## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 1311- 06

A D R I A N E E LA I N E O TT O , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE FOURTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

HA RRI S CO UNTY
C OC HRAN , J
. , fi l ed a di s s ent i ng opi ni on i n w hi ch H OL C OMB , J
. , j oi ned.
O P I N I O N I resp ec tfu ll yd issen t. I t h ink that the tri al co u rtco rrectl yinclu d ed a statuto ryjury in stru c tio n o n c o n c u rre n t ca u sa tio n in th is D W I c a se . T h a t in stru c tio n a p p ro p ria tely d e a ls

w i t h cas es i n w hi ch t he def endant i s char ged w i t h bei ng i nt oxi cat ed on one s ubs t ance , s uch
as al cohol , and def

ends hi m s el f byas s er t i ng t hat he w as i nt oxi cat ed on som e s ubs t ance ot her th a n th e o n e p le d b yth e S ta te . T he cour t of appea l s , i n i t s fi r s t deci s i on i n t hi s cas e, r eac hed t he r i ght r es ul t fort heOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 2

Otto v . S tate , 141 S.W .3d 238 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. grante d). 1 Otto v . S tate , 173 S.W .3d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 2 Otto v . S

tate , 211 S.W .3d 359 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. grante d). 3 r i ght r eas on. U nfor tunat el y , w e conf us ed t hatcour t bygr ant i ng t he defenda nt ’ s pet i t i on for 1 di s cr et i onar yr evi ew and r emandi ng t he cas e for r econs i der at i on i n l i ght of G ra y v . S ta te , 152 S
. W
. 3 d 1 2 5 ( T e x . C r i m . Ap p . 2 0 0 4 )
. I t w as onl yi n their s econd opi ni on t hatt he cour t of 2 appea l s w entas t r ay . W e s houl d r eaf fi r m t he r eas oni ng and r es ul t i n t hei r fi r s t opi ni on. 3 T he evi dence att r i al s how ed t hata pat r ol offi cer s aw appel l ant ’ s van s t opped on t he
s i de of t he r oad at1: 45 a. m . o n a J anuar ym or ni ng. T he engi ne w as r unni ng, and t he headl i ght s w er e on. A ppel l antw as as l eep be hi nd t he dr i ver ’ s w heel , s l ouched ba ck w i t h her
s hi r t off. T he off

i cers m el l ed al cohol and t ri ed t o s hake a ppel l antaw ake, but he w as
u n su c c e ss f

u l. A n o th e r o f

f ice r a rriv e d , an d th e tw o w e re th e n a b le to a w a k e n a p p e llan t w ith a “s t er num - r ub. ” She w as s t ar t l ed, and s he y el l ed and c ur s ed att hem. T he off i cer s as ked her t o put hers hi r t on and t o get o u t o f t he van. She w as “ver yuns t eadyand conf us ed. ” The
o f f ice r p e rf o rm e d a n H G N tes t w h ich in d ica ted th a t sh e w a s in to x ica ted . S h e r e f u se d to p e rf o rm a n y f

ield so b rie ty tes ts or to su b m it a b re a th sa m p le. H e r b re a th sm e lled o f a lco h o l,
an d sh e told th e o f

f ic e rs th a t she “h ad a lot to d ri n k ” e arli er in the ev en ing
. T h e o ff icers arrested h er a n d ch arg ed h er w it h fe lon yD W I. A ppel l antt es t i fi ed t hats he had t w o gl as s es of M er l ot w i t h di nner . She s ai d t hats he
s t opped at a spor t s bar on her w ay hom e and m et a man nam ed Phi l J ones . She t es t i fi ed t hatOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 3

T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 6 .0 4( a ). Th at st atut e pr ov ide s: 4 A p e rs on is c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le if

there su lt w ou ld n ot h ave oc c ur re d b ut f or his conduct, ope ratingeither a lone or c oncurr ently with another c ause, unle ss the concur rent c ause w as cle arly

sufficie nt to produce the result and the c onduct of thea c tor c le arl y ins uf fi c ie nt. h e w a s d rin k in g b e e r, b u t sh e o rd e re d a C o k e . A f ter g o in g to th e re stro o m , sh e d e c id e d to go hom e, but as sh e an d Phi l J ones w al ked outof t he door , s he s uddenl ys t ar t ed “f eel i ng
s i ck” a nd t hought t hats he “ha d eat en s om et hi ng bad atdi nner . ” Phi l J ones w al ked hert o t he van and he l ped hergeti nt o i t . T hen he got i n t he pas s engers i de and s t ar t ed ki s s i ng herand t uggi ng athercl ot hes
. She y el l ed and cur s ed at hi m , and he got out of t he van. She s ai d t hat
s he s t ar t ed t o dr i ve hom e and “t hat ’ s bas i cal l yt he l as t t hi ng I r emem ber
. ” She admi t t ed t hat sh e n e v e r to ld th e o f

f ice rs th a t sh e h a d b e e n a ss a u lted a n d sta ted th a t s h e d id n o t re a lize u n til t he nextdayt hats he bel i eved t hatPhi l J ones m ayhave drugged her , s ugges t i ng R ohypnol
as a pos s i bl e drug, al t hough s he di d not know any t hi ng aboutt hatdr ug. B eca us e appe l l antcl ai m ed t hats om et hi ng ot hert han alco h o l had ca us ed her i nt oxi cat i on, t he St at e re ques t ed t hat t he t r i al j udge i ns t r uct t he j ur y on concur r entcaus at i on underSect i on 6. 04( a)
. H e di d s o w i t h t he fol l ow i ng i ns t r uct i on: 4 A per s on i s cr i m i nal l y r es pons i bl e i f t he r es ul t w oul d not have oc cur r ed but forhi s conduct , oper at i ng ei t her al one or concur r ent l y w i t h anot hercaus e, unl es s t he concur r ent caus e w as cl ear l ys uffi ci entt o pr oduce t he r es ul t and t he c o n d u c t o f

th e a c to r c lea rlyin su f

f icie n t. T her efor e i f y ou fi nd fr om t he evi dence bey ond a r eas onabl e doubtt hat t he int ox i cat i on of [ app el l ant] w ou l d n ot have o ccurr ed b ut for [app el l ant’ s] c o n d u c t, a s c h a rg e d in th e in d ictm e n t, op e ra tin g e ith e r a lo n e o r c o n c u rre n tly w ith a n o th e r c a u se , u n les s th e c o n c u rre n t ca u se w a s c lea rlysu f f icie n t to pr oduce t he r es ul t and t he conduc t of t he [a ppel l ant ] cl ear l yi ns uffi ci ent , y ou w i l l fi nd t he [a ppel l ant ] cr i m i nal l yr es pons i bl e. U nl es s y ou s o fi nd bey ond aOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 4

Otto , 141 S.W .3d at 239-40. Thecourt e xplained that the jury instruction 5 did not authorize an alterna tive means of c onviction, and it did not offer the jury the option to choose betwe en intox ication by alcohol aloneor intox ication by drug s and alc ohol. Instead, the instruc tion added a c larification reg ardingOtto’s culpability , allowingthe jury to find her r esponsible for he r ac tions only if the resultant intox ication “would not haveoccur red but for

[her] conduct,” whe ther taken a lone or in conjunc tion with another ca use. The c harg e also a dded a defe nse, mandating that the jur y could not convict Otto if her actions, alone , wer e clea rly insufficient to havecause d her intoxi cation and theconcur rent c ause, a lon e , w a s c le arl y

su ff ic ie nt t o h ave c a

us e d it
. Id
. 758 S.W .2d 264, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (re jectingdefe ndant’s conte ntion that 6 Section 6.04(a) must be alleg ed in the indictment as a theory that the State may

rely upon at trial r eas onabl e doubt , or i f y ou have a r eas onabl e doubtt her eof, y ou w i l l fi nd t he [ a p p e lla n t] n o t c ri m in a lly re s p o n s ib le a n d s a yb yy o u r v e rd ic t “ N o t G u ilty.” T he j ury fou nd app el l ant gu i l t y of fel on y D W I, and t he t ri al cou rt sent enced he r to f o u r y e a rs’ im p riso n m e n t. In the c o u rto f a p p ea ls, ap p ell an t cl aim ed that the tri al co u rterred in su b m it ti n g a jury in stru c tio n o n c o n c u rre n t ca u sa tio n u n d e r S e c tio n 6 .0 4 (a ). S h e a rg u e d th a t a n yc o n c u rre n tcaus at i on i ns t r uct i on per m i t s a j ur yt o convi ctt he def endanton a t heor ynot allege d in t he in d ictm e n t. T h e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls, in its o rig in a l o p in io n , rig h tlyre jec ted th is a rg u m e n t. 5 H erar gum ent , i f ac cept ed, w oul d i m pl yt hat n o co n cur r ent - caus at i on i ns t r uct i on
s h o u l d e v e r b e g i v e n i n a n y c a s e u n l e s s i t w a s p l e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t b e c a u s e i t w o u l d a l w a ys

“ p e rm it a jury t o conv i ct t he defen dan t on a t heo ry no t al l eged i n t he i nd i ct m ent. ” T hat is l egal l yand l ogi cal l yinco rrect. A nd t hi s C our t expl i ci t l yr ej ect ed t he cont ent i on t hatan al l egat i on conce r ni ng concur r ent caus at i on m us t be s etout i n t he i ndi ct m enti n D ow den v. S ta te .

6Otto Dissenting opinion Pag e 5

and in the jury

charg e). 717 S.W .2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 7 Id . at 351. 8 Id
. 9 Se ege ne ra lly , R OL L I N M. P ER KI N S & R ONAL D N. B O Y CE , C RI M I N A L LAW 772 (3d ed., 10 1982). T h is C o u rt e x p lain e d S e c tio n 6 .0 4 (a ) a n d th e c o n c e p t o f c o n c u rre n t ca u sa tio n in R o b b in s v . S ta te , a mansl aught ercas e pi vot i ng on w het hert he def endant ’ s i nt oxi cat i on or 7 h is ex h au sti o n ca u sed the fa tal ac cide n t. W e h eld th at S ec ti o n 6
. 0 4 (a) req u ir es a “b u t fo r”
c a u s a l lin k b e tw e e n th e d e f e n d a n t’ s c o n d u c t a n d th e re s u ltin g “ h a rm .” 8 I f conc ur r entcaus es ar e pr es ent , t w o pos s i bl e combi nat i ons exi s t t o s at i s fyt he
“ b u t f o r” re q u ire m e n t: (1 ) th e d e f e n d a n t’s c o n d u c t m a yb e su f f icie n t b yitse lf t o have c aus ed t he har m , r egar dl es s of t he exi s t ence of a c oncur r entcaus e; or ( 2) t he def

endant ’ s conductand t he ot hercaus e together m a y b e su f f icie n t to have c aus ed t he har m . H ow ever , § 6. 04( a) fur t herdefi nes and l i m i t s t he “but for ” ca us al i t yforconcur r entcaus es byt he l as t phr as e, “unl es s t he conc ur r ent caus e w as cl ear l ys uffi ci entt o pr oduce t he re s ul t and t he conduct of t he ac t or clea rl yinsu ff

ici en t. ” If

the a d d it ion al ca u se, oth er tha n the d e fe n d an t’ s c o n d u c t, i s c lea rlysu f f icie n t, by i tse lf

, to p ro d u c e th e re su lt and t he defe ndant ’ s conduct , byi t s el f, i s cl ear l yi ns uffi ci ent , t hen t he def endantcannot be convi ct ed. 9 T he purpos e of a s t atut or yconcur r ent - caus at i on i ns t r uct i on i s t o ens ur e t hatt he i s s ue
o f ac tual ca u sati o n m ee ts the “ b u t fo r” o r s i ne qua non t e s t . Th e t e r m s i ne qua non lit e ra lly 10

m eans “w i t hout w h ich n o t. ” T hus , “[w ] i t hout t hi s , t hatw oul d not be; but forone t hi ng,
a n o th e r w o u ld n o t h a v e h a p p e n e d ; h a d n o t th e d e f e n d a n t f ire d th e sh o t, t h e d e c e a se d w o u ldOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 6

Id . (footnotes omitted). 11 P r o f e s s o r s P e r k i n s an d B o yc e e x p l a i nth e f

o ur p o s s i b i l i t i e s i nth i s w ay: 12 (1) Thedeath wa s due entire ly to other ca

uses and theseinjuries did not either singly or in combination shorten the lifeof the de cea sed. (2) One injury cause d thede ath, wh e re a s th e oth e r h a d n oth ingwh ate ve r t o d o w ith thelos s o f l if

e ,– a s if on e re su lte d in

se ve ri ngthehe a d f

ro m th e bo dy

and theoth e r w a s a

re lativ e ly harmless fle sh wound in the arm. ( 3) B oth wounds wererathe r serious, but s till b e a liv e .” 11 T he cl as s i c exa m pl e of c oncur r entcaus at i on i s t he m ur der
- vi ct i m s cena r i o i nvol vi ng t w o di ffe r entpeopl e us i ng t w o s epar at e w eapons and ac t i ng i ndepende nt l y . Suppose , for exampl e, B et t y t he bank t el l er i s s t abbed i n t he bac k byR obberSw i t chbl ade a nd t hen s hot b yR o b b e r R e v o lv e r. If b o th w o u n d s w e re f

a tal, b o th S w itch b lad e a n d R e v o lv e r a re g u ilt y of m ur der
. I f Sw i t chbl ade’ s s t ab w ound w as a mere su p erf i ci al s cr at ch and Bet t ynever
w o u ld h a v e d ied o f

th a t w o u n d a lo n e , R e v o lv e r’s c o n c u rre n t ac t o f sh o o tin g h e r is th e so le
ca u se o f d ea th, an d o n ly R ev o lver is c ri m inally li ab le. O n the o ther h an d , if S w it ch b lade ’s sta b b in g se v e re d B e tty ’s s p in a l co rd a n d w a s su f f icie n t, b y itse lf

, to c a u se h e r d e a th , w h ile R evol ver ’ s s hot onl ygr aze d herfor ehea d, onl ySw i t chbl ade i s cr im ina l l yl i abl e. A l t ernat i vely , i f nei t her w ou nd , by i t sel f, w as fat al , bu t S w i t chb l ade’s and R evo l ver’ s act s, i n combi nat i on, caus ed B et t y ’ s deat h, t hen bot h ar e l i abl e. A nd, fi nal l y , i f nei t herw ound w as
s uffi ci entt o caus e dea t h, and B et t y ’ s deat h w as actuall ycaus ed byan ent i r el ydi ffe r ent per s on or m echa ni s m –s he w as acc i dentall y el ect r ocut ed byr es pondi ng par amedi cs –t hen nei t herR evol vernor Sw i t chbl ade i s l i abl e forcaus i ng B et t y ’ s deat h ( t hough t heyw oul d be li ab le fo r oth er o ff

en ses). 12Otto Dissenting opinion Pag e 7

wh e re a s th e de c e a se d w ou ld h ave re c ov e re d f ro m e ith e r o ne a lon e , th e tw o in combination resulted in death. (4) Ea ch injury was such that it alone would have be e n in sta

ntl y fata l. Id
. Gene rally , a conc urre nt-ca usation instruction is given in a r esult-oriente d offe nse, such 13 as murder , ag gravated assault, injury to a child, etc. H oweve r, the pa rties in this case have made no claim that a c oncurr ent-c ause instruc tion is i nappropriate to the issue of what ca used a person’ s intox ication. Intox ication is, after all, the re sult of the introduction of somethingthat cause s a per son to lose the normal use of his mental or phy sical fa culties. T EX . P EN A L C ODE § 49.01(2)( A) (I

ntox ication means “ not havingthe normal use of mental or phy sical fa culties by rea son of the introduction of a lcohol, a contr olled substance, a drug , a dang erous dr

ug , a combination of two or moreof those substance s, or any other substanc e into the body”). T h e f o cu s o f th e c o n cu rren t- ca u sati o n req u ir em en t i n S ec ti o n 6
. 0 4 (a) is t h is “b u t fo r”
caus at i on: “B ut for ” Sw i t chbl ade’ s actB et t y w oul d s t i l l be al i ve, or “but for ” R evol ver ’ s act B et t yw oul d s t i l l be al i ve, r egar dl es s of w het hert he s ol e ac t of ei t herof t hem w as s uffi ci ent b yits e lf
. A s th e sta tu to ryc o n c u rre n t-c a u sa tio n in stru c tio n w a s a p p lied to th is c a se , th e S tate 13

w as r equi r ed t o pr ove t hat“bu t f o r” d ri nki ng al cohol , appel l antw oul d not have be en i nt oxi cat ed. I t coul d pr ove t hatal cohol w as t he s ol e ca us e of he r i nt oxi cat i on or t hatal cohol p lus som ethin g else– an y thing else– w o rkin g tog ethe r ca u sed h er intox icati o n . B u t i f th e jury found thatso m ethin g else– R o h yp n o l, co ca ine, cough medi ci ne, M & M s –m ade he ri nt oxi cat ed and t hat t he w i ne she d rank w as cl earl yi nsuff i ci ent to cau se her i ntoxi cat i on , t hen i t m ust acqui t . I n i t s or i gi nal opi ni on, t he cour t of appe al s cor r ect l ys etout t he i s s ue: I f a c oncur r entcaus e i s pr es ent , t her e ar e t w o pos s i bl e w ay s i n w hi ch t hi s “but for ” re qui r ement m aybe s at i s fi ed: ( 1) t he def endant ’ s conductm aybe s uffi ci ent , byi t s el f, t o have c aus ed t he r es ul t not w i t hs t andi ng anyconcur r ent caus e; or ( 2) t he defenda nt ’ s conductand a c oncur r entcaus e t oget herm aybe s uffi ci entt o have caus ed t he re s ul t . I n s pi t e of t hes e pos s i bi l i t i es , a j ur ym ayOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 8

Otto , 1 4 1 S
. W
. 3 d

at2 4 0 (c i t i n g Ma rv is v . S tate , 36 S.W .3d 878, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 14 20 01 ); Robbins , 7 17 S.W. 2d at 35 1; Me din a v . S

tate , 962 S.W .2d 83, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1stDist.] 1997, pet. re f’d) ). Se eRo drigu e

z v . S tate , 18 S.W .3d 228, 229-32 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000). 15 Se eGray

v . S tate , 1 52 S.W. 3d

12 5, 12 8 ( Te x. Crim. Ap p. 20 04 ); Su tto n v . S tate , 899 16 S.W .2d 682, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (plurality op.). n o t co n v ict a d e f

e n d a n t if th e c o n c u rre n t ca u se a lo n e is c lea rlysu f f icie n t to p ro d u c e th e re su lt and th e d e f e n d a n t’s c o n d u c t a lo n e is c lea rlyin su f f icie n t. 14 T h e re a so n th a t a c o n c u rre n t-c a u se in stru c tio n u n d e r S e c tio n 6 .0 4 (a ) is p ro p e r, w h ile
a s t r ai ght “combi nat i on” i ns t r uct i on i s l egal l yi ncor r ect , i s beca us e a “ combi nat i on” i ns t r uct i on does not i ncl ude any“butfo r” li m i t at i on. U ndera pur e “c om bi nat i on” i ns t r uct i on, a j ur y coul d i m pr oper l yfi nd t hatt he combi nat i on of hal f a gl as s of w i ne ( w hen the S tat e a ll eg ed alco h o l) an d fiftee n m arihu an a c igare tt es c a u s ed the d ef en d an t’ s i nt oxi cat i on, even t hough t he w i ne w as cl ear l yi ns uffi ci entbyi t s el f t o caus e i nt oxi cat i on. 15 T he s o- cal l ed “s y ner gi s t i c eff ect ” or “s us cept i bi l i t y ” i ns t r uct i on r equi r es “butfor ” ca us at i on b ec au se th ere “the co m b ination o f l iqu o r an d d rug s w h ich w o u ld m ak e a n ind ividu al m o re
s us cept i bl e t o t h e i n f

l u e n c e o f

t h e l i q u o r i s i n e f

f e c t e q u i v a l e n t t o i n t o x i c a t i o n b yl i quor al one. ” T hes e “s y ner gi s t i c ef fec t ” and “s us cept i bi l i t y ” i ns t r uct i ons cont ai n an i m pl i ci t “but 16 f o r ” l i m i t a t i o n , a n d r e q u i r e t h e j u r y t o f i n d t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t wo u l d n o t h a v e b e c o me i nt oxi cat ed “butfor ” the i nges t i on of al cohol
. T he ot hers ubs t ance s m er el yhave t he ef fec t of i ncr eas i ng t he l evel or degr ee of i nt oxi cat i on ca u sed b y al cohol
. I n s um , a s t r ai ght “combi nat i on” ins t r uct i on i m pr oper l yexpands t he al l egat i ons i n t he cha r gi ng i ns t r um entOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 9

