J-A18005-14

2015 PA Super 39

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.R., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: M.J.R. No. 188 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered January 2, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Criminal

Division, at No(s): CP-22-DP-0000146-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R., a Minor IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: M.J.R. No. 189 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered January 2, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Criminal

Division, at No(s): CP-22-DP-0000144-2010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, WECHT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015

M.J.R. (“Foster Mother”), the former foster mother of the two subject 

minor, female children, C.R. (born in September 2006), and D.R. (born in 

February 2008) (collectively, “the Children”), appeals from the Orders 

entered on January 2, 2014, dismissing her Motions for a permanency 

review hearing to determine placement under section 6351 of the Juvenile 
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Act,1 with regard to the Children, who were adjudicated dependent under 

section 6302 of the Juvenile Act.2 The Dauphin County Social Services for 

Children & Youth (“DCSS for C & Y” or the “Agency”) has filed a Motion to 

Quash the appeal, claiming that Foster Mother lacks standing. We agree, 

and quash the appeals for lack of standing.

We note the following relevant facts. On October 1, 2010, the 

Children were placed in the home of Foster Mother and M.R., her husband, 

as foster parents. The Children were adjudicated dependent on October 14, 

2010, and their biological mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights 

on April 5, 2012. 

In July 2012, several indecent assault charges were brought against 

the Children’s foster father, M.R. The trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the Children’s biological parents on August 30, 2012. Thereafter, in 

November 2012, a safety plan with provisions for the Children was put into 

effect by Orders entered on November 2, 2012, signed by Dauphin County 

President Judge Todd A. Hoover. The November 2, 2012 Orders, denying 

the Agency’s Motion for placement, each provided as follows:

ORDER – Based upon the above findings, IT IS ORDERED 

THAT: 

Physical custody of the subject minor child shall remain at 

the foster home of [Foster Mother]. 

 

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351 et seq.

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
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Placement of the subject minor child shall not be modified 

and shall remain at the current foster home. The child’s 

placement is the least restrictive placement that meets 

the needs of the child and there is no less restrictive 

alternative available.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

. . . the safety plan in place concerning the subject minor 

child must be adhered to. IF the safety plan is violated, 

the child shall be immediately removed from the foster 

home.

Such disposition having been determined to be best 

suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral 

welfare of the child.

Orders (Modification of Child’s Placement), 11/2/12. 

Thus, under the November 2, 2012 Orders and the safety plan, the 

Children remained in Foster Mother’s home, with supervisory measures 

implemented for M.R. Under the safety plan, (1) M.R. was not permitted to 

sleep in the home; (2) M.R. was not to have any unsupervised contact with 

the Children; and (3) M.R. was not to have any contact with the Children, in 

the home or otherwise, without a third person being present.

On June 13, 2013, M.R. entered a guilty plea. On June 20, 2013, the 

guardian ad litem for the Children, Joy Fleming, Esquire (“Attorney 

Fleming”), filed a Motion for Modification of the Children’s placement, 

requesting their immediate removal from the home for their safety. On June 

20, 2013, the Agency removed the Children, and placed them in the foster 

home of C.H. and B.H. On June 21, 2013, the Agency filed a Response to 
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the Motion for Modification of the Children’s placement. On June 24, 2013, 

the trial court entered an Order directing the parties to appear for a 

conference on July 8, 2013. Foster Mother was not served with notice of 

either the Motion for Modification or the Response of the Agency, nor was 

she served with notice of the trial court’s Order. Although the Children were 

removed from her home, Foster Mother did not seek to be heard on the 

removal, or to intervene in further dependency proceedings. 

On September 24, 2013, M.R. was sentenced to serve two consecutive 

terms of twenty-four months of probation, and was placed on the Megan’s 

Law Offender list for the next fifteen years. On September 24, 2013 and 

December 3, 2013, a Juvenile Court Master held permanency review 

hearings, and determined that the Children should continue in placement 

with their then current foster parents. By Orders entered on September 25, 

2013, and December 4, 2013, The Honorable John F. Cherry adopted the 

Master’s recommendations.

