COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA111 

Court of Appeals No. 15CA1046 

Adams County District Court No. 14CV31889 

Honorable Mark D. Warner, Judge 

Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

Oakwood Holdings, LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division III 

Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS 

Graham and Richman, JJ., concur 

Announced July 14, 2016 

Murr Siler & Accomazzo, P.C., Joseph A. Murr, Maris S. Davies, Denver, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Sweetbaum Sands Anderson PC, Geoffrey P. Anderson, Reagan Larkin, Denver, 

Colorado; Navaro & Associates LLC, Steven Navaro, Castle Rock, Colorado for 

Defendant-Appellee 
1 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC (Mortgage 

Investments), appeals the district court’s order granting 

defendant’s, Oakwood Holdings, LLC (Oakwood), motion for 

summary judgment. We reverse the district court’s judgment and 

remand the case with directions. 

I. Background 

¶ 2 This case involves a dispute regarding the foreclosure and 

redemption processes in Colorado. Thus, to better understand the 

facts of this case, it is helpful to first provide a brief overview of the 

foreclosure and redemption procedures. 

A. Foreclosure and Redemption 

¶ 3 The foreclosure process protects a creditor’s right to 

repayment of debts, including homeowners’ association liens and 

monetary judgments. Specifically, section 38-38-101, C.R.S. 2015, 

enables a creditor to obtain a judgment and decree of foreclosure 

against a debtor and have the subject property auctioned at a 

foreclosure sale. The creditor can then use the proceeds of the sale 

to satisfy the unpaid debts. 

¶ 4 Foreclosure is not without consequences, however, 

particularly for creditors whose liens are subordinate to — i.e., 
2 

junior to — a lien being foreclosed (junior lienors). Indeed, where 

multiple liens are filed against the foreclosed property, foreclosure 

of a senior lien generally extinguishes all junior liens. § 38-38-501, 

C.R.S. 2015; see also Ferguson Enters., Inc. v. Keybuild Sols., Inc., 

275 P.3d 741, 745 (Colo. App. 2011). 

¶ 5 Accordingly, to protect creditors’ entitlement to payment, the 

General Assembly has provided them with the right to redeem 

foreclosed property on which they have a junior lien. 

See § 38-38-302, C.R.S. 2015. This right to redeem refers to a 

process by which title to the previously foreclosed property vests 

with the redeeming junior lienor, rather than with the purchaser at 

the foreclosure sale (the certificate of purchase holder), if (1) the 

junior lienor follows the required statutory procedures, including 

filing a notice of intent to redeem; (2) the junior lienor pays, within 

its statutory period for redemption, the required redemption 

amount; and (3) no other, more junior lienors exercise their 

subsequent right of redemption. See id.; see also WYSE Fin. Servs., 

Inc. v. Nat’l Real Estate Inv., LLC, 92 P.3d 918, 921-22 (Colo. 2004). 

¶ 6 With respect to the timing for redemption, the “junior lienor 

having the most senior recorded lien” has the first opportunity to 
3 

redeem, which begins “[n]o sooner than fifteen business days” and 

ends “nineteen business days” after the foreclosure sale. 

§ 38-38-302(4)(a). Each subsequent junior lienor then has five 

business days to redeem from the previous lienor’s redemption. 

§ 38-38-302(4)(b)(I). 

¶ 7 Prior to 2008, owners of foreclosed property also had the right 

to redeem from a foreclosure sale. Ch. 275, sec. 2, § 38-38-302, 

1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1664-65. Effective in 2008, however, the 

General Assembly eliminated that right. See Ch. 305, sec. 21, 

§ 38-38-302, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 1467. Under the current 

scheme, only junior lienors have the right to redeem. See

§ 38-38-302. 

B. The Facts 

¶ 8 Turning, now, to the facts of this case, the debtors purchased 

a home in Adams County (the property) in 2006. That same year, 

they defaulted on their obligation to pay monthly fees to the 

Kimblewyck Village Owners Association (Kimblewyck). Kimblewyck 

filed a lien against the property in December 2006. 

¶ 9 In addition to the Kimblewyck lien, the property was also 

encumbered by (1) a lien filed by the Fox Run Owners Association 
4 

and (2) two judgments entered in favor of Community Management 

Association, Inc. (CMA). 

¶ 10 In May 2014, Kimblewyck obtained a judgment and decree of 

foreclosure, and the property was auctioned at a sheriff’s sale on 

September 25, 2014. Mortgage Investments was the successful 

bidder at the foreclosure sale, so the Adams County Sheriff issued 

Mortgage Investments a certificate of purchase. 

¶ 11 On the day before the foreclosure sale, Oakwood purchased 

the Fox Run lien and the two CMA judgments.1 

¶ 12 And, on the day after the foreclosure sale, Mortgage 

Investments obtained a valid power of attorney from the debtor, 

which authorized Mortgage Investments to pay the Fox Run lien 

and the CMA judgments. 

¶ 13 On October 1, 2014, within eight business days after the sale, 

pursuant to section 38-38-302(1)(d), Oakwood filed a notice of 

intent to redeem the Fox Run lien so that it could acquire title to 

the property. On October 7, 2014, Mortgage Investments tendered, 

on behalf of the debtor, pursuant to the power of attorney, payment 

 

1 The parties dispute the exact timing of Oakwood’s purchase. 

However, this factual dispute has no effect on our resolution of the 

case. 
5 

to Oakwood in satisfaction of the Fox Run lien. Although 

Oakwood’s period to redeem had not yet begun, it refused to accept 

payment. 

¶ 14 On October 6, 2014, Oakwood filed a notice of intent to 

redeem one of the CMA judgments. On October 15, 2014, before 

Oakwood’s redemption period had commenced, Mortgage 

Investments again tendered payment to Oakwood in satisfaction of 

the judgment. And, again, Oakwood rejected the payment, despite 

the fact that its redemption period had not yet begun. 

¶ 15 On October 15, 2014, Mortgage Investments filed a complaint 

seeking a declaratory judgment that Oakwood was required to 

accept Mortgage Investments’ tenders on behalf of the debtor. 

Mortgage Investments also filed a motion for a temporary 

restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin Oakwood 

from redeeming. 

¶ 16 The district court granted the request for a temporary 

restraining order and later held a hearing on Mortgage Investments’ 

motion for a preliminary injunction. Ultimately, on November 10, 

2014, the court denied Mortgage Investments’ request for a 
6 

preliminary injunction. On November 20, 2014, Oakwood tendered 

redemption funds and received a sheriff’s deed to the property. 

¶ 17 The parties later filed motions for summary judgment on the 

issue of whether Mortgage Investments could pay off, before the 

redemption period began, the lien and judgments Oakwood had 

purchased. 

¶ 18 As relevant here, Mortgage Investments contended that it 

tendered payment in satisfaction of the lien and judgments before 

Oakwood’s period for redemption had begun and before Oakwood 

tendered redemption funds. Thus, Mortgage Investments argued 

that under WYSE, 92 P.3d at 921-22, Oakwood had not yet 

accomplished redemption. Relying on Osborn Hardware Co. v. 

Colorado Corp., 32 Colo. App. 254, 258, 510 P.2d 461, 463 (1973), 

Mortgage Investments asserted that Oakwood therefore had a duty 

to “accept the tender and to assist in satisfaction of the judgment.” 

¶ 19 In relevant part, Oakwood’s response contended that 

 Mortgage Investments “knew that sufficient funds were already 

being held by the Court Registry to satisfy the liens held by 

Oakwood as a result of the overbid proceeds from [the 

foreclosure] sale”; 
7 

 Osborn is inapplicable because that case was decided before 

the General Assembly eliminated a debtor’s right to postforeclosure redemption in 2008; 

 Oakwood “had already established its choate right of 

redemption prior to [Mortgage Investments’] tender by filing its 

Notice of Intent to Redeem”; and

 Oakwood was not required to accept Mortgage Investments’ 

tender on behalf of the debtors because, under WYSE, a 

certificate of purchase holder cannot extinguish a junior 

lienor’s right to redeem. 

