NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No . 17

- 1433

_____________ MICHELLE RENN CORCHADO; JONATHAN MUSSO

v. FOULKE MANAGEMENT CORP., trading as CHERRY HILL MITSUBISHI & MT. EPHRAIM CHRYSLER DODGE, CHARLES KEARNS; ROBERT BADOLATO; STEVE DOE; SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS; WELLS FARGO DEALER

SERVICES; STEVEN R. CORSEY Foulke Management Corp.; Wells Fargo Dealer Se rvices, Appellants

______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (District Court No. 1:15

- c v - 0 6 600 ) District Judge: Hon . Jerome B. Simandle

______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 26 , 2017

______________ Before: SMITH , Chief Judge , McKEE and RESTRE PO , Circuit Judges

.

(Opinion filed: December 21, 2017 )

_______________________ OPINION 

_______________________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

M c KEE, Circuit Judge.
Foulke Management Corporation and Wells Fargo Dealer Services appeal the District Court’s order denying their motion s to compel arbitration and directing limited discovery . For the reasons that follow , we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. 1
We first consider Appellants ’ conten tion that the arbitration agreement should be
enforced because i t is undisputed that Appellees ’ signatures appear on a copy of the
agreement. The mere fact that Appellees signed copies of the arbitration agreement does

n ot definitively demonstrate that they intended to be bound by its terms , nor does it negate their claims that they were fraudulently induced to sign it

. B oth Appellees specifically allege that they were not aware of the terms of the arbitration agreement when they signed, that they were prevented from reading it before signing , and that they were misled
about the nature and purpose of the document

. We have previously held that “if the plaintiff has responded to a motion to compel
arbitration with addition al facts sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue, then

‘ the parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on [ the ] question. ’ ” 2 Here, after Appellant Foulke filed its

mot ion to compel arbitration, Appellees submitted declarations alleging “additional facts

1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 331 . We have appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of A ppellants’ motion s to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 1 6(a)(1)(B). 2 Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C. , 716 F.3d 764, 776 (2013) (quoting Somerset Consulting, LLC v. United Capital Lender, LLC , 832 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D.Pa. 2011) ) ( alteration in original )

.3

sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue.” 3 Thus , the District Court correct ly
found that limited discovery concerning Appellees’ intent vel non to be bou nd by the
terms of the arbitration agreement was warranted , as they had entered into the record evidence demonstrating that they did not intend to be bound by the terms of the
agreement

. W e next consider A ppellants ’ assert ion that Appellees failed to speci fically allege that they were fraud ulently induced to sign the arbitration agreement s , as opposed to the contract documents collectively, and that they should therefore be compelled to arbitrate the threshold question of arbitrability. 4 Appellees have , in fact, specifically alleged in their
declarations that they were fraudulently induced to sign the arbitration agreements

. In discussing the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act, t he Supreme Court
has held that “if the [plaintiff’s] claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself

– an issue which goes to the ‘making ’ of the agreement to arbitrate

– the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.” 5 The Act was intended “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” 6 Th us, an arbitration agreement, like any
other alleged contract, “may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. ’ ” 7 As the District Court correctly noted here, Appellees have “ass erted a defense of fraud in the inducement of the respective stand

-

3 Id

. 4 Appellants’ Br. at 18

- 19. 5 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. , 388 U.S. 395, 403

- 04 (1967)

. 6 Id . at 404 n. 12. 7 Rent

- A

- C t r. , W

. , Inc. v. Jackson , 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto , 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996))

.4

alone arbitration agreements in opposition to Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration, supported by sworn statements.” 8 Thus, their contentions, if true, would be grounds for invalidating the arbitration agreement under New Jersey law. 9

II

. For the foregoing reasons , we affirm the D istrict C ourt’s order in its entirety.

8 App. at 35. 9 “An agreement to arbitrate, like any other contract, ‘ must be the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law. ’ ” Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P. , 99 A.3d 306, 312 (N.J. 2014) (quoting NAACP of Camden Cn ty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. , 24 A.3d 777, 790 (N.J. App. Div. 2011))

.