Filed 4/12/22 Moreles v. Herrera CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MORELES, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ARAM LOO HERRERA, et al., 

Defendants and Respondents.

 D077032

 (Super. Ct. No. ECU09653)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, L. 

Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Affirmed.

Jose Luis Moreles, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant Jose Luis 

Moreles.

Plourd and Breeze, John W. Breeze; Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. 

Mazur for Defendant and Respondent Adalberto Alejandro Loo. 

INTRODUCTION

Jose Luis Moreles’s father was killed in a traffic collision by a vehicle 

owned by Adalberto Alejandro Loo and driven by his son, Aram Loo Herrera. 
2

Moreles, along with other family members (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued Loo 

and Herrera as a result of the accident.1

As to Loo, Plaintiffs asserted claims for permissive use and negligent 

entrustment. In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court determined that Loo 

was not liable for negligent entrustment and that any remaining liability 

under the permissive use cause of action was statutorily limited to $15,000, 

pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17151.2 Likely referencing a prior offer to 

settle the case for that same amount, Loo’s counsel stated the parties had 

“agreed . . . to a figure to settle the permissive use cause of action.” On 

October 18, 2019, the court entered a written judgment finding in favor of 

Loo on the negligent entrustment cause of action and noting the parties “have 

agreed [to] a monetary figure to settle the [permissive use] cause of action,”

and would “prepare the appropriate documentation.” The parties submitted 

a stipulation in November 2019 indicating Loo had agreed to pay the $15,000,

“in full satisfaction as to his liability.” 

Moreles appeals from the October 18, 2019 judgment. In written 

correspondence to the parties, this court noted the October 18, 2019 judgment 

appeared to be interlocutory in nature because it did not fully resolve the 

permissive use cause of action, and directed the parties to address the issue 

of appealability in their briefing. On appeal, Moreles asserts there was 

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding in favor of Loo on the 

1 Herrera filed an answer to the complaint but subsequently left the 

state, stopped responding to discovery, and did not appear at trial. Moreles 

does not raise any issues specific to Herrera in the present appeal, and 

Herrera has not filed a responsive brief. Our decision is limited to the issues 

raised by Moreles in connection with the judgment entered against Loo. 

2 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless 

indicated otherwise.
3

negligent entrustment cause of action and that he never agreed to a 

settlement on the permissive use cause of action. He does not directly 

address whether the October 18, 2019 judgment is final or appealable. Loo

requests that we take judicial notice of certain post-judgment proceedings

and deem the judgment final in order to reach the merits of the present 

appeal. 

We grant Loo’s request, conclude that Moreles’s contentions lack merit, 

and affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Herrera was driving a 2007 Nissan Sentra (the Nissan) owned by his 

father, Loo, on the evening of February 6, 2015. A pedestrian attempted to 

cross the street in front of him with a shopping cart, but the closest 

streetlight was not working, and it was very dark. Loo tried to avoid the

shopping cart, but did not see the pedestrian until it was too late. The 

Nissan struck the pedestrian—later determined to be Moreles’s father—

causing his death.

Plaintiffs sued Herrera and Loo, and asserted causes of action for 

permissive use and negligent entrustment against Loo. Loo filed a motion for 

summary judgment and asserted he had not given Herrera permission to 

drive the Nissan on the night of the accident. In a declaration, Loo explained

that Herrera was living in the family home at the time of the accident, but 

that he had listed Herrera as an excluded driver on his automobile insurance 

and had made it clear to Herrera that he was not allowed to drive any of the 

family vehicles. Loo stated that Herrera did not have keys to any of the cars 

and that he did not know Herrera was driving the Nissan that evening until

he learned of the accident. The trial court found there was a triable issue of 
4

fact, based in part on conflicting statements Loo made at deposition, and 

denied the motion. 

Loo then moved to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages. He 

asserted Plaintiffs could not prove their claim for negligent entrustment for 

largely the same reasons, and that any award of damages against him for the 

remaining permissive use cause of action would be statutorily capped at 

$15,000. The court stated, at the outset of trial, that it would bifurcate the 

issues of permissive use and negligent entrustment and noted, based on the 

arguments presented and the evidence it had previously reviewed, “I would 

think that the permissive user limits would apply.” The court then took a 

recess to give the parties an opportunity to discuss a potential resolution of 

the claims against Loo. When the parties returned, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

indicated there was an offer to settle the claims against Loo for $15,000, but 

the parties were unable to reach a resolution. 

The case then proceeded to a bifurcated bench trial. Loo testified on his 

own behalf. He explained that he originally purchased the Nissan for 

Herrera to drive to college. When Herrera subsequently dropped out of 

school, Loo removed Herrera from the insurance policy and told Herrera he 

could no longer drive the car. Loo said he typically left the keys to the Nissan 

on the kitchen counter, along with the keys to the other family vehicles, but 

he had no knowledge of Herrera driving the Nissan after he was excluded 

from the insurance policy. Loo was at work on the evening of the accident 

and did not know that Herrera had taken the car. Loo had no knowledge of 

Herrera being involved in a car accident prior to February 2015.

On cross-examination, Loo conceded he originally bought the Nissan for 

Herrera, and that Herrera had driven it for a number of years before being 

excluded on the insurance policy. In addition, Loo acknowledged that 
5

Herrera’s name appeared on the invoice for repairs to the Nissan after the 

accident, but stated that he paid for the repairs and picked the car up

himself. Plaintiffs lodged excerpts from a deposition of Loo taken earlier in 

the case, and argued his previous statements contradicted his testimony at 

trial. Plaintiffs did not present any other witnesses. 

After considering the testimony and the deposition transcripts, the trial 

court made the following findings: 1) Herrera was negligent in operating the 

vehicle on the evening of the accident; but 2) the preponderance of evidence 

did not establish that Herrera had Loo’s permission to drive the vehicle; and 

3) there was no evidence establishing Loo knew or should have known 

Herrera was an incompetent or unfit driver. Based on those findings, the 

court found “there was no negligent entrustment, and thus Mr. Loo’s liability 

as a result of his ownership of this vehicle is limited by the permissive use 

statute . . . to a total of $15,000.” 

After the trial court announced its findings, Loo’s counsel stated, “we’ve 

agreed, counsel and I, to a figure to settle the permissive use cause of action 

against Mr. Loo.” The court ordered plaintiffs to prepare “the appropriate 

paperwork.”

The trial court entered a written judgment on October 18, 2019. It

stated, in relevant part, “[j]udgment . . . is rendered in [Loo’s] favor on the 

cause [of] action for Negligent Entrustment,” and, “[t]he Court, having been 

advised that the parties . . . have agreed to a monetary figure to settle the 

cause of action under the Permissive Use Statute [(§ 17151)], Plaintiffs’ 

counsel is directed to prepare the appropriate documentation for resolution of 

the Permissive Use Cause of Action.” It also awarded a judgment against 

Herrera in the amount of $5 million.
6

On November 8, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation and order as to 

post-judgment actions (the stipulation). The stipulation stated in relevant 

part, that the court entered judgment as to both Loo and Herrera, “as a result 

of said ruling the liability, pursuant to California Vehicle Code Section 17151

is limited to $15,000,” and that Loo “agrees to pay said amount in full

satisfaction as to his liability only.” The associated order, signed by the trial 

court on November 8, 2019, stated, “once payment in the amount of $15,000

is made and the matter is dismissed, then there will be full satisfaction of the 

Judgment.”

On December 17, 2019, Moreles filed a timely notice of appeal from the 

October 18, 2019 judgment. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Appealability

Before briefing on the appeal was submitted, this court sent a letter to 

the parties raising concerns regarding the finality of the October 18, 2019 

judgment. The court noted “the ‘judgment’ that is the subject of this appeal 

appears to be interlocutory in nature, requiring the preparation of ‘the 

appropriate documentation for resolution’ of a remaining cause of action. ‘A 

judgment that disposes of fewer than all the causes of action framed by the 

complaint is not final in the fundamental sense as to any parties between 

whom another cause of action remains pending.’ (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 

Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 307 [(Sullivan)].)” As the court further explained,

“if the plaintiff dismisses the remaining cause of action with prejudice or 

expressly waives on appeal the right to litigate an unresolved cause of action, 

the appellate court may either deem the judgment to be final or amend the 

judgment to reflect a dismissal of that cause of action with prejudice. (Id. at 
7

pp. 308−309.)” Accordingly, the court asked Moreles to submit a letter 

explaining why the appeal should not be dismissed and to provide copies of 

any additional relevant filings or documents demonstrating resolution of the 

permissive use cause of action. Moreles did not respond, so the court directed 

the parties to address appealability in their respective briefs.