¶ 20 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Oakwood, concluding that Oakwood was not required to accept 

Mortgage Investments’ tender of payment on behalf of the debtor. 

Specifically, the court concluded that 

 cases standing for the proposition that a debtor has a right to 

pay judgments and to prevent redemption were inapplicable 

because they were decided before the General Assembly 
8 

eliminated a debtor’s post-foreclosure right to redeem in 

2008;2 

 the property was sold at the foreclosure sale on September 25, 

2014, and Mortgage Investments “did not seek to satisfy 

[Oakwood’s] outstanding judgment and liens until October 14, 

2014,” so “to any extent [it] was acting ‘in the shoes of the 

debtor’ under power of attorney, it failed to exercise the 

debtor’s rights within the statutory redemption period”;3 

 “the General Assembly has not taken affirmative action to give 

a holder of a [c]ertificate of [p]urchase the right to purchase 

recorded debts against the property to frustrate redemption by 

the holder or assignee of the debts recorded on the property”; 

and 

 

2 The district court did not cite or address Mortgage Investments’ 

reliance on Osborn Hardware Co. v. Colorado Corp., 32 Colo. App. 

254, 258, 510 P.2d 461, 463 (1973). 

3 The “statutory redemption period” to which the trial court was 

referring is unclear. As the trial court acknowledged, the General 

Assembly eliminated property owners’ post-foreclosure redemption 

rights effective in 2008. See Ch. 305, sec. 21, § 38-38-302, 2006 

Colo. Sess. Laws 1467. Moreover, based on our review of the 

record, Mortgage Investments tendered payment in satisfaction of 

the liens on October 7, 2014, and October 15, 2014. 
9 

 it could find nothing in the foreclosure scheme that would give 

Mortgage Investments the “statutory right” to force Oakwood 

“to accept the tender.” 

II. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment 

¶ 21 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. Armed Forces Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA 74, ¶ 20. 

¶ 22 “Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and 

supporting documents clearly demonstrate no issue of material fact 

exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Olson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 P.3d 849, 852 

(Colo. App. 2007). 

¶ 23 The facts in this case are undisputed. The appeal turns on 

the district court’s legal conclusion that Oakwood had no duty to 

accept tender of payment in satisfaction of its liens. We review 

such conclusions de novo. See Ferguson, 275 P.3d at 745. 

III. Discussion 

¶ 24 As discussed above, the district court granted Oakwood’s 

motion for summary judgment on the bases that (1) the General 

Assembly has preserved junior lienors’ post-foreclosure right to 

redeem, while simultaneously eliminating that same right for 
10 

debtors; (2) the General Assembly has “not taken affirmative action 

to give a holder of a [c]ertificate of [p]urchase the right to purchase 

recorded debts against the property to frustrate redemption”; and 

(3) it could find nothing in the foreclosure statutes giving Mortgage 

Investments the right to force Oakwood to accept tender of payment 

on behalf of the debtor. Mortgage Investments contends that the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment on those 

grounds. We agree. 

¶ 25 The district court’s, and Oakwood’s, reliance on the 

elimination of a debtor’s post-foreclosure redemption right is 

misplaced. In this case, Mortgage Investments did not attempt to 

make a post-foreclosure redemption. Rather, it was attempting to 

pay, on behalf of the debtor, outstanding liens encumbering the 

property it had purchased at the foreclosure sale. 

¶ 26 Nevertheless, we agree that had Oakwood accepted (or been 

required to accept) Mortgage Investments’ tender of payment, the 

effect would have been to prevent a redemption by Oakwood. The 

question, then, is whether, prior to the start of Oakwood’s period to 

redeem and before it tendered redemption funds, Oakwood had a 
11 

duty to accept Mortgage Investments’ tender of payment, on behalf 

of the debtor, in satisfaction of the lien Oakwood sought to redeem. 

¶ 27 The statute provides that the period for redemption begins 

“[n]o sooner than fifteen business days” after the foreclosure sale, 

but it does not address the rights of debtors, certificate of purchase 

holders, or junior lienors during this period. § 38-38-302(4). 

Indeed, the statute does not explicitly give a certificate of purchase 

holder the right to pay, on behalf of the debtor, liens encumbering 

foreclosed property. Nor does it explicitly give a junior lienor the 

right to refuse a tender of payment in satisfaction of a lien prior to 

the start of the junior lienor’s redemption period and before the 

junior lienor tenders redemption funds. 

¶ 28 Thus, because the statute is silent as to the issue raised in 

this appeal, we interpret it to give effect to the General Assembly’s 

objectives. Buckley v. Chilcutt, 968 P.2d 112, 117 (Colo. 1998). But 

in doing so, we do not write on a clean slate: the supreme court and 

divisions of this court have previously considered the competing 

rights of debtors and junior lienors under earlier versions of the 

redemption statute. 
12 

¶ 29 We begin by noting that “[t]he redemption laws were enacted 

with the beneficent view of helping creditors to recover their just 

demands, nothing more.” Plute v. Schick, 101 Colo. 159, 161-62, 71 

P.2d 802, 804 (1937); Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 258, 510 P.2d at 

463 (same). And, because the right is “purely a creature of statute 

and depends entirely upon the provisions of the statute creating it,” 

WYSE, 92 P.3d at 921, the right to redeem must be “exercised in 

strict compliance with” the redemption statute’s terms, Sant v. 

Stephens, 753 P.2d 752, 756 (Colo. 1988). 

¶ 30 Furthermore, the right to redeem is not absolute; it must be 

balanced against a debtor’s right to pay a judgment. In Plute, the 

supreme court held that a debtor has “a legal right to pay [a] 

judgment, and thereby prevent a redemption by [a] defendant.” 101 

Colo. at 162, 71 P.2d at 804. Ordinarily, once the debtor tenders 

payment, “[t]he creditor’s duty is to accept the tender and to assist 

in satisfaction of the judgment.” Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 258, 510 

P.2d at 463-64; see also Davis Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Coonskin Props., 

Inc., 646 P.2d 940, 944 (Colo. App. 1982) (“There is no dispute in 
13 

the instant case about the right of the debtor to pay its own debts 

and to obtain a satisfaction thereof.”).4

¶ 31 This is not to say that a debtor has an absolute right to 

prevent redemption, either. In WYSE, the supreme court narrowed, 

but did not overrule, Plute, holding that once redemption is 

accomplished, the right to redeem cannot “be extinguished by any 

subsequent satisfaction of the judgment.” 92 P.3d at 920. 

¶ 32 Thus, under Plute, Osborn, and WYSE, debtors have a right to 

pay liens and monetary judgments, and to have creditors accept 

payment and assist in satisfaction thereof, until a junior lienor 

“actually makes [a] redemption.” WYSE, 92 P.3d at 922; see also 

Plute, 101 Colo. at 161-62, 71 P.2d at 804; Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 

258, 510 P.2d at 463-64. 

¶ 33 “[R]edemption by the lienor is actually made or accomplished 

by paying to the public trustee or sheriff, within the statutory 

 

4 We acknowledge that Plute and Osborn were decided before the 

General Assembly eliminated property owners’ right to redeem after 

a foreclosure sale. However, in both cases, the courts followed the 

rule that debtors have a legal right to pay a judgment, despite the 

fact that the property owners’ statutory periods for redemption had 

passed. Plute v. Schick, 101 Colo. 159, 160-63, 71 P.2d 802, 803-

04 (1937); Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 256-58, 510 P.2d at 462-64. 
14 

redemption period for th[e] lienor, the redemption amount required 

by statute.” WYSE, 92 P.3d at 922. 

