NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COUR T 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS D IVISION O NE

STEPHENIE LANEY, Plaintiff/Appellant ,

v.

TOWN OF SPRINGERVILLE TOWN COUNCIL; COUNCILMAN RICHARD DAVID; COUNCILMAN DOUGLAS HENDERSON; COUNCILMAN ROBERT MACKENZIE; COUNCILMAN DON SCOTT; M AYOR PHIL HANSON, JR.; TOWN MANAGER CHRISTOPHER COLLOPY; and ZONING ADMINISTRATOR MICHAEL LARISH, Defendants/Appellees

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No. 1 CA-CV 23-0019

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County No. S0100CV202200142 The Honorable Garrett L. Whiting, Judge Pro Tempore

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL
Stephenie Laney, Springerville Plaintiff/Appellant

Sims Mackin, Phoenix By Kristin M. Mackin Counsel for Defendants/Appellees FILED 1 1-7-2023LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al. Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered th e decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

C A T L E T T , Judge:

¶1 Stephenie Laney (“Laney”) appeals the superior court’s dismissal of her complaint against the Town of Springerville Town Council and others (collectively, the “Counc il”). Because the superior court dismissed Laney’s complaint without pr ejudice, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Laney filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that, in 2021, the Council voted on whether to re-zone certain property. The vote ended in a tie. Nine months later, the Council voted again. The re-zoning measure passed. Laney alleged this second vote violated town ordinances in various ways.
¶3 The Council asked the superior court to dismiss Laney’s complaint for lack of standing and failure to serve a notice of claim. Laney responded, arguing the Council’s motion “focus[ed] on the nuisance to the property not the lack of proper procedures being questioned.” The superior court agreed with the Council and di smissed the complaint. But in so doing, the superior court did not indi cate whether the dismissal was with (or without) prejudice or include language required to make the order final. Laney still appealed.
¶4 Realizing the dismissal order lacked finality language, this Court stayed the appeal for the su perior court to enter a new order containing that language. And anticipa ting that finality language may still be insufficient to vest appellate jurisd iction, this Court warned that it “does not express an opinion on whether . . . the order is substantively appealable.” The superior court ente red a new dismissal order containing finality language but making clear that the dismissal was without prejudice. This Court then lifted the stay.LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al. Decision of the Court

3 DISCUSSION
¶5 Although the Council does not challenge our jurisdiction, “we are obligated to examine our jurisdiction over an appeal” and to dismiss when we lack jurisdiction. Kool Radiators, Inc. v. Evans , 229 Ariz. 532, 534 ¶ 8 (App. 2012) (alterations and citation omitted). “The general rule is that an appeal lies only from a final judgment.” Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. , 168 Ariz. 301, 304 (App. 1991); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101. A complaint dismissed “without prejudice” is not a “final, appealable order.” Kool Radiators, Inc. , 229 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 8. Rule 54(c) finality language “does not render an otherwise non-appealable orde r or judgment appealable as a final judgment.” Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C. , 240 Ariz. 420, 426 ¶ 6 (App. 2016).
¶6 There is one potential exception to the general rule: this Court has jurisdiction when a dismissal with out prejudice “in effect determines the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3). The superior court did not deny Laney leave to amend her complaint. See Robert Schalkenbach Fo und. v. Lincoln Found., Inc. , 208 Ariz. 176, 179–80 ¶¶ 6, 13 (App. 2004) (finding jurisdiction when the trial court dismissed without prejud ice but refused to grant leave to amend). And we cannot independently conclude that Laney’s legal claims are time-barred or that the superior court’s order would otherwise prevent a future appealable judgment. See Osuna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 214 Ariz. 286, 290 ¶ 11 n.4 (App. 2007) (declining to adopt a rule that jurisdiction vests in dismissal without prejudice when claims are otherwise time barred because the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, can be waived, and the court would be “rais[ing] an a ffirmative defense on a defendant’s behalf”); McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc. , 220 Ariz. 71, 74 ¶ 4 (App. 2009) (dismissing appeal when appella nts did “not argue the statute of limitations barred the refiling of any of the claims”).

CONCLUSION
¶7 We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.