In his briefing on appeal, Moreles states the appeal is authorized by 

Code of Civil Procedure section 904, but does not otherwise address the issue

raised in the court’s letters. Loo, however, asserts this court has discretion to 

deem the October 18, 2019 judgment final for the purposes of the present 

appeal. He requests we take judicial notice of certain post-judgment

proceedings, in a concurrently filed motion, and asserts this court should 

reach the merits of Moreles’s appeal, in light of those further proceedings and 

in the interest of justice and judicial efficiency. 

Although we do not typically consider proceedings that occurred after 

the appealed-from judgment or order, it is appropriate to take judicial notice

of subsequent proceedings for the specific purpose of avoiding dismissal of an

otherwise cognizable appeal that was erroneously, or prematurely, noticed

from a non-appealable order. (See, e.g., Giannuzzi v. State of California

(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 462, 464, fn. 2 (Giannuzzi) [granting request for 

judicial notice and deeming notice of appeal from order granting demurrer as 

“commencing a valid appeal from the subsequent judgment”].) We therefore 

grant Loo’s motion and take judicial notice of the post-judgment proceedings. 

(Ibid.; Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of records 

of any court of this state], 459 [“reviewing court may take judicial notice of 

any matter specified in Section 452”].) 
8

A. Additional Post-Judgment Proceedings 

The additional filings establish that, consistent with the order signed 

by the trial court on November 8, 2019, Loo provided a check to Plaintiffs’ 

counsel on November 15, 2019, in the amount of $15,000, and requested that 

Plaintiffs dismiss the case against him with prejudice. Plaintiffs declined to

cash the check or provide the dismissal, and Loo subsequently moved to 

compel acknowledgement of satisfaction of the judgment. 

At a hearing on the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel represented to the trial

court that Plaintiffs refused to sign the check and that he could not deposit it 

without their signatures because it was addressed to them. He explained 

that he had “lost control” of his clients, and they had filed the present appeal 

without his knowledge. The court proposed that Loo provide a new check 

made out to Plaintiffs’ client trust account so that counsel could deposit the 

check, for safekeeping, and provide Loo with the requested acknowledgement 

of satisfaction of the judgment. Counsel agreed and the court issued an order 

granting the motion to compel acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment, 

on the condition that Loo provide the new check. 

On May 15, 2020, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed an “Acknowledgment of [Full]

Satisfaction of Judgment” as to Loo.

B. The October 18, 2019 Judgment May Be Deemed Final

A judgment that disposes of fewer than all causes of action asserted 

against a party is not a final, appealable judgment. (See Sullivan, supra, 15 

Cal.4th at p. 307.) However, the appellate court may deem such a judgment 

final for the purpose of determining appealability if any remaining causes of 

action are subsequently resolved or dismissed. (Id. at pp. 308–309 [court may 

deem appeal is from final judgment where, for example, plaintiff dismisses 

with prejudice or waives the right to litigate any remaining cause of action].) 
9

Similarly, where a trial court makes a ruling resolving a cause of action but 

the ruling is not carried over into the formal judgment, “it is appropriate to 

preserve the appeal by amending the judgment to reflect the manifest intent 

of the trial court.” (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 289,

fn. 1.) 

Here, the trial court made an oral ruling at the conclusion of the bench 

trial that Loo’s liability for the only remaining cause of action was statutorily 

limited to $15,000. It appears that ruling was inadvertently omitted from the 

October 18, 2019 judgment, but the manifest intent of the court is 

nevertheless apparent from the record before us. The court’s intent is further 

confirmed by the subsequent stipulation and order signed by the court on 

November 8, 2019. Finally, the additional post-judgment pleadings establish 

that Loo submitted payment to Plaintiffs for the full amount of his liability 

and, thus, the judgment, as intended by the trial court, is now satisfied, as to 

both causes of action asserted against Loo. 

In the interest of justice and efficiency, we therefore deem the October 

19, 2019 judgment to be final for the purpose of the present appeal and 

proceed to address the merits.3

3 In addition, we note the acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment is

an independently appealable order. (See McCall v. Four Star Music Co. 

(1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1398.) In the alternative, we exercise our 

discretion to deem the notice of appeal as commencing a valid appeal from 

the subsequently filed acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. (See Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); Giannuzzi, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 464, 

fn. 2 [exercising discretion to treat notice of appeal as commencing a valid 

appeal from subsequent judgment].)
10

II.

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Accepting the Stipulation or 

Acknowledgement of Satisfaction of Judgment

Moreles asserts he did not agree to settle the permissive use cause of 

action and did not authorize his counsel to file the stipulation. He contends 

the trial court’s acceptance of the purported settlement, in the absence of a 

writing signed by Plaintiffs, violated Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 states, in relevant part, “[i]f 

parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties 

outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of 

the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment 

pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” In Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 

Cal.4th 578, the California Supreme Court held “the term ‘parties’ as used in

[Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6 (‘If parties to pending litigation 

stipulate . . . for settlement of the case . . .’) means the litigants themselves, 

and does not include their attorneys of record.”4 (Id. at p. 586.)

Here, as Moreles contends, both the stipulation and acknowledgment of 

satisfaction of judgment were signed by counsel only, and not by the litigants 

themselves. However, the purported settlement was initially stated orally 

before the court with Plaintiffs present. But, as we will explain, the record 

establishes the judgment and the subsequent acknowledgment of satisfaction 

of the judgment were based on the trial court’s rulings, and not on an 

agreement between the parties to settle the permissive use cause of action.

4 Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 was amended while the present 

appeal was pending to specify the writing may be signed by the party or “[a]n 

attorney who represents the party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, as amended by 

Stats. 2020, ch. 290, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.)
11

Therefore, the signatures of the litigants were not required under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 664.6. 

The trial court correctly found that, in the absence of a claim for 

negligent entrustment, Loo’s liability was statutorily capped at $15,000, 

pursuant to section 17151. “California is one of several states which . . . has 

supplemented the common law doctrine of negligent entrustment by 

enactment of a specific consent statute.” (Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 

Cal.App.3d 415, 420 (Allen); see also §§ 17150−17157 [addressing liability of 

private motor vehicle owners].) “[S]ection 17150 imposes upon the owner of a 

vehicle, driven by another with the other’s permission, monetary liability to 

an injured party when the injury was the result of the operator’s negligence.”

(Fenley v. Kristoffersen (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 139, 141.) However, section

17151, subdivision (a), limits that liability “to the amount of fifteen thousand 

dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident.” 

(§ 17151, subd. (a); Fenley, at p. 141 [“While expressed in unconditional 

terms, . . . liability [under section 17150] is limited by section 17151, 

subdivision (a), to $15,000.”].) Here, Plaintiffs asserted a single cause of 

action for negligent entrustment against Loo based on death or injury to a 

single person in a single accident. So as the trial court correctly stated, Loo’s 

remaining liability was statutorily capped at $15,000. (§ 17151, subd. (a).) 

Earlier that same day, Loo had offered to settle all the claims against 

him for $15,000. When the court concluded Loo’s liability was statutorily 

capped to that same amount—$15,000—Loo’s counsel stated, “we’ve agreed, 

counsel and I, to a figure to settle the permissive use cause of action.” That 

same language was then incorporated into the October 18, 2019 judgment. 

However, as counsel subsequently clarified in the stipulation, Loo’s liability 

was already capped at $15,000 as a result of the trial court’s rulings. 
12

Further, Loo had agreed “to pay [the entire $15,000] amount in full 

satisfaction as to his liability.” Thus, despite the confusion created by 

counsel’s reference to an agreement to settle the claim, Loo had actually 

agreed to pay the full amount of the maximum liability against him. Put 

another way, Loo agreed to satisfy the judgment entered against him in its 

entirety. That agreement cannot fairly be characterized as a settlement offer 

requiring plaintiffs’ written acceptance. 

