SECOND DIVISION MARCH 15, 2011 1-09-0238) 1-10-0 505) Co ns. CHRIS NELSON, MIKE LUCK ENBACH, an

d ) Appeal from the TONI S. DUNCAN, ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, ) Coo k C oun ty ) v. ) ) T HE CH I CAG O P ARK DI ST RI CT , an I llino is U nit o f Lo ca l ) Gov er n men t; TIM OT HY

J. MI TC HE LL , G en

eral Su peri n ten den t ) & Chief Execut ive Offi

cer ; DARLEN E LE SNI AK, Sec ret ary; ) No. 08 CH 35079 CHICA GO PA RK D ISTRICT COM

MISSIONERS, Pres i dent: ) GER Y J. CHI CO; Vice- Pre sident: BOB P ICKE NS; ) Com m i ssi oner: MA

RGA RET T. BU

RROUGHS ; C omm

i ssi oner ) MARTIN LAIR D KOLDYKE; Co mm issi oner DANIEL ) MATOS-REA

L; Com m i ssi oner R OUHY J. SHA LA BI; THE ) LA TIN SC HO OL

OF CH IC A GO , a

n Il l i n oi s N ot-F or-Prof

i t ) Corpor ation; DO

NALD W . FIRKE, Head of Sch ool; SHELLEY ) Ho no r ab le GR EEN W OO D, Vi

ce Pre si den t, ) Nancy J. Arnold, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judge Presidin g. PRESIDING JU STI CECU NN IN GH AM del i v er ed th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, wit h op inion. Jus t ices Kar nezis and Co nnor s co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. T his consoli

dated appeal

aris es f rom the Jan

uary 22, 2009 order

en tered b y the c i rcui t court of Cook County di sm

is si ng wi th prejudi ce the i nstant taxpay

ers’ lawsui

t file d by t he pla int iffs, Ch r is Nelso n, Mike Lu cke nbach a nd T oni Du ncan, and fr om t he su bseq uent or der of t he c i rc ui t cou rt, whi ch impose d a $ 49, 447 .5 0 sa nct ion, pur sua nt to I ll in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 137 (eff

. Feb. 1, 199 4) , a gainst t he inst ant plaint iff s’ at t or neys. O n app eal, t he pl ai ntif f s arg ue th at: (1) res judicata did no t ba rt he ir c laims in t he inst ant lawsu it; ( 2) t he circ uit co ur t wr ong ly held that t he t er ms o f a set t lement agr eement in a

se pa rate , pri orlawsu it, in which the plaint iff s we re not involved, bar re d t he insta nt la wsui t; and (3) the c i

rcui t court abused its di scretion in i mposin g Rule 137 sanctions agai

nst1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

2 t he plaint iff

s’ at t or neys, a nd er re d in denying t he plaint iff s’ mot ion t o s t rike t he sa nct ions ; a nd t he
amou nt aw ar de d w as ex ce ss ive
. Fo rt he fo llo win g r ea so ns, we affir m t he jud gme n t o f t he cir cu it
co ur t o f Co o k C o un t y. BACK GROUND T his case i nvol ves a com ple x procedural

hi story and onl

y the facts pertin

ent to o urres ol

ution of thi s m atte r are s et f

orth be l ow. F or pu

rpos es of cl ar ity, we characteriz e the litigation that und erpi ns the issues b ef

ore us as Latin I

and LatinII

. On April

16, 2008 , Pro tect Our Par ks, Inc. (POP), a c o mmun it y o r ga niz at io n, alo ng wit h t hr ee ind ividua l Chic ag o t ax pa yer s, filed a la ws uit agains t t he Lat in Scho ol o f Chi cag o ( Lat in Sch ool), the C hi

cago Pa rk D i stri ct (C PD) , th e C i

ty of Ch i cago, an d vari ous i n di v i du als af f i l i ate d w i th CPD a nd th e Ci ty of Ch i cago. See Pro tect Our Par ks, Inc. v. La ti n S ch ool of Ch i cago, N o. 08 –C H– 140 27 ( Ci r. C t. Cook

Co.) ( Latin I ). The plain

tiff s’
co mplaintin Latin I

so ught a de clara t or y judgment re ga rdi n g a n ag re em en t (S outh Fi el d A gr eemen t) between CPD and La

tin Sch ool, whi ch granted Lat i n S ch oolperm i ss i on to f un d a n d c on str uc t a soccer field in t he “ North Me adow of

South Fi el d”are a of Li nc ol n P ark i n C hi cago, i n e xc ha ng e f or La t in School’s pri

ority usa ge of that soccer fi

el d. The Latin I

co m pl ai nt a l so so ug ht t o en

jo in
con stru cti on of the soccer f

ie ld, alle gin g t ha t t he So ut h Fie ld Agreem ent vi olated the Lake Mi

chi gan and Chicag o L ake fro nt Pr ot ect ion Ordinance (Chicago Munici pal Code §16-4 (passed Oct. 24, 1973) , the Ill

in ois Constitution and the pub li c trust do ctrine. A

tt orney He

r bert Caplan

(Atto rney Capl an ), asa b oard

mem be r of POP, verif

ie d the Latin I

compl ai nt and serv

ed as co-counsel

for t he plaint iff s in Latin I . On Apr il 25, 2 008 , t he t rial co ur t in Latin I en t er ed a t emp orary

restra in in g order (T RO)1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

3 agai nst CPD and L atin Sch

ool, order in

g them to hal

t construct ion of

the soccer fi

el d. On May

15, 2008, the Latin I

parties en

tered into a settlem

ent agreem

en t, t he t erms of w

hi ch stated that CPD would m ake a $40,000 pay

me nt to the pla

in tif fs and that the partieswould release each othe r f rom li abi li ty. Speci fi

cally , the pertinen

t part of the settlem

ent agreem

ent stated: “A. [ T he pa r t ies ] ab so lu t ely, un co nd it io na lly an d ir r ev o ca bly releasean d d is ch arg e the ot her from any and all clai ms, dem ands,
causesof action, pro ceedings, sui ts, liab il ities , obligations, promi ses, covenants, co ndit ions, agr eement s, u nder t akings , d ut ies, d ebt s and damages, known or unknown, di rect or in

direct, suspec ted or unsuspe cted, di scl

osed or un

di scl osed, a ri s in g under statute,
re gulat ion, or dinance , t he Unit ed S t at es a nd I lli no is Co nstitutions,
c o mmo n l aw , or o th er

wise , w h i ch ei th er [p ]lai n ti f f s or [d ]e f en da n ts ha s p r ev io us ly

had, now has

or hereafter

ma y h ave agai nst the other
ar ising out of or i

n c onnection wi

th the [CPD’ s] Decem

ber 1, 2006 agr eement wit h t he [ La t in S ch o o l] a nd t he La t in F acili ty, as def in ed in the [p] l ai nti f f s’ [c] om pl ai nt, an d a s a l l eg ed , or w

hi ch sh oul d or
co uld have been

al le ged i n th e l aw su i t Prote ct Our P arks , Inc., et al. v. The LatinScho ol of Ch icag o, et a l., Ca se

No. 08 CH 14027, fi

le d in the Ci rcuit Court o f Cook County, Illi nois . *** B. Notwithstandi

ng anythi ng to t he contrary h

erein this general releasesh

al l n ot b e ap plic ab le a nd sha ll no t r ele as e a ny cla ims1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

4

de man ds , ca us esof action, pro ceedings, sui

ts, liab il ities , obli gations, pro mises, cove

na nts, c ondi tions, ag reem en ts, unde rtak in

gs, dut ies, de b ts and da mag es , kn own or un kn own , di rect orin direct, suspected
o runsu sp ec ted , di

sc l ose d or

un di sc l ose d, a

ri si n g u n der s tatu

te , re gulat ion, ordi

na nc e, the U ni

ted S tat es and Ill

in ois Constitut ions,
comm on la w, or o therwis e: 1. not arisi

ng out o f or i

n conn ection wi th or relatedto t he Li ti ga ti on o rt he [ CP D’ s] De ce mbe r1, 20 06 ag r ee me n t w ith t he [Lati n Sc hool ] and the