On December 18, 2013, Foster Mother filed Motions for permanency 

review hearings to determine the Children’s placement. In her Motions, 

Foster Mother asserted that she does not pose a safety threat to the 

Children, and that they were improperly removed from her home on June 

20, 2013, without notice or an opportunity for her to be heard on the 

necessity of removal. As such, Foster Mother claimed that the removal 

violated section 6336.1(a) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336.1(a), 
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which requires that a foster parent be timely provided notice of hearings and 

an opportunity to be heard. Foster Mother also claimed that the removal 

violated Rules 1604 and 1606 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Court 

Procedure (“Pa.R.J.C.P.”), regarding submission of a report concerning the 

foster child by a foster parent, and the modification of a dependent child’s 

placement, respectively. According to Foster Mother, the actions subsequent 

to the removal of the Children from her home were presented to a Juvenile 

Master, as opposed to the trial court judge, Judge Hoover. She argued that 

the presentation to a Juvenile Master was in violation of an implicit direction

in the trial court’s November 2, 2012 Order, which provided that any 

removal action without a violation of the safety plan was to occur only 

before Judge Hoover, and not before a Master. See Motion, 12/18/13, at ¶¶ 

38-39. 

On January 2, 2014, the trial court, by Judge Cherry, entered an Order 

dismissing Foster Mother’s Motion, ruling that she lacked standing to request 

a permanency review hearing on the Children’s placement. 

On January 29, 2014, Foster Mother filed two Notices of Appeal, along

with Concise Statements of Errors Complained of on Appeal, pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court, sua sponte, consolidated the 

appeals on February 27, 2014.

Foster Mother now presents the following claim for our review:

Did the Dependency Court err when it dismissed [Foster 

Mother’s] Motion for Permanency Review Hearing to Determine 
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Placement on grounds that [Foster Mother] lacked legal standing 

to make such request? 

Foster Mother’s Brief at 4.

Our Supreme Court has set forth our standard of review in dependency 

cases as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). An issue regarding standing to 

participate in dependency proceedings is a question of law warranting 

plenary review, and our scope of review is de novo. See In re S.H.J., 78 

A.3d 1158, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2013); In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 120 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). “[T]he question of standing is whether a litigant is entitled to 

have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” 

Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa. Super. 1998).

In determining that Foster Mother lacked standing to participate in the 

dependency proceedings, the trial court reasoned as follows:

... C.R. and D.R. have been in the legal and physical 

custody of the Agency since October 14, 2010. Though the 

[C]hildren were placed in the pre-adoptive home of [M.R.] and 

[Foster Mother] on October 1, 2010, the [C]hildren were 

removed from that home on June 20, 2013 due to safety 

concerns. C.R. and D.R. were placed and continue to be placed 

in the pre-adoptive home of [C.H. and B.H.]. Similar to In re 

S.H.J., it is not relevant that [Foster Mother] had previously 

been a foster parent to the [C]hildren when considering the 

issue of standing. [Foster Mother] is no longer a foster parent to 
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the [C]hildren. As it stands, [Foster Mother] is not an individual 

with standing as enumerated in the relevant statutory and case 

law. Additionally, [Foster Mother] does not have legal custody of 

the [C]hildren. For these reasons, [Foster Mother] does not 

possess standing in the matter.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/14, at 4.

Foster Mother contends that she had standing to file the Motions for 

permanency review hearings, relying on In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284 (Pa. 

Super. 2005), for the proposition that a prospective adoptive parent, who is 

in loco parentis, has standing to petition the court for custody or termination 

of parental rights, even when she does not have legal custody. Brief for 

Appellant at 8. Foster Mother acknowledges that the Agency retained legal 

custody of the Children. Id. at 9. She argues that, until the Children were 

removed from her home and placed in another home, she had standing to 

petition the court for legal custody by filing a petition for adoption pursuant 

to C.M.S. and Silfies. Id. Foster Mother urges that the removal of the 

Children from her home was improper because there was no emergency, 

and she was not afforded notice of the removal. Id. Foster Mother states 

that, while safety concerns were the reason for modifying the placement, the 

Children had been in Foster Mother’s care, without incident. Id. 

Additionally, Foster Mother argues that, to permit the requirements of 

section 6336.1(a), regarding the participation of foster and pre-adoptive 

parents in dependency proceedings, to be wholly disregarded without 

recourse for her, would render the statute a nullity. Id. at 10.
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Moreover, Foster Mother argues that Pa.R.J.C.P. 1606 required the 

trial court to hold a hearing on the modification of the Children’s placement, 

which, she argues, was not an emergency because the Children had been in 

her care, under the safety plan, while M.R. was charged with his crimes. Id.

at 9. Foster Mother asserts that she was deprived of her constitutional 

guarantee to due process of law because she was not provided with notice of 

the presentation of the modification Motion, so that she could object and be 

given an opportunity to be heard at a hearing. Id. at 10. 

Section 6336.1 of the Juvenile Act addresses notice and hearings in 

juvenile matters and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 6336.1. Notice and hearing

(a) General rule.—The court shall direct the county 

agency or juvenile probation department to provide the 

child’s foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative 

providing care for the child with timely notice of the 

hearing. The court shall provide the child’s foster parent, 

preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child 

the right to be heard at any hearing under this chapter. 

