Plaintiffs init ially filed suit ag ainst Charles H. Ramsey in his official ca

pacity as Chief 1 of the Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt; Chi e f L anie r w a s su bs tit ute d a s D e fe nd ant p ur su ant t o Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 25(d) . Plaintiffs have made clea r that this action is broug ht a g a ins t Ch ie f L anie r o nly in h e r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity and , a s su c h, sh ou ld b e tr e ate d a s a su it a g a ins t the Metropolitan Police De partment. Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n to De f.’s Mot. Summ. J . (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 3; see Kentuc ky v . Graham , 4 73 U. S. 1 59 , 1 65 -6 6 ( 19 85 ) ( “ [A]n o ff ic ia l- c a pa c ity su it i s, in a ll respe cts other than na

me, to be tre ated a s a suit ag ainst the entity .”) MI CHAEL

L . MENTZ ER, e t al

. , Pla int if fs , v . CATHY L . L ANI ER, Chief of the Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-281 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (January 6, 2010) This case is broug ht by

Plaintiffs Michael Mentzer a nd L eo Scully

ag ainst Defe ndant Cathy L . L anie r i n h e r o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity a s Ch ie f o f t

he Me tr op oli tan Po lic e De pa rtme nt. 1 Pla int if fs a lle g e that th e y

su ff e re d a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns in r e ta liatio n f or e ng a g ingin activities protec ted by

Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. , as amende d, the D.C. Whist leblower Protection Act, D.C. Code §§ 1-615.51 et seq. , a nd the D. C. Human Rig hts Act, D.C. Code §§ 2-1401 et seq. Presently befor e the Court is Def

endant’ s [29] Motion for Summary

J udg ment. Plaintiffs have filed a brief in opposition, and De fenda nt has filed a r eply . For

the re asons explained below, the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s motion for
summa ry jud g me nt.The Court strictly adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h) (for merly Rule 56.1 when 2 resolvingmotions for summary judgme nt). Se e Bu rk

e v . G ou ld , 286 F.3d 513, 519 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (f inding district cour

ts must i nvoke the loca l rule bef ore a pplying it to the ca se). The Court has advised the pa

rties that it strictly

adher es to Rule 7(h) a

nd has stated that it “a ssumes fac ts identified by

the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are a dmitted, unless such a fac t is controverte d in the statement of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” [ 7] Orde r at 1 (A

pr. 25, 2006). Thus, in many instances the Court sha ll cite only to one par

ty ’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“Stmt.”) unless a statement is contra dicted by the opposing party . The Court shall also cite dire ctly to evidence in the rec ord, whe re a ppropriate
. 2 I. BACKG ROUND At all times releva

nt to this action, Plaintiffs Michae l Mentzer and L eo Scully wer e police office rs within the Special Ope rations Division of the D.C. Metropolitan Police De partment (“MPD”) . Def

.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1- 2. Plaintiffs previously worke d within the Special Oper ations 2 Division’s Horse Mounted Unit (“ HMU”)
. Id. ¶ 3. While workingin the HMU, Plaintiffs believed that other off

icer s in the unit were not pe rfor ming their

duties appropr iately
. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs were conce rned that other off icer s were not punctual, fa iled to exercise and c are for the horses re g ularly , and inappr opriately eng ag ed in outside employ ment. Id. On September

11, 2003, Offic er Me ntzer sent a letter to Assistant Chi ef of

Police Br oadbent de tailing his conc erns. SeeDef .’s Mem. P. & A . Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J . (“D ef.’ s Me m.” ), Ex. A(S e pt. 11 , 2 00 3 L e tte r) . A lth ou g h M e ntze r h a d p re vio us ly vo ic e d h is c omp la int s to manag ement staff

within the Special Oper ations Division, the September 11, 2003 letter w as his first written complaint. See id. ; Pls .’ Stmt . ¶ 7. Me ntze r’ s le tte r a c c us e d Se rg e ant D a le Poskus, among other

things, of mismana g ing the HMU, submitting fra udulent rec eipts for reimburse ment, failingto disclose the poor he alth condition of his horse, and, a fter le avingthe HMU, stealinghorse f

eed. See Def

.’s Mem., Ex. A at 1-3. The letter claims that Mentzer and Sc ull y “ have be e n b ra

nd e d tr ou ble make rs ” fo r t

he ir atte mpt s to c ri tic ize and

inv e sti g atePlaintiff Scully ’s re vocation of police power s ended on a round June 17-18, 2004, and he 3 returne d to work af

ter a vaca tion on J une 30 or July

1, 2004. See Scully

Dep. at 111. 3 mismanag ement. See id. at 1. Plaintiffs were also conc erne d with the stable in which HMU hor ses wer e housed, which
was a fede rally -owne d fac ility

at For t Dupont. Def.’ s Stm t. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs believed that the horses should have been sta bled at a c ity -owne d fac ility , the historic Cavalry Ba rn on the c ampus of St. Eliz abeth’ s Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 5- 6. On Ma rc h 2 9, 20 04 , Pl a int if

fs atte nd e d a

me e tin gwi th D.C. Councilmember Ji m Graha m, Assistant Chi ef B roadbe nt, and other of ficials conc erningthe HMU and the plans for f

uture stablingof horse s. Id. ¶ 8; Compl. ¶ 30. On April 9, 2004, Plaintiffs attended a party in which a U.S. Capitol police off icer beca me bellig ere nt. Def.’ s Stm t. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs handcuf fed the office r in an e ffor t to control him. Id. ; see Def

.’s Mem., Ex. B (De p. of Michae l Mentzer) at 128; De f.’s Mem., Ex. C (Dep. of L eo Scully) at 106-07. Par

k Police office rs then informe d Plaintiffs that they would handle the situation and asked Plaintiffs to leave . Mentzer Dep. at 128; Scully Dep. at 107. The handc uffe d of fi c e r l ate r c la ime d th at Pla int if fs a ssa ult e d h im. De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 10 . Pl a int if

fs we re ini tia lly investigated by

Capitol P olice and later we re inve stigated by MPD. Id. ; Scully

Dep. at 107-08. On April 14, 2004, five da y s after the incident, MPD place d Plaintiffs on paid administrative leave and re moved them from the H MU. Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 11; P ls.’ Mem., Ex. 8 (Dep. of Micha el Mentzer) at 133. Plainti ffs’ police power s were revoke d for a pproxi mately

two months. See Mentzer Dep. at 147. Plaintiffs claim that the ac tual investigation was completed in just two 3 day s and that there was no re ason to place them on administrative leave
. See Mentzer Dep. at 13 3; S c ull y

De p. at 10 9. Ne ve rt

he le ss, Pla int if

fs we re no t di sc ipl ine d a s a re su lt o f t

hisT h e r e i s a d i s p ut e i nth e r e c o r d

a s t o th e n atur e o f

S c u l l y ’ s r e m o v a l f

r o mth e H M U
. It 4 a pp e ars that Sc ull y

wa s to ld h is r e mov a l w ou ld b e te mpo ra ry , b ut S c ull y

a sse rt e d at hi s deposition in May

2008 that he wa s still technica lly assig ned to the HMU “ on paper ” despite not havingserve d with the unit since his removal in August 2004. See Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 13; S cully

Dep. at 111. 4 particula r investig ation. Def

.’s Stmt. ¶ 12. W hen Serg eant Scully returne d to the HMU, he disciplined sever al offic ers. Scully Dep. at 113. Those offic ers c omplained that Scully was “pickingon them” to then-Commander L anier
. Id. at 113-15. On August 4, 2004, Serg eant Scully was re moved from the H MU and de tailed to the Special Eve nts Bra

nch. De f.’s Stmt. ¶ 13. MPD has asser ted that the re ason for

Scully ’s 4 transfe r wa s that there w as a shor tag e of se rg eants in the Spec ial Events B ranc h. See Def .’s Me m., Ex. D (D e p. of

MPD Pol ic e Chi e f C athe ri ne L anie r) at 81 -8 6; S c ull y De p. at 11 2. Sc ull y was told that he c ould return to the HMUafte r the 2005 pre sidential inauguration. See L anier Dep. at 84; Scully

Dep. at 112-13. Howe ver, Scully was not off

ere d a cha nce to r eturn to the HMU until 2006. See L anier Dep. at 83-84; Def.’ s Mem., Ex . E (Scully Interrog . Answer s) at 2. When Scully

was de tailed out of HMU on August 4, 2004, he was told that there was g oing to be an investig ation into his allege d misconduct. See Scully Dep. at 117. At one point, Scully was told that he was moved out of H MU bec ause of this investigation. Id. at 113. Howe ver, Commander L anier

told Scully

in November

2004 that she had ne ver initiated a ny such investigation. Id. at 11 7. In M arc h 2 00 5, Sc ull y wa s is su e d a

L e tte r o f R e pr ima

nd , a pp are ntl y for usingan expletive in an email to another office r re g ardinga situation that directly aff ecte d Scully
. See Scully

Dep. at 100. Scully

filed a c harg e of discr imination with t he D.C. Off ice of Human Rig hts on March 30, 2005. See Pls.’ Mem., Ex . 4 (Notice of Charg e of D iscrimination). In D e c e mbe r 2 00 4, Of

fi c e r M e ntze r r e qu e ste d th at he be g ive n a n o pp or tun ity to w or k inThe pa rties dispute whethe r Mentzer wa s reque sting a “tra nsfer ” out of the H MU. At 5 his deposition, Mentz er de nied that he wa s reque sting a perma nent re assig nment out of HMU, instead cha

rac terizing his re quest as a “ temporar y assig nment.” Mentzer De p. at 166. 5 a diffe rent division of the Specia l Operations Divisi on with a larg er group of pe ople so that he could show that he w as not a troublemaker. Me ntzer Dep. at 166. Mentzer was inve stigated for 5 insubordination after

his supervisor alleg ed that Mentzer r efuse d to return a g ency equipment for
us e in t he pr e sid e nti a l in a

ugur atio n d

ur ingJanu ary

20 05 . D e f. ’s Stmt . ¶

15 . A ft e r a

fo ur -m on th period of limited duty , Mentzer re turned to the HMU in Apr il 2005. See Mentzer Dep. at 166. Mentzer missed a mandatory medical c linic appointment on May 11, 2005, despite workingthat day . Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 16. On J une 9, 2005, Mentzer r ece ived a pe rfor mance war

ning notice
. De f. ’s S t m t . ¶ 1 7
. T h e n o t i ce i n d i ca t edth atM en t z er wa s i nd an ger

o f b ei n g ra t edb el o w a v er age and cited thr ee a

rea s of improvement: interpe rsonal re lations, work habits, and g ener al policing
. SeeDe f. ’s Me m., Ex. F (P e rf or manc e Ratin gWar

nin gNo tic e ). Me ntze r w a s u lti mate ly tr ans fe rr e d o ut o f t

he HM U a

nd de ta ile d to the Spe c ia l E ve nts B ra nc h in June 20 05 . D e f. ’s Stmt
. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs claim that their jobs with the Special Events B ranc h are not as favor able a s they
wer e in the HMU. A lthough their salarie s and bene fits were not chang ed by the transf

er, Plaintiffs claim that they

would have greater ove rtime opportunities and a more favor able wor k schedule in the HMU. See Mentzer Dep. at 181. Moreover , Plaintiffs were passionate a bout horses a nd the HMU. See L anier Dep. at 58. In J une 2006, Mentzer a

nd Scully met with police Commander Contee and had a discussion reg ardingtheir possible retur n to the HMU. See Scully Interrog . Answer s at 1-2. Sc ull y le arn e d th at se ve ra l of

fi c e rs wi thi n th e HM U ( a bo ut who m Sc ull y

ha d p re vio us ly6

complained) attacke d Scully ’s and Me ntzer’s cha rac ter a nd made thre ats about what might happen if they returne d to the unit. Id. at 2. These office rs would not be moved out of the HMU. Id. Contee told Scully

that he would move Me ntzer and Scully back to the H MU if they wanted to go ba ck. Id. Ho we ve r, Sc ull y did no t r e tur n to the HM U b e c a

us e of the c on tin

uin gpr ob le ms in the unit. Id. Plaintiffs filed this action on Fe bruar y 15, 2006. Duringdiscovery , Plaintiffs produced
sever al re cording s of MPD office rs, includingmeeting s with Pol ice Chief L anier , that wer e made without prior approva l of MPD and without consent of those r ecor ded. De f. Stmt. ¶¶ 21-22. MPD conducted a

n internal a ffa irs investigation of these re cording s in Aug ust 2008. Id. ¶ 23. The interna l affa irs investigation concluded that Of fice r Mentzer should be disciplined. See Def .’s Mem., Ex. H (undated MPD Interna l Affa irs Bur eau Me morandum). II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgme nt is proper whe n “the plea dings, the discovery [i f any] and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under the summary judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe dis tr ic t c ourt

of the ba sis fo r i ts m oti on , a nd ide nti fy ingtho se po rt ion s o f t

he ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og ator ie s, and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s, if any , which it believes de monstrate the a bsence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t.” Celotex Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). In response , the non-moving party

must “g o beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or by

the depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, desig nate spe cific f acts showing7

that there is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 32 4 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . A ll underlying f

acts a nd infere nces a

re a naly zed in the light most favora ble to the non-movingparty . Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The mer e existence of a

fac tual dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summar y judgme nt. See A nderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc

. , 477 U.S. at 248. To be mate rial, the fa ctual
asser tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the iss ue mus t be su

pp or te d b y su ff ic ie nt a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e that a re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld find for the non-moving party . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 ( D.C. Cir. 1987); Liberty Lobby , 4 77 U. S. at 25 1- 52 (t he c ourt mus t de te rm ine “ wh e the r t he e vid e nc e pr e se nts a
su ff ic ie nt d isa g re e me nt t o r e qu ir e su bmi ssi on to a jur y or wh e the r i t is so on e -s ide d th at on e pa rt y
mus t pr e va il a s a

matte r o f l aw” ). “ I f t

he e vid e nc e is m e re ly

c olo ra ble , o r i s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (inter nal citations omitt ed). “ Mere alleg ations or denials in the a dverse party ’s pleading s are insufficient to defe at an other

wise prope r motion for summary judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Call aghan , 9 38 F. Sup p. 46 , 4 9 ( D. D. C. 1 99 6) . T he a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “ sh owthat th e re is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Conclusory asser tions offere d without any fac tual basis for
s u p p o rtd o n o ts at i s fy

an o p p o n en t ’s b urd en t o s etfo rt h“a ff i rm at i v e e v i d en ce ” s h o wi n g a g enuine issue f

or trial. Broaddrick v . Exe c. Office of the President , 139 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Laningham , 813 F.2d at 1241). III . D ISC USS ION De fe nd ant h a s a sse rt e d f

ive dif fe re nt b a se s f

or he r M oti on

fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt. F ir st,8

Def endant c ontends that Plaintiffs’ complaints conce rningthe HMU do not constitute protec ted disclosures under

the D.C. Whist leblower

Protection Act (“ D.C. WP A”) . Second, De fenda nt contends that Plaintiffs have not suffer ed any adver se employ

ment action to provide a

basis for lia bil ity un de r T itl e VI Ior

the D. C. H uma

n Ri g hts Ac t. T hir d, De fe nd ant c on te nd s th at th e re is no evidenc e that the a sserted non- discriminatory rea sons for the e mploy

ment actions at issue
we re a pr e te xt fo r r e ta liatio n. F ourt h, De fe nd ant c la ims that sh e c a nn ot b e he ld p e rs on a lly

lia ble under Title VI Ior the D.C. Human Rig hts Act. And fifth, De fenda nt raises de fense s under the statute of limitations and notice of cla im statute with respec t to alleg ed re taliatory acts oc curr ing prior to Fe bruar

y 2005. The Court shall addr ess ea ch ar g ument in turn. A. P rote cte d Disclosures Under the D.C. Whistleblower P rote ction Act The D.C. WPA states “[a] s upervisor sha ll not threaten to take or take a prohibited personne l action or other

wise re taliate ag ainst an employ ee be cause of the e mploy ee’ s protecte d disclosure or be cause of an e mploy ee’ s ref usal to comply

with an illeg al orde r.” D .C. Code § 1- 61 5. 53 . T he statut e de fi ne s a pr ote c te d d isc los ur e a s: any disclosure of inf

ormation, not specifica lly prohibited by

statute, by

an employ ee to a su pe rv iso r o r a

pu bli c bo dy that th e e mpl oye e re a so na bly be lie ve s e vid e nc e s: (A ) G ro ss m ism ana g e me nt; (B ) G ro ss m isu se or

wa ste of pu bli c re so ur c e s o r f

un ds ; (C) Abuse of

authority in c onnection with the administration of a public program or the e xec uti on

of a pu bli c c on tr a c t; (D) Aviolation of a federa l, state, or local law, rule, or regulation, or of a te rm of a contra ct betwe en the District g overnme nt and a District g o v e r nme nt c o ntrac tor which is not of a mere ly

technica l or minimal nature; or ( E ) A s u b s t an t i a l an d

s p e c i f i c d an g e r t o th e p u b l i c h e a l than d

s a f e ty.9

D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a )(6) . A “public body” includes a member of

the D.C. Council. Id. § 1- 615.52(a) (7). De fenda

nt argues that Plaintiffs’ conc erns—that c erta in HMU offic ers we re not punc tua l, f

a ile d to e xer c ise the ho rs e s, and wo rk e d s e c on d jo bs , a

nd that ma na g e me nt f

a ile d to addre ss those issues—do not amount to allegations of “g ross mismanag ement” a s defined by the D.C. WP A. See De f. ’s Me m. a t 7- 8. Mo re ov e r, De fe nd ant c on te nd s th at Pla int if fs ’ c omp la int s reg ardingthe stabling of horse s at For t Dupont do not qualify

as “disclosure s” bec ause the information re veale d was a lrea dy public knowledg e and known to the supervisors within MPD. The D.C. WPA its elf doe s not define the te rm “g ross mismanag ement.” H oweve r, the D. C. C ourt

of Ap pe a ls h a s r e c og nize d th at th e fe de ra l w his tle blo we r p ro te c tio n s tatut e , 5 U. S.C. § 2302(b)( 8), is instructive in interpre ting the D .C. W PA. W ilb ur n v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 957 A. 2d 92 1, 92 5 ( D. C. 2 00 8) . “ F or the re to b e a

pr ote c te d d isc los ur e , ‘ an e mpl oye e mus t di sc los e such ser ious error s by

the ag ency

that a conc lusion the ag ency err ed is not debata

ble among
rea sonable pe ople.’” W

ilb ur n , 957 A.2d at 925 (qu o t i n g W hite v. De p’t of the Air Force , 391 F.3d 1377, 1382 (F ed. Cir. 2004)). T he ter m “g ross mismanag ement” ha s been de fined a s “a manag ement ac tion or inaction which c reates a substantial risk of sig nificant a dverse impact upon the ag ency ’s ability

to acc omplish i ts miss ion.” Kavanaugh v. Me rit Systems Protection Bo ar d , 1 7 6 Fe d
. Ap p x . 1 3 3 , 1 3 5 (F ed
. C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g W hite v. De p’t of the Air Force , 63 M.S.P .R. 90, 95 (1994)). “ Mere differ ence s of opinion betwee n an employ ee a nd his ag ency superiors a s to the proper approa ch to a pa

rticular pr oblem or the most appropr iate cour se of action do not rise to the leve l of g ross mismanag ement.” W hite v. De p’t of the Air Force , 391 F .3 d at 13 81 . M or e ov e r, “ wh e re a dis pute is i n th e natur e of a po lic y dis pute , ‘ g ro ss mismanag ement’ r equire s that a cla imed ag ency err or in the adoption of, or continued adhe renc e10

to, a policy

be a matter that is not debatable amongrea sonable pe ople.” Id. at1 3 8 3
. U l t i m at e l y, howeve r, the issue is not whether the disclosures in fa ct evidenc ed g ross mismanag ement, but whether the employ ees r easona

bly believed that they

did so. Se e Zirk

lev . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 830 A.2d 1250, 1259-60 (D .C. 2003). The “ proper test” to deter

mine whether

an employ ee’ s be lie f i s r e a so na

ble is whe the r a

dis int e re ste d o bs e rv e r w ithkn ow le dg e of the e sse nti a l f

a c ts known to and re adily

asce rtainable by

the employ ee c ould rea sonably conclude that the g overnme nt’s actions evide nce gross mismanag ement. W illiams v. Johnson , 537 F. Supp. 2d 1 4 1 , 1 5 6 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Zirk le , 830 A.2d at 1250). There are two sets of “disclosure s” at issue: (1) Plaintiffs’ disclosures to MPD senior manag ement re g ardingabuse a nd mismanag ement within the HMU, a s outlined in Office r Me ntze r’ s Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 03 le tte r t o A ssi sta nt C hie f o f P oli c e B ro a db e nt; and (2 ) P la int if

fs ’ meetingwith D.C. Councilmember Gra ham re g arding

the stabling of horse s at For t Dupont. Plaintiffs conce de that their disclosure s to their immediate supervisors a re not at issue. See Pls.’ Mem. at 6-7. The first set of disclosure s includes alleg ations that office rs in the HMU made false statements, neg lige ntly car ed for their horse s, submitt ed fr audulent re quests for reimburse ment, and dama g ed re lations with other mounted police units resulting in a depr ivation of trainingopportunities for HMU of fice rs. See Sept. 11, 2003 L etter. Plaintiffs could have
rea sonably

believed that these disclosures c onstitut ed “a manag ement ac tion or inaction which
c re ate s a su bs tanti a l r isk

of signif ic ant a dv e rs e imp a c t up on the a g e nc y ’s a

bil ity to a c c omp lis h it s mission.” See Kav anaugh , 1 76 F e d. Ap px. at 13 6. De fe nd ant c ha ra c te ri zes Pla int if

fs ’ complaints as re lating to “ minor matters [such] as [ a] perce ived lack of manag eria l skill s.” De f. ’s Me m. at 8. Ho we ve r, the natur e of the se a lle g atio ns is s e ri ou s e no ug h to pe rm it a jur y to11

find that Plaintiffs rea sonably believed the ir disclosures to evide nce gross mismanag ement by HMU off icials. Wit h respe ct to Plaintiffs’ meetingwith Councilmember Gra ham, the par

ties disag ree about whethe r Plaintiffs actua lly disclosed any

new infor

mation. For a

disclosure to be pr otected by the whistleblower statute, it mustcontain information that is notpublicly known. See Meuwissen v. D ep’t of Interior , 234 F.3d 9, 12- 13 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (a pplying f eder al whistleblower statute) . Howeve r, to awa rd summary

judgme nt, there must be no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t as to whether the content of

Plaintiffs’ disclosures wa s public knowledg e. See Tab b v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 605 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D.D .C. 2009) (findingg enuine issue of materia l fac t as to public knowledg e of disclosure s prec luded g rant of summar y judgme nt). Def endant c ontends that the location of the HMU in a f eder al stable wa s “public knowledg e and alre ady known by

plaintiffs’ super

visors and mana g ement.” D ef.’ s Mem. at 9. Plaintiffs acknow ledg e that the stablingcontrove rsy was known w ithin MP D but argue this is irreleva nt beca use it was unknown to Councilmember G raha m. Pls .’ Mem. at 7. It is not apparent f rom the summary judgme nt rec ord asse mbled by the par ties whether

Plaintiffs actually

disclosed any

new information to Councilmember Gr aham dur ing the ir Marc h 2004 meeting . Howeve r, Plaintiffs had complaine d about spec ific deta ils reg ardingthe stabling of horse s at For t Dupont, see M en t z er De p . at1 0 8 , an d

i ti s p ro b ab l e t h ats o m e o f t h es e d et ai l s we re n o tp u b l i c kn o wl ed ge
ava ila ble to C ounc ilm e mbe r G ra ham pr ior to t he me e tin g . D e fe nd ant h a s f a ile d to de mon str ate the abse nce of

a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t based on the pr esent re cord, a nd there fore summary judgme nt is inappropriate on this g round.Th e D. C. c ourt s h ave c on sis te ntl y a pp lie d T itl e VI Ista

nd ard s to the D. C. H uma

n Ri g hts 6 Act, so there is no need to sepa rate ly analy ze the standard f

or an a dverse employ

ment action under the D.C. Human Rights Ac t. See Thong v. A ndre Chreky Salon , 634 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44 n.2 (D .D .C. 20 09 ); Elhusseini v. Compass Group USA, Inc

. , 5 78 F . Su pp . 2 d 6 , 1 1 n .4 (D .D .C. 2008). The D .C. W PA also borrows its standar ds from the Title VI Icontext. Johnson , 935 A.3d at 1117-18. 12 B. Adv e r se Em plo ym e ntAc ti ons Def endant’ s second ba sis for her summary judgme nt motion i s her c ontention that Plaintiffs have not suffe red a ny adver se employ

ment action that could f

orm the basis for

relief
un de r T itl e VI I , th e D. C. H uma n Ri g hts Ac t, o r t

he D. C. WPA . T o ma

ke out a pr ima fa c ie c a se of re ta liatio n und e r e ith e r f

e de ra l or D. C. l aw, Pla int if

fs mus t sh owthat ( 1) the y e ng a g e d in statut or ily pr ote c te d a c tiv ity ; ( 2) the y su ff e re d a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n; a

nd (3 ) t he re is a
causa l connec tion between the two. See J ones v. Be rnanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (d e sc ri bin gsta

nd ard un de r T itl e VI I ); Howard Univ. v. Gre en , 652 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C. 1994) (d e sc ri bin gsta

nd ard un de r D .C. Human Ri g hts Ac t) ; J oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 935 A.2d 1113, 1117-18 (D.C. 2007) ( descr ibing standa rd under D.C. WP A). The Supreme Court has
r e c e n t l y c l ar i f i e d w h atc o n s t i tu t e s ana dv e r s e e mp l o y m e n ta c t i o nf

o r p ur p o s e s o f T i t l e V II. In

6 Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn &Sa nta FeRa ilwa yCo. v . W

hite , 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Supre me Court explained that actions not directly related to employ

ment terms, conditions, or status may be actionable as re taliation under Title VI I
. See 548 U.S. at 61-64. A c halleng ed ac tion may be considere d reta liatory

under Title VI Iif it would have dissuade d a re asonable worke r fr om makingor supportinga cha rg e of discr imination. Id. at 67. The Court e mphasized that the standard is objec tive but context-specific. Id. at 68-69. Thus, a n action may

be conside red reta liatory

for c erta in employ ees but not for others. See id. at 69 (“ A sche dule cha ng e in an13

employ ee’ s work sche dule may make little differ ence to many worke rs, but may

matter enormously

to a youngmother with school-a g e childre n.”) Plaintiffs claim they

wer e subjec ted to a number of re taliatory

actions: they

wer e re moved from duty on the HMU; they

wer e subjec ted to a hostile work e nvironment; their police powe rs
wer e tempora

rily revoke d afte r the incide nt involving the handc uffe d Capitol poli ce of fice r; Se rg e ant S c ull y

wa s p ub lic ly

sc old e d in

fr on t of his su bo rd inate s a

nd un de rm ine d b y

his superiors’ ref

usals to follow throug h on investigations; S cully was g iven a L etter of

Reprimand; and Plaintiffs wer e investig ated f or makingaudio re cording s of their super iors. See Pls. ’ M e m. at 12-13. De fenda

nt denies that these a ctions satisfy the Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn sta nd ard . With respe ct to the suspension surroundingthe investig ation of the Capitol police off icer , Def endant
c la ims that it

c ann ot b e c on sid e re d a

n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n b e c a

us e it d id n ot r e su lt i n discipline and Plaintiffs wer e eve ntually reinstated. See Def

.’s Mem. at 11. How ever , only one
o f th e c a s e s c i t e d

b y D e f e n d an tf o r th i s p r o p o s i t i o ni n v o l v e d a r e t a l i at i o nc l a i mun d e r

T i t l e V II, and Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn has since ma de cle ar that any action ca n be re taliatory

if the employ ee could be r easona

bly dissuaded by

it. The fac t that Plainti ffs’ police power s were revoke d for ap p ro x i m at el y

two m o n th s , d

uri n g wh i ch th ey

we re d en i edo p p o rt un i t i es fo r o v ert i m e, i s en o u gh to find the suspension to be an a dverse action. De fenda nt also claims that Plaintiff Mentzer’s alleg ations reg ardinghis unjusti fiably poor per formanc e rating a nd other disciplinary

actions ar e not actionable be cause Mentzer was ne ver de moted or had his bene fits or pay cut. Ag ain, howeve r, Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn make s c le ar t hat r e ta liatio n is a c tio na

ble un de r T itl e VI Ie ve n ifThe Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn Court e xpla ine d th at T itl e VI Ie sta bli sh e s tw o s e pa

rate 7 standards f

or what constitutes an adver se ac tion—a more re strictive, employ ment-foc used standard f or violations of Title VI I ’s substantive nondiscrimination provisions, and a more expansive standard f

or violations of the statute’s a ntiretaliation provisions. Defe ndant’s arguments reg ardingPlaintiffs’ pay status might pre vail under the more re strictive standar d for discrimination claims, but they are an insuffic ient attack on the broade r standar d for r etaliation c la ims
. 14 not directly

connec ted to pay

g rade or status. To be a ctionable, the c halleng ed conduc t must be 7 materia lly

adver se, produc ing sig nificant, nontrivial har m to the employ ee. See548 U.S. at 67- 68 . In th is c a se , Pl a int if

fs have pr od

uc e d e no ug h e vid e nc e to p e rm it a re a so na ble jur or to
co n cl u d e t h atth es e a ct i o n s m ay h av e d i s s u ad ed

a r ea s o n ab l e w o rk er

fr o mm ak i n g o r s u

p p o rt i n g a char g e of discr imination. Plaintiffs’ remova l from duty in the HMU also qualifie s as an a dverse action under the Burlington N

orthern standard, notwithstandingthe fa ct that the conditions and privileg es of
e mpl oy me nt m ay have re ma ine d th e same . T he re is a mpl e e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d o f P la int if

fs ’ commitment and devotion to the HMU, and a jury could ea sily

conclude that detailingPlaintiffs to a dif fe re nt d ivi sio n w ou ld h ave a punit ive e ff

e c t and dis c oura g e Pla int if

fs fr om e ng a g ingin protec ted ac tivity . Plaintiffs have a lso produced e vidence that in their curr ent assig nments they experience a less desira

ble work sc hedule a

nd are subject to rede ploy ment, which may

involve long, unpr edictable shifts. Defe ndant claims that Mentzer’s tra nsfer out of the HMU c annot be deeme d materia lly

adver se to him beca

use he ha d actua lly

reque sted the transf

er. See Def

.’s Mem. at 11-12. How ever , the re cord on this point is disput ed. While Mentzer did indicate that he wa nted an oppor

tunity to work with a broa der group of pe ople within the Special Ope rations Division to show that he was not a troublemaker, Me ntzer testified at deposition that he neve r soug ht a per

manent tra

nsfer and has r epeatedly

been de nied the opportunity to return to the15

HMU. Thus, there is sufficient evide nce f or a jury to believe that Me ntzer’s transfe r wa s materia lly

adver se. De fe nd ant s imi larl y

c la ims that Sc ull y ’s tr ans fe r c ou ld n ot b e de e me d mate ri a lly a dv e rs e be c a us e he wa s g ive n a

n o pp or tun ity to r e tur n to the HM U i n th e summe r o f 2 00 6 b ut r e fu se d to do so unless cer

tain conditions were met. See De f. ’s Me m. at 13 . G ivi ngSc ull y an o pp or tun ity to return in 2006 does not c hang e the a dversity of the initial transfe r in 2004, althoug h it may be rele vant to whether

the transf

er c ontinued to be mater ially adver se af

ter Scully was off ere d the chanc e to re turn. Scully

claims that he “ orally

conditioned his return upon c reation of a work
e nv ir onme nt t

hat w a s n on -h os til e ” and

c la ims that th e ho sti le wo rk e nv ir onme nt i n th e HM U eff ectively cre ated a “construc tive discharg e.” See Pls. ’ M e m. at 10 . T he D. C. C ir c uit ha s h e ld that a hostile work e nvironment ca n amount to retaliation under Title VI I
. See H

ussain v. Nicholson , 435 F.3d 359, 366 ( D.C. Cir. 2006). Howeve r, in order to establish a hostile work
e nv ir onme nt, Pla int if

fs mus t sh owthat th e y

we re su bje c te d to “ int imi datio n, ri dic ule , a nd ins ult that is sufficiently

sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c onditions of . . . employ ment and cr eate an abusive wor

king e nvironment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc

. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (inter nal
c itatio ns and

qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . T o e sta

bli shc on str

uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e , Pl a int if

fs mus t show that the conditions in the HMU we re “ so intolerable that a rea sonable pe rson in the employ ee’ s position would have felt compe lled” to avoid it. Pa . S tate Po lic e v . S

ud e rs , 5 42 U. S. 129, 141 (2004). Th e re is i ns uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to pe rm it a

jur y to c on c lud e that a

ho sti le work e nvironment exist ed either within or without the HMU. Although Plaintiffs have identified individual adverse actions that may be conside red r etaliatory under Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn , they16

have fa ile d to ide nti fy

a patte rn of a bu siv e c on du c t th at r ise s to the le ve l of e sta bli sh inga ho sti le
wo rk e nv ir onme nt c la im. Pla int if fs po int to e vid e nc e that po lic e mana g e me nt h a d d e c ide d n ot t o conduct a ny investigations int o misconduct by HMU off

icer s as contributingto an “atmosphere of har assment.” See Pls.’ Mem. at 8. But the r ecor d evidenc e cited c onsists of conclusory alleg ations by

the Plaintiffs themselves, see, e .g. , Mentzer Dep. at 120 (discussing “ the extremes they went throug h to retaliate and paint us as be ing disg runtled, ra cist, cra zy liars . . . .”) , and isolated incidents over

a per iod of y ear s, see Scully Dep. at 67-68 (discussingApril 14, 2003 meetingin which Scully

was unde rmined by

his supervisor). Conclusory alleg ations not supported by

fac ts in the recor d are not cre dited on a motion for summary judgme nt. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CW

A, AFL-CIO v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Tr ansp. , 564 F.3d 462, 465 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). “Eve n a fe w isolated incidents of of fensive c onduct do not amount to actionable ha rassment.” Stewart v. Evans , 2 75 F .3 d 1 12 6, 11 34 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) ; see also Baske rville v. Culligan Int’l Co. , 5 0 F .3 d 4 28 , 4 30 (7 th C ir . 1 99 5) (h old ingthat ni ne inc ide nts sp re a d o ve r s e ve n mo nth s d id not constitute sex ual har assment bec ause the supervisor ne ver touc hed the e mploy ee a nd the incidents wer e not suffic iently sever e or pe rvasive) . Plaintiffs did not di rec tly alleg e a c laim of hostile work environme nt in their complaint, and there is not enoug h evidenc e of a perva sive, abusive wor

kplace to permit a findingthat one wa s cre ated in re taliation for Plaintiffs’ prote cted
a c tiv iti e s. C. Evid ence t hat Adverse A ctions Were P ret ext for Re taliation In order to preva il on their retaliation cla ims, P laintiffs must ulti mately show not only

that they suffe red a dverse actions, but that those ac tions were c ausally connec ted to their protec ted
a c tiv iti e s. To e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se of

re ta liatio n, Pla int if

fs “ me re ly

ne e d[] to e sta

bli sh17

fac ts adequate to permit an infe renc e of r etaliatory motive.” Fo rm an v . S

ma ll , 271 F.3d 285, 299 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 1) . O nc e the y e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se , “ the burd e n s hif ts t o th e e mpl oye r t o produce a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for its actions.” Jones v . Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 67 7 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 9) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . H ow e ve r, on c e an e mpl oye r p ro ff e rs a leg itimate, nonretaliatory rea son, the presumption raise d by the prima fa cie c ase is re butted, and the on ly qu e sti on fo r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is whe the r t

he pla int if

f h a s p ro du c e d s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to defe at the prof

fer and support a f

inding of reta liation. Na’im v. Rice , 577 F. Supp. 2d 361, 379 (D .D .C. 20 08 ); Brady v. O ffice of the Serge ant at Arms , 5 2 0 F
. 3 d 4 9 0 , 4 9 4 ( D
. C
. C i r . 2 0 0 8 )
. In
re vie wi nga

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the c ourt

“ loo ks to whe the r a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld inf e r . . . re ta liatio n f

ro m a ll the e vid e nc e , whic h in c lud e s n ot o nly the pr ima

fa c ie c a se but a lso the evidenc e the plaintiff of fer s to attack the e mploy er’ s proffe red e x planation for its ac tion and other e vidence of re taliation.” Jones v . Bernanke , 557 F.3d at 677 (internal quotation mar ks omitted). The plaintiff be ars the bur den of pe rsuasion to show that a de fenda nt’s proff ere d nonreta liatory

rea son for the c halleng ed ac tion is a pretext. Morgan v. Fe d. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. , 328 F.3d 647, 654 ( D.C. Cir. 2003). A plaintiff ca n car ry this burden by

either showing that the proff

ere d rea son is false, Montgomery v. Chao , 546 F.3d 703, 707 ( D.C. Cir. 2008), or “by prese nting e noug h evidenc e to allow a r easona ble trier of

fac t to conclude that ‘ the employ er’ s proffe red e x planation is unworthy of cr edenc e.’” Desmond v . Mukase y , 530 F.3d 944, 9 6 2 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Tex. De p’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). “I f the e mploy er’ s stated belief about the under lying f

acts is re asonable in light of the e vidence , howeve r, there ordinarily is no basis for per

mitti nga jury

to conclude that the employ er is lying about the under lying f

acts.” Brady v. O

ffice of the Serge ant at Arms , 5 2 0 F
. 3 d at4 9 5
. “ In18

exceptional circ umstances, the e vidence supporting a plaintiff’s prima f

acie case may , on its own, suffice to defe at the prof

fer ’s pre sumption of validity and thus rende r summary judgme nt improper.” W

oo dr uff v . P e te rs , 482 F.3d at 530. Def endant ha s asserte d that there are leg itimate, nonretaliatory rea sons for ea ch of the adver se ac tions suffere d by Plaintiffs. The Court shall review eac h of these e x planations and what, if a ny , evidenc e Plaintiffs have produce d to support their view that the a ctions were in fac t
r e t a l i at o r y. 1. P laintif

fs’ Administrative Leave P endin g Investigation Plaintiffs have a sserted that their two-month suspensions following the incident in which they handcuf fed a Capitol poli ce of

fice r we re r etaliatory . Howeve r, De fenda nt maintains that Plaintiffs were place d on administrative leave (with pay , but without poli ce pow ers) as par t of a routine investig ation into the alleg ed assa ult by Plaintiffs. Defe ndant L anier testified in her de po sit ion

that if a po lic e of fi c e r i s a lle g e d to have c omm itt e d a ny a c t th at mi g ht b e c ri min a l, i t is ty pical for that office r to be plac ed on administrative lea ve duringthe cour se of the inve stigation until the U.S. Attorney ’s Off ice de clines to press c harg es. L anier Dep. at 21. The evide nce shows that the alleg ations involving Mentzer a nd Scully wer e re fer

red to the U .S. Attorney ’s Offic e and that a L etter of Dec lination was issued on J une 3, 2004. See Pls.’ Mem., Ex . 1 (June 8, 20 04 Me mor and

um f ro m MPD Of

fi c e of Pr of ’l Re sp on sib ili ty

). Pla int if

fs re tur ne d to duty shortly there afte r. Pla int if fs c la im that th e MPD inv e sti g atio n w a s a sh am. M e ntze r t e sti fi e d at hi s deposition that acc ordingto his understanding , “the investig ation as a whole” wa s completed by the Capitol Pol ice within two day s after the incident, cle aringPlaintiffs of any wrong doing, yet19

Plaintiffs were suspended by MPD five day s after

the incident. See Mentzer Dep. at 130-33. Scully testified at his deposition that I nterna l Affa irs told him i t was “pr ocedur e” f or him to be suspended dur ing the investigation but that they never provided him with a written policy , which he had r equeste d. See Scully Dep. at 109-10. Plaintiffs also cite to a June 8, 2004 Memorandum from the MPD Off

ice of Professional Responsibility in support of their view that Plainti ffs “ had been c lear ed of a

ny wrong doing—a lmost i mmediately afte r the incide nt.” See Pls.’ Mem. at 12. Howeve r, the June 8, 2004 Memorandum simply does not support Plaintiffs’ view—it was written nea

rly two months after the April 9, 2004 incident and state s that “[t] he F orce Investig ation Team has begun a pre liminary revie w of this case in consultation with the United States Attorney ’s Off

ice.” See Pls. ’ M e m., Ex. 1 . In a dd iti on , Pl a int if fs do no t pr ov ide any

ba sis for Me ntzer’s knowledg e of the Capitol P olice’s investig ation. Mentzer’s unsubstantiated te sti mony that th e Ca

pit ol P oli c e c omp le te d th e ir own in ve sti g atio n e xone ratin gPla int if fs wi thi n two day s, combined with Scully ’s testimony that MPD failed to explain in writing why he wa s
su sp e nd e d, do e s n ot d o a

ny thi ngto a c tua lly

dis c re dit the e xplanatio n p ro ff

e re d b y De fe nd ant: that MPD perfor

med its own investigation in response to the Capitol Poli ce of fice r’s c omplaint ag ainst Plainti ffs a

nd that Plaintiffs were place d on administrative leave until the United States Attorney ’s Off

ice de clined to proc eed w ith the case
. Ul tim ate ly , Pl a int if

fs mus t pr od

uc e e no ug h e vid e nc e to p e rm it a re a so na ble jur y to conclude that MPD’s investigation and suspension of Plaintiffs were actua lly motivated by reta liatory

animus. Wi thout a cre dible attack on D efe ndant’s prof fer ed nonre taliatory

rationale , Plaintiffs are le ft with only the fa ct that Plaintiffs were suspended just 17 day s after their mee ting wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r G ra ham. T e mpo ra l pr oximi ty be tw e e n a

pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

and an a dv e rs ePla int if fs do no t argue , a

nd the re is n o e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to ind ic ate , th at Pla int if fs ’ 8 me e tin gwi th C ounc ilm e mbe r G ra ham c on sti tut e d p ro te c te d a c tiv ity un de r T itl e VI Ior

the D. C. Human Rig hts Act. Thus, only Plaintiffs’ D.C. WP A claim is at issue.

20 action ca n establish a prima f

acie case of re taliation if the employ er ha d knowledg e of the protec ted ac tivity
. See Clark County Sc h. Dist. v. Bree den , 5 32 U. S. 2 68 , 2 73 (2 00 1) . B ut o nly in “exceptional circ umstances [will] the evidenc e supportinga plaintiff’ s prima fa cie c ase . . . , on its own, suffice to de feat the proff er’ s presumption of validity and thus rende r summary judgme nt improper.” W

oo dr uff v . P e te rs , 4 82 F .3 d at 53 0. Mo re ov e r, the D. C. C ourt of Ap pe a ls ha s h e ld t hat w ithre sp e c t to c la ims un de r t he D. C. WPA , “ an in fe re nc e of re ta liatio n c ann ot r e st solely on ‘tempora l prox imity ’ (e ven if it is established) whe re the opportunity for r etaliation conflicts with the opponent’ s expl icit evidence of an innoc ent explanation of the eve nt.” J oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 935 A.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. 2007). I n Johnson , the Court found the re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e of

c a us atio n whe re the pla int if fs , who we re D. C. p oli c e of fi c e rs , had fa iled to rebut the e vidence showing that the re al re ason for their tempora

ry suspension was an excessive f

orce complaint filed ag ainst them. See 935 A.2d at 1120-22. The Court noted that the plaintiffs had the burden of “produc ing e vidence to contradic t the [employ er’ s] ex planation for why the investig ation was initiated and why the police powe rs wer e tempora rily revoke d.” Id. at 1121. Her e, Plaintiffs’ evide nce of reta liation amounts to l ittle more than suspicion, which the D.C. Court of Appea ls has expli citly held is insufficient to survive summary judgme nt. See Johnson , 9 35 A. 2d

at 11 20 . B a se d o n th e e vid e nc e in t he re c or d, a

jur y c ou ld n ot r e a so na

bly conclude that the ac tual motivation for the suspension was r etaliation for Plaintiffs’ pr otected dis c los ur e s. 8 2. Se r ge antSc ully ’s As sig nm e ntAwa y fr omth e Hor se M ount e d Un itDef endant L anier

testified at her

deposition that Serg eant Poskus was a lrea dy in the 9 HMU whe n Scully

was de tailed out. See L anie r D e p. at 81 -8 2. Pla int if fs a lle g e d in

the ir complaint that Poskus was moved into the HMU immediately afte r Scully

was de tailed out, see Compl. ¶ 57, but they

have pr oduced no e vidence to support this allegation. 21 Def endant a sserts that Scully was de tailed to the Special Eve nts Bra nch as a temporar y detail in August 2004 beca use of a shortag e of se rg eants in that bra nch and a need f or additional staffingfor the 2005 pr esidential inauguration. De fenda nt L anier testified at her

deposition that the HMU ha d two serg eants for only five or six personnel, whe rea s the Special Eve nts Bra nch had in excess of 40 pe rsonnel and w as in nee d of additional ser g eants be cause of the 2005 inauguration and othe r eve nts. See L anie r D e p. at 85 -8 6. L anie r a lso te sti fi e d th at sh e ha d to ld Scully she hoped to be able to tra nsfer him back to the HMU a fter the inauguration, but she wa s unable to do so bec ause she still had a c ritical shortag e of se rg eants in Specia l Events afte r the inauguration. Id. Scully claims this ex planation is pretextual beca use, ac cordingto his deposition te sti mony , a

no the r s e rg e ant w a s mo ve d into t he HM U s ho rt ly

a ft e r S c ull y

wa s tr ans fe rr e d o ut, without Scully

beingg iven the opportunity to return. See Pls.’ Mem. at 14; Scully Dep. at 120- 21. Additionally , Scully

claims that he wa s g iven conf licting e x planations for his tra nsfer . He
wa s o nc e tol d h e wa s b e ingtr ans fe rr e d b e c a us e of an inve sti g atio n into h is a lle g e d mi sc on du c t, but later wa s told that no such investigation had taken plac e. See Sc ull y De p. at 11 3, 11 7. Sc ull y has not produce d any

evidenc e that ther e wa s not, in fact, a shor tag e of se rg eants in Specia l Events bra

nch. Nor has he pointed to other

evidenc e in the re cord to substantiate his testimony that ano the r s e rg e ant w a s mo ve d into H MUjus t a ft e r S c ull y wa s d e ta ile d o ut. 9 In addition, Scully

has no evide nce to indicate that he wa s transfe rre d as a c onsequenc e ofPlaintiffs have not identified a ny protec ted ac tiviti es that occ urre d betwee n the Marc h 10 29, 2004 meetingwith Councilmember Gra ham and the Ma

rch 2005 f

iling of the EEO c omp la int
. The prote cted a ctivities predatingScully ’s transf er in August 2004 include Scully ’s 11 me e tin gwi th C ounc ilm e mbe r G ra ham in Ma rc h 2 00 4 a

nd the c omp la int s ma de to M PD mana g e me nt a

nd c ulm inatin gin t

he Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 03 le tte r. Pla int if fs do no t sp e c if

ic a lly identify any other prote cted a ctivities in which they have e ng ag ed prior to August 2004. 22 his pr ote c te d a c tiv ity . H is tra ns fe r o c c ur

re d mo re tha

n f our m on ths a ft e r h e me t w ith Councilmember Gr aham. The D.C. Court of Appe als in Johnson expressly reje cted suc h a 10 four- month period as too longto permit an infer ence of ca usation betwee n protec ted disclosures and the a dverse action. See J ohnson , 9 35 A. 2d

at 11 20 (a

pp lyingthe D. C. WPA ); se e als o Breede n , 532 U.S. at 273 (2001) ( applying T itle VI Iand citingwith approva l case s in which three - and f

our-month per iods were held insufficie nt to establish causation). Plaintiffs do contend that the a dverse actions ag ainst them were “continuingviolations.” See Pls.’ St mt. ¶ 28. Howeve r, they

fail to identify

a cha in of specif

ic ac tions to t empora lly

connec t their protec ted activities to their adve rse a ctions. Indeed, most of Plaintiffs’ a lleg ations of an “ atmosphere of 11 hara ssment” per

tain to events that occ urre d in mid-2003. See Mentzer Dep. at 71-72, 77-78 (discussingApril 2003 dec ision not t o investigate misconduct in the HMU) . Acc ording ly , a jury could not rea sonably

conclude that Serg eant Scully ’s August 2004 transfer was motivated by
re ta liator y anim us . Sc ull y a lso c la ims that hi s c on tin ua lly be ingde nie d th e op po rt

un ity to r e tur n to the HM U was ba sed on re taliatory

animus. Howeve r, there is even less e vidence to connec t Scully ’s nonreturn to the H MU to his protected a ctivity than there is with respec t to his August 2004 transf er beca use these de nials of a r eturn to the HMU a re e ven fur

ther re moved in time from his protecte d23

activity . Scully

claims that he made repe ated r equests to re turn to the HMU that we re de nied,
and wh e n f ina lly of fe re d th e c ha

nc e to r e tur

n in 20 06 , h e c ou ld n ot e xer c ise that op tio n b e c a us e MPD had failed to discipline the of fice rs in the HMU who ha d undermined his author ity . The only instance of

protec ted ac tivity

that is identified in the rec ord duringthis ti me per iod is the Marc h 2005 filing of

the cha rg e of discr imination. The events occ urringin 2006 are too far
re mov e d f

ro m th is p ro te c te d a c tiv ity to p e rm it a

n in fe re nc e of

re ta liator y mot ive . A nd

Sc ull y does not in fac t attribute any of his denials to that protec ted ac tion. See Scully Dep. at 121 (“ Th e y wa nte d me out of

that un it b e c a

us e . . . [of

] the de ve lop me nt o f t

he c a lva ry [sic ] barn , my de sir e to m ov e the un it f

or wa rd , a nd the de sir e to g e t us a

g oo d h ome is s ome thi ngthat th e D. C. Go ve rnme nt, the c iti zen s o f t he D. C., the Me tr op oli tan Po lic e wo uld be pr ou d o f, and

. . . th at I . . . inadver

tently embar rasse d [Asst . Police Chief] Broa d[b] ent in front of [Councilmember] Gr aham.” ) A c c or din g ly , th e re is n o e vid e nc e that D e fe nd ant’ s d e nia ls o f h is r e tur n to the HM U
we re mot ivate d b y

re ta liator y anim us . 3. Offic e r M e nt z e r ’s Di sc ipli ne & P e r for m anc e Eva lua ti ons Def endant ha s also proff

ere d leg itimate rea sons for investig atingMentzer for insubordination in early

2005, disciplining him for fa iling to re port to a medica l appointment on a day he wa s working , and g iving him a low pe rfor mance rating . Wit h respe ct to the investigation for insubordination, Def endant c laims that this was a leg itimate investigation fo llo wi nga

su pe rv iso r’ s a lle g atio n th at Me ntze r r e fu se d to re tur n a g e nc y e qu ipm e nt f

or us e in the pre sidential inauguration. De f.’s Mem. at 14. Mentzer does not dispute that his supervisor made this alleg ation and does not off er a ny evidenc e to re but Defe ndant’s prof fer ed explanation. Acc ording ly , Mentzer ca

nnot survive summary

judgme nt with respec t to this adver se ac tion.24

Def endant a lso claims that Mentzer was justifiably disciplined for fa iling to show up for a mandatory

police clinic a

ppointment on May

11, 2005 beca

use he w as workingthat day . Def .’s Mem. at 15. Mentzer doe s not contest that he missed the appointment or that he was w orking
. Rathe r, he c on te nd s th at MPD sh ou ld n ot h ave dis c ipl ini nghim be c a us e he ha d a

va lid e xcu se fo r m iss ingthe a

pp ointme nt: he ha d lo st t

ra c k o f h is c a le nd ar d

ue to t he re c e nt d e ath o f h is g randmother

and thoug ht the appointment was for a diffe rent da

y . See Pls.’ Mem., Ex . G (May 25, 2005 Memorandum) at 2. In support of his argument that his discipline was prete x t, he cites Def endant L anier ’s deposition testimony in which she fir st say s that attendinga fune ral would be an appr opriate r eason to miss a clinic a ppointment and later sa

y s that she ca

nnot answer

a hy pothetical question as to whe ther it would be a ppropriate to discipline an offic er who was “attendingto family

members who ha d had a de ath in the family .” L anier Dep. at 90-95. Ther e is n o e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d, ho we ve r, that Me ntze r w a s e ith e r a tte nd inga fu ne ra l or atte nd ingto family members on the da

y in question. This deposition t estimony by Def endant—ba sed on hy pothetical fa cts that contra dict the undisputed rec ord—ca nnot cre ate a

triable issue of f

act f or the jury as to whethe r De fenda

nt’s explanation is pretext . Acc ording ly , Mentzer ca nnot survive
summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to his dis c ipl ine fo r m iss inga me dic a l a

pp ointme nt. Wit h respe ct to Mentzer’s per formanc e eva luation, Defe ndant asser ts that he rec eived the perf ormanc e ratings he deser

ved. Ultimately , the question befor e the Court is not whether the neg ative eva luation was justified or fa ir, but whether the employ er hone stly

believed it to be
acc urate . Se e Fi

sc hb ac h v . D .C. De

p’ t of Cor r. , 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). Mentzer ha s p ro vid e d n o e vid e nc e to s ug g e st that hi s p e rf or manc e e va luatio n w a s unju sti fi a bly low or to sug g est that MPD believed it to be any thing other

than ac curate. Moreove r, Mentzer ha s25

produce d no evidenc e to conne ct this perfor mance evaluation to any

statutorily

protec ted ac tivity
. Acc ording ly , he ca

nnot survive summary

judgme nt with respec t to this adver se ac tion. 4. Offic e r M e nt z e r ’s As sig nm e ntAwa y fr omth e Hor se M ount e d Un it De fe nd ant a sse rt s th at th e re a so n th at Me ntze r w a s a ssi g ne d o ut o f t he HM U i s b e c a

us e he re quested a

transfe r. Mentzer disputes this, claiming that he “ne ver r equeste d to be re moved from the HMU .” See Pls.’ St mt. ¶ 18. In support of this statement, he c ites his deposition testimony explaining that he ha d mere ly reque sted a “ temporar

y assig nment” else wher e in the Special Ope rations Division. See Me ntze r D e p. at 16 5- 66 . M e ntze r t e sti fi e d th at he ma de thi s reque st in Dece mber of 2004 a nd “during ” 2005. Id. Mentzer explained that he wa s not reque sting a

“tra nsfer ,” which he considere d to mean a pe rmane nt rea ssignment. Id. at 166. Howeve r, the re cord c lear ly indicates that Mentzer a sked to be re moved from the H MU in J une 2005: Q : Wh e nw a s th e la s t t im e y o uw o r k e d th e r e [i nth e H M U ]? A: J une of ‘ 05. Q: What w e re the c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound ingy our t

ra ns fe r o ut? A: The ha

ra ssment Iwas suff

eringfrom Serg eant Poskus and Of fice r L ee, Ste wa rt , a nd Rod ri g ue z. An d I me an, I fe lt that I wa s g oin gto b e phy sic a lly assaulted by one of them, not a ll of them. Iended up—Chief Robinson sent me over to the Special Eve nts Bra nch. Q: Okay . But I

just want to und erstand whether this is at y our re quest or whether this is i nvoluntarily

beca use there had bee n t h e re q uest to be transfe rre d out ear lier? A: I t w a s my

re qu e st. Mentzer Dep. at 178. Mentzer also indicates in his interrog atory answe rs that he ha d reque stedMe ntze r s tate s in his op po sit ion

br ie f t hat “ [h]e ha s r e pe ate dly

so ug ht t o b e re tur

ne d to 12 the unit, but has been de nied.” Pls.’ Mem. at 10. How ever , he provide s no citation to recor d e v i d e n c e th ats u

p p o rt s th i s v i e w , an d

th e C o urth a s n o td i s c o v e r e d an y. Def endant a lso argues that bec ause Me ntzer’s reque st to move out of the HMU wa s 13 voluntary , it cannot constitute an a dverse action. See, e .g. , Fenne y v. D akota, Minn. &E. R.R. Co. , 327 F.3d 707, 717 ( “[A] pl aintiff ca nnot state an a dverse employ ment action if he voluntarily

resig ned . . . .”) . To the extent that Mentzer’s reque st was truly voluntary , this is an a lte rn ativ e g ro un d f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Ho we ve r, be c a us e the re c or d, c on str

ue d mo st favor ably to Mentzer, indicates that Mentzer only reque sted a tempora

ry transfe r out of the HMU, this rationale doe s not completely support summary

judgme nt. Accor dingly , the Court treats voluntariness of the move to a nother unit as the e mploy er’ s proffe red e x planation which Me ntze r m

us t sh owwa s p re te xt. 26 in late 2004 to be deta iled to Special Events. See P l s . ’ S u p p l
. E x . 1 (M en t z er

