### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 25, 200 6 S es sio n

MARC ESKI N, ET AL 

### . v. ALI CE B. BARTEE , ET AL


### .

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-006445-03 The Honorable Kar en R. Williams, Judge

No. W2006-01336-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 27, 2006

Parents, individually and on behalf of their two minor children, sue d various def endants for da ma g e s r e su lti ng fr om an auto mob ile a c c ide nt c a us e d a lle g e dly by the ne g lig e nc e of

de fe nd a nts

. The c omplaint, in addition to seeking damag es for the personal injuries sustained by one of the minor children, se eks dama g es on beha lf of the mother and one minor c hild for neg lige nt inflic t i o n of emotional distress. An uninsured motorist insurance car rier f iled an answ er in the c ause a nd subsequently moved for summary judgme nt, w hich ostensibly involved only the claims for ne g lige nt inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l dis tr e ss. Th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d the su mma ry jud g me nt m oti on bu t f

a ile d to denote that the g rant wa s only a partial summary

judgme nt for that particular c laim. We modifythe trial court' s order by g ranting only a partial summary judgme nt and further rever se and r emand that g ra nt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Modifi ed, Reve rsed and Rem anded

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J . joined and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J

. , c o n c u r s s e p ar a t e l y.

J

. Houston Gordon of Covington, Tennessee; Irma W

. Merrill-St ratton of Memphis, Tennesse e for Ap pe lla nts , M arc Es kin a ndKa re n E sk in, e a c h in div idu a lly and as par e nts a ndne xt frie nd s to Br endan E skin, a minor, and L og an Eskin, a minor

Warren D. McWhirter of Memphis, T ennesse e for Appellee , USAA Casualty I nsuranc e Company

OP IN ION

Marc Eskin and Karen Eskin are the par ents of L og an Eskin (tog ether with Marc E skin and Kar en Eskin, t h e “E skins,” “Plaintiffs,” or “ Appellants”) and B renda n Eskin. On November 19, 2002, Br endan Eskin w as a student at Chimney Rock Elementary School ( “Chi m n ey Rock”). Chi mne y Roc k ha s se pa

rate wa iti ng are a s f

or c hil dr e n w ho ri de bu se s a ndfo r c hil dr e n w ho ri de in-2-

car s. On Novembe r 19, 2002, B renda n Eskin was standing in the car are a wa iting for his ride home. That day , Mrs. Eskin had aske d her n ei gh b o r, J an Dur ban, to pick B renda n up from school. As Br endan w as wa iting, AliceB. Bartee lost control of her vehicle a nd struck B renda n. Ms. Ba rtee ’s

car knocked B renda n to the paveme nt and ra n over him. Ms. Ba rtee ’s v eh i cl e also struck other ch i l d re n as s h e d ro v e o n t o t h e s i d ew al k an d fi n al l y

s tru ckt h e s ch o o l b u i l d i n g.

I mme diate ly fo llo wi ng the a c c ide nt, Mr s. Es kin re c e ive d a ph on e c a ll fr om Ms. Du rb a n. Ms. Durba n told Mrs. Eskin that Ms. Durba n’s vehicle had bee n struck fr om the rea r and that Bre ndan had bee n “hurt” . Ms. Durban’ s tone and statement led Mrs. Eskin to believe that there had only been a minor ac cident and that there w ere no serious injuries. Mrs. Eskin told Ms. Durban that she wa s on her w ay

to the school. Mrs. Eskin immediate ly drove the short distance to the school. She took L og an, B renda n’s y oung est brother , his sist er, a nd another child who was visiting L og an.
Upon ar riving at Chimney

Rock, Mrs. Eskin parke d and wa lked, with the children
, t o the front of the school. As she ca me upon the ac cident sce ne, she sa w B renda n ly ing unc onscious on the pave ment in a pool of blood. Mrs. Eskin immediate ly tried to g o to her son’s side but wa s kept from doing so. L og an Eskin also witnessed his brothe r in this state. At the t i m e Mrs. Eskin and L og an ar rived a t the scene , Br endan ha d rec eive d n o m ed i ca l intervention and wa s ly ing in the position he fell afte r being hit by Ms. Ba rtee ’s vehicle

.
On November 1 7
, 2 0 0 3 , Marc and Ka ren Eskin, in their individual ca pacities a nd as repr esentatives and par ents of their minor c hildren, B renda n Eskin and L og an Eskin, filed a Complaint aga inst Alice B. Ba rtee , Robert A. Eng , Fa wn P. Cress-Eng and the Shelby CountyBoa

rd of Ed uc a tio n ( tog e the r the “ De fe nd a nts ” ). She lby Cou nty wa s a lso na me d a s a de fe nd a nt i n th e c a se but ha s been dismiss ed with pr ejudice. In their Complaint, the Eskins seek, int e r a lia , damag es for

sever e emotional injuries to K are n Eskin and L og an Eskin caused by the Def endants’ ne g lige nce a nd suffe red by

them when they

came upon the acci d en t s ce n e and witnessed B renda n ly ing on the paveme nt, unattended, in a pool of blood. The Eskins se rved the Complaint on t heir own insura nce
car rier, U SAA Casualty

Insuranc e Company

(“ US AA
, ” o r “ Ap p el l ee ”) u n d erT en n es s ee ’s Un i n s u red Motorist S tatute bec ause Ms. B arte e wa s uninsured.

On Octobe r 5, 2004, USAA filed an Answer to the Complaint i n which it asserts, int e r a lia
, that the Eskins had fai l ed t o s t at e a claim upon which r elief c an be g rante d. On or a bout J uly 11, 20 05 , U SAAfi le d a

Mo tio n fo r Sum mary Judg me nt. We no te that th e Mo tio n d oe s n ot “ state wi th pa rt ic ula ri ty the g ro un ds therefore ” a s r e qu ir e d b y Te nn .R. Civ .P. 7. 02 (1 ). Ho we ve r, in i ts

me mor a nd um o f l a w i n s up po rt of the Mo tio n, USA A s pe c if ic a lly a sse rt s th a t:

1. A Tenne ssee plaintiff c ann o t re cover ag ainst a def

endant f or neg lige nt infliction of emoti onal di stress when she was not present at the time of injury

to a third person a nd did not observe the a ccide nt

oc c ur thr ou g h o ne of

he r s e ns e s.-3- 2. Plaintiffs Karen Eskin and L og an Eskin ca nnot rec over f or neg lige nt infliction of emotional distres s beca use they wer e neither prese nt when B renda n Eskin was i n j u red nor did they

make a ny sensory observation of Br endan E skin being injured.

The Eskins opposed USAA’ s motion for summary judgme nt and, on or a bout November

22, 2005, filed the Affidavit of Karen Eskin, a response to USAA’s stateme nt of undisputed materia l fac ts, and

a memora ndum of law in support of their position.

The motion for summary

judgme nt was heard by the t rial court on Dec ember 9, 2005. On F e br ua ry 17 , 2 00 6, the tr ia l c ou rt

e nte re d it s O rd e r g ranti ng the mot ion for summa ry jud g me nt i n fa vo r o f U SAA . T he Or de r s ta te s:

This cause came on to be heard on Dec ember 9, 2005. Ba sed up on Me mor a nd a

su bmi tte d in the c a us e , c a se la w c ite d b y Cou ns e l, arg ument of C ounsel and the entire re cord a s a whole, the court finds that the Mo tio n f

or Sum mary

Judg me nt f

ile d b y USA A C a su a lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny is we ll tak e n an d sho uldbe g rante d. Th is c a us e sh a ll r e ma in u na ff

e c te d a s to the re ma ini ng De fe nd a nts

.