Unless a foster parent, preadoptive parent or 

relative providing care for a child has been awarded 

legal custody pursuant to section 6357 (relating to 

rights and duties of legal custodian), nothing in this 

section shall give the foster parent, preadoptive 

parent or relative providing care for the child legal 

standing in the matter being heard by the court.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336.1 (emphasis added).

Rule 1606 addresses the modification of dependent child placement 

and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Rule 1606. Modification of Dependent Child’s Placement
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A. County agency’s duties.

(1) Emergencies.

(a) Only in an emergency when a judge cannot be 

reached, a child may be placed temporarily in a 

shelter care facility or other appropriate care.

(b) The county agency immediately shall notify the 

court and all parties of any change made due to the 

emergency.

(c) The county agency shall file a motion or 

stipulation for modification of the dispositional order 

by the next business day of the child’s placement in 

a shelter care facility or other appropriate care. 

(2) Non-emergent cases. In all other cases, the county 

agency shall seek approval of the court for a change in 

the child’s placement prior to the removal of the child 

from the placement by filing a motion or a stipulation of 

modification of the dispositional order.

B. Contents of the motion. The motion for modification of 

the dispositional order shall include:

(1) the specific reasons for the necessity of change 

to the order;

(2) the proposed placement;

(3) the current location of the child;

(4) the manner in which any educational, health 

care, and disability needs of the child will be 

addressed;

(5) an averment as to whether each party concurs 

or objects to the proposal, including the child’s 

wishes if ascertainable; and

(6) the signatures of all the parties.

C. Objections. If a party objects to proposed modification of 

the dispositional order, the objections shall be filed no later than 
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three days after the filing of the motion for modification of the 

child’s placement.

D. Court’s duties. Once the county agency has requested 

approval from the court to modify a child’s placement or after an 

emergency change in placement has already taken place, the 

court may:

(1) schedule a prompt hearing to determine 

whether there will be a modification of the child’s 

placement;

(2) enter an appropriate order to modify the child’s 

placement; or

(3) enter an order denying the motion.

Comment: This rule is intended to address changes in the 

child’s placement. Brief temporary removals for hospitalization, 

respite situations, visitations, or other matters when a child will 

be returned to the same placement are not covered under this 

rule.

Pursuant to paragraph (A)(1), if there must be a change in 

the placement of the child due to an emergent situation, the 

county agency may temporarily place a child in a shelter-care 

facility or other appropriate care pending the filing of a motion 

for modification of the dispositional order. The county agency 

immediately is to notify the court and all parties of the change 

made and file a motion or stipulation by the next business day.

Pursuant to paragraph (A)(2), in all other cases, the court 

is to make a decision prior to the child being removed from the 

placement. Stability for the child is critical. Multiple placements 

can add to a child’s trauma. A child should not be shuffled from 

home to home out of convenience for a foster parent, relative, or 

other person caring for the child.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1606. 

First, we address whether Foster Mother has standing to participate in 

the present dependency proceedings, through the filing of her Motions for 

permanency review hearings regarding the placement of the Children, in 
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order to have them returned to her. Essentially, Foster Mother’s Motion is a 

motion to intervene in the dependency proceedings. 

This Court has explained that 

[p]arty status in dependency proceedings is limited to only three 

classes of persons: “(1) the parents of the juvenile whose 

dependency is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile 

whose dependency is at issue; or (3) the person whose care and 

control of the juvenile is in question.” In the Interest of L.C., 

II, 900 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

In re S.H.J., 78 A.3d at 1160-61. 

These categories logically stem from the fact that upon an 

adjudication of dependency, the court has the authority to 

remove a child from the custody of his or her parents or legal 

custodian. Due process requires that the child’s legal caregiver, 

be it a parent or other custodian, be granted party status.

Id. at 1161 (citation, quotation marks, emphasis and some punctuation 

omitted). This Court has consistently held that foster parents and persons 

acting in loco parentis do not have standing to intervene in dependency 

cases. Id. at 1161 (citing, inter alia, In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 122-23 (Pa. 

Super. 2009)).3 

 

3

In In re J.S., a panel of this Court addressed an appeal, by the agency 

and the mother of the subject child, from the trial court’s grant of permission 

for the child’s foster parents to intervene in an ongoing dependency 

proceeding. The panel reversed, citing section 6336.1. The panel reasoned 

that the foster parents lacked legal custody and lacked standing both to 

participate in the proceedings and to review the juvenile court record. Id. 

at 122-23. Moreover, the panel noted that the foster parents could not 

stand in loco parentis to the child because their status as foster parents was 

subordinate to the agency, which maintained legal custody and was primarily 

responsible for the child’s care and custody. Id. at 122 n.4.
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In In re C.M.S., cited by Foster Mother, this Court concluded that 

prospective adoptive parents have standing in loco parentis with regard to a 

child, and may commence a legal proceeding involving the child, either for 

custody or termination of parental rights. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d at 1288-

89 (citing, inter alia, Silfies, 713 A.2d at 643-45).4 Because the petitioners 

in In re C.M.S. stood in loco parentis to the child, this Court concluded that 

they had standing to file a termination petition.

We conclude that In re C.M.S. and Silfies are inapplicable in the 

instant case, as the present case is not a termination or custody matter, but 

a dependency case. As stated above, this Court has held that foster parents 

and persons acting in loco parentis do not have standing to intervene in 

dependency cases. In re S.H.J., 78 A.3d at 1161-62. Further, the panel in 

In re S.H.J. expressly declined to apply case law addressing standing in 

custody, termination, and adoption matters, to cases involving dependency 

proceedings.

We, therefore, need not address Foster Mother’s argument that she 

was deprived of her in loco parentis status, and her ability to petition for 

adoption or legal custody of the Children, based upon the failure of the 

guardian ad litem to adhere to the process set forth in Rule 1606. Foster 

 

4 Silfies involved an appeal from the dismissal of two successive child 

custody complaints filed by prospective adoptive parents who had assumed 

considerable parental duties with regard to the child at issue. The panel 

found that the prospective adoptive parents stood in loco parentis to the 

child, and had standing to bring the custody action.
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Mother has not established standing under any of the three categories 

articulated in L.C., II. To the extent that Foster Mother contends that the 

removal process was improper in this matter, she does not have standing, 

as a party to the dependency proceedings, to bring that issue before the 

Court. 

Citing In re J.F., 27 A.3d 1017, 1025 (Pa. Super. 2011), Foster 

Mother also claims that, even without standing, the lack of notice and 

opportunity to be heard with regard to her is reversible error, absent a 

showing that these requirements were constructively met. Brief for 

Appellant at 10. Foster Mother urges that, in accordance with section 

6336.1(a), she was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to 

the dependency court’s adjudication of the Petitions for modification of the 

Children’s placement under Pa.R.J.C.P. 1006(A)(2). Brief for Appellant at 9.

In In re J.F., this Court recognized that a foster mother, who lacked 

standing in a dependency matter, had the right to notice and an opportunity 

to be heard. In re J.F., 27 A.3d at 1021 (relying on 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6336.1(a)). In that case, this Court ruled that, although there was not 

strict adherence to the rules concerning notice to the foster parent under the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Procedure, the foster mother was made aware 

of the proceedings, and a meaningful hearing was conducted. Id. at 1023-

24. 
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Unlike the foster mother in In re J.F., there is nothing in the record to 

demonstrate that Foster Mother sought to be heard at the proceedings 

regarding the removal of the Children. The record reflects that Foster 

Mother knew about the removal of the Children when they were taken from 

her home on June 20, 2013. However, Foster Mother did not file a motion 

seeking to participate in the first hearing regarding the removal of the 

Children from her home, occurring on September 3, 2013. Nor did she 

attempt to participate in the second hearing, occurring on December 3, 

2013. Foster Mother filed her Motions for a permanency review hearing, to 

determine placement of the Children, on December 18, 2013, approximately 

six months after the Children’s removal from her home on June 20, 2013. 

Thus, Foster Mother’s argument concerning the denial of due process in the 

removal process in this matter, based on In re J.F., is misplaced. By her 

six-month delay, she obviously is seeking to advocate for herself as a foster 

parent deserving of the Children’s placement with her, instead of seeking to 

act in the best interests of the Children. 

As stated in the Comment to Rule 1606,

[s]tability for the child is critical. Multiple placements can add to 

a child’s trauma. A child should not be shuffled from home to 

home out of convenience for a foster parent, relative, or other 

person caring for the child.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1606, cmt. We conclude that Foster Mother’s failure to file a 

motion in relation to the removal hearings, and instead seeking to become a 
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party to the dependency proceeding, where she lacks standing, is fatal to

her present appeals. 

As Foster Mother’s appeal is from the denial of her Motions for a 

permanency review hearing regarding the placement of the Children, and, as 

she lacked standing to file such a Motions, we are constrained to quash 

Foster Mother’s appeals for lack of standing.

Applications to Quash granted; appeals quashed; Superior Court 

jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/2015