1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Sundiata Acoli (f/k/a Clark Edward Squire) v. New Jersey State Parole Board (A-52-14) (075308)

Argued October 13, 2015 -- Decided February 23, 2016

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a majority of the Court.

This appeal requires the Court to address the statutory process governing parole, and to determine whether 

it was error for an appellate panel to order parole where the full Parole Board did not conduct an in-person 

assessment and hearing of a convicted murderer.

In 1974, Sundiata Acoli was convicted of murder; atrocious assault and battery; assault and battery; assault 

with an offensive weapon; assault with intent to kill; illegal possession of a weapon; and armed robbery. The trial 

court imposed an aggregate sentence of life plus twenty-four to thirty years. In 2010, at the age of seventy-three, 

and after serving almost thirty-seven years of his sentence, Acoli became eligible for parole for the third time. A 

parole hearing officer performed an initial review of Acoli’s file, and the case was referred to a Parole Board panel 

for a hearing. After interviewing Acoli at length, the two-member Board panel determined that “a substantial 

likelihood exists that [Acoli] would commit a new crime if released on parole at this time.” The two-member panel 

transferred the case to a three-member Board panel to establish a future eligibility term -- that is, when Acoli could 

reapply for parole. The three-member panel set a future eligibility term of 120 months.

Following the administrative process for review, Acoli filed an appeal with the full Parole Board. The full 

Board conducted a review based on the record as developed before the panels, commonly known as a paper hearing. 

In that review, the Parole Board considered the record developed by the hearing officer and the two- and threemember panels, but the Board did not hear testimony itself or otherwise create its own record. The full Board

approved the denial of parole to Acoli and the establishment of a 120-month future eligibility term. The Parole 

Board identified its decision as a final agency decision for the purposes of appellate review.

Acoli appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Board’s basis for denying parole 

constituted arbitrary and capricious action. The panel ordered that the Parole Board “expeditiously set conditions 

for [Acoli’s] parole.” The Board filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the panel should have remanded 

the case to the Parole Board for a full hearing, rather than ordering parole. According to the Board, that result was 

compelled by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), which required that the full fifteen-member Parole Board conduct a hearing 

before paroling an inmate who has been convicted of murder. The Appellate Division denied the motion. The panel 

reasoned that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) is triggered only when a two-member Board panel recommends parole.

The Court granted the Parole Board’s petition for certification, 221 N.J. 220 (2015), and motion for a stay.

HELD: The administrative scheme for parole envisioned that a convicted murderer would undergo a full hearing 

before the Parole Board prior to securing release from incarceration. In Acoli’s circumstances, the appropriate 

remedy is a remand to the full Parole Board for completion of the administrative parole process. That process in its 

totality requires a full hearing before the Parole Board on his suitability for parole release and shall permit the 

victims of his criminal acts to be heard, if they wish, by the Board prior to a decision on his parole.

1. The State Parole Board is the agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether an inmate satisfies the 

criteria for parole release under the Parole Act of 1979. Judicial review of the Parole Board’s decisions is guided by 

the arbitrary and capricious standard that constrains other administrative action. (pp. 9-11)

2. The Parole Act and its implementing regulations set forth the process that normally governs parole 

determinations. For most crimes, correctional personnel prepare a report that is filed with a Parole Board panel. 

Then a designated hearing officer reviews that report, along with other supporting documentation. If the hearing 

officer determines that there is a basis for denial of parole, or that a hearing is otherwise necessary, the case must be 

referred to a panel of the Board for an informal hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c). After the hearing, the Board 
2

panel can either “certify the parole release of the inmate” or “deny parole and file . . . a statement setting forth the 

decision,” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(d). If the Board panel denies parole, the inmate may appeal to the full Parole 

Board, which may affirm, modify, or reverse the Board panel’s decision, or remand for further findings. (pp. 11-13)

3. The Parole Act creates an alternative parole track for inmates convicted of murder. For inmates serving a term 

for murder and other serious offenses, a hearing officer cannot recommend parole; the individual hearing officer 

must refer the case to a Board panel for a hearing. In the case of an inmate convicted of murder, even after the 

hearing, the panel is without authority to certify parole; it can only recommend parole. When a Board panel 

recommends parole, referral to the full Board is automatic. Parole cannot be certified “until a majority of the full 

parole board, after conducting a hearing, concurs in that recommendation.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f). That alternate 

track grew out of 1989 and 1993 amendments to the Parole Act, addressing the parole process for murder inmates

and victim rights, respectively. (pp. 13-16)

4. Acoli maintains that a full hearing is required only when the two-member panel recommends parole to a 

convicted murderer. That literal reading misses the overall import of the consequences of the legislative outcome 

that the 1989 amendatory language sought to achieve, namely to ensure that no convicted murderer would be 

released without having had a full Board hearing to consider the murder inmate’s grant of parole. At the very least, 

the language is ambiguous in expressing the sense of this amendment and its operation in all settings involving the 

parole release of a convicted murderer, making resort to legislative history to resolve the question raised by the 

ambiguity appropriate. Here the legislative history does not support the constrained reading advanced by Acoli. 

Instead, the Board’s proposed interpretation finds support from the general understanding of the amendment’s 

import contained in contemporaneous legislative history. See, e.g., Office of the Governor, News Release (June 29, 

1989) (explaining on Governor’s signing of bill into law that new legislation “requires the full Parole Board to 

review parole recommendations for inmates convicted of first-degree murder”); Senate Judiciary Committee, 

Statement to Assembly No. 2772 (signaling same expectation). (pp. 16-20)

5. Moreover, generally, when construing language of a statutory scheme, deference is given to the interpretation of 

statutory language by the agency charged with the expertise and responsibility to administer the scheme. Here that 

agency -- the Board -- expected that, if ever its affirmance of a two-member panel’s decision to deny release to a 

convicted murderer were reversed on judicial review, the full Board would have the opportunity to conduct its final 

and full Parole Board hearing that is implicitly required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), including the opportunity to 

interview the inmate in that setting. The Board’s interpretation of what the Legislature expected of it in the 

execution of its delegated predictive task is reasonable and thus entitled to deference by the courts. (pp. 20-22) 

6. The Appellate Division here declined to remand to the Parole Board for a full hearing. The panel, essentially, 

saw no point to that step, having itself evaluated Acoli’s bases for asserting that he is ready for release and 

determining that there has been no convincing reason presented to date to require his further incarceration. That 

remedy basically substituted the appellate panel’s judgment for that of the agency charged with the expertise to 

make such highly predictive, individualistic determinations -- the full Parole Board. (p. 23)

7. Finally, in 1993, the Legislature pointedly added reference to the rights of victims. That language supports the 

conclusion that, prior to a murder inmate’s parole release, the Legislature expected that the full Board would 

conduct a hearing with the inmate present for examination, and that the victim(s) would receive notice of that 

hearing and be given the opportunity to address the Board and to witness the full Board’s interaction with the 

incarcerated murderer prior to his or her approval for release. Under the truncated review that occurred here, and on 

which the appellate panel based its order requiring the Board to set conditions for Acoli’s release, that language 

would be substantially neutered, if not rendered meaningless. (pp. 23-24).