Moreover, even if the trial court did err by accepting the stipulation or 

the acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment without a writing signed by 

the litigants as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, there 

would be no prejudice. It is undisputed that Loo did in fact submit payment 

to Plaintiffs for $15,000, the full amount of his potential liability. As such, 

there was no more favorable result available to Plaintiffs and reversal would 

not be warranted in any event.5 (See Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 

Cal.4th 548, 574 [“When the error is one of state law only, it generally does 

not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the 

absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would 

have been reached.”].) 

III.

There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Verdict on the 

Negligent Entrustment Cause of Action

Moreles also asserts the trial court failed to adequately consider the 

totality of evidence before entering judgment in favor of Loo on the negligent 

entrustment cause of action. To the contrary, the trial court explicitly stated 

5 Moreles contends “an error is error harmless or not,” but does not 

suggest any way in which Plaintiffs could have received a more favorable 

result. 
13

that it considered the testimony offered by Loo—the only witness presented 

at trial—and the additional deposition testimony submitted by Plaintiffs. 

The court then made several factual findings based on that evidence and

concluded Plaintiffs had not proven a claim for negligent entrustment. To 

the extent Moreles is asserting the trial court’s factual findings were not 

supported by the evidence, we disagree. 

We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. 

(Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981; see also Winograd v. 

American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 [“If the trial 

court’s resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it 

must be affirmed”]; Allen, supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at p. 421 [“Review of the 

evidence [on appeal] is limited to determining whether the [factual] finding is 

supported by substantial evidence.”].) “Under this deferential standard of 

review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and 

we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, 

drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson, at 

p. 981.) 

CACI No. 724 outlines the elements of the tort of negligent 

entrustment of a motor vehicle6 as follows:

“1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; 

“2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated by 

[name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by [name 

of driver] with the owner’s permission]; 

6 Negligent entrustment is based on the common law doctrine that

“ ‘ “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one 

whom he [or she] knows, or [should have known], is incompetent or unfit to 

drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by 

that driver.” ’ ” (Lindstrom v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 644, 648.)
14

“3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known, that 

[name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; 

“4. That [name of defendant] permitted [name of driver] to drive 

the vehicle; and 

“5. That [name of driver]’s incompetence or unfitness to drive 

was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of plaintiff].” 

(Boldface omitted.)

The trial court considered each of the elements as set forth in CACI No. 

724, and determined the evidence did not establish that Herrera had Loo’s 

permission to drive the vehicle or that Loo knew or should have known that 

Herrera was an incompetent or unfit driver. The court’s findings were 

supported by substantial evidence. Loo was the only witness at trial. He

testified he had removed Herrera from the insurance policy and told Herrera 

he could no longer drive the car. He also testified that he was at work on the 

evening of the accident and did not know Herrera had taken the car. Finally, 

he testified he had no knowledge of Herrera being involved in a car accident 

prior to February 2015. 

Moreles contends there were contradictions between Loo’s trial 

testimony and his previous declaration and deposition testimony. However, 

Loo explained at least some of those discrepancies, and it was up to the trial 

court, as the trier of fact, to determine Loo’s credibility. On appeal, “[w]e do 

not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” (Pope v. 

Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246; see also Johnson v. Pratt & 

Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622 [“Credibility is an issue 

for the fact finder.”].) Moreles further contends that the insurance records 

Loo submitted in connection with his motion for summary judgment were not 

sufficient to establish Herrera was an excluded driver at the time of the 
15

accident. However, the trial court did not rely on those documents in making 

its factual findings, and instead relied on Loo’s testimony at trial. In any 

event, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was entitled to assess Loo’s 

credibility and to credit his testimony against any contradictory evidence. 

(See Babick, at p. 1246.) 

We therefore conclude there was substantial evidence to support the 

judgment in favor of Loo on the negligent entrustment cause of action.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Loo shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

HALLER, J.