¶ 34 Oakwood does not dispute that Mortgage Investments 

tendered, on behalf of the debtor, payment in satisfaction of the 

liens Oakwood sought to redeem before Oakwood’s statutory period 

for redemption had begun and before Oakwood tendered 

redemption funds to the sheriff. 

¶ 35 Accordingly, Oakwood had not yet accomplished redemption 

by tendering redemption funds within the statutory period, id., so it 

had a “duty . . . to accept [Mortgage Investments’] tender and to 

assist in satisfaction of the judgment,” Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 

258, 510 P.2d at 463-64; see also Plute, 101 Colo. at 161-62, 71 

P.2d at 804. 

¶ 36 This result is consistent with the purpose of the redemption 

statute. The General Assembly did not provide junior lienors the 

right of redemption to give real estate speculators an alternative 

means for acquiring foreclosed properties. Rather, as courts have 

repeatedly stated, the purpose is to help creditors protect their 

interests in repayment of debts. Plute, 101 Colo. at 161-62, 71 P.2d 

at 804. 
15 

¶ 37 And, in this case, we hold only that, prior to the start of a 

junior lienor’s redemption period and before a junior lienor tenders 

redemption funds, a certificate of purchase holder may pay, on 

behalf of the debtor, existing liens encumbering a foreclosed 

property. In the event that a certificate of purchase holder does so, 

the junior lienor will have received his or her just demand: payment 

of the judgment underlying the lien. See id. In such cases, 

redemption is therefore unnecessary because the junior lienor 

would no longer have a need to “protect [a] security interest[], which 

would be lost upon transfer of title to the purchaser” of the 

foreclosed property. WYSE, 92 P.3d at 921. 

¶ 38 Moreover, a contrary holding would, in our view, discourage 

participation in foreclosure sales. Indeed, it would make little sense 

for a party to compete to purchase property at a foreclosure sale if a 

certificate of purchase holder had no ability to pay, on behalf of the 

debtor, liens encumbering foreclosed property, despite the fact that 

the period for redemption had not started. Instead, the party could 

simply (1) acquire the most junior lien; (2) reject tender of payment 

in satisfaction of the lien made prior to the start of the redemption 

period; and (3) wait at the back of the line to exercise an absolute 
16 

right to redeem. Consequently, a contrary holding would encourage 

a race to acquire the most junior lien, rather than participation in 

the foreclosure sale. 

¶ 39 As Oakwood acknowledges, the purpose of the foreclosure 

statutes is to use a debtor’s property to pay off as many creditors as 

possible. See Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Land Title Ins. Corp., 216 

P.3d 597, 602 (Colo. App. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 207 P.3d 

141 (Colo. 2009). And, presumably, more competition at 

foreclosure sales will lead to higher purchase prices. Accordingly, 

we cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended parties to 

use the right of redemption as a work-around for the usual process 

of competing to purchase foreclosed property. 

¶ 40 Lastly, we are not persuaded by Oakwood’s reliance on failed 

Colorado Senate Bill 10-093, which would have given certificate of 

purchase holders the right to compel junior lienholders to accept a 

post-foreclosure tender of payment in lieu of redemption. See S.B. 

10-093, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010). Because 

a particular item of legislation may fail for many reasons, we do not 

infer legislative intent from the General Assembly’s failure to enact 
17 

proposed legislation. Ritter v. Jones, 207 P.3d 954, 962 (Colo. App. 

2009). 

IV. Conclusion 

¶ 41 Mortgage Investments tendered payment on behalf of the 

debtor in satisfaction of the judgments and lien Oakwood had 

purchased. And it did so before the period for redemption had 

begun and before Oakwood tendered redemption funds. 

Accordingly, Oakwood had not yet made or accomplished a 

redemption, so its duty as a creditor was to “accept the tender and 

to assist in satisfaction of the judgment.” Osborn, 32 Colo. App. at 

258, 510 P.2d at 463-64. 

¶ 42 We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment and remand 

the case with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of 

Mortgage Investments. 

JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.