## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Davis , 2012 IL App (2d) 110581

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. APRYL A DAVI S, Defe ndant-Appe llant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-0581

Filed J une 27, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Substantial compliance with the reg ulations reg arding the taking of urine samples in relation to a statutory suspension of one’s driver’ s license for driving under the influence of canna bis was sufficie nt wher e there was no fema le officer available to take the sample from a fema le driver, and service of the notic e o f summary suspension was sufficie nt with the office r’s mailing of the notice to the addre ss shown on the traff ic ticket, notwithstanding the f

act that the notice was re turned a s undelivera ble.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Du Pag e County
, No. 10-DT- 4336; the Hon. Cary

B. Pierc e, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l S tephen J

. Klein, of Ramsell & Associates, L L C, of Wheaton, for appellant.

Robert B. Be rlin, State’s Attorney
, of Wheaton (L isa Anne Hoffma n, Assistant State’s Attorney
, and L awr ence M. Ba uer and Victoria E. J ozef, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of counsel), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE HUT C HI NSON delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Z enoff

and B urke c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 On November 12, 2010, the State char g ed d ef en d ant, Apryla Davis, by citation with driving under the influence (DUI ) (625 I L CS 5/ 11-501(a ) (West 2010)), posse ssion of less than 2.5 g rams of canna

bis (720 I L CS 550/4(a) (West 2010)), and failure to dim headlig hts (625 I L C S 5/12-210 (West 2010)). There afte r, defe ndant filed a petition to resc ind the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileg es, which the trial cour t d i smissed without prejudice

. After rec eiving the results o f defe ndant’s urine test, the State mailed defe ndant the law enfor ceme nt sworn repor t on Fe bruar

y 14, 2011. The repor

t, howeve r, was returne d to the State as undelivera ble. On Fe bruar

y 28, 2011, the State char g ed defe ndant by information with DUI and mailed her confirmation of the statutory summary suspension. On April 1, 2011, defe ndant filed a motion to reinstate her petition to re s ci n d t he statutory summary suspension. The trial court g rante d the motion but denied the petition and defe ndant now appea ls, contending that the trial court err ed in denying the petition, beca use (1) the State failed to provide defe ndant with a hear ing within 30 day s of Fe bruar y 14, 2011, the day the notice of

the summary

suspension was mailed; (2) she was not serve d with the notice of the summary suspension; (3) the arr esting office r, a male, violated I llinois law by administering the urine test to her and did not proper ly authenticate the sample; and (4) the State lacke d probable cause to arre st her for DUI . We affir

m.

¶ 2 I . Ba ckg round ¶ 3 On November 12, 2012, while patr o l l i n g R o u t e 3 4 n ea r Eola Road, Offic er N athan Schramka observe d that the headlig hts on defe ndant’s vehicle appea red brig hter than other headlig hts on the road. Def endant’ s vehicle w a s tr a

veling behind Schramka ’s vehicle and she failed to dim her headlights. Schramka slowed his vehicle, allowing defe ndant to pull in front of him, and initiated a traff ic stop. When Schramka explained the rea son for the stop,

-2-defe ndant told him that a friend incor rec tly installed her he adlig hts. ¶ 4 As Schramka spoke with de fenda nt, he smelled a strong odor of canna bis coming from her vehicle. After being ask ed whether anyone smoked in the vehicle, defe ndant admitted that she smoked ca n n ab i s the previous day

. Schramka asked defe ndant if there wer e any items in the vehicle, and defe ndant responde d that ro l l i n g p aper s wer e located on the vehicle’s fl o o rb oard. Schramka asked defe ndant if there was any canna bis in the vehicle, def en d an t acknow ledg ed there was, and she retrie ved marijuana from the car ’s cente r console. Schramka sear ched defe ndant and the other occupa nts of the vehicle, but found no other c ontraba

nd. ¶ 5 Schramka arr ested defe ndant for possession of cannabi s

. De fe ndant admitted that the marijuana belong ed to her, and afte r first stating that she had not smoked canna bis since the prior day
, she admitted that she smoked ca nnabis at appr ox imately

noon that day . Be cause Schramka believed that defe ndant was under the influence of drug s, he arr ested her for DUI

. ¶ 6 After arr esting defe ndant, Schramka transporte d her to the Aurora police depar tment a nd issued a citation for DUI

. There afte r, Schramka reque sted a urine sample, which defe ndant
ag ree d to provide. Be cause there wer e no fema le office rs prese nt, Sc hr a mk a p la c e d d e fenda

nt in a ce ll with a steel door and a sm all window. The c ell contained a toilet located behind a five-f oot-hig h brick wall. Schramka closed the cell door, but d i d n o t l ock it, and stood approximately 10 to 15 fee t awa y

. Def endant came out of the cell and handed the sample to Schramka
, who seale d and initialed the sample. Schramka transporte d the sample to the State Police reg ional headqua

rters. ¶ 7 On Novembe r 23, 2010, defe ndant fil ed a petition to resc ind the s ummary suspension. Def endant acknow ledg ed in her petition that she was not serve d with the notice of summary

sus pension form. The trial court dismiss ed the petition without prejudice on Dec ember 3, 2010. ¶ 8 The lab results for the sam p l e we re re turned on Fe bruar y 14, 2011, and indicated the
prese n ce o f tetrahydroca nnabinol (THC), or canna bis. Schramka completed a law enfor ceme nt sworn repor

t. On Fe bruar

y 14, 2011, Schramka handwr ote an envelope with the addre ss de fenda

nt pr ovided, inserted the sworn repor t, se aled the envelope
, and mailed the

sworn re port to her by

United States mail. ¶ 9 On Fe bruar

y 25, 2011, Schramka noticed that the envelope addre ssed to defe ndant was returne d as undeliver able. Schr amka checke d defe ndant’s addr ess on the I llinois Secre tary of State’s databa se, which indicated that her addre ss was the same as the one he wrote on the envelope

. Schramka did not attempt to rese nd the repor t to defe ndant. On Fe bruar y 28, 2011, defe ndant was char g ed by information with DUI and was sent a confirmation of her statutory summary suspension, scheduled to c ommence on A pril 1, 2011. ¶ 10 On April 1, 2011, defe ndant fi l ed a m o tion to reinstate her petition to resc ind and a motion to resc ind the summary suspension beca use of the lack of a timely hear ing. The trial court noted that it had dismiss ed defe ndant’s November 23, 2010, petition be cause the file did not con t ai n the not ice of summary suspension. Def endant maintained that the “30-day clock” beg an running on Fe bruar y 14, 2011, the date that Schramka mailed the sworn repor t, beca use defe ndant had alre ady filed a petition to resc ind. The State counter ed that

-3-defe ndant’s November petition was premature beca use the sworn repor

t had y et to be issued. Acc ording to the S tate, defenda nt had t h e o p p o rt u nity to file a petition to resc ind afte r t he

sworn repor

t was serve d. The trial court, with a differ ent presiding judge
, disag ree d with the dismiss al of the November petition, but did not find err o r “b ec au s e t here was no sworn repor t.” The tria l c ourt g rante d defe ndant’s motion to reinstate her petition, but conside red the petition filed on April 1, 2011. The tria l court denie d the motion to rescind. ¶ 11 On April 15, 2011, the trial court hear d arguments on whet h er d ef en dant’s summary suspension should be resc inded bec ause Schr amka did not prope rly place her unde r ar

rest; he lacke d rea sonable g rounds to believe that she was driving under the influence ; he did not proper ly rec ite the war

ning to motorist; she did not test positive for illega l drug s; and she was not served w ith the notice of the summar y suspension. ¶ 12 Def

endant c alled Schra

mka to testify . Schramka

testified that he initiated a tr aff ic s top af t er d ef endant failed to dim her headlig hts. Schramka testified that he smelled a “stron g odor of canna

bis” coming from the car

. Schramka testified that he asked defe ndant when was the last time someone smoked in the vehicle, and she responde d that someone smoked in the vehicle the prior afte rnoon. Schramka asked defe ndant if “ther e was any thing in the car [he] shou l d know about,” and defe ndant responde d that there wer e rolling paper s in the car

. Schramka testified that he asked defe n d an t i f t h ere was any “we ed” in the car , and she responde d “y es.” Schr amka testified that defe ndant retrieved marijuana from the vehicle ’s
cente r console and that he pla c e d h er under arr est. Schramka testified that defe ndant admitted that she “smoked w eed” ear lier that day

. ¶ 13 Def

endant testified. Def

endant testified that she ag ree d to su b m i t to a urine test at the Aurora police depar

tment. Def

endant t es t i fi ed that there wer e no fema le office rs prese nt when she submitt ed to the urine test. Def endant testified that she lived at 2428 Gene va L ane in Montgome ry in Fe bruar y 2011. During that time, she did not rec eive a notice of summary suspension. On cr o ss-examination, defe ndant acknow ledg ed that she moved to her neig hbor’s house at 2436 Geneva L ane in the “middle of Marc h” and did not update her addre ss with the Secre tary of State. On redire ct examination, defe ndant testified t h at she chec ked her mail at her old addre ss while she lived with her neig hbor and moved back to her old house at the e nd of Mar ch. ¶ 14 Def

endant’ s mother, J ola Da v i s , t es t i fi ed. Davis testified that she had lived at 2428 Gene va L ane continuously for the last eig ht y ear s. Davis testified t h at she did not have diffic u l t y re ceiving mail. Davis testified that she did not see the envelope containing the notice of summar

y suspension befor e the time of the hear ing. ¶ 15 The trial court denied defe ndant’s petition to resc ind the summary suspension. The trial
court conclude d that Schramka substantially com p lied with the reg ulations for taking defe ndant’s urine sample, prese rved her dignity
, and maintained the integ rity of the sample. The tr i al co u rt fu rther found that Schramka was not require d to take additional steps in mailing the sw orn re port. Specifica lly , the trial cour t concluded:
“I can’ t blame the U.S. Postal Service and g rant a resc ission based upon that. I think that there might have been other avenue s, one more step migh t h ave been made by the

arr esting office r, but I don’t think he’s obliga ted to. *** He testified that he *** chec ked

-4-[wit h] t he Secr etar y of State ag ain to see if the re w as any chang e of addre ss and it was still the same a ddress ***.” ¶ 16 After

the trial cour

t denied her

motion to reconsider, de fenda nt timely appea led.

¶ 17 I I . Discussion ¶ 18 A. Timeliness of He aring ¶ 19 Def

endant’ s first contention on appe al is that the trial court err ed by not rescinding

her
summary suspension beca use the S tate failed to provide her wit h a hearing within 30 day s afte r the notice of the summary suspension was mailed

. De fe ndant emphasizes that she
proper ly filed a petition to resc ind on November 23, 2010, which the trial co urt dismiss ed without prejudice on Dec ember 3, 201 1

. Def endant maintains that, beca use she filed a petition to resc ind on November 23, 2010, that petition caused the 30-day period to run as

soon as Schramka mailed her the sworn repor t on Fe bruar

y 14, 2011. The State counter s that, b eca use defe ndant’s orig inal petition to resc ind was both filed and dismiss ed b ef o re t h e notice of summary suspension was serve d on defe ndant, the 30-day period did not beg in to run until April 1, 2011, when def endant f iled a timely

petition to rescind. ¶ 20 Deter

mining how to compute the 30-day period for h o l d i ng a hear ing on a petition to

resc ind a statutory summary suspension prese nts a question of law subject to de novo revie w. People v. Riffice
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 961, 963 (2009). Section 2-118.1(b) of the I llinois Vehicle Code (the Ve hicle Code) pr ovides: “Within 90 day s afte r the notice of statutory summary suspension or re vocation ser ved under Section 11-501.1, the person may make a written reque st for a judicial hear ing in the circ uit court of venue. *** Wit hin 30 day s afte r rec eipt of the written reque st ***, the hear ing shal l b e conducte d by the circ uit court having jurisdiction. *** The hear ing[ ] shall proce ed in the court in the same manne r as in other civil proce eding s.” 625 I L CS 5/2-118.1(b) ( West 2010).
“In interpre ting section 2-118.1(b) of t he Vehicle C o d e, we must asce rtain and g ive effec t to the leg islature’s intent.” People v. Moreland
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100699, ¶ 7

. “T h e b est indication of the leg islature’s intent is the languag e used in the statute, which must be g iven its plain and ordinary meaning .” Id. (citing People v. McClure
, 218 I ll. 2d 375, 382 (2006))

. When statutory lang uag e is unambig uous, the statute must be applied as written wi thout

resor ting to other aids of construction. People v. Bywater
, 223 I ll. 2d 477, 481 (2006). Courts
must c onstrue the statute as a whole, bear ing in mind both the subject the statute addre sses and the l egi s lature’ s objective in enac ting it. Moreland
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100699, ¶ 7. In doing so, howeve r, a court “should not rea d into the statute exceptions, li m i t at i o n s, or conditions that the leg islature did not provide.” Id. (citing McClure , 218 I ll. 2d at 382). ¶ 21 I n the curr ent matter, the plain languag e o f s ec t i o n 2 -1 1 8

. 1 (b) of the Vehicle Code unambig uously

provides that a pe rson may make a written re quest for a judicial hear ing to

resc ind the s u m m ar y suspension “[w]i thin 90 day s after the notice of statutory summary suspension or revoc ation serve d under section 11-501.1.” (Emphasis added.) 625 I L CS 5/2- 118.1(b) (West 2010). Pursuant to the statute’s plain languag e, by qualifying that a petition
may be broug ht only “af ter” the n o t i ce of summary suspension is serve d, the leg islature

-5-clea rly intended that such a petition may not b e b ro u gh t “bef ore” the State serve s the defe ndant with notice of the summary suspension. See W eb s t er ’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 62 (1990) (defining “af ter” as “following in ti me or plac e *** subsequent to in time or order ”). To hold othe rwise would be tantamount to re adinginto se ction 2-118.1(b) a condition that the leg islature did not provide. See McClure , 218 I ll. 2d at 382. ¶ 22 Having deter

mined that section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Co d e p er m i ts a petition to

resc ind a summary suspension to be proper ly broug ht only afte r the State has serve d notice of the suspension, the rema ining question is when defe ndant proper ly broug ht he r petition. Pursuant to se ction 2-118.1(b)
, a defe ndant may bring a petition within 90 day s afte r being

serve d notice pursuant to section 11-501.1 of t h e Ve h icle Code. 625 I L CS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2010). Section 11-501.1(d) of the Ve hicle Code provide s in pertinent par t: “I f the person *** submits to a test that discloses *** any amount of a drug
, substance,

