alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 885.

#### Secundino Mendezona, Plaintiff in Error, *v.*The United States.

April 18, 1910.

Docketed and dismissed on motion of *Mr. Solicitor General Bowers*for the defendant in error.

*The Attorney General*for the defendant in error.

No one opposing.

In error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-23-00126-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 90th District Court

Young County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR11766

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

DESMOND DAJUAN SANDERS, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Desmond Dajuan Sanders, Jr. attempts to appeal a judgment 

adjudicating his guilt following his unsuccessful stint on deferred adjudication 

community supervision. But his notice of appeal was untimely; the notice was due 

“within 30 days after the day sentence [wa]s imposed . . . in open court,”

1 Tex. R. 

App. P. 26.2(a)(1), and it was not filed until the thirty-first day—one day too late. See

Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a).

“A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke a court of appeals’s 

jurisdiction,” Taylor v. State, 424 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see Tex. R. 

App. P. 25.2(b), so we notified Appellant of our concern that his untimely notice 

deprived us of jurisdiction. We warned him that we could dismiss the appeal for want 

of jurisdiction unless, within ten days, he provided evidence that his notice of appeal 

had been timely filed,

2 or he showed other grounds for continuing the appeal. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. More than ten days have passed, but we have not received a 

response.

1Appellant has not provided any indication that he filed a motion for new trial. 

Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(2).

2We noted that our record showed no motion for new trial, and we asked him 

to provide evidence that he had placed his notice of appeal in the mail on or before 

the deadline. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b); Taylor, 424 S.W.3d at 43–44 (discussing

mailbox rule in Rule 9.2). Even this was a stretch, though, as Appellant’s notice of 

appeal appears to have been electronically filed by his counsel.
3

Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss his appeal for 

want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); Walker v. State, Nos. 02-22-00114-

CR, 02-22-00115-CR, 2022 WL 4272865, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 15, 

2022, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 6, 2023
Exhibit 32.2

Written Statement of the Chief Executive and Acting Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  1350



Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. 1350, I, the undersigned Principal Executive Officer  of Legacy Wine & Spirits International, Ltd. (the "Company"),  hereby certify, based on  my  knowledge,  that  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company  for  the  quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies  with  the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act  of 1934  and that information contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition  and results of operations of the Company.



Date: May 31, 2009

/s/Jaclyn Cruz

Jaclyn Cruz

Chief Financial Officer
#### In re: John A. KING, Debtor. John A. King, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Renee Blackman, H. Sloan Blackman, Misty D. Shephard, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-11232

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 8, 2010.

Leila Hirayama Watson, Cory Watson Crowder & Degaris, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John A. King, Birmingham, AL, pro se.

Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

John King appeals *pro se*a judgment in favor of Renee Blackman, Sloan Blackman, and Misty Shephard in their adversary proceeding against King in his bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court ruled that King’s debts were nondischargeable because he made false oaths about the existence of financial records and about his examination and approval of a statement of financial affairs and schedules accompanying his petition for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4). We affirm.

King argues there was insufficient evidence to prove he made false oaths, but we disagree. King’s statement of financial affairs and schedules omitted assets and interests in entities and trusts that were relevant to determining his financial condition. *See Swicegood v. Ginn,*924 F.2d 230, 232 (11th Cir.1991); *Chalik v. Moorefield,*748 F.2d 616, 618-20 (11th Cir.1984). The bankruptcy court was entitled to find that King’s omissions were intentional and to discredit his evasive and inconsistent testimony. *See Chalik,*748 F.2d at 619. The bankruptcy court did not clearly err by denying King a discharge.

King makes two other complaints about the adversary proceeding, but both complaints are meritless. First, King argues that the bankruptcy court omitted findings of fact from its written order, but the bankruptcy court made extensive oral findings of fact during the adversarial hearing. King cites no authority that requires a bankruptcy court to make its findings in a written order. Second, King complains that the bankruptcy judge was biased, but King failed to raise that objection in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy judge had the discretion to question King, comment on the evidence and his knowledge of other proceedings that related to King’s petition for bankruptcy, and admonish King to respond to questions. *See*Fed. R.Evid. 614(b); *Hanson v. Waller,*888 F.2d 806, 812-13 (11th Cir.1989) (discussing *Moore v. United States,*598 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir.1979)). The record does not support King’s argument that the bankruptcy judge abused that discretion.

The judgment in favor of the Blackmans and Shephard is AFFIRMED.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 11

- 00373

- CV

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

v.

Professional Pharmacy II §

§

§

§ From the 17th District Court

o f Tarrant County (17

- 231360

- 08 )

December 31, 2014

Opinion by Justice Gardner



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal and holds that there was

error in the trial court’s judgment. In accordance with rule of appellate procedure

46.3, we su ggest a remittitur of $64,000. If Appellee Professional Pharmacy II

files in this court within twenty days from the date of this opinion, a remittitur of

$64,000, we will reform the judgment to award Appellee Professional Pharmacy

II $99,180.55 (eighty

- fi ve percent of $116,683) in actual damages and

$14,677.20 in prejudgment interest 1 and, as so reformed, affi rm the trial court’s

judgment. If the suggested remittitur is not timely filed, we will reverse the trial

1 $14,677.20 reflects a recalculated award of prejudgment interest on damages in the amount of $99,180.55 at the rate of five percent simple interest from July 15, 2008

, through J une 29, 2011

. See Mahon v. Caldwell, Haddad, Skaggs, Inc. , 783 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (suggesting proportional reduction in prejudgment interest as part of suggested remittitur).court’s judgment and remand Appellee Profe ssional Pharmacy II’s negligence

claim to the trial court for a new trial on both liability and damages

.

It is further ordered that each party shall bear their own costs of this

appeal , for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

_ /s/ Anne Gardner

__________ Justice Anne Gardner
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Federal Maritime Commission","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov","author_name":"Catie-Megan Moran","author_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov\/author\/cmoranfmc-gov\/","title":"Commission Issues Order in Petition No. P3-18","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"RauYHX84R9\"><a href=\"\/commission-issues-order-in-p3-18\/\">Commission Issues Order in Petition No. P3-18<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"\/commission-issues-order-in-p3-18\/embed\/#?secret=RauYHX84R9\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Commission Issues Order in Petition No. P3-18” — Federal Maritime Commission\" data-secret=\"RauYHX84R9\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(c,l){\"use strict\";var e=!1,o=!1;if(l.querySelector)if(c.addEventListener)e=!0;if(c.wp=c.wp||{},c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage);else if(c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if(!t);else if(!(t.secret||t.message||t.value));else if(\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret));else{for(var r,s,a,i=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),n=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=0;o<n.length;o++)n[o].style.display=\"none\";for(o=0;o<i.length;o++)if(r=i[o],e.source!==r.contentWindow);else{if(r.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message){if(1e3<(s=parseInt(t.value,10)))s=1e3;else if(~~s<200)s=200;r.height=s}if(\"link\"===t.message)if(s=l.createElement(\"a\"),a=l.createElement(\"a\"),s.href=r.getAttribute(\"src\"),a.href=t.value,a.host===s.host)if(l.activeElement===r)c.top.location.href=t.value}}},e)c.addEventListener(\"message\",c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",t,!1),c.addEventListener(\"load\",t,!1);function t(){if(o);else{o=!0;for(var e,t,r,s=-1!==navigator.appVersion.indexOf(\"MSIE 10\"),a=!!navigator.userAgent.match(\/Trident.*rv:11\\.\/),i=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),n=0;n<i.length;n++){if(!(r=(t=i[n]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\")))r=Math.random().toString(36).substr(2,10),t.src+=\"#?secret=\"+r,t.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",r);if(s||a)(e=t.cloneNode(!0)).removeAttribute(\"security\"),t.parentNode.replaceChild(e,t);t.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:r},\"*\")}}}}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n"}
Exhibit 7.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report on Form 40-F of New Gold Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.
The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The
information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.

Date: April 2, 2007



|                                                         
|---------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Chris J. Bradbrook                                   
|Chris J. Bradbrook, President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Jefri TRIGNO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-74784.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 16, 2010.*

Filed Nov. 22, 2010.

Armin Alexander Skalmowski, Law Office of Armin Skalmowski, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner.

Liza Murcia, Margaret Kuehne Taylor, Esquire, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department

*194of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jefri Trigno, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings, *Telele v. Mukasey,*533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.2008), and we deny the petition for review.

In his opening brief, Trigno fails to challenge the agency’s dispositive determination that his asylum claim is time-barred. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996) (issues that are not addressed in the argument portion of a brief are deemed waived).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies regarding the only incident of physical harm that Trigno allegedly suffered in Indonesia. *See Kaur v. Gonzales,*418 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding the discrepancies about number of persecutors and date of incident were significant because they involved one of the few interactions between the petitioner and her persecutors); *Rivera v. Mukasey,*508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.2007) (adverse credibility finding supported where hearing revealed numerous instances in which petitioner attempted to explain inconsistencies and IJ found explanations insufficient). Accordingly, Trig-no’s withholding of removal claim fails.

Because Trigno’s CAT claim is based on the testimony the agency found not credible, and he points to no other evidence to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Indonesia, his CAT claim also fails. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir.2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[Exhibit 32.2]

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

       In  connection with the Quarterly Report of BF Acquisition
Group IV,  Inc.  (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for  the  period
ending October 31, 2001 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William Colucci,
Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of
2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements  of
Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act  of  1934;
and

          (2)  The  information contained in  the  Report  fairly
presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition  and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: June 16, 2004

                                    /s/ William Colucci
                                    ------------------------------
                                    William Colucci, Treasurer
                                    BF Acquisition Group II, Inc.
EXHIBIT 32

                         Statement furnished pursuant to
                             18 U.S.C. Section1350,
                             as adopted pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Phyllis A. Murphy, President and Chief Executive Officer and Stephen L. Mourlam,
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Webster City Federal
Bancorp ("the Company") each certify in his or her capacity as an officer of the
Company that he or she has reviewed the quarterly report of the Company on Form
10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 and that to the best of his or her
knowledge:

      (1)   the report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) of
            the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
            report.

The purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18, Chapter 63,
Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. It is not intended that this statement be deemed to
be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.


August 12, 2004                        /s/ Phyllis A. Murphy
Date                                   ---------------------
                                           Phyllis A. Murphy
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


August 12, 2004                        /s/ Stephen L. Mourlam
Date                                   ----------------------
                                           Stephen L. Mourlam
                                           Executive Vice President, Chief
                                           Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0270

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JOR-EL RUBEN QUIROZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including September 21, 2020, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 12 2020

08/12/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0270
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Huntsman Corporation and Huntsman International LLC
(the "Companies") for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J. Kimo Esplin, Chief Financial Officer
of the Companies, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:



/s/ J. KIMO ESPLIN J. Kimo EsplinChief Financial Officer


May 7,
2010

---



QuickLinks
#### Barry KAMINSKY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-1016-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 6, 2010.

Barry Kaminsky, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York (Varuni Nelson, David M. Eskew, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Barry Kaminsky, *pro se,*appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendant the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on plaintiffs claims under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

This Court reviews *de novo*the district court’s grant of summary judgment under FOIA. *National Council of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice,*411 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir.2005). “In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate....” *Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994). “Affidavits or declarations supplying facts indicating that the agency has conducted a thorough search ... are sufficient to sustain the agency’s burden,” and we accord such affidavits a “presumption of good faith.” *Id.*(footnote omitted). This presumption “cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other docu*618ments.” *Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo,*166 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Having conducted an independent and *de novo*review *of*the record in light of these principles, we affirm the judgment below for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. We have considered Kaminsky’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the January 19, 2010 judgment is AFFIRMED.
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Federal Maritime Commission","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov","author_name":"Catie-Megan Moran","author_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov\/author\/cmoranfmc-gov\/","title":"License Applicants May 8, 2023","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"XhNmoW6OFC\"><a href=\"\/oti\/license-applicants-may-8-2023\/\">License Applicants May 8, 2023<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"\/oti\/license-applicants-may-8-2023\/embed\/#?secret=XhNmoW6OFC\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“License Applicants May 8, 2023” — Federal Maritime Commission\" data-secret=\"XhNmoW6OFC\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(c,l){\"use strict\";var e=!1,o=!1;if(l.querySelector)if(c.addEventListener)e=!0;if(c.wp=c.wp||{},c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage);else if(c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if(!t);else if(!(t.secret||t.message||t.value));else if(\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret));else{for(var r,s,a,i=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),n=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=0;o<n.length;o++)n[o].style.display=\"none\";for(o=0;o<i.length;o++)if(r=i[o],e.source!==r.contentWindow);else{if(r.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message){if(1e3<(s=parseInt(t.value,10)))s=1e3;else if(~~s<200)s=200;r.height=s}if(\"link\"===t.message)if(s=l.createElement(\"a\"),a=l.createElement(\"a\"),s.href=r.getAttribute(\"src\"),a.href=t.value,a.host===s.host)if(l.activeElement===r)c.top.location.href=t.value}}},e)c.addEventListener(\"message\",c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",t,!1),c.addEventListener(\"load\",t,!1);function t(){if(o);else{o=!0;for(var e,t,r,s=-1!==navigator.appVersion.indexOf(\"MSIE 10\"),a=!!navigator.userAgent.match(\/Trident.*rv:11\\.\/),i=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),n=0;n<i.length;n++){if(!(r=(t=i[n]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\")))r=Math.random().toString(36).substr(2,10),t.src+=\"#?secret=\"+r,t.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",r);if(s||a)(e=t.cloneNode(!0)).removeAttribute(\"security\"),t.parentNode.replaceChild(e,t);t.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:r},\"*\")}}}}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n"}