Lati n F aci l i ty, or; 2. bet wee n or among t he [ CPD ] o r it s Co mmi ssio ner s, t he [Lati n Sc hool ] and the

Ci ty of Ch i cago.” The settl em

en t ag re em en t f ur th er sta ted th at Latin I

w oul d b e di sm i ss ed wi thou t pre j udi ceupon exec ut ion o f the agr eement by the p ar t ies, a ndt hat it w ou ld be dismissed w ith p re judice “u po n t he
execution by the Latin School an

d [CPD] of [a] termination agreement,” which wo uld t er minate t he South F i eld A greem

en t. (Empha si s ad

ded.) On th at same day, May 15 , 2 008 , t he t rial co ur t app ro ved t he se t t lement a gr eement , a nd entered an agreed order dis

mi ssi ng Latin I wit ho ut pr ejudice and s t at ing t hat t he ca se w ou ld be dis mi ssed wi th prej udi ce conti

ngen t upon the executi on of the termi nation agreem

ent b etween

CPD
and La tin School. On Ju ne 19 , 2 008 , C PD and La t in School en

tered into a termi

nation a greeme nt as requi

red by t he t er ms of t he May 15, 200 8 set tlement agr eement and t he tr ial cou rt ’s orde

r. Th e term i na ti on1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

5 agr eement t er minat ed t he So ut h Fie ld A gr ee men t be t we en CP D a nd La t in School an

d provided

that C PD wou l d a ss

um e al l of La ti n S ch ool ’s rem ai ni ng con tracts re l ati

ng to the con stru cti on of th e so cc er field an d t ha t CP D w o uld re imburse L at in Scho ol fo r t he co nst ru ct ion wo rk do ne und er t he ter m s of th e S outh

Fi el d A gr eemen t. On June 24, 2008, t he t rial co ur t in Latin I , notin g that CPD and Lati

n School h

ad entered i n to a term i nation agreem

ent an d that CPD had tendered $40,000 to t he Latin I pla in tif fs as requi red by t he term s of the settlem

ent agreem

ent, entered an order dism is si ng Latin I wit h pr ejudice . T he June 24, 2008 o rder also al l owe d the tri

al cou rt to “reta

i n jurisd i cti on f or th e s ol e p urp ose

of enfo rc ingthis settlemen

t agr eemen

t; pro vided, however, that t he [c]our t’s j urisd iction sh all cease upon the later o f the [CPD’s] deter mi nation of this m

at t er aft er its recei

pt o f the C

hicago Plan Com m i ssi on’ s rec omm

endation, if

an y , *** or October 1, 2 008.” In an e-m ai l da ted July 8, 2008 from A

tt orney C apl an to Latin Sch ool and to t he gen

eral sup er intend ent of

CP D, Ti moth y Mi tch el l (M i tch el l), A ttorn ey Ca pl an ra i se d s ev

eral ob j ec ti on s to t he l anguag e of

the term i na tion agree men t. In par t icular , he o bje ct ed t o CP D’ s a ss ump t io n o f La t in Schoo l’s rem ai ni ng con struction

contracts an

d CPD ’ s obl i ga

ti on to re i m b ur se La ti n Sc h ool wi th “p ub lic mone

ys for the ill egal soccer fi el d construction.” Atto rney Caplan’s e-mai

l f urther stat ed that he i nten ded to raise these

obj ections i

n “ sub seq uen t proceed i ngs .” On Au gust 29 , 2008, A

ttorney Capl an , as co-co unse l f

or t he Latin I

pla in tif fs , fi le d an
em ergency moti on to en f orc e th e s ettl em en t ag re em en t b ef oreth e tr i al cou rt (e mergen cy moti on to en f orce), ar guing t ha t CP D v io lat ed t he t er ms o f t he se t t leme nt ag r ee men t be ca us e it impr o pe r ly removed a s core boa rd f rom the con stru cti on s i te of the soccer fi

el d and argui

ng that a notice provi

ded1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

6 by CPD regardin

g a Septemb er 3, 2008 publ ic heari ng ab out the soccer fi

el d at issue

was in adequate. The em ergency mo t io n t o en fo r ce did not r ai se an y of A ttorn ey Ca pl an ’s obj ec ti ons

to the term s of t he term i na ti on ag r ee men t , wh ich we r e e xp r es se d in hi s Jul y 8, 2008 e-m

ai l. Sub sequentl

y, the tria l court deni

ed the em ergency motion to enf

orce. OnSep t ember 2 2, 200 8, while the t rial co ur t in Latin I sti l l re tai n ed j uri sd i cti on ov er th e enfo rc ement of

t he s et t lemen t ag re eme nt , p laint iffs Chri s Nel son, Mi ke Lucken

bach and Toni Duncan fil ed t he inst ant t ax pa yer law su it ag ai n st CPD , L ati

n Sc h ool , a n d vari ous

i n di v i du als af f i l i ate d w i th these two entities (

LatinII ). The compl

a int in LatinII

al l eg ed tha t the Ju ne 19, 200 8 te rm

i na ti on ag re em en t, wh i ch b rough t Latin I t o an en d, wa s “v o id

or voidabl

e” becaus e i

ts terms provide d

that CPD agreed to use publi

c fun ds “ to reim

burse Lati n [School] $900,000 to $1.3 mil li on” for the ill

egal
con stru cti on of the soccer f

ie ld. F urther, t he LatinII

co mplaintal

l eg ed tha t CPD ’s as su m ption of La t in Sc ho o l’s r ema inin g c onstr uction cont racts violated CPD and Illi nois b iddi ng requiremen

ts. Atto rney Caplan also served as co-counsel for the LatinII

plai ntif fs. On Oc t o be r23 , 20 08 , CP D a nd La t in S ch o o l filed a jo in t m oti ont o d ismi ss in LatinII (moti onto di sm

i ss ) pu rs ua nt to s ec ti on 2 -61 9.1 of

the Ill i noi s C odeof Ci vi l Proc ed ure (Cod e) , arguin g, inter alia , t hat t he LatinII

law su it wa s b ar r ed by res judicataand by t he r elease t er ms in the
se t t lemen t ag re eme nt o f Latin I . 735 IL CS 5/2 -619.1 (We st 2008 ). On January 22, 2009, a h eari

ng on CPD a nd Lati n Sc hool ’smotion

to dis m i ss was h eld. Af ter hear ingargum

en ts by the p art i es, t he t rial co ur t in LatinII granted the motion to dism is s under
se ct io n 2
- 61 9 o f t he Co de , ho ld ing t ha t t he mat t er wa s b ar r ed by res judicata . T he trial co ur t sa id i n perti n en t pa rt:1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

7

“All t he r eq uis it es o f resjudicata are present here. First , t he taxp ay ers are i n pr i vi ty w i th one another. It’s clea

rly st at ed in t he
co mplaintt hat was fil

ed be for e [ t he t rial co ur t in Latin I ] t hat t he pla int iffs t he r e w er e t ax pa yer s a s w ell a s thegro up [POP], but t hey
were in div idua l taxpa ye rs as well who wer e plaint iff s. And clear ly, the
case be f ore m e, [ LatinII ] case, t he pl ain

tiff s s et t he ms el

ves out as taxpay ers. So t he requi

remen t o f pri vi ty i s establ

is hed. The sec ond re quir ement is w he t he rt he r e is a f i na l di sp osi ti on of the merits. There cert ain ly was a fi nal disposition of the merits. It ’s in the Ju

n e 2 4th , 2 008 or der of [ t he t rial co ur t in Latin I ] in whi ch [i t] dism issed the casewit h pr ejudice . T hat ’s a final dispo sitio n on t he meri ts. And t he t hird r equ isite is t hat t he issue s we re or co uld have be en r ais ed in t he sa me – in t he ca se , in the earli er cas e, and t hat t he
case in volves the sam

e set o f operat iv

e facts. That ’s als o met cle ar ly. The f i na l di sposi tion on the meri ts that occ

urr ed in [ La tin I

] was predica ted ex pr es sly

on t he executi

on of th e te rm i n ati on ag re em en t, the v ery agr eement that the

pl ai ntif f s i n th i s su i t now se ek to decl

are as i nv al i d.” In gr ant ing t he mo t io n t o dis miss , t he t r ial c o ur t fur t he rhe ld t ha t t he inst an t law su it was bar re d by the release terms of

the May 15, 2008 settl em

en t ag re em en t. The trial

court al so stat ed that it had1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

