erm itfutur e acce ss to th e p riv at e ro ad , andals o s ou gh t d am ag es forth e p as t d en ia l o f acc es s. By co nt ras t, i n t he in st an t ca se , Horo wit ch cla im s equi tabl e rel ie f on ly in the al te rn at iv e to m on ey

da m ag es . This arg um en t i s p ers ua si ve to us be cau se , inan y cas e in whi ch th e two types of r el ie f are s etinth e al te rn at iv e, itis cle ar tha t the
sa ti sf act io n o f th e cl ai m

form on ey

da m ag es wou ldpre cl ud e an y furth er l it ig at io n on th e m at te r of

equi tabl e rel ie f. Addres si ng th e co nc ernun de rlyin g P al m Beac h Po lo an d Di Pao la , th ere i s n o p os si bi li ty in thi s ca se th atth e li ti ga ti on wou ldno t be term in at edby the off

er o f jud gm en t. Diam on d a ls o a rg ue s t ha t the co nt in ue d wo rk ab il it y of t he off

er o f jud gm en t st atut e co un se ls infav orof app lying th e st atut e to th es e fac ts . If a pl ai nt iff co ul d si m pl y “ ta ckon ” anequi tabl e cl ai m inth e al te rn at iv e to hi s cl ai m s fo r da m ag es an d th ereb y pre cl ud e th e ap pl ic at io n o f th e st atut e, th enhe co ul d avo idth e ap pl ic at io n of th e st atut e th ro ug h a rtf

ul pl ead in g. Th is ris k i s p art ic ul arl y acu te ina cas e li ke th is on e, in whi ch th e equi tabl e cl ai m is so lac ki ng inm eri t: th e jet i n que st io n i s no t a u ni qu e g oo d a ndHoro wit ch th eref or e can no t o bt ai n s pe ci fic pe rfo rm an ce t o fo rce i ts sal e. See Fl a. St at . § 6 72 .71 6( 1) (ad op ti ng th e Uni fo rm Co m m erci al Co de

21po si ti onth at“ [s ]peci fic pe rfo rm an ce m ay be de cree d wh ere t he go od s ar e u ni qu e orinot he r pr op er ci rcu m st an ces ”); Geor ge Vin in g & So ns , Inc . v. J on es , 49 8 S o. 2d69 5, 6 97 (Fl a. 5t h DCA 1 98 6) (“ [S]pec ifi c p erfo rm an ce o f a co nt ractis li m it ed to th os e in vo lv in g aun ique subjec t m at te r su chas a n a gr eem en t t o c on ve y lan d.” );
se e al so Klei n v . Pep si Co , Inc ., 84 5 F .2d76 , 80 (4t h C ir. 1 98 8) (refu si ng to award sp eci fic pe rfo rm an ce fo r th e d el iv ery of a jet b ecau se , am on g o th er re as on s, the ai rcra ft wa s n otun ique withi n the m ean in g o f th e Vir gi ni a Co m m erci al Co de ). Inli gh t o f th e la ck

of c on tro ll in g F lo rid a la w, andbe cau se we are i n any ev en t ce rti fy in g t he off

er o f jud gm en t i ss ue di sc us se d abo ve , inSect io n II I.A, we cert ify the fol lo win g que st io n: DOES FLA. STAT . § 7 68 .79 APPLY TO CASES THAT SEEK EQU ITABLE RELIEF IN THE AL TERNATIVE T O MONEY DAMAGES; AND, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT GENERALLYAPPLY TO SUCH CASES, IS THERE ANY EXCEPTION FOR CIRC UMSTANCES IN WHICH THECLAIM FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF IS SERIOUSLY LACKING IN MERIT? C. Does th e FDUTPA fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on ap pl y ina cas e in whi cha pl ai nt iff’s FDUTPA cla im

fai ls be cau se th e la w of a no th er jur is di ct io n g ov ern s t he is su e? Unl es s Di am on d i s en ti tl edto reco ve r it s fu ll att orne y ’s fees pu rs ua ntto th e

22of

fer o f jud gm en t s ta tu te , itwil l b e n eces sa ry to ad dr es s i ts cla im

foratt orne y ’s fees
un de r th e FDUTPA. The FDUTPA st at es , inrel ev an t p art , th at : Inan y civ il li ti ga ti on res ul ti ng fro m anactor p ract ic e in vo lv in g a vi ol at io n o f th is pa rt, . . . th e p rev ai li ng pa rty, afterjud gm en t i n the tri al co urt an d e xh au st io n o f al l ap pe al s, i f an y , m ay rece iv e h is or h er reas on ab le att orne y ’s fees an d c os ts fro m th e n onpr ev ai li ng pa rty. Fl a. St at . § 5 01 .21 05 (1 ). Flo rid a’s co urts ha ve in te rp ret edth is fee- sh ift in g pr ov is io n t o app ly und er ci rcu m st an ces inwhi ch a pl ai nt iff ha s s ue d u nd er the FDUTPA andlo st , eve n wh enth e p la in ti ff h as lo stbe cau se th e co urt co nc lu de d th atth e al le ge d v io la ti on was n oton e th atactua ll y fel l u nd er the st atut e, no twi th st an di ng th e fac t tha t s uc h a n a ctis by defi ni ti onno t “ a v io la ti onof t hi s pa rt” inth e m os t l it eral sen se . See Ru st ic Vil la ge v. Fri edm an , 41 7 S o. 2 d 3 05 , 30 5 (Fl a. 3dDCA 19 82 ) (“ [W] he re a p la in ti ff b rin gs a cl ai m un de r th e Act , an at to rn ey ’s fee i s t o b e al lo weda pr ev ai li ng de fen da ntev enth ou gh th e tr ia l ju dg e ho ld s t ha t the act io n i s n oton e co nt em pl at edby the Act.”) ; s ee al so M.G.B. Hom es , In c. v. Am ero n Ho m es , Inc ., 30 F.3d11 3, 1 15 (11 th Cir . 19 94 ) (awar di ng at to rn ey ’s fees to a pr ev ai li ng de fen da ntina su itbe twee n c om pe ti to rs aft er fi nd in g th atth e FDUTPA do es no t ap pl y to su it s b etweenco m

pe ti to rs , st at in g tha t i f it were Fl or id a la w to de ny att orne y ’s fees un de r th es e ci rcu m st an ces th en“ no 23pr ev ai li ng de fen da ntwou ldev er b e en ti tl edto att orne y ’s fees un de r th e DTPA, for

by defi ni ti on de fen dant s p rev ai l b y de m on st rat in g t he in ap pl ic ab il ity of the DTPA to th ei r act io ns ”); Bro wn v . Gard en s b y th e SeaSo uth C on do m in iu m Ass oc ., 42 4 So . 2d18 1, 1 84 (Fl a. 4t h DCA 1 98 3) (award in g a tt orne y ’s fees to a pr ev ai li ng de fen da ntev enth ou gh th e tr an sa ct io n d idno t qua li fy as a“ co ns um er tran sa ct io n”
an d t he FDUTPA th eref

or e d idno t ap pl y ). 4 Howev er, the in st an t ca se is di st in gu is habl e—i n n on e o f th es e cas es was t he FDUTPA fou ndno t t o app ly becau se th e la w of afor ei gn juri sd ic ti on go ve rn edth e un fai r tr ad e p ract ic es cla im . Mor eo ve r, Ru st ic Vil la ge reco gn iz ed , indi ct a, th at th ere m ig htbe a di st in ct io n i f th e FDUTPA di d n otactua ll y “ ap pl y ”: The pl ai nt iff

[arg ue s] th aton ce the tri al co urt h adfou ndth e Act “ in ap pl ic ab le ,” itco ul d n otth enut il iz e th e Actforth e p ur po se of gr an ti ng th e p rev ai li ng de fen da ntanatt orne y ’s fee. Itis ap pa ren t tha t Diamond cites to spec ific languag e in Rustic Village , 417 So. 2d at 306 (“The 4 plaintiff, havinginvoked the Ac t, is li able f or an attorney ’s fe e bec ause he did not prevail.”) , and L eitman v. B oone, 439 So. 2d 318, 322 (F la. 3d DCA) ( “[B]y invoking a

n exis ting a

nd valid statute which c alls for a

n awa rd of attorney s’ fe es, one ma y subject himself to havingattorney s’ fee s asserte d ag ainst him if he does not preva il.”), to arg ue that a pla intiff is liable for attorney ’s fee s whene ver he “invokes” the FD UTPA and then loses thecase . Howeve r, this languag e does not dispose of the instant case beca use neither

of those ca ses pre sents a situation in which the FDU TPA does not apply

beca use anothe r state’ s substantive law g overns. More over, L eitman car ries little weight: it s poke on the issue only in dicta, see id. (findingthat attorney fee s were improper a s “a c onsequenc e of the non-existence of a contra ct,” notwithstandingthe plaintiff’s invocation of the F DUTPA), a nd the Florida Supreme Court subseque ntly disagree d with L eitman on other grounds in Gibson v. Courtois, 539 S o. 2d 459 (F la. 1989). Ac cording ly , we conclude that no Florida

court ha s held that the mere invocation of the F DUTPA is sufficie nt to trig g er its fe e-shiftingprovision. 24th is is no t the cas e si nc e th e Actwas app li edinth e act io n. Itis si m pl y th ataft er b ei ng ap pl ie d, i t d idno t p ro du ce a re m edy forth is pl ai nt iff

. Bec au se th e in st an t ca se is di st in gu is habl e, no Flo rid a cas es pro vi de cle ar g ui da nc e on whet he r th e FDUTPA sh ou ldap pl y on th e fac ts of t hi s ca se . W e n on ethe le ss fin d s om e g ui da nc e o n h ow t o p ro ceedinth is si tu at io n b y ex am in in g h ow t he off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te ha s b een ap pl ie d i n d is pu te s g ov ern ed by the subs ta nt iv e la w of o th er s ta te s. In BDO Sei dm anv. Br it is h C ar Au ct io ns , 80 2 S o. 2 d 3 66 (Fl a. 4t h DCA 2 00 1) , a Flo rid a co urt was pre se nt edwith t he qu es ti on of wh ethe r itwas o bl ig edto ap pl y a ch oi ce o f law ana lysis to de te rm in e whe th er the off

er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te wou ldap pl y ina cas e b ro ug htinFlo rid a b ut go ve rn edby T enne ss ee l aw. It u lt im at el y he ldth atth e le gi sl atur e was cle ar i n st at in g t ha t the st atut e ap pl ie s t o “ an y ” ci vi l ac ti onforda m ag es fil edina Fl or id a co urt, tha t i t was un ne ces sa ry to co nduc t a c ho ic e o f la w ana lysis inth e fac e o f
su ch a cl ear l eg is la ti ve st at em en t, an d t ha t the off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te th eref or e ap pl ie d. Id . at 3 68 -6 9. In a co nc urren ce, J ud ge Gros s as se rte d t ha t the st atut e wou ldha ve ap pl ie d e ve n u nd er ch oi ce o f la w ana lysis , bec au se th e st atut e is a pr oc edur al m ech an is m

forch oi ce o f la w purp os es an d F lo rid a p ro cedur al law s ti ll ap pl ie s ev enwhen an ot he r st at e’s subs ta nt iv e la w go ve rn s. Id . at 3 70 (Gro ss ., J.,
co nc urrin g) . On th e b as is of B DO Seid m an , th is Co urt h as als o e xp li ci tl y he ldth at 25th e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te “ is ap pl ic ab le to cas es . . . th atare trie d i n the Sta te of

Fl or id a ev enth ou gh th e subs ta nt iv e la w th atgo ve rn s t ha t ca se is th atof a no th er st at e.” Mc Mah anv. To to , 31 1 F .3d10 77 , 10 81 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). The ap pl ic at io n of th e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te to th es e cas es pro vi de s s up po rt f orth e arg um en t th atFlo rid a co urts m ig htli ke wis e ap pl y th e fee -s hi fti ng pro vi si on s o f th e FDUTPA
un de r ci rcu m st an ces inwhi ch th e subs ta nt iv e la w of a no th er s ta te ap pl ie d s o l on g as a pl ai nt iff

no ne th el es s trig ge redth e p ro cedur al pro vi si on s o f th e FDUTPA by
su in g u nd er i t. 5 App lying th e fee -s hi fti ng pro vi si on inth es e ci rcu m st an ces als o a dv an ces Fl or id a’s in te res t i n p rev en ti ng un fai r tr ad e p ract ic es cla im s fr om be in g b ro ug ht
ne ed le ss ly. As o ne Flo rid a co urt h as reco gn iz ed : [I]t is no t u nc omm on forli ti gant s t o i njec t cl ai m s o f frau d a nd de cep ti ve tra de pra ct ic es in to a co nt ractua l d is pu te . This tac ti c co m pl ic at es a la wsu it , rai se s t he st ak es , andin crea se s t he li ti ga ti on ex pe ns es . W e h av e en co un te redfew cas es wher e su ch cla im s wer e su cces sf ul
. Man de l v . Deco rat or ’s Mart , Inc . of Dee rfi el d B each , 96 5 S o. 2 d 3 11 , 31 3 n .1 (F la
.

A law may

be substantive for

Erie pur poses (mea

ning it applies in fe dera l court) 5 yet proc edura l for other

purposes, such a s a choic e of la w ana ly sis. Sun Oil Co. v. W ortman, 486 U.S. 716, 726-28, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-25, 100 L . Ed. 2d 743 (1988); B DO Seidman, 802 So. 2d at 370-71 (Gross, J ., concur ring ). Ac cording ly , the prospec t that the FDU TPA’s fee -shifting provision might be thought of as proc edura l for choic e of la w purposes doe s not place at risk its status as substantive for Erie purposes. 264t h DCA 2 00 7) . A pla in ti ff i nt ro du ces th e sa m e co m pl ic at io ns , andth e sa m e st rai n on th e Fl or id a co urt s y st em , when ev er h e rai se s a F DUTPA clai m , reg ard le ss of whi chst at e’s subs ta nt iv e la w is ul ti m at el y fou ndto go ve rn . Accor di ng ly, itis pl au si bl e th atth e Fl or id a co urts wou ldwis h t o c urb t hi s b eh av io r by ho ld in g s uc h a pl ai nt iff acco un tabl e u nd er the fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on . It app ears to us th atFlo rid a la w wou ldli ke ly treatth e FDUTPA’s feesh ift in g p ro vi si on m

uc h l ik e itwou ldth e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te , app lying itev en in act io ns inwhi ch th e la w of a no th er s ta te was u lt im at el y fou ndto go ve rnth e subs ta nt iv e cl ai m s. Ho wev er, b ecau se we are i n a ny even t ce rti fy in g que st io ns rel at edto th e o fferof ju dg m en t s ta tu te , bec au se th ere i s ro om to di st in gu is h the FDUTPA’ s fe e-s hi fti ng pro vi si on an d t he off er o f jud gm en t s ta tu te , andbe cau se we ha ve fou ndno Flo rid a cas es di rect ly addres si ng whet he r th e FDUTPA wou ld ap pl y to cir cu m st an ces li ke th es e, we cert ify the fol lo win g que st io n: DOES FLA. STAT . § 5 01 .21 05 ENTITLE A PREVAILING DEFEND ANT TO AN ATTO RNEY’ S FEE AWARD IN A CASE IN WHICH A PLAINTIFF BRINGS AN UNFAIR TRADE PRAC TICES CLAIM UNDER THE FDUTPA, BUT THE D ISTRIC T COURT DECIDES THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE L AW OF A DIFFERENT STATE G OVERNS THE U NFAIR TRADE PRACTIC ES

27CLAIM, AND THE DE FENDANT UL TIMATELY PREVAILS ON TH AT

CLAIM? D. W ou ldth e FDUTPA fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on supp ort anawardof f ees forth e en ti re l it ig at io n, o r on ly for the sev en -m on th pe rio d b efo re the co urt h el d tha t Ariz on a law, rath er tha n F lo rid a la w, app li ed ? If the FDUTPA fee-s hi fti ng pro vi si on ap pl ie s t o thi s ca se , we are l eftwith th e que st io n o f whe th er i t ap pl ie s t o t he en ti re ca se or o nl y to th e se ve n m on th s be twee n the ti m e Hor owi tc h ra is edhi s FDUTPA cl ai m an d t he ti m e th e d is tri ct co urt fo un d t ha t h e co ul d n otpro ceedun de r th e FDUTPA. One pl au si bl e rea di ng of the st atut e’s requi rem en t, tha t the “ ci vi l l it ig at io n res ul t[] fro m

anactor p ract ic e in vo lv in g avi ol at io n o f [the FDUTPA] ,” is th atth e st atut e ap pl ie s o nl y

to li ti ga ti on inwhi ch a pl ai nt iff at l eas t al le ge s a v io la ti on of th e FDUTPA. At th e p oi ntth atHoro wit ch ceas edli ti ga ti ng hi s FDUTPA cl ai m to pu rs ue anAriz on a Co ns um er FraudAct cl ai m , he was no lo ng er as se rti ng a vi ol at io n o f th e FDUTPA, so pe rh ap s t he fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on sh ou ldno t ap pl y fro m th atpo in t o nwa rd . On th e o th er h an d, the FDUTPA do es no t awa rdfees un ti l aft er “ ex haus ti on of a ll ap pe al s.” B ecau se Horo wit ch co ul d h av e ap pe al edth e di st ric t co urt’s d eci si on th atth e FDUTPA di d n otap pl y , andbe cau se an y su ch

28ap pe al wou ldha ve tak enpl ace a fte r th e se ve n m on thpe rio d u nd er d is cu ss io n, i t i s

al so po ss ib le th atth e fee -s hi fti ng pro vi si onwou ldco ve r th e en ti re ca se . Fl or id a’s cas es ad dr es si ng th e ap pl ic ab il it y of t he FDUTPA fee-s hi fti ng pr ov is io n d o n otreac h t hi s i ss ue . In Ru st ic Vil la ge , Bro wn, an d M GB, di sc us se d ab ov e, no cla im s wer e le ft u nr es ol ve d a fte r th e d is po sa l o f th e FDUTPA cl ai m . Acco rd in gl y , th ere was no pe rio d o f li ti ga ti on du rin g wh ic h o nl y no n- FDUTPA cl ai m s wer e atis su e. Ano th er s etof F lo rid a cas es est ab li sh es th atanatt orne y m ay reco ve r fo r ti m e sp en t d efen di ng cla im s re la te d t o aFDUTPA cla im , bu t the se cas es are al so of l it tl e he lp be cau se no ne of t he m reac he s t hi s p ro bl em . Thes e cas es tel l u s t ha t: [I]n act io ns co nt ai ni ng a de cep ti ve tra de pra ct ic es co un t an d o ne or m or e al te rn at iv e th eo rie s o f rec ov ery, all ba se d o n the same tra ns act io n, n o a ll oc at io n o f at to rn ey ’s servi ces ne edbe m ad e ex cep t to th e ex te ntco un se l ad m it s t ha t a p orti on of t he servi ces was t ot al ly un rel at edto th e 5 01 cla im or i t i s s ho wn t ha t the servi ce re la te d t o is su es , su ch as p un it iv e d am ag es , whi ch were cl earl y be y on d t he sco pe of a 50 1 p ro ceed in g. Hein de l v . Sou th si de Ch ry sl er-P lym ou th , Inc ., 47 6 S o. 2 d 2 66 , 27 2 (F la . 1s t DCA 19 85 ); s ee al so LaFern ey v. Sc ot t Sm it h Ol ds m ob il e, In c., 41 0 S o. 2 d 5 34 , 53 6 (Fl a. 5t h DCA 1 98 2) (“ [T]here was real ly onl y on e tr an sa ct io n o r se t o f fac ts whi ch ga ve ris e to all fiv e ‘the or ie s’ inth e co m pl ai nt. . . . As ap pe ll an t p oi nt s o ut , pro of

29of

a de cep ti ve tra de pra ct ic e u nd er Ch ap te r 50 1 m ay well , andfreque nt ly doe s, in vo lv e p ro of

of b reac h o f co nt ractan d fr au d o r m is rep res en ta ti on .”). Howev er, th es e cas es are d is ti ng ui sh ab le be cau se no ne of t he se cas es in vo lv e ci rcu m st an ces in whi chth e cas e was st il l l iv e aft er the FDUTPA cla im was d is po se d o f. The imm ed ia te qu es ti on is no t wh ethe r Hor owi tc h’s o th er cl ai m s wer e co gn iz ab le as al te rn at iv e cl ai m s ar is in g o utof t he same con su m er tran sa ct io n a s t he FDUTPA cl ai m , bu t wh ethe r th e FDUTPA fee- sh ift in g p ro vi si on s ap pl ie d a fte r th e FDUTPA cl ai m ha d b een ex ti ng ui sh ed
. Bec au se th ere i s l it tl e g ui da nc e in Flo rid a la w on th e que st io n o f whe th er the FDUTPA fee-s hi fti ng pro vi si on ex te nd s t o t he pe rio d a fte r whi ch th e FDUTPA cl ai m was e li m in at ed , andbe cau se we are al read y cert ifyin g t he qu es ti onof whe th er the FDUTPA app li es to th is cas e atall , we cert ify the fol lo win g que st io n: IF FLA. STAT. § 5 01 .21 05 APPLIES UNDER THE CIRCUMS TANCES DESCRIB ED IN THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, DOE S IT APPLY ONLY T O THE PERIOD OF LITIGATION UP TO THE POINT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HELD T HAT THEPLAINTIFF COULD NOT PURSUE THE FDUTPA CLAIM BEC AUSE FLORIDA LAW DID NOT A PPLY TO HIS UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES CLAIM , OR DOES IT APPLY T O THE ENTIRETY OF

30THE LITIGAT ION?

IV. CONCLUSION

“ The ph ras in g o f th es e [fo ur ] qu es ti on s i s n otin te nd edto li m itth e Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt’s co ns id erat io n o f th e is su es in vo lv edor t he m anne r in whi ch it gi ve s i ts an swe rs .” MCI Worl dC om Netwo rkServ s. v . Mas te c, In c., 37 0 F .3d 10 74 , 10 79 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ). In o rd er t o a ss is t i n t he res ol ut io n o f th es e que st io ns , th e rec or d i n t hi s ca se an d the bri efs of t he pa rti es sh al l b e tr an sm it te d t o t he Fl or id a Supr em e Co urt. QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.

31