COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ROSALYN MAYFIELD 

v. Record No. 1826-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION APRIL 9, 1996 

and 

AMERICAN PROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Karen M. Rye (Melody L. Cockrell, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Timothy P. Murphy (William W. Nexsen; 

Stackhouse, Smith & Nexsen, on brief), for 

appellees. 

 Rosalyn Mayfield (claimant) appeals from a decision of the 

Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) that denied her 

claim for compensation benefits for injuries she contends she 

received in an accident while in the employ of The Southland 

Corporation (employer). The deputy commissioner ruled in her 

favor; however, on review by the full commission, it concluded 

that "a preponderance of the evidence fails to support claimant's 

claim," and the opinion of the deputy was reversed and the 

recommended award vacated. 

 Although claimant frames four issues for our decision, all 

are determined by whether claimant, as a matter of law, met her 

burden to prove she received compensable injuries arising out of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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an accident that was work related. 

 Claimant's principal argument is that the parties agreed 

that "an accident had occurred arising out of and in the course 

of [claimant's] employment"1

 but concedes that employer's defense 

that an injury did not occur in that accident remained "intact 

despite the stipulation" and "that [the] stipulation 

. . . does not jeopardize the defenses otherwise put forth by 

Employer." Employer concedes that it defended this "claim on the 

grounds that [claimant] was not injured as a result of the 

incident." However, employer contends a stipulation that an 

"incident" occurred is not a concession that an "accident" 

occurred.2 As we view the commission's opinion, its decision may 

be read to say that if an accident occurred, claimant failed to 

meet her burden to show that a compensable injury resulted 

therefrom. 

 In its opinion, the commission stated that because there is 

a "significant legal distinction" between the words "incident" 

and "accident," the burden remains on claimant to show by the 

record that an accident within the meaning of the Workers' 

Compensation Act (Act) "in fact occurred, and the said accident 

 

 1That statement appears to be the understanding of the 

deputy commissioner whose opinion states that the parties "agreed 

that an accident took place within the course of the claimant's 

employment but denies that the claimant was injured in the 

accident." 

 2Employer's assertion that it agreed only that an "incident" 

occurred pales in the face of the statement made by the deputy in 

its opinion. 
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arose out of and during the course of employment with this 

employer." For the purposes of our opinion, we find that the 

record adequately establishes that this was an accident within 

the meaning of the Act that occurred during the course of 

claimant's employment. The issue, therefore, is whether the 

record supports the commission's finding that the record did not 

contain credible evidence sufficient to meet claimant's burden to 

show that she suffered a compensable injury as a result of that 

accident. 

 The following statements taken from the commission's opinion 

disclose that its findings of fact, based upon the lack of 

credibility of claimant's proof that her injuries were received 

in the November 26, 1993 accident, are supported by the record: 

 As this case is before the Commission on 

the claimant's claim, she has the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence 

that she suffered injury by accident that 

arose out of and during the course of the 

employment with this employer. That burden 

is one of persuasion. It is not sufficient 

to show that an accident occurred without 

also showing that injury resulted from that 

accident. 

 [T]he Commission has traditionally not 

required strict formality and unwavering 

adherence to evidentiary rules. However, the 

Commission has insisted that the record taken 

as a whole must establish in each particular 

case that an accident defined in the Act in 

fact did occur, and that injury resulted from 

that accident. 

 * * * * * * * 

 Defense Exhibit 2 was completed by three 

separate individuals; claimant, M. Mallory, 

and Dr. Woods, and the same question was 

asked to all three individuals, and that 
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question was whether the disability arose 

from injury or illness arising out of the 

employment with this employer, and all three 

individuals stated "no" it did not. The 

position taken by claimant in Defense Exhibit 

2 is contradictory of the position she takes 

before the Commission. Although we may 

overlook minor inconsistencies in the 

evidence considered in its entirety, the 

inconsistencies in this record raise 

substantial credibility questions and call 

into doubt the testimony given by claimant. 

 The same inconsistencies likewise detract 

from the medical opinions of record. . . . 

[T]hese medical opinions lack the probative 

value and weight necessary to establish the 

requisite causal connection between the 

incident claimant describes and the injury 

she claims. 

 Contrary to claimant's assertions, the commission's opinion 

was based upon its finding that claimant's medical evidence was 

not sufficiently credible to convince the fact finder that 

claimant had sustained a compensable injury that arose from the 

collision/accident that occurred on November 26, 1993. 

 "'Generally, the full commission remains free to make 

different findings of fact than those made by the deputy 

commissioner.'" Virginia Dep't. of State Police v. Dean, 16 Va. 

App. 254, 257, 430 S.E.2d 550, 551 (1993) (quoting Williams v. 

Auto Brokers, 6 Va. App. 570, 573, 370 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1988)). 

"We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

employer, as the prevailing party below, and '[t]he fact that 

contrary evidence may be found in the record is of no consequence 

if credible evidence supports the commission's finding.' 

Manassas, 13 Va. App. at 229, 409 S.E.2d at 826 (citations 
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omitted)." Bean v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 16 Va. App. 183, 

186, 428 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1993). "A question raised by 

conflicting medical opinion is a question of fact." Commonwealth 

v. Powell, 2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1986) 

(citations omitted); see also Cafaro Constr. Co. v. Strother, 15 

Va. App. 656, 660, 426 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1993); City of Norfolk v. 

Lillard, 15 Va. App. 424, 429, 424 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1992); Island 

Creek Coal Co. v. Honaker, 9 Va. App. 336, 340, 388 S.E.2d 271, 

273 (1990). "Generally, a ruling by the commission that the 

claimant's evidence is insufficient to prove that an injury was 

causally related to the employment must be upheld on appeal 

because the question is one of causation, which is a factual 

determination frequently turning upon the weight and credibility 

accorded to the evidence." Stancill v. Ford Motor Co., 15 Va. 

App. 54, 57, 421 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1992) (citing Code 

§ 65.2-706(A)); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 

12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). "The actual determination of 

causation is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on 

appeal if there is credible evidence to support the finding." 

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 

814, 817 (1989) (citing Code § 65.1-98, now Code § 65.2-706); see 

also American Filtrona Co. v. Hanford, 16 Va. App. 159, 165, 428 

S.E.2d 511, 515 (1993); Lillard, 15 Va. App. at 430, 424 S.E.2d 

at 246 (1992). "Where reasonable inferences may be drawn from 

the evidence in support of the commission's factual findings, 
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they will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal." Hawks v. 

Henrico County Sch. Bd., 7 Va. App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 

(1988) (citation omitted); see also Chase Packaging Corp. v. 

Dorsey, 15 Va. App. 248, 251, 421 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1992). "The 

commission made the initial and only resolution of the factual 

discrepancy [in the conflicting testimony]. . . . We are bound 

by that factual finding." Grove v. Allied Signal, Inc., 15 Va. 

App. 17, 19, 421 S.E.2d, 32, 33 (1992). 

 We cannot say that the commission's finding was plainly 

wrong or that the record does not support its decision. 

Accordingly, in response to the issues stated by claimant, we 

find that we are not required to reverse the commission's finding 

as to whether an accident occurred; that considered in its 

entirety, the record does not require that we remand this case 

for further consideration by the commission; and that the 

commission's decision is supported by credible evidence and is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.