In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-3252

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES ZOHFELD, 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 07 CR 403—Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2009—DECIDED FEBRUARY 11, 2010

 

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and

TINDER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Charles Zohfeld, after pleading

guilty to stalking the surgeon who saved his life, was

sentenced within the Sentencing Guidelines range. He

complains that the district court relied on inaccurate

information in sentencing him and improperly considered the mental health treatment he may have

received in prison when arriving at his sentence. After
2 No. 08-3252

reviewing the record, we find that the district court

did not rely on any inaccurate information in sentencing Zohfeld. We also find that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in considering Zohfeld’s

mental health among the variety of factors it discussed

at sentencing. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Charles Zohfeld was rushed to the emergency room

in May 2005 after suffering an apparent heart attack.

Emergency room physicians stabilized Zohfeld and

transferred him to the surgery unit. A cardiac surgeon

performed open heart surgery and implanted a pacemaker, saving Zohfeld’s life.

But after his successful recovery, Zohfeld began to

harass and threaten the surgeon and his staff—making

repeated threatening phone calls, appearing at the clinic

without appointments, and monitoring the surgeon’s

family’s whereabouts. On one phone call, he said, “I

have been able to buy a Beretta 9-millimeter handgun

and I will bring it by for [the surgeon] to see.” On

another call, he stated that he had been “practicing with

my 9-millimeter handgun. . . . You really should consider

taking out the stuff you put into me. I was the wrong

person to stick a knife into. Got that?” Eventually, the

surgeon felt the need to relocate his practice and

family from Illinois to California. Much to the surgeon’s

dismay, after moving to California, Zohfeld again appeared at his medical office, and the threats continued.
No. 08-3252 3

Zohfeld was arrested and charged with two counts of

making threatening phone calls in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 875(c). He pleaded guilty, and the government filed

a memorandum requesting a sentence above the suggested Guidelines range based on the severe impact

Zohfeld’s crimes had, as well as Zohfeld’s expressed

desire to continue to harass the surgeon. The government also asked the district court not to apply the

two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility

despite the fact that Zohfeld quickly pleaded guilty

after his arrest.

Prior to sentencing Zohfeld, the district court granted

his motion to be examined by a psychiatrist. Dr. Bernard

Rubin, the examining physician, found him competent

to stand trial. He also found that Zohfeld was delusional and would benefit from extensive therapy and

psychiatric medication. Zohfeld voluntarily entered

group therapy during his pre-sentencing detention. His

therapist, Dr. Richard Bongard, advised the court that

continuing therapy would be beneficial to Zohfeld.

At the sentencing hearing, over the government’s

objection, the court found that Zohfeld accepted responsibility for his actions and awarded him the corresponding

two-level reduction. It then calculated the Guidelines

range, which the parties agreed was 18 to 24 months’

imprisonment. The government requested a sentence of

24 to 30 months’ imprisonment, arguing that Zohfeld’s

conduct had a severe impact on the surgeon and others.

Zohfeld’s counsel asked the court to sentence Zohfeld

to probation so he could receive outpatient psychiatric

treatment.
4 No. 08-3252

Before reaching its decision, the district court discussed

a variety of factors. Prominent in the court’s mind was

the severe impact Zohfeld’s crime had on his victim

and his victim’s family. The court also stated that it

felt that Zohfeld needed psychological treatment and

medication in a custodial environment because he

was not actively participating in the group therapy. The

court acknowledged that it could not mandate that

Zohfeld receive treatment, but Zohfeld said he needed it,

so the district court instructed the Bureau of Prisons to

place him at a facility that would give him the best

mental health treatment possible. It then sentenced

him to 24 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years of

supervised release. Zohfeld appeals his sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

We interpret Zohfeld’s argument as having two parts:

(1) the district court erred by relying solely on the

fact that it believed that Zohfeld needed custodial

mental health care in sentencing him to prison rather

than probation; and (2) the district court relied on inaccurate information (its belief that he would receive adequate mental health care in prison) when it imposed

his sentence. Neither of these arguments has merit.

