1

384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . P D
- 1917- 06

R A U L A D A M M A R T IN E Z, JR . , A p p ell a n t

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS
ON APP ELLANT’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE THI RTEENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

HA RRI S CO UNTY
H ERV EY , J. , fil e d a di sse nt ing opi nio n in whic h K ELLER , P .J., M EY ER S and K E AS L E R JJ., jo ine d.
DI S S E NT I NG OP I NI ON The fe dera l c onstitut ional decision in Miranda v. Arizona e sta bli sh e s th e pr op hyla c tic ru le 1 that an in -c us tod

y su sp e c t mu st b e “ wa

rn e d” that he ha s c e rt a in r ig hts , s uc h a s th e ri g ht t o r e ma in silent, before the police c an question the s uspect. I n this case, a ppellant basica lly

claims that, eve n tho ug h h e re c e ive d the se wa rn ing s be fo re he vo lun tari ly ma de a c us tod ia l vi de ota

pe d s ta te me nt t oMartinez–2

2 542 U.S. 600, 618-22 (2004) ( Kenne dy , J ., concur ring in the judgme nt).
3 See Maj. op. at 8 (f

inding Justi ce K ennedy ’s re asoning persua sive).
4 Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 604-18 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg , and B rey er, JJ .).
5 I f this were so, J ustice S o uter’s plura lity opinion in Se ibe rt

c ou ld n ot c on ta in a

ma jor ity the po lic e , th e se wa

rn ing s n e ve rt

he le ss f a ile d to “ a de qu a tel y and eff e c tiv e ly ” a

pp ri se him

of his rig hts under Miranda

. The majority

opinion appear s to de cide that J ustice Ke nnedy ’s one- judge concur

ring opinion in Mi sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt contains the Court’s h olding in that ca se. S ee M arks v. United States , 430 2 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (w here “a f rag mented Court decides a case and no single r ationale e x plaining the re sult enjoy s the assent of f ive J ustices, the holding of the Court ma y be viewed as that position taken by those Memb e r s wh o c o ncurr ed in the judg ments on the narr owest g rounds”) (interna l quotes omi tte d)

. Th e ma

jor ity op ini on a lso a pp e ars to d e c ide that appella nt w ins un de r t

he “ ho ldi ng ” in 3 Justi c e Ke nn e dy ’s c on c ur ri ngop ini on

inSe ibe rt , beca

use the incomplete rec ord that appe llant has
prese nted establishes that a “two-step interrog ation technique was used [i n this case] in a ca lculated
way to undermine the Miranda war ning.” See Maj. op. at 10. Th e c ourt of a pp eal s’ majo ri ty

op ini on de c ide d th a t Just ic e Sou te r’ s f our- jud g e plu ra lity opinion in Se ibe rt co n t ai n s t h e C o u rt ’s h o l d i n g b ec au s e, ev en t h o u gh J u s t i ce Ke n n ed y ’s o n e- j u d ge 4 opinion concurr ed in the judg ment on “nar rowe r” g rounds, the “unde rly i n g rationale s of J ustice Kenne dy ’s conc urre n ce and [J ustice Souter’s] plurality opinion are so diver g ent that they rende r M a r k s’s n arro we s t -gr o u n d s -i n t er p re t at i o nru l e i n ap p l i cable.” See M artinez , 204 S.W .3d 914, 918-21 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2006). The c ourt of appe als’ majority o p i n i on, howeve r, dec ided that 5Martinez–3

h o ld in g an d w o u ld h a v e li tt le , if an y , b in d in g e f f e c t in th is c a s e . U n d e r th e s e c ir c umstances, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Oregon v . Elstad wo uld argua bly c on tr ol the dis po sit ion of thi s case , and appellant would lose. See O regon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“ a suspec t who has on c e re sp on de d to un wa

rn e d y e t no nc oe rc ive qu e sti on ingis n ot the re by dis a ble d fr om wa ivi nghis rig hts and confe ssing after he has been give n the re quisite Miranda wa rn ing s” ); se e als o S

e ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 612 n.4 (sug g esting that the def endant would have lost under Elstad ); bu t se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 622-29 (O’ Connor, J ., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J ., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ .) (sug g esting that defe ndant might have won unde r Elstad ).
6 The c ourt of appe als’ dissenting opinion, therefor e, would have decide d that appellant wins under a “nar rowe r” holding t h an t h e one that the court of a ppeals’ ma

jority opinion decided that appellant loses unde r.

7 T h e s t a t e d i d

n o ts e e k t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y. appellant lose s u n d er J ustice Souter’s plura lity opinion. Se e id . The c ourt of appe als’ dissenting
op in ion wo uld have de c ide d th a t Just ic e Ke nn e dy ’s “ na rr ow e r” on e -j ud g e c on c ur ri ngop ini on

in Se ibe rt contains the Court’s holding under Marks’s narr owest-g rounds appr oach a nd that appellant should w in unde r this holding. See M artinez , 204 S.W. 3d 92 4- 28 (Y ane z, J ., dis se nti ng ). Iwo uld 6 de c ide th at it is unne c e ssa ry to d e te rm ine wh e the r Jus tic e Sou te r’ s o r Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ’s plu ra lity opinions in Se ibe rt

control the disposition of this ca se beca use appellant has not c arr ied his burden to present a

sufficie nt rec ord showing t hat he wins under either one of these opinions. See W ord v. Sta te , 206 S.W .3d 646, 651-52 (Te x .Cr.App. 2006) (appe llate courts should not presume err or fr om a silent rec ord and it is the appealing party ’s burde n to present a rec ord showing proper ly

prese rved,

re ve rs ibl e e rr or ); Ro we ll v . S tat e , 66 S.W .3d 279, 280-81 (Te x .Cr.App. 2001). Appellant wa s convicted of capital murde r (murde r committed during a robbery ) and
sentenc ed to life in prison. The e vidence from appe llant’s trial shows that three people we re shot 7 during a robbe ry

committed by

appellant a

nd another

person, both of whom used fire arms. One of the robbe ry

victims died from his gunshot w ounds. The other two independe ntly

identified appe llantMartinez–4

8 Duri ngc los ingjur

y a rg ume nts , th e state c la ime d th a t it wa s si g nif

ic ant t hat bo th v ic tim s ind e pe nd e ntl y

ide nti fi e d a

pp e lla nt a s o ne of

the ro bb e rs (a

pp are ntl y c omp ari ng the c ha

nc e s of this to winning the lotter

y ): [S TATE]: Mr. Camilo couldn’t look at hi m or poi nt at hi m. They scar ed the hell out of him . B ut w hat’ s th e ir

mot ive ? An d, fu

rt he rm or e , le t me a sk

y ou thi s, g e e , b e c a

us e Iwa nt i n on thi s. What are the od ds that tho se tw o lit tle Me xica n me n are g oin g to pick the same defe ndant, t h e s am e man that had the shotgun pointed at them that night w h o a ls o o w n s a

s h o tgu n , w h o a ls o h a s a s k inn y f r ie n d th at m e e ts the descr iption that was g iven by the name of J ames Ruiz and that also the defe ndant himself puts himself there? What are the odds? Boy , if that was a lottery ticket, we would all be ric h and neve r have to work ag ain. Wouldn’t that be nice?
9 Appellant’s state ment was the only evidenc e pre sented at appellant’s tria l that did not place appellant at the scene of the robbe ry wher e the victims wer e shot

. All of t he other evidenc e shows that appellant wa s at the sce ne of the robber y . Thoug h the g reater we ight of the evidenc e pre sented at appe llant ’s trial establishes that appe llant was one of two arme d robber s at the sce ne of the ro bb e ry , th is e vid e nc e a lso ra ise d a legi tim a te qu e sti on of wh e the r a

pp e lla nt a c tua lly

fi re d h is wea pon. Our re view of the trial rec ord indicate s that whether appellant a ctually fired his we apon, and not whethe r he w as at the sc ene of the ro b b ery , was proba

bly the most leg itimately

disputed fa c tua l is su e a t a

pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l.
10 F or e xamp le , th e state argue d d ur ingc los ingjur

y argume nts a t a

pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l: [S TATE]: I f y ou believe this de fenda nt’s statement, y ou take e very thing he say s as a s o ne of the ro bb e rs fr om a

ph oto sp re a d a

pp ro xima te ly tw o mon ths a ft e r the inc ide nt. Th e y a lso 8 ide nti fi e d a

pp e lla nt a t tr ia l a s on e of the ro bb e rs . Th e po lic e qu e sti on e d a pp e lla nt on the da

y of his

arr e st, and

a pp e lla nt v olun tar il y ma de the vid e ota pe d c us tod ia l st a te me nt a t is su e in t

his c a se in

re sp on se to po lic e qu e sti on ing a ft e r re c e ivi ngand wa ivi nghis Miranda rig hts. This statement was admitte d i n t o ev i dence at appe llant’s trial. Appellant c laimed in this statement that he was in a

near by car acting as a lookout while others r obbed the victims. The state c laimed at appe llant’s trial 9 that appellant’ s statement was unw orthy of belief, b u t t h at even this self- servingstatement wa s

su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sha pp e lla nt’ s g uil t. 10Martinez–5

true, say s it here twice on this tape: Iwas a lookout. Iwas sitting in the c ar, looking around, know ing the se g uy s were g oing to g et a lick. You’ re a lookout and y ou’re g uilty of ca pital murder. * * * No w [a pp e lla nt’ s la wy e r], wo uld

have y ou and sh e we nt o n a

bo ut, y ou kn ow, this confe ssion and all this sugg estiveness a nd et ce tera , et cete ra, e t ceter a, as thoug h the office rs put these wor ds in her client’s mouth. Well, y ou know what? Iwatche d that tape a nd y ou’ve g ot it in evidence a n d I counted at least seven times whe re the defe ndant in that particular tape sa y s he’s e ither a lookout or he ’s watc hing out. I don’t believe t h at . Ithink that statement is totally self-se rving and I

think y ou pr ob a bly a ll d o, too . Y ou ’r e int e lli g e nt. * * * Well, y ou know what? I f y ou want to believe that statement, y ou g o rig ht ahea d, but even–if y ou believe that statement, I don’t, but if y ou do and it ’s up to y ou, y ou are the judg es of the e vidence befor e y ou. You believe it, fine. But if you believe w hat he say s in that statement, he’s guilty of ca pital murder.
11 Th e g ro un d u

po n w hic h w e g ra

nte d r e vie w s ta te s: Whether the Court of Appea ls misapplied the standards of Se ibe rt in determining that a pr op e r a nd fu nc tio na l Miranda war

ning w as g iven Appellant he re a nd fi n ding Appellant’s c ustodial statement admissible. Ap pe lla nt c la ime d o n d ir e c t a

pp e a l th a t th e tr ia l cour t er ro ne ou sly de nie d a mot ion to

su pp re ss t his state me nt. Ad dr e ssi ngthe me ri ts o f t his c la im und e r t

he Un it ed S tates S up re me Court’s fra cture d decision in Se ibe rt , th e c ourt of a pp e a ls d e c ide d th at Se ibe rt did not require

su pp re ssi on of a pp e lla nt’ s st a te me nt. We e xer c ise d o ur dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity to r e vie w this decision. 11
I n Se ibe rt , a police of

fice r consc iously

decide d to i n t er ro g ate the in- custody defe ndant wi t h o u tp ro v i d i n g Miranda war nings and obtained a c onfession. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 604-06. After about a twe nty -minute bre ak, thi s same police of fice r provided the defe ndant with Miranda

war nings a nd obtained basic ally

the same c onfession af

t er more interr og ation during which the interrog ating office r also conf ronted the de fenda

nt with some of her prior unwa rned state ments. SeeMartinez–6

12 Se e Sta te v . S

e ibe rt , 93 S.W .3d 700, 701 (Mo. 2002), aff’d , 54 2 U. S. a t 61 7; bu t se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 612 n.4.

13 J ustice Souter’s plura lity

opinion sets out “a s er i es of r eleva nt fac ts that bear on w hether Miranda war

nings de livered midstrea

m coul d be ef

fec tive enoug h to acc omplish t heir objec t: the completene ss and detail of the quest i o n s and answ ers in the f irst round of interr og ation, the overla pping c ontent of the two stateme nts, the timi ng and setting of the fir st and second, the continuity of police pe rsonnel, and the deg ree to which the interr og ator’s que s t ions treated the s e c o n d r o u n d a s c o n ti n u o u s w it

h th e first.” Se e Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 61 5; see also Martinez , 204 S.W .3d at 917, 921 (a

pply ing these factors to uphold admissibili ty of appe llant’s voluntary custodial statement). id . A Missouri trial court suppressed t he ini tial unwar ned confession, but admitted the later war ned

one. Se e id . The Mis s o u ri S u p re m e Court decided, in what appea rs to be a ty

pe of “ fruit of the
po iso no us tr e e ” ana ly sis , that “ [i]n the c ir c ums tanc e s he re , wh e re the int e rr og a tio n was n early

c on tin uo us , . . . the s econ d [ war ne d] st a te me nt, c le arl y

the pr od uc t of the inv a lid

fi rs t st a te me nt, should have be en suppre ssed.” I n its frag mented dec isi o n , a Supreme Court majority reje cted a 12 “fr uits” analy sis but ult imately ag ree d with the Missouri Sup re me Court that the sec ond war ned confe ssion should have bee n suppressed. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 604-18 (Souter , J ., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and B rey er, JJ .) and at 618-22 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring in the judgme nt). Ju s ti c e So u te r ’ s p lu

r a li ty o p in io n in Se ibe rt

decide d that this confession should have be en

s u p p re s s ed , b ec ause by

“any objective mea sure . . . it is likely that if the interr og ators employ the technique of wi t h h o l d i ng war nings until afte r the interr og ation succe eds in eliciting a conf ession, the wa rn ing s w ill be ine ff

e c tiv e in pr e pa

ri ngthe su sp e c t f

or su c c e ssi ve int e rr og a tio n, c los e in t ime and similar in content” a

nd would “likely mislead and deprive a def endant of knowledg e esse ntial to h is a bil ity to u nd e rs tand the natur e of

his ri g hts .” Justi c e Sou te r’ s p lur a lity op ini on a lso 13 descr ibed the fa ct s i n t h at case , which bea r ver y littl e re semblance to the fac ts in the recor d thatMartinez–7

appellant ha s prese nted in this case: At the op po sit e e xtre me are the fa c ts h e re , w hic h b y any ob je c tiv e me a sure re ve a l a p olice strate g y

adapte d to undermine the Miranda w ar n in g s . ( F o o tn o te o mi tte d). The unwa rned inter rog ation was conducte d in the station house, and the que stioning was sy stematic, exhaustive, and mana g ed with psy cholog ical ski ll. When the police wer e finished there was littl e, if any thing, of incriminating potential left unsaid. The war ned phase of questioning proce eded a fter a pause of only 15 to 20 minutes, in the same plac e as the unwar

ned segment. When the same off icer who had c onducted the fi rs t p h as e rec ited the Miranda wa rn ing s, he sa id n oth ingto c ounte r t he pr ob a ble misim pression that the a dvice that a ny thing Seiber

t said could be used a g ainst her a l s o ap p l i ed t o t h e de t ai l s o f th e in cu l p at o ry s t at em en t p re v i o u s l y el i ci t ed

. In particula r, the police did not advise her that h er prior stateme nt could not be used. (F ootnote omitted). Nothing w as said or done to dispel the oddity of wa rning about leg al rig hts to sil ence and counse l rig ht after the police ha d led h er throug h a sy stematic interr og ation, and any uncer tainty on her part about a rig ht to stop t alking about matters pr eviously

discussed would onl y

have be en ag g ravated by the way Offic er Hanr ahan set the sce ne by saying “ we’ ve bee n talking f or a little while about what hap p en edo nW ed n es d ay t h e t we l ft h , h av en ’t we ? ” ( C i t at i o nt o re co rdo m i t t ed). The i mp r e s s io nth a t t

h e f u rth e r qu e s ti o n in g w a s a

me r e c o n ti n u a ti o no f

th e e ar li er quest i o n s and re sponses was f ostered by

ref ere nces ba ck to the conf

ession alre ady g iven. I t would have be en re asonable to re gar d the two sessions as par ts of a continuum, in which it would have be en unnatur al to ref use to repe at at the se cond stag e what had been said bef ore. The se circ umstances must be see n as cha lleng ing the co m p re h en s ibilit y

and ef fica cy of the Miranda wa

rn ing s to the po int

that a rea sonable pe rson i n the s uspect’s shoes would not have unde rstood them to convey a messag e that she r etained a choice about continuing to talk. (Footnote omitted). Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 616-17. Justi c e Ke nn e dy ’s c on c ur ri ngop ini on

a sse rt e d that Justi c e Sou te r’ s p lur a lity op ini on “ c uts
too br oad ly ” by

a pp lying“ an o bje c tiv e inq uir y fr om t he pe rs pe c tiv e of

the su sp e c t” to “ bo th intentional and unint entional two-stag e interr og ations.” Se e Se ibe rt , 5 4 2 U

. S

. a t6 2 1

- 2 2 ( K e n n e dy, J., c on c ur ri ngin t he jud g me nt) . Just ic e Ke nn e dy st ate d th at he “ wo uld a pp ly a na rr ow e r t e st applicable only

in the infreque nt case , su ch as we have he re, in whic h the two-step inter rog ation
t echnique was used in a

calc ulated wa

y to undermine the Miranda war ning.” Se e id

. Ap pa re ntl y ag ree ing w ith the rest of Just ice Souter’ s plurality opinion, J ustice Ke nnedy further s ta ted that, wher eMartinez–8

14 The ma jo r it y o p in io n a s s e rts th a t th e p o li c e “ qu e s ti o n e d a p p e ll an t a b o u t th e c r im e at the police station w ithout g iving the re quired [ Miranda ] warning s.” See Maj. op. at 10. The recor d that appellant ha s prese nted r ef l ec t s that, when Sosa initially broug ht appellant to the police station, a pp e lla nt d e nie d a

ny inv olv e me nt i n th e of

fe ns e whe n So sa

and ano the r o ff

ic e r a sk e d a

pp e lla nt i f a “de liberate two-step strate g y ” is used, the postwarning statements “that ar e re lated to the substance of pre war

ning statements” must be exclu d ed unless curative measure s are taken be fore the postwarningstatement is made. Se e id

. These curative measure s “should be desig ned to ensure that

a re asonable person in the suspec t’s situation would unde rstand the import a nd eff ect of the Miranda

war ning a nd of the Miranda waiver .” Se e id . “F or ex am p l e, a subst antial bre ak in time and circ umstances be tween the prew arningstatement an d the Miranda wa rn ingmay

su ff ic e in m os t circ umstances, a s it allows the acc used t o d i s t inguish the two c ontext s and appr eciate that the interrog ation has take n a new turn.” Se e id

. I n this case, appellant filed a motion to suppress his state ment about a month before his trial be g an. Hi s mo tio n to su

pp re ss a lle g e d, in r e le va

nt p art , th a t: The wr itten statements, admissions or confe ssions, if any wer e made , do not refle ct that the proper admonitions were g iven, in violation of Ar ti c le 38 .2 2, Se c ti on 2 of the Texas Code of Crim inal Pr o cedure ; the F if th, Sixth and F ourtee nth Am endm ents to the Uni te d St at e s C ons ti tu ti on; and Art icle I, Sect ion 10 of the Te xa s C ons ti tu ti on. (Emphasis in orig inal). The only witness to testify

at the suppre ssion hearingwas Of fice r Mac ario Sosa. He testified that he ar rested a ppellant for this off

ense a nd took him to a police st at i o n , where they arr ived at about 10:30 a.m. Appellant de nied any involvement in the offe nse whe n Sosa and anothe r off icer

a sk e d a pp e lla nt i f h e wa

nte d to dis c us s it . So sa

te sti fi e d that he had no t “ re a d [a pp e lla nt] h is [ Miranda ] rights at that time.” 14Martinez–9

he wanted to disc uss it. The police asking appellant if he wanted to disc uss it is not “interr og ation” for Miranda purposes. Se e Rh od e Is lan d v . I

nn is , 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (“inter rog ation” is any wo rd s o r a c tio ns on the pa rt of the po lic e that the po lic e sh ou ld k no w a re re a so na

bly lik e ly to e lic it an in c ri min a tin g re sp on se ); Mo ra n v . S tat e , 213 S.W

. 3 d 9 1 7, 922-23 (Te x .Cr.App.), cert. de nied , 128 S.Ct . 235 (2007) ( police officer ’s comment to in-custody defe ndant t hat the police ha d spoken to other witnesses just a fter defe ndant had invoked his rig ht to counsel when police asked de fenda nt if he wa nted to d i s cuss the off

ense w as not “interr og ation” thus not requiringexclusion of def en d an t ’s s u

b s eq u en ti n cr i m i n at i n g s t at em en t ). T h e p o l i ce we re , t h er ef o re , n o tre qu i red to provide Miranda war

nings be fore asking appellant if he wanted to discuss it. Even if it could be said that the police “questioned appellant about t he cr ime” for Miranda purposes whe n they initially broug ht him to the police station, appellant’s de nial of any involvement in the offe nse af ter the police asked him if he wante d to discuss it was nothing like the twe nty or thirty minute, unwarne d interrog ation in Se ibe rt tha t pro du c e d the de fe nd ant’ s inc ri min a tin g state me nt, wh ic h s he re pe a te d a bo ut t we nty minutes later duringthe same inter rog ation. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 604-05.
15 Sosa testified that the poly g raphe r re views the e ntire ca se file in order to de cide whic h questions to ask during the poly g raph e x amination.

16 The re cord a

ppear s to ref

lect that appellant ag ree d to take the poly g raph e x amination afte r Sosa asked him if he w as willing to do so. Q. [DEFENSE]: L ike I

said, up until that ti me, y ou had neve r g iven h im any ind ic a tion th at he didn’ t ha ve to t a ke the po lyg ra

phor ta lk t o a ny bo dy a bo ut t his offe nse? A. [S OSA]: Ihad basic ally asked him if he w as wil ling to take a polyg raph in re g ards to t his inc ide nt. Appar ently

not satisfied with appellant’s a nswer de ny ing a

ny involv em en t i n the offe nse, Sosa then arr ang ed for appellant to ta ke a poly g raph examination. These a rra ng ements took about an hour dur ing w hich time appellant wa s not questioned by the police

. Al though Sosa did not

15
sp e c if ic a lly inf or m a pp e lla nt t hat “he did

n’ t hav e to t a ke the po lyg ra phor ta lk t o a ny bo dy a bo ut t his offe nse,” he did ask him if he was w illing to do so. An “unknown po l y gra p h er ” conducted the 16 poly g raph e x amination, which lasted a bout three or four hours until about 4: 30 p.m. Sosa was not
prese nt during the poly g raph e x amination. Sosa testified at the s uppression hea ring that he did notMartinez–10

17 The c ourt of appe als (as doe s this C ourt) appa rently considere d this testim ony to mean that a pp e lla nt w a s n ot Mirandized

befor e the poly g raph ex amination. See M artinez , 204 S.W .3d at 921 (“The instant case pr esents a Se ibe rt problem beca use [appellant] made pr e-Miranda state me nts to police off icer s and a polyg raph e x aminer, was then g iven sepa rate Miranda wa

rn ing s b y a ma g istrate and the inter

rog ating office rs, and finally appea red in a videotaped inter

rog ation that was a dmitted into evidence at trial.”) . This testimony , howeve r, does not esta blish that ap p ellant was not Mirandized b ef

o re the poly g raph e x amination. The re cord is ac tually silent on this critical issue under Seibe rt. This issue is critical under Se ibe rt , be c a us e , if a pp e lla nt w a s Mirandized

befor e the poly g raph e x amination, then he loses unde r any rea ding of Se ibe rt
. 18 The re cord is silent on which portions of the three to f our-hour poly g raph examination that appellant “ failed.” For

all we know, a

ppellant could have “fa ile d ” p o rt i o n s of the polyg raph that we re un re la te d t o th is o ff e ns e (e .g ., a

pp e lla nt c ou ld h a ve g ive n a

fa lse name re su lti ngin h im “fa iling” the poly g raph) . Sosa also testified that it would be more a ccur ate to say that “De ception was indicated” on c erta in questions, but that he did not know “ the prec ise questions that w ere asked that supposedly

ref lected de ception.” Q. [ DEFE NS E] : Ibe lie ve Isa id e arl ie r t hat y ou tol d [a pp e lla nt] h e fa ile d. I n f

a c t, that’s not what a poly

g raph e x aminer w ould say t o y o u ; i s n ’t that true? Someone d o e s n ’ tf a i l o r p a s s a p o l yg r a p h , d o t h e y? A. [SOSA ]: No , th a t’ s n ot a c or re c t te rm . Q. So it wo uld be mor e c or re c t to sa y the po lyg ra

ph e xpe rt or e xami ne r wo uld say to kn owwh e the r t

he po lyg ra

phe xami ne r i nf

or me d a pp e lla nt o f h is Miranda ri g hts

. Q. [ DEF ENSE]: So the pol y g raph ex aminer g ives the per son information as they ’re a sk ingqu e sti on s a

bo ut t he of fe ns e ; is that c or

re c t? A. [S OSA]: Iwasn’t pr esent so I can’ t tell y ou exactly

what happen ed d u ring the examination. Q. So y ou can’ t sa

y for sure that the poly g raphe r did not provide him with details of the of fe ns e in o rd e r t o a sk

him qu e sti on s? A. I can’ t sa

y whether he provide d details and Miranda war nings, w hat have y ou, no, ma ’a m. 17 When the poly g raph e x amination was ove r, Sosa was informed by the poly g raph e x aminer that appellant had “fa iled” it. The re cord is other wise silent on just ex actly what occ urre d during 18Martinez–11

y ou: Dece ption was indicated on this question or that question? A. They would h av e gi v en a perce ntag e or de g ree of dec eption, y es, ma’a m, per question. Q. B ut, ag ain, without those rec ords, y ou don’t rec all the precise questions that wer e asked that supposedly

ref lected de ception? A. No, ma’ am.
19 S ee Ma r t i nez , 2 04 S.W. 3d a t 91 6 ( no tin g that a

“ re c or d w a s n ot c re a te d o f t he qu e sti on s, s t a t e m e n t s , o r

r e s u l t s o f

t h e p o l y g r a

p h e xam i n a t i o n ” ) ; com

pa re Sei be rt , 542 U.S. at 613 (“The unwar ned interr og ation was c on d u ct ed i n the station house, and the que stioning wa s sy stematic, exhaustive, and manag ed with psy cholog ical skill. W hen the police we re f inished there w as little, if any thing, of incriminating potential left unsaid.”)

. 20 Arguably , this is t he only evidenc e that mig ht raise a viable issue under Se ibe rt , s ince it i s po ssi ble that a

pp e lla nt “ wo uld ha rd ly thi nk he ha d a g e nu ine ri g ht to re ma in sile nt” a ft e r b e ingtol d that h e h ad “f

ailed” a poly g raph e x amination. One c ould speculate on this sil ent re cord that appellant, ha

ving initially d en i ed any

involvement in the offe nse whe n first broug ht to the police statio n, c on tin

ue d to den y any inv olv e me nt i n th e of

fe ns e duri ngthe po lyg ra

phe xami natio n a

nd that, when c onfronted by

the police with having“fa il ed ” the poly g raph, he hardly thought he had a g enuine r ight to re main silent (in part bec ause he co u l d h av e thoug ht that the “fa iled” polyg raph c ou ld b e us e d a g a ins t him la te r a t tr ia l) and , th us , a ft e r r e c e ivi nghis Miranda war nings twic e, g ave the somewhat incriminating state ment that minimi zed his involvement in the offe nse but still pl ace d him at the scene (the stateme nt that the state ar g ued at trial still established his guilt). This is another rea son why

it might be critical for the r ecor d to refle ct whethe r or not appe llant rec eived Miranda war nings be fore the poly g raph e x amination and what ac t u al l y occur red dur ing the poly g raph examination. the three to four-hour

poly g raph e x amination. 19
Sosa informed appellant that he had “fa iled” the poly g raph examination and th en t o ok 20

a pp e lla nt be fo re a ma g istrate , wh o inf or me d a pp e lla nt o f h is Miranda ri g hts a t a bo ut 4 :55 p. m. S os a the n to ok a pp e lla nt t o a no the r p oli c e statio n w he re Sos a a g a in i nf or me d app e lla

nt o f h is Miranda ri g hts a t a

bo ut 5 :16 p. m. T his wa s th e fi rs t ti me that So sa pe rs on a lly

inf or me d a pp e lla nt of his Miranda ri g hts . App e lla

nt w a ive d th e se ri g hts and vo lun tari ly pr ov ide d the state me nt at iss ue in t hisMartinez–12

21 Com pa re Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 61 6 ( “ Whe n th e same of fi c e r w ho ha d c on du c te d th e fi rs t ph a se rec ited the Miranda war

nings, he said nothing to counter the probable misimpression that the advice that any thing Seibert said could be used ag ainst her also applied to the details o f t h e i n cu l p atory state me nt pr e vio us ly e lic ite d. I n part ic ula r, the po lic e did

no t a dv ise that he r p ri or

state me nt c ou ld not be used. [Footnote omitted]

. Nothing was said or done to dispe l the oddity o f w ar n i n g about le g a l right s to sil e nc e and c ouns e l r ig ht a ft e r t

he po lic e ha d le d h e r t hr ou g h a sy ste ma tic interrogation, and an y uncertainty on her part about a right to stop talking ab out m atte rs pr e vio uslydisc uss e d would only hav e be e n ag gr av at e d by the way Office r Han r aha n se t t he sc e ne by s ay ing ‘we ’v e be e n ta lking for a lit tl e while abo ut whathappe ne d on W e dne sda y t he twelf th, haven’t we ?’ [C itation omit ted ]. The im pr e ssi on t hatth e furt he r que st ion ing was a m ere continuation of the earlierquestions and respon ses was f oster ed by refere nces back to the confession al ready given .”) ( emphasis supplied).

22 Se e Se ibe rt , 93 S.W .3d at 701.
23 Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 611-13. case while beingquestioned by Sosa and anothe r off icer . The police stopped questioning a ppellant at 6:08 p.m

. During this int ervie w of a ppellant, the police did not re fer to, or confr ont appellant with, any statements (incr iminating or othe rwise) that appellant m a y h a v e ma de duringthe poly g raph examination and the police did not repe at t hat appellant had “failed” the poly g raph e x amination. 21 Appellant’s c losing stateme nt at the suppression hea ring prese nted a smorg asbord of rea sons for suppre ssing a

ppellan t ’s statement. None of these r easons, howe ver, pr esente d a cla im that appellant’ s statement, “c lear ly the produc t of [any ] i nvalid first stat em en t, should have bee n

su pp re sse d” or

that a pp e lla nt h a d n ot b e e n “a de qu a te ly and e ff e c tiv e ly ” a

pp ri se d o f h is Miranda 22 ri g hts be fo re he ma de thi s st a te me nt. 23 [DEFENSE]: Your Honor, just preliminarily , we note the lack of an express e d

w a ive r of ri g hts a t th e be g inn ingof

the vid e ota

pe ba sic a lly wi th the de te c tiv e , kno wi ngthe se rig hts, do y ou want to talk? There is no express waiver of the rig hts; however, mor e importantly , we a sk y ou to consider the da y -long worth of a ctivities that seem to be qu ite va g ue in D e te c tiv e Sos a ’s min d, the la c k o f a ny reco rd- ke e pin g , th e ina

bil ity to e xpla in w hat’ s b e e n g oin g on , wh a t wa s ta lke d a bo ut a ll d ay

lon g , th e la c k, mos tMartinez–13

24 I t is also noteworthy

that appellant r aised no c laim or issue during the suppression hea ring that Sosa informing him that he had “f ailed” th e p o ly g raph e x amination cause d the subsequent g iving of the Miranda war

nings to him to be ineff

ective suc h that h e “h ardly [t houg ht] he had a g enuine r ight to re main silent.”

25 Appellant made no claim that this f ai led to addre ss whether

the Miranda war

nings that he re c e ive d b e fo re makin g the state me nt “ a de qu a te ly a nd e ff e c tiv e ly ” a

pp ri se d h im o f t

he se ri g hts

. importantly , of any rea ding of rig hts or Miranda war nings during all the questioning that oc c ur re d thro ug ho ut t

he da y by the po lyg ra

ph e xami ne r a

nd the n thro ug h th e se hu g e bla nk s o f t ime up un til the tr ip t o th e ma g ist rate , w hic h d id n ot o c c ur un til almost 5:00 o’clock. We s ub mit

tho se are no t su ff

ic ie nt i nte rveningc ir c ums tanc e s to re mov e any ta int

. First of a ll, the lack of w arning s befor e the da y ’s q u est ioning a nd then on the tape itself. We urg e y ou to consider the c oerc ive techni q u es t hat ar e used, the arg umen tati o no f

[a p p e ll an t’ s ] r e f

u s a l t o a c c e p t h is d e n ia ls o f g u il t, th e s u g g e s ti on made that ther e is evidenc e that exists when it doesn’t truly exis t and so forth. And we a lso ur g e y ou to c on sid e r De te c tiv e Sos a ’s la c k o f m e mor y c on c e rn ingthe e ve nts surr ound ing the takin g of the state me nt a lso ra ise so me qu e sti on a bo ut t he c re dib ili ty inv olv e d with re g ard to wh a t he say s a bo ut w hat w a s d on e . We ur g e y ou to s up pr e ss the state me nt. 24
I n it s c los ingstate me nt at the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e sta

te argue d th a t a

pp e lla nt v olu nta ri ly

ma de the state me nt a ft e r r e c e ivi ng , und e rs tand ingand wa ivi nghis Miranda ri g hts

. [S TATE]: Very

brief, Judge . All Iwould do is reoff er, of course , the videotape that y ou hear d and take into consideration ever y thing that Offic er Sosa said in terms of [appellant] not being forc ed, thre atene d, promised, any thing in any

way to give the state me nt that he d id, that hi s Miranda war nings w ere g iven prope rly , they wer e re ad off the blue car d, State’s Exhi bit No. 2. Specifica lly afte r ea ch wa rn i ng , the de fe nd ant w a s a sk e d w he the r o r n ot h e un de rs too d th a t r ig ht. He did . H e did it a g a in on the videotape . He wa s–not only purcha sed food and drink, allowed to g o to the rest room, a llowed to make phone calls, bot t o m line, J udg e, is his statement was voluntarily

made. 25 Th e tr ia l c ourt

de nie d a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss b a se d on fin din g s th a t a pp e lla nt “ did fre ely , voluntarily

and knowing ly

waive his rig hts to remain silent and g ive that statement.” The trial

co u rt m ad e t h e f

o l l o wi n g ru l i n g:Martinez–14

26 Appellant made no claim that this ruling f ailed to addr ess any

claim that the Miranda w ar n i n g s t h a t a

p p e l l an t r e c e i v e d b e f

o r e m a k i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t d i d n o t“ a d e qu a t e l y an d e f f e c t i v e l y” a pp ri se him

of the se ri g hts

. 27 I t is , th e re fo re , c le ar t

hat a pp e lla nt co uld have a le rt e d the tr ia l court to t he Mis so ur i Su

pr e me Court’s decision in Se ibe rt during the suppression hea ring just two da y s b ef

o re. Appellant’s trial too k p l a c e b e t w e e n M ay 1 9 , 2 0 0 3 , an d M ay 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , w i t h t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s h e a ri ng a lso occur ring on May

19, 2003. The Missouri Supreme Court had ha nded down its dec ision in Se ibe rt about six months before this on Dece mber 10, 2002. Se e Sta te v . S e ibe rt , 9 3 S

. W

. 3 d at 700. On May 19, 2003, the Supreme Court e x erc ised its writ of cer tiorari jurisdiction to reviewthe Missouri Supreme C o u rt ’s d ecision. Se e Mi sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt , 538 U.S. 1031 (2003). The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Se ibe rt on J une 28, 2004, about one wee k afte r appe llant filed his brief on direc t appea l in the court of a ppeals. Se e Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 60 0; Martinez , 204 S.W .3d at 924 n. 19 (Y ane z, J ., dis se nti ng ). Ap pe lla nt’ s bri e f on dir e c t a

pp e a l a lso c ite d to the Mis so ur i Su pr e me Court’s decision in Se ibe rt
. [THE COURT] : I am g oing to a dmit the statement. Imake a specific finding Ihave fo un d O ff

ic e r S os a to b e a c redib le witne ss. Th e arr e st w arr ant i s a g oo d a rr e st wa rr ant. I t a pp e are d th a t [a

pp e lla nt] d id f re e ly , v olu

nta ri ly and kn ow ing ly

wa ive his rig h ts to r e ma in s il e n t an d g iv e th a t s tate me n t. T h e r e w a s n o te s ti mo n y o f any threats. The behavior of Of fice r Sosa appea

rs to be exemplary

and it is admitted. 26
W h e nt h e s t a t e o f

f e r e d a p p e l l an t ’ s s t a t e m e n t i n t o e v i d e n c e a t a p p e l l an t ’ s t r i a l j u s tt w o d a ys afte r the suppre ssion hearing , appellant reurg ed his “ea rlier objection” and for the f irst time directed the trial cour

t’s attention to “

Mi sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt .” [S TATE]: At this time I ’m g oing to of fer 1A into evidence

. [DEFENSE]: Your Honor, at this time w e reur g e our ear lier objec tion and just to add to it, a refe renc e t o Missouri v. Seibert, S-E-I -B -E-R-T, U .S. Supreme Court case , pending , No. 02-1371. 27 [THE COURT] : My

ruling stands the same. A dmitted. Ap pe lla nt’ s c la im f

or su pp re ssi nghis state me nt b e c a me e ve n mo re fo c us e d a nd c le ar i n h is brief on dir ect a

ppeal. In addition to containing a citation to the Missouri Supreme Court’s dec ision i n Se ibe rt , a

p p e l l an t ’ s b r i e f o n d i r e c t a p p e a l a l s o p r e s e n t e d t h e ar g u m e n t t h a t t h e a d m i s s i o n in toMartinez–15

28 There is no Fifth Amendment rig ht “ag ainst self-incr imination.” The F ifth Amendment rig ht at issue in Miranda and ca ses like this is a pe rson’s rig ht not “ to be com pelled in a ny c ri min a l c a se to be a witness a g ainst himself” (e mphasis s u p plied). U.S. C O N ST . amend. V. Re quiring an inc us tod y su sp e c t to be inf

or me d o f h is Miranda ri g hts be fo re the po lic e c an q ue sti on him a pp a re ntl y is intended to safe g uard this rig ht. See M iranda , 384 U.S. at 467, 478-79. evidenc e of his stateme nt was constitutional error , beca use “the unwar

ned and the war

ned questioning oc curr ed as an unint err upted and continuous proce ss.” Among other thing s, appellant

argue d in his br ie f o n d ir e c t a

pp e a l: What occurr ed her e wa s that the unwar ned interr og ation proce ss, in cl u d i ng submitt ing A

ppellant for polyg raphing , was used ta ctically to ge t Appellant to make a dmi ssi on s b e fo re he wa s awa re of his le g a l r ig hts . T hat App e lla nt e ve ntu a lly re c e ive d h is w arn ing s b e fo re the vid e o r e c or de r w a s tu rn e d on wa s too lit tle too la te afte r about hours [sic] of custodial interrog ation.
I n Miranda , the Supreme Court, having c oncluded that in-c ustody interrog ation of a suspe ct by the police is “inhe rently compelling ,” decide d that it was constitutionally nece ssary

for the police
to “adequately and eff

ect ively apprise[]” the in-custody suspect of cer tain rig hts, such as the rig ht
t o re m ai ns i l en t , b ef

o re i n t erro gat i o nca nb egi ni no rd er “t o co mb at t h es e [ i n h e r e n t l y co mp el l i n g]
p re s s u re s an d

t o p er m i t [ t h e s u s p ec t ] a f u l l o p p o rt u n i t y

t o ex er ci s e t h e [ Fi ft h Am en d m en t ] p ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incr imination (sic).” See M iranda , 384 U.S. at 445-58, 467 (e mphasis su p p lied). 28
J ustice Souter’s plura lity

opinion in Se ibe rt decide d that the “question-first” interr og ation technique of inf or min g an in -c us tod

y su sp e c t of

his Miranda rig hts in the middl e of a “coor dinated and

c on tin uin g int e rr og a tio n” a ft e r t he su sp e c t ha s ful ly

c on fe sse d d oe s n ot “ a de qu a te ly and e ff e c tiv e ly apprise[]” this sus pect of

his rights. Se e Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 61 1- 14 . T his op ini on state s: Whe n a con fe ssi on

so ob ta ine d is of

fe re d a nd c ha lle ng e d, a tte nti on

mus t be pa id t o the conf licting objec ts of Miranda and question-f irst. Miranda addre ssed “interr og ation prac tices . . . likely

. . . to disable [ an indi vidual] from making a f ree and ra tio na l c ho ic e ” a

bo ut s pe a kin g , (c itatio n omi tte d) , a nd he ld t hat a su sp e c t mu stMartinez–16

be “ ade quat e ly a nd e ffec ti ve ly ” a dv ise d o f t he c ho ic e the Con sti tut ion g ua ra nte e s, (citation omitted). The obje ct of que stion-first is to render Miranda war nings ineffe ctive by

waiting for a

particula rly opportune time to g ive them, afte r the suspect has alre ady

confe ssed. J u s ta s “ n o t a l i s m an i c i n c an t a t i o n[ i s ] r e qu i r e d t o s a t i s f y [ Miranda’s ] st ricture s,” (citation omitted), it wo u l d be absur d to think that mere re citation of the litany s u f f i c e s t o s a t i s f

y Miranda in e ve ry

c on c e iva ble c ir c ums tanc e . “ Th e inq uir y is simply whether the war nings reasona

bly ‘conve [y ] t o [a suspect] his rig hts as r e qu i r e d b y Miranda .’” (Citations omitted). The threshold issue when inter rog ators qu e sti on fi rs t and wa rn la te r i s thus wh e the r i t w ou ld b e [obj e c tiv e ly ] re a so na ble to fi nd tha t in th e s e c i r c u

m sta nc e s th e wa

rn ing s c ou ld f

un c tio n “ e ff

e c tiv e ly ” a s Miranda require s. Could the war

nings eff ectively advise the suspect that he had a r eal c hoice about g iving a

n admissible statement at that j uncture ? Could they rea sonably

convey that he could c hoose to st o p t al k i n g ev en if he had talked e arlier ? For unless the war nings c ould place a

suspect who has just been inter rog ated in a position to make such an infor

med choice , there is no practica l justi fication for ac ceptingthe forma l war nings a s compliance with Miranda , or for treatingthe sec ond stag e of int e rr og a tio n a s d ist inc t fr om t he fi rs t, u

nw arn e d a

nd ina dmi ssi ble se g me nt. (F ootnote omitted). Th e re is n o d ou

bt a bo ut t he ans we r t

hat pr op on e nts of

qu e sti on -f

ir st g ive to t

his question about the ef

fec tiveness of wa

rning s g iven onl y afte r succ essful interrog ation, and we think their answer is corre ct. B y

any objecti v e measure, applied to the cir cu m s t ance s exempli fied he re, it is likely that if the interr og ators e mpl oy the te c hn iqu e of

wi thh old ingwa

rn ing s unti l a ft e r i nte rr og a tio n s uc c e e ds in el i ci t i n g a conf

ession, the war

nings w ill be ineffe ctive in pre paringthe suspect f or succe ssive interrog ation, close in time and similar in content

. After all, the re ason that question-first is catc hing on is a s obvious as i ts manifest purpose , which is to g et a confession the s uspect would not make if he under stood his rights at the outset; the sensi b l e underlying a ssumption i s that with one confe ssion in hand before the war nings, the interrog ator c an count on g etting its duplicate , with trifling trou b le. Upon h ea ri n g warni ngs on ly in th e afterm ath of i nterr ogation and just after m akin g a confession , a susp ect wou ld h ardly thin k h e h a d a genuin e right to r e m ain sil e nt , le t a lon e pe r sis t i n so be lie vin g onc e th e pol ic e be ga n t o le ad hi m ov e r th e sa m e gr ound a ga in . (F ootnote omitted). A more l i k el y re ac tion on a su sp e c t’ s p art

wo uld be pe rp le xity

a bo ut t he re a so n fo r dis c us sin g ri g hts a t that po int , bewilder ment being an unpromising frame of mind for know ledg eable decision. What is wo rs e , te lli nga

su sp e c t th a t “any

thi ngy ou say c an a nd wi ll b e us e d a g a ins t y ou ,” wi tho ut e xpre ssl y

e xce pti ng the state me nt jus t gi ve n, c ou ld l e a d to an e nti re ly rea sonable infe renc e that what he has j ust said will be used, with subsequent silence being o f no avail. Thus, when Miranda war nings a re inser ted in the midst of coordinated and c ontinuing interr og ation, they are likely to misl ead a

nd “depr iv[ e] a de fe nd ant o f k

no wl e dg e e sse nti a l to his a bil ity to u nd e rs tand the natur e of

his ri g htsMartinez–17

29 Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 608 ( Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of a

ny custodial c on fe ssi on

on wa rn inga su sp e c t of

his ri g hts ); M

iranda , 38 4 U.S. at

47 6 ( g ivi ngof

wa rn ing s is prer equisite to admissibil ity of custodial conf

ession).
30 The c ourt of appea ls’ majority opinion in thi s case , there fore , may have e rrone ously

decide d that “the unde rly ing rationale s of J ustice Kenne dy ’s concur renc e and the plurality opinion [of J ustice Souter] are so diver g ent that they rende r Marks’s na

rr ow e st- g ro unds -i nt e rp re ta tio n r ule inapplicable.” See M

artinez , 204 S.W .2d at 920. I t w ould a ppear that J ustice Ke nnedy ’s conc urring opinion might contain the holding in Se ibe rt under Marks’s narr ower -g rounds appr oach. Se e als o Martinez , 204 S.W .3d at 920 n.5 (noting that the Fifth Circuit has de cided in two re cent unpublished decisions that J ustice Ke nnedy ’s conc urre nce se ts out the h o l d ing in Se ibe rt). Th e de fe nd a nt i n Se ibe rt wo n und e r Jus tic e Sou te r’ s and Justi c e Ke nn e dy ’s plu

ra lity op ini on s a

pp are ntl y be c a us e these opinions ag ree d that the question-firs t i n t er ro g ation technique in Se ibe rt was used in a calc ulated way to unde rmine and did under mine the Miranda war

ning. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 616 n. 6 (Souter, J.) and at 620 (Ke nnedy , J .). and the c onsequenc es of a bandoning them.” (Cit ation omitted). By the same toke n, it w ou ld o rd ina

ri ly be un re a lis tic to t

re a t two spate s o f i nte g ra te d a nd pr oximate ly conducte d ques tioning as inde pendent inter rog ations subject to independe nt evaluation sim ply

beca use Miranda war

nings f ormally punctuate them in the middle. Id . (empha sis suppli ed). J ustice Souter’s plura lity opinion in Se ibe rt , there fore , sets out a rule that first providing Miranda war

nings to an in-custody suspect in the middle of a near ly continuous interrog ation afte r the suspect has just c onfesse d is the same a s providing no Miranda war nings at all. I f t he police the n obtain another war

ned confession during this near ly continuous interrog ation proce ss in the absenc e of any “cur ative mea sures,” this confession must be suppresse d, since this confe ssion will be considere d to have be en obtained w ithout the requisite prophylactic Miranda wa rn ing s. See 29
Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 61 1- 16 . Just ic e Ke nn e dy ’s c oncurr ing op ini on a pp are ntl y a g re e s e xce pt t o require “that the two-step [or que stion-first] interrog ation technique was used in a calc ulat ed way to undermine the Miranda war ning.” Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 622 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring in the judgme nt). Both of the se opinions, theref ore, c onsidered it sig nificant (a lmost di spositive) that the 30Martinez–18

31 See Maj. op. at 14.
32 Arguably , the rec ord from the suppression hear ing ref lects that neither

the trial cour

t, based on it s ruling a

t the suppression hea

ring , nor the state, ba sed on its closing state ments at the suppression hea

ring , understood appe llant to be making a claim based on the principles discusse d in either the U nited States Supreme Court’s or the Missouri Supre me Court’s dec isions in Se ibe rt (which c ould expl ain the lac k of a c omplete re cord on w hat exactly occur red dur ing the poly g raph ex am i n at i o n , particula

rly a cr itical issue under Se ibe rt of whe ther a

ppellant ac tually

rec eived Miranda war

nings pr ior to the poly g raph e x amination). Se e Bu cha na n v. S tat e , 207 S.W .3d 772, 77 5 (T e x.Cr .App . 20 06 ) (“ Whe n the ob je c tio n is no t sp e c if

ic , and the le g a l ba sis is not

ob vio us , it does not serve the purpose of the contempor aneous- objection rule f or an appellate court to rea ch the me ri ts o f a

fo rf e ita ble iss ue tha

t is e sse nti a lly

ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l.” ) ( e mph a sis in orig inal). un wa rn e d in te rr og a tio n pro du c e d a con fe ssi on that w a s r e pe a te d a lmo st v e rb a tima ve ry sh or t ti me later ( about twenty minutes) during a war ned interrog ation. The stateme nt in this Court’s opinion th a t it “ is im mate r ia l to o u r c o n s id e r a ti o n w h e th e r in c r im in a ti n g s tate me n ts e me r g e d f rom the

unwar ned interr og ation” ignor es the most signifi ca n t co mponent of Se ibe rt that le d th e Court

to 31 conclude that the Miranda war nings pr ovided to the defendant, just twenty minutes after

she provided a

complete c onfession duringan unwarn ed int err og ation, failed to “ adequately and eff ectively” inform the de fenda nt that she did no t have to pr ovide another confe ssion. See, e .g., Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 615 (s o m e re l evant facts that “be ar on w hether Miranda war nings de livered mid str e a m c ou ld b e e ff

e c tiv e e no ug h to a c c omp lis h th e ir ob je c t” are “ the c omp le te ne ss a nd de ta il of the que stions and answer s in the first round of inter rog ation [and] the over lapping content of the two statements”)

. Assuming that appellant pr eser ved a Se ibe rt claim for a

ppellate r eview, appellant ha s not 32
prese nted a rec ord showing t hat he is entitled to relief under Se ibe rt
. The rec ord does not show that the police actua lly used the “question-f irst” interrog ation technique de scribed in Se ibe rt , an d th a t,Martinez–19

33 Com pa re J on es v . S tat e , 119 S.W .3d 766, 775 (Tex

. C r. Ap p. 2003) (de fenda nt’s war ned statement inadmissible beca use “the unwar

ned and w arne d statements in this case we re g iven during a nea rly undiffer entiated sing le eve nt, taking pla ce in the sa me room as a

n uninterrupted a

nd continuous proce ss”).

34 An d e ve n if

it c ou ld b e sa id t

hat th e sin g le qu e sti on

by the po lic e to a

pp e lla nt a sk inghim

if he wa nted to discuss it was interrog ation for Miranda purp os e s, it i s c le ar t hat th is d oe s n ot r e se mbl e the unwar ned interr og ation in Se ibe rt that produce d a conf

ession.
35 Appellant pre sented no e vidence at the suppression hearing(such a s, for e x ample, he w as not inf or me d of his Miranda rig hts befor e the poly g raph ex amination or t hat he fully confe ssed during this ex amination) that would eve n raise an issue of whe ther something may have tr anspired at the poly g raph e x amination or there afte r that mig ht have c aused the subsequent g iving of the Miranda war nings to be inef

fec tive. Com

pa re Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 605-06 (interr og ating office r testified at suppression hea

ring that he “ma de a ‘ conscious dec ision’ to withhold M iranda war

nings, thus resor ting to an inter

rog ation technique he had bee n taug ht; question first, then give the war nings, a nd then re peat the que stion ‘until I g et the answ er that she’s alre ady provided onc e’” ) a n d at 616 n.6 (noting that the “intent of the [i nterrog ating ] officer w ill rarely be as c andid l y admitted as it was here ”). U nder the se circ umstances, the state never assumed any burden to prove that the poly g raph examination (or any

interrog ation technique that the police could ha v e b ee n using) cause d the if they did use such a ta ctic, they did so in a calc ulated wa

y to undermine the Miranda wa rn ing . T his

rec ord does not suppor

t a finding that appellant ha d just confessed dur ing a near ly continuous and

un int e rr up te d in te rr og a tio n p ro c e ss w he n So sa inf or me d a pp ell ant o f h is Miranda rig hts and obtained the state ment at issue her e. 33 Th e inc omp le te re c or d that a pp e lla nt ha s pr e se nte d do e s sh ow that, wh e n a pp e lla nt w a s f ir st b ro u gh t to the police station, the police did not interr og ate him for pur poses of Miranda and 34 appellant did not make a

ny unwar ned incriminating statements that the police later use d during the

war ned intervie w. And, bec ause the rec ord is silent on exactly what occur red during the poly g raph examination, it is diff

icult, if not impossible, to c onclude that something may have tr anspired dur ing this poly g raph e x amination to cau s e t h e s ubsequent g iving of the Miranda war

nings to be ineffe ctive. S u ch a conc lusion would be based on pur e spec ulation. The re cord that appellant

3 5 36Martinez–20

subsequent giving of the Miranda war nings to be ineffe ctive. Se e Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 819 n.22 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006) (state does not assume burde n to pr ove voluntarine ss of a de fenda nt’s confe ssion unless the defe ndant ca rries initial burden to pr esen t ev i d ence to support finding of i n v o l u n t ar i n es s ) ( ci t i n g State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W .3d 720, 727 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006).

36 I t is sig nificant that the videotape d interview c lear ly ref lects that the police did not refe r to, or conf ront appe llant with, any

statements (incr iminating or othe rwise) that app e ll a nt m a y h a ve made during the poly g raph e x amination. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 6 0 4 (i nterrog ating office r follows unwar ned confe ssion with Miranda war nings “and then le ads the suspec t to cover the same g round a se c on d ti me ” ) a

nd a t 60 5 (d ur ing wa rn e d int e rr og a tio n, int e rr og a tin g of fi c e r c on fr on ts s us pe c t w ith he r u nw arn e d s ta te me nts ); Martinez , 204 S.W .3d at 921 (noting that ap p ell ant “wa s repe ating the po ly g r a p h e r ’ s g e n e r a l s tate me n ts r e g ar d in g th e c r im e [th a t thr e e p e o p le w e r e s h o t] , n o t h is own unwar ned stateme nts”).
37 Our c ase la

w is actua lly

to the contra

ry . Se e W

or d , 206 S.W .3d at 651-52. has pre sented doe s not establish that someone in appellant’ s position “would hardly think that he had

a g e nu ine ri g ht t o r e ma in s ile nt” wh e n h e vo lun tari ly pr ov ide d th e c us tod ia l sta te me nt at iss ue in t his

c a se a ft e r b e inginf

or me d o f a nd wa ivi nghis Miranda rig hts. Se e W or d , 206 S.W .3d at (a

ppealing party has burde n to present a

rec ord showing proper ly prese rved, r ever sible err or). The majority

opinion permits appellant to win by prese nting a

n incomplete re cord showing

no re ve rs ibl e e rr or

wi th g a ping ho les o f s ile nc e on

c ri tic a l is su e s, ba se d o n th e a sse rt ion that th is Court has “long held that the prosecution bear s the burden of provingadmissibili ty when a Miranda violation is found.” See M aj

. o p . at 1 1 (c i t i n g Cre ag e r v . S tat e , 952 S.W .2d 852, 860 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) and A l v a ra do v . Stat e , 912 S.W .2d 199, 211 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995)). The case s cited in the majority opinion do not support a holding that t h e ap pealingparty can pr esent a

n incomplete and silent recor d showing no reve rsible er ror a nd win. 37 The majority opinion’s c itation to Creager cites to a c oncurr ing opinion in Creager which sets out the unrema

rkable proposition that “[w]hen the State bear s the burde n of proof on a motionMartinez–21

38 Rather than relying on a si lent rec ord, t he defenda nt in Alvarado actua lly

prese nted evidenc e that, i f believe d by

the fa ctfinder , would have suppor ted a f inding that the de fenda

nt’s confe ssion was invol untary placing the burden on the s tate to prove voluntariness. See A lvarado , 912 S.W .2d at 210-11. in which the defe ndant seeks to suppr ess a statement, which he claims was obtaine d in violation of Miranda , the State need prove waiver only by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” See Creage r , 952 S.W .2d at 860 n.2 (Mey ers, J., concurr ing)

. Alvarado did not involve a claimed Miranda violation, and the de fenda

nt in Alvarado , r a t h e r

t h anr e l y i n g o nani n c o mp l e t e an d s i l e n tr e c o r d , a c tu a lly testified and pr esente d oth er ev idence at a suppre ssion hearingthat raised the issue of the

v o lu n ta r in e s s o f h is c o n f

e s s io n b e f

o r e th e s tate w a s p u t to it s b u r d e n to p r o v e voluntariness. See Alvarado , 912 S.W .2d at 210-11; se e als o Ke lly v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d at 819 n.22 (state doe s not 38 assume burde n to prove voluntarine ss of a de fenda nt’s confe ssion unless the defe ndant ca rries initial burden to ra ise an issue of involuntar iness of the c onfession). A def endant ha s alway s been r equire d to make some ini tial showing on the record in the trial
court that raises a leg itimate issue of whether he is e ntitled to relief under the specific claim that he
prese nts (usually

by making an evide ntiary showing that would support the claim). See H errera v
. Sta te , 241 S.W .3d 520, 526-27 (Te x .Cr.App. 2007) (me re f iling of motion to suppress does not thrust bur den on the state to show compliance with Miranda unless and unti l defe ndant prove s that statements he wishe s to ex clude wer e result of custodial interrog ation) and at 533-34 (Cochra n, J .,
concur ring ) (“ The rig ht to Miranda war nings applies once the defe ndant establishes that the se tting is one of custodial interrog ation. [Footnote omitted]

. Only then does the State ha

ve a ‘ heavy

burden’
to e sta bli shthat Miranda wa

rn ing s we re g ive n an d tha t the de fe nd ant vol un tari ly wa ive d th os e ri g htsMartinez–22

39 Se e als o Ke lly , 2 04 S.W. 3d a t 81 9 n .2 2 ( de fe nd ant h a d in iti a l burd e n to pr od uc e e vid e nc e to su pp or t f ind ingtha

t sh e did no t c on se nt t o b loo d d

ra w) ; F o rd v
. S t a te , 1 5 8 S.W .3d 488, 492 (Tex. C r. Ap p. 2005) (de fenda nt, claiming F ourth Amendment violation, bea rs initial burden of producingevidenc e to support finding of improper police conduc t such as prov i n g t h at a searc h occur red w ithout a warr ant shifting the burden to the state to establish t h e v ali dity of the sea

rch) ; T er razas , 4 S. W. 3 d

a t 7 2 7 ( s tate n e v e r

a s s u me d b u r d e nto p r o v e v o lu

n ta r in e s s o f d e f e n dant’s confe ssion because defe ndant did not car ry her initial burden of ra ising a n issue of voluntariness)

. 40 For example, appellant’s suppression motion did not raise a n issue of the e ffe ctiveness of the Miranda war

nings that appellant rec eived. Appellant’s suppression motion alleg ed that “prope r admonitions” wer e not give n. This is quit e diffe rent fr om alleg ing that “prope r admonitions” wer e g iven but that these “prope r admonitions” did not “ade quately and eff ectively” apprise a

ppellant of his rights unde r Miranda . The a lleg ation in a ppellant’s suppression motion and the ar g uments he ma de a t th e su pp res sion h e ari ngc e rt a inl y did no t put any

burd e n o n th e State to p ro ve that th e se
“ p r o p e r a d m o n i t i o n s ” w e r e i n e f f e c t i v e . T h e s t a t e r e s p o n d e d t o t h e o n l y c l a i m p r e se nte d in a pp e lla nt’ s su pp re ssi on mot ion wh e n it p ro ve d at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ngthat “ pr op e r a dmo nit ion s” wer e, in fa ct, g iven. Arguably , appellant’ s citation to “ Se ibe rt ” duringth e m i d d l e of trial two day s after the suppression hea

ring raised the issue of the e ffe ctiveness of the war nings. Iwould, howeve r, dec ide that this, coming a s it did just two day s afte r the suppression hear ing in the middle of trial without an y f u rt h e r e x p l an a t i o no f

w h y “ Se ibe rt ”would re quire a differ ent result, still did not r aise a ny issue as to the ef

fec tiveness of the w arning s under Se ibe rt
. and vo lun tari ly

re sp on de d to c us tod ia l qu e sti on ing .” ). On ly the n do e s the burd e n sh if t to t he state 39 to defe at t h i s s p ecif

ic claim with its failure to do so beingg rounds for a succe ssful appea l by

the other pa rty

. Se e id . T he Court ’s de c isi on is ba se d on the state ’s fa ilure to p ro ve so me thi ngthat it

never had the bur den to prove , beca use appe llant never

“ra ised” the issue. 40
I n th is c a se , the state c arr ie d its “h e a vy burd e n” in the tr ia l c ourt to e sta bli shthat Miranda

wa rn ing s w e re g ive n a

nd tha t a pp e lla nt v olu nta ri ly wa ive d h is Miranda ri g hts and vo lu nta ri ly

r e s p o n d e d

t o c u s t o d i a l qu e s t i o n i n g p r o d u c i n g t h e v i d e o t a

p e d s t a t e m e n ta ti s s u e i nt h i s c a s e . If appellant r eally

meant to put the trial cour t and the other party on notice that it ne eded to pr ove that the se wa rn ing s r e a lly did no t “ a de qu a te ly and e ff e c tiv e ly ” a

pp ri se him

of the se ri g hts , th e n h e sh ou ld have sa id so instead of re maining silent. In other wor ds, he should have “ raised” this iss ue.Martinez–23

Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

H e r v e y , J.

Filed: De cembe r 17, 2008 Pub lis h