Rodriguez , 18 S.W .3d at 229-32 (jur y instruction improperly

expanded indictment 17 a lle g atio n o f i nto xicatio n b y a lc oh ol whe n it

de fi ne d intoxic atio n a s th e “ int ro du c tio n o f a lc oh ol, a drug , or a c ombination of both of those substance s, into the body” and a uthorized conviction for a ny such combination). Se eBrown v . S

tate , 122 S.W .3d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Te x as cour ts are 18 forbidden f

rom instructingthe jury

on any presumption or evide ntiary sufficie ncy

rule that doe s no t ha ve a statut or y ba sis .” ); At

k ins v . S tate , 990 S.W .2d 763, 765-68 (Te x . App.—Austin 1999, pet. re f’d) . In Atkins , the cour t of appe als held that the followinginstruction in a DWIcasewas an improper

comment on the evide nce: Yo u a reins tr uc te d th at if

a De fe nd ant a llo ws his phy sic a l c on dit ion to d e te ri or ate to such an e x tent that he ther eby makes himself moresusceptible to the influenc e of alc ohol than he other

wise would havebeen a

nd by reason there of he bec omes intoxicated by theintroduction of alcohol into his body , h e wo uld be in t he same position as though his intox ication, if any , was produc ed by the use of a lcohol a lon e and you fi nd fa c ts o f t he fo re g oin gbe yon d a

re a so na bledo ub t. Id . at 765. Se eOtto , 173 S.W .3d at 71 (Cochr an, J., concurring ). 19 f ro m a lco h o l to a lco h o l an d w h a tev e r o th e r su b sta n c e th e e v id e n c e sh o w s; a c o n c u rre n t- 17

c a u sa tio n , sy n e rg istic e f f e c t, or su sc e p tib ili tyin stru c tio n d o e s n o t. T he p res ent i nst ruct i on , subm i t t ed as i t w as i n t he general w ords of the st at ute, i s al so
a v ast i m p rov em en t up o n the in stru cti o n in either G r ay o r Sut t on beca us e i t does not pl uck out ce rt ai n evi dence fors peci al m ent i on and i s not a comm enton t he w ei ght of any evi dence
. I t s i m pl y , but cl ear l y , expl ai ned t o t he j ur yt he conc eptof conc ur r entcaus at i on

18 i n i t s s t atut or yt er m s . I t di d not even ment i on t he w or d al cohol , R ohypnol , or anyot her
su b s t ance . I t w as a “pl ai n- vani l l a” i ns t r uct i on. J ur yi ns t r uct i ons t hatar e bas ed on t he 19

s p e c if ic la n g u a g e o f

a s ta tu te d o n o t c o n s titu te a c o m m e n t o n th e w e ig h t o f th e e v id e n c e . I n s um , I t hi nk t hat t hi s i s pr eci s el y t he r i ght s t atut or y i ns t r uct i on t o gi ve t he j ur yw hen t he def ens e t o a D W I char ge i s t hat“I w as i nt oxi cat ed al l r i ght , but not on t he s ubs t ance t hatOtto Dissenting opinion Pag e 10

y ou pl ed i n t he i ndi ct m ent . ” I t i s s i m pl e, pur el ys t atut or y , and does not comm enton t he evi dence
. T he advoc at es t hen have fre e re i n t o t al k about comm on s ens e, combi nat i ons of
s ubs t ance s , “butfor ” ca us at i on, and s y ner gi s t i c eff ect s . I t her efor e r es pect ful l y di s s ent t o t he

m aj or i t y ’ s concl us i on t hatt he t r i al j udge er r ed i n gi vi ng w hat I t hi nk i s t he per fec t concur r ent
caus e ( a. k. a. “s us cept i bi l i t y ” or“s y ner gi s t i c ef fec t ”) i ns t r uct i on.

Fi l ed: Febr uar y6, 2008 P ub l i sh