DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

J.R.M., A Child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Nos. 4D17-832, 4D17-833, 4D17-835 and 4D17-836

[October 18, 2017]

Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial 

Circuit, Palm Beach County; Luis Delgado, Judge; L.T. Case Nos.

16CJ002765ASB, 16CJ002766ASB, 16CJ002768ASB and

16CJ002769ASB

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MAY, J.

Special conditions of a juvenile disposition order are challenged in this 

appeal. A juvenile argues the trial court erred in imposing three special 

conditions to his probation. We agree in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The State charged the juvenile in five separate cases with a variety of 

crimes. The trial court withheld adjudication for trespass, attempted 

robbery of a conveyance, attempted burglary of a structure or conveyance, 

battery on a law enforcement officer, and burglary of a conveyance. The 

State nolle prossed additional charges. The cases have been consolidated 

for this appeal.

The juvenile’s predisposition report provided a comprehensive 

evaluation of him. He had a 2.8 GPA, never failed a class, and was not 

associated with any gangs. He played football in high school and hoped

for a college football scholarship. He had substance abuse issues and 

unresolved family issues. Sports played a big role in his life. The report 
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classified him as a moderate risk to reoffend.

The Department of Juvenile Justice [DJJ] recommended probation, an 

8:00 p.m. curfew, no contact with the victims, their families, or their 

property, monthly drug testing, apology letters, and 50 hours of 

community service. The DJJ also recommended family counseling, 

individual therapy, substance abuse counseling, and that he continue his 

involvement in team sports.

At the disposition hearing, the trial court withheld adjudication and 

placed the juvenile on probation. The court ordered him NOT to play 

sports over defense counsel’s objection and reminder of the DJJ 

recommendation. After the juvenile told the court about his recent success 

in track and his upcoming football game, the court stated:

Here’s my problem . . . , I think sports [are] supposed to teach 

you a great deal about life, you know, what you’re supposed 

to do, what you’re not supposed to do and when you let other 

people down.

And I think it does se[nd] an incredibly awful message to 

people to say that we can do things that are wrong and still be 

allowed to play our sports.

I’m going to take away your sports. That’s your punishment. 

Do you understand?

I want you to play sports. So you can show me that you’re on 

the honor ro[ll], I’ll give you back your sports. So you have to 

get A’s and B’s [this semester].

The court added that if the juvenile skipped a class, was absent, or was 

tardy, the juvenile would not be allowed to play sports.

The trial court next asked what the juvenile would be doing during the 

summer, and his mother replied that they were going to find him a job. 

The court then ordered the child to attend his courtroom every Friday from 

June 9th until August 11th from 8:30 in the morning until the close of 

court. “I’m going to put my eyeballs on you every single Friday. You’re 

going to come to court, you’ll be dressed like a gentlem[a]n, you’ll be

respectful.”

Defense counsel objected. But, the trial court imposed the Friday 

attendance, suggested the juvenile may be randomly drug tested, and 
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required successful completion of substance abuse counseling and an 

anti-theft course. The juvenile subsequently moved to correct the 

disposition orders. No order was entered before the expiration of thirty 

days. The juvenile did file a supplemental record containing one corrected 

disposition order.

On appeal, the juvenile argues the disposition order contains illegal 

terms and conditions of probation, which must be struck. He argues the 

required attendance at court every Friday violates judicial neutrality, is 

not clearly related to a legitimate sentencing goal, interferes with his 

opportunity for employment, creates supervision issues for the court and 

DJJ, and violates due process. He next argues the condition preventing 

him from playing sports until he makes the honor roll violates the goal of 

rehabilitation and imposes a condition outside of his control. He also 

disputes a third condition that he complete both a substance abuse and 

an anti-theft course. He requests a reversal and remand for the trial court 

to strike these conditions.

The State responds that the juvenile failed to preserve the disposition 

order issues. In any event, the State argues a remand should be limited 

to striking the court attendance condition. It suggests the other two 

conditions—making honor roll prior to playing sports and completing

substance abuse and anti-theft courses—are reasonably related to his 

rehabilitation.

We review a trial court’s imposition of special conditions of probation 

for an abuse of discretion. Spano v. State, 60 So. 3d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2011).

Here, defense counsel’s objection to the special conditions at the 

disposition hearing and the subsequent motion to correct the disposition 

order sufficiently preserved the disposition order issues. See Larson v. 

State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Fla. 1991) (“[T]he reasons underlying the 

contemporaneous objection rule are inapplicable to the conditions of 

probation if those conditions in fact are illegal.”); E.S.B. v. State, 822 So. 2d 

579, 580 n.1 (Fla 1st DCA 2002) (“Appellant’s utilization of rule 8.135(b)(2)

preserved this issue for appellate review.”).

“The discretion to impose a special condition of probation or community 

control is not unbridled.” Spano, 60 So. 3d at 1109 (internal quotation 

omitted). A condition of probation “is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to 

the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which 

is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not 

reasonably related to future criminality.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 
4

378 So. 2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).

The trial court ordered the juvenile’s attendance at court every Friday 

during summer after being notified that the juvenile was going to look for 

a job. Not only did the condition limit his job opportunities, it did not meet 

any of the special condition factors. There is no relationship between the 

crimes committed and the condition. Nor is it related to future criminality. 

It is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. The condition should be 

stricken.1

J.H. v. State, 107 So. 3d 1249, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) is persuasive

concerning the court’s prohibiting of the juvenile’s participation in sports. 

There, the First District struck a condition prohibiting a juvenile from 

participating in sports because it was not reasonably related to 

rehabilitation. Id. at 1250. Here, the trial court sought to keep the juvenile 

busy. Removing him from sports does not meet this goal.

Without further comment, we find the other conditions imposed 

reasonably related to the crime and the juvenile’s rehabilitation.

In his last issue, the juvenile argues the disposition orders are 

inconsistent with the executed plea forms. The State agrees. In case 16-

CJ-002768, the disposition order should reflect trespass of a conveyance 

with a $50 cost of prosecution. In case 16-CJ-002766, the disposition 

order should reflect burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, and the 

second charge, which was nolle prossed, should be petit theft over $100—

not grand theft of a motor vehicle.

The trial court attempted to correct one disposition order, but the effort 

came too late. The juvenile filed his motion to correct on May 26, 2017; 

the trial court filed its corrected disposition order on July 31, 2017, after 

it lost jurisdiction. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8135(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B). And, the 

supplemental record did not contain a corrected disposition order for case 

number 50-2016-CJ-002766, regardless of its date.

We therefore reverse and remand the case for the court to strike two of 

the special conditions imposed and to correct the disposition orders.

Reversed in part and remanded.

TAYLOR and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

 

1 We note this condition was for the summer of 2017 and is no longer in effect. 

That does not however convert an invalid condition into a valid one.
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* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.