IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

CORY EVANS,

Appellant.

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No. 35990-5-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Cory Evans stole four security cameras and damaged 

a pole within a gated community. A jury found him guilty of second degree malicious 

mischief and second degree burglary.

He appeals his conviction for second degree burglary. He argues the State 

presented insufficient evidence that the gated community is completely enclosed by 

fencing or a combination of fencing and structures. We agree and, therefore, reverse 

Evans’s conviction for second degree burglary. 

FACTS

Todd Hagen, President of Quail Ridge Homeowner’s Association (Quail Ridge),

noticed that four of the five security cameras on a pole inside the community’s gated 

FILED

JUNE 25, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35990-5-III

State v. Evans

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entrance were missing. The pole was also damaged. The cost to repair the pole and to 

replace the four cameras totaled around $4,700. 

Hagen obtained the recorded video. The video showed an individual climbing the 

entry wall, reaching out, and pulling the cameras from the pole. Still pictures from the 

video were captured, including still shots of the individual’s face. Sergeant Kurt Vigesaa 

looked at the still photos and recognized the suspect as Cory Evans. 

The State charged Evans with second degree burglary and second degree malicious 

mischief. The State called Hagen as its primary witness at trial. Hagen testified that 

Quail Ridge is a gated community with 38 residences inside the property. The State 

asked Hagen to describe how the community is gated:

Q. And tell us about the gated community. How is it gated?

A. So right off of 54th, there’s an—a keypad to enter—to enter 

the community, and residents would enter either the keypad, or if they have 

a transponder in their car, they would click a button and open up the gate to 

come in. And then the gate closes after about 15 seconds or once you enter 

the community.

Report of Proceedings at 99. Hagen thereafter added that vendors, such as those working 

on a house, had access only if a resident shared a daytime code with the vendor. The 

State admitted photographs of the front gate—three of which show a brick wall attached 

to and extending from the gate. 
No. 35990-5-III

State v. Evans

3

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and the trial court imposed a 

standard range sentence. 

Evans timely appealed. 

ANALYSIS

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Evans contends there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of burglary in 

the second degree because the State did not show Quail Ridge was completely enclosed 

by a fence or structure. We agree. 

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he or she admits the 

truth of all of the State’s evidence. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 

P.3d 19 (2017). “Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of 

fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements 

of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “[A]ll reasonable inferences from 

the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against” 

Evans. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 

To find Evans guilty of second degree burglary, the jury had to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Evans entered or remained unlawfully in a building other than a 

vehicle or dwelling with an intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein. 
No. 35990-5-III

State v. Evans

4

RCW 9A.52.030(1). “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, can also mean a 

“fenced area.” RCW 9A.04.110(5). The area must be completely enclosed by fencing or 

enclosed by a combination of fencing and other structures. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 

572, 580, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009); State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). 

In Engel, the defendant was convicted of second degree burglary for theft of 

aluminum auto wheels from the business premises of Western Asphalt. Engel, 166 

Wn.2d at 574. Western Asphalt’s premises covered over seven acres, which included

several buildings and a yard. Id. One-third of the property was fenced. Id. The rest of 

the property was not fenced; it was bordered with stock piles, “‘banks, high banks, [and] 

sloping banks.’” Id. at 575 (alteration in original). The theft occurred at night when the 

business was closed and the front gate was locked. Id. at 574. A jury found Engel guilty 

of second degree burglary, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 575. The Supreme 

Court reversed. Id. at 581. 

The court noted that burglary in the second degree required one to enter or remain 

unlawfully in a building and, in addition to its ordinary meaning, a building included a 

“fenced area.” Id. at 576 (citing RCW 9A.52.030; RCW 9A.04.110(5)). 

The State argued that Western Asphalt’s boundary was “‘surrounded by natural 

barriers’” and a fence and, these aspects combined, satisfied the “‘fenced area’”
No. 35990-5-III

State v. Evans

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requirement. Id. at 578. Engel argued that the ordinary meaning of a “‘fenced area’” is 

an area completely enclosed by a fence, and Western Asphalt’s yard did not meet this 

definition because of the hills and slopes surrounding a portion of the boundary of the 

yard. Id. 

Under the State’s argument, criminals could unknowingly cross a boundary that 

was unmarked and unfenced and, thus, be liable for burglary if they merely remained on 

the property without approaching any buildings or structures. Id. at 580. Thus, to avoid 

absurd results, the court reasoned that “‘fenced area’ is limited to the curtilage of a 

building or structure that itself qualifies as an object of burglary . . . . The curtilage is an 

area that is completely enclosed either by fencing alone or . . . a combination of fencing 

and other structures.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The State relies on Wentz. There, the court affirmed a conviction for first degree 

burglary where the backyard was surrounded by a six-foot high wooden fence with 

padlocked gates. 149 Wn.2d at 352. The apprehending officer had to climb over the 

fence to gain entry into the backyard to arrest Wentz, who was hiding. Id. The court 

determined that a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Wentz’s backyard was “surrounded” by a fence. Id. 
No. 35990-5-III

State v. Evans

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We distinguish Wentz. There, the evidence supported an inference that the 

backyard was fully enclosed by a fence. Here, the evidence does not support an inference 

that the community of 38 residences was fully enclosed. Hagen testified that Quail Ridge 

is a gated community and residents and vendors enter the community through a gate using 

an access code. In context, Hagen’s testimony is limited to how vehicles access the 

community. He did not testify that the community was fully enclosed by a fence and/or 

other structure. The State admitted photographs of the front gate—three of which show a 

brick wall attached to and extending from the gate. There was no evidence that the brick 

wall extended around the entire community. Moreover, the phrase “gated community” is 

sufficiently ambiguous that it does not necessarily mean fully enclosed. See AMERICAN 

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 5th ed., 

https://www.thefreedictionary.com/gated+community (last visited June 21, 2019) (“A 

subdivision or neighborhood, often surrounded by a barrier, to which entry is restricted to 

residents and their guests.”). 

Because a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Quail 

Ridge is fully enclosed by a fence and/or other structure, we reverse Evans’s conviction 

for second degree burglary. We direct the trial court to resentence Evans on his singular 

conviction for second degree malicious mischief. 
No. 35990-5-III 

State v. Evans 

Reversed and remanded. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

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Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. 

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