or intox icating compound in the person’ s breath, blood
, o r urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of canna bis ***, the l aw en fo rcement office r shall immediately submit a sworn repor t to the circ uit court of venue and the Secre tary of State ***.” 625 I L CS 5/ 11-501.1(d) (West 2010).
Fur ther, subsec tion (f) provide s: “The law enfor ceme nt office r submitt ing the sworn r e p o r t u nder para g raph (d) shall serve immediate notice of the statutory summary suspension or revoc ation on the person and the suspension o r re v o cation and disqualification shall be eff ective as provided in
para g raph (g ). I n case s wher e *** any amount of a drug
, substance, or compound resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cann ab i s * ** is established by a subsequent analy sis of blood or urine collecte d at the time of arr est, the arr esting office r *** shall g ive notice as provided in this [s] ection or by deposit in the United States mail of the notice in an envelope with postag e prepa id and addre ssed to the person at his addre ss as s h o wn on the Uniform Traf fic Ticket ***.” 625 I L CS 5/11-501.1(f) (West 2010). ¶ 23 Her e, the r ecor d clea rly ref lects that the State had y et to serve defe ndant with notice of the summary suspension when she filed her November 23, 2010, petition to resc ind. At that time, Schramka ’s sworn repor t was not completed, beca use he was waiting for the results of d ef en d an t ’s urine test. Fur

ther, defe ndant acknow ledg ed in her petition that she “wa s not

serve d with the [n] otice of [s]umm ary [s] uspension form.” After Schramka mailed defe ndant the sworn repor

t and defe ndant rec eived confirmation of the summary suspension, defe ndant filed a motion to reinstate her petition. There fore
, defe ndant proper ly filed her petition on April 1, 2011, and wa s aff orded a hear ing w ithin 30 day s of that date. ¶ 24 Def

endant c ites Moreland
, People v. Fitterer
, 322 I ll. App. 3d 820 (2001), and People

v. Madden
, 273 I ll. App. 3d 114 (1995), as “contr olling prec edent” for the proposition that the State failed to provide her with a hear ing within 30 day s of her proper ly filed petition to

resc ind. In Moreland
, the defe ndant was pulled over for driving err atically
, and a Br eatha ly zer confirme d that he was driving under the influence

. Moreland
, 2011 I L App (2d) 100699, ¶ 2. The ar re s t i n g office r immediately serve d the defe ndant with a sworn repor t advising the defe ndant that his driving privileg es would be suspended in 46 day s and that he

-6-had a rig ht to a hear ing. Id. On May 4, 2010, the defe ndant filed a petition to resc ind. Id. ¶ 3.

At the first court hearing
, the defendant point ed out that he did not have a confirmation of the suspension. Id. Over the defe ndant’s objection, t h e t rial court continued the matter, advising the def

endant that the 30 da

y s in which he wa s entitled to a hearing would not be tolled. Id. There afte r, the Secre tary of State filed the confirmation of the suspension with the trial court, and on J une 4, 2010–31 day s afte r the defe ndant filed his petition–the defe ndant moved t o resc ind the s uspension on the basis that he was not aff orded a hearin g within 30 day s. Id. ¶ 4. The trial court g rante d the defe ndant’s petition to resc ind ( id. ), and we aff irmed afte r concluding that the 30-day period in which the defe ndant was entitled to a hear ing beg an to run be fore the Secr etar y of State conf

irmed the suspension. Id. ¶ 11. ¶ 25 I n Fitterer
, the defe ndant was arr ested for DUI on August 14, 1999, and g iven notice of

a sum mary suspension. Fitterer
, 322 I l l. App. 3d at 821-22. The defenda nt filed a petition
to resc ind on September 22, 1999. During the initial court hear ing, the trial court found that the rec ord indicated no pending suspension and, there fore
, struck the petition while g ranting the defe ndant leave to reinstate it. Id. at 822. There afte r, the defe ndant reinstated his petition, which the trial court g rante d afte r concludin g t h at the defe ndant had been entitled to a hear ing within 30 day s o f t h e d ate he orig inally filed his petition. Id. We aff irmed, concluding : “Af ter he rec eived the valid August 14 notice, [t he] defe ndant promptly filed his petition
to resc ind. The 30-day period beg an, entitling [t he] defe ndant to a hear ing by October 22. No such hear ing occur

red, howeve r, beca

use the rec ord did not timely ref lect a pending suspension. The delay was attributable to the arr esting office r, not the Secre tary , but the

cruc ial point is t hat it was not occ asioned by [t he] defenda

nt.” Id. at 824. ¶ 26 I n Madden
, the defe ndant was arr ested for DUI on September 3, 1994, and the ar resting office r ser

ved him with notice of a

summary suspension. Madden , 273 I ll. App. 3d at 114. The d ef en d ant filed a petition to resc ind the s ummary suspension on September 30, 1994. Id. At the initial court hear ing, the parties advised the trial court that the defe ndant’s abstrac t did not indicate that a sum mary suspension was p en d i n g, and the trial court dism issed the petition as unripe, with leave to reinst at e. Id

. at 114-15. On November 18, 1994, the defe ndant reinstated the petition and the trial court denied it. Id. at 115. The revie wing court

reve rsed, noting that the Secre tary of State had not confirme d the suspension within 30 day s of the filing of the petition. Id. at 116. The revie wing court emphasized that ripene ss would
not have been an issue at the initial hear ing, and a timely hear ing would have occur red, if the confirmation of the suspension had been sent out in a more seasona ble manner

. Id. Be cause the delay in holding the hear ing was attributable to the State, the revie wing court conclude d, the def endant’ s summary

suspension must be rescinde d. Id. ¶ 27 Moreland
, Fitterer
, and Madden are not applicable to the prese nt matter. In eac h of those

case s, the defe ndant proper ly filed a petition to resc ind afte r having been serve d with notice of a summary suspension. Conversely
, here, as defe ndant acknowledg ed in her November 23, 2010, petition, she had n o t y et been serve d with notice of a summary suspension. As noted above, the plain and unambigu o u s languag e of section 2-118.1(b) provides that a person may reque st a judi cial hear ing after notice of a sum mary suspension is serve d. 625 I L CS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2010). Thus, the simple point esca ping defe ndant is that, to adopt

-7-her position and conclude that her November 23, 2010, petition was proper ly befor e the trial

court–e ven though she had y et to b e s erve d with notice of a summary suspension–would require us to disreg ard clea r statutory intent by rea ding into the statute a condit i o n wh ere none exists. ¶ 28 Acc ording ly
, defe ndant was proper ly aff orded a hear ing within 30 day s of her tim e ly f il e d petition to resc ind her s u m m ar y suspension, as mandated by section 2-118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code.

¶ 29 B. Ser vice of Summary

Suspension Notice ¶ 30 Def

endant next contends that the trial court err ed in not resc inding her statutory summary suspension bec au s e the State failed to proper ly serve her with notice of the summary suspension. Def

endant argues that section 11-501.1(f ) of the Vehicle Code provides that the law enf orce ment office r submitting the sworn r eport “ shall” ser ve im mediate notice of the

summ ar y s u s p ension. Acc ording to defe ndant, the State failed to comply with section 11- 501.1(f) beca

use the addre ssed envelope containing the notice was returne d to Schramka as undelivera

ble. The State argues that it complied with section 11-501.1(f ) beca use Schramka place d the notice i n the United States mail in an envelope addre ssed to defe ndant, at the addre ss she provided, with pre paid postag e. ¶ 31 Whether the State proper ly serve d defe ndant pursuant to section 11-501.1(f ) prese nts a

n issue of statutory construction subject to de novo revie w. People v. Colli ns , 214 I ll. 2d 206, 214 (2005). As noted above, the primary objective of statutory interpre tation is to asce rtain the leg islative intent. People v

. Kohl
, 364 I ll. App. 3d 495, 499 (2006). The plain lang uag e of a statute is the best indicati o n o f leg islative intent. Colli ns , 214 I ll. 2d at 214. A court should not depar

t from plain statutory languag e by rea ding into the statute ex ceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with the leg islative intent, nor is a court permitted to inject provisions that are not found in the statute. People v. R o b er t s , 214 I ll. 2d 106, 116 (2005). “[W ]hen the l an gu ag e of a statute or rule is unambig uous, the only leg itimate function of c ourts is to enforc e the law as written.” Id. at 120-21. ¶ 32 The plain and unambig uous languag e of section 11-501.1(f ) of the Vehicle Code ref

lects that the leg islature intended for service of the notice of summary suspension to be satisfied by mailing with prepa id postag e the notice to the defe ndant’s addre ss as shown on the traff ic ticket. Specific ally , that section provides tha t, when a drug conce ntration is determined by

an analy sis of blood or urine, the arr esting office r can g ive notice by depositing in the United States mail the notice in an envelope
, postag e prepa id, addre ssed to the person as shown on the traff ic ticket. 625 I L CS 5/11-501.1(f) (West 2010). I f the leg islature had i n t en d ed to require a law enfor ceme nt office r to ensure rec eipt of the notice, for example, it could have require d that service of the notice confor m with section 2-203 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (the Code) (735 I L CS 5 /2-203 (West 2010)), g overning service on individuals when commencing a civil action. Section 2-203 provides that service may be m ad e upon an individual by leaving a copy of the summons with the individual persona lly or by leaving a copy at the individual’s “ usual place of abode,” with a person residing there who is at le ast 13 y ear s old, provided that the summons is also mailed to that a ddress in a seale d envelope

-8-with prepa id postag e. 735 I L C S 5 / 2 -2 0 3 (West 2010). There fore
, our leg islature’s use of

statutory lang uag e in sec tion 11-501.1(f) pe rmitting a la w enf orce ment office r to serve the notice of summary suspension by United States mail, provided that cer tai n conditions are followed, but declining to require the State to phy sically leave a copy of the notice with the defe ndant or at the defe ndant’s usual place of abode, ref lects its clea

r intent that the State is

n o t re q u i re d to take additional steps to ensure that the defe ndant rec eives the notice. See People v. Spencer
, 4 0 8 I ll. App. 3d 1, 8 (2011) (“The maxi m expre ssio unius est exc lusio alterius is an aid of statutory construction that means ‘t h e ex p re s sion of one thing is the exclusion of another

