Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1710-JT-2488 | May 14, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of:

E.H. (Minor Child);

J.H. (Father),

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1710-JT-2488

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn Moores, 

Judge

The Honorable Larry Bradley, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1705-JT-406

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] J.H. (“Father”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with his 

son, E.H., (“E.H.”), claiming that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in E.H.’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside Father’s home will not be remedied; (2) a continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the E.H.’s well-being; and (3) 

termination of the parent-child relationship is in E.H.’s best interests. 

Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision 

to terminate the parent-child relationship, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the termination of 

the parent-child relationship.

Facts

[3] The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment reveal that 

E.H. was born in February 2006. His parents are Father and K.S. (“Mother”). 

In 2009, Father and E.H. were transported to the hospital by ambulance after 

being involved in an automobile accident. Father thought he was going to be 

 

1 E.H.’s mother is not a party to this appeal.
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arrested so he left three-year-old E.H. at the hospital by himself. At the time of 

the accident, Mother was involved in a relationship with D.B. (“D.B.”). 

Shortly after the accident, Mother gave birth to E.H.’s stepsister, B.B. (“B.B.”). 

[4] In March 2016, Mother was arrested for possession of heroin and child 

endangerment after she was found in her car with her children. She had passed 

out from using heroin and had a needle sticking out of her arm. As a result of 

Mother’s arrest, DCS filed a petition alleging that E.H. was a child in need of 

services (“CHINS”). Father, who had not had any contact with E.H. since he 

had left the child at the hospital seven years earlier, could not be located, and 

E.H. was placed in kinship care with D.B. 

[5] Father was eventually located in August 2016 and served with paperwork for 

the CHINS proceeding. However, he failed to attend any of the CHINS 

hearings and family meetings. The trial court adjudicated E.H. to be a CHINS 

in September 2016 and ordered Father to complete a Father Engagement

Program. 

[6] In May 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both 

Mother and Father. Father appeared telephonically at the termination hearing

because he was incarcerated in a county jail on a failure to identify charge and

was scheduled to be released the following day. Following his release, he was 

still facing a probation violation and did not know where he was going to live. 

Father admitted that he had not participated in the court-ordered CHINS 

services and that the last time he had seen eleven-year-old E.H. was the night he 
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had left the then three-year-old child in the hospital. Father agreed that E.H. 

would not recognize him.

[7] The evidence further revealed during the eight years that Father had not seen or 

spoken to E.H., Father could have reached Mother by contacting her mother. 

Mother’s mother testified that Father had not contacted her during that time. 

At the time of the hearing, Mother had signed a consent for D.B. to adopt E.H. 

According to Mother, D.B. had raised E.H. for the past eight years, and E.H. 

viewed him as his father.

[8] Also at the time of the hearing, E.H. lived with D.B. and B.B. He was doing 

well in school and playing football. E.H.’s therapist Charity Gichina 

(“Therapist Gichina”) testified that E.H. had been working on anger issues as a 

result of Father abandoning him and failing to contact him for eight years. As 

E.H. addressed this anger in therapy, he became more compliant at school and 

his grades improved. Therapist Gichina further explained that E.H. received 

the consistency and love that he needed from D.B. She also expressed her 

concern that if Father’s parental rights were not terminated, “that [would]

destabilize [E.H.] and . . . expose him to experience past trauma reminders.” 

(Tr. 91). In addition, Therapist Gichina testified that E.H. did not want to see 

Father. She recommended terminating Father’s parental rights.

[9] Guardian Ad Litem Jennifer Ankney (“GAL Ankney”) testified that 

termination was in E.H.’s best interests. Father had shown no interest in 

pursuing a relationship with his son for the past eight years, and E.H. wanted 
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D.B. to adopt him. DCS Family Case Manager Ashli Saba (“Case Manager 

Saba”) also testified that termination was in E.H.’s best interests. According to 

Case Manager Saba, D.B. planned to adopt E.H.

[10] Following the hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating

Father’s parental relationship with E.H. Father appeals.

Decision

[11] Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of his

parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their 

children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, the law 

provides for termination of that right when parents are unwilling or unable to 

meet their parental responsibilities. In re Bester, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 

2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents 

but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999), trans. denied.

[12] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not weigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgment. Id. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining 

whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly 
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erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly 

and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30.

[13] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

[14] Here, Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the 

termination of his parental rights. Specifically, he first contends that the 

evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that: (1) 

the conditions that resulted in E.H.’s removal or the reasons for placement 
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outside the parent’s home will not be remedied; and (2) a continuation of the 

parent-child relationships poses a threat to E.H.’s well-being.

[15] At the outset, we note that INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive. Therefore, DCS is required to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence only one of the three requirements of subsection (B). In re A.K., 924 

N.E.3d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We therefore discuss only whether there 

is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in E.H.’s removal or 

the reasons for his placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[16] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the 

conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include 

parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, 

failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. 

A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the 

parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be 
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remedied. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions 

does not preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best 

predictor of his future behavior. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. 

[17] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that E.H. was removed from Mother’s

home because of her drug use and neglect. He was not placed with Father 

because DCS was initially unable to locate him. When Father was located, he 

was served with paperwork for the CHINS proceeding. However, he failed to 

attend any of the CHINS hearings and family meetings. He also failed to 

participate in court-ordered services after E.H. was adjudicated to be a CHINS. 

At the time of the hearing, Father was incarcerated. Although he was 

scheduled to be released the following day, he was facing a probation violation 

and did not know where he was going to live. Father admitted that he had not 

seen E.H. in eight years. This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion 

that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in 

E.H.’s placement outside the home would not be remedied. We find no error. 

[18] Father also argues that there is insufficient evidence that the termination was in 

E.H.’s best interests. In determining whether termination of parental rights is in 

the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of 

the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to 

those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is 

proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. In 

re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court 
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need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, 

mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. In addition, a child’s need for permanency is a 

central consideration in determining the child’s best interests. In re G.Y., 904 

N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Further, the testimony of the service providers 

may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. McBride v. 

Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003). 

[19] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that E.H. had been working with his 

therapist on anger and abandonment issues regarding Father. As E.H. 

addressed his anger in therapy, he became more compliant at school and his 

grades improved. E.H. received the consistency and love that he needed from 

D.B., and E.H.’s therapist was concerned that if Father’s parental rights were 

not terminated, “that [would] destabilize [E.H.] and . . . expose him to 

experience past trauma reminders.” (Tr. 91). D.B. had been E.H.’s father 

figure for the previous eight years and wanted to adopt E.H. E.H. did not want 

to see Father and was in favor of the adoption. GAL Ankney and Case 

Manager Saba both testified that termination was in E.H.’s best interests. This 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in E.H.’s 

best interests.

[20] We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 
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1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial 

court. 

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.