I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED, AD J UD GED AND DECRE E D t hat the Motion for summary J udg ment of USAA Casualty I nsuranc e C o m pany

should be and is her eby

g rante d, and USA A C a su a lty

I nsuranc e Compa ny

is h e re by

dis mis se d w ith pr e jud ic e . T his Or de r s ha ll b e a fi na l Ord e r as c on te mpl a te d b y Rul e 54.02 of the Te nnessee Rule s o f Civil Procedur e, the Court finding that there is no just rea son for delay

. Court costs shall abide further Or de r o f the Cou rt

.

Although the g rant of summary judgme nt a ppear s to be a full summary judgme nt for USAA, it i s n ote wo rthy

that th e tr ia l c ou rt

sp e c if ic a lly stat ed in th e Or de r that “ thi s c a us e sh a ll r e ma in unaff ecte d as to the rema ining de fenda nts.” Obviously , service of proc ess on the insuranc e compa ny under the uninsured motorist cover ag e would be e qually applicable to claims made in the c omplaint by the other plaintiff, and most spec ifically Br endan E skin. The re cord is quite cle ar tha t the parties contemplated a

motion for s u m m ar y j udg ment dealing only with the claims of Ka

ren Eskin a nd L og an Eskin for the neg lige nt infliction of emoti onal distress clam. More over, the Orde r of the trial court de alt only

with the motion as filed and submitted to the court. Unde r these circumstanc es, the

or de r s ho uldbe a nd is he re by a me nd e d to g rant on ly a pa rt ia l su mma

ry jud g me nt to USA A C a su a lty I ns ur a nc e Compa ny

fo r the c la ims of

ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss.
That being said, we turn now to the issues raised by the Eskins, as stated in their brief:-4- 1. Whether a Te nnessee plaintiff can rec over for neg lige nt infliction

o f e m o t i o n al d i s tre s s as a re s u l t o f i n j u ri es t o an o t h er wh en , al t h o u gh not present whe n the injury occur red, the plaintiff came upon the

scene immediately

afte r the incide nt an d “sensorially observe d” the injuries to the close familymember.

2. Whether the facts of this case prese nt a jury question allowing the pla int if fs to e sta bli sh that th e ir

lov e d o ne ’s inj urie s a ndthe plaint if fs ’

re su lti ng e mot ion a l in

juries we re pr oximate a ndfo re se e able re su lts of the de fenda nt’s neg lige nce.

3. Whether Tenne ssee a llows recove ry for e motional trauma ca

used by witnessing the afte rmath of the injurie s in al l o f their a larming details and sensorially

observing a loved one’s injuries at the ac cident

scene

.
4. Whe the r the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Co urt’s r e je c tio n o f the ri g id analy sis requiring an “overly formulaic” approa ch of e arlier case s and adoption of the g ener al neg lige nce approa ch requiring “s u ff icient proxim it y to th e in

ju r y c a u s in g e v e n t” a ll o w s r e c o v e r y to a n individual who, although not pr esen t when the hor rific injuries

occur red to their l o v ed one, “se nsorially observe d” those injuries moments later at the sc ene be fore the loved one is moved.

I t is well settled that a motion for s u m m ar y j u d gm ent s hould be g rante d when the mova nt demonstrates tha t there a

re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that the moving party is entitled to a judg ment as a ma tter of law

. See Tenn. R

. Civ. P . 56.04. The pa rty moving f

or summary jud g me nt b e ars the bu rd e n of de mon str a tin g that no ge nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f

a c t e xists . Se e Bain
v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997) . On motion for summary judgme nt, the court must take the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f the no nmov ing pa rt y , a llo w a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in fa vor of that pa rty , and disca

rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. See id. I n By rd v . Ha ll
, 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn.1993) , our Supreme Court state d:

Once it is shown bythe moving p ar t y t h at t here is no ge nuine issue of material fac t, the nonmoving pa rty must them d em o n s t rate , by aff idavits or discovery

materia l, that the re is a

g enuine, mate rial fa ct dispute to warr ant a tria l. I n this reg ard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his ple ading s but must set forth spec ific fa cts showing that there is a g enuine issue of material fa c t f or tr ia l.

Id . at 210-11 (c itations omi tted).-5-

Summary judgme nt is only appropriate when the facts and the leg al conc lusions drawn fr om the fa cts rea sonably

permit only

one conc lusion. S e e C

a r v e l l v
. B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (T e nn .1 99 5). Becaus e on ly qu e sti on s o f l a w a

re inv olv e d, the re is n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss reg arding a trial court' s g rant or de nial of summary judgme nt. Se e Bain , 936 S.W .2d at 622. Th e re fo re , ou r re vie w of the tr ia l c ou rt ' s g rant of su mma ry jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. Se e Wa rre n v . Es tat e of Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997)

.

I n the instant case , the uni n s u red motorist car rier c ontends that Plaintiffs cannot re cover ag ainst t h e De fenda nts for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress when the Plaintiffs did not observe the injury -produc ing acc ident. Plaintiffs, however , contend that it is not absolutely essential that a pla int if f a c tua lly ob se rv e the inj ury -p ro du c ing a c c ide nt. Ra the r, Pla int if fs a sse rt that, if it i s fo re se e able that a pla int if

f, c omi ng up on the sc e ne of a n ac c ide nt imme diate ly a ft e r the inc ide nt, wi ll observe the condition of the injured pe rson, then that plaintiff m ay rec over da mag es for

neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. The issue prese nted by these diverg ent contentions i s t h e i s s ue inv olv e d in thi s a

pp e a l.

I n Cam per v. Minor , 915 S.W .2d 439 (Tenn. 1996) , the Court abandone d the re quirement of phy sical manife station, or injury rule, a nd held that ca ses claiming neglig ent infliction of emotional distress should be analy zed unde r the g ener al neg lige nce a pproac h. “I n other wor ds, the p l a i n t i f f m u s tp r e s e n tm a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e a s t o e a c h o f t h e f i v e e l e m e n t s o f

g e n e r a l n e g l i g e n c e

–d u t y, br e a c h o f d uty , in

jury or los s, c a us a tio n in fa c t, a nd pr oximate or le g a l c a us e

. . . in or de r t o a vo id summary judgme nt.” Id. at 446. The Court went on to say that the law should provide a rec overy only f o r “ s e r io u s ” o r “ s e v e r e ” e mo ti o n a l in ju r ie s , w h ic h th e Co u r t d e f in e d a s in ju r ie s “ w h e r e a
re a so na ble pe rs on , n or ma lly

c on sti tut e d, wo uld be un a ble to a de qu a te ly

c op e wi th the me nta l st

re ss
en gen d er ed b y

the circ umstances of

the ca se.” Id

. at 446. The Court c oncluded that the c laimed injury must be supported by

expert medical or sc ientific proof

. Id.

L ater the same y ear , o u r

Su p r e me Co u r t a g ain c onsidered a

case involving neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. I n Ramse y v . Be av e rs , 931 S.W .2d 527 (Tenn. 1996) , the Court had bef ore it a c a se wh e re a so n sue d a def e nd a nt sta tin g a

c la im f or ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss when the de fenda nt went off the road and struck his mother
, killing her instantly . The plaintiff- son witnessed his m o t h er b ei n g struck by the def endant’ s vehicle but wa s not in im mediate thre at of phy sical harm, i.e., not within the “z o n e o f d anger .” The Ram sey Court noted that “rather than focusing on subjective stateme nts of fea r or surmised conc lusions of whether one ’s phy sical loca tion is within t he zone of dang er, we hold that in the future, liability shall be dete rmined by application of g ener al neg lige nce la w as set forth in t his Opinion.” Ram sey at 531. Specific ally , the Ram sey Court stated:

We, the ref ore, hold that to recove r for emotional injuries sustained as

a re su lt o f d e a th o r i nju ry

of a thi rd p ers on , p la int if

f mus t e sta

bli sh t h at d ef en d an t 's n egl i gen ce wa s t h e c au s e in fa ct o f t h e t h i rd p er s o n 's d e a t h o r i n

j u r y a s w e l l a s p l a i n t i f

f' s e m o t i o n a l i n

j u r y. S e c o n d l y, plaintiff must establish that the third person' s death or injury and-6- plaintiff' s emotional injury wer e proximate and foresee able r esults of defe ndant' s neg lige nce.
Establishing fores eea

bility , and ther efor e a duty of ca re to plaintiff,

re q u i re s co n s i d er at i o n o f a n u m b er o f re l ev an t fa ct o rs

. T h e p l ai n t i ff 's ph y sic a l lo c a tio n a t th e tim e of the e ve nt o r a c c ide nt anda wa re ne ss of the a c c ide nt a

re e sse nti a l f

a c tor s. Ob vio us ly , it

is m or e fo re se e able that one witnessing or having a sensory observation F N2 of the e vent will suffer e ffe cts from it. As has be en explained:

The impac t of persona lly observing the inj ury -p ro du c ing e ve nt i n mos t, a lth ou g h c on c e de dly not all, case s distinguishes the plaintiff' s result ant emoti o n al di stress from the e motion felt when one learns of the injury

or de at h of a love d one fr om another , or obser ves pain a nd suffe rin g but not the tr a u m a t i c c a u s e o f

t h e i n j u r y.

Thing v . L

a Chu sa , 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 879, 771 P.2d 81 4, 82 8 (1 98 9)

. Th us , plaint if f mus t e sta

bli sh su ff ic ie nt pro ximity to the injury -produc ing e vent to allow sensory o b s ervation by plaintiff.

FN2. The term “sensory observation” is use d to allow, under c ircumstance s in whic h all prer equisites are met, rec overy

by one who e ither does not or cannot visually observe the eve nt, but observes the event by

s o m e o t h e r

s e n s e , s u c h a s a u d i b l y.

Id. at 531.

The Court we nt on to discuss other fac tors, such as de g ree of injury to the third person a nd the pla int if

f’ s r e la tio ns hip to the thi rdpe rs on , n on e of wh ic h a re iss ue s in vo lve d in thi s a pp e a l.

I n the instant case , dealing with summary judgme nt, Mrs. Eskin’s Affida vit concerning the fac ts is undis puted. She was notified that there had bee n a minor ac cident at he r son’s school, a nd sh e wa s o n h e r w a y

to p ic k u p h e r s on . Sh e g ot to C him ne y Roc k im me diate ly

a ft e r the a c c ide nt,

o b s e r v e d h e r

s o n u n a t t e n d e d i n t h e s a m e p o s i t i o n a s h e f e l l a f t e r b e i n g s tr u c k b y t h e v e h i c l e

. In short, it is undi sputed that the Plai n t i ffs arrived at the scene immediately afte r the a ccide nt and observe d the same sc ene that the Plaintiffs would have observed had th ey b ee n prese nt when the accident ac tually

occur red. The Ram sey Co u rt h e ldth a t a “ p lain ti f f mu s t e s ta

b li s h s u f f ic ie nt proxi mityto the injury -produc ing e vent to a llow se nsory observation by plaintiff.” Id

. a t 5 3 1

. We believe that the Plaintiffs ha ve produce d evidenc e of sufficie nt pr ox imity to t h e i n j u ry -produc ing-7-

event. More over, the Plaintiffs certainly had sensory observa nce of the condition of their son a nd brother. Under the particula r fac tual situation pre sented by the rec ord in this case , it is apparent that

a person can happen upon a n acc ident immediately afte r it occur s and per ceive a horrible situation t h a tc o u l d p r o d u c e e m o t i o n a l d i s tr e s s a tl e a s te q u a l t o t h a t p r o d u c e d b y o b s e r v i n g t h e i n j u r yproducing event a s it occurs. O n e c a n im a g in e v ar io u s s c e n ar io s a n a lo g o u s to th e s itu a ti o n in th e p r e s e n t c a se. F or instance, a

mother could be out w ith he r child or c hildren wa lking, with the c hildren running ahea d play ing. Upon rea ching the corner, the children turn the corner and while t hey are out of the sig ht of t he mot her, one of t he children is struck by a car that jum ps the curb. T he child is seriously and critica lly injured, and the m o t h er t u rn s the corner a nd comes upon the sc ene. T he mother did not sensorily observe the injury -produc ing e vent, but she certainly observe d the injury

that cause d her to h a ve the dis tr e ss. Pe rh aps a mor e log ic a l sc e na

ri o, a ndon e that oc c ur s o n many oc c a sio ns , c ou ld involve a fa milyon an automobile trip trave ling in two vehicles. The lead ve hicle is involved in an

acc ident, althoug h out of sight of the second ve hicle. The second ve hicle ar rives on the sc ene of

the

acc ident immediately

afte r the accide nt occur s, and the oc cupants of the second ve hicle obser ve the

carnag e cr eate d by

the ac cident. Assuming that the other fac tors require d for ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress are prese nt, we see very littl e, if a ny , differ ence betwee n the a ct u al obs erva nce of the injury

producing acc ident and obser ving theresult of t he injury producing acc ident immediately

afte r it occur s. I t certainly seems to be foresee able that ther e could be situations such as this, and the Ram sey Cou rt ’s qu otatio n f ro m Thing v . L

a Chu sa , 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 8 6 5
, 8 7 9
, 7 7 1 P. 2 d 8 1 4
, 8 2 8 (1989), see supra, set out above indicates that the Court was not

e sta bli sh ing a brig ht l ine ru le that th e re mus t be a c tua l ob se rv a nc e of the inj ury pr od uc ing a c c ide nt. I t appea r s th e Co u r t r e c o g n iz e d th a t th e r e may b e c ir c u ms tan c e s w h e r e s e n s o r y o b s e r v a n c e o f the injury -produc ing e vent is not an absolute esse ntial element.

Other jurisdictions have not been uniform in their decisions reg arding this particular f actor

. The Supreme Court of Washington in Hegel v. Mc Mahon , 136 Wash.2d 122, 960 P.2d 424 (Wash. 1998), discussed the dive rse view s held by various jurisdictions. The Court said:

Other jurisdictions have develope d a wide spec trum of rules to define liability

for ne g lige nt i n f

li c ti on of emotional distress. Alaska has allowe d a m o t her to bring a cla im where she saw he r injured daug hter at the hospital after the ac cident. See Bec k v. State Dep't of Transp. & Pu b. Faciliti es , 837 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1992) . Maine holds that a defenda nt is only liable for emotional distress that arises w hen pare nts actually

witness their child re ceiving an injury

. See Cam eron
v . P e pin , 610 A.2d 279, 284 (Me.1992)

. Connecticut and Wy oming have a dopted a principled intermedia te appr oach w hich limits the scope of liability , y et still a l l o ws recovery to those plaintiffs who wi tne ss the ir

re la tiv e ' s in

jurie s a t t he sc e ne of

a n a c c ide nt. Th e se states re cog nize *132 a cause of ac tion where a plaintiff witnesse s the victim's injuries at the scene of an a ccide nt shortly afte r it occur s and befor e ther e is m aterial chang e in the attendant circumstanc es. See-8- Cloh essy v . Bachelor
, 23 7 Con n. 31 , 6 75 A. 2d85 2 ( 19 96 ); Gates v. Richardson , 719 P.2d 193 (Wy o.198 6 ). This rule a ddresse s the

c on c e rn s o ve r l imi tle ss l ia bil ity by a llo wi ng re c ov e ry

on ly to the c la ss of cla imants who are prese nt at the sce ne bef ore the horror

of the

acc ident has abated. It dispenses with the a rbitrary require ment that a plaintiff a ctually

witness the ac cident, y et pre serve s the limit ation

o n li ab il it y

e s ta b li s h e d in G a in

. T h e c r it ic a l f a c to r s ar e the

c ir c ums ta nc e s un de r wh ic h the ob se rv a tio n is ma de , a ndno t a ny ri g id

a dh e re nc e to the le ng th o f t ime that ha s p a sse d s inc e the a c c ide nt.

Id. at 429.

The Washing to nCo u r

t w a s c o n s ide ring two case s consolidated for dispositi on, both of which involved family

members that a

rrived at the scene of the acc ident and saw their loved one s as they exis ted i n t h e af

termath of the injury

producing acc ident. The Court, in a ve ry rea soned opinion, adopted the a

pproac h of the Connec ticut and Wy oming Courts, set out above , and held:

[A] family

member ma y

rec over f

or emotional distress caused by

o b s e r v i n g a n i n

j u r e d r e l a t i v e a tt h e s c e n e o f a n a c c i d e n ta f

t e r i ts

o cc u rr en ce an d b ef

o re t h er e i s s u b s t an t i al ch an ge i n t h e r el at i v e's

c on dit ion or loc a tio n. Ap plying thi s ru le to the fa c ts of th ese ca se s,
we c onclude that it was improper f or the lowe r courts to dism iss the Plaintif fs ' c la ims fo r n e g lig e nt i nf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. Be cause Plaintiffs in both cases we re pr esent at the s ce n e, and may ha ve wi tne sse d th e ir

famil y me mbe rs ' su ff

e ri ng before the re wa s a substantial chang e in the victim' s condition or location, their menta l distress was not unfor esee able a s a matter of law.

Id . at 429-30.

I n light of the apparent re cog nition bythe Ram sey Court that the sensory observa nce of

the injury producing event is not an absolute essential e lement, we a dopt the holding of the Washington Supreme Court quoted a

bove. Ea ch ca se must be considered on its particula r facts and under

g ener al

ne g lig e nc e ru le s.

The Concur

ring Opinion in this case g oes into g reat detail conce rning the opinion of the California c ourt in Thing v . L a Chu sa , 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). The majority does not disag ree with the Concurring Opinion a s to th e fac t s of Thin g or the pa rticular holding of Thin g. Wha t is imp orta nt, ho we ve r, is the fa c t th a t Thing established a bright- line rule that a p l ai n t i ff could not

r e c o v e r f o r n e g l i g e n ti n f

l i c t i o n o f e m o t i o n a l d i s tr e s s u n l e s s t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s p r e s e n ta tt h e i n

j u r yproducing event at the time it occurre d and wa s awa re at that time that it wa s causing injury to the victim. Id. at 829-30. The Ram sey co u rt , i n co n s i d er i n g Thing , did n ot q uo te or oth e rw ise re fe r t o the holding in Thing a n d c o n f in e d it s d is c ussion of Thing to rec og nize that there we re situations-9-

wher e the e motional dist ress c ould be as g reat even thoug h one did not observe the injury -produc ing event. In Ram sey , th e Cou rt sp e c if ic a lly state d that “ plaint if

f mus t e sta

bli sh su ff ic ie nt p ro ximity t o the injury -produc ing e vent to allow sensory observation by

plaintiff.” Ram sey , 9 3 1 S. W.2d at 531. The Ram sey co u rt co uld have, by adopting the ruling of the California court, e stablished a brig ht line rule that ac tual observa nce o f t h e i n jury -produc ing e vent was a nece ssary

element of neg lige nt inf

liction of emotional distress

. T h e Ram sey court did not do this and reiter ated that g ener al neg lige nce rules would control the c ause of action base d on neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. The c ourt conc luded that a plaintiff “ may nonetheless suff

er c ompensable me ntal injury

as a result of injuries to a closely rela ted t hird person which plaintiff obs erve s sensorily .” Ram sey , 931 S.W .2d at 532.

There fore , t h e o rd er of

the trial court is modi fied to g rant summary judgme nt only

on the claims of Mar c Eskin and Kare n Eskin for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress, and the order in its entirety

is rever sed. The c ase is re manded to the tria l court for such further proce eding s as may be ne c e ssa

ry c on sis te nt with this Op ini on . Cost s o f this app e a l are a sse sse d a g a ins t U SAACa su a lty In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y, a n d i t s s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RANK CRA WF O R D
, PR E S I D I N G JU D G E , W. S.