1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-21-1997

Saroop v. Garcia

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7196

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Saroop v. Garcia" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 67.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/67
1

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 96-7196 

 ___________ 

 U.S.A. EX REL: LOLITA SAROOP 

v. 

 JESUS A. GARCIA 

 Lolita Saroop, 

 Appellant 

 _______________________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 

 Division of St. Croix 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-00006) 

 ___________________ 

 Argued December 13, 1996 

 Before: SCIRICA, NYGAARD and McKEE, Circuit Judges

 (Filed March 21, 1997) 

 MELODY M. WALCOTT, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 

 Office of the Federal Public Defender 

 P.O. Box 3450 

 Christiansted, St. Croix 

 U.S. Virgin Islands 00822 

 Attorney for Appellant 

 MICHAEL A. HUMPHREYS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 

 Office of the United States Attorney 

 1108 King Street, Suite 201 

 Christiansted, St. Croix 

 U.S. Virgin Islands 00820 

 Attorney for Appellee 
2

 __________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 __________________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 The issue on appeal in this habeas corpus case is the 

validity of the extradition treaty between the United States and 

Trinidad and Tobago. The district court found there was a valid 

treaty permitting extradition. We will affirm. 

I.

 In 1991, Lolita Saroop, a citizen of Trinidad and 

Tobago, was indicted in the United States Virgin Islands for drug 

trafficking and conspiracy.1 She was charged with supplying and 

packaging illegal drugs for a conspiracy based in St. Croix and 

profiting from their sale.2

 

1. The Indictment contained four counts: 

(1) Conspiracy to unlawfully possess, import and distribute, and 

possess aboard an aircraft arriving in the United 

States, quantities of controlled substances, including 

cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

846, 963; 

(2) Attempt to unlawfully import into the United States a 

Scheduled II controlled substance in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 963; 

(3) Unlawfully possessing and bringing on board an aircraft 

arriving in the United States a Scheduled II controlled 

substance which was not a part of the aircraft's 

manifest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 955, 960(a)(1); and 

(4) Attempt to possess with the intent to distribute a Scheduled 

II controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, 

and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. 

2. In 1991, Burrell Gill, a co-conspirator, was convicted on 

these charges in the Virgin Islands. United States v. Gill, 968 

F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 963 (1992). 
3

 Citing a 1931 treaty between the United States and 

Great Britain, the United States sought her extradition.3 Saroop 

claimed the 1931 United States-Great Britain treaty was never 

ratified by the independent nation of Trinidad and Tobago. An 

invalid treaty, she argued, could not support her extradition. 

But the Trinidad and Tobago courts found the treaty valid and 

refused to quash the extradition arrest warrant. In 1995, the 

government of Trinidad and Tobago surrendered Saroop to the 

United States Marshal for transfer to St. Croix. 

 While awaiting trial in the United States Virgin 

Islands, Saroop filed a petition in absentia with the Privy 

Council for leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court 

of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago. The Privy Council is the 

court of last resort in the British Commonwealth of which 

Trinidad and Tobago is a participating member. This legal 

structure survived Trinidad and Tobago's independence from Great 

Britain. The Privy Council denied her petition without a 

hearing. 

 In 1996, Saroop filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 in the District Court for the Virgin Islands 

raising the same argument rejected by Trinidad and Tobago - that 

her extradition was unlawful because there was no valid 

extradition treaty. Finding a valid treaty between the two 

 

3. Extradition is defined as "the process by which a person 

charged with or convicted of a crime under the law of one state 

is arrested in another state and returned for trial or 

punishment." Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of 

the United States § 474, pt. IV. 
4

nations, the district court denied her petition. This appeal 

followed.4

 II. 

 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 

legal conclusions on a plenary basis and factual findings for 

clear error. Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 1996); 

United States ex rel. Schiano v. Luther, 954 F.2d 910, 911 (3d 

Cir. 1992). Interpretations of foreign law are subject to 

plenary review and may be resolved by reference to any relevant 

information. Grupo Protexa S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, a 

Div. of Marine Office of America Corp., 20 F.3d 1224, 1239 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 481 (1994); Kilbarr Corp. v. 

Business Sys. Inc., B.V., 990 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1993); 

Mobile Marine Sales, Ltd. v. M/V Prodromos, 776 F.2d 85, 89 (3d 

Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 

 

4. Saroop is still in custody in MDC Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, 

awaiting trial. The district court stayed the criminal 

proceedings pending appeal. 
5

III. 

 Because treaties are agreements between nations, 

individuals ordinarily may not challenge treaty interpretations 

in the absence of an express provision within the treaty or an 

action brought by a signatory nation. Although the district 

court found Saroop had standing, the government contends only 

Trinidad and Tobago had standing to sue.5 See United States v. 

Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1298-1301 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Dominica has 

exercised its power to surrender Riviere as a matter of comity 

for charges not listed in the extradition order; Riviere has no 

basis for objection to its actions."); Matta-Ballesteros v. 

Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 

(1990) ("Treaties are designed to protect the sovereign interest 

of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to determine 

whether a violation of sovereign interests has occurred and 

requires redress"); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. 

Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

1009 (1986). 

 Had Saroop brought suit invoking the treaty or the Rule 

of Specialty, she would lack standing.6 United States v. 

 

5. Although not directly raised on appeal, the government has 

asked us to revisit it. Because standing was argued before the 

district court we will address it. 

6. "The rule of specialty is based on principles of 

international comity and is designed to guarantee the 

surrendering nation that the extradited individual will not be 

subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving 

government." Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 

1989); see Fiocconi v. Attorney General of United States, 462 

F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); 
6

Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-1301 (3d Cir. 1991); MattaBallesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990) ("It is well established that 

individuals have no standing to challenge violations of 

international treaties in the absence of a protest by the 

sovereigns involved."); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 

(1st Cir. 1981). But Saroop does not invoke the terms of the 

treaty to avoid extradition. Instead, she asserts the treaty is 

invalid. 

 For this reason, we believe the government's reliance 

on United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991), is 

misplaced. In Riviere, the petitioner contended his extradition 

from Dominica on drug charges violated the extradition treaty 

between the United States and Dominica and the Rule of Specialty, 

and barred his prosecution for firearms offenses. Because the 

extradition agreement runs between sovereigns, not individuals, 

and because Dominica consented to extradition, we held Riviere 

lacked standing. Riviere's rights to challenge extradition were 

"derivative." Rather than invoking derivative rights, Saroop 

maintains there was no extradition treaty between the United 

States and Trinidad and Tobago. Where the validity of the 

extradition treaty itself has been challenged, a petitioner like 

Saroop has standing. 

 IV. 

(..continued) 

Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and 

Practice, vol. 1, ch. 7, p. 359-60 (2d rev. ed. 1987). Saroop 

has not set forth a specialty challenge to her extradition. 
7

 In 1931, the United States entered into an extradition 

treaty with Great Britain. In 1935, Great Britain adopted an 

Order in Council7 that provided: 

From and after the 24th day of June 1935, the Extradition Acts 

1870-1932 shall apply in respect of the United Kingdom 

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Channel 

Islands, the Isle of Man, and all British Colonies in 

the case of the United States of America under and in 

accordance with the said treaty of the 22nd December 

1931. 

The 1931 treaty, therefore, defined the United States' 

relationship with Trinidad and Tobago, at the time a colony of 

Great Britain. 

 On August 31, 1962, Trinidad and Tobago became an 

independent dominion of Great Britain under the Order in Council 

of 1962 and the Trinidad and Tobago Independence Act 1962. On 

August 1, 1976, Trinidad and Tobago's dominion status ceased by 

virtue of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago Act 1976. 

Thereafter, Trinidad and Tobago became an independent republic. 

 Saroop contends there was no valid extradition treaty 

with the United States because Trinidad and Tobago was neither a 

named party to the original 1931 extradition treaty nor did it 

ratify or expressly adopt it. The government proffers two 

 

7. "The Sovereign of the United Kingdom has inherent power to 

legislate or issue executive instructions by exercise of the 

Royal Prerogative. . . . An Order of Her Majesty in Council is 

made with the advice of the Privy Council, and signed by the 

Clerk of the Council. An Order in Council is nearly always used 

in establishing the Constitution of a Dependent Territory. They 

are also used for ordinary legislation or for extending 

particular Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament to the dependent 

territories." 3 Guy W. Lewin Smith, Modern Legal Systems 

Cyclopedia 3.260.6, § 1.1(B)(4) (Kenneth Robert Redden ed., 

William S. Hein & Co. 1990). Trinidad and Tobago was considered 

a "Dependent Territory" before it became an independent republic. 
8

arguments in support of a valid treaty - deferral to the judgment 

of the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago under the 

international principle of comity and deferral to the 

understanding of each sovereign's executive branch as evidenced 

by their actions and pronouncements. On either ground, the 

district court found that Saroop was properly extradited. 

A 

 Saroop presented her arguments against extradition in 

the courts of Trinidad and Tobago. At each level, the courts 

found her claim meritless. The High Court of Justice found no 

ground to bar Saroop's extradition under the 1931 extradition 

treaty between the United States and Great Britain. The High 

Court wrote: 

By Section 4 of [the 1962 Act], the [Extradition] Act qualified 

as one of the existing laws of the Colony of Trinidad 

and Tobago immediately before the commencement of [the 

1962 Act]. It was consequently preserved by the 

provisions of that section as part of the law of the 

independent Dominion of Trinidad and Tobago. . . . But 

all existing laws then in force [prior to 1976] in the 

independent Dominion of Trinidad and Tobago were 

preserved as part of the law of the Republic by Section 

4 of the 1976 Act so that the [Extradition] Act 

continued its life thereafter as part of the law of the 

Republic. 

In the Matter of Itmo Lolita Saroop, H.C.A. No. 3040, at 5-6 

(High Court of Justice Nov. 29, 1993). The High Court expressly 

held the 1931 treaty was incorporated into the law of the 

independent nation of Trinidad and Tobago and was still binding. 

 Under the international principle of comity this 

judgment is entitled to recognition. The Supreme Court has 

defined comity as: 
9

neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of 

mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is 

the recognition which one nation allows within its 

territory to the legislative, executive or judicial 

acts of another nation, having due regard both to 

international duty and convenience and to the rights of 

its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 

protection of its laws. 

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also

Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 

F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1994)("Under the principle of 

international comity, a domestic court normally will give effect 

to executive, legislative, and judicial acts of a foreign 

nation.")(quoting from Remington Rand Corporation-Delaware v. 

Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987)). Such 

deference "fosters international cooperation and encourages 

reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability 

through satisfaction of mutual expectations." Spatola v. United 

States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting from Laker 

Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 

937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

 While the comity doctrine does not reach the force of 

obligation, it creates a strong presumption in favor of 

recognizing foreign judicial decrees.8 See Republic of 

Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d 

Cir. 1994); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

8. We note as to foreign judgments in particular, the 

Restatement provides: "[A] final judgment of a court of a 

foreign state . . . establishing or confirming the status of a 

person . . . is conclusive between the parties, and is entitled 

to recognition in courts in the United States." Restatement 

(Third) of The Foreign Relations of The United States § 481 

(1986). 
10

The decision to defer to a foreign judgment falls within the 

sound discretion of the trial judge and comity should be avoided 

only when it would be detrimental or prejudicial to the interests 

of the United States. See Philadelphia Gear Corp., 44 F.3d at 

191; Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 

435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). 

 But the Supreme Court has required that certain 

criteria be satisfied before a court of the United States 

recognizes a foreign nation's judgment. The Court said: 

[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a 

full and fair trial abroad [1] before a court of 

competent jurisdiction, [2] conducting the trial upon 

regular proceedings, [3] after due citation or 

voluntary appearance of defendant, [4] and under a 

system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial 

administration of justice . . ., [5] and there is 

nothing to show either prejudice in the court, . . . or 

fraud in procuring the judgment . . . the merits of the 

case should not, in an action brought in this country 

upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial 

or an appeal . . . . 

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 202-203. As a condition to honoring 

a foreign country's judicial decrees, the Court also requires 

reciprocity on the part of the foreign nation. Id. at 210. 

 Saroop does not contend her judicial proceedings in 

Trinidad and Tobago violated the strictures set forth in Hilton 

v. Guyot. Nor from our review of the record, does there appear 

to be any basis for such a challenge. Saroop, a Trinidadian 

citizen, chose to file her action in Trinidad and Tobago. There 

is no assertion that Trinidad and Tobago failed to follow its own 

regular judicial proceedings, engaged in prejudicial or 

fraudulent practices, or refused to extend deference to United 
11

States' judicial findings. See In the Matter of Itmo Lolita 

Saroop, H.C.A. No. 3040 (High Court of Justice Nov. 29 1993). 

 In support of her argument to ignore the High Court's 

judgment and the international principle of comity, Saroop cites 

a 106 year old district court decision, Ex Parte McCabe, 46 F. 

363 (W.D. Tex. 1891). But this case is inapposite. In Ex Parte 

McCabe the district court held his extradition improper under 

principles of comity because of a clear treaty provision and past 

United States' practice precluding the extradition of an American 

citizen to Mexico. Here, there is no treaty provision or past 

practice which precludes reliance on the Trinidad and Tobago 

courts' judgment. 

 Extension of comity will not prejudice the interests of 

the United States. Rather it furthers those interests because 

the United States recognizes the 1931 treaty as binding itself 

and Trinidad and Tobago. Under the doctrine of international 

comity, we will defer to the judgment of the High Court of 

Justice for Trinidad and Tobago on the validity of the 1931 

extradition treaty and its continued vitality at the time of 

Saroop's extradition. Therefore, we hold there was a valid 

extradition treaty at the time of Saroop's surrender. 

B 

In the alternative, the district court held there was 

an enforceable agreement between the governments of the United 

States and Trinidad and Tobago based on their intent and actions. 

 When determining whether two nations have entered into an 

extradition treaty, courts usually defer to the intentions and 
12

actions of each nation's executive branch. See Terlinden v. 

Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 290 (1902). 

 In Terlinden, the Imperial German Consul filed a 

complaint before a United States Commissioner requesting a 

warrant for the arrest and surrender of Gerhard Terlinden, a 

subject of the former Kingdom of Prussia and a fugitive from the 

German Empire, for forgery and counterfeiting. In 1852, the 

United States entered into an extradition treaty with the Kingdom 

of Prussia which sanctioned the surrender of fugitives for the 

crime of forgery. In 1871, the Kingdom of Prussia was subsumed 

into the newly formed German Empire. Terlinden filed a habeas 

corpus petition in federal court asserting there was no treaty 

between the United States and the German Empire which sanctioned 

the extradition of fugitives, and the extradition treaty between 

the United States and the former Kingdom of Prussia was 

terminated by operation of law after the incorporation of Prussia 

into the German Empire. 

 The Supreme Court examined whether the United States 

and Germany acted in accordance with the understanding that the 

1852 treaty was still in effect. "[O]n the question whether [the 

extradition] treaty has ever been terminated, governmental action 

in respect to it must be regarded as of controlling importance." 

 Terlinden 184 U.S. at 285. It was "out of the question" that a 

Prussian fugitive could sue in the United States' courts to 

challenge the executive departments' conclusion that the treaty 

obligations between the two nations survived the German Empire's 

absorption of the Prussian Kingdom. Id. at 286. The Court held: 
13

We concur in the view that the question whether power remains in 

a foreign state to carry out its treaty obligations is 

in its nature political and not judicial, and that the 

courts ought not to interfere with the conclusions of 

the political department in that regard. . . . The 

decisions of the Executive Department in matters of 

extradition, within its own sphere, and in accordance 

with the Constitution, are not open to judicial 

revision . . . ." 

Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 288, 290; see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 

U.S. 447, 474-475 (1913). 

 Whether a treaty remains in force after a change in the 

sovereign status of one of the signatories has been treated by 

other Courts of Appeals as a political question better left to 

the executive branch of government. Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 

851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The continuing validity of the Treaty 

after Singapore's independence from the United Kingdom presents a 

political question, and we must defer to the intentions of the 

State Departments of the two countries."); New York Chinese TV 

Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 852 (2d 

Cir.) ("'It is well settled that on the question whether [a] 

treaty has ever been terminated, governmental action in respect 

to it must be regarded as of controlling importance.' [citations 

omitted]. Moreover, the judiciary should refrain from 

determining whether a treaty has lapsed, and instead should defer 

to the wishes of the elected branches of government." (quoting 

from Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 285)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 

(1992); Matter of Extradition of Tuttle, 966 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 

1992) (citing Terlinden with approval); Sabatier v. Dabrowski, 

586 F.2d 866, 868 (1st Cir. 1978) (the court must give "great" 
14

deference to the conduct of the two countries when deciding a 

treaty's applicability). 

 We will look to the intent and actions of Trinidad and 

Tobago and the United States to ascertain if there was a valid 

treaty. The nations' conduct proves dispositive. Terlinden 184 

U.S. at 285; New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. 954 F.2d at 852; 

Sabatier, 586 F.2d at 868.9

 We recognize there has been no express confirmation of 

an extradition treaty between the United States and the 

independent nation of Trinidad and Tobago. Nor has there been an 

exchange of diplomatic letters between the two nations expressly 

placing Trinidad and Tobago under the 1931 treaty. But Trinidad 

and Tobago clearly believes, as demonstrated through its 

legislative mandates, there is a valid extradition treaty which 

sanctioned its surrender of Saroop to the American authorities. 

 

9. The Vienna Convention of Succession of States in Respect of 

Treaties provides: 

A bilateral treaty which at the date of a succession of States 

was in force in respect of the territory to which the 

succession of States relates is considered as being in 

force between a newly independent State and the other 

State party when: 

(a) they expressly so agree; or 

(b) by reason of their conduct they are to be considered as 

having so agreed.

United Nations Convention on the Succession of States in Respect 

of Treaties, (Article 24) Vienna, Austria, August 23, 1978 

(emphasis supplied). The United States is a party to the Vienna 

Convention and is consequentially bound by its obligations. See

767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the Republic 

of Zaire to United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir.) ("The 

Vienna Convention entered into force April 24, 1964. One hundred 

and thirteen member states have ratified it, including the United 

States . . . ."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993). 
15

Under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago Act 1976, the laws 

in force before the declaration of independence were preserved 

and remain in effect as part of the law of the new republic. The 

1976 Act Section 5.1 provides in part: 

Subject to the provisions of this section, the operation of the 

existing law on and after the appointed [independence] 

day shall not be affected by the revocation of the 

Order in Council of 1962 but the existing laws shall be 

construed with such modifications, adaptions, 

qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to 

bring them into conformity with the act. 

Great Britain's Order in Council of 1962 provided that all laws 

in effect prior to Trinidad and Tobago's change of status to an 

independent Dominion of Great Britain would remain in effect. 

Therefore, the 1935 Order in Council, which specified the United 

States-Great Britain 1931 extradition treaty was applicable to 

the British colonies, was incorporated into the law of the 

independent Trinidad and Tobago nation. 

 The passage of the Commonwealth and Foreign Territories 

Act 1985 by the Trinidad and Tobago legislature confirms its 

intention to assume the privileges and obligations of all 

extradition treaties Great Britain entered into on its behalf. 

The act provides: 

Every Order in Council made under the applied United Kingdom Acts 

entitled the Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1906, with 

respect to any foreign territory and having effect as 

part of the law of Trinidad and Tobago immediately 

before the commencement of this act shall continue to 

have such effect in relation to that foreign territory, 

and the Extradition Act and the said applied United 

Kingdom's Acts shall continue in force in so far as is 

necessary to give effect to any such Order in Council, 

until an Order is made under Section 4 applying this 

Act to that foreign territory. 
16

This statute incorporated the Great Britain treaties, including 

the 1931 treaty and the 1935 Order in Council, into Trinidad and 

Tobago law. 

 Additionally, in 1962, Trinidad and Tobago exchanged 

diplomatic letters with an emissary of the British government 

affirming that Trinidad and Tobago assumed the obligations and 

responsibilities found in the 1931 treaty as well as all other 

valid international agreements entered into by Great Britain on 

its behalf. The letter provides in part: 

[A]ll obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the 

United Kingdom which arise from any valid international 

instrument . . . shall henceforth be assumed by the 

Government of Trinidad and Tobago, insofar as such 

instruments may be held to have application to Trinidad 

and Tobago . . . . 

United Nations -- Treaty Series no. 6581. Saroop contends these 

letters do not support the treaty's validity because the United 

States was not an executor. Nonetheless, the letters illustrate 

Trinidad and Tobago's adoption of the 1931 treaty into law. 

 It is also of some consequence that Trinidad and Tobago 

surrendered Saroop to the United States under a diplomatic 

request premised on the 1931 extradition treaty. No objection 

was made. It is evident that Trinidad and Tobago found the 

request proper under an existing extradition agreement. 

 For its part, there is ample evidence the United States 

believes there is an extradition treaty with the independent 

nation of Trinidad and Tobago. The United States Congress has 
17

listed all its bilateral extradition treaties in 18 U.S.C. § 

3181. This includes an extradition treaty with Trinidad and 

Tobago signed in 1931 and entered in force in 1935. Furthermore, 

the United States recorded the 1931 extradition treaty in the 

U.S. State Department's "Treaties in Force" publication. See

Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Treaties 

in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Agreements of the United 

States in Force on January 1, 1996. 

 In the past, the United States State Department, 

through its Office of the Legal Advisor, has represented to the 

courts that there is a valid extradition treaty between the 

United States and Trinidad and Tobago. Hoi-Pong v. Noriega, 677 

F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D. Fla. 1988). At the time of Saroop's 

surrender, the United States which filed its extradition request 

under the 1931 treaty clearly recognized the treaty as governing 

the extradition. 

 Finally, there is a presumption that when a colonized 

state earns its independence from a colonial nation, prior 

treaties recognized by the former colonial power will devolve to 

the successor in interest nation. "Particularly in reference to 

emerging nations, the weight of authority supports the view that 

new nations inherit the treaty obligations of the former 

colonies." Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 

(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 

1973) (extradition treaty entered into between the United States 

and Great Britain is valid as to India, even though India had 

gained its independence from Great Britain); see also
18

Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 

1983) (The United States-Denmark extradition treaty applied to 

Iceland after it became an independent nation). Moreover, the 

Vienna Convention acknowledged a presumption that successor 

nations adopt the bilateral treaty agreements which their 

formerly affiliated countries entered into on their behalf.10 

V.

 Therefore, based on either the international principle 

of comity or the nations' conduct and intent, we agree with the 

district court there was a valid binding extradition treaty. 

 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 

of the district court. 

 

10. Article 24 of the Vienna Convention provides: 

(1) A bilateral treaty which at the date of a succession of 

States was in force in respect of the territory to 

which the succession of States relates is considered as 

being in force between a newly independent State and 

the other State party when: 

(a) they expressly so agree; or 

(b) by reason of their conduct they are to be considered as 

having so agreed. 

(2) A treaty considered as being in force under paragraph 1 

applies in the relations between the newly independent 

State and the other State Party from the date of 

succession of States, unless a different intention 

appears from their agreement or is otherwise 

established. 

United Nations Convention on the Succession of States in Respect 

of Treaties, (Article 24) Vienna, Austria, August 23, 1978. 
19