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******************************************************TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL

FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 134 ET AL. (AC 35904)
Beach, Sheldon and Schaller, Js. Argued September 19, 2014—officially released February 3, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Tyma, J.)
Michael S. Casey, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher J. Smedick, for the appellant (plaintiff).
William S. Palmieri, for the appellee (defendant John J. Jasinski).Opinion SCHALLER, J. The plaintiff, the town of Stratford, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its applicationtovacate an arbitration award and granting the application to confirm the arbitration award filed by the defendant John Jasinski.1 On appeal, the plaintiffclaimsthat(1)thecourtimproperlydetermined that the arbitration award was not in violation ofapplicable public policy,2 (2) the court improperly determined that the arbitration panel did not exhibit evident partiality toward the defendant, and (3) the plaintiff
was denied a‘‘full andfairhearing’’ pursuantto General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3). We affirm thejudgment ofthe trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevantto this appeal. DonnaBest, the emergencymedical services administrator for the plaintiff, received an anonymous letter regarding an incident involving the defendant. Best gave the letterto the plaintiff’s director ofhuman resources, Ronald Ing, who began to investigate the defendant. The anonymous letter called attention to an incident that took place on April 26, 2010, when the defendant, a paramedic, and Jennifer Simmons, avolunteeremergencymedicaltechnician, while workingfortheplaintiff, respondedtoacalltotransport
a patient to the hospital. While en route to the hospital following the patient pick up, and with the patient still in the back of the ambulance, the defendant returned to the plaintiff’s emergency services headquarters at 900 Longbrook Avenue in Stratford to drop Simmons off. In the purported language of the profession, the defendant returned to headquarters to perform a ‘‘crew swap.’’ The anonymousletterallegedthatthe defendant performed the crew swap so that Simmons would not be late for her regular paidjob. The defendant claimed that he performed the crew swap to put an end to the verbally aggressive behavior Simmons was directing toward the patient.3
As a result ofthis investigation, Ing, on behalf ofthe plaintiff, terminated the defendant’s employment by a letter datedAugust 2, 2010. The letter statedthe following reasons, the defendant: did not take the patient directlyto the hospital and instead electedto do a crew swap withthe patient inthe ambulance, failedto report the unprofessional behavior of Simmons, and failed to verifyand correctthe emergencymedical services form documenting the call to show the occurrence of the
crew swap. On behalf ofthe defendant, the union filed
a timely grievance, claiming that the plaintiff had violated the collective bargaining agreement between the partiesbyterminatingthe defendantwithoutjustcause. The union sought arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. OnApril 5, 2012, andMay4, 2012, anarbitrationpanelconducted a hearing to resolve two questions: ‘‘Was [the defendant] terminated forjust and sufficient cause in accordance with [the collective bargaining agreement]? Ifnot, what shall the remedy be?’’ On July 19, 2012, the arbitrators issued a unanimous decision in favor of the defendant.
The arbitrators found that the investigation was not conducted fairly and objectively, because Best, who had previously accused the defendant of misconduct, resulting in his dismissal,4 was ‘‘intimate[ly] involved’’ in this investigation. The arbitration panel also found that the plaintiff ‘‘mischaracterized’’ and ‘‘overinflated’’ the incident in order ‘‘tojustify discharging’’ the defendant. The panel noted that the plaintiffactually encouraged crew swaps during nonemergency calls to avoid overtime. In sum, the panel found that the defendant had not been terminated for good and sufficient cause in accordance withthe collective bargaining agreement and ordered that he be reinstated.
Theplaintifffiledan applicationtovacatethe arbitration award and the defendant filed an application to confirm the arbitration award. The plaintiffargued that the award should be vacated because: (1) it violated public policy and was contrary to public safety and state regulations; (2) the arbitrators exhibited evident partiality, and (3) it was not afforded a ‘‘full and fair hearing.’’ In its July 9, 2013 decision, the court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate and granted the defendant’s applicationto confirmthe award. The court foundthat this state has a clear, well-defined and dominant public policy of protecting patients from ‘‘ ‘detrimental acts’ ’’ by emergency medical personnel, and thatthere is aresulting expectationthat suchpersonnel will provide reasonable care and treatment to patients. The court determined, specifically, that the claim that the awardviolatedpublicpolicywas colorable andmerited de novo review. Upon review of the claim on its merits, the court concluded that the award in favor ofthe defendant did notviolatepublicpolicyandthatthere was no evidence that the crew swap adversely impacted the patient’s health or safety. The court also found that the award did not run contrary to public policy by undermining the plaintiff’s ability to manage and discipline its employees. The court took note of the investigatory participation of Best, who the court noted had an adverse history with the defendant.5 Additionally, in response to the plaintiff’s arguments regarding the partiality of the arbitration panel6 and the lack of a ‘‘full andfair’’hearingasgroundsforvacatingtheaward,7the court found that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden.
On appeal, the plaintiff asserts the same three grounds to support its claim that the court should have vacated the arbitration award and asks that we remand the case for further hearings. We affirm the decisionof the court. Prior to review of the plaintiff’s claims, we set forth the standardforappellatereview. Ouranalysisisguided bythe well establishedprinciples oflaw governing consensual arbitration. ‘‘Arbitration is a creature of contract and the parties themselves, by the terms of their submission, define the powers of the arbitrators.

