COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

April 19, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP160 Cir. Ct. No. 2019TP205

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

IN THE INTEREST OF D.O., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

S.J.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

ELLEN R. BROSTROM, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2022AP160

2

¶1 DUGAN, J.1 Sharon appeals from an order of the circuit court 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Danielle.

2

 On appeal, Sharon 

argues that the circuit court failed to “sufficiently consider” whether the 

relationship she had with her daughter would cause her daughter harm once 

Sharon’s parental rights were terminated and the relationship severed. This court 

concludes that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and appropriately 

considered the relationship between Sharon and her daughter and any

consequences of severing that relationship. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth 

below, this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State filed a petition to terminate Sharon’s parental rights to her 

daughter on October 17, 2019.

3

 The petition alleged that Sharon failed to assume 

parental responsibility and that Danielle was a child in continuing need of 

protection or services. The petition described that Sharon had a history of

“impulsive” and “out of control” behavior that led to multiple criminal charges 

and left Danielle with relatives for long periods of time without basic necessities 

or clean clothes. The petition also described that Sharon had a history of being 

homeless and unemployed. 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2019-20). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 For ease of reference, we use pseudonyms to refer to the individuals involved in these

confidential proceedings.

3

 The State also petitioned to terminate the rights of Danielle’s father. The father’s rights 

are not at issue in this appeal.
No. 2022AP160

3

¶3 Sharon entered a plea of no contest and was consequently found to 

be an unfit parent. The circuit court continued to the dispositional hearing and 

took testimony from Danielle’s paternal aunt, Danielle’s case supervisor, and 

Sharon. 

¶4 Danielle’s aunt and the case supervisor testified that Danielle had 

been living outside of the parental home since 2017 when Danielle was 

approximately four years old and that Danielle had been living with her aunt since 

2019. Both Danielle’s aunt and the case supervisor testified that Danielle’s health 

and well being had improved since she was removed from Sharon’s care and, in 

particular, when Danielle began living with her aunt. Danielle’s aunt testified that 

Danielle has a bond with her, called her “TT,”

4

and knows her as her aunt. She 

further testified that Danielle knew Sharon was her mother, and the case 

supervisor also testified that Danielle, who was now eight years old, was aware of 

who her parents were. Danielle’s aunt and the case supervisor further described

that Danielle continued to have phone contact with Sharon, but described that 

Danielle was emotional after contact with her mother. Both also testified that 

Danielle looked to her aunt, not Sharon, for daily care and security, and testified 

that Danielle had grown to feel that her placement with her aunt was her home. 

¶5 When Sharon testified, she described that she kept in contact with 

Danielle and that they had a relationship with one another. Sharon testified to 

drawings and other items that she had exchanged with Danielle since her 

incarceration and explained that they have a good relationship. 

 

4

 Danielle’s aunt testified that “TT” refers to aunty. 
No. 2022AP160

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¶6 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court recognized that this was 

“a really hard case” and weighed the factors found in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). 

Ultimately, the circuit court found that it was in Danielle’s best interests to 

terminate Sharon’s parental rights. Sharon now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶7 “Wisconsin has a two-part statutory procedure for the involuntary 

termination of parental rights.” Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 

Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. In the first phase, called the “grounds” phase, “the 

petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence” that at least one of the 

twelve grounds enumerated in WIS. STAT. § 48.415 exists. Steven V., 271 

Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶24-25; see also WIS. STAT. § 48.31(1). In the second phase, often 

referred to as the “dispositional phase,” the court must decide if it is in the child’s 

best interest that “the parent’s rights be permanently extinguished.” Steven V., 

271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶26-27; see also WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2). Sharon’s appeal 

requires this court to review the second phase of the proceedings.

¶8 “At the dispositional hearing, the court must consider any agency 

report submitted and the six factors enumerated in [WIS. STAT.] § 48.426(3) in 

determining the best interests of the child.” Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS v. Julie 

A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶4, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. “The court may also 

consider other factors, including factors favorable to the parent; but all factors 

relied upon must be calibrated to the prevailing standard: the best interests of the 

child.” Id. The factors listed under § 48.426(3) are:

(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination. 

(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the 

disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was 

removed from the home.
No. 2022AP160

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(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the 

parent or other family members, and whether it would be 

harmful to the child to sever these relationships.

(d) The wishes of the child.

(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the 

child.

(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more 

stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the 

termination, taking into account the conditions of the 

child’s current placement, the likelihood of future 

placements and the results of prior placements.

¶9 This court will uphold the circuit court’s decision to terminate 

parental rights “if there is a proper exercise of discretion.” State v. Margaret H., 

2000 WI 42, ¶32, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. “A proper exercise of 

discretion requires the circuit court to apply the correct standard of law to the facts 

at hand.” Id. As noted, in making its determination, “the best interests of the 

child is the paramount consideration” for the circuit court. Id., ¶33.

¶10 Sharon concedes that the circuit court properly considered all the 

factors of WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) with the exception of the third factor, namely 

whether Danielle had a substantial relationship with Sharon and whether it would 

be harmful to Danielle to sever that relationship. This court concludes that the 

circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in finding that it was in 

Danielle’s best interests to terminate Sharon’s parental rights.

¶11 After taking testimony at the hearing, the circuit court summarized 

the testimony stating that Danielle’s aunt had put Danielle’s needs first when her 

own mother had not. The circuit court continued summarizing the testimony 

finding that
No. 2022AP160

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what it tells me is that these parents do not put [Danielle’s]

interests first, but the people in the room who put her 

interests first are the two women sitting in the jury box.

And I get it .... You know that you want to fight 

for your daughter, but, you know, to have phone calls with 

her at this late juncture saying I’m taking you back, it just 

doesn’t show any sensitivity to what you guys have put this 

little girl through.

....

But [Sharon’s] life was super chaotic. In and out of 

custody. Leaving [Danielle] with various relatives. 

Leaving her in a condition where she’s obviously not being 

cared for well. 

....

If she’s [the aunt’s] daughter, the aunt is going to be 

sure she goes to college. She’s going to be a role model for 

her and a support her.

What does she have, you know, with the parents? I 

mean, I’m not trying to be cruel, but really like your lives 

are chaotic. You don’t offer her that. You don’t offer her a 

vision of who she can really be. 

¶12 As a complete review of the record demonstrates, the circuit court 

thoroughly and extensively considered the testimony as it related to each of the 

factors and found that it was in Danielle’s best interests to terminate Sharon’s 

parental rights. See David S. v. Laura S., 179 Wis. 2d 114, 149, 507 N.W.2d 94 

(1993) (“[T]he best interests of the child is the polestar of all determinations under 

ch. 48.”). As the circuit court stated, terminating Sharon’s rights would “empower 

[Danielle] to have the most stability and security she can have.”

¶13 Specifically as to the relationship between Sharon and Danielle, the 

circuit court stated that it could not gauge whether there was a substantial

relationship between them but it could see that Sharon’s role in Danielle’s life was 

of an “in and out nature.” Indeed, Danielle had been separated from her mother
No. 2022AP160

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“for a full half of her life,” and “[t]here was a fair amount of separation prior to 

that with incarceration and not properly caring for her before that.” 

¶14 However, the circuit court also found that “not a whole lot [was] 

going to change in this family constellation” and “[Sharon] is still going to [be]

her mom, and [Danielle’s aunt] will legally become her mom, but she’s still really 

her TT.” In other words, termination of Sharon’s parental rights would make 

Danielle’s aunt legally responsible for Danielle and make Danielle’s aunt the daily 

caretaker and provider, but Danielle would continue to know Sharon as her mother 

and continue to have some form of contact with her biological parents. The circuit 

court also recognized that Danielle has “strongly expressed” her desire to remain 

with her aunt. 

¶15 Consequently, the circuit court found that Danielle overall had a 

healthy and stable relationship with her aunt, with whom Danielle had lived since 

2019, and it was in Danielle’s best interests to allow her aunt to adopt Danielle in 

order to preserve what Danielle had with her aunt and remove the chaos and 

instability Danielle experienced with Sharon. As the circuit court stated, 

“[Danielle] doesn’t need to shoulder this mess. ... She can continue to see her 

family as she sees and knows her family.” However, by terminating Sharon’s 

rights, “[Danielle] will know she is never leaving [her aunt’s] home. She will 

always be a member of her family, and no one gets to play tug of war with her, 

and no one gets to emotionally manipulate her[.]” 

¶16 In short, the record when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the 

circuit court properly exercised its discretion, appropriately considered the 

relationship between Sharon and Danielle, and weighed that relationship with the 

other factors to determine what was in Danielle’s best interests—the polestar of 
No. 2022AP160

8

the proceedings. Before explicitly discussing the factors, the circuit court 

provided a summary of the testimony in which it recognized that Danielle had 

found stability and security with her aunt, and it was in Danielle’s best interests to 

terminate Sharon’s parental rights in order that Danielle may be able to continue 

that stability and security. The circuit court stated, “[W]hen you look at the 

balance of the factors in total and in particular when you look at the fact that this 

family constellation really isn’t going to be changed on a functional level I think 

that overall they mitigate in favor of termination.” Thus, this court concludes that 

the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.

¶17 Indeed, Sharon conceded that the circuit court appropriately 

considered all but one of the factors of WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3), and in making this 

argument, Sharon isolates one factor from the rest in arguing that the circuit court 

erroneously exercised its discretion. This court declines to isolate one factor when

it is the evaluation of all the factors together that are to be used in determining the 

best interests of the child at this phase of the proceedings. See Margaret H., 234 

Wis. 2d 606, ¶36. Moreover, it is for the circuit court to determine the relative 

weight to be assigned to each factor and “exclusive focus on any one factor is 

inconsistent with the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3).” See id., ¶¶29, 35 

(“[W]e cannot mandate the relative weight to be placed on this factor.”). Because 

the circuit court thoroughly considered all the factors together, this court affirms 

the circuit court’s order to terminate Sharon’s parental rights.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.