50496 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 210 / Wednesday, November 1, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

prohibited security. The employee shall 

continue to be recused until the date of 

the DAEO’s written confirmation that 

divesture has been accomplished. 

(2) Extension of period to divest. 

Upon a showing of undue hardship, the 

DAEO may extend the 90 day period for 

divestiture specified in paragraphs (e) 

through (f) of this section. 

(3) Disqualification pending 

divestiture. Pending divestiture of 

prohibited securities, an employee must 

disqualify himself or herself, in 

accordance with § 2635.402 of this title, 

from participation in particular matters 

which, as a result of continued 

ownership of the prohibited securities, 

would affect the financial interests of 

the employee, or those of the spouse or 

dependent child of the employee. 

(g) Waivers. The DAEO may grant a 

written waiver from this section based 

on a determination that the waiver is 

not inconsistent with part 2635 of this 

title or otherwise prohibited by law and 

that, under the particular circumstances, 

application of the prohibition is not 

necessary to avoid the appearance of an 

employee’s misuse of position or loss of 

impartiality, or to otherwise ensure 

confidence in the impartiality and 

objectivity with which the 

Commission’s programs are 

administered, or in the case of a special 

Government employee, divestiture 

would result in substantial financial 

hardship. A waiver under this 

paragraph must be in writing and may 

impose conditions, such as requiring 

execution of a written disqualification. 

§ 5601.103 Notice of disqualification when 

seeking employment. 

(a) An employee who has been 

assigned to or is supervising work on a 

particular matter that affects the 

financial interests of a prospective 

employer and who is required, in 

accordance with § 2635.604(a) of this 

title, to disqualify himself or herself 

from participation in that matter shall 

provide written notice of 

disqualification to the DAEO within 3 

business days. The DAEO shall inform 

the employee’s supervisor that the 

employee is disqualified from the 

matter. Public filers must comply with 

the notification requirement set forth in 

§ 2635.607 of this title even when not 

required to disqualify from participation 

in a particular matter. Employees who 

file a notification statement in 

compliance with § 2635.607 of this title 

are not required to file a separate notice 

under this section. 

(b) An employee may withdraw 

written notice under paragraph (a) of 

this section upon determining that 

disqualification from participation in 

the matter is no longer required. A 

withdrawal of disqualification shall be 

in writing and shall be provided to the 

DAEO. The DAEO shall inform the 

employee’s supervisor that the 

employee is no longer disqualified from 

the matter. 

§ 5601.104 Prohibited outside 

employment. 

An employee shall not engage in 

outside employment, either on a paid or 

unpaid basis, with or for an entity on 

the prohibited securities list described 

in § 5601.102(b)(1)(i) through (vi). 

§ 5601.105 Prior approval for outside 

employment. 

(a) Prior approval for outside 

employment. An employee who wishes 

to engage in outside employment, either 

on a paid or unpaid basis, shall obtain 

the prior written approval of the DAEO. 

A request for such approval shall be 

submitted in writing with sufficient 

description of the employment to enable 

the DAEO to give approval based on an 

informed determination that the outside 

employment is not expected to involve 

conduct prohibited by statute or Federal 

regulation, including paragraph (a) of 

this section and part 2635 of this title. 

The DAEO shall provide a copy of any 

written approvals for outside 

employment to the employee’s 

supervisor. 

(b) Scope of approval. An employee 

must submit a new request for approval 

upon either a significant change in the 

nature or scope of the outside 

employment or a change in the 

employee’s Commission position or 

assigned responsibilities. 

[FR Doc. 2017–23764 Filed 10–31–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2017–0717; Special 

Conditions No. 25–704–SC] 

Special Conditions: The Boeing 

Company Model 777–8 and 777–9 

Airplanes; Interaction of Systems and 

Structures 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for The Boeing Company 

(Boeing) Model 777–8 and 777–9 

airplanes. These airplanes will have 

novel or unusual design features when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport-category 

airplanes. These design features include 

systems that, directly or as a result of 

failure or malfunction, affect airplane 

structural performance. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on Boeing 

on November 1, 2017. We must receive 

your comments by December 18, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2017–0717 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov/, 

including any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478). 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark Freisthler, FAA, Airframe and 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 210 / Wednesday, November 1, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 50497 

Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–1119; facsimile 

425–227–1320. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

substance of these special conditions 

has been subject to the public-comment 

process in several prior instances with 

no substantive comments received. The 

FAA therefore finds it unnecessary to 

delay the effective date and that good 

cause exists for making these special 

conditions effective upon publication in 

the Federal Register. 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

Background 

On April 19, 2017 (for the Model 777– 

8 airplane), and May 12, 2015 (for the 

777–9 airplane), Boeing applied for an 

amendment to Type Certificate (TC) No. 

T00001SE to include the new Model 

777–8 and 777–9 airplanes. These 

airplanes are derivatives of the Model 

777–300ER airplane currently approved 

under TC No. T00001SE. The Model 

777–9 airplane is a stretched-fuselage, 

large, twin-engine airplane with seating 

for 408 passengers and a maximum 

takeoff weight of 775,000 pounds. 

The Model 777–8 airplane, a 

shortened-body derivative of the Model 

777–9 airplane, is a large, twin-engine 

airplane with seating for 359 passengers 

and a maximum takeoff weight of 

775,000 pounds. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, 

Boeing must show that the Model 777– 

8 and 777–9 airplanes meet the 

applicable provisions of the regulations 

listed in TC No. T00001SE, or the 

applicable regulations in effect on the 

date of application for the change, 

except for earlier amendments as agreed 

upon by the FAA. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Model 777–8 and 777–9 

airplanes because of a novel or unusual 

design feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design features, or should any other 

model already included on the same 

type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, these special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Model 777–8 and 777– 

9 airplanes must comply with the fuelvent and exhaust-emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34, and the noisecertification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Model 777–8 and 777–9 airplanes 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: 

These Boeing airplanes have full-time, 

digital, electronic flight-control systems 

(EFCS) affecting the pitch, yaw, and roll 

axes of the airplanes. In addition, the 

airplanes are equipped with on-ground 

load-alleviation systems to reduce 

braking loads. The current regulations 

are inadequate for considering the 

effects of these systems and their effects 

upon structural performance. These 

special conditions define the criteria to 

be used in the assessment of the effects 

of these systems on structures. 

The general approach of accounting 

for the effect of system failures on 

structural performance would be 

extended to include any partial or 

complete system failure, alone or in 

combination with other partial or 

complete system failures, as would 

affect structural performance. 

Discussion 

Active flight-control systems are 

capable of providing automatic 

responses to external inputs from 

sources other than pilots. These systems 

have been expanded in function, 

effectiveness, and reliability such that 

fly-by-wire flight controls, without a 

manual backup system in the event of 

system failures, are becoming standard 

equipment on larger transport-category 

airplanes. As a result of these 

advancements in flight-control 

technology, the current safety standards 

contained in part 25 do not provide an 

adequate basis to address an acceptable 

level of safety for airplanes equipped 

with these advanced systems. Instead, 

certification of these systems has been 

achieved by issuance of special 

conditions under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

For example, stability-augmentation 

systems (SAS), and to a lesser extent 

load-alleviation systems (LAS), have 

been used on transport-category 

airplanes for many years. Past approvals 

of these systems were based on both 

special conditions and individual 

findings of equivalent level of safety 

with existing rules. 

Although autopilots are also 

considered active control systems, 

typically their control authority has 

been limited such that the consequences 

of system failures could be readily 

counteracted by the pilot. Now, 

autopilot functions are integrated into 

the primary flight controls and are given 

sufficient control authority to maneuver 

the airplane to its structural design 

limits. This advanced technology, with 

its expanded authority, requires a new 

approach to account for the interaction 

of control systems and structures. 

The usual deterministic approach to 

defining the loads envelope contained 

in part 25 does not fully account for 

system effectiveness and system 

reliability. These automatic systems 

may be inoperative or may operate in a 

degraded mode with less than full 

system authority. Therefore, it is 

necessary to determine the structural 

factors of safety and operating margins 

such that the joint probability of 

structural failures, due to application of 

loads during system malfunctions, is not 

greater than that found in airplanes 

equipped with earlier-technology 

control systems. To achieve this 

objective, it is necessary to define the 

failure conditions, with their associated 

frequency of occurrence, to determine 

the structural factors of safety and 

operating margins that will ensure an 

acceptable level of safety. 

Earlier automatic control systems 

usually provided two states: Either fully 

functioning, or a total loss of function. 

Flightcrew readily detected these 

conditions. The new, active, flightcontrol systems have failure modes that 

allow the system to function in the 

degraded mode without full authority. 

This degraded mode is not readily 

detectable by the flightcrew. Therefore, 

monitoring systems are required on 

these new systems to provide an 

annunciation of a condition of degraded 

system capability. 


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50498 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 210 / Wednesday, November 1, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

In these special conditions, and in the 

current standards and regulations, the 

term ‘‘any’’ requires the applicant to 

address all items covered by the term, 

rather than addressing only a portion of 

the items. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to Boeing 

Model 777–8 and 777–9 airplanes. 

Should Boeing apply at a later date for 

a change to the type certificate to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would apply to 

that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only a certain 

novel or unusual design feature on one 

model of airplane. It is not a rule of 

general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Boeing Model 

777–8 and 777–9 airplanes. 

Interaction of Systems and Structures 

For airplanes equipped with systems 

that affect structural performance, either 

directly or as a result of a failure or 

malfunction, the influence of these 

systems and their failure conditions 

must be taken into account when 

showing compliance with the 

requirements of part 25, subparts C and 

D. 

For airplanes equipped with flightcontrol systems, autopilots, stabilityaugmentation systems, load-alleviation 

systems, fuel-management systems, and 

other systems that either directly, or as 

a result of failure or malfunction, affect 

structural performance, the following 

criteria must be used for showing 

compliance. If these special conditions 

are used for other systems, it may be 

necessary to adapt the criteria to the 

specific system. 

1. The criteria defined herein only 

address the direct structural 

consequences of the system responses 

and performance. They cannot be 

considered in isolation, but should be 

included in the overall safety evaluation 

of the airplane. These criteria may, in 

some instances, duplicate standards 

already established for this evaluation. 

These criteria are only applicable to 

structure the failure of which could 

prevent continued safe flight and 

landing. Specific criteria that define 

acceptable limits on handling 

characteristics or stability requirements, 

when operating in the system-degraded 

or inoperative mode, are not provided in 

these special conditions. 

2. Depending upon the specific 

characteristics of the airplane, 

additional studies that go beyond the 

criteria provided in these special 

conditions may be required to 

demonstrate the airplane’s capability to 

meet other realistic conditions, such as 

alternative gust or maneuver 

descriptions for an airplane equipped 

with a load-alleviation system. 

3. The following definitions are 

applicable to these special conditions. 

a. Structural performance: Capability 

of the airplane to meet the structural 

requirements of part 25. 

b. Flight limitations: Limitations that 

can be applied to the airplane flight 

conditions following an in-flight 

occurrence, and that are included in the 

airplane flight manual (e.g., speed 

limitations, avoidance of severe weather 

conditions, etc.). 

c. Operational limitations: 

Limitations, including flight limitations, 

that can be applied to the airplane 

operating conditions before dispatch 

(e.g., fuel, payload and master 

minimum-equipment list limitations). 

d. Probabilistic terms: Terms such as 

probable, improbable, and extremely 

improbable, as used in these special 

conditions, are the same as those used 

in § 25.1309. 

e. Failure condition: This term is the 

same as that used in § 25.1309. 

However, these special conditions apply 

only to system-failure conditions that 

affect the structural performance of the 

airplane (e.g., system-failure conditions 

that induce loads, change the response 

of the airplane to inputs such as gusts 

or pilot actions, or lower flutter 

margins). 

Effects of Systems on Structures 

1. General. The following criteria will 

be used in determining the influence of 

a system and its failure conditions on 

the airplane structure. 

2. System fully operative. With the 

system fully operative, the following 

apply: 

a. Limit loads must be derived in all 

normal operating configurations of the 

system from all the limit conditions 

specified in part 25, subpart C (or 

defined by special conditions or 

findings of equivalent level of safety in 

lieu of those specified in subpart C), 

taking into account any special behavior 

of such a system or associated functions, 

or any effect on the structural 

performance of the airplane that may 

occur up to the limit loads. In 

particular, any significant nonlinearity 

(rate of displacement of control surface, 

thresholds, or any other system 

nonlinearities) must be accounted for in 

a realistic or conservative way when 

deriving limit loads from limit 

conditions. 

b. The airplane must meet the 

strength requirements of part 25 (static 

strength, residual strength), using the 

specified factors to derive ultimate loads 

from the limit loads defined above. The 

effect of nonlinearities must be 

investigated beyond limit conditions to 

ensure that the behavior of the system 

presents no anomaly compared to the 

behavior below limit conditions. 

However, conditions beyond limit 

conditions need not be considered when 

it can be shown that the airplane has 

design features that will not allow it to 

exceed those limit conditions. 

c. The airplane must meet the 

aeroelastic stability requirements of 

§ 25.629. 

3. System in the failure condition. For 

any system-failure condition not shown 

to be extremely improbable, the 

following apply: 

a. At the time of occurrence. Starting 

from 1g level flight conditions, a 

realistic scenario, including pilot 

corrective actions, must be established 

to determine the loads occurring at the 

time of failure and immediately after the 

failure. 

i. For static-strength substantiation, 

these loads, multiplied by an 

appropriate factor of safety that is 

related to the probability of occurrence 

of the failure, are ultimate loads to be 

considered for design. The factor of 

safety is defined in Figure 1, below. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 210 / Wednesday, November 1, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 50499 

ii. For residual-strength 

substantiation, the airplane must be able 

to withstand two thirds of the ultimate 

loads defined in special condition 3.a.i. 

For pressurized cabins, these loads must 

be combined with the normal operating 

differential pressure. 

iii. Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must be shown up to the 

speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For 

failure conditions that result in speeds 

beyond VC/MC, freedom from 

aeroelastic instability must be shown to 

increased speeds, so that the margins 

intended by § 25.629(b)(2) are 

maintained. 

iv. Failures of the system that result 

in forced structural vibrations 

(oscillatory failures) must not produce 

loads that could result in detrimental 

deformation of primary structure. 

b. For the continuation of the flight. 

For the airplane in the system-failed 

state, and considering any appropriate 

reconfiguration and flight limitations, 

the following apply: 

i. The loads derived from the 

following conditions (or defined by 

special conditions or findings of 

equivalent level of safety in lieu of the 

following conditions) at speeds up to 

VC/MC (or the speed limitation 

prescribed for the remainder of the 

flight) must be determined: 

1. the limit symmetrical maneuvering 

conditions specified in §§ 25.331 and 

25.345. 

2. the limit gust and turbulence 

conditions specified in §§ 25.341 and 

25.345. 

3. the limit rolling conditions 

specified in § 25.349, and the limit 

unsymmetrical conditions specified in 

§§ 25.367, and 25.427(b) and (c). 

4. the limit yaw-maneuvering 

conditions specified in § 25.351. 

5. the limit ground-loading conditions 

specified in §§ 25.473, 25.491, 

25.493(d), and 25.503. 

ii. For static-strength substantiation, 

each part of the structure must be able 

to withstand the loads in special 

condition 3.b.i., multiplied by a factor of 

safety depending on the probability of 

being in this failure state. 

The factor of safety is defined in 

Figure 2, below. 

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) 

Where: 

Tj = Average time spent in failure mode j (in 

hours) 

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode 

j (per hour) 

Note: If Pj is greater than 10¥3 per flight 

hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be 

applied to all limit load conditions specified 

in part 25, subpart C. 

iii. For residual-strength 

substantiation, the airplane must be able 

to withstand two-thirds of the ultimate 

loads defined in paragraph 3.b.ii. of 

these special conditions. For 

pressurized cabins, these loads must be 

combined with the normal operating 

differential pressure. 

iv. If the loads induced by the failure 

condition have a significant effect on 

fatigue or damage tolerance, then their 

effects must be taken into account. 

v. Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must be shown up to a speed 

determined from Figure 3, below. 

Flutter clearance speeds V′ and V′′ may 

be based on the speed limitation 

specified for the remainder of the flight 

using the margins defined by 

§ 25.629(b). 


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50500 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 210 / Wednesday, November 1, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

V′ = Clearance speed as defined by 

§ 25.629(b)(2). 

V′′ = Clearance speed as defined by 

§ 25.629(b)(1). 

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) 

Where: 

Tj = Average time spent in failure mode j (in 

hours) 

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode 

j (per hour) 

Note: If Pj is greater than 10¥3 per flight 

hour, then the flutter clearance speed must 

not be less than V′′. 

vi. Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must also be shown up to V′ 

in Figure 3, above, for any probable 

system-failure condition, combined 

with any damage required or selected 

for investigation by § 25.571(b). 

c. Consideration of certain failure 

conditions may be required by other 

sections of part 25 regardless of 

calculated system reliability. Where 

analysis shows the probability of these 

failure conditions to be less than 10¥9

per flight hour, criteria other than those 

specified in this paragraph may be used 

for structural substantiation to show 

continued safe flight and landing. 

4. Failure indications. For systemfailure detection and indication, the 

following apply: 

a. The system must be checked for 

failure conditions, not extremely 

improbable, that degrade the structural 

capability below the level required by 

part 25, or that significantly reduce the 

reliability of the remaining system. As 

far as reasonably practicable, the 

flightcrew must be made aware of these 

failures before flight. Certain elements 

of the control system, such as 

mechanical and hydraulic components, 

may use special periodic inspections, 

and electronic components may use 

daily checks, in lieu of detection and 

indication systems, to achieve the 

objective of this requirement. These 

certification-maintenance requirements 

must be limited to components that are 

not readily detectable by normal 

detection-and-indication systems, and 

where service history shows that 

inspections will provide an adequate 

level of safety. 

b. The existence of any failure 

condition, not extremely improbable, 

during flight, that could significantly 

affect the structural capability of the 

airplane, and for which the associated 

reduction in airworthiness can be 

minimized by suitable flight limitations, 

must be signaled to the flightcrew. For 

example, failure conditions that result 

in a factor of safety between the airplane 

strength and the loads of part 25, 

subpart C below 1.25, or flutter margins 

below V′′, must be signaled to the crew 

during flight. 

5. Dispatch with known failure 

conditions. If the airplane is to be 

dispatched in a known system-failure 

condition that affects structural 

performance, or that affects the 

reliability of the remaining system to 

maintain structural performance, then 

the provisions of these special 

conditions must be met, including the 

provisions of special condition 2 for the 

dispatched condition, and special 

condition 3 for subsequent failures. 

a. Expected operational limitations 

may be taken into account in 

establishing Pj as the probability of 

failure occurrence for determining the 

safety margin in Figure 1. 

b. Flight limitations and expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Qj as the 

combined probability of being in the 

dispatched failure condition, and the 

subsequent failure condition, for the 

safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. 

c. These limitations must be such that 

the probability of being in this 

combined failure state, and then 

subsequently encountering limit load 

conditions, is extremely improbable. No 

reduction in these safety margins is 

allowed if the subsequent system-failure 

rate is greater than 10¥3 per flight hour. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

23, 2017. 

Victor Wicklund, 

Manager, Transport Standards Branch, Policy 

and Innovation Division, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2017–23699 Filed 10–31–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2017–0718; Special 

Conditions No. 25–705–SC] 

Special Conditions: The Boeing 

Company Model 777–8 and 777–9 

Airplanes; Design Roll Maneuver for 

Electronic Flight Controls 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for The Boeing Company 

(Boeing) Model 777–8 and 777–9 

airplanes. These airplanes will have a 

novel or unusual design feature when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport-category 

airplanes. This design feature is an 

electronic flight-control system (EFCS) 

that provides control of the airplane 

through pilot inputs to the flight 

computer. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: This action is effective on Boeing 

on November 1, 2017. We must receive 

your comments by December 18, 2017. 


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