. . . The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only ifthe agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. HartfordSteamBoilerInspection &Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 109, 779 A.2d 737 (2001).
Arbitration is favored when settling private disputes and, as such, judicial review of arbitration awards is conducted in a manner ‘‘designed to minimize interferencewithanefficientandeconomicalsystemofalternative dispute resolution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Saturn Construction Co. v. PremierRoofing Co., 238 Conn. 293, 304, 680A.2d 1274 (1996). Twotypes of evidentiary submissions are allowed in arbitration proceedings, restricted and unrestricted, which function to limit the undertaking of the arbitration panel. Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80, 881 A.2d 139 (2005). The scope of the submission is negotiated bythe contracting parties priorto a dispute. Underanunrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decisionis consideredfinalandbinding. Id. Inthis situation, courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact. Id. ‘‘The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to determine if the award conforms to the submission.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection&Ins. Co., supra, 258 Conn. 110. ‘‘[A] limited scope ofjudicial review is warranted giventhe factthat the parties voluntarily bargained forthe decision ofthe arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed the risks of and waived objections to that decision.

. . . It is clear that a party cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely what the arbitrators were authorized to do merely because that party dislikes the results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The purpose of a determination as to whether an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators were obligated to do, but, rather, to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. ‘‘Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court ofwhether the submissionwasrestrictedorunrestrictedtellsthe courtwhat its scope of review is regarding the arbitrators’ decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Furthermore, ‘‘[w]here the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that

. . . the interpretation of theagreementbythearbitratorswas erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartyv. CantorFitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 80. Section 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part the following grounds upon which to vacate an award issued based on an unrestricted arbitration submission: ‘‘(1) If the award hasbeenprocuredbycorruption, fraudorunduemeans; (2) ifthere has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hearevidencepertinent andmaterialtothe controversy
or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceededtheirpowers orso imperfectlyexecutedthem that amutual, final and definite award upon the subject mattersubmittedwas notmade.’’ ‘‘In [the] construction of§ 52-418 (a) (4), [ourSupreme Courthas], asageneral matter, looked to a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers

. . . . [It has] also recognized, however, that

. . . [a]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application ofthe law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 81.
The court determined inthe present actionthatthere
was an agreement to a consensual and unrestricted submission in the collective bargaining agreement. In its appeal, the plaintiff asserts three grounds for vacating the arbitration award: (1) the award violated public policy; (2) the panelwas notimpartialtowardthe plaintiff in violation of § 52-418 (a) (2); and (3) the plaintiff
was denied a ‘‘full and fair hearing’’ pursuant to § 52- 418 (a) (3). We are not persuaded.
I
The plaintiff claims that the award violates the welldefinedpublicpolicy ofthis state, prohibitingparamedics from acting in a manner contrary to the welfare of their patients. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the
crew swap violated § 19a-179-9 (f) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, which provides: ‘‘No person engaged in the provision of emergency medical services shall commit an act which is detrimental to the safety, health, or welfare ofapatient or the general public.’’ Theplaintiffalso arguesthatthe awardviolatespublicpolicybecauseitinterfereswiththemanagement rights of the plaintiff by limiting its contractual and legal right to manage its employees. ‘‘Ordinarily, wherethereis aconsensual, unrestricted submission to arbitration, the only question is whether the award conforms to the submission.

. . . One exception to that rule, however, is where the award violates clear public policy.

. . . Where a party challenges an award on the ground that it violates public policy, de novo review is in order if the challenge has
a legitimate, colorable basis.

. . . That de novo review is limited, however, to the two critical questions: (1) whetherthere is an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy and (2) whether the award violates that policy.

. . . It does not extend to the facts found by the arbitrator.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 142 Conn. App. 213, 223–24, 70 A.3d 42, cert. granted, 309 Conn. 909, 68 A.3d 662 (2013). We note that this exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violates a strong public policy. Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 7, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).
We agree with the trial court that Connecticut has a clear, well-defined and dominant public policy of protecting patients from detrimental acts by emergency medicalservicespersonnel. SeeRegs. Conn. StateAgencies § 19a-179-9 (f). Emergencypersonnelaretoprovide reasonable care and treatment to the patients whom they oversee. See id.; see also General Statutes § 20- 206nn (5) (paramedic subjectto discipline fornegligent conduct). Although we determine that the underlying claim made by the plaintiff is colorable, we conclude that the award in the present action does not violate public policy.
On the basis ofthe facts presented to the arbitration panel, there was no evidence that the defendant’s crew swap constituted a detrimental act, or that it put the patient in harm’s way. Instead, it was reported that the patient went to the hospital because of a request by her family, and that the family also requested that the patientbe transportedto ahospital furtheraway, based
on a preference for its care. Moreover, counsel for the plaintiff conceded during argument before this court that the crew swap took no more than four minutes to complete. The arbitrators also credited the evidence that the plaintiff allowed this type of crew swaps: ‘‘[C]rew swaps are performed routinely when the patient, as in this case, is stable. The [plaintiff] also encourages crew swaps during nonemergency calls to avoid overtime.’’ Because the conduct ofthe defendant did not constitute a detrimental act, we agree with the court that the award does not violate public policy.
With regard to the plaintiff’s second public policy claim, that the award limits its legal right to managecontractual and disciplinary actions with regard to its employees, we conclude that this claim has no merit. The plaintiff’s argument suggests that, by commenting
on its investigatory practices, specifically, the involvement of Best, the panel nullified the plaintiff’s management rights over the investigation ofthe grievance. We
are not persuaded. The arbitrators merely appear to have commented on the inclusion of certain actors within the investigation, who conceivably assisted in the analysis and findings in this case. We also reject this argument.
II
The plaintiff next claims that, pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (2), the award should be vacated because there
was evident partiality on the part of the arbitrators. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the panel made arbitrary findings based on evidence that was not contained in the record, which it claims establishes the panel’s evident partiality and bias against it. The plaintiff points to the arbitration panel’s discussion of the bias of Best and argues that there was no evidence that her participation showed any pretextual bias. The plaintiff further argues that there was no evidence to support the finding that the plaintiff dismissed Simmons, the volunteer who accompanied the defendant, to bolster the case against the defendant, or that any otherissueswere raisedas apretextin orderto support the plaintiff’s dismissal.
Aparty seeking to vacate an arbitration award onthe groundofevidentpartialityhastheburdenofproducing sufficient evidence in support ofthe claim. ‘‘An allegation that an arbitratorwas biased, ifsupported by sufficient evidence, may warrant the vacation of the arbitration award.

. . . The burden of proving bias or evident partiality pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (2) rests on the party making such a claim, and requires more than
a showing of an appearance ofbias.

. . . In construing § 52-418 (a) (2), [our Supreme Court] concluded that evidentpartialitywill be found where areasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration. To put it in the vernacular, evidentpartialityexistswhere itreasonably looks as though a given arbitrator would tend to favor
one ofthe parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexsonv.Foss, 276Conn. 599, 617, 887A.2d872 (2006).
The trial court noted that, ‘‘[the plaintiff’s] claims of the arbitrators’ alleged improper construction of the facts relating to the crew swap or characterizations of the evidence, without more, does not constitute sufficient evidence of evident partiality by the arbitrators.’’ We agree. The plaintiff’s argument that certain factual findingsmadebythearbitrationpanelwerebiasedlacks support. For example, the arbitration panel’s decision stated: ‘‘We note that there was no evidence to show that

. . . Best holds a bias against the [defendant] butwe do note that the union made many assertions ofher bias. While we did not perceive bias on the part of

. . . Best, we do note that the whole investigation seems improper because of her involvement from the beginning until the [defendant’s] termination.’’ Despite the plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, we read the arbitration panel’s decision to say that it did not perceive bias on the part of Best or receive evidence thereof, but it did take issue with her participation due to the adverse history between her and the defendant. In this case, the arbitrationpanelwas authorizedto make such
a finding, as it pertained to whether the defendant was terminated for just and sufficient cause. See Bic Pen Corp. v. LocalNo. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 583–84, 440 A.2d 774 (1981) (‘‘[t]he submission constitutes the character of the entire arbitration proceedings and defines and limits the issues to be decided’’). The facts presented by the plaintiff did not make it reasonably look as though any of the arbitrators would tend to favor the defendant or disfavor the plaintiff in this case, as required to establish evident partiality.
III Finally, the plaintiff claims that, pursuant to § 52- 418 (a) (3),8 the award should be vacated because the arbitration panel failed to provide a ‘‘full and fair hearing.’’ Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the panel refused to consider evidence relating to past disciplinary actions against the defendant. We disagree.
Under the facts presented by the plaintiff, this claim doesnotprovideanadequatebasistovacatethearbitrators’ decision. ‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement bythe arbitratorswas erroneous. Courtswillnotreview the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal questions involved.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bic Pen Corp

. v. Local No. 134, supra, 183 Conn. 584.
We are unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that thepreclusionofcertainevidencebeforethearbitration panel renders the award unfair. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the arbitration panel engaged in misconduct. Based upon applicable Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that arbitrators are entrusted to act upon their discretion in deciding whether to hear or, conversely, nothearevidence. SeeBridgeportv.Kasper Group, Inc., 278 Conn. 466, 474, 899 A.2d 523 (2006) (arbitrators afforded ‘‘substantial discretion’’ in determining admissibility of evidence). As a result, the court’s determination was proper. The judgment is affirmed.In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 JohnJasinskiis amemberofthe International FederationofProfessional and Technical Engineers, Local 134, which represented his interests in the underlying action. For clarity, we refer to Jasinski as the defendant and to the named defendant as the union.

2 The plaintiffraises two public policy issues on appeal, which have been organized as one issue for purposes of this decision.

3 The arbitration panel found in part: ‘‘We believe that the reason for the

crew swap was two-fold. The first was to drop off a volatile and angry Simmons who had profaned the patient as reported by the [defendant], and the second reason was to drop her off so she could go to work.’’

4 The union also sought arbitration in this previous matter which resulted in a finding that the defendant was not terminated for good and sufficient cause, and the panel ordered that he be reinstated.

5 ‘‘The arbitrators considered the evidence and the memoranda submitted by the parties in rendering their written decision. The strongly worded decision makes clear that the arbitrators were troubled by Best’s involvement in the investigation, as shown by their collective comment that Ing should have had some management person other than Best assist him.

. . . BasedonBest’sinvolvement, thearbitrators concludedthattheinvestigation

was not conducted fairly and objectively, and that [the plaintiff] mischaracterized and overinflated the incident tojustify discharging [the defendant].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

6 ‘‘[The plaintiff’s] claims ofthe arbitrator’s alleged improper construction of the facts relating to the crew swap or characterizations of the evidence, without more, does not constitute sufficient evidence of evident partiality tojustify vacation ofthe award. The assertions do not even give rise to the appearance of partiality by the arbitrators. Therefore, [the plaintiff] has failed to meet its burden to establish evident partiality.’’

7 ‘‘[The plaintiff’s] claim of an unfair hearing due to the preclusion of certain evidence, without more, is merely an expression of [the plaintiff’s] disagreement and dissatisfaction with the award.’’

8 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3) provides in relevant part that an award shall be vacated ifthe court finds that ‘‘the arbitrators have been guilty

. . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy

. . . .’’