Opinion filed March 3 1 , 2017



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ __ ______ 

### No. 11

- 1 6

- 00 29 3

- C V

_____ _ _____ 

### IN THE INTEREST OF A.S

. , A CHILD

On Appeal from the 3 26 th District Court

T a ylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 8024

- CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court entered an order in which it terminat ed the parental rights of
the parents of A.S

. Both parents a ppeal ; e ach presents a single issue challeng ing the sufficiency of the evidence as to the child’s best interest

. We affirm.

Termination Standards and Findings
T ermination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001 (b) ( West Supp. 201 6 ). To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case , we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding2

wa s true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

– 26 (Tex. 2002). With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. d enied). But courts may use the non

- exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the c hild now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent

- child relationship is not a pr oper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s
best interest. C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d at 266. To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001 (b) (1)(A )

– ( T) and that termination is in t he best interest of the child.
F AM

. § 1 61.001 (b) . In this case, the trial court found that the mother committed four
of the acts listed in Section 161 .001 (b) (1)

— those found in subsections (D), (E) , (N),
and (O)

— and that the father committed two of those acts

— those found in subsections (N) and (O)

. The trial court also found that termination of each parent’s rights would be in the child ’ s best interest. See id. § 161.001 (b) (2). On appeal,3

n either parent challenges the findings made pu rsuant to Section 161.001(b)(1); however, both parents challenge the best interest findings.

Evidence and Analysis: Best Interest The parents assert that the evidence presented at trial wa s in sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights
would be in A.S

. ’s best interest and that the best interest of A.S. would be served by appointing the parents as possessory conservators. We disagree.
The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services
removed A.S. fr om the parents based upon domestic violence committed by the father against the mother and the parents’ use of drugs while A.S. was in their care.
B oth parents were arrested while the Department was at the parents’ hotel room investigating the initial inta ke

. A.S . was less than three months old at that time
, a nd she was placed with her maternal great aunt

. The mother , who had a history with the Department, partially complied with
her court

- ordered family service plan , and the Department attempted a monitored
return to the mother. The monitored return, however, was unsuccessful , and the
child was returned to the great aunt after less than three weeks. The monitored return
ended when the mother left A.S. with the mother’s g randmother and explained that
she “just couldn’t do it anymore.” The mother’ s drug use obviously interfered with her ability to take care of A.S.; the mother admitted that she continued to abuse methamphetamine , although she testified that her drug of cho ice was cocaine . As a
result of her continued methamphetamine use
, the mother’s visitations were suspended sometime after the unsuccessful monitored return. T he mother agreed that, at th e time of trial , A.S. was where she needed to be because the mother was not a good candidate to be a parent to A.S. at that time, but the mother did not want her rights to be terminated as she hoped to find an answer for her drug problem in
the future.4

The evidence at trial show s that the father tested positiv e for methamphetamine at the time of the removal and while this case was pending. A police officer who was present at the time of the removal and arrested the father for assault family violence testified that the father appeared to be “loaded on methamphe tamine.” The father did not comply with his court

- ordered family service plan, was in and out of jail during these proceedings, and did not mainta in contact with the Department. The father did not regularly visit the child; he may have attended “a couple ” of visits early on in this case. The father was incarcerated at the time of the final hearing and did not testify at trial

. A.S. had lived with her maternal great aunt for nearly all of her life ; the mother and A.S. had even lived with the great aunt u pon being released from the hospital
after A.S. was born

. According to the Department’s supervisor, t he great aunt went

“ above and beyond ” in this case and tried to help the mother become th e parent that
she needed to be. The great aunt even moved to Abi lene and bought a house so that
the mother would not have to travel as far to see the child and to otherwise try to help the mother

. Ultimately, though, the great aunt feared that the mother’s

“ continuous use of drugs” rendered her incapable of being a safe caregiver for A.S. The great aunt believed that termination of the parents’ rights would be in the child’s best interest, but she also said that, if in the future the parents were “in the right place” a nd had turned their lives around, she might be willing to allow them to have some sort of relationship with A.S. The great aunt had a safe, stable , and loving home and desired to adopt A.S. A.S. was bonded to the great aunt and her family. A.S. was doing well in the great aunt’s care and was developmentally on target.
The case supervisor for the Department believed that termination of the parents’ rights and adoption by the great aunt would be in A.S.’s best interest. The Department’s goal for A.S. was for her t o be adopted by her great aunt. The child’s5

guardian ad litem agreed that termination of the parents’ rights was in A.S.’s best
interest. We do not agree with the parents ’ contention that the evidence was insufficient to show that termination of the parents’ rights would be in A .S.’s best
interest , no r do we agree with their assertion that A.S.’s best interest would be served by appointing the parents as possessory conservators. A factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet a chil d’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet a child’s needs in the future. In re J.D. , 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Additionally, a factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the w ell

- being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent. Id. The parents had endangered A.S.’s well

being and had not demonstrated an ability to meet th e child’s needs in the future. At the time of the termination hearing, A.S. was eighteen months old and, thus, could not verbally express her desires. “When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with
the foster famil y, are well

- cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent.” Id. T he evidence in this case did not indicate a strong bond between the parents and A.S

. The father had constructively abandoned A.S., and the mother’s visitations had been susp ended due to her drug use. A.S. had lived with her great
aunt for all but two months of her life. A.S. was very bonded to the great aunt’s
f amily , and the great aunt was committed to adopt ing A. S. , keep ing her safe
, and provid ing her with permanency

. The need for permanency is a paramount
consideration for a child’s present and future physical and emotional needs
, and the goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling government
interest. Id.
B ased upon the Holley factors an d the evidence in the record
, we cannot hold
that the trial court’s best interest finding s are not supported by clear and convincing6

evidence

. See Holley
, 544 S.W.2d at 371

– 72. T he trial court could reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in the child ’s best interest for the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to be terminated

. We hold that t he evidence
i s both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding s

. We overrule the sole issue presented by the mother and the sole issue presented by the father in this appeal

. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the trial court’s order of termination

.

MIKE WILLSON
JUSTICE

March 3 1 , 2017 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J. , and Bailey, J.