UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-4402

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NICHOLAS SHAMAR GRIFFIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00174-D-1)

Submitted: March 23, 2021 Decided: March 26, 2021

Before THACKER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sophia L. Harvey, LIAO HARVEY PC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nicholas Shamar Griffin pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with 

intent to distribute powder cocaine and more than 280 grams of crack cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 293 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Griffin’s 

attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in 

which she asserts that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questions the validity 

of Griffin’s guilty plea and the reasonableness of his sentence. Although advised of his 

right to file a supplemental pro se brief, Griffin has not done so. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm. 

Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a colloquy in which 

it informs the defendant of, and determines that he understands, the nature of the charges 

to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum penalty he 

faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); 

United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). The court also must ensure 

that the defendant’s plea is voluntary in that it did not result from force, threats, or promises 

outside the plea agreement, and is supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Griffin did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise 

preserve any error in the plea proceedings, we review the adequacy of the plea colloquy 

for plain error. Williams, 811 F.3d at 622. Our review of the transcript reveals that the 

district court fully complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, that a factual 
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basis supported the plea, and that Griffin’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 

We find no error, let alone plain error.

Next, counsel questions whether Griffin’s sentence is reasonable. We review a 

criminal sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines 

range,” for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In 

determining procedural reasonableness, we examine, among other factors, whether the 

district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the 

parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence based on facts that were not clearly erroneous, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51.

Only after determining that the sentence is procedurally reasonable do we consider 

whether it is substantively reasonable, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the 

circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted 

by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals no significant procedural or 

substantive errors. Griffin’s sentence of 293 months’ imprisonment falls within his 

properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months. The 
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district court allowed the parties to present arguments, gave Griffin the opportunity to 

allocute, considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained the 

selected sentence. We find that Griffin has not met his burden of rebutting the presumption 

that his within-Guidelines range sentence is reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have 

found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform Griffin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Griffin requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this 

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy 

thereof was served on Griffin.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED