Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID A. SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

McIntyre & Smith Attorney General of Indiana

Bedford, Indiana

GEORGE P. SHERMAN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TAMMY SPENGLER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 88A01-1207-CR-318

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Larry W. Medlock, Judge

Cause No. 88C01-1106-MR-419

May 16, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge 
2

At some point prior to June 22, 2011, Tammy Spengler and her co-defendant, Timothy 

Orman, killed her co-defendant’s father and uncle and left their bodies to rot in a shed on the 

property where the killings took place. Approximately one-and-a-half to two weeks later, 

Spengler admitted to her mother that she had killed two people. At her mother’s suggestion, 

Spengler turned herself into the police, admitted to the killings, and gave police information 

that led to the discovery of the victims’ decomposing bodies. Following trial, Spengler was 

convicted of murder, aiding in murder, and invasion of property.

On appeal, Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

certain conversations conducted over jailhouse phone lines. Specifically, Spengler claims 

that her comments made during a conversation between Spengler and her co-defendant 

amounted to an involuntary statement made during a custodial interrogation and that the 

admission of a recording of certain conversations between Spengler and her mother was 

unfairly prejudicial. Spengler also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her 

convictions and that her 120-year sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court 

acted within its discretion in admitting the recordings of Spengler’s conversations with her 

co-defendant and her mother, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Spengler’s convictions, 

and that Spengler’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 22, 2011, Spengler called her mother, Tammy Thacker, and asked her mother 

to pick her up at a service station in Floyds Knobs. While Thacker and Spengler were 

driving back toward Thacker’s home in Palmyra, Spengler told Thacker that she had killed 
3

“Tim and Bum” a few weeks ago. Tr. Vol. I, p. 142. “Tim and Bum” referred to Timothy 

M. Orman and Roy Orman, her boyfriend Timothy Orman’s1father and uncle, respectively. 

Spengler told Thacker that she and her boyfriend had placed the bodies in a shed on the 

property where the killings took place. At Thacker’s suggestion, Spengler agreed to notify 

police about the killings and turn herself in. Thacker and Spengler stopped at a gas station in 

Palmyra, from where Spengler called the police. 

After Spengler told the 911 dispatcher that she had killed two people and expressed a 

desire to turn herself in, Spengler was met at the gas station by multiple police officers. 

Spengler told the officers that she “killed two people about a week and a half ago[,]” Tr. Vol. 

I, p. 158, and told the officers where the killings took place as well as the location of the 

bodies. Spengler told the officers that she placed the bodies in a blue shed and that she did

not “know if [she] locked it or not.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 175. Spengler was then placed in the back 

of a police vehicle and read her Miranda2rights. 

Other officers were dispatched to the address given by Spengler as the location of the 

killings. These officers were subsequently able to locate the victims’ bodies in a shed on the 

property. The victims’ bodies were clothed, wrapped in either a sheet or blanket, wrapped in 

plastic, and stacked one on top of the other. There was a strong stench from the 

decomposing bodies emanating from the shed. The shed had become overrun by thousands 

 

1

 Because one of the victims and Spengler’s co-defendant are both named “Timothy,” we will refer to 

Spengler’s boyfriend as Spengler’s co-defendant throughout this memorandum decision.

2

 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4

of flies and also had a layer of maggot larva or maggot pupae approximately an inch deep on 

the floor.

Upon investigating the residence on the property, detectives found numerous guns and 

large amounts of ammunition. Detectives also found evidence in the form of blood stains, 

bloody handprints, pieces of flesh, skull fragments, spent shell casings, a black plastic bag 

with bloody clothing inside, and a pair of sandals. Detectives also noticed that someone had 

made an attempt to clean up the scene. A hole in an aluminum screen door which appeared 

to be made by a shotgun blast was covered with tape. There was another hole on the door 

that seemed to be made by a piece of solid projectile. In addition, interior locks and padlocks 

appeared to have been forced open. 

Investigators recovered lead projectiles from Timothy M. Orman’s body, and birdshot3

was recovered from both Timothy M. Orman’s and Roy Orman’s bodies. Upon examining 

the victims’ bodies, investigators found that Timothy M. Orman’s head was no longer 

attached to his body and that it was “markedly fragmented due to trauma.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 239. 

Two large pieces of lead projectile were recovered from Timothy M. Orman’s arm, a 

projectile fragment was recovered from his head, and birdshot was found in his chest, hand, 

and head. In addition, Timothy M. Orman’s skull displayed fractures associated with a 

gunshot wound to the jaw. His skull was in multiple pieces, and certain sections of his skull 

were never recovered. 

Investigators also found that Roy Orman was shot in the face and torso with birdshot. 

 

3

 Birdshot is a type of ammunition used in shotguns. 
5

Investigators concluded that as many as eight shots could have been fired at the victims. 

Further investigation revealed that Roy Orman had previously obtained a protective order 

prohibiting Spengler from being around him or his residence. 

On June 24, 2011, the State charged Spengler with two counts of murder, a felony;

4

two counts of aiding murder, a felony;

5

and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.6 On 

February 7, 2012, the State moved to amend the charging information and to add a firearm 

sentencing enhancement. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motions.

Spengler’s trial was held on May 9-17, 2012, after which the jury found her guilty of 

the murder of Timothy M. Orman, aiding in the murders of both Timoth M. Orman and Roy 

Orman, and invasion of privacy. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 20, 

2012. During this hearing, the trial court merged the aiding in the murder of Timothy M. 

Orman conviction into the murder conviction and sentenced Spengler to consecutive terms of 

sixty years each for the murder of Timothy M. Orman and aiding in the murder of Roy 

Orman. The trial court also sentenced Spengler to a consecutive term of one year for the 

invasion of privacy conviction, for an aggregate term of one hundred twenty one years. This 

appeal follows. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

On appeal, Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

 

4

 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2010).

5

 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

6

 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2010).
6

certain evidence, that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to sustain 

her convictions, and that her sentence is inappropriate.

I. Admission of Evidence

Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain 

evidence at trial. Specifically, Spengler claims that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting a recording of a conversation she had with her co-defendant while both were 

incarcerated prior to trial. Spengler also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting a recording of certain phone conversations that took place between Spengler and 

her mother.

The evidentiary rulings of a trial court are afforded great deference. 

Norton v. State, 785 N.E.2d 625, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We review a trial 

court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

Southern v. State, 878 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied

(2008). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court. Id. We will reverse only when a manifest abuse of discretion denies the 

defendant a fair trial. Norton, 785 N.E.2d at 629.

Marshall v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “Moreover, we will sustain 

the trial court if it can be done on any legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v. State, 

724 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 2000).

A. Spengler’s Conversation with Her Co-Defendant

On appeal, Spengler claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a 

recording of a conversation that took place between Spengler and her co-defendant while 

both were incarcerated prior to trial. In challenging the admissibility of the recording of this 
7

conversation, Spengler does not claim that she had any expectation of privacy or that any 

such right was violated when jail officials recorded the conversation between Spengler and 

her co-defendant. Instead, Spengler argues that the comments she made during the 

conversation qualified as an involuntary statement given during a custodial interrogation. In 

support of this argument, Spengler asserts that her co-defendant qualified as a government 

agent because police arranged for the conversation to take place after her co-defendant 

offered to make a statement to police about the murders if he were first permitted to speak to 

Spengler. 

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel at all critical stages 

of prosecution.” Dodson v. State, 502 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind. 1987) (citing United States v. 

Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)). The Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listener 

merely collects, but does not induce, incriminating statements. Hobbs v. State, 548 N.E.2d 

164, 167 (Ind. 1990). However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is violated when the 

government intentionally creates a situation likely to induce an incriminating statement from 

a charged defendant in the absence of counsel.” Dodson, 502 N.E.2d at 1336 (citing Massiah 

v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)). This can include instances where police promise 

leniency or hire an inmate to act as an informant in exchange for the inmate revealing

incriminating statements made by fellow inmates. See generally id. (providing that a 

statement of a fellow inmate is inadmissible at trial if the fellow inmate was promised any 

benefit or leniency in exchange for the information).

With regard to questions about whether a statement was voluntarily given, the Indiana 
8

Supreme Court has held:

In determining whether a statement was voluntarily given we consider the 

surrounding circumstances. A statement must not be induced by any violence, 

threats, promises or any other improper influences. In viewing the 

voluntariness of a confession we do not weigh the evidence. If there is 

sufficient evidence to support the trial court, we will not disturb the ruling of 

admissibility.

Turner v. State, 273 Ind. 627, 629, 407 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1980) (internal citations omitted).

Again, here, the record reveals that, at Spengler’s co-defendant’s request, jail officials 

allowed Spengler and her co-defendant to engage in a monitored conversation in the 

jailhouse visitation booths via the jailhouse recorded phone lines. Nothing in the record

indicates that Spengler’s co-defendant attempted to elicit any incriminating statements from 

Spengler or was promised or received any leniency or benefit for attempting to elicit 

incriminating statements from Spengler. To the contrary, the record indicates that Spengler’s 

co-defendant was acting on his own initiative and that the conversation took place at 

Spengler’s co-defendant’s request, apparently so that he could try to convince Spengler to 

deny any involvement in the killings and allow him to take sole responsibility for their 

crimes.7 

Upon review, we conclude that the record supports an inference that Spengler’s codefendant was acting on his own behalf, not on behalf of the State when he spoke to 

Spengler. As such, he did not qualify as a governmental agent when he spoke to Spengler. 

 

7

 Review of the conversation indicates that Spengler repeatedly rejected her co-defendant’s request 

that she deny involvement in or knowledge of the killings and subsequent placement of the bodies in the shed. 

Spengler repeatedly indicated that she was involved in the killings and indicated that she had already admitted 

as much to the police. 
9

See generally Hobbs, 548 N.E.2d at 167 (holding that the trial court acted within its 

discretion in admitting testimony of co-inmate of defendant who testified about statements 

made by defendant regarding the crime because the co-inmate acted on his own initiative and 

was not instructed by police to initiate any conversation with or collect information from 

defendant or promised any benefit in exchange for doing so); Dodson, 502 N.E.2d at 1336 

(holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence because the 

inmate at issue acted on his own initiative and not at the request of police). Accordingly, 

Spengler’s comments made during her conversation with her co-defendant did not qualify as 

involuntary statements made during a custodial interrogation. The trial court, therefore, did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting a recording of this conversation at trial. 

B. Spengler’s Phone Conversations with Her Mother

Spengler also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a recording 

of conversations Spengler engaged in with her mother over the jailhouse recorded phone 

lines. Again, in challenging the admissibility of the recording of these conversations, 

Spengler does not claim that she had any expectation of privacy or that any such right was 

violated when jail officials recorded the conversation between her and her mother. Instead, 

Spengler argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the recording of these

conversations because the content of the conversations was unfairly prejudicial. Specifically, 

Spengler argues that the content of the calls, which included repeated use of curse words and 

occasional references to potential criminal penalties, activities offered in prison, and possible 

homosexual conduct, “likely had a significant unfair prejudicial impact on the jury in 
10

Spengler’s case.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16.

“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “‘In order to be 

admissible, the evidence need only have some tendency, however slight, to make the 

existence of a material fact more or less probable, or tend to shed any light upon the guilt or 

innocence of the accused.’” Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 

(quoting Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), trans. denied. 

However, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Evid. R. 403. The Indiana 

Supreme Court has noted that because all relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution is 

“inherently prejudicial,” “the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value against the 

likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury.” Richmond v. State, 685 

N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ind. 1997).

During the conversations at issue in the instant appeal, Spengler made numerous 

references to the killings which indicated that she was knowledgeable about, was present for,

and participated in the killings. These statements are relevant as they have a tendency to shed

light on Spengler’s guilt. See Steinberg, 941 N.E.2d at 524. Despite the unquestionable 

relevance of Spengler’s comments about the killings, Spengler claims that the conversations 

are unfairly prejudicial because during these conversations, both Spengler and her mother 

repeatedly used curse words and Spengler made sporadic references to the potential penalties 
11

that she could face if convicted. Spengler also made sporadic references to activities 

provided in prison and to her “wife,” which could allude to a potential homosexual 

relationship. Spengler, however, does not explain how she was prejudiced by these sporadic 

references or her and her mother’s use of curse words. We find it extremely unlikely that the 

jury decided to convict Spengler merely because of a few sporadic references to a “wife,” 

potential penalties, or services offered in prison when the recording of the conversations 

contained multiple statements acknowledging Spengler’s guilt. The probative value of 

Spengler’s statements, which, again, indicated that she was knowledgeable about, was 

present for, and participated in the killings, far outweighs the potential harm of the repeated 

use of curse words by both Spengler and her mother and periodic references to potential 

homosexual behavior, activities offered in prison, and the potential range of penalties that 

Spengler might face, if convicted. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the recording of the conversations between Spengler and her mother.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Spengler next contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for 

murder and aiding murder.

8

 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, 

appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of 

appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to 

determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this 

 

8

 Spengler does not present any argument relating to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to her 

conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.
12

structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they 

must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts 

affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements 

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary 

that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to 

support the verdict. 

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and quotations 

omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be reached based on 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v. State, 968 

N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in original). Upon review, appellate courts do not 

reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 

433, 435 (Ind. 2002). Inconsistencies in witness testimony go to the weight and credibility of 

the testimony, “the resolution of which is within the province of the trier of fact.” Jordan v. 

State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. 1995). 

Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1) provides that “[a] person who: (1) knowingly or 

intentionally kills another human being ... commits murder, a felony.” “A person engages in 

conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, [s]he is aware of a high 

probability that [s]he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (2010). “A person engages in 

conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, it is [her] conscious objective 

to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).

Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 (2010) allows a defendant to be convicted of a crime 

based on accomplice liability. Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 provides that one “who 

knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense 
13

commits that offense.” Under the statute, the individual who aids another person in 

committing a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d 

437, 441 (Ind. 2000); see also Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000). A jury may 

infer complicity and participation in a crime from defendant’s (1) presence at the scene of the 

crime; (2) failure to oppose the crime; (3) companionship with the one engaged therein; and 

(4) course of conduct before, during, and after the offense which tends to show complicity. 

Hauk, 729 N.E.2d at 998; Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). While 

the defendant’s presence during the commission of the crime and her failure to oppose the 

crime are, by themselves, insufficient to establish accomplice liability, the jury may consider 

them along with other facts and circumstances tending to show participation. Boyd, 766 

N.E.2d at 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind. 

1999)). “In order to sustain a conviction as an accomplice, there must be evidence of the 

defendant’s affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference 

of common design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may be reasonably drawn.” 

Id. (citing Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).

Spengler’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence appears to be predicated on her 

incorrect contention that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the recordings of her 

conversations with her co-defendant and her mother. Spengler also appears to ignore the 

evidence of her numerous admissions of guilt, including statements to her mother and police 

prior to her arrest. Instead, Spengler claims that the evidence is insufficient to prove she 

committed or aided in committing the killings because at trial, her co-defendant attempted to 
14

take full responsibility for the killings by testifying that he acted alone. Spengler also claims 

that the State presented an “undifferentiated mass” of evidence from which a reasonable juror 

could not find her guilty. Spengler’s claims in this regard, however, merely amount to an 

invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 

N.E.2d at 435. 

The evidence presented at trial, which, again, included multiple admissions by 

Spengler that she committed or participated in the killings, was sufficient to sustain 

Spengler’s murder and aiding in murder convictions. Spengler admitted to killing the victims 

and to helping to move their bodies to a shed. After admitting to the killings, Spengler told 

police where the bodies were located. In addition, the forensic investigator who reviewed the 

evidence collected from the crime scene testified that, while she could not positively identify 

Spengler as a source of the DNA evidence recovered at the crime scene, she could not rule 

Spengler out as a possible source of the DNA. In light of the evidence supporting the 

verdict, including Spengler’s admissions to committing the crimes in question, the jury could 

reasonably infer that Spengler knowingly or intentionally killed Timothy M. Orman and that 

she aided in the knowing or intentional killing of Roy Orman. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 229; 

Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146-47. As such, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain 

Spengler’s convictions.

III. Appropriateness of Sentence

Spengler also contends that her 121-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of her offenses and her character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The 
15

Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “‘concentrate less 

on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more 

on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is 

being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.’” Paul v. State, 888 

N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002), trans. denied). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that her

sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

With respect to the nature of her offenses, Spengler concedes that the crimes of which 

she was convicted and her treatment of the victims’ remains can accurately be described as 

“heinous,” Appellant’s Br. p. 23, but argues that her aggregate 121-year sentence is 

nonetheless inappropriate. Spengler argues that her sentences should be run concurrently 

rather than consecutively because her criminal acts constituted a single episode of criminal 

conduct rather than a larger pattern of criminal behavior. However, we note that the statutory 

authority limiting consecutive sentences for criminal acts committed during a single episode 

of criminal conduct explicitly excludes crimes of violence, including murder. See Ind. Code 

§ 35-50-1-2 (2010) (providing that murder is a crime of violence and exempting crimes of 

violence from the stated limitation for consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a 

single episode of criminal conduct).

The record demonstrates that Spengler and her co-defendant shot and killed two 
16

persons and placed their bodies in a shed. The bodies remained in the shed for approximately 

one-and-a-half to two weeks before Spengler informed police of the killings and the location 

of the bodies. By the time police found the bodies, the bodies had begun to decompose and 

the shed where the bodies were placed had been overrun by flies and other insects. Spengler 

is correct to describe her actions as “heinous.”

With respect to her character, Spengler claims that her 121-year sentence is 

inappropriate because she has a documented history of mental health issues, she was 

relatively young at the time she committed the crimes, and she has a minor criminal history. 

A person’s mental health history should be considered at sentencing if there is a nexus 

between the defendant’s mental health and the crime in question. See Corralez v. State, 815 

N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In the instant matter, nothing in the record 

establishes a nexus between these claimed mental health issues and the commission of the 

instant criminal acts. Moreover, upon evaluation of Spengler’s competency to stand trial, Dr. 

Asad Ismail found that Spengler exhibited an “average” intelligence and did not display any 

evidence of psychosis, delusions or hallucinations, mania, or hypomania. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2, p. 81.

Further, in Indiana, a trial court is only required to consider a criminal defendant’s age 

at sentencing if the defendant is younger than sixteen years old. See generally Monegan v. 

State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504-05 (Ind. 2001) (providing that relevant statutory authority evinces 

strong legislative sentiment that a child younger than sixteen should be treated differently in 

our judicial and correctional systems that one who is sixteen or older). Spengler, who, again,
17

was twenty-three when she committed the instant criminal acts, is not entitled to receive 

special consideration because of her age. 

We acknowledge that Spengler’s criminal history is relativelyminor and lacks gradual 

escalation. Spengler’s criminal history consists of a juvenile adjudication for what would be 

Class D felony escape if committed by an adult. Spengler claims her minor criminal history 

prior to the commission of the instant offenses does not “show a pattern of escalation.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 26. We cannot agree. Spengler went from committing the relatively minor

criminal act of what would be Class D felony escape if committed by an adult to committing 

murder and aiding in the murder of a second person. This exhibits a rapid escalation of the 

seriousness of Spengler’s criminal acts. In addition, the pre-sentence investigation report that 

was completed prior to sentencing indicates that Spengler has a pending Class D felony 

battery resulting in bodily injury charge, and that her victim in that case is a law enforcement 

officer. Spengler’s criminal history, her commission of the instant criminal acts, and her 

pending criminal charge indicate an ongoing disregard for the lives and safety of others as 

well as a disregard for the law. 

In summary, Spengler, together with her co-defendant, shot and killed her codefendant’s father and uncle, dragged their bodies to a shed, and left the bodies to rot. We 

cannot say that her 121-year sentence is inappropriate. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

BROWN, J., concurs.

RILEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
18

________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TAMMY SPENGLER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 88A01-1207-CR-318

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

RILEY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part

While I agree with the majority’s analysis and result reached in the admission of 

evidence issues and the sufficiency of the evidence argument, I respectfully dissent from the 

majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s imposition of Spengler’s 121-year sentence. 

As noted, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. Based on Spengler’s relative minor criminal history which consists of a single 

juvenile adjudication, I would sentence her to two concurrent terms of sixty years each for 

Counts I and IV and a consecutive term of one year for Count V, invasion of privacy, for an 

aggregate term of sixty-one years. 
19