UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1090

LINDA PRINCE-GARRISON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND 

BOARD OF PHARMACY, 

 Defendant – Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:07-cv-01165-CCB) 

Submitted: December 17, 2008 Decided: March 13, 2009 

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion. 

Michael J. Snider, Jason I. Weisbrot, SNIDER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, 

Attorney General of Maryland, John S. Nugent, Assistant Attorney 

General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Linda Prince-Garrison appeals the district court’s 

order dismissing her complaint against the Maryland Department 

of Health and Mental Hygiene, Maryland Board of Pharmacy 

(“DHMH”) alleging race, gender, and national origin 

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (ATitle VII@), 

and disability discrimination under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12117 (“ADA”) (2000). 

We conclude Prince-Garrison pled sufficient facts to create a 

reasonable inference of retaliation. Thus, this claim was 

improperly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim. We find the district court properly dismissed 

the claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment.1 

 This court reviews de novo a district court’s Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. 

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2008). 

“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the 

sufficiency of a complaint . . . .” Edwards v. City of 

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In ruling on a 

12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint 

 1

 Prince-Garrison concedes on appeal that the district court 

properly dismissed her age discrimination claim, claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and state tort claim. 

2 
are to be taken as true and all reasonable factual inferences 

are to be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 

244. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does 

not need detailed factual allegations, [it] requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 

1964-65 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The 

complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

 Under the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A 

civil rights plaintiff need not plead facts that constitute a 

prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in order to survive a 

motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 

511-15 (2002). Nevertheless, the plaintiff retains the burden 

to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her 

claim. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 

346-47 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII claim may either 

offer direct evidence of discrimination or rely on the burden—

3 
shifting framework that was adopted by the Supreme Court in 

McDonnell Douglas. To plead a case of disparate treatment 

sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Prince-Garrison 

must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she has 

satisfactory job performance; (3) she was subjected to adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside 

her class received more favorable treatment. See Holland v. 

Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 955 (2008). 

 Prince-Garrison contends that she was subject to 

disparate treatment based upon race, gender, and national 

origin. The district court properly determined that PrinceGarrison failed to state a claim of disparate treatment because, 

by her own description, Prince-Garrison’s performance at DHMH 

was never satisfactory, as she consistently received reports of 

deficient work performance. In addition, Prince-Garrison did 

not plead significant adverse employment actions, in view of the 

voluntary settlement she entered with DHMH and her voluntary 

resignation. 

 The other actions complained of by Prince-Garrison, 

such as her employer’s failure to provide her with office 

supplies, reprimands for insubordination, meetings with 

supervisors, and directions to attend counseling, do not 

constitute adverse employment actions. See Thompson v. Potomac 

4 
Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding 

that neither “disciplinary discussion” prompted by employee’s 

insubordination nor performance evaluation unaccompanied by 

tangible effects on employment were adverse employment actions 

for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII). 

 The district court also properly dismissed PrinceGarrison’s claim of discriminatory discipline. This court has 

found that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory 

discipline under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: (1) she is 

part of a class protected by Title VII; (2) her prohibited 

conduct was comparably serious to misconduct by employees 

outside the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures 

taken against her were more harsh than those enforced against 

other employees. See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 

511 (4th Cir. 1993). An allegation of discriminatory discipline 

however, does not necessarily require proof of an adverse 

employment action. See Cook, 988 F.2d at 511. Because PrinceGarrison failed to identify a fellow employee who engaged in 

misconduct similar to hers or was disciplined in any way, the 

district court correctly dismissed this claim. 

 Next, to establish a hostile work environment 

harassment claim, Prince-Garrison must show she was subjected 

to: (1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a protected ground; 

(3) “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions” 

5 
of her employment and create an abusive work environment; and 

(4) imputable to her employer. See Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 

733, 745-46 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a hostile 

work environment exists, courts view the totality of the 

circumstances, including Athe frequency of the discriminatory 

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 

unreasonably interferes with an employee=s work performance.@ 

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). A 

defendant must show both that she subjectively perceived her 

workplace environment as hostile and also that it would be 

objectively perceived as hostile or abusive. Id. at 22. 

 The district court correctly determined that PrinceGarrison’s conclusory allegations of discrimination on the basis 

of race, gender, and national origin were inadequate to state a 

claim. Prince-Garrison’s complaint did no more than set forth 

the legal standard for a hostile work environment and wholly 

failed to provide factual allegations to support her assertion 

that such a hostile environment existed at DHMH. Accordingly, 

we conclude the district court properly dismissed this claim. 

 Finally, Prince-Garrison contends that the district 

court erred in dismissing her retaliation claim. To establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation, Prince-Garrison must prove that 

she engaged in a protected act, DHMH acted adversely against 

6 
her, and there is a causal connection between the act and the 

adverse action. See Holland, 487 F.3d 208, 218. Protected 

activity within the meaning of Title VII includes opposing 

discriminatory practices or participating in any manner in a 

Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Kubicko v. 

Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999). The 

adverse action need not be an ultimate employment decision, but 

must be “materially adverse,” meaning “it might well have 

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 

of discrimination.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Moreover, to state a claim of retaliation, an 

employee must be complaining of an unlawful employment practice 

or actions the employee reasonably believes are unlawful. 

Jordan, 458 F.3d at 338-39. 

The district court found that Prince-Garrison failed 

to state a claim of retaliation because she did not show a 

materially adverse employment action. The court noted the fact 

that an internal settlement between the parties retracted a 

five-day suspension and a prospective termination, and gave 

Prince-Garrison backpay. The court found a one-day suspension 

that remained was not objectively material. Moreover, the court 

found that Prince-Garrison failed to allege a causal connection 

between the protected activity and any adverse action because 

7 
three months separated her initial complaint of discrimination 

and the purported retaliatory conduct. 

We conclude that under notice pleading requirements, 

Prince-Garrison stated a claim of retaliation sufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss. Prince-Garrison engaged in 

protected activity during the complaint process with the 

Maryland Commission on Human Rights and when she repeatedly 

complained of discrimination to staff at MHDH. Prince-Garrison 

states that after her complaints she was prospectively 

terminated and immediately suspended. After these actions were 

rescinded, Prince-Garrison contends, she was micromanaged and 

treated with hostility. Prince-Garrison asserts she was also 

threatened with a cultural discrimination complaint to be filed 

by her supervisor if she did not rescind her complaints. While 

the activities Prince-Garrison complained of do not amount to 

actual discrimination or harassment prohibited by Title VII, it 

is enough for a retaliation claim that Prince-Garrison 

reasonably believed she was engaging in protected activity by 

complaining about them. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 339-40. Moreover, 

the district court is incorrect in concluding that the mediation 

and settlement resolved all adverse employment actions. PrinceGarrison was threatened with suspension at least three times and 

with termination twice, and despite later remedial action, there 

remains an inference of retaliation for engaging in a protected 

8 
9 

act. We conclude that because Prince-Garrison’s complaint 

sufficiently creates an inference that retaliation occurred, the 

district court erred in finding that Prince-Garrison failed to 

state a claim of retaliation. 

 Accordingly we vacate the district court’s order 

dismissing her retaliation claim and remand for further 

proceedings.2 We affirm the remainder of the order. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid in the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED

IN PART, AND REMANDED

 2

 By the disposition, we intimate no view as to the 

appropriate resolution of Prince-Garrison’s retaliation claim.