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ML MANAGER v. JENSEN 171

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ML Manager, LLC, and SOJ Loan, LLC

Dale M. Jensen and Vicki S. Jensen, appe

Pioneer Ventures, LLC, garnishee-

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed January 10, 2014. No. S-12-1147.

1. Garnishment: Appeal and Error. Garnishment is a legal proceeding. To the 

extent factual issues are involved, the findings of a garnishment hearing judge 

have the effect of findings by a jury and, on appeal, will not be set aside unless 

clearly wrong.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

3. Garnishment: Statutes. Garnishment in aid of execution is a legal remedy 

unknown at common law and was created by statute.

4. Garnishment: Statutes: Case Disapproved. As set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-2218 (Reissue 2008), the code of civil procedure, which encompasses the 

entirety of chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, should not be strictly 

construed. To the extent that NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 219 Neb. 296, 

363 N.W.2d 362 (1985), and Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 

647 N.W.2d 615 (2002), or other Nebraska cases, have held that chapter 25 statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, they are now 

disapproved on those grounds.

5. Garnishment: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Because the garnishment statutes 

are part of chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, an appellate court views 

them under the general rules of statutory interpretation.

6. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The rules of statutory interpretation require an 

appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a statute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so they are consistent, harmonious, 

and sensible.

7. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, 

and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of 

statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

8. ____: ____. An appellate court will give effect to all parts of a statute and avoid 

rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.

9. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute 

that is not warranted by the legislative language.

10. Garnishment: Legislature: Intent. The Nebraska Legislature sought to protect 

a garnishee from the often unnecessary and sometimes oppressive litigation by 

demanding an expeditious disposition of garnishment proceedings.

11. Garnishment: Notice. A garnishee is not required to provide notice, through 

service or any other means, of the interrogatory answers to the garnishor.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: 

Stephanie F. Stacy, Judge. Affir
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Joel Bacon, of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, P.C., 

L.L.O., for appellants.

Terry R. Wittler and Gregory S. Frayser, of Cline, Williams, 

Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for garnishee-appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Stephan, Miller-

Cassel, JJ

Per Curia

NATURE OF CASE

This is an appeal from an order overruling an “Objection 

to Garnishee’s Answers to Interrogatories” on the finding that 

the objection was filed after the 20-day time period set forth in 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1030 (Reissue 2008). ML Manager, LLC, 

and SOJ Loan, LLC (collectively ML Manager), contend that 

under § 25-1030, the 20-day time period should not begin until 

the garnishor receives notice. The issue presented as a matter 

of first impression is whether a garnishee must serve the garnishor with its interrogatory answers.

BACKGROUND

ML Manager obtained a valid default judgment against Dale 

M. Jensen and Vicki S. Jensen for the principal amount of 

$52,024,377.16. On April 24, 2012, ML Manager had a summons and order of garnishment in aid of execution issued to 

Pioneer Ventures, LLC. Along with the summons, ML Manager 

served Pioneer Ventures with interrogatories. The summons 

stated that “[y]ou are required by law to answer the attached 

Interrogatories and file them in this court within 10 days of 

service of this Summons upon you.”

On April 30, 2012, Pioneer Ventures timely filed its answers 

to the interrogatories with the clerk of the court. ML Manager 

was not served with the answers, but independently learned of 

the answers on May 7, 2012. On May 25, ML Manager filed 

an objection to the answers to interrogatories. ML Manager 

requested a hearing on the issues raised in its objection.

A hearing was held on the objections. No evidence was presented, and there is no bill of exceptions. In its order, the trial 

court ruled that ML Manager’s objection was untimely under 
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§ 25-1030, because the objection was filed more than 20 days 

after Pioneer Ventures had filed its answers on April 30, 2012. 

ML Manager now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

ML Manager assigns, restated and summarized, that the 

trial court erred by (1) ruling that the 20-day time limit of 

§ 25-1030 began to run from when the answer was filed and 

not when ML Manager received actual notice, (2) not requiring 

service of the answers by Pioneer Ventures upon ML Manager, 

and (3) not permitting the objection even if the 20-day period 

had expired.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Garnishment is a legal proceeding. To the extent factual 

issues are involved, the findings of a garnishment hearing 

judge have the effect of findings by a jury and, on appeal, will 

not be set aside unless clearly wrong.1

[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.2

ANALYSIS

ML Manager argues that the 20-day period to file an application should not have begun until ML Manager had received 

actual notice that the interrogatory answers had been filed. In 

support of this contention, ML Manager argues that (1) the 

garnishment statutes require service and notice, (2) the rules 

of civil procedure require a garnishee to serve its answers, 

and (3) ML Manager should be excused for failing to file 

the objection within 20 days. We address these arguments in 

that order.

