Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 67A04-1711-CR-2524 | May 1, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel C. Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert Wikle,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 1, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

67A04-1711-CR-2524

Appeal from the Putnam Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charles D. Bridges, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

67D01-1511-CM-667 

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 67A04-1711-CR-2524 | May 1, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Robert Wikle appeals his conviction for resisting law enforcement, as a Class A 

misdemeanor, following a bench trial. He presents a single issue for our review, 

namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 18, 2015, Wikle was home alone when he heard a commotion on 

his front porch. He opened his front door and found a woman fighting with her 

teenaged daughter.1 Wikle intervened, and the woman called her boyfriend, 

who soon arrived and physically assaulted Wikle. At some point, Wikle called 

the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department and reported a “disturbance.” Tr. at 

6. When Deputy Richard Cooper arrived, he saw a man and a woman in a car 

at the end of Wikle’s driveway, and he saw Wikle exit the front door of his 

house carrying a shotgun.

[3] Deputy Cooper ordered Wikle to “drop the weapon multiple times,” but Wikle 

“refused.” Id. at 7. After approximately “twenty or thirty seconds,” Wikle 

placed the shotgun in a chair. Id. Deputy Cooper then ordered Wikle “to the 

ground,” but he did not comply. Id. Deputy Cooper approached Wikle and 

tried to detain him, but Wikle “refused to be detained.” Id. at 8. In particular, 

as Deputy Cooper tried to get Wikle to put his hands behind his back, Wikle 

 

1

 Wikle did not know the woman or her daughter.
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“pulled away” and turned towards Deputy Cooper, which Deputy Cooper 

interpreted to be an “aggressive move.” Id. at 9. Deputy Cooper then “took 

[Wikle] to the ground physically” and “wrestled with him on the ground for a 

minute or so to get him into [hand]cuffs.” Id. at 8. Deputy Cooper never got 

Wikle in handcuffs, but the situation deescalated quickly. At some point, 

Deputy Cooper helped Wikle sit down in a chair, and they discussed the events 

that led up to Wikle’s call to the Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Cooper did not 

arrest Wikle at that time.

[4] A few weeks later, the State charged Wikle with resisting law enforcement, as a 

Class A misdemeanor. Following a bench trial in June 2017, the trial court 

entered judgment of conviction, but imposed no sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Wikle contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well 

settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 

[judgment]. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We 

do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. 

Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder 

could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
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[6] To prove resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was 

required to show that Wikle knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, 

obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the law 

enforcement officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s 

duties. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2015). On appeal, Wikle first

contends that the State did not prove that he acted knowingly or intentionally. 

In particular, Wikle asserts that he had been “knocked unconscious” by the 

woman’s boyfriend before Deputy Cooper arrived, so, he maintains,

it is possible that[,] when pulling away and turning toward 

Deputy Cooper, Wikle was not acting either with a conscious 

objective to resist, obstruct, or interfere with Deputy Cooper, or 

an awareness of a high probability that he was doing so. He may 

have been confused from his head injuries, and not realizing [sic]

that his actions could hamper the activities of the law 

enforcement officer that he had requested.

Appellant’s Br. at 15. But Wikle’s contentions amount to a request that we 

reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. It was within the trial court’s 

discretion as factfinder to determine whether Wikle’s actions were knowing and 

intentional despite his injuries.

[7] Wikle next contends that the State did not prove that he forcibly resisted 

Deputy Cooper. In particular, Wikle states that “nothing about Deputy 

Cooper’s testimony leads to a conclusion that Wikle did these acts in a forceful 

manner.” Id. at 14. We cannot agree.
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[8] In Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court 

explained as follows:

the word “forcibly” is an essential element of the crime and 

modifies the entire string of verbs—resists, obstructs, or 

interferes—such that the State must show forcible resistance, 

forcible obstruction, or forcible interference. [Spangler v. State,] 

607 N.E.2d 720, 722-23 (Ind. 1993). We also held [in Spangler]

that the word meant “something more than mere action.” Id. at 

724. “[O]ne ‘forcibly resists’ law enforcement when strong, 

powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement 

official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 723. “[A]ny 

action to resist must be done with force in order to violate this 

statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly 

resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Id. at 724.

But even so, “the statute does not demand complete passivity.” 

K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). In Graham v. 

State, we clarified that “[t]he force involved need not rise to the 

level of mayhem.” 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). In fact, even 

a very “modest level of resistance” might support the offense. Id. at 966 

(“even ‘stiffening’ of one’s arms when an officer grabs hold to 

position them for cuffing would suffice”).

(Emphasis added.)

[9] Here, again, Deputy Cooper testified that when he tried to place handcuffs on 

Wikle, Wikle pulled away from him, made an “aggressive move” towards him, 

and “wrestled” on the ground with him for approximately one minute. Tr. at 8-

9. We hold that Deputy Cooper’s testimony is sufficient to prove that Wikle

refused to be detained and forcibly resisted him. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 833 

N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding evidence sufficient to support 
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resisting law enforcement conviction where defendant pushed away officers 

“with his shoulders” when officers tried to grab him and then “stiffened up” to 

resist officers’ attempts to get him inside a police vehicle). The State presented 

sufficient evidence to support Wikle’s resisting law enforcement conviction.

[10] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.