2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-21-2002

USA v. Edwards

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-1847

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Edwards" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 663.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/663
PRECEDENTIAL 

 Filed October 21, 2002 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 02-1847 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

ROBERT ALLEN EDWARDS, 

a/k/a FIDEL SALIM, 

a/k/a JAMES F. WINTER, III, 

a/k/a CHARLES KING, 

a/k/a DONALD W. COLEMAN 

 Ronald Allen Edwards, 

 Appellant 

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Criminal No. 97-cr-00117-01) 

District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

on September 3, 2002 

Before: RENDELL, ALDISERT and GREENBERG, 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: October 21, 2002) 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

PER CURIAM: 

Robert Allen Edwards appeals the District Court’s denial 

of his post-judgment motion seeking a sentence reduction 

on the basis of Amendment 634 to the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. Because the District Court’s 

disposition of Edwards’ motion was proper, we will affirm 

its order denying his request to modify his term of 

imprisonment. 

On July 25, 1997, Edwards pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to counterfeit and forge securities and launder 

money, one count each of bank fraud and criminal 

forfeiture, and eight counts of money laundering. Edwards’ 

motion for a downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

 3553(b) was denied, and he was subsequently sentenced 

to 84 months imprisonment, five years of supervised 

release and was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, we 

reversed Edwards’ sentence and remanded solely for resentencing on the issue of restitution. United States v. 

Edwards, 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998). Upon re-sentencing, 

the District Court vacated the restitution component and 

reimposed Edwards’ original sentence. Edwards thereafter 
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that: 

(1) his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and 

voluntarily; (2) his sentence was improperly enhanced by a 

constitutionally invalid 1973 state murder conviction; and 

(3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. It 

appears that Edwards also contested the use of the money 

laundering Sentencing Guidelines, arguing that his conduct 

was outside the heartland of money laundering activities. 

The District Court denied Edwards’ motion and we declined 

to issue him a certificate of appealability. See C.A. No. 00- 

2731. 

Edwards returned to the District Court and filed a motion 

under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) on January 31, 2002, seeking 

to modify his term of imprisonment on the basis of 

Amendment 634 to United States Sentencing Guidelines 

("U.S.S.G.") 2S1.1. Amendment 634, which became 

 2 

 effective after Edwards was sentenced, alters the guideline 

range in connection with the offense of laundering of 

monetary instruments. Because Amendment 634 is not 

listed in Subsection (c) of Section 1B1.10, which sets forth 

the policy statement regarding when a reduction in a term 

of imprisonment is warranted based upon an amendment 

to a guideline range, the District Court concluded that 

there was no legal basis for a modification of Edwards’ 

sentence and, thus, denied the motion by order entered 

February 25, 2002. Undeterred, Edwards asked the court 

to reconsider its denial of his sentence modification request 

in a motion framed as being filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b). In that motion filed March 4, 2002, Edwards 

argued that Amendment 634 is a clarifying, rather than 

substantive, amendment which may be given retroactive 

effect despite the fact that it is not listed in Subsection (c) 

of Section 1B1.10 as an amendment that would authorize 

a modification or reduction in his term of imprisonment. 

See, United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 

1998). The District Court nonetheless denied Edwards’ 

motion, in an order entered March 21, 2002, concluding 

that Amendment 634 effects a substantive change to the 

money laundering guidelines. This timely appeal from the 

March 21, 2002 order followed. 

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

 3231 and 3582(c). We have jurisdiction to review its 

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 3742. 

Our review over legal questions concerning the proper 

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. 

United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 

1995). 

As we noted in United States v. Marmolejos, substantive 

changes to the guidelines are not to be given retroactive 

effect. 140 F.3d at 490-91. While we have not yet opined as 

to whether Amendment 634 is a substantive or clarifying 

amendment, four of our sister circuits have, and all have 

concluded that the amendment effects a substantive 

change to the Guidelines. United States v. Descent, 292 

F.3d 703, 708 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. King, 280 
F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. McIntosh, 

280 F.3d 479, 485 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. 

 3 

 Sabbeth, 277 F.3d 94, 97 (2nd Cir. 2002). We agree with 

the reasoning of these decisions and likewise conclude that 

Amendment 634 is a substantive amendment. As stated by 

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sabbeth , 277 F.3d 

at 97, Amendment 634 "redefines the way in which the 

offense level associated with the crime of money-laundering 

is calculated, so that the offense level for money-laundering 

may now be dependent upon the offense level assigned to 

the underlying offense." Accordingly, we conclude that 

retroactive application of Amendment 634 is not available 

to Edwards and that the District Court properly denied his 

 3582(c)(2) motion seeking to modify his term of 

imprisonment. 

Thus, Edwards has no legal basis for contending that the 

District Court erred in denying his motion filed pursuant to 

 3582(c)(2) or for seeking reconsideration of that decision. 

Edwards appears to concede as much, but now urges that 

the District Court should have construed his 

reconsideration motion as one filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b), seeking relief from operation of the court’s 

judgment, by relating it to his previously denied 2255 

motion. Unfortunately for Edwards, this contention affords 

him no relief. Initially, we note that the text of his motion 

explicitly seeks to have the District Court reconsider the 

order entered February 25, 2002, denying his 3582(c)(2) 

motion, and was filed within ten days of that order. 

Additionally, even if it could be deemed to be related to the 

denial of his original 2255 motion, it would be construed 

not as a Rule 60(b) motion, but, rather, as an unauthorized 

successive motion under 2255 which the District Court 

may have been without jurisdiction to consider. 1 Moreover, 

even if the District Court had entertained Edwards’ motion 

as one filed pursuant Rule 60(b)(6) requesting relief from 

operation of its earlier judgment, presumably the motion 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Rodriguez v. 

Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 200 (2d Cir. 2001), that"a Rule 60(b) motion to 

vacate a judgment denying habeas is not a second petition under 

 2244(b)," "majority of circuit courts . . . have held that a Rule 60(b) 

motion to vacate a judgment denying habeas either must or may be 

treated as a second or successive habeas petition." Id. at 200 n.2 

(collecting cases). 

 4 

 would have met with the same fate given the District 

Court’s determination that Amendment 634 was a 

substantive one. As for Edwards’ chance of success on 

appeal from such a denial, we note that he would not even 

have progressed as far as the briefing schedule. See Morris 

v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 1999) (certificate of 

appealability required to appeal denial of Rule 60(b)); see 

also United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 267-68 (3d Cir. 

2000)(allegation that sentencing court misapplied 

Sentencing Guidelines did not present constitutional issue 
for which a certificate of appealability could be granted). 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 

order of the District Court entered March 21, 2002. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit