[Cite as State ex rel. Group Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2022-Ohio-906.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State ex rel. : 

Group Management Services, Inc., 

 : 

 Relator, 

 : 

v. No. 20AP-346 

 : 

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 Respondents. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 22, 2022

 

On brief: Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co., L.P.A., and 

Christopher A. Gray, for relator. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J. 

Alatis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

On brief: Gallon, Takacs & Boissoneault Co., L.P.A., and 

Theodore A. Bowman, for respondent Edward J. Koprowski. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

NELSON, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator Group Management Services, Inc. ("GMS") didn't like the decision of 

the Industrial Commission of Ohio to afford a new hearing to workers' compensation 

claimant Edward J. Koprowski on the basis that Mr. Koprowski had not received notice of 

his first hearing. So GMS filed a petition with us asking that we grant a writ of mandamus 

ordering the Commission to vacate that decision and deny Mr. Koprowski's claim without 

further ado. 
No. 20AP-346 2 

{¶ 2} The matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 53 

and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. Upon review of full briefing and 

the stipulated evidence, the magistrate issued the attached decision with findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. After concluding that "there is some evidence to support the 

[Commission's] decision that Koprowski did not have prior actual knowledge of the * * * 

hearing or timely subsequent knowledge of the [resulting] order, that Koprowski did not 

cause the failure of notice through his own fault or neglect, and that the failure of notice 

was due to circumstances beyond Koprowski's control," the magistrate recommended that 

no writ issue. Appended Mag. Decision at ¶ 25, 34. 

{¶ 3} GMS has filed no objections to the magistrate's decision. After our 

independent review of the matter, and discerning no error of law or other defect on the face 

of the magistrate's decision, we adopt the magistrate's decision and deny the requested writ. 

Writ of mandamus denied. 

DORRIAN and JAMISON, JJ., concur. 

NELSON, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned 

to active duty under the authority of the Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 6(C). 

___________________ 
No. 20AP-346 3 

APPENDIX 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State ex rel. : 

Group Management Services, Inc., 

 : 

 Relator, 

 : 

v. No. 20AP-346 

 : 

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 Respondents. 

 : 

 

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 20, 2021

 

Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co., L.P.A., and Christopher A. 

Gray, for relator. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, for 

respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

Gallon, Takacs & Boissoneault Co., L.P.A., for respondent 

Edward J. Koprowski. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

{¶ 4} Relator, Group Management Services, Inc. ("GMS") seeks a writ of 

mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate 

an order entered by a staff hearing officer ("SHO") granting relief to respondent Edward J. 

Koprowski pursuant to R.C. 4123.522, on the basis that Koprowski had failed to receive 

notice of a prior commission order. 
No. 20AP-346 4 

Findings of Fact: 

{¶ 5} 1. Koprowski worked as a truck driver for C & G Transportation, Inc. located 

in Wayne, Ohio.1 Koprowski asserted a workplace injury in the course of and arising out of 

his employment occurring on December 4, 2018 when he fell from the back of a dump 

trailer. Koprowski sought treatment at St. Luke's Hospital in Maumee, Ohio, on December 

5, 2018. (Stip. at 3.) He submitted his First Report of Injury on December 5, 2019. (Stip. 

at 1.) 

{¶ 6} 2. C & G Transportation participates in Ohio's workers' compensation 

program. For purposes of managing workers' compensation risk, C & G Transportation is 

a member of relator GMS, a self-insured employer organization ("PEO") that the Ohio 

Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") designates as the employer of record for 

purposes of Koprowski's claim. (Stip. at 6.) 

{¶ 7} 3. The First Report of Injury submitted by Koprowski gave his address as 

1740 East Wooster St., Bowling Green, Ohio 43402. (Stip. at 1.) This was also the address 

he provided on the employee accident report he submitted to GMS on January 2, 2019. 

(Stip. at 2-3.) In subsequent proceedings Koprowski stated in an affidavit that the Bowling 

Green address was an extended stay hotel where he resided in January and February 2019. 

(Stip. at 27.) 

{¶ 8} 4. Koprowski's initial medical treatment records at St. Luke's Hospital on 

December 5, 2018 also list the Bowling Green address as Koprowski's home address. (Stip. 

at 4.) 

{¶ 9} 5. BWC mailed a notice to Koprowski on January 18, 2019 notifying him that 

GMS had not certified Koprowski's claim. (Stip. at 6.) This letter was addressed to the 

Bowling Green mailing address and was not returned by the U.S. Postal Service as 

undeliverable. 

{¶ 10} 6. The commission sent on February 5, 2019 a notice of hearing to Koprowski 

at the Bowling Green address notifying him of a February 22, 2019 date at the commission's 

Toledo office for a hearing to address his claim. This notice was not returned by the U.S. 

Postal Service as undeliverable. 

1 This company appears at times in the record and pleadings as "C & C Transportation." 
No. 20AP-346 5 

{¶ 11} 7. The commission sent to Koprowski at the Bowling Green address on 

February 14, 2019 a notice of continuance for the February 22, 2019 hearing. 

{¶ 12} 8. The commission sent to Koprowski at the Bowling Green address on 

March 7, 2019 a new notice of hearing to be held March 25, 2019, again at the commission's 

Toledo office. (Stip. at 12-13.) 

{¶ 13} 9. The March 25, 2019 hearing took place and Koprowski did not appear. 

The district hearing officer ("DHO") consequently issued an order on March 28, 2019 

denying Koprowski's claim. (Stip. at 14-15.) A copy of the DHO's order was sent to the 

Bowling Green address. 

{¶ 14} 10. On April 5, 2019, the commission recorded a notice that the March 28, 

2019 DHO order had been returned as undeliverable. (Stip. at 16-18.) On April 8, 2019, 

the commission recorded a notice that the February 14, 2019 continuance notice had been 

returned as undeliverable. (Stip. at 19-21.) On May 22, 2019, the commission docketed a 

notice that the March 7, 2019 notice of hearing had been returned as undeliverable. (Stip. 

at 22-25.) 

{¶ 15} 11. Koprowski filed on October 15, 2019 a request for relief pursuant to 

R.C. 4123.522 seeking to vacate the DHO's order for lack of notice of the hearing. To this, 

Koprowski attached his affidavit stating that he had moved from the Bowling Green address 

in February 2019 and otherwise explaining the circumstances under which he failed to 

receive mail from the commission. These filings are the first in the file that reflect an 

appearance by counsel for Koprowski. The request for relief gives Koprowski's address as 

1236 Eastland Drive, Oregon, Ohio 43616. 

{¶ 16} 12. Koprowski's October 3, 2019 affidavit provides as follows: 

I am the Claimant in the above captioned workers' 

compensation claim and do state upon my oath that the 

following is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. 

From January through sometime in February 2019, I was living 

at an extended stay hotel located at 1740 E. Wooster St., #320, 

Bowling Green, Ohio. In February 2019, I moved out of the 

hotel and moved in with my mother at 1238 Eastland Drive, 

Oregon, Ohio. I was advised I was unable to process a 

forwarding order at the post office as the extended stay hotel 

was a business. As I was no longer living at 1740 E. Wooster 

Street, #320, Bowling Green, Ohio when the Industrial 
No. 20AP-346 6 

Commission of Ohio issued its Notice for the March 25, 2019 

hearing. I did not receive the notice of the hearing date and 

time. As I did not receive notice of the hearing, I did not attend 

the hearing on March 25, 2019. Subsequently, I did not receive 

the decision from the March 25, 2019 hearing as the decision 

was also sent to 1740 E. Wooster St., #320, Bowling Green, 

Ohio, where I no longer lived. 

(Stip. at 27.) 

{¶ 17} 13. On February 21, 2020, an SHO conducted a hearing to address 

Koprowski's request for relief. (Stip. at 30.) Koprowski appeared and testified that he 

verbally informed a supervisor at C & G Transportation about his new address. GMS 

furnished affidavits from two of its employees who stated that Koprowski had never 

contacted GMS to update his address prior to GMS receiving notice of Koprowski's request 

for relief pursuant to R.C. 4123.522. 

{¶ 18} 14. The SHO mailed an order on February 27, 2020 concluding as follows: 

The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the Injured Worker did not 

receive the District Hearing Officer order issued 03/28/2019 

and did not have actual knowledge of the information 

contained therein. It is found that the failure to receive such 

order was beyond the control and without the fault or neglect 

of the Injured Worker. 

Therefore, the Injured Worker's appeal that previously was 

filed on [10/14/2019] is found to have been timely made. State 

ex rel. Scott v. Connor, 16 Ohio App.3d 151, 474 N.E.2d 1233 

(10th Dist.1984). The appeal is referred for hearing on the next 

available District Hearing Officer docket. 

The Injured Worker testified that he was living in an extended 

stay hotel. He then moved to his mother's home. He attempted 

to complete a forward mail form with the post office, but the 

post office could not honor this request as the hotel is a 

business address. The Injured Worker let his employer know 

that he was moving to his mother's home and gave them the 

address. He was not represented in this claim on 02/19/2019, 

when he moved to his mother's home. He was unaware that in 

addition to letting his employer know about his move he 

needed to update his mailing address with the Industrial 

Commission. 

(Stip. at 30.) 
No. 20AP-346 7 

 

{¶ 19} 15. GMS filed an application for reconsideration, which the commission 

denied by order dated April 7, 2020. (Stip. at 33.) 

{¶ 20} 16. Koprowski filed his formal notice of change of address with BWC on 

March 19, 2020. (Stip. at 32.) 

{¶ 21} 17. GMS filed its complaint in mandamus with this court on July 9, 2020. 

Discussion and Conclusions of Law: 

{¶ 22} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a 

determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought 

and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel. 

Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of 

mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by 

entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott 

v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). On the other hand, where the record contains 

some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion 

and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio 

St.3d 56 (1987). Furthermore, questions of credibility and the weight to be given evidence 

are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact finder. State ex rel. Teece v. 

Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.2d 165 (1981). 

{¶ 23} GMS seeks a writ setting aside the commission's grant of relief pursuant to 

R.C. 4123.522. The statute provides as follows: 

The employee, employer, and their respective representatives 

are entitled to written notice of any hearing, determination, 

order, award, or decision under this chapter and the 

administrator of workers’ compensation and his representative 

are entitled to like notice for orders issued under divisions (C) 

and (D) of section 4123.511 and section 4123.512 of the Revised 

Code. An employee, employer, or the administrator is deemed 

not to have received notice until the notice is received from the 

industrial commission or its district or staff hearing officers, 

the administrator, or the bureau of workers’ compensation by 

both the employee and his representative of record, both the 

employer and his representative of record, and by both the 

administrator and his representative. 

If any person to whom a notice is mailed fails to receive the 

notice and the commission, upon hearing, determines that the 
No. 20AP-346 8 

failure was due to cause beyond the control and without the 

fault or neglect of such person or his representative and that 

such person or his representative did not have actual 

knowledge of the import of the information contained in the 

notice, such person may take the action afforded to such person 

within twenty-one days after the receipt of the notice of such 

determination of the commission. Delivery of the notice to the 

address of the person or his representative is prima-facie 

evidence of receipt of the notice by the person. 

{¶ 24} The statute therefore makes clear that the parties to a workers' compensation 

claim are entitled to written notice of action taken in a claim, including an impending 

hearing. Courts in this domain have applied the "mailbox rule" to presume that a notice 

that was mailed has been received in due course. Weiss v. Ferro Corp., 44 Ohio St.3d 178 

(1989). Parties seeking to rebut that presumption must prove three things: 

[T]he party alleging the failure to receive notice must first 

prove that (1) the failure of notice was due to circumstances 

beyond the party's or the party's representative's control, (2) 

the failure of notice was not due to the party's or the party's 

representative's fault or neglect, and (3) neither the party nor 

the party's representative had prior actual knowledge of the 

information contained in the notice. 

State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 286 (2000), quoting 

Weiss. Once the commission resolves these issues as a question of fact, the commission 

may determine that the complaining party is unconditionally entitled to renewed notice 

of the action or hearing. Id. at 287-88. "Thus, when the moving party sustains its burden 

of proof, the effect is that the party is not 'deemed' to have received notice until the 

commission makes the determination that the party did not receive notice of the order 

initially and the party receives notice of this determination." Id. at 287, citing Weiss at 

182-83. On the question of failure of notice due to circumstances beyond a party's control 

and without neglect, the commission, as in other factual areas, is the exclusive evaluator 

of weight and credibility, and this court must defer to the commission's decision. Id. at 

287, citing State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1996). 

{¶ 25} GMS argues that the SHO improperly gave undue weight to the fact that 

Koprowski was initially unrepresented in his claim, and that as a result the SHO applied an 

improper standard of exculpatory ignorance. GMS further argues that the SHO wrongly 
No. 20AP-346 9 

concluded that actual notice provided to C & G Transportation constituted constructive 

notice to the commission and GMS. For the reasons that follow, the magistrate concludes 

that there is some evidence to support the SHO's decision that Koprowski did not have prior 

actual knowledge of the DHO hearing or timely subsequent knowledge of the DHO’s order, 

that Koprowski did not cause the failure of notice through his own fault or neglect, and that 

the failure of notice was due to circumstances beyond Koprowski's control. 

{¶ 26} The SHO noted Koprowski's affidavits and testimony before the SHO. One 

fact established by this, if believed, was that Koprowski had verbally informed a supervisor 

that his actual employer, C & G Transportation, about his change of address. This was the 

employer to whom Koprowski reported for work, which supervised and controlled his daily 

work activity, and took the initial notice of Koprowski's injury before transmitting it to 

GMS. The SHO could reasonably conclude that, based on an extremely tenuous 

relationship with GMS, Koprowski would not reasonably be expected to inform GMS, 

rather than C & G Transportation, of his new address. 

{¶ 27} Koprowski also made a diligent attempt, according to his evidence, to have 

his mail forwarded by the U.S. Post Office, which declined on the basis that it would not 

forward mail from a commercial address. While the magistrate notes that this is a rather 

novel restriction to find imposed by a local postmaster, GMS has submitted no evidence to 

the contrary in the course of these proceedings. The SHO could reasonably conclude that 

Koprowski made a sufficient effort to ensure that subsequent mail to his former address 

would follow him as he moved. The determination by the SHO on these questions is largely 

a question of fact and hinges on Koprowski's actions. This court will not substitute its 

factual judgment for that of the commission on this particular issue. 

{¶ 28} The SHO also concluded, perhaps somewhat less typically, that Koprowski's 

lack of knowledge excused his failure to inform the commission of his new address. The 

SHO’s determination here appears based in part on Koprowski’s lack of representation in 

this phase of the claims process, and a consequently greater degree of leniency for 

noncompliance with administrative procedure. 

{¶ 29} An injured worker has a duty to provide up to date and accurate address 

information to BWC and the commission to permit officiant adjudication of his or her 
No. 20AP-346 10 

claim. State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-991, 2003-Ohio-4175, 

¶ 26. This includes a duty to file change-of-address forms when necessary. Russell at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 30} GMS points out that in Russell, this court refused the writ sought by the 

claimant. In Russell, however, this court was faced with an SHO's order denying

R.C. 4123.522 relief. Our determination in Russell essentially turned on the discretion of 

the commission, not an absolute rule as to where the line must be drawn in establishing a 

worker’s responsibility to keep his address current with the commission. This court noted 

that it was not an abuse of discretion for BWC to make use of the address on file that the 

claimant failed to update, and the commission could reasonably conclude that the claimant 

had not proven "his failure to receive notice by mail was due to circumstances beyond his 

control or the failure to receive notice was not due to his own neglect." Russell at ¶ 9. A 

similar result was reached in State ex rel. Altston v. Interpak, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP534, 2010-Ohio-790, regarding an incorrect First Report of Injury address repeated in the 

file for the following six months and a consequent failure of service. There, the commission 

found that the claimant was responsible for lack of a current address to which to send 

notice, and this court declined to disturb the commission's discretion by issuance of a writ. 

{¶ 31} Both these cases turned on the proper exercise of discretion by the 

commission in denying relief. Under the same standard of deferral to the commission’s 

factual discretion, the magistrate hesitates to overturn the commission’s determination 

that it wished to grant relief and consider Koprowski’s claim on the adjudicated merits 

rather than essentially by default. 

{¶ 32} Moreover, the magistrate does not consider that the commission is absolutely 

foreclosed from considering Koprowski’s pro se status. GMS correctly points out that 

courts in Ohio certainly may hold pro se litigants to the same standard of procedural 

compliance and efficiency applied to legal counsel, and cases beyond counting have so held: 

Ohio courts presume that pro se litigants have knowledge of the 

law and legal procedures, and they generally hold pro se 

litigants to the same standard as represented litigants. Collins 

v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1161, 2003-

Ohio-2952, ¶ 28. Consequently, a pro se litigant "cannot expect 

or demand special treatment." Kessler v. Kessler, 10th Dist. No. 

09AP-740, 2010-Ohio-2369, ¶ 8. Because a trial court would 

not explain procedural rules to a lawyer, it does not err by 
No. 20AP-346 11 

failing to explain them to a pro se litigant. Bostic v. Davis, 10th 

Dist. No. 14AP-635, 2015-Ohio-1968, ¶ 12. 

Mootispaw v. Mohr, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-885, 2016-Ohio-1246, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 33} However, no case holds that an administrative tribunal has no discretion at 

all to extend procedural leniency to pro se litigants in the interest of reaching a substantially 

just result. Here, the SHO could, based upon the evidence, conclude that the failure of 

communication between C & G Transportation and GMS was not attributable to 

Koprowski. The SHO could also weigh the circumstances and consider Koprowski’s status 

as a pro se litigant when assessing his responsibility for the lack of notice. 

{¶ 34} The magistrate accordingly concludes that the SHO did not abuse her 

discretion when granting R.C. 4123.522 relief and it is the decision and recommendation of 

the magistrate that no writ issue in this case. 

 /S/ MAGISTRATE 

 MARTIN L. DAVIS 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), 

unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual 

finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).