FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, BUREAU OF TRADE ANALYSIS

Study of the 2008 Repeal of the Liner Conference 

Exemption from European Union Competition Law
Federal Maritime Commission

Bureau of Trade Analysis

Staff Report

Study of the 2008 Repeal of the Liner Conference 

Exemption from European Union Competition Law

January 2012

Washington, DC
FOREWORD

On September 25, 2006, the European Union (“EU”) announced the repeal of EC 

Regulation No. 4056/86, which provided a block exemption from EU competition law 

for liner shipping conferences in EU trades. It also announced a two-year transition period, 

until October 18, 2008, before the repeal would take effect. The decision to repeal the 

block exemption was based on the findings of a lengthy review initiated by the European 

Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition in March 2003. 

As the expert, independent agency charged with regulating liner shipping in US trades, 

the Federal Maritime Commission (“Commission”) has a responsibility to keep abreast of 

changes in foreign laws and regulations, including the EU’s repeal, which might affect liner 

activities in US trades. To fulfill that responsibility, the Commission directed its Bureau of 

Trade Analysis (“Bureau”) to assess what impact the EU repeal might be having on shipping 

in US liner trades.

The Bureau embarked on this Study with the understanding that the global recession 

had a considerable impact on international trade in 2008–2009 and would present a major 

challenge to any effort to determine the impact of the EU repeal. To address that challenge, 

the Bureau focused the Study on the three main East/West liner trades and, in particular, 

a comparative assessment of two somewhat similar Asia-based trades – the Far East/United 

States trade and the Far East/North Europe trade.

The Study begins with an explanation of its origins; provides background on the Study’s 

EU and US legislative contexts; differentiates this Study from a number of relatively recent 

liner carrier antitrust reviews; and explains the analytical methods used. The heart of the 

Bureau’s research appears in Chapters Five and Six – the market analyses of the three major 

East/West trades and, in particular, the results of difference-in-differences estimations that 

compare the two largest of those trades. Chapter Seven presents the Study findings. 

In the course of its research, the Bureau relied on a broad range of informational 

sources including PIERS, AlphaLiner, Drewry, Eurostat, Containerisation International, 

as well as the Commission’s own internal data sources such as filed service contracts and 

quarterly monitoring reports. Useful information was also provided by respondents to the 

Commission’s November 1, 2010 Notice of Inquiry, and a variety of trade press, carrier, 

and carrier agreement websites. In particular, we would like to acknowledge and thank the 

Shanghai Shipping Exchange for its assistance in providing the Bureau with helpful data on 

Asia-based trades.

Moreover, I personally would like to express appreciation to the staff members of the 

Bureau who devoted long hours and late evenings to complete this project. Their dedication 

and determination to produce an accurate and comprehensive study is commendable. 

We hope the data and analyses contained in the Study will prove to be informative and 

useful to the international shipping community.

Austin L. Schmit

 Director, Bureau of Trade Analysis

Federal Maritime Commission

January 2012
Table of Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  vi

The Core Issue vii

Research Context  . .

Methods and Results . 

Chapter 1: Origin and Goals of the Study. 

Chapter 2: Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews . . . . 5

OSRA’s Regulatory Reforms 5

EU Review of the Liner Conference Block Exemption 7

Recent Reviews of Liner Competition 12

How this Study Goes Beyond Recent Reviews 15

Chapter 3: Some Complicating Factors . 

Expected Impact of the EU Repeal .

Exogenous Shock: The Global Recession 17

Chapter 4: Methods of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

Combining Multiple Approaches 21

Structure, Conduct and Performance 21

Comparative Evaluation: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 22

Notice of Inquiry Responses .

Chapter 5: Market Analyses of Three Trades . 

Introduction 27

North Europe/US .

Background 28

Commentary 30

Transatlantic Market Structure .

Transatlantic Carrier Conduct .

Transatlantic Economic Performance 80

Far East/Europe 89

Background 89

Commentary 90

Asia/Europe Market Structure .

Asia/Europe Carrier Conduct . 

Asia/Europe Economic Performance 136

Far East/US 140

Background 140

Discussion Agreements 143

Commentary  . 

Transpacific Market Structure 148

Transpacific Carrier Conduct 181

Transpacific Economic Performance . 
Chapter 6: Difference-in-Differences Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Methodology 209

Analyzing the Impact of the Repeal 210

Steps Involved in DD Analysis 212

DD Estimates of the Impact of Repeal on Other Variables of Interest . 

General Observations on the DD Results . 

KMI Study DD Estimates Compared . 

Chapter 7: Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Complicating Factors 217

Primary Finding . 

Secondary Findings 219

Appendices

Appendix I: Notice of Inquiry 223

Appendix II: Rate Volatility Measures . 

Appendix III: Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends 247

Appendix IV: Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010 261

Appendix V: Regulation of Ocean Carrier Agreements in the Transatlantic Trade 271

Appendix VI: Timeline of Events Relating to

Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade 277

Appendix VII: Analysis of Service Contract Rates

in the Transatlantic Trade . 

Appendix VIII: Service Contract Rate Profiles 

for the Major East-West Trades 295

Appendix IX: Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data 301

Appendix X: An Empirical Analysis of EU’s Policy of 

Abolishing the Liners’ Block Exemption 

from Competition Rules . 

Appendix XI: Mergers and Acquisitions (Global) 315

Appendix XII: Slow Steaming Services in the 

Major East-West Trades, December 2010 319

Appendix XIII: Slow Steaming Trends in the 

Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010 . 

Appendix XIV: Glossary of Acronyms . 
vii

Executive Summary

The Core Issue

1. In 2006, the European Union (“EU”) decided to repeal its block exemption from 

European competition law for liner shipping conferences. After a two-year transition 

period, the repeal went into effect in October 2008. Shortly after the repeal was 

announced, the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC” or “Commission”) decided to 

study its impact.

2. The primary issue addressed in this Study is: What impact has the repeal of the liner conference 

block exemption in Europe had on US liner trades? US shippers raised the possibility of such 

impacts in comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission in 2006. A 2008 

Congressional Research Service report raised similar concerns. Those concerns were 

premised on an expectation that the EU repeal of the liner conference block exemption 

would produce freight rate reductions in EU liner trades relative to US liner trades.

3. The possibility of unanticipated impacts on US liner trades resulting from differences 

in international liner shipping regulations is a topic of considerable interest to the 

Commission. As the expert, independent agency charged with regulating liner shipping 

in US trades, the FMC has a responsibility to keep abreast of changes in foreign laws and 

regulations that might affect liner activities in US trades. 

4. To meet that responsibility, the Commission initiated this research, Study of the 2008 

Repeal of the Liner Conference Exemption from EU Competition Law (“the Study”). By 

assessing whether the repeal of the conference block exemption has had any negative 

impact on US liner trades, the Commission hopes to determine whether any changes to its 

current regulations or oversight activities would be warranted.

5. To answer the Study’s core question it was necessary to address several related, preliminary 

questions:

•	 What were the anticipated impacts of the repeal of the block exemption in EU trades?

•	 Did those anticipated impacts occur? 

•	 Given observable impacts of the repeal on EU trades (if any), what follow-on 

consequences might one anticipate in US trades?

•	 Did any such follow-on consequences occur? 

6. The analysis of the effects of the repeal is complicated by two factors that, taken together, 

produce a substantial challenge to reaching clear and persuasive findings: 

(1) The occurrence, nearly simultaneously with the repeal’s implementation, 

of a massive exogenous shock – a global recession that produced the largest 

decline in trade volumes in liner history; and 

(2) The fact that any impacts from the repeal were likely to be relatively 

modest (that is, have a minimal intervention impact) because the market 

power of the carrier agreements being terminated had already been severely 

limited by earlier regulatory reforms and legal interventions. 
viii

In short, any effects of the repeal of the block exemption on liner shipping were likely to 

be not only small but also masked by the deeply felt effects of the global recession. Only 

now are markets recovering enough to allow a proper assessment of the impact of the 

repeal in isolation from the recession. 

7. Based on an analysis of available information from 2006 through 2010, the Study’s primary 

finding is that no significant changes in rate levels occurred between EU and US liner 

trades due to the repeal. During the period examined, the repeal of the block exemption 

appears not to have put US shippers at a disadvantage to EU shippers in Far East trades.

8. On a pre- and post-repeal comparative basis, differences in the changes in average revenue 

per twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) (as a proxy for all-in freight rates) between the 

eastbound Far East/US trade and the westbound Far East/Europe trade appear to have 

been trivial. Average revenue per TEU declined by $150 in the Far East/US trade, and 

by $141 in the Far East/EU trade, suggesting that the repeal of the block exemption 

had little or no effect on average revenue or freight rate levels in the largest US and EU 

import trades. A comparison between the westbound US/Far East trade and the eastbound 

Europe/Far East trade shows a similar minor difference in the US and EU export trades. 

On a pre- and post-repeal comparative basis, average revenue per TEU increased by $149 

in the US/Far East trade, and by $125 in the Europe/Far East trade.

9. The Study’s primary finding (item 7) is supplemented by tentative secondary findings 

derived from a comparative analysis of Far East-based US and EU trades. Those secondary 

findings are presented below (item 17). 

Research Context 

10. The two legislative measures that provide the context for this study are the Ocean 

Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (“OSRA”) that took effect on May 1, 1999, and 

European Commission (EC) Regulation No. 1419/2006 that repealed the EU liner 

conference block exemption. The former achieved its pro-competitive reforms while 

allowing continued antitrust immunity for liner agreements with rate authority. The 

latter eliminated such immunity in EU liner trades by repealing the conference block 

exemption, but allowing immunity to continue for “consortia,” which are roughly 

equivalent to vessel sharing agreements under FMC regulations, below a given market 

share threshold.

11. In practical terms, the main difference between the two regulatory approaches is that 

US regulations, based on OSRA reforms to the Shipping Act of 1984, allow carrier 

rate discussion agreements to operate in US trades. Carrier rate discussion agreements are 

prohibited in EU trades. 

12. In March 2003, the EC initiated a review of the liner conference block exemption. The 

review’s main objective was to ascertain whether the policy assumptions supporting the 

original exemption in 1986 were still valid. The block exemption had been justified on 

the assumption that liner conferences brought stability, ensuring shippers reliable services 

that could not be achieved by less restrictive means. Following a number of European 

court cases challenging how the block exemption was to be interpreted, the DirectorateGeneral for Competition (“DG Comp”) came to the view that the liner shipping industry 

had changed considerably since 1986 and the block exemption was overdue for review.

13. With respect to application of the exemption, DG Comp determined that it applied 

only to conferences and not carrier rate discussion agreements. As a result, the EC review 
Executive Summary

ix

was conducted in terms of whether existing liner organizations with pricing authority 

(nominally conferences) were (a) doing what conferences traditionally (at least in theory) 

were supposed to do – collectively set rates and manage trade-wide capacity, and (b) 

thereby providing the presumed benefits of traditional conferences – reliable service and 

stable rates. 

14. In practice, however, EU-based carrier agreements like the Trans-Atlantic Conference 

Agreement and the Far Eastern Freight Conference already had – because of the 

prevailing practice of pricing via confidential, individual contracts (rather than 

conference tariffs) – even less authority than discussion agreements.1

 Thus, DG Comp’s 

review was essentially an evaluation of the performance of carrier organizations that 

were less than carrier discussion agreements in terms of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) 

of conference tariffs. 

Methods and Results

15. In developing a comparative assessment that would allow the Commission to compare 

US and EU trades in a way that would identify any effects of the repeal of the block 

exemption, it was important to apply multiple approaches in the analysis. These 

approaches included:

•	 Descriptive studies of the three major East/West trade lanes with respect to market 

structure, carrier conduct, and economic performance. That data also provided the 

basis for a subsequent comparative analysis of those trades. 

•	 A difference-in-differences analysis of elements contained within a traditional structureconduct-performance framework for analyzing markets, for example, average revenue 

per container (as a proxy for all-in rates), vessel utilization levels, and the like, to help 

identify any “intervention effects” attributable to the repeal of the block exemption.2

•	 A general assessment, taking account of the above research, of significant changes in 

the major East/West trades, in particular, the likelihood of any impact on shippers in 

US-based trades. 

16. Once the relevant structure, conduct, and performance data were collected and 

reviewed, the main analytical method applied in the Study was a difference-indifferences comparison of the Far East/US trade, which was not directly affected by 

the repeal, and the Far East/North Europe trade, which was.3

 Those two trades were 

selected because they were similar in such respects as magnitude of container volumes, 

commodity mixes and values, trade imbalances, shipper characteristics, and market 

1 During the period of the EC review, “conferences” in EU trades operated under legal constraints with respect 

to sharing member lines’ rate and revenue information, and to producing guidelines applicable to confidential rate 

agreements that did not apply to discussion agreements in US trades. So, arguably, members of EU trade “conferences” 

had fewer tools for cooperative action than did members of US trade discussion agreements.

2 Difference-in-differences estimation is commonly used to measure the effect or impact of a new policy, law, medical 

treatment, or other type of program intervention. The difference in outcomes before and after the change in policy, 

law, or treatment for the (treatment) group affected by that intervention is compared to the difference in outcomes for 

a (control) group for whom there is no such intervention. In the context of our study, one can compare changes in 

outcomes among carriers operating in a liner trade that has had antitrust immunity repealed (the treatment group) to 

outcomes among carriers operating in a trade where that immunity still remains (the control group).

3 Generally, the Asia-based trades reviewed in this Study are referred to as the Far East/US and Far East/North Europe 

trades rather than Asia/US and Asia/North Europe. However, sometimes, the latter terms are used, and sometimes the 

Far East/US trade is referred to as the transpacific trade. The terms Far East and Asia are synonymous for the purpose 

of this study. They exclude the India Subcontinent (South Asia), Russian ports (Vladivostok), and Central Asia, but do 

include Southeast Asia.
x

participants. In addition, they are the largest and most important liner trades globally and 

were similarly affected by the global recession. 

17. The analysis of the two Far East-based trades showed:

•	 The impact of the repeal on average revenue per TEU appears to have been trivial – A result 

that suggests that the repeal likely did not, independent of the global recession’s impact, 

produce a relative decline in average rate levels in EU trades as compared with US 

trades from October 2008 through 2010. 

•	 There appears to have been an increase in rate volatility in the EU trades – A result that 

suggests the possibility that the activities of the discussion agreement in the Far East/

US trade may have had a dampening effect on rate volatility. However, other factors, 

such as the prevalence of annual contracts in the Far East/US trade and the difficulty 

in redeploying very large vessels from the Far East/North Europe trade, may also have 

contributed to the differences in rate volatility. 

•	 Following the repeal, there appears to have been a small increase in market concentration

– A result that suggests that, in the absence of a forum for carrier discussions and 

information sharing, market concentration may increase slightly more rapidly. 

•	 There was a relative decline in market share stability that may be related to rate volatility and 

market concentration – Market share stability noticeably declined in the Far East/North 

Europe trade in the post-repeal period. That was also the trade in which relative rate 

volatility and market concentration appeared to have increased. In contrast, there was 

increased market share stability in the Far East/US trade. 

18. In summary, the Study’s findings are:

•	 The repeal of the block exemption does not appear to have resulted in any negative 

impact on US liner trades. Average revenue per TEU (a proxy for all-in rates) declined 

to the same degree in both US and EU import trades being compared. Average 

revenue per TEU increased to a similar degree in both US and EU export trades being 

compared.

•	 While the activities of carrier rate discussion agreements in US trades do not appear 

to have increased average rates relative to rates in EU trades (nor to have improved 

carriers’ revenues), they may have contributed to modestly reduced rate volatility.

•	 The repeal of the block exemption may have resulted in a modest increase in market 

concentration. However, given the lack of concentration in the liner trades studied, 

such an increase is unlikely to present problems.

19. The results of the difference-in-differences analysis raise the following questions: Given 

the results for average revenue per container in the two trades, what difference, if any, 

does it make to carriers or shippers if a block exemption or antitrust immunity is granted 

or withheld for conferences or rate discussion agreements? Given the results of the rate 

volatility comparison, does discussion and information sharing among rate discussion 

agreement member lines have a separate and distinct utility apart from the success or 

failure of the lines’ common pricing proposals (general rate increases and other pricing 

guidelines)? 

20. Finally, trends in rates, volatility, and concentration in the Far East/Europe and Far East/

US trades beyond the period studied, merit further review.
1

Chapter 1:

Origin and Goals of the Study

On September 25, 2006, the European Union (“EU”) announced the repeal of its block 

exemption from European competition law for liner conferences (“the repeal” or “the 

repeal of the block exemption”) while allowing a two-year transition period that postponed 

implementation of the repeal until October 18, 2008.1

 The block exemption, EC Regulation 

No. 4056/86, had been in place for roughly two decades. A review of the block exemption 

conducted by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (“DG 

Comp”), between March 2003 and December 2005,2

 determined that liner conferences 

operating in EU trades were not producing the anticipated benefits that provided the original 

rationale for the exemption, namely reliable service and rate stability.3

 In 2010, international 

container trade to or from the EU, now subject to EU competition law, accounted for over 

40 percent of the world’s container traffic.4

 Trade to or from the US accounted for almost 20 

percent of world container traffic.

Shortly after the September announcement, a DG Comp official participating in a hearing 

held by the Antitrust Modernization Commission (“AMC”)5

 in Washington, DC stated 

that the transition from a block exemption to no exemption in the transatlantic trades likely 

would go smoothly because most US/EU cargo already was being shipped under individual 

service contacts (and thus was not subject to conference regulation), and there were few 

rate-fixing agreements in US/EU trades.6

 Two years later, when the repeal took effect, that 

prediction proved accurate. 

However, a separate question concerning possible indirect and longer term consequences 

of the EU repeal for US trades was raised in the context of the same October 2006 AMC 

hearing. Testimony submitted on behalf of American exporters and importers raised a 

question as to whether US shippers might suffer a competitive disadvantage if carrier 

1 EC Regulation No. 1419/2006, repealing EC Regulation No. 4056/86.

2 The review of the block exemption was initiated with the publication of a Consultation Paper in March 2003. A 

White Paper was published in October 2004, and the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to repeal the 

block exemption for liner conferences on December 14, 2005. The European Commission’s proposal for a new Council 

Regulation repealing Regulation 4056/86 was subsequently submitted to the EU Council of Ministers for adoption and 

to the European Parliament for consultation. 

3 The results were summarized in the recitals of EC Regulation No. 1419/2006.

4 Drewry Container Forecaster (Table 2.8, October 2011) reports that in 2010 global container traffic volume was 

152.1 million TEUs; this figure represents loaded TEUs moved by ship, excluding transshipments. Inclusive of intra-EU 

shipping movements, EU container trade with the world totaled 62.6 million TEUs in 2010, while the US container 

trade with the world totaled 29 million TEUs. Excluding intra-EU trade, EU container trade with the rest of the world 

was 37 million TEUs in 2010. US container trade with the EU accounted for 11.8 percent of the total US container 

trade in 2010 and 13.6 percent in 2006.

5 The Antitrust Modernization Commission was a panel of experts in US antitrust law established by Congress to 

examine whether there was a need to modernize existing US antitrust laws and make appropriate recommendations. Its 

first public meeting was held on July 15, 2004, and its final report was submitted on April 2, 2007.

6 Fabrizia Benini, Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, before the Antitrust 

Modernization Commission’s hearing on Shipping Act antitrust immunity, October 18, 2006, hearing transcript, page 83. 

The only liner conference operating between Europe and the US when the repeal was announced was the Trans-Atlantic 

Conference Agreement (“TACA”). TACA members ceased all commercial activities under the Agreement as of June 

30, 2008 and formally terminated the Agreement on file with the Federal Maritime Commission as of October 1, 2008. 

In addition, various liner companies operating in US/EU trades filed a new agreement, the Container Trade Statistics 

Agreement to allow member lines to gather, compile, aggregate, exchange, disseminate, and to meet and discuss certain 

trade statistics. 
Chapter 1

2 

agreements that were prohibited in EU trades were allowed to continue in US trades. 

Subsequently, a similar question was raised in a Congressional Research Service report.7

The possibility of unanticipated negative impacts on US shippers resulting from 

international differences in shipping regulations is a topic of considerable interest to 

the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC” or “Commission”). As the independent 

federal agency charged with regulating liner shipping in US trades, the Commission has 

a responsibility to keep abreast of changes in foreign laws and regulations that may affect 

liner activities in US trades. To meet that responsibility, the Commission initiated this 

research study, Study of the 2008 Repeal of the Liner Conference Exemption from European Union 

Competition Law (“the Study”). By assessing the impact of the repeal of the block exemption 

on US trades, particularly any negative impact, the Commission hopes to determine the need 

for changes to its current regulations or oversight activities.

In undertaking the Study, the Commission noted the recommendations made by 

American shippers to the AMC. Shippers told the AMC that, in light of the EU repeal of 

the block exemption, it would be appropriate for the US government to undertake a review 

of the antitrust immunity granted under the Shipping Act. In particular, shippers opined that 

such a review should include an analysis of any impact that changes adopted in Europe might 

have on the shipment of goods in US trades.8

 The Study aims to provide such an analysis. 

The EU repeal produced a striking difference in how liner shipping is regulated in the 

major East/West trades. In the transpacific trade, regulated under the Shipping Act of 1984 

(“Shipping Act”), carriers, under a legislative grant of antitrust immunity, maintain carrier 

discussion agreements (“CDAs”) that, among other things, exchange market information, 

jointly conduct market research, and develop non-binding proposals (voluntary guidelines) 

dealing primarily with rates and auxiliary charges, for member lines’ use when negotiating 

service contracts.9

In the post-repeal North Europe/US and Far East/North Europe trades, collective 

development of rate and surcharge guidelines is prohibited, and the exchange of market 

information among lines is constrained. So, due to the now considerable differences in 

international liner shipping regulations, the question arises: Did the EU’s prohibition of 

certain forms of carrier cooperation have any negative consequences for shippers in US trades?

To answer the core question – what impact on US liner trades is the repeal of the 

conference block exemption in Europe likely to have10 – it was first necessary to address 

several interrelated, preliminary questions:

7 John Frittelli, Congressional Research Service, “Reauthorization of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC): An 

Opportunity to Reexamine the Congressionally Mandated Antitrust Exemption for Ocean Liner Carriers?” September 18, 

2008. Frittelli speculated about a hypothetical ability of carriers to raise rates in, for example, the transpacific trade to off-set 

any rate reductions in EU trades that might follow repeal of the block exemption.

8 Comments submitted by Nicholas J. DiMichael and Karyn A. Booth, on behalf of the National Industrial 

Transportation League (“NITL”), to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, October 18, 2006, page 9. 

9 The distinction between “discussion agreements” and “conferences” is an important one, and is discussed in more 

detail later in this Study. For the moment it is worth noting that the original EU block exemption was rationalized in 

terms of the activities of traditional liner conferences (such as establishing a common conference tariff as the vehicle for 

the member lines’ collective pricing activities, accompanied by the legal requirement that member lines actually charge 

the prices posted in the common tariff). At least in theory, traditional conferences also had the authority to collectively 

control capacity in the trade in which they operated. In the late 1980s, as traditional conferences struggled to maintain 

rates in the face of competition by new non-conference competitors, a new type of organization – carrier discussion 

agreements (“CDAs”) – was developed in which conference member lines and non-conference lines could discuss 

market conditions, pricing levels, and the like. Unlike traditional conferences, CDAs have no common tariff and are not 

required to abide by jointly proposed rates or rate levels. After the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 took effect and 

confidential one-to-one contracting spread, traditional conferences were largely replaced by CDAs in the US trades. 

10 During the open session of the October 27, 2010 FMC meeting, Chairman Lidinsky explicitly confirmed that the 

“core purpose” of the Study was to analyze the impact of EU government’s decision to repeal the liner conference block 

exemption on US trades. (FMC meeting transcript, page 48.) 
Origin and Goals of the Study

3

1. What were the anticipated impacts of the repeal of the block exemption in EU trades?

2. Did those anticipated impacts occur? Why or why not?

3. Given observable impacts of the repeal on EU trades (if any), what follow-on 

consequences might one anticipate in US trades?

4. Did any such follow-on consequences occur?

To address those preliminary questions and related issues,11 this Study examines the 

changes that occurred in carrier activities, especially with regard to pricing and service, in 

selected US and EU trades from 2006 through 2010. It investigates how the repeal of the 

liner conference block exemption might have affected market structure (such as market 

concentration), carrier conduct (such as capacity decisions), and the economic performance 

of liner shipping operations (such as rate levels and volatility) in each trade. More specifically, 

the Study was designed to meet the following goals:

1. To identify and collect relevant data that accurately describes key developments in each 

of the three major East/West liner trades (Far East/US, North Europe/US and Far 

East/North Europe) for the research period 2006 through 2010;

2. To identify and quantify any significant changes in market structure, carrier conduct, and 

economic performance that occurred between the Study’s designated pre-repeal and 

post-repeal periods in each trade;

3. To determine whether any of the identified changes can be ascribed, with reasonably 

credible evidence and analysis, to the EU’s repeal of the liner conference block 

exemption; and

4. To determine, to the extent possible, whether the EU repeal has had or is likely to 

have any significant impact on shippers in US liner trades.

11 At the open session of the Commission’s April 21, 2010 meeting, staff identified several related issues, including: 

carrier pricing, US exporter competitiveness, freight rate volatility, and the effectiveness of ocean carrier agreements in 

the absence of authority to discuss rates.
5

Chapter 2: 

Legislative Contexts and Recent 

Competition Reviews

Before introducing the Study’s technical analyses, it may be helpful to briefly review the US 

and European legislative contexts within which concerns about the EU block exemption 

repeal’s possible impact on US liner trades were raised, and several relatively recent 

assessments of carrier competition. The two most important measures that provide this 

Study’s legal and policy context are the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (“OSRA”) that 

took effect on May 1, 1999; and EC Regulation No. 1419/2006 that repealed the EU liner 

conference block exemption.1

OSRA’s Regulatory Reforms 

Described as “the culmination of a nearly four-year effort to update and revise the Shipping 

Act, with virtually all segments of the industry represented in the legislative reform process,”2

OSRA was designed to change the way liner shipping operated in US trades. The effort 

that culminated in the passage of OSRA began in mid-1995 with an inter-industry accord 

on fundamental principles for revising the Shipping Act of 1984, including: (1) the ability 

of shippers to negotiate confidential service contracts with individual lines free from liner 

conferences regulating their members’ contracting decisions; (2) removal of the statutory 

requirement that lines publicly disclose rates and offer the same rates to “similarly situated” 

shippers; and (3) continuation of antitrust immunity, subject to FMC oversight, for filed 

carrier agreements in US trades.

The legislative phase of the reform movement began when the House Transportation and 

Infrastructure Committee took up H.R. 2149, the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1996. 

After the House passed H.R. 2149, a similar measure, S. 414, was introduced in the Senate 

on March 1, 1997. Following a series of revisions, S. 414 passed the Senate in May 1998, was 

amended and passed in the House in August 1998, received final Senate approval in October 

1998, and was signed into law. It took effect on May 1, 1999.

The importance that reformers attached to confidential service contracting under OSRA 

can be understood in light of several studies of liner competition conducted during the late 

1980s through the mid-1990s. In those years, liner shipping in US trades was the subject of 

1 In discussing the repeal of the liner conference block exemption, the Study makes reference to three European 

institutions: The European Union, the European Commission, and the Directorate-General for Competition. This note 

explains their roles for readers not familiar with the European Union’s system of governance.

The European Union (“EU”) is an economic and political union of 27 independent member states that was formally 

established in 1993. It operates through a hybrid system of supra-national institutions and intergovernmental decisions 

negotiated among the member states. The EU has developed a single market through a standardized system of laws that 

apply in all member states, and operates under a common competition policy within that market.

The European Commission (“EC”), one of the EU’s supra-national independent institutions, is the executive 

arm of the EU and is responsible for initiating legislation and for the day-to-day administration of the EU. It proposes 

legislative acts for the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to adopt. It is also responsible for managing the 

EU’s budget and programs and implementing common policies. The EC is divided into several departments known as 

Directorates-General.

The Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Comp”) is the EC department responsible for direct enforcement 

of EU competition rules. Its policy areas include antitrust, mergers, cartels, market liberalization, control of state aid, and 

the promotion of competition principles in EU legislation. It monitors markets and conducts sector inquiries. It had the 

central role in the review of the liner conference exemption and the recommendation for its repeal.

2 FMC, “The Ocean Shipping Reform Act: An Interim Status Report,” June 2000, page 2.
Chapter 2

6

extensive congressionally mandated research and an accompanying public debate. Section 

18 of the Shipping Act of 1984 required the FMC to conduct a five-year study of the 

performance of the liner industry under the new law. The results of that study (“Section 

18 Study”) were reviewed and commented on by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the 

Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the Department of Transportation (“DOT”). 

The Section 18 Study and DOJ, FTC, and DOT comments then provided the basis for a 

subsequent policy review by the Advisory Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping 

(“ACCOS”).3

 ACCOS completed its review and submitted its report and recommendations 

to the President and Congress in April 1992.4

Although Congress ultimately took no action on the ACCOS Report’s recommendations, 

two ACCOS staff economists (one from DOJ and one from FTC) subsequently published 

their own assessment of liner cooperation and competition. Their paper, an econometric 

analysis entitled “The Effectiveness of Collusion under Antitrust Immunity: The Case of 

Liner Shipping Conferences” (1995),5

 was based on data collected by the FMC for the 

Section 18 Study. In the Concluding Remarks section of their paper, the authors note that:

Although we find no significant relationship between conference market share and 

freight rates, our evidence indicates that freight rates were significantly lower on those 

routes where individual conference carriers were allowed to enter into service contracts 

with individual shippers. These results suggest that some conference rules, perhaps when 

combined with relatively high market share, may allow carriers to maintain rates at higher 

levels than they would otherwise. Market power is undermined when carriers within a 

conference are allowed to independently contract with shippers.6

Based on a period between late 1984 and early 1986 when transpacific conference 

member lines were allowed to enter into “autonomous” service contracts, the authors’ 

speculated that independent contracting between shippers and individual carriers (free from 

regulation by conferences) likely would undermine any market power that conferences 

with high market share might be able to exercise.7

 In other words, individually negotiated 

confidential service contracts, which OSRA would later introduce, should effectively 

undermine any conference collective pricing effort.

As expected, the implementation of OSRA in US trades had immediate and dramatic 

consequences. It ended the authority of liner conferences to regulate their member lines’ 

contract rates and terms, and strongly encouraged service contract confidentiality.8

 OSRA’s 

promotion of one-to-one, confidential service contracts between shippers and individual 

liner operators introduced a degree of commercial freedom and flexibility that soon made 

service contracting the overwhelmingly preferred method of doing business. As one major 

US shipper organization later noted, 

3 ACCOS was established on April 10, 1991 to conduct a comprehensive review of the liner conference system in US 

trades. It held five field hearings around the country, took testimony from over 100 witnesses, and conducted in-depth 

interviews with 120 industry representatives supplemented by information provided by the FMC (Section 18 Report), 

DOT, DOJ, and FTC. It issued its final report on April 10, 1992.

4 Report of the Advisory Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping, April 10, 1992, Washington, D.C.

5 P.S. Clyde and J.D. Reitzes, (1995), “The Effectiveness of Collusion under Antitrust Immunity: The Case of Liner 

Shipping Conferences,” US Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Staff Report, December 1995.

6 Clyde and Reitzes, pages 37 and 38. 

7 The authors’ econometric analysis found no statistical relationship between market share and freight rates, indicating, 

as they acknowledged, that conferences in US trades were not acting as profit maximizing cartels. They did, however, 

determine that increases in market concentration were associated with statistically significant, but economically small, 

increases in freight rates. (Pages 2 and 3.)

8 For example, OSRA ended a previous Shipping Act requirement that certain service contract information, including 

rates, be made publicly available. 
Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews

7

“[t]he US regulatory system implemented under OSRA is working well and has resulted 

in significant benefits to the industry stakeholders ... [and] has allowed the US maritime 

industry to become more reliant on competition than in the past and to operate more 

efficiently now that the bureaucracies of the old conference systems no longer exist to 

control the dealings between shipper and carriers.”9

As the FMC’s 2001 OSRA Impact Study noted: “The liner shipping industry has been 

experiencing dynamic structural changes over the past several years. OSRA was enacted in 

full recognition of these changes and has helped to foster their continuing evolution.”10 In the 

context of those industry changes, OSRA was seen as achieving its main regulatory objectives: 

•	 Encouraging greater choice, flexibility, and innovation in the contracting process;

•	 Providing contract confidentiality; and

•	 Facilitating closer working relations between shippers and their chosen carriers.

In the dozen or so years since OSRA was first implemented, contract carriage under 

confidentially negotiated arrangements has become the norm in US trades and beyond. For 

example, on November 29, 2001, the European Commission published a notice stating its 

intention to exempt the maritime aspects of a revised Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement 

(“TACA”), formerly the Trans-Atlantic Agreement, from EU competition law. The revised 

TACA embodied a comprehensive attempt to put into effect a set of guiding principles for 

future EU-based conference agreements. As DG Comp officials noted: “From the [European] 

Commission’s perspective, the most important of these principles was that conference 

members would be free to enter into confidential individual contracts with shippers.”11

Thus, within three years of its passage, OSRA’s general approach to contracting had been 

extended to all three major East/West trades and many North/South trades. Although the 

service arrangements in non-US trades did not necessarily take the form of service contracts 

as defined in the Shipping Act, the underlying regulatory approach was essentially the same. 

In US trades today, the Shipping Act of 1984 allows liner companies to establish various 

sorts of multi-member liner agreements that have limited antitrust immunity, including 

some that authorize member lines to discuss and voluntarily agree on pricing matters. 

Antitrust immunity under the Shipping Act is, however, constrained by a variety of explicitly 

prohibited acts and restrictions on “unreasonable practices.” Carrier agreements are also 

subject to ongoing monitoring and enforcement actions by the FMC. 

EU Review of the Liner Conference Block Exemption

Even before the DG Comp began its review of the block exemption in 2003, it took steps 

to ensure that EU-based liner conferences could not restrict the availability to shippers of 

individual, confidential service contracts. In particular, DG Comp adopted the position that 

9 Nicholas J. DiMichael and Karyn A. Booth, comments on behalf of NITL to the AMC, October 18, 2006, page 4. 

10 The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, FMC, September 2001, page 2. Presumably, the reference 

to the liner shipping industry “experiencing dynamic structural changes” during the period prior to the reform initiative 

refers to several trends, including:

•	An expanded role for trade-wide, non-binding carrier discussion agreements;

•	Substantial increases in vessel sizes to capture economies of scale;

•	The creation and expansion of multi-trade operational alliances (“global strategic alliances”) among ocean carriers to 

expand service networks; 

•	Carrier expansion beyond ocean and intermodal carriage into related logistics services;

•	Industry consolidation; and

•	Increased use of sophisticated electronic information management systems.

11 Jean-Francois Pons and Eric Fitzgerald, “Competition in the maritime transport sector: a new era,” Competition 

Policy Newsletter, February, 2002, page 11. This article, by two DG Comp officials, contains a sub-section which 

outlines the litigation and discussions that eventually led to the consensus conference guidelines mentioned.
Chapter 2

8

the block exemption for liner conferences applied only to rate setting via conference tariffs 

and not to service contracting. DG Comp officials entered discussions with carriers and 

shippers with a view, in the words of DG Comp officials, “to breaking the sterile cycle of 

litigation and establishing a consensus on the way forward. Out of these discussions came an 

indicative set of guiding principles for future conference agreements. From the [European] 

Commission’s perspective, the most important of these principles was that conference 

members should be free to enter into confidential individual contracts with shippers.”12

It is also worth noting that the US and EU push for individual confidential contracts had a 

direct and substantial impact on TACA. As the OSRA Impact Study noted: “A combination 

of regulatory actions both in the US and Europe dramatically altered the structure and 

influence of the conference [that is, TACA]...the collective market share of the conference 

dropped from close to 80 percent to roughly 50 at present.”13 By 2006, the combined market 

share of the remaining TACA members had declined to only 40 percent. “In terms of 

conference participants, TACA’s membership has fallen from a high of 17 carriers to a low 

of 7 carriers.”14 In terms of contracting, TACA went from being a conference in which a 

major portion of the trade’s cargo moved under TACA service contracts (reportedly almost 

600 such contracts in 1998) to a situation at the end of 1999 in which 80 percent of the 

cargo moved under non-conference service contracts (approximately 30 conference contracts 

remained). By 2000, there were only three conference contracts.15

In short, by 2000, TACA was substantially smaller, less influential, and had lost the ability 

to regulate its diminished membership’s pricing activities. Beyond publishing conference 

tariff rates, TACA’s only method for affecting rates was its authority to publish a model 

contract and a set of rate matrices that member lines could reference or adopt when 

negotiating their own individual, confidential contracts. The model contract and proposed 

rate matrices amounted, in effect, to a European equivalent of the voluntary service contract 

guidelines that were allowed under OSRA. Thus, while TACA remained a traditional 

liner conference in name, in practice it appears to have operated much as what in US trades is 

known as a discussion agreement.

In March 2003, the EC initiated a review of the liner conference block exemption, the 

main objective of which was to ascertain whether the policy assumptions supporting the 

original exemption were still valid. The block exemption was justified on the assumption 

“that conferences bring stability, ensuring exporters reliable services which cannot be 

achieved by less restrictive means.”16 But by March 2003, following a number of court cases 

challenging how the block exemption was to be interpreted, DG Comp’s view was that the 

liner shipping industry had changed considerably since 1986, and Regulation 4056/86 was 

overdue for review.17

During the course of its review of the block exemption, DG Comp focused on the four 

conditions listed in Article 101(3) of the EC Treaty that were required for any exemption 

from competition law:18

12 Pons and Fitzgerald. 

13 OSRA Impact Study, page 11. 

14 Ibid. 

15 OSRA Impact Study, page 12. 

16 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1419/2006, paragraph (3).

17 A summary recounting of the historical context, review process and ultimate findings of the EC Review can be 

found in Fabrizia Benini, and Carsten Bermig, “The Commission proposes to Repeal the Liner Conference Block 

Exemption,” EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Spring 2006, pages 43-49.

18 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1419/2006, paragraphs (4) through (7). 
Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews

9

Condition One — Efficiency Gains: The exemption must contribute to improving the 

production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress (in this 

case, stability of freight rates and reliability of service) in ways that flow from (i.e., have a 

direct causal link to) a conference’s price setting and capacity regulation.

Condition Two — Fair Share for Consumers: Any economic benefits achieved by the 

restriction of competition (i.e., a conference’s rate setting or capacity management activities) 

must be fairly shared with consumers.

Condition Three — Restrictions are Indispensible: The exempted conduct must be 

indispensible to achieving the presumed benefits (stable rates and reliable service) flowing from 

conference price setting or capacity management. That is, no less restrictive way of achieving 

the presumed benefits is available.

Condition Four — No Elimination of Competition: Conference lines must remain subject 

to effective competitive constraint (i.e., competition among carriers cannot be eliminated in a 

substantial part of the market).

On June 12, 2003, Professor Mario Monti, then European Commissioner for 

Competition Policy, elaborated, in a speech entitled “A Time for Change? Maritime 

Competition Policy at the Crossroads,” on the approach being taken in the DG Comp 

review process. He said that:

•	 The burden of proof would be on the carriers.

•	 The carriers would have to present arguments and evidence that established a causal 

link between the restrictions authorized by the block exemption (price setting and 

capacity management) and its alleged benefits. It would not be sufficient merely to 

demonstrate that service was reliable and rates were stable.

•	 DG Comp “would want to see hard evidence that the benefits could not be achieved 

by less restrictive means, such as by the increase in the number of long-term contracts 

and a greater use of operational agreements such as vessel sharing and consortia.”19

•	 Any benefits generated under the authority to set rates or manage capacity must clearly 

outweigh any negative effects – with the onus on the carriers to demonstrate a net 

benefit to shippers.

In outlining its reasons for re-evaluating the block exemption, the European Commission 

highlighted the impact of individual confidential service contracts.20 So, it was perhaps 

inevitable that the liner industry’s reliance on confidential service agreements played a role in 

DG Comp’s rationale for eliminating the block exemption.

DG Comp’s findings, listed by the relevant Article 101(3) conditions, were:

Condition One: The carriers had not provided data showing that (1) actual freight rates 

had been stable, or (2) that rate setting via the conference tariff or conference capacity 

management efforts had contributed to rate stability or service reliability. DG Comp, after 

adopting a definition of price stability as “the maintenance of freight rates at a more or less 

constant level by liner conferences, in accordance with a set structure over a substantial 

19 Mario Monti, “A Time for Change? Maritime Policy at the Crossroads,” June 12, 2003, speech to the European 

Shippers Council, Antwerp, Speech/03/294.

20 Staff Working Document: Annex to the Proposal for a Council Regulation, December 14, 2005, page 5, paragraphs 

9 and 10.
Chapter 2

10

period of time,” asserted that “with or without conferences there is rate volatility.”21

Condition Two: DG Comp asserted that, even though member lines did not enforce the 

conference tariff, the existence of published conference rates provided a “benchmark” for 

member line’s use in setting individually negotiated contact rates. Such “benchmarks” were 

said to result “in a reduction of shippers’ negotiating power.” In addition, the listing of 

surcharges and ancillary charges in a conference’s tariff, charges which were subsequently 

adopted by non-conference lines as well, resulted in there being “no price competition 

between conference members and non-conference members for this part of the trade.”22

Condition Three: DG Comp noted the growth of operational arrangements such as 

consortia and alliances that did not involve common pricing, and pointed out that such 

consortia and global alliances supported operational efficiencies. In effect, DG Comp 

suggested that such non-price setting operational agreements combined with the wide use of 

service contracts were the real sources of any relative service and rate stability in EU trades, 

and consequently represented a less anti-competitive way to accomplish the policy goal of 

the liner block exemption.

Condition Four: DG Comp determined that while it appeared that the fourth condition 

of Article 101(3) was being fulfilled – that is, competition was not being eliminated from 

the market – the review’s previous findings (e.g., no clear benefits, restrictions on shipper 

negotiating power due to tariffs’ benchmark effects and a lack of competition on surcharges), 

and the increasing links among carriers via operational agreements, made it necessary to 

evaluate the effectiveness of competition on a case-by-case basis rather than endorse a 

broader block exemption.

While the first finding alone (i.e., no evidence of benefits from allowing carriers 

collectively to propose common rates or manage capacity) would, in principle, have been 

enough to support a recommendation to end the exemption, DG Comp strengthened its 

argument for repeal by claiming shippers were being harmed and the existence of a less anticompetitive alternative to conferences.

On August 6, 2004, the European Liner Affairs Association (“ELAA”) proposed a third 

option, an alternative between the then existing block exemption for liner conferences and no 

exemption at all. ELAA, on behalf of 21 carriers that reportedly held roughly 90 percent of 

liner capacity worldwide, submitted a proposal for the creation of an “exchange of information 

system” (“EIS”) to replace the conference system in EU trades.23 On March 10, 2005, it 

21 Benini and Bermig, “The Commission proposes to repeal the Liner Conference Block Exemption,” Spring 2006, 

page 45. It is worth noting that the definition of price stability adopted by DG Comp seems to be based on a (somewhat 

vague) Stability-vs.-Volatility test that treats “stability” more as a binary yes-or-no concept rather than a relative moreor-less one. To meet such a test the carriers would have had to show that the freight rates actually charged were more 

or less flat over some extended period of time (which they were not) as a direct and demonstrable result of conference 

tariff enforcement (which, under a system dominated by pricing via individual, confidential service contracts, was not 

possible). 

22 Benini and Bermig, page 45.

23 The EIS as proposed by ELAA would have allowed members of that agreement to exchange aggregated data on 

capacity, demand, and rate levels expressed through indices, via an independent data service, and to exchange views in 

Trade Committee meetings in order to better understand market developments.
Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews

11

further supplemented its original EIS proposal.24

The ELAA’s EIS proposal was supported by a June 2004 economic analysis undertaken 

for ELAA by Charles River Associates (“CRA”) entitled “Competitive Impacts of 

Information Exchange,” (“CRA Analysis”). The authors of the CRA Analysis noted that 

the economic literature on information exchange claims that, in theory, such information 

exchanges can have pro-consumer or anti-competitive impacts depending on whether 

collusion is likely to be a problem or not given the type and specific characteristics of the 

information being exchanged.25 The CRA Analysis contained a review of the likely benefits 

and potential concerns of an EIS of the type that ELAA subsequently proposed.

The ELAA’s EIS proposal is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, DG Comp gave 

the proposal serious consideration including a preliminary assessment meeting on July 13, 

2005, and a subsequent external consultant’s report on its merits.26 Second, the willingness of 

ELAA to propose an EIS suggests that its members may have viewed the exchange of market 

information among lines in a trade (even absent any collective ability to propose rates or 

surcharges) as being a substantial element in their ability to provide reliable liner service. The 

EIS proposal appears to be an option that would preserve the lines’ authority to participate in 

what they viewed as helpful information sharing and collective discussions regarding market 

conditions.

Another point worth noting is that, in reaching its findings, DG Comp determined that 

the liner block exemption could be applied only to conferences and not to later organizational 

variations such as carrier discussion agreements. Consequently, the EC review was conducted 

mainly in terms of whether existing liner organizations with much weakened pricing 

authority (nominally conferences) were doing what conferences traditionally, at least in theory, 

were supposed to do (collectively set rates and manage trade-wide capacity), and were 

thereby providing the presumed benefits of traditional conferences – namely, reliable service 

and stable rates. 

In practice, however, EU-based carrier agreements like TACA and the Far Eastern 

Freight Conference (“FEFC”) had already become much weaker than carrier discussion 

agreements in the US trades.27 DG Comp’s review was essentially an evaluation of the 

performance of weaker quasi-CDAs in terms of the legislative assumptions that had justified 

the original exemption for traditional conferences (such as achieving rate stability via 

conference tariff pricing). Consequently, when the repeal took effect in October 2008, the 

EU was, in effect, proscribing quasi-CDAs and the sort of EIS proposed by ELAA.

24 A brief discussion of what is characterized as “a new regime to replace the conference block exemption” can be 

found in the EU’s December 14, 2005, MEMO/05/480, entitled “Proposal to repeal block exemption for liner shipping 

conferences – Frequently Asked Questions.” Referring to the ELAA proposal for “an exchange of information” 

system, the memo noted: “To be acceptable, any new system for information exchange must respect the competition 

rules. Some elements of the current ELAA proposal appear to be in line with these requirements. However, others are 

problematic notably because they do not differ in effect from what conferences do today. Accepting the ELAA proposal 

as it is today would remove all the pro-competitive effects of the abolition of the conference system.” 

25 Dr. Rainer Nitsche and Nils von Hinten-Reed, “Competitive Impacts of Information Exchange,” Charles River 

Associates, Brussels, June 2004, page 5. 

26 Directorate-General for Competition, Information Note, “Issues Raised in Discussion with the Carrier Industry in 

Relation to the Forthcoming Commission Guidelines on the Application of Competition Rules to Maritime Transport 

Services,” paragraphs 3-6, (undated). 

27 During the 1990s there were a number of conflicts over the interpretation of the liner conference block exemption, 

resulting in decisions (upheld by the Court of First Instance) prohibiting inland haulage collective price setting on 

the inland leg of a multi-modal shipment, conference prohibition of members entering into individual contracts, and 

restrictive clauses applied to individual service contracts. In November 2002, an individual exemption was granted to 

the revised Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement that noted that provisions in a carrier agreement regarding individual 

and multi-carrier service contracts were outside the scope of the block exemption. Subsequently, the practical 

importance of conference tariffs disappeared as most rates were established in individual contracts, and “conferences” 

became de facto CDAs. 
Chapter 2

12

Recent Reviews of Liner Competition

This Study is the most recent in a series of US and European reviews addressing liner 

shipping competition since OSRA became effective in May 1999.28 Because the shift to 

pricing via confidential, individual service contracts brought about the virtual elimination of 

traditional liner conferences in US trades, the focus of contemporary policy discussions about 

liner competition has tended to focus on the role of carrier discussion agreements (with nonbinding rate authority). The repeal of the EU’s block exemption has now made it possible 

to attempt to compare the real-world impact of two differing regulatory approaches – one 

authorizing, the other prohibiting CDAs. Because this Study analyzes empirical data on the 

structure, conduct, and performance of liner shipping under these two regulatory approaches, 

it offers a perspective not available in previous reviews of liner competition. Those previous 

post-OSRA reviews include:

•	 The FMC’s September 2001 study entitled The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act 

of 1998 (“OSRA Impact Study”).

Based on an evaluation of changes during the first two years that the new legislation 

was in effect, the OSRA Impact Study concluded that the reform measures were 

achieving Congress’ policy objective of promoting a more market-driven, efficient 

liner shipping industry. The OSRA Impact Study found that, although market forces 

were mainly responsible for developments in liner shipping, US trades experienced a 

markedly changed business environment under OSRA. In particular, that study cited 

the ability of shippers to contract directly with individual carriers (rather than being 

subject to conference regulation), and the confidentiality of service contract terms as 

major pro-competitive reforms promoting greater market responsiveness.29

•	 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (“OECD”) April 16, 

2002 report on Competition Policy in Liner Shipping (“OECD Report”).

The OECD Report’s authors found no clear evidence that allowing carriers to 

collectively agree on rates was necessary for service reliability or generated net benefits to 

shippers. Consequently, they recommended that OECD member states no longer extend 

antitrust immunity to liner companies to collectively discuss and agree on rates. A lack of 

unanimity among OECD states regarding the Report’s recommendations, however, led 

to its failure to gain OECD endorsement. Nevertheless, the Report’s primary impact — 

as two DG Comp officials pointed out — was in simply raising the policy issue.30

28 In addition to the series of US and EU reviews discussed here, Australia and Singapore also conducted reviews 

of their liner competition policies, and New Zealand’s Productivity Commission recently announced (July 2011) a 

study of its international freight transport service – air and ocean – to be completed by April 1, 2012. Liner shipping 

antitrust immunity will be one topic in a broad range of questions to be addressed. Australia’s review, the Productivity 

Commission Inquiry (“PCI”), into the justification for, and possible alternatives to continued industry specific 

competition regulation for liner shipping, was conducted from June 23, 2004 to February 23, 2005. The PCI report 

recommended repeal of the liner industry exemption (Part X of the Trade Practices Act of 1974) from otherwise 

applicable competition law. However, its recommendations were not acted on by the Government of Australia. 

The Singapore review, conducted by the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”), assessed the necessity of 

continuing Singapore’s block exemption for liner shipping agreements. The CCS review began in January 2010 and 

ended in December of the same year. On December 16, 2010, based on the CCS review findings, Singapore’s Minister 

of Trade and Industry extended their block exemption for five years (until December 31, 2015) without substantial 

changes in its scope. 

29 OSRA Impact Study, “Executive Summary,” page 2. 

30 “The great merit of the OECD’s initiative on liner shipping competition policy is to have opened the debate on 

a topic that has long been taboo. Whatever the shortcomings, real or perceived, of its various reports, the OECD 

Secretariat has undoubtedly asked the right questions.” Jean-Francois Pons and Eric Fitzgerald, “Competition in the 

maritime sector: a new era,” February 2002. A critique of the “shortcomings” referred to can be seen in the December 

2001 paper “Analysis and Comments on the OECD Secretariat’s Paper, ‘Liner Shipping Competition Policy Report’” 

submitted by the World Shipping Council, a carrier trade association.
Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews

13

The OECD Report’s authors also proposed a compromise, consensus 

recommendation on liner antitrust policy based on three principles: (1) freedom to 

negotiate rates, surcharges and other terms of carriage on an individual and confidential 

basis, (2) freedom for carriers and shippers to contractually protect the confidentiality of 

key contract terms of negotiated service contracts, including rates, with such contract 

confidentiality being given maximum protection, and (3) freedom of carriers to pursue 

operational and/or capacity agreements with other carriers as long as the agreements do 

not confer undue market power to the parties involved. The Report’s authors noted 

that they viewed the three principles as consistent with OSRA, and that the principles 

could, and were meant to coexist with a regulatory regime that continued to extend 

antitrust immunity to rate discussions and price-setting.31

•	 DG Comp’s review of Regulation 4056/86 (“EC review”), including, specifically, the 

block exemption for liner conferences, that began in March 2003 and resulted in the 

repeal of the block exemption.

As described in greater detail earlier, DG Comp reviewed Regulation 4056/86 to 

determine whether liner conferences in the EU trades were delivering the presumed 

benefits on which the block exemption originally had been established. The review 

process involved the collection of data and other information from industry and shipper 

sources, public hearings and three DG Comp-funded consultant studies.32

The explanatory memorandum supporting the proposal to end the block 

exemption argued that liner conferences in the EU trades no longer fulfilled the 

original conditions for the block exemption. The EC review’s findings indicated that 

DG Comp believed that confidential service contracting and the use of operational 

agreements among lines provided a less restrictive alternative than conferences for 

stabilizing rates and ensuring reliable service.33 DG Comp also alleged that conferences 

harmed shippers by constraining their contract negotiating power and precluding 

competition on certain additional charges. 

•	 The October 18, 2006 Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Hearing on Antitrust 

Immunity Provided Under The Shipping Act of 1984 (“AMC Hearing”).

On November 2, 2002, Congress authorized creation of the AMC to examine 

whether there was a need to modernize US antitrust law, and to identify and study any 

related issues.34 Shipping Act antitrust immunity was a part, but relatively minor part, 

of the AMC’s overall mandate. The AMC Hearing included testimony by panelists 

31 “Competition Policy in Liner Shipping, Final Report,” Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Division 

of Transport, OECD, April 16, 2002, pages 78-80, paragraphs 204-215. 

32 Those consultant studies are: (1) a paper by Erasmus University (the final version submitted on November 12, 2003); 

(2) Economic Assistance Study on Liner Shipping (May 2005 revised final report) by ICF Consulting; and (3) The Application 

of Competition Rules to Liner Shipping (October 26, 2005 final report) by Global Insight, Institute of Shipping Economics 

and Logistics, and Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy, Berlin University of Technology. 

33 “Conference members increasingly offer their services via individual service agreements entered into with individual 

exporters. In addition conferences do not manage the [amount of] carrying capacity that is available as this is an 

individual decision taken by each carrier. Under the current market circumstances price stability and reliability of service 

are brought about by individual service agreements.” Proposal for a Council Regulation, 12/14/05, COM (2005) 651 final, 

2005/0264 (CNS), Explanatory Memorandum, pages 12 and 13. 

34 Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, under Public Law No. 107-273, 107th Congress. 
14

representing the FMC,35 the liner shipping industry, American importers and exporters, 

ocean transportation intermediaries, and US public port authorities. A DG Comp 

official also attended and presented testimony concerning DG Comp’s review process 

and the EU’s decision to eliminate the liner conference block exemption. 

On the topic of statutory immunities from antitrust law, such as found in the 

Shipping Act of 1984, the AMC final report noted: “Congress is currently considering 

the repeal of several immunities, including those covering the business of insurance 

and international shipping conferences. The [Antitrust Modernization] Commission 

strongly encourages such review. The [Antitrust Modernization] Commission believes 

that statutory immunity from the antitrust laws should be disfavored.”36

•	 An October 18, 2008 Congressional Research Service report entitled Reauthorization 

of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC): Opportunity to Reexamine the Congressionally 

Mandated Antitrust Exemption for Ocean Liner Carriers? (“CRS Report”)

The CRS Report contained no findings or policy recommendations. It provided 

background information concerning liner agreements in US trades, the legislative 

history of US shipping law, information on Asian and European approaches to 

liner competition, and various stakeholder groups’ views on Shipping Act antitrust 

immunity. In its concluding chapter, the CRS Report author emphasized that: 

“Congress could decide to follow the EU’s lead and repeal antitrust immunity or it 

could take a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to observe any positive or negative effects that 

the repeal may have on the European liner trade.”37 The CRS Report also raised the 

question as to whether the repeal of antitrust immunity in European trades might result 

in carriers attempting “to recoup their revenue losses [in EU trades] by raising rates in 

other trades, such as the US trans-Pacific.”38

As this brief summary of post-OSRA reviews of liner competition illustrates, OSRA 

and subsequent DG Comp actions eliminated the utility of most liner conferences. In 

their place, trade-wide CDAs, for example, the Transpacific Stabilization Agreement 

(“TSA”) and Westbound Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (“WTSA”)39 in the Pacific, 

became the primary vehicles for carrier cooperation on pricing. However, the shift from 

conferences to CDAs, even in an environment where rates were largely set in one-to-one, 

confidential contract negotiations, did not end questions about, or controversy regarding 

carrier antitrust immunity. 

35 In response to an AMC request to identify the costs and benefits of antitrust immunity and make recommendations 

on whether the existing immunity should be retained, modified or repealed, then FMC Chairman Steven Blust advised 

that he and three other commissioners felt “that the existing laws and processes are working very well.” (Hearing 

transcript, page 60.) One FMC Commissioner, Joseph Brennan, wrote the AMC favoring a modification that would 

“repeal antitrust immunity with respect to rate-setting and rate discussions by ocean common carriers.” (See the letter 

from Commissioner Brennan to Deborah A. Garza, Chair AMC, October 11, 2006.) 

36 Antitrust Modernization Commission Report and Recommendations, submitted to Congress and the President 

on April 2, 2007, “Immunities and Exemptions,” pages viii and ix. Repeal of liner shipping antitrust immunity was 

addressed in H.R. 6167, The Shipping Act of 2010, which sought to eliminate carrier antitrust immunity. It was 

introduced by Rep. James Oberstar and Rep. Elijah Cummings, but was never acted on by the relevant committee. 

37 John Frittelli, CRS Report, page 20. 

38 Ibid page 21. 

39 It should be noted that trade-wide discussion agreements came into existence well before OSRA reforms eliminated 

the authority for traditional conference regulation of members’ pricing (contracts and tariffs) activities. TSA, for example, 

was established in 1989. Originally, CDAs facilitate the exchange of information about freight rates, capacity, and 

trade conditions between conference lines and independent (non-conference) lines. As conferences disappeared, CDAs 

became the dominant trade-wide carrier organization. 
Legislative Contexts and Recent Competition Reviews

15

How this Study Goes Beyond Recent Reviews

While not designed to directly evaluate which, if either, of the two major regulatory 

approaches (OSRA or EU competition law) might provide the optimal model for liner 

shipping regulation, the Study does go beyond the predecessor studies mentioned above in at 

least three respects:

•	 It provides a detailed, empirical description of what happened in the three major East/

West trades since the EU’s announced repeal of the liner block exemption;

•	 It provides a comparative analysis across trade lanes to identify and assess, to the degree 

possible, any significant impacts of the EU’s repeal; and

•	 It focuses its analysis on empirical data concerning market structure, carrier conduct 

and economic performance in major East/West trades rather than theoretical 

discussions of liner conferences.

As a result, the Study has generated evidence, insights and new research questions 

relevant to the still unsettled issue of how best to regulate international liner competition 

and cooperation.
17

Chapter 3:

Some Complicating Factors

Reviewing the situation of the three major East/West trades from 2006 through 2010 has 

had its challenges. Two issues in particular complicated the analysis of the repeal of the liner 

block exemption: The fact that any impacts from the repeal were likely to be relatively 

modest (minimal intervention impact) because the market power of carrier agreements was 

already limited by the demise of traditional conferences following OSRA and actions by DG 

Comp; and the occurrence, nearly simultaneously with the repeal’s implementation, of a 

massive exogenous shock – the biggest decline in trade volumes in liner history as the result 

of a substantial global recession. Taken together, they suggest that any effect(s) of the repeal 

on liner shipping very likely would be masked by the effects of the global recession. 

Expected Impact of the EU Repeal

For several reasons, the immediate impact of the repeal of the EU liner block exemption 

was deemed likely to be moderate, at least in the two Europe-based trades being considered 

here. In the North Atlantic, the existing carrier “conference,” TACA, had been substantially 

weakened under OSRA. The vast majority of the cargo carried by its member lines moved 

under confidential, individual service contracts. Furthermore, TACA members’ combined 

market share amounted to only about 50 percent of the cargo carried – meaning half the trade 

volumes moved with independent (non-TACA) lines. Nor did TACA engage in capacity 

management activities – which, in any event, likely would have been futile given its members’ 

limited market presence. In short, TACA lacked market power. So any “intervention effect” 

from the repeal of the block exemption likely would be moderate at best.

Similarly, the Far East/North Europe trade’s liner “conference,” the FEFC, was 

operating under the significant constraints that DG Comp put in place in 2002. Although 

the combined capacity of FEFC’s member lines accounted for approximately 74 percent of 

westbound capacity and 69 percent of eastbound capacity, the FEFC did not collectively 

manage trade-wide capacity. Nor was the FEFC able to regulate its members’ contract rates. 

Like TACA, FEFC was essentially a de facto CDA subject to the limitations associated with 

such agreements.

The main alleged harm attributed to organizations like TACA and FEFC in DG Comp’s 

repeal proposal was (a) that conference tariff rates set a “benchmark” in advance of individual 

lines’ contract negotiations, and (b) that various proposed charges, such as terminal handling 

charges (“THCs”), had been adopted by non-conference lines. DG Comp viewed the wide 

adoption of conferences’ proposed charges as precluding competition in that portion of total 

shipper costs covered by surcharges. Thus, the main immediate positive impact of the repeal 

for shippers was expected to be a decline in auxiliary charges and surcharges, plus a possible 

moderate decline in the freight rates. 

Exogenous Shock: The Global Recession

The greatest difficulty in identifying what consequences might be attributable to the repeal 

of the block exemption was the impact that the global recession had on international trade 

and, consequently, on trade volumes, vessel utilization levels and revenues earned in liner 

shipping. As described in the final report of the National Commission on the Causes of 
Chapter 3

18

the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, the US housing and financial crisis 

that led to the worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression came to a head at 

approximately the same time that the EU repeal of the block exemption took effect:

The crisis reached seismic proportions in September 2008 with the failure of Lehman 

Brothers and the impending collapse of the insurance giant American International Group 

(AIG). Panic fanned by the lack of transparency of the balance sheets of major financial 

institutions, coupled with the tangle of interconnections among institutions perceived as 

being “too big to fail,” caused the credit markets to seize up. Trading ground to a halt. 

The stock market plummeted. The economy plunged into a deep recession.1

Approximately 57 percent of US companies reported that they were somewhat or 

very affected by credit constraints. Without access to credit, and faced with an uncertain 

economy, businesses reduced costs by laying-off workers and cutting back on capital 

investments. A related decline in global trade volumes hurt the US economy and the 

economies of its trading partners. For example, the decline in US exports in the final six 

months of 2008 alone reportedly reduced Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) growth by three 

percentage points.2

The recession slowed economic growth on a worldwide scale. Global real GDP growth 

remained positive, but was halved from 4.2 percent in 2000-2007 to two percent in 2008-

2010. Across countries there was an enormous amount of variation in growth. After sluggish 

growth on the order of one percent in 2008, the EU-27 economy contracted 4.2 percent 

in 2009. In the US, GDP growth was negative from the 2nd quarter of 2008 to the 2nd

quarter 2009. The US recession hit its nadir in first quarter of 2009 with minus 6.8 percent 

annualized growth. In China, rapid economic growth of 13 percent in first quarter of 2007 

was halved to 6.2 percent in first quarter of 2009. 

Other indicators of economic performance were also ominous. The Consumer 

Confidence Index (“CCI”), a leading indicator that measures consumer sentiments based on 

a monthly survey of households, dropped long before output retracted, and began declining 

as early as August 2007. Consumer confidence continued to fall steadily until bottoming out 

in February 2009, at 23 percent of the index level of July 2007. European consumers began 

to lose confidence at about the same time as their American counterparts. The European 

Commission’s CCI indicator declined from June 2007 to February 2009. 

The world’s three largest economies, the US, European Union, and China, faced different 

economic conditions as a result of the global recession. A demand shock in the US and 

Europe meant that China, the world’s leading exporter, would trade less with its major 

counterparts. International trade plummeted at a rate far faster than the contraction in GDP. 

As for the liner shipping industry, PIERS trade data for the US shows that aggregate foreign 

container trade began decreasing on a year-on-year basis starting in second quarter 2008.3

At its lowest point in first quarter 2009, US container trade was down 20 percent from the 

previous year.

The trade volume recovery in 2010, however, was robust. US imports from China had 

dropped 45 percent on a year-on-year basis in February 2009, but had rebounded by 46.2 

percent in February 2010. In all three major trade lanes, both directions posted year-on-year 

growth by January 2010. A strong peak season in 2010 indicated that US trades had resumed 

their normal patterns, with volumes close to pre-recession levels.

1 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, PublicAffairs Books, January 2011, page xvi. 

2 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, “Business: ‘Squirrels Storing Nuts’,” pages 394-397.

3 A detailed review of the impact of the global recession of 2008-09 on the liner industry is provided in Appendix IV, 

“Liner Recession and Recovery.”
Some Complicating Factors

19

The sharp decline in volumes, vessel utilization levels, freight rates and liner company 

revenues followed by an almost equally sharp rebound in Far East-based trades, means 

that the Study’s research period (2006-2010) includes a period of what might be called 

“normality” (2006 through mid-2008) and a decidedly non-normal “stress period” (late 

2008 through mid-2010). Ideally, one would have preferred to have compared two relatively 

“normal” periods to evaluate the impact of the exemption’s repeal. 

Eventually the data collected for this Study may provide the foundation for a longerterm study closer to the “ideal” mentioned above. In the meantime, however, a somewhat 

less-than-ideal comparison of what occurred in the five years from January 1, 2006 through 

December 31, 2010 is not without value. For example, the crisis that ran from third quarter 

2008 through third quarter 2010 provides an opportunity, in the form of a natural “stress 

test” experiment, to see if carriers in trade lanes where CDAs are allowed to operate, such 

as the transpacific, were able to provide a greater degree of rate and service stability than 

occurred in trade lanes, such as the Far East/North Europe trade, where opportunities for 

carrier cooperation were more restricted due to the repeal of the block exemption.
21

Chapter 4:

Methods of Analysis

Combining Multiple Approaches

Given the substantial challenges described above, it became important to adopt multiple 

approaches to the analysis. These approaches include:

•	 Descriptive studies of the three major East/West trade lanes with respect to market 

structure, participant conduct, and economic performance. 

•	 A difference-in-differences analysis of freight rates, vessel utilization, and the like to 

identify any intervention effects from the repeal of the block exemption.1

•	 A general assessment (taking account of the above research) of conditions in the major 

East/West trades, and, in particular, the likelihood of any negative impact on shippers 

in US trades. 

To address the Study’s core question – What impact has the repeal of the conference block 

exemption in Europe had on US liner trades? – it is necessary to respond to the two underlying 

questions:

•	 Did the anticipated changes as a result of the repeal of the EU block exemption in EU 

trades actually occur?

•	 If so, did those changes have any follow-on consequences for shippers in US-based 

trades in which limited antitrust immunity remains in place?

The Study aims to identify and quantify any significant impacts the EU repeal of the 

block exemption may have on US liner trades. That requires establishing a causal relationship, 

if one exists, between a specific policy intervention (the repeal of the block exemption) and 

any post-intervention changes (that is, any intervention effects) to market structure, carrier 

conduct, and, particularly, economic performance in the EU and US trades. 

Structure, Conduct and Performance

The relevant economic factors to be analyzed are generally referred to, in shorthand, as 

SCP — standing for Structure, Conduct and Performance. In brief, an SCP-based analysis 

involves examining:

•	 Market Structure: This refers to the relatively stable features of the market in which 

rival firms and their customers interact. Those features are the ones that most tend to 

influence rivalry among buyers (shippers) and sellers (carriers) within given markets 

(liner shipping trades). Typically, those features include cargo volume and route length 

which may affect seller concentration, cargo characteristics, trade imbalances, barriers 

1 Difference-in-differences estimation is commonly used to measure the effect or impact of a new policy, law, medical 

treatment or other type of program intervention. The difference in outcomes before and after the change in policy, 

law or treatment for the (treatment) group affected by that intervention is compared to the difference in outcomes for 

a (control) group for whom there is no such intervention. In the context of our study, one can compare changes in 

outcomes among carriers operating in a liner trade that has had antitrust immunity repealed (the treatment group) to 

changes in outcomes among carriers operating in a trade where that immunity still remains (the control group).
Chapter 4

22

to entry and exit, government regulations, growth rate of market demand, and the like.

•	 Firm Conduct: This refers to the strategies or behaviors that firms engage in pursuing 

a competitive advantage in a given market. That could involve pricing policies, 

research and development, investments in productive assets, mergers and acquisitions, 

cooperation with rivals (explicit or tacit), and the like.

•	 Economic Performance: This refers to the economic outcomes achieved by firms and by the 

industry in terms of efficient resource allocation, observed profitability, and the like.

The traditional SCP model is based on the hypothesis that there is an explicit relationship 

between market structure (for example, the number and size of buyers and sellers) and firm 

conduct in that market (for example, a firm’s pricing decisions and investment strategies), and 

that firm conduct, in turn, largely explains each firm’s economic performance. In the case 

of this Study, the trades’ original SCP profiles and their post-repeal SCP profiles, and any 

changes that were observed, were compared across trades to determine what the differences 

were and how those differences changed following the repeal. The data developed in the 

SCP comparisons is then used in the difference-in-differences analysis (described below).

Using SCP factors, one available analytical approach could have been simply to select 

a trade originally dominated by OSRA-related requirements that, post-repeal, became 

dominated by the requirements of EU competition law (for example, the North Europe/

US trade) and make direct before and after comparisons. Such an approach utilizes a single 

market assessment (“SMA”) of impact. In essence, SMA involves identifying, measuring, 

and comparing key pre- and post- intervention SCP observations in the subject trade. For 

example, one might collect observations of various pre-repeal conditions such as rate levels, 

rate volatility, or liner vessel utilization and similar observations for the post-intervention 

period, and then identify and quantify the observable changes. However, in this case, the 

repeal of the block exemption, the policy intervention being assessed could be masked by 

confounding variables other than the repeal. So, a SMA would only establish the existence 

and degree of a post-intervention change, not a causal relationship to the policy intervention 

(repeal) being assessed. Consider the following illustrative example:

Subject Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention Change

Hypothetical Trade:

Average Revenue per TEU

$1,000 

Average Revenue per TEU

$960 

Average Revenue per TEU

($40) [- 4%] Decline in 

Average Revenue per TEU

In the above example, the decline of $40 per TEU following the repeal does not 

represent solid evidence of a causal relationship between the intervention and the decline 

in rates. It would be unlikely that that the full $40 decline in average revenue per TEU 

would be the exclusive result of the repeal of the block exemption (a pure intervention 

effect), especially given the near simultaneous onset of the global recession’s impact on trade 

volumes. Consequently, additional information and more robust analytical techniques would 

be needed to determine what would most plausibly explain the decline in average revenue. 

A SMA of a single trade that experienced the policy intervention (repeal of the block 

exemption) is unsatisfactory. It would be unlikely to produce clear and persuasive results.

Comparative Evaluation: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 

A step beyond an analysis of a single trade would be a comparison of key economic factors 

across the East/West trades. The Study uses difference-in-differences estimates (“DD”) to 

identify any impacts attributable to a discrete policy intervention, and is a more plausible 

analytic process than SMA. DD estimates involve comparing pre- and post-intervention 
Methods of Analysis

23

conditions in certain relationships (using, for example, SCP factors) between the two subject 

trades. A DD analysis, as will be explained in greater technical detail later in the Study, 

compares the relationship between subjects (say carrier operations in the transpacific trade 

and carrier operations in the Far East/North Europe trade) with respect to a given factor (say 

rate volatility) before the policy intervention (repeal of the block exemption) and again after 

the intervention. That is, rather than simply comparing the gross changes in a single trade, 

a DD approach makes a trade-vs.-trade comparison for given variables (such as rate levels, 

rate volatility, vessel utilization levels, etc.) in the pre-intervention period, and then makes 

another trade vs. trade comparison after the intervention. For example:

Subjects Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention Difference in differences

Transpacific trade $2,000 AR per TEU $1,500 AR per TEU

Far East/N. Europe trade $2,500 AR per TEU $3,000 AR per TEU

Difference $500 (25%) $1,500 (100%) $1,000 or 75% (100% - 25%)

The Study applies a basic DD analysis to discriminate between impacts caused by the repeal 

of the block exemption and impacts such as those caused by the global recession. To do so, 

DD analysis compares an EU trade (such as the Far East/Europe trade) with a similar, non-EU 

trade unaffected by the policy intervention under analysis (such as the Far East/US trade). 

Notice of Inquiry Responses

On November 1, 2010, the FMC issued a detailed Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) to solicit 

information and comments from the liner industry and shipping public that could be 

potentially useful to the Study.2

 The requested information and data were intended to assist 

the agency to identify and evaluate any discernable trade-specific effects of the repeal. The 

NOI was divided into six sections:

•	 General questions on possible impacts of the repeal, 

•	 Specific questions regarding the North Europe/United States trade, 

•	 Specific questions regarding the Far East/United States trade, 

•	 Specific questions about the Far East/Europe trade, 

•	 Questions addressing comparisons among the foregoing trades, and 

•	 A set of additional questions for liner companies. 

Fifteen carriers,3

 two shipowners’ groups,4 and one logistics and transportation consultant,5

but no individual shippers or shipper trade associations, responded to the NOI. 

A summary of responses to the NOI is provided in Appendix I. The four initial questions, 

however, present interesting general perspectives on the respondents’ experiences under EU 

competition law. Those questions, and a summary of the responses, are provided below.

2 “NOI—An Analysis of the European Union’s Repeal of the Liner Conference Block Exemption,” Federal Maritime 

Commission, November 1, 2010.

3 APL Co. PTE Ltd.; Atlantic Container Line AB; CMA CGM, S.A.; COSCO Container Lines North America, Inc. 

(on behalf of COSCO Container Lines Company); Evergreen Line; Hamburg Süd; Hanjin Shipping Company, Ltd.; 

Hapag-Lloyd AG; Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.; K Line America, Inc. (on behalf of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, 

Ltd.); A.P. Moller Maersk A/S; NYK Line (North America) Inc. (on behalf of Nippon Yusen Kaisha); Orient Overseas 

Container Line Ltd.; Yang Ming Transport Corp.; and Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd.

4 The Asian Shipowners’ Forum and the Japanese Shipowners’ Association. 

5 Global Logistics & Transport Consulting.
24

•	 Based on your experience since September 2006 (when the EU announced its decision to 

terminate the block exemption for liner conferences to take effect October 2008), what impacts, 

if any, have you identified on your company’s commercial activities, in any trade lane, that you 

would attribute to the termination of the EU conference block exemption? Please explain. If you 

believe there have been such impacts, please indicate when that impact first occurred.

Most carriers listed (1) higher relative rate volatility, (2) greater surcharge complexity 

and higher surcharge levels, and (3) reduced levels of service (relative to the US transpacific 

trade). Several carriers said impacts were minimal or they could not identify any – and one 

carrier added that, in its view, the repeal had provided no shipper benefits.

•	 Based on your experience since October 2008 (when the EU exemption for liner conferences 

was terminated), has any class of shipper or class of vessel-operating common carrier received a 

competitive advantage or been put at a competitive disadvantage as a result of the EU decision to 

terminate the exemption? If so, please explain.

A substantial majority said it was too difficult to tell or that they had seen no particular 

advantages or disadvantages being created. For respondents that identified advantages or 

disadvantages, rate volatility was said to be harder on small carriers, and a more complex 

pricing environment (as, for example, for surcharges) was also identified as a problem. One 

carrier opined that there had been increased concentration, mainly due to market share 

growth of the three largest carriers in EU trades, relative to the transpacific trade.

•	 Based on your experience since October 2008 (when the EU exemption for liner conferences 

was terminated), have differences between the US and EU liner shipping competition regulations 

created any problems for your company? If so, please explain.

A substantial majority said either “no” or indicated that, in general, it would be more 

convenient for carriers if there was one common set of rules. There was, however, no 

mention of any particular problems. Several carriers used their responses to reinforce their 

views on rate volatility and non-uniform surcharges as problems.

•	 Does your company view cooperation among ocean carriers in operational agreements (e.g., vessel 

sharing agreements, alliances, consortia, etc.) as generally having a positive, neutral, or negative 

impact on the availability or cost of liner shipping services? Please explain. Does the EU market 

share threshold of 30 percent for such operational agreements have any effect with respect to that 

impact? If so, please explain.

Uniformly, operational agreements were viewed positively. On the question of a 30 

percent market share threshold, one carrier mentioned it as a way to prevent the formation 

of monopolies. Several others raised questions about the threshold’s potential effect on 

formation of new vessel sharing arrangements, and its possible impacts with respect to service 

at new ports or in niche markets. However, most lines mentioned that they had no actual 

problems staying below the 30 percent threshold.

Broadly speaking, responses to the first four NOI questions indicated that some carrier 

respondents believed that there were areas in which the EU repeal might have had an impact. 

Those areas included (1) a difference in relative rate volatility, (2) changes in surcharges 

(both in complexity and amount), and (3) the levels of service provided in different trades. 

In addition, one carrier indicated that trade-lane differences in industry concentration might 

have been affected by the repeal. A few carriers also speculated that the alleged differences 

in rate volatility and surcharges across trades might have disproportionately affected smaller 
25

shippers. In general, however, responding carriers did not see the repeal as having led to any 

clear competitive advantages or disadvantages for any class of shipper or carrier.

The NOI responses were treated not as factual evidence of claims being asserted, but 

rather as useful suggestions that relative rate volatility, service levels, market concentration, 

and the dynamics of surcharges were areas that might warrant analytical attention.

The carrier respondents indicated no specific problems with having to accommodate two 

different regulatory approaches to liner competition and cooperation. The responses suggest 

that, in the absence of actual conflicts of law, there may be no pressing need to conform 

regulatory approaches. In addition, responses to the fourth question indicate that the current 

exemptions, in the US and Europe, for operational agreements are viewed positively and 

seen as commercially important.
27

Chapter 5:

Market Analyses of Three Trades

Introduction 

This section presents descriptive studies of the three East/West trades covered in this Study: 

the North Europe/US trade, the Far East/North Europe Trade, and the Far East/US trade. 

The first two trades, being EU-based, were directly affected by the repeal of the liner 

conference block exemption. TACA, which operated in the North Europe/US trade, was 

terminated, as was the Far Eastern Freight Conference (“FEFC”), which operated in the Far 

East/North Europe trade. Because the Far East/US trade is outside the scope of the EU’s 

jurisdiction, the two transpacific carrier agreements, TSA and WTSA, continue to operate.

Each trade is presented separately beginning with a brief background description, 

followed by a commentary on what happened in the subject trade during the 2006-2010 

review period. That commentary draws from the structure-conduct-performance data tables 

and charts prepared for this analysis. Each table and chart addresses a particular aspect of 

market structure, carrier conduct or economic performance in the trade being analyzed. An 

explanatory paragraph introduces each table and chart. 

This set of information also was subsequently used as the basis for the difference-indifferences comparisons that make up the analytical heart of the Study (see Chapter 6). The 

summary comments, charts and data tables are presented here to acquaint the reader with the 

considerable material that was developed, and to give the reader a general overview of what 

changed during the five years under consideration.

Because the Study includes difference-in-differences estimates comparing the Far East/

North Europe trade and the Far East/US trade, additional background information (as 

compared to the North Europe/US trade) is provided for those trades. In particular, a 

detailed description of the structure and operation of TSA and WTSA is presented in a 

separate sub-section following the Far East/US trade’s general background information. That 

sub-section also includes a brief description of how Asian nations address liner competition 

law exemptions.
Chapter 5

28

North Europe/US

Background

This section provides a summary background discussion on the market characteristics of 

the liner shipping industry and the agreement activity of carriers between the US and the 

EU at the time of the block exemption repeal and thereafter. The repeal directly impacted 

the US shipping trades with EU nations by making all forms of conference and price fixing 

agreements between carriers illegal, resulting in their termination. For purposes of this Study, 

the examination of the repeal focuses on the major trade lane between the US and North 

Europe and does not address the US/South Europe trade lane in the Mediterranean region.1

Traditionally, the port range of the North Europe sector of the trade spans the area from 

Bayonne, France to North Cape, Norway.2

In 2010, North Europe was the second largest US liner trade by volume after Northeast 

Asia, accounting for ten percent of the total volume, and 16 percent of the total value, of US 

container cargo worldwide.3

 In general, however, the trade of containerized goods between 

the developed economies of the US and North European nations has matured at a more 

moderate rate of growth than the accelerated pace in other US liner trades. Over the twentyyear period from 1990 through 2010, container cargo volume in the US/North Europe trade 

grew by 61 percent.4

 In comparison to other trade regions, however, US container cargo 

volume with Asia, Central/South America, and the Indian Subcontinent grew substantially 

more by 250, 280, and 550 percent, respectively.5

 It was determined from an analysis of the 

responses to the Commission’s NOI that on average the liner services of the carriers in the 

trade accounted for around four percent of their total revenue earnings. Further, profitability 

in the trade, relative to the Far East trades, had noticeably deteriorated over the period from 

2006 through 2010 (see Table TA-26).6

Container cargo growth in the trade is also affected by such economic factors as the rates 

of economic growth and currency exchange. As developed economies, the rates of economic 

growth in the US and the EU, as measured by the real gross domestic product (“GDP”), 

have been moderate and closely correlated. Most notably, at the time of the repeal, the 

economies of the US and the EU simultaneously descended into a recession, which started 

in the fourth quarter of 2008 and lasted throughout most of 2009. In the second quarter of 

2009, compared to the same period in the preceding year, the economies hit a low point as 

GDP contracted by four percent in the US and five percent in the EU.7

 Toward the end of 

2010, the economies began to recover as GDP grew moderately at a quarterly rate of about 

three percent in the US and two percent in Europe.8

1 The liner services and ports in these two trade lanes are largely separate and non-substitutable, meaning US liner cargo 

bound for North Europe ports is not transshipped through South Europe ports to any significant degree, and vice versa. 

Also, the US/North Europe trade is the largest of the two liner shipping trades with a greater number of direct services 

where a conference agreement was in effect at the time of the block exemption repeal.

2 The market in the North Europe port range includes container shipments originating and destined for the countries 

of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 

United Kingdom.

3 Port Import Export Reporting Service (PIERS), United Business Media Limited; and USA Trade Online, US Census Bureau.

4 PIERS.

5 Ibid.

6 See comments to questions 24 and 26 of the NOI in Appendix I.

7 OECD.Stat Extracts (April 18, 2011).

8 Ibid.
Market Analyses of Three Trades

29

Similarly, the rates of exchange between the US dollar and European currencies 

fluctuated measurably between 2006 and 2010. The value of the euro peaked at a monthly 

record high of $1.58 in July 2008, and the British pound peaked at a monthly high of $2.07 

in November 2007.9

 At these levels, the strength of the European currencies against the US 

dollar increased the purchasing power of European consumers for US exports. By the end 

of December 2010, the values of the euro and the British pound had fallen to $1.32 and 

$1.56, respectively.10 The trend of cargo growth in the trade closely mirrored the trends 

of economic growth and currency exchange between the US and North Europe, which 

accordingly affected the demand and price of liner shipping service. These correlations and 

trends will be examined in closer detail in the proceeding section.

Over the years, the market characteristics of liner shipping in the US/North Europe trade 

have remained fairly consistent. Within North Europe, the top trading foreign nations with 

the US are Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. In the 

US, the majority of container cargo in the trade moves through the ports of New York, 

Charleston, Norfolk, Houston, and Savannah. In North Europe, the ports of Antwerp, 

Belgium; Bremerhaven, Germany; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; and Le Havre, France 

handle the largest portion of container traffic in the trade.

Traditionally, consumer goods imported from North Europe moving inbound to the 

US have composed the headhaul direction of the trade, meaning the direction of the trade 

with the greatest quantity of cargo that usually generates the highest revenue. The top 

containerized commodities imported from North Europe include beer, auto parts, furniture, 

printing paper, beverages, tires, chemicals, and wine & spirits (see Tables TA-14a-e).

In the outbound trade direction, many of the top containerized US exports are materials 

used in manufacturing and building, such as lumber, wood pulp, kraft paper, synthetic resins 

and rubber, and chemicals (see Tables TA-14a-e). The major shippers of these US exports 

have been engaged in exporting their products to North Europe for decades and command 

a substantial portion of the cargo. In addition, used automobiles shipped in containers 

have also become a popular US export in the trade and are usually handled by ocean 

transportation intermediaries, such as non-vessel-operating common carriers (“NVOCCs”) 

(see Tables TA-14a-e).

Container cargo shipped by NVOCCs, as opposed to beneficial cargo owners (“BCO”) 

or shippers’ associations, is more prevalent in the inbound direction from North Europe. 

From 2006 through 2010, the total cargo shipped by NVOCCs was 35 percent in the 

inbound direction as opposed to 21 percent in the outbound direction.11 For the same 

period, the amount of cargo shipped in refrigerated containers was not significant, amounting 

to only four percent in each trade direction.

In terms of rate agreements between carriers, TACA was the last conference to operate in 

the trade subject to the competition laws and the block exemption regulations, Regulation 

4056/86, of the EU and US shipping statutes. In 1992, the conference first formed as the 

Trans-Atlantic Agreement (“TAA”) with a combined membership that held 80 percent of 

the market share in the trade. The actions of the carriers under the authority of TAA, and 

subsequently TACA, resulted in a series of protracted and complex regulatory decisions and 

9 Federal Reserve Bulletin.

10 Ibid.

11 The figures on the percentage of NVOCC cargo are derived for the trade as a whole based on PIERS data, which 

may to some extent be understated. From the NOI responses, it appears that the percentage of NVOCC cargo was 

higher; for example, it was around 55 percent on average for 2010. See public comments to question 25 of the NOI. 
Chapter 5

30

litigation before the EC and the European Courts that lasted until 2003.12 The FMC also 

initiated a series of formal proceedings to investigate the activities of the carriers in TAA/

TACA for possible violations of the Shipping Act.

Gradually, the conference modified its authority to comply with the decisions of 

the regulatory agencies and the requirements of the revised legislation under OSRA. In 

September 2006, the termination of the conference system in the trade became definite 

when the EU voted to repeal Regulation 4056/86 with a two-year transition period. At the 

time, membership in TACA dropped to five carriers with a total market share of around 40 

percent.13 By the end of June 2008, TACA terminated its tariff and discontinued operating as 

a conference; the agreement was terminated at the end of September 2008.