[3] Garnishment in aid of execution is a legal remedy 

unknown at common law and was created by statute.3 Generally, 

in cases where a court enters judgment in favor of a creditor, 

the judgment creditor may, as garnishor, request that the court 

1 Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 

(2002).

2 DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 285 Neb. 974, 830 N.W.2d 490 (2013).

3 See Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, supra note 1.
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issue a summons of garnishment against any person or business 

owing money to the judgment debtor.4 As garnishee, the person 

or business owing money to the judgment debtor must answer 

written interrogatories furnished by the garnishor to establish 

whether the garnishee holds any property or money belonging 

to or owed to the judgment debtor.5 The garnishee is required 

to answer within 10 days from the date of service.6 If the garnishor is not satisfied with the interrogatory answers, it has 20 

days to file an application for determination of the liability of 

the garnishee.7 Upon establishing through pleadings and trial 

that the garnishee holds property or credits of the judgment 

debtor, the garnishee must then pay such amounts to the court 

in satisfaction of the garnishor’s judgment against the judgment debtor, subject to certain statutory exceptions with regard 

to wages.8

To determine whether the garnishee is required to provide 

service or notice, we must look to the statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1026 (Reissue 2008) explains how the garnishee should 

answer the interrogatories and states:

The garnishee shall answer, under oath, all the interrogatories put to him touching the property of every 

description and credits of the defendant in his possession 

or under his control at the time of the service of the summons and interrogatories, and he shall disclose truly the 

amount owing by him to the defendant, whether due or 

not, and, in case of a corporation, any stock therein held 

by or for the benefit of the defendant, at the time of the 

service of the summons and interrogatories. The fee for 

filing of answer may be taxed and collected in the same 

manner as other costs in such proceedings.

Section 25-1056 specifies that “[t]he summons shall be 

returnable within ten days from the date of its issuance and 

4 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1056 (Reissue 2008).

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 See § 25-1030.

8 Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, supra note 1.
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shall require the garnishee to answer within ten days from 

the date of service upon him or her.” If the garnishee fails to 

answer, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1028 (Reissue 2008) states the 

garnishee “shall be presumed to be indebted to the defendant.” 

If the garnishee answers, § 25-1030 gives the garnishor an 

opportunity to challenge the garnishee’s answers to the interrogatories. Section 25-1030 states, in its entirety:

If the garnishee appears and answers and his or her 

disclosure is not satisfactory to the plaintiff, or if he 

or she fails to comply with the order of the court, by 

delivering the property and paying the money owing 

into court, or giving the undertaking required in section 

25-1029, the plaintiff may file an application within 

twenty days for determination of the liability of the garnishee. The application may controvert the answer of the 

garnishee, or may allege facts showing the existence of 

indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant or of the 

property and credits of the defendant in the hands of the 

garnishee. The answer of the garnishee, if one has been 

filed, and the application for determination of the liability of the garnishee shall constitute the pleadings upon 

which trial of the issue of the liability of the garnishee 

shall be had. If the plaintiff fails to file such application within twenty days, the garnishee shall be released 

and discharged.

Rules of Statutory Interpret

for Garnishment Statu

Under our traditional rules of interpretation, if a statute is 

in derogation of common law, it is to be strictly construed.9

Starting in 1985, we have repeatedly held that, being in derogation of common law, garnishment statutes should be strictly 

construed.10 But in doing so, we ignored Neb. Rev. Stat. 

9 Dykes v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Ag. Socy., 260 Neb. 375, 617 N.W.2d 817 

(2000).

10 NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 219 Neb. 296, 363 N.W.2d 362 

(1985). See, Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, supra note 1; J.K. v. 

Kolbeck, 257 Neb. 107, 595 N.W.2d 875 (1999); Torrison v. Overman, 250 

Neb. 164, 549 N.W.2d 124 (1996).
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§ 25-2218 (Reissue 2008), which states that “[t]he rule of 

the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be 

strictly construed has no application to this code.” The predecessor to § 25-2218 was originally codified in 1867, as part II, 

§ 1, of Nebraska laws entitled “Code of Civil Procedure.” At 

that time, § 1 had a second sentence that stated, “[i]ts provisions, and all proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, 

with a view to promote its object, and assist the parties in 

obtaining justice.”11 This second sentence was removed when 

the language was codified under § 25-2218. In 1883, this court 

held that § 1 required the court to reject strict constructionism 

when interpreting any statute in the code of civil procedure.12

And until 1985, § 1 and its successors, including § 25-2218, 

were accordingly used to reject strict construction of statutes 

within the code of civil procedure in favor of the standard rules 

of construction.13

In 1985, this court, relying on cases from Michigan and 

Wisconsin, applied strict construction to garnishment statutes 

for the first time.14 In doing so, we seemingly overlooked 

§ 25-2218. This was error.