In t erro g. Responses) at 9. Mentzer does not argue that he w as for ced out of the HMU by

the har assment of the of fi c e rs in r e ta liatio n f

or his pr ote c te d a c tiv iti e s; h e me re ly argue s th at he did

no t, i n f a c t, want to be out of the unit. See Pls.’ Mem. at 10. But eve n if Mentzer did not “wa nt out of the unit,” as he te stifies at one point, see Mentzer Dep. a t 165, there c an be no g enuine dispute that he ult imate ly

a sk e d to be re mov e d f

ro m th e un it i n 2 00 5. Re a din gthe fa c ts i n th e light m os t favor able to Mentzer, Me ntzer reque sted to be tempora rily remove d from the unit in J une 2005. And there is no concre te evidenc e in the re cord that Mentzer reque sted to return to the H MU or that any of his reque sts were denied. Even if it could be sa id that Scully spoke on beha lf of 12 Mentzer when ma

king his own r equests to re turn to the HMU, ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord to actually

connec t the denials to any protec ted ac tivity

such that a jury

could infer

a re taliatory motive. I n sum, Mentzer has fa iled to rebut De fenda nt’s explanation that he was tra nsfer red out of the HM U at hi s o wn

re qu e st. 13 5. Ot he r Adv e r se Ac ti ons In their opposition to Defenda nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt, Plainti ffs c ite the L etterPlaintiffs do not argue, either in their Complaint or their opposition brief, that the 14 Marc h 2005 L etter of

Reprimand is ca

usally connec ted to the filing of the c harg e of discrimination, which occ urre d on Marc h 30, 2005. I t is also not clear f rom the re cord whether the L e tte r o f R e pr ima

nd wa s is su e d a ft e r t

he c ha rg e of dis c ri min atio n w a s f

ile d ( in whic h c a se it must have bee n on Marc h 31, 2005 if Scully ’s testimony is corre ct) or whether

Def endant wa s awa re of the c ha rg e of dis c ri min atio n at th e tim e the L e tte r o f R e pr ima nd wa s is su e d. Thus , Plaintiffs have not put forth e vidence to establish a prima fa cie c ase of reta liation based on temporal proximit y

to the char g e of discr imination. I t sh ou ld b e no te d th at D e fe nd ant d oe s n ot a dd re ss t his inc ide nt i n h e r o pe nin gor re ply 15 briefs in support of summar y judgme nt. Although this Court has discre tion in such circ umstances to tre at unopposed a rguments as conc eded, the Court declines to do so her e be c a us e Pla int if

fs did no t in c lud e any

a lle g atio ns re g ard ingthe L e tte r o f R e pr ima nd in t he ir Complaint and have ba

rely made a ny argument about it in their opposition.

27 of Reprimand issued to Scully in March 2005 a s an example of a r etaliatory action. See Pls.’ Mem. at 12. The only

evidenc e of this L etter of Reprimand in the re cord is in Scully ’s deposition testimony , wher e Scully

explains t hat he wa s written up by Def endant L anier

for usingan expletive in an email to a lieutenant. Plaintiffs have not produce d any evidenc e sug g esting that De fe nd ant’ s r atio na le fo r i ssu ingthe L e tte r o f R e pr ima nd wa s p re te xtua l; i ns te a d th e y sim ply argue that the L etter of

Reprimand wa s “one step in a prog ressive discipline pr ocess that c an support lost pay

in future instanc es and ha rm ca ree r adva nceme nt.” Pls.’ Mem. at 12. Plaintiffs also do not expl ain how this L etter of Reprimand is ca

usally connec ted to Scully ’s protec ted activity , other than to list this action as one in a list of seve ral a lleg edly reta liatory

actions that followed Plaintiffs’ prote cted disclosure s in 2004 and ea rlier. See Pls. ’ M e m. at 8- 12 . T his is 14
no t su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to e ve n ma ke out a pr ima fa c ie c a se of

re ta liatio n. Ac c or din g ly , th e re is

15 no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t for trial re g ardingthe L etter of Reprimand. Plaintiffs have a lso claimed that De fenda nt’s investigation into P laintiffs’ tape rec ording of MPD office rs without their permission was a reta liatory

act. De fenda

nt, however , has asse rted28

a leg itimate justi fication for that investig ation—that the tape r ecor dings w ere made in violation of police de partment policy , specific ally , Gene ral Or der 304.04. See Def .’s Mem. at 16; De f.’s Mem., Ex. H (undated MPD Interna l Affa irs Bur eau Me morandum). Plaintiffs do not deny that they made the ta

pe re cording s but contend that their c onduct was la wful and that Defe ndant’s investigation and char g es—includingref err al to the U.S. Attorney ’s Off ice f or possible criminal char g es—ar e ther efor e unsubstantiated. See Pls.’ Mem. at 12-13. Even if Plaintiffs’ c onduct
wa s la wf ul, the y c ann ot s ur

viv e summa

ry jud g me nt u

nle ss t he y pr e se nt e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o attack D efe ndant’s re asonable belief that the conduct may have be en unlawf

ul. See F ischbach , 86 F .3 d at 11 83 (“ On c e the e mpl oye r h a s a rt ic ulate d a

no n- dis c ri min ator

y e xplanatio n f

or its action . . . the issue is not the cor rec tness or desira

bility of the re asons offe red but whe ther the employ er hone stly

believes in the r easons it offe rs.”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs have fa iled to provide any evidenc e that sug g ests Def endant’ s investigation was
unrea sonable or a

sham. Ther efor e, they

cannot survive summary judgme nt on this i ssue. D. P ersonal Liabi lity De fe nd ant a

rgue s n e ith e r t

he D. C. Wh ist le blo we r P ro te c tio n A c t, t he D. C. H uma

n Ri g hts Act, nor Title VI Ipermits individual supervisors to be name d as def endants. De f.’s Mem. at 9, 16. Howeve r, as noted a

bove, see supra note 1, Plaintiffs have sued D efe ndant L anier only in her officia l capa city , and ther efor e they have not state d a cla im ag ainst any individual supervisors. E. Statute of Limitat ions an d Notice of Claim Statute In a dd iti on

to t he de fe ns e s o n th e me ri ts, De fe nd ant c la ims that so me or a ll o f P la int if

fs ’ claims are barr ed by

the statute of limitations or by Plaintiffs’ failure to notify the District of claims ag ainst it in compli ance with D.C. Code § 12-309. See Def .’s Mem. at 17-19. Under the29

no tic e of c la im s tatut e , a

pla int if f m us t no tif y the Di str ic t of

any po te nti a l c la im a g a ins t it wi thi n six months after the injury or dama g e wa s sustained. See D.C. Code § 12-309. Plaintiffs’ notice of cla ims was serve d on the District on J uly 20, 2005. Def

endant ther efor e cla ims that S cully ’s claim of re taliatory

transfe r in August 2004 is barred. Similarly , Def endant c laims that the oney ear statute of limitations for D.C. Human Rights Ac t and D.C. WP A claims, see D.C. Code §§ 2-1403.16, 1-615.54( a), ba rs any claims ac cruingbefor e F ebrua ry 15, 2005. See De f. ’s Me m.
at 18 -1 9. Pla int if

fs argue that th e ir

c la ims did

no t a c c ru e be fo re Ma

rc h 2 00 5 a

nd the re fo re the se d ef en s es ar e i n ap p l i cab l e. Be cau s e t h e C o urtfi n d s th atP l ai n t i ff s h av e n o tp ro d

u ce d en o u gh evidenc e to survive summary judgme nt on any

of their c laims, however , the Court need not deter mine whether

any of Plaintiffs’ cla ims are ba rre d by the statute of limitations or the notice of cla im statute. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court sha ll GRANT Def endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment in its entirety . An appr opriate O rder acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January

6, 2010 / s / CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge