IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-10021

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DONNIE RAY WILLARD, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:02-CR-83-1

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Proceeding pro se, Donnie Ray Willard, Jr., federal prisoner # 28690-177,

appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence in

light of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Willard pleaded guilty

to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack

cocaine) and was sentenced to 188 months in prison. 

The district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under

§ 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while the court’s

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 26, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 12-10021

interpretation of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Evans, 587

F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2009). Section 3582(c)(2) permits the discretionary

modification of a defendant’s sentence “in the case of a defendant who has been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(o).” § 3582(c)(2); see United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.

2009).

As an initial matter, the record refutes Willard’s assertions that the

Government failed to determine whether he was eligible for a sentencing

reduction and that the Government and the district court, in finding that he was

not entitled to a reduction, incorrectly determined that he was a career offender. 

The district court agreed with the Government that, although Willard was

eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief based on Amendment 750, the court should not

exercise its discretion to grant such relief. 

We also find without merit Willard’s arguments that the district court, in

denying him a reduction under Amendment 750, accorded too much weight to

his post-conviction disciplinary record, failed to accord proper weight to his postconviction rehabilitative conduct, and failed to properly consider the § 3553(a)

factors. The sentencing court’s decision whether to reduce a defendant’s

sentence is informed by the applicable § 3553(a) factors and the pertinent

guideline policy statements. § 3582(c)(2). The district court may also consider

Willard’s post-sentencing conduct occurring after imposition of the original term

of imprisonment. See United States v. Robinson, 542 F.3d 1045, 1052 (5th Cir.

2008). The record reflects sufficient consideration of Willard’s post-sentencing

conduct and the § 3553(a) factors. See Evans, 587 F.3d at 672-74.

Willard’s argument that he is entitled to relief under the Fair Sentencing

Act of 2010 (FSA) is without merit. A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a full

resentencing, Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 269-94 (2010), and is

limited to the consideration only of retroactive amendments to the Guidelines. 

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No. 12-10021

Thus, although the FSA led to Amendment 750, the FSA, standing alone, has no

implications for a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. 

Lastly, Willard has not shown that the interests of justice required the

appointment of counsel as the § 3582(c)(2) motion did not involve complicated or

unresolved issues. See Robinson, 542 F.3d at 1052. The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

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Case: 12-10021 Document: 00511900204 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/26/2012