. ’ [ C i t ati on.] This maxi m is based in logic and common sense and dictates that wher e a statute or regulation lists the things to which it ref ers, it may be inferr ed that all omissions there from should be unde rstood as exclusions.”). ¶ 33 Her e, the rec ord unequivoca lly ref lects, and defe ndant conce des, that Schramka place d the notice o f s u m mary suspension in a seale d envelope
, postag e prepa id, addre ssed to defe ndant at the addre ss shown on the ticket. There fore
, the State complied with the notice require ments pursuant to section 11-501.1( f) of the Vehic le Code. ¶ 34 I n support of her contention, defe ndant cites People v. Os b o r n , 1 84 I ll. App. 3d 728 (1989 ). I n Osborn
, the State appea led a judgme nt from the trial court g ranting the defe ndant’s petition to resc ind the statutory summary suspension beca use the defe ndant was not serve d with notice of the suspension, as require d by statute. Id. at 728-29. The State
argued that, beca

use the defe ndant availed himself of his rig ht to a hear ing, he was not prejudice d by

the lack of

statutory notice. Id. ¶ 35 This court re

jected the State’s argument on the basis that the State had f ailed to ra ise it befor e the trial court and thus had forf eited it. Id. at 729. The revie wing court further noted in dicta that the argument would not be persua sive, even if it wer e proper ly befor e the court, beca use due proce ss require d that a de fe n d ant be given notice “as require d by statute.” Id.
at 730. There fore
, the revie wing court conclude d, until the St ate se rved the defe ndant with notice of a summary suspension, there could be no suspension to be confirme d or resc inded. Id. ¶ 36 Def

endant’ s relianc e on Osborn i s m i s p l ac ed

. De fe n d ant emphasizes that “it was undispu t ed t h at the defendant was never serve d the not ice of the s worn report.” Howeve r, here
, there is a dispute as to whether Schramka ’s mailing defe ndant the sworn repor t satisfied the statute’s service require ments. Specifica lly
, the court in Osborn was silent as to whether the State made any eff

ort to comply with the statute’s service require ments or made any other attempt to serve the defendant with not ice of the s ummary suspension. Conversely
, in this

case , t h e re co rd unequivoca lly ref lects that Schramka place d the sworn repor t in a seale d envelope
, postag e prepa id, and addre ssed the envelope to defe ndant as shown on the ticket. When the packa g e was returne d, Schramka undertook the additional step of double-c hecking defe ndant’s addre ss on the Secre tary of State’s databa se. As discussed above, those steps

wer e sufficient to comply with the service require ments put forth in section 11-501.1(f) of the Vehicle Code. There fore
, beca use Osborn primarily conce rned forf eiture and was silent

as t o the State’s compliance with the statute’s service require ments, we find its holding irrele vant her e.

-9-¶ 37 C. Urine Te st

¶ 38 Def

endant’ s third contention is that Schramka improperly administered the urine test and failed to proper ly authenticate the sample. Specifica lly
, defe ndant argues that the State failed
to comply with s ec t i o n 1 2 86.330 of title 20 of the I llinois Administrative Code (the Administrative Code), which r equire s a police of fice r, ag ency , employ ee, or nurse to be of the same g ender as the person underg oing the test. 20 I l l

. Adm. Code 1286.330 (2012). Def endant also argues that Schramka could not authenticate the sample, beca use he did not watch he r urinate while she provide d the sample. The State responds that itcomplied with secti o n 1286.330 beca

use S chra mka, as the arresting office r, was authorized to collect the sample. The State maintains that, even if the Administrative Code require s the person administering the test to be of the same g ender as the defe ndant, the State substantially complied with it. ¶ 39 Section 11-501.2(a ) of the Vehicle Code provides that evidenc e of a drug conce ntration in a person’ s blood, as d et er m i n ed by that person’ s blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, is admissible. 625 I L CS 5/11-501.2(a) (West 2010). Section 11-501

. 2 (a )( 1) further provides that a c hemical a naly sis of a per son’s blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance shall be perf

ormed acc ording to standards promulg ated by the Depa rtment of State Police (State Police). 625 I L CS 5/11-501.2(a) (1) (West 201 0 )

. T h e V e h ic le Code specific ally ref ere nces part 1286 of title 20 of t h e Ad m i n i s trative Code. See People v. Henry
, 398 I ll. App. 3d 1019, 1022 (2010). Sec tion 1286.330 provides in releva nt part: “The following proce dures shall be used t o o b t ai n a urine sample from a subject to deter mine the pre sence of alc ohol, other drug s or intox icatingcompounds: (a) A sample of urine shall be collecte d in a manner to prese rve the dignity of the individual and to ensure the integ rity of the sample. (b) A u ri n e s am p le may be collecte d by the arr esting office r, another law enfor ceme nt office r, an ag ency employ ee, or

a hospital nurse who can authenticate the sample. The office r, ag ency employ ee, or nurse shall be of the same sex as the subject under g oing the testing.” 20 I ll. Adm. Code 1286.330 (2012). ¶ 40 I n this case , Schramka substantially compl i ed wi t h s ec t i o n 1 2 8 6

. 3 3 0 in collecting defe ndant’s urine. We find support for our finding in People v. Bishop
, 354 I ll. App. 3d 549 (2004). I n Bishop
, the defe ndant was convicted of DUI resulting in an automobile acc ident. Id. at 551. On ap p ea l
, the defe ndant argued that the State failed to collect a sample of his urine in compliance with section 1286.330(d) of title 20 of the Administrative Code, which require d that the “ ‘ urine sample sha ll be collecte d from the subject’s first emptying of the bladder in a clea

n, dry container .’ ” Id. at 555 (quoting 20 I l l

. Ad m. Code 1286.330(d) (2002))

. The defe ndant noted that the hospital drew the first urine sample and that the second sample, drawn by police, was taken hours later; there fore
, the second sample did not strictly confor m wit h s ec t ion 1286.330(d). Id

. The revie wing court reje cted the defe ndant’s
argument, finding that substantial compliance was sufficie nt and that substantial compliance

was satisfied in that case

. Id. at 556. The revie wing court noted that h o s p i t al p rocedure
p re v ented the State from taking a sample from the first emptying of the bladder

. Id. T h e

-10-revie wing court further noted that, “if we wer e to ag ree that any deviation whatsoeve r from

the regulations rende red the results of a sample inadmissible, ‘we would be ignor ing the fac t that strict compliance is not alway s rea listi cally or humanly possible.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 34)

. ¶ 41 We find the rea soning in Bishop persua sive in the curr ent matter. Schramka testified that he broug ht defe ndant to the Aurora police depar tment and as k ed i f a fe male office r was prese nt to assist him in ad m i n istering the urine test. The office rs at the police depar tment responde d that no fema le office rs wer e prese nt, so Schramka had defe ndant collect the urine sample while she was in a cell, with the cell door closed, and behind a wall. We a g ree with the court’s finding in Bishop that, beca use strict compliance with the regulations is not alway s rea listi c, only substantial compliance is require d. Thus, we ho l d t hat the slight deviation her e did not rende r the sample ina dmissibl e. ¶ 42 I n rea chingour dete rmination, we note that defe ndant’s dig nity and the integ rity

of the sample wer e prese rved while she collecte d the sample, as require d by section 1286.330(a)

. I ll. Adm. Code 1286.330 (2012). Wit h respe ct to defe ndant’s dignity
, Schramka testified that defe ndant went into a cell with a solid stee l door and a small window. The cell contained a toilet behind a brick wall that was five fee t high. Whil e defe ndant collecte d the sample, the door to the cell was closed, but not locked, and Schramka stood 10 to 15 fee t awa y

. Schramka testified that he could not see defe ndant. When finished, defe n d ant advised Schramka
, and he testified that she was fully dresse d. At that point, Schramka opened the cell door and defe ndant handed him the sample. Def endant’ s testimony reg arding the urine coll ec t i o n was consistent with Schramka ’s testimony

. Def endant acknow ledg ed that she collecte d the sample in a cell behind a brick wall. She admitt ed t h at s h e co uld not see Schramka or any other office rs while she collecte d the sample and that there wer e no other people in the c ell while she c ollected the sa mple. ¶ 43 Moreove r, the integ rity of the sample was also prese rved. Schramka testified that, afte r defe ndant handed him the sample, he seale d the container
, initialed it, and transporte d it to the State Police reg ional headqua rt er s

. Def endant admitted that, when she provided the sample, there wer e no other substances in the cell and that she handed the sample direc tly to Schramka afte r she provided it. The rec ord is de void of any indication that the sample wa s compromised. ¶ 44 Ba sed on the fore g oing, we conclude that, consistent with the revie wing court’s holding in Bishop
, strict compliance with section 1286.330 was not require d. In the prese nt case , the State substantially complied with section 1286.330 beca use defe ndant’s dignity an d the integ rity of the sample w ere prese rved.

¶ 45 D. Probable Cause to Arre st Defe ndant ¶ 46 Def

endant’ s fi n al co n t en t i o n i s t h at S chramka lacke d probable cause to arr est her. Def endant disputes “whe ther [S chra mka] had the requisite knowledg e to even formulate an opinion that [ she] was under the influence of ca nnabis.” The State counter s that Schramka had a suffic i en t k nowledg e base to believe that defe ndant was under the influence of

canna bis, noting that Schramka testified that he completed a 40-hour course in alcohol and

-11-drug DUI detec tion while in t h e police aca demy
, followed by a “re fre sher course ” in May

2009. ¶ 47 “A hear ing on a petition to resc ind a summary suspension of driving privileg es is a civil
proce eding .” People v. Marsala
, 376 I ll. App. 3d 1046, 1048 (2007). Where a defe ndant, as here
, alleg es that the arr esting office r did not have rea sonable g rounds to believe that she or he was driving under the influence
, the defendant be ars the burden to produce prima facie evidenc e that the office r lacke d rea sonable g rounds. See People v. Stanton
, 269 I ll. App. 3d 654, 656 (1995). Evidence may include the defe ndant’s testimony that she or he was driving
proper ly
, exhibi ted no sy mptoms of drug or alcohol impairment, or was n ot driving

. See People v. Bavone
, 394 I ll. App. 3d 374, 377 (2 0 0 9). When the State moves for entry of judgme nt at the close of the defe ndant’s evidenc e, the trial court must consider all evidenc e, including evidenc e favor able to the State, and, in doing so, assess witness cre dibilit y , draw all rea sonable infere nces from the testimo n y , and consider the weig ht and quality of the evidenc e. Id. (citing People v . Tibbetts , 351 I ll. App. 3d 921, 927-28 (2004))

. ¶ 48 When de termining whether rea sonable g rounds exis ted for an arr est, courts employ the probable cause analy sis derive d from the fourth amendment. People v. W ear , 229 I ll. 2d 545, 560-61 (2008). When using this test, we apply a tw o -part standard of revie w. Id. at 561 (citing People v. Luedemann
, 222 I ll. 2d 530, 542 (2006))

. “A revie wing court will uphold finding s of hi storical fact made by the circ uit court unless such findings demonstrate clear

err or, and a revie wing court must g ive due weig ht to any infere nces drawn from those fac ts by the fac t finder.” Id. Howeve r, we revie w de novo the trial court’s ultimate leg al ruling as to whether

a petition to rescind should be grante d. Id. at 562. ¶ 49 I n this case , Schramka had probable cause to arr est defe ndant. Schramka testified that he had 40 hours of DUI drug and alcohol training at the police aca demy
, followed by a one-da y “re fre sher course ” in May 2009. Schramka further testified that he made seven or eig ht DUI

arr ests relating to ca

nnabis befor e ar

restingdefe ndant. ¶ 50 Moreove r, defe ndant’s emphasis on Schramka ’s technica l t ra i n i n g wi t h re s p ec t t o

canna bis misconstrues the prac tical nature of probable cause

. Probabl e ca u s e i s not g uilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jack son , 232 I ll. 2d 246, 275 (2009). I nstead, as our supreme court has emphasized, probable cause deals with probabilities and involves “fa ctual and prac tical considerations of ever y day life on which rea sonable and prudent men, not leg al technici ans, act.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id. As a result, “the exis tence of probable cause depends upon the tota lity of the circ umstances at the time of the arr est.” W ear , 229 I ll. 2d at 564. Her e, Schramka testified that there was an odor of canna bis coming from def endant’ s vehicle, that defe ndant admitted there wer e rolli ng paper s in the car , and that she admitted that she smoked canna bis ear lier in the day

. Ba sed on the above testimony
, a rea sonable and cautious person could have conclude d that defe ndant was driving under the influence of canna

bis. See id. at 565. There fore , probable cause exis ted to a rre st de fenda

nt for DU I

. ¶ 51 We reject d ef en d an t ’s ar gu m en t t h at the evidenc e prese nted at the hear ing w as insufficient to support a probable -ca use f in d in g

. Se c ti o n 1 1

- 5 0 1 ( a) ( 6 ) prohibits a person from being in phy sical control of a vehicle if there is “any” amount of an unlawfully consumed

-12-substance in that person’ s urine. 625 I L CS 5/11-501(a) (6) (West 2010). Schramka testified

that he smelled a strong odor of cannabis coming from defe ndant’s vehicle; defe ndant retrie ved marijuana from the vehicle’ s cente r console and admitted to him that she smoked marijuana ear lier that day

. Ba sed on that evidenc e, Schramka cou l d have rea sonably suspected that defe ndant was operating a vehicle with an unlawfully consumed substance in her ur ine. ¶ 52 We find support for this finding in our rec ent d ec i s i o n in People v. Miranda
, 2012 I L App (2d) 100769. I n Miranda
, the defen d an t was indicted for driving while his urine contained any amount of canna bis pursuant to section 11-501(a )(6)

. Id. ¶ 2. Noting that the probable -ca

use test was “hig hly defe rential,” we conclude d that the arr esting office r lacke d probable cause t o co l lect a urine sample when his aff idavit aver

red to finding phy sical evidenc e of alcohol consumption but said “next to nothing about controlled substances, and what scant mention it did make was unsupported by fac ts.” Id

. ¶ 1 1

. S pecif ically
, the aff idavit ref ere nced only beer bottles, that the office r s m el led alcohol on the defe ndant’s breath and lear

ned from the defe ndant that he had consumed alcohol, and that the defe ndant failed a field sobriety test. Id. The aff idavit’s only ref

ere nce to a controlled substance was the office r’s “prof

essional opinion that [t he defe ndant was] under the influence of alcohol and/or drug s.” Id. ¶ 12. ¶ 53 Although we rea ched the opposite conclusion in Miranda
, i.e.
, that the o ff i ce r d i d not have sufficie nt evidenc e of substance use to amount to p ro b ab l e cause , its rea soning is instructive here

. Unlike in Miranda
, Schram k a t estified that he smelled a strong odor of

canna bis coming from the car , defe ndant told him there wer e rolling paper s in t h e car , defe ndant retrie ved marijuana from the vehicle’ s cente r console, and defe ndant admitted to him that she “smoked wee d” ear lier that day

. Clearly
, Sc h ra m k a’s testimony reg arding a strong odor of canna

bis, defe ndant’s retrie ving marijuana from the vehicle, and defe ndant’s acknow ledg ment that she smoked marijuana ear lier that day was suffici en t t o satisfy the “hig hly defe rential” probable -ca use test. There fore
, Schramka had probable cause to conclude that defe ndant was operating her vehicle with a n unlawfully consumed substance in her urine

.

¶ 54 I I I . Conclusion ¶ 55 For the fore g oing rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Du Pag e County

.

¶ 56 Affir

med.

-13-