[4] As set out in § 25-2218, the code of civil procedure, which encompasses the entirety of chapter 25 of the 

Nebraska Revised Statutes, should not be strictly construed. 

To the extent that NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn.15

and Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe,

16 or other Nebraska 

cases, have held that Chapter 25 statutes in derogation of the 

common law are to be strictly construed, they are now disapproved on those grounds.

11 Rev. Stat. pt. II, § 1, p. 394 (1867).

12 Kepley v. Irwin, 14 Neb. 300, 15 N.W. 719 (1883).

13 See, e.g., Kearney Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390, 63 N.W. 941 

(1895); Rine v. Rine, 91 Neb. 248, 135 N.W. 1051 (1912); McIntosh v. 

Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 N.W. 152 (1931); Orchard & Wilhelm 

Co. v. North, 125 Neb. 723, 251 N.W. 895 (1933); and Rogers v. Western 

Electric Co., 179 Neb. 359, 138 N.W.2d 423 (1965).

14 NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., supra note 10.

15 Id.

16 Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, supra note 1.
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[5-9] Because the garnishment statutes are part of chapter 

25, we will view them under our general rules of statutory 

interpretation. The rules of statutory interpretation require an 

appellate court to give effect to the entire language of a statute, 

and to reconcile different provisions of the statutes so they are 

consistent, harmonious, and sensible.17 Statutory language is 

to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and this court will 

not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory 

words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.18 We will give 

effect to all parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous 

or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence.19 It is not within 

the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is 

not warranted by the legislative language.20

Interpretation of Garnis

Statute

A plain reading of § 25-1030 establishes that if the garnishee appears and answers, the plaintiff must file an application within 20 days. Nowhere in § 25-1030 is the garnishee 

required to serve its interrogatory answers or to provide any 

notice to the garnishor. Likewise, § 25-1026, which sets the 

requirements for how the garnishee shall answer the interrogatories, does not require service or notice.

ML Manager argues that § 25-1030 requires actual notice, 

because a garnishee’s answer can only be “not satisfactory” to 

the garnishor if the garnishor knows the garnishee’s answer. 

Such an interpretation is flawed because the inclusion of that 

language is to indicate why a garnishor would want to file an 

application for a trial. There is no indication in the remaining 

parts of the statute to indicate that the language was intended 

to create an actual notice requirement. It seems unlikely that 

the Legislature would intend to create a notice requirement for 

the 20-day time period so inconspicuously.

17 Amen v. Astrue, 284 Neb. 691, 822 N.W.2d 419 (2012).

18 Id.

19 See id.

20 Id.
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In all other instances in the garnishment statutes, the 

Legislature has been explicit when it requires service and 

notice. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1011(1) (Cum. Supp. 2012) states 

that “[t]he summons and order of garnishment and the interrogatories in duplicate, a notice to judgment debtor form, and 

a request for hearing form shall be served upon the garnishee 

in the manner provided for service of a summons in a civil 

action.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1030.01 (Reissue 2008) requires 

the plaintiff to provide notice of a trial to the garnishee and 

defendants. Throughout the statutory scheme, the Legislature 

was explicit as to service by the garnishor, but was silent on 

requiring service of the interrogatory answers by the garnishee. 

This indicates that the Legislature intended to create separate 

requirements for the garnishor and garnishee on the issue of 

service and notice.

[10] We have previously stated that the statutory language 

indicates that the purpose of § 25-1030 was to create an expedited garnishment proceeding.21 As a stranger to the proceedings in which a judgment has been obtained, a garnishee is 

normally an innocent third party exposed to inconvenience 

and hazards or expense of extended litigation.22 The Nebraska 

Legislature sought to protect a garnishee from this often 

unnecessary and sometimes oppressive litigation by demanding an expeditious disposition of proceedings.23 To achieve 

prompt disposition, the garnishment statutes have specified a 

relatively short time for counteraction by a judgment creditor 

or garnishor in the event of any dissatisfaction with a garnishee’s disclosure contained in answers to interrogatories, 

namely, a written application filed within 20 days in order 

to determine liability where a garnishee’s answers negate a 

debt, property, or credit due the judgment debtor from the 

garnishee.24 While garnishment affords the plaintiff a remedy 

or means to satisfy a judgment, the garnishment statutes also 

21 NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., supra note 10.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.
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embody a remedy and mechanism for the garnishee to obtain 

resolution of a question concerning the garnishee’s liability to 

avoid unnecessary litigation.25 Therefore, we find that a purpose of § 25-1030 is to provide an expeditious disposition for 

the garnishee without imposing an additional burden of requiring the garnishee to serve the garnishor with answers.

ML Manager argues that we should interpret the garnishment 

statute in a manner consistent with notions of due process. In 

general terms, a litigant has the due process right to adequate 

notice or of the opportunity to be heard.26 We have stated that 

if a statute is constitutionally suspect, we endeavor to interpret 

it in a manner consistent with the Constitution.27 ML Manager 

argues that notions of due process would be violated if the statute does not require service.

We disagree. Although the statute does not require the 

garnishee to provide notice through service, the statute does 

provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. After 

the garnishor serves the garnishee with the summons and 

interrogatories, the garnishee is required to answer within 

10 days.28 On day eleven, the garnishor can ask the clerk 

of the court whether an answer has been filed. This simple 

procedure provides the garnishor with adequate notice. The 

garnishor then has the opportunity to file an application that 

challenges the filed answers and requests a hearing to settle 

the matter. Even if the answer had been filed by the garnishee 

on the day it received the interrogatories, the garnishor on 

day eleven would have 9 days to file its application. This 

procedure provides the garnishor with an opportunity to 

be heard.

[11] Therefore, we find that the garnishment statutes, when 

read as a whole, do not require the garnishee to provide 

notice, through service or any other means. This construction 

25 NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 228 Neb. 306, 422 N.W.2d 542 

(1988).

26 See Marshall v. Wimes, 261 Neb. 846, 626 N.W.2d 229 (2001).

27 State v. Sinica, 220 Neb. 792, 372 N.W.2d 445 (1985).

28 See § 25-1056.
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is consistent with the meaning of the statute, the Legislature’s 

intent, and the notions of due process.

Next, ML Manager argues that even if the garnishment statutes do not require notice and service, service is required by 

Nebraska’s rules of civil procedure. ML Manager directs our 

attention to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1105(a) (rev. 2008), which 

states that “every pleading subsequent to the original complaint 

. . . shall be served upon each of the parties.” An answer to 

an interrogatory is a pleading.29 Thus, ML Manager argues 

the 20-day period could not have run, because the answer was 

not served.

However, Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1101 states that the rules 

of civil procedure “apply to the extent not inconsistent with 

statutes governing such matters.” It continues that the rules 

of civil procedure “shall be construed and administered to 

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 

every action.”

Having established that the garnishment statutes do not 

require service, we find that § 6-1101 of the rules of pleading 

is inconsistent with the statutes that govern this matter. Section 

6-1101 requires this court to apply the more specific garnishment statutes, which do not require service. This construction is consistent with the rules of civil procedure’s purpose 

of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 

every action.

Finally, ML Manager argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to permit the filing of the objection after 

the 20 days had passed. ML Manager argues that the facts 

of this case establish excusable neglect that should entitle it 

to relief.

ML Manager cites Underwriters v. Cannon,

30 a 1975 

case from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In Underwriters, 

the plaintiff failed to answer within 20 days and filed an 

“‘APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME’” after the 

29 See NC+ Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., supra note 25.

30 Underwriters v. Cannon, 538 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1975).
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deadline had expired.31 The trial court granted the extension 

of time. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed and stated 

that nothing “persuades us to depart from our position that the 

extension of time within which to file pleadings in a garnishment proceeding is a matter properly within the sound judicial 

discretion of the trial court.”32

Without deciding whether our garnishment statutes would 

permit a trial court to grant an extension of time to file 

the objection, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying ML Manager’s request to excuse the 

late filing. ML Manager has presented no valid reason, other 

than ignorance, as to why it failed to file its objection on 

time. ML Manager received actual notice of the answer well 

before the 20-day period had expired and had ample time to 

answer. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the extension.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the garnishment statutes do not require the 

garnishee to serve, or give notice to, the garnishor of the interrogatory answers. Such an interpretation is consistent with the 

plain meaning of the statutes, the statutes’ purpose to lessen 

the burden on the garnishee as an innocent third party, and the 

basic notions of due process. The decision of the trial court 

is affirmed.

Affirmed

McCormack, J., participating on brief

Wright, J., not participating

31 Id. at 211.

32 Id. at 212.