8 “no re al rea so n t o t ake up [ CPD and L at in Scho ol’s a rg ument s] u nder 2- 615 .” No net heless, t he trial courtnoted that “t wo o f the bases on whi ch the plai

ntif fs pur port to procee d he

re, two statutory bases, ne it he ro ne o f t he m ap ply. T he mun icip al c o de [ ha s] no ap plic at io n, wh ich t he pla in ti ffs concede; and the Il

li nois Park District Code, by i

ts terms, does not seek to res tri ct the pow ers of [CPD] or any other park di st rict which was previ ously form ed under a spec ia

l c harter.” The trial
cou rt th en di sm i ss ed th e en ti re ty of th e i n sta n t l aw su i t– LatinII –with prej udic e. On that same day

, January 22, 2009, t he LatinII

pla int iffs file d a no t ice o f ap pe al b efo r e t his
cou rt. On Fe br ua ry 9, 2 009 , CP D f

i l ed a R ule 1 37 m

oti on f orsan ctions (motion for sanctions) agains t the LatinII

pla in tif fs , arguin g that t he Latin II

compl ai nt was not well

-founded in fact or law. On Fe bruary 17, 2009, t he Latin II

pla in tif fs fi le d a moti on to s tri ke an d di sm i ss (m oti on to stri ke), ar gu ing t ha t t he I llino is C it ize n P ar t icip at io n A ct (735 ILCS 110/5 et seq. (We st 2008 )) barred CPD’s Rul e 1 37 m

oti on for sanc t ions. On Ju ne 25 , 2 009 , t he t rial co ur t in LatinII denied t he plai ntif fs’ moti on

to strike, f

in din g that the Ill i noi s C i tizen P arti

ci pa ti on A ct w asi na ppl i ca bl e “ to a Rul e 137 motion .” On October 29, 2009, following a he ari ng on t he mot ion fo r sa nct ions, t he t rial co ur t fou nd that Ru l e 1 37 sa n cti on s w er e a

pp rop riate

because the LatinII

co mplaint w as ba rr ed by res judicata and the release language

of the settlem

ent agreem

ent and, thus, had n

o basi s i n l aw. Further, the trial courtfound that the LatinII pla int iffs ma de “d elibe r at e mis ch ar ac t er iza t io ns o f t he ev en t s fr o m [ Latin I ]” i n the i r respons e to CPD and L at in Scho ol’s O ct obe r 2 3, 200 8 mo t ion t o d ismi ss. The tria l court in LatinII t hen gr ant ed t he mot ion fo r sa nct ions, imposing sanc t ions jo intly and seve ra lly aga inst t he plai ntif fs’ attor neys:1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

9

“[T ]he [c]ourt f

i nds the a ttorneys here sho uld be sa nct ioned for fil ing t his co mplaintand f

or mi scharacteri

zations m ade in briefs defe nding t he compl

ai nt aga ins t t he mot ion t o d ismi ss. The [c ]o ur t finds t he attor ne ys sho uld ha ve kn o wn t ha t t his c o mpla int wa s no t we llgrounded, in

fact, i t was not warranted by ex is ting l aw. It was i nterp osedfor an i

mproper purpose. And the pl eadi ng m ade n o attempt at a g o o d[ -] fait h ar gu ment fo r mo difica t io n o f exi stin g la w. The sanc t ions t ha t will be impo se d t o da y will be o nly agai nst the three at t o rne ys [for the pla

in tif fs ], who are *** [Att orney Capl an], Ken n eth Go ldst ein, an

d C l i nton Kri slov and n

ot agai nst the parties

themsel ves. The san cti ons w i l l cons i st of p ay

men t of [CP D’s ] attorn ey s’ f ee s ex pen ded i n th i s ca se.” The trial court then order ed CPD t o submi t an itemi zed petition for fees and costs. On Novem be r 19 , 20 09, CP D subm

i tted a pe ti ti on f or f ee s a nd cos ts (p eti

ti on f orfees) in the
amou nt of $ 83,960 .02. O n No vember 2 3, 200 9, t he t rial co ur t in LatinII , up o n find ing ce r t ain qu es t io na ble i

tem s on CP D’ s p eti

ti on f or f ee s, ord er ed

CP D to subm

it a revi sed petiti on for fe es and cost s. On De cem be r 14 , 20 09, CP D subm

i tted a rev i se d pe ti ti on for fe es i n the am ount o f $67,250. On January 8, 20 10, t he plai ntiff s’ att orneys

fi le d a written response ch al le ngi ng CPD’s revi sed pe ti ti on f or fe es. O n F ebruary

10, 201 0, t he t rial co ur t in LatinII awa rd ed fee s sanc t ions aga inst t he pla in tif fs ’ atto rney

s i n the am ount o f $49,447.50. On February 17, 2010, t he LatinII

pla int iffs f

i l ed a n otice of a ppea l be f ore t his co ur t , se eking1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

10 reversal of t he fo llowing t rial co ur t or der s: ( 1) June 25, 200 9 o rd er denying the pl ai nti f f s’ moti on to strikeCPD’s Rul

e 137 motion for sanctions; (2) Oc tobe r 29 , 20 09 or

de r gran ti ng CP D’ s m oti on f or sanctions; and (3) February 10, 2010 ord er awarding sanctions agai nst the plain

tiff s’ at t or neys in the
am ount o f $49,447.50. On March 29, 2010, the plai

ntif fs’ atto rney

s tendered pay

me nt, in the am ount o f $49,447.50 to CPD, un der pro test and a re ser vat ion o f right s. O n Mar ch 31 , 2 010 , t his co ur t gr ant ed t he plai ntif fs’ moti on to co nso lidat e t he t wo app eals– namely, t he tri al cou rt’ s Jan ua ry 22, 200 9 de ci si

on dismissing LatinII

o n t he b as is o f res judicataand t he t rial co ur t ’s Febr uar y 10, 201 0 o rd er awa rd ing fee s ancti ons agai

nst the pl ai

ntif fs ’ atto rney

s i n the am ount o f $49,447.50. AN AL YSIS We determ

i ne the f oll owi ng i ssues: ( 1) wh

ethe r res judicatabarred the LatinII pla i nt if fs’
com pl ai n t; (2 ) w het her t he r elease t er ms of t he settlem ent agreem

ent barred the LatinII

plai ntif fs’
com pl ai n t; and (3) whether the tri al

co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion in imposing Rule 137 sanctions agai nst the pl ai nti f f s’ attorn ey s a nd erred i n d en y i ng the pl ai nti f f s’ moti on t o st r ike t he Ru le 137 sanctions, and wh ether the am

ount awarded as sanctions was ex cessi ve. We f i rst determ

i ne wh ethe r res judicatabarred the LatinII pl ai ntif f s’ com pl ai nt. The pl ai n ti f f s i n th e i n sta n t l aw su i t– LatinII –a rgue th at res judicata did not bar t he inst ant law su it be ca

us e the terms of

the settl em en t agree men t did n ot bind any one bey ond the Latin I plai ntif fs, and thus, the trial

court ’s di sm

is sal of the compl

ai nt violated thei

r due process righ

ts, as Latin II pla in tif fs . Specif

ic al ly , the plai ntif fs argue t hat no priv

ity exi sted between the Latin I pla int iffs and the LatinII

pl ai nti f f s a nd tha t no “ i de nti ty of the ca us esof act ion” e xiste d bet wee n t he1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

11 cla ims alleged in Latin I

and LatinII

so as t o sa t isfy

t he r eq uir eme nt s o f res judicata
. Mo re ove r, t he pla int iffs con

ten d that the tri

al cou rt’ s b road appl i ca ti on of resjudicata

violated publ

ic policy , whi ch
en cou ra ge s c i tizen s a n d orga n iza ti on s to pa

rti ci pa te f re el y i n th e p roc es s of

gov er n men t. CPD an d L ati n Sc h ool cou n ter th at th e r eq ui re men ts of res judicatawere satisf ie d and b arred th e i n sta n t l aw su i t. I nit iall y, we no t e t hat t he plaint iff s o n app eal in Lat in II

im pr ope rl y i n cl ud ed argu men ts re lating t o t he meri

ts of t heir claims in LatinII . H ow ever , w e de cline to add re ss t he merit s o f the pla int iff s’ claims be caus e the

sol e i nqu i ry be f ore thi s court on

thi s i ssue i s wh

ethe r the tri al court pr o pe r ly dis mi ssed LatinII

o n t he b as es o f res judicataand t he r elease t er ms of t he se t t lement agr eement ent er ed int o by t he pa rt ies in Latin I . A determ i na tion of w hether a cl ai m i s b arred un de r th e doctri

ne of res judicatai s a

que sti on of la w, which we rev

ie w de novo
. Arvia v. Madigan , 209 Ill . 2d520, 52 6, 809 N .E.2d 88, 9 3 (200 4). Furth er, our rev

i ew of a di sm i ss al un de r s ec ti on 2 -61 9 of

the Code is de novo
. DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Ill . 2d 49, 59, 857 N.E .2d 229, 236 (2 006). Th e d o ct rine o f res judicataprovides that “ ‘a f in al judg ment o n t he mer it s r en de r ed by a c o ur t o f co mpe t en t jur isd ict io n bars any subse que nt act ions between t he sa me p arti esor th ei r pr i vi eson th e s am e c au se of action.’ ” Hudson v. City of Chicago , 228 Ill . 2d 462, 467, 889 N.E.2d 210, 213 (2008) (quo ting Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co. , 17 2 I ll. 2d 325, 33 4, 665 N .E.2d 119 9, 1204 (1996 )). “Res judicata bars n ot only what was actually

deci ded in the fi rst act ion but als o whatever could have been deci ded.” Id. In orde

r f or res judicatato ap ply to bar a c laim, t hr ee re qu ire ment s mu st be s at isfi ed : (1) a fi nal judgm ent on the m

erits has been rendered by a c o ur t o f co mpe t en t jur isd ict io n; (2) the pa rties or th ei r p ri v i es ar e i den ti ca l i n b oth1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

12 actions;and (3) an

i den tity of c aus e of

action ex i sts. Id. In the i nstant ca se, LatinII

, the plai ntif fs ’ openi ng bri ef states generally

that t hey “ch al le nge all t he re qu ire ment s” o f res judicataon appeal , but they only make s ubst ant ive arg ument s cha llenging t he se co nd a nd t hird re qu ire ment s o f res judicata . T hus, any arg ument s pu rp or t ingto chal le nget he fi rst re qu ire ment o f res judicata –r elat ing to a fi nal judgm ent on the m

erits–have b een

for feite d by t he pla int iffs on

appeal . See Ill . S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff . Sept. 1, 2006)) (“[p]oints not argued are waiv ed and shal l n ot be rai sed i

n the repl

y br ief, inoral

argum en t, or on peti

tion f or rehe ari

ng”). Nonethel ess, we f

in d that t he Jun

e 24, 2008 order entered by the trial court dis mi ssi ng Latin I wi th pre j udi ceupon the execution of

the term i na ti on a gre em en t wa s a f i na l j udg men t on the me rits that
sa t isfied t he fir st ele ment o f resjudicata . See Board of Education of Sunset Ridge School District No. 29 v. Village of Northbrook, 295 Il l . Ap p. 3d 90 9, 915, 6 92 N.E.2 d 1278 , 1283 ( 1 99 8) (a dis mi ssal of an action with prejudi

ce constitut ed an adjudi

cation of that action on t he m erits); see also Keim v. Kalbf

leisch , 57 I ll. A pp . 3d 62 1, 62 4, 37 3 N
. E . 2d 56 5, 56 8 ( 19 78 ) ( “a dis miss al ‘ wit h pre judice’ is as concl

usi ve of the ri

ghts of the parties

as i f the s

uit had b een prosecuted to a fi nal adj udi cation,”and “

the dis mi ssal with prej udic e of p laintiff’s first co mplaint, pur sua nt t o a set t lement agree men t, is a f i na l j udgm en t on the m

eri ts”). We find t hat t he sec ond re qui

rem en t for res judicata–the parties or their pri vies are identic al in bot h act ions– was sat isfied. O n Janu ar y 22, 200 9, t he t rial co ur t in Latin II , in gr ant ing CPD and Lat in Scho ol’s mo t ion t o d ismi ss, fou nd t hat t he individual t axpa yer p laintiffs in Latin I were i n pr ivity with t he t axpa yer p laintiffs in LatinII . We agree. Al thoughthe LatinII

pla in tif fs were not part ie s to t he Latin I la wsui t, as Chicago t axpay

ers,1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

13 they we r e in pr ivit y wit h t he ind ividua l Latin I pla i ntif f s, wh o were a l so Ch i cago tax pay ers. A taxpayer action is def

in ed as one that is: “bro ught by

priv ate persons in

their capa

ci ty ast ax pa yer s, o n be ha lf of themsel

ve s an d asrepre sen

tativ es of a cl ass of tax pay ers simila r ly si tuated withi

n a taxi ng di str i ct o rar ea , up o n a gr o un d w hic h is
com mon to all mem bers of the class, and f

or t he purpose of se eking reli ef fr o m illeg al o run au t ho r ize d a ct s o f pu blic b o die s o rpu blic offi cials, wh i ch ac ts are in

juri ous to their com

mon i nterests as taxp ay ers.” (Intern al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) Scachitti

v. UBS Financial Services , 21 5 I ll. 2d 484, 493, 831 N.E. 2d 544, 550 (2005 ).

“ For pu rp o se s o f res judicata , priv ity exi sts ‘between

parties wh

o adequately

represent the sam

e l egal i ntere sts.’ ” Village of Northbrook , 295 Ill . App. 3d at 918, 692 N.E .2d at 1285 (quo ting Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Boyd , 286 Ill . App. 3d 911, 916, 678 N.E .2d 308, 311 (199 7)). Thus, t he
re levant inq uir y is whether the i nterests of the LatinII

plaint iff s we re ade qua t ely repr ese nt ed in Latin I. See Yorulmazoglu v. Lake For est Hospital , 359 Ill . App. 3d 554, 559, 834 N.E. 2d 468, 473 (2005 ). We ho ld

that t he LatinII

plai ntif fs’ in terests in the i

nstant case were adequa

tely represented in Latin I . The Lati n II

pl ai n ti f f s’ com pl ai nt s pe cif i cal l y ch al l en ge d the terms of

the term i na ti on agr eement allowing CPD to reim burse Lati n School f or co sts associa

ted with constructin

g the soccer field and to assum

e Latin School’s rem

ai ni ng construction contracts, whi le the Latin I

pla int iffs
so ught to hal

t con str uc ti on of th e s occ er

f i el d u n der the te

rm s of th e S outh

Fi el d A gr eemen t.1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

14 Howev er, we fi nd that the in

terests o f the LatinII

plaint iff s we re t he sam

e as those represented

in Latin I be caus e the

overri di ng c once rn in both cases was

an un l aw f ul tra n sf er of pu b l i c p rop er

ty to
a pri v ate pa rty –w h eth er i t b e a l l owi n g L ati n Sc h ool to build o n and ac qu ire pr io r it y us ag e o f pu blic la nd; allowing public funds to be reimburse d t o La tin Scho ol, a privat e ent ity; or diver t ing pu blic fun ds t o co nt inu e c o nst ruc t io n o f t he so cc er field aft er alle ge dly v io lat ing pu blic bidding requi rements. Thus, we find tha t pr ivity existe d bet wee n t he individual t axpa yer p laintiffs in Latin I and the taxpay

er pla int iffs in LatinII

. M ore ov er , w e f

i n d th at pri v i ty ex i ste d b etw een

PO P, th e c om m un i ty orga ni za ti on plaint iff in Latin I , a nd t he LatinII

taxpayer plai

ntif fs, because thei

r interests were a lso align ed. See People

ex rel . Hartiganv. Illinois

Comm erc e Com m’n , 243 Ill . App. 3d 544, 551, 611 N. E . 2d 13 21 , 13 26 ( 19 93 ) ( t ax pa yer s’ int er es t s w er e a de qu at ely re pr ese nt ed bygo ver nmenta l and
consum er gr ou ps) . T hus, co nt ra ry t o t he pl ai ntif f s’ argum en ts, Latin I need not be cert if

ied as a cl ass act ion in o rd er for it t o ha ve a binding e ffect on t he inst ant t axpa yer p laintiffs in LatinII . Nonethel ess, the LatinII

pl ai n ti f f s a rgue th at th ey h ad n o pri v i ty wi th the Latin I

plai ntif fs, and they ci ted Taylor v

. Sturgell , 553 U .S. 880 (2 008), Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama , 517 U.S. 793 (1996), and SouthCent ral Be ll Telephone Co. v. Alabama , 52 6 U .S. 1 60 ( 199 9), f or supp ort. We f in d the casesci

ted by the LatinII

pl ai n ti f f s to be inapp licable to t he fact s o f the insta nt c ase. In Taylor , th e p l ai nti f f , Bren t Tay l or (Ta y l or), b roug ht a l aw sui t un de r th e Free dom

of In f orm ati on A ct (F OIA

) (5 U.S .C. §55 2(b)(4 ) (2 006 )) to s eekrec ords f rom the Fe de ral A vi ati on Administr at ion ( FAA) pertai ni ng to ce rtai n a i rcraf ts. Taylor , 553 U.S. at 885. T he t r ial c o ur t he ld that Tayl or’s laws uit was precl

uded by a prior j udgme

nt agai nst Tay lor’s f rien d, Greg Herrick1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

15 (Herri ck), who had

uns ucce ssf ull y sue d the FA A f or the s am

e docum en ts. Id. On appeal

t o t he Uni ted St at es Su pr eme Co ur t , t he co ur t r eje ct ed t he do ct r ine o f pr ec lus io n by “v irtual repre sen tation ,” holdi

ng that the prior j udgme

nt agai nst Herrick di

d not bar Tay l orfro m maintaining his la ws uit because Herri

ck h ad n ot adequa tel y repre sen ted Tay l or in the pri or la

wsui t. Id. at 885, 905. We find the fact s in Taylor t o be dis t ing uis ha ble fro m the in stant case, where Taylor , unlike t his case, was no t a t ax pa yer ’s law su it be ing pr ec lu de d b y a pr ior judg ment o f a lawsu it br ou ght by ot her taxpay ers and wh

ere the in terests o f the LatinII

pla int iffs h er e w er e a de qu at ely r ep r es en t ed in Latin I. Like wise, we find Richards and South Central Bell Telephone Co. also t o be dis t ing uis ha ble f rom the instant case. In tho se cases, the Suprem e C ourt h el d that a pri ortaxpay er’s lawsui

t barred a later taxpayer’s cause of action because there wasno i ndi cation tha t the court

in t he firs t law su it had sp ec i al pr oce du re s to safeg uar d t he in

terest s of the absent part ies, or t hat the par ties i n the fi rst l aw su i t un ders tood th

ei r law su i t to be on b ehal

f of absen t part ie s. See Richards , 517 U.S. at 802; South Centr

al Bell Te l ephone Co. , 5 26 U .S . a t 168 . H er e, t he t rial co ur t in Latin I sp ec ifica lly reviewed and a ppr ove d t he t er ms of t he May 15, 2008 settleme

nt agreeme

nt, and thus, we f

in d that there was proper judi cial

overs i ght ens

uri ng th at the i ntere sts of

the c omm

on tax pay ers were ad eq ua t ely

re pr ese nt ed in Latin I . T her efo re, we hol d that privi ty ex is ted between the Latin I pla in tif fs and LatinII

pla int iffs, and t hus , t he s ec o nd r eq uir eme nt o f res judicatawa s m et. The thi rd el em en t for res judicatarequires that t here m

ust be an ident ity o f caus e o f act ion. The pl ai ntif f s arg ue th at there

was no “i dentity of cause of action” because LatinII chal le nged CPD’s reim

bursem ent of publ

ic fun ds to Latin School an

d CPD’ s a ssu mpt ion o f the re maining1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

16 con stru cti on co nt ra ct s, whic h we re unr ela t ed t o t he h alt ing o f con str uc ti on and Lat in School’s pri ori ty usage of the so cce r field at issue in Latin I . T he y co nt en d t ha t t he cla ims a lleg ed he r e in LatinII co uld no t have be en br ou ght in Latin I . CPD and Lati

n School c ounter tha

t the two l aw sui ts i nv ol ve d a n i de nti ty of ca us e of ac ti on because they

both aris e from

a si ngle group o f operativ

e fac ts, t he South Fi el d Agreem ent, which was
ac t ua lly litigat ed in Latin I . Moreo ver, they argue that the June 19, 2008 termi nation a greeme nt was
an int eg ra l pa rt o f Latin I

and, thus, was “indeed one of the then exi sting f acts u nd er ly ing t he de t er minat io n o f res judicata .” I llino is ha s adopte d the “ tran sacti ona l tes t” i n d eterm i ni ng whether a

n i de nti ty of ca us e of
ac ti on ex i sts f or th e p urp ose s of res judicata
. Pu r su an t t o t he t r an sa ct io na l t es t , “se pa r at e c laims will be con si dered the sa m e c au se of ac ti on f or pu rpos esof res judicatai f

the y ari se f rom a si ngle group of op er at ivefacts, regar dless of whether they

assert dif feren t t heories of relie f.” River Park, Inc. v. City of Hi ghland Park , 184 I ll. 2d 290, 311, 703 N.E. 2d 883, 893 (1998). Furt her, “the transac tional test pe rm i ts c l ai m s to b e c ons i de red

pa rt of the sa me c au se of ac ti on even if there is not a substantia

l overlap of e vidence [ne ede d t o s ust ain the sec ond lawsu it t hat wo uld have sus t ained t he f i rst l awsui t], so long as the

y a rise from the sam e transaction.” Id. In t he ca se a t bar , t he claims alleged in Latin I and LatinII

arose f rom a s i ngl e groupof op er at ivef

ac ts– n am el y , the c on tra cti n g of th e S outh Fi el d A gre em en t be twe en CP D a nd La ti n S ch ool whi ch prov i de d f or th e b ui l di ng of a soccer f i el d on publ i c l an d. Th e al l eg ati ons i n th e c om pl ai nt of LatinII cen tered aroun d th e te rm s of th e J un e 1 9, 2 00 8 term

i n ati on ag re em en t, which arose so lely f rom the si ngl e groupof

ope rati ve f ac ts surroun

di ng the con stru cti on of the soccer

fi el d as provi ded1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

17 by th e S outh Fie ld A gr ee men t . T he So ut h Fie ld A gr ee men t wa s t he su bje ct o f t he alle ga t io ns in Latin I by whi ch the Latin I

pla in tif fs sought a TRO to hal

t construct ion. F

urther, t he Sout h Fiel d A gr eemen

t, asCP D a

nd La ti n S ch ool n oted , spe ci

f i ca l l y con tai n ed ter m s rel ati n g to t er minatio n and
re imbursement of construction expe nses , alb ei t under dif feren t circum stancesthan occurred

her e–t he very sam e i ssue al le ged i n the LatinII

. Mo re ove r, we find t hat t he allega t ions in LatinII re gar ding t he issue s o f reimburs ement of pu b l i c f un dsto Lat in Scho ol and CPD ’s as sumpt ion o f the remai ni ng construc tion cont racts could havebeen lit ig at ed in Latin I . The re cord sh owstha t on J ul y 8, 2 008 , A

ttorn ey Ca pl an , ascocounsel to the Latin I

plaint iff s, e -mailed bo t h Lat in Scho ol and Mitc hell, t he superi ntenden t o f CPD,
re gar ding his o bject ions to the la nguage o f t he t er minat io n a gr ee men t . On Au gu st 29 , 20 08 , wh ile t he t rial co ur t in Latin I

sti ll re tai n ed j uri sd i cti on , A ttorn ey Ca pl an f i l ed an em ergen cy moti onto e nf orc e be f ore th e c ourt, i n w hi ch he f ai l ed to al l eg e a ny of hi s c onc ern s a bou t the term i na ti on agr eement r ais ed in his Ju ly 8, 2008 e-m

ail
. Be ca us e a n attor n ey ’s kn owl ed ge i s i m pu ted to hi s c l i en

t, we fi nd that Atto rney

Caplan’s knowle dge of the terms of the termi nation a greeme nt on Jul y 8, 2008
was im puted to hi s cl

ie nts, the Latin I

pl ai ntif f s, by that da te. See, e .g. , Segal v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 404 Ill . App. 3d 998, 1002, 938 N.E. 2d 192, 196 (2010) (“notice to an attor ney

constitutes notice to the cli ent and kn

owledge of a

n attor ney is knowle dge o f,
orim puted to the clie

nt, notwi thstanding whether the atto rney has actual

ly comm unicated such knowle dge to the clie

nt”). We f

in d that at t he tim

e of Attorney

Caplan’s August 29, 2008 em

ergency mo t io n t o e nfor ce, t he t rial co ur t in Latin I had retain

ed j urisdi ction to enforce the May

15, 200 8 set t lement ag reeme nt–wh i ch wa s c onti

ng en t upon the execution of

the Ju ne 19, 200 8 te rm

i na ti on1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

18 ag re em en t. Thus, on August 29, 2008, t he t rial co ur t in Latin I had jur isdict ion t o e nfor ce bo t h t he set t lement agr eement and the termi nation a greeme nt. Therefore, because

the Latin I

pla in tif fs had knowle dge of

t he t er ms o f t he t er minat io n a gr ee men t by Ju ly 8, 20 08 , at wh ich t ime the tri al court in Latin I re t ained jur isdict ion t o e nfor ce bo t h t he se t t lement a nd t er minatio n agr eement s, w e find that t he claims alleged in LatinII co uld have been br ou ght an d lit iga t ed in Latin I . Ac co r din gly, we ho ld that al l three requi

remen ts have b een

satisf ie d and the LatinII

compl ai nt was barred

by the d oc t rine
o f res judicataand properly dis mi ssed. Because we hav

e determi ned th at res judicatabarred the i nstant action, we

need not addr ess whether t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in

fi ndi ng that t he release terms of the settlemen t agr eemen

t also barred t he claims alleged in LatinII . We n ex t deter m i n e w h eth er th e tr i al cou rt e rre d i n den y i n g th e p l ai n ti f f s’ moti on to str ike CPD’s Rul e 137 m

ot ion f or sanctions, ab

used its d iscre t ion in imposing R ule 13 7 sa nct ions agains t the pla in tif fs ’ atto rney

s and wh ether the am

ount awarded as sanctions was ex cessi ve. The pla int iffs a r gu e t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in d en ying t he ir motion to strike CPD’s Rul e 137
m oti on for sanc t ions be cause the Ci tizen Partici pation Act (Act) (735 I LCS 110/5 et seq. (West 2008)) appli

es t o ba r t he Ru le 1 37 mo t io n fo rsa nc t io ns. Sp ec ifica lly, t he y co nt en d t ha t a R ule 137
m oti on for sanctions i s consi

dered a “cl

ai m” withi n the m eani ng of the A

ct, and that a mo t io n fo r sanc t ions is within t he sc op e o f the Act . T he pla in tif fs further m ai ntain that the Act m

ay be appl ie d
co nc ur r en t ly wi t h Rul e 1 37 wit ho ut us ur pi ng ju di cia l au t ho r it y. CPD cou n ter s th at R ul e 1 37 moti ons f

or san cti ons “are n

ot [la wsui ts] br ought to i nterf ere wi th [ t he ] va lidex er cis e o f c o ns t it ut io na l r ig ht s, ” b ut r at he r , t he y “ are the me ans b y w hich our1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

19 Supreme C ourt prevents ab use of j udic ia

l process.” CPD furt her ar gue s t hat t he ap plicat ion o f the Act to a Rul e 137 m

ot ion f or sanctions woul

d “resul t in an unconsti tut iona l e n cr oa chment on t he j udi ciary and a di rect confl ict with Rul

e 137 becaus e i

t would underm

in e the j udi ci ary ’s power to prot ect ag ai

n st a buse of its p roce ss .” Thu s, CPD c onte nds, th i s w oul d v i ol atethe se pa rati on of powers between the l

egi sl ature and the j udic ia

ry. W e agree. The Act states in

relev ant part t he f

oll owing: “[T ]he pu r

po se o f t his Act [is] t o s t rike a balanc e bet wee n t he ri gh ts of persons t o fil

e lawsu its f or i njury an d the c ons

ti tutiona l righ ts of per so ns to pe ti ti o n, speak freely , associate freely, and ot herwise pa rti ci pa te i n g ove rn men t; to prote ct an d e nc o ur ag e p ub lic pa rti ci pa ti on in go ver nment t o t he maximum exte nt per mitt ed byla w; to establi sh

an efficient proc es s f

or ide nti f i ca ti on a nd ad j udi ca ti on of [ St r at eg ic L aw su it s Ag ain st Pu blic Par ti ci pa ti on] , an d to pr ovi def or att orney’s f

ees and costs t o pr evaili

ng m ovants. * * * §15 *** This Act app lies to any mo t io n t o dis po se o f a

cla im in a ju dic ial p r o ce ed ing o n t he gr o un ds t ha t t he cla im isbas ed o n, rel ate s to, or i s i

n r es pon se to an y ac t or acts of

t he mo ving pa r t y in furt he ra nce

of t he moving p ar t y’s right s o f pet itio n, sp eec h,
ass oci ati on, or to otherwise p arti ci pate i n gov ern men t. A cts in furt her ance of t he co nst itu t ional r ight s t o p et itio n,1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

20

spe ech, asso ciat ion, an

d pa rti ci pa ti on i n g ove rn men t are i m m une f rom liab ilit y, r eg ar dle ss o f int en t o rpu r po se , ex ce pt wh en no t ge nu ine ly ai me d at pr oc ur ing favo ra ble go ver nment a ct ion, res ul t, or outcome .” 735 IL CS 11 0/5, 15 (We st 2008 ). At t he o ut se t , we no t e t ha t t he pl ain t iffs mad e n o men t io n o f t he Ac t in a ny o f t he ir in it ia l ple adi ngsbe fo r e t he t r ial c o ur t in LatinII . It was not until

CPD fi le d a Rule 1 37 mo t ion fo r sa nct ions agains t t he plaint iff

s t hat t he plaint iffs re spo nded by raising t he issue of t he Act as a defens ive
measu re . We find

that t he A

ct was neve

r in tended to be used in

this way . Further, we fi

nd that t he trial co ur t had d iscre t ion t o impo se a nd enfo rc e o ur sup re me co ur t ru les in de ny in g the plai ntif fs’
m oti on to strike. See Employer’s Consortium, Inc. v. Aaron , 298 Ill . App. 3d 187, 191, 698 N.E. 2d 189, 193 (199 8) (“[a] t rial cour t has discretion to enf orce sup reme court rules and i mpose sanc t ions
on the partiesasappropri atean d nec es sa ry to prom ote the u ni m pe de d f l ow of l i ti ga ti on an d ma int ain t he integ rit y of o ur co ur t syst em”). The plaint iff s’ ar gument r eg ar din g t he ap plic ab ilit y o f t he Ac t in th i s c as e, tak

en to its l ogical extreme, would me an that under f acts si mi la rto those here, Rul e 137
co uld never apply

si nce an argu men t ca n al wa y s b e m ade th at a la wsui t was brought “i

n f urtherance of th e c on sti

tuti on al ri gh ts to petiti

on, sp eech, a ssoc i ati on, an d parti ci pation i n gov ern men t.” That
r es ult wou l d b e, i

n e ss en ce , a v i ol ati on of t he se par at ion o f po wer s bet wee n t he legislat ive and t he judi ci al br an ch esof go ve rnme nt be ca us e t he Ac t wo uld allow t he legislat ur e t o e ncr oa ch up on t he inherent pow er s of

th e j udi ci

ar y to crea te i ts o wn ru l es to deal with matte rs within the co urt ’s
au t ho r it y. See Kunkel v. Walton , 17 9 Il l . 2d 519 , 52 8, 6 89 N .E.2 d 10 47, 105 1 (1 997 ) (“ se pa rati on of pow ers *** i s v i ol ate d w he n a l eg i sl ati ve en ac tmen t un dul y en croa ch esupon t he inhere nt powers1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

21 of the j udi ci ary , or di rectl y orirre co ncilably

co nfli ct s wit h a ru le of t his co ur t on a matt er wit hin the
cou rt’ s a uthority”). As

the trial court correct ly

stated in den

yi ng the LatinII

pl ai n ti f f s’ m oti on to strik e CPD’ s Rul

e 137 m otion f or sancti ons: “It is c lea r** * t ha t t his [Act], if applie d to gran t i m m un i ty to pla int iff taxp ay ers fr o m a R ule 13 7 mo t io n, wo uld be an impe r miss ible
usurp ati on of t he legislat ur e o f the ru le[- ]mak ing aut hor ity o f the Su pr em e C our t. Su pr eme CourtRule 137 seeks to p revent abuse of p ro ces s by pena lizing

ve xa t io us un wa rr an t ed ac t io ns in ac co rd ance wit h t he standards set out in that rule. * * * A Ru le 137 mot ion is by

defi ni tion not a sui

t t o interf ere, *** not a s uit t o int er fer e w it h a va lid e xe r cis e o f a p ub lic right to pe ti ti on and t o s pee ch. Th e w hol e p oi nt of a R ule 1 37 m oti on is th at th e p l eadi n g to whi ch i t wa s a dd re ss ed wa s n ot a v al i d e x ercise

of a ri gh t to engage in the judi cial

pro cess. A plead ingt hat a [ c] ou rt det er mines pur sua nt t o Ru le 1 37 is not w ell-gr ou nd ed in

law an d fact is n

ot a val id exercise of those rights. Theref

ore, th e [ A ct] ca

n n ot b e i n ter pr ete d to i

n ten d to1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

22

imm unize a ny par t y, any suit fro m a Rule 1 37 mo t ion. S ec o nd ly, the le gis la

ture cannot pro vi

de i mm uni ty by an y p ar ty oran a t t o r ne y f

ro m compliance wit h Su pr eme Co ur t ru les, a nd t he l egi slature i s pre sum

ed to know that. T he r efo r e, t his [Act ] c anno t be in terpret ed t o e xt end to m

oti on s b rough t pu rsua n t to *** R ul e 137 .” Ac co r di ng ly, we hold t hat t he Act did not apply to bar CPD’s Rul e 1 37 m oti on f orsanctions agai

nst t he LatinII

pla in tif fs in this case an d the trial co urt di d n ot er r i n den y i n g th e p l ai n ti f f s’ m oti on to strike CPD’s motion for sanctions. Ne xt, the pla

in tif fs argue that t he t r ial c o ur t er r o ne o us ly im posed Rule 137 sanctions agains t t he ir atto rney s becaus e “there was

no basis i n l aw” to hold that the LatinII co mplaint w as ba rr ed by ei ther res judicataor t he r elease of t he se t t lement a gr eement . T he pla in tif fs contend that they h

ad
a r ea so na ble basis t o br ingth e i n sta n t tax pa yer l aw su i t ( LatinII ) , an d t hu s, Ru le 1 37 sa nc t io ns s ho uld not ha ve be en i m posed
. CPD ar gu es t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t did no t ab us e it s d isc r et io n in s an ct io nin g th e p l ai n ti ff s’ at t o rne ys because the plai

ntif fs’ co mplaint in LatinII

wa s n ot well gro unded in

law an d the plai ntif fs’ response to CPD and Latin School’s mo tion to dism is s the LatinII

compl ai nt contain

ed
m i sch arac ter

iza ti on s of f ac t. We review the trial

cour t’s im

position of Rule 137 sancti ons u nde r an ab us e of di screti on stan dard. Dow

d & Dow d, Ltd. v. Gleason , 181 Ill . 2d 460, 487, 693 N.E.2d 358, 372 (1 998 ). An abuse of d iscre t ion o ccu rs w hen “no re aso nable pe rso n co uld have t ake n t he view[the tr i al cou rt] adopted.” Sterdjevich v. RMK Management Corp. , 343 I ll. App. 3d 1, 19, 796 N.E.2d 1146, 1160-1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

23 61 (2003) . “The purpo se of Rule 137 i s to prevent t he f il in g of false an

d f ri vol ous lawsui

ts.” Yunker
v. Farmers

Automobile Management Corp. , 404 Ill . App. 3d 816, 824, 93 5 N.E.2d 630, 63 7 (201 0). Ho wever, “[t]he rul e i s not in tended to penali

ze liti gants and thei

r att orneys

because they wer e zealous but unsuccess ful

in pursuin g an acti on.” Id. Further, Rule 137 requires

that t he trial

court provide an ex pl an ati on i n i m pos i n g s an cti on s, an d th at a re v i ewi n g c our t m ay on l y af f i rm th e i m pos i ti on of s ancti ons on

the g round s sp eci

f i ed b y the tri al court. Sadler v. Creekmur , 35 4 I ll. App. 3d 1029, 1045-46, 821 N.E. 2d 340, 3 54 (2004 ). In reviewin g the t rial cour t’s decision to im

pose san cti ons, “ ‘the pri mary con si de rati on i s w he the r th e tri al cou rt’ s dec i si on wa s i nf orm ed , b as ed on va lid reasoni ng, and f oll ows logi cally

from the facts.’ ” Sterdjevich , 343 Ill. Ap p. 3d at 19, 796 N.E.2d at 1161 (quo ting Technology Innovation Center, Inc., v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies Corp. , 315 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 23 8, 244, 7 32 N.E.2 d 1129 , 1134 ( 2000) (. Rule 137 provi

des i n perti nen t part the fol

l owin g: “Ev ery ple adi ng, motion an

d ot her paper of a party represen

ted by an atto rney s ha ll be s ign ed by at lea st o ne at t o rne y o f r ec o r d in his in div idua l na me * **. Th e s i gnatu

re of an attorn ey orparty consti

tut es a ce rtif ic a te by hi m that he has read the pl

eadi ng, m ot ion or other pape r; th at t o the best of h

is knowle dge, in

form ation, and b elie f form ed af ter rea son

able inq uir y it is w ell g r o un de d in fac t an d is warranted by ex i sti ng l aw or a g ood-f

ai th a rgu men t f ort he ext ensio n, modifi cation, or reversal

or ex i sti ng l aw , an d that i t i s n ot in terpo sed for any i mproper pur pose, such as to harass o r to cause unn ece ssa ry1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

24

del ay or needless i

ncrease in the cost of l

iti gation.” Ill . S. Ct. R. 137 (ef f . Feb . 1, 1994 ). Here, on October 29, 2009, in i mposi ng Rul e 137 sanctions, the trial

court hel d that t he Latin II co mpla int wa s file d w it h no ba sis in law be ca us e it was bar re d by t he d o ct rine o f res judicataand by the release of the settlem ent agreem

ent entered i

nto by the pla int if

fs in Latin I . The

tria l court noted t hat Att or ney Cap lan “act ually dra fte d t he se t t lement a gr eement in [ Latin I ],” and that he was b oth “ th e [p] laintiff and an a t t or ney” in Latin I . The trial court ci ted Marvel of Illinois, Inc. v. Marvel Contaminant Control Industries, Inc. , 318 Ill . App. 3d 856, 744 N.E.2d 312 (200 1) , in hold ingt hat Rule 1 37 s anct ions were prope r b ec au se the “ maj ori ty of t he [ plaint iff

s’] re spo nse t o [ t he
m oti on to dismiss in Latin II

] co nsis t ed o f de liber at e mis ch ar ac t er iza t io n o f t he ev en t s fr o m [ Latin I ].” In su m, t he t rial co ur t co nclude d t hat t he plaint i f f s’ att or neys sho uld have kno wn t hat t he
co mplaintin LatinII

was not well gr ou nded in fact or war ra nt ed byexi stin g la w, that it was in terpo sed for an impro per pur po se a nd t hat t he p l eadi n g m ade “ n o atte m pt a t a g ood[ -]f

ai th argum en t for m odi f i cation of exi sti ng l aw.” In the case at bar, the LatinII com pl ai nt nam ed th ree i ndi vi dual pl ai ntif f taxp ay ers w ho we re not per so na lly

invo lved wit h t he lit iga t io n o f Latin I , no r w er e t hey signat or ies t o t he se t t lement agr eement entered in

to am ong the Latin I

pla int iffs and C PD and L at in Scho ol. Ho weve r, t he record shows tha t Attor ne y Ca pl an ha d s erv ed asco-c oun se l

f ort he plaint iff

s in bot h Latin I

and Latin II and had ve rified t he co mplaint in Latin I . As discussed, the issues raised in LatinII

by the plai ntif fs, t hro ugh t heir at t or neys, c ou ld have be en r aised befo re t he t rial co ur t in Latin I . Had the plain tiff s’ atto rney s conducted a reasonabl

e i nqui ry un der Rul e 137, they woul

d have realiz ed

that t he cla ims1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

25 in LatinII co uld have been br ou ght in Latin I , wh ile t he t r ial c o ur t in Latin I retained jurisdi ction over t he en fo r ce men t o f t he se t t leme nt ag r ee men t , an d c o nse qu en t ly, t he r e w o uld not have b een a re as on to fi le the LatinII

lawsu it aft er t he fact . We have al ready f ound that t he Latin II

com pl ai nt wasnot we ll gr o un de d i n la w b ec au se it wa s b ar r ed by res judicata
. T he r efo r e, it wa s n ot un rea son ab l e f or the trial court to fi

nd that the LatinII

la wsui t was fi le d for an i

mproper purpose under Rul e 137. The tri al cou rt, i n i m pos i ng Rul e 1 37 s an

cti ons , al so f ound, wit hou t spe cificity, t hat t he plai ntif fs’ resp onse

to the m otion to dis m i ss th ei r c o mpla int in LatinII

con siste d of “ de l i b erate misc ha r ac t er iza t io n” o f t he ev en t s fr o m Latin I . I t is well e stablis hed that the trial

court ’s f in din gs must be supported by

the record. Accordingl

y, we f in d that, based on our reviewof the record, we
ca nn ot say that the tria l court’s rul i ng was u nre ason ab l e. Wh ile noti

ng tha t the tri al cou rt di d n ot el ab ora te bey ond its com

me nt that t here were “ delib erat e mischaracterizations” in the pl ain tiff s’ response to the motion to dism iss t he ir co mplaint in LatinII

, there i s suf f i ci en t support i

n the rec ord
as a wh ole to support the tri

al court’s i m posi tion of s ancti ons. Th

eref ore , we canno t say t hat no r ea so na ble person could h ave taken the v

ie w adopted by the tria

l c our t , a nd t hu s, w e r eject t he plai ntif fs’ ar gument t hat t he trial

cou rt f ai l ed to make a

n i nf orm ed de ci si on r eg ard i ng the basis u pon whi ch it i mposed Rul

e 137 sanctions. Accordin gly , we hold that

the trial cour t di d n ot ab us e i ts discretion i

n granting CPD’s Rul

e 137 motion for sanctions against the plai ntif fs’ attor neys. Ne xt, the pla

in tif fs argue t ha t t he amo un t o f sa nc t io ns imp o se d a ga ins t t he pl ain t iffs ’ a t t o rne ys was excess iv

e. The pl ai

ntif fs contend that the amount of $49,447.50 im posedas sa nct ions sho uld be re duc ed “by elimi

nat inginapp r o pr iat e t ime [and] padded excess ti me .” The pl ai

ntif fs ma ke vari ous argu men ts re gar ding t he validity o f the tri al co ur t ’s eva luat ion o f the informat ion u po n which t he1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

26 am ount o f s ancti ons i s bas ed. CPD counters that t he trial court did n

ot abuse i

s di scr et ion in the a mou nt of sa nct ions awarded be ca us e the re cord

sh owstha t i t ha d c ond uc ted a c are f ul rev i ew of t he billi ng re co rd s. We agree. The standard of revi ew i n determi ni ng whether the am

ount o f s ancti ons aw arded was exce ssive is an

abuse of di scretion standard. See Kellett v. Roberts , 281 Ill . App. 3d 461, 466-67, 667 N.E.2d 558, 562 (1 996). In the i nstant ca se, the rec ord sho ws t hat t he t rial co ur t , a fte r g ra nt ing CPD’s moti on

f or s an cti on s, ord er ed

CP D to su bmit an ite mized pe t itio n for fees a nd co st s re lating to wo r k p er fo r med by it s a t t o rne ys i n th e c as e. C PD s

ubm i tted a pe ti ti on f or f ee s a nd cos ts (p eti

ti on f or f ee s) i n th e a moun t of $83 ,96 0.0 2. A

f ter rev i ew i ng the pe ti ti on f orf ee s, th e tri al cou rt di d n ot ac ce pt it an d o r de r ed CP D t o su bmit a re vi se d pe ti ti on f or f ee s. CPD s

ubm i tted a rev i se d pe ti ti on f orf ee s i n th e a moun t of $6 7,2 50 . Th

e p l ai n ti f f s’ att or neys fil

ed a wr itt en r esp ons e cha llenging CPD’s revised petition f

or fees. Foll

owing a heari ng on the revi

sed fee pe tition, the court said that it “went through these bi

ll in gs caref ull y” and that i t “did n ot fi nd an ythi ng that [i t] would con

test.” The trial court remarked at the he arin g: “Being famil

iar w ith t he cas e and kn

owi n g w h at th e a rgum en ts we re, I f i nd the f ac t tha t more th an one l aw yer h ad to wo rk on t hi s ca se not at all s

urprisi ng an d resul ting i n the f in e work t hat I saw

i n fro nt of me. I d on ’t c on si

der a n y of th at t o be ov er- bill

ing. I t hink that’ s ap propriate.” The trial court then awarded f

ees agai nst the pl ai

ntif fs ’ atto rney

s i n the am ount o f $49,447.50.1-09-0238)

1-10-0 505) Co ns.

27 We fi nd no t hi ng in t he r ec o r d t o su pp o r t t he vie w t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ac t ed un r ea so na bly. Thus, we h ol d th at th e a moun t of sa n cti on aw arde d w as

n ot ex ce ss i v e a n d th e tr ia l c our t did n

ot abuse i ts di scre tion i n de term i ni ng th e am ount of san cti ons a warde d. Nevertheless, the pla

in tif fs contend that t he t rial co ur t ’s “lack of jud icial tempe ra ment and openhos ti l i ty” tow ard

the pl ai nti f f s’ attorn ey s d uri ng the Fe br ua ry 10, 201 0 hea

ri ng on the i ss ueof t he pe t it ion f

or fees, as wel

l a s at subsequen

t March 2010 and Ma

y 2010 proceedi

ngs, supp ort a fi ndi ng of an abuse of dis cretion. We disagree. The is sues be fo r e t his cou rt i n th i s c as e re l ateto res judicatain barri ng LatinII

and t o t he is sue of sa nct ions. As discu ssed , w e ar e sa t isfied and t he rec ord s upp or ts that t he trial court was thoro ugh in its r evi ew of the f

eepe ti ti on s ubm i tted b y CP D. The

cou rt’ s r ul i ng wa s b as ed

on appropri ate i nf orma tion and data w

hi ch i t revi ewed be f ore ma kin g a deci si on. Therefore, we need not address the pl

ai ntif fs ’ argum ents rel ating to concerns outside the scope of our revie

won ap pe al, in cl udin g the alle ged conduct of the trial court in proceedin

gs subs equent to t hose at is sue here. For t he fo r eg o ing r ea so ns, we affir m the judgm

ent of the ci

rcuit court’s January

22, 2009 order dismissing LatinII

with prej udic e, and af

fi rm the judgme

nt of the ci

rcuit court’s June 25, 2009 order denying t he plain

tiff s’ motion t o st rike, t he circuit co urt ’s Oct ober 29, 2 009 gr anting CPD’s Ru le 137 moti on

for sanc tions, and the c ircui

t cour t’s February

10, 2010 order imposi

ng $49,447.50 in fees as a san

ction against the plai

ntif fs’ attor neys. Af fi rmed.