The provision of mental health treatment was but one

of a number of factors that the court properly considered

before imposing a sentence. Contrary to Zohfeld’s argument, it was not the “sole” reason he was sentenced to

prison rather than probation; in fact, it was not even

the primary reason. Zohfeld had committed a serious
No. 08-3252 5

offense that significantly impacted multiple people—the

surgeon, his family and staff—and the district court

concluded that a term of incarceration was warranted.

In reaching this conclusion, the court listened to the

arguments of both parties, heard testimony from

Zohfeld and Zohfeld’s daughter, and examined the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court repeatedly emphasized the seriousness of Zohfeld’s conduct, and even noted that in light of the offense it

had given thought to imposing a sentence above the

Guideline range. Its primary reason for rejecting Zohfeld’s

request to sentence him to probation—aside from the

fact that probation was below the bottom of the Guidelines range of 18 months—was the seriousness of

Zohfeld’s actions.

In addition to considering the seriousness and impact

of Zohfeld’s crime, the court did address Zohfeld’s

mental health issues. It correctly recognized that without

mental health treatment, Zohfeld might be more likely

to continue his criminal behavior. It acknowledged

that although Zohfeld had been attending group

therapy sessions, counselors reported that he had not

actively been participating in them. Therefore, the

court stated that it was not confident that Zohfeld

would receive the treatment he needed in a non-custodial

environment. The court recognized, however, that while

it could not force treatment on Zohfeld, it could recommend that the Bureau of Prisons place him at a

facility where he could avail himself of such treatment.

We review a district court’s sentences for reasonableness but its sentencing procedures under a non-
6 No. 08-3252

deferential standard. United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d

749, 754 (7th Cir. 2007). A within-Guidelines sentence is

presumed reasonable. United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d

691, 696 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 347 (2007)). The district court has wide latitude

to consider many factors, including the need for mental

health treatment, when imposing a sentence. Indeed,

§ 3553(a) specifically directs the court to consider

a defendant’s need for medical care. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(D) (court shall consider need for sentence

imposed to “provide the defendant with needed [. . .]

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner”); see also United States v. Farris, 448

F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (“By recommending his

participation in . . . mental health counseling, the court

appreciated the need for a sentence that provided Farris

with appropriate correctional treatment.”). Here, the

district court adequately took into account the § 3553(a)

factors in determining a sentence for Zohfeld. Applying

those factors, it concluded that a within-Guidelines

sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense,

promoted respect for the law, and provided just punishment. That an additional factor considered was Zohfeld’s

need for mental health treatment was not an abuse

of discretion.

Zohfeld’s point that a district court may not rely on

inaccurate information when imposing a sentence is

legally correct, but of no relevance here. See, e.g., United

States v. Jones, 454 F.3d 642, 652 (7th Cir. 2006); United

States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 868 (7th Cir.

1984). Zohfeld does not dispute that he has mental
No. 08-3252 7

health issues or that he needs treatment. Instead, he

argues that the “inaccurate” information was the court’s

belief that he would receive adequate treatment in

prison. The Bureau of Prison’s manual states that prisoners are entitled to free mental health counseling, and,

if appropriately diagnosed by a psychiatrist, prescription

drugs to treat their mental health problems. See BOP:

Inmate Mental Health Treatment and Counseling,

http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/mental.jsp (last visited January 12, 2010); United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d

779, 789 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he law is very clear that

a sentencing judge ‘may appropriately conduct an

inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to

the kind of information he may consider, or the source

from which it may come.’ . . . A corollary to this

general principle is the rule that a sentencing judge

‘may consider relevant information without regard to

the rules of evidence . . . provided that the information has [a] sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

probable accuracy.’ ” (citations omitted)). The district

court is entitled to rely on this information when concluding that the Bureau of Prisons would give Zohfeld

adequate mental health treatment. It did not rely

on inaccurate information when imposing Zohfeld’s

sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Zohfeld’s sentence is AFFIRMED.

2-11-10