In September 2009, the EC voted to renew and modify its block exemption regulations 

for consortia agreements between ocean carriers, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 

906/2009. Among the modifications, the EC reduced the market share threshold by which 

consortia are block exempted from 35 to 30 percent. Forms of consortia, or operational, 

agreements in the trade include all three of the major alliance arrangements; these are The 

New World Alliance Agreement, The Grand Alliance Agreement II, and the COSCO/KL/

YMUK/Hanjin Worldwide Slot Allocation and Sailing Agreement (“CKYH Group”) (see Table 

TA-16). In addition, as the recession reduced the demand for liner service in the trade, a 

number of carriers increased the coordination of their services and vessel space under a series 

of operational agreements with the alliances; the carriers include Maersk Line, Evergreen 

Line, Hamburg Süd, and Zim Integrated Shipping Services, Ltd. (see Table TA-16).14 The 

next section addresses these developments and more in relation to the market conditions that 

prevailed during the review period from 2006 through 2010.

Commentary

This section provides comments on the market conditions and the activities of carriers in the 

US/North Europe trade for the review period from 2006 through 2010. The review period 

provides a span of time to assess the trade prior to and after the repeal of the block exemption 

regulations by the EU. As noted, the repeal directly impacted the trade by terminating the 

legal immunity for conferences, which forced TACA to disband in 2008. 

Over the review period, the geographic distribution of cargo was unaffected. The top 

five trading nations in North Europe together accounted for over 80 percent of the total 

container cargo moved in the trade in 2006 and 2010; as noted, these nations are Germany, 

Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. In the US, the majority of 

container cargo moved through Atlantic ports, around 75 percent in 2006 and 2010, while 

Gulf and Pacific ports handled around 15 and 10 percent, respectively, for the same periods 

(see Tables TA-13a and TA-13e).

Market concentration in the trade increased moderately among the participating ocean 

carriers over the review period. In 2006, the top four carriers with the highest market shares 

had a concentration ratio (“CR4”) of 54 percent and included in ranking order HapagLloyd, Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company (“MSC”), and Evergreen Line (see 

Table TA-7a). In 2010, the CR4 increased to 58 percent and included in ranking order 

MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk Line, and APL Co. Pte. Ltd. (“APL”) (see Table TA-7e). 

12 See Appendix V for a detailed discussion on the regulation of ocean carrier agreements in the transatlantic trade. 

13 The remaining TACA members at the time of the termination of the conference were Atlantic Container Line AB, 

Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Co., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, and Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd.

14 The agreements include the New World Alliance/Maersk Line Slot Exchange Agreement, the Grand Alliance/Zim/HSDG 

Atlantic Space Charter Agreement, and the ELJSA/CKYH Vessel Sharing Agreement-Trans Atlantic Express Service. 
Market Analyses of Three Trades

31

Market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) increased 

from 918 in 2006 to 1145 in 2010 (see Chart TA-8).15 The extent of entry and exit by ocean 

carriers in the trade was limited over the review period (see Table TA-11).16

At the beginning of the review period in 2006, the quantity of imported containers and 

the freight rates at which they moved were substantially higher in the inbound direction, 

the traditional headhaul lane, than the outbound direction where US export growth and 

freight rates were comparatively depressed (see Table TA-1 and Chart TA-2). During this 

time, the ratio of import containers to export containers reached its highest level of 1.62 

in July 2006 (see Table TA-5 and Chart TA-6), and the average contract rate for import 

containers peaked at $2,567 per FEU in February 2006, while the average contract rate for 

US export containers sunk to a low of $854 per FEU for the entire first quarter of 2007 (see 

Chart TA-20). In 2006 and 2007, the utilization of vessel capacity in the inbound direction 

tended to peak seasonally in the months of March through July in the 80 percent range and 

higher (see Table TA-23 and Chart TA-24).

In 2007 and 2008, a shift in the directional flow of cargo occurred and the quantity of US 

container exports to North Europe grew and surpassed container imports by a slight margin 

for a short period of time (see Table TA-1 and Chart TA-2). The ratios of import containers 

to export containers were 0.91 and 0.98 in January and February of 2008 (see Table TA-5 

and Chart TA-6), and in April 2008, the volume of export containers peaked for the review 

period, having risen 35 percent since April 2006 (see Table TA-1 and Chart TA-2). The 

shift in cargo growth was precipitated by the sharp decline in the value of the US dollar 

against the euro and other European currencies, which stimulated the foreign demand for US 

container exports and suppressed the demand for European container imports.17

In 2008, the utilization of vessel capacity in the outbound direction peaked at levels in 

the high 80 to low 90 percent range in the months from February through August (see Table 

TA-23 and Chart TA-24). Consequently, the freight rates for US container exports steadily 

rose. In October 2008, the average contract rate for container exports peaked at $1,794 per 

FEU, an increase of 110 percent from the lows of $854 per FEU in the first quarter of 2007 

(see Chart TA-20). During this period, the members of the TACA used the last vestiges 

of their rate authority to implement general rate increases (“GRIs”) in their outbound 

tariff prior to the termination of the conference. In the inbound direction, freight rates of 

container imports incrementally declined in the same period but on average remained above 

the outbound rate levels for container exports (see Chart TA-20).

The period of robust growth in US container exports was cut short when recessionary 

conditions in the US and North European economies began to unfold, coinciding with the 

repeal of Regulation 4056/86 in October 2008. Toward the end of 2008 and into 2009, 

container cargo volume in both trade directions plummeted due to the contraction in 

demand, and the increase in excess capacity caused utilization to fall to its lowest level in the 

review period. In the first half of 2009 compared to the same period in 2008, container cargo 

volume had fallen by 34 percent in the outbound direction and 24 percent in the inbound 

direction (see Table TA-1 and Chart TA-2), and the utilization levels were in the 60 percent 

range in both trade directions (see Table TA-23 and Chart TA-24). 

15 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and 

an HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. 

16 Over the review period, Norasia Container Lines Ltd., Gold Star Line Ltd., and China Shipping Container Lines Co. 

Ltd. exited from the trade, and Compania Sud Americana de Vapores (CSAV) entered the trade.

17 As noted, the value of the euro peaked at a monthly record high of $1.58 in July 2008, increasing the purchasing 

power of European consumers for US exports. Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Chapter 5

32

The depressed market conditions precipitated sharp declines in freight rates of both 

container imports and exports. In the inbound direction, the average contract rate of 

container imports sunk to its lowest level of $1,694 per FEU in June 2009, marking a decline 

of 34 percent from the peak of $2,567 per FEU in February 2006 (see Chart TA-20). In the 

outbound direction, the rate increases of 2008 in container exports eroded as freight rates 

regressed back to just above the low levels experienced in 2006 and 2007.

To cope with the depressed market conditions and sustain their operations in the trade, 

carriers took decisive measures to coordinate their services to a greater extent using their 

operational authority in agreements. Major carriers in conjunction with the three alliance 

groups entered into operational agreements to reconfigure and reduce their services to 

remove excess vessel capacity and maintain sufficient service levels (see Table TA-16). 

Consequently, by the start of 2010, carriers had removed a sizable portion of excess capacity 

from the market of around 24 percent in each trade direction, and the amount of capacity 

supplied in the trade under forms of operational agreements had increased from around 50 

percent in 2006 to 70 percent.18 The number of direct services in the trade was reduced 

from 22 in 2006 to 14 in 2010 (see Tables TA-17a and TA-17e). Major carriers that used 

to be more preeminent, such as Maersk Line and Evergreen Line, reduced their presence in 

the trade substantially by cutting capacity and services. In contrast, MSC and Hapag-Lloyd 

maintained their capacity and services in the trade.

Throughout 2010, the volume of container cargo in both trade directions grew 

marginally, as weak market conditions still affected the trade and prevented a full recovery 

of container volume equal to the pre-recessionary period (see Table TA-1 and Chart TA-2). 

By the end of 2010 compared to 2006, container imports and exports were more in balance 

at a ratio of 1.11 (see Table TA-5 and Chart TA-6). With less excess capacity in the market, 

utilization levels improved, and freight rates steadily increased in both trade directions. By 

the end of 2010, freight rates of container imports were still below the 2006 levels, but 

container export rates were comparable to the levels realized in the 2008 period of strong 

export growth (see Chart TA-20). Shifts in market share among competing carriers in the 

trade, as measured by the market share instability index (“MSII”), was at its highest level of 

19 percent in 2010 (see Table TA-25). This degree of market share change in 2010 indicates 

that competition among carriers intensified, but it also reflects the change in market share 

that resulted from the service and capacity reductions implemented by carriers. Most notably, 

Maersk Line and Evergreen Line lost market share, while MSC gained a sizable share of the 

market in 2010 (see Table TA-9).

Over the review period, the US/North Europe trade, like most of the liner trades, was 

affected by external economic factors that transformed the structure of the market and the 

levels of service and freight rates. With the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 by the EU, carriers 

could no longer use a conference system to address or influence market conditions. It is 

difficult to assess to what extent a conference could have controlled or lessened the effects of 

the recession that occurred in 2009. At the time of the repeal, the influence and authority of 

TACA had waned, and the total market share of its remaining members had dropped to 40 

percent. Carriers increased their cooperation under operational agreements to cope with the 

depressed market conditions. These measures enabled carriers to continue to remain in the 

trade and sustain sufficient service levels by sharing vessel space and reducing operating costs 

by removing under-used capacity. Thus, under distressed market conditions, in the absence 

of a conference system, it appears that carriers used their operational authority to deploy 

18 Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research.
Market Analyses of Three Trades

33

vessel capacity more efficiently, which increased both utilization levels and freight rates in the 

trade. It would be difficult to determine whether carriers would have behaved any differently 

if they had been able to participate in a conference at this time.

The remainder of this section consists of a series of tables and charts that track and 

describe changes between 2006 and 2010 in various aspects of market structure, carrier 

conduct and economic performance in the US/North Europe trade.
34

Transatlantic Market Structure

Table TA-1 Monthly TEU Cargo Volumes 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time 

series data showing by trade direction the total number of US container exports that moved 

outbound to North Europe, and the total number of container imports that moved inbound 

to the US from North Europe. The container imports and exports are measured in TEUs. 

The trend in the number of the containers moved over the time series shows the extent 

of cargo growth and seasonality in each trade direction based on the foreign and domestic 

consumer demand for container exports and imports, which affects the demand and price of 

the liner shipping services in the trade. Further, the number of containers moved inbound 

and outbound identifies the headhaul and backhaul directions of the trade, and the extent 

of any imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo. The source of the container 

cargo data is the Port Import Export Reporting Service (“PIERS”), United Business Media 

Limited.

TA–1 US/North Europe Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in TEUs

US to N. Europe TEUs N. Europe to US TEUs

Jan-06 97,856 135,280

Feb-06 97,548 137,046

Mar-06 110,283 155,914

Apr-06 104,484 160,427

May-06 112,846 155,153

Jun-06 100,232 150,751

Jul-06 96,318 156,250

Aug-06 97,688 147,330

Sep-06 97,904 141,249

Oct-06 110,642 151,733

Nov-06 106,178 147,570

Dec-06 99,008 136,810

Jan-07 106,467 123,685

Feb-07 108,636 124,199

Mar-07 136,488 159,648

Apr-07 125,602 145,128

May-07 127,430 154,782

Jun-07 120,372 152,197

Jul-07 116,962 152,505

Aug-07 125,928 149,973

Sep-07 121,981 132,731

Oct-07 128,712 145,800

Nov-07 118,673 139,191

Dec-07 110,566 138,307

Jan-08 123,428 112,240

Feb-08 135,780 133,661

Mar-08 137,363 139,398

Apr-08 140,886 140,734

May-08 138,115 139,915

Jun-08 128,966 133,327

Jul-08 132,241 148,651
35

TA–1 US/North Europe Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in TEUs (continued)

US to N. Europe TEUs N. Europe to US TEUs

Aug-08 130,898 130,894

Sep-08 118,535 132,463

Oct-08 121,873 143,098

Nov-08 105,047 125,063

Dec-08 92,761 118,666

Jan-09 85,112 86,268

Feb-09 90,376 98,769

Mar-09 93,719 110,683

Apr-09 87,697 108,904

May-09 86,403 96,370

Jun-09 87,944 108,303

Jul-09 91,570 120,704

Aug-09 94,713 110,964

Sep-09 96,147 111,897

Oct-09 99,532 117,289

Nov-09 95,687 112,537

Dec-09 94,832 112,736

Jan-10 89,779 96,901

Feb-10 91,318 100,124

Mar-10 114,419 123,355

Apr-10 108,787 124,368

May-10 103,587 124,576

Jun-10 102,343 124,408

Jul-10 100,425 131,563

Aug-10 105,748 129,134

Sep-10 103,063 116,013

Oct-10 109,533 128,647

Nov-10 104,484 128,143

Dec-10 102,651 113,699

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
36

Chart TA-2 Monthly and Three-Month Moving Average TEU Cargo Volumes 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the actual import and export container cargo loads in each 

direction of the US/North Europe trade. The chart also provides a three-month moving 

average of the import and export cargo loads to smooth out fluctuations in the data and 

delineate the overall trend lines more clearly. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series 

of time in months over the review period, and the vertical axis measures container cargo loads 

in thousands of TEUs. The trend lines of the data show the extent of growth, seasonality, and 

change that occurred over the review period in the consumer demand for container imports 

and exports in the trade. In turn, the extent of container cargo growth, or a serious reduction 

in container cargo volume due to a contraction in demand, affects the price of liner shipping 

service in the trade. Further, the trend lines of container imports and exports identify the 

headhaul and the backhaul directions of the trade, and any imbalance and change over time in 

the directional flow of cargo. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

170

TA–2 US/North Europe Trade 

Loaded TEUs by Month

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive

US to N. Europe

3-month moving average

N. Europe to US

3-month moving average

Loaded TEUs (Thousands)

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal
37

Table TA-3 Monthly Metric Ton Volumes for Containerized Cargo

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time 

series data showing by trade direction the total weight of the container exports that moved 

outbound to North Europe, and the total weight of the container imports that moved 

inbound to the US from North Europe. The weight of the containers is measured in metric 

tons. The trend in the metric tons of containers moved over the time series is an indication 

of the extent of cargo growth and seasonality in each trade direction based on the foreign and 

domestic demand for container exports and imports. The trend in the data also shows the 

extent of any weight imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo in the trade. The 

weight of the cargo moving in a trade lane can affect the utilization of vessel capacity and 

impose draft limitations on containerships. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

TA–3 US/North Europe Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in Metric Tons

US to N. Europe

Metric Tons

N. Europe to US

Metric Tons

Jan-06 767,780 1,175,751

Feb-06 761,173 1,201,666

Mar-06 845,002 1,376,249

Apr-06 817,694 1,422,882

May-06 858,365 1,367,230

Jun-06 767,649 1,308,465

Jul-06 732,474 1,359,503

Aug-06 731,422 1,273,267

Sep-06 746,355 1,238,211

Oct-06 853,535 1,330,655

Nov-06 821,821 1,279,395

Dec-06 782,965 1,193,206

Jan-07 847,287 1,085,287

Feb-07 859,710 1,065,051

Mar-07 1,065,665 1,390,351

Apr-07 986,040 1,276,049

May-07 979,586 1,359,982

Jun-07 937,242 1,319,859

Jul-07 882,178 1,292,837

Aug-07 936,393 1,279,825

Sep-07 957,491 1,139,229

Oct-07 997,867 1,237,268

Nov-07 881,804 1,205,640

Dec-07 798,857 1,188,094

Jan-08 929,022 970,207

Feb-08 1,028,630 1,171,021

Mar-08 1,014,107 1,210,779

Apr-08 1,019,678 1,212,108

May-08 1,011,100 1,211,155

Jun-08 931,046 1,149,533

Jul-08 951,705 1,260,464

Aug-08 978,779 1,118,777

Sep-08 849,797 1,147,525

Oct-08 912,475 1,277,409
38

TA–3 US/North Europe Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in Metric Tons (continued)

US to N. Europe

Metric Tons

N. Europe to US

Metric Tons

Nov-08 810,893 1,109,787

Dec-08 706,686 1,044,046

Jan-09 669,465 761,237

Feb-09 688,188 862,194

Mar-09 715,607 968,595

Apr-09 689,674 965,413

May-09 690,472 856,630

Jun-09 694,083 949,939

Jul-09 723,114 1,045,385

Aug-09 755,074 968,194

Sep-09 769,125 993,715

Oct-09 813,419 1,043,080

Nov-09 767,619 1,004,435

Dec-09 748,902 1,002,414

Jan-10 756,616 880,658

Feb-10 740,484 890,815

Mar-10 926,210 1,119,994

Apr-10 886,205 1,139,564

May-10 845,153 1,136,564

Jun-10 844,266 1,130,359

Jul-10 821,501 1,169,100

Aug-10 855,268 1,131,252

Sep-10 836,080 1,031,807

Oct-10 887,989 1,141,458

Nov-10 839,921 1,143,269

Dec-10 804,754 1,008,497

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
39

Chart TA-4 Monthly and Three-Month Moving Average 

Metric Ton Volumes for Containerized Cargo 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend lines 

of time series data showing the actual metric tons of import and export container cargo that 

moved in each direction of the US/North Europe trade. The chart also provides a threemonth moving average of the metric tons of import and export container cargo to smooth 

out fluctuations in the data and delineate the overall trend lines more clearly. The horizontal 

axis of the chart gives the series of time in months over the review period, and the vertical 

axis measures container cargo in millions of metric tons. The trend lines of the data show 

the extent of growth, seasonality, and change that occurred over the review period in the 

amount of metric tons that moved in each trade direction. Further, the trend lines show the 

extent of any weight imbalance and change over time in the directional flow of the cargo 

in the trade. The change over time in the trend lines reflects the change in the consumer 

demand for container imports and exports. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

TA–4 US/North Europe Trade 

Liner Cargo Volume in Metric Tons

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Metric Tons (Millions)

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

US to N. Europe

3-month moving average

N. Europe to US

3-month moving average
40

Table TA-5 Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time series 

data showing the ratio in the weight and number of container imports divided by the weight 

and number of container exports moving in the US/North Europe trade. The weight of 

the container cargo is measured in metric tons, and the number of containers is measured in 

TEUs. The ratio of container imports to container exports provides a measure of the extent 

of any imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo in the trade. The higher the ratio 

is above 1.0 the higher the extent of an imbalance in the weight or number of container 

imports in excess of container exports. A ratio of less than 1.0 indicates a period of time 

when container exports exceeded container imports. Further, the ratio shows the extent to 

which the US demand for container imports exceeded the foreign demand for US container 

exports. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

TA–5 Imbalance in the US/North Europe Trade

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Metric Tons TEUs

Jan-06 1.53 1.38

Feb-06 1.58 1.40

Mar-06 1.63 1.41

Apr-06 1.74 1.54

May-06 1.59 1.37

Jun-06 1.70 1.50

Jul-06 1.86 1.62

Aug-06 1.74 1.51

Sep-06 1.66 1.44

Oct-06 1.56 1.37

Nov-06 1.56 1.39

Dec-06 1.52 1.38

Jan-07 1.28 1.16

Feb-07 1.24 1.14

Mar-07 1.30 1.17

Apr-07 1.29 1.16

May-07 1.39 1.21

Jun-07 1.41 1.26

Jul-07 1.47 1.30

Aug-07 1.37 1.19

Sep-07 1.19 1.09

Oct-07 1.24 1.13

Nov-07 1.37 1.17

Dec-07 1.49 1.25

Jan-08 1.04 0.91

Feb-08 1.14 0.98

Mar-08 1.19 1.01

Apr-08 1.19 1.00

May-08 1.20 1.01

Jun-08 1.23 1.03

Jul-08 1.32 1.12

Aug-08 1.14 1.00

Sep-08 1.35 1.12

Oct-08 1.40 1.17
41

TA–5 Imbalance in the US/North Europe Trade

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo (continued)

Metric Tons TEUs

Nov-08 1.37 1.19

Dec-08 1.48 1.28

Jan-09 1.14 1.01

Feb-09 1.25 1.09

Mar-09 1.35 1.18

Apr-09 1.40 1.24

May-09 1.24 1.12

Jun-09 1.37 1.23

Jul-09 1.45 1.32

Aug-09 1.28 1.17

Sep-09 1.29 1.16

Oct-09 1.28 1.18

Nov-09 1.31 1.18

Dec-09 1.34 1.19

Jan-10 1.16 1.08

Feb-10 1.20 1.10

Mar-10 1.21 1.08

Apr-10 1.29 1.14

May-10 1.34 1.20

Jun-10 1.34 1.22

Jul-10 1.42 1.31

Aug-10 1.32 1.22

Sep-10 1.23 1.13

Oct-10 1.29 1.17

Nov-10 1.36 1.23

Dec-10 1.25 1.11

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
42

Chart TA-6 Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the ratio in weight and number of the container imports to 

container exports that moved in the US/North Europe trade. The weight of the containers 

is measured in metric tons, and the number of the containers is measured in TEUs. The 

horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time in months over the review period, and the 

vertical axis measures the level of the ratio of container imports to container exports. The 

trend lines of the ratio show the extent of an imbalance in the weight or number of container 

imports in excess of container exports in the trade over the review period. The degree to 

which the trend lines exceed 1.0 shows the degree of an imbalance in container imports 

above container exports. A trend line that falls below one indicates a period of time when 

the weight or number of container exports exceeded container imports. The trend lines over 

the time series show how any imbalance in directional flow of container cargo changed over 

the review period. They can also be interpreted as showing the change over time in the US 

demand for foreign container imports compared to the foreign demand for US container 

exports. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

2.00

TA–6 Imbalance in the US/North Europe Trade

Ratio of US Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive

TEUs

Metric Tons

Ratio

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal
43

Tables TA-7a-e Annual Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI)

The following tables provide measures of the annual levels of market concentration among 

the shipping lines that participated in the US/North Europe trade for the review period from 

2006 through 2010. The shipping lines that operated vessels in the trade for each year of 

the review period are shown in ranking order from largest to smallest based on the amount 

of their total annual container cargo carriage. The amount of total containers moved by 

each shipping line is combined to include imports and exports and is measured in TEUs. 

The percentage of market share is derived for each shipping line from the container data. 

From the market share figures, measures of market concentration are derived to show the 

concentration ratio of the top four shipping lines with the highest market shares (“CR4”) 

and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). The CR4 is simply derived as the sum of 

the percent of the market shares of the top four lines. The figures in the Market Share and 

Cumulative Percent columns in the following tables have been rounded to the nearest whole 

number and may not appear to sum accurately.

The HHI for each year is expressed in bold at the bottom of the HHI column in each 

table and is derived as the sum of the squared values of the market share of each shipping 

line. As a benchmark for assessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as 

moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. It would be 

expected that a greater degree of competition among market participants is present in a less 

concentrated market. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.
44

TA–7a US/North Europe 

Total Liner Cargo [Imports and Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2006

Rank Shipping Line 2006 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Hapag-Lloyd 534,235 18% 18% 321.53 

2 Maersk 429,807 14% 32% 208.12 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 371,710 12% 45% 155.66 

4 Evergreen Line 260,008 9% 54% 76.16 

5 American President Lines 189,114 6% 60% 40.29 

6 OOCL 136,988 5% 65% 21.14 

7 Atlantic Container Line 118,802 4% 68% 15.90 

8 Independent Container Line 106,418 4% 72% 12.76 

9 NYK Line 106,173 4% 76% 12.70 

10 CMA CGM 92,765 3% 79% 9.69 

11 NORASIA Line 70,224 2% 81% 5.56 

12 K Line 69,112 2% 83% 5.38 

13 Mitsui OSK Line 68,321 2% 86% 5.26 

14 China Shipping Container Line 68,119 2% 88% 5.23 

15 Hanjin Shipping 66,111 2% 90% 4.92 

16 Atlantic Cargo Shipping 64,865 2% 92% 4.74 

17 COSCO 60,889 2% 94% 4.18 

18 Yang Ming Line 50,743 2% 96% 2.90 

19 Hyundai Merchant Marine 47,106 2% 98% 2.50 

20 Zim Container Line 46,127 2% 99% 2.40 

21 Hamburg Sud 20,988 1% 100% 0.50 

22 Marfret 715 0% 100% 0.00 

2006 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 2,979,341 100% -- 918 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
45

TA–7b US/North Europe 

Total Liner Cargo [Imports and Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2007

Rank Shipping Line 2007 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Hapag-Lloyd 580,138 19% 19% 344.12 

2 Maersk 422,119 13% 32% 182.19 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 401,293 13% 45% 164.65 

4 Evergreen Line 276,869 9% 54% 78.38 

5 American President Lines 178,736 6% 59% 32.66 

6 OOCL 135,194 4% 64% 18.69 

7 Atlantic Container Line 131,529 4% 68% 17.69 

8 China Shipping Container Lines 119,739 4% 72% 14.66 

9 CMA CGM 119,092 4% 76% 14.50 

10 Independent Container Line 106,292 3% 79% 11.55 

11 NYK Line 105,452 3% 82% 11.37 

12 Zim Container Line 79,717 3% 85% 6.50 

13 Mitsui OSK Line 76,042 2% 87% 5.91 

14 K Line 66,492 2% 89% 4.52 

15 COSCO 58,788 2% 91% 3.53 

16 Hanjin Shipping 58,248 2% 93% 3.47 

17 Hamburg Sud 57,033 2% 95% 3.33 

18 Atlantic Cargo Shipping 55,312 2% 97% 3.13 

19 Yang Ming Line 51,514 2% 98% 2.71 

20 Hyundai Merchant Marine 47,428 2% 100% 2.30 

21 Marfret 311 0% 100% 0.00 

2007 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 3,127,335 100% -- 926 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
46

TA–7c US/North Europe 

Total Liner Cargo [Imports and Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2008

Rank Shipping Line 2008 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Hapag-Lloyd 564,069 18% 18% 334.06 

2 Maersk 440,457 14% 33% 203.69 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 399,690 13% 46% 167.73 

4 Evergreen Line 250,412 8% 54% 65.84 

5 American President Lines 188,873 6% 60% 37.45 

6 OOCL 176,737 6% 65% 32.80 

7 Atlantic Container Line 150,703 5% 70% 23.85 

8 CMA CGM 124,715 4% 74% 16.33 

9 NYK Line 121,262 4% 78% 15.44 

10 Independent Container Line 109,468 4% 82% 12.58 

11 Hamburg Sud 86,984 3% 85% 7.94 

12 Mitsui OSK Line 78,544 3% 87% 6.48 

13 Zim Container Line 61,777 2% 89% 4.01 

14 China Shipping Container Lines 59,306 2% 91% 3.69 

15 K Line 51,052 2% 93% 2.74 

16 Hanjin Shipping 49,611 2% 94% 2.58 

17 Hyundai Merchant Marine 46,751 2% 96% 2.29 

18 COSCO 44,594 1% 97% 2.09 

19 Yang Ming Line 41,883 1% 99% 1.84 

20 Atlantic Cargo Shipping 38,836 1% 100% 1.58 

21 Marfret 465 0% 100% 0.00 

2008 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 3,086,189 100% -- 945 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
47

TA–7d US/North Europe 

Total Liner Cargo [Imports and Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2009

Rank Shipping Line 2009 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Hapag-Lloyd 477,824 20% 20% 402.34 

2 Mediterranean Shipping Company 338,388 14% 34% 201.78 

3 Maersk 325,182 14% 48% 186.34 

4 American President Lines 170,402 7% 55% 51.17 

5 OOCL 164,445 7% 62% 47.65 

6 Evergreen Line 149,170 6% 68% 39.21 

7 Atlantic Container Line 124,813 5% 73% 27.45 

8 NYK Line 104,040 4% 78% 19.07 

9 Independent Container Line 85,314 4% 81% 12.83 

10 CMA CGM 78,526 3% 85% 10.87 

11 Mitsui OSK Line 65,610 3% 87% 7.59 

12 Zim Container Line 59,717 3% 90% 6.28 

13 Hamburg Sud 50,831 2% 92% 4.55 

14 Hyundai Merchant Marine 37,679 2% 94% 2.50 

15 Hanjin Shipping 35,099 1% 95% 2.17 

16 K Line 31,009 1% 96% 1.69 

17 China Shipping Container Lines 26,105 1% 98% 1.20 

18 Yang Ming Line 26,061 1% 99% 1.20 

19 COSCO 20,956 1% 100% 0.77 

20 Atlantic Cargo Shipping 10,802 0% 100% 0.21 

21 Marfret 184 0% 100% 0.00 

2009 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 2,382,157 100% -- 1027 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
48

TA–7e US/North Europe 

Total Liner Cargo [Imports and Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2010

Rank Shipping Line 2010 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Mediterranean Shipping Company 545,532 21% 21% 423.96 

2 Hapag-Lloyd 531,285 20% 41% 402.10 

3 Maersk 277,290 10% 51% 109.53 

4 American President Lines 170,378 6% 58% 41.35 

5 OOCL 166,081 6% 64% 39.29 

6 Atlantic Container Line 142,982 5% 69% 29.12 

7 Independent Container Line 117,368 4% 74% 19.62 

8 NYK Line 116,227 4% 78% 19.24 

9 Evergreen Line 102,000 4% 82% 14.82 

10 Hamburg Sud 94,813 4% 85% 12.81 

11 CMA CGM 92,698 3% 89% 12.24 

12 Mitsui OSK Line 75,021 3% 92% 8.02 

13 Zim Container Line 69,648 3% 94% 6.91 

14 Hyundai Merchant Marine 40,873 2% 96% 2.38 

15 K Line 26,747 1% 97% 1.02 

16 Hanjin Shipping 25,322 1% 98% 0.91 

17 Yang Ming Line 25,248 1% 99% 0.91 

18 COSCO 15,765 1% 99% 0.35 

19 CSAV 11,497 0% 100% 0.19 

20 Atlantic Cargo Shipping 1,990 0% 100% 0.01 

21 Marfret 706 0% 100% 0.00 

2010 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 2,649,470 100% -- 1145 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
49

Chart TA-8 Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI) 

The chart provides a summary of the changes in market concentration among the 

participating shipping lines in the US/North Europe trade over the review period from 2006 

through 2010. Measures of market concentration in the trade for each year are provided 

showing the concentration ratio of the top four shipping lines with the highest market shares 

(“CR4”) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). The CR4 is derived as the sum of 

the percent of the market shares of the top four shipping lines, and the HHI is derived as the 

sum of the squared values of the market share of each participating shipping line in the trade. 

The market share of each shipping line is based on its total annual container cargo carriage in 

the trade measured in TEUs. 

As a benchmark for assessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as 

moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. PIERS is the 

source of the container cargo data.

918

54%

926

54%

945

54%

1027

55%

1145

58%

CR4

HHI

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

TA-8 US/North Europe Trade

Measures of Market Concentration CR4 & HHI

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

Market Share of Top Four Carriers in Trade (CR4)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0
50

Table TA-9 Changes in the Market Shares of Participants

The table provides a summary of the changes in the market share percentages of the 

participating shipping lines in the US/North Europe trade for each year of the review period 

from 2006 through 2010. The annual market share percentages of each shipping line are 

based on its total annual container cargo carriage in the trade measured in TEUs. The shifts 

in market share between the shipping lines provide an indication of how well each line 

competed in the marketplace from one year to the next and over the course of the review 

period. Spaces where no percentages appear in the table [identified by dashes] signal the exit 

or entry of a shipping line in the trade. The bottom row of the table gives the size of the 

market in millions of TEUs as measured by the sum of the annual amount of total import 

and export containers moved in the trade by each of the identified shipping lines. Only those 

shipping lines that deployed vessels in the trade in a given year were included as market 

participants. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data. 

TA-9 US/North Europe 

Changes in the Market Shares of Participants

Shipping Line 2006 MS 2007 MS 2008 MS 2009 MS 2010 MS

Hapag-Lloyd 18% 19% 18% 20% 20%

Maersk 14% 13% 14% 14% 10%

Mediterranean Shipping Company 12% 13% 13% 14% 21%

Evergreen Line 9% 9% 8% 6% 4%

American President Lines 6% 6% 6% 7% 6%

Orient Overseas Container Line 5% 4% 6% 7% 6%

Atlantic Container Line 4% 4% 5% 5% 5%

Independent Container Line 4% 3% 4% 4% 4%

NYK Line 4% 3% 4% 4% 4%

CMA CGM 3% 4% 4% 3% 3%

K Line 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%

Mitsui OSK Line 2% 2% 3% 3% 3%

China Shipping Container Lines 2% 4% 2% 1% -- 

Hanjin 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%

Atlantic Cargo Shipping 2% 2% 1% 0% 0%

COSCO 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%

Yang Ming Line 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%

Hyundai Merchant Marine 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%

Zim Container Line 2% 3% 2% 3% 3%

Hamburg Sud 1% 2% 3% 2% 4%

Marfret 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Norasia Line (2006) -- CSAV (2010) 2% -- -- -- 0%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Market Size (Millions of TEUs) 2.98 3.13 3.09 2.38 2.65

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
51

Table TA-10 Changes in Cargo Lifts and Market Shares of the 

Major Alliances and Vessel Sharing Arrangements 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the total number 

and market share percentage of annual containers moved as a group by members of each 

of the alliance agreements and the selected vessel sharing agreements operating in the US/

North Europe trade. The total number of annual containers moved by each agreement is 

the sum of the total number of annual containers moved by each member of the agreement 

and is combined to include imports and exports measured in TEUs. The annual market 

share percentage is derived by dividing the total number of containers of each agreement 

by the total number of import and export containers that moved in the trade; the quotient 

is multiplied by 100. The table also gives the sum, and the corresponding market share 

percentage, of the annual containers moved in the trade by all of the alliance agreements (as 

one group) and by all of the alliance and selected vessel sharing agreements (as one group). 

The selected vessel sharing agreements shown in the table are those where an alliance, as a 

group, formed a service, or services, under an agreement in partnership with non-alliance 

carriers operating in the trade. Over the review period, the table shows any annual change 

that occurred in the total number, and corresponding market share percent, of containers 

moved by the various agreements and groups of agreements. The source of data is PIERS.
52

TA-10 US/North Europe

Changes in Cargo Lifts (TEUs) and Market Shares of the Major Alliances and VSAs

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 304,541 302,206 314,168 228,102 286,272 

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 777,396 820,784 862,069 746,309 813,593 

COSCO/KL/YMUK/Hanjin Worldwide Slot 

Allocation and Sailing Agreement 246,855 235,041 187,140 113,125 93,082 

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance/Maersk Line Slot Exchange 

Agreement 734,349 724,324 754,625 553,284 563,562 

The Grand Alliance/Zim Atlantic Vessel Sharing 

Agreement -- -- 923,846 -- -- 

The Grand Alliance/Zim/HSDG Atlantic Space 

Charter Agreement -- -- -- 856,857 978,054 

ELJSA/CKYH Vessel Sharing Agreement - Trans 

Atlantic Express Service -- -- -- 262,295 195,083 

Liftings by Alliances 1,328,792 1,358,030 1,363,377 1,087,535 1,192,947 

Liftings by Alliances including Partners 1,758,600 1,780,149 1,865,611 1,672,436 1,736,699 

Total Trade Liftings 2,979,341 3,127,335 3,086,189 2,382,157 2,649,470 

Shares of Capacity

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 10.2% 9.7% 10.2% 9.6% 10.8%

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 26.1% 26.2% 27.9% 31.3% 30.7%

COSCO/KL/YMUK/Hanjin Worldwide Slot 

Allocation and Sailing Agreement 8.3% 7.5% 6.1% 4.7% 3.5%

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance/Maersk Line Slot Exchange 

Agreement 24.6% 23.2% 24.5% 23.2% 21.3%

The Grand Alliance/Zim Atlantic Vessel Sharing 

Agreement -- -- 29.9% -- -- 

The Grand Alliance/Zim/HSDG Atlantic Space 

Charter Agreement -- -- -- 36.0% 36.9%

ELJSA/CKYH Vessel Sharing Agreement - Trans 

Atlantic Express Service -- -- -- 11.0% 7.4%

Market Share of Alliances 44.6% 43.4% 44.2% 45.7% 45.0%

Market Share of Alliances including Partners 59.0% 56.9% 60.5% 70.2% 65.5%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
53

Table TA-11 Carrier Entry and Exit 

The table shows the level of entry and exit of shipping lines participating in the US/North 

Europe trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. Only those 

shipping lines that deployed vessels in liner services in the trade were counted as market 

participants. For purposes of this study, market entry was counted as the initiation of a new 

liner service in which a shipping line deployed some or all of its own vessels and was not 

deploying vessels in any other liner services in the trade at the time when the new service 

was initiated. Market exit was counted as a shipping line terminating its services in the 

trade and removing its vessels. The level of market entry and exit provides an indication of 

whether barriers to entry in a market exist, which affects competition between the market 

participants. The exit or entry of shipping lines in a trade is also a function of the demand 

for liner shipping services. A contraction in demand for an extended period may cause lines 

to exit a trade without attracting new entry. Established shipping lines are able to enter and 

exit trades more readily without incurring any great amount of sunk cost as opposed to the 

start up of a new shipping line in a trade where the capital investment can be substantial. The 

source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

TA–11 US/North Europe Trade

Entries and Exits

Entry/Exit based on carriers listed as operators in the transatlantic trade as identified by Drewry

N. Europe 

to US Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

US to 

N. Europe Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

1Q06 1Q06

2Q06 2Q06

3Q06 3Q06

4Q06 Norasia, Gold Star

164,669 TEUs 4Q06

1Q07 1Q07

2Q07 2Q07

3Q07 3Q07

4Q07 4Q07

1Q08 1Q08

2Q08 2Q08

3Q08 3Q08

4Q08 4Q08

1Q09 1Q09

2Q09 2Q09

3Q09 3Q09

4Q09 CSCL 104,247 TEUs 4Q09 CSCL 92,664 TEUs

1Q10 1Q10

2Q10 2Q10

3Q10 3Q10

4Q10 CSAV 147,256 TEUs 4Q10 CSAV 131,626 TEUs

Derived from Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports, Drewry Maritime Research
54

Table TA-12 Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) and Ratio of Market Size to MES

The table on the left estimates the minimum efficient scale (“MES”) of weekly liner service 

in the US/North Europe trade for each year of the review period from 2006 through 

2010. The MES for each year is measured as the smallest level of service among comparable 

shipping lines that can sustain a competitive weekly service loop in the trade. For each year, 

the table identifies the shipping lines, frequency, type, number of vessels, the average TEU 

vessel capacity of each MES, and any changes in MES over time. 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the right also 

gives the ratio of the size of the market to the MES of service in each direction of the US/

North Europe trade. The ratio is derived by dividing the annual capacity of the market by 

the annual capacity of the MES in each direction of the trade. The MES for each year is 

measured as the smallest level of service among comparable shipping lines that can sustain a 

competitive weekly service loop in the trade. The market size is measured as the sum of the 

annual capacity of all of the liner services offered in the trade. The table shows the change 

in the ratio in each trade direction over the review period. It would be expected that a high 

ratio of market size to MES indicates that competition among market participants is greater 

and barriers to market entry are lower. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

TA–12 US/North Europe Trade

Trend in Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) Ratio of Market Size to MES

N. Europe to US US to N. Europe

2006 CMA CGM w/CSCL and 

Hatsu (Evergreen Line) 

weekly loop service using 5 vessels of 

2,646 TEU vessel capacity on average 22 21 

2007 CMA CGM w/CSCL and 

Evergreen 

weekly loop service using 5 vessels of 

2,730 TEU vessel capacity on average 20 20 

2008 CMA CGM w/CSCL and 

Evergreen 

weekly loop service using 5 vessels of 

2,820 TEU vessel capacity on average 19 19 

2009 CKYH Alliance weekly loop service using 4 vessels of 

2,725 TEU vessel capacity on average 18 18 

2010 CKYH Alliance w/ 

Evergreen 

weekly loop service using 4 vessels of 

2,726 TEU vessel capacity on average 16 16 

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
55

Tables TA-13a-e Container Volume and Market Share 

between US Coastal Ranges and Foreign Nation

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables give the total number 

and market share percentages of annual containers that moved between the US Atlantic, 

Gulf, and Pacific coasts and each foreign nation included in the geographic scope of the 

liner shipping trade between the US and North Europe. The regions of the Great Lakes, 

US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico are included in the US Atlantic coast, and Alaska and 

Hawaii are included in the US Pacific coast. The total number of containers for each year is 

combined to include imports and exports measured in TEUs. Each market share percentage 

of container cargo is derived as a function of the total number of import and export 

containers that moved in the trade for each year, e.g., 11.9 percent of the total number of 

containers in the trade for 2006 moved between the foreign nation of Belgium and the 

US Atlantic coast. The tables show the geographic distribution and extent of demand in 

container cargo between the US and each North European nation through each US coastal 

range. Over the review period, the tables show any change that occurred in the distribution 

and demand of container cargo in the trade. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.
56

TA–13a US/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by North European Country and US Port Range

2006 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 26,170 4,764 2,477 33,411 

Belgium (Luxembourg) 356,632 119,773 27,919 504,324 

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 31,591 6,658 4,148 42,397 

Denmark 38,181 9,983 7,730 55,894 

Estonia 7,938 1,394 410 9,742 

Finland 57,760 7,592 4,193 69,545 

France 191,260 35,325 34,441 261,026 

Germany 627,221 91,603 66,926 785,750 

Hungary 7,635 1,201 723 9,559 

Ireland 40,109 5,424 5,676 51,209 

Latvia 14,043 4,024 1,692 19,759 

Lithuania 25,624 2,450 2,438 30,512 

Netherlands 354,992 69,002 45,076 469,070 

Norway 21,495 7,671 4,493 33,659 

Poland 51,376 6,714 7,741 65,831 

Sweden 83,795 11,320 12,286 107,401 

Switzerland 14,453 3,069 1,731 19,253 

United Kingdom 326,431 69,246 42,481 438,158 

Total 2006 2,276,706 457,213 272,581 3,006,500 

2006 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 0.9% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1%

Belgium (Luxembourg) 11.9% 4.0% 0.9% 16.8%

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 1.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.4%

Denmark 1.3% 0.3% 0.3% 1.9%

Estonia 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%

Finland 1.9% 0.3% 0.1% 2.3%

France 6.4% 1.2% 1.1% 8.7%

Germany 20.9% 3.0% 2.2% 26.1%

Hungary 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%

Ireland 1.3% 0.2% 0.2% 1.7%

Latvia 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7%

Lithuania 0.9% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0%

Netherlands 11.8% 2.3% 1.5% 15.6%

Norway 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 1.1%

Poland 1.7% 0.2% 0.3% 2.2%

Sweden 2.8% 0.4% 0.4% 3.6%

Switzerland 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6%

United Kingdom 10.9% 2.3% 1.4% 14.6%

Total 2006 75.7% 15.2% 9.1% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
57

TA–13b US/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by North European Country and US Port Range

2007 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 35,943 6,788 6,084 48,815 

Belgium (Luxembourg) 396,879 142,948 31,743 571,570 

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 30,008 7,123 5,438 42,569 

Denmark 31,847 9,217 8,345 49,409 

Estonia 5,929 917 677 7,523 

Finland 72,904 5,885 5,813 84,602 

France 190,693 36,665 34,879 262,237 

Germany 627,649 97,824 76,498 801,971 

Hungary 7,914 1,367 891 10,172 

Ireland 36,499 4,872 4,411 45,782 

Latvia 19,213 3,379 1,880 24,472 

Lithuania 38,205 2,622 3,793 44,620 

Netherlands 368,266 65,229 51,190 484,685 

Norway 19,865 6,439 4,568 30,872 

Poland 60,886 5,336 9,020 75,242 

Sweden 82,837 14,776 13,114 110,727 

Switzerland 18,056 3,030 2,145 23,231 

United Kingdom 332,148 65,809 49,507 447,464 

Total 2007 2,375,741 480,226 309,996 3,165,963 

2007 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 1.5%

Belgium (Luxembourg) 12.5% 4.5% 1.0% 18.1%

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 1.3%

Denmark 1.0% 0.3% 0.3% 1.6%

Estonia 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%

Finland 2.3% 0.2% 0.2% 2.7%

France 6.0% 1.2% 1.1% 8.3%

Germany 19.8% 3.1% 2.4% 25.3%

Hungary 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%

Ireland 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 1.4%

Latvia 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8%

Lithuania 1.2% 0.1% 0.1% 1.4%

Netherlands 11.6% 2.1% 1.6% 15.3%

Norway 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 1.0%

Poland 1.9% 0.2% 0.3% 2.4%

Sweden 2.6% 0.5% 0.4% 3.5%

Switzerland 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7%

United Kingdom 10.5% 2.1% 1.6% 14.1%

Total 2007 75.0% 15.2% 9.8% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
58

TA–13c US/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by North European Country and US Port Range

2008 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 37,050 6,597 6,030 49,677 

Belgium (Luxembourg) 389,808 126,704 29,794 546,306 

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 24,095 6,401 5,400 35,896 

Denmark 29,727 10,693 6,845 47,265 

Estonia 6,256 796 557 7,609 

Finland 88,909 7,960 5,184 102,053 

France 178,670 33,655 27,666 239,991 

Germany 615,443 97,269 70,216 782,928 

Hungary 6,401 1,313 843 8,557 

Ireland 38,537 5,084 4,025 47,646 

Latvia 15,751 3,730 1,978 21,459 

Lithuania 44,693 4,610 3,850 53,153 

Netherlands 357,571 68,538 48,891 475,000 

Norway 22,803 7,112 4,269 34,184 

Poland 68,202 4,850 11,063 84,115 

Sweden 84,009 10,379 11,045 105,433 

Switzerland 18,198 3,668 2,876 24,742 

United Kingdom 329,914 63,828 44,250 437,992 

Total 2008 2,356,037 463,187 284,782 3,104,006 

2008 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 1.6%

Belgium (Luxembourg) 12.6% 4.1% 1.0% 17.6%

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 0.8% 0.2% 0.2% 1.2%

Denmark 1.0% 0.3% 0.2% 1.5%

Estonia 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%

Finland 2.9% 0.3% 0.2% 3.3%

France 5.8% 1.1% 0.9% 7.7%

Germany 19.8% 3.1% 2.3% 25.2%

Hungary 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%

Ireland 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5%

Latvia 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7%

Lithuania 1.4% 0.1% 0.1% 1.7%

Netherlands 11.5% 2.2% 1.6% 15.3%

Norway 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1%

Poland 2.2% 0.2% 0.4% 2.7%

Sweden 2.7% 0.3% 0.4% 3.4%

Switzerland 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8%

United Kingdom 10.6% 2.1% 1.4% 14.1%

Total 2008 75.9% 14.9% 9.2% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
59

TA–13d US/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by North European Country and US Port Range

2009 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 24,623 4,653 4,235 33,511 

Belgium (Luxembourg) 284,682 105,669 27,762 418,113 

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 19,196 6,068 3,079 28,343 

Denmark 23,403 8,642 6,018 38,063 

Estonia 3,529 372 449 4,350 

Finland 27,319 3,647 2,533 33,499 

France 155,474 27,638 25,521 208,633 

Germany 479,355 82,297 62,129 623,781 

Hungary 4,955 1,865 844 7,664 

Ireland 32,361 4,049 3,289 39,699 

Latvia 13,793 1,577 1,633 17,003 

Lithuania 24,443 2,918 2,467 29,828 

Netherlands 275,630 60,374 42,714 378,718 

Norway 16,975 5,242 3,267 25,484 

Poland 50,673 5,151 9,480 65,304 

Sweden 58,133 8,694 9,071 75,898 

Switzerland 18,482 3,902 3,031 25,415 

United Kingdom 254,725 54,131 36,992 345,848 

Total 2009 1,767,751 386,889 244,514 2,399,154 

2009 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 1.0% 0.2% 0.2% 1.4%

Belgium (Luxembourg) 11.9% 4.4% 1.2% 17.4%

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 1.2%

Denmark 1.0% 0.4% 0.3% 1.6%

Estonia 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%

Finland 1.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.4%

France 6.5% 1.2% 1.1% 8.7%

Germany 20.0% 3.4% 2.6% 26.0%

Hungary 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3%

Ireland 1.3% 0.2% 0.1% 1.7%

Latvia 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7%

Lithuania 1.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.2%

Netherlands 11.5% 2.5% 1.8% 15.8%

Norway 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1%

Poland 2.1% 0.2% 0.4% 2.7%

Sweden 2.4% 0.4% 0.4% 3.2%

Switzerland 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1%

United Kingdom 10.6% 2.3% 1.5% 14.4%

Total 2009 73.7% 16.1% 10.2% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
60

TA–13e US/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by North European Country and US Port Range

2010 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 18,890 2,717 2,180 23,787 

Belgium (Luxembourg) 357,476 126,694 33,098 517,268 

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 21,250 5,996 2,877 30,123 

Denmark 24,636 7,125 5,912 37,673 

Estonia 4,329 407 440 5,176 

Finland 30,265 3,882 2,927 37,074 

France 168,700 29,159 28,385 226,244 

Germany 549,738 91,112 73,321 714,171 

Hungary 6,019 2,489 1,037 9,545 

Ireland 32,253 4,526 3,972 40,751 

Latvia 10,646 1,724 1,483 13,853 

Lithuania 27,139 4,782 2,929 34,850 

Netherlands 301,304 62,265 49,113 412,682 

Norway 18,477 4,275 3,570 26,322 

Poland 49,629 6,252 10,207 66,088 

Sweden 65,650 9,444 10,669 85,763 

Switzerland 9,877 1,035 1,057 11,969 

United Kingdom 277,511 61,025 45,194 383,730 

Total 2010 1,973,789 424,909 278,371 2,677,069 

2010 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Austria 0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.9%

Belgium (Luxembourg) 13.4% 4.7% 1.2% 19.3%

Czech Rep. (Slovakia) 0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1%

Denmark 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 1.4%

Estonia 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%

Finland 1.1% 0.1% 0.1% 1.4%

France 6.3% 1.1% 1.1% 8.5%

Germany 20.5% 3.4% 2.7% 26.7%

Hungary 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%

Ireland 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5%

Latvia 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.5%

Lithuania 1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 1.3%

Netherlands 11.3% 2.3% 1.8% 15.4%

Norway 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 1.0%

Poland 1.9% 0.2% 0.4% 2.5%

Sweden 2.5% 0.4% 0.4% 3.2%

Switzerland 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%

United Kingdom 10.4% 2.3% 1.7% 14.3%

Total 2010 73.7% 15.9% 10.4% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
61

Tables TA-14a-e Top Moving Commodities by Year: Container 

Exports and Imports between the US and North Europe

On an annual basis for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables 

list in ranking order the top 20 US export container commodities moved outbound to 

North Europe, and the top 20 import container commodities moved inbound to the US 

from North Europe. The top commodities are ranked from largest to smallest based on the 

number of annual containers moved in TEUs in each trade direction. The tables also give 

the percent of the annual number of each top commodity as a function of the total number 

of containers moved in each corresponding direction of the trade. The tables show the types 

and extent of commodities that accounted for the majority of container cargo in each trade 

direction based on foreign and domestic consumer demand. Over the review period, the 

tables show any change in the mix, ranking, and number of the top container commodities 

that moved in the trade as affected by changes in consumer demand and other market factors. 

PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

TA–14a US/North Europe Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2006 US to North Europe 2006 North Europe to US

Rank Commodity 2006 TEUs PCT Commodity 2006 TEUs PCT

1 Automobiles 92,953 8% Beer & Ale 177,837 10%

2 Wood Pulp 74,430 6% Auto Parts 102,284 6%

3 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 64,943 5% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 77,508 4%

4 General Cargo, Misc 47,980 4% Furniture 74,538 4%

5 Auto Parts 46,145 4% General Cargo, Misc 65,425 4%

6 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 35,907 3% Non Alcoholic Beverages 49,506 3%

7 Logs & Lumber 31,524 3% Household Goods 41,607 2%

8 Household Goods 24,310 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 35,388 2%

9 Plastic Prods, Misc 22,735 2% Glassware 32,655 2%

10 Medical Equip & Supplies 21,847 2% Machnry Misc, Casette Players 30,465 2%

11 Rubber, Synthetic 20,670 2% Still Wines 27,980 2%

12 Machnry Misc, Casette Players 20,304 2% Woodenware, Misc. 25,449 1%

13 Edible Nuts 19,586 2% Plastic Prods, Misc 23,330 1%

14 Lawn & Garden Equip 18,270 1% Engines, Motors, & Parts 21,215 1%

15 Unclassifiable Chemicals 18,057 1% Machinery Parts, Misc 20,983 1%

16 Still Wines 17,799 1% Synth Resins & Plastics 20,426 1%

17 Synth Resins & Plastics 16,868 1% Candy, Jam, Confections 19,796 1%

18 Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 15,001 1% Construction & Bldg Equip 19,262 1%

19 Empty Containers, Drums Etc. 14,356 1% Logs & Lumber 18,509 1%

20 Tobacco 13,309 1% Trucks, Lifts, & Parts 17,429 1%

All Other 593,993 48% All Other 873,920 49%

Total 2006 1,230,986 100% Total 2006 1,775,513 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
62

TA–14b US/North Europe Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2007 US to North Europe 2007 North Europe to US

Rank Commodity 2007 TEUs PCT Commodity 2007 TEUs PCT

1 Automobiles 157,327 11% Beer & Ale 183,550 11%

2 Wood Pulp 76,855 5% Auto Parts 95,696 6%

3 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 75,082 5% Non Alcoholic Beverages 71,584 4%

4 General Cargo, Misc 64,415 4% Furniture 68,135 4%

5 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 50,023 3% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 65,483 4%

6 Auto Parts 47,825 3% General Cargo, Misc 58,840 3%

7 Logs & Lumber 30,790 2% Household Goods 43,493 3%

8 Household Goods 30,238 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 31,817 2%

9 Unclassifiable Chemicals 26,123 2% Machnry Misc, Casette Players 31,263 2%

10 Rubber, Synthetic 25,910 2% Glassware 29,959 2%

11 Medical Equip & Supplies 25,038 2% Still Wines 24,899 1%

12 Plastic Prods, Misc 24,542 2% Plastic Prods, Misc 23,877 1%

13 Machnry Misc, Casette Players 22,592 2% Woodenware, Misc. 22,068 1%

14 Still Wines 21,179 1% Machinery Parts, Misc 20,697 1%

15 Edible Nuts 19,733 1% Vodka 20,515 1%

16 Lawn & Garden Equip 18,663 1% Candy, Jam, Confections 19,735 1%

17 Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 18,575 1% Medical Equip & Supplies 19,327 1%

18 Synth Resins & Plastics 16,822 1% Construction & Bldg Equip 18,912 1%

19 Grocery Prods, Misc. 14,739 1% Engines, Motors, & Parts 18,137 1%

20 Construction & Bldg Equip 13,334 1% Spirits, Misc. 18,023 1%

All Other 668,012 46% All Other 832,137 48%

Total 2007 1,447,817 100% Total 2007 1,718,146 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
63

TA–14c US/North Europe Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2008 US to North Europe 2008 North Europe to US

Rank Commodity 2008 TEUs PCT Commodity 2008 TEUs PCT

1 Automobiles 195,515 13% Beer & Ale 166,597 10%

2 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 75,226 5% Auto Parts 90,833 6%

3 Wood Pulp 74,292 5% Non Alcoholic Beverages 71,683 4%

4 General Cargo, Misc 70,217 5% Furniture 68,702 4%

5 Auto Parts 52,354 3% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 58,598 4%

6 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 45,906 3% General Cargo,Misc 51,328 3%

7 Household Goods 32,735 2% Household Goods 37,464 2%

8 Unclassifiable Chemicals 32,640 2% Machnry Misc, Casette Players 30,146 2%

9 Medical Equip & Supplies 27,475 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 25,316 2%

10 Logs & Lumber 26,285 2% Glassware 24,146 2%

11 Plastic Prods, Misc 23,065 2% Plastic Prods, Misc 23,296 1%

12 Machnry Misc, Casette Players 22,374 1% Still Wines 21,684 1%

13 Rubber, Synthetic 20,973 1% Construction & Bldg Equip 21,078 1%

14 Still Wines 19,627 1% Vodka 20,488 1%

15 Grocery Prods, Misc. 19,626 1% Medical Equip & Supplies 19,295 1%

16 Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 19,411 1% Machinery Parts, Misc 19,157 1%

17 Edible Nuts 19,377 1% Spirits, Misc. 18,224 1%

18 Tobacco 16,232 1% Candy, Jam, Confections 17,494 1%

19 Lawn & Garden Equip 16,099 1% Synth Resins & Plastics 16,467 1%

20 Drilling Mud & Soil Cmp 14,646 1% Woodenware, Misc. 14,515 1%

All Other 681,817 45% All Other 781,600 49%

Total 2008 1,505,894 100% Total 2008 1,598,110 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
64

TA–14d US/North Europe Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2009 US to North Europe 2009 North Europe to US

Rank Commodity 2009 TEUs PCT Commodity 2009 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 70,499 6% Beer & Ale 148,342 11%

2 Automobiles 67,964 6% Auto Parts 63,418 5%

3 Wood Pulp 62,994 6% Non Alcoholic Beverages 57,798 4%

4 General Cargo, Misc 62,680 6% Furniture 57,746 4%

5 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 35,941 3% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 50,835 4%

6 Auto Parts 35,397 3% General Cargo, Misc 36,763 3%

7 Household Goods 30,871 3% Household Goods 35,869 3%

8 Medical Equip & Supplies 27,846 3% Vodka 21,049 2%

9 Unclassifiable Chemicals 25,069 2% Still Wines 20,148 2%

10 Edible Nuts 22,127 2% Glassware 19,278 1%

11 Logs & Lumber 21,301 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 18,708 1%

12 Rubber, Synthetic 18,950 2% Machnry Misc, Casette Players 18,364 1%

13 Grocery Prods, Misc. 17,332 2% Medical Equip & Supplies 18,195 1%

14 Still Wines 16,869 2% Plastic Prods, Misc 17,491 1%

15 Machnry Misc, Casette Players 16,751 2% Spirits, Misc. 16,608 1%

16 Plastic Prods, Misc 15,691 1% Candy, Jam, Confections 14,832 1%

17 Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 11,093 1% Machinery Parts, Misc 14,820 1%

18 Lawn & Garden Equip 10,556 1% Synth Resins & Plastics 14,258 1%

19 Tobacco 10,129 1% Woodenware, Misc. 13,712 1%

20 Titanium Dioxide 9,710 1% Whiskey & Rum 12,488 1%

All Other 513,961 47% All Other 624,702 48%

Total 2009 1,103,732 100% Total 2009 1,295,423 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
65

TA–14e US/North Europe Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2010 US to North Europe 2010 North Europe to US

Rank Commodity 2010 TEUs PCT Commodity 2010 TEUs PCT

1 Paper&Paperboard, Incl Waste 78,244 6% Beer & Ale 150,123 10%

2 Wood Pulp 62,225 5% Auto Parts 80,876 6%

3 Automobiles 61,695 5% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 64,946 5%

4 General Cargo, Misc 56,827 5% Furniture 58,203 4%

5 Auto Parts 40,687 3% Non Alcoholic Beverages 55,169 4%

6 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 36,627 3% Household Goods 35,442 2%

7 Container Cargo, Mdse 32,528 3% General Cargo, Misc 25,754 2%

8 Household Goods 31,235 3% Container Cargo, Mdse 24,425 2%

9 Medical Equip & Supplies 28,712 2% Still Wines 23,832 2%

10 Unclassifiable Chemicals 26,109 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 22,252 2%

11 Edible Nuts 22,190 2% Glassware 20,930 1%

12 Logs & Lumber 22,062 2% Vodka 20,202 1%

13 Rubber, Synthetic 22,039 2% Spirits, Misc. 19,158 1%

14 Plastic Prods, Misc 21,801 2% Medical Equip & Supplies 18,663 1%

15 Grocery Prods, Misc. 20,158 2% Synth Resins & Plastics 17,800 1%

16 Lawn & Garden Equip 18,631 2% Machnry Misc, Casette Players 16,844 1%

17 Still Wines 16,616 1% Candy, Jam, Confections 16,067 1%

18 Empty Containers, Drums Etc. 14,864 1% Machinery Parts, Misc 15,465 1%

19 Machnry Misc, Casette Players 14,359 1% Plastic Prods, Misc 15,378 1%

20 Synth Resins & Plastics 13,047 1% Woodenware, Misc. 14,078 1%

All Other 595,483 48% All Other 725,322 50%

Total 2010 1,236,137 100% Total 2010 1,440,929 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
66

Table TA-15 Annual Value of Liner Cargo and Average Value per Kilogram (Kg)

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the left gives the 

total value of container exports moved outbound to North Europe, and the total value of 

container imports moved inbound to the US from North Europe. The value of container 

cargo is expressed in US dollars. The table also gives the percent of annual growth or decline 

in the value of container exports and imports from one year to the next over the review 

period. The table shows the direction of the trade with the highest value of container cargo 

and any imbalance and change over time in the directional value and growth of container 

exports and imports. 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the right gives 

the value per kilogram (Kg) of container exports that moved outbound to North Europe, 

and the value per Kg of container imports that moved inbound to the US from North 

Europe. The figures for each year are derived from the total US dollar value of container 

exports and imports divided by their total weight in kilograms. The table also gives the 

percent of annual growth or decline in the value per Kg of container exports and imports 

from one year to the next over the review period. On a per Kg basis, the table shows the 

direction of the trade with the highest unit value of container cargo and any change over 

time. USA Trade Online (US Census Bureau) is the source of the data.

TA–15 Container Cargo Value by Year

Trade Between the US and North Europe

Annual Value of Liner Cargo Average Value of Liner Cargo per Kg

Year US to N. Europe

Percent 

Change N. Europe to US

Percent 

Change

US to 

N. Europe

Percent 

Change

N. Europe 

to US

Percent 

Change

2006 $38,637,979,535 18% $75,771,547,805 6% $4.13 10% $4.62 9%

2007 $43,274,337,420 12% $82,202,506,919 8% $4.09 -1% $5.19 12%

2008 $50,129,242,987 16% $89,168,524,653 8% $4.35 6% $5.60 8%

2009 $36,252,867,297 -28% $70,415,975,744 -21% $4.39 1% $5.50 -2%

2010 $41,533,561,828 15% $79,376,740,068 13% $4.21 -4% $5.12 -7%

Source: USA Trade Online
67

Transatlantic Carrier Conduct

Table TA-16 Active Agreements in the Trade and their Authorities

The table shows each agreement between shipping lines in the US/North Europe trade that 

was in effect and on file with the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) in each calendar 

quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. For each agreement, the table gives 

the FMC number, name, membership, authority, and period of time when the agreement 

was in effect. The table shows any change in agreement activity among shipping lines in the 

trade over the review period. The source of data is the FMC.
Chapter 5

68

TA–16 Carrier Agreements Active in the US/North Europe Trade for 2006 through 2010

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

Conference Agreement

10168 New Caribbean Service 

Rate Agreement CMA, CSAV, HSud, HL Rate (binding) • • •

10714 Trans-Atlantic American 

Flag Liner Oper.

APL, Maersk, HL, Amer. 

Ro/Ro

Rate (binding), Joint SC, 

Info Ex, Ad hoc Vessel 

Sharing [removed conf. 

rate authority for EU on 

8/19/2008]

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11375 Trans-Atlantic Conference 

Agreement 

ACL, Maersk, MSC, NYK, 

OOCL

Rate (binding), 

Conference SC, Info Ex, 

Ad hoc Vessel Sharing, 

Equip. Exchange

• • • • • • • • • • •

Joint Service Agreement

11280 Star West Joint Service 

Agreement Albion, Overseas

Joint service on rates, 

sc, Vessels, equipment, 

sailing schedule, port 

calls

•

11854 Greensea Inc. Joint 

Service Agreement

Green Chartering, 

Seatrade

Joint service on rates, 

sc, Vessels, equipment, 

sailing schedule, port 

calls

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11982 Evergreen Line Joint 

Service Agreement Evergreen, Hatsu, Italia

Joint service on rates, 

sc, Vessels, equipment, 

sailing schedule, port 

calls

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Non-Rate Discussion Agreement

12048 Container Trade 

Statistics Agreement Multiple Information Exchange • • • • • • • • •

12108 World Liner Data 

Agreement Multiple Information Exchange •

Alliance Agreement

11602 The Grand Alliance 

Agreement II HL, NYK, OOCL

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

services, port calls, 

equipment, info. exch. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
69

TA–16 Carrier Agreements Active in the US/North Europe Trade for 2006 through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

11960 New World Alliance 

Agreement APL, Hyundai, MOL

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

services, port calls, 

equipment, info. ex. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Vessel Sharing/Sailing Agreement

10955

ACL/H-L Reciprocal 

Space Charter and 

Sailing Agreement

ACL, HL Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11261 ACL/WWL Agreement ACL, Wallenius Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11384 MOSK/Hoegh Autoliners 

Space Charter Agreement Hoegh, MOL Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11401

MLL/Hapag-Lloyd Space 

Charter and Sailing 

Agreement

HL, Lykes, TMM Vessel sharing, service • • •

11415 MPA Space Charter and 

Sailing Agreement ACL, MSC Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11526 MOSK/Hoegh Autoliners 

Space Charter Agreement Hoegh, MOL Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11533

CGM TDM/Marfret 

Reciprocal Space 

Charter, Sailing and 

Cooperative Working 

Agreement

CGM, Marfret Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11545 Agreement between 

CSAV and MOL CSAV, MOL Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11705 Grand Alliance-CP Ships 

Atlantic Agreement CP, HL, NYK, OOCL, PO Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • •

11722 NWA/Maersk Line Slot 

Exchange Agreement

APL, Hyundai, Maersk, 

MOL

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11794

The COSCON/KL/YMUK/

Hanjin Worldwide Slot 

Allocation and Sailing 

Agreement

Cosco, HJ, KL, YM Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11797 New Caribbean Service 

Consortium Agreement

CMA, CSAV, HSud, HL, 

PO

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service • • •
Chapter 5

70

TA–16 Carrier Agreements Active in the US/North Europe Trade for 2006 through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

11823 Contship/P&O Vessel 

Sharing Agreement Cont, PO Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service • •

11824

Contship/PONL-CMA 

CGM/Marfret Vessel 

Sharing Agreement

Cont, CMA, Marfret, PO Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service • •

11825 CS/PONL-HSDG 

Agreement Cont, HSud, PO Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service • •

11826 CS/PONL-Hapag-Lloyd 

Agreement Cont, HL, PO Vessel sharing, service • •

11827

Europe-Australia-New 

Zealand-US East Coast 

Bridging Agreement

Cont, CMA, HSud, HL, 

Marfret, PO Vessel sharing • •

11848

WWL/K-Line 

Transatlantic Space 

Charter Agreement

KL, Wallenius Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11867 Norasia/GSL Round The 

World Service Agreement Gold, Norasia Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • • • •

11931 CMA CGM/Marfret Vessel 

Sharing Agreement CMA, Marfret Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11936

CMA CGM/CSCL Cross 

Space Charter, Sailing, 

and Cooperative Working 

Agreement

China, CMA Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • • • • •

11955

CMA CGM/CSCL/ELJSA 

Cross Space Charter, 

Sailing, and Cooperative 

Working Agreement

China, CMA, Evergreen Vessel sharing, service, 

equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11969 ZIM/ELJSA Agreement Zim, Evergreen Vessel sharing, service • • • • • • •

12026

Grand Alliance/Zim 

Atlantic Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

HL, NYK, OOCL, Zim Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service, port calls • • • • • • • • •

12034

Hamburg Sud/Maersk 

Line Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

HSud, Maersk

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service [deleted N. 

Europe on 5/30/2009] • • • • •
71

TA–16 Carrier Agreements Active in the US/North Europe Trade for 2006 through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

12068

Grand Alliance/Zim/

HSDG Atlantic Space 

Charter Agreement

HL, NYK, OOCL, HSud, 

Zim

Vessel sharing, capacity, 

service, port calls • • • • • • •

12075

MSC/CMA CGM North 

Europe-US Atlantic & 

Gulf Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

MSC, CMA Vessel sharing, service • • • • • •

12076

ELJSA/CKYH Vessel 

Sharing Agreement - 

Trans Atlantic Express 

Service

Evergreen, Cosco, KL, 

YM Vessel sharing, service • • • • • •

12103

CMA CGM/CSAV Victory 

Bridge Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

CMA, CSAV Vessel sharing, service • • •

12115

HSDG-CCNI USWCEurope Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

HSud, CCNI Vessel sharing, service •

Vessel Sharing Agreement

11155

WWL/NYK Atlantic Space 

Charter and Cooperative 

Working Agreement

NYK, Wallenius Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11523 WWL/Hoegh Autoliners 

Space Charter Agreement Hoegh, Wallenius Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11687 CCNI/CMA CGM Space 

Charter Agreement CCNI, CMA Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11723 New World Alliance 

Facilitation Agreement APL, Hyundai, MOL Vessel sharing, capacity • •

11798 Atlantic Space Charter 

Agreement

Cosco, CP, HL, KL, NYK, 

OOCL, PO, YM Vessel sharing •

11821 MSC/CMA CGM Space 

Charter Agreement CMA, MSC Vessel sharing, capacity • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11863

CMA CGM/P&O-HapagLloyd Space Charter 

Agreement

CMA, HL, PO Vessel sharing •
Chapter 5

72

TA–16 Carrier Agreements Active in the US/North Europe Trade for 2006 through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

11882 Zim/Coscon Slot Charter 

Agreement Cosco, Zim Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11912 Dole-HSud Space Charter 

and Sailing Agreement Dole, HSud Vessel sharing, 

equipment • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

11927 ITS/Hatsu Marine MUS 

Slot Charter Agreement Italia, Hatsu Vessel sharing, 

equipment • • • • • •

11928 Maersk Line/HLAG Slot 

Charter Agreement HL, Maersk

Vessel sharing [removed 

N. Europe from scope on 

5/18/07] • • • • • •

11937 MSC/CKY Space Charter 

Agreement Cosco, KL, MSC, YM Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • •

11994 Maersk Line/HSDG 

Space Charter Agreement Maersk, HSud Vessel sharing •

12005

CSCL/CMA CGM Slot 

Charter and Cross 

Slot Charter and Swap 

Agreement Victory Bridge

China, CMA Vessel sharing • • • • • • • •

12024 K-Line/NYK Atlantic 

Space Charter KL, NYK Vessel sharing • • • • •

12037

Maersk Line CMA CGM 

Transatlantic Space 

Charter Agreement

CMA, Maersk Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • •

12039 ELJSA/CSCL NUE Slot 

Charter Agreement China, Evergreen Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • •

12058 Hoegh Autoliner/K-Line 

Space Charter Agreement KL, Hoegh Vessel sharing • • • • • • • •

12065 YMUK/CSCL Cross Slot 

Charter Agreement YM, China Shipping Vessel sharing • • • • • • • •

12106

HLAG/HSDG TransAtlantic Space Charter 

Agreement

HL, HSud Vessel sharing • •

12107

HLAG/HMM TransAtlantic Space Charter 

Agreement

HL, Hyundai Vessel sharing •

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, Agreements Library
73

Tables TA-17a-e Liner Services in the Transatlantic Trade

The tables list the liner services offered by shipping lines operating in the US/North Europe 

trade for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010. For each liner service in 

each year, the tables identify the service name, type, shipping lines, frequency, the number 

of service vessels, the average TEU vessel capacity, the annual TEU operational capacity, 

and the percent of the market capacity provided by the service. The percent of the market 

for each service is derived as a function of the total annual amount of operational capacity 

deployed in the market. The tables show the annual level of liner services and capacity 

offered by the shipping lines serving the trade and any changes that occurred over the review 

period. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

TA–17a Liner Services between the US and North Europe

As of October 1, 2006

Service 

Name Service Type Carriers Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average Ship 

Size (TEU 

Capacity) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEU) 

Percent 

of Market 

Capacity

PAX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 13 4,712 245,701 7%

ATX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 4 2,923 152,401 5%

GAX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 5 3,043 158,650 5%

GMX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 6 3,005 156,689 5%

TA2 Loop Maersk Line 7 5 4,082 212,868 6%

TA3 Loop Maersk Line 7 3 2,544 132,634 4%

TA6 Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe Maersk Line 7 11 4,115 214,549 6%

APX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

NWA: APL, 

Hyundai, MOL 7 12 4,432 231,101 7%

N. Atlantic Loop MSC 7 4 3,487 181,809 5%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop MSC 7 6 6,315 329,273 10%

N. Atlantic Loop ACL 7 5 1,850 96,464 3%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop Atlanticargo 10 5 1,000 36,500 1%

Atlantic Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe

CMA CGM, HapagLloyd, Marfret 14 6 2,195 57,235 2%

Liberty 

Bridge Loop CMA CGM, China 

Shipping 7 4 2,688 140,173 4%

Victory 

Bridge Loop

CMA CGM, 

China Shipping, 

Evergreen

7 5 2,646 137,949 4%

NEC/NEX Loop Evergreen, Zim 7 4 2,283 119,055 4%

TAS1 Loop Cosco, Hanjin, K 

Line, Yang Ming 7 4 3,051 159,088 5%

NUE Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Evergreen 7 12 4,214 219,730 7%

Trident Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe Hamburg Sud 14 6 2,108 54,959 2%

N. Atlantic Loop ICL 7 4 1,472 76,741 2%

MPS (Pacific) Loop Hapag-Lloyd 11 6 2,168 71,938 2%

Atlantic/

Pacific Round-the-World Norasia, Gold Star 7 13 3,159 164,699 5%

Total 3,350,206 100%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

74

TA–17b Liner Services between the US and North Europe

As of October 1, 2007

Service 

Name Service Type Carriers Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average Ship 

Size (TEU 

Capacity) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEU) 

Percent 

of Market 

Capacity

PAX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 13 4,753 247,823 8%

ATX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 4 2,924 152,466 5%

GAX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 5 3,237 168,786 5%

GMX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 6 2,966 154,630 5%

TA2 Loop Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,825 7%

TA3/TP7 Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Maersk Line 7 12 4,905 255,761 8%

APX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

NWA: APL, 

Hyundai, MOL 7 12 4,578 238,693 8%

N. Atlantic Loop MSC 7 4 3,622 188,861 6%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop MSC 7 6 6,465 337,086 11%

N. Atlantic Loop ACL 7 5 1,850 96,464 3%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop Atlanticargo 10 5 1,000 36,500 1%

Atlantic Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe CMA CGM, Marfret 14 6 2,289 59,677 2%

Liberty 

Bridge Loop CMA CGM, China 

Shipping 7 4 2,761 143,979 5%

Victory 

Bridge Loop

CMA CGM, 

China Shipping, 

Evergreen

7 5 2,730 142,371 5%

NEC/NEX Loop Evergreen, Zim 7 4 2,198 114,584 4%

Atlantic Loop Cosco, Hanjin, K 

Line, Yang Ming 7 4 3,043 158,671 5%

NUE Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Evergreen 7 12 4,214 219,730 7%

Trident Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe Hamburg Sud 7 10 2,478 107,653 3%

N. Atlantic Loop ICL 7 4 1,519 79,205 3%

Total 3,114,765 100%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
75

TA–17c Liner Services between the US and North Europe

As of October 1, 2008

Service 

Name Service Type Carriers Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average Ship 

Size (TEU 

Capacity) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEU) 

Percent 

of Market 

Capacity

PAX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 13 4,734 246,836 8%

GAX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 5 3,237 168,786 6%

GMX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 6 2,966 154,630 5%

ATX Loop GA [Hapag-Lloyd, 

NYK, OOCL], Zim 7 4 4,214 219,743 7%

TA2 Loop Maersk Line 7 5 3,965 206,736 7%

TA3/TP7 Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Maersk Line 7 12 4,934 257,251 9%

APX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

NWA: APL, 

Hyundai, MOL 7 12 4,657 242,851 8%

N. Atlantic Loop MSC 7 4 4,928 256,960 9%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop MSC 7 6 5,150 268,544 9%

N. Atlantic Loop ACL 7 5 1,850 96,464 3%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop Atlanticargo 10 5 1,000 36,500 1%

PAD/NASP Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe CMA CGM, Marfret 14 6 2,288 59,660 2%

Victory 

Bridge Loop

CMA CGM, 

China Shipping, 

Evergreen

7 5 2,820 147,053 5%

TAS1/NTA Loop Cosco, Hanjin, K 

Line, Yang Ming 7 4 3,043 158,671 5%

NUE Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Evergreen 7 12 4,218 219,965 7%

Trident Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe Hamburg Sud 7 12 2,825 147,299 5%

N. Atlantic Loop ICL 7 4 1,441 75,138 3%

Total 2,963,087 100%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

76

TA–17d Liner Services between the US and North Europe

As of October 1, 2009

Service 

Name Service Type Carriers Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average Ship 

Size (TEU 

Capacity) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEU) 

Percent 

of Market 

Capacity

PAX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 13 4,693 244,694 10%

GAX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 5 3,237 168,786 7%

GMX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 6 3,138 163,650 7%

ATX Loop GA [Hapag-Lloyd, 

NYK, OOCL], Zim

7 4 4,249 221,542 9%

TA2 Loop Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,804 8%

TA3/TP7 Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe Maersk Line 7 12 4,963 258,781 10%

APX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

NWA: APL, 

Hyundai, MOL

7 12 4,700 245,050 10%

N. Atlantic Loop MSC 7 5 4,019 209,573 8%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop MSC 7 7 5,217 272,014 11%

N. Atlantic Loop ACL 7 5 1,850 96,464 4%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop Atlanticargo 15 4 1,000 24,333 1%

PAD/NASP Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe CMA CGM, Marfret 14 6 2,314 60,338 2%

Victory 

Bridge Loop

CMA CGM, 

China Shipping, 

Evergreen

7 4 2,777 115,830 5%

TAS1/NTA Loop

CKYH [Cosco, K 

Line, Yang Ming, 

Hanjin]

7 2 2,802 73,065 3%

TAE Loop CKYH group, 

Evergreen

7 2 2,783 72,557 3%

N. Atlantic Loop ICL 7 4 1,441 75,138 3%

Total 2,513,619 100%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
77

TA–17e Liner Services between the US and North Europe

As of October 1, 2010

Service 

Name Service Type Carriers Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average Ship 

Size (TEU 

Capacity) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEU) 

Percent 

of Market 

Capacity

PAX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 13 4,693 244,694 10%

GAX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 5 3,237 168,786 7%

GMX Loop

Grand Alliance: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL

7 6 2,966 154,630 6%

ATX Loop Grand Alliance, 

Zim, Hamburg Sud 7 4 4,613 240,522 10%

AES Loop Hapag-Lloyd 7 3 2,757 143,740 6%

TA2 Loop Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,804 9%

APX Pendulum: US/

Asia/N. Europe

NWA: APL, 

Hyundai, MOL 7 13 4,761 248,256 10%

N. Atlantic Loop MSC 7 5 4,818 251,235 10%

Victory 

Bridge Loop MSC, CMA CGM 7 8 6,503 339,078 14%

N. Atlantic Loop ACL 7 5 1,850 96,464 4%

S. Atlantic/

Gulf Loop Atlanticargo 15 4 1,000 24,333 1%

PAD/NASP Pendulum: US/

Australia/N. Europe CMA CGM, Marfret 14 6 2,344 61,120 3%

TAE Loop CKYH group, 

Evergreen 7 4 2,726 142,128 6%

N. Atlantic Loop ICL 7 4 1,850 96,477 4%

Total 2,423,267 100%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

78

Charts TA-18a-c Changes in Capacity in the Transatlantic Trade

The charts provide trend lines showing the levels of average weekly vessel capacity supplied 

in each trade direction per quarter for the review period from 2006 through 2010. Chart 

TA-18a shows the trend line of average weekly capacity in each trade direction over the 

entire review period; the horizontal axis gives the series of time in quarters from 2006 through 

2010, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly amount of vessel capacity supplied 

for each quarter in TEUs. Charts TA-18b-c compare the levels of average weekly capacity 

supplied for each year per calendar quarter; the horizontal axis gives the series of time as 

the four quarters of a single year, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly amount 

of vessel capacity supplied for each quarter in TEUs. Chart TA-18b compares the levels of 

capacity in the inbound trade direction, and Chart TA-18c compares the levels of capacity in 

the outbound trade direction. The source of the data is Drewry Maritime Research.

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

TA–18a North America/North Europe Trade

Average Weekly Capacity (TEUs)

Source: Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

N. Europe to N. America

N. America to N. Europe
79

1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

TA–18b Westbound Capacity from North Europe to North America

Source: Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

TA–18c Eastbound Capacity from North America to North Europe 

Source: Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)
Chapter 5

80

Transatlantic Economic Performance

Chart TA-19 Quarterly Average Revenue per TEU, Inbound and Outbound

The chart provides trend lines of time series data showing the levels of average revenue per 

TEU earned by shipping lines in the inbound and outbound directions of the US/North 

Europe trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. The horizontal 

axis of the chart gives the time series in calendar quarters over the review period, and the 

vertical axis measures the average revenue per TEU in US dollars. The average revenue 

figures are derived from published information and are inclusive of ocean freight, accessorial 

charges, and any charges for inland haulage. The trend lines throughout the review period 

show the quarterly change in the average revenue earnings of the shipping lines in each trade 

direction. The level of earnings and the change over time are a function of the corresponding 

supply and demand conditions in the trade as affected by market and regulatory factors. 

The sources of data are Containerisation International, Informa Plc; and Container Trade 

Statistics, Ltd.

$500

$750

$1,000

$1,250

$1,500

$1,750

$2,000

$2,250

$2,500

TA–19 Transatlantic Average Revenue per TEU (all-in)

Source: Containerisation International/CTS

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

Average Revenue per TEU

Europe to US

US to Europe

CI-Online ceased tracking average revenue per TEU at 

the end of 2009. The data points in this chart were 

extended beyond the fourth quarter of 2009 by linking 

to the ELAA/CTS indexes in the North Atlantic.
81

Chart TA-20 Average Service Contract Rates, 

Transatlantic (Inclusive of Fuel Charges)

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the levels of average service contract rates in each direction 

of the US/North Europe trade. The average contract rate levels are derived from 225 rate 

observations taken from 211 selected service contracts between major carriers and shippers 

based on a basket of the top container commodities that moved in each trade direction. 

In this chart, the contract rates are inclusive of ocean freight, currency adjustment factors 

(“CAF”), bunker adjustment factors (“BAF”) and all other fuel charges, origin/destination 

terminal handling charges (“THC”), and some charges for inland haulage. The service 

contract rates are aggregated and weighted by the total percentage of cargo volume for the 

entire review period for each of the commodities included in this analysis. The horizontal 

axis gives the series of time in months over the review period, and the vertical axis measures 

the average contract rate levels in US dollars per FEU. The trend lines over the review 

period show the change in the average service contract rates for the selected commodities 

in each trade direction. The average contract rates and the change over time are a function 

of the corresponding supply and demand conditions as affected by market and regulatory 

factors. The source of data is the Federal Maritime Commission.

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

$2,000

$2,200

$2,400

$2,600

$2,800

TA–20 US/North Europe Trade

Weighted Average Service Contract Ocean Freight Rates*

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, SERVCON

N. Europe to US

US to N. Europe

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Marshall-Edgeworth Weighting Method

* Inclusive of ocean freight, surcharges and some inland haulage.

US Dollars per FEU
Chapter 5

82

Chart TA-21 Average “Core” Service Contract Rates, Transatlantic 

(i.e., Exclusive of Fuel Charges that were Assessed as a Separate Charge)

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the average levels of “core” service contract rates in each 

direction the US/North Europe trade. The average core rates are derived from 225 rate 

observations taken from 211 selected service contracts between major carriers and shippers 

based on a basket of the top container commodities that moved in each direction of the 

trade. In this chart, the core rates include ocean freight, CAF, THC, and some inland 

haulage charges, but exclude any separately assessed BAF or other fuel charges. Thus, the 

average rate levels in this chart reflect more of the change in base rates absence the influence 

of fuel costs. The core rates are aggregated and weighted by the total percentage of cargo 

volume for the entire review period for each of the commodities included in this analysis. 

The horizontal axis gives the series of time in months over the review period, and the 

vertical axis measures the average core rate levels in US dollars per FEU. The trend lines over 

the review period show the change in the average core, or base, rates in the service contracts 

of the selected commodities in each trade direction. The source of data is the Federal 

Maritime Commission.

TA–21 US/North Europe Trade

Weighted Average Service Contract Ocean Freight Rates

(Excluding Fuel Charges)*

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, SERVCON

Marshall-Edgeworth Weighting Method

* The figures represent core ocean freight rates excluding any fuel 

charges that were assessed as separate charges.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

N. Europe to US

US to N. Europe

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

$2,000

$2,200

$2,400

US Dollars per FEU
83

Chart TA-22 Average Service Contract Rates and Average Core Rates 

Together, Transatlantic (Showing the Assessment of Fuel Charges)

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend lines 

of time series data showing the levels of the average rates, inclusive of fuel charges, and the 

average core rates, exclusive of fuel charges, in selected service contracts for each direction 

of the US/North Europe trade. The rates are derived from 225 rate observations taken 

from 211 selected service contracts between major carriers and shippers based on a basket 

of the top container commodities that moved in each direction of the trade. Aside from 

the inclusion or exclusion of fuel charges, the rates include ocean freight, CAF, THC, and 

some inland haulage charges. Thus, the difference between the trend lines for the average 

rates and the average core rates shows the extent and assessment of fuel cost for the selected 

service contracts by trade lane and the change over time. Both sets of rates are aggregated 

and weighted by the percentage of cargo volume for the entire review period for each of the 

commodities included in this analysis. The horizontal axis gives the series of time in months 

over the review period, and the vertical axis measures the average rate levels in US dollars 

per FEU. The source of the data is the Federal Maritime Commission.

TA–22 US/North Europe Trade

Weighted Average Service Contract Ocean Freight Rates

(Showing Assessment of Fuel Charges)

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, SERVCON

N. Europe to US total rates US to N. Europe total rates

N. Europe to US core rates US to N. Europe core rates

Marshall-Edgeworth Weighting Method

Total rates include ocean freight, surcharges and some inland haulage. 

Core rates exclude any fuel charges that were assessed as separate charges.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

$400

$600

$800

$1,000

$1,200

$1,400

$1,600

$1,800

$2,000

$2,200

$2,400

$2,600

US Dollars per FEU

$2,800
Chapter 5

84

Table TA-23 Transatlantic Average Monthly Vessel 

Utilization, Inbound and Outbound

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the percentage 

levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for each direction of the US/North Europe trade. 

The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of container cargo moved in each 

trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity supplied in each trade direction 

and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo and vessel capacity are measured 

in TEUs. The trend in the percentage levels of utilization shows how the supply of, and 

demand for, vessel space are aligned in each trade lane and the change in utilization over 

the review period as affected by market conditions and other factors. A higher percentage 

of utilization indicates that supply and demand are more closely aligned, whereas a lower 

utilization percentage shows a period of greater excess vessel capacity in the market. The 

degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts on the level of freight rates. It would 

be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend in utilization levels. Further, 

the utilization of vessel space provides a general indication of service quality by showing 

whether shipping lines are deploying vessel space efficiently in relation to demand in the 

marketplace. The sources of data are PIERS; Containerisation International, Informa Plc; and 

Drewry Maritime Research.

TA–23 US/North Europe Capacity Utilization

US to N. Europe N. Europe to US

Jan-06 72% 78%

Feb-06 72% 79%

Mar-06 84% 93%

Apr-06 66% 81%

May-06 81% 89%

Jun-06 72% 87%

Jul-06 69% 86%

Aug-06 66% 76%

Sep-06 65% 72%

Oct-06 71% 76%

Nov-06 67% 73%

Dec-06 63% 68%

Jan-07 67% 66%

Feb-07 66% 65%

Mar-07 81% 81%

Apr-07 81% 80%

May-07 82% 85%

Jun-07 68% 74%

Jul-07 73% 80%

Aug-07 79% 79%

Sep-07 76% 70%

Oct-07 82% 77%

Nov-07 74% 73%

Dec-07 69% 72%

Jan-08 78% 61%

Feb-08 87% 74%

Mar-08 87% 76%

Apr-08 90% 77%

May-08 88% 77%
85

TA–23 US/North Europe Capacity Utilization 

(continued)

US to N. Europe N. Europe to US

Jun-08 82% 73%

Jul-08 88% 84%

Aug-08 88% 74%

Sep-08 75% 71%

Oct-08 72% 73%

Nov-08 72% 74%

Dec-08 62% 69%

Jan-09 60% 51%

Feb-09 62% 56%

Mar-09 64% 64%

Apr-09 65% 68%

May-09 61% 58%

Jun-09 63% 66%

Jul-09 61% 67%

Aug-09 65% 63%

Sep-09 88% 85%

Oct-09 80% 78%

Nov-09 80% 77%

Dec-09 79% 78%

Jan-10 78% 72%

Feb-10 81% 76%

Mar-10 103% 95%

Apr-10 92% 94%

May-10 87% 95%

Jun-10 88% 96%

Jul-10 86% 97%

Aug-10 92% 96%

Sep-10 89% 86%

Oct-10 79% 81%

Nov-10 83% 88%

Dec-10 82% 79%

Sources: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive; 

Containerisation International, and Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

86

Chart TA-24 Transatlantic Average Monthly Vessel 

Utilization, Inbound and Outbound

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the percentage levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for 

each direction of the US/North Europe trade. The horizontal axis gives the series of time 

in months over the review period, and the vertical axis measures the level of vessel capacity 

utilization as a percentage. The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of 

container cargo moved in each trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity 

supplied in each trade direction and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo 

and vessel capacity are measured in TEUs. The trend line over the time series shows the 

change in vessel capacity utilization as affected by the change in the market conditions of 

supply and demand in each trade lane. A higher percentage level of utilization indicates that 

supply and demand are more closely aligned, whereas a lower percentage level of utilization 

shows a period of greater excess vessel capacity in the market. A utilization level that exceeds 

100 percent indicates a period of time when the demand for vessel space exceeded the supply 

of vessel space. The degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts on the level 

of freight rates. It would be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend 

in utilization levels. Further, the utilization of vessel space provides a general indication of 

service quality by showing whether shipping lines are deploying vessel space efficiently in 

relation to demand in the marketplace. The sources of data are PIERS; Containerisation 

International, Informa Plc; and Drewry Maritime Research.

TA–24 US/North Europe

Capacity Utilization

Sources: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive; 

Containerisation International and Drewry Maritime Research US to N. Europe

N. Europe to US

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Average Utilization
87

Table TA-25 Market Share Instability Index

The table gives, in the form of a market share instability index (“MSII”), the total change in 

market share of the participating shipping lines in the US/North Europe trade from one time 

period to the next for the review period from 2006 through 2010. The MSII for the entire 

trade is the sum of the absolute values of the change in the percentages of market share of 

the individual shipping lines that occurred from one period to the next. The percentage of 

market share for each shipping line is derived from its total container carriage in the trade for 

the given period. The amount of total container carriage for each shipping line is combined 

to include imports and exports measured in TEUs. A high value of MSII indicates that a high 

portion of the market shifted among the shipping lines in the trade for a given time. The 

source of data is PIERS.

TA–25 US/North Europe

Market Share Instability Index

Shipping Line 2006 TEUs 2007 TEUs 2008 TEUs 2009 TEUs 2010 TEUs

Hapag-Lloyd 2.4% 0.6% 0.3% 1.8% 0.0%

Maersk 2.7% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 3.2%

Mediterranean Shipping Company 3.4% 0.4% 0.1% 1.3% 6.4%

Evergreen Line 0.7% 0.1% 0.7% 1.9% 2.4%

American President Lines 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.0% 0.7%

Orient Overseas Container Line 0.4% 0.3% 1.4% 1.2% 0.6%

Atlantic Container Line 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%

NYK Line 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 0.0%

Independent Container Line 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8%

Mitsui OSK Line 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%

Atlantic Cargo Shipping 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.8% 0.3%

K Line 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%

China Ocean Shipping 0.5% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.3%

Hanjin 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5%

Norasia Line 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Yang Ming Line 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%

Hyundai Merchant Marine 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%

CMA CGM 1.8% 0.7% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2%

Zim Container Line 0.2% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1%

China Shipping Container Lines 1.9% 1.5% 1.9% 0.8% 1.1%

CSAV 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%

Hamburg Sud 0.7% 1.1% 1.0% 0.7% 1.4%

Marfret 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Total Market Share Instability Index 17.4% 11.6% 10.9% 13.7% 19.3%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

88

Table TA-26 Profitability

The table gives a summary of the responses to question 26 of the Commission’s Notice of 

Inquiry (NOI) issued November 1, 2010, An Analysis of the European Union Repeal of the Liner 

Conference Block Exemption. Question 26 of the NOI requested that shipping lines compare 

the profitability of their operations in three trade lanes for the review period, and for each 

year, identify the most and least profitable of the three trade lanes. The specific trade lanes 

are: (1) from the Far East to the US, (2) from the Far East to Europe, and (3) from North 

Europe to the US. The table shows that in 2006, a majority of respondents identified the 

North Europe/US lane as the most profitable and the Far East/US lane as the least profitable, 

on a relative basis. By 2010, of the three trade lanes, the Far East/Europe lane was identified 

by a majority of respondents as the most profitable and the North Europe/US as the least 

profitable. The decline in profitability in the trade lane from North Europe to the US over 

the review period corresponds to the decline in the level of freight rates in the trade lane 

from 2006 to 2010.

TA–26 Analysis of Q26 Responses to the NOI

North Europe/US Far East/Europe Far East/US

2006 Most Profitable ∙ Least Profitable

2007 ∙ Most Profitable Least Profitable

2008 Least Profitable Most Profitable ∙

2009 Most Profitable Least Profitable ∙

2010 Least Profitable Most Profitable ∙
89

Far East/Europe

Background

This section provides a summary discussion of the market characteristics of the liner shipping 

industry and the agreement activity of carriers operating between the EU and the Far East 

at the time of the repeal and thereafter. As in the transatlantic, the repeal directly impacted 

the shipping trades between the EU and the Far East by eliminating all forms of conference 

and price fixing agreements between ocean carriers. Similar to the transatlantic trade, the 

geographic market of liner services is divided into two separate and non-substitutable trade 

lanes between North Europe and South Europe in the Mediterranean region. This study 

focuses on the major trade lane between North Europe and the Far East.

In 2010, as the largest liner shipping trade in the EU, the Far East/North Europe trade 

accounted for 63 percent of the total container imports that moved inbound (westbound) 

to the EU, and 35 percent of the total container exports that moved outbound (eastbound) 

from the EU. In terms of vessel capacity, the trade is the second largest in the world with 

about half the amount of the vessel capacity that is deployed in the intra-Asia market and 

slightly more than the amount deployed in the transpacific market. It was determined from 

an analysis of the NOI responses that on average the liner services of the carriers in the trade 

accounted for around 24 percent of their total revenue earnings. In addition, by 2010, the 

trade lane from the Far East to Europe was identified as the most profitable relative to the 

two other trade lanes examined.

Within the Far East, China is by far the largest trading nation of container cargo with 

the EU, followed by Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Japan, and South Korea. By region, 

nearly 75 percent of the total container cargo in the trade moves through Northeast Asia 

while the remaining 25 percent moves through Southeast Asia. The top Far East ports in 

the trade include, Shanghai (China), Singapore, Hong Kong, Shenzhen (China), and Pusan 

(South Korea). In North Europe, the largest portion of container cargo in the trade is 

handled through Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), 

and Bremerhaven (Germany).

As noted, container cargo moving westbound from the Far East to North Europe 

constitutes the headhaul trade lane in quantity and revenue. Usually, the volume of container 

cargo moving westbound tends to peak in the third and early fourth quarter of each year 

as retailers in Europe prepare for the holiday season. In response, carriers serving the trade 

deploy additional vessel capacity from June through October to accommodate the surge 

in demand. Major container commodities moving westbound to North Europe include 

electronics, furniture, toys, apparel, and footwear. In the eastbound direction to the Far 

East, major commodities from North Europe include wood pulp, plastics, wastepaper, scrap 

metal, beverages, and chemicals. It appears from the NOI responses that the average amount 

of container cargo in the trade shipped by NVOCCs was around 55 percent of the total in 

2010, while BCOs accounted for the remaining 45 percent.

Carriers serving the westbound trade lane have integrated the practice of slow-steaming 

their vessels into most of their service loops in response to the rise in fuel prices. Prior 

to 2007, the majority of service loops in the trade lane ran at durations of eight weeks. 

Currently, the typical duration of a service loop has increased to ten weeks.

In contrast to the US/Far East trade, significantly more container cargo moves under 

short-term freight rate agreements (three months or less) and spot rates. Based on an analysis 

of the NOI responses, it appears that on average 54 percent of container cargo in the Far 

East/Europe trade moved under short-term rate agreements. This pricing structure may lead 
Chapter 5

90

to greater rate volatility where the pricing of ocean freight fluctuates on a more immediate 

and extreme basis in response to short term market conditions.

Until the repeal, carriers were able to issue collective announcements on rate increases and 

surcharges under the Far Eastern Freight Conference (“FEFC”). Formed in 1879, the FEFC 

was one of the oldest conference agreements in operation when the block exemption was 

repealed in October 2008. At that time, the membership in FEFC included 17 carriers with a 

combined market share of 72 percent of the total vessel capacity deployed in the trade.1

Similar to TACA, the FEFC became embroiled in legal disputes and litigation with the 

EC and the European Courts. While powerful in the past, the authority of the members 

in FEFC to regulate pricing in the trade had diminished considerably in the latter years 

of the conference. As with TACA, the EC imposed restrictions on the authority of the 

FEFC members to discuss confidential rate agreements, or to police and enforce adherence 

to conference rates. As such, the announcements of rates increases and surcharges served 

as recommended directives for carriers to follow. Rate announcements by the FEFC 

were established and issued under sub-agreements. In the westbound direction, the Asia 

Westbound Rate Agreement issued rate announcements at quarterly intervals covering the 

geographic scope from the Far East, excluding Japan,2

 to North Europe. In the eastbound 

direction, the Eastbound Management Agreement issued rate announcements sporadically for 

specific commodities or freight-all-kinds (FAK). The conference continued to operate until 

October 17, 2008, the day before the repeal took effect.

As in the US, all of the three major alliance groups operate in the Far East/North Europe 

trade. In addition, numerous carriers coordinate their services or charter space with the 

alliances in the trade; these include CMA CGM, Yang Ming, APL, Hyundai, MOL, Zim, 

and Evergreen Line. In 2010, the amount of vessel capacity deployed under these agreements 

accounted for 73.4 percent of the total capacity in the trade (see Table AE-10).

Commentary

This section provides comments on the market conditions and the activities of carriers in the 

Far East/North Europe trade for the review period from 2006 through 2010, which provides 

a span of time to assess the trade prior to and after the repeal of the block exemption by the 

EU. As noted, the repeal directly impacted the trade by terminating the FEFC.

In general, as globalization has advanced, the trade in containerized commodities between 

the Far East and North Europe has grown relatively strongly, with a particularly rapid 

acceleration throughout 2006 and most of 2007 (see Charts AE-2 and AE-4). After peaking 

in late 2007, the rapid growth in imports to North Europe from the Far East subsided and 

went into a steep decline. This decline bottomed out in first quarter 2009 and a recovery 

began at the end of 2009, gaining momentum until third quarter 2010. Throughout the prerepeal period, exports from North Europe to the Far East expanded slowly. They suffered a 

short but relatively shallow decline in late 2008, followed by a quick recovery. After peaking 

in mid-2009, container exports to the Far East went into decline. 

By mid-2009, as exports from North Europe were peaking, import cargo had fallen off 

to such an extent that container exports in tonnage terms from North Europe to the Far 

East exceeded container imports. This situation lasted through early 2010 (see Chart AE-4).3

1 The members of FEFC were ANL Container Lines Pty Ltd., APL Co. Pte Ltd., CMA CGM, CSAV Norasia, 

Egyptian Intl. Shipping Co., Hapag-Lloyd, Hyundai Merchant Marine, K Line, Maersk Line, MISC Berhad, MOL, 

MSC, NYK, OOCL, Safmarine, Yang Ming, and Zim.

2 In the westbound trade lane from Japan to Europe, a separate conference operated, known as the Japan Europe Freight 

Conference, which issued rate announcements for contract periods of six and twelve month intervals.

3 A similar situation prevailed in the Far East/US trade during this same time.
91

The imbalance ratio in this trade varies from about 1.7 to 2.3 depending on the time of year. 

During the peak season in the trade, for example, over two TEUs are imported from the Far 

East for every one TEU exported (see Table AE-5).

In terms of the geographic distribution of cargo in the trade, the container trade with 

China grew from a share of 34 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2010 (see Tables AE-13a 

and AE-13e). However, container cargo shares declined among other Far East nations, 

including Singapore, from 16 percent in 2006 to 12 percent in 2010; Hong Kong, from nine 

percent in 2006 to eight percent in 2010; and Japan, from six percent in 2006 to four percent 

in 2010 (see Tables AE-13a and AE-13e).

The top moving commodities in each direction of the trade have remained comparatively 

stable over the period (see Table AE-14). The top 20 export commodities from North 

Europe account for over 80 percent of all movements by weight; the respective figure for 

the top 20 import commodities is about 75 percent. Except for the recession-impacted year 

of 2009, the total annual value of liner export cargo from North Europe to the Far East and 

the average unit value of that cargo were increasing strongly, as was the total annual value of 

liner imports to North Europe from the Far East (see Table AE-15). The average unit value 

of liner imports, however, showed no clear trend. 

The extent of entry and exit by carriers in the trade was sporadic and modest (see Table 

AE-11). A few small carriers entered the trade and exited soon thereafter during the course 

of the recession. Likewise, other carriers exited the trade during the recessionary period only 

to re-enter in 2010. MISC, however, permanently exited the trade due to the recession. 

With a contraction in services (see Tables AE-17a-e), and an increase in cooperative 

operational arrangements (see Table AE-16), market concentration in the trade increased 

over the review period only modestly. In 2006, the top four carriers with the highest shares 

of capacity in this trade had a concentration ratio (“CR4”) of 41 percent and included 

in ranking order Maersk Line, COSCO, MSC, and Hanjin (see Table AE-7a). In 2010, 

the CR4 increased to 48 percent and included in ranking order Maersk Line, CMA 

CGM, MSC, and COSCO (see Table AE-7e). Market concentration as measured by the 

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) increased from 808 in 2006 to 924 in 2010 (see Chart 

AE-8).4

 Maersk Line remained the largest carrier in the trade throughout the entire period, 

providing over 20 percent of the annual capacity deployed (see Table AE-9). MSC and 

CMA CGM obtained noteworthy gains in their share of trade capacity over the study period.

Trade capacity expanded unrelentingly in the Far East/North Europe trade all the way 

through to third quarter 2008 but, even so, was barely able to keep pace with demand until 

the latter began to soften in late 2007. Consequently, capacity utilization, which had been 

high and rising throughout 2006 and most of 2007, began to fall through all of 2008 and 

reached its lowest point in first quarter 2009 (see Table AE-20 or Chart AE-21). In response 

to this deteriorating situation, carriers withdrew capacity (see Chart AE-18). As third quarter 

2009 began, average weekly capacity was almost 20 percent lower than it had been just one 

year earlier. Capacity stayed more or less flat for over a year but began being reintroduced in 

the last half of 2010 at a fairly brisk pace.

Average revenue per TEU broadly paralleled the vicissitudes of capacity utilization in 

the headhaul direction of the trade although the amplitude of the swings in average revenue 

far exceeded that of average capacity utilization (see Chart AE-19). With average capacity 

utilization in the high-90s, average revenue in the headhaul direction of the Far East/North 

4 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and 

an HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated.
Chapter 5

92

Europe trade peaked at over $2,000 per TEU entering the fourth quarter 2007. From the 

end of that year through mid-2009, average revenue fell sharply as carriers struggled to 

remove capacity at a pace in keeping with rapidly declining demand and as competition 

for the cargo that remained intensified. Average revenue decreased for roughly 18 months, 

bottoming out in mid-2009 at well under $1,000 per TEU. At that point, average revenue 

turned sharply upward for the next eight months and, by first quarter 2010, had matched 

levels last seen in fourth quarter 2007.5

 At such comparatively high levels of average revenue, 

capacity quickly began coming back into the trade during the second half of 2010. Average 

revenue declined during this time in response to growing excess capacity in the trade. 

In the backhaul trade from North Europe to the Far East, average revenue per TEU was 

fairly stable throughout 2006 and most of 2007 but then began to increase until the end of 

2008, mostly in response to the rising price of bunker fuel. A strong recovery in backhaul 

rates occurred at the same time as rate recovery in the headhaul direction (from mid-2009 

through mid-2010) prompted by a strong showing in exports from Europe and rising average 

capacity utilization rates that were helped along by capacity having been kept more or less at 

the same level during this time.

The remainder of this section consists of a series of tables and charts that track and 

describe changes between 2006 and 2010 in various aspects of market structure, carrier 

conduct, and economic performance in the Far East/Europe trade.

5 It is worth noting that the 2010 revenue recovery by carriers in the Far East/North Europe trade occurred more 

quickly than the recovery in the Far East/US trade – within eight months rather than 12 months.
93

Asia/Europe Market Structure

Table AE-1 Quarterly TEU Cargo Volume 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time series 

data showing by trade direction the total number of North Europe container exports that 

moved outbound to Asia, and the total number of container imports that moved inbound 

to North Europe from Asia. The container imports and exports are measured in TEUs. The 

trend in the number of the containers moved over the time series shows the extent of cargo 

growth and seasonality in each trade direction based on the foreign and domestic consumer 

demand for container exports and imports, which affects the demand and price of the 

liner shipping services in the trade. Further, the number of containers moved inbound and 

outbound identifies the headhaul and backhaul directions of the trade, and the extent of any 

imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo. The source of the container cargo data 

is Eurostat.

AE–1 Asia/North Europe Trade

Quarterly Cargo Volume in TEUs

Asia to N. Europe N. Europe to Asia

1Q06 1,735,926 1,006,754

2Q06 1,888,148 1,072,515

3Q06 2,079,751 1,082,695

4Q06 2,084,530 1,130,143

1Q07 2,092,836 1,124,785

2Q07 2,266,103 1,141,143

3Q07 2,539,214 1,105,768

4Q07 2,339,661 1,095,373

1Q08 2,253,278 1,118,141

2Q08 2,278,307 1,204,898

3Q08 2,427,506 1,133,858

4Q08 2,142,707 965,283

1Q09 1,883,755 951,005

2Q09 1,900,068 1,193,918

3Q09 2,005,146 1,227,101

4Q09 1,982,071 1,193,420

1Q10 2,122,067 1,112,341

2Q10 2,232,098 1,133,848

3Q10 2,517,504 1,029,319

4Q10 2,310,642 1,055,249

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

94

Chart AE-2 Quarterly TEU Cargo Volume 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart shows trends 

in the actual import and export container cargo loads in each direction of the Asia/North 

Europe trade. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time in quarters over the 

review period, and the vertical axis measures container cargo loads in thousands of TEUs. 

The trend lines show the extent of growth, seasonality, and change that occurred over the 

review period in the consumer demand for container imports and exports in the trade. In 

turn, the extent of container cargo growth, or a serious reduction in container cargo volume 

due to a contraction in demand, directly affects the price of liner shipping service in the 

trade. Further, the trend lines of container imports and exports identify the headhaul and the 

backhaul directions of the trade, and any imbalance and change over time in the directional 

flow of cargo. The source of the container cargo data is Eurostat.

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

N. Europe to Asia

Asia to N. Europe

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

AE–2 Asia/North Europe Trade

Loaded TEUs by Quarter

Source: Eurostat Loaded TEUs (Millions)
95

Table AE-3 Quarterly Metric Tons of Container Cargo

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides the 

total weight of the container exports that moved outbound from North Europe to Asia, 

and the total weight of the container imports that moved inbound to North Europe from 

Asia, measured in metric tons. The trend in the metric tons of container cargo moved over 

the time series is an indication of the extent of cargo growth and seasonality in each trade 

direction based on the foreign and domestic demand for container exports and imports. The 

trend in the data also shows the extent of any weight imbalance in the directional flow of 

container cargo in the trade. The weight of the cargo moving in a trade lane can affect the 

utilization of vessel capacity and impose draft limitations on containerships. The source of the 

container cargo volume data is Eurostat.

AE–3 Asia/North Europe Trade

Quarterly Cargo Volume

Containerized Metric Tons

Asia to N. Europe N. Europe to Asia

1Q06 12,497,000 11,752,000

2Q06 14,027,000 12,380,000

3Q06 14,898,000 12,181,000

4Q06 15,257,000 13,047,000

1Q07 16,007,000 13,083,000

2Q07 16,995,000 13,180,000

3Q07 18,251,000 12,579,000

4Q07 16,746,000 12,609,000

1Q08 16,509,000 12,979,000

2Q08 17,420,000 13,810,000

3Q08 17,639,000 13,120,000

4Q08 15,613,000 10,767,000

1Q09 13,047,000 10,910,000

2Q09 13,272,000 14,503,000

3Q09 13,111,000 14,583,000

4Q09 13,534,000 13,922,000

1Q10 13,898,000 12,849,000

2Q10 15,145,000 12,941,000

3Q10 16,853,000 11,871,000

4Q10 15,621,000 11,984,000

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

96

Chart AE-4 Quarterly Metric Tons of Container Cargo 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart shows trends in 

the actual metric tons of import and export container cargo that moved in each direction 

of the Asia-North Europe trade. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time by 

quarter over the review period, and the vertical axis measures container cargo in metric tons. 

The trend lines of the data show the extent of growth, seasonality, and change that occurred 

over the review period in the amount of metric tons that moved in each trade direction. 

Further, the trend lines show the extent of any weight imbalance and change over time in 

the directional flow of the cargo in the trade. The change over time in the trend lines reflects 

the change in the consumer demand for container imports and exports. The source of the 

container cargo data is Eurostat.

N. Europe to Asia

Asia to N. Europe

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

AE–4 Asia/North Europe Trade

Quarterly Containerized Cargo in Metric Tons

Source: Eurostat Metric Tons (Millions)

0

2

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

4
97

Table AE-5 Quarterly Inbound to Outbound Cargo Ratio 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time 

series data showing the ratio in the weight and number of container imports divided by the 

weight and number of container exports that moved in the Asia/North Europe trade. The 

weight of the container cargo is measured in metric tons, and the number of containers is 

measured in TEUs. The ratio of container imports to container exports provides a measure 

of the extent of any imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo in the trade. The 

higher the ratio the higher the extent of an imbalance in the weight or number of container 

imports in excess of container exports. A ratio of less than 1.0 indicates a period of time 

when container exports from North Europe exceeded container imports from Asia. Further, 

the ratio shows the extent to which North Europe’s demand for container imports from Asia 

exceeded Asia’s demand for North Europe’s container exports. The source of the container 

cargo data is Eurostat.

AE–5 Trade Imbalance between the Asia and North Europe

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Metric Tons TEUs

1Q06 1.06 1.72

2Q06 1.13 1.76

3Q06 1.22 1.92

4Q06 1.17 1.84

1Q07 1.22 1.86

2Q07 1.29 1.99

3Q07 1.45 2.30

4Q07 1.33 2.14

1Q08 1.27 2.02

2Q08 1.26 1.89

3Q08 1.34 2.14

4Q08 1.45 2.22

1Q09 1.20 1.98

2Q09 0.92 1.59

3Q09 0.90 1.63

4Q09 0.97 1.66

1Q10 1.08 1.91

2Q10 1.17 1.97

3Q10 1.42 2.45

4Q10 1.30 2.19

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

98

Chart AE-6 Quarterly Inbound to Outbound Cargo Ratio

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the ratio of container imports to container exports (in 

both TEUs and metric tons) that moved in the Asia/North Europe trade. The weight of 

the containers is measured in metric tons, and the number of the containers is measured in 

TEUs. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time in quarters over the review 

period, and the vertical axis measures the level of the ratio of container imports to container 

exports. The trend lines of the ratio show the extent of an imbalance in the weight or 

number of container imports in excess of container exports in the trade over the review 

period. The degree to which the trend lines exceed 1.0 shows the degree of an imbalance 

in container imports above container exports. A trend line that falls below 1.0 indicates 

a period of time when the weight or number of container exports from North Europe 

exceeded container imports. The trend lines over the time series show how any imbalance 

in directional flow of container cargo changed over the review period. They can also be 

interpreted as showing the change over time in the North Europe demand for container 

imports from Asia compared to Asia’s demand for North Europe container exports. The 

source of the container cargo data is Eurostat.

AE–6 Imbalance in the Asia/North Europe Trade

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Source: Eurostat Ratio

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

Metric Tons

TEUs

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal
99

Tables AE-7a-e Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI) in the Asia/North Europe Trade

The tables provide measures of the annual levels of market concentration among the shipping 

lines that participated in the Asia/North Europe trade in the westbound (headhaul) direction 

for the review period from 2006 through 2010. The shipping lines that operated vessels in 

the trade for each year are shown in ranking order based on their annual capacity deployed 

in the trade. The capacity share is derived for each shipping line from the total container 

capacity data. From the capacity share data, two measures of market concentration are 

derived: the concentration ratio of the top four shipping lines with the highest capacity shares 

(“CR4”) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). The CR4 is simply derived from 

the sum of the percent of the capacity shares of the top four lines. The figures in the Market 

Share and Cumulative Percent columns in the following tables have been rounded to the 

nearest whole number and may not appear to sum accurately.

The HHI for each year is shown in bold at the bottom of the HHI column and is 

derived from the sum of the squared values of the capacity shares for each shipping line. 

As a benchmark for assessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as 

moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 has highly concentrated. The sources of 

the capacity data are Drewry Maritime Research and AXS-Alphaliner.

AE–7a Share of Capacity Operated (TEUs)*

Asia to North Europe (Westbound)

CR4 & HHI - 2006

Rank Shipping Line 2006 TEUs Capacity Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 1,707,153 20% 20% 392.74 

2 COSCO 655,484 8% 27% 57.90 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 654,104 8% 35% 57.66 

4 Hanjin Shipping 551,820 6% 41% 41.03 

5 Evergreen 535,640 6% 48% 38.66 

6 CMA CGM 512,073 6% 54% 35.34 

7 China Shipping Container Lines 500,796 6% 59% 33.80 

8 NYK Line 438,863 5% 64% 25.95 

9 Hapag-Lloyd 389,855 5% 69% 20.48 

10 OOCL 386,960 4% 74% 20.18 

11 Hyundai Merchant Marine 372,496 4% 78% 18.70 

12 Mitsui OSK Line 350,516 4% 82% 16.56 

13 American President Lines 328,642 4% 86% 14.55 

14 K Line 316,408 4% 89% 13.49 

15 Yang Ming Line 241,309 3% 92% 7.85 

16 CSAV 226,689 3% 95% 6.92 

17 PONL 173,731 2% 97% 4.07 

18 Pacific International Line 63,778 1% 98% 0.55 

19 Wan Hai Lines, Ltd 63,778 1% 98% 0.55 

20 Malaysian Int’l Shipping Co. 62,282 1% 99% 0.52 

21 Zim Container Line 36,892 0% 99% 0.18 

22 United Arab Shipping Company 27,088 0% 100% 0.10 

23 Chipolbrok 13,432 0% 100% 0.02 

24 Marfret 3,284 0% 100% 0.00 

25 CP Ships 1,273 0% 100% 0.00 

2006 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 8,614,342 100% -- 808

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
Chapter 5

100

AE–7b Share of Capacity Operated (TEUs)*

Asia to North Europe (Westbound)

CR4 & HHI - 2007

Rank Shipping Line 2007 TEUs Capacity Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 2,054,628 21% 21% 444.60 

2 CMA CGM 800,791 8% 29% 67.54 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 783,560 8% 37% 64.66 

4 COSCO 685,433 7% 44% 49.48 

5 Evergreen Line 636,139 7% 51% 42.62 

6 China Shipping Container Lines 602,018 6% 57% 38.17 

7 Hanjin Shipping 515,309 5% 62% 27.97 

8 OOCL 482,891 5% 67% 24.56 

9 NYK Line 443,043 5% 72% 20.67 

10 K Line 436,213 4% 76% 20.04 

11 Hapag-Lloyd 402,659 4% 80% 17.08 

12 Hyundai Merchant Marine 388,514 4% 84% 15.90 

13 Mitsui OSK Line 376,817 4% 88% 14.95 

14 American President Lines 342,774 4% 92% 12.37 

15 CSAV 291,815 3% 95% 8.97 

16 Yang Ming Line 197,783 2% 97% 4.12 

17 Pacific International Line 99,240 1% 98% 1.04 

18 Wan Hai 99,240 1% 99% 1.04 

19 Malaysian Int’l Shipping Co. 59,265 1% 100% 0.37 

20 United Arab Shipping Company 27,894 0% 100% 0.08 

21 Chipolbrok 13,432 0% 100% 0.02 

22 Islamic Republic of Iran Shpg Lines 2,814 0% 100% 0.00 

23 Marfret 1,552 0% 100% 0.00 

24 Deutsche-Afrika Linien 441 0% 100% 0.00 

2007 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 9,744,262 100% -- 876 

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
101

AE–7c Share of Capacity Operated (TEUs)*

Asia to North Europe (Westbound)

CR4 & HHI - 2008

Rank Shipping Line 2008 TEUs Capacity Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 2,315,515 21% 21% 439.95 

2 CMA CGM 914,656 8% 29% 68.65 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 826,699 7% 37% 56.08 

4 COSCO 745,833 7% 44% 45.64 

5 Evergreen Line 688,662 6% 50% 38.92 

6 China Shipping Container Lines 646,433 6% 56% 34.29 

7 Hanjin Shipping 629,015 6% 61% 32.47 

8 OOCL 538,019 5% 66% 23.75 

9 NYK Line 492,617 4% 71% 19.91 

10 Hapag-Lloyd 459,848 4% 75% 17.35 

11 Hyundai Merchant Marine 430,587 4% 79% 15.21 

12 Mitsui OSK Line 428,715 4% 83% 15.08 

13 K Line 421,343 4% 86% 14.57 

14 American President Lines 370,379 3% 90% 11.26 

15 Yang Ming Line 356,624 3% 93% 10.44 

16 CSAV 283,436 3% 96% 6.59 

17 Zim Container Line 133,649 1% 97% 1.47 

18 Pacific International Line 99,686 1% 98% 0.82 

19 Wan Hai 99,686 1% 99% 0.82 

20 United Arab Shipping Company 75,345 1% 99% 0.47 

21 Malaysian Int’l Shipping Co. 66,294 1% 100% 0.36 

22 Chipolbrok 12,132 0% 100% 0.01 

23 Islamic Republic of Iran Shpg Lines 3,201 0% 100% 0.00 

24 Deutsche-Afrika Linien 1,021 0% 100% 0.00 

2008 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 11,039,391 100% -- 854 

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
Chapter 5

102

AE–7d Share of Capacity Operated (TEUs)*

Asia to North Europe (Westbound)

CR4 & HHI - 2009

Rank Shipping Line 2009 TEUs Capacity Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 1,965,509 21% 21% 443.54 

2 CMA CGM 948,783 10% 31% 103.35 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 854,355 9% 40% 83.80 

4 COSCO 620,803 7% 47% 44.25 

5 China Shipping Container Lines 572,876 6% 53% 37.68 

6 Hanjin Shipping 570,398 6% 59% 37.35 

7 Evergreen Line 535,674 6% 65% 32.94 

8 OOCL 470,631 5% 70% 25.43 

9 NYK Line 432,335 5% 75% 21.46 

10 Hapag-Lloyd 403,160 4% 79% 18.66 

11 Hyundai Merchant Marine 380,429 4% 83% 16.62 

12 Yang Ming Line 356,551 4% 87% 14.60 

13 K Line 352,218 4% 91% 14.24 

14 Mitsui OSK Line 327,886 4% 94% 12.34 

15 American President Lines 307,424 3% 97% 10.85 

16 United Arab Shipping Company 77,560 1% 98% 0.69 

17 CSAV 62,305 1% 99% 0.45 

18 Malaysian Int’l Shipping Co. 58,220 1% 100% 0.39 

19 Pacific International Line 11,333 0% 100% 0.01 

20 Wan Hai 11,333 0% 100% 0.01 

21 Chipolbrok 10,832 0% 100% 0.01 

22 Deutsche-Afrika Linien 129 0% 100% 0.00 

2009 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 9,332,747 100% -- 919 

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
103

AE–7e Share of Capacity Operated (TEUs)*

Asia to North Europe (Westbound)

CR4 & HHI - 2010

Rank Shipping Line 2010 TEUs Capacity Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 2,036,529 21% 21% 446.01 

2 CMA CGM 1,087,342 11% 32% 127.14 

3 Mediterranean Shipping Company 929,469 10% 42% 92.90 

4 COSCO 564,227 6% 48% 34.24 

5 Evergreen Line 551,192 6% 54% 32.67 

6 Hanjin Shipping 521,721 5% 59% 29.27 

7 OOCL 509,525 5% 64% 27.92 

8 NYK Line 456,750 5% 69% 22.43 

9 China Shipping Container Lines 430,746 4% 73% 19.95 

10 Hapag-Lloyd 420,318 4% 78% 19.00 

11 Hyundai Merchant Marine 379,666 4% 82% 15.50 

12 Mitsui OSK Line 357,263 4% 85% 13.73 

13 Yang Ming Line 340,819 4% 89% 12.49 

14 American President Lines 334,968 3% 93% 12.07 

15 K Line 328,496 3% 96% 11.60 

16 United Arab Shipping Company 247,920 3% 98% 6.61 

17 Pacific International Line 58,547 1% 99% 0.37 

18 Wan Hai 58,547 1% 100% 0.37 

19 Zim Container Line 16,294 0% 100% 0.03 

20 Chipolbrok 10,773 0% 100% 0.01 

2010 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 9,643,120 100% -- 924 

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
Chapter 5

104

Chart AE-8 Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI) 

The chart provides a summary of the changes in market concentration among the shipping 

lines that participated in the Asia/North Europe trade in the westbound (headhaul) direction 

for the review period from 2006 through 2010. The percent of capacity share is derived 

for each shipping line from the container capacity data. From the capacity share data, two 

measures of market concentration are derived: the concentration ratio of the top four 

shipping lines with the highest capacity shares (“CR4”) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 

(“HHI”). The CR4 is indicated by the light columns and right hand scale and is simply 

derived as the sum of the percent of the market capacity shares of the top four lines. The 

HHI for each year is shown by the dark columns and the left hand scale and is derived as the 

sum of the squared values of the market capacity shares for each shipping line. 

As a benchmark for accessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as 

moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 has highly concentrated. The source of 

the container data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–8 Asia/North Europe Trade

Measures of Market Concentration CR4 & HHI

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

Capacity Share of Top Four Carriers in Trade (CR4)

CR4

HHI

600

650

700

750

800

850

900

950

1000

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

808

41%

876

44%

854

44%

919

47%

924

48%
105

Table AE-9 Changes in the Shares of Participants 

The table provides a summary of the changes in the capacity share percentages of the 

participating shipping lines in the Asia/North Europe Westbound trade for each year of 

the review period from 2006 through 2010. The annual capacity share percentages of each 

shipping line are based on its total annual container capacity in the trade measured in TEUs. 

The shifts in capacity share between the shipping lines (as an indication of market presence) 

provide an indication of how well each line competed in the marketplace from one year to 

the next and over the course of the review period. Spaces where no percentages appear in 

the table [identified by dashes] signal the exit or entry of a shipping line in the trade. The 

bottom row of the table gives the size of the market in millions of TEUs as measured by the 

sum of the annual westbound capacity in the trade by each of the identified shipping lines. 

Only those shipping lines that deployed vessels in the trade in a given year were included 

as market participants. The sources of the capacity data are Drewry Maritime Research and 

AXS-Alphaliner.

AE–9 Asia/North Europe Westbound Trade*

Changes in the Share of Capacity of Participants 

Shipping Lines 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Maersk 22% 21% 21% 21% 21%

COSCO 8% 7% 7% 7% 6%

Mediterranean Shipping Company 8% 8% 7% 9% 10%

Hanjin Shipping 6% 5% 6% 6% 5%

Evergreen Line 6% 7% 6% 6% 6%

CMA CGM 6% 8% 8% 10% 11%

China Shipping Container Line 6% 6% 6% 6% 4%

NYK Line 5% 5% 4% 5% 5%

Hapag-Lloyd 5% 4% 4% 4% 4%

OOCL 4% 5% 5% 5% 5%

Hyundai Merchant Marine 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%

Mitsui OSK Line 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%

American President Lines 4% 4% 3% 3% 3%

K Line 4% 4% 4% 4% 3%

Yang Ming Line 3% 2% 3% 4% 4%

CSAV 3% 3% 3% 1% -- 

Pacific International Line 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%

Wan Hai 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%

Malaysian Int’l Shipping Co. 1% 1% 1% 1% -- 

Zim Container Line 0% -- 1% -- 0%

United Arab Shipping Company 0% 0% 1% 1% 3%

Chipolbrok 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Marfret 0% 0% -- -- -- 

Deutsche-Afrika Linien -- 0% 0% -- -- 

Islamic Republic of Iran Shpg Lines -- 0% 0% -- -- 

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Market Size (Millions of TEUs) 8.61 9.74 11.04 9.33 9.64

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carriers, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier.

Sources: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner
Chapter 5

106

Table AE-10 Changes in the Shares of Capacity of the 

Major Alliances and Vessel Sharing Arrangements 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the vessel 

capacity in TEUs and share of total capacity as a group by members of each alliance agreement 

and the selected vessel sharing agreements operating in the Asia/North Europe trade. The 

total capacity of each agreement is the sum of the total capacity offered by each member 

of the agreement and is combined to include both import and export capacity measured in 

TEUs. The annual capacity share percentage is derived by dividing the total capacity of each 

agreement by the total capacity offered in the trade and multiplying this quotient by 100. The 

table also gives the sum, and the corresponding share percentage, of the annual vessel capacity 

deployed in the trade by all of the alliance agreements (as one group) and by all of the alliance 

and selected vessel sharing agreements (as one group). The selected vessel sharing agreements 

shown in the table are those where an alliance, as a group, formed a service, or services, under 

an agreement in partnership with non-alliance carriers operating in the trade. Over the review 

period, the table shows any annual change that occurred in vessel capacity operated by, and 

corresponding capacity share percent of, the various agreements and groups of agreements.
107

AE– 10 Asia/North Europe Trade

Changes in Capacity (TEUs) and Shares of Capacity of the Major Alliances and VSAs

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 1,988,724 2,087,809 2,298,347 1,837,827 1,967,732 

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 2,252,330 2,409,639 2,698,975 2,376,157 2,435,172 

CKYH Worldwide Slot Allocation 

and Sailing Agreement 3,377,217 3,461,614 4,033,104 3,557,794 3,247,696 

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance/CMA CGM 

Slot Charter Arrangement 2,854,130 3,353,064 3,688,153 3,294,418 3,631,507 

New World Alliance/Yang Ming 

Slot Charter Arrangement 2,450,448 2,460,786 2,967,292 -- -- 

Grand Alliance/APL Slot Charter 

Arrangement 2,873,806 3,057,503 3,399,028 2,937,103 3,050,089 

Grand Alliance/HMM Slot 

Charter Arrangement 2,956,736 3,143,954 3,506,684 3,054,755 3,132,143 

Grand Alliance/MOL Slot Charter 

Arrangement 2,915,172 3,115,269 3,489,559 2,974,440 3,091,017 

Grand Alliance/ZIM Slot Charter 

Arrangement -- -- -- -- 2,465,712 

Grand Alliance/Evergreen Slot 

Charter Arrangement -- -- -- -- 3,390,438 

Capacity by Alliances 7,618,271 7,959,062 9,030,425 7,771,778 7,650,600 

Capacity by Alliances including 

Partners 10,934,125 11,685,102 13,387,522 11,066,195 12,267,912 

Shares of Capacity

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 12.8% 12.1% 11.9% 11.3% 11.8%

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 14.5% 13.9% 13.9% 14.6% 14.6%

CKYH Worldwide Slot Allocation 

and Sailing Agreement 21.7% 20.0% 20.8% 21.8% 19.4%

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance/CMA CGM 

Slot Charter Arrangement 18.4% 19.4% 19.1% 20.2% 21.7%

New World Alliance/Yang Ming 

Slot Charter Arrangement 15.8% 14.2% 15.3% -- --

Grand Alliance/APL Slot Charter 

Arrangement 18.5% 17.7% 17.6% 18.0% 18.2%

Grand Alliance/HMM Slot 

Charter Arrangement 19.0% 18.2% 18.1% 18.7% 18.7%

Grand Alliance/MOL Slot Charter 

Arrangement 18.8% 18.0% 18.0% 18.2% 18.5%

Grand Alliance/ZIM Slot Charter 

Arrangement -- -- -- -- 14.7%

Grand Alliance/Evergreen Slot 

Charter Arrangement -- -- -- -- 20.3%

Market Share of Alliances 49.0% 46.0% 46.7% 47.6% 45.8%

Market Share of Alliances 

including Partners 70.3% 67.5% 69.2% 67.8% 73.4%

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports
Chapter 5

108

Table AE-11 Carrier Entry and Exit 

The table shows the level of entry and exit of shipping lines participating in the Asia/North 

Europe trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. Only those 

shipping lines that deployed vessels in liner services in the trade were counted as market 

participants. For purposes of this study, market entry was counted as the initiation of a new 

liner service in which a shipping line deployed some or all of its own vessels and was not 

deploying vessels in any other liner services in the trade at the time when the new service 

was initiated. Market exit was counted as a shipping line terminating its services in the 

trade and removing its vessels. The level of market entry and exit provides an indication of 

whether barriers to entry in a market exist, which affects competition between the market 

participants. The exit or entry of shipping lines in a trade is also a function of the demand 

for liner shipping services. A contraction in demand for an extended period may cause lines 

to exit a trade without attracting new entry. Established shipping lines are able to enter and 

exit trades more readily without incurring any great amount of sunk costs as compared to the 

start up of a new shipping line in a trade where the capital investment can be substantial. The 

sources of data are Drewry Maritime Research and AXS-Alphaliner.

AE–11 Asia/North Europe Trade

Entries and Exits

Entry/Exit based on carriers listed as operators in the Asia/North Europe trade as identified by Drewry

N. Europe 

to Asia Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

Asia to 

N. Europe Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

1Q06 1Q06

2Q06 2Q06

3Q06 3Q06

4Q06 4Q06

1Q07 1Q07

2Q07 2Q07

3Q07 IRISL 5,332 TEUs 3Q07 IRISL 6,131 TEU

DAL 836 TEUs

4Q07 4Q07

1Q08 1Q08

2Q08 2Q08

3Q08 IRISL 5,616 TEUs 3Q08 IRISL 6,458 TEUs

4Q08 4Q08

1Q09 1Q09

2Q09

CSAV 193,899 TEUs

PIL 35,476 TEUs*

Wan Hai 35,476 

TEUs*

2Q09

CSAV 249,218 TEUs

DAL 836 TEUs

PIL 45,330 TEUs*

Wan Hai 45,330 

TEUs*

3Q09 3Q09

4Q09 4Q09

1Q10 MISC 42,788 TEUs 1Q10 MISC 56,882 TEUs

2Q10

PIL 29,499 TEUs*

Wan Hai 29,499 

TEUs*

2Q10

PIL 33,740 TEUs*

Wan Hai 33,740 

TEUs*

3Q10 3Q10

4Q10 4Q10

* Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports provide capacity data by service string. For services with multiple carries, 

AXS-Alphaliner, which provides vessel data by string, was used to determine the TEU capacity attributed to each individual 

carrier. Pacific International Line (PIL) and Wan Hai provide only one service string in the trade. The capacity of that string is 

split evenly between the carriers because they provide an equal number of similarly sized vessels.

Derived from Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports and AXS-Alphaliner.
109

Table AE-12 Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) and Ratio of Market Size to MES

The table on the left estimates the minimum efficient scale (MES) of weekly liner service 

in the North Europe/Asia trade for each year of the review period from 2006 through 

2010. The MES for each year is measured as the smallest level of service among comparable 

shipping lines that can sustain a competitive weekly service loop in the trade. For each year, 

the table identifies the shipping line, frequency, type, number of vessels, the average TEU 

vessel capacity of each MES, and any changes in MES over time. 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the right also 

gives the ratio of the size of the market to the MES of service in each direction of the Asia/

North Europe trade. The ratio is derived by dividing the annual capacity of the market by 

the annual capacity of the MES in each direction of the trade. The MES for each year is 

measured as the smallest level of service among comparable shipping lines that can sustain a 

competitive weekly service loop in the trade. The market size is measured as the sum of the 

annual capacity of all of the liner services offered in the trade. The table shows the change 

in the ratio in each trade direction over the review period. It would be expected that a high 

ratio of market size to MES indicates that competition among market participants is greater 

and barriers to market entry are lower. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–12 Asia/North Europe Trade

Trend in Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) Ratio of Market Size to MES

 N. Europe to Asia Asia to N. Europe 

2006 CMA CGM weekly loop service using 8 vessels of 

6,659 TEU vessel capacity on average 30 40

2007 Maersk weekly loop service using 8 vessels of 

8,925 TEU vessel capacity on average 21 27

2008 CKYH Alliance weekly loop service using 8 vessels of 

9,447 TEU vessel capacity on average 22 25

2009 Grand Alliance weekly loop service using 9 vessels of 

8,934 TEU vessel capacity on average 20 24

2010 Grand Alliance weekly loop service using 10 vessels of 

8,063 TEU vessel capacity on average 24 29

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

110

Tables AE-13a-e Annual Container Volumes by 

European Port Range and Asian Country

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables give the total number 

and market share percentages of annual containers that moved between the EU member 

states and each Asian nation included in the geographic scope of the liner shipping trade 

in the Far East/Europe trade. The total number of containers for each year is combined to 

include imports and exports measured in TEUs. Each market share percentage of container 

cargo is derived as a function of the total number of import and export containers that 

moved in the trade for each year, e.g., 34 percent of the total number of containers in the 

trade for 2006 moved between the nation of China and North Europe. The tables show the 

geographic distribution and extent of demand in container cargo between EU member states 

and each Asian nation through ports in North Europe and the Mediterranean. Over the 

review period, the tables show any changes that occurred in the distribution and demand of 

container cargo in the trade. The source of the container cargo data is Eurostat.
111

AE–13a Asia/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and European Port Range

2006 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 16 64 80 

Cambodia 596 679 1,275 

China 5,145,259 1,543,467 6,688,726 

East Timor 66 15 81 

Hong Kong 1,426,684 377,767 1,804,451 

Indonesia 65,786 81,682 147,468 

Japan 919,969 71,712 991,681 

Macau 34 59 93 

Malaysia 884,226 257,407 1,141,633 

North Korea - 191 191 

Philippines 3,495 5,475 8,970 

Singapore 2,436,604 429,179 2,865,783 

South Korea 592,386 101,927 694,313 

Taiwan 529,746 87,177 616,923 

Thailand 67,939 46,280 114,219 

Vietnam 7,656 31,281 38,937 

Total 2006 12,080,462 3,034,362 15,114,824 

2006 Container Volume Percentage

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

China 34.0% 10.2% 44.3%

East Timor 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Hong Kong 9.4% 2.5% 11.9%

Indonesia 0.4% 0.5% 1.0%

Japan 6.1% 0.5% 6.6%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 5.9% 1.7% 7.6%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%

Singapore 16.1% 2.8% 19.0%

South Korea 3.9% 0.7% 4.6%

Taiwan 3.5% 0.6% 4.1%

Thailand 0.4% 0.3% 0.8%

Vietnam 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%

Total 2006 79.9% 20.1% 100.0%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

112

AE–13b Asia/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and European Port Range

2007 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 21 24 45 

Cambodia 1,343 1,131 2,474 

China 6,454,526 2,013,604 8,468,130 

East Timor - - - 

Hong Kong 1,392,211 380,705 1,772,916 

Indonesia 25,726 75,782 101,508 

Japan 840,419 91,665 932,084 

Macau 2 69 71 

Malaysia 1,243,765 224,115 1,467,880 

North Korea - 15 15 

Philippines 4,959 8,494 13,453 

Singapore 2,483,512 424,603 2,908,115 

South Korea 637,843 114,613 752,456 

Taiwan 513,387 83,077 596,464 

Thailand 94,957 72,149 167,106 

Vietnam 12,212 47,401 59,613 

Total 2007 13,704,883 3,537,447 17,242,330 

2007 Container Volume Percentage

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

China 37.4% 11.7% 49.1%

East Timor 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Hong Kong 8.1% 2.2% 10.3%

Indonesia 0.1% 0.4% 0.6%

Japan 4.9% 0.5% 5.4%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 7.2% 1.3% 8.5%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%

Singapore 14.4% 2.5% 16.9%

South Korea 3.7% 0.7% 4.4%

Taiwan 3.0% 0.5% 3.5%

Thailand 0.6% 0.4% 1.0%

Vietnam 0.1% 0.3% 0.3%

Total 2007 79.5% 20.5% 100.0%

Source: Eurostat
113

AE–13c Asia/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and European Port Range

2008 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 26 50 76 

Cambodia 190 1,950 2,140 

China 6,592,154 2,013,264 8,605,418 

East Timor - - - 

Hong Kong 1,252,058 392,122 1,644,180 

Indonesia 27,993 83,930 111,923 

Japan 827,415 92,339 919,754 

Macau 94 7,199 7,293 

Malaysia 1,229,621 177,207 1,406,828 

North Korea - 47 47 

Philippines 3,796 11,004 14,800 

Singapore 2,363,122 381,898 2,745,020 

South Korea 610,238 168,996 779,234 

Taiwan 481,544 83,415 564,959 

Thailand 120,457 102,382 222,839 

Vietnam 15,270 55,460 70,730 

Total 2008 13,523,978 3,571,263 17,095,241 

2008 Container Volume Percentage

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

China 38.6% 11.8% 50.3%

East Timor 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Hong Kong 7.3% 2.3% 9.6%

Indonesia 0.2% 0.5% 0.7%

Japan 4.8% 0.5% 5.4%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 7.2% 1.0% 8.2%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%

Singapore 13.8% 2.2% 16.1%

South Korea 3.6% 1.0% 4.6%

Taiwan 2.8% 0.5% 3.3%

Thailand 0.7% 0.6% 1.3%

Vietnam 0.1% 0.3% 0.4%

Total 2008 79.1% 20.9% 100.0%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

114

AE–13d Asia/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and European Port Range

2009 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 19 89 108 

Cambodia 158 1,925 2,083 

China 6,393,249 1,745,588 8,138,837 

East Timor - 2 2 

Hong Kong 1,249,177 321,470 1,570,647 

Indonesia 25,191 87,067 112,258 

Japan 634,596 62,502 697,098 

Macau 2 185 187 

Malaysia 1,053,687 146,858 1,200,545 

North Korea - 935 935 

Philippines 5,303 7,337 12,640 

Singapore 1,786,586 387,126 2,173,712 

South Korea 565,370 163,633 729,003 

Taiwan 490,834 87,740 578,574 

Thailand 116,609 59,378 175,987 

Vietnam 15,703 54,744 70,447 

Total 2009 12,336,484 3,126,579 15,463,063 

2009 Container Volume Percentage

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

China 41.3% 11.3% 52.6%

East Timor 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Hong Kong 8.1% 2.1% 10.2%

Indonesia 0.2% 0.6% 0.7%

Japan 4.1% 0.4% 4.5%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 6.8% 0.9% 7.8%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%

Singapore 11.6% 2.5% 14.1%

South Korea 3.7% 1.1% 4.7%

Taiwan 3.2% 0.6% 3.7%

Thailand 0.8% 0.4% 1.1%

Vietnam 0.1% 0.4% 0.5%

Total 2009 79.8% 20.2% 100.0%

Source: Eurostat
115

AE–13e Asia/North Europe Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and European Port Range

2010 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 38 57 95 

Cambodia 747 1,466 2,213 

China 7,155,038 2,132,155 9,287,193 

East Timor - - - 

Hong Kong 1,351,595 338,998 1,690,593 

Indonesia 32,924 67,997 100,921 

Japan 700,732 65,582 766,314 

Macau 2 4,678 4,680 

Malaysia 1,014,078 168,351 1,182,429 

North Korea - 5 5 

Philippines 3,340 9,497 12,837 

Singapore 1,936,267 486,636 2,422,903 

South Korea 713,373 220,323 933,696 

Taiwan 456,175 79,408 535,583 

Thailand 130,283 59,731 190,014 

Vietnam 18,476 50,593 69,069 

Total 2010 13,513,068 3,685,477 17,198,545 

2010 Container Volume Percentage

Country North Europe Mediterranean Total 

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

China 41.6% 12.4% 54.0%

East Timor 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Hong Kong 7.9% 2.0% 9.8%

Indonesia 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%

Japan 4.1% 0.4% 4.5%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 5.9% 1.0% 6.9%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%

Singapore 11.3% 2.8% 14.1%

South Korea 4.1% 1.3% 5.4%

Taiwan 2.7% 0.5% 3.1%

Thailand 0.8% 0.3% 1.1%

Vietnam 0.1% 0.3% 0.4%

Total 2010 78.6% 21.4% 100.0%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

116

Tables AE-14a-e Top Moving Commodities by Year: Exports 

and Imports between North Europe and Asia

On an annual basis for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables 

list in ranking order the top 20 export container commodities moved outbound from North 

Europe to Asia, and the top 20 import commodities moved inbound to North Europe from 

Asia. The top commodities are ranked from largest to smallest based on the total weight in 

metric tons in each trade direction. The tables also give the percent of the annual volume 

of each top commodity as a function of the total weight of all commodities moved in each 

corresponding direction of the trade. The tables show the types and extent of commodities 

that accounted for the majority of cargo in each trade direction based on foreign and 

domestic consumer demand. Over the review period, the tables show any change in the mix, 

ranking, and volume of the top commodities that moved in the trade as affected by changes 

in consumer demand and other market factors. Eurostat is the source of the commodity data.
117

AE–14a Asia/North Europe Trade

2006 Top Moving Export and Import Commodities in Metric Tons

2006 North Europe to Asia 2006 Asia to North Europe

Rank Commodity 2006 Mtons PCT Commodity 2006 Mtons PCT

1

Wood Pulp Etc; 

Recovered (Waste & 

Scrap) Paper & Paperboard

 4,112,017 15% Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 4,214,213 8%

2 Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,650,119 13% Furniture; Bedding Etc; 

Lamps Nesoi Etc; Prefab 3,633,900 7%

3

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,883,243 7% Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 3,130,750 6%

4 Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,719,771 6% Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 2,879,756 6%

5 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 1,415,945 5% Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 2,858,492 5%

6 Iron And Steel 1,409,691 5%

Art Of Stone, Plaster, 

Cement, Asbestos, Mica 

Etc.

 2,599,953 5%

7 Milling Products; Malt; 

Starch; Inulin; Wht Gluten 894,470 3% Articles Of Iron Or Steel 2,455,254 5%

8 Beverages, Spirits And 

Vinegar 864,521 3% Ceramic Products 2,029,642 4%

9 Articles Of Iron Or Steel 762,280 3% Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 1,891,535 4%

10 Copper And Articles 

Thereof 672,265 2% Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 1,888,887 4%

11 Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 628,689 2%

Toys, Games & Sport 

Equipment; Parts & 

Accessories

 1,768,048 3%

12 Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 592,270 2% Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 1,418,553 3%

13 Meat And Edible Meat 

Offal 561,684 2% Iron And Steel 1,407,561 3%

14 Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 550,943 2%

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,339,741 3%

15 Organic Chemicals 533,055 2% Glass And Glassware 1,025,948 2%

16 Sugars And Sugar 

Confectionary 524,947 2% Prep Vegetables, Fruit, 

Nuts Or Other Plant Parts 920,693 2%

17 Aluminum And Articles 

Thereof 482,808 2% Footwear, Gaiters Etc. And 

Parts Thereof 821,202 2%

18 Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 458,337 2% Apparel Articles And 

Accessories, Not Knit Etc. 811,766 2%

19 Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 425,336 2% Organic Chemicals 800,801 2%

20

Tanning & Dye Extracts 

Etc; Dye, Paint, Putty Etc; 

Inks

 376,680 1% Coffee, Tea, Mate & 

Spices 780,297 2%

All Other 4,692,016 17% All Other 13,332,248 26%

Total 2006 27,211,087 100% Total 2006 52,009,240 100%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

118

AE–14b Asia/North Europe Trade

2007 Top Moving Export and Import Commodities in Metric Tons

2007 North Europe to Asia 2007 Asia to North Europe

Rank Commodity 2007 Mtons PCT Commodity 2007 Mtons PCT

1

Wood Pulp Etc; 

Recovered (Waste & 

Scrap) Paper & Paperboard

 4,059,469 15% Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 5,407,098 8%

2 Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,795,893 14% Furniture; Bedding Etc; 

Lamps Nesoi Etc; Prefab 4,557,422 7%

3 Iron And Steel 2,242,092 8% Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 3,714,017 5%

4

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,775,653 6% Articles Of Iron Or Steel 3,685,546 5%

5 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 1,503,403 5% Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,493,510 5%

6 Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,459,115 5%

Art Of Stone, Plaster, 

Cement, Asbestos, Mica 

Etc.

 3,299,642 5%

7 Beverages, Spirits And 

Vinegar 879,950 3% Iron And Steel 3,195,459 5%

8 Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 755,501 3% Ceramic Products 2,626,267 4%

9 Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 748,728 3%

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 2,377,840 4%

10 Meat And Edible Meat 

Offal 731,440 3% Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 2,342,667 3%

11 Copper And Articles 

Thereof 729,026 3% Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 2,332,325 3%

12 Articles Of Iron Or Steel 666,023 2% Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 2,316,562 3%

13 Milling Products; Malt; 

Starch; Inulin; Wht Gluten 646,609 2%

Toys, Games & Sport 

Equipment; Parts & 

Accessories

 1,799,772 3%

14 Organic Chemicals 562,981 2% Glass And Glassware 1,662,246 2%

15 Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 507,297 2% Edible Vegetables & 

Certain Roots & Tubers 1,630,742 2%

16 Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 477,488 2% Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 1,607,144 2%

17 Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 470,048 2% Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,109,056 2%

18 Aluminum And Articles 

Thereof 464,379 2% Prep Vegetables, Fruit, 

Nuts Or Other Plant Parts 1,108,136 2%

19

Tanning & Dye Extracts 

Etc; Dye, Paint, Putty Etc; 

Inks

 379,818 1%

Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc.; 

Bitumin Subst; Mineral 

Wax

 1,090,225 2%

20 Dairy Prods; Birds Eggs; 

Honey; Ed Animal Pr Nesoi 373,611 1% Organic Chemicals 1,063,610 2%

All Other 4,667,805 17% All Other 17,418,198 26%

Total 2007 27,896,331 100% Total 2007 67,837,483 100%

Source: Eurostat
119

AE–14c Asia/North Europe Trade

2008 Top Moving Export and Import Commodities in Metric Tons

2008 North Europe to Asia 2008 Asia to North Europe

Rank Commodity 2008 Mtons PCT Commodity 2008 Mtons PCT

1

Wood Pulp Etc; 

Recovered (Waste & 

Scrap) Paper & Paperboard

 5,709,722 18% Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 5,698,023 8%

2 Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,877,514 12% Furniture; Bedding Etc; 

Lamps Nesoi Etc; Prefab 4,409,029 7%

3 Iron And Steel 2,329,622 7% Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 3,824,582 6%

4

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,806,485 6% Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,436,320 5%

5 Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,791,056 6% Articles Of Iron Or Steel 3,223,411 5%

6 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 1,618,698 5%

Art Of Stone, Plaster, 

Cement, Asbestos, Mica 

Etc.

 3,131,653 5%

7 Meat And Edible Meat 

Offal 1,008,514 3% Iron And Steel 2,560,635 4%

8 Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 961,794 3% Ceramic Products 2,465,873 4%

9 Copper And Articles 

Thereof 869,633 3% Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 2,291,239 3%

10 Beverages, Spirits And 

Vinegar 840,198 3% Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 2,254,644 3%

11 Articles Of Iron Or Steel 786,007 3% Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 2,231,348 3%

12 Aluminum And Articles 

Thereof 769,112 2%

Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc.; 

Bitumin Subst; Mineral 

Wax

 1,829,057 3%

13 Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 751,040 2%

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,713,438 3%

14 Organic Chemicals 662,007 2%

Toys, Games & Sport 

Equipment; Parts & 

Accessories

 1,704,455 3%

15 Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 596,294 2% Glass And Glassware 1,635,341 2%

16 Milling Products; Malt; 

Starch; Inulin; Wht Gluten 565,374 2% Edible Vegetables & 

Certain Roots & Tubers 1,581,650 2%

17 Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 477,856 2% Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 1,526,621 2%

18 Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 444,192 1% Organic Chemicals 1,117,818 2%

19 Ceramic Products 356,433 1% Prep Vegetables, Fruit, 

Nuts Or Other Plant Parts 1,054,219 2%

20

Tanning & Dye Extracts 

Etc; Dye, Paint, Putty Etc; 

Inks

 349,801 1% Ships, Boats And Floating 

Structures 1,027,533 2%

All Other 4,777,233 15% All Other 18,445,731 27%

Total 2008 31,348,585 100% Total 2008 67,162,619 100%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

120

AE–14d Asia/North Europe Trade

2009 Top Moving Export and Import Commodities in Metric Tons

2009 North Europe to Asia 2009 Asia to North Europe

Rank Commodity 2009 Mtons PCT Commodity 2009 Mtons PCT

1

Wood Pulp Etc; 

Recovered (Waste & 

Scrap) Paper & Paperboard

 6,881,354 21% Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 3,781,266 7%

2 Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 5,061,625 15% Furniture; Bedding Etc; 

Lamps Nesoi Etc; Prefab 3,750,810 7%

3 Iron And Steel 2,215,292 7% Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 3,344,522 6%

4 Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 2,158,794 7% Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,034,280 6%

5 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 1,389,385 4%

Art Of Stone, Plaster, 

Cement, Asbestos, Mica 

Etc.

 2,963,543 6%

6

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 1,238,565 4% Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 2,627,792 5%

7 Copper And Articles 

Thereof 1,149,520 3% Articles Of Iron Or Steel 2,191,563 4%

8 Meat And Edible Meat 

Offal 969,432 3% Ceramic Products 2,078,352 4%

9 Beverages, Spirits And 

Vinegar 748,921 2% Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 1,796,032 3%

10 Aluminum And Articles 

Thereof 739,141 2% Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 1,695,074 3%

11 Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 683,395 2%

Toys, Games & Sport 

Equipment; Parts & 

Accessories

 1,417,696 3%

12 Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 677,495 2% Glass And Glassware 1,253,273 2%

13 Organic Chemicals 668,091 2%

Mineral Fuel, Oil Etc.; 

Bitumin Subst; Mineral 

Wax

 1,231,423 2%

14 Milling Products; Malt; 

Starch; Inulin; Wht Gluten 631,314 2% Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 1,169,549 2%

15 Articles Of Iron Or Steel 529,801 2% Iron And Steel 1,040,540 2%

16 Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 505,640 2% Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,033,141 2%

17 Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 448,761 1% Animal Or Vegetable Fats, 

Oils Etc. & Waxes 903,267 2%

18 Raw Hides And Skins (no 

Furskins) And Leather 440,150 1% Organic Chemicals 902,348 2%

19 Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 390,539 1% Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 585,195 1%

20 Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 383,846 1%

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 543,868 1%

All Other 5,158,885 16% All Other 14,904,522 29%

Total 2009 33,069,947 100% Total 2009 52,248,055 100%

Source: Eurostat
121

AE–14e Asia/North Europe Trade

2010 Top Moving Export and Import Commodities in Metric Tons

2010 North Europe to Asia 2010 Asia to North Europe

Rank Commodity 2010 Mtons PCT Commodity 2010 Mtons PCT

1

Wood Pulp Etc; 

Recovered (Waste & 

Scrap) Paper & Paperboard

 5,158,845 15% Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 4,812,502 8%

2 Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 4,886,796 14% Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 4,599,994 8%

3

Salt; Sulfur; Earth & 

Stone; Lime & Cement 

Plaster

 2,571,391 8% Furniture; Bedding Etc; 

Lamps Nesoi Etc; Prefab 4,389,102 7%

4 Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 2,069,025 6% Plastics And Articles 

Thereof 3,382,851 6%

5 Iron And Steel 1,816,525 5%

Art Of Stone, Plaster, 

Cement, Asbestos, Mica 

Etc.

 3,252,118 5%

6 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 

Machinery Etc.; Parts 1,629,440 5% Articles Of Iron Or Steel 2,880,521 5%

7 Meat And Edible Meat 

Offal 1,193,579 3% Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 2,276,427 4%

8 Copper And Articles 

Thereof 1,125,132 3% Ceramic Products 2,240,266 4%

9 Milling Products; Malt; 

Starch; Inulin; Wht Gluten 942,329 3% Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 2,056,078 3%

10 Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 909,781 3% Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 1,859,478 3%

11 Beverages, Spirits And 

Vinegar 863,523 3% Iron And Steel 1,690,092 3%

12 Aluminum And Articles 

Thereof 702,027 2%

Toys, Games & Sport 

Equipment; Parts & 

Accessories

 1,636,013 3%

13 Wood And Articles Of 

Wood; Wood Charcoal 658,881 2% Vehicles, Except Railway 

Or Tramway, And Parts Etc 1,448,581 2%

14 Rubber And Articles 

Thereof 644,993 2% Glass And Glassware 1,430,744 2%

15 Organic Chemicals 639,936 2% Organic Chemicals 1,192,113 2%

16 Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 633,085 2% Miscellaneous Chemical 

Products 1,143,607 2%

17 Articles Of Iron Or Steel 622,436 2% Prep Vegetables, Fruit, 

Nuts Or Other Plant Parts 1,067,670 2%

18 Food Industry Residues & 

Waste; Prep Animal Feed 445,588 1% Paper & Paperboard & 

Articles (inc Papr Pulp Artl) 1,007,740 2%

19 Raw Hides And Skins (no 

Furskins) And Leather 398,384 1% Footwear, Gaiters Etc. And 

Parts Thereof 971,605 2%

20 Electric Machinery Etc; 

Sound Equip; TV Equip; 393,453 1% Fish, Crustaceans & 

Aquatic Invertebrates 941,156 2%

All Other 5,890,857 17% All Other 15,714,821 26%

Total 2010 34,196,008 100% Total 2010 59,993,482 100%

Source: Eurostat
Chapter 5

122

Table AE-15 Annual Value of Liner Cargo and Average Value per Kilogram (Kg)

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the left gives 

the total value of container exports moved outbound from North Europe to Asia, and the 

total value of container imports moved inbound to North Europe from Asia. The value 

of container cargo is expressed in US dollars. The table also gives the percent of annual 

growth or decline in the value of container exports and imports from one year to the 

next over the review period. The table shows the direction of the trade with the highest 

value of container cargo and any imbalance and change over time in the directional value 

and growth of container exports and imports. Eurostat’s ComExt database is the source 

of the data. (USA Trade Online data were used to derive container penetration rates by 

commodity at the HS2 level which were then applied to the ComExt data to obtain the 

value of containerized cargo.)

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table on the right gives 

the value per kilogram (Kg) of container exports that moved outbound from North Europe 

to Asia, and the value per Kg of container imports that moved from Asia to North Europe. 

The figures for each year are derived from the total US dollar value of container exports and 

imports divided by their total weight in kilograms. The table also gives the percent of annual 

growth or decline in the value per Kg of container exports and imports from one year to the 

next over the review period. On a per Kg basis, the table shows the direction of the trade 

with the highest value of container cargo and any change over time. Eurostat is the source of 

the data.

AE–15 Container Cargo Value by Year

Trade Between Asia and North Europe

Annual Value of Liner Cargo Average Value of Liner Cargo per Kg

Year N. Europe to Asia

Percent 

Change Asia to N. Europe

Percent 

Change

N. Europe

to Asia

Percent 

Change

Asia to 

N. Europe

Percent 

Change

2006 $90,697,765,354 -- $209,348,276,170 -- $3.33 -- $4.03 --

2007 $107,605,627,858 19% $273,566,396,797 31% $3.86 16% $4.09 2%

2008 $125,570,558,529 17% $316,379,086,538 16% $4.01 4% $4.78 17%

2009 $110,731,382,294 -12% $250,988,990,560 -21% $3.35 -16% $4.80 0%

2010 $127,277,933,979 15% $313,725,201,717 25% $3.72 11% $5.23 9%

Source: Eurostat
123

Asia/Europe Carrier Conduct

Table AE-16 Active Agreements in the Trade 

The table shows each agreement between shipping lines in the North Europe/Asia trade that 

was operating in the trade in each calendar quarter of the review period from 2006 through 

2010. For each agreement, the table gives the period of time when the agreement was in 

effect. The table shows any change in cooperative activity among shipping lines in the trade 

over the review period. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–16 Carrier Agreements in the Asia/North Europe Trade

• The period of time the agreement was in effect.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Conferences

Far Eastern 

Freight 

Conference 

(FEFC)

• • • • • • • • • • •

Alliances

The Grand 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The New World 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Cosco/K-Line/

Yang Ming/

Hanjin/Senator 

(CKYH)

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Vessel Sharing Arrangements

CMA CGM/

China Shipping 

Company • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Pacific 

International 

Lines (PIL)/

Wan Hai

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

CSAV/Norasia • • • • • • • • • • • • •

CMA CGM/

Hapag-Lloyd/

Marfret • • • • • •

Evergreen/

Italia 

Marittima/

Hatsu Marine

• • • • • •

China 

Shipping/Zim • • • •

CMA CGM/

DeutscheAfrika Linien 

(DAL)

• • • • • • •

IRISL/ECL • • • •

Hanjin/UASC • • • •

CMA CGM/

Hapag-Lloyd • • • • • • • • •

China 

Shipping/

Evergreen • • • • • •

The Grand 

Alliance/The 

New World 

Alliance

• •
Chapter 5

124

AE–16 Carrier Agreements in the Asia/North Europe Trade (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

CMA CGM/

Maersk •

China 

Shipping/

Evergreen/

CMA CGM

•

Slot Chartering Arrangements

Australian 

National Line 

on CMA CGM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

APL on CMA 

CGM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

APL on Grand 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

CMA CGM on 

New World 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Grand Alliance 

on the New 

World Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Safmarine on 

Maersk • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Zim on China 

Shipping • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

CMA CGM on 

Evergreen • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Yang Ming on 

New World 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • •

Evergreen/

China 

Shipping/Zim 

Reciprocal 

• • • • • •

UASC on 

Hanjin • • • • • • • • • • •

HMM on Grand 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

MOL on Grand 

Alliance • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Zim on CSAV/

Norasia • • • • •

UASC on 

Hanjin Cosco • • •

HMM on CMA 

CGM • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

MOL on CMA 

CGM • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

UASC on 

Cosco • • • •

Senator on 

Hanjin UASC • •

Maersk on 

Evergreen • • • •

Hanjin and 

Senator on 

UASC • • •

CMA CGM on 

APL •
125

AE–16 Carrier Agreements in the Asia/North Europe Trade (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Hanjin on 

UASC • • • • • • •

China 

Shipping/

CMA CGM 

Reciprocal

• • • • • • •

Zim on Grand 

Alliance • • • • • • •

CMA CGM/

Evergreen 

Reciprocal • • • • • • •

Evergreen/

Maersk 

Reciprocal • •

CMA CGM/

Maersk 

Reciprocal • • • • •

PIL on CKYH •

Evergreen on 

Grand Alliance • • •

HDS Lines on 

China Shipping • • •

NYK on 

Evergreen • • •

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

126

Tables AE-17a-e Liner Services in the Asia/North Europe Trade

The tables list the liner services offered by shipping lines operating in the North Europe/Asia 

trade for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010. For each liner service in 

each year, the tables identify the service name, type, shipping lines, frequency, the number 

of service vessels, the average TEU vessel capacity, the annual TEU operational capacity, 

and the percent of the market capacity provided by the service. The percent of the market 

for each service is derived from the total annual amount of operational capacity deployed 

in the market. The tables show the annual level of liner services and capacity offered by the 

shipping lines serving the trade and any changes that occurred over the review period. The 

source of the data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–17a Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2006

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

EU1 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 8 6,433 335,461 3.0%

EU2 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 8 6,224 324,537 2.9%

EU3 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 8 8,404 438,235 3.9%

EU4 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 7,448 388,372 3.5%

AE1 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 9,300 484,929 4.4%

AE2 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 8,211 428,151 3.9%

AE7 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 8,431 439,629 4.0%

AE8 ETE Maersk Line 7 7 7,163 373,492 3.4%

AE9 ETE Maersk Line 7 7 4,953 258,271 2.3%

AE10 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 5,087 265,231 2.4%

Japan Exp. JEX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 6,381 332,737 3.0%

Asia Exp. EAEX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 6,194 322,979 2.9%

China Exp. CEX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 5,751 299,900 2.7%

South China Exp. SCX 

(APL/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 5,582 291,061 2.6%

FAL (French Asia Line) ETE CMA CGM 7 ***(7) 8,326 379,861 3.4%

NCX (North China 

Express) ETE CMA CGM 7 8 6,659 347,213 3.1%

FAL2/AEX7 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 ***(6) 9,274 362,673 3.3%

AME (Asia Europe 

service) ETE CSAV Norasia 7 ***(7) 5,372 258,765 2.3%

JES/AE2 (K Line) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,609 292,482 2.6%

AE1/AES (Yang Ming) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,890 307,115 2.8%

NCX (Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 8,951 466,757 4.2%

AEX (Hanjin/Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,544 289,093 2.6%
127

AE–17a Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2006 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

FEX (Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,715 297,977 2.7%

SCX (Cosco/Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 7 5,514 287,538 2.6%

PDS (Hanjin) PDM

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 12 4,914 256,221 2.3%

AEC ETE UASC 7 10 3,788 197,507 1.8%

WAE (Evergreen/

Hatsu/Italia) PDM Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 12 5,445 283,900 2.6%

CEM (Evergreen/

Hatsu/Italia) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 8 8,073 420,949 3.8%

Silk Express ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 9 9,111 475,079 4.3%

Lion service ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 9 7,237 377,340 3.4%

Australia service Multi Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 13 3,084 160,788 1.4%

China Shipping AEX 1 ETE China Shipping 7 9 5,652 294,717 2.7%

China Shipping/Zim 

AEX 2 ETE China Shipping, Zim 7 ***(2) 5,678 65,793 0.6%

PIL/Wan Hai ETE PIL, Wan Hai 7 8 2,809 146,443 1.3%

CMA CGM/HapagLloyd/Marfret RTW CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, 

Marfret 7 12 2,280 118,903 1.1%

Chipolbrok ETE CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, 

Marfret 12-13 500 14,600 0.1%

Rickmers ETE CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, 

Marfret 15-16 600 14,400 0.1%

Total 11,099,099 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

128

AE–17b Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2007

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

EU1 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 8 6,404 333,936 2.7%

EU2 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 7,586 395,533 3.2%

EU3 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 8,762 456,887 3.7%

EU4 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 8,256 430,515 3.5%

AE1 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 8,178 426,413 3.5%

AE2 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 8,925 465,375 3.8%

AE7 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 11,912 621,152 5.1%

AE8/AE10 Butterfly BUT Maersk Line 7 17 7,880 410,904 3.4%

AE9 ETE Maersk Line 7 7 6,414 334,459 2.7%

Japan Exp. JEX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 6,381 332,737 2.7%

Asia Exp. AEX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 6,800 354,571 2.9%

China Exp. CEX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 5,761 300,421 2.5%

South China Exp. SCX 

(APL/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 5,582 291,061 2.4%

FAL1 ETE CMA CGM, MOL 7 9 8,426 439,344 3.6%

FAL3 ETE CMA CGM 7 8 6,680 348,321 2.9%

FAL2/AEX7 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 8 9,497 495,227 4.1%

AME (Asia Europe 

service) ETE CSAV Norasia 7 8 6,287 327,848 2.7%

JES/AE2 (K Line) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,613 292,704 2.4%

AE1/AES (Yang Ming, 

K Line) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 8,622 449,576 3.7%

Loop 1/NCX (Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 8,982 468,354 3.8%

Loop 2/AEX (Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 5,664 295,318 2.4%

Loop 3/FEX (Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 6,166 321,500 2.6%

Loop 4/SCX (Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 7 7,573 394,855 3.2%

AEC ETE UASC 7 10 3,876 202,127 1.7%

CES ETE Evergreen 7 8 7,024 366,251 3.0%

CEM ETE Evergreen 7 8 8,073 420,949 3.4%

Silk Express ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 9 9,178 478,567 3.9%

Lion service ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 10 8,497 443,079 3.6%

Australia service Multi Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 ***(12) 3,180 153,079 1.3%

China Shipping AEX 1 ETE China Shipping 7 8 8,588 447,790 3.7%

China Shipping AEX 2 ETE China Shipping 7 ***(3) 5,629 110,067 0.9%
129

AE–17b Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2007 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

PIL/Wan Hai ETE PIL, Wan Hai 7 8 4,284 223,400 1.8%

Hapag-Lloyd Suez 

pendulum PDM Hapag-Lloyd 7 ***(11) 2,317 110,730 0.9%

CMA CGM/DAL Nemo 

service PDM CMA CGM, DAL 7 ***(11) 2,747 121,200 1.0%

Chipolbrok ETE 12-13 500 14,600 0.1%

Rickmers ETE 15-16 600 14,400 0.1%

IRIS ECL pendulum ETE IRIS 7 ***(9) 2,610 111,363 0.9%

Total 12,204,613 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

130

AE–17c Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2008

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

EU1 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 6,411 334,305 2.5%

EU2 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 10 7,631 397,907 3.0%

EU3 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 8,762 456,887 3.4%

EU4 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 9 8,574 447,079 3.4%

EU5 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 8 3,306 172,404 1.3%

AE1/AE8 Butterfly BUT Maersk Line 7 ***(17) 8,368 412,073 3.1%

AE2 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 10,037 523,340 3.9%

AE7 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 13,509 704,392 5.3%

AE9 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 6,512 339,541 2.6%

AE10 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 7,603 396,431 3.0%

Japan Exp. JEX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 ***(8) 6,381 295,766 2.2%

Asia Exp. AEX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 ***(8) 6,800 315,175 2.4%

China Exp. CEX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 ***(8) 6,239 289,196 2.2%

South China Exp. SCX 

(APL/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 8,110 422,879 3.2%

FAL/FAL1 ETE CMA CGM, HMM 7 9 8,519 444,228 3.4%

FAL3 ETE CMA CGM 7 9 6,867 358,071 2.7%

FAL2/AEX7 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 8 9,497 495,227 3.7%

FAL4/AEX8 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 ***(4) 9,620 250,820 1.9%

ANE ETE CSAV Norasia 7 ***(8) 6,287 291,421 2.2%

PAN/PM1 (K Line) PDM

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 13 5,613 292,666 2.2%

AE1/AES (Yang Ming, 

K Line) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 8,621 449,550 3.4%

AE3/AES3 (Yang 

Ming) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 ***(6) 5,573 193,734 1.5%

Loop 1/AES (Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 8 9,447 492,574 3.7%

Loop 2/AEX (Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 ***(7) 5,670 258,700 2.0%

Loop 3/FEX (Hanjin) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 ***(8) 6,622 308,454 2.3%

Loop 4/AEN (Cosco) ETE

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin, 

Senator

7 ***(8) 8,946 414,663 3.1%

AEC3/CNX ETE UASC, Hanjin 7 8 6,557 341,907 2.6%

AEC1 ETE UASC 7 10 3,802 198,247 1.5%

CES ETE Evergreen 7 8 7,024 366,251 2.8%

CEM ETE Evergreen 7 8 8,073 420,949 3.2%

Silk Express ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 10 9,258 482,759 3.6%
131

AE–17c Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2008 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

Lion service ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 10 8,433 439,705 3.3%

Australia service Multi Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 13 3,153 164,386 1.2%

China Shipping AEX 1 ETE China Shipping 7 8 8,069 420,754 3.2%

Zim EWX ETE Zim 7 ***(8) 4,251 197,036 1.5%

PIL/Wan Hai FES ETE PIL, Wan Hai 7 ***(8) 4,252 197,100 1.5%

Hapag-Lloyd Suez 

pendulum PDM Hapag-Lloyd 7 ***(10) 2,362 102,656 0.8%

CMA CGM/DAL NEMO 

service PDM CMA CGM, DAL 7 ***(12) 2,788 134,192 1.0%

Chipolbrok ETE 15-16 500 11,774 0.1%

Rickmers ETE 15-16 600 14,400 0.1%

Total 13,249,599 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

132

AE–17d Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2009

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

EU1 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 ***(8) 6,512 301,803 2.8%

EU2 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 ***(8) 6,857 317,799 2.9%

EU3 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 ***(9) 8,934 419,244 3.9%

EU4 ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, MISC, NYK, OOCL 7 10 8,502 443,345 4.1%

AE1/AE10 Butterfly BUT Maersk Line 7 19 8,284 431,962 4.0%

AE2 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 8,400 438,000 4.0%

AE7 ( ) ETE Maersk Line 7 10 13,351 696,138 6.4%

AE9 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 6,846 356,963 3.3%

Japan Exp. JEX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 6,378 332,556 3.1%

Asia Exp. AEX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 8,366 436,239 4.0%

South China Exp. SCX 

(APL/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 7,983 416,251 3.8%

FAL1 ETE CMA CGM 7 10 9,738 507,757 4.7%

FAL3 (** **) ETE CMA CGM 7 9 8,880 463,029 4.3%

FAL2/AEX7 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 8 9,497 495,227 4.6%

AE1/AES (Yang Ming, 

K Line) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 8,625 449,732 4.1%

AE3/AES3 (Yang 

Ming, K Line) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 8,205 427,838 3.9%

AEN/NNX (Cosco/

Hanjin) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 8,750 456,256 4.2%

AEX (Cosco/Hanjin) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 9,898 516,123 4.7%

FEX (Hanjin) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 6,540 341,003 3.1%

AEC2 ETE UASC 7 9 6,924 361,049 3.3%

CES ETE Evergreen 7 9 6,872 358,303 3.3%

CSCL/Evergreen 

AEX1/CEM ETE CSCL, Evergreen 7 8 8,695 453,402 4.2%

Silk Express ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 11 12,218 637,072 5.9%

Lion service ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 11 8,799 458,786 4.2%

Australia service Multi Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 14 3,752 195,644 1.8%

New NEMO/EAX ETE CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd 7 12 2,799 145,974 1.3%

Chipolbrok ETE 15-16 500 11,774 0.1%

Rickmers ETE 15-16 600 14,400 0.1%

Total 10,883,669 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research

  Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.
133

AE–17e Liner Services between Asia and North Europe

As of October 1, 2010

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

AE1/AE10 Butterfly BUT Maersk Line 7 21 8,232 429,225 3.3%

AE2 ETE Maersk Line 7 10 8,407 438,344 3.4%

AE7 ETE Maersk Line 7 10 13,173 686,878 5.3%

AE9 ETE Maersk Line 7 9 7,014 365,753 2.8%

LPA (NYK) ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 10 9,026 470,626 3.6%

LPB/NWX pendulum 

(Hapag-Lloyd) PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 17 8,690 453,131 3.5%

LPC (OOCL) ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 10 8,063 420,428 3.2%

LPD ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 10 6,083 317,195 2.4%

Japan Exp. JEX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: 

APL, HMM, MOL 7 9 6,594 343,851 2.6%

Asia Exp. AEX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: 

APL, HMM, MOL 7 9 8,210 428,072 3.3%

South China Exp. SCX 

(APL/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: 

APL, HMM, MOL 7 9 8,194 427,259 3.3%

CEX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: 

APL, HMM, MOL 7 10 6,172 321,805 2.5%

FAL1 ETE CMA CGM 7 10 10,837 565,083 4.4%

FAL3 ETE CMA CGM 7 10 9,030 470,840 3.6%

FAL5/AE8 ETE CMA CGM, Maersk Line 7 10 13,045 680,204 5.2%

NE1 ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 9,848 513,520 4.0%

NE2 ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 8,586 447,716 3.5%

NE3 ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 1 8,905 464,348 3.6%

NE4 ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 8,777 457,664 3.5%

NE5 ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 6,521 340,012 2.6%

AEC1 ETE UASC 7 ** *(10) 4,044 191,696 1.5%

AEC2 ETE UASC 7 10 6,928 361,267 2.8%

CES ETE Evergreen 7 10 7,129 371,721 2.9%

CSCL/Evergreen 

AEX1/CEM ETE CSCL, Evergreen 7 8 9,192 479,323 3.7%

AEX7/AEX7/FAL2 ETE CSCL, Evergreen, CMA 

CGM 7 9 9,067 472,802 3.6%

Silk Express ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 11 13,945 727,156 5.6%

Lion service ETE Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 11 11,341 591,357 4.6%

Australia service Multi Mediterranean Shipping 

Co (MSC) 7 14 3,153 164,395 1.3%

FES ETE PIL, Wan Hai 7 9 4,253 221,740 1.7%

AME ETE Zim 7 11 3,471 180,978 1.4%

New NEMO/EAX ETE CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd 7 13 2,798 145,896 1.1%

Chipolbrok ETE 15-16 500 11,774 0.1%

Rickmers ETE 15-16 600 14,400 0.1%

Total 12,976,459 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

134

Charts AE-18a-c Changes in Average Weekly Capacity 

in the Asia/North Europe Trade

The charts provide trend lines showing the levels of average weekly vessel capacity supplied 

in each trade direction per quarter for the review period from 2006 through 2010. Chart 

AE-18a shows the trend line of average weekly capacity in each trade direction over the 

entire review period; the horizontal axis gives the series of time in quarters from 2006 

through 2010, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly amount of vessel capacity 

supplied for each quarter in TEUs. Charts AE-18b-c compare the levels of average weekly 

capacity supplied for each year per calendar quarter; the horizontal axis gives the series of 

time as the four quarters of a single year, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly 

amount of vessel capacity supplied for each quarter in TEUs. Chart AE-18b compares the 

levels of capacity in the westbound trade direction, and Chart AE-18c compares the levels of 

capacity in the eastbound trade direction. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–18a Asia/North Europe Trade

Average Weekly Capacity (TEUs)

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

0

50

100

150

200

250

Asia to North Europe WB

North Europe to Asia EB

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)
135

1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

AE–18b Westbound Capacity

From Asia to North Europe

Source: Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

AE–18c Eastbound Capacity

From North Europe to Asia

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chapter 5

136

Asia/Europe Economic Performance

Chart AE-19 Quarterly Average Revenue per TEU, Inbound and Outbound

The chart provides trend lines of time series data showing the levels of average revenue per 

TEU earned by shipping lines in the westbound and eastbound directions of the Asia/North 

Europe trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. The horizontal 

axis of the chart gives the time series in calendar quarters over the review period, and the 

vertical axis measures the average revenue per TEU in US dollars. The average revenue 

figures are derived from published information and are inclusive of ocean freight, accessorial 

charges, and any charges for inland haulage. The trend lines throughout the review period 

show the quarterly change in the average revenue earnings of the shipping lines in each trade 

direction. The level of earnings and the change over time are a function of the corresponding 

supply and demand conditions in the trade as affected by market and regulatory factors. 

The sources of data are Containerisation International, Informa Plc; and Container Trade 

Statistics, Ltd.

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

AE–19 Average Revenue per TEU 

in the Asia/North Europe Trade*

Source: Containerisation International, Informa Plc, 

and Container Trade Statistics, Ltd. North Europe to Asia EB

Asia to North Europe WB

* Fluctuations in the average revenue per container data obtained from Containerisation International (“CI”) 

parallel similar data published by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange. Fluctuations in the China (export-only) 

Containerized Freight Index (“CCFI”) published by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange, that tracks movements 

in average container rates from China to North Europe, closely match the fluctuations in the Asia to Europe 

average revenue per container data obtained from CI. It is not known, however, exactly how closely the 

underlying CCFI average rate information mirrors the CI average revenue data because the CCFI is publicly 

available in index form only. (The Shanghai Shipping Exchange generously contributed CCFI weekly data 

dating back to January 6, 2006 for use in this Study.)

Average Revenue per TEU
137

Table AE-20 Average Quarterly Vessel Utilization, Inbound and Outbound

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the 

percentage levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for each direction of the Asia/North 

Europe trade. The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of container cargo 

moved in each trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity supplied in each 

trade direction and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo moved and vessel 

capacity are measured in TEUs. The trend in the percentage levels of utilization shows how 

the supply of, and demand for, vessel space are aligned in each trade lane and the change 

in utilization over the review period as affected by market conditions and other factors. A 

higher percentage of utilization indicates that supply and demand are more closely aligned, 

whereas a lower utilization percentage shows a period of greater excess vessel capacity in 

the market. The degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts the level of freight 

rates. It would be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend in utilization 

levels. Further, the utilization of vessel space provides a general indication of service quality 

by showing whether shipping lines are deploying sufficient vessel capacity in relation to 

demand in the marketplace. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

AE–20 Asia/North Europe Trade

Quarterly Capacity Utilization

Quarter N. Europe to Asia Asia to N. Europe

1Q06 57% 83%

2Q06 62% 92%

3Q06 56% 94%

4Q06 56% 93%

1Q07 60% 92%

2Q07 62% 98%

3Q07 55% 99%

4Q07 53% 92%

1Q08 52% 81%

2Q08 57% 86%

3Q08 49% 81%

4Q08 42% 69%

1Q09 44% 67%

2Q09 67% 83%

3Q09 64% 87%

4Q09 66% 85%

1Q10 62% 92%

2Q10 66% 104%

3Q10 54% 95%

4Q10 54% 78%

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

138

Chart AE-21Average Quarterly Vessel Utilization, Inbound and Outbound

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the percentage levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for 

each direction of the Asia/North Europe trade. The horizontal axis gives the series of time 

in quarters over the review period, and the vertical axis measures the level of vessel capacity 

utilization as a percentage. The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of 

container cargo moved in each trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity 

supplied in each trade direction and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo 

moved and vessel capacity are measured in TEUs. The trend line over the time series shows 

the change in vessel capacity utilization as affected by the change in the market conditions 

of supply and demand in each trade lane. A higher utilization level indicates that supply and 

demand are more closely aligned, whereas a lower utilization level shows a period of greater 

excess vessel capacity in the market. A utilization level that exceeds 100 percent indicates 

a period of time when the demand for vessel space exceeded the supply of vessel space. 

The degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts the level of freight rates. It 

would be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend in utilization levels. 

Further, the utilization of vessel provides a general indication of service quality by showing 

whether shipping lines are deploying sufficient vessel capacity in relation to demand in the 

marketplace. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

AE–21 Asia/North Europe Capacity Utilization

Source: Drewry Maritime Research North Europe to Asia EB

Asia to North Europe WB

Average Utilization

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal
139

Table AE-22 Market Share Instability Index (MSII)

The table gives, in the form of a market share instability index (“MSII”), the total change in 

market share of participating shipping lines in the Asia/North Europe trade from one time 

period to the next for the review period from 2006 through 2010. The MSII for the entire 

trade is the sum of the absolute values of the change in the percentages of market share of 

the individual shipping lines that occurred from one period to the next. The percentage 

of market share for each shipping line is derived from its total container capacity in the 

trade for the given period. A high value of MSII indicates that a high portion of the market 

shifted among the shipping lines in the trade for a given time. The source of data is Drewry 

Maritime Research.

AE–22 Asia/North Europe Trade

Market Share Instability Index

Year Quarter N. Europe to Asia Asia to N. Europe

2006

1st Quarter 4.6% 1.8%

2nd Quarter 26.4% 24.3%

3rd Quarter 2.6% 2.7%

4th Quarter 5.7% 4.4%

2007

1st Quarter 6.3% 8.0%

2nd Quarter 4.2% 4.0%

3rd Quarter 3.2% 3.9%

4th Quarter 4.1% 6.2%

2008

1st Quarter 4.0% 3.8%

2nd Quarter 8.1% 7.0%

3rd Quarter 4.6% 4.5%

4th Quarter 7.3% 6.0%

2009

1st Quarter 10.2% 9.4%

2nd Quarter 14.1% 15.0%

3rd Quarter 5.4% 6.3%

4th Quarter 6.2% 8.7%

2010

1st Quarter 6.5% 5.6%

2nd Quarter 4.9% 5.8%

3rd Quarter 13.6% 12.0%

4th Quarter 9.8% 8.0%

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

140

Far East /US

Background

The transpacific is by far the United States’ largest ocean liner trade lane.1

 The transpacific 

accounts for approximately 65 percent all US containerized cargo. Around 70 percent of 

US container imports originate from the transpacific, and this region receives approximately 

50 percent of US container exports. These percentages have fluctuated little since 2006. 

Globally, the transpacific is the third largest ocean liner trade lane after the intra-Asia and the 

Asia-Europe trade lanes.2

Over the past decade, eastbound transpacific container cargo (US imports) and westbound 

container cargo (US exports) each grew, on average, by six percent.3

 Since 2006, eastbound 

transpacific cargo increased by just one percent and westbound cargo grew by seven percent. 

For both imports and exports, China is the United States’ largest overseas ocean liner trading 

partner, and accounts for nearly 60 percent of the ocean liner trade between the US and Asia 

(see Tables TP-13a-e).

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach handle over 40 percent of all US container 

cargo originating from or destined to Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. Over 70 percent of 

the transpacific container trade moves through Pacific Coast ports (see Tables TP-13a-e). 

Another 25 percent moves through the US Atlantic Coast ports (see Tables TP-13a-e). Of 

all Atlantic Coast ports, the Port of New York/New Jersey handles the most transpacific 

container cargo. The US Gulf Coast handles very little transpacific container cargo because 

most transpacific container cargo destined to, or originating from, this region moves 

intermodally through the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The Port of Houston 

handles the most transpacific container cargo along the Gulf Coast, but its share of the overall 

transpacific market is around one percent.

The top three foreign ports that handle over 40 percent of all container cargo destined 

to, or originating from, the US are the Chinese ports of Shanghai, Yantian and Hong 

Kong. Six of the top ten foreign ports that move transpacific container cargo are Chinese 

ports, and they handle more than half of all transpacific container cargo. The Ports of Busan 

(Korea), Kaohsiung (Taiwan), Singapore and Tokyo (Japan) are the only four non-Chinese 

ports to make it into the top ten and together they handle approximately 22 percent of all 

transpacific US cargo. 

The eastbound trade lane is the headhaul leg of the transpacific. This is due to higher 

container volumes, shipment value, time definite requirements (except for westbound 

refrigerated shipments) and revenues (see Tables TP-1 and TP-15 and Chart TP-2). In 2010, 

the US imported two containers for just under one container that it exported (see Table 

TP-5 and Chart TP-6). However, the trade imbalance appears to be shrinking. In 2006, the 

US imported three containers for every container that it exported. Major transpacific imports 

include furniture, clothing, toys, footwear and automobile parts, while major exports include 

wastepaper, scrap metal, animal feed, and agricultural products (see Tables TP-14a-e).

US exports are heavier than Asian imports. The average weight is 11 metric tons per 

TEU for a westbound container cargo compared to only six metric tons per TEU for 

1 The transpacific encompasses the US container trade with countries located in Northeast and Southeast Asia. 

2 The intra-Asia trade is as large as the transpacific and Asia-Europe container markets combined. Asian Recovery to Strain 

Infrastructure, APL Warns by Peter T. Leach, Journal of Commerce Online, May 20, 2010. 

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all cargo-related data cited in this section are sourced from the Port Import Export Reporting 

Service (PIERS), United Business Media, Ltd.
141

eastbound container cargo.4 Because container exports are so much heavier, outbound 

sailings have a tendency to reach their maximum loading weight before all their available 

container slots are filled.

Because of the trade and weight imbalance, transpacific carriers need to return substantial 

numbers of empty containers back to Asia. Effective capacity, the maximum number of 

containers that can be placed on a ship after taking account of all operational considerations, is 

affected by a variety of factors, including the mix of container sizes onboard, oversized project 

cargo (machinery, industrial vehicles, etc.), load-bearing constraints on hatches and the deck, 

balancing the ship, maintaining visibility from the bridge, and load sequencing of priority cargo.

In the eastbound trade lane, cargo volumes surge throughout the summer and early fall 

as retailers begin preparing for the holiday season by shipping merchandise manufactured 

in Asia to the US (see Tables TP-1 and TP-3 and Charts TP-2 and TP-4). In anticipation 

of the peak season, carriers often deploy additional capacity beginning in June and ending 

in October. Recently, transpacific carriers have noticed a surge in cargo volumes after the 

holidays as US retailers are anxious to restock depleted inventories before the Chinese 

New Year when factories in China close for their major holiday. During these peak times, 

transpacific carriers usually attempt to assess a Peak Season Surcharge (“PSS”) to cover the 

cost to deploy additional capacity needed. Except for the few weeks prior to the Chinese 

New Year, transpacific container volumes are at their lowest during the winter months and 

early spring. Carriers typically remove capacity during this slack season.

In the westbound trade, cargo volumes do not peak during the year as they do in the 

eastbound trade (see Tables TP-1 and TP-3 and Charts TP-2 and TP-4). Commodity 

volumes are generally seasonal throughout the year depending on when agricultural products 

are harvested and shipped. Carriers find it difficult to predict agricultural export volumes 

due to crop failures, slower or faster harvesting times due to weather conditions, and to the 

fact that the time between harvesting and when the product actually ships has become more 

detached. Typically, transpacific carriers do not assess a PSS on westbound cargo movements 

since westbound container volumes are significantly lower than eastbound volumes and, 

therefore, the deployment of additional capacity is not usually required. However, some US 

exporters from time-to-time may experience capacity and equipment shortages, especially 

agricultural exporters booking space out of the Pacific Northwest, and obtaining equipment 

in the agricultural regions of the upper Midwest can be challenging.

Comparing 2006 with 2010, annualized, operational capacity remained flat despite the 

2009 recession (See Tables TP-17a-e).5

 However, there were 21 percent fewer carriers 

operating in the transpacific in third quarter 2006 when compared to the same quarter in 

2010 (see Tables TP-17a-e). This was mainly due to mergers and carriers leaving the market. 

During the third quarter of 2010, 81 service strings were operating in the transpacific trade, a 

fourteen percent decrease from the third quarter 2006 (see Tables TP-17a-e). The number of 

vessels deployed in the transpacific fell by five percent.6

 In third quarter 2006, there were 645 

vessels operating in the transpacific, and by third quarter 2010 this number had fallen to 610 

(see Tables TP-17a-e).

The transpacific is a very competitive market (see Table TP-9). It is occupied by 

4 PIERS. The World Shipping Council estimated that, in 2008, transpacific exports weighed on average 12 tons per 

TEU whereas imports weighed 9 tons per TEU. See Facts About Serving US Export Commerce, February 2010 at http://

www.worldshipping.org/Facts_About_Serving_U_S__Export_Commerce___Feb_2010_-2-.pdf. 

5 See The Drewry Container Forecaster, 3Q10, Appendix 1, pages 157–163 and The Drewry Container Market Quarterly, 

September 2006, Table 5.5, pages 85–92.

6 Ibid.
Chapter 5

142

numerous large global carriers that compete vigorously with each other. Some of the 

moderate size carriers have joined together to form global alliances. The global alliances and 

the large independent global carriers, such as Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC and Evergreen, face 

strong competition from niche containership operators and new entrants. To a lesser degree, 

the global containership companies also must compete for certain cargoes against breakbulk 

and bulk operators.

Three global ocean liner alliances operate in the transpacific, the CKYH Alliance,7

 the 

New World Alliance8

 and the Grand Alliance9 (see Table TP-10). An alliance is a group of 

ocean carriers who have agreed to coordinate vessel service strings and share vessel space 

on each other’s ships. Although ships are generally operated independently by each alliance 

member, they sail on a jointly developed schedule. Despite their operational cooperation, 

alliance members compete with each other for customers and independently market and 

price their services.10 Through this cooperation, alliances may reduce operational costs, 

expand port coverage, and trim transit times. The three global alliances also operate in the 

transatlantic and the Asia-Europe trade lanes. During third quarter 2010, the three alliances 

together supplied 49 percent of all eastbound transpacific capacity, the same percentage they 

supplied in third quarter 2006.11 Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM have a variety of vessel 

sharing agreements restricted to the transpacific, and one could consider these three carriers 

as operating in an informal alliance.12

In 2006, the top five eastbound transpacific carriers in rank order, in terms of TEUs 

lifted, were Maersk Line, Evergreen, Hanjin, APL and China Shipping. In 2010, the top five 

eastbound carriers in rank order were Maersk Line, Evergreen, APL, Hanjin and Hyundai.

The westbound transpacific carrier rankings experienced even greater fluctuations. In 

2006, the top five carriers in rank order were Maersk Line, Hanjin, Evergreen, APL and 

OOCL. In 2010, the top five westbound carriers in rank order were Maersk Line, MSC, 

Evergreen, APL and Hanjin.

Market shares among global carriers have fluctuated with some carriers gaining at the 

expense of others. As examples, Maersk Line, the world’s largest containership company, has 

seen its share of the transpacific market shrink from 2006 to 2010; whereas MSC, the world’s 

second largest containership company, has expanded its transpacific market share. 

Although global containership operators are prominent in the transpacific market, niche 

operators also actively compete to carry containerized cargo. For example, Matson, a US 

flag operator, offers two inbound transpacific ocean liner services from a number of Chinese 

ports to the Port of Long Beach.13 From 2006 to 2010, Matson increased its TEU liftings 

by 107 percent from 59,000 TEUs to 123,000 TEUs. Matson was the 19th largest eastbound 

7 The CKYH Alliance consists of COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming and Hanjin. See FMC Agreement No. 011794 at 

http://www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011794-014.pdf. 

8 The New Word Alliance members are APL, HMM, and Mitsui. See FMC Agreement No. 011960 at http://www2.

fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011960-006.pdf. 

9 The Grand Alliance members include Hapag-Lloyd, NYK Line and OOCL. See FMC Agreement No. at http://

www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011602-012.pdf.

10 Although alliance members price independently of each other, all members of the three alliances, with the exception 

of Mitsui, are members of the TSA and WTSA that collectively establish VSCGs on rates and surcharges.

11 See The Drewry Container Forecaster, October 1, 2010, Appendix 1.1, pages 126-131 and The Drewry Container Market 

Quarterly, September 2006, Table 5.13, pages 105-135.

12 These agreements include the CMA CGM, MSC, Maersk Line North and Central China-US Pacific Coast Two 

Loop Space Charter, Sailing and Cooperative Working Agreement (FMC Agreement No. 012032), Maersk Line/CMA 

CGM TP5 Space Charter Agreement (FMC Agreement No. 012119), Maersk Line/MSC Space Charter Agreement 

(FMC Agreement No. 012036), and the CMA CGM Maersk Line Space Charter, Sailing and Cooperative Working 

Agreement Asia to USEC and PNW-Suez/PNW & Panama Loops (FMC Agreement No. 012057). 

13 See Matson’s website at http://www.matson.com/china/index.html. 
143

transpacific carrier in 2006 and the 17th largest in 2010. In the westbound transpacific, 

Matson moves very little cargo destined to China, carrying less than 7,000 TEUs in 2010. 

Instead, the carrier moves more profitable domestic offshore container cargo destined to 

Hawaii and the US territory of Guam. Another US flag operator, Horizon, entered the 

eastbound transpacific with a business plan that closely parallels Matson’s. In December 2010, 

Horizon launched an eastbound service from Shanghai and Ningbo to Los Angeles and 

Oakland, which involved carrying domestic offshore container cargo westbound.14

Because of the relative ease of market entry in the transpacific trade, incumbent carriers 

have to contend with new containership companies entering the transpacific container 

market. In addition to Horizon, TS Lines, PO Shipping, Grand China Shipping, and the 

Containership Company all launched new transpacific services in 2010. These new entrants 

offered service only between Asia and the US West Coast.15 Such services require the 

deployment of just five vessels to provide a weekly service compared to eight or more vessels 

for a weekly service to the US East Coast.

Beyond actual new entrants, the contestability of this trade is evidenced by competition 

from other shipping sources. For example, breakbulk carriers also move container cargo 

in the transpacific. Westwood, a subsidiary of the forest product company Weyerhaeuser, 

moves westbound logs, lumber, newsprint and wood pulp by breakbulk for its parent 

company from the Pacific Northwest to Asia. But the carrier also moves containers on deck 

for other shippers on its vessels. Eastbound, Westwood moves containers as well as breakbulk 

and project cargoes destined to the Pacific Northwest.16

In some instances, container operators compete with bulk operators to move certain 

commodities from the US to Asia. For example, grain exporters will consider transporting 

their cargo by container or bulk carrier depending on which mode offers the lowest 

freight rate.17 Containerized grain movements represent approximately five percent of total 

oceangoing grain exports.18 In addition, grain exporters use containers to allow commodity 

identity preservation (“IP”),19 serve niche markets, and facilitate just-in-time delivery.20 Scrap 

metal exporters also migrate between container and bulk carriers depending on which mode 

offers the lower freight rate.

Discussion Agreements

There are two major rate discussion agreements in the transpacific that, among other things, 

establish voluntary service contract guidelines (“VSCGs”) on rates and surcharges. The 

Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (“TSA”)21 develops VSCGs for Asian imports to the US 

14 See Horizon’s website at http://www.horizonlines.com/Ocean-Services/Asia-Service.aspx. 

15 In 2011, as trade conditions deteriorated, Horizon, Grand China and the Containership Company left the trade, and 

PO Shipping and TS Lines reduced their services.

16 See Westwood’s website at http://www.weyerhaeuser.com/Businesses/WestwoodShipping/About.

17 See the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service’s Grain Transport Report for January 11, 2011 at page 2.

18 Ibid, September 24, 2009, at page 2. 

19 Identity-preserved (IP) grains are frequently referred to as specialty, high value, premium or niche market grains. 

They are produced with a specific end use in mind -- perhaps human food, a specific kind of animal feed, cosmetics, 

pharmaceuticals or industrial use. 

20 Op. cit, USDA Agricultural Marketing Service.

21 The members of the TSA include APL, China Shipping, CMA CGM, COSCO, Evergreen, Hanjin, Hapag-Lloyd, 

HMM, K Line, Maersk Line, MSC, NYK Line, OOCL, Yang Ming and Zim. The TSA’s geographic scope includes 

Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. In July 2007, the TSA amended its basic agreement to 

include the Indian Subcontinent within its geographic scope. FMC Agreement No. 011223.
Chapter 5

144

and the Westbound Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (“WTSA”)22 develops VSCGs for 

US exports to Asia. Typically, the two agreements’ guidelines address general rate increase 

proposals and surcharges, but they also decide on guidelines for inclusion in tariff rules, such 

as for free time and demurrage.

TSA consists of 15 carriers, who had a combined market share of 92 percent in 2010. 

Currently, Mitsui OSK Line (“MOL”) is the only global carrier not a member of the TSA; 

it had four percent of the transpacific trade in 2010. At one time, MOL was a TSA member, 

but it resigned in 2008. Despite the resignation of MOL, the TSA’s membership has grown 

since 2006. Between 2006 and 2010, five carriers have joined TSA. After resigning in 

January 2006, CMA CGM re-joined the TSA in March 2007. MSC joined the TSA in May 

2007, followed by Zim in June 2007, China Shipping in January 2008 and Maersk Line in 

January 2010. Primarily due to an expanding membership, TSA’s market share increased by 

31 percentage points between 2006 and 2010.

WTSA consists of ten carriers, who had a combined market share of 62 percent in 2010, 

down from 65 percent in 2006. Over the five year review period, there were no changes in 

WTSA’s membership. All WTSA members are also members of TSA. 

In January 2007, both TSA and WTSA changed their executive structure, replacing the 

former Secretariat with a four-member carrier committee, known as the CEO Executive 

Committee. Each year, the CEO Executive Committee is elected by each agreement’s 

membership. The CEO Executive Committee then elects an Executive Committee 

Chairman who speaks on behalf of each agreement. An Executive Administrator handles the 

administrative functions of the two agreements. 

Both TSA and WTSA have two decision making committees, the Chief Executive 

Officers Committee (“CEO Committee”) and the Revenue Policy Committee (“RPC”). 

Either or both of these committees must unanimously agree to the establishment of VSCGs. 

The CEO Committee representatives consist of each member’s CEO or similar top-ranking 

executive. The CEOs meet approximately four to six times a year to provide overall 

guidance to all other committees. The RPC consists of carrier officials who report directly 

to each company’s CEO. The RPC meets regularly, usually by telephone, to discuss service 

contracting issues, as well as market conditions, economic forecasts or regulatory issues that 

may affect service contract negotiations or the movement of container cargo.

Additionally, both TSA and WTSA have a Local Working Committee (“LWC”) in many 

foreign countries within the geographic scope of their respective agreements. There are two 

LWCs in China – one in North China and one in South China. LWCs meet periodically 

and only at the request of the Executive Administrator. These meetings are convened to 

discuss and provide information or recommendations on specific local issues identified by 

the Executive Administrator, such as proposed government regulations or surcharges by local 

ports. The LWCs do not have authority to act on behalf of the full membership.

The non-decision making committee structures of TSA and WTSA are different because 

of the way each agreement sets VSCGs. WTSA establishes commodity subcommittees to 

recommend VSCGs on specific commodities because individual carriers negotiate service 

contracts throughout the year. TSA members on the other hand, negotiate almost all 

their service contracts in the spring to become effective May 1. Additionally, TSA usually 

establishes, in November of the prior year, VSCGs that are intended to apply across-the-board 

to all commodities.

22 The members of the WTSA include APL, COSCO, Evergreen, Hanjin, Hapag-Lloyd, HMM, K Line, NYK 

Line, OOCL and Yang Ming. The WTSA’s geographic scope includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian 

Subcontinent. FMC Agreement No. 011325.
145

As WTSA typically sets VSCGs to coincide with the main shipping season for each 

commodity, it convenes commodity subcommittees to examine market conditions and 

to make recommendations regarding rates and/or terms of carriage. Recommendations 

made by the commodity subcommittees must be approved by either the RPC or CEO 

Committee or both. Commodity subcommittees are composed of the top five carriers that 

move a particular commodity. 

TSA has several non-decision making committees: Cost Committee, Bunker Committee 

and Origin Review Committee (“ORC”). The Cost Committee attempts to estimate 

the average cost that agreement members incur in providing transpacific liner service, and 

uses those estimates to make general pricing recommendations to the RPC and/or CEO 

Committee. Similarly, the Bunker Committee attempts to estimate the average bunker 

costs that agreement members incur in providing transpacific liner service and makes 

recommendations to the RPC and/or CEO Committee on the application of a Bunker 

Adjustment Factor (“BAF”). The Cost and Bunker committees did not meet in 2010; instead 

the RPC itself addressed those cost issues. ORC meets overseas, typically in China, during 

the slack season to discuss current market conditions. A summary is then forwarded to the 

RPC and CEO Committee. The ORC met just once in 2010, but typically meets three or 

four times a year.

Unlike the EU, Asian nations generally permit ocean liner rate discussion agreements. 

Like the EU, they also allow vessel sharing arrangements and global alliances. Japan and 

Korea have laws, similar to the Shipping Act, that exempt ocean liner agreements from 

their competition law. However, other Asian nations have implemented or are considering 

competition law that prohibits companies from colluding on rates and services. For example, 

Singapore has a competition law, but ocean liner agreements are exempt from it. That 

competition law exemption is, however, for a fixed duration. The exemption expired in 

2010, but Singapore has extended it through 2015. Singapore announced it was continuing 

the exemption given that “...the presence of an extensive network of liner shipping 

companies has played, and continues to play a large part in contributing to Singapore’s status 

as a premier international maritime centre.”23

China enacted a competition law in 2008, but the government has yet to issue 

implementing regulations. Chinese officials are said to be waiting for commissioned academic 

studies to be completed before deciding on any exemption from the law for ocean liner 

agreements. Currently, ocean liner agreements, including the TSA and WTSA, continue to 

operate as usual in Chinese trades. 

Chinese maritime regulations require ocean carrier agreements to be filed with the 

government. In 2009, the Chinese government also issued regulations stipulating that export 

container rates and tariffs be “normal and reasonable.” In addition, the regulations mandate 

that each carrier file minimum and maximum tariff and service contract rates with the 

Shanghai Shipping Exchange. These regulations prohibit carriers from moving cargo for free 

or assessing negative freight rates.

In May 2009, India implemented its competition law without an exemption for ocean liner 

agreements. As result, the TSA and WTSA suspended India from their geographic scopes, 

and they no longer discuss or establish VSCGs for container cargo to/from India. India is 

considering an exemption for ocean liner agreements. Like China, India has commissioned an 

economic study and, once completed, will make a decision on whether to issue an exemption. 

23 Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, Press Release dated 16 December 2010. 
Chapter 5

146

Commentary 

This section addresses liner shipping activities in the transpacific for the review period of 

2006 through 2010.24 The review period provides a span of time to assess the trade prior 

to and after the repeal by the European Union of its block exemption regulations for liner 

shipping conferences. The repeal had no direct impact on the transpacific trade because 

the original block exemption did not apply in this trade. In the transpacific trade, carrier 

agreements with rate authority continue to enjoy antitrust immunity and remain subject to 

regulatory oversight by the FMC. These comments address economic factors and the changes 

over the review period that shaped the structure of the market and affected the conduct and 

performance of the ocean carriers.

As globalization has advanced, the trade in containerized commodities between the 

US and its transpacific trading partners has grown rapidly over the past two decades. US 

container cargo volume with nations in Asia grew by 250 percent, as a whole, from 1990 

through 2010. An analysis of the NOI responses appeared to show that on average the liner 

services of the carriers in the trade accounted for around 30 percent of their total revenue 

earnings. Over the review period, the geographic distribution of cargo changed little. China 

is the United States’ largest trading partner, both in the transpacific and globally. China 

accounts for nearly 60 percent of the total transpacific ocean liner trade with the United 

States (see Tables TP-13a-e). Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong are the United 

States’ other major trading partners in the transpacific and together account for approximately 

27 percent of the total ocean liner trade (see Tables TP-13a-e). Over 70 percent of the 

transpacific ocean liner cargo moves through US Pacific Coast ports with the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach handling much of the volume. Over 25 percent of the transpacific 

ocean liner cargo moves through US Atlantic Coast ports with the Port of New York-New 

Jersey handling most of the volume. Less than two percent of all transpacific ocean liner 

cargo moves through US Gulf Coast ports.

During the five-year review period, market concentration in the transpacific trade 

declined modestly (see Chart TP-8). In 2006, the top four carriers with highest market shares 

had a concentration ratio (“CR4”) of 40 percent, but by 2010, the CR4 was 36 percent. 

Market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) declined 

from 705 in 2006 to 651 in 201025 (see Tables TP-7a-e). The transpacific trade experienced a 

modest amount of new entry late in the review period as several small lines opted to provide 

limited port-to-port service (mainly to NVOCC shippers) between China and Southern 

California (see Table TP-11).

In terms of value and quantity, US imports from Asia make up the headhaul direction of 

the transpacific trade, that is, the trade direction with the greatest quantity of cargo and that 

generates the highest revenue for carriers (see Table TP-15). From 2006 through mid-2007, 

demand for US imports from Asia initially increased, but in the last half of 2007 began to sag. 

A long period of robust growth in US container imports was cut short as the global recession 

unfolded in late 2008. That recession-driven decline in demand gave rise to a significant 

increase in excess capacity that peaked in March 2009 and did not abate until the final 

quarter of the year – at which time average revenue per container began to recover. 

Competition among lines for the diminished availability of cargo was particularly fierce 

24 The United States’ trading partners in the transpacific include China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 

Mongolia, Macau, Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Sri Lanka, 

Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and India.

25 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as not concentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and 

an HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. 
147

in late 2008 through mid-2009, and ended only as lines began to remove excess capacity or 

absorb if by slow steaming service strings. For example, available vessel capacity in the US/

Far East trade dropped by an estimated 21 percent between August 2008 and January 2010.26

From the final months of 2009, through the summer of 2010, a combination of significant 

increases in demand for liner services and very low levels of excess capacity led to freight 

rate increases that began moderately and then ramped up sharply in early 2010. Those rates 

peaked at the end of the 3rd quarter 2010 and declined through the remainder of the year.

When demand rebounded in late 2009 and continued through much of the first half of 

2010, the absence of the withdrawn vessel capacity, and the lines’ forceful efforts to recover 

the revenues lost in the previous year,27 pushed rates back to levels that matched and then 

slightly exceeded the pre-crisis peak rates in mid-2008. 

In the US outbound trade to the Far East (US exports), demand increased, while average 

revenue per container was relatively stable throughout 2006 and 2007. Average revenue 

per container then increased throughout 2008 until the end of the 3rd quarter. The impact 

of the global recession saw demand plunge and helped to produce a rapid increase in excess 

capacity. That, in turn, led to a dramatic decline in average revenue per container – with 

serious consequences for carriers’ financial well-being – beginning in October 2008. That 

decline did not bottom out until mid-2009. In mid-2009, average revenue per container 

began to rebound in the westbound trade and increased steadily for a full year before they 

began to decline again in the late summer of 2010. 

Available capacity for the US export trade to the Far East is limited by capacity decisions 

made by the lines based on expected import volumes (i.e., based on the headhaul trade). In 

addition, factors such as cargo weight, container availability at inland points, the demand for 

containers in Asia, and the seasonality of various cargoes affect US exports. Consequently, 

the connection between excess capacity (however defined) and demand for shipping service 

is more complex than it is in the inbound (US imports) trade.

The remainder of this section consists of a series of tables and charts that track and 

describe changes between 2006 and 2010 in various aspects of market structure, carrier 

conduct, and economic performance in the Far East/US trade.

26 Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter, Volume 2010, Issue 51, 12/14/2010 to 12/20/2010.

27 In particular, the Emergency Revenue Charge of $400 per FEU (effective January 15, 2010) that TSA’s member lines 

instituted, with what was reportedly a high degree of success, led to a significant increase in rate levels in the Far East/

US trade. See Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter, Vol. 2010, Issue 4, 1/19/2010 to 1/25/2010. 
Chapter 5

148

Transpacific Market Structure

Table TP-1 Monthly TEU Cargo Volume 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time series 

data showing in each trade direction the total number of US container exports that moved 

outbound to Asia, and the total number of container imports that moved inbound to the 

US from Asia. The container imports and exports are measured in TEUs. The trend in the 

number of the containers moved over the time series shows the extent of cargo growth and 

seasonality in each trade direction based on the foreign and domestic consumer demand 

for container exports and imports, which affects the price of the liner shipping services 

in the trade. Further, the number of containers moved inbound and outbound identifies 

the headhaul and backhaul directions of the trade, and the extent of any imbalance in the 

directional flow of container cargo. The source of the container data is PIERS.

TP–1 US/Asia Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in TEUs

US to Asia TEUs Asia to US TEUs

Jan-06 372,852 1,073,860

Feb-06 367,518 915,666

Mar-06 429,075 970,853

Apr-06 373,277 1,140,313

May-06 397,665 1,164,565

Jun-06 379,444 1,146,888

Jul-06 361,129 1,145,792

Aug-06 370,528 1,253,755

Sep-06 373,522 1,224,273

Oct-06 397,317 1,274,988

Nov-06 386,116 1,140,552

Dec-06 382,848 1,082,509

Jan-07 400,321 1,090,483

Feb-07 400,002 1,117,404

Mar-07 439,364 1,000,797

Apr-07 420,690 1,119,780

May-07 455,017 1,140,172

Jun-07 471,573 1,204,546

Jul-07 405,342 1,198,843

Aug-07 442,681 1,212,436

Sep-07 416,942 1,245,943

Oct-07 453,921 1,186,173

Nov-07 462,370 1,118,158

Dec-07 465,099 1,039,613

Jan-08 468,608 1,066,722

Feb-08 534,970 1,049,734

Mar-08 527,449 893,112

Apr-08 515,744 1,033,311

May-08 523,269 1,112,337

Jun-08 492,064 1,031,619

Jul-08 525,964 1,087,059

Aug-08 492,056 1,173,417

Sep-08 451,354 1,123,507
149

TP–1 US/Asia Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in TEUs (continued)

US to Asia TEUs Asia to US TEUs

Oct-08 430,690 1,133,565

Nov-08 352,026 978,225

Dec-08 339,399 865,144

Jan-09 346,303 904,733

Feb-09 371,660 680,951

Mar-09 467,457 790,505

Apr-09 464,735 834,508

May-09 488,081 835,149

Jun-09 478,351 856,559

Jul-09 481,222 950,575

Aug-09 498,389 993,292

Sep-09 473,859 998,029

Oct-09 489,092 1,051,589

Nov-09 481,894 941,405

Dec-09 495,381 893,554

Jan-10 430,109 955,535

Feb-10 459,281 866,915

Mar-10 500,822 872,455

Apr-10 498,739 943,258

May-10 487,786 1,051,020

Jun-10 464,090 1,094,163

Jul-10 465,390 1,087,477

Aug-10 467,541 1,200,048

Sep-10 448,756 1,128,130

Oct-10 530,360 1,141,159

Nov-10 519,741 1,059,959

Dec-10 523,521 951,023

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
Chapter 5

150

Chart TP-2 Monthly and Three-Month Moving Average TEU Cargo Volumes 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the actual import and export container cargo loads in each 

direction of the US/Asia trade. The chart also provides a three-month moving average of 

the import and export cargo loads to smooth out fluctuations in the data and delineate the 

overall trend lines more clearly. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time 

in months over the review period, and the vertical axis measures container cargo loads in 

thousands of TEUs. The trend lines of the data show the extent of growth, seasonality, and 

change that occurred over the review period in the consumer demand for container imports 

and exports in the trade. In turn, the extent of container cargo growth, or a serious reduction 

in container cargo volume due to a contraction in demand, directly affects the price of 

liner shipping service in the trade. Further, the trend lines of container imports and exports 

identify the headhaul and the backhaul directions of the trade, and any imbalance and change 

over time in the directional flow of cargo. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

TP–2 US/Asia Trade

Loaded TEU by Month

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Loaded TEUs (Thousands)

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

US to Asia

3-month moving average

Asia to US

3-month moving average

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal
151

Table TP-3 Monthly Container Cargo Volumes in Metric Tons 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time 

series data showing in each trade direction the total weight of the container exports that 

moved outbound from the US to Asia, and the total weight of the container imports that 

moved inbound to the US from Asia. The trend in the metric tons of containers moved 

over the time series is an indication of the extent of cargo growth and seasonality in each 

trade direction based on the foreign and domestic demand for container exports and imports. 

The trend in the data also shows the extent of any weight imbalance in the direction flow 

of container cargo in the trade. The weight of the cargo moving in a trade lane can affect 

the utilization of vessel capacity and impose draft limitations on containerships. PIERS is the 

source of the container cargo data.

TP–3 US/Asia Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in Containerized Metric Tons

US to Asia Metric Tons Asia to US Metric Tons

Jan-06 3,819,858 6,631,591

Feb-06 3,752,783 5,679,803

Mar-06 4,356,508 6,143,599

Apr-06 3,795,227 7,120,120

May-06 4,043,119 7,335,601

Jun-06 3,879,167 7,157,826

Jul-06 3,740,536 7,098,469

Aug-06 3,838,967 7,628,135

Sep-06 3,881,032 7,325,486

Oct-06 4,111,287 7,574,074

Nov-06 4,015,085 6,974,876

Dec-06 4,003,448 6,719,096

Jan-07 4,235,499 6,781,021

Feb-07 4,216,327 6,793,493

Mar-07 4,606,454 6,297,897

Apr-07 4,386,867 7,025,843

May-07 4,764,489 7,241,637

Jun-07 4,933,156 7,582,594

Jul-07 4,261,374 7,468,458

Aug-07 4,624,703 7,343,079

Sep-07 4,496,304 7,400,686

Oct-07 5,074,143 7,004,272

Nov-07 4,916,874 6,807,033

Dec-07 4,938,310 6,471,536

Jan-08 5,025,829 6,654,136

Feb-08 5,713,135 6,460,683

Mar-08 5,588,266 5,661,397

Apr-08 5,426,014 6,524,039

May-08 5,467,859 6,990,553

Jun-08 5,234,866 6,501,685

Jul-08 5,516,028 6,702,481

Aug-08 5,164,963 7,132,927

Sep-08 4,733,312 6,733,596

Oct-08 4,489,256 6,814,182

Nov-08 3,663,840 6,152,324
Chapter 5

152

TP–3 US/Asia Trade

Monthly Cargo Volume in Containerized Metric Tons 

(continued)

US to Asia Metric Tons Asia to US Metric Tons

Dec-08 3,502,772 5,528,794

Jan-09 3,480,969 5,665,833

Feb-09 3,896,457 4,248,064

Mar-09 4,928,750 4,940,226

Apr-09 4,933,482 5,237,874

May-09 5,221,431 5,233,971

Jun-09 5,126,493 5,300,673

Jul-09 5,178,408 5,825,051

Aug-09 5,390,981 5,947,253

Sep-09 5,162,914 5,925,987

Oct-09 5,310,435 6,283,216

Nov-09 5,287,910 5,787,822

Dec-09 5,441,651 5,606,134

Jan-10 4,794,315 5,920,885

Feb-10 5,006,954 5,275,683

Mar-10 5,448,116 5,519,324

Apr-10 5,375,323 5,881,020

May-10 5,273,309 6,583,827

Jun-10 5,055,368 6,778,334

Jul-10 5,017,252 6,693,698

Aug-10 5,013,146 7,212,368

Sep-10 4,822,532 6,656,500

Oct-10 5,799,892 6,698,700

Nov-10 5,643,130 6,445,744

Dec-10 5,669,471 5,978,564

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
153

Chart TP-4 Monthly and Three-Month Moving 

Average in Container Cargo Metric Tons 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the actual import and export container cargo loads in each 

direction of the US/Asia trade. The chart also provides a three-month moving average of the 

import and export cargo loads to smooth out fluctuations in the data and delineate the overall 

trend lines more clearly. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time in months 

over the review period, and the vertical axis measures container cargo loads in millions of 

metric tons. The trend lines of the data show the extent of growth, seasonality, and change 

that occurred over the review period in the consumer demand for container imports and 

exports in the trade. In turn, the extent of container cargo growth, or a serious reduction 

in container cargo volume due to a contraction in demand, directly affects the price of 

liner shipping service in the trade. Further, the trend lines of container imports and exports 

identify the headhaul and the backhaul directions of the trade, and any imbalance and change 

over time in the directional flow of cargo. PIERS is the source of the container cargo data.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

TP–4 US/Asia Trade 

Liner Cargo Volume in Metric Tons

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Metric Tons (MIllions)

US to Asia

3-month moving average

Asia to US

3-month moving average
Chapter 5

154

Table TP-5 Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table provides time 

series data showing the ratio in the weight and number of container imports divided by the 

weight and number of container exports that moved in the US/Asia trade. The weight of 

the container cargo is measured in metric tons, and the number of containers is measured in 

TEUs. The ratio of container imports to container exports provides a measure of the extent 

of any imbalance in the directional flow of container cargo in the trade. The higher the 

ratio, the higher the extent of an imbalance in the weight or number of container imports in 

excess of container exports. A ratio of less than 1.0 indicates a period of time when container 

exports exceeded container imports. Further, the ratio shows the extent to which the US 

demand for container imports from Asia exceeded Asia’s demand for US container exports. 

PIERS is the source for the container cargo data.

TP–5 Trade Imbalance between the US and Asia

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Metric Tons TEUs

Jan-06 1.74 2.88

Feb-06 1.51 2.49

Mar-06 1.41 2.26

Apr-06 1.88 3.05

May-06 1.81 2.93

Jun-06 1.85 3.02

Jul-06 1.90 3.17

Aug-06 1.99 3.38

Sep-06 1.89 3.28

Oct-06 1.84 3.21

Nov-06 1.74 2.95

Dec-06 1.68 2.83

Jan-07 1.60 2.72

Feb-07 1.61 2.79

Mar-07 1.37 2.28

Apr-07 1.60 2.66

May-07 1.52 2.51

Jun-07 1.54 2.55

Jul-07 1.75 2.96

Aug-07 1.59 2.74

Sep-07 1.65 2.99

Oct-07 1.38 2.61

Nov-07 1.38 2.42

Dec-07 1.31 2.24

Jan-08 1.32 2.28

Feb-08 1.13 1.96

Mar-08 1.01 1.69

Apr-08 1.20 2.00

May-08 1.28 2.13

Jun-08 1.24 2.10

Jul-08 1.22 2.07

Aug-08 1.38 2.38

Sep-08 1.42 2.49

Oct-08 1.52 2.63
155

TP–5 Trade Imbalance between the US and Asia

Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo (continued)

Metric Tons TEUs

Nov-08 1.68 2.78

Dec-08 1.58 2.55

Jan-09 1.63 2.61

Feb-09 1.09 1.83

Mar-09 1.00 1.69

Apr-09 1.06 1.80

May-09 1.00 1.71

Jun-09 1.03 1.79

Jul-09 1.12 1.98

Aug-09 1.10 1.99

Sep-09 1.15 2.11

Oct-09 1.18 2.15

Nov-09 1.09 1.95

Dec-09 1.03 1.80

Jan-10 1.23 2.22

Feb-10 1.05 1.89

Mar-10 1.01 1.74

Apr-10 1.09 1.89

May-10 1.25 2.15

Jun-10 1.34 2.36

Jul-10 1.33 2.34

Aug-10 1.44 2.57

Sep-10 1.38 2.51

Oct-10 1.15 2.15

Nov-10 1.14 2.04

Dec-10 1.05 1.82

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive 
Chapter 5

156

Chart TP-6 Ratio of Inbound to Outbound Cargo 

For each month of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend lines 

of time series data showing the ratio in weight and number of the container imports to the 

weight and number of container exports that moved in the US/Asia trade. The weight of 

the containers is measured in metric tons, and the number of the containers is measured in 

TEUs. The horizontal axis of the chart gives the series of time in months over the review 

period, and the vertical axis measures the level of the ratio container imports to container 

exports. The trend lines of the ratio show the extent of an imbalance in the weight or 

number of container imports in excess of container exports in the trade over the review 

period. The degree to which the trend lines exceed 1.0 shows the degree of an imbalance in 

container imports above container exports. A trend line that falls below 1.0 indicates a period 

of time when the weight or number of container exports exceeded container imports. The 

trend lines over the time series show how any imbalance in directional flow of container 

cargo changed over the review period. They can also be interpreted as showing the change 

over time in the US demand for container imports from Asia compared to Asia’s demand for 

US container exports. PIERS is the source for the container cargo data.

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

TP–6 Imbalance in the US/Asia Trade

Ratio of US Inbound to Outbound Cargo

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Ratio

Metric Tons

TEUs

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0
157

Tables TP-7a-e Annual Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI)

The tables provide measures of the annual levels of market concentration among the shipping 

lines that participated in the US/Asia trade for the review period from 2006 through 2010. 

The shipping lines that moved more than 1,000 TEUs for each year are shown in ranking 

order based on their total annual container carriage. The amount of total containers moved 

by each shipping line includes both imports and exports. The percent of market share is 

derived for each shipping line from the container data. From the market share data, two 

measures of market concentration are derived: the concentration ratio of the top four 

shipping lines with the highest market shares (“CR4”) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 

(“HHI”). The CR4 in the Cumulative Percent column is simply derived as the sum of 

the percent of the market shares of the top four lines. The figures in the Market Share and 

Cumulative Percent columns in the following tables have been rounded to the nearest whole 

number and may not appear to sum accurately.

The HHI for each year is shown in bold at the bottom of the HHI column and is derived 

as the sum of the squared values of the market shares for each shipping line. As a benchmark 

for assessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the US 

Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a market with an HHI below 

1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and an 

HHI above 2500 has highly concentrated. The source of the container data is PIERS.
Chapter 5

158

TP–7a US/Asia

Total Liner Cargo [Imports & Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2006

Rank Shipping Line 2006 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 2,463,759 14% 14% 185.1 

2 Evergreen Line 1,954,776 11% 24% 116.5 

3 Hanjin Shipping 1,606,535 9% 33% 78.7 

4 American President Lines 1,238,629 7% 40% 46.8 

5 COSCO 1,120,120 6% 46% 38.3 

6 OOCL 1,039,859 6% 52% 33.0 

7 Hyundai Merchant Marine 1,020,917 6% 58% 31.8 

8 Yang Ming Line 988,868 5% 63% 29.8 

9 China Shipping Container Line 932,498 5% 68% 26.5 

10 K Line 922,838 5% 73% 26.0 

11 NYK Line 921,381 5% 78% 25.9 

12 Mediterranean Shipping Company 856,748 5% 83% 22.4 

13 Mitsui OSK Line 693,125 4% 87% 14.7 

14 CMA CGM 656,472 4% 91% 13.1 

15 Hapag-Lloyd 583,329 3% 94% 10.4 

16 Wan Hai Lines Ltd 270,956 1% 95% 2.2 

17 Zim Container Line 262,297 1% 97% 2.1 

18 China National Foreign Trade Transportation 

Corp. 128,894 1% 98% 0.5 

19 P & O Nedlloyd 86,530 0% 98% 0.2 

20 CSAV Norasia 65,193 0% 98% 0.1 

21 Westwood Shipping Lines 59,896 0% 99% 0.1 

22 Matson Navigation Company, Inc 59,426 0% 99% 0.1 

23 CP Ships USA LLC 36,017 0% 99% 0.0 

24 US Lines Ltd 35,889 0% 99% 0.0 

25 ANL Container Line 30,563 0% 100% 0.0 

26 United Arab Shipping Company 12,265 0% 100% 0.0 

27 Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 7,672 0% 100% 0.0 

28 Emirates Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd 7,179 0% 100% 0.0 

29 Seth Shipping Corp 6,233 0% 100% 0.0 

30 Star Shipping 5,747 0% 100% 0.0 

31 Saga Forest Carriers International 5,264 0% 100% 0.0 

32 Amerasia Shipping Line 5,236 0% 100% 0.0 

33 Lykes 4,206 0% 100% 0.0 

34 Rickmers Linie (America) 4,186 0% 100% 0.0 

35 Maruba S.C.A. 3,934 0% 100% 0.0 

36 Great Western Steamship 3,669 0% 100% 0.0 

37 Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Co in 

Shanghai 3,502 0% 100% 0.0 

38 Scanwell Container Line Ltd 1,511 0% 100% 0.0 

39 Mexican Line 1,040 0% 100% 0.0 

2006 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 18,107,160 100% -- 705 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
159

TP–7b US/Asia

Total Liner Cargo [Imports & Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2007

Rank Shipping Line 2007 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Evergreen Line 2,052,440 11% 11% 118.1 

2 Maersk 1,954,640 10% 21% 107.1 

3 Hanjin Shipping 1,699,139 9% 30% 80.9 

4 American President Lines 1,413,300 7% 38% 56.0 

5 COSCO 1,203,109 6% 44% 40.6 

6 Yang Ming Line 1,176,345 6% 50% 38.8 

7 OOCL 1,121,731 6% 56% 35.3 

8 China Shipping Container Lines 1,098,946 6% 62% 33.8 

9 Hyundai Merchant Marine 1,066,448 6% 68% 31.9 

10 K Line 1,021,609 5% 73% 29.3 

11 NYK Line 967,268 5% 78% 26.2 

12 Mediterranean Shipping Company 909,819 5% 83% 23.2 

13 CMA CGM 849,506 4% 88% 20.2 

14 Mitsui OSK Line 762,064 4% 92% 16.3 

15 Hapag-Lloyd 693,684 4% 95% 13.5 

16 Zim Container Line 281,503 1% 97% 2.2 

17 Wan Hai Lines Ltd 175,441 1% 98% 0.9 

18 Matson Navigation Company, Inc 95,015 1% 98% 0.3 

19 Westwood Shipping Lines 56,267 0% 98% 0.1 

20 United Arab Shipping Co 42,047 0% 99% 0.0 

21 China National Foreign Trade Transportation 

Corp. 41,332 0% 99% 0.0 

22 Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 40,772 0% 99% 0.0 

23 Emirates Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd 34,064 0% 99% 0.0 

24 ANL Container Line 33,253 0% 99% 0.0 

25 US Lines Ltd 32,780 0% 100% 0.0 

26 CSAV Norasia 30,527 0% 100% 0.0 

27 Saga Forest Carriers International 7,221 0% 100% 0.0 

28 Seth Shipping Corp 5,863 0% 100% 0.0 

29 Amerasia Shipping Line 5,065 0% 100% 0.0 

30 Rickmers Linie (America) 4,111 0% 100% 0.0 

31 Namucar Line 3,186 0% 100% 0.0 

32 Star Shipping 2,337 0% 100% 0.0 

33 Guarani Line Ltd 2,080 0% 100% 0.0 

34 Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Co in 

Shanghai 1,684 0% 100% 0.0 

35 Gear Bulk 1,631 0% 100% 0.0 

36 Shipping Corporation of India 1,243 0% 100% 0.0 

37 Horizon Lines 1,167 0% 100% 0.0 

2007 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 18,888,633 100% -- 675 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

160

TP–7c US/Asia

Total Liner Cargo [Imports & Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2008

Rank Shipping Line 2008 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Evergreen Line 1,996,199 11% 11% 120.4 

2 Maersk 1,901,203 10% 21% 109.2 

3 Hanjin Shipping 1,503,837 8% 30% 68.3 

4 American President Lines 1,346,076 7% 37% 54.7 

5 Hyundai Merchant Marine 1,091,087 6% 43% 36.0 

6 OOCL 1,080,500 6% 49% 35.3 

7 Yang Ming Line 1,079,882 6% 55% 35.2 

8 Mediterranean Shipping Company 1,017,022 6% 61% 31.2 

9 NYK Line 1,013,129 6% 66% 31.0 

10 K Line 1,009,637 6% 72% 30.8 

11 CMA CGM 992,700 5% 77% 29.8 

12 COSCO 913,644 5% 82% 25.2 

13 China Shipping Container Lines 885,619 5% 87% 23.7 

14 Mitsui OSK Line 759,267 4% 91% 17.4 

15 Hapag-Lloyd 738,234 4% 95% 16.5 

16 Zim Container Line 285,608 2% 97% 2.5 

17 Wan Hai Lines Ltd 235,185 1% 98% 1.7 

18 Matson Navigation Company, Inc 94,257 1% 99% 0.3 

20 ANL Container Line 65,042 0% 99% 0.1 

21 Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 62,386 0% 99% 0.1 

22 Westwood Shipping Lines 54,496 0% 100% 0.1 

23 United Arab Shipping Co 38,665 0% 100% 0.0 

24 Seth Shipping Corp 6,380 0% 100% 0.0 

25 US Lines Ltd 6,105 0% 100% 0.0 

26 Rickmers Linie (America) 3,653 0% 100% 0.0 

27 Emirates Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd 3,556 0% 100% 0.0 

28 Saga Forest Carriers International 2,526 0% 100% 0.0 

29 CSAV Norasia 2,233 0% 100% 0.0 

30 Namucar Line 1,990 0% 100% 0.0 

31 Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Co in 

Shanghai 1,773 0% 100% 0.0 

32 Amerasia Shipping Line 1,707 0% 100% 0.0 

33 Star Shipping 1,307 0% 100% 0.0 

34 Guarani Line Ltd 1,044 0% 100% 0.0 

2008 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 18,195,952 100% -- 669 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
161

TP–7d US/Asia

Total Liner Cargo [Imports & Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2009

Rank Market Participant (Shipping Line) 2009 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Maersk 1,748,311 11% 11% 115.6 

2 Evergreen Line 1,708,916 11% 21% 110.5 

3 Hanjin Shipping 1,297,635 8% 29% 63.7 

4 American President Lines 1,158,239 7% 36% 50.7 

5 Mediterranean Shipping Company 1,131,914 7% 43% 48.5 

6 Hyundai Merchant Marine 995,884 6% 49% 37.5 

7 CMA CGM 992,496 6% 56% 37.3 

8 OOCL 942,603 6% 61% 33.6 

9 K Line 939,326 6% 67% 33.4 

10 Yang Ming Line 919,538 6% 73% 32.0 

11 China Shipping Container Line 881,345 5% 78% 29.4 

12 NYK Line 797,960 5% 83% 24.1 

13 COSCO 780,759 5% 88% 23.1 

14 Mitsui OSK Line 683,145 4% 92% 17.7 

15 Hapag-Lloyd 613,606 4% 96% 14.2 

16 Zim Container Line 300,389 2% 98% 3.4 

17 Matson Navigation Company, Inc 88,548 1% 98% 0.3 

18 Wan Hai Lines Ltd 84,980 1% 99% 0.3 

19 ANL Container Line 57,230 0% 99% 0.1 

20 Westwood Shipping Lines 34,523 0% 99% 0.0 

21 Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 33,972 0% 100% 0.0 

22 United Arab Shipping Co 30,324 0% 100% 0.0 

23 CSAV Norasia 29,264 0% 100% 0.0 

24 Seth Shipping Corp 7,402 0% 100% 0.0 

25 Rickmers Linie (America) 2,284 0% 100% 0.0 

2009 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 16,260,595 100% -- 675 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

162

TP–7e US/Asia

Total Liner Cargo [Imports & Exports]

CR4 & HHI - 2010

Rank Market Participant (Shipping Line) 2010 TEUs Market Share Cumulative Percent HHI

1 Evergreen Line 1,766,963 10% 10% 94.9 

2 Maersk 1,758,113 10% 19% 94.0 

3 Hanjin Shipping 1,490,703 8% 28% 67.6 

4 American President Lines 1,461,915 8% 36% 65.0 

5 Hyundai Merchant Marine 1,239,315 7% 43% 46.7 

6 Mediterranean Shipping Company 1,188,232 7% 49% 42.9 

7 COSCO 1,084,541 6% 55% 35.8 

8 China Shipping Container Lines 1,059,233 6% 61% 34.1 

9 Yang Ming Line 1,045,727 6% 67% 33.3 

10 CMA CGM 938,283 5% 72% 26.8 

11 K Line 937,947 5% 77% 26.8 

12 OOCL 928,495 5% 82% 26.2 

13 NYK Line 829,662 5% 87% 20.9 

14 Mitsui OSK Line 785,778 4% 91% 18.8 

15 Hapag-Lloyd 646,693 4% 95% 12.7 

16 Zim Container Line 319,883 2% 96% 3.1 

17 Matson Navigation Company, Inc 129,504 1% 97% 0.5 

18 CSAV Norasia 114,532 1% 98% 0.4 

19 Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 80,715 0% 98% 0.2 

20 ANL Container Line 79,807 0% 99% 0.2 

21 Wan Hai Lines Ltd 77,968 0% 99% 0.2 

22 TCC (The Containership Co) 55,236 0% 99% 0.1 

23 Westwood Shipping Lines 54,161 0% 100% 0.1 

24 PO Shipping Co Ltd (Hainan) 37,623 0% 100% 0.0 

25 Seth Shipping Corp 10,515 0% 100% 0.0 

27 Horizon Lines 4,469 0% 100% 0.0 

28 United Arab Shipping Co 3,441 0% 100% 0.0 

29 Rickmers Linie (America) 2,465 0% 100% 0.0 

30 Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Co in 

Shanghai 1,267 0% 100% 0.0 

31 Wallenius Wilhelmsen Line 1,110 0% 100% 0.0 

2010 Total TEUs & Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 18,134,297 100% -- 651 

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
163

Chart TP-8 Concentration Ratios (CR4 and HHI) 

The chart provides a summary of the changes in market concentration among the 

participating shipping lines in the US/Asia trade over the review period from 2006 through 

2010. Two measures of market concentration are shown: the concentration ratio of the top 

four shipping lines with the highest market shares (“CR4”) in the light columns with the 

scale shown on the right and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) in the dark columns 

with the scale shown on the left. The CR4 is derived as the sum of market shares of the top 

four shipping lines, and the HHI is derived as the sum of the squared values of the market 

shares for each shipping line participating in the trade. The market share of each shipping line 

is based on its total annual container carriage in the trade measured in TEUs. 

As a benchmark for accessing concentration based on HHI, the 2010 Horizontal Merger 

Guidelines of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission view a 

market with an HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 as 

moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 has highly concentrated. The source of 

the container data is PIERS.

705

40%

675

38%

669

37%

675

36%

651

36%

CR4

HHI

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

TP-8 US/Asia Trade

Measures of Market Concentration CR4 & HHI

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

Market Share of Top Four Carriers in Trade (CR4)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

720

700

680

660

640

620

600
Chapter 5

164

Table TP-9 Changes in the Market Shares of Participants 

The table provides a summary of the changes in the market share percentages of the 

participating shipping lines in the US/Asia trade for each year of the review period from 

2006 through 2010. The annual market share percentages of each shipping line are based on 

its total annual container cargo carriage in the trade measured in TEUs. The shifts in market 

share between the shipping lines provide an indication of how well each line competed in 

the marketplace from one year to the next and over the course of the review period. The 

bottom row of the table gives the size of the market in millions of TEUs as measured by the 

sum of the annual amount of total import and export containers moved in the trade by each 

of the identified shipping lines. Only those shipping lines that deployed vessels in the trade in 

a given year were included as market participants. PIERS is the source of the container cargo 

data.

TP–9 US/Asia Trade

Changes in the Market Shares of Participants

Shipping Line 2006 MS 2007 MS 2008 MS 2009 MS 2010 MS

Evergreen Line 11% 11% 11% 11% 10%

Maersk 14% 10% 10% 11% 10%

Hanjin Shipping 9% 9% 8% 8% 8%

American President Lines 7% 8% 7% 7% 8%

Hyundai Merchant Marine 6% 6% 6% 6% 7%

Mediterranean Shipping Company 5% 5% 6% 7% 7%

COSCO 6% 6% 5% 5% 6%

China Shipping Container Lines 5% 6% 5% 5% 6%

Yang Ming Line 5% 6% 6% 6% 6%

CMA CGM 4% 5% 5% 6% 5%

K Line 5% 5% 6% 6% 5%

OOCL 6% 6% 6% 6% 5%

NYK Line 5% 5% 6% 5% 5%

Mitsui OSK Line 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%

Hapag-Lloyd 3% 4% 4% 4% 4%

Zim Container Line 1% 1% 2% 2% 2%

Matson Navigation Company, Inc 0% 1% 1% 1% 1%

CSAV Norasia 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%

Pacific International Line (Pte) Ltd 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

ANL Container Line 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Wan Hai Lines Ltd 2% 1% 1% 1% 0%

TCC (The Containership Co) -- -- -- -- 0%

Westwood Shipping Lines 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

P O Shipping Co Ltd (Hainan) -- -- -- -- 0%

US Lines Ltd 0% 0% 0% -- -- 

Emirates Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd 0% 0% 0% -- -- 

China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp. 1% 0% 0% -- -- 

Swire Shipping Ltd 0% 0% 0% 0% -- 

Maruba S.C.A. 0% 0% 0% -- -- 

Indotrans 0% 0% -- -- -- 

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Market Size (Millions of TEUs) 18.06 18.81 18.14 16.22 18.11

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
165

Table TP-10 Changes in Cargo Lifts and Market Shares of 

Major Alliances and Vessel Sharing Arrangements 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the total number 

and market share percentage of annual containers moved as a group by members of each 

alliance and the selected vessel sharing agreements operating in the US/Asia trade. The total 

number of annual containers moved by each agreement is the sum of the total number of 

annual containers moved by each member of the agreement and is combined to include 

imports and exports measured in TEUs. The annual market share percentage is derived by 

dividing the total number of containers of each agreement by the total number of import and 

export containers that moved in the trade and multiplying the quotient by 100. The table 

also gives the sum, and the corresponding market share percentage, of the annual containers 

moved in the trade by all of the alliance agreements (as one group) and by all of the alliance 

and selected vessel sharing agreements (as one group). The selected vessel sharing agreements 

shown in the table are those in which an alliance, as a group, formed a service, or services, 

under an agreement in partnership with non-alliance carriers operating in the trade. Over 

the review period, the table shows any annual change that occurred in the total number, and 

corresponding market share percentage, of containers moved by the various agreements and 

groups of agreements. The source of data is PIERS.

TP–10 US/Asia

Changes in Cargo Lifts (TEUs) and Market Shares of the Major Alliances and VSAs

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 2,952,671 3,241,812 3,196,430 2,837,269 3,487,008 

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 2,544,569 2,782,683 2,831,864 2,354,169 2,404,850 

CKYH Worldwide Slot Allocation and Sailing 

Agreement 4,638,361 5,100,201 4,506,999 3,937,259 4,558,918 

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Grand Alliance/ZIM Transpacific VSA -- -- -- 2,654,558 2,724,733 

Liftings by Alliances 10,135,601 11,124,696 10,535,293 9,128,697 10,450,776 

Liftings by Alliances including Partners 10,135,601 11,124,696 10,535,293 9,429,086 10,770,659 

Shares of Capacity

Alliances 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

New World Alliance Agreement 16.3% 17.2% 17.6% 17.4% 19.2%

The Grand Alliance Agreement II 14.0% 14.7% 15.6% 14.5% 13.3%

CKYH Worldwide Slot Allocation and Sailing 

Agreement 25.6% 27.0% 24.8% 24.2% 25.1%

Alliances including Partners 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Grand Alliance/ZIM Transpacific VSA -- -- -- 16.3% 15.0%

Market Share of Alliances 56.0% 58.9% 57.9% 56.1% 57.6%

Market Share of Alliances including Partners 56.0% 58.9% 57.9% 58.0% 59.4%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

166

Table TP-11 Carrier Entry and Exit 

The table shows the level of entry and exit of shipping lines participating in the US/Asia 

trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. Only those shipping 

lines that deployed vessels in liner services in the trade were counted as market participants. 

For purposes of this study, market entry was counted as the initiation of a new liner service 

in which a shipping line deployed some or all of its own vessels and was not deploying 

vessels in any other liner services in the trade at the time when the new service was initiated. 

Market exit was counted as a shipping line terminating its services in the trade and removing 

its vessels. The level of market entry and exit provides an indication of whether barriers to 

entry in a market exist, which affects competition between the market participants. The 

exit or entry of shipping lines in a trade is also a function of the demand for liner shipping 

services. A contraction in demand for an extended period may cause lines to exit a trade 

without attracting new entry. Established shipping lines are able to enter and exit trades more 

readily without incurring any great amount of sunk cost as opposed to the start up of a new 

shipping line in a trade where the capital investment can be substantial. The sources of data 

are Drewry Maritime Research and the Federal Maritime Commission.
167

TP–11 US/Asia Trade

Entries and Exits

Entry/Exit based on carriers listed as operators in the transpacific trade as identified by Drewry

US to 

Asia Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

Asia to 

US Entry into Trade Exit from Trade

1Q06 1Q06

2Q06 Matson 23,558 TEUs Great Western 

91,004 TEUs 2Q06 Matson 147,241 TEUs Great Western 

113,755 TEUs

3Q06 Emirates 10,401 TEUs 

With Zim 3Q06 Emirates 13,001 TEUs 

With Zim

4Q06 4Q06

1Q07 1Q07

2Q07 Swire Shipping 2,048 

TEUs

Gold Star 20,470 

TEUs w/CSAV Norasia

Indotrans 2,048 TEUs

2Q07 Swire Shipping 1,222 

TEUs Indotrans 611 TEUs

3Q07 3Q07

4Q07 4Q07

1Q08

Norasia and Sinotrans 

83,366 TEUs w/Wan 

Hai & CSAV 

1Q08

Norasia and Sinotrans 

83,366 TEUs w/Wan 

Hai & CSAV 

2Q08 2Q08 ANL and US Lines 

53,354 TEUs

3Q08 3Q08

4Q08 4Q08

1Q09 1Q09

2Q09 2Q09

3Q09 Wan Hai and PIL 

42,899 TEUs 3Q09 Wan Hai and PIL 

50,943 TEUs

4Q09 Swire Shipping 2,048 

TEUs 4Q09 Swire Shipping 2,432 

TEUs

1Q10 1Q10

2Q10

CLANSA and Maruba 

22,967 TEUs w/CMA 

CGM

2Q10

CLANSA and Maruba 

22,967 TEUs w/CMA 

CGM

3Q10 PIL 67,477 TEUs

TCC 121,066 TEUs 3Q10 PIL 80,679 TEUs

TCC 142,054 TEUs

4Q10

Norasia 32,322 TEUs 

w/CSAV

Hainan Pan Ocean 

127,395 TEUs

4Q10

Norasia 38,099 TEUs 

w/CSAV

Hainan Pan Ocean 

150,167 TEUs

Derived from Drewry Container Forecaster Quarterly Reports, and the Federal Maritime Commission
Chapter 5

168

Table TP-12 Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) and Ratio to Market Size to MES

The table estimates the minimum efficient scale (MES) of weekly liner service in the US/Asia 

trade for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010. The MES for each year is 

measured as the smallest level of service among comparable shipping lines that can sustain a 

competitive weekly service loop in the trade. For each year, the table identifies the shipping 

lines, frequency, type, number of vessels, the average TEU vessel capacity of each MES, and 

any changes in MES over time. It would be expected that where the ratio of the size of the 

market to MES is high, the trade would be more competitive and easier for new participants 

to enter. 

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table also gives the ratio 

of the size of the market to the minimum efficient scale (MES) of service in each direction 

of the US/Asia trade. The ratio is derived by dividing the annual capacity of the market by 

the annual capacity of the MES in each direction of the trade. The MES for each year is 

measured as the smallest level of service among comparable shipping lines that can sustain a 

competitive weekly service loop in the trade. The market size is measured as the sum of the 

annual capacity of all of the liner services offered in the trade. The table shows the change 

in the ratio in each trade direction over the review period. It would be expected that a high 

ratio of market size to MES indicates that competition among market participants is greater 

and barriers to market entry are lower. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

TP–12 US/Asia Trade

Trend in Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) Ratio of Market Size to MES

Asia to US US to Asia

2006 Hapag-Lloyd/APL weekly loop service using 6 vessels of 

4,293 TEU vessel capacity on average 83 83

2007 MSC weekly loop service using 6 vessels of 

5,492 TEU vessel capacity on average 65 63

2008 APL weekly loop service using 6 vessels of 

5,570 TEU vessel capacity on average 64 62

2009 APL weekly loop service using 6 vessels of 

5,762 TEU vessel capacity on average 56 54

2010 Evergreen weekly loop service using 6 vessels of 

6,447 TEU vessel capacity on average 57 56

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
169

Tables TP-13a-e Container Volume by US Port Range and Foreign Nation

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables give the total number 

and market share percentages of annual containers that moved between the US Atlantic, 

Gulf, and Pacific Coasts and each foreign nation included in the geographic scope of the liner 

shipping trade between the US and Asia. The regions of the Great Lakes, US Virgin Islands, 

and Puerto Rico are included in the US Atlantic Coast, and Alaska and Hawaii are included 

in the US Pacific Coast. The total number of containers for each year is combined to include 

imports and exports measured in TEUs. Each market share percentage of container cargo 

is derived as a function of the total number of import and export containers that moved in 

the trade for each year, e.g., 44.7 percent of the total number of containers in the trade for 

2006 moved between the nation of China and the US Pacific Coast. The tables show the 

geographic distribution and extent of demand in container cargo between the US and each 

Asian nation through each US coastal range. Over the review period, the tables show any 

change that occurred in the distribution and demand of container cargo in the trade. PIERS 

is the source of the container cargo data.
Chapter 5

170

TP–13a US/Asia Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and US Port Range

2006 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 141 12 599 752 

Cambodia 6,117 6 43,719 49,843 

China 2,546,685 180,397 8,093,758 10,820,840 

Hong Kong 277,149 14,330 819,985 1,111,464 

Indonesia 138,955 1,277 347,249 487,481 

Japan 246,584 1,989 1,457,519 1,706,092 

Laos 18 - 72 90 

Macau 1,415 4 5,395 6,813 

Malaysia 86,967 5,480 287,101 379,549 

Mongolia 161 - 764 925 

North Korea 3 - 127 131 

Philippines 56,727 616 195,481 252,824 

Singapore 47,794 1,808 139,512 189,114 

South Korea 220,975 22,927 848,180 1,092,081 

Taiwan 201,686 2,175 884,920 1,088,781 

Thailand 145,606 1,817 435,598 583,022 

Vietnam 89,036 1,625 264,638 355,300 

Total 2006 4,066,162 234,467 13,824,678 18,125,307 

2006 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%

China 14.1% 1.0% 44.7% 59.7%

Hong Kong 1.5% 0.1% 4.5% 6.1%

Indonesia 0.8% 0.0% 1.9% 2.7%

Japan 1.4% 0.0% 8.0% 9.4%

Laos 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 0.5% 0.0% 1.6% 2.1%

Mongolia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4%

Singapore 0.3% 0.0% 0.8% 1.0%

South Korea 1.2% 0.1% 4.7% 6.0%

Taiwan 1.1% 0.0% 4.9% 6.0%

Thailand 0.8% 0.0% 2.4% 3.2%

Vietnam 0.5% 0.0% 1.5% 2.0%

Total 2006 22.4% 1.3% 76.3% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
171

TP–13b US/Asia Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and US Port Range

2007 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 75 - 496 571 

Cambodia 8,497 8 48,873 57,377 

China 2,830,006 186,905 8,230,557 11,247,468 

Hong Kong 287,656 9,596 773,303 1,070,554 

Indonesia 157,595 3,040 366,677 527,312 

Japan 240,083 2,298 1,383,175 1,625,556 

Laos 8 - 147 155 

Macau 1,022 9 4,325 5,355 

Malaysia 93,928 4,138 272,572 370,639 

Mongolia 84 - 157 242 

North Korea 4 20 51 75 

Philippines 62,731 767 190,680 254,178 

Singapore 70,270 4,131 160,562 234,963 

South Korea 240,941 36,744 925,728 1,203,413 

Taiwan 227,967 5,363 1,052,326 1,285,656 

Thailand 158,327 2,491 394,434 555,251 

Vietnam 132,901 2,987 332,830 468,717 

Total 2007 4,512,217 258,497 14,136,959 18,907,673 

2007 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%

China 15.0% 1.0% 43.5% 59.5%

Hong Kong 1.5% 0.1% 4.1% 5.7%

Indonesia 0.8% 0.0% 1.9% 2.8%

Japan 1.3% 0.0% 7.3% 8.6%

Laos 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 0.5% 0.0% 1.4% 2.0%

Mongolia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.3%

Singapore 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 1.2%

South Korea 1.3% 0.2% 4.9% 6.4%

Taiwan 1.2% 0.0% 5.6% 6.8%

Thailand 0.8% 0.0% 2.1% 2.9%

Vietnam 0.7% 0.0% 1.8% 2.5%

Total 2007 23.9% 1.4% 74.8% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

172

TP–13c US/Asia Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and US Port Range

2008 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 156 - 461 617 

Cambodia 11,365 41 46,333 57,740 

China 2,812,477 189,599 7,559,048 10,561,124 

Hong Kong 250,693 7,246 721,917 979,856 

Indonesia 187,904 3,569 359,176 550,649 

Japan 255,536 7,422 1,321,326 1,584,285 

Laos 3 1 104 108 

Macau 943 2 3,086 4,031 

Malaysia 105,593 3,846 277,680 387,119 

Mongolia 73 - 411 484 

North Korea 120 - 308 428 

Philippines 67,295 1,169 172,833 241,297 

Singapore 66,645 5,369 151,811 223,825 

South Korea 244,898 45,453 994,137 1,284,488 

Taiwan 247,857 6,068 971,090 1,225,016 

Thailand 172,840 4,444 366,513 543,797 

Vietnam 171,629 5,393 379,297 556,319 

Total 2008 4,596,139 279,622 13,325,585 18,201,345 

2008 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%

China 15.5% 1.0% 41.5% 58.0%

Hong Kong 1.4% 0.0% 4.0% 5.4%

Indonesia 1.0% 0.0% 2.0% 3.0%

Japan 1.4% 0.0% 7.3% 8.7%

Laos 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 0.6% 0.0% 1.5% 2.1%

Mongolia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.4% 0.0% 0.9% 1.3%

Singapore 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 1.2%

South Korea 1.3% 0.2% 5.5% 7.1%

Taiwan 1.4% 0.0% 5.3% 6.7%

Thailand 0.9% 0.0% 2.0% 3.0%

Vietnam 0.9% 0.0% 2.1% 3.1%

Total 2008 25.3% 1.5% 73.2% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
173

TP–13d US/Asia Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and US Port Range

2009 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 183 33 594 811 

Cambodia 13,488 83 37,924 51,496 

China 2,743,667 205,706 6,739,664 9,689,037 

Hong Kong 230,320 8,951 630,606 869,876 

Indonesia 169,251 4,236 323,373 496,860 

Japan 190,455 3,801 1,057,030 1,251,286 

Laos 11 - 17 28 

Macau 416 - 1,025 1,442 

Malaysia 96,926 2,894 224,952 324,772 

Mongolia 97 - 282 379 

North Korea - - - - 

Philippines 55,428 1,365 156,239 213,033 

Singapore 56,553 13,119 128,434 198,106 

South Korea 236,011 34,021 871,920 1,141,953 

Taiwan 226,755 5,757 730,664 963,176 

Thailand 148,480 3,380 315,639 467,499 

Vietnam 170,911 10,973 414,879 596,763 

Total 2009 4,339,040 294,320 11,633,337 16,266,697 

2009 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3%

China 16.9% 1.3% 41.4% 59.6%

Hong Kong 1.4% 0.1% 3.9% 5.3%

Indonesia 1.0% 0.0% 2.0% 3.1%

Japan 1.2% 0.0% 6.5% 7.7%

Laos 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 0.6% 0.0% 1.4% 2.0%

Mongolia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.3%

Singapore 0.3% 0.1% 0.8% 1.2%

South Korea 1.5% 0.2% 5.4% 7.0%

Taiwan 1.4% 0.0% 4.5% 5.9%

Thailand 0.9% 0.0% 1.9% 2.9%

Vietnam 1.1% 0.1% 2.6% 3.7%

Total 2009 26.7% 1.8% 71.5% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

174

TP–13e US/Asia Trade

Container Volume and Market Share

by Asian Country and US Port Range

2010 Container Volume (TEUs)

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 90 16 425 531 

Cambodia 12,547 65 45,921 58,534 

China 2,956,627 161,585 7,643,265 10,761,477 

Hong Kong 278,518 7,454 723,905 1,009,877 

Indonesia 200,184 3,209 333,362 536,756 

Japan 216,955 3,372 1,199,011 1,419,338 

Laos - - 7 7 

Macau 202 - 733 934 

Malaysia 103,639 3,599 225,805 333,043 

Mongolia 76 - 778 855 

North Korea 6 - 14 20 

Philippines 61,813 1,663 176,524 239,999 

Singapore 66,681 20,136 144,806 231,623 

South Korea 271,211 31,062 1,021,594 1,323,866 

Taiwan 244,586 5,607 812,320 1,062,512 

Thailand 164,304 4,042 338,917 507,263 

Vietnam 198,011 8,211 452,904 659,126 

Total 2010 4,775,527 250,023 13,120,381 18,145,932 

2010 Container Volume Percentage of the Total Trade

Country Atlantic Gulf Pacific Total

Brunei 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Cambodia 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%

China 16.3% 0.9% 42.1% 59.3%

Hong Kong 1.5% 0.0% 4.0% 5.6%

Indonesia 1.1% 0.0% 1.8% 3.0%

Japan 1.2% 0.0% 6.6% 7.8%

Laos 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Macau 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Malaysia 0.6% 0.0% 1.2% 1.8%

Mongolia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

North Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Philippines 0.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.3%

Singapore 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 1.3%

South Korea 1.5% 0.2% 5.6% 7.3%

Taiwan 1.3% 0.0% 4.5% 5.9%

Thailand 0.9% 0.0% 1.9% 2.8%

Vietnam 1.1% 0.0% 2.5% 3.6%

Total 2010 26.3% 1.4% 72.3% 100.0%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
175

Tables TP-14a-e Top Moving Commodities by Year: Container 

Exports and Imports between the US and Asia

On an annual basis for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the tables 

list in ranking order the top 20 US export container commodities moved outbound to 

Asia, and the top 20 import container commodities moved inbound to the US from Asia. 

The top commodities are ranked from largest to smallest based on the number of annual 

containers moved in TEUs in each trade direction. The tables also give the percentage of 

the annual number of each top commodity as a function of the total number of containers 

moved in each corresponding direction of the trade. The tables show the types and extent of 

commodities that accounted for the majority of container cargo in each trade direction based 

on foreign and domestic consumer demand. Over the review period, the tables show any 

change in the mix, ranking, and number of the top container commodities that moved in 

the trade as affected by changes in consumer demand and other market factors. PIERS is the 

source of the container cargo data.

TP–14a US/Asia Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2006 US to Asia 2006 Asia to US

Rank Commodity 2006 TEUs PCT Commodity 2006 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 960,686 21% Furniture 1,890,173 14%

2 Mixed Metal Scrap 265,714 6% Toys 614,875 5%

3 Pet & Animal Feeds 263,956 6% General Cargo, Misc 503,912 4%

4 Fabrics, Incl. Raw Cotton 248,692 5% Footware 445,363 3%

5 Logs & Lumber 155,831 3% Auto Parts 401,407 3%

6 Wood Pulp 121,920 3% Plastic Prods, Misc 390,791 3%

7 Foam Waste & Scrap 120,966 3% Women’s & Infantware 358,676 3%

8 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 112,367 2% EDP, Number, Address Machinery 346,360 3%

9 Vegetables 97,323 2% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 321,361 2%

10 Soybeans & Prods 92,097 2% Hard Ware, Misc 294,136 2%

11 Grains & Flour Prods 84,423 2% Lamps & Parts 293,794 2%

12 General Cargo, Misc 72,433 2% Elec & Electronic Prods, Misc 220,203 2%

13 Synth Resins & Plastics 65,296 1% TV Equip 209,695 2%

14 Plastic Prods, Misc 64,358 1% Sheets, Towels, Blankets 209,619 2%

15 Grocery Prods, Misc. 61,501 1% Apparels, Misc. 202,195 1%

16 Meat, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 58,610 1% Sporting Goods, Misc 189,493 1%

17 Poultry, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 57,638 1% Woodenware, Misc. 182,468 1%

18 Newspapers 56,031 1% Cooking, Ironing, Heat Appliances 182,429 1%

19 Vegetable Fibres 51,653 1% Kitchenware 178,383 1%

20 Auto Parts 50,963 1% Menswear 175,250 1%

All Other 1,528,704 33% All Other 5,923,432 44%

Total 2006 4,591,161 100% Total 2006 13,534,015 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

176

TP–14b US/Asia Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2007 US to Asia 2007 Asia to US

Rank Commodity 2007 TEUs PCT Commodity 2007 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 1,027,223 20% Furniture 1,836,371 13%

2 Mixed Metal Scrap 326,419 6% Toys 615,579 5%

3 Pet & Animal Feeds 284,050 5% General Cargo, Misc 588,104 4%

4 Soybeans & Prods 218,102 4% Footware 446,050 3%

5 Grains & Flour Prods 210,466 4% Auto Parts 413,942 3%

6 Fabrics, Incl. Raw Cotton 207,177 4% Plastic Prods, Misc 381,209 3%

7 Logs & Lumber 204,295 4% Women’s & Infantware 378,738 3%

8 Foam Waste & Scrap 146,328 3% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 345,041 3%

9 Wood Pulp 142,683 3% EDP, Number, Address Machinery 332,729 2%

10 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 125,964 2% Hard Ware, Misc 325,724 2%

11 Metal Scrap, Ferrous, Pig Iron 120,627 2% Lamps & Parts 280,108 2%

12 General Cargo, Misc 106,599 2% Elec & Electronic Prods,Misc 226,281 2%

13 Vegetables 92,114 2% Sheets, Towels,Blankets 220,263 2%

14 Meat, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 78,235 1% Apparels, Misc. 220,182 2%

15 Grocery Prods, Misc. 71,570 1% Sporting Goods, Misc 202,911 1%

16 Plastic Prods, Misc 69,660 1% Paper & Paperboard,Incl Waste 194,756 1%

17 Poultry, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 60,689 1% Metalware, Misc 190,648 1%

18 Synth Resins & Plastics 57,154 1% Cooking, Ironing, Heat Appliances 178,970 1%

19 Hides, Skins, Furs 51,237 1% Menswear 176,932 1%

20 Automobiles 51,082 1% TV Equip 172,235 1%

All Other 1,581,574 30% All Other 5,947,575 43%

Total 2007 5,233,247 100% Total 2007 13,674,347 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
177

TP–14c US/Asia Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2008 US to Asia 2008 Asia to US

Rank Commodity 2008 TEUs PCT Commodity 2008 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 1,093,398 19% Furniture 1,727,786 14%

2 Mixed Metal Scrap 367,249 6% Toys 561,771 4%

3 Pet & Animal Feeds 277,491 5% General Cargo, Misc 446,995 4%

4 Grains & Flour Prods 239,235 4% Footware 419,663 3%

5 Metal Scrap, Ferrous, Pig Iron 232,515 4% Auto Parts 362,776 3%

6 Soybeans & Prods 220,638 4% Women’s & Infantware 357,052 3%

7 Logs & Lumber 202,278 4% Plastic Prods, Misc 352,314 3%

8 Fabrics, Incl. Raw Cotton 201,153 4% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 317,651 3%

9 Foam Waste & Scrap 162,926 3% EDP, Number, Address Machinery 310,889 2%

10 Wood Pulp 144,611 3% Hard Ware, Misc 262,915 2%

11 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 131,686 2% Elec & Electronic Prods, Misc 241,459 2%

12 Meat, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 119,672 2% Lamps & Parts 240,737 2%

13 General Cargo, Misc 107,520 2% Sheets, Towels, Blankets 204,491 2%

14 Vegetables 105,709 2% Apparels, Misc. 191,804 2%

15 Poultry, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 75,521 1% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 180,177 1%

16 Grocery Prods, Misc. 72,855 1% Sporting Goods, Misc 176,329 1%

17 Automobiles 63,744 1% Cooking, Ironing, Heat Appliances 167,196 1%

18 Plastic Prods, Misc 60,395 1% Metalware, Misc 164,830 1%

19 Unclassifiable Chemicals 55,526 1% Menswear 155,162 1%

20 Synth Resins & Plastics 52,867 1% Kitchenware 150,196 1%

All Other 1,666,175 29% All Other 5,555,556 44%

Total 2008 5,653,165 100% Total 2008 12,547,750 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

178

TP–14d US/Asia Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2009 US to Asia 2009 Asia to US

Rank Commodity 2009 TEUs PCT Commodity 2009 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 1,218,818 22% Furniture 1,476,290 14%

2 Mixed Metal Scrap 350,904 6% Toys 482,166 4%

3 Pet & Animal Feeds 273,506 5% Footware 390,286 4%

4 Grains & Flour Prods 248,659 4% Women’s & Infantware 351,727 3%

5 Metal Scrap, Ferrous, Pig Iron 200,874 4% General Cargo, Misc 341,171 3%

6 Logs & Lumber 199,689 4% Plastic Prods, Misc 308,051 3%

7 Wood Pulp 187,321 3% Auto Parts 298,987 3%

8 Soybeans & Prods 173,698 3% EDP, Number, Address Machinery 274,351 3%

9 Foam Waste & Scrap 172,807 3% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 270,733 3%

10 Synthetic Resins, NSPF 152,153 3% Hard Ware, Misc 209,402 2%

11 Fabrics, Incl. Raw Cotton 150,420 3% Sheets, Towels, Blankets 201,646 2%

12 Meat, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 106,234 2% Elec & Electronic Prods, Misc 200,033 2%

13 Vegetables 95,410 2% Lamps & Parts 194,701 2%

14 General Cargo, Misc 92,817 2% Apparels, Misc. 178,146 2%

15 Plastic Prods, Misc 82,999 1% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 162,460 2%

16 Poultry, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 73,478 1% Cooking, Ironing, Heat Appliances 151,899 1%

17 Grocery Prods, Misc. 71,097 1% Sporting Goods, Misc 147,445 1%

18 Synth Resins & Plastics 59,627 1% Menswear 147,104 1%

19 Hides, Skins, Furs 51,273 1% TV Equip 138,330 1%

20 Automobiles 48,508 1% Kitchenware 130,579 1%

All Other 1,526,131 28% All Other 4,675,343 44%

Total 2009 5,536,424 100% Total 2009 10,730,848 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
179

TP–14e US/Asia Trade

Top Moving Container Export and Import Commodities by Year

2010 US to Asia 2010 Asia to US

Rank Commodity 2010 TEUs PCT Commodity 2010 TEUs PCT

1 Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 1,105,002 19% Furniture 1,653,980 13%

2 Mixed Metal Scrap 297,845 5% Toys 573,742 5%

3 Pet & Animal Feeds 295,204 5% Footware 443,575 4%

4 Grains & Flour Prods 273,312 5% Auto Parts 408,770 3%

5 Logs & Lumber 208,030 4% Women’s & Infantware 358,590 3%

6 Fabrics, Incl. Raw Cotton 190,467 3% Plastic Prods, Misc 350,165 3%

7 Foam Waste & Scrap 179,442 3% Auto & Truck Tire & Tubes 330,684 3%

8 Soybeans & Prods 166,623 3% EDP, Number, Address Machinery 315,569 3%

9 Wood Pulp 165,716 3% General Cargo, Misc 274,451 2%

10 Metal Scrap, Ferrous, Pig Iron 158,280 3% Hard Ware, Misc 244,866 2%

11 Synthetic Resins, Nspf 127,645 2% Sheets, Towels,Blankets 242,016 2%

12 Meat, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 118,799 2% Elec & Electronic Prods, Misc 234,413 2%

13 General Cargo, Misc 117,995 2% Lamps & Parts 227,004 2%

14 Vegetables 96,125 2% Apparels, Misc. 211,391 2%

15 Grocery Prods, Misc. 92,153 2% Paper & Paperboard, Incl Waste 175,961 1%

16 Soluble Coffee 84,811 1% Cooking, Ironing, Heat Appliances 173,768 1%

17 Alumin Rods, Forgings, Scrap 77,251 1% Sporting Goods, Misc 172,396 1%

18 Poultry, Chiefly Fresh & Frozen 72,777 1% Kitchenware 167,227 1%

19 Plastic Prods, Misc 71,594 1% Menswear 166,845 1%

20 Synth Resins & Plastics 61,862 1% TV Equip 151,532 1%

All Other 1,834,840 32% All Other 5,474,196 44%

Total 2010 5,795,774 100% Total 2010 12,351,140 100%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
Chapter 5

180

Table TP-15 Annual Value of Liner Cargo and Average Value per Kilogram (Kg)

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the total 

value of US container exports moved outbound to Asia, and the total value of container 

imports moved inbound to the US from Asia. The value of container cargo is expressed 

in US dollars. The table also gives the percent of annual increase or decline in the value of 

container exports and imports from one year to the next over the review period. The table 

shows the direction of the trade with the highest value of container cargo and any imbalance 

and change over time in the directional value and growth of container exports and imports. 

USA Trade Online, US Census Bureau, is the commercial source of the data.

For each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table also gives the value 

per kilogram (Kg) of US container exports that moved outbound to Asia, and the value 

per Kg of container imports that moved from Asia to the US. The figures for each year are 

derived from the total US dollar value of container exports and imports divided by their total 

weight in kilograms. The table also gives the percentage of annual increase or decline in the 

value per Kg of container exports and imports from one year to the next over the review 

period. On a per Kg basis, the table shows the direction of the trade with the highest value 

of container cargo and any change over time. USA Trade Online, US Census Bureau, is the 

source of the data.

TP–15 Container Cargo Value by Year

Trade Between the US and Asia

Annual Value of Liner Cargo Average Value of Liner Cargo per Kg

Year US to Asia

Percent 

Change Asia to US

Percent 

Change

US to 

Asia

Percent 

Change

Asia to 

US

Percent 

Change

2006 $62,464,793,542 16% $331,861,460,959 11% $1.49 2% $4.26 -3%

2007 $71,958,731,989 15% $361,029,701,435 9% $1.49 0% $4.55 7%

2008 $83,536,041,844 16% $380,220,602,556 5% $1.54 3% $5.08 12%

2009 $70,674,197,596 -15% $312,648,581,102 -18% $1.40 -9% $5.19 2%

2010 $86,323,832,060 22% $376,890,329,191 21% $1.56 12% $5.29 2%

Source: USA Trade Online
181

Transpacific Carrier Conduct

Table TP-16 Active Agreements in the Trade and their Authorities

The table shows each agreement between shipping lines in the US/Asia trade that was in 

effect and on file with the Federal Maritime Commission in each calendar quarter of the 

review period from 2006 through 2010. For each agreement, the table gives the FMC 

number, name, membership, authority, and period of time when the agreement was in 

effect. The table shows any change in agreement activity among shipping lines in the trade 

over the review period. The source of data is the Federal Maritime Commission.
Chapter 5

182

TP–16 Carrier Agreements In The Transpacific Trade For 2006 Through 2010

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Conference Agreement

008493

Trans-Pacific 

American Flag 

Berth Operators 

Agreement

APL, Maersk

Vessel sharing and service 

rationalization authority; 

covers US government 

cargo only

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Rate Discussion Agreements

010050 US-Flag Discussion 

Agreement APL, Maersk, HL

Rate authority (Nonbinding), discussion 

of non-rate matters of 

interest, voluntary service 

contract guidelines

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011223

Transpacific 

Stabilization 

Agreement

NYK, Hanjin, Yang 

Ming, HYMM, APL, 

OOCL, K-Line, 

HL, CMA CGM, 

COSCO, Evergreen 

Line, MSC, China 

Shipping, Zim, 

Maersk Line

Rate authority (Nonbinding), voluntary service 

contract guidelines, ad 

hoc vessel sharing, joint 

service contracts, and 

discuss environmental 

issues

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011325

Westbound 

Transpacific 

Stabilization 

Agreement

Hanjin, APL, K-Line, 

HYMM, NYK, Yang 

Ming, OOCL, HL, 

COSCO, Evergreen 

Line 

Rate authority (Nonbinding), voluntary service 

contract guidelines, 

joint service contracts, 

discussion of capacity 

rationalization plans

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Non-Rate Discussion Agreement

011427

Japanese-United 

States Flag 

Carrier Discussion 

Agreement

NYK, MOL, APL, 

K-Line

Discussion of non-rate 

matters of interest • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Joint Service Agreement 

011982

Evergreen Line 

Joint Service 

Agreement

Evergreen, Italia, 

Hatsu Joint service • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
183

TP–16 Carrier Agreements In The Transpacific Trade For 2006 Through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Alliance Agreements

011602 The Grand Alliance II NYK, OOCL, HL

Vessel sharing, 

service and capacity 

rationalization, equipment 

interchange, joint service 

contracts 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011960 The New World 

Alliance Agreement APL, HYMM, MOL

Vessel sharing, 

service and capacity 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Vessel Sharing/Sailing Agreements

011324

Transpacific 

Space Utilization 

Agreement

APL, Yang Ming, 

HYMM, Westwood, 

Hanjin, NYK, 

K-Line, OOCL, HL, 

Evergreen

Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011435 APL/HLAG Space 

Charter Agreement APL, HL

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization, equipment 

interchange • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011646 CSAV/NYK Space 

Charter Agreement CSAV/NYK Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011689 ZiM/CSCL Space 

Charter Agreement

China Shipping, 

Zim Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011794

COSCO/KL/YMUK/

HANJIN/Senator 

Worldwide Slot 

Allocation & Sailing 

Agreement

K-Line, Yang Ming, 

Hanjin, COSCO

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization, equipment 

interchange • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011885

CMA CGM/MSC

Reciprocal Space 

Charter, Sailing 

And Cooperative 

Working Agreement

CMA CGM, MSC

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization, operating 

expense sharing, 

equipment interchange

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011886 HMM/MOL Space 

Charter Agreement HYMM, MOL Vessel sharing, equipment 

interchange • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Chapter 5

184

TP–16 Carrier Agreements In The Transpacific Trade For 2006 Through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

011922

TNWA/GA

Cooperative 

Working Agreement

APL, HYMM, MOL, 

NYK, OOCL, HL

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011940

CMA CGM/Maruba 

Cross Space 

Charter, Sailing 

And Cooperative 

Working Agreement

CMA CGM, Maruba, 

China Shipping

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization, equipment 

interchange • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011948

CMA CGM/CSCL

Cross Space 

Charter, Sailing 

And CWA-Central 

China/US West 

Coast, Yang Tse/

AAC2 Service

China Shipping, 

CMA CGM

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization, equipment 

interchange • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011957 FOML/ZIM Space 

Charter Agreement

FESCO Ocean 

Management, Ltd., 

Zim

Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011964

Maersk Line/MOL

Space Charter 

Agreement

Maersk Line, MOL Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011977 Coscon/WHL Space 

Charter Agreement

COSCO, Wan Hai 

Lines Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

011987

WHL/PIL Slot 

Exchange And 

Sailing Agreement

Wan Hai Lines, 

Pacific International 

Lines

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

012004

HMM/ELJSA

Slot Exchange 

Agreement

HYMM, Evergreen 

Joint Service 

Agreement

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

012006

HMM/ELJSA Suez 

Slot Exchange 

Agreement

HYMM, Evergreen 

Joint Service 

Agreement

Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
185

TP–16 Carrier Agreements In The Transpacific Trade For 2006 Through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

012032

CMA CGM/MSC/

Maersk Line No. 

& Central ChinaUS Pacific Coast 

Two Loop Space 

Charter, Sailing 

And Cooperative 

Working Agreement

Maersk Line, CMA 

CGM, MSC Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • • •

012036

Maersk Line/MSC

TP5 Space Charter 

Agreement

Maersk Line, MSC Vessel sharing • • • • • • • • • • •

012042

MOL/ELJSA

Slot Exchange 

Agreement

MOL, Evergreen 

Joint Service 

Agreement

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • •

012043

MOL/APL/HMM

Japan/USWC Slot 

Charter Agreement

APL, MOL, HYMM Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • • • • • •

012055

Maersk Line/CMA 

CGM Cooperative 

Working Agreement

CMA CGM, Maersk 

Line

Information Exchange 

related to obtaining joint 

contracts for MTO services • • • • • • • • •

012057

CMA CGM/Maersk 

Line Space Charter, 

Sailing & Coop 

Working Agreement

CMA CGM, Maersk 

Line Vessel sharing • • • • • • • •

012063

Grand Alliance/Zim 

Transpacific Vessel 

Sharing Agreement

HL, NYK, OOCL, 

Zim

Vessel sharing, 

service and capacity 

rationalization • • • • • • •

012069

CSCL/ELJSA

Slot Exchange 

Agreement

China Shipping, 

Evergreen Vessel sharing • • • • • • •

012070

CSCL/ELJSA

Vessel Sharing 

Agreement-Asia & 

Mexico, US East 

Coast Service

China Shipping, 

Evergreen, UASC

Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • • • • •
Chapter 5

186

TP–16 Carrier Agreements In The Transpacific Trade For 2006 Through 2010 (continued)

• The period of time the agreement was in effect and on file with the FMC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number Name Members Authority Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

012081

MSC/CMA CGM

Cross Slot Charter 

Agreement On 

Bohai Service/

The Northern Loop 

of China To USWC 

Agreement and 

Sunrise Service

MSC, CMA CGM Vessel sharing • • • • • •

012088

HANJIN/

WHL/Coscon 

Transpacific 

Vessel Sharing 

and Slot Allocation 

Agreement

Hanjin, Wan Hai, 

Coscon, Evergreen 

Line Joint Service, 

HYMM, Turkon 

Container

Vessel sharing • • • • •

012092

MOL/”K” Line 

Space Charter And 

Sailing Agreement

MOL, K-Line Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • • • •

012101

NYK/”K” Line/MOL

Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

NYK, MOL, K-Line Vessel sharing, service 

rationalization • •

012113 CSCL/CSAV Slot 

Swap Agreement

China Shipping, 

CSAV Vessel sharing •

012114

Hainan P O 

Shipping Co., Ltd 

And T.S. Lines Ltd. 

Vessel Sharing 

Agreement

Hainan P O 

Shipping Co., Ltd, 

T.S. Lines Ltd.

Vessel sharing, agreement 

service contracts •

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, BTA Agreements Library
187

Tables TP-17a-e Liner Service in the Transpacific Trade

The tables list the liner services offered by shipping lines operating in the US/Asia trade 

for each year of the review period from 2006 through 2010. For each liner service in each 

year, the tables identify the service name, type, shipping lines, frequency, the number of 

service vessels, the average TEU vessel capacity, the annual TEU operational capacity, and 

the percentage of the market capacity provided by the service. The percent of the market 

for each service is derived as a function of the total annual amount of operational capacity 

deployed in the market. The tables show the annual level of liner services and capacity 

offered by the shipping lines serving the trade and any changes that occurred over the 

review period. The sources of data are Drewry Maritime Research and the Federal Maritime 

Commission.

TP–17a Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2006

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP6 PDM Maersk Line 7 11 8,073 420,935 2.0%

TP2 PDM Maersk Line 7 9 2,806 146,330 0.7%

TP1 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 2,123 110,720 0.5%

TP5 ETE Maersk Line 7 4 4,882 254,548 1.2%

TP8 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,804 1.0%

TP9 & TP10 BUT Maersk Line 7 9 6,576 342,903 1.6%

TP14 ETE Maersk Line 7 4 3,220 167,900 0.8%

Far East/Central 

America/Mexico Maersk Line 7 7 3,855 201,033 1.0%

TP3 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 4,685 244,315 1.2%

TP7 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 4,341 226,333 1.1%

TP12 ETE Maersk Line 7 7 4,582 238,941 1.1%

Asia/Caribbean Maersk Line 7 8 4,306 224,521 1.1%

MECL2/SZX2 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 4,893 255,128 1.2%

SSX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 8,063 420,428 2.0%

SCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 6,457 336,686 1.6%

PNX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 5,613 292,695 1.4%

JCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 2,992 155,991 0.7%

NWX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 5,437 283,490 1.4%

CCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 4 4,236 220,864 1.1%

NCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 3,177 165,679 0.8%

AEX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 5,401 281,612 1.3%

PAX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 13 4,712 425,701 2.0%

ECN ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 4,473 233,222 1.1%

ECS/EC3

Grand Alliance/New 

World Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL, APL, 

HMM, MOL

7 ***(3) 3,893 76,129 0.4%
Chapter 5

188

TP–17a Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2006 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs)

Percent 

of Market

PS1 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 4,963 258,768 1.2%

PS2 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,108 266,346 1.3%

PS3 (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 4 5,072 264,469 1.3%

PSX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,281 275,346 1.3%

PSW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,095 265,668 1.3%

SAX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,762 300,447 1.4%

PCE (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 3,596 187,516 0.9%

PNW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,479 337,834 1.6%

PCX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 4 4,062 211,817 1.0%

APX/CNY 

(MOL/APL) PDM New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 12 4,432 231,101 1.1%

NYX (APL/

HMM/MOL)

New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 4,771 248,800 1.2%

PSW1 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,583 291,103 1.4%

PSW2 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,561 289,966 1.4%

PSW3 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,602 187,839 0.9%

PS4 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,407 177,672 0.9%

PNW (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,285 275,565 1.3%

PN3 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 1,682 87,694 0.4%

SEA (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 7,500 391,071 1.9%

CLX (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 ***(2) 2,264 59,026 0.3%

CEN (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,446 283,970 1.4%

PNN (C/HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 5,468 285,117 1.4%

PNS (C/HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 5,638 293,981 1.4%

PDS (HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 12 4,914 256,221 1.2%

PSX (HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 7,500 391,071 1.9%

CAX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 4,389 228,855 1.1%

AWE1/AWH 

(HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,154 216,614 1.0%

AWE2/AWC (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 3,690 192,381 0.9%

AWE3/AWY 

(YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 3,822 199,303 1.0%
189

TP–17a Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2006 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs)

Percent 

of Market

AWE4/AWK (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,548 237,172 1.1%

AWE5(HJ/K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 ***(6) 3,745 146,456 0.7%

WAE (EG/

Hatsu/IT) PDM Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 12 5,445 283,900 1.4%

NUE (EG) PDM Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 12 4,214 219,730 1.1%

TPS (Hatsu) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 5 6,470 337,385 1.6%

HTW (EG/

Hatsu/IT) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 5 6,692 348,940 1.7%

AUE (EG) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 8 4,229 220,512 1.1%

CPS (EG/IT) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 4 5,364 279,694 1.3%

CPN (IT/EG) ETE Evergreen, Italia 

Marittima, Hatsu Marine 7 5 2,868 149,546 0.7%

CUE ETE Evergreen, Cosco 7 7 2,851 148,672 0.7%

AAS ETE CSCL 7 5 7,724 402,751 1.9%

AMA PDM CSCL 7 10 4,658 242,876 1.2%

AMAX RTW CSCL 7 10 4,210 219,532 1.1%

AAC2/Yang Tse 

service ETE CSCL, CMA CGM 7 4 4,178 217,866 1.0%

ANW1/Seattle 

Bridge ETE CSCL, CMA CGM 7 5 4,787 249,629 1.2%

New Orient 

Express ETE MSC 7 5 6,713 350,025 1.7%

Transpacific 

Pendulum PDM MSC 7 9 4,921 256,572 1.2%

CSAV Norasia/

Gold Star RTW CSAV Norasia, Gold Star 7 13 3,159 164,699 0.8%

PEX1/AECAX/

AAE1 ETE CMA CGM, ANLCL, CSCL 7 9 4,108 214,191 1.0%

PEX2/AAE2 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 ***(6) 3,345 130,820 0.6%

PEX3 ETE CMA CGM 7 9 3,114 162,396 0.8%

MTP ETE Wan Hai, CSAV Norasia, 

Sinotrans 7 4 2,872 149,754 0.7%

PRX ETE CMA CGM, MSC 7 5 8,197 427,425 2.0%

ZCS PDM Zim 7 14 4,896 255,299 1.2%

AMP PDM Zim, CSAV Norasia, 

CSCL 7 13 3,541 184,646 0.9%

AUX ETE Zim, Italia Marittima 7 9 3,006 156,753 0.8%

AGX ETE Zim, Emirates 7 ***(8) 2,633 122,032 0.6%

Asia-Americas 

1/MAX ETE Hapag-Lloyd, APL 7 6 4,293 223,858 1.1%

CTP1 ETE Wan Hai 7 5 4,013 209,249 1.0%

Triangle US Lines 7 ***(5) 1,119 36,461 0.2%

China-Long 

Beach Express Matson 7 5 2,824 147,241 0.7%

Westwood ETE Westwood 7 8 §§ §§ 

ANDEX CSAV 7 ***(9) 2,521 118,323 0.6%

ALEX NYK 7 10 2,002 104,369 0.5%
Chapter 5

190

TP–17a Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2006 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs)

Percent 

of Market

ASPA2/North 

Asia Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 9 2,177 113,498 0.5%

ASPA1/China 

Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 9 2,617 136,464 0.7%

Andes Express MSC 7 10 2,673 139,378 0.7%

LACAS Maersk Line 7 9 3,042 158,595 0.8%

Andes/CWL K Line, MOL 7 9 2,423 126,331 0.6%

ACSA CLANSA, Maruba, CMA 

CGM, CSCL 7 11 1,986 103,551 0.5%

New Margarita 

Express NYK 7 9 1,481 77,200 0.4%

Indotrans Indotrans 800 12,800 0.1%

Total 20,880,060 100%

***() Services temporarily under strength, for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

  Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.

§§ Estimated slot allocation on these conbulkers is 1,500 TEU eastbound and 1,000 TEU westbound.

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
191

TP–17b Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2007

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP6 PDM Maersk Line 7 12 8,067 420,619 2.0%

TP1 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 2,824 147,251 0.7%

TP5 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,804 1.0%

TP8 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,300 224,214 1.1%

TP9/FM1 PDM Maersk Line 7 10 6,576 342,912 1.6%

TP3 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 4,591 239,368 1.1%

TP7/TA3 PDM Maersk Line 7 12 4,905 255,761 1.2%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC1 Maersk Line 7 ** *(7) 4,803 219,117 1.0%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC2 Maersk Line 7 6 7,200 375,429 1.8%

SSX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 8,063 420,428 2.0%

SCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 6,407 334,062 1.6%

PNX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 5,691 297,058 1.4%

JCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 3,007 156,783 0.7%

NWX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 5,604 292,209 1.4%

CCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 4 5,035 262,552 1.3%

NCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 ***(4) 3,959 206,421 1.0%

AEX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 5,686 296,507 1.4%

PAX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 19 4,753 247,823 1.2%

NCE ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 4,147 216,230 1.0%

SCE ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 4,686 244,354 1.2%

PS1 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 5,262 274,393 1.3%

PS2 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,108 266,346 1.3%

PS3 (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 4 4,531 236,246 1.1%

PSX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,668 295,567 1.4%

PSW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,711 297,788 1.4%

SAX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,762 300,447 1.4%

PCE (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 4,249 221,545 1.1%

PNW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,479 337,834 1.6%

PCX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 4 4,651 242,516 1.2%

APX/CNY 

(MOL/APL) PDM New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 12 4,578 238,693 1.1%

NYX (APL/

HMM/MOL)

New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 4,771 248,800 1.2%
Chapter 5

192

TP–17b Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2007 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

SZX (APL/

HMM/MOL)

New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 ***(7) 4,501 205,339 1.0%

PSW1 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,576 290,749 1.4%

PSW2 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,651 289,966 1.4%

PSW3 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,667 191,218 0.9%

PS4 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7  (6) 3,537 184,419 0.9%

PS5 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 1,803 94,014 0.4%

PNW (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,612 292,605 1.4%

PN3 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,979 207,476 1.0%

SEA (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,520 287,829 1.4%

CEN (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,446 283,970 1.4%

CLX (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 2,773 144,605 0.7%

PNN (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 5,484 285,951 1.4%

PNS (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 5,484 285,951 1.4%

MAP (HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 12 4,388 228,785 1.1%

PSX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 7,500 391,071 1.9%

CAX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 5,454 284,361 1.4%

AWE1/AWH 

(HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,300 225,785 1.1%

AWE2/AWC (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 3,783 197,263 0.9%

AWE3/AWY 

(YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,141 215,911 1.0%

AWE4/AWK (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,800 250,286 1.2%

AWE5(HJ/K/

YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,058 211,576 1.0%

SINA (K/UASC/

YM/HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 3,728 194,382 0.9%

UAM PDM Evergreen 7 12 5,445 283,900 1.4%

NUE PDM Evergreen 7 12 4,214 219,730 1.0%

TPS ETE Evergreen 7 5 5,364 279,694 1.3%

HTW ETE Evergreen 7 5 6,138 320,074 1.5%

AUE ETE Evergreen 7 8 4,229 220,512 1.1%

CPS ETE Evergreen 7 4 4,603 240,014 1.1%

CPN ETE Evergreen 7 ** *(4) 2,868 119,637 0.6%

CUE ETE Evergreen, Cosco 7 8 3,239 168,917 0.8%

AAS/AMA PDM CSCL 7 9 5,655 294,850 1.4%

AAC ETE CSCL 7 5 6,244 325,601 1.6%
193

TP–17b Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2007 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

AAC2/Yang Tse 

service ETE CSCL, CMA CGM 7 4 4,538 236,611 1.1%

ANW1/Seattle 

Bridge ETE CSCL, CMA CGM 7 5 4,153 216,560 1.0%

New Orient 

Express ETE MSC 7 (6) 5,492 286,395 1.4%

Transpacific 

Pendulum PDM MSC 7 9 4,937 257,412 1.2%

PEX1/USE1/

AAE1 ETE CMA CGM, ANL, CSCL 7 8 4,041 210,703 1.0%

PEX2/AAE2 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 ***(7) 3,273 149,337 0.7%

PEX3 ETE CMA CGM 7 8 4,886 253,714 1.2%

ESX/SAX ETE

New World Alliance/CMA 

CGM: APL, HMM, MOL, 

CMA CGM

7 8 4,591 239,368 1.1%

MTP ETE Wan Hai, CSAV Norasia, 

Sinotrans 7 ***(3) 2,665 104,208 0.5%

PRX ETE CMA CGM, MSC 7 5 8,197 427,425 2.0%

ZCS PDM Zim 7 14 4,892 255,105 1.2%

AMP PDM Zim, CSCL 7 13 3,557 185,476 0.9%

AUX ETE Zim, Evergreen 7 8 4,489 234,050 1.1%

AGX ETE Zim, Emirates 7 ***(9) 2,921 137,057 0.7%

AME/MAX ETE Hapag-Lloyd, APL 7 6 4,292 223,815 1.1%

CTP ETE Wan Hai 7 5 3,580 186,651 0.9%

Triangle US Lines, ANL 7 8 1,191 62,076 0.3%

China-Long 

Beach Express Matson 7 5 2,758 143,800 0.7%

Westwood ETE Westwood 7 8 §§ §§ §§ 

PACAR CSAV 14 5 1,730 45,104 0.2%

ANDEX CSAV 7 ***(9) 2,849 133,699 0.6%

ALEX NYK 7 10 2,278 118,771 0.6%

ASPA2/North 

Asia Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 ***(8) 2,444 113,295 0.5%

ASPA1/China 

Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 9 2,696 140,583 0.7%

Andes Express MSC 7 11 2,999 156,391 0.7%

Andes/CWL K Line, MOL 7 10 2,443 127,401 0.6%

ACSA CLANSA, Maruba, CMA 

CGM, CSCL 7 11 2,208 115,122 0.5%

New Margarita 

Express NYK 7 9 1,625 84,750 0.4%

Swire Shipping Swire Shipping 800 12,800 0.1%

Total 20,945,197 100.0%

***() Services temporarily under strength, for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

  Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.

§§ Estimated slot allocation on these conbulkers is 1,500 TEU eastbound and 1,000 TEU westbound.

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

194

TP–17c Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2008

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP6 PDM Maersk Line 7 13 8,127 423,761 2.0%

TP1 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 2,824 147,251 0.7%

TP5 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,062 211,804 1.0%

TP9/FM1 PDM Maersk Line 7 10 7,080 369,177 1.8%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC1 Maersk Line 7 (6) 4,904 255,691 1.2%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC2 Maersk Line 7 6 7,200 375,429 1.8%

TP7/TA3 PDM Maersk Line 7 12 4,934 257,251 1.2%

TP3 ETE Maersk Line 7 8 4,723 246,251 1.2%

SSX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 8,063 420,428 2.0%

SCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 6,407 334,062 1.6%

PNX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 5,755 300,100 1.4%

JCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 3,008 156,867 0.8%

NWX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 5,604 292,209 1.4%

CCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 8,253 430,325 2.1%

AEX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 5,631 293,622 1.4%

PAX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 13 4,734 246,836 1.2%

NCE ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 4,694 244,747 1.2%

SCE ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 4,874 254,144 1.2%

PS1 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 4,792 249,860 1.2%

PS2 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 5,762 300,447 1.4%

PS3 (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 3,212 167,504 0.8%

PSX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,350 331,107 1.6%

PSW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,711 297,788 1.4%

SAX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 6,570 290,418 1.4%

PCE (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,108 266,346 1.3%

PNW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,479 337,834 1.6%

PCX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 4,962 258,712 1.2%

APX/CNY 

(MOL/APL) PDM New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 12 4,657 242,851 1.2%

NYX (APL/

HMM/MOL)

New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 4,870 253,955 1.2%

SZX (APL/

HMM/MOL)

New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 5,073 264,521 1.3%
195

TP–17c Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2008 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

PSW1 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,576 290,749 1.4%

PSW2 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,725 194,232 0.9%

PSW3 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,508 182,917 0.9%

PS4 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,561 289,966 1.4%

PNW/AES2 (K) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 13 5,613 292,666 1.4%

PN3 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,597 187,568 0.9%

SEA (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,446 283,970 1.4%

CEN (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 6,678 348,231 1.7%

New CUE (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 7 2,743 143,013 0.7%

PNN (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 5,540 288,871 1.4%

PNS (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 5,540 288,871 1.4%

MAP (HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 12 5,242 273,346 1.3%

PSX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 7,500 391,071 1.9%

CAX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 4,389 228,855 1.1%

AWE1/AWH 

(HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,055 211,459 1.0%

AWE2/AWC (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 ** *(8) 4,172 193,363 0.9%

AWE3/AWY 

(YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,386 228,686 1.1%

AWE4/AWK (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,800 250,486 1.2%

AWE5(HJ/K/

YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 ***(7) 4,083 186,287 0.9%

SINA (K/UASC/

YM/HJ) PDM CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 ***(8) 3,841 178,010 0.9%

UAM PDM Evergreen 7 12 5,364 279,694 1.3%

NUE PDM Evergreen 7 12 4,218 219,965 1.1%

AUS BUT Evergreen 7 9 6,271 326,970 1.6%

HTW ETE Evergreen 7 5 5,309 276,837 1.3%

AUE ETE Evergreen 7 8 4,222 220,160 1.1%

CPN ETE Evergreen 7 5 2,890 150,672 0.7%

FPS ETE Evergreen 7 8 3,014 157,146 0.8%

AAS ETE CSCL 7 5 7,360 383,792 1.8%

AAC ETE CSCL 7 ***(4) 4,869 203,128 1.0%

ANW1/Seattle 

Bridge ETE CSCL, CMA CGM 7 5 4,251 221,649 1.1%

Transpacific 

pendulum PDM MSC 7 (11) 4,781 249,281 1.2%

TP8/NOX/

Bohai Rim

Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 5 8,140 424,422 2.0%
Chapter 5

196

TP–17c Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2008 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP2/Eagle/

Yang Xi

Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 5 8,272 431,347 2.1%

PEX1/AAE1 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 8 4,079 212,528 1.0%

PEX2/AAE2 ETE CMA CGM, CSCL 7 ***(7) 3,457 160,252 0.8%

PEX3 ETE CMA CGM 7 8 5,078 264,781 1.3%

JAS ETE

New World Alliance/

Evergreen: APL, HMM, 

MOL, Evergreen

7 4 3,109 162,138 0.8%

ESX/SAX ETE

New World Alliance/CMA 

CGM: APL, HMM, MOL, 

CMA CGM

7 8 4,815 251,094 1.2%

PRX ETE CMA CGM, MSC 7 5 8,197 427,425 2.1%

ZCS PDM Zim 7 14 4,892 255,105 1.2%

AMP PDM Zim 7 13 3,321 173,158 0.8%

AGX ETE Zim 7 10 3,093 161,262 0.8%

AME1 ETE Hapag-Lloyd 7 6 4,120 214,846 1.0%

CTP ETE Wan Hai, PIL 7 5 4,252 221,722 1.1%

China-Long 

Beach Express Matson 7 5 2,758 143,800 0.7%

Loop1 ETE Westwood 14 3 1,871 48,780 0.2%

Loop2 ETE Westwood 14 4 §§ §§ 

ANDEX CSAV 8 9 2,876 131,202 0.6%

ALEX NYK 7 10 2,481 129,366 0.6%

ASPA2/North 

Asia Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 9 2,515 131,157 0.6%

ASPA1/China 

Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 10 3,271 170,554 0.8%

Asia Andes 

Express MSC 7 11 3,137 163,695 0.8%

Andes/CWL1 K Line, MOL 7 9 2,450 127,733 0.6%

ACSA CLANSA, Maruba, CMA 

CGM, CSCL 7 11 2,491 129,897 0.6%

New MAREX NYK 7 9 1,612 84,072 0.4%

Swire Shipping Swire Shipping 800 12,800 0.1%

Total 20,776,345 100%

***() Services temporarily under strength, for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

  Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.

§§ Estimated slot allocation on these conbulkers is 1,500 TEU eastbound and 1,000 TEU westbound.

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
197

TP–17d Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2009

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP6 PDM Maersk Line 7 14 9,964 519,529 2.9%

TP1 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 2,824 147,251 0.8%

TP5 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,055 211,429 1.2%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC2 Maersk Line 7 7 7,063 268,292 1.5%

TP7/TA3 PDM Maersk Line 7 12 4,963 258,781 1.4%

SSX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 8,063 420,428 2.3%

SCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 7 6,385 332,954 1.9%

NWX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 6,133 319,803 1.8%

CCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 5,620 293,043 1.6%

AEX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 5,585 291,200 1.6%

PAX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 13 4,693 244,694 1.4%

NCE ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 4,910 256,021 1.4%

PNX ETE

Grand Alliance/Zim: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL, Zim

7 6 8,342 434,993 2.4%

SCE ETE

Grand Alliance/Zim: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL, Zim

7 8 4,568 238,176 1.3%

PS1 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 5,398 281,482 1.6%

PS2 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 5,762 300,447 1.7%

PSX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 6,274 327,162 1.8%

SAX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 6,565 342,300 1.9%

PCE (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,108 266,346 1.5%

PS5 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 4,106 214,119 1.2%

PNW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,479 337,834 1.9%

PCX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,800 354,571 2.0%

APX/CNY 

(MOL/APL) PDM New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 12 4,700 245,050 1.4%

NYX (APL/

HMM/MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 4,795 250,013 1.4%

SZX (APL) New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 8 5,073 264,521 1.5%

PSW1 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,576 290,749 1.6%

PSW2 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,936 205,245 1.1%

PSW3 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 3,508 182,917 1.0%

PS4 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,551 289,445 1.6%
Chapter 5

198

TP–17d Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2009 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

PNW (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 4,337 226,144 1.3%

SEA (C/HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,772 300,989 1.7%

CEN (C/HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,694 296,901 1.7%

PNN (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 5,540 288,871 1.6%

PNS (C/HJ) BUT CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,540 288,871 1.6%

PSX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 4 7,500 391,071 2.2%

CAX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 4,389 228,855 1.3%

SJX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,066 212,004 1.2%

AWE1/AWH 

(HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,024 209,823 1.2%

AWE2/AWC (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,206 219,319 1.2%

AWE3/AWY 

(YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,372 227,969 1.3%

AWE4/AWK (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,800 250,286 1.4%

AWE5 (HJ/K/

YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 8 4,194 218,707 1.2%

UAM PDM Evergreen 7 13 5,691 296,749 1.7%

NUE ETE Evergreen 7 9 4,227 220,408 1.2%

HTW ETE Evergreen 7 5 8,073 420,949 2.3%

TPS ETE Evergreen 7 5 6,332 330,169 1.8%

AUE ETE Evergreen 7 8 4,429 230,980 1.3%

AAE1/AUE2 ETE CSCL, Evergreen 7 8 4,267 222,520 1.2%

AAC ETE CSCL 7 5 8,530 444,779 2.5%

ANW1 ETE CSCL 7 5 2,940 153,300 0.9%

PEX2/PACAR/

AAE2 ETE CMA CGM, CSAV, CSCL 7 10 4,224 220,251 1.2%

PEX3 RTW CMA CGM 7 10 4,996 260,511 1.5%

PRX ETE CMA CGM, MSC 7 5 8,230 429,115 2.4%

TP8/NOX/

Bohai Rim ETE Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 5 8,300 432,796 2.4%

TP2/Eagle/

Yang Xi ETE Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 ** *(3) 8,178 255,844 1.4%

TP10/Hudson/

CSX ETE Maersk Line, CMA CGM, 

HMM 7 8 4,109 214,262 1.2%

Transpacific 

pendulum ETE MSC 7 12 6,035 314,700 1.8%

ZCS PDM Zim 7 15 4,933 257,203 1.4%

JAS ETE

New World Alliance/

Evergreen: APL, HMM, 

MOL, Evergreen

7 5 2,990 155,918 0.9%

AME1 ETE Hapag-Lloyd 7 6 4,181 217,992 1.2%

China-Long 

Beach Express Matson 7 5 2,758 143,800 0.8%

Loop1 ETE Westwood 14 3 1,871 48,780 0.3%
199

TP–17d Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2009 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

Loop2 ETE Westwood 14 4 §§ §§ 

ANDEX CSAV 7-8 10 2,897 137,335 0.8%

ALEX-NEO NYK 7 11 2,445 127,504 0.7%

Asia Andes 

Exp./ASPA2/

North Asia 

Express

MSC, Hamburg Sud, 

CCNI 7 11 4,146 216,203 1.2%

ASPA1/China 

Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 10 4,016 209,427 1.2%

Andes/CWL K Line, MOL 7 ***(9) 2,462 115,517 0.6%

ACSA CLANSA, Maruba, CMA 

CGM, CSCL 7 11 2,559 133,457 0.7%

Total 17,959,074 100%

***() Services temporarily under strength, for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

  Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.

§§ Estimated slot allocation on these conbulkers is 1,500 TEU eastbound and 1,000 TEU westbound.

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

200

TP–17e Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2010

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

TP6 PDM Maersk Line 7 14 9,685 505,011 2.4%

TP1 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 2,824 147,251 0.7%

TP5 ETE Maersk Line 7 5 4,240 221,065 1.0%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC2 Maersk Line 7 7 8,222 428,711 2.0%

Asia/Caribbean 

AC3 Maersk Line 7 7 4,280 223,171 1.1%

TP7 (via 

Panama) ETE Maersk Line 7 12 4,963 258,781 1.2%

SSX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 6 8,063 420,428 2.0%

SCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 8 6,508 339,359 1.6%

NWX/LPB PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 17 8,690 453,131 2.1%

CCX ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 5 6,001 312,920 1.5%

AEX (via Suez) ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 10 5,712 297,850 1.4%

PAX PDM Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 13 4,693 244,694 1.2%

NCE (via 

Panama) ETE Grand Alliance: HapagLloyd, NYK, OOCL 7 9 4,922 256,647 1.2%

PNX ETE

Grand Alliance/Zim: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL, Zim

7 7 8,271 431,296 2.0%

SCEC ETE

Grand Alliance/Zim: 

Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 

OOCL, Zim

7 8 4,667 243,331 1.2%

PS1 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 5,337 278,272 1.3%

PS2 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 5,780 301,386 1.4%

SAX (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 6,622 345,290 1.6%

PCE (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 6 4,591 239,405 1.1%

PS5 (APL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 5,108 266,346 1.3%

PSX (MOL) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 7 6,292 328,098 1.6%

PNW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,479 337,834 1.6%

PCX (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 6,800 354,571 1.7%

PSW (HMM) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 5 4,635 241,682 1.1%

APX/CNY 

(MOL/APL) PDM New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 13 4,761 248,256 1.2%

NYX (APL/

HMM) (via 

Panama)

ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 4,649 242,389 1.1%

SZX (APL) (via 

Suez) ETE New World Alliance: APL, 

HMM, MOL 7 9 5,006 261,016 1.2%

PNW/PN1 (K/

MOL) ETE K LINE, MOL joint 

network 7 6 5,645 294,364 1.4%
201

TP–17e Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2010 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

JAS/PS3 

(MOL/K) ETE K LINE, MOL joint 

network 7 5 4,843 252,517 1.2%

AWE4/SVE (via 

Suez) ETE K LINE, MOL joint 

network 7 9 5,778 301,258 1.4%

PSW1 (K) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 4,613 240,552 1.1%

PSW2 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,556 289,706 1.4%

PS4 (YM) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,551 289,445 1.4%

SEA (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,992 312,440 1.5%

CEN (C) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 7,834 408,470 1.9%

PNN/PNW1 

(C/HJ)

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,631 279,527 1.3%

PNS /PNW2 

(C/HJ)

CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,454 284,398 1.3%

PSX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 7,643 398,554 1.9%

CAX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 5 5,482 285,847 1.4%

SJX (HJ) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 6 4,354 227,039 1.1%

AWE1/AWH 

(HJ) (via 

Panama)

ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,024 209,823 1.0%

AWE2/AWC (C) 

(via Panama) ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,697 244,903 1.2%

AWE3/AWY 

(YM) (via 

Panama)

ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,198 218,919 1.0%

AWE5/AWN 

(HJ/YM) (via 

Panama)

ETE CKYH: Cosco, K Line, 

Yang Ming, Hanjin 7 9 4,083 212,899 1.0%

HTW ETE Evergreen 7 5 8,073 420,949 2.0%

TPS ETE Evergreen 7 6 6,447 336,182 1.6%

UAM PDM Evergreen 7 14 5,570 290,421 1.4%

NUE (via 

Panama) ETE Evergreen 7 9 4,324 225,477 1.1%

AUE (via 

Panama) ETE Evergreen 7 8 4,539 236,683 1.1%

AAC2/CPS2 ETE CSCL, Evergreen 7 5 4,230 220,575 1.0%

AAE1/AUE2 

(via Panama) ETE CSCL, Evergreen 7 8 4,266 222,459 1.1%

AAC ETE CSCL 7 5 8,518 444,132 2.1%

ANW1 ETE CSCL 7 5 4,564 237,970 1.1%

PEX2/PACAR/

AAE2 (ETE/

RTW via 

Panama/CGH)

ETE CMA CGM, CSAV, CSCL 7 11 4,383 228,528 1.1%

Far East/ECNA 

AMEX (via 

Panama)

ETE CSAV 7 10 3,510 183,001 0.9%

ANDEX 3 CSAV 7 ** *(1) 2,708 20,172 0.1%

ASIAM PDM CSAV Norasia 7 ***(3) 3,551 50,503 0.2%
Chapter 5

202

TP–17e Liner Services between the US and Asia

As of October 1, 2010 (continued)

Service Name

Service 

Type Carriers

Frequency 

(in days)

No. of 

Ships

Average 

Capacity 

(TEUs) 

Annualized 

Operational 

Capacity (TEUs) 

Percent 

of Market

PEX3 (via 

Panama/Suez) RTW CMA CGM 7 11 5,079 264,818 1.3%

PRX ETE CMA CGM, MSC 7 6 8,242 429,779 2.0%

TP2/Eagle/

Yang Tse ETE Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 6 7,043 367,225 1.7%

TP8/NOX/

Bohai Rim ETE Maersk Line, MSC, CMA 

CGM VSA 7 6 8,280 431,743 2.0%

TP3-TP9/

Columbus 

(double loop, all 

water segment 

via Suez)

Maersk Line, CMA CGM 

VSA 7 15 7,069 368,587 1.7%

Transpacific 

pendulum (via 

Suez)

ETE MSC 7 12 8,264 430,935 2.0%

ZCS (via 

Panama) PDM Zim 7 15 4,900 255,524 1.2%

CTP ETE PIL 7 6 1,641 85,556 0.4%

Great Dragon ETE TCC 7 5 2,889 150,641 0.7%

AME1/MAX ETE Hapag-Lloyd, APL 7 6 4,585 239,084 1.1%

CLB1 ETE Matson 7 5 2,758 143,800 0.7%

CLB2 ETE Matson 7 ***(3) 3,659 114,485 0.5%

CAE ETE Hainan Pan Ocean 

Shipping 7 5 3,054 159,244 0.8%

Loop1 ETE Westwood 14 3 1,871 48,780 0.2%

Loop2 ETE Westwood 14 4 §§ §§ 

ANDEX Loop A CSAV 7 11 4,232 220,659 1.0%

ANDEX Loop B CSAV 7 9 3,023 157,645 0.7%

ALX1/

ANDES1/WL1 NYK, K Line, MOL 7 ***(9) 4,028 189,039 0.9%

ALX2/

ANDES2/WL2 NYK, K Line, MOL 7 9 2,636 137,454 0.7%

Asia Andes 

Express MSC 7 10 5,611 265,981 1.3%

ASPA1/China 

Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 11 4,333 225,959 1.1%

ASPA2/North 

Asia Express Hamburg Sud, CCNI 7 10 2,725 142,094 0.7%

ACSA CMA CGM, CSCL 7 12 2,544 132,625 0.6%

ACSA2 CMS CGM, HMM 7 ***(3) 2,862 44,775 0.2%

Total 21,102,336 100%

***() Services temporarily under strength, for various reasons (the number of ships in operation is given in brackets).

**** Includes two smaller ships working in tandem.

§§ Estimated slot allocation on these conbulkers is 1,500 TEU eastbound and 1,000 TEU westbound.

Source: Drewry Container Forecaster, Drewry Maritime Research
203

Charts TP-18a-b Changes in Annual Capacity in the Transpacific Trade

The charts provide trend lines showing the levels of average weekly vessel capacity supplied 

in each trade direction per month for the review period from 2006 through 2010. Chart TP18a shows the trend line of average weekly capacity in the eastbound trade direction over 

the entire review period. The horizontal axis gives the series of time in months from 2006 

through 2010, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly amount of vessel capacity 

supplied for each month in TEUs. Chart TP-18b compares the level of average weekly 

capacity supplied for each year per month. The horizontal axis gives the series of time as 

the 12 months of a single year, and the vertical axis measures the average weekly amount of 

vessel capacity supplied for each month in TEUs. The source of the data is Drewry Maritime 

Research.

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

TP–18a Asia to US Capacity (Monthly)

Source: Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

270

280

290

300

310

320

330

340

350

360

TP–18b Asia to US Capacity by Year

Source: Drewry Maritime Research Average Weekly TEU Capacity (thousands)

270

280

290

300

310

320

330

340

350

360

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chapter 5

204

Transpacific Economic Performance

Chart TP-19 Quarterly Average Revenue per TEU, Inbound and Outbound

The chart provides trend lines of time series data showing the levels of average revenue 

per TEU earned by shipping lines in the inbound and outbound directions of the US/Asia 

trade for each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010. The horizontal axis of 

the chart gives the time series in calendar quarters over the review period, and the vertical 

axis measures the average revenue per TEU in US dollars. The average revenue figures 

are inclusive of ocean freight, accessorial charges, and any charges for inland haulage. The 

trend throughout the review period shows the quarterly change in the average revenue 

earnings of the shipping lines in each trade direction. The level of average revenue and the 

change over time are a function of the corresponding supply and demand conditions in the 

trade as affected by market and regulatory factors. The data sources are Containerisation 

International, Informa Plc; TSA and WTSA.

TP–19 Transpacific Average Revenue 

per TEU (US Dollars)*

Sources: Containerisation International, Informa Plc; TSA and WTSA US to Asia WB

Asia to US EB

Average Revenue per TEU

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

* Fluctuations in the average revenue per container data obtained from Containerisation International (“CI”) 

tracks closely similar data that the Commission receives from TSA on a confidential basis. Fluctuations in 

the China (export-only) Containerized Freight Index (“CCFI”) published by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange, 

that tracks movements in average container rates from China to the US west and east coasts, also follow 

closely the fluctuations in average revenue from CI and TSA. It is not known, however, exactly how closely the 

underlying CCFI average rate information mirrors the CI and TSA average revenue data because the CCFI is 

publicly available in index form only. (The Shanghai Shipping Exchange generously contributed CCFI weekly 

data dating back to January 6, 2006 for use in this Study.)
205

Table TP-20 Capacity Utilization between the US and Asia 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the table gives the 

percentage levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for each direction of the US/Asia trade. 

The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of container cargo moved in each 

trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity supplied in each trade direction 

and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo and vessel capacity are measured 

in TEUs. The trend in the percentage levels of utilization shows how the supply of, and 

demand for, vessel space are aligned in each trade lane and the change in utilization over 

the review period as affected by market conditions and other factors. A higher percentage 

of utilization indicates that supply and demand are more closely aligned, whereas a lower 

utilization percentage shows a period of greater excess vessel capacity in the market. The 

degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts on the level of freight rates. It would 

be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend in utilization levels. Further, 

the utilization of vessel space provides a general indication of service quality by showing 

whether shipping lines are deploying sufficient vessel space in relation to demand in the 

marketplace. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

TP–20 US/Asia Trade

Quarterly Capacity Utilization

Asia to US US to Asia

1Q06 80% 42%

2Q06 91% 40%

3Q06 90% 37%

4Q06 83% 37%

1Q07 81% 42%

2Q07 91% 48%

3Q07 92% 44%

4Q07 81% 48%

1Q08 78% 54%

2Q08 84% 56%

3Q08 86% 51%

4Q08 73% 37%

1Q09 63% 43%

2Q09 74% 55%

3Q09 80% 53%

4Q09 79% 54%

1Q10 79% 54%

2Q10 100% 65%

3Q10 86% 55%

4Q10 74% 52%

Source: Drewry Maritime Research
Chapter 5

206

Chart TP-21 Capacity Utilization between the US and Asia 

For each quarter of the review period from 2006 through 2010, the chart provides trend 

lines of time series data showing the percentage levels of the utilization of vessel capacity for 

each direction of the US/Asia trade. The horizontal axis gives the series of time in quarters 

over the review period, and the vertical axis measures the level of vessel capacity utilization 

as a percentage. The percentage levels are derived by dividing the amount of container cargo 

moved in each trade direction by the amount of container vessel capacity supplied in each 

trade direction and multiplying the quotient by 100. The container cargo and vessel capacity 

are measured in TEUs. The trend line over the time series shows the change in vessel 

capacity utilization as affected by the change in the market conditions of supply and demand 

in each trade lane. A higher percentage level of utilization indicates that supply and demand 

are more closely aligned, whereas a lower percentage level of utilization shows a period 

of greater excess vessel capacity in the market. A utilization level that exceeds 100 percent 

indicates a period of time when the demand for vessel space exceeded the supply of vessel 

space. The degree to which supply and demand are aligned impacts on the level of freight 

rates. It would be expected that the trend in rate levels correlates to the trend in utilization 

levels. Further, the utilization of vessel space provides a general indication of service quality 

by showing whether shipping lines are deploying sufficient vessel space in relation to demand 

in the marketplace. The source of data is Drewry Maritime Research.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

TP-21 US/Asia Capacity Utilization

Source: Drewry Maritime Research US to Asia WB

Asia to US EB

Average Utilization

Pre-Repeal Post-Repeal

4Q103Q102Q101Q104Q093Q092Q091Q094Q083Q082Q081Q084Q073Q072Q071Q074Q063Q062Q061Q06
207

Table TP-22 Market Share Instability Index (MSII)

The table gives, in the form of a market share instability index (MSII), the total change in 

market share of the participating shipping lines in the US/Asia trade quarterly for the review 

period from 2006 through 2010. The MSII is the sum of the absolute values of the change in 

percentages of market share of the individual shipping lines that occurred from one quarter to 

the next. A high value of MSII indicates that a high portion of the market shifted among the 

shipping lines in the trade for a given time. The source of the data is PIERS.

TP-22 US/Asia Trade

Market Share Instability Index

Asia to US US to Asia

2006

1st Quarter 5.8% 7.8%

2nd Quarter 8.0% 5.4%

3rd Quarter 6.3% 7.6%

4th Quarter 6.2% 12.4%

2007

1st Quarter 5.9% 7.7%

2nd Quarter 5.6% 12.5%

3rd Quarter 6.3% 9.3%

4th Quarter 6.0% 10.2%

2008

1st Quarter 6.3% 7.0%

2nd Quarter 7.8% 5.5%

3rd Quarter 5.9% 10.4%

4th Quarter 5.6% 11.3%

2009

1st Quarter 7.4% 14.2%

2nd Quarter 9.5% 9.3%

3rd Quarter 8.3% 7.9%

4th Quarter 7.6% 7.9%

2010

1st Quarter 5.5% 8.9%

2nd Quarter 6.6% 9.3%

3rd Quarter 8.4% 11.4%

4th Quarter 8.9% 10.7%

Source: Federal Maritime Commission, PIERS Interactive
209

Chapter 6: 

Difference-in-Differences Analyses

Methodology

This study was undertaken to examine the impact of the removal of the block exemption 

on the US liner trades. The initial approach was to look at the US/North Europe trade and 

examine characteristics of that market before the removal of the exemption and again after 

the removal of the exemption. The intent was to identify changes following the removal 

of the block exemption in a single market. Assuming the absence of any other significant 

influences, this single market analysis exercise presumably would have shown the impact of 

the repeal of the block exemption because one could assume that changes were the result of 

the repeal’s “intervention effect.” That initial approach, however, proved insufficient.

The severity of the global recession in late 2008 through 2009 completely undermined 

that approach. The recession’s dramatic dampening impact on rates and service presented a 

particular problem: How could one isolate the impact of the repeal from the impact of the 

recession? In other words, how would it be possible to isolate the recession’s impact on the 

market in a way that allowed an examination of the impact of the block exemption? The 

relatively simple econometric device of difference-in-differences estimate (“DD”) is designed 

to address this very problem and is, in fact, commonly used to measure the effect or impact 

of a new policy, law, or medical treatment intervention.

The ingenuity of the DD method is to not look at only one market but to look at two

and compare the differences in the two markets over time. In selecting markets to compare, 

ideally, one would choose as the first market one in which the impact of some policy 

being assessed or condition would occur. The second market would be one in which the 

condition or policy did not occur but shared the overriding influence (in this case the global 

recession) that masks the impact of the policy or condition being studied in the first market. 

In our case, one might expect the first market to be the North Europe/US trade. However, 

the DD method is only as reliable as the assumption on which it is built, namely, that the 

relationships over time between the two trades being compared are constant (i.e., that they 

move together but for the policy difference in one trade that is absent in the other – in 

our case, the removal of the block exemption).1

 Clearly, the greater the similarity between 

the trades being compared, the better the chance that the assumption on which the DD 

estimation depends will not be breached. In the present case, the second market would be a 

trade as similar as possible to the North Atlantic but one that was never exposed to the block 

exemption. However, there are no non EU-based, US trades that provide a suitably close 

comparison to the North Europe/US trade. 

The next best option was to compare differences between two closely comparable 

trades – one unaffected by the removal of the block exemption and the other affected by 

it. The best candidate trades available for such an analysis are the Far East/US and Far East/

Europe trades, respectively. These two trades are not only closely comparable along several 

1 Refer to Appendix IX for a more detailed explanation of the difference-in-differences methodology being used in this 

chapter.
Chapter 6

210

prominent dimensions,2 but also they are the largest and most important trades globally; and 

developments in both trades were seriously affected by the global recession at about the time 

the repeal took effect.3

The DD estimates are obtained by comparing the two markets before the repeal of the 

block exemption and the same two markets again after the repeal. In our case, this means 

comparing characteristics of the Far East/US trade with the Far East/Europe trade before 

the removal of the block exemption. Those characteristics include rate levels and volatility, 

capacity utilization and several other outcome variables from January 2006 to September 

2008. The same comparison of characteristics is done after the repeal (October 2008 through 

December 2010). This latter step would identify the difference in rate levels and volatility, 

capacity utilization, and other outcome variables between the two trades after the repeal of 

the block exemption. The next step is to compare the difference in the two trades (in rate 

levels and volatility, capacity utilization, and other outcome variables) before the repeal of the 

block exemption with the difference in those same characteristics after the repeal. 

All things equal one would assume that the two trades would change in the same way 

and move together (i.e., they would still be different but the difference would remain 

constant) unless something happened in one trade that did not happen in the other (the 

repeal of the block exemption). More specifically, one would assume that the relationship 

between the two trades would stay the same during the time period being examined (in our 

case 2006 through 2010). That is, they would move together except for the repeal that one 

trade experienced but the other did not. The idea is that the global recession affected both 

trades and would influence both trades in a similar enough way not to change the previous 

relationship between the two trades. If there were a change in the relationship between 

the two trades (i.e., if the differences in the two trades were to change after the repeal), in 

theory, it would not be attributable to the global recession because both trades had that in 

common. Rather, it would be attributable to the repeal. 

In the present study two difference-in-differences analyses were conducted to give the 

best possible assurance on the legitimacy of the results. A DD was conducted on the headhaul 

directions of the Far East to Europe and Far East to US trades and a separate DD was 

conducted on the backhaul directions of both Far East trades. A fuller and more technical 

explanation of the DD methodology used and results obtained is contained in Appendix IX.

Analyzing the Impact of the Repeal

A simple difference-in-differences analysis of the repeal of the block exemption is described 

in this section. 

Quite soon after the repeal became effective, the Korea Maritime Institute (“KMI”) 

published an empirical analysis of the EU’s action abolishing the liner block exemption that 

relied on a DD estimation model.4

 The “treatment” group in that analysis consisted of the 

Far East to Europe trade and the “control” group was the Far East to North America trade. 

2 The US and EU economies were affected to a similar degree by the global recession and both trades involve the 

same trading partners at the other end of the trade route. Other close similarities include: container volumes of similar 

magnitude; historical growth patterns; large ships deployed over relative long distance; seasonal variations in trade 

volumes; similar commodity mixes and values; trade imbalances (with the export leg from Asia being very dominant); 

shipper characteristics; and the market participants.

3 Consideration was given to comparing differences in the North Europe/US trade (affected by the repeal) with the Far 

East/US trade (unaffected by the repeal); however, initial exploratory work showed that the former trade did not appear 

to react to the global recession in the same manner as the latter, suggesting that the results of a DD analysis would be 

unreliable.

4 Korea Maritime Institute, “International Regulation Trends of Concerted Action of Liner Shipping Companies and 

Korea’s Policy Measures,” 2010. Details of the method used are contained in Appendix X.
Difference-in-Differences Analyses

211

The study reported that the more meaningful results belonged to comparisons involving 

the headhaul directions in both trades (i.e., comparing differences between both trades before 

and after repeal in the westbound Far East to Europe trade to differences observed in the 

eastbound Far East to North America trade). In their analysis, the pre-repeal period consisted 

of six quarters, from the second quarter of 2007 through the third quarter of 2008, while the 

post-repeal period consisted of just three quarters from the fourth quarter of 2008 through 

the second quarter of 2009.5

 The study generated DD estimates for the volatility of ocean 

rates, trade lane concentration as measured by the concentration ratio for the top five carriers 

(“CR5”) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), load factor, and revenue. In each 

case, the pre- and post-repeal values of the aforementioned variables were computed as 

means utilizing all the fiscal quarters in each period (pre-repeal and post-repeal).6

The analysis described below adopted a similar approach to that used in the KMI study, 

though data was collected over longer pre-repeal and post-repeal time periods.7

 For the 

reasons stated in the previous section, the relative performance of two reasonably comparable 

trades was compared using the DD method. In the analysis that follows, the Far East to 

Europe trade forms the “treatment” group because carriers operating in this trade from 

the fourth quarter of 2008 onward did so without benefit of antitrust immunity. The Far 

East to US trade, operating wholly under OSRA and lying beyond the reach of the EU’s 

repeal, acts as the “control” group. Because of the key assumption that underpins simple 

DD analysis (discussed above), the comparison trades should be as similar as possible. For this 

reason, no attempt was made to compare the relative performance of the North Europe/

US trade (another possible “treatment” group) to the Far East to US control group. As 

explained earlier, the headhaul direction of the North Europe/US trade switched direction 

at about the same time as the global financial crisis as a result of the US dollar strengthening 

appreciably against the Euro and other European currencies. The trend in this foreign 

exchange relationship shifted abruptly with deeply felt effects on the trade. Because most 

Asian currencies are pegged in some fashion to the US dollar no similar shift occurred in the 

comparison group, the Far East to US trade. 

The focus of the analysis presented below rests on the headhaul directions of the Far 

East to Europe and Far East to US trades, i.e., the westbound and eastbound direction, 

respectively, of each trade. Given the heavy imbalances in cargo volume and revenue 

earned, carrier conduct and economic performance overwhelmingly are conditioned by 

circumstances and events in the headhaul direction of these trades.8

5 It should be noted that this short post-repeal period coincided with a fast and steep decline in trade volumes, capacity 

utilization, average revenues and mounting losses in both liner trades – the worst in recent memory. The recovery 

phases in those trades did not materialize until late 2009, well beyond the KMI study’s post-repeal period.

6 DD analysis traditionally relies on single point-in-time observations before and after an intervention has occurred. 

Usually, this single value encompasses the average of outcomes for an entire year, but need not do so. Averaging 

outcomes over several time points may have value in situations where outcomes are subject to seasonal or other timing 

effects (e.g. cyclicality) because averaging may smooth out outcomes disrupted by these effects. Alternatively, such effects 

might be captured more effectively using dummy variables or other controls.

7 The present study’s pre-repeal period covers 11 fiscal quarters from the first quarter of 2006 through the third quarter of 

2008, and 9 fiscal quarters in the post-repeal period from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the fourth quarter of 2010.

8 For the sake of completeness, DD estimates based on the backhaul directions of the Far East to Europe and Far East to 

US trades are presented in Appendix IX.
Chapter 6

212

Steps Involved in DD Analysis

Three steps are involved in calculating difference-in-differences. The first step involves 

identifying outcome variables of interest.9

 Borrowing from the structure-conduct-performance 

analytic framework applied earlier, this study has compiled data for several intermediate 

and final outcome variables that relate to market structure, carrier conduct and economic 

performance – average revenue or rate levels, rate volatility, market concentration, average 

capacity utilization, and market share stability. The DD results for each of these variables are 

presented and discussed in the section that follows.10 Data for an important outcome variable 

– profitability – was not available on a trade lane basis, and no convincing quantitative tradewide data was available for another important outcome measure – service quality.

The second step consists of defining an appropriate time dimension. In this study, the two 

periods being compared are the period from January 2006 through September 2008 and the 

period from October 2008 through December 2010. The first period ends just before the 

block exemption was repealed in October 2008 and the second period ends in December 

2010 so as to allow sufficient time for data to become available, finalized and analyzed in 

time to produce a final report in late 2011. The two periods were selected to cover about the 

same amount of time. Although this latter point is not a requirement for DD analysis, it is 

important that the choice of periods clearly distinguishes the “before repeal” period from the 

“after repeal” period.

The last step consists of computing averages for the selected variables of interest in each 

trade lane (Far East to Europe and Far East to the US) in each time period (before and after 

the repeal) and displaying those values in tabular form. The example tabulated below shows 

the DD estimate of the impact of the repeal on average revenue per TEU. The trade lanes 

being compared are shown on the rows of the table, while the pre-repeal and post-repeal 

time periods are shown in the columns. The simple differences in average revenue levels 

between the two trade lanes and between the two time periods are shown in the margins of 

the columns and rows, respectively. The difference-in-differences (DD) estimate is shown in 

the bottom right-hand corner of the table. The DD estimate in that cell is the difference-indifferences between the two rows or between the two columns. In either case, the DD result 

is always the same. In each DD results table that follows, as explained earlier, the westbound 

direction of the trade from the Far East to Europe is compared to the eastbound direction of 

the trade from the Far East to the US.

Table 6.1: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Average Revenue

Trade Lane

Average Revenue per TEU

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006

to Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

to Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) $1,730 $1,589 ($141)

Far East to US (not subject to the repeal) $1,747 $1,597 ($150)

Difference between the trades ($17) ($8) $9 DD Estimate

The results in table 6.1 can be read in two ways. By reading the columns, one sees the 

differences between the two trades. It turns out, for example, that during the pre-repeal 

period, from January 2006 through September 2008, revenue per TEU averaged about 

the same in both the Far East to Europe trade and the Far East to US trade, i.e., just less 

9 A DD analysis can be conducted on as many outcome variables for which there are data.

10 DD analysis also can be used to explore the mechanisms underlying the main outcome variables. In this context, 

we have produced DD estimates for some outcomes, such as market concentration and capacity that are intermediate 

outcome measures, respectively, of market structure and carrier conduct rather than final outcome measures.
Difference-in-Differences Analyses

213

than $1,750. Even in the period after the repeal was enacted, from October 2008 through 

December 2010, average revenue per TEU also was about the same in both trade lanes, 

but at a noticeably lower level of just less than $1,600. The DD estimate is the difference 

between an almost zero (i.e., average revenue at the same level) pre-repeal difference and an 

almost zero (i.e., average revenue again at the same level) post-repeal difference, leading to 

an almost zero DD estimate. Thus, the repeal of the block exemption itself seems not to have 

impacted average revenue levels in the Far East to Europe trade when viewed against the 

trending of average revenue in the Far East to US trade. 

Double differencing can also be understood by reading the results in table 6.1 by using 

the rows. Reading the first row of results in isolation would suggest that the repeal had a 

quite substantial effect in the Far East to Europe trade by reducing average revenue by $141 

per TEU (or by 8 percent of pre-repeal average revenue). However, on the second row of 

results, it will be noticed that the Far East to US trade fared just as well or badly (depending 

on one’s perspective), with average revenue falling by $150 per TEU (or by just over 8 

percent of pre-repeal average revenue). The DD estimate is obviously the same as before 

(i.e., essentially zero - actually $9 in favor of the Far East to US trade), which suggests that 

the average reduction in rate levels of $140 to $150 per TEU experienced in both trade 

lanes in the post-repeal period likely was due to factors other than the repeal (such as excess 

capacity caused by the global recession, for example).

DD Estimates of the Impact of Repeal on Other Variables of Interest

DD estimates of the impact of repeal on other variables of interest to the study, including 

market concentration, rate volatility, market share stability, and capacity utilization, are 

reported below.

Table 6.2: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Market Concentration (“HHI”)

Trade Lane

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006

to Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

to Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) 856 917 61

Far East to US (not subject to the repeal) 633 665 32

Difference between the trades 223 252 29 DD Estimate

Concentration appears to have increased slightly in both trades, but not significantly. The 

DD estimate is very small in relation to overall HHI. Although the HHI indicates that the 

market structure is not concentrated in both trade lanes, the Far East to US trade retained 

noticeably lower HHI scores than the Far East to Europe trade in both periods.

Table 6.3: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility

(as measured by dispersion about mean average revenue – one standard deviation)

Trade Lane

Standard deviation of 

average revenue

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006

to Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

to Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) $260 $510 $250 

Far East to US (not subject to the repeal) $90 $260 $170 

Difference between the trades $170 $250 $80 DD Estimate

Rate volatility is measured in table 6.3 in the periods before and after the repeal in terms 

of the standard deviation of average revenue per TEU about the mean average revenue. 

Given that average revenue per TEU was more or less at the same absolute level in both 
Chapter 6

214

trades, a larger standard deviation indicates a greater spread of average revenue about the 

mean, suggesting greater rate volatility. While rate volatility appears to have increased in both 

trades, the DD estimate suggests that removal of the block exemption resulted in greater rate 

volatility in the Far East to Europe trade compared to the Far East to US trade.

Table 6.4 measures rate volatility in relative rather than absolute terms by expressing the 

standard deviation of average revenue as a percentage of the mean average revenue in both 

periods. This measure provides a more valid comparison of volatility when the trades being 

compared have noticeably different levels of average revenue (which is not the case in our 

comparison). The basic DD result in this table leads to the same conclusion as in the previous 

table; namely, while rate volatility has increased in both trade lanes (most likely as a result of 

the global recession), greater volatility occurred in the Far East to Europe trade.

Table 6.4: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility

(as measured by standard deviation of revenue divided by average revenue)

Trade Lane

Standard deviation as a 

percentage of average revenue

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006

to Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

to Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) 15% 32% 17%

Far East to US (not subject to the repeal) 5% 16% 11%

Difference between the trades 10% 16% 6% DD Estimate

One way rate volatility could have increased more in one trade compared to the 

other over time, all other factors being equal, would be if the intensity of competition 

had increased in that trade. Using market share data to compute an index of market share 

instability as suggested by Sys, the DD results in table 6.5 seem to indicate that shifts in 

market shares intensified in the Far East to Europe trade in the post-repeal period, albeit 

modestly, and diminished modestly in the Far East to US trade.11 Also, the results indicate 

that in the period prior to the repeal market share instability was relatively greater in the 

Far East to US trade compared to the Far East to Europe trade, but that situation seemed to 

reverse itself in the post-repeal period.12

Table 6.5: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Market Share Stability

Trade Lane

Market Share Stability Index

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006

to Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

to Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) 6.4% 8.4% 2.0%

Far East to US (not subject to the repeal) 9.6% 7.6% -2.0%

Difference between the trades -3.2% 0.8% 4.0% DD Estimate

The final outcome variable for which DD estimates are available is capacity utilization. 

The results are displayed in table 6.6. Average capacity utilization, or load factor, fell in both 

trades in the post-repeal period. However, in the Far East to Europe trade average capacity 

11 Christa Sys, “Is the container shipping industry an oligopoly?” Transport Policy, 16 (2009) 259-270. 

12 The market share stability index is an indicator of the magnitude of shifts in market shares over time. According to 

Sys, market share instability is a measure of the shift in the relative position of firms within an industry or market. The 

index is considered to be an indicator of the intensity of competition. The measure used here was provided by Hymer 

& Pashigan (Turnover of firms as a measure of market behavior, Review of Economics & Statistics, 44, 1962, 82-87). This 

index, which they call an instability index, sums the absolute value of the change between two points in time in the 

market share of each firm. The value of the index varies from zero to one. An index value close to zero indicates market 

shares are relatively stable. An index value close to one indicates market shares are relatively unstable. The higher is the 

index, the greater is the implied level of competition.
Difference-in-Differences Analyses

215

utilization fell by just under two percentage points compared to a reduction of over seven 

percentage points in the Far East to US trade.

Table 6.6: DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Capacity Utilization

(Quarterly Load Factor)

Trade Lane

Average Load Factor

Difference between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Far East to Europe (subject to the repeal) 86.9% 85.0% -1.9%

Far East to U.S. (not subject to the repeal) 86.1% 78.7% -7.4%

Difference between the trades 0.8% 6.3% 5.5% DD Estimate

A summary appears below of the DD estimates discussed above. In each case, the 

estimated impact of the repeal on the variable of interest in the Far East to Europe trade, the 

treatment group, was measured relative to what happened in the Far East to US trade lane 

(i.e., the control group). 

Table 6.7: Summary of the Impacts of the Repeal

Variables of Interest Estimated Impact of the Repeal in the Far East to Europe Trade

Average revenue per TEU No or minimal impact on revenue levels

Rate volatility Greater rate volatility (i.e., instability of average revenue)

Market concentration No or minimal impact on market concentration

Market Share Stability Greater market share instability

Capacity utilization Improved capacity utilization

The findings discussed above all relate to the headhaul directions of the Far East trade to 

Europe and the US. A DD analysis conducted on the backhaul directions of these two trades 

reveal a similar set of findings. The results of that analysis are to be found in Appendix IX.

General Observations on the DD Results

The basic DD analysis conducted above indicates that average revenue per TEU declined 

to the same degree in the Far East to Europe and the Far East to US trade lanes, suggesting 

that the repeal of the block exemption for liner conferences had little or no effect on average 

revenue levels. Rate volatility was seen to have increased in both trades in the post-repeal 

period, but noticeably more so in the Far East to Europe trade. In reaction to the global 

recession, average revenue in the Far East to Europe trade fell more swiftly and to deeper 

depths than in the Far East to US trade, but it also recovered more quickly and to greater 

heights. Market concentration was broadly similar across the two trade lanes as well as 

between the pre- and post-repeal periods. However, market share instability worsened in the 

Far East to Europe trade in the post-repeal period (contrasting against an improvement in 

the Far East to US trade). The roiling of market shares in the former trade possibly could be 

a primary cause of the greater rate volatility experienced in that trade. Rate actions are used 

not only to gain or protect market share, but also to help fill ships with excess capacity and, 

in fact, the Far East to Europe trade did secure higher utilization rates relative to the Far East 

to US trade in the post-repeal period.

In the US trades, discussion agreements may help facilitate maintenance of the status quo 

of their members’ market shares. The ability to regularly discuss trade conditions disappeared 

in the European trades after repeal of the block exemption. So, it is perhaps not surprising 

that our DD results indicate more market share instability in the Far East to Europe trade 

compared to the Far East to US trade where the Transpacific Stabilization Agreement 
Chapter 6

216

members regularly meet to discuss trade conditions and agree on voluntary guidelines with 

respect to pricing and other terms of service. However, market share instability in the Far 

East to Europe trade may well have translated into greater rate volatility - at levels over and 

above those that may have been evoked by the global recession itself. However, an important 

research question remains to be answered: Is the apparent instability of market share in the 

Europe trade, and the rate volatility that seems to go with it, an ephemeral effect of the 

repeal of the block exemption (i.e., a relatively short-term adjustment) or an effect that will 

endure over the long-term?

KMI Study DD Estimates Compared

The KMI Study, described earlier, reported that rate volatility in the Far East to Europe 

trade after implementation of the EU repeal increased relative to that found in the Far East 

to North America trade. That study also found that concentration in the Far East to Europe 

trade relative to the Far East to North America trade had decreased, implying that the 

“EU’s policy has enhanced competition” among liner operators in the Far East to Europe 

trade. The KMI Study asserted that this enhanced competition has resulted in more efficient 

utilization of vessel space. Finally, a significant reduction in total revenue in the Far East to 

Europe trade was established relative to the Far East to North America trade.

The findings of this Study, based on observations taken over a longer stretch of time, 

partly support and partly contradict those reported in the KMI Study. The present study 

found no appreciable difference in average revenue levels between the two trades ascribable 

to the repeal. However, the findings reported here do support the conclusion in the KMI 

Study that rate volatility in the Far East to Europe trade is greater relative to the Far East to 

US trade. Notwithstanding the fact that rate volatility appears to have increased appreciably 

in both trades, the DD estimate for rate volatility in this Study is substantially lower than the 

estimate reported by KMI, suggesting perhaps that operators in the Far East to Europe trade 

may be adjusting to their new regulatory environment.

The KMI Study asserted that competition was enhanced in the Far East to Europe trade 

because concentration decreased relative to the Far East to North America trade. Results in 

this Study are unable to support this finding. The present study found only modest increases 

in concentration and no appreciable difference in those increases when comparing one trade 

to the other. However, this Study examined changes in market shares as a possible indicator of 

competition and, on that basis, found some evidence of very modest increases in market share 

turnover in the Far East to Europe trade relative to the Far East to US trade. This Study’s 

results appear to support the KMI Study’s claim that the former trade achieved relatively 

better capacity utilization of vessels (which that study ascribed to enhanced competition).13

13 The KMI Study estimated that average capacity utilization of vessels in the Far East to Europe trade was improved 

by 5 percentage points relative to the Far East to North America trade; the Study estimates this figure to be 5.5 

percentage points.
217

Chapter 7: 

Findings

The primary issue addressed in the Study is: What impact has the repeal of the liner conference 

block exemption in Europe had on US liner trades? That concern was originally raised by US 

shippers in comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission in 2006. It was raised 

again in a Congressional Research Service report in 2008. More specifically, the concern 

was whether (a) shippers in EU countries might gain a commercial advantage over their US 

competitors in third markets (for example, Asia) due to post-repeal freight rate decreases 

in EU trades, or (b) carriers might raise rates in US trades to offset any rate reductions 

experienced in the EU trades following repeal of the block exemption. Both versions were 

premised on an expectation that the EU repeal of the liner conference block exemption 

would produce rate reductions in EU liner trades relative to US liner trades.

Complicating Factors

As indicated previously in Chapter 3, Some Complicating Factors, and Chapter 6, 

Difference-in-Differences Analyses, of the Study, there are two factors that, when taken 

together, produce a substantial challenge to reaching clear and persuasive findings: 

1. The occurrence, nearly simultaneously with the repeal’s implementation, of a massive 

exogenous shock – a global recession that produced the largest decline in trade volumes 

in liner history; and 

2. The fact that any impacts from the repeal were likely to be relatively modest (that is, 

have a small intervention impact) because the market power of the carrier agreements 

being terminated had already been severely limited by earlier regulatory reforms and 

legal interventions. 

Primary Finding

Based on the analysis of available information, albeit over a relatively short period of time, 

the Study found that no significant repeal-driven relative change in rate levels occurred. This 

result suggests that the repeal likely did not (independent of the global recession’s impact) 

produce changes in average rate levels in EU trades relative to US trades, or conversely, 

that discussion agreements like TSA (an agreement with rate authority, but no capacity 

management authority) have not typically been able to raise average rate levels in spite of the 

member lines’ ability to discuss and agree upon voluntary rate actions.

The findings indicate that the repeal of the block exemption appears to have produced 

no commercial disadvantages to US shippers. Changes in differences in average revenue per 

TEU (as a proxy for all-in freight rates) between the eastbound Far East/US trade and the 

westbound Far East/North Europe trade during the pre- and post-repeal periods appear to 

have been minor. Average revenue per TEU declined to the same degree in the two trades, 

suggesting that the repeal of the block exemption had little or no effect on average revenue 

(and freight rate) levels.

In a September 25, 2006 press release concerning the Competitiveness Council’s decision 

to repeal Regulation 4056/86, the EC addressed this question: What are the expected economic 

effects of the repeal of the block exemption? Those expectations were summarized as follows:
Chapter 7

218

The [European] Commission has concluded that a repeal of the block exemption will 

bring about substantial benefits to EU industry and consumers, in particular as regards 

transport prices, reliability of liner shipping services, competitiveness of the EU liner 

shipping industry and small EU liner carriers. The repeal of the block exemption will 

therefore also contribute to the Lisbon objectives.

The European Commission’s main expectations of the economic impact of repealing the 

conference block exemption were:

•	 transport prices for liner shipping services will decline; 

•	 service reliability on deep sea and short sea trades is expected to improve; 

•	 service quality will either be unaffected or will improve; 

•	 the competitiveness of EU liner shipping firms will be positively impacted, if impacted 

at all; 

•	 small liner shipping carriers will not experience particular problems, and 

•	 EU ports, employment, trade and/or developing countries will experience no negative 

impact and possibly a positive impact.1

Given DG Comp’s findings that liner conferences in EU-based trades harmed shippers 

by reducing shippers’ bargaining power, and listing surcharges and ancillary charges in 

conference tariffs, it is clear that the primary expected benefit was a repeal-driven price 

decrease in EU trades. 

Did the anticipated repeal-generated moderate decline in prices, including ancillary 

charges and surcharges, occur? Based on this Study’s data, the findings of the DG Compsponsored analysis of terminal handling charges,2

 and a review of FMC service contract 

surcharge data,3

 the repeal does not appear to have caused a decline in freight rates or other 

charges. Rates certainly did decline due to the dramatic impact of the global recession on 

international trade volumes and vessel utilization levels; but the difference-in-differences 

analysis indicates that the post-repeal fall in freight rates was not attributable to the repeal of 

the liner conference block exemption. 

That finding may, in itself, raise questions about whether the value to carriers of 

the previous block exemption, or the alleged harm to shippers of the carriers’ activities 

conducted under the exemption, may have been less substantial than previously believed. A 

number of the Study NOI responses indicated that there was no appreciable impact on the 

carriers’ commercial activities – a point reported in the trade press at the time.4

As for ancillary charges, of which terminal handling charges (“THCs”) received significant 

attention in the DG Comp review, expectations of post-repeal reductions in charges do not 

seem to have been fulfilled. For example, initial indications are that, on the whole, THC’s 

in EU-trades increased rather than declined – after having remained virtually unchanged for 

1 Memo/06/344, Brussels, 25th September 2006, “Competition: Repeal of Block Exemption for Liner Shipping 

Conferences – frequently asked questions.” 

2 Ben Hackett, “Terminal Handling Charges During and After the Liner Conference Era,” October 6, 2009.

3 See a review of “Service Contract Rate Profiles for the Major East-West Trades,” at Appendix VIII.

4 “Block Exemption Working,” Chris Dupin, American Shipper, March 2011. The article, reviewing the public 

comments of NOI responders (mostly carriers), included this observation by NITL executive VP Peter Gatti: “[S]everal 

of the European carriers see little impact on their operations because they weren’t using the immunity anyway.”
Findings

219

nearly 15 years in Europe.5 In addition, significant differences in THC pricing among carriers 

are said to have developed, creating a situation in which stable, standardized trade-lanebased THCs (apparently related to the CENSA 80/20 formula) were replaced by a variety 

of individual THCs that lines adopted based on different elements and cost levels. This 

development, while perhaps more economically efficient, has apparently resulted in higher

average THCs for shippers.

As for liner service reliability and quality, the Commission had originally hoped that 

shipper input, for example in response to the Study’s November 1, 2010 Notice of Inquiry, 

might provide useful insights into shippers’ perceptions of how liner service might have 

changed from 2006 through 2010. Unfortunately, that input was not forthcoming. As a 

result, service reliability and quality had to be addressed by proxy. Capacity utilization and 

port-to-port transit times served as useful, albeit limited, proxies for service reliability. 

To the extent that excess capacity existed in a trade, it could be argued that the available 

capacity on offer likely was sufficient to meet shippers’ demand for liner service. During 

periods when capacity was extremely tight – for example, when utilization levels reached or 

exceeded 100 percent – the presumption was that service reliability likely was inadequate. 

Measurements of available capacity and capacity utilization rates served to identify periods 

and trade lanes in which service reliability may have been problematic.

Port-to-port transit times as a second proxy for service reliability may not capture the 

many dimensions to which the term service reliability might appropriately be applied. It 

should, however, cover the carriers’ introduction of various degrees of slow (and extra-slow) 

steaming6

 – as a cost reduction measure (albeit one with environmental benefits as well). 

Changes in transit times due to slow steaming are more likely to have been recession-driven 

rather than due to the repeal of the block exemption.

To the extent that data on capacity utilization and on transit times can serve as useful 

proxies for service quality, there was no persuasive evidence that the repeal of the liner 

conference block exemption either improved or hurt service quality. The main explanation 

for change appears to be the effects of (and responses by the lines to) the global recession – 

that is, declining cargo volume and the need to reduce operational costs.

Secondary Findings

The Study’s primary finding, that US liner trades did not experience any negative 

consequences from the EU’s repeal of the block exemption, can be supplemented by several 

additional findings from the difference-in-differences analyses undertaken. Those secondary 

findings are presented below. 

The impact of the repeal on rate stability appears to have been an increase in volatility 

– A result that suggests that the existence of a discussion agreement in a trade (or, at least, in 

the Far East trades) may have some dampening effect on rate volatility. Rate volatility was 

seen to have increased in both trades in the post-repeal period, but noticeably more so in the 

Far East/Europe trade. In reaction to the global recession, average revenue in the Far East/

Europe trade fell more swiftly and to deeper depths than in the Far East/US trade, but also 

recovered more quickly and to greater heights. However, given the lack of impact of the 

repeal on average revenue per container (as a proxy for all-in rates), a discussion agreement’s 

5 “The terminal handling charges in European ports virtually all increased from their conference levels.” Ben Hackett, 

page 21. “The carriers took the opportunity of change to introduce terminal handling charges in ports where they had 

not charged before such as in Klaipeda (where the THC was part of the ocean freight for both the shipper and the 

carrier) and Pireaus and Istanbul where some carriers had a free in/free out policy before.” Ben Hackett, page 22.

6 See Appendix XII for details on slow steaming and changes in transit times.
Chapter 7

220

potential impact on rate volatility may have more to do with the member lines sharing 

information and discussing market conditions rather than with their joint pricing proposals 

(such as GRIs). 

The impact of the repeal on market concentration appears to be increased 

concentration – A result that suggests that, in the absence of a forum for carrier discussions 

and information sharing, market concentration may increase slightly more rapidly. Although 

market concentration was broadly similar across the two trades in the pre- and post-repeal 

periods, there was a somewhat greater post-repeal increase in concentration in the Far East/

Europe trade. However, given the absence of concentration (industry-wide and in the major 

East/West trades), as measured by HHI and CR4, such modest increases are unlikely to 

present a problem.

The impact of the repeal on market share stability could be related to rate volatility 

and market concentration – Market share stability noticeably declined in the Far East/

North Europe trade in the post-repeal period in contrast to increased market share stability 

in the Far East/US trade. However, to understand the effects of increased market share 

instability, one needs to assess the situation at a disaggregated level. Are the shifts in market 

share among lines more-or-less random, or do they display a particular trend?

Given the difference-in-differences results with respect to rate volatility (a relative increase 

in the Far East/Europe trade) and market concentration (a relative increase in the Far East/

Europe trade), it seems possible that post-repeal market share instability and increased rate 

volatility may be associated with some of the larger carriers expanding their market share – 

resulting in increased concentration.7

 A key research question that remains to be answered 

is whether the apparent market share instability, and any associated rate volatility, is an 

ephemeral effect of the repeal or one that may have long-term consequences.

The impact of the repeal on capacity utilization is unclear – The numbers suggest 

that, following the repeal, lines in the Far East/Europe trade were better able to maintain 

relatively higher utilization levels than were TSA lines (which, it must be noted, lacked 

capacity management authority). The outcome also may be related to different typical 

contract lengths (3-month versus annual), earlier and greater use of slow steaming, differences 

in new entry during the research period, or other factors. 

The impact of the repeal on average capacity deployed appears to have resulted in 

relatively less capacity being removed from the Far East/Europe trade – A result that 

suggests that, in the absence of a discussion agreement in the trade that is able to exchange 

more-or-less real time information on anticipated demand and available capacity, lines tend 

to maintain more capacity than they might when a trade-lane-based discussion forum exists. 

The fact that the Far East/Europe trade experienced higher levels of capacity utilization 

might provide some explanation why less capacity was removed relative to the US/Far East 

trade. The fact that the trade uses very large vessels that cannot be economically redeployed 

in other trades is also a likely factor.

Taken together, the secondary findings suggest a number of interesting further questions. 

For example: What difference, if any, does it make to carriers or shippers if a block exemption 

7 Data on market shares in the westbound Far East/Europe trade (Asian exports to Europe) indicate that two of the 

three largest carriers (CMA CGM and MSC) significantly increased their market shares in the post-repeal period, and the 

largest (Maersk) retained its 20% plus market share. 
Findings

221

or antitrust immunity is granted or withheld?8 Does discussion and information sharing among 

carrier discussion agreement members have a separate and distinct utility apart from the success 

or failure of the lines’ common pricing proposals (GRIs and additional charges)?

One possible and reasonable hypothesis worthy of examination and development is that 

a carrier discussion agreement like TSA (that is, one with pricing authority but no capacity 

management authority) may be ineffective in improving member lines’ average revenue per 

container in a market characterized by pricing under confidential, one-to-one contracts, but 

effective in helping to reduce rate volatility. 

Should such a hypothesis be confirmed, and given the considerable conflict that exists 

between shippers and carriers over the legislative authority for lines to collectively propose 

voluntary rate actions, there may be some value in revisiting ELAA’s idea of information 

exchange systems.9

8 There are certainly legal consequences that flow from exemptions/immunities such as limitations on exposure to law 

suits, triple damages, etc., that doubtless matter to ocean carriers. Those are not considered in this discussion. 

9 The option of replacing trade-lane-based carrier agreements that have authority to agree on rate actions (and perhaps 

capacity management activities) with potentially less anticompetitive agreements that would be limited to discussions and 

information exchange on market conditions was initially raised by ELAA in the early stages of the DG Comp review. 
223

Appendix I

Notice of Inquiry

On November 1, 2010, the Commission issued a formal Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”), An 

Analysis of the European Union Repeal of the Liner Conference Block Exemption. The NOI 

presented questions requesting information and comments from the public on the effects 

of the repeal by the European Union (“EU”) of its block exemption regulations for liner 

shipping conferences, Regulation 4056/86. The repeal became effective on October 18, 

2008. Information provided in response to the NOI assisted the Commission in its analysis of 

any consequences affecting the US liner trades that could be associated with the EU’s policy 

decision to repeal Regulation 4056/86. Where applicable, the Commission incorporated 

information from the NOI in this Study.

The NOI contained questions divided into the following six sections: (a) general 

questions for any interested party, (b) questions pertaining to the trade between the US 

and North Europe, (c) questions concerning the trade between the US and the Far East, 

(d) questions about the trade between the Far East and Europe, (e) comparisons among the 

foregoing trades, and (f) additional questions for carriers.

Fifteen vessel-operating common carriers,1

 two groups of shipowners,2 and one logistics 

and transportation consultant3

 responded to the notice. There were no responses to the NOI 

from shippers or groups representing the interest of shippers. Many of the carriers provided 

a public version and a confidential version of their responses to the NOI questions. The 

proceeding section presents a list of the NOI questions and a summary of the responses 

provided for public disclosure.

NOI Questions and Responses

Section A: General Questions

1. Based on your experience since September 2006 (when the EU announced its decision to terminate 

the block exemption for liner conferences to take effect October 2008), what impacts, if any, have 

you identified on your company’s commercial activities, in any trade lane, that you would attribute 

to the termination of the EU conference block exemption? Please explain. If you believe there have 

been such impacts, please indicate when that impact first occurred.

Most carriers listed (1) higher relative rate volatility, (2) more surcharge 

complexity and higher surcharge levels, and (3) reduced service (relative to US 

transpacific trade). Several carriers said impacts were minimal or they could not 

identify any – and one carrier in this group added that the repeal had provided no 

shipper benefits.

1 APL Co. PTE Ltd.; Atlantic Container Line AB; CMA CGM, S.A.; COSCO Container Lines North America, Inc. 

(on behalf of COSCO Container Lines Company); Evergreen Line; Hamburg-Sud; Hanjin Shipping Company, Ltd.; 

Hapag-Lloyd AG; Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.; K Line America, Inc. (on behalf of Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, 

Ltd.); A.P. Moller Maersk A/S; NYK Line (North America) Inc. (on behalf of Nippon Yusen Kaisha); Orient Overseas 

Container Line Ltd.; Yang Ming Transport Corp.; and Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd.

2 The Asian Shipowners’ Forum and the Japanese Shipowners’ Association.

3 Global Logistics & Transport Consulting.
Appendix I

224

2. Based on your experience since October 2008 (when the EU exemption for liner conferences 

was terminated) has any class of shipper or class of vessel-operating common carrier received a 

competitive advantage or been put at a competitive disadvantage as a result of the EU decision to 

terminate the exemption? If so, please explain.

A substantial majority said it was too difficult to tell or that they saw no particular 

advantages or disadvantages created. Of the respondents that identified advantages or 

disadvantages: rate volatility was said to be harder on small carriers, and the complex 

pricing environment was also called a problem. One carrier opined that there had 

been increased concentration, mainly by growth of the three largest carriers, in EU 

trades relative to the transpacific.

3. Based on your experience since October 2008 (when the EU exemption for liner conferences was 

terminated), have differences between the US and EU liner shipping competition regulations created 

any problems for your company? If so, please explain.

A substantial majority said either “no” or indicated that, in general, it would be 

more convenient for carriers if there was one common set of rules. There was, 

however, no mention of particular problems. One carrier noted that the EU repeal 

highlighted the waste created by requirements to file tariffs and service contracts. 

Several carriers used the question to reinforce their views on rate volatility and 

non-uniform surcharges as problems with the EU approach.

4. Does your company view cooperation among ocean carriers in operational agreements (e.g., vessel 

sharing agreements, alliances, consortia, etc.) as generally having a positive, neutral, or negative 

impact on the availability or cost of liner shipping services? Please explain. Does the EU market 

share threshold of 30 percent for such operational agreements have any effect with respect to that 

impact? If so, please explain.

Uniformly, operational agreements are viewed positively. On the question of a 

30 percent market share cap, one carrier mentioned it as a way to prevent the 

formation of monopolies. Several others raised questions about the cap’s effects on 

formations of new VSAs and possible impacts with respect to service at new ports or 

in niche markets. Most lines, however, mentioned that they had no actual problems 

staying below the 30 percent cap.

Section B: Questions about the North Atlantic Trade (North Europe/US)

5. Approximately what percent of your company’s freight earnings (lines, OTIs) or shipping expenses 

(shippers) involves international shipping in the North Europe/US trade? Does your company’s 

business involve US imports (westbound service) only, US exports (eastbound service) only, or 

both? Please explain briefly.

There were eleven carriers that requested confidentiality on their earnings in the 

trade. Among the public disclosures, ACL indicated that 98 percent of its earnings 

originated from the trade; however, unlike most carriers, the services of ACL 

are primarily dedicated to the North Atlantic. Other carriers disclosed that their 

earnings in the trade ranged from 2.5 to 10.3 percent. Global Logistics stated 

that 12 percent of its clients’ business was devoted to the trade. The respondents 

disclosed that they service both trade directions.
Notice of Inquiry

225

6. How, and to what extent, did the recent economic recession (2008-2009) affect your company’s 

liner shipping-related business in the North Europe/US trade? Please explain.

There were seven carriers requesting confidentiality of their responses to question 

6. Based on public information, the respondents indicated that the recession caused 

cargo volume (demand), capacity utilization levels, freight rates, and revenues in the 

trade to decline substantially, which resulted in financial losses. Yang Ming cited 

60 percent declines in cargo volume and revenue, and Global Logistics stated that 

its business in the trade was down by more than 30 percent. In response to these 

conditions, carriers said that they acted to remove excess capacity by terminating 

services, deploying smaller vessels in service strings, and forming new vessel sharing 

and slot chartering agreements with each other. A carrier explained that as of the 

date of this submission, capacity had not been restored to the trade because the 

market, in terms of demand and rates, had not improved sufficiently. NYK also 

noted that the extensive amount of debt, and cost of servicing debt, assumed by 

carriers due to the recession will continue to be a financial burden in the future.

7. Based on your experience prior to July 2008, when the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement 

(TACA) disbanded, did the existence of TACA have any impact on your liner shipping-related 

business in the North Europe/US trade? If so, please explain.

Both former conference and non-conference carriers claimed that in the latter 

years of the conference, the main impact of TACA on business in the trade was 

its common tariff surcharges and ancillary charges, and to a degree, it provided 

market indicators with its rate announcements. In addition, since TACA 

disbanded, many carriers observed that pricing has become more volatile in the 

trade, particularly with respect to such major surcharges as bunker and terminal 

handling charges.

8. Based on your experience in the period from October 2008 to the present (i.e., since the EU block 

exemption was terminated), has there been any significant change(s) in liner services in the North 

Europe/US trade that you attribute to the EU terminating the block exemption? For example, 

changes in:

The level of freight rates and surcharges;

Most carriers complained of greater volatility in rates and surcharges due to the 

repeal and also the recession. Some carriers observed a trend toward all-in rates 

and stated that rate fluctuations were exacerbated by the loss of carrier discussions.

The frequency with which rates or surcharges are adjusted up or downward (volatility);

Most carriers observed greater volatility in rates and surcharges after the repeal 

when TACA carriers were no longer able to engage in discussions and began 

setting rates and charges individually.

The assessment of surcharges;

Most carriers observed that after the repeal the levels of surcharges began to vary 

on an individual basis by carrier, resulting in complaints from shippers. CMA 

CGM noticed that bunker charges in particular began to be reviewed and changed 

on a monthly basis. ACL explained that shippers’ complaints over the variance in 

surcharges in the trade led them to discontinue most of their surcharges.
Appendix I

226

The level of competition among carriers;

Some carriers observed an increase in competition after the repeal, while others 

found competition to be equally as “intense” as before the repeal. Zim noted that 

market concentration among the top three competing carriers has increased since 

the repeal. Global Logistics related competition in the trade to market conditions 

and not the repeal.

The service contracting practices or terms offered by ocean carriers;

Most respondents found no change in service contracting after the repeal.

The availability of vessel capacity and container equipment; or

Most respondents did not attribute changes in the availability of vessel capacity 

and container equipment to the repeal. Carriers attributed the withdrawal of vessel 

capacity in the trade to the recession and market demand.

The level or quality of liner services (including customer service, billing accuracy, etc.)

Most respondents indicated that liner services were not affected due to the repeal. 

Zim, however, made the following points regarding service and the repeal: 

greater volatility in service, in terms of number, capacity, port calls, resulted from 

greater volatility in rates; there is less incentive to invest in a trade where rates 

are declining; and there is no organization in the trade where carriers can address 

important issues. Global Logistics complained that unexpected changes in service 

create planning problems for its clients, and customer service and documentation 

by carriers are inconsistent.

9. For CY 2010 to date, please estimate the percentage of your annual business (by volume) in the 

North Europe/US liner trade that moved under (a) annual (or longer) service contracts, (b) shorterterm freight agreements, (c) spot rates, and (d) other (please specify). Has that changed significantly 

since October 2008? If so, please explain.

There were eleven carriers requesting confidentiality of their responses to question 

9. Based on public information, the respondents indicated that the duration and 

method of pricing in the trade had not changed since October 2008. Most of the 

cargo in the trade was shipped under service contracts with durations of a year 

or more. However, ACL and Hamburg Sud indicated that major portions of the 

cargo they handled were shipped under freight agreements of less than a year in 

one or both directions of the trade.

10. Following repeal of the EU block exemption, ocean carriers created a global information system 

under Container Trade Statistics, Ltd. (CTS) in which a majority of ocean carriers serving the 

North Europe/US trade participate. CTS provides certain data free on its web site, including 

indices of the carriers’ aggregated average revenue per TEU per month. CTS also sells other data. 

To what extent, if at all, does your company access and use CTS Europe/US trade data, and, if 

it does so, for what purpose(s)?

Most respondents indicated that they use CTS data to evaluate market trends and 

pricing in the trade relative to their own market positions. Several of the carriers 

explained that CTS data is useful for investment and decision making or market 

strategy purposes. Global Logistics uses the data in general terms to assess its 

contract rates against the trade. Many respondents noted that they also use other 
Notice of Inquiry

227

commercial sources of data in addition to CTS data, including PIERS, Drewry, 

and Department of Commerce.

Section C: Questions about the Transpacific Trade (Far East/US)

11. Approximately what percent of your company’s freight earnings (lines, OTIs) or shipping expenses 

(shippers) involve international shipping in the Far East/US trade? Does your company’s business 

involve US imports (eastbound service) only, US exports (westbound service) only, or both?

There were eleven carriers requesting confidentiality of their responses to question 

11. ACL and Hamburg Sud noted that the questions in Sections C, D, and E were 

not applicable to their operations in part or full because neither carrier operated 

services in the specified Far East trades. CMA CGM and OOCL disclosed that, 

respectively, 13 and 35 percent of their earnings were generated from their 

operations in both directions of the Far East/US trade. Global Logistics indicated 

that nearly 70 percent of its business on behalf of its clients was dedicated to the 

trade and involved both imports and exports.

12. How, and to what extent, did the economic recession (2008-2009) affect your company’s liner 

shipping related business in the Far East/US trade? Please explain.

Eight carriers requested confidentiality of their responses to question 12. Based 

on the information made public, respondents complained of a substantial decline 

in cargo volume and loss of revenue in the trade due to the economic recession 

in 2009. Specifically, OOCL and Yang Ming revealed that in 2009 compared to 

2008, cargo volume declined in both directions of the trade by 13 to 20 percent, 

and the level of freight rates fell by 24 to 30 percent. Global Logistics stated 

that its business in the trade declined by 31 percent in 2009. To deal with these 

conditions, carriers stated that measures were taken to remove excess capacity in 

the trade by reconfiguring services, reducing vessel deployments, and increasing 

service coordination among carriers through various forms of operational 

agreements.

13. Based on your experience from January 2006 to the present, have the activities of the Transpacific 

Stabilization Agreement (TSA) or the Westbound Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (WTSA) 

had any significant impact on your company’s liner shipping related businesses in the Far East/US 

trades? If so, please explain.

In general, carriers expressed the view that TSA and WTSA have a positive impact 

on the trade. The carriers cited the promotion of rate stability in the trade as a 

positive attribute of the discussion agreements. Another positive feature of the 

agreements expressed by the carriers is the provision for shipper advisory boards, 

which the carriers explained permits them to meet with shippers to discuss, among 

other things, market trends, shipper priorities, equipment availability, shipper and 

carrier concerns, and anticipated changes in rates. Carriers also noted that TSA 

allows its members to discuss environmental issues with the intent of reducing 

pollution caused by liner shipping operations. Global Logistics maintained that 

market forces predominately influenced freight rates and conditions in the trade 

rather than the activities of carriers in TSA and WTSA; however, it stated that the 

recovery of rates in the inbound trade direction in 2010 was likely escalated by 
Appendix I

228

TSA.

14. Based on your experience in the period from October 2008 to the present, have there been any 

significant characteristics of ocean liner services in Far East/US trades that you attribute to actions 

taken by TSA or WTSA member lines acting collectively? For example, significant characteristics in:

The level of freight rates and surcharges;

Carriers reiterated the view that discussions and information exchange under 

TSA and WTSA promote and provide a degree of stability and predictability in 

rates and surcharges, but ultimately, market forces drive rate and surcharge levels. 

Global Logistics pointed to the significant rate increases obtained in 2010 as 

evidence of TSA’s influence.

The frequency with which rates or surcharges are adjusted upward or downward (rate volatility);

Again, carriers maintained that the ability to assess and discuss trade conditions 

under TSA and WTSA results in less frequent changes in rates and surcharges that 

are more closely in line with changes in the market, but rate volatility is essentially 

a function of the supply and demand equation in the trade.

The assessment of surcharges;

Carriers explained that the assessments of surcharges are based on costs and that the 

surcharges set under discussion agreements, such as the BAF formula under TSA, 

provide transparency and predictability, which are qualities requested by shippers. 

Carriers stressed, however, that the assessment of any surcharge is an individual 

decision on the part of a carrier and subject to negotiation with shippers. Global 

Logistics found it difficult to negotiate a fixed charge for fuel costs with carriers, 

noting that carriers prefer a floating charge that varies based on fuel prices.

The level of competition among ocean carriers;

Carriers asserted that discussion agreements do not impede or limit competition 

in the trade, noting that in the inbound trade direction, competition between 

members of TSA is intense, as well as with carriers that are not members of TSA.

The service contracting practices or terms offered by ocean carriers;

Carriers did not attribute the practices and terms of service contracts to the 

collective actions of carriers in discussion agreements, explaining that service 

contracts are negotiated on a confidential and individual basis subject to market 

conditions and the leverage of shippers. Global Logistics stated that it requires 

intense negotiations with carriers on behalf of its clients to insert any specific or 

unique terms or language into service contracts.

The availability of vessel capacity and container equipment; and

Carriers asserted that such operational matters as the deployment of vessel capacity 

and equipment are not within the authority or collective control of the discussion 

agreements but are decisions made on an individual basis by each carrier. K Line 

agreed that such matters are decided by the individual carrier but added that the 

exchange of information under the discussion agreements did result in an increase 

in the availability of capacity to shippers.
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229

The level of quality of liner services (including customer service, billing accuracy, etc.).

Again, carriers commented that service matters are based on the decisions of 

individual carriers and are not matters addressed collectively under or influenced 

by discussion agreements. Global Logistics complained of a deterioration of service 

in the trade starting in 2008 and noted that it is difficult for its clients to plan for 

the future because of frequent service changes on short notice.

15. For CY 2010 to date, please estimate the percentage of your annual business (by volume) in the 

Far East/US liner trade that moves under (a) annual (or longer) service contracts, (b) shorter-term 

freight agreements, (c) spot rates, and (d) other (please specify)? Has that changed significantly since 

October 2008? If so, please explain.

There were eleven carriers requesting confidentiality of their responses to question 

15. Based on public information, OOCL revealed that upwards of 95 percent or 

more of its cargo moves under contracts with an annual duration or longer. K Line 

also disclosed that the majority of its cargo moved under annual contracts, but it 

explained that the rates are subject to change based on market fluctuations. Global 

Logistics reported that close to 80 percent of its clients’ cargo moves under annual 

contracts. Respondents did not report any significant changes since 2008.

Section D: Questions about the Europe-Asia trade (Far East/Europe)

16. Approximately what percent of your company’s freight earnings (lines, OTIs) or shipping expenses 

(shippers) involve international shipping in the Far East/Europe trade? Does your company’s 

business involve European imports (westbound service) only, European exports (eastbound service) 

only, or both? Please explain briefly.

Ten carriers requested that their responses to question 16 be confidential. The 

carriers providing public information disclosed that between 12 to 28 percent of 

their earnings were generated from their operations in the trade. Global Logistics 

stated that 12 percent of its clients’ business was devoted to the trade. The 

respondents disclosed that they service both trade directions.

17. How, and to what extent, did the recent economic recession (2008-2009) affect your company’s 

liner shipping-related business in the Far East/Europe trade? Please explain.

Six carrier responses to question 17 are confidential. Among the public disclosures, 

Yang Ming reported declines of 20 percent in cargo volume and 50 percent in 

rates due to the effects of the recession on the trade. Similarly, APL reported 

a 20 percent decline in its cargo volume in the trade, and Hyundai stated that 

freight rates fell by 43 percent in 2009. Global Logistics experienced a 35 percent 

decline in business due to the recession. K Line noted that during the recession 

rate levels dropped below the charter hire cost of vessels. With some of the largest 

containerships deployed in this particular trade, carriers explained that the recession 

created a huge amount of excess vessel capacity from the drop in demand. As 

such, carriers withdrew and/or rationalized services and vessel capacity, began (or 

increased) the slow steaming of vessels, and formed new vessel sharing and slot 

chartering agreements to cope with the trade imbalance and financial losses.
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230

18. Based on your experience prior to October 2008 (i.e., before the Far Eastern Freight Conference 

disbanded), did the existence of FEFC have any impact on your liner shipping-related business in 

the Far East/Europe trade? Please explain.

Among the former members of the conference, the general consensus is that 

FEFC was an invaluable platform for carriers to discuss and address industry 

related matters on infrastructure, market conditions, and environmental initiatives. 

Carriers also commented that FEFC provided a forum of communication with 

shippers on matters of common interest, which promoted greater stability in 

the trade. Carriers explained that voluntary guidelines on rates and surcharges 

set under FEFC enhanced transparency and stability in the trade by providing 

reliable benchmarks for contract negotiations between shippers and carriers. As 

such, carriers stressed that voluntary guidelines were useful in preventing wild and 

unpredictable swings in rate levels, which benefited both shippers and carriers. 

They added that rates and surcharges in trades without antitrust immunity tend to 

be more volatile.

19. Based on your experience in the period from October 2008 to the present (i.e., since the EU block 

exemption was terminated), has there been any significant change(s) in liner services in the Far 

East/Europe trade that you attribute to the EU’s ending of the block exemption? For example, 

changes in:

The level of freight rates and surcharges;

Most carriers claimed that before and after the repeal of the block exemption, 

freight rates remained subject to intense market competition. The guidelines 

proposed by the FEFC provided a baseline for carriers to evaluate their freight 

rates and a starting point in negotiations with shippers. Most carriers believe that 

the lack of such a baseline has increased the volatility in both rates and services 

in the trade. As for surcharges, before the abolishment of the conference, carriers 

were free to follow the FEFC’s tariffs or come up with their own. After FEFC, 

carriers now determine the levels and terms of their surcharges on an individual 

basis. As a result, surcharge levels and their application vary from carrier to carrier 

based on the individual carrier’s operating costs and commercial decisions.

The frequency with which rates or surcharges are adjusted upward or downward (rate volatility);

Most carriers stated that since the termination of the block exemption, freight rates 

and surcharges have been adjusted more frequently than what was traditionally the 

case before, and attribute this to the repeal of the block exemption and the loss of 

FEFC as well as the economic recession.

The assessment of surcharges;

After termination of the EU block exemption, carriers claimed they were 

required to develop their own unique versions of surcharges and the dates of their 

implementation based on operating costs, commercial decisions, and to a great 

extent customer feedback. As a result, surcharge levels and their application varied 

from carrier to carrier. A few carriers mentioned that this led to confusion and 

dissatisfaction among shippers who complained that the varying surcharges made 

it more difficult to evaluate and compare offers from different carriers. One carrier 

added that there is now a push by certain shippers on carriers to eliminate the 

separate application of surcharges and offer, instead, “all in” rates.
Notice of Inquiry

231

The level of competition among ocean carriers;

Carriers claimed that before and after the repeal, freight rates, surcharges, and 

services in the Far East/Europe trade were subject to market competition and that 

this competition was and still is substantial. Zim further noted that the Far East/

Europe trade is more concentrated than the other trades with three major carriers 

increasing their combined market share to about 45 percent over the last three 

years. Evergreen believes that lack of the stabilizing influence of FEFC during the 

economic downturn led to destructive pricing wars that threaten the survival of 

small, low-cost carriers and warns that the net result would be less competition 

rather than more competition in the trade.

The service contracting practices or terms offered by ocean carriers;

Some carriers reported that their service contracting practices and terms offered 

became more complicated because of the variety of rate structures of the other 

carriers in the market. Other carriers stated there was no change.

The availability of vessel capacity and container equipment; and

Most carriers stated that there was no change to the availability of vessel capacity 

and container equipment attributable to the repeal; instead, it was the global 

recession that forced carriers to rationalize services and slow steam vessels as cost 

cutting measures. Evergreen believes, however, that the lack of a common view 

on market outlook that carriers had under FEFC postponed the reactivation of idle 

vessels and precluded carriers from long-term investments, including orders of new 

vessels and container equipment.

The level or quality of liner services (including customer service, billing accuracy, etc.).

Most carriers stated that there was no change to the level or quality of their liner 

services since the repeal of the EU block exemption. A few carriers, however, 

mentioned that customers were confused and dissatisfied because of the lack 

of uniformity of the surcharges among different carriers making it difficult to 

compare offers. Zim noted that, before the repeal, FEFC promoted dialogue with 

customers to obtain their views and recommendations on better practices, which 

assisted the lines in adapting their individual operations. Hanjin and Evergreen 

stated that increased volatility of rates and surcharges, and rationalization of 

services, which they blame in part on the abolishment of FEFC, resulted in huge 

losses across the container shipping industry. The view was expressed that with 

carriers struggling for survival and making every effort in cost-cutting programs, 

there was little left for service improvements and that the level and quality of liner 

services could be affected over time.

20. For CY 2010 to date, please estimate the percentage of your business (by volume) in the Far 

East/Europe liner trade that moved under (a) annual (or longer) service contracts, (b) shorter-term 

freight agreements, (c) spot rates, and (d) other, please specify? Has that changed significantly since 

October 2008? If so, please explain

There were eleven carriers that requested their responses to question 20 be 

confidential. The responses varied from the respondents that provided public 

information. APL stated that the majority of its cargo in the trade moved under 

three month agreements. OOCL reported that the majority of its cargo in the 
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232

trade moved under spot rates, and Global Logistics revealed that 72 percent of the 

cargo of its clients moved under annual contracts.

21. Following repeal of the EU block exemption, ocean carriers created a global information system 

under the Container Trade Statistics, Ltd. (CTS), in which a majority of ocean carriers serving the 

Far East/Europe trade participate. CTS makes certain data free on its web site, including indices 

of the carriers’ aggregated average revenue per TEU by month. CTS also sells other data. To what 

extent, if at all, does your company access and use Far East/Europe trade data, and (if it does so) 

for what purpose?

Most of the respondents indicated that they use the CTS and other trade data to 

monitor market shares, cargo volumes, and freight rate trends to help their service 

planning and marketing activities. However, NYK reported that they resigned 

from the agreement and have never used CTS data for any purpose.

Section E: Comparisons among Trades

22. Based on your experience since October 2008 (since the E.U. block exemption was terminated) 

are there differences in the characteristics of the Far East/US trade versus the Far East/Europe 

or North Europe/US trades that you attribute to differences between US and European liner 

competition regulations? For example, differences in:

The level of freight rates and surcharges;

Zim stated that in the trades with no conferences or voluntary discussion 

agreements, there is greater rate and service volatility. K Line explained that after 

the removal of the block exemption, the timing and quantum of rate increases 

and surcharges varied, which caused confusion and inconvenience because of the 

frequency. Evergreen stated that the existence of TSA and WTSA has a helpful 

effect on the volatility aspect. Likewise, OOCL stated that the freight rates tend 

to fluctuate more frequently in the Far East/Europe and US/Europe trades. Other 

respondents reported there were no obvious differences since the level of freight 

rates are subject to the supply and demand conditions of their respective markets. 

Likewise surcharges are adjusted to reflect relative operating costs.

The frequency with which rates or surcharges are adjusted upward or downward (rate volatility);

Hapag-Lloyd stated that discussion agreements bring stability to the trade, and 

noted that rate levels during the recession did not fluctuate as drastically in the 

transpacific trade as they did in the Far East/Europe trade. K Line reported 

that, while rates fluctuate based on supply and demand, the magnitude of such 

adjustments to the carriers’ profit and loss is more frequent in the Far East/Europe 

trade. Zim stated that rates and charges are revised less frequently in trades where 

conferences or voluntary discussion agreements exist than in trades where such 

agreements are not present. Evergreen believes that, because of the existence 

of TSA and WTSA, the frequency of changes in rates and surcharges has not 

been as extreme in the Transpacific-US trades as in the Far East to Europe trade 

lanes. Further, the respondents explained that because the majority of US-related 

trades are under long-term service contracts, rates and surcharges are adjusted less 

frequently than in the Far East/Europe trade, which has fewer contracts and more 

spot rates that generally change quarterly.
Notice of Inquiry

233

The assessment of surcharges;

Carriers indicated that for the most part there are no differences between the trades 

because surcharges are adjusted to reflect the change of operating costs. However, 

carriers added that TSA and WTSA give more transparency and consistency to 

these charges, whereas in the Far East/Europe trade, the surcharges vary more. 

Zim explained that while there is competition on surcharges, conferences and 

discussion agreements establish voluntary guidelines and fact-based formulas that 

provide transparency on the elements of specific surcharges, and offer shippers 

more predictability as they have requested.

The level of competition among ocean carriers;

Carriers asserted that they strongly compete with one another in all of these 

markets. In the view of Zim, the transpacific market is less concentrated in 

comparison to the Far East/Europe and US/Europe markets. Zim stated that the 

major three carriers have more dominance in the Far East/Europe trade, which 

could be attributed to the removal of the block exemption.

The service contracting practices or terms offered by ocean carriers;

Most all of the respondents indicated that there is no difference between the trades 

because each carrier negotiates contracts individually and confidentially with its 

customers.

The availability of vessel capacity and container equipment; and

The respondents indicated there is no difference since decisions on these issues are 

made by the lines individually outside of conferences or discussion agreements. 

Evergreen pointed out that the container shipping industry is a highly capital 

intensive industry and it takes sustainable freight rates to maintain the service 

network.

The level or quality of liner services (including customer service, billing accuracy, etc.)

Most respondents commented that there are no differences between the trades 

because customer service is handled individually by carriers, and conferences and 

discussion agreements are not involved in such matters. Zim noted that in general, 

conferences and discussion agreements provide a forum for dialogue with shippers 

to obtain their views and recommendations on service quality and improvements.

23. Please identify any significant similarities and dissimilarities (for example, cargo volumes, scope or 

scale of operations, shipper mix, geography, market concentration levels, contracting practices, legal 

requirements, etc.) that existed in liner shipping markets in (1) the Far East/US trade and (2) the 

Far East/Europe trade during the period 2006-2010. In your opinion, how (if at all) would those 

similarities and dissimilarities likely impact a comparison of liner pricing and service behavior across 

those two trades?

Respondents described a number of similarities that exist between the two trades 

including: cargo volume and cargo growth rates, commodity mix, container 

cargo from China dominates both trades, the same VOCCs and NVOCCs 

operate in both trades, security rules on filing advanced manifest are similar in 

the US and Europe.
Appendix I

234

In terms of dissimilarities between the two trades, respondents cited the following: 

ports in Europe are more modern, efficient, and larger than US ports; labor 

practices are more costly and less productive at US ports; vessel calls in the US 

require more port time; Europe is more of a port-to-port trade than the US; the 

Suez canal to Europe can handle larger vessels than the Panama canal to the US 

Atlantic coast; Europe has more feeder and barge services than the US; NVOCCs 

ship more cargo in Europe than in the US; Europe no longer allows carriers to 

participate in price fixing agreements; the US trade is subject to greater regulations 

including tariff and service contract requirements; freight rates are less contractual 

for a shorter duration in Europe than the US; rates and surcharges vary more in 

Europe due to the repeal of the block exemption; services are more customized 

with all inclusive fixed contractual rates in the US than in Europe.

Section F: Additional Questions for Vessel-Operating Common Carriers

24. Please estimate the percentage of your liner revenues (globally) that were earned in each of the 

following trade lanes during CY 2010 to date: (a) North Europe/US liner trade; (b) Far East/

US Liner trade; (c) Far East/Europe liner trade; (d) all other liner trades; and (e) Total (all liner 

trades combined).

Eleven carriers requested confidentiality of their responses to question 24. The 

respondents providing public information indicated, aside from ACL, that 50 

percent or more of their earnings were generated from other liner trades than 

those specified in (a) through (c) of question 24.

25. In each of the three major East-West trades, please estimate the percentage of cargo your company 

carried for beneficial cargo owners (BCO) accounts, (b) OTI accounts, (c) other accounts (if any, 

please explain) during CY 2010 to date.

Eleven carriers requested confidentiality of their responses to question 25. Based 

on the public information that was provided, ACL and Hamburg Sud only served 

the North Europe/US trade; ACL primarily carried BCO cargo (90 percent) in 

the trade, whereas the majority of cargo carried by Hamburg Sud was for OTIs 

(70 percent inbound and 55 percent outbound). OOCL reported that in the 

Europe trades, the majority of the cargo that it carried was for OTIs, while in the 

Far East/US trade, the majority of the cargo that it carried was for BCOs.

26. In each if the three major East-West trade lanes, please indicate which lanes have tended to be the 

relatively most profitable and which was the relatively least profitable for each year between 2006 

and 2010 (inclusive).

Ten carriers requested confidentiality of their responses to question 26, and other 

respondents did not answer the question. OOCL was the only respondent to 

provide public information to question 26. In 2006, OOCL identified the Far 

East/US trade lane as the relatively most profitable and the Far East/Europe trade 

lane as the relatively least profitable. Thereafter, from 2007 through 2010, OOCL 

identified the Far East/Europe trade as the relatively most profitable and the North 

Europe/US trade lane as the relatively least profitable.
Notice of Inquiry

235

27. Based on your experience during the period from January 2006 to the present, have there been any 

significant changes in the nature of your business in the North Europe/US liner shipping market 

related to changes in:

Seasonality of cargo movements;

Most respondents indicated that there was no change in cargo seasonality. Yang 

Ming noted that the trade is highly matured and not subject to such changes.

Commodity values;

Most respondents indicated that there was no change in commodity values, and 

Hanjin claimed that commodity value has no direct relationship with the revenue 

earnings of carriers.

Directional cargo imbalances (imports vs. exports);

Respondents indicated that currency exchange rates affected the cargo imbalance. 

As the US dollar declined in value against European currencies, US export cargo 

grew as European import cargo declined or remained unchanged. Consequently, 

toward the latter part of the review period, the directional balance of cargo 

volume stabilized.

Number of carriers serving the trade; or

Respondents did not observe any major changes in the number of carriers serving 

the trade; however, it was noted that carriers acted to reduce capacity and services 

over the review period.

Minimum scale (number and size of vessels) needed to serve the trade efficiently.

Respondents provided a variety of answers. CMA estimated the minimum size of 

vessels at 2,500 to 3,000 TEUs with five to six vessels per string. Hanjin estimated 

efficient vessel size at between 3,000 and 4,500 TEUs; K Line estimated average 

vessel size at 4,500 TEUs; and Hyundai commented that the trade has vessels of 

less than 5,000 TEUs in capacity. Hamburg Sud explained that the trade has a 

slim profit margin and it is critical to match supply and demand closely to reduce 

exposure to losses due to rate volatility. It added that rate volatility drives capacity 

and service down.

28. Based on your company’s experiences in the North Europe/US trade, please identify any 

substantial changes that occurred in your liner business (operations, marketing, pricing, etc.) in 

the two years following repeal of the EU liner conference exemption (CY 2009 and 2010) as 

compared with the two years preceding the repeal (2006-2007)? If any, please explain.

Respondents identified rate volatility and the trend toward all-in rates as 

substantial changes in the trade in the latter half of the review period after the 

repeal. Hamburg Sud commented that shorter term contracts with lower volume 

commitments increased rate volatility in the trade. Hyundai noted that as the trade 

began to recover in 2010, the implementation of individual GRIs and surcharges 

created confusion in the market, and some shippers expressed a desire to discuss 

rate matters with carriers as a group. K Line stated that prior to the repeal, vessel 

capacity increased by 20 percent as new deliveries in other trades dumped more 

tonnage into the transatlantic, but when demand dropped in the post-repeal 

period, capacity was withdrawn from the trade, which has not been added back to 
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236

date because of the weak outlook in demand. Yang Ming believes that the market 

changes in the latter half of the review period were due to the recession and said 

the repeal and loss of TACA had no impact on its business.

29. Based on your experience during the period from January 2006 to present, have there been any 

significant changes in the nature of your business in the Far East/US liner shipping market related 

to changes in:

Seasonality of cargo movements;

Carriers reported that the inbound peak season is shifting or expanding. Some 

carriers found that last year’s inbound peak season began early and ended early. 

Other carriers reported that traditionally the inbound peak season began in July and 

continued through October, but now begins in June and runs through November. 

Outbound volumes are seasonal throughout the year mainly due to the harvesting 

and shipping of agricultural products.

Commodity values;

Some carriers commented that the value of US agricultural exports rose toward 

the end of the review period because of an increase in the demand in Far East 

nations for US products of corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton.

Directional cargo imbalances (imports vs. exports);

Carriers acknowledged that the cargo imbalance poses challenges for them and 

that container imports from the Far East are overwhelmingly higher than US 

export containers. Also, US export cargo is much heavier than imports, so fewer 

loaded containers can be shipped westbound. Further, agricultural exports are 

unpredictable due to crop failures and the variance in harvest times. Some carriers 

expressed the view that the imbalance between imports and exports is improving.

Number of carriers serving the trade;

Carriers reported that service and capacity in the trade were reduced during the 

economic recession in 2009 and, as conditions improved in 2010, a few new 

carriers entered the trade, but their services and capacity are not comparable to the 

major carriers.

Minimum scale (number and size of vessels) needed to serve the trade efficiently.

Carriers indicated that the minimum scale of service in the trade is around five to 

six vessels with a capacity of 5,000 to 7,000 TEUs per vessel for the Far East/US 

Pacific Coast, and nine to ten vessels with a capacity of 4,000 to 5,000 TEUs per 

vessel for the Far East/US Atlantic Coast. Carriers noted that larger vessels with 

a capacity of 8,000 TEUs and greater are now more commonly deployed in the 

trade.

30. Based on your experience during the period from January 2006 to the present, have there been any 

significant changes in the nature of your business in the Far East/EU liner shipping market related 

to changes in:

Seasonality of cargo movements;

Most carriers said there was no change. However, Yang Ming stated the seasonal 

effect of the Chinese holidays has become more significant.
Notice of Inquiry

237

Commodity values;

Most carriers said there was no change in commodity values. Hyundai, however, 

said it has noticed that some high value cargo has transferred from air transport to 

ocean transport such as laptop computers. Evergreen said that the volume of solar 

panels and electronic goods is increasing.

Directional cargo imbalances (imports vs. exports);

K Line submitted data prepared by Drewry Maritime Research, which shows that 

the imbalance ratio of imports vs. exports in the European trade with the Far East 

was 2.3 to 1 in 2006, and peaked in 2007 at 2.6 to 1. The ratio was at its lowest 

at 2.1 to 1 in 2009. Other carriers agreed with this assessment and attributed the 

reduction of the imbalance to growing exports from Europe due to the increased 

demand and purchasing power of China.

Number of carriers serving the trade;

Carriers expressed the view that entry and exit in the trade depends on market 

conditions. If rates are high and profits are being made, new carriers often enter 

the trade in relatively limited scope. When supply and demand are out of balance, 

carriers exit the trade.

Minimum scale (number and size of vessels) needed to serve the trade efficiently.

Since 2006, carriers reported that larger size ships are being deployed to achieve 

economies of scale. The minimum scale was eight or nine 5,000-7,000 TEU 

vessels for Far East/Europe services. As the trade grew and fuel prices rose, the 

minimum scale of service increased. The Far East/Europe services now require 

nine or ten 8,000-10,000 TEU vessels to be efficient and cost competitive. 

Carriers noted that it has become increasingly difficult for carriers to survive in this 

market without obtaining lower operating costs per container with larger vessels.
239

Appendix II

Rate Volatility Measures

In this appendix, the volatility of freight rates in both directions of the transatlantic and the 

headhaul directions of the Asia to US and Asia to Europe trades are examined. A summary 

of the NOI responses that deal specifically with rate volatility also is provided. Three rate 

volatility measures were examined: the Historical Volatility Index, Korea Maritime Institute 

Volatility Index, and the Erasmus Volatility Index. All were developed using the quarterly 

freight rates as shown in the table below.1

 While the measures indicate the magnitude by 

which volatility has changed up or down, none of the measures are capable of distinguishing 

what caused the change(s) – the repeal or the great recession.

Table II.A Quarterly Freight Rates (US$ per TEU)

Period

Europe to 

Asia EB

Asia to 

Europe WB

Asia to 

US EB

US to 

Asia WB

US to 

Europe EB

Europe to 

US WB

1Q06 793 1454 1836 815 995 1829

2Q06 804 1408 1753 828 1010 1829

3Q06 806 1494 1715 839 1041 1854

4Q06 792 1545 1671 777 1066 1762

1Q07 755 1549 1643 737 1032 1692

2Q07 744 1658 1675 765 1067 1653

3Q07 792 2014 1709 751 1144 1667

4Q07 959 2109 1680 761 1175 1707

1Q08 1064 2030 1757 845 1261 1637

2Q08 1104 1937 1844 987 1381 1610

3Q08 1141 1837 1934 1170 1644 1600

4Q08 1109 1619 1890 1196 1731 1600

1Q09 853 1023 1670 913 1481 1325

2Q09 742 897 1383 802 1431 1168

3Q09 787 1061 1232 817 1424 1133

4Q09 920 1422 1322 883 1527 1250

1Q10 1090 2060 1440 978 1369 1115

2Q10 1263 2146 1680 1122 1539 1252

3Q10 1226 2177 1944 1158 1615 1359

4Q10 1116 1899 1808 1059 1615 1391

The Historical Volatility Index

The steps taken to create the Historical Volatility Index (“HVI”) are similar to how stock 

traders express the annualized price volatility of a stock except that quarterly data, rather than 

daily data, are used. First, the percent change is calculated as the natural log of the ratio of 

the freight rate from each quarter to its previous quarter. The annualized HVI is calculated as 

the standard deviation of the percentage changes for the last four quarters and then multiplied 

by two using the “square root of time rule.”2

 The HVI measures how far rate swings over a 

1 The data sources are CI-Online, ELAA/CTS, TSA, and WTSA.

2 In general, to get the volatility of a particular time span with the volatility calculated from certain periodic data, where 

the time span has K periods, one needs to multiply the volatility by the square root of K. Since the data is quarterly, the 

volatility is annualized by multiplying it by the square root of four, the number of quarters in a year.
Appendix II

240

given period tend to stray from the average freight rate of the previous four quarters. Higher 

volatility means freight rates could change dramatically over a short period of time in either 

direction. Lower volatility means freight rates do not fluctuate so dramatically, but rather 

change in value at a more predictable pace over time. 

The Transatlantic Trade

The chart below shows the historical volatility of the freight rates in the trade between the 

US and Europe in both directions. The Historical Volatility Index remained relatively low at 

about seven percent until the third quarter of 2008 coinciding with the shock of the global 

economic recession and the repeal of the European Commission’s repeal of the conference 

block exemption. For the US/Europe eastbound direction, the HVI reached its highest 

levels in the first half of 2009 at about 28 percent. For the Europe/US westbound direction, 

the HVI reached its highest level of 25 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009. By the end of 

2010, the HVI for both directions had leveled off at about 20 percent or about three times 

higher than before the third quarter of 2008. 

It is also interesting to note that before repeal of the block exemption, the freight rate 

volatility for cargo moving from the US to Europe eastbound direction was slightly more 

volatile at seven percent compared to the volatility of the freight rate for cargo moving 

from Europe to the US westbound at five percent. Since the fourth quarter of 2009, the 

westbound direction has become more volatile at 21 percent compared to 18 percent in the 

eastbound direction. 

Chart II.B Historical Volatility Index 

for the Transatlantic Trade

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Europe to US WB

US to Europe EB

Volatility Index

Comparison between the Asia/US and Asia/Europe Trades

The chart below compares the historical volatility of the freight rates of cargo moving in the 

headhaul directions of trade between Asia and the US and Asia and Europe. In the period 

before repeal, the HVI in the Asia to Europe trade averaged 15 percent compared to five 

percent in the Asia to US trade, and after repeal, rate volatility increased to 39 percent in the 

Asia to Europe trade and to 18 percent in the Asia to US trade. 
Rate Volatility Measures

241

Chart II.C Historical Volatility Indices 

for the Asia to US and Asia to Europe Trades

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

60%

70%

50%

80%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Asia to Europe WB

Asia to US EB

Volatility Index

The KMI Volatility Index

The KMI Volatility Index (“KVI”) is calculated as the standard deviation of the freight rates 

of the last four quarters divided by their average. This approach is similar to what was used in 

the Korea Maritime Institute paper (Appendix X) except that instead of just pre- and postrepeal calculations, the index is calculated as a quarterly series. The KVI measures how far 

rate swings over a given period tend to stray from the average freight rate of the previous 

four quarters.

The Transatlantic Trade

The chart below shows the KMI Volatility Index of the freight rates between the US and 

Europe in both directions. The KVI averaged five percent and three percent in the period 

of time before repeal of the block exemption in the eastbound and westbound directions, 

respectively. After repeal, the KVI increased to eight percent in the eastbound direction and 

to nine percent westbound. By this measure, volatility was at its greatest during the third 

quarter of 2008 for the eastbound direction and during the third quarter of 2009 for the 

westbound direction. This measure also shows that freight rate volatility was higher in the 

eastbound direction before repeal and higher in the westbound direction after repeal.
Appendix II

242

Chart II.D KMI Index for the 

Transatlantic Trade

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

12%

14%

16%

10%

18%

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Europe to US WB

US to Europe EB

Comparison between the Asia/US and Asia/Europe Trades

The chart below compares the KVI of the freight rates of cargo moving in the headhaul 

directions of trade between Asia and the US and Asia and Europe. In the period before 

repeal of the block exemption, the KVI in the Asia to Europe trade averaged eight percent 

compared to three percent in the Asia to US trade, and after repeal, rate volatility increased 

to 23 percent in the Asia to Europe trade and to 12 percent in the Asia to US trade. 

According to this measure, the average freight volatility in both trades is four times greater 

after the repeal of the block exemption than before. 

Chart II.E KMI Indices for the Asia to 

US and Asia to Europe Trades

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Asia to Europe WB

Asia to US EB

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%
Rate Volatility Measures

243

The Erasmus Volatility Index

The first two measures of rate volatility simply observe absolute variations in freight rates 

over time and ignore the fact that liner shipping is part of an economic system, where 

fluctuations in rates may have more than one reason, such as increases or decreases in demand 

for transportation or increases in the cost of transportation. For this reason, a third measure 

of rate volatility is presented where quarterly changes in freight rates are compared to the US 

GDP deflator with a base year of 2005=100 as a benchmark. 

This approach was first outlined in the Statistical Analysis on Freight Rate Stability 

Appendix of the Erasmus Report3

 and suggests that a change in period-to-period freight rates 

should not deviate from changes in the overall level of prices in the economy. The Erasmus 

Volatility Index (“EVI”) is calculated as the ratio of the percentage change in the freight 

rate to the percentage change in the GDP deflator. When the EVI is positive, freight rates 

and the deflator are moving in the same direction (both moving up or both moving down). 

When the EVI is negative, freight rates and the deflator are moving in opposite directions. 

The greater the magnitude of this measure in either direction indicates greater deviation 

or volatility away from the US GDP deflator as a benchmark for price movements in the 

overall economy. A value of +1 indicates perfect co-movement. There is no upper or lower 

boundary. 

The table below provides the US GDP Deflator data used to develop this measure.4

 US 

GDP in the fourth quarters of 2008 and 2009 shrank from the quarter before them.

Table II.F US GDP Deflator with Base Year 2005=100

Year\Qtr 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

2006 102.07 102.97 103.76 104.22

2007 105.35 106.17 106.71 106.94

2008 107.42 108.33 109.54 109.22

2009 109.48 109.56 109.75 109.67

2010 109.95 110.49 111.04 111.15

Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

The Transatlantic Trade

The chart below shows the EVI of the freight rates between the US and Europe trade in 

both directions. The EVI remained relatively stable until the third quarter of 2008 coinciding 

with the shock of the global economic recession and repeal of the conference block 

exemption when freight rates began a steep decline. It was not until the second quarter of 

2010 that freight rates began to improve. This measure also shows that freight rate volatility 

was higher in the eastbound direction before repeal and higher in the westbound direction 

after repeal. Before the third quarter of 2008, the EVI averaged six points above unity 

(perfect co-movement) in the eastbound direction and two points below in the westbound 

direction. After the repeal, the EVI averaged 26 points and 42 points below unity in the 

eastbound and westbound directions, respectively. 

3 The report can be found on the European Commission’s official website at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/

consultations/2003_reg_4056_86/final_report_erasmus.pdf

4 The US GDP data are published by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, at http://www.

bea.gov/national/. The US GDP deflator is calculated as the Nominal GDP (current market prices) divided by the 

“Real” GDP (chained 2005 dollars) times 100. 
Appendix II

244

Chart II.G Erasmus Volatility Index 

for the Transatlantic Trade

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Europe to US WB

US to Europe EB

0

50

-50

-100

-150

-200

-250

-300

100

Erasmus Volatility Index

Comparison between the Asia/US and Asia/Europe Trades

The chart below compares the EVI of the freight rates of cargo moving in the headhaul 

directions of trade between Asia and the US and Asia and Europe. In the period before 

repeal of the block exemption, the freight rates in both trades remained relatively stable when 

compared against the US GDP as the benchmark. The Asia to Europe trade was slightly 

more volatile with the EVI averaging 11 points above unity compared to less than one point 

below for the Asia to US trade. After the repeal, the average EVI for the Asia to Europe 

trade dropped to 65 points below unity and to 48 points below in the Asia to US trade.
Rate Volatility Measures

245

Chart II.H Erasmus Volatility Indices 

for the Asia to US and Asia to Europe Trades

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Asia to Europe WB

Asia to US EB

0

100

-100

-200

-300

-400

-500

200

Erasmus Volatility Index

Summary of NOI Responses Regarding Rate Volatility

This section summarizes responses that deal with rate volatility to the FMC’s Notice of 

Inquiry. Fifteen liner carriers, two ship owners’ associations, and one logistics consulting firm 

provided responses.

Most carriers stated that since the termination of the block exemption, freight rates and 

surcharges have been adjusted more frequently than what was traditionally the case before, 

and most attribute this to the abolishment of the FEFC. One carrier attributed the rate 

volatility to OSRA and said the repeal had no effect in this regard, and a few suggested that 

it may not be possible to determine whether this volatility is attributed to the global recession 

and gradual recovery or to regulatory issues.

The Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF) stated that the lack of antitrust immunity in the 

European trades has had several negative impacts including greater rate volatility in the AsiaEurope trades than in comparable US trades. 

As an example, they compared freight rate data from CI Online and ELAA/CTS to show 

that before the EU policy change the standard deviation of rates (their measure of volatility) 

in the Asia-Europe trade was just 1.2 times that of the transpacific trade, and that afterwards, 

rate volatility for the Asia-Europe trade increased to 2.5 times the deviation of rates in the 

transpacific. 
Appendix II

246

Finally, some carriers concluded that rate volatility is greater in the European trades 

than in the US trades because the majority of US-related trades are under long term service 

contracts. Rates and surcharges adjust less frequently than in the Far East/Europe trade, 

which has fewer contracts and more spot rates that change frequently.
247

Appendix III

Observations on THC and 

BAF Surcharge Trends

A Review of SERVCON’s Surcharge Data in the Three Study Trades

Using the FMC’s service contract filing system (“SERVCON”), selected service contract 

data over the five-year study period in the three headhaul trades were compiled for this 

brief study of Terminal Handling Charge (“THC”) and Bunker Adjustment Factor (“BAF”) 

trends – North Europe to the US, Far East to Europe, and Far East to the US. Contracts were 

selected for major shippers who moved products in each of the trades. Additionally, the Study 

examined the service contract data of a number of shippers of the major moving commodities, 

as identified by PIERS data, moving in the North Europe/US trade. This appendix reviews 

the behavior of surcharges contained in those service contracts over the five-year study period. 

The THC and BAF are discussed below. Specifically, the Study sought to answer the following 

three questions in describing the trends. First, does the data show a movement to ‘all inclusive’ 

pricing of service contracts? Second, is there a degree of uniformity among the various carriers’ 

surcharges? Lastly, has the level of the surcharges changed in any descriptive manner? 

Origin THCs (“OTHCs”) in the westbound North Europe to US trade showed a slight 

movement away from all inclusive, or all-in, rates with 71.4 percent of the service contracts in 

this time series moving under all-in rates at the beginning of the study period and 70.0 percent 

at the end. Conversely, destination THCs (“DTHCs”) showed a slight movement towards allin rates with 71.4 percent of service contracts being all-in at the beginning of the study period, 

increasing to 81 percent in fourth quarter 2009 through April 2010, and then slightly ebbing 

to end the study period at 75 percent. (See Table III.A). In answering the second question in 

this trade, both the origin and the destination terminal handling charges were examined. It 

appeared that there was significantly less uniformity in the origin terminal handling charges than 

the destination terminal handling charges. The level of both the origin and destination terminal 

handling charges fluctuated throughout the study period, with the average OTHC increasing 

by approximately 25 percent, while the DTHC decreased by approximately 10 percent.1

 The story of the BAF in the westbound Europe to US trade is one of increasing use and, 

thus, a move away from rates being ‘all inclusive’ of all surcharges. (See Table III.A). The 

proportion of service contracts containing no separate BAF appears to have peaked in late 

2007, approximately one year prior to the repeal, at 76 percent. By the end of the study period, 

60 percent of service contracts had a separately stated BAF. With respect to the degree of 

uniformity, BAFs did not appear to be uniformly assessed throughout the period. The degree of 

dissimilarity increased over the study period as the number of service contracts having separately 

stated BAFs increased.2

 The average BAF increased steadily through September 2008, but since 

that time it has been on a downward trajectory with its lowest level occurring in the second 

quarter of 2009, at a level representing just 49 percent of the level at the start of the study period.3

1 Although the average decreased by this amount, with the exception of one major carrier, the destination THC 

remained the same. 

2 In the pre-repeal period, when TACA was operating, there was considerable uniformity in the level of BAF, not only 

among TACA members but also among independent carriers. 

3 These changes in BAF closely mirrored movements in the market price of bunker fuel that reached an all-time high in 

July 2008 and a low in mid-2009, when the full force of the global recession was being felt.
Appendix III

248

In terms of emergency BAF (“EBAF”), there did not appear to be any change toward 

assessing a separate EBAF throughout the study period. The same number of contracts (2) 

had a separately stated EBAF throughout most of the period. The average level of the EBAF 

increased 43 percent from the beginning of the study period to the time of repeal. For 

several months post-repeal, no service contracts in this sample contained separate EBAFs. 

However, in August 2009, those contracts returned to a separately stated EBAF, but at levels 

significantly lower than in the pre-repeal period. 

As mentioned above, for the North Europe to US westbound trade only, surcharge data 

based on the service contract data of shippers of major moving commodities was reviewed. 

(See Table III.B). These data show a marked increase in the percentage of service contracts 

that were ‘all inclusive’ of surcharges, both THC and BAF. The trend towards all inclusive 

rates was, as expected, more robust in terms of THCs. The degree of uniformity of surcharges 

appeared to be more pronounced in the instant time series, especially during the time in 

which a rate conference existed in the trade (i.e., prior to repeal). With respect to levels of 

average surcharges, the major moving commodity shippers’ contract data shows the impact 

of the conference pricing on the destination THC, where the average DTHC remained the 

same until late 2008. With respect to BAF, the major moving commodity shippers’ contracts 

appear to have contained much higher average charges. The EBAF was generally eschewed 

until just prior to the repeal, and again from February 2009 through July 2009.

In the westbound Far East to Europe trade, the percentage of service contracts all 

inclusive of THCs nearly doubled throughout the study period, with most of that increase 

coming after October 2008 in the post-repeal period. (See Table III.C). The degree of 

uniformity of the THCs became less consistent throughout the study period, with a marked 

increase in variation after October 2008. The average THC level has increased by 34 

percent, with most of that increase occurring after the repeal of the block exemption.

In terms of the application of BAF in this trade, there does not appear to have been a 

large conversion to all inclusive contracts. At the start of 2006, approximately 36 percent of 

the contracts did not contain a separately stated BAF. Throughout the period, the percentage 

fluctuated between a maximum of 47.4 percent and a minimum of 21.1 percent and ended 

the period at the maximum level again. In this trade, there did not appear to be a high degree 

of uniformity of BAF levels between carriers. The average BAF more than doubled from the 

beginning of the study period through the fourth quarter of 2008, then diminished slightly, 

but still remained well above its starting point at the end of the study period. In this sample 

of service contracts in the trade, EBAFs were not separately stated until early 2010. 

In the Far East to US trade, the percentage of contracts with all inclusive service contract 

rates increased steadily through the first quarter of 2010, when it peaked at 55 percent. (See 

Table III.D). Since that time, there has been a slight decrease with approximately 50 percent 

of the contracts in this cross-section being all inclusive at the end of the study period. In 

this trade, there was an unusually high degree of uniformity in the THC levels throughout 

the study period. Any variation appeared to be a function of the origin port, for example, 

with all contracts originating from Hong Kong being assessed the same THC amount. The 

average level of OTHC assessed has decreased over the study period, and remains at a much 

lower level than OTHCs in the other trades examined in this study.

The percentage of service contracts inclusive of BAF decreased significantly in the Far 

East to US trade. At the end of the study period, the vast majority of service contracts 

specified a BAF. The average BAF level increased significantly through 2008, but since then 

has returned to a level similar to that of early 2006.
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

249

Table III.A

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of All-In 

DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF 

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF 

Jan-06 14 10 71.4% $191 10 71.4% $500 10 71.4% $404 12 85.7% $846

Feb-06 15 11 73.3% $191 11 73.3% $500 10 66.7% $539 13 86.7% $846

Mar-06 16 12 75.0% $191 12 75.0% $500 11 68.8% $539 14 87.5% $846

Apr-06 16 12 75.0% $191 12 75.0% $500 11 68.8% $547 14 87.5% $846

May-06 19 13 68.4% $231 15 78.9% $427 13 68.4% $558 17 89.5% $846

Jun-06 19 13 68.4% $231 15 78.9% $427 13 68.4% $551 17 89.5% $846

Jul-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $631 18 90.0% $890

Aug-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $639 18 90.0% $890

Sep-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $639 18 90.0% $890

Oct-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $639 18 90.0% $890

Nov-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $639 18 90.0% $890

Dec-06 20 13 65.0% $222 15 75.0% $441 13 65.0% $639 18 90.0% $890

Jan-07 21 14 66.7% $239 15 71.4% $441 14 66.7% $576 19 90.5% $818

Feb-07 21 14 66.7% $239 15 71.4% $441 14 66.7% $568 19 90.5% $818

Mar-07 21 14 66.7% $239 15 71.4% $441 14 66.7% $568 19 90.5% $818

Apr-07 21 14 66.7% $239 15 71.4% $441 14 66.7% $568 19 90.5% $818

May-07 21 14 66.7% $194 16 76.2% $484 15 71.4% $531 19 90.5% $818

Jun-07 21 14 66.7% $194 16 76.2% $484 15 71.4% $531 19 90.5% $818

Jul-07 21 14 66.7% $194 16 76.2% $484 15 71.4% $646 19 90.5% $917

Aug-07 21 14 66.7% $194 16 76.2% $484 15 71.4% $646 19 90.5% $917

Sep-07 21 14 66.7% $194 16 76.2% $484 15 71.4% $663 19 90.5% $917

Oct-07 21 15 71.4% $198 17 81.0% $480 16 76.2% $711 19 90.5% $1,030

Nov-07 21 15 71.4% $198 17 81.0% $480 15 71.4% $613 19 90.5% $1,030

Dec-07 21 15 71.4% $198 17 81.0% $480 14 66.7% $699 19 90.5% $1,030

Jan-08 21 16 76.2% $214 17 81.0% $480 14 66.7% $699 19 90.5% $1,030

Feb-08 21 16 76.2% $214 17 81.0% $480 14 66.7% $716 19 90.5% $1,030
Appendix III

250

Table III.A (continued)

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of All-In 

DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF 

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF 

Mar-08 21 16 76.2% $214 17 81.0% $480 14 66.7% $716 19 90.5% $1,030

Apr-08 21 16 76.2% $214 17 81.0% $480 14 66.7% $716 19 90.5% $1,030

May-08 21 15 71.4% $220 16 76.2% $484 14 66.7% $872 20 95.2% $1,214

Jun-08 21 15 71.4% $220 16 76.2% $484 14 66.7% $879 20 95.2% $1,214

Jul-08 21 15 71.4% $235 16 76.2% $484 13 61.9% $879 20 95.2% $1,214

Aug-08 21 15 71.4% $235 16 76.2% $484 11 52.4% $728 20 95.2% $1,214

Sep-08 21 15 71.4% $235 16 76.2% $484 11 52.4% $830 20 95.2% $1,214

Oct-08 21 15 71.4% $248 16 76.2% $484 11 52.4% $729 21 100.0% N.A.

Nov-08 21 15 71.4% $248 16 76.2% $484 10 47.6% $697 21 100.0% N.A.

Dec-08 21 15 71.4% $248 16 76.2% $484 10 47.6% $685 21 100.0% N.A.

Jan-09 21 15 71.4% $222 16 76.2% $484 8 38.1% $524 21 100.0% N.A.

Feb-09 21 15 71.4% $222 16 76.2% $462 8 38.1% $341 21 100.0% N.A.

Mar-09 21 15 71.4% $222 16 76.2% $462 8 38.1% $344 21 100.0% N.A.

Apr-09 21 15 71.4% $222 16 76.2% $462 6 28.6% $320 21 100.0% N.A.

May-09 21 15 71.4% $230 16 76.2% $462 9 42.9% $284 21 100.0% N.A.

Jun-09 21 15 71.4% $230 16 76.2% $440 9 42.9% $199 21 100.0% N.A.

Jul-09 21 15 71.4% $230 16 76.2% $440 9 42.9% $218 20 95.2% $320

Aug-09 21 15 71.4% $230 16 76.2% $440 8 38.1% $220 20 95.2% $370

Sep-09 21 15 71.4% $230 17 81.0% $445 8 38.1% $242 20 95.2% $370

Oct-09 21 15 71.4% $230 17 81.0% $445 8 38.1% $273 20 95.2% $420

Nov-09 21 15 71.4% $230 17 81.0% $445 7 33.3% $273 20 95.2% $420

Dec-09 21 15 71.4% $230 17 81.0% $445 7 33.3% $258 20 95.2% $420

Jan-10 21 14 66.7% $280 17 81.0% $445 7 33.3% $285 20 95.2% $440

Feb-10 21 14 66.7% $280 17 81.0% $433 7 33.3% $286 20 95.2% $450

Mar-10 21 14 66.7% $280 17 81.0% $433 7 33.3% $286 20 95.2% $440

Apr-10 21 14 66.7% $280 17 81.0% $433 7 33.3% $289 20 95.2% $450
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

251

Table III.A (continued)

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of All-In 

DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF 

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF 

May-10 21 15 71.4% $248 16 76.2% $446 8 38.1% $299 19 90.5% $460

Jun-10 21 15 71.4% $239 16 76.2% $446 8 38.1% $304 19 90.5% $430

Jul-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 8 40.0% $297 18 90.0% $420

Aug-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 9 45.0% $303 18 90.0% $430

Sep-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 9 45.0% $304 18 90.0% $430

Oct-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 9 45.0% $303 18 90.0% $430

Nov-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 8 40.0% $304 18 90.0% $430

Dec-10 20 14 70.0% $239 15 75.0% $446 8 40.0% $309 18 90.0% $460
Appendix III

252

Table III.B

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Moving Commodity Shippers’ Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Jan-06 32 9 28.1% $190 10 31.3% $500 12 37.5% $747 32 100.0% N.A.

Feb-06 33 9 27.3% $191 9 27.3% $500 12 36.4% $758 33 100.0% N.A.

Mar-06 33 9 27.3% $191 9 27.3% $500 12 36.4% $762 33 100.0% N.A.

Apr-06 32 9 28.1% $190 9 28.1% $500 12 37.5% $758 32 100.0% N.A.

May-06 33 9 27.3% $194 9 27.3% $500 11 33.3% $770 33 100.0% N.A.

Jun-06 33 9 27.3% $194 9 27.3% $500 11 33.3% $808 33 100.0% N.A.

Jul-06 35 10 28.6% $194 10 28.6% $500 12 34.3% $825 35 100.0% N.A.

Aug-06 35 10 28.6% $189 11 31.4% $500 11 31.4% $813 35 100.0% N.A.

Sep-06 35 10 28.6% $189 11 31.4% $500 11 31.4% $813 35 100.0% N.A.

Oct-06 35 10 28.6% $189 11 31.4% $500 11 31.4% $824 35 100.0% N.A.

Nov-06 35 10 28.6% $189 11 31.4% $500 11 31.4% $758 35 100.0% N.A.

Dec-06 35 10 28.6% $189 11 31.4% $500 11 31.4% $754 35 100.0% N.A.

Jan-07 35 10 28.6% $209 10 28.6% $500 11 31.4% $712 35 100.0% N.A.

Feb-07 36 10 27.8% $209 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $698 36 100.0% N.A.

Mar-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $703 36 100.0% N.A.

Apr-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $703 36 100.0% N.A.

May-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $721 36 100.0% N.A.

Jun-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $824 36 100.0% N.A.

Jul-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $843 36 100.0% N.A.

Aug-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $852 36 100.0% N.A.

Sep-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 11 30.6% $970 36 100.0% N.A.

Oct-07 36 10 27.8% $210 10 27.8% $500 12 33.3% $1,006 36 100.0% N.A.

Nov-07 36 9 25.0% $208 10 27.8% $500 12 33.3% $997 36 100.0% N.A.

Dec-07 36 9 25.0% $208 10 27.8% $500 12 33.3% $1,030 36 100.0% N.A.

Jan-08 36 10 27.8% $220 11 30.6% $500 12 33.3% $1,018 36 100.0% N.A.

Feb-08 36 9 25.0% $222 10 27.8% $500 12 33.3% $1,056 36 100.0% N.A.
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

253

Table III.B (continued)

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Moving Commodity Shippers’ Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent AllIn BAFAverage 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Mar-08 36 9 25.0% $222 10 27.8% $500 14 38.9% $1,023 36 100.0% N.A.

Apr-08 36 9 25.0% $222 10 27.8% $500 15 41.7% $1,008 36 100.0% N.A.

May-08 34 9 26.5% $223 9 26.5% $500 15 44.1% $964 34 100.0% N.A.

Jun-08 36 10 27.8% $224 10 27.8% $500 15 41.7% $943 36 100.0% N.A.

Jul-08 36 11 30.6% $232 11 30.6% $500 16 44.4% $739 36 100.0% N.A.

Aug-08 36 11 30.6% $232 11 30.6% $500 16 44.4% $771 36 100.0% N.A.

Sep-08 36 11 30.6% $232 11 30.6% $500 15 41.7% $804 36 100.0% N.A.

Oct-08 36 11 30.6% $230 11 30.6% $500 16 44.4% $732 35 97.2% $754

Nov-08 36 11 30.6% $230 11 30.6% $500 17 47.2% $749 35 97.2% $668

Dec-08 35 13 37.1% $236 13 37.1% $500 20 57.1% $763 34 97.1% $570

Jan-09 33 13 39.4% $229 13 39.4% $489 18 54.5% $589 32 97.0% $428

Feb-09 32 14 43.8% $239 14 43.8% $488 17 53.1% $330 32 100.0% N.A.

Mar-09 32 17 53.1% $244 17 53.1% $478 19 59.4% $275 32 100.0% N.A.

Apr-09 31 18 58.1% $247 18 58.1% $475 19 61.3% $221 31 100.0% N.A.

May-09 29 18 62.1% $238 18 62.1% $470 18 62.1% $219 29 100.0% N.A.

Jun-09 29 18 62.1% $238 18 62.1% $470 18 62.1% $221 29 100.0% N.A.

Jul-09 30 19 63.3% $238 19 63.3% $470 18 60.0% $233 30 100.0% N.A.

Aug-09 30 19 63.3% $239 19 63.3% $470 18 60.0% $260 29 96.7% $100

Sep-09 30 19 63.3% $239 19 63.3% $470 18 60.0% $310 28 93.3% $129

Oct-09 31 20 64.5% $240 20 64.5% $470 19 61.3% $375 28 90.3% $167

Nov-09 31 20 64.5% $240 20 64.5% $470 19 61.3% $380 28 90.3% $164

Dec-09 32 21 65.6% $243 21 65.6% $450 19 59.4% $372 28 87.5% $269

Jan-10 31 21 67.7% $238 21 67.7% $445 18 58.1% $394 28 90.3% $184

Feb-10 30 21 70.0% $237 21 70.0% $427 18 60.0% $390 27 90.0% $179

Mar-10 31 20 64.5% $236 21 67.7% $434 18 58.1% $401 28 90.3% $189

Apr-10 31 19 61.3% $236 20 64.5% $431 18 58.1% $398 30 96.8% $254
Appendix III

254

Table III.B (continued)

North Europe to the US Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (Per FEU)

Major Moving Commodity Shippers’ Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent AllIn BAFAverage 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

May-10 30 19 63.3% $229 20 66.7% $424 18 60.0% $396 29 96.7% $266

Jun-10 30 19 63.3% $228 20 66.7% $424 18 60.0% $399 29 96.7% $246

Jul-10 30 20 66.7% $236 20 66.7% $424 17 56.7% $399 28 93.3% $398

Aug-10 30 20 66.7% $236 20 66.7% $424 17 56.7% $392 28 93.3% $374

Sep-10 30 20 66.7% $236 20 66.7% $424 17 56.7% $392 28 93.3% $374

Oct-10 28 18 64.3% $238 18 64.3% $424 16 57.1% $415 26 92.9% $384

Nov-10 28 18 64.3% $238 18 64.3% $424 16 57.1% $413 26 92.9% $372

Dec-10 29 19 65.5% $237 19 65.5% $424 17 58.6% $418 27 93.1% $386
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

255

Table III.C

Far East-Europe Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Jan-06 14 3 21.4% $176 3 21.4% $160 5 35.7% $394 14 100.0% N.A.

Feb-06 15 4 26.7% $176 4 26.7% $160 6 40.0% $391 15 100.0% N.A.

Mar-06 15 4 26.7% $176 4 26.7% $160 6 40.0% $402 15 100.0% N.A.

Apr-06 16 4 25.0% $184 4 25.0% $175 6 37.5% $423 16 100.0% N.A.

May-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $201 7 36.8% $426 19 100.0% N.A.

Jun-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $201 7 36.8% $440 19 100.0% N.A.

Jul-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $201 7 36.8% $442 19 100.0% N.A.

Aug-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $203 7 36.8% $439 19 100.0% N.A.

Sep-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $203 7 36.8% $441 19 100.0% N.A.

Oct-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $203 7 36.8% $444 19 100.0% N.A.

Nov-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $203 7 36.8% $438 19 100.0% N.A.

Dec-06 19 7 36.8% $200 5 26.3% $203 7 36.8% $436 19 100.0% N.A.

Jan-07 19 7 36.8% $210 5 26.3% $205 7 36.8% $443 19 100.0% N.A.

Feb-07 19 8 42.1% $205 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $426 19 100.0% N.A.

Mar-07 19 8 42.1% $205 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $424 19 100.0% N.A.

Apr-07 19 8 42.1% $205 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $428 19 100.0% N.A.

May-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $431 19 100.0% N.A.

Jun-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $398 19 100.0% N.A.

Jul-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $408 19 100.0% N.A.

Aug-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $409 19 100.0% N.A.

Sep-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $414 19 100.0% N.A.

Oct-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 8 42.1% $418 19 100.0% N.A.

Nov-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 7 36.8% $398 19 100.0% N.A.

Dec-07 19 9 47.4% $199 6 31.6% $192 7 36.8% $404 19 100.0% N.A.

Jan-08 19 9 47.4% $201 6 31.6% $214 6 31.6% $428 19 100.0% N.A.

Feb-08 19 9 47.4% $201 6 31.6% $214 6 31.6% $424 19 100.0% N.A.
Appendix III

256

Table III.C (continued)

Far East-Europe Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Mar-08 19 9 47.4% $201 6 31.6% $214 5 26.3% $444 19 100.0% N.A.

Apr-08 19 9 47.4% $201 6 31.6% $214 5 26.3% $470 19 100.0% N.A.

May-08 18 8 44.4% $219 6 33.3% $196 5 27.8% $661 18 100.0% N.A.

Jun-08 19 8 42.1% $233 6 31.6% $230 5 26.3% $740 19 100.0% N.A.

Jul-08 19 8 42.1% $233 6 31.6% $230 5 26.3% $766 19 100.0% N.A.

Aug-08 19 7 36.8% $223 7 36.8% $212 4 21.1% $809 19 100.0% N.A.

Sep-08 19 7 36.8% $223 7 36.8% $212 4 21.1% $830 19 100.0% N.A.

Oct-08 18 7 38.9% $211 7 38.9% $196 4 22.2% $880 18 100.0% N.A.

Nov-08 18 7 38.9% $211 7 38.9% $196 4 22.2% $876 18 100.0% N.A.

Dec-08 18 7 38.9% $211 7 38.9% $196 4 22.2% $829 18 100.0% N.A.

Jan-09 18 8 44.4% $229 8 44.4% $185 4 22.2% $717 18 100.0% N.A.

Feb-09 19 8 42.1% $240 8 42.1% $208 4 21.1% $680 19 100.0% N.A.

Mar-09 19 8 42.1% $240 8 42.1% $208 4 21.1% $647 19 100.0% N.A.

Apr-09 19 8 42.1% $240 8 42.1% $208 5 26.3% $644 19 100.0% N.A.

May-09 19 7 36.8% $254 9 47.4% $182 7 36.8% $559 19 100.0% N.A.

Jun-09 19 7 36.8% $254 10 52.6% $156 8 42.1% $514 19 100.0% N.A.

Jul-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 8 42.1% $545 19 100.0% N.A.

Aug-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 8 42.1% $599 19 100.0% N.A.

Sep-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 8 42.1% $628 19 100.0% N.A.

Oct-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 8 42.1% $685 19 100.0% N.A.

Nov-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 7 36.8% $711 19 100.0% N.A.

Dec-09 19 8 42.1% $252 9 47.4% $166 7 36.8% $705 19 100.0% N.A.

Jan-10 19 8 42.1% $240 9 47.4% $182 8 42.1% $792 17 89.5% $125

Feb-10 19 8 42.1% $240 9 47.4% $182 8 42.1% $796 17 89.5% $125

Mar-10 19 8 42.1% $240 9 47.4% $182 8 42.1% $796 17 89.5% $125

Apr-10 19 8 42.1% $240 9 47.4% $182 8 42.1% $807 17 89.5% $125
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

257

Table III.C (continued)

Far East-Europe Westbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data 

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

May-10 19 8 42.1% $245 8 42.1% $215 8 42.1% $833 18 94.7% $150

Jun-10 18 8 44.4% $261 8 44.4% $201 8 44.4% $837 17 94.4% $150

Jul-10 18 8 44.4% $261 8 44.4% $201 7 38.9% $852 17 94.4% $150

Aug-10 19 9 47.4% $261 8 42.1% $214 8 42.1% $837 18 94.7% $150

Sep-10 18 9 50.0% $250 8 44.4% $193 8 44.4% $833 17 94.4% $150

Oct-10 19 9 47.4% $261 8 42.1% $214 8 42.1% $840 18 94.7% $150

Nov-10 19 9 47.4% $261 8 42.1% $214 9 47.4% $811 18 94.7% $150

Dec-10 19 9 47.4% $261 8 42.1% $214 9 47.4% $825 18 94.7% $150
Appendix III

258

Table III.D

Far East-US Eastbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Jan-06 16 5 31.3% $162 16 100.0% N.A. 12 75.0% $363 16 100.0% N.A.

Feb-06 17 6 35.3% $162 17 100.0% N.A. 13 76.5% $361 17 100.0% N.A.

Mar-06 17 6 35.3% $162 17 100.0% N.A. 13 76.5% $361 17 100.0% N.A.

Apr-06 17 6 35.3% $162 17 100.0% N.A. 13 76.5% $373 17 100.0% N.A.

May-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $391 19 100.0% N.A.

Jun-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $385 19 100.0% N.A.

Jul-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $385 19 100.0% N.A.

Aug-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $394 19 100.0% N.A.

Sep-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $394 19 100.0% N.A.

Oct-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $406 19 100.0% N.A.

Nov-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $406 19 100.0% N.A.

Dec-06 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 11 57.9% $402 19 100.0% N.A.

Jan-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 10 50.0% $379 20 100.0% N.A.

Feb-07 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 10 50.0% $371 20 100.0% N.A.

Mar-07 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 10 50.0% $371 20 100.0% N.A.

Apr-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 10 50.0% $389 20 100.0% N.A.

May-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $477 20 100.0% N.A.

Jun-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $477 20 100.0% N.A.

Jul-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $485 20 100.0% N.A.

Aug-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $485 20 100.0% N.A.

Sep-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $510 20 100.0% N.A.

Oct-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 11 55.0% $514 20 100.0% N.A.

Nov-07 19 8 42.1% $162 19 100.0% N.A. 10 52.6% $484 19 100.0% N.A.

Dec-07 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 10 50.0% $462 20 100.0% N.A.

Jan-08 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 9 45.0% $408 20 100.0% N.A.

Feb-08 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 9 45.0% $420 20 100.0% N.A.
Observations on THC and BAF Surcharge Trends

259

Table III.D (continued)

Far East-US Eastbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

Mar-08 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 9 45.0% $420 20 100.0% N.A.

Apr-08 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 9 45.0% $431 20 100.0% N.A.

May-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 8 40.0% $479 20 100.0% N.A.

Jun-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 8 40.0% $488 20 100.0% N.A.

Jul-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 7 35.0% $574 20 100.0% N.A.

Aug-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $565 20 100.0% N.A.

Sep-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $614 20 100.0% N.A.

Oct-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $646 20 100.0% N.A.

Nov-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $652 20 100.0% N.A.

Dec-08 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $620 20 100.0% N.A.

Jan-09 20 9 45.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 4 20.0% $326 20 100.0% N.A.

Feb-09 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $226 20 100.0% N.A.

Mar-09 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $229 20 100.0% N.A.

Apr-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $194 20 100.0% N.A.

May-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 8 40.0% $197 20 100.0% N.A.

Jun-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 7 35.0% $178 20 100.0% N.A.

Jul-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $187 20 100.0% N.A.

Aug-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $214 20 100.0% N.A.

Sep-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $224 20 100.0% N.A.

Oct-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $254 20 100.0% N.A.

Nov-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $271 20 100.0% N.A.

Dec-09 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 5 25.0% $284 20 100.0% N.A.

Jan-10 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $271 20 100.0% N.A.

Feb-10 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $262 20 100.0% N.A.

Mar-10 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $262 20 100.0% N.A.

Apr-10 20 11 55.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $269 20 100.0% N.A.
Appendix III

260

Table III.D (continued)

Far East-US Eastbound Trade

THCs and BAFs (per FEU)

Major Shipper Servcon Data

Month

Total 

Contracts

# of 

All-In OTHC

Percent 

All-In OTHC

Average 

OTHC

# of 

All-In DTHC

Percent 

All-In DTHC

Average 

DTHC

# of 

All-In BAF

Percent 

All-In BAF

Average 

BAF

# of 

All-In EBAF

Percent 

All-In EBAF

Average 

EBAF

May-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 7 35.0% $338 20 100.0% N.A.

Jun-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 7 35.0% $359 20 100.0% N.A.

Jul-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 7 35.0% $356 20 100.0% N.A.

Aug-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $352 20 100.0% N.A.

Sep-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $352 20 100.0% N.A.

Oct-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $352 20 100.0% N.A.

Nov-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $353 20 100.0% N.A.

Dec-10 20 10 50.0% $162 20 100.0% N.A. 6 30.0% $356 20 100.0% N.A.
261

Appendix IV

Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010

On September 15, 2008, the US investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. The 

following day, insurance firm AIG was rescued by $85 billion in US federal assistance.1

 The 

turmoil that brought the American financial system to its knees was part of a larger crisis: A 

US housing market bubble popped in 2007, precipitating paralysis in credit markets. Banks 

were heavily invested in toxic assets, devastating the financial sector on a global scale. The 

deep economic downturn, dubbed the Great Recession, saw credit markets shrink, liquidity 

evaporate, and foreign trade diminish.

Amidst such a hostile economic climate, the liner shipping industry was hit particularly 

hard. The industry, “both the greatest beneficiary and hammering pulse” of globalization, 

became its victim.2

 Carriers battled over market share, undercut each other’s rates, and drove 

liner industry revenues to unprecedented lows. Yet no major carrier went bankrupt. The 

liner shipping industry appears to have weathered the worst of the recession. In 2010, trade 

volumes increased and carriers reported record profits.

The depth of the contraction in liner shipping from late 2008 through 2009, and the 

extent of the recovery in 2010 can best be understood by considering the recent trends 

in the world economy and liner shipping. During the past decade, liner shipping enjoyed 

growth rates far above world output growth and increasingly relied on a burgeoning fleet. In 

turn, the liner shipping industry suffered more than the overall economy during the recent 

recession. The 2008-2009 downturn also accelerated ongoing shifts in global trade patterns 

that may shape carriers’ business strategies in coming years.

Global Economic Expansion

The global economy grew impressively over the past decade. Despite political and economic 

turbulence in 2009 and 2010 among the world’s advanced countries, global Gross Domestic 

Product (“GDP”) continued to expand.

Much of the growth occurred in the world’s most populous countries. China, India, 

Brazil and Indonesia, which together account for 40% of the world’s population, were 

among the economic powerhouses driving the world’s GDP growth.3

 For example, while 

developed countries averaged a moderate 1.7% GDP growth rate during the past decade 

(2000-2010), emerging economies grew steadily by 6.1% per year.4

 China alone averaged

10.2% GDP growth per year in the 2000s, up from 6.6% per year during the 1990s. At such 

an extraordinary and sustained growth rate, Chinese living standards doubled roughly every 

seven years. China’s economy has enjoyed a decade of rapid export-led economic growth.

The Great Recession has accelerated a structural change in the global economy. 

Economies such as China have ‘emerged’ to take their places as drivers of global growth. 

The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) notes that developing economies weathered the 

recession better than developed nations. Increasing intra- and inter-developing country trade 

1 A timeline of the crisis can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8242825.stm

2 Alexander Jung. “Shipping Industry Fights for Survival.” Bloomberg Businessweek, 11 Aug 2009.

3 Tyler Cowen. “Fruitful Decade for Many in the World.” New York Times, 2 Jan 2010.

4 The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2010, 

http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm. 
Appendix IV

262

has weakened the dominance of developed countries, possibly signifying a shift in global 

trade patterns.5

Trends in the Liner Shipping Industry

Demand

The liner shipping industry rode the wave of economic growth for much of the past decade. 

In fact, world container trade grew three to four times faster than GDP growth. Between 

2003 and 2007, global port handling of containers grew by an average of 12.4% per year, 

compared to global GDP growth of 3.6% per year. 6 Regions such as the Far East, Middle 

East, and South Asia were exceptional performers. By a different metric, global demand as 

a function of net cargo TEU moves grew by an average of 13% per year between 2002 and 

2007.7

 (See Chart IV.A)

Chart IV.A Annualized Growth in Global Demand

Port Handling

Net Cargo Slot Moves

0

-15%

-10%

-5%

5%

10%

15%

20%

1Q032Q033Q034Q031Q042Q043Q044Q041Q052Q053Q054Q051Q062Q063Q064Q061Q072Q073Q074Q071Q082Q083Q084Q081Q092Q093Q094Q091Q102Q103Q104Q10

Across all regions, liner shipping demand flourished from 2000 to 2007. Even with real 

GDP growth in the United States of just 1.9% per year, container imports and exports 

grew by 6.9%.8

 The rapid increase in trade volume is best exemplified by data concerning 

one of the world’s largest trade routes, the transpacific. Container imports from China to 

the US West Coast nearly tripled from 2000-2007, and peaked in 2007 when US imports 

approached seven million TEUs.

If China was an economic powerhouse in the past decade, its growth in liner shipping trade 

was no less remarkable. According to the World Shipping Council, in 2007 China accounted 

for 31.9 million TEUs of exports, making it the world’s leading exporter by volume with 

26.5% of global market share.9

 China’s ascent was rapid. As recently as 1995, only four of 

5 Adam Lockstein. “The New Emerging Order.” Swiss Style 2010.

6 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 2.1 “Quarterly Container Growth by Region.”

7 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 4.1 “Estimated Development of the Container market Supply/Demand 

Balance.”

8 PIERS Trade Data. US TEU Liftings (Export & Import), 2000-2007.

9 World Shipping Council – Liner Trade Statistics. < http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/

trade-statistics>.
Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010

263

40 transpacific strings called at Chinese ports. By 2006, 73 of 78 transpacific strings called at 

Chinese ports. Port calls had increased tenfold and the average ship size had nearly doubled.10

Supply

In order to cope with and take advantage of increasing demand for liner services, carriers 

ratcheted up global capacity. Drewry cites fleet capacity (TEU) growth of roughly 11% per 

year. Since 2000, the number of vessels in the cellular container fleet has nearly doubled to over 

4,600 vessels, while overall capacity nearly tripled to 12.7 million TEU.11

Carriers increased capacity by purchasing newer, larger ships. (See Chart IV.B) The 

upward trend in vessel size is dramatic. In 2000, the largest 200 vessels averaged 5,115 TEUs 

in capacity. By 2009, the largest 200 vessels had nearly doubled in size to an average capacity 

of 9,337 TEUs.12 The orderbook as of July 2010 counted 155 new 10,000+ TEU vessels, a 

354% increase over the fleet’s 46 existing megaships.13 Larger vessels allow carriers to realize 

the cost-saving benefits of economies of scale. A study on the expansion of the Panama Canal 

estimates a 17% reduction in total voyage costs (operating and capital costs) if a carrier deploys 

an 8,000 TEU vessel instead of a 4,000 TEU vessel on the Asia–US East Coast all-water 

route. The cost savings accrue to over $28 million per string during the course of a year.14

Chart IV.B Fleet Size & Distribution

Total Capacity

% Fleet Capacity 

from Ships > 6,000 TEU

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Total Capacity (Million TEU)

Proportion of Fleet Capacity from ships over 6000 TEUs

Another indicator of liner industry performance comes from the vessel charter market. 

The charter market was more volatile than either the container fleet capacity or demand. In 

particular, time charter rates for a 3,500 TEU vessel bottomed out at $12,000 per day in the 

fourth quarter of 2001, rose to $43,000/day in 2005, and leveled off around $32,000 by 2008. 

One would expect a certain level of demolition of aging vessels to occur annually, but strong 

market conditions can affect this trend. (See Chart IV.C)

10 Johor Bahru. “Transhipment & Global Container Traffic Growth.” 5th ASEAN Ports & Shipping Conference 12 Jun 

2007.

11 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster: Container Fleet Data. 

12 MDS Transmodal, 2009. 

13 Alphaliner. “Cellular Fleet at 1st July 2010.”

14 “Transpacific Vessel Deployment Options with an Expanded Panama Canal.” R.K. Johns & Associates Inc. 2004.
Appendix IV

264

Chart IV.C Time Charter Rates & Demolition Data 1Q00 2Q00 3Q00 4Q00 1Q01 2Q01 3Q01 4Q01 1Q02 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04 3Q04

4Q041Q052Q053Q054Q051Q062Q063Q064Q061Q072Q073Q07

4Q071Q082Q083Q084Q081Q092Q093Q094Q091Q10

350,632 TEU

Average Time Charter Rate 

for 3,500 TEU Vessel ($/day) Demolition (TEU)

$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

$35,000

$40,000

$45,000

$50,000

US Dollars per Day

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

TEU

The Great Recession, 2008-2010

Sizing Up the Recession

The Great Recession slowed output growth on a global scale, and some national economies 

actually contracted during the downturn. Economic indicators such as real GDP, the 

Consumer Confidence Index (“CCI”) and the unemployment rate paint a picture of a sharp 

drop in output that continues to have protracted adverse effects.

On a global scale, real GDP growth remained positive, but halved from 4.2% (2000-2007) 

to 2% (2008-2010). European countries were the worst hit by the recession, while emerging 

markets fared relatively well. The EU-27 experienced -4.2% growth in 2009. In the US, 

GDP growth was negative from 2nd quarter 2008 to 2nd quarter 2009. The US recession hit 

its nadir in the first quarter of 2009, and has since recovered to positive growth rates.

Other indicators of economic performance were even more ominous. The CCI is 

a leading indicator that measures consumer sentiments, based on a monthly survey of 

households. CCI in the US dropped long before output retracted. The US CCI began freefalling as early as August 2007. Consumer confidence continued to decline steadily until 

bottoming out in February 2009, at a mere 23% of the index in July 2007.

European consumers began to lose confidence at the same time as their American 

counterparts. The European Commission’s CCI indicator dropped swiftly from June 2007 

to February 2009. As Chart IV.D shows, consumer confidence bounced back faster in 

Europe than in the US. The decline in consumer confidence in developed economies such 

as the US and EU reflects uncertainty and poor economic performance. Chinese consumers, 

in contrast, have remained confident in light of their country’s unabated GDP growth. 

Globally, Nielsen reports that consumer confidence finally returned to pre-recession levels in 

1st quarter 2010 and that a large majority of countries surveyed recorded a rise in confidence 

over the previous quarter. 
Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010

265

Chart IV.D Consumer Confidence Indices Comparison

USA

Europe

-35

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

Jan-00Jul-00Jan-01Jul-01Jan-02Jul-02Jan-03Jul-03Jan-04Jul-04Jan-05Jul-05Jan-06Jul-06Jan-07Jul-07

Jan-08Jul-08Jan-09Jul-09Jan-10Jul-10

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

US Consumer Confidence Index

EU Consumer Confidence Index

The unemployment rate, a lagging indicator, doubled from 5% in May 2008 to over 10% 

in October 2009 in the US. United States unemployment continued to hover near 10% and 

well above the long-term average unemployment rate of 5.7%.15 In Europe, unemployment 

ratcheted up from a decade low 6.7% in February 2008 to a high of 9.6% in February 2010, 

where the rate has since leveled off. As can be seen in Chart IV.E, unemployment did not 

spike as drastically in Europe, where rates have traditionally been higher than the US. 

Chart IV.E Unemployment Rate

USA

Europe

Jan-00

Apr-00

Jul-00

Oct-00

Jan-01

Apr-01

Jul-01

Oct-01

Jan-02

Apr-02

Jul-02

Oct-02

Jan-03

Apr-03

Jul-03

Oct-03

Jan-04

Apr-04

Jul-04

Oct-04

Jan-05

Apr-05

Jul-05

Oct-05

Jan-06

Apr-06

Jul-06

Oct-06

Jan-07

Apr-07

Jul-07

Oct-07

Jan-08

Apr-08

Jul-08

Oct-08

Jan-09

Apr-09

Jul-09

Oct-09

Jan-10

Apr-10

Jul–10

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

Although growth rates have since recovered in Organization for Economic Co-operation 

and Development (“OECD”) countries, unemployment remains high and signifies that full 

recovery is far from over. For instance, unemployment did not drop significantly in 2011. 

15 US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Appendix IV

266

Government Interventions

In response to the downturn, many national governments responded with fiscal stimulus 

packages or money allocated to create or maintain jobs, spending, and infrastructure. The US 

Congress passed a $787 billion bill in February 2009. The Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

allocated the money in three broad categories: tax benefits, entitlements, and grants, contracts 

and loans. China announced as early as November 2008 intentions to implement a $586 

billion stimulus package. Overall economic stimulus accounted for 7% of China’s GDP in 

2009-2010, 5.5% of the US economy, and about 1-1.5% for the Eurozone.16

An important result of the global recession has been a sovereign debt crisis in Europe, 

particularly in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Doubts surrounding high deficit 

spending and debt levels in Greece led to a $147 billion rescue package designed by the 

European Union and the International Monetary Fund, contingent on strict austerity levels 

imposed upon the Greek government.17 General fear over the stability of the Euro currency 

caused the Euro to depreciate 20% against the US dollar between October 2009 and June 

2010, prompting the establishment of a $975 billion emergency fund providing guaranteed 

loans to Eurozone members.

The Liner Industry

Recession

2009 was the worst year in the post-war (WWII) history of liner shipping. Globally, 

container lines lost an estimated total of $15-20 billion.18 Most of these losses can be 

attributed to the world’s largest liner companies. According to American Shipper, the top 15 

carriers made $13.3 billion in profit from 2005-2008, only to lose almost all of it – $11.4 

billion – in 2009.19

Many major carriers turned to emergency loans or equity investment in order to stay 

afloat. Hapag-Lloyd was rescued by a combination of German government guarantees of 

$1.8 billion in loans and extra investment from shareholders. Chile’s CSAV was restructured 

with new shareholder equity as well as a plan to sell equity to the owners of their leased ships 

in return for low charter rates. Among Korean shipping lines, Hyundai Merchant Marine 

and Hanjin agreed to sell ships to a specially-created state ship owning fund in order to raise 

money. Israeli carrier, Zim, was bailed out by $450 million in liquidity and a $100 million 

emergency loan fund from its controlling stakeholders.20 Meanwhile, CMA CGM secured a 

$500 million credit line from its bankers in late 2009.21 A year later, the Yildirim Group of 

Turkey invested $500 million into CMA CGM, allowing the carrier to strengthen its equity 

base and secure the financing of its investment plan.22

Despite incurring losses of over $2.1 billion in 2009, Maersk did not seek new equity 

investment. Maersk’s container shipping company was able to weather the downturn and 

very weak rates in the Asia-Europe trade due to the deep pockets of its parent company 

(which itself reported $4.3 billion in losses in 2009).23 Most major carriers have secured 

16 David Barboza. “China Plans $586 Billion Economic Stimulus.” NY Times, 9 Nov 2008.

17 Nelson D. Schwartz. “Europe Faulted on Too-Tepid Stimulus.” NY Times, 11 March 2009.

18 American Shipper. “Who’s (NOT) Making Money.” 22 Jun 2010.

19 Ibid.

20 Robert Wright. “Zim bail-out approved by narrow vote.” Financial Times, 6 Nov 2009.

21 Bruce Barnard. “CMA CGM Gets $500 Million Credit Line.” Journal of Commerce, 18 Dec 2009.

22 CMA CGM press release of November 26, 2010. http://www.cma-cgm.com/AboutUs/PressRoom/Press-Release_

Agreement-between-CMA-CGM-and-YILDIRIM_9994.aspx. 

23 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 6.9 “Financial Results of Selected Carriers.”
Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010

267

capital via equity offerings, business deals or state interventions. As a result, no major carrier 

failed even in the face of the challenging market conditions.

American Shipper writes that carriers who had high exposures to charter vessels often 

fared the worst in the recession because of the higher fixed cost of chartering. Ship owners 

also found themselves in dire straits. In 2009, charter rates plummeted. Daily rates fell from 

$32,500 in 1st quarter 2008 to about $5,500 in 4th quarter 2009. In addition, the average 

charter period was reduced from twenty-four months in mid-2007 to four months during all 

of 2009. Carriers either returned vessels to ship owners once contracts ended or renegotiated 

at cutthroat rates below daily operating costs. Charter rates bottomed out in the 1st quarter of 

2010 and the average charter period began to recover.24

Carriers were unable to quickly decrease effective capacity to accommodate the reduced 

demand for liner services. As a result, capacity utilization rates dropped. Lumpy supply due 

to large ships meant that ships were forced to sail half-empty or not at all. Carriers reduced 

effective capacity by idling or demolishing ships after first consolidating or eliminating 

services. Demolitions by number of TEU increased tenfold from 2007 to 2009. In 2009, idle 

ships accounted for some 10% of the total fleet, peaking at 12% in March. Both demolitions 

and idling decreased in 2010. The idle fleet had been reduced to just 2.5% by the end of 

2010 as carriers switched to a new strategy – slow steaming.

Slow steaming is a strategy to reduce emissions, cut costs, utilize idle ships and redress 

supply/demand imbalances. Large vessels that normally sail at 23-25 knots slow to 17-19 knots 

or even to 14-16 knots in ‘extra-slow’ steaming. Slower speeds mean higher fuel efficiency 

and lower operating costs for carriers. Shippers, on the other hand, face longer transit times. 

Alphaliner estimates that with 8,500 TEU ships and bunker costs of $500 per ton, carriers could 

save as much as $20 million per year on an Asia-Europe string by slow steaming.25 In addition 

to cost-savings, slow steaming allows carriers to add vessels to a string without increasing the 

string’s effective capacity. By doing so, carriers utilize idle ships without increasing capacity.

The use of slow steaming accelerated by 2010, and, despite record deliveries of 

newbuildings, the idled fleet has decreased. Carriers have increasingly turned to extra-slow 

steaming as well. JOC Sailings reports that extra-slow steaming absorbed 4.1% of the cellular 

fleet in June 2010. Despite a variety of strategies to reduce effective capacity, the total fleet 

capacity continued to grow throughout the contraction.

Predictably, with such a mismatch in supply and demand, rates plummeted. Rates in the 

Asia-Europe trade were hit particularly hard. In 1st quarter 2009, freight rates fell to about 

$300, only 10% of the rate a year earlier. Reuters reported as early as December 2008 that 

some “shipping firms are willing to move goods for a zero freight rate and exporters are only 

responsible for bunker (fuel) and terminal handling charges” on the Asia-Europe route.26 The 

Great Recession caused a demand shock in the container trade and price wars in the world’s 

largest-volume routes.

Recovery & Other Issues

If 2009 was the worst year in liner shipping, 2010 may have been the best. Drewry estimated 

that carriers would collectively earn $17 billion in profit in 2010, completely erasing the 

losses of 2009.27 All major carriers were profitable again, but for some lines market conditions 

proved especially lucrative. The Maersk parent company reported record net profits for 2010, 

24 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 7.1 “Average Time Charter Rates.”

25 Joseph Bonney. “Carriers Move Full Speed into Slow Steaming.” Journal of Commerce, 12 Jan 2010.

26 Allison Leung. “Maersk Cuts Asia-US Container Rates-Sources.” Reuters, 5 Dec 2008.

27 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster (4th quarter 2010). Executive Summary.
Appendix IV

268

spearheaded by returns from its shipping division. Maersk Line earned $2.6 billion in 2010, 

after losing $1.59 billion the previous year.28 COSCO, too, reported record profits in 2010 

as well as a more than 50% increase in revenues. Not all carriers profited equally, however. 

CSAV reported only $171 million in net profits in 2010.29 CSAV chose volume over profit, 

using the recovery to increase market share by offering low freight rates and opening new 

services. Fast growing lines like APL and Zim also moved more volumes but were slow to 

return to profitability.

As for rates, the Journal of Commerce reports that China-North Europe rates shot up 68% 

from October 2009 to February 2010. Asia-Europe was the hardest hit major route, but 

recovered with equal speed. The former European Liner Affairs Association (“ELAA”) 

monitored the aggregate average monthly revenue per TEU of its members. In Chart IV.F, 

the ELAA freight rate index on European imports from Asia fell disproportionately compared 

to the corresponding drop in volume. While volumes plummeted temporarily in February 

2009 and eventually surpassed 1 million TEU per month in August, it took carriers over a 

year to regain average revenue levels of 4th quarter 2008. In the meantime, carrier revenues 

were reduced 50% during the first half of 2009. 

Chart IV.F European Containerized Imports from Asia,

2008-2010

Volume

Average Revenue 

Index (2008 = 100)

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Millions of TEU

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

Index

Carriers continue to slow steam in order to absorb the excess supply of vessel capacity, 

which enables carriers to increase rates and profit levels. Excess effective capacity was finally 

withdrawn from the market, but it came at the cost of productivity. Productivity decreased 

because slow steaming reduces effective capacity on a string and increases the amount of 

time in a vessel’s loop. For instance, the number of TEU moves per effective slot decreased 

from 17.2 per year in 3rd quarter 2007 to 13.2 in 1st quarter 2009. It takes more resources to 

operate the same strings as before, while moving more or less the same amount of cargo. 

In early 2010, a container shortage materialized. When demand for liner services fell, so 

too did demand for new container purchases. After 8% growth in the container box fleet 

28 Robert Wright. “Maersk predicts turnaround as volumes recover.” Financial Times, 10 Nov 2010, and Maersk Line’s 

financial statements.

29 CSAV’s financial statements.
Liner Recession and Recovery, 2008-2010

269

from 2004 to 2008, almost none were built during 2009. Most container production occurs 

in China, where factories simply shut down during the recession.30 The shortage was further 

exacerbated by slow steaming, which absorbed an additional one million containers.31 Trade 

imbalances and lengthy repositioning times also played a role in the container shortage. 

Carriers did eventually reposition and acquire more containers, reducing the impact of the 

shortage in the second half of 2010.

US exporters were hardest hit by container shortages. On the major US trade, the 

transpacific route, US exports are the backhaul direction. Imports tend to be high value 

consumer items, which garner higher shipping rates, while exports tend to be heavy bulk 

items such as waste paper. In the US, container shortages present challenging logistical 

problems. Empty containers sit piled at coastal ports, hundreds or even thousands of miles 

from the inland agricultural regions where they are needed. Given lengthy turnaround time 

for boxes and the rate differential between imports and exports, carriers can make more 

money by shipping empty containers back to China to be used again for US imports.

Chart Sources

Chart IV.A Annualized Global Demand Growth Rate

•	 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 2.1 “Quarterly Container Growth by 

Region.”

•	 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 4.1 “Estimated Development of the 

Container market Supply/Demand Balance.”

Chart IV.B Fleet Size & Distribution

•	 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 3.1 “World Cellular Containership 

Fleet by Size Range.”

Chart IV.C Time Charter Rates & Demolition Data

•	 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 7.1 “Average Time Charter Rates.”

•	 Drewry Quarterly Container Forecaster. Table 3.5 “Sales for Demolition.”

Chart IV.D Consumer Confidence Indices

•	 University of Wisconsin at Madison: Agricultural & Applied Economics website

•	 http://future.aae.wisc.edu/data/monthly_values/by_area/998?area=US&tab=sales&gri

d=true. 

•	 European Commission Economic Databases & Indicators website

•	 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/index_

en.htm. 

•	 China National Bureau of Statistics website

Chart IV.E Unemployment Rate

•	 US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

•	 Eurostat Database online

Chart VI.F Rate & Volumes for European Imports

•	 European Liner Affairs Association website, ELAA.net/trade

30 Chris Dupin. “Boxed Out.” American Shipper Aug 2010.

31 Peter T. Leach & William B. Cassidy. “Cloudy, with a Chance of Pain.” Journal of Commerce, 12 July 2010.
271

Appendix V

Regulation of Ocean Carrier Agreements 

in the Transatlantic Trade

Trade and shipping between the United States and Europe has historically been a mutually 

beneficial commercial exchange that has sustained and enriched both economies. To 

clarify the current state of the liner shipping industry in the US/Europe trade, this section 

provides background on the relevant legal and legislative decisions that impacted agreements 

between ocean carriers operating in the trade prior to and after the repeal of the block 

exemption regulations for liner shipping conferences, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86

(“Regulation 4056/86”).

The repeal took effect on October 18, 2008; however, the decision to revoke legal 

immunity for liner shipping conferences occurred on September 25, 2006, when the Council 

of Ministers of the European Union (“EU Council”) adopted Council Regulation (EC) No. 

1419/2006. This decision was preceded by a lengthy review of Regulation 4056/86 initiated 

by the European Commission (“EC”) on March 27, 2003, that involved hearings, numerous 

EC reports and studies, and extensive comments from the liner shipping industry and the 

shipping public.

The repeal of Regulation 4056/86 impacted the US/Europe trade by making all forms 

of conference and price fixing agreements between ocean carriers illegal, resulting in their 

termination. As such, it was the only US shipping trade directly affected by the repeal, which 

makes it a market of particular economic interest for this Study.

Background on Carrier Agreements in the Trade

In terms of agreement activity among ocean carriers, the US/Europe trade has a long and 

involved history. As liner shipping evolved with the invention of the steam ship, some of the 

first agreements between ocean carriers were formed in the US/Europe trade; these included 

the Transatlantic Shipping Conference in 1868, the North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference in 

1868, and the Trans-Atlantic Freight Conference in 1895.1

 In more recent history, however, the 

Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (“TACA”)2

 was the last conference to operate in the trade 

and one of the most highly controversial and litigated agreements under the competition 

rules of the European Union (“EU”).3

In a protracted series of legal disputes over a period of eleven years, the EC and the 

TACA carriers became embroiled in lengthy and intricate arguments over the intended 

meaning and application of the block exemption regulations. In an appealed EC decision 

1 Luis Ortiz Blanco, Shipping Conferences Under EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2007, p.5.

2 TACA operated in the trade lane between the US and North Europe, traditionally defined as spanning the range 

from Bayonne, France to North Cape, Norway. The North Europe sector of the trade included container shipments 

originating and destined for the countries of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 

Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, 

Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 

3 Specifically, Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements between undertakings which affect trade between 

Member States [of the EU] and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of 

competition within the common market [of the EU]. Article 102 of the EC Treaty prohibits any abuse of a dominant 

position by an undertaking within the common market or any substantial part of it that may affect trade between 

Member States. The term “undertakings” is interpreted to mean entities which are engaged in economic or commercial 

activities. 
Appendix V

272

against TACA, the European Court exclaimed:

[I]t is true that the contested decision is one of the longest ever adopted by the 

Commission in application of Articles 85 and 86 [renumbered as Articles 101 and 102] 

of the Treaty, that that decision raises relatively complex issues of fact and law in respect 

of which, when the actions were brought, there was no relevant case-law and that as 

Community law stands at present there is no provision limiting the length of the written 

pleadings or the number of documents lodged in support of an action for annulment 

under Article 173 of the Treaty.4

This drawn out and exhaustive legal dispute with TACA likely had an impact on the EC’s 

decision to initiate its review of Regulation 4056/86, which resulted in the repeal of the 

block exemption.

In applying Regulation 4056/86 to TACA and other conferences, the EC interpreted 

the language of the regulation narrowly and literally. Unlike the Shipping Act that exempts 

other forms of agreements between regulated entities, Regulation 4056/86 only exempted 

a liner conference among vessel-operating carriers that operated, inter alia, under uniform or 

common freight rates as defined in Article 1(3)(b) of the regulations, which was the identical 

definition of a liner conference adopted under the United Nations Convention on a Code of 

Conduct for Liner Conference.5

 Further, unlike the Shipping Act, the EU block exemption 

did not apply to price fixing agreements under conferences for inland transport operations 

and quayside services.6

 The EC strictly applied the exemption to cover port-to-port maritime 

transport services performed by liner conferences. Such maritime transport services, as 

provided in Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86, included, inter alia, concerted practices by 

conference members to regulate capacity and allocate cargo or revenue. In applying the 

block exemption in these cases, however, the EC deemed that such concerted practices must 

be for the purpose of improving services to transport users and not for the sole purpose of 

potentially affecting rate increases.7

From the inception of TACA to its termination, the EC adopted three major decisions on 

the conference as the structure of the agreement evolved and its authority and market power 

eventually eroded. Initially in 1992, recessionary conditions in the trade, compounding the 

problems of excess vessel capacity and depressed freight rates, induced the major carriers 

to consolidate under a single conference agreement, called the Trans-Atlantic Agreement

(“TAA”), with a total market share of about 80 percent.8

 TAA superseded the USA-North 

Europe Rate Agreement and the North Europe-USA Rate Agreement, which had formerly 

controlled 55 to 60 percent of the trade. The authority of TAA was unique in that it allowed 

the parties to form a dual pricing structure whereby certain members were bound by the 

conferences rates while other members could voluntarily adhere to the conference rates or 

price independently. TAA also provided authority for its members to implement a capacity 

management program in the inbound direction from North Europe that withheld a portion 

of the supply of vessel capacity from use in the market.

The authority available to the members of TAA was successfully employed to achieve 

4 Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [2003] ECR II3275, paragraph (1646) (30 September 2003).

5 United Nations, Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conference, Geneva, Part 1, Chapter 1 (6 April 1974).

6 Article 5(3) of Regulation 4056/86.

7 Alla Pozdnakova, Liner Shipping and EU Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2008, p. 151.

8 At the time the conference became effective in August 1992, there were 12 carrier members; these were: A.P. MollerMaersk Line; Atlantic Container Line AB; Cho Yang Shipping Co.; Compagnie Generale Maritime; DSR/Senator Joint 

Service; Hapag-Lloyd AG; Mediterranean Shipping Co.; Nedlloyd Lijnen BV; Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd.; 

P&O Container Limited; Polish Ocean Line; and Sea-Land Service, Inc. 
Regulation of Ocean Carrier Agreements in the Transatlantic Trade

273

sizable rate increases, which almost immediately incited severe criticism from transport 

users, prompting regulatory action in the US and Europe. In 1994, the Federal Maritime 

Commission (“FMC”) initiated a series of formal proceedings to investigate whether the 

complaints and allegations of transport users against TAA violated the Shipping Act.9

 These 

proceedings were later discontinued in 1995 with the approval of a settlement agreement that 

imposed certain conditions on the conference, which, inter alia, required that the agreement 

be amended to allow for independent action on service contracts by its members.

In its decision on the conference, the EC determined that TAA was operating in violation 

of the EU competition rules [Article 101(1)] and did not qualify for an exemption under 

Regulation 4056/86 due to its dual pricing structure, capacity management program, and 

price fixing on inland haulage.10 Significantly, the EC viewed the pricing structure of TAA 

as a scheme that provided rate flexibility for traditionally non-conference carriers and not a 

true conference operating under uniform or common rates as defined in the regulations.11

Further, the EC interpreted the capacity management program of TAA to be a tool intended 

primarily for suspending and artificially maintaining unused capacity in the market to increase 

the prices of European exports.12 On appeal, the EC’s decision against TAA was upheld by 

the European Court.13

In response to the objections raised against TAA, the conference restructured its 

agreement as TACA and eliminated the dual pricing structure, capacity management 

program, and other controversial provisions from the agreement. In July 1994, the 

restructured conference agreement was submitted before the EC for consideration of a 

block exemption under Regulation 4056/86, and in October 1994, TACA took effect 

under the Shipping Act. After a lengthy review and comment period, in September 1998, 

the EC determined that the TACA carriers did not qualify for any form of exemption and, 

therefore, acted in violation of the Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty with respect to: (1) their 

price fixing on inland transport services within Europe, (2) their agreement on the terms and 

conditions for entering into service contracts with shippers, and (3) their agreement on rates 

of brokerage and freight forwarder remuneration.14 In addition, the EC determined that the 

TACA carriers had abused their dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the 

EC Treaty by: restricting the availability and content of service contracts,15 and restricting 

competition to reinforce their dominant market position.16 For abusing their dominant 

market position in violation of Article 102, the EC imposed fines on each TACA member 

that collectively amounted to 273 million European currency units (“ECU”).17 On appeal, 

the European Court later annulled the EC’s decision against the TACA carriers on the 

abuse of their dominant market position and the fines that were imposed against the carriers 

9 These proceedings included FMC Fact Finding Investigation No. 21, Activities of the Trans-Atlantic Agreement and its 

Members; FMC Docket No. 94-29, Practice of the Trans-Atlantic Agreement and its Members with respect to Independent Action; 

and FMC Docket No. 94-30, Container Pool Practices of the Trans-Atlantic Agreement and its Members.

10 Commission Decision 94/980/EC, Commission of the European Communities (19 October 1994).

11 Ibid., paragraphs (320) to (358).

12 Ibid., paragraphs (359) to (370).

13 Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [2002] ECR II-875 (28 February 2002).

14 Commission Decision 1999/243/EC, paragraphs (400) to (518).

15 Ibid., paragraphs (551) to (558).

16 The EC determined that the TACA carriers restricted competition to reinforce their dominant position by providing 

incentives to new carrier entrants to join the conference rather than enter the trade as independent competitors. Ibid., 

paragraphs (559) to (567).

17 Ibid., paragraphs (583) to (606).
Appendix V

274

relating to that part of the decision.18 The Court, however, upheld the EC’s decision on the 

application of an exemption for the agreement and the violations committed under Article 

101(1).19

Around the time of the EC’s proceeedings against TACA, the US shipping statutes 

were revised in October 1998 to introduce new legislative measures aimed at increasing 

competition within the liner shipping industry under the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 

1998 (“OSRA”). Most notably, OSRA prohibited agreements among ocean carriers 

from restricting, or interfering with, the right of their members to enter into individual 

service contracts on a confidential basis, but permitted agreements to adopt service contract 

guidelines that could be adhered to on a voluntary basis by their members.20

In effect, OSRA replaced the uniform system of pricing through the structure of 

conference agreements with a more competitive system of pricing directly between 

individual carriers and shippers. Consequently, in most of the US liner trades, conference 

agreements were replaced with less rigidly structured discussion agreements that contained 

voluntary rate authority. However, such agreements were not in compliance with the 

requirements of the block exemption regulations under Regulation 4056/86 that only 

provided for conference agreements on uniform or common freight rates. Therefore, carriers 

operating in the US/EU trades that still sought legal immunity to voluntarily agree on rates 

could only participate in conferences that discuss and agree on conference tariff and service 

contract rates. After OSRA was enacted, however, the movement of most liner cargo in the 

US trades rapidly shifted from conference tariffs and service contracts to individual service 

contracts between carriers and shippers that are kept confidential.21 Consequently, the actual 

rate authority of conferences dwindled to only a small portion of the market.

In an attempt to comply with OSRA and the latest decision of the EC, TACA again 

revised its agreement by substantially restructuring its authority. Most notably, the new 

version of the agreement reduced the authority of the conference by prohibiting: (1) the 

TACA secretariat and members from discussing, collecting, or exchanging information 

on non-conference service contracts, or adopting voluntary guidelines on such contracts; 

(2) collective pricing on inland transport services within the Europe; and (3) agreements 

on forwarder compensation and brokerage on cargo shipments from Europe. Further, a 

number of carriers withdrew from the conference reducing its market share in the trade to 

50 percent. The revised TACA agreement took effect under the Shipping Act in December 

1998, and was notified with the EC in January 1999. Eventually, the EC adopted a decision 

granting the revised TACA agreement a complete exemption from the competition rules for 

a period of six years.22

By the time of the review period starting in 2006, the influence of the conference and the 

activity of its remaining members had diminished considerably from when the conference 

first formed. Subsequently, Hapag-Lloyd was forced to resign from TACA as a condition 

for the EC’s approval of its acquisition of CP Ships in 2005. The membership of P&O 

Nedlloyd Ltd. was absorbed into Maersk Line with its acquisition in early 2006. Membership 

in the conference dropped to five carriers with a total market share of around 40 percent.23

18 Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98 (30 September 2003).

19 Ibid.

20 Section 5(c) of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 USC 40303(a).

21 The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, FMC, pp. 16-21 (September 2001).

22 Commission Decision 2003/68/EC, Official Journal of the European Communities (14 November 2002).

23 The remaining TACA members at the time of the termination of the conference were Atlantic Container Line AB, 

Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Co., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, and Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd. 
Regulation of Ocean Carrier Agreements in the Transatlantic Trade

275

Further, as noted, in September 2006, the termination of the conference system in the trade 

was definite when the EU Council voted to repeal Regulation 4056/86 with a two-year 

transition period.

Under these conditions, the conference primarily conducted meetings at the senior 

executive level under its primary committees; and the frequency of these meetings declined 

as the end of the conference drew near in 2008. In the latter period of its existence, the 

conference primarily focused its activities on providing some degree of marketplace guidance 

by setting tariff general rate increases and surcharges. In particular, the price of bunker fuel 

substantially escalated during this period and TACA increased its bunker adjustment factor 

by 40 percent,24 as was also the case with the major non-conference carriers. The TACA 

members also discussed and exchanged general trade information. In general, carriers 

described the influence of the conference during this period as providing some direction on 

surcharges and upcoming rate increases that carriers in the trade could follow and a forum for 

discussion of market data and information.25 By the end of June 2008, TACA terminated its 

tariffs and discontinued operating as a conference; the agreement was terminated at the end 

of September 2008 prior to the date of block exemption repeal.

Carrier Agreements after the Repeal

To provide carriers with direction in the post repeal period, the EC issued competition 

guidelines, which, inter alia, addressed information exchange between competitors in liner 

shipping.26 While the guidelines did not sanction information exchange between carriers, 

they set forth standards under which forms of information exchange should be assessed 

within the structure of the market to determine whether or not the exchange of information 

would violate the law by restricting competition.27

Just prior to the repeal in October 2008, carriers operating between the US and the 

EU formed the Container Trade Statistics Agreement (“CTSA”) to provide for a system of 

information exchange in compliance with the EC’s competition guidelines. Initially, CTSA 

had 20 carrier members and authorized the collection and dissemination of historic and 

aggregated liner shipping data in the EU trades, including monthly cargo volumes and 

price indices based on the monthly average revenue of the participating carriers. CTSA 

also transformed the European Liner Affairs Association (“ELAA”) into an official trade 

association under which the members could confer, and established Container Trades 

Statistics, Ltd. (“CTS”) as a business enterprise to manage its commercial affairs. Under CTS, 

certain data at the highest aggregated level is made available to the public over the internet at 

no charge, while less aggregated data is made available to the public by paid subscription.28

Prior to the formation of CTSA, ELAA functioned as a representative for the liner 

shipping industry on maritime transportation matters before the EC and within the EU. In 

July 2010, ELAA decided to disband to allow CTS to operate more effectively as a business 

and remain in compliance with the competition rules of the EU.29 The World Shipping 

24 TACA Tariff FMC Nos. 53 and 60, The Descartes Systems Group, Inc.

25 See public comments to question 7 of FMC Notice of Inquiry, An Analysis of the European Union Repeal of the Liner 

Conference Block Exemption, issued November 1, 2010. 

26 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport services, Commission of the European 

Communities, Brussels, paragraphs (38) to (59) (1 July 2008).

27 As an alternative to the conference system, a system of information exchange between ocean carriers was first 

proposed by the European Liner Affairs Association (“ELAA”) on behalf of the liner shipping industry. Review of 

Regulation 4056/86: Proposal for a new Regulatory Structure, ELAA, Letter from Mr. Ken Bloch Soerensen of ELAA to Ms. 

Lowri Evans of EC DG Competition/Services (6 August 2004).

28 See www.containerstatistics.com.

29 Eric Johnson, Lines file with FMC to index transpacific data, American Shipper (November 10, 2010).
Appendix V

276

Council took over the functions of ELAA as the EU representative for the industry. CTS 

was sold to an entity not affiliated with any shipping lines to operate as an independent 

company for profit. In December 2010, CTSA was superseded by the World Liner Data 

Agreement (“WLDA”), in which 15 carriers participate. WLDA has the same authority as 

CTSA to collect and disseminate trade data; however, its geographic scope was expanded 

to include all of the US liner trades worldwide. Under the terms of WLDA, the carrier 

members have contracted with CTS to manage the collection and compilation of trade data 

and the commercial business of marketing and selling the data. CTS expanded its business 

to offer liner trade data globally beyond just the EU trades. Users that subscribe to CTS 

data find it of value in conducting market analysis similar to other commercial sources of 

trade data.30 In June 2011, CTSA was formally terminated as an agreement on file under the 

Shipping Act.

Another regulatory change by the EC involved modifications to its block exemption 

regulations for consortia agreements31 between or among carriers in the EU trades.32 In 

September 2009, the EC renewed and modified its regulations granting a conditional 

block exemption from Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty for specific concerted activities of 

carriers operating in consortia agreements in the EU trades.33 Among the most substantive 

modifications to the regulations, the EC reduced the market share threshold by which 

consortia are block exempted from 35 to 30 percent. Further, the regulations were modified 

to specify that the block exemption does not apply to carrier agreements that involve: (1) the 

fixing of prices when selling liner services to third parties, (2) the limitation of capacity or 

sales (except capacity adjustments made in response to fluctuations in supply and demand), 

and (3) the allocation of markets or customers. The regulations also eliminated all past 

references to conferences or provisions and authorities pertaining to conferences. The revised 

regulations took effect in April 2010, and will remain in effect for five years till April 2015.

Most carriers in the US/Europe trade operate services in some form of cooperative 

consortia from highly integrated alliance or vessel-sharing agreements to more loosely 

structured arrangements such as space-charter agreements. The ability to cooperate in 

consortia was particularly useful to carriers in addressing the problems of severe excess 

capacity and financial losses that occurred in the trade during the 2009 recessionary period. 

By the end of 2010, there were 48 operational agreements between carriers on file and in 

effect at the FMC pertaining to the liner services operating in the trade lanes between the US 

and North Europe, and the US and South Europe in the Mediterranean region.

30 See public comments to question 10 of FMC Notice of Inquiry, An Analysis of the European Union Repeal of the Liner 

Conference Block Exemption, issued November 1, 2010. 

31 In its latest review of the consortia regulations, the EC determined that:

A consortium is a joint service provided by two or more shipping lines. Its main features are sharing of 

space and the determination of port calls and schedules. There is a great variety of different consortium 

agreements operating in the market. For the purposes of the Draft Consortia BER a consortium 

agreement can be made of one or a set of separate but interrelated agreements such as reciprocal slot 

charters, under which the parties operate the joint service. The legal form of the arrangement is considered 

less important than the underlying economic reality that the parties provide a joint service.

Technical Paper on the Revision of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 823/2000 on the Application of Article 81(3) [now Article 

101(3)] of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices between Liner Shipping Companies 

(Consortia) as last amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 611/2005 of 20 April 2005, Commission of the European 

Communities, paragraph (39) (October 2008).

32 Pursuant to its authority under Council Regulation (EEC) No. 479/92, the EC first adopted block exemption 

regulations for consortia agreements between liner carriers that did not authorize price fixing under Commission 

Regulation (EC) No. 870/95, which took effect on 22 April 1995. In April 1996, the first major alliance formed in the 

trade under the Grand Alliance Agreement between Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie GmbH, Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 

Nippon Yusen Kaisha, and P&O Nedlloyd Limited.

33 Article 3 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 906/2009 (28 September 2009).
277

Appendix VI

Timeline of Events Relating to Liner 

Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

February 6, 1962

The Council of Ministers of the European Communities [now renamed the Council 

of Ministers of the European Union (“EU Council”)] adopted Council Regulation 

(EEC) No. 17, which first applied the laws of competition, i.e., Articles 85 and 86 

[now Articles 101 and 102] to all activities covered under the Treaty establishing the 

European Economic Community (“EC Treaty”).

November 26, 1962

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EEC) No. 141 exempting transport 

from the application of Regulation No. 17. 

July 19, 1968

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68 applying the laws 

of competition to transport by rail, road, and inland waterways. Article 5 of Regulation 

No. 1017/68 exempted agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which 

contributed towards improving the quality of transport services. 

March 20, 1984

The Shipping Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”) was signed into law by the President. Among 

its reforms, the 1984 Act provided that carrier agreements be allowed to take effect 

upon 45 days after filing with the FMC, unless enjoined under section 6(h). The 1984 

Act further authorized service contracts between carriers or conferences and shippers, 

and mandated that members of conference agreements be allow to take independent 

action on any rate or service item after a notice period of no more than 10 days. The 

1984 Act took effect on June 18, 1984. 

December 22, 1986

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86 (“Regulation 

4056/86”) applying the laws of competition to maritime transport [defined as 

international maritime transport services from or to one or more Community ports, 

other than tramp vessel services], which specifically provided for a block exemption of 

liner shipping conferences. Regulation 4056/86 took effect on July 1, 1987. 

February 25, 1992

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EEC) No. 479/92 applying the laws 

of competition to certain agreements, decisions, and concerted practices (consortia) 

between liner shipping companies. Regulation 479/92 empowered the EC with the 

authority to exempt certain forms of consortia between carriers. 

August 28, 1992

Carrier parties to the Trans-Atlantic Agreement (“TAA”) first notified the agreement with 

the European Commission (“EC”) for consideration under Regulation 4056/86. 
Appendix VI

278

August 31, 1992

TAA, FMC Agreement No. 011375, took effect under the Shipping Act, replacing the 

USA-North Europe Rate Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011241, and the North EuropeUSA Rate Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011242, and increasing conference market 

share from 61 percent to 83 percent inbound, and 54 percent to 83 percent outbound. 

TAA implemented a capacity management program in the inbound trade direction 

from North Europe. 

September 24, 1992

The EC informed TAA that it would also examine the agreement under Regulation 

1017/68. 

December 10, 1993

The EC issued a statement of objections against TAA. 

July 5, 1994

Carrier parties to the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement, (FMC Agreement No. 

011375-013), (“TACA”) notified the agreement with the EC for consideration under 

Regulation 4056/86. 

July 15, 1994

By letter, the EC informed TACA that it would examine the agreement on the basis of 

an individual exemption with respect to activities authorized under the agreement that 

the EC considered to be outside of the block exemption under Regulation 4056/86. 

July 27, 1994

The FMC initiated Fact Finding Investigation No. 21, Activities of the Trans-Atlantic 

Agreement and Its Members in response to petitions from shipper groups requesting FMC 

action against the agreement. 

October 19, 1994

The EC adopted Decision 94/980/EC finding TAA ineligible for an exemption and in 

breach of the competition laws and ordering the carriers to cease operating under the 

agreement. 

October 24, 1994

TACA took effect under the Shipping Act; TACA was filed as an agreement 

modification to TAA, FMC Agreement No. 011375-013. The capacity management 

program implemented under TAA was removed from TACA at the time of its 

effectiveness. 

November 23, 1994

The FMC amended its order to add TACA to the scope of its investigation under 

Fact Finding Investigation No. 21 and further issued Orders of Investigation in FMC 

Docket No. 94-29, Practices of the Trans-Atlantic Agreement and it Members With Respect 

to Independent Action, and FMC Docket No. 94-30, Container Pool Practices of the TransAtlantic Agreement and its Members. 

December 23, 1994

Carrier parties to TAA/TACA submitted an application of annulment of the Decision 

94/980/EC against TAA to the European Court of First Instance, and requested that 

the decision be suspended pending appeal. Registered as Case T-395/94 R. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

279

March 9, 1995

The FMC approved a settlement agreement with the TAA/TACA carriers to terminate 

Fact Finding Investigation No. 21 and dismiss FMC Docket Nos. 94-29 and 94-30; the 

settlement agreement was approved on the condition that TACA be amended to allow 

for independent action on service contracts by its members. 

March 10, 1995

The European Court of First Instance granted the request of the TAA/TACA carriers 

to suspend Decision 94/980/EC pending appeal. 

April 20, 1995

The EC first adopted block exemption regulations (subject to certain conditions) 

for consortia agreements between liner carriers that do not involve price fixing 

(Commission Regulation (EC) No. 870/95), which took effect on April 22, 1995.

April 23, 1995

As required under the FMC settlement agreement, an amendment to TACA (011375-

016) to allow for independent action on service contracts (commencing on January 1, 

1996) took effect under the Shipping Act. 

June 21, 1995

The EC issued a statement of objections against TACA to adopt a decision 

withdrawing TACA’s immunity from fines for inland price fixing within the European 

Union (“EU”). 

November 29, 1995

Carrier parties to TACA notified the EC of the European Inland Equipment 

Interchange Arrangement (“EIEIA”). 

January 13, 1996

The amendment to TACA (011375-022) implementing EIEIA took effect under the 

Shipping Act. 

March 1, 1996

The EC issued a supplementary statement of objections indicating that the EIEIA did 

not alter its statement of objections against TACA issued on June 21, 1995. 

April 29, 1996

Effective under the Shipping Act, the Grand Alliance formed in the trade between 

Hapag-Lloyd, NOL, NYK, and P&O Nedlloyd, FMC Agreement No. 011536. 

May 24, 1996

The EC issued a statement of objections against TACA to adopt a decision to deny 

TACA an exemption and find TACA in breach of EU law for certain practices, to 

cease such practices, and to impose fines against the parties for abuse of their dominant 

position. 

November 26, 1996

The EC adopted Decision C(96)3414 to withdraw the TACA parties’ immunity from 

fines for fixing inland rates within the EU. 
Appendix VI

280

January 1, 1997

TACA parties implemented a hub-and-spoke system of inland cooperation for certain 

EU ports. 

January 10, 1997

TACA parties notified the EC of the hub-and-spoke system claiming that this new 

cooperation satisfied the conditions for an exemption for inland price fixing. 

January 20, 1997

Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd acquired DSR-Senator Lines GmbH from parent company 

Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG. Both Hanjin and DSR-Senator were members of TACA 

at the time. 

January 27, 1997

TACA parties submitted an application for annulment of Decision C(96)3414 

(withdrawal of immunity from fines for inland price fixing) to the European Court of 

First Instance. Registered as Case T-18/97. 

February 16, 1997

Effective under the Shipping Act, COSCO, K Line, and Yang Ming began operating 

collectively in the trade under a series of agreements, FMC Agreement Nos. 011560, 

011561, and 011562. 

April 11, 1997

The EC issued a supplementary statement of objections indicating that notwithstanding 

the hub-and-spoke system, the objections of its statement against TACA issued on May 

24, 1996 remained, including the practice of inland price fixing in the EU where such 

services fall outside of the scope of the hub-and-spoke system. 

May 16, 1997

CP Ships Ltd. completed its acquisition of Lykes Lines, Inc. from Lykes Brothers 

Steamship Co. 

November 12, 1997

NOL completed its acquisition of APL Limited. 

November 24, 1997

TACA amendment (011375-033) deleting Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd. as a party to the 

agreement took effect under the Shipping Act. 

January 31, 1998

Effective under the Shipping Act, the Grand Alliance Agreement II formed in the trade 

between Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, P&O Nedlloyd, and OOCL, FMC Agreement No. 

011602. 

February 17, 1998

TACA amendment (011375-038) deleting NOL as a party to the agreement took effect 

under the Shipping Act. 

March 30, 1998

Effective under the Shipping Act, APL and Mitsui OSK Line first began cooperating in 

the trade under Agreement No. 011611. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

281

August 6, 1998

TACA amendment (011375-040) deleting Cho Yang Shipping Co. as a party to the 

agreement took effect under the Shipping Act. 

September 16, 1998

The EC adopted Decision 1999/243/EC finding TACA ineligible for any form of 

exemption for engaging in practices that breached EU competition law; ordering 

TACA to cease all such practices; and imposing fines that in total amounted to ECU 

(European currency unit) 273 million for abusing their dominant position by (1) 

entering into an agreement to place restrictions on the availability and content of 

service contracts, and (2) altering the competitive structure of the market. 

October 14, 1998

The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (“OSRA”) was signed into law by the 

President. Among its reforms, OSRA strictly prohibited carrier agreements from 

restricting the right of its member to engage in individual service contracts with 

shippers on a confidential basis. OSRA took effect on May 1, 1999. 

December 7, 1998

Certain parties to TACA submitted an application for annulment of Decision 

1999/243/EC against TACA to the European Court of First Instance. Registered 

as Case T-191/98. December 29, 1998, NOL and NYK each submitted separate 

applications for annulment of Decision 1999/243/EC. Registered as Case T-212/98 

and Case T-213/98, respectively. December 30, 1998, TMM/Tecomar registered an 

application for annulment of Decision 1999/243/EC. Registered as Case T-214/98. 

December 31, 1998

TACA amendment (011375-044) took effect under the Shipping Act to: (1) restate the 

agreement [4th edition]; (2) remove the authority to set inland rates collectively within 

the European Economic Area in favor of a not-below-cost rule based on each carrier’s 

individual costs for inland transport; (3) revise service contract authority to comply 

with the requirements of OSRA and the EC [the EC prohibited TACA parties and 

secretariat from discussing, collecting, or exchanging information on non-conference 

service contracts,1

 or adopting voluntary service contract guidelines for such contracts]; 

limit forwarder compensation/brokerage to shipments from US; reduce the notice 

period for independent action from ten to three days; and delete Tecomar Limited, 

Mexican Line Ltd., DSR-Senator Line, and Hyundai Merchant Marine Co as parties to 

the agreement. At this point, with the loss in membership, the conference market share 

dropped to about 50 percent in each trade direction. 

January 29, 1999

TACA parties notified the revised version of the TACA agreement (“revised TACA”) 

with the EC for consideration under Regulation 4056/86. 

February 12, 1999

The North Atlantic Agreement (“NAA”) was filed at the FMC as a conference agreement 

with the intention of replacing TACA. Membership in NAA included the TACA 

carriers plus eleven other carriers in the trade, which amounted to a market share of 

1 The EC considered conference service contracts to be those contracts negotiated directly through the conference 

secretariat on behalf of the TACA members. The EC viewed all other contracts negotiated outside of the conference 

secretariat by TACA members to be non-conference service contracts.
Appendix VI

282

84 percent. NAA set forth a system of information exchange between its members; 

the agreement was withdrawn after the FMC issued a formal request for additional 

information. 

February 22, 1999

The European Court of First Instance ordered that Cases T-191/98, T-212/98, 

T-213/98, and T-214/98 against TACA be joined for written and oral proceedings, 

and judgment. 

February 26, 1999

TACA amendment (011375-047) deleting POL-Atlantic as a party to the agreement 

took effect under the Shipping Act. 

May 6, 1999

The EC published a summary of the notification of the revised TACA agreement for 

public comment. 

May 29, 1999

TACA amendment (011375-048) to reduce the notice period for independent action 

from three days to one day took effect under the Shipping Act. 

June 4, 1999

The European Shippers’ Council (“ESC”) submitted comments to the EC raising 

objections against the revised TACA agreement. 

August 4, 1999

The EC notified the TACA parties by letter that it would continue its investigation 

of the revised TACA agreement due to serious doubts about the eligibility of an 

exemption for the agreement under the competition laws. 

December 10, 1999

A.P. Moller-Maersk completed its acquisition of Sea-Land Services Inc.

December 10, 1999

TACA amendment (011375-051) deleting Sea-Land Services Inc. as a party to the 

agreement and modifying the trade name of Maersk took effect under the Shipping 

Act.

January 1, 2000

CP Ships Ltd. completed its acquisition of Americana Ships from TMM Lines (Grupo 

TMM). 

April 19, 2000

The EC adopted Commission Regulation (EC) No. 823/2000 to renew the block 

exemption regulations for consortia agreements between carriers for a five-year period 

till 2005. Regulation 823/2000 took effect on April 26, 2000. 

October 9, 2000

Effective under the Shipping Act, the New World Alliance between APL, Mitsui OSK 

Line, and Hyundai Merchant Marine formed in the trade under FMC Agreement No. 

011723. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

283

December 1, 2000

The TACA parties submitted a supplementary notification to the EC on an amendment 

to the revised TACA agreement to implement a program to temporarily withdraw 

capacity for the off-peak season of 2000/2001. 

December 4, 2000

TACA amendment (011375-054) took effect under the Shipping Act to implement a 

program to temporarily withdraw capacity for the off-peak season of 2000/2001. 

November 29, 2001

The EC issued Commission Notice 2001/C 335/03 stating its intention to grant the 

revised TACA agreement an exemption under the competition rules. 

December 10, 2001

TACA amendment (011375-058) took effect under the Shipping act to implement a 

program to temporarily withdraw capacity for the off-peak season of 2001/2002. 

February 28, 2002

The European Court of First Instance dismissed the TAA/TACA parties’ applications 

to annul Decision 94/980/EC against TAA (Case T-395/94 R) and Decision 

C(96)3414 to withdraw immunity from fines for inland price fixing (Case T-18/97). 

No appeals of the judgments were lodged by the parties. 

April 16, 2002

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) published 

its final report on Competition Policy in Liner Shipping, recommending, inter alia, that 

exemptions for common pricing and rate discussions among liner carriers be reexamined and eliminated unless exceptionally justified. 

April 28, 2002

Effective under the Shipping Act, COSCO, K Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, and Senator 

consolidated their agreements and services in the trade under the COSCO/KL/

YMUK/Hanjin/Senator Worldwide Slot Allocation and Sailing Agreement, FMC Agreement 

No. 011794. 

August 6, 2002

CP Ships Ltd. completed its acquisition of Italia di Navigazione. 

November 14, 2002

The EC adopted Commission Decision 2003/68/EC granting the revised TACA 

agreement an exemption under the competition rules for a period of six years. 

December 16, 2002

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation 

of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 and 102 of the EC Treaty. 

Regulation 1/2003 eliminated the notification and exemption process for agreements 

before the EC. Under the new regulations, an agreement that fulfills the conditions of 

the exemption rule contained in the EC Treaty [Article 101(3)] is legal and enforceable 

by national courts; conversely, a restrictive agreement that does not fulfill Article 101(3) 

is void and unenforceable from the beginning. Undertakings are required to self-assess 

their business practices to determine whether they comply with the competitions laws. 
Appendix VI

284

December 21, 2002

TACA amendment (011375-060) took effect under the Shipping Act to implement a 

program to temporarily withdraw capacity for the off-peak season of 2002/2003. 

March 27, 2003

The EC initiated its formal review of Regulation 4056/86 by issuing a consultation 

paper to elicit public comment on whether current market conditions continue to 

justify a need for the block exemption of liner shipping conferences in the EU trades. 

June 12, 2003

The ESC submitted its comments to the EC’s consultation paper in opposition to 

continuing Regulation 4056/86.

June 18, 2003

The European Liner Affairs Association (“ELAA”) submitted its comments to the EC’s 

consultation paper in support of continuing Regulations 4056/86.

September 30, 2003

The European Court of First Instance gave its judgment on the TACA parties’ 

applications to annul Decision 1999/243/EC against TACA (Cases T-191/98, 

T-212/98, T-213/98, and T-214/98). The Court upheld the EC’s decision to deny 

TACA an exemption for engaging in practices that breached the laws of competition. 

Conversely, the Court annulled the fines of ECU 273 million levied in total against the 

TACA parties due to a lack of evidence in support of the EC’s decision.

November 12, 2003

The EC issued a report summarizing the comments received in response to its 

consultation paper, prepared for the EC by consultants at Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 

Among its findings, based on an analysis of freight rates, the report indicated that liner 

shipping conferences were not price-setting cartels that adhered to set price levels. 

December 4, 2003

The EC held a public hearing on the review of Regulation 4056/86 to allow interested 

parties to present oral and written arguments in support of their positions. 

February 20, 2004

ELAA submitted post-hearing comments to the EC in support of retaining Regulation 

4056/86. 

April 19, 2004

ESC submitted comments to the EC in response to ELAA’s post-hearing comments. 

June 16, 2004

The EC issued a discussion paper on its review of the Regulation 4056/86 proposing 

that the block exemption for liner shipping conferences be repealed. 

August 6, 2004

In connection with the review of Regulation 4056/86, ELAA first submitted before the 

EC a proposal for a system of information exchange to replace the conference system. 

September 2004

ESC submitted comments to the EC responding to ELAA’s proposal urging the EC to 

proceed with the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 and revise the consortia regulations. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

285

October 13, 2004

The EC issued a white paper on its review of Regulation 4056/86 requesting public 

comment on, inter alia, the proposal to repeal the block exemption for liner shipping 

conferences and proposals for alternative legal systems to replace conferences, including 

the proposal recommended by ELAA. 

December 15, 2004

ELAA submitted comments to the EC in response to its white paper. 

December 2004

ESC submitted comments to the EC in response to its white paper in opposition to 

ELAA’s proposal noting that it can only be assessed “as having the objective of coordinating 

the supply of capacity disguised as a mechanism for enhancing individual investment decisions.” 

Instead, ESC recommended that the EC issue general guidelines for the industry on the 

application of the competition laws. 

March 10, 2005

ELAA provided the EC with a competitive impact assessment (under Article 101 of 

the EC Treaty) of its information exchange proposal in response to the EC’s request by 

letter dated November 22, 2004. 

April 20, 2005

The EC adopted Commission Regulation (EC) No. 611/2005 to renew the block 

exemption regulations for consortia agreements between carriers for a five-year period 

till 2010. Regulation 611/2005 took effect on April 26, 2005. 

May 2005

ICF Consulting completed Economic Assistance Study on Liner Shipping for EC 

Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, assessing the impact of the repeal of the 

block exemption for liner shipping conferences. 

June 30, 2005

ESC submitted to the EC its response to ELAA’s competitive impact assessment of its 

proposed information exchange system. 

July 13, 2005

The EC issued a discussion paper informing Member States of the status of its review of 

Regulation 4056/86 and the responses received to its white paper of October 13, 2004. 

October 7, 2005

ELAA submitted comments to the EC in response to its discussion paper to Member 

States. 

October 26, 2005

The EC issued its final report on The Application of Competition Rules to Liner Shipping

prepared by Global Insight. The report found that the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 

would have either no impact or a positive impact on competition in the liner shipping 

industry, and the information exchange system of ELAA was unacceptable in its 

proposed form because it might facilitate collusion. 
Appendix VI

286

November 7, 2005

ELAA submitted to the EC a Survey on terminal handling charges and currency and bunker 

adjustment factors, prepared by the Center of Maritime Economics and Logistics (MEL), 

Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 

December 14, 2005

The EC issued a proposal for a Council Regulation repealing Regulation 4056/86 for 

consideration before the EU Council, along with an impact assessment of the proposal. 

December 21, 2005

The parent company of Hapag-Lloyd, TUI AG, completed its acquisition of CP Ships. 

December 23, 2005

ELAA submitted comments before the EC on its impact assessment of the proposal for 

a Council Regulation repealing Regulation 4056/86 expressing disappointment that the 

“same old, tired arguments have been repeated throughout the document.” In addition, ELAA 

submitted comments before the EC on its report prepared by Global Insight. 

January 23, 2006

TACA amendment (011375-065) deleting Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie GmbH as a 

party to the agreement took effect under the Shipping Act. 

February 10, 2006

TACA amendment (011375-066) deleting P&O Nedlloyd Limited as a party to the 

agreement and modifying the trade name of Maersk took effect under the Shipping 

Act. 

February 12, 2006

A.P. Moller-Maersk completed its acquisition of P&O Nedlloyd Limited. 

June 16, 2006

ELAA submitted before the EC a revised proposal for a system of information exchange 

to replace the conference system. 

June 30, 2006

ESC submitted before the EC its response in opposition to the revised system of 

information exchange proposed by ELAA. 

June 30, 2006

Effective under the Shipping Act, APL, Hyundai, and Mitsui consolidated their 

agreements under the New World Alliance Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011960. 

September 25, 2006

The EU Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) No. 1419/2006 to repeal 

Regulation 4056/86. Regulation 1419/2006 extended the block exemption for 

conferences over a two-year transition period until October 18, 2008. 

September 29, 2006

The EC issued a consultative paper requesting public comment on the revised system of 

information exchange proposed by ELAA. In the paper, the EC provided its assessment 

on the compatibility of ELAA’s revised proposal under the competition laws [Article 

101 of the EC Treaty]. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

287

October 18, 2006

The US Antitrust Modernization Commission (“AMC”) conducted a public hearing 

to take testimony and receive evidence on the antitrust immunity and exemptions 

provided to the liner shipping industry under the Shipping Act. Representatives of the 

FMC and EC testified at the hearing. 

April 2, 2007

The AMC issued its Report and Recommendations to the President and Congress of the United 

States. On the Shipping Act, the AMC acknowledged the pro-competitive changes that 

have occurred within the liner shipping industry since OSRA took effect, but found 

nothing unique about the industry that would prevent it from complying with US 

antitrust law. 

July 4, 2007

The EC began a review of its consortia regulations by conducting a market 

investigation of consortia in the EU trades. The review was prompted by the repeal of 

Regulation 4056/86. Questionnaires seeking information on consortia arrangements 

were sent to carriers, shippers and freight forwarders. The deadline to respond was 

September 3, 2007. 

September 14, 2007

The EC issued for public comment draft guidelines on the application of the 

competition laws to maritime transport services. The guidelines addressed information 

exchange between competitors in liner shipping. 

November 9, 2007

ELAA submitted before the EC its comments and recommended modifications in 

support of the draft guidelines and provisions for information exchange between 

competitors. 

November 9, 2007

ESC submitted before the EC its comments and recommended modification to the 

draft guidelines expressing its concerns and opposition to the provisions for information 

exchange between carriers. 

November 9, 2007

The Global Shippers’ Forum submitted before the EC its comments in support of the 

establishment of general guidelines for carriers to follow, but strongly opposed the 

adoption of any form of information exchange proposed by ELAA. 

November 20, 2007

In connection with its review of consortia, the EC issued further questionnaires to a large 

number of individual transport users, i.e. shippers and freight forwarders, and to five main 

transport users’ associations. In this regard, the questions sought to discern the benefits of 

consortia for transport users. The deadline to respond was December 20, 2007. 

April 23, 2008

ELAA submitted comments to the EC in connection with its review of the block 

exemption regulations for consortia. Among other things, ELAA recommended that all 

market share thresholds and limitations on the length of time for consortia agreements 

be eliminated. 
Appendix VI

288

June 30, 2008

The parties to TACA suspended operations under the conference and canceled the 

conference tariffs. Former TACA parties began operating and pricing independently 

under their own individual tariffs on July 1, 2008. 

July 1, 2008

The EC issued the final version of its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(now 

Article 101) of the EC Treaty to maritime transport service that provided for a framework 

to allow information exchange between liner carriers under conditions where the 

exchange would not facilitate collusion or restrict competition in the marketplace. 

September 30, 2008

TACA was formally terminated. TACA last reported a market share of about 40 

percent in each trade direction for the 1st quarter of 2008. At the time of termination, 

the last remaining members were Atlantic Container Line, Maersk Line, MSC, NYK, 

and OOCL. 

October 13, 2008

The Container Trade Statistics Agreement (“CTSA”), FMC Agreement No. 012048, 

took effect under the Shipping Act. CTSA provided for a system of information 

exchange between 20 carriers in the trade between the US and the EU. The combined 

market share of the CTSA members was 88 percent in the US/North Europe trade, 

and 96 percent in the US/South Europe trade. CTSA prohibited collusion on rates, 

charges, capacity, or services between its members based on the information provided 

under the agreement. 

October 13, 2008

TUI AG sells two-thirds share of Hapag-Lloyd to investment group Albert Ballin KG. 

October 18, 2008

The repeal by the EU of the block exemption regulations for liner shipping 

conferences, Regulation 4056/86, took effect in the EU trades. 

October 21, 2008

The EC issued for public comment a preliminary draft of its revised block exemption 

regulations for consortia agreements between carriers in the EU trades along 

with a technical paper explaining the proposed modifications and the results of 

its questionnaires to carriers and shippers. Among the most substantive proposed 

modifications to the regulations, the EC reduced the market share threshold by which 

consortia are block exempted from 35 percent to 30 percent. In addition, the proposed 

regulations directed that the calculation of market share (for purposes of applying the 30 

percent threshold) must aggregate the individual and joint (i.e., the subject consortia) 

services operated by the carrier parties in the same relevant market along with the full 

market shares of all of the other consortia agreements of the carrier parties in the same 

relevant market. Further, the proposed regulations were modified to restrict the block 

exemption from applying to carrier agreements that involve: (1) the fixing of prices 

when selling liner services to third parties, (2) the limitation of capacity or sales (except 

capacity adjustments made in response to fluctuations in supply and demand), and (3) 

the allocation of markets or customers. The proposed regulation also eliminated all past 

references to conferences or provisions and authorities pertaining to conferences. The 

deadline to submit comments on the proposed regulation was November 21, 2008. 
Timeline of Events Relating to Liner Shipping in the Transatlantic Trade

289

November 2008

ELAA submitted comments, and a substantial amount of supplementary information 

in support of its comments, before the EC on the draft consortia regulations. ELAA 

supported the EC’s decision to renew the consortia block exemption. As modified in 

the current draft form, however, ELAA disagreed with the proposed regulations mainly 

with respect to: (1) the “unsupported and incorrect assumption” on the part of the EC that 

there is no competition between carriers in a consortium (ELAA terms this the “single 

block philosophy”), (2) the aggregation of market shares of carriers in consortia linked 

by common membership, (3) the reduction of the market share threshold, and (4) the 

conditional time periods imposed on the withdrawal of membership from consortia 

agreements. To address its concerns, ELAA recommended that material modifications 

be made to the proposed regulations; these included deleting the provisions on the 

aggregation of market share, increasing the market share threshold for block exempted 

consortia to 50 percent, and deleting or substantially lengthening the conditional time 

periods on the membership withdrawal provisions from consortia. 

November 2008

ESC submitted brief comments before the EC regarding the draft consortia regulations. 

Overall, ESC expressed its support for the proposed regulations as drafted, noting that 

they align the block exemption for consortia between carriers with those of other 

block exemptions for horizontal agreements. Nonetheless, ESC recommended that 

certain provisions be eliminated because it believes they still condone activities that 

reflect past conference behavior and are therefore anticompetitive toward shippers. 

Further, ESC recommended that clarifying language be appended to the regulations to 

explain exactly which types of agreements fall under the block exemption and which 

types of agreements require self-assessment under Article 101(3) of the EC Treaty.2

ESC foresees a time when there will no longer be a need for the block exemption of 

consortia, and all carriers will be required to self-assess their activities in accordance 

and compliance with the competition laws. ESC referred to this renewal of the block 

exemption as a grace period whereby carriers may become accustomed to the practice 

of self-assessment under the competition laws. 

May 22, 2009

Hamburg Sud terminated its pendulum service in the trade and entered into a service 

arrangement with the members of the Grand Alliance and Zim under the Grand 

Alliance/Zim/HSDG Atlantic Space Charter Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 012068. 

August 12, 2009

CMA CGM entered into a service arrangement with MSC under MSC/CMA CGM 

North Europe-US Atlantic and Gulf Vessel Sharing Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 

012075, replacing its service agreement with Evergreen Line and China Shipping. 

Subsequently, China Shipping withdrew its vessels and exited from the trade. 

2 The prohibitions under Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty may be declared inapplicable under Article 101(3) in the 

case of: any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, any decision or category of decisions between 

associations of undertakings, any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving 

the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a 

fair share of the resulting benefits, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 

not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 

competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Appendix VI

290

August 27, 2009

Evergreen Line discontinued its NUE pendulum service in the trade and formed a 

service arrangement with members of the CKYH group under the ELJSA/CKYH 

Vessel Sharing Agreement - Trans Atlantic Express Service, FMC Agreement No. 012076. 

September 28, 2009

The EC issued the final version of its revised block exemption regulations for consortia 

agreements between carriers in the EU trades, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 

906/2009. In the final version of the regulations, the EC retained the reduced 30 

percent market share threshold for consortia agreements to be block exempted but 

eliminated the provision on the aggregation of market shares of carriers in consortia 

linked by common membership. The revised regulations took effect on April 26, 2010, 

and will remain in effect until April 25, 2015. 

December 2009

Maersk Line discontinued its TA3/TP7 pendulum service and took space on the APX 

pendulum service operated by members of the New World Alliance under the New 

World Alliance/Maersk Line Slot Exchange Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 011722. 

January 12, 2010

CTSA was amended (012048-001) to delete three Japanese carriers from the 

membership of the agreement; these are Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.; Mitsui O.S.K. 

Lines, Ltd.; and Nippon Yusen Kaisha. 

June 30, 2010

CMA CGM entered into a service arrangement with CSAV under the CMA CGM/

CSAV Victory Bridge Vessel Sharing Agreement, FMC Agreement No. 012103, replacing 

its service arrangement with MSC. 

July 2010

ELAA was dissolved and its function as the EU representative for the liner shipping 

industry was taken over by the World Shipping Council. CTS, Ltd. was sold to an 

entity unaffiliated with the shipping lines to operate as an independent company for 

profit.

December 4, 2010

The World Liner Data Agreement (“WLDA”), FMC Agreement No. 12108, became 

effective under the Shipping Act. WLDA has the same authority as CTSA to collect 

and disseminate trade data; however, its geographic scope includes all of the US liner 

trades worldwide. The carrier members of WLDA have contracted with CTS to 

manage the collection and compilation of trade data and the commercial business of 

marketing and selling the data.

June 21, 2011

CTSA was formally terminated as an agreement on file under the Shipping Act. 
291

Appendix VII

Analysis of Service Contract Rates 

in the Transatlantic Trade

I. Methodology

The analysis of service contract rates in the US/North Europe trade uses data from a 

selection of service contracts on file with the Commission and contained in its electronic 

database, SERVCON. The analysis provides time series data in monthly increments of the 

average service contract rates, weighted by cargo volume, for the top container import 

and export commodities that moved in the trade for the review period from 2006 through 

2010. Commercial trade data1

 was used to identify the top container import and export 

commodities in the trade, the major US and European ports that handled the greatest 

throughput of containers of each top commodity, the major shippers of each top commodity 

and the ocean carriers that moved the shippers’ cargo in the trade.

Based on these parameters, specific contracts were selected from SERVCON and tracked 

over the review period.2

 Where possible, these parameters were kept consistent over the 

review period, meaning the same commodities, shippers and carriers were tracked from the 

start of the review period through the end. In some instances, however, a shipper might 

switch to the liner service of a different carrier during the review period; in which case, the 

service change is reflected in the analysis.

For the most part, port-to-port rates were used in the analysis corresponding to the 

major port pairs that handled the greatest throughput of containers for each commodity. In 

addition, where applicable, assessorial charges were added to the ocean freight rate to obtain 

the total rate per FEU (forty-foot equivalent unit) at which the container moved. Each 

service contract, and any amendments to the contract used in the analysis, were tracked on a 

monthly basis to reflect any change in the level or application of rates and charges. The total 

monthly service contract rates for the major import and export commodities were aggregated 

and weighted based on cargo volume3

 to obtain a single weighted average service contract 

rate per FEU for each month of the review period in each direction of the trade.

Sections II and III below provide a more detailed discussion of the specific parameters and 

trends in the weighted average service contract rates for liner imports in the inbound trade 

direction and liner exports in the outbound trade direction.

1 The commercial source of the container cargo data is the Port Import Export Reporting Service (PIERS), United 

Business Media Limited.

2 The rates of major shippers of major commodities provide some assessment of the market rates at which the majority 

of the cargo moved. To the degree that the contracts of major shippers, who have the strongest negotiating power 

among shippers in the market, incurred rate increases, surcharges, and other service contact terms implemented by 

carriers, it would be expected that the contracts of smaller shippers were affected similarly if not to a greater extent. 

Therefore, it may be reasonably inferred that where increases and charges took effect in the contracts of major shippers, 

a similar impact within the overall trade occurred in the ocean carriage of the like commodities.

3 The service contract rates are weighted by the percentage of the total container cargo volume that moved in the 

corresponding trade direction for each of the selected commodities over the entire review period from 2006 through 

2010.
Appendix VII

292

II. United States Liner Imports from North Europe

A. Service Contracts: The analysis of service contracts in the inbound (import) trade 

direction from North Europe to the US included 133 rate observations from 121 original 

service contracts, where 21 rate observations included some level of charges for inland 

haulage.4

 In addition to the base rates, where applicable, other major charges were added 

to the analysis, including currency adjustment factors (“CAF”), bunker adjustment factors 

(“BAF”) and all other fuel charges, and origin/destination terminal handling charges for ports 

in the US and Europe.

B. Basic Rate Trends: On a weighted average basis over the review period (2006-2010), 

the monthly rate levels of service contracts in the inbound direction ranged from a high of 

$2,567 per FEU in February 2006 to a low of $1,694 per FEU in June 2009. At the start 

of the repeal of the block exemption, rate levels fell 26 percent from $2,284 per FEU in 

October 2008 to the low of $1,694 per FEU in June 2009; from which point, rate levels 

rebounded by 29 percent to $2,191 per FEU by the end of the review period in December 

2010.

C. Commodities: The following major liner import commodities from North Europe, 

which accounted for 37 percent of the total import cargo volume for the review period, 

were included in the analysis as weighted based on the cargo volume percentages below:

Table VII.A Major Liner Import Commodities 

from North Europe

Rank Commodity

Percent of Cargo Volume 

based on Weight

1 Beer and Ale 29%

2 Auto Parts 15%

3 Furniture 11%

4 Paper 11%

5 Beverages 11%

6 Tires 5%

7 Machinery 4%

8 Glassware 4%

9 Wine 4%

10 Vodka 3%

11 Chemicals 2%

D. Shippers: Thirteen different major shippers of the top import commodities were included 

in the analysis. (Their names have been withheld for confidentiality reasons.)

E. Carriers: Nine different ocean carriers were included in the analysis. (Their names have 

been withheld for confidentiality reasons.) Collectively, they moved 82 percent of the total 

cargo volume of the top import commodities for the review period.

4 Charges for inland haulage were included in cases where port-to-port rates were not available in the contracts and 

where such charges were verified through shipper information, such as through rates for auto parts moving from a 

manufacturing plant to an assembly plant or warehouse. Further, charges of inland haulage were added where, through 

direct contact, shippers identified the specific rates under which their cargo was shipped in the trade. 
Analysis of Service Contract Rates in the Transatlantic Trade

293

III. United States Liner Exports to North Europe

A. Service Contracts: The analysis of service contracts in the outbound (export) trade 

direction from the US to North Europe included 92 rate observations from 90 original 

service contracts, where 19 rate observations included some level of charges for inland 

haulage. In addition to the base rates, where applicable, other major charges were added 

to the analysis, including currency adjustment factors (“CAF”), bunker adjustment factors 

(“BAF”) and all other fuel charges, and origin/destination terminal handling charges for ports 

in the US and Europe.

B. Basic Rate Trends: On a weighted average basis over the review period (2006-2010), 

the monthly rate levels of service contracts in the outbound trade direction ranged from 

a low of $854 per FEU in February 2007 to a high of $1,794 per FEU in October 2008. 

At the start of the repeal of the block exemption, rate levels fell 38 percent from $1,794 

per FEU in October 2008 to a low of $1,104 per FEU in May 2009; from which point, 

rate levels rebounded by 44 percent to $1,593 per FEU by the end of the review period in 

December 2010.

C. Commodities: The following major liner US export commodities to North Europe, 

which accounted for about 40 percent of the total export cargo volume for the review period, 

were included in the analysis as weighted based on the cargo volume percentages below:

Table VII.B Major Liner Export Commodities 

to North Europe

Rank Commodity

Percent of Cargo Volume 

based on Weight

1 Automobiles 23%

2 Wood Pulp 14%

3 Paper 14%

4 General Cargo 12%

5 Auto Parts 9%

6 Synthetic Resins 8%

7 Logs/Lumber 5%

8 Medical Supplies 5%

9 Chemicals 5%

10 Synthetic Rubber 4%

D. Shippers: Seventeen different major shippers of the top export commodities were 

included in the analysis. (Their names have been withheld for confidentiality reasons.)

E. Carriers: Ten different ocean carriers were included in the analysis. (Their names have 

been withheld for confidentiality reasons.) Collectively, they moved 80 percent of the total 

cargo volume of the top export commodities for the review period.
295

Appendix VIII

Service Contract Rate Profiles for 

the Major East-West Trades

Service contract rate data were compiled for a convenience sample of shippers who shipped 

in both the transatlantic trade, which was directly impacted by the repeal, and the transpacific 

trade, which was not directly impacted. With access to some service contracts containing rate 

information for the Asia/North Europe trade, it was decided to add this additional trade to 

the data collection effort because it was directly impacted by the repeal. This collection of 

data would allow for rates in the transpacific trade, which is regulated under OSRA, to act 

as a “control group” against rates in the transatlantic and Asia/North Europe trades that no 

longer allowed carriers to discuss rates and surcharges after October 18, 2008. 

Rate data were extracted from selected service contracts relating to the following trades 

during the period from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010: 

•	 Transatlantic, eastbound and westbound

•	 Transpacific, eastbound and westbound

•	 Asia/North Europe, westbound only

A convenience sample of at least 20 shippers per trade was selected for examination. Only 

data pertaining to beneficial cargo owners (“BCO’s”) and Shipper Associations were used in 

this analysis. The selection criteria established was that each shipper must have a minimum 

of four years or 48 months of activity from the same origin port or point to the same 

destination port or point for the study period that commenced on January 1, 2006 and ended 

on December 31, 2010. 

Data collected for the shippers consisted of a minimum of 48 out of the full 60-month 

period. Five global shippers, out of the 41 total shippers, shipped in each of the five trade 

lanes during the study period (an insufficient number of shippers were available for the 

North Europe to Asia (eastbound) trade). The goal was to use, whenever possible, the same 

US origin for exports in the transatlantic eastbound and transpacific westbound trades or 

same US destination for imports in the transatlantic westbound and transpacific eastbound 

trades as well as the same vessel-operating common carrier (“VOCC”). While the origin and 

destination always remained the same, shippers switched carriers on occasion; therefore, the 

Study followed the path where the rates led. The same VOCC was used exclusively in 70 

percent of the service contract records for the entire period. The ability to adjust to market 

conditions, as well as loyalty and consistency, appear to be strong factors between major 

shippers staying with incumbent carriers for a minimum of five years. 

This data collection exercise showed that major shippers export from multiple locations, 

therefore, trying to find consistency for the same origins proved to be more difficult than 

anticipated. US exporters tend to use certain plants or facilities for exporting to Europe, 

whereas they may have other suitable alternatives when exporting to the Asia. Numerous 

instances were encountered whereby a shipper’s contract was tracked for several years only to 

have to eliminate it from the study as it did not meet the requisite time frame.

In selecting the convenience sample of shippers, a range of commodities shipped was 

used, such as chemicals, tires, machinery, general department store merchandise (“GDSM”), 
Appendix VIII

296

food products, auto parts, agricultural products, medical items, furniture, electronics, toys, 

hardware, houseware items, computers and accessories, office supplies, photo apparatus, 

footwear and apparel. Special care was used to include as many carriers as possible so that the 

rates and surcharges would be indicative of a wide range of ocean carriers.

It was interesting to note that relatively few carriers seem to adopt a “global pricing 

synergy” by offering rates to a wide range of ports and geographical areas under a single 

contract. Most carriers put an emphasis on specific trade lanes and, in these circumstances, it 

is not uncommon for a carrier to conclude multiple contracts with the same shipper.

The rate elements collected consisted of ocean freight rate, currency adjustment factor 

(“CAF”), all charges pertaining to bunker fuel, as well as terminal handling charges at origin 

and destination. In reviewing the data it was rather obvious that the global recession and 

subsequent recovery which together lasted from approximately October 1, 2008 until May 

31, 2010 was the dominating feature during this period. 

Transatlantic eastbound and westbound aggregated rates were fairly consistent during the 

study period. While transatlantic westbound rates dropped during the global recession period, 

transatlantic eastbound rates did not see as dramatic a drop and remained higher than in the 

pre-repeal period. In the transpacific trade, which was not directly affected by the repeal, 

export and import rates trended in the same general pattern. When import rates increased, so 

did export rates. Similarly, when transpacific eastbound rates dropped, transpacific westbound 

rates followed suit. Both transatlantic westbound and transpacific eastbound rates showed a 

similar trend pattern, which likely is attributable to US consumer confidence and consumer 

demand generally.

A review of the charts for the three headhaul legs over the study period, consisting of 

the transpacific eastbound trade, transatlantic westbound trade, and Asia/Europe westbound 

trade, showed the patterns to be somewhat similar, although rates in the Asia/Europe 

westbound trade seemed notably more volatile than in the other two trades. Both the 

transpacific eastbound and transatlantic westbound trades are primarily driven by annual 

contracts, which until the end of 2007 mainly had fixed or rolled-in bunker charges. After 

January 2008, bunker charges in the transpacific eastbound and transatlantic westbound 

trades were most often floating. The Asia/Europe westbound trade contracts were most 

often subject to monthly bunker and CAF adjustments. In addition, Asia/Europe westbound 

contracts were often subject to quarterly or semi-annual rate reviews which allowed for 

adjustments in the base rate. 

A review of the charts for the three backhaul legs consisting of the transpacific westbound, 

transatlantic eastbound, and Europe/Asia eastbound trades showed the trends to be almost 

identical over the course of the study period.

Overall, this brief chart analysis of the three major east-west trade lanes indicates that 

imports and consumer demand appears to be the catalyst and main driving force in the 

marketplace. As more demand is generated for imported goods, it then creates a need from 

producing countries to source more raw materials from the buying countries. The US tends 

to import at a slower pace from Europe when the dollar is weaker, however, imports still 

remain the headhaul in this trade. Europe is more likely to source raw materials from the 

US when the dollar is weaker, yet that region relies more heavily on Asia than the US for 

finished goods.
Service Contract Rate Profiles for the Major East-West Trades

297

Chart VIII.A Average Service Contract 

All-In Rates Headhaul Direction US Dollars per FEU

Transatlantic 

Westbound

Transpacic 

Eastbound

Asia-Europe 

Westbound

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

$4,500

$5,000

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Chart VIII.B Average Service Contract 

All-In Rates Backhaul Direction US Dollars per FEU

Transatlantic 

Eastbound

Transpacic 

Westbound

Asia-Europe 

Eastbound

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10
Appendix VIII

298

Chart VIII.C Average Service Contract 

All-In Rates Transpacific Trades US Dollars per FEU

Transpacic

Westbound

Transpacic

Eastbound

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

$4,500

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

Chart VIII.D Average Service Contract 

All-In Rates Asia/Europe Trades US Dollars per FEU

Asia–Europe

Westbound

Asia–Europe

Eastbound

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

$4,500

$5,000
Service Contract Rate Profiles for the Major East-West Trades

299

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

Chart VIII.E Average Service Contract 

All-In Rates Transatlantic US Dollars per FEU

Transatlantic

Westbound

Transatlantic

Eastbound

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Sep-08

Oct-08

Nov-08

Dec-08

Jan-09

Feb-09

Mar-09

Apr-09

May-09

Jun-09

Jul-09

Aug-09

Sep-09

Oct-09

Nov-09

Dec-09

Jan-10

Feb-10

Mar-10

Apr-10

May-10

Jun-10

Jul-10

Aug-10

Sep-10

Oct-10

Nov-10

Dec-10
301

Appendix IX

Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

A. Asia to Europe Estimates

Table IX.A.1 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Average Revenue

Trade Lane

Average Revenue per TEU

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) $1,730 $1,589 ($141)

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) $1,747 $1,597 ($150)

Difference between the trades ($17) ($8) $9 DD Estimate

Table IX.A.2 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility 

(as measured by standard deviation divided by average revenue)

Trade Lane

Std dev as % of avg revenue

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) 15% 32% 17%

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) 5% 16% 11%

Difference between the trades 10% 16% 6% DD Estimate

Table IX.A.3 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility

(as measured by dispersion about mean average revenue – one standard 

deviation)

Trade Lane

Standard deviation of 

average revenue

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) $260 $510 $250 

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) $90 $260 $170 

Difference between the trades $170 $250 $80 DD Estimate

Table IX.A.4 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Capacity Utilization 

(Quarterly Load Factor)

Trade Lane

Average Load Factor

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) 86.9% 85.0% -1.9%

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) 86.1% 78.7% -7.4%

Difference between the trades 0.8% 6.3% 5.5% DD Estimate
Appendix IX

302

Table IX.A.5 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on 

Market Concentration (HHI)

Trade Lane

Herfindahl Hirschman Index

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) 856 917 61

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) 633 665 32

Difference between the trades 223 252 29 DD Estimate

Table IX.A.6 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Market Share Stability

Trade Lane

Market Share Stability Index

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) 6.4% 8.4% 2.0%

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) 9.6% 7.6% -2.0%

Difference between the trades -3.2% 0.8% 4% DD Estimate

Table IX.A.7 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on 

Average Capacity Deployed per Quarter 

Trade Lane

Average Capacity 

Deployed per Qtr (TEU)

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Asia to Europe (subject to the repeal) 2,381,000 2,370,000 (11,000)

Asia to US (not subject to the repeal) 4,125,000 3,950,000 (175,000)

Difference between the trades (1,744,000) (1,580,000) 164,000 DD Est

B. Europe to Asia Estimates

Table IX.B.1 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Average Revenue

Trade Lane

Average Revenue per TEU

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) $887 $1,012 $125 

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) $843 $992 $149 

Difference between the trades $44 $20 $24 DD Estimate

Table IX.B.2 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility

(as measured by standard deviation divided by average revenue)

Trade Lane

Std dev as % of avg revenue

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) 17% 19% 2%

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) 15% 15% 0%

Difference between the trades 2% 4% 2% DD Estimate
Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

303

Table IX.B.3 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Rate Volatility

(i.e. dispersion about mean average revenue)

Trade Lane

Standard dev 

of average revenue

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) $150 $191 $41 

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) $129 $148 $19 

Difference between the trades $21 $43 $22 DD Estimate

Table IX.B.4 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Capacity Utilization 

(Quarterly Load Factor)

Trade Lane

Average Load Factor

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) 46.7% 49.9% 3.2%

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) 42.4% 52.0% 9.6%

Difference between the trades 4.3% -2.1% -6.4% DD Estimate

Table IX.B.5 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal 

on Market Concentration (HHI)

Trade Lane

Herfindahl Hirschman Index

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) 828 874 46

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) 693 670 -23

Difference between the trades 135 204 69 DD Estimate

Table IX.B.6 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on Market Share Stability

Trade Lane

Market Share Stability Index

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) 6.7% 8.6% 1.9%

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) 11.3% 10.2% -1.1%

Difference between the trades -4.6% -1.6% 3% DD Estimate

Table IX.B.7 DD Estimate of the Impact of Repeal on 

Average Capacity Deployed per Quarter 

Trade Lane

Average Capacity 

Deployed per Qtr (TEU)

Difference 

between periods

Jan. 2006 to 

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008 to 

Dec. 2010

Europe to Asia (subject to the repeal) 1,847,000 1,756,000 (91,000)

US to Asia (not subject to the repeal) 3,438,000 3,247,000 (191,000)

Difference between the trades (1,591,000) (1,491,000) 100,000 DD Est
Appendix IX

304

C. Data used in calculating the estimates

Korea Maritime Institute (“KMI”) Study Difference-in-Differences Method

Table IX.C.1 Freight Rate (average revenue per TEU)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-N. America (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

2006 1Q US$793 US$1,454 US$1,836 US$815 

2006 2Q 804 1,408 1,753 828 

2006 3Q 806 1,494 1,715 839 

2006 4Q 792 1,545 1,671 777 

2007 1Q 755 1,549 1,643 737 

2007 2Q 744 1,658 1,675 765 

2007 3Q 792 2,014 1,709 751 

2007 4Q 959 2,109 1,680 761 

2008 1Q 1,064 2,030 1,757 845 

2008 2Q 1,104 1,937 1,844 987 

2008 3Q 1,141 1,837 1,934 1,170 

standard deviation

average

 US$150 

 887 

 US$260 

 1,730 

 US$90 

 1,747 

 US$129 

 843 

2008 Q4 US$1,109 US$1,619 US$1,890 US$1,196 

2009 1Q 853 1,023 1,670 913 

2009 2Q 742 897 1,383 802 

2009 3Q 787 1,061 1,232 817 

2009 4Q 920 1,422 1,322 883 

2010 1Q 1,090 2,060 1,440 978 

2010 2Q 1,263 2,146 1,680 1,122 

2010 3Q 1,226 2,177 1,944 1,158 

2010 4Q 1,116 1,899 1,808 1,059 

standard deviation

average

 US$191 

 1,012 

 US$510 

 1,589 

 US$260 

 1,597 

 US$148 

 992 

Sources: CI-online, CTS, TSA and WTSA

Volatility of avg revenue as measured by sd/average

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-N. America (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal 17% 15% 5% 15%

post-repeal 19% 32% 16% 15%

Difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect on Volatility

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - N. America

eastbound 6%

westbound 2%

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Formula

(Mean of treatment group, post-repeal - Mean of control group, post-repeal)

MINUS (Mean of treatment group, pre-repeal - Mean of control group, pre-repeal)
Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

305

Other measures examined by the FMC

Changes in average revenue levels (absolute)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-N. America (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal US$887 US$1,730 US$1,747 US$843 

post-repeal 1,012 1,589 1,597 992

Difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect on Average Revenue

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - N. America

eastbound $9

westbound -$24

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Changes in dispersion about the mean average revenue (standard deviation)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-N. America (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal US$150 US$260 US$90 US$129 

post-repeal 191 510 260 148

Difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect on Average Revenue

dispersion about the mean

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - N. America

eastbound $80

westbound $22

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only
Appendix IX

306

Table IX.C.2 Capacity Utilization

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

2006 1Q 51.4% 92.6% 79.8% 42.1%

2006 2Q 55.9% 92.8% 91.2% 40.1%

2006 3Q 49.9% 90.0% 90.3% 37.2%

2006 4Q 48.2% 90.1% 83.1% 37.4%

2007 1Q 50.4% 98.7% 80.8% 42.3%

2007 2Q 52.2% 95.0% 91.0% 48.1%

2007 3Q 45.8% 85.3% 91.6% 44.0%

2007 4Q 40.0% 78.9% 81.4% 48.2%

2008 1Q 38.3% 86.1% 78.2% 53.6%

2008 2Q 43.7% 78.3% 84.4% 55.6%

2008 3Q 37.7% 67.4% 86.5% 51.2%

standard deviation

average

6.1%

46.7%

9.0%

86.9%

5.3%

86.1%

4.3%

42.4%

2008 4Q 32.7% 66.7% 73.2% 36.7%

2009 1Q 37.3% 83.9% 63.0% 42.8%

2009 2Q 56.5% 91.8% 73.9% 55.2%

2009 3Q 55.4% 87.4% 80.1% 53.0%

2009 4Q 55.8% 93.3% 78.7% 54.0%

2010 1Q 54.0% 100.1% 79.4% 54.0%

2010 2Q 55.5% 88.8% 99.7% 64.8%

2010 3Q 52.6% 74.1% 86.3% 54.7%

2010 4Q 49.3% 78.9% 73.8% 52.4%

standard deviation

average

8.8%

49.9%

10.3%

85.0%

10.2%

78.7%

8.0%

52.0%

Source: Drewry Maritime Research

Capacity Utilization

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal 46.7% 86.9% 86.1% 42.4%

post-repeal 49.9% 85.0% 78.7% 52.0%

Difference-in-differences estimate of the repeal on capacity utilization

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - US

eastbound 5.5%

westbound -6.4%

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Formula

(Mean of treatment group, post-repeal - Mean of control group, post-repeal)

MINUS (Mean of treatment group, pre-repeal - Mean of control group, pre-repeal)
Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

307

Table IX.C.3 Market Concentration (HHI)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

2006 1Q 684 682 578 662

2006 2Q 881 867 599 709

2006 3Q 865 888 623 773

2006 4Q 867 887 621 706

2007 1Q 850 871 605 698

2007 2Q 842 860 620 665

2007 3Q 866 895 651 700

2007 4Q 870 882 661 691

2008 1Q 848 866 669 681

2008 2Q 771 858 667 672

2008 3Q 769 859 668 667

standard deviation

average

61

828

59

856

32

633

31

693

2008 4Q 758 841 674 652

2009 1Q 806 850 673 684

2009 2Q 870 920 677 707

2009 3Q 936 988 671 679

2009 4Q 929 951 667 668

2010 1Q 930 947 666 678

2010 2Q 947 983 661 663

2010 3Q 829 868 653 647

2010 4Q 860 902 639 650

standard deviation

average

67

874

55

917

12

665

19

670

Market Concentration (HHI) 

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal 828 856 633 693

post-repeal 874 917 665 670

Difference-in-differences estimate of the repeal on market concentration (HHI)

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - US

eastbound 29

westbound 69

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Formula

(Mean of treatment group, post-repeal - Mean of control group, post-repeal)

MINUS (Mean of treatment group, pre-repeal - Mean of control group, pre-repeal)
Appendix IX

308

Table IX.C.4 Market Share Stability Index

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

2006 1Q 4.6% 1.8% 7.4% 10.0%

2006 2Q 26.4% 24.3% 15.1% 11.4%

2006 3Q 2.6% 2.7% 7.1% 7.8%

2006 4Q 5.7% 4.4% 6.4% 12.4%

2007 1Q 6.3% 8.0% 5.9% 8.6%

2007 2Q 4.2% 4.0% 8.6% 24.9%

2007 3Q 3.2% 3.9% 27.8% 15.9%

2007 4Q 4.1% 6.2% 6.7% 10.2%

2008 1Q 4.0% 3.8% 6.5% 7.2%

2008 2Q 8.1% 7.0% 7.8% 5.6%

2008 3Q 4.6% 4.5% 6.1% 10.6%

standard deviation

average

6.7%

6.7%

6.2%

6.4%

6.6%

9.6%

5.3%

11.3%

2008 4Q 7.3% 6.0% 5.8% 11.6%

2009 1Q 10.2% 9.4% 7.5% 14.5%

2009 2Q 14.1% 15.0% 9.1% 9.3%

2009 3Q 5.4% 6.3% 8.5% 7.9%

2009 4Q 6.2% 8.7% 7.8% 7.9%

2010 1Q 5.2% 4.3% 5.9% 9.2%

2010 2Q 4.9% 5.8% 6.6% 9.3%

2010 3Q 13.7% 12.1% 8.5% 11.4%

2010 4Q 10.0% 8.1% 9.1% 10.7%

standard deviation

average

3.6%

8.6%

3.4%

8.4%

1.3%

7.6%

2.1%

10.2%

The index is based on the sum of changes in market shares quarter-to-quarter by all carriers.

Market Share Stability Index

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal 6.7% 6.4% 9.6% 11.3%

post-repeal 8.6% 8.4% 7.6% 10.2%

Difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect on Market Share Stability

Asia-Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - US

eastbound 4.0%

westbound 3.0%

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Formula

(Mean of treatment group, post-repeal - Mean of control group, post-repeal)

MINUS (Mean of treatment group, pre-repeal - Mean of control group, pre-repeal)

The index is based on the sum of changes in market shares quarter-to-quarter by all carriers
Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

309

Table IX.C.5 Capacity Deployed per Quarter (thousands of TEUs)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

2006 1Q 1725 2103 3842 3242

2006 2Q 1640 2046 3974 3341

2006 3Q 1754 2210 4201 3532

2006 4Q 1816 2254 4330 3643

2007 1Q 1751 2217 4129 3426

2007 2Q 1778 2288 3955 3272

2007 3Q 1901 2473 4238 3503

2007 4Q 1950 2572 4333 3546

2008 1Q 1974 2613 4071 3306

2008 2Q 1948 2617 3981 3255

2008 3Q 2080 2800 4173 3436

standard deviation

average

132

1847

245

2381

183

4125

143

3438

2008 4Q 2108 2789 4312 3551

2009 1Q 1889 2479 4036 3296

2009 2Q 1585 2128 3728 3046

2009 3Q 1684 2268 3927 3209

2009 4Q 1667 2270 3930 3209

2010 1Q 1583 2181 3611 2988

2010 2Q 1533 2131 3450 2854

2010 3Q 1771 2423 4142 3423

2010 4Q 1986 2664 4415 3646

standard deviation

average

199

1756

237

2370

318

3950

262

3247

Capacity Deployed per Quarter (thousands of TEUs)

Asia-Europe (Treatment) Asia-US (Control)

eastbound westbound eastbound westbound

pre-repeal 1847 2381 4125 3438

post-repeal 1756 2370 3950 3247

D-in-D estimate of the repeal on average capacity deployed quarterly (thousands of TEUs)

Asia - Europe

eastbound westbound

Asia - US

eastbound 164

westbound 100

Compares headhaul-to-headhaul and backhaul-to-backhaul directions only

Formula

(Mean of treatment group, post-repeal - Mean of control group, post-repeal)

MINUS (Mean of treatment group, pre-repeal - Mean of control group, pre-repeal)
Appendix IX

310

D. Difference-in-Differences Explained Further

Difference-in-differences (DD) estimation is commonly used to assess the impact of a program intervention, new policy or law. DD estimation of impact involves identifying a specific 

intervention or the implementation of a particular policy or law. The difference in outcomes 

before and after the change in policy for the group affected by the new policy is compared 

to the difference in outcomes for the group to whom the new policy does not apply. In the 

context of this study, for example, in order to identify the possible outcome effects of removing the limited antitrust immunity granted to liner shipping, one must isolate liner trades 

where this immunity has been repealed. One can then compare changes in outcomes among 

carriers operating in those liner trades that have had antitrust immunity repealed to outcomes 

among carriers operating in trades where such immunity still remains. 

Using DD, the impact of a policy on an outcome can be assessed relatively simply by 

calculating a double difference – one over time (i.e. before and after the policy change) and 

one across groups (i.e. between the group subject to the policy change and the group not 

subject to it). In its simplest form, this method requires only aggregate data for each outcome 

variable of interest. And, so long as aggregate data are available for these two groups (i.e. the 

“treatment” group subject to the new policy and the “control” group not subject to it) for at 

least two time periods (i.e. for a period before the policy was implemented and for a period 

after implementation), the DD method will produce impact estimates that are more reliable 

than those based on a single difference either over time or between groups.

How double differencing produces impact estimates is illustrated in Chart IX.D. In this 

chart, the difference in outcomes between the group subject to the new policy and the group 

untouched by it are observed after the new policy has been implemented. The difference 

observed in the post-implementation period, however, does not reveal the true impact of the 

new policy since circumstances in one group (i.e. trade lane) could be different from those in 

the other group (i.e. trade lane). This phenomenon is referred to in the technical literature as 

selection bias. However, selection bias can be accounted for if outcome data is available for the 

“treatment” and “control” groups before the new policy was implemented. So long as what 

differentiates the two groups is time-invariant (i.e. fixed in time), then subtracting the difference 

in outcomes before the new policy was implemented from the difference in outcomes after the 

policy was implemented should produce plausible estimates of the impact of the intervention.

The DD method can provide answers to a question such as: Did removal of the block 

exemption in Europe have a positive effect on carriers’ capacity utilization rates? As long 

as the outcome variable of interest – average capacity utilization in this example – can be 

measured both before and after implementation of the new policy, the DD method can 

furnish an estimate of its impact. The impact of repeal on average capacity utilization, or any 

other variable of interest, is estimated by subtracting the difference observed between the 

two groups (i.e. the European trade lane impacted by the repeal and the other non-European 

trade lane left unaffected by it) before the repeal from the difference observed between the 

two groups after repeal. Chart IX.D illustrates this interpretation of the DD method. Time 

is depicted on the horizontal axis and two periods are distinguished – the pre-repeal period 

from January 2006 through September 2008 and the post-repeal period from October 2008 

through December 2010. The average capacity utilization rate is shown on the vertical axis. 

Each circle in the chart illustrates an average capacity utilization rate. Two circles illustrate 

the overall average capacity utilization rates during the pre-repeal and post-repeal periods. 

The solid circles illustrate the average capacity utilization rate for carriers operating in the 

Asia to Europe trade lane (subject to the repeal) and the hollow circles illustrate the average 

for carriers operating in the Asia to US trade lane (not affected by the repeal).
Difference-in-Differences Estimates and Data

311

Chart IX.D DD as a Difference between 

Post-Repeal and Pre-Repeal Differences

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

94%

85%

80%

91%

89%

Asia to Europe trade, 

subject to the policy change 

Asia to US trade, 

not subject to the policy change 

Expected outcome if 

there had been no policy change 

Pre-Repeal Averages Post-Repeal Averages

Observable difference in the outcome 

variable before the policy change 

is 9 percentage points.

Jan 2006 Oct 2008 Dec 2010

Observable difference in the outcome 

variable after the policy change 

is 11 percentage points.

Impact of the policy change 

is the difference between differences 

(11% - 9% = 2 percentage points)

Outcome Variable: Average Capacity Utilization 

It should be obvious now that the “raw” difference observed in this illustration between 

the two trade lanes in the post-repeal period (91 percent minus 80 percent) does not represent 

the true impact of the repeal. If taken as an indication of the impact of the repeal, this 11 

percentage point difference would overstate the repeal’s impact. The truth of this statement is 

evident when average capacity utilization rates observed before the repeal are evaluated and 

compared. In the pre-repeal period the difference in average capacity utilization between the 

two trade lanes in this illustration was 9 percent (94 percent minus 85 percent). As a result, 

just the gain in average capacity utilization (11 percent minus 9 percent = 2 percent) should 

be interpreted as the impact of the repeal of the block exemption. However, the validity of 

this DD estimate critically depends on the assumption that, absent the repeal, the trend in 

the Asia to Europe trade lane would have been similar to that in the Asia to US trade lane 

absent the repeal. The dotted line in Chart IX.D which runs parallel to the trend observed 

in the Asia to US trade lane and which starts where the Asia to Europe trade lane was in the 

pre-repeal period, represents the DD model’s best estimate of what would have happened 

to average capacity utilization in the Asia to Europe trade had the repeal not occurred. It 

should now be clear that the DD approach relies on an assumption of parallelism between what 

happened and what would have happened in the absence of the repeal and any attempt at a 

causal interpretation of DD estimates based on the simple DD method used in Chapter 6 rests 

on this vital assumption.

In the absence of the repeal of the block exemption in Europe, the assumption of 

parallelism asserts that the Asia to Europe trade lane would have continued to experience the 

same trends in outcomes, or other variables of interest, as the Asia to US trade lane operating 

outside of Europe. This assumption, therefore, views carriers in both trades as operating in 

similar “parallel worlds” in which events in one world (i.e. trade lane) are equivalently felt in 

the other.1

 Given the trends observed in our earlier more detailed longitudinal examination 

1 J.D. Angrist & J.S. Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion, p 230. Princeton University 

Press, 2008.
Appendix IX

312

of structure, conduct and performance in these two trades, although stringent, this 

assumption seems reasonably plausible in the case of the two trades analyzed in Chapter 6.

The assumption that the two trades operate in “parallel worlds” can be investigated 

using data on multiple periods or if more complex DD methods are used. If more data was 

available in the pre-repeal period, for example, one could test the assumption that trends 

were the same in both trade lanes in the absence of the repeal by comparing outcomes in, for 

example, the 2003 through 2005 period with those in the 2006 through 2008 period. In this 

manner, one could simply view whether the Asia to US trade provides an adequate measure 

of the counterfactual of the variables of interest in the Asia to Europe trade in the absence of 

the repeal of the block exemption by establishing whether strong visual evidence of common 

underlying trends exists between the “treatment” and “control” trade lanes.

An alternative to having more outcome data available would be to incorporate into the 

analysis data on other variables that possibly could influence the outcome variables and/or 

are thought to be correlated with the repeal. Incorporating other variables into the analysis, 

however, means a substantial loss of simplicity and would require shifting from the simple 

and easy-to-interpret estimates obtained in the simple DD model to using regression models 

based, for example, on a sufficiently large cross-section (or panel) of individual shippers or 

carriers. If such data were available, the use of regression to develop DD estimates based 

on either a cohort of shippers or a large group of carriers active in the Asia to US and Asia 

to Europe trade lanes would be well worth exploring.2

 Using this enhanced technique, 

covariates could be added to the regression model(s) to attempt to control for the impact 

of the global recession, thereby relaxing the stringent assumption implicit in the simpler 

“parallel worlds” DD estimation method. The addition of control variables conceivably could 

destroy any impacts of the repeal established using the simpler DD method. That is to say, it 

is possible that controlling for any potential time-varying trends between the Asia to Europe 

and Asia to US trades could drive the impacts of the repeal estimated previously to zero or 

turn apparently positive impacts into negative ones, and vice-versa.

2 Unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain cross-sectional data from carriers operating in the major east-west trades.
313

Appendix X

An Empirical Analysis of EU’s Policy 

of Abolishing the Liners’ Block 

Exemption from Competition Rules*

Korea Maritime Institute, December 2009

1. Method of difference-in-difference estimation 

Effect of EU’s Abolition Policy 

= (xi

, post−policy, EA−EU route - xi, post−policy, EA−NA route) 

- (xi

, pre−policy, EA−EU route - xi, pre−policy, EA−NA route) 

where EA means East Asia, EU European, NA North America. 

For an intuitively mathematical explanation, see the below manipulation: 

1) Notations 

Effect of global crisis gci

Effect of EU’s Abolition Policy abi

Characteristic of EA-EU route EUi

Characteristic of EA-NA route NAi

2) Expressions for the Variables 

So, each variable can be expressed as follow: 

xi

, post−policy, EA−EU route = EUi + gci + abi

xi

, post−policy, EA−NA route = NAi + gci

xi

, pre−policy, EA−EU route = EUi

xi

, pre−policy, EA−NA route = NAi

3) The result 

Effect of EU’s Abolition Policy 

= (xi

, post−policy, EA−EU route - xi, post−policy, EA−NA route) 

- (xi

, pre−policy, EA−EU route - xi, pre−policy, EA−NA route) 

= {(EUi + gci

 + abi) – (NAi + gci)} – {(EUi) – (NAi)} 

2. Empirical Results 

First of all, it should be kept in mind that the combinations such as (EA-EU west-bound, 

EA-NA east-bound) and (EA-EU east-bound, EA-NA west-bound) are better than the 

other combinations because the former combinations showed the similar global crisis effects. 

That is, (EA-EU west-bound, EA-NA east-bound) routes both showed more reduction in 

trade volume after global crisis, but (EA-EU east-bound, EA-NA west-bound) routes both 

showed less reduction in trade volume in the same period. So these combinations include 

an approximately same global crisis effect. Therefore, in the following empirical results, the 

more meaningful ones belong to these combinations but the others are less meaningful. 

 According to CI-Online data, the EU-route rate volatility after EU’s policy has increased 

relative to that of NA route. The increase in rate volatility can be interpreted harmful to both 

the shipper and shipping company. 

* We have been informed that the research results presented here (reproduced from the original) are not the official 

views of the Korean Maritime Institute. Furthermore, they do not represent the position of the Government of Korea. 

The results reflect only the views of the authors.
Appendix X

314

Table 1–Difference-in-difference estimation of volatility of ocean rates 

EA-EU route

East-Bound West-Bound

EA-NA route

East-Bound -2% 15%

West-Bound 6% 22%

Source: CI-Online

According to the results shown in Table 2 and Table 3, there has been decrease of the 

concentration in EU route, relative to NA route. These results mean that EU’s policy has 

enhanced the competition among the liners in EU routes. As shown in Table 4, this increase 

in competition resulted in the more efficient utilization of vessel space. 

Table 2–Difference-in-difference estimation of CR5 

EA-EU route

EA-NA route -11.7%

Note: 1) The values are calculated based on the services, 

which have been provided to Busan Port. 

2) CR5 means the 5-firm concentration ratio. 

Source: CI-Online and Containerisation International Yearbook 

Table 3–Difference-in-difference estimation of HHI 

EA-EU route

EA-NA route -17.9%

Note: 1) that of Table 2 

2) HHI means Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 

Source: Refer to that of Table 2

Table 4–Difference-in-difference estimation of load factor

EA-EU route

East-Bound West-Bound

EA-NA route

East-Bound 15.6% 5.2%

West-Bound 11.1% 0.7%

Source: Drewry, Container Market | 2009/10, 2009. 10

However, according to the results in Table 5, there have been significant reductions in 

the liners’ revenue. These results can be interpreted that the dynamic risk hedging function 

of shipping conference has been eliminated. 

Table 5–Difference-in-difference estimation of revenue (Unit: billion $)

EA-EU route

East-Bound West-Bound

EA-NA route

East-Bound 1.3 -0.9

West-Bound 0 -2.8

Source: refer to that of Table 4
315

Appendix XI

Mergers and Acquisitions (Global)

A.P. Moller Maersk

Maersk Line (takeover 2005) (Renamed 2006)

Maersk-Sealand (1999)

 Maersk

 Sealand

 Torm Lines (2002)

Royal P&O Nedlloyd (2002)

 P&O Nedlloyd (2005)

 Blue Star Line (1998)

 Farrell Line (2000)

 Oceanica AGW (renamed Mercosul Line) (2000)

MCC Transport Singapore Pte Ltd

Norfolk Line Containers

Norse Merchant (2005)

Safmarine Container Lines (1999)

Unicorn Lines (2002) (renamed Ocean Africa Container Line) (2004)

SCF Oriental Lines (2004)

CMA CGM (1999)

CMA

CGM

CGM (1977)

 MessMar

 Tansat

 Australian National Lines (ANL) (1998)

Cagema

Cheng Lie Navigation Ltd (2007)

CoMaNav (2007)

US Lines (2007)

Delmas (2006)

Setramar (2001)

OTAL (2005)

Sudcargos (2005)

United Baltic Corp (Andrew Wier) (2002)

MacAndrews & Ellerman Iberian (Andrew Wier) (2002)

Delom SA (2002) (controlling interest- 80%)

Feeder Associate Systems (FAS)

Gemartrans
Appendix XI

316

Evergreen Line (2007)

Evergreen

Hatsu Marine Ltd (2007)

Lloyd Triestino ( 1998) (renamed Italia Marittima)

Hapag Lloyd (2005)

Hapag Lloyd

CP Ships (2005)

Italia di Navigazione (2002)

TMM (2000)

Christensen Canada-Africa Line (2000)

ANZDL (1998)

Ivarans ( 1998)

Contship Container Lines (1997)

Lykes Lines (1997)

Casl (1995)

China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL)

Shanghai Puhai Shipping Company (2005)

Universal Shipping

APL/NOL (1997)

APL

NOL

NYK

Nippon Liner Systems (1991)

Hanjin/Senator ( 1997)

Hanjin

DSR-Senator (renamed Senator Lines - 2002)

MOL

P&O Nedlloyd (2005) (SAECS trade)

Hamburg Sud

Costa Container Lines (2007)

Gilnavi srl di Navigazione (2004)

FOML (renamed FESCO Australia New Zealand Liner Services (FANZL)) (Mar 2006)

Ybarra (renamed Ybarra Sud) (2006)

Columbus Line (2004)

Kien Hung Line (2003)

Ellerman deep sea services (Andrew Wier) (2002)

Crowley American Transport (2000)

Alianca (1998)
Mergers and Acquisitions (Global)

317

CSAV

Norsul container activities (2002)

Norasia (2000)

PIL

Advanced Container Lines (1994)

Pacific Direct Line (2006)

Pacific Eagle Lines

Wan Hai

Interasia (2005)

Trans-Pacific Lines (2002)

Grimaldi

Finnlines (2005)

Nordo Link (2002)

ACL (2002)

Original Source: Transport Policy 16 (2009), Table B1, p.269 - Updated July 2011
319

Appendix XII

Slow Steaming Services in the Major 

East-West Trades, December 2010

Using information collected by AXS-Alphaliner, staff compiled the attached tables to show 

the extent to which services in the major east-west trades are slow steaming as of December 

2010. Reflecting the greater fuel cost savings achievable on longer voyages using bigger 

ships, slow steaming is more prevalent in the Asia/Europe and transpacific trades than in the 

transatlantic trade. At the end of December 2010, well over 90 percent of weekly capacity 

in the Asia/Europe trade was being generated by slow steaming services. Overall, 61 percent 

of the transpacific weekly capacity is generated by slow steaming services. This proportion 

is higher (77 percent) to the US East Coast where voyages are much longer and more time 

is spent at sea. Fifty-six percent of weekly capacity is generated by slow steaming services to 

and from the US West Coast. Only 43 percent of the weekly capacity in the transatlantic 

trade is generated by slow steaming where the relatively short voyage distance and smaller 

ships used mean the potential fuel cost saving in this trade is much lower.

Table XII.A Slow Steaming Summary - Transatlantic 

(December 2010)

North Europe Mediterranean Total

 Total Services: 15 13 28

 Total Slow Steaming Services: 3 6 9

 Number Ships Deployed: 91 107 198

 Average Vessel Size: 4,069 4,269 4,183

 Total Weekly Capacity: 51,240 51,195 102,435

 Total Slow Steaming Weekly Capacity: 16,164 27,697 43,861

 Percent Weekly Capacity Slow Steaming: 32% 54% 43%

 Percent Services Slow Steaming: 20% 46% 32%

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis using Alphaliner data extracts.
Appendix XII

320

Table XII.B Slow Steaming Services in the Transatlantic 

(December 2010)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage Freq

# of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

no North Europe 1020

Maersk Line - Atlantic South service - 

TA-2 (US flag service) (NWA : ATS) (CMA 

CGM : Liberty Bridge) 

1 N. Eur / US Gulf / USEC 7 5 4,000 teu 35 4,360 0

yes North Europe M071 

New World Alliance - Atlantic Pacific 

Express (APX) - Atlantic string (Maersk : 

TA-1) (CMA CGM : Liberty Bridge 2) 

2 FE / USEC / N. Eur 7 13 4,000 / 

5,000 teu 91 4,737 4,737

yes North Europe M090 Grand Alliance - PAX - Europe-USECUSWC string  1 N. Eur / USEC / PSW / FE 7 14 4,600 / 

5,000 teu 98 4,709 4,709

no North Europe 1026 Grand Alliance / Zim / HS - North 

Europe-USEC service (ATX)  3 N. Eur / USEC 7 4 4,000 / 

4,500 teu 28 4,613 0

no North Europe 1031 Grand Alliance - North Europe-US GulfMexico service (GuMex / GMX)  1 N. Eur / USEC(S) / USG 7 6 2,800 / 

3,300 teu 42 2,940 0

no North Europe 1035 Hapag-Lloyd - Atlantic Express Shuttle 

(AES) (Antwerp-New York service)  1 N. Eur / USEC 7 3 2,500 / 

2,800 teu 21 2,716 0

no North Europe 1072 CKYH / Evergreen - Trans Atlantic 

Express (TAE)  3 N. Eur / USEC 7 4 2,800 / 

3,000 teu 28 2,726 0

no North Europe 1106 Grand Alliance - Europe-US Gulf service 

(GAX) (US flag service)  1 N. Eur / USEC(S) / USG 7 5 3,300 teu 35 3,237 0

no North Europe 1115

CMA CGM / CSAV - North Europe-South 

USEC-US Gulf service (Victory Bridge / 

SAMEX) 

2 N. Eur / USEC / USG 7 5 2 700 / 

3,400 teu 35 3,155 0

no North Europe 1122 MSC - North Europe-USEC (North) 

service  1 N. Eur / USEC (N) 7 5 3 800 / 

5000 teu 35 4,869 0

yes North Europe 1130 MSC - North Europe-South USEC-US Gulf 

service (CMA CGM : New Victory Bridge)  1 N. Eur / USEC (S) / USG 7 7 5 500 / 

6700 teu 49 6,718 6,718

no North Europe 1140 Independent Container Line (ICL) - 

Transatlantic service  1 N. Eur / USEC 7 4 1 500 / 

2000 teu 28 1,953 0

no North Europe 1150 ACL - Transatlantic conro service 

(Grimaldi-owned)  1 N. Eur / USEC(N) 7 5 2 908 teu 

(conros) 35 2,908 0

no North Europe M184 CMA CGM / Marfret - Europe-US-ANZ 

Pendulum via PANAMA (PAD)  2 Eur / USEC / ANZ 14 6 2 200 / 

2500 teu 84 1,165 0
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

321

Table XII.B Slow Steaming Services in the Transatlantic 

(December 2010) (continued)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service # of 

Operators Coverage Freq # of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

no North Europe 6591 Ecuadorian Line - Europe-US-Ecuador 

container/reefer service  1 N. Eur / USEC(S) / 

Ecuador 7 5 434 teu 35 434 0

yes Mediterranean 1616 Maersk Line / CMA CGM - West MedUSEC service (MGS / Amerigo)  2 Med / US 7 6 2 700 / 

4300 teu 42 3,021 3,021

yes Mediterranean 3599 Maersk Line - India-ME-USEC service - 

MECL 2 - Med-US string  1 Indian sub / ME / Med / 

USEC 7 10 4 500 / 

5000 teu 70 4,916 4,916

yes Mediterranean 3595 Indamex / IAX - India-America Direct 

Express service  5 N. Am / India 7 8 3 800 / 

4500 teu 56 4,239 4,239

yes Mediterranean 26741

CMA CGM - China-USEC-Tangier-ME 

(eastbound) service (new PEX 3) - USMed string 1 FE / US Gulf / USEC 7 11 5 000 teu 77 5,078 5,078

yes Mediterranean 2139 Grand Alliance - Asia-Med-USEC - AEX - 

Med-US string  2 FE / USEC via Suez 7 10 5 300 / 

5800 teu 70 5,712 5,712

no Mediterranean 3594

UASC / Hanjin - India-Med-US service 

(MINA / IMU) - Med-US string (COSCO 

: TAS-4) 

2 Ind. sub / ME / Med / 

USEC 7 9 3 800 / 

4250 teu 63 3,901 0

yes Mediterranean 1631 MSC - Med-USEC service  1 Med / USEC 7 6 4 000 / 

5000 teu 42 4,732 4,732

no Mediterranean 1632 MSC - Med-US Gulf service  1 Med / US Gulf 7 6 4 000 / 

5000 teu 42 5,003 0

no Mediterranean 1636 MSC - Med-Panama-USWC service 

(California Express)  1 Med / Pan / USWC 7 8 2 500 / 

4000 teu 56 4,193 0

no Mediterranean 1641 Hapag-Lloyd - Mediterranean Gulf 

Express (MGX)  1 Med / USG / Mexico 7 7 3 200 teu 49 3,057 0

no Mediterranean 1660 Hapag-Lloyd - Med Pacific Express 

(MedPac / MPS)  1 Med / Caribb. / NCSA / 

WCNA 11 6 2 100 / 

2500 teu 65 1,495 0

no Mediterranean M160 Zim Container Service (ZCS) - Med-US 

string  1 Med / USEC / USWC / FE 7 15 4 200 / 

5000 teu 105 4,951 0

no Mediterranean 1680 Turkon Line - Med-America Line 1 Med / USEC 9 5 1 150 teu 45 897 0

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, using Alphaliner data extracts.
Appendix XII

322

Table XII.C Slow Steaming Summary - Far East/Europe 

(December 2010)

North Europe Mediterranean Total

 Total Services: 31 21 52

 Total Slow Steaming Services: 28 20 48

 Number Ships Deployed: 312 202 514

 Average Vessel Size: 8,174 6,250 7,418

 Total Weekly Capacity: 251,846 124,866 376,712

 Total Slow Steaming Weekly Capacity: 231,332 120,468 351,800

 Percent Weekly Capacity Slow Steaming: 92% 96% 93%

 Percent Services Slow Steaming: 90% 95% 92%

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, using Alphaliner data extracts.
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

323

Table XII.D Slow Steaming Services in the Far East/Europe Trade 

(December 2010)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage Freq

# of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31203 CKYH - Asia-North Europe Loop 1 - NE 1 

(UASC : AEC 3)  2 N. Eur / FE 7 8 9,500 / 

10,000 teu 63 8,742 8,742

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31204 CKYH - Asia-North Europe Loop 2 - NE 2 

(UASC : AEC 4)  2 N. Eur / FE 7 9 8,000 / 

9,000 teu 63 8,587 8,587

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31205 CKYH - Asia-North Europe Loop 3 - NE 3 

(via Port Said wbd) (UASC : AEC 5)  1 N. Eur / FE 7 10 8,000 / 

10,000 teu 70 9,021 9,021

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31206 CKYH - Asia-North Europe Loop 4 - NE 4 

(via Port Said ebd) (UASC : AEC 6)  3 N. Eur / FE 7 9 8,000 / 

9,000 teu 63 8,778 8,778

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31209 CKYH - Asia-North Europe Loop 5 - NE 5 

(UASC : AEC 7)  1 N. Eur / FE 7 9 6,500 teu 63 6,521 6,521

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3200 CMA CGM - Asia-Europe service - FAL 1 

(CSCL : AEX 3 / APL-MOL : NCE)  1 Europe / Med / ME / FE 7 11 8,500 / 

11,000 teu 77 10,881 10,881

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3210 CMA CGM - Asia-Europe service - FAL 3 

(CSCL : AEX 4) (APL : CFX)  1 Eur / ME / FE 7 10 8,500 / 

9,500 teu 70 9,025 9,025

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3205 CMA CGM / CSCL - Asia-Europe service - 

FAL 2 / AEX 7  3 Europe / FE 7 9 8,500 / 

9,500 teu 63 9,191 9,191

yes North Europe / 

Far East M187 

CMA CGM / Hapag-Lloyd / North EuropeMediterranean-Oceania (New NEMO / 

EAX) - Asia-Europe-string 

2 Eur / Med / ANZ 7 13 2,800 teu 91 2,799 2,799

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3207 CMA CGM / Maersk - Asia-Europe 

service - FAL 5 / AE-8  2 Europe / FE 7 10 11,000 / 

13,000 teu 70 13,287 13,287

no North Europe / 

Far East 32151 CSCL / Evergreen - Asia-Europe Express 

1 (AEX 1 / CEM) (CMA CGM : FAL 10)  2 Europe / Med / FE 7 8 8,000 / 

10,000 teu 56 8,788 0

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3012 Evergreen Line - China Europe Service 

(CES) (CMA CGM : FAL 15)  1 N. Eur / Med / FE 7 10 7,000 / 

8,000 teu 70 7,129 7,129

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30711 Grand Alliance - Europe-Asia - Loop A 

(EU A)  1 Europe / FE 7 10 8,500 / 

9,000 teu 70 9,104 9,104

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30713 Grand Alliance - Europe-Asia - Loop C 

(EU C)  1 Europe / FE 7 10 8,000 teu 70 8,063 8,063

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30715 Grand Alliance - Europe-Asia - Loop D 

(EU D)  3 N. Eur / FE (China) 14 5 5,700 / 

6,700 teu 70 3,059 3,059
Appendix XII

324

Table XII.D Slow Steaming Services in the Far East/Europe Trade 

(December 2010) (continued)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage Freq

# of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

no North Europe / 

Far East M095 Grand Alliance - Europe-Asia-WCNA - 

Asia-Europe string - Loop B (EU B)  1 Eur / FE / PNW 7 16 8,500 teu 112 8,692 0

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30412 Maersk Line - AE-1  1 N. Europe / FE 7 10 8,000 / 

8,500 teu 70 8,414 8,414

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30510 Maersk Line - AE-10  1 N. Europe / FE 7 10 8,500 teu 70 8,317 8,317

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30421 Maersk Line - AE-2  1 N. Europe / Med / FE 7 10 8,500 teu 70 8,482 8,482

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30471 Maersk Line - AE-7 - ‘E’-class loop  1 N. Europe / FE 7 10 9,500 / 

15,200 teu 70 14,070 14,070

yes North Europe / 

Far East 30491 Maersk Line - AE-9  1 N. Europe / FE 7 10 6,200 / 

7,200 teu 70 6,847 6,847

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3190 MSC - Asia Middle East Europe (Silk 

Service)  1 N. Eur / Med / ME / FE 7 11 13,798 / 

14,000 teu 77 13,927 13,927

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3192 MSC - Asia-Europe service (Lion Service)  1 N. Eur / Med / FE / ME 7 11 9,000 / 

14,000 teu 77 12,870 12,870

no North Europe / 

Far East M172 MSC - Euro service - Europe-ANZ service 

- Singapore-Europe string (westbd only)  1 Eur / Mascareignes / 

Australia / FE / Eur 7 13 3,000 / 

4,000 teu 91 3,034 0

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3110

New World Alliance - Asia Europe 

Express (AEX - EU 2) (HMM loop) (CMA 

CGM : FAL 11) 

1 N. Eur / FE 7 10 6,800 / 

8,900 teu 70 8,480 8,480

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31121 New World Alliance - Central China 

Express (CEX)  3 Europe / FE 7 10 6,400 teu 70 6,180 6,180

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3100

New World Alliance - Japan Europe 

Express (JEX - EU 1) (MOL loop) (CMA 

CGM : FAL 12) 

1 N. Eur / FE (Japan) 7 10 6,400 / 

6,700 teu 70 6,589 6,589

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31122 New World Alliance - South China 

Express (SCX)  2 Europe / FE 7 10 8,100 / 

8,500 teu 70 8,196 8,196

yes North Europe / 

Far East 32401 PIL / Wan Hai - Far East-Europe service 

(FES)  2 Europe / FE 7 9 4,250 teu 63 4,253 4,253

yes North Europe / 

Far East 31227 UASC - Far East-Europe service - AEC 2 

(Hanjin : CME)  1 N. Eur / ME / FE 7 10 6,900 teu 70 6,928 6,928
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

325

Table XII.D Slow Steaming Services in the Far East/Europe Trade 

(December 2010) (continued)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage Freq

# of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

yes North Europe / 

Far East 3233 Zim - Asia-Med-Europe (AME)  1 Europe / FE 7 11 3,400 / 

4,250 teu 77 3,593 3,593

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

31231 CKYH - Asia-Med Loop 1 - MD 1  2 Med / FE 7 8 5,500 teu 63 4,908 4,908

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

31232 CKYH - Asia-Med Loop 2 - MD 2  2 Med / FE 7 8 5,500 / 

6,500 teu 63 5,453 5,453

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

31233 CKYH - Asia-Med Loop 3 - MD 3  1 Med / FE 7 8 5,500 teu 63 4,994 4,994

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

3211 CMA CGM - Med-Asia Express service 

(MEX)  1 Med / Asia 7 11 5,700 / 

6,700 teu 77 6,092 6,092

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32142 CMA CGM / Maersk - Asia-Near EastAdriatic service - BEX 2 / AE-12  2 Med / Asia 7 9 6,500 teu 63 6,656 6,656

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32145 CSAV Norasia - Asia-Near East-Black Sea 

service (ABS / ABX)  1 Med / Asia 7 9 5,000 / 

5,500 teu 63 5,553 5,553

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32146 CSAV Norasia - Asia-West Med service 

(Mare Nostrum)  1 Med / Asia 7 10 5,000 / 

6,500 teu 70 6,108 6,108

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32312

CSCL / K Line / Yang Ming / PIL / Wan 

Hai - Asia-Black Sea service (ABX / CBX 

/ SB 1) 

5 Med / FE 7 8 4,000 / 

4,250 teu 56 4,312 4,312

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

M033 Evergreen Line - WCNA-Asia-Med service 

(UAM) - Asia-Med string (FEM)  1 Med / FE / PNW 7 14 5,300 / 

5,600 teu 98 5405 5,405

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

2139 Grand Alliance - Asia-Med-USEC - AEX - 

Asia-Med string  2 FE / USEC via Suez 7 10 5,300 / 

5,800 teu 70 5712 5,712

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

30750 Grand Alliance / New World Alliance - 

Med-Asia - loop EU M / MED  5 Med / FE 7 9 6,000 / 

7,500 teu 63 6,702 6,702
Appendix XII

326

Table XII.D Slow Steaming Services in the Far East/Europe Trade 

(December 2010) (continued)

Slow 

Steaming Trade Lane Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage Freq

# of 

ships Ship Used Rotation (days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32315 HDS Lines - Far East-Med service (FMCL) 

(aka AMEL = FMX + SMX)  1 Asia / Med 9 7 2,700 / 

3,300 teu 63 2,254 2,254

no

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

3116

HMM / Hanjin / Yang Ming / UASC - 

Asia-East Med-Adriatic service (MAE / 

AAX / AMC-3) 

4 Med / FE 7 8 4,200 / 

5,000 teu 56 4,399 0

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

M067 Maersk Line - AE-6 (Med only) - Med-FE 

string of pendulum  1 Med / FE / WCNA 7 14 9,500 / 

10,000 teu 98 9736 9,736

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

30511 Maersk Line / CMA CGM - AE-11 / New 

MEX 2  2 Med / FE 7 10 8,200 / 

8,500 teu 70 8,380 8,380

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

30432 Maersk Line / CMA CGM - Asia-Black 

Sea service (AE-3 / BEX)  2 Med / FE 7 11 6,500 teu 77 6,509 6,509

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

31971 MSC - Asia-E. Med service (Tiger 

Service)  1 Med / FE 7 10 8,000 / 

9,000 teu 70 8,886 8,886

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

3195 MSC - Asia-Med service (Dragon Service)  1 Med / ME / FE 7 11 8,000 / 

12,500 teu 77 10,166 10,166

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

32405 PIL / Wan Hai - Sino-Black Sea service 

(SB 2 / BSC)  2 Med / FE 7 8 2,500 / 

3,100 teu 56 2,703 2,703

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

3137 UASC / CSCL - Asia-Med service (AMC-1 

/ AMX 1) (Hanjin : MEX)  2 Med / ME / FE 7 9 5,600 teu 63 5,685 5,685

yes

Med / Far East 

- dedicated 

services

3261 Zim - Asia-East Med Express service 

(EMX) (CSCL : AMX 2) (HL : ABX)  1 Med / FE 7 10 4,250 teu 70 4,253 4,253

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, using Alphaliner data extracts.
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

327

Table XII.E Slow Steaming Summary - Transpacific

(December 2010)

West Coast Pendulum East Coast Total

 Total Services 45 6 15 66

 Total Slow Steaming Services 22 4 11 37

 Number Ships Deployed 288 75 142 505

 Average Vessel Size 5,942 5,273 4,960 5,562

 Total Weekly Capacity 253,019 31,010 73,276 357,305

 Total Slow Steaming Weekly Capacity 141,985 21,134 56,516 219,635

 Percent Weekly Capacity Slow Steaming 56% 68% 77% 61%

 Percent Services Slow Steaming 49% 67% 73% 56%

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, using Alphaliner data extracts.
Appendix XII

328

Table XII.F Slow Steaming Services in the Transpacific

(December 2010)

US Coast

Slow 

Steaming Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage

# of 

Ships Ships Used

Rotation 

(days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

WC no 22231 APL - Transpacific / PS 5 (APL loop)  1 FE / PSW 5 5,100 / 

5,500 teu 35 5,108 0

WC yes 2668 CMA CGM / MSC - Pearl River Express - PRX (ANL : 

USW-3)  2 FE / WCNA 6 8,000 teu 42 8,324 8,324

WC yes 2660 COSCO - China North East-WCNA service (CEN)  1 China (North) / PNW / 

PSW 6 7,500 / 

8,500 teu 42 7,385 7,385

WC no 24224 COSCO / Hanjin - CH-PNW North Loop (PNN)  2 FE / PNW 5 5,500 teu 35 5,360 0

WC no 24225 COSCO / Hanjin - CH-PNW South Loop (PNS)  2 FE / PNW 5 5,000 / 

5,800 teu 35 5,583 0

WC yes 2650 COSCO / Hanjin - South China-WCNA service (SEA / 

South China Express)  2 FE (South) / WCNA 6 5,400 / 

8,500 teu 42 6,832 6,832

WC yes 2707 CSAV Norasia - Indian Subcont-FE-USWC service 

(ASIAM)  1 ISC / FE / USWC 11 3,500 teu 77 3,392 3,392

WC no 26785 CSCL - America-Asia Container service - AAC 

(Evergreen : CPS)  1 China / WCNA 5 5,700 / 

8,500 teu 35 7,964 0

WC no 26783 CSCL - Far East-WCNA service (ANW 1)  1 FE / USWC 5 4,200 teu 35 4,210 0

WC yes 20311 Evergreen Line - China-PSW/PNW service (TPS)  1 FE / PSW / PNW 6 6,300 / 

7,000 teu 42 6,447 6,447

WC no 2021 Evergreen Line - Hong Kong-Taiwan-PSW service (HTW) 

(CSCL : AAS)  1 FE / PSW 5 8,000 teu 35 8,073 0

WC yes M033 Evergreen Line - WCNA-Asia-Med service (UAM) - AsiaWCNA string  1 Med / FE / PNW 14 5,300 / 

5,600 teu 98 5,405 5,405

WC no 20312 Evergreen Line / CSCL - China-PSW service (CPS 2 / 

AAC 2) 2 FE / PSW 5 4,200 teu 35 4,230 0

WC yes M095 Grand Alliance - Europe-Asia-WCNA - TP string (NWX)  1 Eur / FE / PNW 16 8,500 teu 112 8,500 8,500

WC no 21711 Grand Alliance - Transpacific / CCX (Central China 

Express)  2 FE / USWC 5 5,500 / 

6,500 teu 35 6,073 0

WC yes 2161 Grand Alliance - Transpacific / New SCX  1 FE / USWC 8 6,500 teu 56 6,513 6,513

WC yes 2175 Grand Alliance - Transpacific / PNX (Pacific NW 

Express)  2 FE / PNW 7 5,500 / 

10,000 teu 49 8,271 8,271
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

329

Table XII.F Slow Steaming Services in the Transpacific

(December 2010) (continued)

US Coast

Slow 

Steaming Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage

# of 

Ships Ships Used

Rotation 

(days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

WC yes 2150 Grand Alliance - Transpacific / SSX (South ChinaCalifornia Express)  1 FE / USWC 6 8,000 teu 42 8,063 8,063

WC no 2700 Hainan P O Shg / TS Lines - China-America West 

Coast Express service (CAE)  2 FE / USWC 5 2,700 / 

3,400 teu 35 3,195 0

WC no 2437 Hanjin - Transpacific / China-Busan-California service 

(CAX)  1 FE / PSW 5 3,000 / 

4,250 teu 35 4,487 0

WC yes 2424 Hanjin - Transpacific / PSX  1 FE / PNW 6 7,500 / 

8,500 teu 42 7,657 7,657

WC no 2438 Hanjin / Wan Hai - Transpacific / Singapore-JapanCalifornia service (SJX)  2 FE / PSW 6 4,000 teu 42 4,382 0

WC no 20412 Horizon Lines - US-Hawaii-China service (US flag 

service) (Five Star Express - FSX) 1 FE / Hawaii / WCNA 5 2,800 teu 35 2,825 0

WC yes 26657 K Line - PSW-1 (Hanjin : SCP)  1 FE / WCNA 6 4,400 / 

4,800 teu 42 4,508 4,508

WC yes 25611 K Line / MOL - PNW / PN-1 service  2 FE / WCNA 6 5,500 / 

6,300 teu 42 5,644 5,644

WC no 2045 Maersk Line - TP-5 (US flag service) (CMA CGM : 

Sunrise)  1 FE / WCNA 5 4,000 teu 35 4,333 0

WC yes M067 Maersk Line - TP-6 1 Med / FE / WCNA 14 9,500 / 

10,000 teu 98 9,736 9,736

WC yes 20511

Maersk Line / MSC / CMA CGM - Transpacific VSA 

- Loop 1 - TP-2 / Eagle / Yang Tse (Southern China 

loop) 

3 FE / PSW 6 6,500 / 

8,000 teu 42 7,234 7,234

WC yes 2052

Maersk Line / MSC / CMA CGM - Transpacific VSA - 

Loop 2 - TP-8 / New Orient Express / Bohai (Northern 

China loop) 

3 FE / PSW 6 8,000 teu 42 8,000 8,000

WC no 2302 Matson - China-Long Beach Express (CLX 2)  1 FE / PSW 5 3,500 teu 35 3,695 0

WC no 2301 Matson - China-Long Beach Express (CLX) - via Hawaii 

and Guam (US flag service)  1 FE / PSW / Hawaii 5 2,200 / 

2,900 teu 35 2,758 0

WC no 26661 MOL / K Line - PSW-3 / JAS (Hanjin : KPS)  2 FE / PSW 5 4,800 / 

5,000 teu 35 4,793 0
Appendix XII

330

Table XII.F Slow Steaming Services in the Transpacific

(December 2010) (continued)

US Coast

Slow 

Steaming Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage

# of 

Ships Ships Used

Rotation 

(days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

WC no 2267 New World Alliance - Transpacific / Pacific China 

Express (PCX) (HMM loop)  1 FE / PNW / PSW 5 6,800 teu 35 6,800 0

WC yes 2272 New World Alliance - Transpacific / Pacific Coast 

Express - PCE  1 FE / PSW 6 4,700 teu 42 4,700 4,700

WC no 2280 New World Alliance - Transpacific / PNW (HMM loop)  1 FE / PNW 5 6,479 teu 35 6,479 0

WC yes 2210 New World Alliance - Transpacific / PS 1 (APL loop)  1 FE / PNW / FE 7 5,000 / 

5,500 teu 49 5,138 5,138

WC yes 2222 New World Alliance - Transpacific / PS 2 (APL loop) + 

AME 2 / MAX 2 (APL / Hapag-Lloyd)  1 FE / PSW 7 4,500 / 

5,500 teu 49 5,750 5,750

WC no 22601 New World Alliance - Transpacific / PSW (HMM loop)  1 FE / PSW / PNW 5 4,600 teu 35 4,666 0

WC yes 2264 New World Alliance - Transpacific / PSX (South East 

Asia-California) (MOL loop)  1 FE / PSW 7 6,000 / 

6,350 teu 49 6,293 6,293

WC yes 2203 New World Alliance - Transpacific / SAX (APL loop)  1 FE / PSW 7 5,500 / 

7,000 teu 49 6,551 6,551

WC yes 26881 PIL - China Transpacific service (CTP)  1 FE / PNW 6 1,500 / 

1,800 teu 42 1,642 1,642

WC no 2696 The Containership Company (TCC) - China-US ‘Great 

Dragon’ service  1 FE / USWC 5 2,800 / 

3,000 teu 35 2,938 0

WC no 2820 Westwood Shipping Line - PNW-NE Asia service  1 FE / PNW 7

1,700 / 

2,000 teu 

(conbulkers 

+ cc)

56 1,975 0

WC no 2665 Yang Ming - PSW-2 / YPS  1 FE / PSW 5 5,500 teu 35 5,556 0

WC no 26672 Yang Ming - PSW-4 / CUX / PS 4  1 FE / PSW 5 5,500 teu 35 5,551 0

Pendulum yes 2026 Evergreen Line - Far East-USEC service (NUE) (CSCL 

: AAE 4)  1 FE / US 9 4,200 teu 63 4,325 4,325

Pendulum yes M090 Grand Alliance - PAX pendulum - Pacific string  1 N. Eur / USEC / PSW / FE 14 4,600 / 

5,000 teu 98 4,709 4,709

Pendulum no 2047 Maersk Line - TP-7 - FE-USEC service  1 FE / USEC 9 4,500 / 

5,000 teu 63 4,925 0

Pendulum yes 2061 Maersk Line / CMA CGM - FE-PNW - Columbus / TP-9  2 FE / PNW 15 6,500 / 

7,400 teu 105 7,363 7,363
Slow Steaming Services in the Major East-West Trades, December 2010

331

Table XII.F Slow Steaming Services in the Transpacific

(December 2010) (continued)

US Coast

Slow 

Steaming Scode Service

# of 

Operators Coverage

# of 

Ships Ships Used

Rotation 

(days)

Average 

Weekly 

Capacity

Slow 

Steaming 

Capacity

Pendulum yes M071 New World Alliance - FE-USEC service - String of 

Atlantic Pacific Express (APX)  2 FE / USEC / N. Eur 13 4,000 / 

5,000 teu 91 4,737 4,737

Pendulum no M160 Zim Container Service (ZCS) - Pacific string (CSCL : 

AAE 3)  1 Med / USEC / USWC / FE 15 4,200 / 

5,000 teu 105 4,951 0

EC yes 2582 CKHY Alliance - FE-USEC - AWC / AWE 2 Loop  1 FE / USEC 9 3,500 / 

5,100 teu 63 4,476 4,476

EC yes 2588 CKHY Alliance - FE-USEC - AWH / AWE 1 Loop  1 FE / USEC 9 4,000 teu 63 4,024 4,024

EC yes 2589 CKHY Alliance - FE-USEC - AWN / AWE 5 Loop  2 FE / USEC 9 4,250 teu 63 4,250 4,250

EC yes 2583 CKHY Alliance - FE-USEC - AWY / AWE 3 Loop  1 FE / USEC 9 3,900 / 

5,000 teu 63 4,198 4,198

EC yes 26741 CMA CGM - FE-USEC-Tangier-ME (eastbound) service 

(new PEX 3)  1 FE / US Gulf / USEC 11 5,000 teu 77 5,078 5,078

EC no 26752 CSAV - Far East-USEC service (AMEX)  1 FE / USEC 10 3,500 / 

4,200 teu 70 3,782 0

EC yes 26798 CSCL / Evergreen - Asia-Mexico-USEC service (AAE 1 

/ AUE 2)  2 ME/ FE / WCNA 9 4,000 / 

5,000 teu 70 4,192 4,192

EC yes 2005 Evergreen Line - Asia-USEC service (AUE)  1 FE / USEC 9 4,200 / 

5,000 teu 63 4,506 4,506

EC yes 2139 Grand Alliance - Asia-Med-USEC - AEX - Suez route  2 FE / USEC via Suez 10 5,300 / 

5,800 teu 70 5,712 5,712

EC yes 21901 Grand Alliance - FE-USEC / North & Central China 

Express service (NCE)  1 FE / USEC 9 4,900 teu 63 4,922 4,922

EC yes 21903 Grand Alliance / Zim - FE-USEC / South China Express 

service (SCE)  4 FE / USEC 9 4,000 / 

4,900 teu 63 4,637 4,637

EC yes 25861 K Line / MOL - FE-USEC - AWK / AWE 4 / SVE (South 

China Vietnam-USEC service)  2 FE / USEC via Suez 9 5,500 teu 63 5,776 5,776

EC no 26702 MSC - FE-USEC service (Golden Gate service) (via 

Suez)  1 FE / ME / USEC via Suez 12 8,000 / 

8,500 teu 84 8,281 0

EC yes 2291 New World Alliance - Asia-USEC - SZX - Suez route (US 

flag service) (Hanjin : AWZ)  1 FE / Col. / ME / USEC 

/ ME 9 4,500 / 

5,000 teu 63 4,745 4,745

EC no 2285 New World Alliance - FE-USEC service - New York 

Express (NYX)  2 FE / USEC 9 4,500 / 

5,000 teu 63 4,697 0

Source: Compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau of Trade Analysis, using Alphaliner data extracts.
333

Appendix XIII

Slow Steaming Trends in the Major 

East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

The information tabulated in this document helps to illuminate trends in slow steaming 

that have taken shape during the last several years in the three major east-west liner trades 

(i.e., the transpacific, Asia-Europe, and the transatlantic). The data were complied by using 

extracts of chronological information from Lloyds Voyage Records that specified the sailing and 

arrival dates of thousands of voyages undertaken by hundreds of containerships operating in 

each of the trades. The tabulations that follow compare over time average elapsed voyage 

time (in days) between specified pairs of ports on a “last port out” and “first port in” basis. 

On an annual basis, the elapsed time for all voyages between each port-pair was averaged, 

converted into hours, and divided into the nautical distance between each port-pair specified 

to determine trends in average ocean-cruising speed between the ports concerned.

In addition to calculating average cruising speed between the key port-pairs in each trade 

for inbound and outbound voyages separately, trade-wide weighted averages were calculated 

to obtain summary-level information. Trends in average speeds on a trade-wide basis are 

show below:

Table XIII.A Transpacific inbound, weighted average speed 

for all voyages between the port-pairs selected

US Inbound US Outbound

2006 22.0 knots (1,263 voyages) 18.7 knots (1,359 voyages)

2007 22.0 knots (1,321 voyages) 18.9 knots (1,292 voyages)

2008 21.7 knots (1,102 voyages) 18.0 knots (1,121 voyages)

2009 21.4 knots (1,012 voyages) 17.6 knots (1,125 voyages)

2010 20.4 knots (978 voyages) 16.3 knots (1,000 voyages)

Table XIII.B Asia-Europe, weighted average speed for 

all voyages between the port-pairs selected

Europe Inbound Europe Outbound

2006 20.2 knots (1,250 voyages) 19.9 knots (852 voyages)

2007 20.7 knots (1,442 voyages) 20.4 knots (955 voyages)

2008 19.9 knots (1,688 voyages) 19.1 knots (1,254 voyages)

2009 19.6 knots (1,294 voyages) 17.5 knots (1,015 voyages)

2010 18.4 knots (1,376 voyages) 16.7 knots (928 voyages)

Table XIII.C Transatlantic, weighted average speed for 

all voyages between the port-pairs selected

US Inbound US Outbound

2006 17.0 knots (804 voyages) 17.4 knots (645 voyages)

2007 17.1 knots (734 voyages) 17.1 knots (732 voyages)

2008 17.0 knots (750 voyages) 16.6 knots (731 voyages)

2009 16.4 knots (727 voyages) 16.1 knots (687 voyages)

2010 16.6 knots (574 voyages) 16.0 knots (440 voyages)
Appendix XIII

334

Key Observations

•	 In 2010, four of the six trade legs examined adopted an average cruising speed of just 

over 16 knots, namely, the transatlantic inbound and outbound legs, the transpacific 

outbound leg, and the outbound leg from Europe to Asia. With regard to the other 

two trade legs, European inbound voyages from Asia operated at just over 18 knots, 

while US inbound voyages from Asia operated at just over 20 knots, on average.

•	 Transpacific voyages traditionally have operated at significantly slower speeds on the 

US outbound leg – three to four knots slower on average than the inbound leg.

•	 Transpacific inbound voyages in 2010 were steaming at almost 201⁄2 knots on average 

during the ocean crossing, compared to just over 16 knots outbound – the widest 

disparity in the past five years. 

•	 Between 2006 and 2010, inbound transpacific voyages reduced average speed by just 

over 11⁄2 knots compared to a reduction of over 21⁄2 knots for outbound voyages. 

•	 Transpacific inbound voyages steam faster than European inbound voyages from Asia 

(about two knots faster). In both trades, outbound voyages now cruise more or less at 

the same speed on average. However, in the early part of the period outbound voyages 

from Europe to Asia cruised a knot or so faster than outbound voyages from the US to 

Asia.

•	 The transpacific and Asia-Europe trades have both exhibited similar speed reductions 

(in absolute terms).

•	 Until 2009, both directions of the Asia-Europe trade operated at similar speeds. 

However, in 2009 and 2010, voyages outbound from Europe to Asia reduced speed 

more than inbound voyages. 

•	 Transatlantic voyages operate at speeds in the mid-teens in both trade directions, and 

have done so throughout the period studied. Over this five-year period, the average 

speed of transatlantic voyages has been reduced by about one half knot (inbound) and 

one knot (outbound).
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

335

Table XIII.D Transpacific Trade

Inbound Outbound

Busan, South Korea - Long Beach, USA 

nautical 

miles:

5,294

Long Beach, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

5,294

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 300 9.6 8 23.0 49 11.6 10 19.0

2007 229 9.5 8 23.3 24 12.9 9 17.1

2008 172 9.8 8 22.5 18 14.6 11 15.2

2009 110 9.7 7 22.8 11 12.6 10 17.5

2010 154 9.9 7 22.2 36 12.4 10 17.8

Busan, South Korea - Oakland, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,978

Oakland, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

4,978

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

183 11.4 9 18.2

2007 180 11.1 7 18.7

2008 109 11.0 9 18.9

2009 161 11.5 10 18.0

2010 103 12.0 9 17.3

Busan, South Korea - Seattle, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,637

Seattle, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

4,637

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 131 8.8 7 22.0 97 9.7 8 20.0

2007 134 8.7 7 22.2 88 9.8 8 19.6

2008 137 8.9 7 21.6 87 10.9 9 17.8

2009 159 9.0 6 21.4 57 10.6 9 18.2

2010 153 9.7 7 19.9 77 11.7 9 16.6

Busan, South Korea - Los Angeles, USA

nautical 

miles:

5,289

Los Angeles, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

5,289

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 176 10.0 8 22.1 24 11.8 10 18.7

2007 149 9.8 8 22.6 30 11.5 11 19.2

2008 113 9.8 8 22.4 11 12.7 11 17.3

2009 101 10.0 8 22.1 15 13.3 11 16.5

2010 102 10.4 9 21.2 25 13.4 12 16.4

Busan, South Korea - Tacoma, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,657

Tacoma, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

4,657

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 79 11.4 8 17.0 30 9.6 9 20.3

2007 117 11.1 8 17.6 43 10.0 9 19.4

2008 90 10.9 8 17.8 46 9.8 9 19.7

2009 71 10.2 6 19.1 34 10.5 9 18.4

2010 65 8.9 8 21.7
Appendix XIII

336

Table XIII.D Transpacific Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Busan, South Korea - Vancouver, 

Canada

nautical 

miles:

4,669

Vancouver, Canada - Busan, South 

Korea

nautical 

miles:

4,669

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 50 10.1 8 19.2 45 10.5 8 18.5

2007 47 10.2 8 19.1 17 10.4 9 18.8

2008 41 10.1 8 19.2 35 12.2 11 16.0

2009 9 10.1 8 19.2 33 11.4 9 17.1

2010 23 9.4 7 20.7 49 12.1 10 16.1

Busan, South Korea - Savannah, USA

nautical 

miles:

9,593

Savannah, USA - Busan, South Korea

nautical 

miles:

9,593

Year Voyages Average Minimum Speed Voyages Average Minimum Speed

2006 62 19.7 18 20.3 95 21.5 17 18.6

2007 92 20.2 19 19.8 99 21.7 16 18.4

2008 50 20.1 19 19.9 87 21.7 17 18.4

2009 53 20.6 19 19.4 83 21.0 17 19.1

2010 43 21.6 19 18.5 75 24.9 18 16.0

Tokyo, Japan - Oakland, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,547

Oakland, USA - Tokyo, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,547

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

232 10.0 8 18.9

2007 242 10.1 9 18.7

2008 221 10.3 9 18.3

2009 243 10.7 9 17.7

2010 221 11.3 10 16.8

Tokyo, Japan - Tacoma, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,271

Tacoma, USA - Tokyo, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,271

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 137 7.6 6 23.3 3 9.0 9 19.8

2007 141 7.5 6 23.8 5 11.0 9 16.2

2008 128 7.7 7 23.1 30 10.1 8 17.6

2009 116 8.0 7 22.3 10 10.6 9 16.8

2010 51 8.3 7 21.4 34 12.0 10 14.9

Tokyo, Japan - Vancouver, Canada

nautical 

miles:

4,283

Vancouver, Canada - Tokyo, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,283

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

147 9.1 8 19.5

2007 155 9.0 7 19.8

2008 92 9.4 8 18.9

2009 110 9.9 8 18.1

2010 54 11.3 9 15.8
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

337

Table XIII.D Transpacific Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Yokohama, Japan - Oakland, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,536

Oakland, USA - Yokohama, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,536

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

165 10.5 9 18.0

2007 172 10.3 9 18.3

2008 106 10.7 9 17.7

2009 109 11.1 10 17.0

2010 92 11.8 10 16.1

Yokohama, Japan - Los Angeles, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,834

Los Angeles, USA - Yokohama, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,834

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 74 9.7 8 20.8 30 11.5 10 17.5

2007 78 9.1 8 22.0 3 12.3 12 16.3

2008 92 9.2 8 21.9 90 11.5 10 17.5

2009 85 9.4 8 21.3 62 12.1 10 16.7

2010 41 9.9 8 20.4 73 13.3 10 15.2

Yokohama, Japan - Dutch Harbour, USA

nautical 

miles:

2,550

Dutch Harbour, USA - Yokohama, Japan

nautical 

miles:

2,550

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

79 6.5 5 16.3

2007 59 6.3 5 16.8

2008 72 6.4 5 16.7

2009 75 6.9 5 15.5

2010 64 6.5 5 16.4

Yokohama, Japan - Vancouver, Canada

nautical 

miles:

4,272

Vancouver, Canada - Yokohama, Japan

nautical 

miles:

4,272

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

73 9.6 8 18.5

2007 93 9.1 8 19.6

2008 59 10.3 9 17.2

2009 70 10.3 9 17.3

2010 51 12.2 10 14.6

Kaohsiung, Taiwan - Los Angeles, USA

nautical 

miles:

6,115

Los Angeles, USA - Kaohsiung, Taiwan

nautical 

miles:

6,115

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 174 10.8 10 23.6 95 12.5 11 20.4

2007 178 10.8 10 23.5 62 12.3 11 20.8

2008 151 11.2 10 22.8 50 13.4 11 19.1

2009 134 11.6 10 21.9 50 13.7 12 18.6

2010 96 12.2 11 20.9 40 15.5 12 16.4
Appendix XIII

338

Table XIII.D Transpacific Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Kaohsiung, Taiwan - Vancouver, Canada

nautical 

miles:

5,545

Vancouver, Canada - Kaohsiung, Taiwan

nautical 

miles:

5,545

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 43 9.9 9 23.4

Too few voyages observed

2007 40 10.0 9 23.1

2008 39 9.8 9 23.6

2009 35 10.1 9 22.9

2010 21 10.4 8 22.3

Shanghai, China - Long Beach, USA nautical 

miles:

5,278

Long Beach, USA - Shanghai, China nautical 

miles:

5,278

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 34 11.1 10 19.8 12 13.0 12 16.9

2007 78 10.8 8 20.3 20 13.3 11 16.6

2008 80 10.9 9 20.3 8 13.8 10 16.0

2009 95 10.9 10 20.2 2 18.5 17 11.9

2010 174 12.1 10 18.2 6 14.2 12 15.5

Yantian, China - Long Beach, USA

nautical 

miles:

6,340

Long Beach, USA - Yantian, China

nautical 

miles:

6,340

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 3 11.3 9 23.3

Too few voyages observed

2007 38 12.0 11 22.1

2008 9 11.7 11 22.6

2009 44 12.5 12 21.2

2010 55 13.1 10 20.2

Note: All voyage transit times are calculated on the basis of “last port out, first port in.”

Source: Data Extracted and Compiled from Lloyd’s Voyage Records, May 24, 2011
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

339

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade

Inbound Outbound

Singapore, Singapore - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

8,265

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Singapore, 

Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,265

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 210 16.2 14 21.3 67 17.0 16 20.2

2007 198 15.7 14 21.9 81 16.9 15 20.4

2008 195 16.1 12 21.5 77 17.8 15 19.4

2009 136 16.2 13 21.2 42 19.9 17 17.3

2010 110 18.0 14 19.1 46 21.0 18 16.4

Singapore, Singapore - Southampton, 

U.K.

nautical 

miles:

8,063

Southampton, U.K. - Singapore, 

Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,063

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 87 15.2 12 22.1 52 16.1 14 20.9

2007 93 15.5 15 21.6 38 16.8 15 20.0

2008 90 15.9 15 21.1 36 19.1 16 17.6

2009 80 16.5 14 20.4 52 19.0 15 17.7

2010 22 19.0 16 17.7 46 20.3 18 16.5

Singapore, Singapore - Valencia, Spain

nautical 

miles:

6,670

Valencia, Spain - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

6,670

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 48 12.8 11 21.7 25 14.7 12 18.9

2007 87 13.1 12 21.2 16 15.6 14 17.8

2008 54 13.5 12 20.6 39 15.2 13 18.2

2009 18 14.9 13 18.6 59 16.2 12 17.2

2010 41 14.7 11 19.0 11 17.6 15 15.8

Singapore, Singapore - Hamburg, 

Germany

nautical 

miles:

8,513

Hamburg, Germany - Singapore, 

Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,513

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 11 17.3 16 20.5 33 17.7 16 20.1

2007 52 16.5 15 21.5 29 17.5 16 20.2

2008 68 17.5 15 20.2 53 18.5 16 19.1

2009 26 17.3 16 20.4 3 21.7 20 16.4

2010 84 19.2 16 18.4 18 20.5 17 17.3

Singapore, Singapore - Gioia Tauro, Italy

nautical 

miles:

5,957

Gioia Tauro, Italy - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

5,957

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 2 13.5 11 18.4 38 13.1 12 19.0

2007 37 11.5 11 21.6 2 17.0 17 14.6

2008 57 11.8 11 21.0 9 14.1 12 17.6

2009 54 12.9 11 19.2 12 15.7 11 15.8

2010 41 13.0 12 19.1 19 14.1 10 17.6
Appendix XIII

340

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Singapore, Singapore - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

8,063

Le Havre, France - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,063

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 34 15.5 15 21.7 149 15.8 13 21.3

2007 41 16.6 13 20.2 113 15.9 13 21.2

2008 52 17.1 15 19.6 103 17.5 13 19.2

2009 43 18.1 11 18.5 69 18.4 11 18.2

2010 27 19.0 15 17.7 49 19.0 11 17.6

Singapore, Singapore - Felixstowe, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

8,184

Felixstowe, U.K. - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,184

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 10 16.5 16 20.7 53 16.0 14 21.3

2007 7 15.9 15 21.5 69 15.9 15 21.4

2008 28 17.4 15 19.6 51 19.5 15 17.5

2009 18 17.3 16 19.7 59 19.7 15 17.3

2010 4 17.3 16 19.8 40 20.2 17 16.9

Singapore, Singapore - Antwerp, 

Belgium

nautical 

miles:

8,258

Antwerp, Belgium - Singapore, 

Singapore

nautical 

miles:

8,258

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

44 17.0 14 20.2

2007 99 16.4 15 21.0

2008 95 17.4 15 19.8

2009 68 17.4 16 19.8

2010 31 20.8 18 16.6

Singapore, Singapore - Algeciras, Spain

nautical 

miles:

6,917

Algeciras, Spain - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

6,917

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

75 14.2 11 20.3

2007 22 14.7 13 19.6

2008 5 15.4 14 18.7

2009

2010 22 17.2 16 16.8

Singapore, Singapore - Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia

nautical 

miles:

4,301

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - Singapore, 

Singapore

nautical 

miles:

4,301

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 96 9.0 7 20.0 67 10.4 7 17.2

2007 68 8.4 7 21.4 133 9.1 7 19.6

2008 116 9.3 7 19.4 249 9.5 7 18.9

2009 68 10.2 7 17.5 109 9.6 7 18.7

2010 144 10.2 8 17.6 172 10.4 7 17.2
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

341

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Singapore, Singapore - Jebel Ali, U.A.E.

nautical 

miles:

3,449

Jebel Ali, U.A.E. - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

3,449

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 112 7.9 6 18.2 180 7.5 6 19.1

2007 122 8.2 6 17.6 151 6.7 6 21.4

2008 133 8.3 6 17.4 243 7.3 6 19.6

2009 91 7.8 6 18.4 273 8.2 6 17.5

2010 131 8.3 6 17.4 177 8.7 6 16.4

Singapore, Singapore - Salalah, Oman

nautical 

miles:

3,165

Salalah, Oman - Singapore, Singapore

nautical 

miles:

3,165

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 59 6.6 4 19.9 41 6.7 4 19.8

2007 34 6.0 5 22.0 50 6.6 5 19.9

2008 11 7.5 5 17.5 13 6.8 5 19.5

2009 26 6.5 5 20.3 66 7.7 6 17.2

2010 61 7.2 5 18.2 91 7.4 5 17.8

Port Klang, Malaysia - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

7,881

Le Havre, France - Port Klang, Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

7,881

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 56 15.9 14 20.6

Too few voyages observed

2007 75 15.1 12 21.7

2008 73 15.3 11 21.5

2009 42 15.5 15 21.2

2010 71 17.0 14 19.3

Port Klang, Malaysia - Marsaxlokk, 

Malta

nautical 

miles:

5,892

Marsaxlokk, Malta - Port Klang, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

5,892

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 69 11.2 9 21.9 14 11.9 11 20.6

2007 54 11.3 10 21.8 28 11.6 9 21.2

2008 53 11.9 9 20.7 37 12.2 9 20.1

2009 45 11.7 10 20.9

2010 64 13.1 10 18.7 14 17.0 11 14.4

Port Klang, Malaysia - Zeebrugge, 

Belgium

nautical 

miles:

8,017

Zeebrugge, Belgium - Port Klang, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

8,017

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

10 16.1 15 20.7

2007 46 16.4 15 20.4

2008 40 16.6 16 20.2

2009 44 21.5 16 15.6

2010 51 19.5 9 17.1
Appendix XIII

342

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Port Klang, Malaysia - Southampton, 

U.K.

nautical 

miles:

7,881

Southampton, U.K. - Port Klang, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

7,881

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 31 15.7 13 20.9

Too few voyages observed

2007 22 15.5 14 21.1

2008 38 15.4 13 21.3

2009 24 16.4 14 20.0

2010 57 17.1 16 19.2

Port Klang, Malaysia - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

8,083

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Port Klang, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

8,083

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 6 16.7 15 20.2 35 16.1 14 20.9

2007 29 17.3 16 19.5 42 16.9 14 20.0

2008 46 17.5 15 19.3 43 19.2 17 17.6

2009 7 18.3 18 18.4 39 24.3 17 13.9

2010 32 18.4 17 18.3 7 27.4 25 12.3

Port Klang, Malaysia - Valencia, Spain

nautical 

miles:

6,488

Valencia, Spain - Port Klang, Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

6,488

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 19 13.9 12 19.4 12 14.2 13 19.1

2007 7 15.4 13 17.5 19 14.1 13 19.2

2008 10 14.2 12 19.0 17 14.3 13 18.9

2009 11 13.5 12 20.0 19 15.2 11 17.8

2010 3 14.3 14 18.9 2 15.0 14 18.0

Port Klang, Malaysia - Jebel Ali, U.A.E.

nautical 

miles:

3,267

Jebel Ali, U.A.E. - Port Klang, Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

3,267

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 167 7.3 6 18.7 32 7.3 6 18.6

2007 124 6.6 6 20.6 78 7.0 6 19.5

2008 179 7.2 5 18.9 119 7.1 6 19.1

2009 186 7.0 6 19.3 71 8.2 6 16.7

2010 175 7.3 6 18.6 22 9.4 7 14.5

Port Klang, Malaysia - Jeddah, Saudi 

Arabia

nautical 

miles:

4,119

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - Port Klang, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

4,119

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 60 8.3 7 20.7 48 7.8 7 22.1

2007 126 8.6 7 19.9 84 8.2 7 21.0

2008 168 8.9 7 19.3 107 8.6 7 19.9

2009 166 8.9 7 19.3 84 9.6 7 17.9

2010 125 9.5 7 18.1 136 10.8 7 15.9
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

343

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Port Klang, Malaysia - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

8,076

Antwerp, Belgium - Port Klang, Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

8,076

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

38 17.3 16 19.4

2007 38 16.5 16 20.4

2008 28 17.3 15 19.5

2009 4 20.8 19 16.2

2010 25 19.7 17 17.1

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Southampton, 

U.K.

nautical 

miles:

6,535

Southampton, U.K. - Colombo, Sri 

Lanka

nautical 

miles:

6,535

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 30 12.7 6 21.4

Too few voyages observed

2007 32 13.1 12 20.8

2008 34 13.7 13 19.8

2009 46 13.2 7 20.7

2010 42 14.5 7 18.8

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Hamburg, 

Germany

nautical 

miles:

6,985

Hamburg, Germany - Colombo, Sri 

Lanka

nautical 

miles:

6,985

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 47 14.0 13 20.8

Too few voyages observed

2007 56 14.5 11 20.1

2008 40 14.3 13 20.4

2009 40 14.6 11 19.9

2010

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

6,737

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Colombo, Sri 

Lanka

nautical 

miles:

6,737

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 45 13.4 12 20.9

Too few voyages observed

2007 43 13.7 12 20.6

2008 49 14.0 13 20.0

2009 21 14.2 11 19.7

2010 11 15.8 14 17.7

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Zeebrugge, 

Belgium

nautical 

miles:

6,671

Zeebrugge, Belgium - Colombo, Sri 

Lanka

nautical 

miles:

6,671

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

2007 42 13.2 12 21.0

2008 41 13.2 12 21.0

2009 46 14.0 13 19.9

2010 35 14.5 14 19.2
Appendix XIII

344

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Taranto, Italy

nautical 

miles:

4,417

Taranto, Italy - Colombo, Sri Lanka

nautical 

miles:

4,417

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 44 12.5 9 14.7 6 13.3 8 13.8

2007 48 10.0 9 18.5 22 10.2 9 18.1

2008 50 9.3 8 19.8 58 9.6 7 19.2

2009 15 9.7 8 18.9 58 10.1 7 18.2

2010 8 10.6 10 17.3 78 10.9 7 16.9

Colombo, Sri Lanka - Marsaxlokk, Malta

nautical 

miles:

4,546

Marsaxlokk, Malta - Colombo, Sri Lanka

nautical 

miles:

4,546

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 2 9.5 9 19.9

Too few voyages observed

2007 9 10.7 10 17.8

2008 35 11.0 8 17.3

2009 26 12.1 11 15.6

2010 34 12.3 11 15.4

Hong Kong, China - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

9,481

Le Havre, France - Hong Kong, China

nautical 

miles:

9,481

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 5 16.8 6 23.5

Too few voyages observed

2007 13 19.2 19 20.5

2008 31 19.4 6 20.4

2009 10 20.1 19 19.7

2010 8 21.5 19 18.4

Shanghai, China - Bremerhaven, 

Germany

nautical 

miles:

10,603

Bremerhaven, Germany - Shanghai, 

China

nautical 

miles:

10,603

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

2007

2008 19 20.3 7 21.8

2009 36 21.2 20 20.8

2010 40 22.4 8 19.8

Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia - Le Havre, 

France

nautical 

miles:

8,052

Le Havre, France - Tanjung Pelepas, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

8,052

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

2007 23 16.0 14 21.0

2008 18 16.3 15 20.6

2009 13 16.6 16 20.2

2010 6 18.3 18 18.3
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

345

Table XIII.E Asia - Europe Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia - Taranto, 

Italy

nautical 

miles:

5,934

Taranto, Italy - Tanjung Pelepas, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

5,934

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

34 11.9 9 20.7

2007 23 12.1 10 20.4

2008 18 13.1 12 18.9

2009 6 14.0 13 17.7

2010 9 17.0 15 14.5

Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia - Algeciras, 

Spain

nautical 

miles:

6,906

Algeciras, Spain - Tanjung Pelepas, 

Malaysia

nautical 

miles:

6,906

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

1 14.0 14 20.6

2007 31 14.3 13 20.1

2008 19 17.2 14 16.8

2009 8 23.0 18 12.5

2010 16 23.4 21 12.3

Note: All voyage transit times are calculated on the basis of “last port out, first port in.”

Source: Data Extracted and Compiled from Lloyd’s Voyage Records, June, 14, 2011
Appendix XIII

346

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade

Inbound Outbound

Le Havre, France - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,082

New York, USA - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

3,082

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 154 7.1 5 18.0

Too few voyages observed

2007 177 7.1 5 18.0

2008 150 7.2 5 17.9

2009 166 8.2 6 15.8

2010 103 7.8 6 16.5

Algeciras, Spain - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,185

New York, USA - Algeciras, Spain

nautical 

miles:

3,185

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 40 8.4 6 15.9 29 7.0 6 19.0

2007 45 9.0 6 14.8 34 7.0 6 19.0

2008 72 8.4 6 15.7 12 6.9 6 19.2

2009 82 7.5 5 17.8

2010 118 8.2 6 16.1 1 6.0 6 22.1

Bremerhaven, Germany - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,469

New York, USA - Bremerhaven, Germany

nautical 

miles:

3,469

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 6 8.2 7 17.7 12 7.9 7 18.3

2007 3 8.0 7 18.1 52 7.8 6 18.5

2008 11 8.5 7 17.1 64 7.5 6 19.3

2009 4 9.3 8 15.6 73 8.3 6 17.4

2010 31 9.5 7 15.2 19 8.7 7 16.6

Bremerhaven, Germany - Charleston, 

USA

nautical 

miles:

3,944

Charleston, USA - Bremerhaven, 

Germany

nautical 

miles:

3,944

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 163 9.8 8 16.8

Too few voyages observed

2007 140 10.0 8 16.5

2008 119 9.8 8 16.7

2009 116 10.2 8 16.0

2010 56 9.9 8 16.7

Antwerp, Belgium - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,269

New York, USA - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,269

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

49 6.7 5 20.3

2007 51 7.2 6 19.0

2008 46 7.2 6 18.8

2009 37 7.7 6 17.7

2010 51 8.2 7 16.6
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

347

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Antwerp, Belgium - Charleston, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,735

Charleston, USA - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,735

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

90 9.7 7 16.0

2007 86 9.7 7 16.0

2008 50 9.4 7 16.6

2009 103 10.0 8 15.6

2010 72 9.7 8 16.1

Antwerp, Belgium - Wilmington, NC, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,583

Wilmington, NC, USA - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,583

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

2007

2008

2009 34 10.7 10 13.9

2010 38 10.6 9 14.0

Antwerp, Belgium - Chester, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,267

Chester, USA - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,267

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

43 9.3 7 14.7

2007 45 9.0 8 15.1

2008 43 9.3 8 14.6

2009 13 9.6 8 14.2

2010 4 12.8 12 10.7

Antwerp, Belgium - Norfolk, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,448

Norfolk, USA - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,448

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

75 8.5 8 16.9

2007 54 8.5 8 16.8

2008 47 8.6 8 16.7

2009 40 8.3 8 17.4

2010 49 8.8 8 16.4

Antwerp, Belgium - Montreal, Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,129

Montreal, Canada - Antwerp, Belgium

nautical 

miles:

3,129

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 29 10.2 8 12.7 43 8.1 6 16.1

2007 30 8.8 7 14.8 35 9.0 7 14.5

2008 32 8.4 7 15.5 42 9.3 7 14.0

2009 6 8.5 8 15.3 25 8.6 7 15.2

2010 5 8.2 7 15.9 10 8.0 7 16.3
Appendix XIII

348

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Bremerhaven, Germany - Montreal, 

Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,289

Montreal, Canada - Bremerhaven, 

Germany

nautical 

miles:

3,289

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

10 8.8 8 15.6

2007 73 8.3 7 16.6

2008 88 9.2 8 14.9

2009 70 9.1 8 15.1

2010 18 12.7 12 10.8

Cagliari, Italy - Halifax, Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,390

Halifax, Canada - Cagliari, Italy

nautical 

miles:

3,390

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

2007

2008 10 7.3 6 19.3 11 7.1 6 19.9

2009 33 7.6 6 18.6 35 7.3 6 19.4

2010 42 7.1 6 19.8 42 7.4 6 19.1

Felixstowe, U.K. - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,195

New York, USA - Felixstowe, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

3,195

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 48 7.3 5 18.3

Too few voyages observed

2007 52 7.3 6 18.2

2008 45 7.2 6 18.4

2009 46 7.8 6 17.2

2010 3 7.7 7 17.4

Gioia Tauro, Italy - Halifax, Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,692

Halifax, Canada - Gioia Tauro, Italy

nautical 

miles:

3,692

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 45 7.9 6 19.4 45 6.9 5 22.3

2007 50 7.5 5 20.6 47 7.4 5 20.8

2008 33 7.4 6 20.8 30 7.6 6 20.3

2009

2010

Le Havre, France - Charleston, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,585

Charleston, USA - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

3,585

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 11 7.9 6 18.9

Too few voyages observed

2007 8 7.4 6 20.3

2008 5 8.2 8 18.2

2009 24 8.6 7 17.4

2010 29 8.9 7 16.7
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

349

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Le Havre, France - Veracruz, Mexico

nautical 

miles:

4,866

Veracruz, Mexico - Le Havre, France

nautical 

miles:

4,866

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 39 12.4 11 16.3

Too few voyages observed

2007 39 12.2 11 16.6

2008 24 13.0 12 15.6

2009

2010 15 13.4 13 15.1

Liverpool, U.K. - Chester, U.S.A.

nautical 

miles:

2,966

Chester, U.S.A. - Liverpool, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

2,966

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 45 8.4 7 14.7

Too few voyages observed

2007 40 8.4 7 14.8

2008 44 8.5 7 14.6

2009 40 9.0 8 13.8

2010 48 9.1 8 13.6

Liverpool, U.K. - Montreal, Canada

nautical 

miles:

2,812

Montreal, Canada - Liverpool, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

2,812

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 23 8.3 7 14.2 23 7.5 6 15.6

2007 17 8.6 7 13.6 23 7.4 7 15.9

2008 24 8.1 7 14.4 27 8.2 7 14.3

2009 13 8.5 7 13.8 12 8.3 7 14.1

2010 5 6.6 5 17.8 5 8.0 7 14.6

Marsaxlokk, Malta - Miami, USA

nautical 

miles:

4,805

Miami, USA - Marsaxlokk, Malta

nautical 

miles:

4,805

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

48 10.5 8 19.0

2007 43 10.7 4 18.8

2008 39 11.5 10 17.4

2009 9 11.7 11 17.2

2010 1 11.0 11 18.2

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Halifax, 

Canada

nautical 

miles:

2,741

Halifax, Canada - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

2,741

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 40 5.8 5 19.9

Too few voyages observed

2007 37 6.0 5 18.9

2008 42 5.8 5 19.7

2009 41 6.0 5 18.9

2010 43 5.9 5 19.3
Appendix XIII

350

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Charleston, 

USA

nautical 

miles:

3,751

Charleston, USA - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

3,751

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

58 9.9 8 15.8

2007 56 9.9 9 15.8

2008 46 9.4 8 16.6

2009 51 9.6 8 16.3

2010 51 9.4 8 16.6

Rotterdam, Netherlands - New York, 

USA

nautical 

miles:

3,275

New York, USA - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

3,275

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 24 8.1 6 16.9 51 7.5 6 18.2

2007 11 8.3 6 16.5 57 7.9 6 17.2

2008 18 7.6 6 17.9 50 7.6 6 18.0

2009 11 8.4 7 16.3 50 7.5 7 18.1

2010 21 8.3 6 16.5 1 12.0 12 11.4

Rotterdam, Netherlands - Montreal, 

Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,134

Montreal, Canada - Rotterdam, 

Netherlands

nautical 

miles:

3,134

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 74 7.9 7 16.6

Too few voyages observed

2007 10 7.7 7 17.0

2008 67 8.2 7 15.9

2009 75 8.0 7 16.3

2010

Southampton, U.K. - New York, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,077

New York, USA - Southampton, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

3,077

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 63 7.7 6 16.6

Too few voyages observed

2007 73 7.9 7 16.3

2008 53 7.8 6 16.5

2009 47 7.9 7 16.2

2010 47 7.4 6 17.2

Thamesport, U.K. - Charleston, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,665

Charleston, USA - Thamesport, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

3,665

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

3 10.0 10 15.3

2007

2008 34 10.8 9 14.2

2009 38 11.4 9 13.4

2010 24 10.9 10 14.0
Slow Steaming Trends in the Major East-West Trades, 2006 through 2010

351

Table XIII.F Transatlantic Trade (continued)

Inbound Outbound

Thamesport, U.K. - Halifax, Canada

nautical 

miles:

2,656

Halifax, Canada - Thamesport, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

2,656

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

5 5.6 5 19.8

2007

2008 21 6.5 6 17.1

2009 32 6.8 6 16.3

2010 13 6.5 5 16.9

Tilbury, U.K. - Philadelphia, USA

nautical 

miles:

3,345

Philadelphia, USA - Tilbury, U.K.

nautical 

miles:

3,345

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006

Too few voyages observed

53 8.1 7 17.2

2007 57 8.4 7 16.6

2008 48 8.4 7 16.6

2009 30 8.8 8 15.8

2010 19 8.2 7 17.0

Valencia, Spain - Montreal, Canada

nautical 

miles:

3,549

Montreal, Canada - Valencia, Spain

nautical 

miles:

3,549

Year Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed Voyages Avg. Days Minimum Speed

2006 8 9.9 9 15.0

2007 2 9.5 9 15.6 19 10.4 8 14.3

2008 1 11.0 11 13.4 33 10.8 9 13.7

2009 23 9.1 7 16.2 35 9.9 7 15.0

2010 8 8.9 7 16.7 22 9.4 7 15.8

Note: All voyage transit times are calculated on the basis of “last port out, first port in.”

Source: Data Extracted and Compiled from Lloyd’s Voyage Records, June, 14, 2011
353

Appendix XIV

Glossary of Acronyms

ACCOS Advisory Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping

AMC Antitrust Modernization Commission

BAF Bunker Adjustment Factor

BCO Beneficial Cargo Owner

BUT Butterfly Service Pattern

CAF Currency Adjustment Factor

CCI Consumer Confidence Index 

CCS Competition Commission of Singapore

CDA Carrier Discussion Agreements

CKYH COSCO/KL/YMUK/Hanjin Worldwide Slot Allocation and Sailing Agreement

CR4 Top-4 firm concentration ratio

CR5 Top-5 firm concentration ratio 

CRA Charles River Associates

CRS Congressional Research Service

DD Difference-In-Differences Estimating Methodology

DG Comp EU Directorate-General for Competition

DOJ US Department of Justice

DOT US Department of Transportation 

EC European Commission

EIS Exchange of Information System

ELAA European Liner Affairs Association

ETE End-To-End Service Pattern

EU European Union

FAK Freight-All-Kinds

FEFC Far Eastern Freight Conference

FEU Forty-foot Equivalent Units

FMC US Federal Maritime Commission

FTC US Federal Trade Commission

GDP Gross Domestic Product
Appendix XIV

354

GDSM General Department Store Merchandise

GRI General Rate Increase

HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

IP Identity Preservation (commodities)

Kg Kilogram

KMI Korea Maritime Institute

LWC Local Working Committee 

MES Minimum Efficient Scale

MSII Market Share Instability Index

NITL National Industrial Transportation League

NOI Notice of Inquiry

NVOCC Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carrier

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ORC Origin Review Committee

OSRA Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998

PCI Productivity Commission Inquiry

PDM Pendulum Service Pattern

PIERS Port Import Export Reporting Service 

PSS Peak Season Surcharge 

RPC Revenue Policy Committee

RTW Round-the-World Service Pattern

SCP Structure, Conduct and Performance Analytical Framework

SMA Single Market Assessment

TAA Trans-Atlantic Agreement 

TACA Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement

TEU Twenty-foot Equivalent Units

THC Terminal Handling Charge

TSA Transpacific Stabilization Agreement

VOCC Vessel-Operating Common Carrier

VSCG Voluntary Service Contract Guideline

WTSA Westbound Transpacific Stabilization Agreement