The remedy imposed by the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings.

JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, expresses the view that the plain and unambiguous language of 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) requires a full evidentiary hearing by the Parole Board only when a Board panel 

recommends that a murder inmate be paroled; nothing in the language of that subsection or the legislative history 

suggests that the Legislature intended to address anything other than the circumstance of a Board panel’s decision to 

recommend release of a convicted murderer. The statutes applicable to cases in which the Board panel denies 

parole, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c) and -123.58, do not mandate that the full Parole Board conduct an evidentiary 
3

hearing.

JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in 

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE 

RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-52 September Term 2014

075308

SUNDIATA ACOLI (f/k/a CLARK 

EDWARD SQUIRE),

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE 

BOARD,

Respondent-Appellant.

Argued October 13, 2015 – Decided February 23, 2016

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General,

argued the cause for appellant (John J. 

Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New 

Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).

Bruce I. Afran argued the cause for 

respondent.

Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for 

amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union

of New Jersey Foundation (Edward L. Barocas, 

Legal Director, attorney).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

After a two-member panel of the Parole Board denied parole 

to petitioner Sundiata Acoli, a convicted murderer who twice 

before had been denied parole, Acoli filed an internal

administrative appeal. That administrative appeal entitled him 
2

to a review by the full Parole Board of the record that had been 

developed before the Board panel, as well as any additional 

material submitted by Acoli. Because he had not been 

recommended for parole, the full Board did not conduct an inperson assessment of Acoli consistent with its regulations

governing the parole process. The Parole Board affirmed the

denial of parole and the extended future parole eligibility date

established for Acoli. 

Acoli appealed to the Appellate Division, and, in an 

unpublished opinion, the appellate panel reversed the Parole 

Board. The Appellate Division determined that, based on the 

administrative record developed, the Parole Board’s affirmance 

of the denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious. The

appellate panel ordered the Parole Board to “expeditiously set 

conditions for parole.”

We granted the Parole Board’s petition for certification, 

which argues only that it was error, under the statutory process 

governing parole, for the Appellate Division to have proceeded 

directly to ordering Acoli’s parole. Construction of the 

statutes governing the parole process leads us to conclude that 

the Appellate Division acted prematurely in ordering Acoli’s 

parole release. 

As we perceive the legislative intent expressed through the 

parole statute, the administrative scheme for parole envisioned
3

that a convicted murderer would undergo a full hearing before 

the Parole Board prior to securing release from incarceration. 

Submitting the decision of a two-member panel’s denial of parole

to a truncated Board review of a murder inmate’s alleged errors

does not substitute for the full Board in-person review and 

hearing of a convicted murderer prior to his or her parole 

release. Accordingly, we hold that the appropriate remedy in 

Acoli’s circumstances is a remand to the full Parole Board for

completion of the administrative parole process. That process 

in its totality requires a full hearing before the Parole Board

on his suitability for parole release and shall permit the 

victims of Acoli’s criminal acts to be heard, if they wish, by 

the Board prior to a decision on his parole. We reverse and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I.

We begin with a summary of the relevant facts and the 

procedural path that this appeal has taken. Foremost, the 

procedural history sets the stage for the statutory construction 

issue at the heart of this appeal. 

Stemming from his involvement in the 1973 roadside murder 

of State Trooper Werner Foerster and assault of Trooper James 

Harper along the New Jersey Turnpike, Acoli was convicted in 

1974 of murder; atrocious assault and battery; assault and 

battery; assault with an offensive weapon; assault with intent 
4

to kill; illegal possession of a weapon; and armed robbery. 

Under the sentencing provisions in place at the time, the trial 

court sentenced Acoli to a life term for the murder conviction

and consecutive sentences of ten to twelve years of imprisonment

for his conviction for assault with intent to kill; two to three 

years of imprisonment for illegal possession of a weapon; and 

twelve to fifteen years of imprisonment for armed robbery. 

Taken together, he received an aggregate sentence of life plus 

twenty-four to thirty years.

In 2010, at the age of seventy-three, and after serving 

almost thirty-seven years of his sentence, Acoli became eligible 

for parole for the third time.1 A parole hearing officer 

performed an initial review of Acoli’s file, and the case was 

referred to a Parole Board panel for a hearing. After 

interviewing Acoli at length, the two-member Board panel 

determined that “a substantial likelihood exists that [Acoli] 

would commit a new crime if released on parole at this time.” 

Because of that determination, the two-member panel transferred 

the case to a three-member Board panel to establish a future 

eligibility term -- that is, when Acoli could reapply for parole 

-- under administrative guidelines. The three-member panel set 

a future eligibility term of 120 months. 

 

1 Acoli previously had been denied parole in 1993 and 2004.
5

Following the administrative process for review, Acoli

filed an appeal with the full Parole Board. The full Board 

conducted a review based on the record as developed before the 

panels, commonly known as a paper hearing. In that review, the 

Parole Board considered the record developed by the hearing 

officer and the two- and three-member panels, but the Board did 

not hear testimony itself or otherwise create its own record. 

With that as the record before it, the full Board (minus the 

Board members who had participated in earlier panel decisions)

approved the denial of parole to Acoli and the establishment of 

a 120-month future eligibility term. The Board’s findings were 

set forth in a nine-page written decision that essentially 

adopted the Board panels’ determinations. 

The Parole Board identified its decision as a final agency 

decision for the purposes of appellate review. See R. 2:2-

3(a)(2). Acoli appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. 

The Appellate Division concluded that the Board’s basis for 

denying Acoli parole constituted arbitrary and capricious 

action, and the panel ordered that the Parole Board 

“expeditiously set conditions for [Acoli’s] parole.”

The Board filed a motion for reconsideration. It asked the 

panel to reassess its remedy and, further, requested a stay 

pending reconsideration. The Board argued that, rather than 

ordering parole, the Appellate Division should have remanded the 
6

case to the Parole Board for a full hearing. According to the 

Board, that result was compelled by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), 

which required that the full fifteen-member Parole Board conduct 

a hearing before paroling an inmate who has been convicted of 

murder. 

Concluding that the Board misconstrued N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f), the Appellate Division denied the motion for 

reconsideration in a written order. According to the appellate 

panel, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) is triggered only when a twomember Board panel recommends parole. Viewing that subsection 

to be designed as a curb on a rogue two-member panel that might

improperly release a convicted murderer, the appellate panel 

dismissed the subsection as inapplicable to Acoli’s 

circumstances. To the appellate panel, nothing in N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.55(f) mandated a plenary hearing before the full Parole 

Board “if the inmate was not certified for parole by an assigned 

member or the board panel prior to the Board considering an 

appeal from a denial of parole.” Accordingly, the appellate

panel saw no reason to disturb its prior decision and dismissed

as moot the Board’s stay application.

The Parole Board filed a motion for a stay before this 

Court, pending this Court’s determination on its petition for 

certification. We granted the stay and the Board’s petition for 

certification. Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 221 N.J. 220 
7

(2015). We also granted amicus curiae status to the American 

Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ).

II.

A.

The Board maintains that the Legislature directed that 

before an inmate serving a sentence for murder can be paroled, 

the full Board must certify parole, by a majority vote, after a 

hearing. That legislative aim, the Board says, was thwarted by 

the Appellate Division’s narrow construction of N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f), which would require a full Board hearing only when 

the two-member panel recommends parole. Accordingly, the Board 

asks this Court to remand to the Board for a full hearing. 

The Board emphasizes the distinctions between the 

administrative paper appeal (the type of appeal that occurred 

here) and the full evidentiary hearing. To the Board, the two

proceedings are not interchangeable. The full hearing provides 

each Board member with the chance to question the inmate and 

hear his or her responses, using those responses as aids in 

assessing whether the inmate is likely to commit a crime if 

released. However, the administrative appeal is simply a paper 

review of the record before the Board panel, its decision, and 

the inmate’s objections to it. 

Last, the Board argues that the Appellate Division deprived 

the victims of their right to appear before the fifteen-member 
8

Board. Although the victims may have had a chance to appear 

before the two-member panel, the Board contends that the 

Legislature specifically granted victims the right to provide 

input before the full Board, guiding its parole consideration of

an incarcerated convicted murderer.

B.

Focusing on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), 

Acoli argues that the subsection applies only when a two-member 

Board panel recommends parole for an incarcerated convicted

murderer. According to Acoli, the Appellate Division correctly 

determined that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) did not apply in his 

circumstances. Acoli contends that the Legislature’s purpose 

undergirding that provision is to prevent a two-member Board 

panel, acting alone, from paroling an inmate serving a sentence 

for murder. He urges this Court to find no ambiguity in the 

statute and maintains that to grant the Board’s requested relief 

would attribute to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) an intent that runs 

contrary to its plain language. 

The ACLU-NJ makes a similar argument, maintaining that the 

plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) renders it 

inapplicable here. The ACLU-NJ divides the roads ordinarily 

taken for parole release into three general categories: (1) the

Board panel could certify parole, triggering an inmate’s 

release; (2) if the Board panel denies parole, the inmate can 
9

appeal that denial to the full Board, which could then certify 

release; and (3) an appellate court could find the Board’s 

denial so arbitrary that the court intervenes and grants parole. 

The ACLU-NJ explains that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f) cuts off the 

first path -- a Board panel certifying parole -- for inmates 

convicted of murder. However, the ACLU-NJ asserts that the 

subsection left untouched the second and third routes to parole.

Emphasizing the words of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), the ACLUNJ states that the subsection applies only when a Board panel 

recommends a murder inmate for parole. Because the Board panel 

here denied Acoli’s parole request, the ACLU-NJ argues that the

subsection is plainly inapplicable and urges affirmance of the 

Appellate Division judgment.

III.

We begin with the structure of the Parole Board and the 

parole process. The State Parole Board is composed of a chair, 

fourteen associate members, and three alternate members. 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.47(a). Appointed by the Governor with the 

advice and consent of the Senate, those members are appointed to

bring expertise in “law, sociology, criminal justice, juvenile 

justice or related branches of the social sciences.” Ibid.

Like other administrative agencies that employ specialized 

knowledge to administer a regulatory scheme, the Parole Board is 

the “agency charged with the responsibility of deciding whether 
10

an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the 

Parole Act of 1979.” In re Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108, 

112 (1984). Drawing on the diverse backgrounds of its members, 

the Parole Board makes “highly predictive and individualized 

discretionary appraisals.” Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 

62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973).

Those appraisals must realistically be recognized to be

inherently imprecise, as they are based on “‘discretionary 

assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing 

primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than 

simply what he has done.’” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal 

& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed.

2d 668, 677 (1979) (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and 

the Expert -- Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. 

L. Rev. 803, 813 (1961)); see also Trantino v. N.J. State Parole 

Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 201 (2001) (Baime, J.A.D., dissenting) 

(“Stripped to its essentials, a parole board’s decision concerns 

a prediction as to an inmate’s future behavior, a 

prognostication necessarily fraught with subjectivity.”). But 

that imprecision does not allow parole determinations to escape 

judicial scrutiny. Judicial review of the Parole Board’s 

decisions is guided by the arbitrary and capricious standard 

that constrains other administrative action. See Hawley, supra, 

98 N.J. at 112-13. 
11

It is settled law that the parole of an inmate may come 

about through appellate review of the parole process when that 

process has been completed and the Board has been shown to have

acted arbitrarily in denying parole. In Trantino, supra, this

Court confronted the Parole Board’s argument that “the actual 

granting or withholding of parole is a function reposing 

exclusively in the Parole Board, and there is no such thing as 

judicial parole.” 166 N.J. at 173 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Although the Parole Board rarely acts so far outside 

of its discretion as to invite judicial intervention, we 

recognized in Trantino that the power to reverse the agency and 

order that parole be granted “may be encompassed within the 

province of judicial review.” Ibid. 

That said, the Parole Act and its implementing regulations 

set forth the process that normally governs parole 

determinations. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.69; N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.1 to -4.3. 

For most crimes, as an inmate’s parole eligibility date 

approaches, correctional personnel prepare a pre-parole report 

that is filed with a Parole Board panel. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.54(a). Then a “designated hearing officer” reviews that 

report, along with other supporting documentation, and 

determines “whether there is a basis for denial of parole” or 

whether “additional information providing a basis for denial of 
12

parole would be developed or produced at a hearing.” N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.55(a). 

If the hearing officer finds no basis to deny parole and no 

need to develop more information at a hearing, he or she then 

submits a written recommendation “to the assigned member of the 

[B]oard panel that parole release be granted.” Ibid. If the 

Board panel member concurs, parole is certified. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(b). 

But if the hearing officer “determines that there is a 

basis for denial of parole, or that a hearing is otherwise 

necessary,” the case must be referred to a panel of the Board 

for a hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c). The hearing is 

informal. Ibid. The Board panel can receive “as evidence any 

relevant and reliable documents or videotaped or in person 

testimony, including that of the victim of the crime or the 

members of the family of a murder victim if the victim or a 

family member so desires.” Ibid. After the hearing, which also

can be ordered if a panel member disagrees with the hearing 

officer’s recommendation, see N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.16(d), the Board

panel can either “(1) certify the parole release of the inmate” 

or “(2) deny parole and file . . . a statement setting forth the 

decision,” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(d). 

If the Board panel denies parole, the inmate may appeal in 

writing that denial decision to the full Parole Board. N.J.S.A.
13

30:4-123.58(a); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.2(a). Under that procedure, 

in contrast to the process when the panel recommends parole of a 

convicted murderer, an in-person review of the inmate by the 

full Board is not part of the structure of this review. Cf.

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.19(c) (setting procedure to ensure murder 

inmate’s presence at full Board review when two-member panel 

recommends parole of murder inmate under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.18(c)). In the review of a denial of parole, the full 

fifteen-member Board, minus the Board panel members that 

participated in the hearing, decides the appeal. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.58(a). The Parole Board may affirm, modify, or reverse the 

Board panel’s decision, or it can remand for further findings. 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.2(f). 

Importantly, the Parole Act creates an alternative parole 

track for inmates convicted of murder. For inmates serving a 

term for murder and other serious offenses, a hearing officer 

cannot recommend parole; the individual hearing officer must 

refer the case to a Board panel for a hearing. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.15(b). In the case of an inmate convicted of murder, even 

after the hearing, the panel is without authority to certify 

parole; it can only recommend parole. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(c). 

When a Board panel recommends parole, referral to the full Board 

is automatic. Ibid. Parole cannot be certified “until a 
14

majority of the full parole board, after conducting a hearing,

concurs in that recommendation.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f). 

That alternate track grew out of 1989 and 1993 amendments

to the Parole Act. Reflecting those amendments, N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f) currently provides: 

Notwithstanding the provision of any other law 

to the contrary, if an inmate incarcerated for 

murder is recommended for parole by the 

assigned board member or the appropriate board 

panel, parole shall not be certified until a 

majority of the full parole board, after 

conducting a hearing, concurs in that 

recommendation. The board shall notify the 

victim’s family of that hearing and family 

members shall be afforded the opportunity to 

testify in person or to submit written or 

videotaped statements.

The first sentence of the subsection, addressing the parole 

process for murder inmates, was enacted in 1989, see L. 1989, c.

115, § 1, and the second sentence on victim rights came in 1993, 

see L. 1993, c. 222, § 1. 

In a statement issued when it considered the 1989 

amendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee detailed the parole 

process and the effect that the 1989 amendment would have:

Under present procedures, whenever any inmate 

nears his parole eligibility date, a hearing 

officer is assigned to review that inmate’s 

record. If the hearing officer determines 

that no basis for denial of parole exists, he 

recommends to the parole board member assigned 

to that case that the inmate be released. If 

the board member concurs in that 

recommendation, parole is certified.
15

If the hearing officer does not recommend 

parole or if the assigned board member does 

not certify a parole recommendation, a parole 

hearing is held by the appropriate board 

panel. After that hearing, the board panel 

either certifies or denies parole.

Under this bill, whenever an inmate 

incarcerated for murder is recommended for 

parole, parole shall not be certified until a 

majority of the full parole board, after 

conducting a hearing, concurs in that 

recommendation.

[Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to 

Assembly No. 2772 (1989).]

That amendment was signed into law in June 1989 by Governor

Thomas H. Kean.

The Legislature amended the statute yet again in 1993 to

address the hearing conducted by the full Board when considering 

the release of a convicted murderer, adding the following 

language: “The board shall notify the victim’s family of that 

hearing and family members shall be afforded the opportunity to 

testify in person or to submit written statements.” L. 1993, c.

222, § 1. The Sponsor’s Statement accompanying the legislation 

explained:

Under present law, the full Parole Board is 

required to hold a hearing prior to certifying 

the parole of an inmate incarcerated for 

murder. This bill would permit the family of 

the murder victim to testify in person or 

submit written documents at that hearing.

[Sponsor’s Statement to S. No. 1243 (1992).]
16

With that background to the parole process in mind, we turn 

to the matter before us.

IV.

In the performance of administrative law actions and 

determinations, process matters. An administrative agency 

exercises its delegated authority and applies its intended 

expertise pursuant to the Legislature’s enabling act that frames

the performance of the agency’s assigned tasks. The prescribed 

process includes “the means by which the Legislature expects the 

agency to act.” See 37 New Jersey Practice, Administrative Law 

and Practice § 1.6, at 10 (Steven L. Lefelt et al.) (2d ed. 

2000). The parole scheme operates within that general 

construct. 

The decision to grant or deny parole has been granted to a 

legislatively created administrative body comprised of persons 

having a combined background deemed suitable by the Legislature 

to make exceedingly difficult predictive pronouncements about an 

individual’s likelihood to reoffend. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.47(a). The process created by the Legislature for that body 

to follow is one that reflects the trust reposed in the body of 

individuals selected to serve as the decision makers for an

agency cast with responsibility and authority to make difficult 

predictive determinations. See Hawley, supra, 98 N.J. at 112 

(stating that, under Parole Act of 1979, Parole Board is tasked 
17

with serious responsibility of determining “whether an inmate 

satisfies the criteria for parole release”); Beckworth, supra, 

62 N.J. at 359 (noting that Board is expected to draw from 

members’ diverse backgrounds when making “highly predictive and 

individualized discretionary appraisals”). 

Here, the administrative process calls for stepped decision 

making. In this instance, we are called on to discern how that 

administrative process was intended to work, inclusive of 

judicial review, in the context of a sequence of events not 

faced before by this Court under the present statutory 

configuration.2 Our task here, as in every matter involving 

statutory construction, is the same: “‘to divine and effectuate 

the Legislature’s intent.’” Perez v. Zagami, 218 N.J. 202, 209 

(2014) (quoting State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 263 (2013)). 

The best evidence of that intent is the plain language of 

the statute, which thus serves as the starting point for 

statutory review. Id. at 209-10. However, if there is 

ambiguity lurking in the statute’s plain language such that its 

application in particular circumstances “is not clear” or “is 

susceptible to more than one plausible meaning,” the Court may 

 

2 The Board represents that in the twenty-five years since the 

enactment of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), in cases where appellate 

courts ordered the parole of a murder inmate, the full Parole 

Board had conducted a full hearing. That historical fact is not 

disputed.
18

look beyond the statutory text to extrinsic sources to aid in 

understanding the Legislature’s will. State v. Olivero, 221 

N.J. 632, 639 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our focus is drawn then, as it must be, to the legislative 

amendments that created the current provision codified as 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f), which deserves repeating in full: 

Notwithstanding the provision of any other law 

to the contrary, if an inmate incarcerated for 

murder is recommended for parole by the 

assigned board member or the appropriate board 

panel, parole shall not be certified until a 

majority of the full parole board, after 

conducting a hearing, concurs in that 

recommendation. The board shall notify the 

victim’s family of that hearing and family 

members shall be afforded the opportunity to 

testify in person or to submit written or 

videotaped statements.

Although that subsection clearly and expressly prevented 

the parole of a convicted murderer by the sole action of a 

simple two-member panel of the full Board, as Acoli and amicus 

the ACLU-NJ have argued, we are hard pressed to view the 

legislative language as restrictively as they do in the setting 

of this appeal. They maintain that a full hearing is required 

only when the two-member panel recommends parole to a convicted 

murderer. However, that literal reading of the language misses 

the overall import of the consequences of the legislative 

outcome that the 1989 amendatory language sought to achieve, 

namely to ensure that no convicted murderer would be released 
19

without having had a full Board hearing to consider the murder 

inmate’s grant of parole.

Although not expressly stated in that manner in the 1989 

amendatory language when the Legislature was reacting to a panel 

of the Board recommending parole without any full Board review 

of that result, that animating principle is implicit in the 

increased procedural hurdles that the Legislature saw fit to 

insert into the then-existing parole process for inmates

incarcerated for murder. At the very least, the language is 

ambiguous in expressing the sense of this amendment and its

operation in all settings involving the parole release of a 

convicted murderer, making resort to legislative history to 

resolve the question raised by the ambiguity appropriate. 

Here the legislative history that is available does not 

support the constrained reading, advanced by Acoli and by the 

ACLU-NJ, of the 1989 amendatory language contained in the first 

sentence of subsection (f). Instead, the Board’s proposed 

interpretation finds support from the general understanding of 

the amendment’s import contained in contemporaneous legislative 

history. See, e.g., Office of the Governor, News Release (June 

29, 1989) (explaining on Governor’s signing of bill into law

that new legislation “requires the full Parole Board to review 

parole recommendations for inmates convicted of first-degree 
20

murder”); Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Assembly No. 

2772 (signaling same expectation). 

Moreover, generally, when construing language of a 

statutory scheme, deference is given to the interpretation of 

statutory language by the agency charged with the expertise and 

responsibility to administer the scheme. See US Bank, N.A. v. 

Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 199 (2012) (explaining that when plain

language leads to more than one reasonable interpretation, 

extrinsic evidence may be considered, and that such evidence 

includes agency’s interpretation of statute it is tasked with 

administering). Here that agency -- the Board -- maintains that 

it operated under the expectation that, if ever the Board’s 

affirmance of a two-member panel’s decision to deny release to a 

convicted murderer were reversed on judicial review, the full 

Board would have the opportunity to conduct its final and full 

Parole Board hearing that is implicitly required by N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.55(f), including the opportunity to interview the 

inmate in that setting. 

The Board points to the lack of that full review here and 

argues, persuasively, that its absence is significant and 

contrary to the legislative design for careful and thorough 

review at all administrative levels prior to parole release of 

murder inmates. The Parole Board maintains that there are 

differences between a review on the papers and a plenary 
21

hearing. One reviews a denial by the two-member panel, and, in 

the other, the full Board is itself considering whether to 

approve the grant of parole to a convicted murderer. We accept 

that those hearings are different in nature and kind, the latter 

calling on the dynamic in-person interaction of the full Board’s 

members with the convicted murderer to assess collectively the 

inmate’s suitability for parole. In that exchange, the diverse

backgrounds and expertise of the individual Board members may be 

utilized and inform the considered judgment of the decisional 

body. 

It makes little administrative sense to expect the full 

Board to conduct the equivalent of a full Board review for 

release of a convicted murderer whenever a two-member panel 

withholds parole. To convert every such appeal to a full-blown 

review would waste Board personnel and fiscal resources. 

Rather, it is reasonable for the Board to focus its attention on 

the inmate’s reasons for criticizing the two-member panel’s 

record and decision and have that limited review be subject to 

judicial review before the Board is required to conduct a

resource-intensive full hearing. 

We recognize that the agency’s implementing regulations did 

not specify such a step, as it had never before occurred (all 

prior judicial parole orders of murderers having come after the 

full Board had conducted a full review). However, the 
22

regulatory scheme in its totality underscores the need for 

ensuring a murder inmate’s appearance at a full Board 

examination prior to securing parole release, see N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.19(c), and specifies the extensive actions that the

Board and the Department of Corrections must take in order to 

satisfy that important step in the process. In light of the 

rarity of that circumstance, we do not place much weight on the 

failure for such an occurrence to be spelled out in the 

administrative regulations. The Board’s interpretation of what 

the Legislature expected of it in the execution of its delegated 

predictive task is reasonable and thus entitled to deference by 

the courts. In re Election Law Enf’t Comm’n Advisory Op. No.

01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (“We will defer to an agency’s 

interpretation of both a statute and implementing regulation, 

within the sphere of the agency’s authority, unless the 

interpretation is ‘plainly unreasonable.’” (quoting Reilly v. 

AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 485 (2008))).

That supports showing patience, exercising judicial 

restraint, and allowing the administrative process to reach its 

conclusion. By virtue of our remand, we ensure that subsequent 

judicial review, if critical of the substance of that ultimate

determination by the Parole Board under the applicable standard 

of review, does not impermissibly result in a judicial 

substitution of a decision reposed by the Legislature with the 
23

Parole Board. The Appellate Division here declined to remand to 

the Parole Board for a full hearing, as was requested on 

reconsideration by the Parole Board. The panel, essentially, 

saw no point to that step, having itself evaluated Acoli’s bases 

for asserting that he is ready for release and determining that 

there has been no convincing reason presented to date to require 

his further incarceration. That remedy basically substituted 

the appellate panel’s judgment for that of the agency charged 

with the expertise to make such highly predictive, 

individualistic determinations –- the full Parole Board. We are 

reluctant to agree with the appellate panel that such a 

determination should have been made without having allowed the 

completion of all steps that the Legislature deemed necessary in 

the deliberation on paroling a convicted murderer.

Finally, we note that statutory construction abhors an 

interpretation that would render meaningless words within a 

statute. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 

212 N.J. 576, 587 (2013) (observing as “bedrock assumption” that 

Legislature does not include meaningless language). “[E]very 

effort should be made to avoid rendering any part of the statute 

superfluous.” State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 

(2014). In 1993, the Legislature pointedly added reference to 

the rights of victims, stating
24

The board shall notify the victim’s family of 

that hearing and family members shall be 

afforded the opportunity to testify in person 

or to submit written statements.

[L. 1993, c. 222, § 1.]

That language supports the conclusion that, prior to a 

murder inmate’s parole release, the Legislature expected that 

the full Board would conduct a hearing (1) with the inmate 

present for examination, not a paper review of the record below, 

and that (2) the victim or victims would receive notice of that 

hearing and be given the opportunity to address the Board and to 

witness the full Board’s interaction with the incarcerated 

murderer prior to his or her approval for release. Under the 

truncated review that occurred here, and on which the Appellate 

Division based its order requiring the Board to set conditions 

for Acoli’s release, that language would be substantially 

neutered, if not rendered meaningless. It is not equivalent to 

point to a victim’s right to submit material to the two-member 

panel that would then be part of the paper-record review 

conducted by the full Board on a recommendation of parole 

denial.

In sum, the Appellate Division’s remedy missed a step by 

not remanding to the full Board for a full hearing and 

assessment of Acoli’s suitability for parole release. We 

express no view on what the outcome of that full assessment 
25

should be. Whatever it shall be, there will be a right of 

appeal to the Appellate Division. If Acoli is denied parole, 

then that would be the appropriate time at which the Appellate 

Division might have occasion to consider whether the unusual 

remedy of judicially ordered parole of a convicted murderer 

might be in order. However, that possibility must await 

completion of the parole process in its entirety.

V.

The remedy imposed by the Appellate Division is reversed,

and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.3

JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily 

assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN 

filed a separate, dissenting opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and 

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate.

 

3 It is difficult to reconcile the charged nature of the 

dissent’s language with the commonplace remedy of a remand to 

complete an administrative process, as ordered in this matter. 

To the extent that the dissent is so impassioned because it is 

Acoli whose case is remanded, we add only this. It was the 

procedural setting of this case that gave rise to an issue of 

first impression. Our resolution of that issue will govern the 

parole process for all inmates incarcerated for murder, not only 

Acoli.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-52 September Term 2014

075308

SUNDIATA ACOLI (f/k/a CLARK 

EDWARD SQUIRE),

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE 

BOARD,

Respondent-Appellant.

JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting.

Fifteen years ago, this Court stated that “[n]o matter how 

great the pressure, agencies of government cannot ignore the law 

in special cases.” Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J.

113, 197 (2001). The Court made that statement because the New 

Jersey Parole Board, in a controversial case, repeatedly refused 

to parole an inmate despite the governing statute that called 

for his release. See id. at 121, 189. The inmate, Thomas 

Trantino, had brazenly and brutally killed two police officers

thirty-seven years earlier. See id. at 121-22. The Court knew 

that the public would “find it incomprehensible that the law 

requires parole release of an inmate who was responsible for the 

murder of two police officers.” Id. at 196. It nevertheless 

ordered Trantino’s release because, after almost four decades in 

prison, there was no longer a substantial likelihood that he 
2

would commit another offense. Id. at 190. The Court emphasized 

that the “case [was] more about the rule of law than it [was] 

about Thomas Trantino,” and that the law must apply “equally to 

all persons, the bad as well as the good.” Id. at 197-98 

(quoting Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224, 228 (1975)). The Court 

concluded with these words: “If ever courts permit agencies of 

government to create exceptions to the rule of law, applying it 

for the many but exempting the disfavored, we will have 

irreparably damaged the foundation of our democracy.” Id. at 

198.

The present case tests whether our Court is willing to keep 

faith with the guiding principles set forth in Trantino.

Sundiata Acoli, now seventy-nine years old, committed 

infamous crimes forty-two years ago -- the murder of one New 

Jersey State Trooper and the atrocious assault and battery of 

another. He was sentenced to a term of life plus twenty-four to 

thirty-years imprisonment. Based on the law in effect when he 

committed those abhorrent crimes, he has been eligible for 

parole. The Parole Board denied Acoli parole in 1993, 2004, and 

2011. On the last occasion, as on earlier ones, the Parole 

Board maintained that there was a substantial likelihood that 

Acoli would commit another crime if released. 

The Appellate Division reversed, finding no support in the 

record for the conclusion that Acoli posed a threat if paroled. 
3

The Appellate Division determined that the Board’s denial of 

parole was therefore arbitrary and capricious and ordered the 

Board to release Acoli after setting appropriate conditions.

In ordering Acoli’s release, the appellate panel simply 

followed the plain words of the governing parole statute and 

gave this notorious inmate the protection of the law. The 

courageous appellate panel clearly recognized that its decision 

would not be popular and might be misunderstood, but was willing 

to suffer the public’s opprobrium because the law commanded the 

result. 

The Board does not challenge the Appellate Division’s 

finding that the denial of parole lacked evidential support. 

Instead, the Board argues without any statutory support that the 

Appellate Division must (1) remand to the Board to hear directly 

from Acoli, although the Board evidently had no desire to hear 

from him when it last convened, and (2) allow the victim’s 

family members to be heard, although they were given the 

opportunity to register their opinions through written or 

videotaped statements. 

In accepting the Board’s argument and overturning the 

Appellate Division, the majority ignores a plainly written 

statute and our jurisprudence governing appeals from a final 

decision of a state agency. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55; In re 

Appeal of Certain Sections of Unif. Admin. Procedure Rules, 90 
4

N.J. 85, 96 (1982) (“The final decision constitutes the ultimate 

regulatory result.”). The majority’s strained and unreasonable 

interpretation of our law will keep Acoli in prison for more 

hearings and more appeals -- without in any way altering the 

Appellate Division’s unchallenged legal conclusion that Acoli 

poses no danger to the public. The now forty-two-year record in 

this case will not meaningfully change on remand; nor is it 

reasonable to expect that the Board’s decision will change. But 

the majority decrees that these pointless steps be taken. 

Acoli committed the most heinous crime: the murder of a 

law enforcement officer -- a crime, which, if committed today, 

would result in a life sentence without parole eligibility. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(2). But even the most despised inmate is 

entitled to the protection and enforcement of the law. That was 

the lesson in Trantino. That is a lesson, sadly, forgotten

today. Because Acoli has not been given the benefit of the 

statute as written, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to -123.69, provides 

two pathways in the parole process for inmates sentenced to 

prison for murder. Both paths begin the same way. A pre-parole 

report, which includes any statements submitted by the victim’s 

relatives, is forwarded to a panel of the Parole Board. 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54(a), (b)(2); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.7(c)-(d). A 
5

hearing officer then reviews the pre-parole report and any 

related material and refers the case to a Board panel. N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.15(a)(1), (b). The Board panel must notify the 

victim’s relatives of their right to testify or submit written 

or videotaped statements at the hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.54(b)(2). Next, a Board panel reviews the pre-parole report 

and conducts a hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c); N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.16(a). At the hearing, the Board panel “receive[s] as 

evidence any relevant and reliable documents or videotaped or in 

person testimony, including that of the victim of the crime or 

the members of the family of a murder victim if the victim or a 

family member so desires.” Ibid.

Pathway one is when the Board panel denies parole. In that 

circumstance, the inmate may appeal to the full Parole Board for 

a review of the panel decision. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.58(a); 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.1(a). The inmate and victim’s relatives have 

no statutory right to appear in person before the full Parole 

Board, although they are provided the opportunity to be heard 

before the Board panel. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c). The full 

Board, however, has the inherent authority to permit the inmate 

and the victim’s relatives to make statements or give testimony 

before rendering a decision. If the full Parole Board denies 

parole in a final agency determination, the inmate has the right 

of appeal. See Trantino, supra, 166 N.J. at 173. 
6

The Appellate Division is authorized to correct arbitrary 

decisions of the Parole Board and, when necessary, to order the 

release of a prisoner held in violation of the law. Ibid. That 

power is the essence of judicial review. It ensures that the 

rule of law is not sacrificed to the caprice of government 

actors rendering decisions that cannot be justified by the 

record or governing statutes. Ibid. Under the law applicable 

to Acoli, parole could be denied only if a preponderance of the 

evidence established a “substantial likelihood” the individual 

would commit a crime if released. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) 

(1979), amended by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) (1997) and N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.56(c) (1979), amended by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(c) 

(1997).

Pathway two is when a Board panel recommends that an inmate 

incarcerated for murder be released on parole. In that 

circumstance, the case is referred automatically to the full 

Parole Board. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(c). 

When the Board panel recommends release, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f)

directs that “parole shall not be certified until a majority of 

the full parole board, after conducting a hearing, concurs in 

that recommendation.” That statute also provides that the 

victim’s family shall be notified of the hearing and “be 

afforded the opportunity to testify in person or to submit 

written or videotaped statements.” Ibid. 
7

Subparagraph (f) was enacted as an amendment to N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.55 to prevent a two-member Board panel from paroling an 

inmate incarcerated for murder without review by the full Parole 

Board. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Assembly 

No. 2772 (Feb. 23, 1989). In enacting subparagraph (f) (pathway 

two), the Legislature was aware that a final determination by 

the Parole Board under pathway one was subject to judicial 

review and could be reversed if arbitrary and capricious, and 

that the court was empowered to order parole. See, e.g., N.J. 

State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 551 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988) (ordering parole in 

1988); Mallamaci v. Dietz, 146 N.J. Super. 15, 22-23 (App. Div. 

1976) (ordering parole in 1976). In other words, subparagraph 

(f) has no bearing on pathway one. Nothing in the language of 

subparagraph (f) or the legislative history suggests that the 

Legislature intended to address anything other than the 

circumstance of a board panel’s decision to recommend release of 

a convicted murderer.

II.

A.

The law pertaining to pathway one governs the outcome of 

this case.

In 2010, for the third time, Acoli was eligible for parole. 

A “pre-parole report” was prepared, see N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54(a); 
8

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.7(c)-(f); the victim’s family members were 

advised of their right “to provide a written or videotaped 

statement” or testify before the Parole Board panel, see

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54(b)(2); and the Board panel met with Acoli 

and reviewed his file along with the victim-impact statements,

see N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(c). The two-member Board Panel denied 

parole. With the addition of a third member, the Board Panel 

imposed a future parole eligibility term of ten years, making 

Acoli eligible for parole at the age of eighty-three. 

Acoli appealed to the full Parole Board in accordance with 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.58(a) and N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.1(a). Although 

Acoli had no right to appear before the Parole Board to present 

his case, the Board had the authority to conduct a personal 

interview of him. Acoli did not receive an invitation to appear 

before the Board. The full Parole Board reviewed Acoli’s 

complete file covering the entirety of Acoli’s incarceration. 

Acoli’s hearing on the written record, before the full Board, 

conformed with the applicable statutes and regulations. 

In a “Notice of Final Agency Decision,” dated February 23, 

2011, the full Parole Board denied Acoli parole, finding a 

substantial likelihood that Acoli, if released, would commit 

another offense. The Board based its decision on (1) Acoli’s 

conviction of the murder of Trooper Foerster in 1973 and earlier 

minor charges, for which he received probationary sentences; (2) 
9

his purported lack of insight into his criminal behavior 

committed thirty-seven years earlier; (3) his account of events 

about the Trooper Foerster murder, which the Board found “not 

credible”; and (4) his refusal or inability to accept the 

State’s version of what occurred. The Board found that Acoli’s 

“answers made it difficult to understand how and why his 

thinking has transitioned from violent to non-violent thinking” 

in the years since his incarceration in 1973. Acoli had been a 

member of the Black Panther party in the 1960’s and 1970’s but, 

while in prison, renounced the use of violence as a means of 

bringing about societal change. Last, the Board attributed to 

Acoli “impulsive and questionable judgment” because he 

personally called the psychologist to ask her when his 

psychological evaluation would be conducted for his pre-parole 

report.

B.

The Appellate Division concluded that a “thorough scrutiny 

of the record” did not “support the Board’s stated reasons for 

denial of parole, namely that if released Acoli would be likely 

to commit another crime.” This conclusion is not disputed. The 

appellate panel made the following observations: (1) Acoli has 

not committed a single disciplinary infraction since 1996, and 

accumulated only minor infractions since 1979; (2) his 

institutional progress report indicated that he “‘has displayed 
10

a positive rapport with both staff and inmates’”; (3) Acoli 

“completed at least 100 different programs for self-improvement 

as well as vocational training”; (4) Acoli was a prisoner 

representative for the correctional facility’s social resource 

organization, and as a result of “his positive institutional 

record, he became a member of the Honors Unit program”; and (5) 

in 2008, prison staff reported that Acoli had “demonstrated 

adequate coping skills . . . and ability to establish positive 

interaction with others,” and that he was expected “to be able 

to transition to the community if paroled.”

The appellate panel also referenced the pre-parole mental 

health evaluation conducted by Lois D. Goorwitz, Ph.D. Dr. 

Goorwitz noted that Acoli “‘expressed regret and remorse about 

his involvement in the death of the state trooper’” and 

“‘appeared to be answering honestly.’” Dr. Goorwitz also found 

Acoli “‘to be very cooperative, self[-]reflective, thoughtful, 

and non[-]defensive in his responses to the questions posed to 

him.’” (alteration in original). She concluded that “‘there 

were “NO psychological contraindications to granting parole.”’” 

The panel expressed that it was “appalled by Acoli’s senseless 

crimes” but that the Parole Board’s decision was wholly 

contradicted by the record and that “Acoli has paid the penalty 

under the laws of this State for his crimes.” Because the 

Appellate Division determined that “[t]he record simply does not 
11

support further denial of parole,” it directed the Parole Board 

to take the appropriate steps leading to Acoli’s release.

C.

The Appellate Division also denied the Parole Board’s 

motion for reconsideration. The appellate panel rejected the 

Board’s argument that its final parole decision was not, in 

fact, final because Acoli was not granted “a full evidentiary 

hearing” under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.55(f). The appellate panel 

noted that the plain and unambiguous language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f) requires a full evidentiary hearing by the Parole 

Board only when a Board panel recommends that a murder inmate be 

paroled. The Appellate Division pointed out that N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f) does not apply to inmates, such as Acoli, who are 

denied parole by a Board panel. The statutes applicable to 

cases in which the Board panel denies parole, N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(c) and -123.58, do not mandate that the full Parole Board 

conduct an evidentiary hearing. The appellate panel indicated 

that, “in a nine-page ‘Notice of Final Agency Decision,’ the 

Board methodically reviewed the evidence and determined that . . 

. there was a substantial likelihood that [Acoli] would commit a 

crime if released,” and unanimously elected to deny Acoli 

parole. The appellate panel stated that the Parole Board’s 

assertion that the Appellate Division’s reversal of the full 

Board’s final decision was the equivalent of a Parole Board 
12

panel recommending parole, thus triggering a remand for an 

evidentiary hearing, was “patently incorrect.”

III.

The Appellate Division’s straightforward application of the 

law cannot be faulted. A majority of this Court has rewritten 

the plain, unambiguous language of the statute to reach an 

outcome that it believes the Legislature would find reasonable. 

That is a new canon of statutory interpretation. Nothing in the 

statutory text supports the majority’s decision. Moreover, as 

suggested by the Appellate Division, the majority’s result 

upends the meaning of a final administrative determination. 

Presumably, when the full Parole Board denies parole to a 

murder inmate, the Board has completed a comprehensive review of 

the record, including the inmate’s interview, the victim-impact 

statements, the inmate’s history of institutional adjustment and 

progress, psychological reports, and all other relevant 

material. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.58(a); N.J.A.C. 10A:71-4.1(a). 

This is not and should not be a pro forma undertaking. 

Under the majority’s new formulation, after the full Parole 

Board denies parole to a murder convict in a final agency 

determination, following an earlier denial by a Board panel, the 

Appellate Division can render only an advisory decision -- even 

when the record utterly fails to show a substantial likelihood 

that the inmate will commit another offense if released on 
13

parole. That approach ignores our existing jurisprudence. The 

majority requires that the Appellate Division must remand to the 

full Board for an evidentiary hearing. If the Parole Board 

conducted a thorough review the first time, however, we cannot 

expect the Parole Board will change the view it expressed in a 

nine-page, single-spaced decision. Instead, we have the makings 

of a show hearing. Acoli will be given the opportunity to 

appear before the full Parole Board to repeat what he has said 

earlier and to be called lacking in credibility based on his inperson presentation. The victim’s family also has the 

opportunity to repeat what the Parole Board has read or reviewed 

through videotaped statements. Then, a parole denial will 

follow, a new round of appeals, and the Appellate Division can 

revisit the matter when Acoli is an octogenarian.

The tortured interpretation of the statutory scheme creates 

a merry-go-round that will extend the incarceration of Acoli --

but for no rational or just purpose. In Trantino, this Court 

committed the judiciary to the task of ensuring that 

administrative agencies not thwart the law in unpopular cases. 

Trantino, supra, 166 N.J. at 197. In that case, we held that 

the law cannot bend to the strong winds of public opinion. 

Perhaps few will shed a tear that Acoli will spend more years in 

prison -- without any legal justification -- for the murder of a 

police officer. But this case is about more than one 
14

individual. It is about the integrity of our justice system. 

The rule of law must apply even to the most disfavored member of 

society. 

The precepts articulated in Trantino are as relevant today 

as they were fifteen years ago. By reversing the Appellate 

Division, the majority has forsaken those precepts. I therefore 

respectfully dissent. 

 
 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-52 SEPTEMBER TERM 2014

ON CERTIFICATION FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court

SUNDIATA ACOLI (f/k/a CLARK EDWARD 

SQUIRE),

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent-Appellant.

DECIDED February 23, 2016

PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY 

DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin

CHECKLIST REVERSE AND

REMAND DISSENT

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER -----------------

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X 

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA -----------------

JUSTICE SOLOMON X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 4 1