2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-25-2011

Glenda Cain v. Wellspan Health

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1216

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Recommended Citation

"Glenda Cain v. Wellspan Health" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1589.

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-1216

_____________

GLENDA CAIN,

 Appellant

 

v.

WELLSPAN HEALTH

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District Of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 08-cv-1704

District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

March 21, 2011 

Before: FUENTES, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 25, 2011)

_____________

OPINION

_____________

 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Glenda Cain, who is African-American, was employed by York Hospital, a wholly 

owned subsidiary of Wellspan Health (“Wellspan”), as a team-leader in the York 
2

Hospital cafeteria. Cain was purportedly dismissed for permitting her subordinate to 

make unauthorized entries into the Hospital’s electronic time keeping system in such a 

way that suggested Cain had arrived to work on time when in fact she had not. Following 

her termination, Cain filed suit against Wellspan, alleging race and gender discrimination 

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law claims for breach of 

contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Wellspan on all counts. Cain now appeals. We will 

affirm. 1 

I.

We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and 

procedural history of this case, which are carefully set forth in the District Court’s 

opinion. See Cain v. Wellspan Health, No. 1:08-cv-1704, 2009 WL 5112352, at *1 

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009). In her detailed and thoughtful opinion, Judge Rambo

explained her reasons for granting Wellspan’s motion for summary judgment on the same 

issues raised on appeal. Since we can add little to the District Court’s reasoning, we will 

affirm the order granting summary judgment substantially for the reasons set forth in the 

court’s opinion.2 

 

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2

 We will discuss one argument in greater detail. Appellant also maintains that the 

District Court did not consider that her federal discrimination claims arose out of 

Wellspan’s failure to “allow her to confront her accusers and have an opportunity to be 

represented by an attorney during the termination process.” Bl. Br. 7. We disagree with 

appellant’s characterization of the District Court opinion. The District Court did consider 
3

II.

Next, we consider Wellspan’s pending motion for sanctions, filed on July 28, 

2010, which seeks imposition of costs or dismissal of Cain’s appeal. Wellspan cites two 

reasons in support of this motion: (1) appellant’s failure to provide a credible explanation 

for filing her opening brief three days after the filing deadline of July 12, 2010 and 

Wellspan’s late receipt of Cain’s submissions; and (2) appellant’s violation of this 

Court’s July 21, 2010 Non-Compliance Order. On July 21, 2010, this Court ordered 

appellant to remedy certain defects in the filing of her brief and appendix by July 26, 

2010. Although appellant complied with some of our requirements by the deadline, she 

did not come into complete compliance with the Order until August 6, 2010. It is within 

our discretion to sanction an attorney or party for failing to comply with a court order or 

the filing requirements set forth in our local rules. L.A.R. 107.3. 

Given that appellant satisfied all the requirements of our Non-Compliance Order

by August 6, 2010, and in light of the fact that on August 17, 2010 we granted appellant’s 

motion to file the brief and appendix out of time, we will deny Wellspan’s motion for 

sanctions. 

 

the “procedures employed by Wellspan to investigate the allegations of wrong doing by 

Cain” but found these procedures were relevant only if Cain “had produced evidence that 

Wellspan used some other procedures where similar complaints were lodged against 

Caucasian or male employees.” Id. at *8. However, Cain “has produced no such 

evidence, and, thus, her focus on the underlying investigation is merely a distraction.” Id. 

In short, Judge Rambo concluded that “[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that 

Wellspan approached other similarly situated allegations of dishonesty differently.” Id. 

We agree. For this same reason, we are not now persuaded by appellant’s argument that 

the procedures of the grievance process provided evidence of race or gender 

discrimination, given that appellant did not provide any evidence that other complaints 

were treated differently. 
4

III.

For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Wellspan and deny Wellspan’s motion for sanctions.