United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 02-3997

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western

v. * District of Missouri.

*

Brian Jeffrey Brown, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: April 15, 2003

Filed: April 21, 2003

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Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

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FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Brian Brown appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the

indictment based on his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We affirm.

In July 1998, the government indicted Brown in the Western District of

Missouri for possessing a false identification document and making false statements

in a passport application. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(4), (b)(1), 1542. At the time,

Brown was in custody awaiting trial on child molestation charges in Arkansas. Not

wanting to disrupt the proceedings in Arkansas on the more serious charges, the U.S.

Attorney’s Office in Missouri did not seek immediate custody of Brown. In March
*

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

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1999, Brown pleaded nolo contendre to a reduced Arkansas charge of possession of

child pornography. He was sentenced to forty-two months in prison. 

In August 1999, a detainer on the federal charges was personally served on

Brown in the Arkansas Department of Corrections. The detainer advised Brown he

had a right to a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA)

by mailing a written notice of his request to the appropriate U.S. Attorney and the

appropriate district court. The detainer stressed that because the 180-day time limit

may be tolled by delays attributable to the prisoner, he should “periodically inquire

. . . whether [his] written notice of request for a final disposition of the charges

against [him] has been received.” The detainer also stated, “[T] he 180-day time limit

does not commence until your written notice . . . has actually been delivered to the

appropriate U.S. Attorney and the appropriate District Court.” Although Brown

circled the response indicating he desired a speedy trial, the response was not

received by the U.S. Attorney or the district court. The U.S. Attorney’s office first

learned of Brown’s desire for a speedy trial in July 2001 when it received a copy of

a pro se motion Brown had filed with the district court seeking to dismiss the

indictment because of an alleged violation of the IADA. In response, the Government

obtained custody of Brown and Brown appeared in federal court on July 26, 2001. 

In December 2001, Brown was released from state custody and released on

bond on the federal charges. He filed a motion to dismiss the federal indictment

based on the three-year delay between the indictment and initial appearance in federal

court. Brown later acknowledged he had not complied with the technical

requirements of the IADA and sought dismissal of the indictment based solely on the

Sixth Amendment. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court*

 denied Brown’s

motion to dismiss. Brown pleaded guilty to making a false statement in connection
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with a passport application, and the district court sentenced Brown to supervised

probation for forty-eight months. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a speedy

trial. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); United States v. Sprouts,

282 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002). “[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused

must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold

dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-

52. This generally occurs if the delay is at least one year long. Id. at 652 n.1. If the

defendant makes this showing, then the court conducts the speedy trial analysis by

weighing four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the

defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 651-52;

Sprouts, 282 F.3d at 1042-43. The extent to which a defendant must prove prejudice

from a delay in prosecution is directly related to the government’s reasonableness in

its pursuit of the defendant. Wilson v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 388, 395 (6th Cir. 2001).

In concluding Brown’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, the district court

found that although the delay was excessive, it was not intentional; Brown’s attempt

to assert his right was half-hearted because he never contacted the U.S. Attorney or

the district court to inquire about the status of his case; and Brown suffered no actual

prejudice from the delay. 

On appeal, Brown contends no proof of prejudice was required because the

three-year delay was presumptively prejudicial. We reject this contention.

“‘[P]resumptive prejudice’ does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of

prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable

enough to trigger the [four-factor] enquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1.

Considering the length and reason for the delay and Brown’s lack of diligence in

asserting his rights, we cannot say Brown was relieved of his burden to show the

delay actually prejudiced him. United States v. Walker, 92 F.3d 714, 716-17 (8th Cir.
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1996). Indeed, in a case involving a thirty-seven month delay, we concluded the

delay was uncommonly long, but went on to consider the four Doggett factors. Id.

In our view, the district court committed no error in analyzing the four factors

in this case. First, the three-year delay weighs in favor of Brown. Second, the

government did not negligently delay its prosecution or intentionally delay to gain

some impermissible advantage at trial. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-67. Contrary

to Brown’s claim of negligence, the undisputed evidence shows the government

reasonably chose not to obtain immediate custody of Brown to avoid disrupting his

Arkansas prosecution on charges of child molestation. The government was aware

that under the antishuttling provision of the IADA, Brown would have to be kept in

federal custody in Missouri until the federal prosecution was concluded. Further,

soon after the federal authorities learned the Arkansas prosecution had ended (thirteen

or fourteen months after federal indictment), they filed a federal detainer against

Brown informing him of the pending federal charges and how to ensure he received

a speedy trial. Brown did not follow the directions, however. Because Brown did not

contact the U.S. Attorney or the district court to inquire about his case or his request

for a speedy trial, the third factor weighs against Brown. Fourth, because the

government was reasonable in its pursuit of Brown on the federal charges, Brown

must show the delay actually prejudiced him to prevail on his Sixth Amendment

claim. Sprouts, 282 F.3d at 1043; Wilson, 250 F.3d at 395. Brown has not attempted

to do so. The time Brown spent in the Arkansas prison was the result of his Arkansas

charges, not pretrial detention on the federal charges. Further, Brown does not assert

that he was anxious about the federal charges or that the delay impaired his defense

on the federal charges. See Sprouts, 282 F.3d at 1043 (explaining ways delay may

prejudice defendant). 

In sum, the district court correctly rejected Brown’s speedy trial claim by

denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. 
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.