### FILED OCTOBER 26, 2017 In the Office ofthe Clerk ofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING TON DIVISION THREE In the Matter ofthe Termination of ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 35015-1-111 Z.K.F.t
UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KORSMO, J.

- A mother challenges the termination ofherparental rights to her daughter, arguing that not all necessary services were provided and that it was not in the best interest ofthe child to endtheirrelationship. We affirm. FACTS C.P. is the mother ofZ.K.F. C.P. came to the attention ofthe Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) after a referral from the local prosecutor's office. That office was concerned about C.P.'s mental health and the existence ofsevere domestic violence in herrelationship with her boyfriend. 1 Concerns were raised that the

tToprotectthe privacy interest ofZ.K.F., a minor, we use initials throughout this opinion. General Order ofDivision III, In Re the Use of Initials orPseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ appellate_ trial_ courts/?fa=atc.genorders

_orddisp&ordnumber=2012_001&div=III. 1The boyfriend was not the child's father. The father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.No. 35015-1-111 

### In re Termination ofZ.K.F.
abuse affected her ability to care for her child and to acquire safe and stable housing. DSHS provided referrals for domestic violence advocacy services as well as mental health and housing services. A no contact order separated C.P. and her boyfriend. Z.K.F. alternated homes, living two weeks with each parent each month. The following year Z.K.F. disclosed sexual abuse by her father and DSHS began a dependency action. C.P. was homeless and initially could not be found. Once located, a social worker offeredto assist with housing, but C.P. was not interested. The caseworker also triedto arrange visitation between C.P. and Z.K.F. The child was placed with a relative living out oftown. C.P. did not wantto travel to see her daughter, butwanted her daughter to travel to visit her. After a contestedtrial, the court found the child dependent. The social worker recommended thatthe court order C.P. to participate in a substance abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation, a psychological evaluation, random urinalysis testing, sexual victimization counseling, and domestic violence victim's assessment and education. However, the court also determined that the evidence did not support finding that C.P. had drug, alcohol, or mental healthproblems. The court did order C.P. to participate in parenting education, attend a domestic violence victim assessment, and receive housing assistance. The social workerreferred C.P. to local providers ofthe noted services. C.P. was able to obtain housing at Haven ofHope, but was unable to comply with the facility's 2No. 35015-1-111 

### In re Termination ofZ.K.F. guidelines and left after a few weeks. DSHS did notknow where C.P. lived afterthat, although she maintained some contactwiththe caseworker. After missing several visits, the court suspended C.P.'s visitations with Z.K.F., althoughthatright was later restored. C.P. tookpart in a clinical parenting assessmentthat led clinical social worker Rebecca Springerto express concerns about C.P.'s parenting skills and style. The mother thrust the obligation ofcare-taking onthe child instead ofthe otherway around. C.P. declinedparenting education even though Ms. Springerthought she would benefit from it. C.P. also underwent an assessmentwith a clinicalpsychologist. The doctor diagnosed C.P. with moderate or current major depression, alcohol and cannabis dependence with currentuse, and "arule out" ofposttraumatic stress disorder. The doctor, who believed the prognosis for C.P.'sparenting ability was poor, saw C.P. for therapy twice in December 2015, and again onMay 11, 2016. C.P. neverreturned for additional therapy. OnFebruary 3, 2016, the court found that C.P. had failed to comply with the court's dependency orderby notparticipating inparenting classes, the mental health assessment recommendations, or counseling for Z.K.F.'s sexual victimization. The court ordered additional services, including a psychological evaluation, a drug and alcohol evaluation, and other services. Soonthereafter C.P. missed three scheduledvisits with Z.K.F. and visitation again was suspended. A third referral to Children's Home Society for weekly in-home parenting services lasting 12 to 18 weeks was attempted, but after

3No. 35015-1-111 

### In re Termination ofZ.K.F. only four meetings during a two monthperiod, C.P. asked to discontinue the in-home education. Visitation was reinstated in April 2016, but lack ofcompliance and progress in parenting led the court to change the child'spermanentplanto adoption. A petitionto terminate parental rights was filed in June 2016. C.P. continued to have trouble finding a stable living situation through the trial in December 2016. C.P. was notpresent for the trial. The court found thatwhile C.P. had completedthe parenting andpsychological evaluations and hadparticipated in four parenting sessions and three therapy sessions, she had not completed any sessions for parents ofsexually abused children, norhad she completed domestic violence treatment. The court further found that C.P. had a "chronically unstable lifestyle that is unsuitable for a child." Z.K.F. hadbeen living in relative placement since April 2015, butthe social workerbelievedthe placement could not becomepermanent without adoption; the guardian ad litem also believed terminatingparental rights was in the child's best interest. The court concluded thattermination ofC.P.'s parental rights was inthe child's best interest and granted the terminationpetition. Written findings and conclusions oflaw were entered soonthereafter, formally terminating the parent-childrelationship. C.P. promptly appealed to this court. A panel consideredthe matterwithout oral argument.

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### No. 35015-1-111 

### In re Termination ofZ.K.F.
ANALYSIS C.P. contends both that the evidence does not support the determination that all reasonable available services were offered orprovided, and thattermination ofthe parent-child relationship was not in the child's best interest. We will address those two contentions in the ordernoted. 

### Services Offered The parties debate whether appropriately tailored services were made available to C.P. We agree with the trial court's assessmentthatthey were. In orderto terminate the parent-childrelationship, the State first must establish the six elements ofRCW 13.34.180(1).2 

### The trial court then must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence thatthe parent is currently unfit. 

### In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 918, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). "'Clear, cogent, and convincing' means highly probable." 

### In re Welfare of MR.H, 145 Wn. App. 10, 24, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). The trial court's findings are entitled to great deference onreview and those findings will be upheld when supported by substantial evidence. 

### In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). Substantial evidence is that sufficientto persuade a fair2 

### The State mustpresent evidence establishing that (1) the child has been found to be dependent, (2) the court has entered a dispositional order, (3) the child has beenremoved from the custody ofthe parent for at least six months, (4) all the necessary services have been afforded to the parent to correct the parental deficiencies, (5) there is little likelihood ofremedying the parental deficiencies, and (6) continuation ofthe parent-childrelationship clearly diminishes the child'sprospects ofpermanentplacement. RCW 13.34.180(1). 

### 5No. 35015-1-111 In re Termination of Z.K.F. minded, rational person ofthe truth ofthe evidence. World Wide Video, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 387, 816 P.2d 18 (1991). The fourth statutory factor is the one at issue inthis appeal: Thatthe services ordered under RCW 13.34.136[31have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrecting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). It also is the State's burden to establish this factor, as with all six ofthe§ 180 factors, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i). When a parenthas unique needs, DSHS must offer services tailored to meetthe parent's unique needs. In re Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 850, 644 P.2d 1245 (1983); In re Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644,651, 102 P.3d 847 (2004). DSHS, "however, is notrequired to offer services when a parent is unable to benefit from the services." In re Welfare of S.J., 162 Wn. App. 873, 881, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). Further, "evenwhere the State inexcusably fails to offer a service to a willingparent ...termination is appropriate ifthe service would not have remedied the parent's deficiencies in the foreseeable future." In re Dependency of TR., 108 Wn. App. 149, 164, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).

3 RCW 13.34.136 requires the creation ofa permanencyplan for determiningthe child's future living situation. The permanencyplan is developed in conjunctionwith the dependency action. RCW 13.34.136(1). 6

### No. 35015-1-111 In re Termination ofZ.K.F. Here, the mother claims that several necessary services were notprovided, orwere notprovidedtogether. However, the record reflects that all necessary services were, in fact, provided. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) only applies to services ordered bythe trial court in the dependency action. RCW 13.34.136. Thus, the mother's unrequited requests for a rental car, drug treatment in Malibu, California, and on-line courses, all are without merit because the dependencyjudgenever ordered such services. C.P. also argues thatthe court did nottimely orderpsychological and substance abuse evaluations and treatment, and also failed to orderthem in a co-occurring manner. The issue first came up during the dependency hearing, with C.P. opposingthe social worker's requests that she be evaluated and treated in both ofthose areas. Thetrial court found the evidence insufficient to orderthe evaluations. Itwas only after C.P. requested treatment that the court had a basis for reconsidering the issue and ordering the services. At that point, the evaluations were conducted and the treatment ordered. The services

were as timely provided as C.P. allowed them to be. She also argues thatthe psychological and substance abuse services needed to be co-occurring, but she can cite to nothing inthe record that would support her claim. The services were occurring during the same time period, but ifthey needed to be conducted in some other mannerthan they were offered, some type ofevidence from a therapy providerwould be necessary to establish why the current efforts were failing. There simply is nothing to supportthis contention.7No. 35015-1-111 

### In re Termination ofZ.K.F. Similarly, C.P. insists she was cognitively impaired and nottreated appropriately, butthe evidence simply does notbearhertheory out. She was seen by twopsychologists who managed to find other mental healthproblems, but made no findings ofcognitive impairment. This contention is without merit. DSHS offered all court-directed services in the appropriate manner. C.P. declined toparticipate in several ofthem and only occasionallyparticipated in other services. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the trial court's determination that all ordered services were provided. 

### BestInterest of the Child C.P. also argues thattermination ofthe parent-childrelationship was not in the best interest ofZ.K.F. The evidence supports the trial court's contrary determination. IfDSHS meets its burden as tothe sixtermination factors ofRCW 13.34.180(1), then "the trial court must find by a preponderance ofthe evidence thattermination is in the best interests ofthe child." 

### MR.H, 145 Wn. App. at 24 (citing RCW 13.34.190(2)); 

### In re Dependency of K.NJ., 171 Wn.2d 568, 576-577, 257 P.3d 522 (2011) (citing RCW 13.34.190(l)(b)). C.P. primarily argues thatbecause she did notreceive all necessary services, then automatically the best interest ofthe child standard was not satisfied. Since

we have rejected her argument about necessary services, this derivative argument is without merit.

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### In re Termination ofZ.K.F. Moreover, the record supports the best interest determination. At the time oftrial, Z.K.F. was seven and had lived with the same family member for the last 20 months. She had not seen her mother for two months, and only sporadically before that. C.P. was still not in a position to care for herself, let alone raise a child. The prognosis for C.P. becoming even a minimally adequate parent was poor. The social workers and the guardian ad litem all believed that adoption was in the child's best interest to allow her to integrate into a stable home. There was no competing evidence suggesting otherwise. The evidence supports the trial court's determination that the child's best interest

was served by terminating the mother-child relationship. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not beprinted in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

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