The Honor able J. Garvan Mur tha, J udg e of the United States District Court for the * District of Ve rmont, sitti ng by desig nation. 10-0681 Za rg ar y v . C ity of N ew Y ork UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS

F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT S UM M ARY OR DER Ru lings by summary orde r d o n ot have prece den tial ef f ect. Citatio n to a summary order f iled on o r after Ja n u ar y 1, 2 00 7, is p er mit te d an d is go ve rn ed b y Fed er al R u le of A p p el la te Pro ce d u re 32 . 1 an d t h is c ou rt ’s Loca l Rule 3 2. 1. 1. W h en c it in g a su mma ry o rd er in a d oc u me n t file d with t h is c ou rt , a p ar ty mu st c it e either the Federal Ap pen dix or an electron ic data base (w ith th e n otation “su mmary ord er”). A pa rty c iting a su mma ry o rd er mu st s er ve a c op y of i t on a n y p ar ty n ot r ep re se n te d b y co u n se l.

At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Ci rc u i t , h eld at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, i n the City of Ne w York, on the 1 day

of F ebrua

ry , two thousand eleve n. st PRES ENT: ROBERT D. SACK,

DEB RA ANN L I VI

NGSTON, Circuit Judges , J . GARVAN MURTHA ,

District Judge
. *

E L IZ A B E T H Z A R G A RY , i n d i v i d u a l l y, a s G u ar d i anf

o r S h a m u e l N a t h anZ ar g ar

y, Plaintif f-Appellant ,

-v.- No. 10-0681-c v
CI TY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant-

Appellee
SAI NT B ARNAB US HOSPI TAL , NEW YORK CI TY HEAL TH AND HOSPI TAL S CORP ORA TI ON , PA UL

F AV OU RS, JO HN OL I VE RI , F OU R F EM AL E CO RRE CTI ON OF F I CER S, SI X MAL E CORRECTI ON OF FI CERS , J EFF REY PEREZ, VA NN DUN N, DR., BREND A ROSS , HARRY SHUMAN, EVELYN JEANNI TON, JOHN UPADI AH, DR., JOHN2

WACHTEL , DR., J OHN ED AWAY, DR., PATRI CI A MORGESE, ERNESTO MARRERO, AL SPEL L MAN, B ENI VI EDO SANTIAGO, L I L L I AN HARRI SON, MI CHEL L E BROWN,

De fe nd an ts.

ROBERT RAMB ADADT , New Y ork, York, for Plain tif

f- Ap pe lla nt.
M AT T HEW D. I

NGB ER (Michelle J. Annunz iata on the brief ) May er B rown L L P, New Yor k, New Y ork for Defendant- Appellee
. Appea l from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Richar d J . Holwell, Judge .) UPON DUE CONSI DERATI ON, it is here by ORDERED, ADJ UDGED , AND DE CREED that the district court’s O rder dated Apr il 20, 2009, d i re ct i n g that judgme nt be enter ed in favor of defe ndant-a

ppellee the City

of Ne w York (“the City ”) and its Or der dated J anuar y 26, 2010, denying a motion to modify , amend, or otherwise g rant re lief fr om that prior Orde r ar e AF FI RMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Z arg ary (“Z arga ry ”) ap peals fr om a judg ment of the district
c ourt in f a vo r o f t he City on Z arg ary ’s F ir st A me ndme nt c la im s st emm ing fr om h e r o ne -t ime incar cer ation at the Rose M. Singer Correc tional F acility in N ew York. Specifica lly , Zar g ary ’s complaint alleg es that the City ’s “c u s t o m o r p olicy ” of r equiring all new pr ison inmates to be photogr aphed without hats or other head cover ings as par t of its prisoner intake pr ocedur e violated her First Amendment rig hts insofa r as it r equire d her to br iefly remove a headsc arf she we ars a s part of her relig ious obse rvanc e as an Orthodox Jew. T he district c ourt conclude d, afte r a be nch trial, that the policy as applied satisfied t he we ll-established standar d for c onstitut ional challeng es to prison rules or r eg ulations. Se e Tur ne r v . S afe ly , 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1978). I t thus direc ted t hat judg ment3

be e nte re d in

fa vo r o f t he City and de nie d Z arg ary ’s e ns uin g mot ion to am e nd , va c a te , o r o the rw ise g rant re lief fr om that judgment. On appe al, Z arg ary raises three claims: first, she conte nds the district court er red in finding for the City in its April 20, 2009 Order; se cond, she c ontends the district court e rre d by denying he r
su bs e qu e nt mot ion to am e nd , va c a te or oth e rw ise g ra nt re lie f fr om that Ord e r wh ic h, sh e c on te nd s,
ov e rl oo ke d h e r “ ind e pe nd e nt[ ]” c la im that the City vio la te d he r ri g hts by fa ili ngto p ro vid e he r w ith
acc ess to an Or

thodox rabbi at the time of her intak e an d p h o t og raph; fina lly , she conte nds the distric t co u rt er re d in finding, by Orde r date d May

13, 2008, that she had va lidly waived he r jury rig ht with respe ct t o these claims. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underly ing f acts, the pr oc e dura l hi sto ry , a

nd the iss ue s on app e a l, an d re vis it tho se iss ue s only a s nec e ssa ry to f a c ili ta te this discussion. As a pre liminary

matter, we must de termine which of these issues are proper ly befor e us on appea l. The City

contends that be cause Z arg ary ’s notice of appea l, on its fac e, challeng es only the d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s Ja n u ar

y 2 6 , 2 0 1 0 O r d e r

“ d e n y in g Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s mo ti o np u r s u an t t o F RC P 5 9(a) (2), 60(b)( 1), and 60( b)(6) to alter or a mend the Apr il 20, 2009 judg ment,” neither the April 20, 2009 Orde r itself—which c ontained the district court’s finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law a fter the be nc h tr ia l— n or

the May 13 , 2 00 8 O rd e r i s p ro pe rl y be fo re thi s Co ur

t. We a g re e , in

pa rt
. Fe d. R. App. P. 3 provides that a “notice of appe al must . . . designate the judg ment, order , or pa rt the re of be inga pp e a le d, ” and , a s w e hav e pr e vio us ly e xpla ine d, the ru le is j ur isd ic tio na l in
natur e . A c c or din g ly , o ur a pp e llate jur isd ic tio n is lim ite d to tho se iss ue s p ro pe rl y no tic e d in
acc ordanc e with Rule 3. S e e N e w P h o n e C

o . v . C i t yo f N

. Y. , 498 F. 3 d 1 2 7 , 1 3 0 (2d Cir. 2007). Howeve r, beca

use we “libera lly

construe[] [ that] requirement,” Am e te x Fa br ics v. Ju st I

n M ate ria ls,4

Inc. , 140 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1998), our la w makes c lear

that a “notice of appe al from de nial of a [Rule 59 or 60] m otion . . . suffices to brin g u p fo r re v iew the unde rlying or der or judgme nt, at least whe re the motion re news arguments previously made.” “R” B est Pro du c e, I nc . v . D iSa

pio , 540 F.3d 115, 121 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Acc ording ly , on these facts, we are satisfied that Z arg ary ’s notice of
a pp e a l is su ff

ic ie nt t o b ri ng be fo re us bo th the Janu ary 29 , 20 10 Or de r and the “ un de rl y ing ” Ap ri l 20, 2009 “orde r or judg ment.” Howeve r, the notice of appe al makes no men t i on of the jury waiver or the district cour

t’s May 13, 2008 Orde r, which was not itself the subjec t of either the underlying A pril 20, 2009 decision or the subseque nt motion for r econside ration there of. We thus ag ree with defe ndant that this issue is not properly

befor e us on appe al. See generally Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1995). Procee ding to those issues that are proper ly befor e us, Z arg ary first contends the district court
err ed in finding for the City , afte r a be nch trial, on what it viewed as Z arg ary ’s sole F irst Amendment cl ai m . “In r ev i ew i n g a d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s d ec i s i o n i n a b en ch t ri al , we re v i ew t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa ct for c lear

err or and its conc lusions of law de novo .” W hite v. W hite Rose Food , 237 F.3d 174, 17 8 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 1) ; se e als o B esse me r Tr us t Co ., N.A . v . B ra nin , 618 F.3d 76, 85 ( 2d C ir. 2010) (same)
. Her e, Z arg ary challeng es the district c ourt’s leg al conc lusion that the Cit y policy , as applied to her, survives constituti onal scrutiny beca use it is “rea sonably

related to leg itimate penolog ical interests.” Sa lah ud

din v. Go or

d , 467 F.3d 263, 274 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I t is we ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t c ha lle ng e s to pr iso n p oli c ie s are e va luate d und e r a “ re a so na ble ne ss test less restrictive tha

n ordinarily

applied to allege d infring ements of f undamental c onstitut ionalThe district cour t concluded that “bec ause the events at issue in this case prec eded the 1 enac tment of [the Religious L and Use and Institut ionalized Persons Act, known as] “RL UI PA, application of that statute’s standar d would be incor rec t as a matter

of law.” Zargary v. City of N

. Y. , 607 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) . Neither party contests this conclusion on appea l. 5 rig hts” so as to ac cou n t fo r t h e unique considerations re levant to orde rly prison administration. 1 O’ Lon e v . E

sta te of S ha ba zz , 4 8 2 U
. S
. 3 4 2 , 3 4 9 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( i n t e r n a l qu o t a t i o nm ar

k s o m i t t e d )
. In applying that “re asonable ness test,” our inquiry is guided principa lly

by four f actor s: (1) is there “a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the leg itimate g overnme ntal interest put fo rw ard to j us tif y it” ; ( 2) “ are the re a lte rn a tiv e me ans of e xer c isi ngthe ri g ht [i n q

ue sti on ] t hat r e ma in open to prison inmates”; (3) what “impact” will “ acc ommodation of the asser ted constitutional right [ ] have on guards a

nd other inmates, a

nd on the allocation of pr ison resourc es,” a nd (4) a re “ rea dy alternatives” to the cha lleng ed prison policy available
. Turner , 482 U.S. at 89-91. De nov o revie w of the r ecor d below and the Tur ne r fa c tor s sa

tis fi e s u s th at th e po lic y

in question passes constitutional muster. Specifica lly , we c onclude f or substantially

the re asons set fo rt h b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

that th e po lic y is re a so na bly re la te d to the City ’s un a ssa ila ble int e re sts in identifying prisoners a

nd maintaining pr ison and prisoner sa fety and sec urity
. Cf. Fr om e r v . S c ull y , 87 4 F .2 d 6 9, 76 (2 d Ci r. 19 89 ) (a ff ir min g pr iso n po lic y re qu ir ing ne w inm a te s to ke e p b e ard s a t a leng th of less than one inc h, finding a “log ical . .
. connec tion between be ard le ng th and ea se of ide nti fi c a tio n of fa c ia l f

e a tur e s” ). We r e

je c t Z arg a ry ’s c on te nti on

on a pp e a l th a t “ re a dy

a lte rn a tiv e s” to the challeng ed policy

exis t w hich rende r it unreasona ble, principa lly

beca use she f ails to identify
any su c h “ ob vio us , e a sy

a lte rn a tiv e s” that c ou ld a c c omp lis h th e same e nd s “ a t de m ini mi s c os t to valid penolog ical intere sts.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and ellips is omit ted). More over, e ven
a ssumin g a lte rn a tiv e s e xist, we re ite rate tha t th e pr e vai li ng st andar d d oe s n ot a mou nt t o a “ le a st6

restric tive means test” a

nd acc ording ly

“prison off

icials do not have to set up and then shoot down
ever y conce ivable alternative method of ac commodating the claimant’ s constitutional complaint.” Turner , 482 U.S. at 90-91. Consistent with the dist rict cour t, theref ore, w e conc lude that the challeng ed policy

satisfies constitutional muster. Z arga ry next challeng es the district cour t’s denial of he r motion to vacate , amend, or otherwise g rant relief from the April 20, 2009 Orde r. Befor e the district cour t, she soug ht such relief on the g round that the Apr il 20, 2009 Order f ailed to eva luate, as a

n independe nt First Amendment claim, her alleg ation that the City

violated her

rig hts by failing to provid e ac cess to an O rthodox rabbi at the time of her intake . The district cour t rejec ted that arg ument, finding that “[i] t has neve r been pla intiff’s claim . . . that her rig hts
. . . wer e independently violated by the C ity beca use she wa s unable to spea

k with a ra

bbi on the night in question,” a nd furtherthat “[e]ven if plaintiff had advanc ed an inde pendent claim” based on acc ess to the rabbi, “ that claim would have failed on the
me ri ts. ” B e fo re thi s c ourt , s he c ha lle ng e s th os e fi nd ing s a s e rr on e ou s. We reviewthe denial of

a motion for re consideration for abuse of di scre tion. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aere a Boliviana , 1 62 F .3 d 7 24 , 7 29 (2 d Cir
. 19 98 ). We se e no su c h a bu se on the se fac ts. To the contra

ry , we note tha t the district court wa s intim ately familiar with the c laims and issues in this case, and that its primary finding—i.e, t hat Zar g ary “neve r” advanc ed a “cla im . . . that he r r ig h ts
. . . w e r e in d e p e n d e n tl y v io late d b y th e Ci ty b e c a u s e s h e w a s u n a

b le to spe ak with a rabbi” —was infor

med by the nea rly seven y ear s it spent supervising the development of this case , during which time it resolved two summary judgme nt motions and hear d a bench t ri al
. Zarg ary identifies no basis in this recor d for disturbing that finding , let alone for concluding that the district
c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

re a c hin g it.7

To the extent Za

rg ary raises any

other a rg uments, we have conside red the m and re ject them as meritless. Ac cording ly , we AF FI RM the judgment of district court FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk