NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ROBERTO MEDINA-MARTINEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0461 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2015-100468-001 

The Honorable George H. Foster, Jr., Judge

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kevin D. Heade

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 11-15-2018
STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent C. Cattani joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Roberto Medina-Martinez appeals from the following 

convictions: two counts of sexual conduct with a minor, two counts of 

molestation of a child, attempt to commit sexual conduct with a minor, and 

sexual abuse. Medina-Martinez argues that the superior court’s denial of 

his repeated motions for new counsel violated his right to competent 

counsel and due process under the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Because 

the court acted within its discretion when denying the motions, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Medina-Martinez was arrested and incarcerated in January 

2015 on multiple counts related to sexual conduct with his 12-year-old stepdaughter. The court found him indigent and appointed attorney Tyrone 

Mitchell to represent him. In the two and a half years between MedinaMartinez’s arrest and trial, he made several written and oral motions for a 

change of counsel, the denial of which gives rise to this appeal.

¶3 Medina-Martinez first moved for new counsel in March 2015, 

requesting an attorney who spoke Spanish, his native language. The court 

addressed the motion at a pretrial conference, explaining that while the 

court understood Medina-Martinez might be more comfortable with a 

Spanish-speaking defense attorney, the court could not guarantee he would 

be provided one. Mitchell explained to the court that his assistant spoke 

Spanish, and Medina-Martinez agreed to “table the motion” twice. The 

court dismissed Medina-Martinez’s request for new counsel after he agreed 

to permit Mitchell to continue representation based on Mitchell’s

assurances that they would meet frequently to discuss the case.

¶4 On at least six more occasions between September 2015 and 

April 2017, Medina-Martinez moved for new counsel, alleging that his 

defense attorney did not communicate with him. He claimed that Mitchell 

failed to provide him discovery documents, did not answer his messages, 

did not visit him in jail, and had effectively terminated representation. The 
STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ

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3

court routinely addressed these oral and written motions during scheduled 

conferences and hearings, each time allowing both Medina-Martinez and 

Mitchell to speak. 

¶5 Mitchell disagreed with Medina-Martinez’s characterizations 

and repeatedly avowed to the court that he reviewed discovery with his 

client, regularly held video conferences, and sent Spanish-speaking staff to 

meet with Medina-Martinez in person. According to Mitchell, at one point,

Medina-Martinez asked him to deliver a Spanish translation of the entire 

case file for his review. Mitchell said he could not do so because he lacked 

the resources to fulfill Medina-Martinez’s request. The court had already

explained to Medina-Martinez a month earlier that his attorney could not 

send police reports—which contained information relating to the charges 

of child molestation—to jail for safety reasons. 

¶6 Beginning in December 2015, some of Medina-Martinez’s 

motions for new counsel included other allegations. Medina-Martinez

asserted that his attorney had an “extreme conflict of interest,” had 

committed ethical violations, and that “there is no client[-]attorney trust,” 

but did not allege specific facts, other than lack of communication, to 

support his claims. He also seemed to suggest that the police reports and 

grand jury indictments were fabricated. When the court gave him the 

opportunity to address his motions in court, Medina-Martinez did not 

elaborate; he simply repeated his allegations—that there was a lack of 

communication between him and his attorney and that he wanted access to 

discovery. For example, the following interaction took place in August 

2016, after Medina-Martinez moved for new counsel, alleging fabrication of 

evidence and ethical violations by his attorney:

THE COURT: Okay. I did receive your motion to change 

counsel, sir. That's why we set the hearing today. . . . The issue 

that I read in your motion is essentially your concern about 

not seeing the discovery in this case. Is that accurate?

THE DEFENDANT: Accurate.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else that you want to 

add to your motion, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Well I asked for a full discovery.

THE COURT: Right. And I understand that, but I'm asking is 

there . . . anything else that you want to add to that motion?
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THE DEFENDANT: No.

¶7 The court repeatedly denied Medina-Martinez’s motions after 

giving both attorney and defendant time to address the allegations. At a 

status conference, the court noted that it “[had] no doubt” Mitchell had 

reviewed discovery with Medina-Martinez. Despite Medina-Martinez’s 

repeated motions, Mitchell continued to represent him, handling plea offers 

and negotiating trial dates. Although anxious for his trial to begin, MedinaMartinez filed a final request for new counsel two weeks before trial. After 

hearing from Medina-Martinez once more, the court denied his request, 

citing Medina-Martinez’s desire to try the case promptly, which was in 

direct conflict with the appointment of new counsel. Based on these

conflicting goals, the court denied Medina-Martinez’s request for new 

counsel and confirmed the trial setting two weeks later.

¶8 At trial, Mitchell engaged in his duties as defense counsel by 

participating in voir dire, giving an opening statement, questioning 

witnesses (including Medina-Martinez himself), objecting to testimony, 

moving for a judgment of acquittal, and giving a closing argument. The jury 

found Medina-Martinez guilty of six counts related to sexual abuse of a 

minor. After sentencing, he timely appealed. Although a different attorney

represents Medina-Martinez on appeal, Mitchell has continued to handle

aspects of his criminal defense as recently as April 2018. 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Medina-Martinez argues that the superior court violated his 

right to counsel and due process when denying his numerous requests for 

a change of counsel, pointing to a breakdown in the attorney-client 

relationship and irreconcilable differences with Mitchell. We review the 

superior court’s decision to deny a request for new counsel for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶ 27 (2005).

¶10 Criminal defendants have a right under both the federal and 

state constitutions to representation by competent counsel. U.S. Const. 

amend. VI.; Ariz. Const. art. 2, §§ 4, 24; see also A.R.S. § 13-114(2); Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 6.1. Nevertheless, a defendant is not entitled to counsel of his 

choice. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 28. In evaluating a motion for change 

of counsel, the superior court balances the defendant’s rights with judicial 

economy and efficiency, considering factors from State v. LaGrand: 

“whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, 

and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the 

timing of the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already 
STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ

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elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the 

defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel.” 152 Ariz. 483, 486-87 

(1987); State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 507, ¶ 11 (1998). 

¶11 An irreconcilable difference between a defendant and his 

attorney typically requires appointment of new counsel. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 

at 186, ¶ 29. However, the defendant must allege facts sufficient to support 

the belief that an irreconcilable difference exists, presenting “the clear 

prospect of an unfair trial.” Id. at 186, ¶ 30. A defendant’s disagreement 

about strategy, concern over lack of attention, or a general loss of trust in 

defense counsel, without more, does not constitute an irreconcilable 

difference. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 360, ¶ 22 (2009); State v. Paris-Sheldon, 

214 Ariz. 500, 505, ¶ 14 (App. 2007).

¶12 Here, Medina-Martinez argues that the LaGrand factors 

required the superior court to appoint him new counsel. We disagree. The 

bulk of Medina-Martinez’s appeal and repeated motions for new counsel

express frustration at what he perceived as an inattentive defense attorney. 

But a defendant’s concern over lack of attention is not a sufficient ground 

for appointment of new counsel. Contrary to Medina-Martinez’s 

allegations of abandonment, Mitchell continued his representation, 

engaging with the court at hearings and conferences, making requests on 

behalf of his client, and using his Spanish-speaking investigator to 

communicate with Medina-Martinez. Medina-Martinez may have 

preferred for Mitchell to meet with him in person at the jail to review his 

case, but Mitchell stated that he held several video conferences with his 

client, interaction comparable to an in-person visit. Each time MedinaMartinez raised this request in court with Mitchell present, his attorney

responded by setting forth the actions he had taken on his client’s behalf 

and often assured the court he would continue to expend efforts to address 

his client’s concerns. The court analyzed the circumstances using factors set 

out in LaGrand and acted within its discretion by denying MedinaMartinez’s motion for new counsel.

¶13 Medina-Martinez’s other key complaint when requesting 

new counsel was his lack of access to discovery. Medina-Martinez also 

asked Mitchell to have all documents translated into Spanish. As Mitchell 

informed the court, his Spanish-speaking staff had communicated with 

Medina-Martinez regarding the details of the case, and Mitchell stated that 

he did not have the resources required to translate his entire file into 

Spanish. The court did not err in denying these requests for new counsel on 

this basis. See Calderon-Palomino v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 419, 422-23, ¶¶ 6, 11

(App. 2001) (“The cost in time, money and administrative disruption of 
STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ

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providing foreign language services are legitimate government interests” 

and “[t]he decision not to provide [a defendant] with a Spanish translation 

of all disclosure documents and court documents is rationally related to 

those interests.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, as the court explained to 

Medina-Martinez early on, possession of documents related to his case in 

jail would “put[] [Medina-Martinez’s] safety at risk.” Rather than giving 

Medina-Martinez the case file, the court reviewed Mitchell’s efforts to 

inform Medina-Martinez of the case against him; Mitchell regularly 

promised to redouble his efforts. The court expressed that it found 

Mitchell’s statements credible, acting within its discretion when it denied 

Medina-Martinez’s motions.

¶14 The remainder of Medina-Martinez’s complaints to the court 

were not specific enough to show the clear prospect of an unfair trial. 

Medina-Martinez argues several points, including his lack of trust in his 

attorney and that Mitchell failed to investigate his belief that police reports

and grand jury indictments were fabricated. But his motions and statements 

to the court gave insufficient detail to allege a colorable claim of 

irreconcilable differences. When the court gave Medina-Martinez the 

opportunity to elaborate, he did not give any details related to these 

allegations.

¶15 Even when we view Medina-Martinez’s individual 

complaints as a whole, we cannot say that the court erred in denying him 

new counsel. The superior court is in the best position to evaluate the 

attorney-client relationship, and it did so when it weighed MedinaMartinez’s complaints against Mitchell’s responses in court and his 

performance as Medina-Martinez’s advocate. The court acted within the 

bounds of reason when it denied Medina-Martinez’s requests for new 

counsel.

¶16 In his reply brief, Medina-Martinez challenges the sufficiency 

of the superior court’s inquiry into the alleged breakdown of 

communication with his defense attorney. Because this argument was 

raised for the first time in a reply brief, we need not address it. Dawson v. 

Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 111, ¶ 91 (App. 2007); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a), 

(c). However, even if we were to review on this basis, we would not disturb 

the superior court’s ruling. Between March 2015 and May 2017, the court 

regularly addressed Medina-Martinez’s concerns. Each time the court ruled 

on the motions for new counsel, Medina-Martinez either acquiesced or the 

court made a credibility determination by weighing Medina-Martinez’s 

claims against Mitchell’s assurances. On this record, the court acted within 
STATE v. MEDINA-MARTINEZ

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its discretion by denying Medina-Martinez’s repeated motions for new 

counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.