Affirmed as Modified and Opinion filed January 23, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00876-CR

JOE AMOS SHAW, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1292395

O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant Joe Amos Shaw of murder and assessed his 

punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction for attempted capital murder, at life. 

The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly and assessed court costs against 

him. Appellant asserts that (1) the trial court reversibly erred by denying him the 

opportunity to impeach the assistant medical examiner regarding a crime of moral 

turpitude; (2) the trial court reversibly erred by allowing testimony during 

punishment regarding either an irrelevant extraneous offense or victim impact 
2

evidence; (3) he was entitled to a sua sponte extraneous offense jury instruction in 

the punishment charge; and (4) court costs should be deleted from the judgment 

because there is insufficient evidence to support them. We agree that insufficient 

evidence supports the court costs, reform the judgment to delete these costs, and 

affirm the judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with the murder of Rhonda Scott, the woman with 

whom he lived at the time of her death. The decedent‘s body was found by family 

members in her garage on January 15, 2011, a day after she last spoke to anyone. 

Her car was missing but was later found abandoned through the GPS tracking 

device installed in it. Her family members contacted the police, who arrived at the 

scene. Appellant was required to wear an electronic ankle monitor during the time 

he lived with the decedent. Officers discovered that the ankle monitor appeared to 

have been cut off, the strap was cut through, and the bracelet was located in the 

bedroom. A unit in the home displayed the words ―bracelet gone‖ and emitted a 

loud beeping noise. Appellant was not at the house. While at the scene, the 

officers received notice that appellant‘s ex-wife contacted police and requested a 

welfare check at the decedent‘s residence ―to make sure that everybody was . . . 

okay.‖

At appellant‘s trial, his ex-wife testified that appellant arrived at her home 

the evening of the decedent‘s death in the decedent‘s car. She stated he had been 

drinking and was despondent and suicidal; he told her he had been fighting with 

the decedent. Another of appellant‘s friends also testified, relating that appellant 

also told him he had been fighting with the decedent. Several days after the 

discovery of the decedent‘s body, police discovered appellant at a local hospital by 
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tracing a phone call he made to his ex-wife. When approached by police officers, 

appellant provided a fictitious name before he was arrested.

At appellant‘s trial, an assistant medical examiner (M.E.) testified regarding 

the injuries sustained by the decedent. The decedent had a gunshot wound beneath 

her eye, with gun particle burns to her face. These particle burns indicated that the 

shot was fired from more than two inches and less than two feet from her face. 

She had no defensive wounds and the blood found on her hands indicated that they 

could have been close to her face when the bullet struck her. The assistant M.E.

testified that the manner of the decedent‘s death was homicide.

After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the jury found appellant 

guilty as charged and proceeded to the punishment phase of his trial. Appellant 

pleaded ―not true‖ to the alleged enhancement of a prior conviction for attempted 

capital murder. 

As is relevant to this appeal, the State presented a fingerprint expert who 

testified that appellant‘s prints appeared on a penitentiary packet showing a 

conviction for attempted capital murder in Bell County, Texas. Appellant was 

convicted on July 20, 1982; the offense occurred on May 21, 1982. The State 

called a witness from Killeen, Texas, Doris Mashburn, who testified about a 

woman named Lorene Johnson. Ms. Mashburn knew Lorene very well; Lorene

had worked for her for a long time. Ms. Mashburn distinctly remembered May 21, 

1982, because that was the day that she opened her door to discover Lorene passed 

out and bleeding from numerous stab wounds. Ms. Mashburn accompanied 

Lorene to the hospital, where hospital personnel were able to save Lorene‘s life. 

According to Ms. Mashburn, Lorene had to have rehabilitation and when she 

returned to work, her arm was in a cast. When Lorene learned about this case, she 

had headaches and was disturbed. 
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After both sides rested and closed, the trial court charged the jury. The jury 

found the enhancement paragraph ―true‖ and assessed punishment at confinement 

for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The 

trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury‘s verdict and assessed 

court costs of $334 against appellant in the judgment. This appeal timely followed.

ANALYSIS

A. Impeachment of Assistant M.E.

In his first issue, appellant asserts that the trial court reversibly erred by 

denying him the opportunity to impeach the assistant M.E. regarding a crime of 

moral turpitude. Before calling the assistant M.E., the prosecutor for the State 

explained at a bench conference that the assistant M.E. was currently on a pretrial 

diversion that began in October 2012 for the felony offense of giving a false 

statement to obtain credit. The prosecutor explained that the assistant M.E.

performed the autopsy on the decedent before being placed on the pretrial 

diversion and that she would be testifying about the autopsy and her report. The 

prosecuting attorney asked the trial judge if he was going to permit appellant to 

question this witness regarding either the felony offense or the pretrial diversion. 

―Exposing a witness‘s motivation to testify for or against the accused or the 

State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination.‖ Carpenter v. State, 

979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). But a trial judge has some 

discretion and may limit cross-examination as inappropriate for a number of 

reasons. See id.; see also Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138, 147–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). ―A long line of cases hold that a witness may be cross-examined for bias 

concerning a pending charge because his testimony may be  ̳given under a promise 

or expectation of immunity, or under the coercive effect of his detention by 

officers . . . conducting the present prosecution.‘‖ Irby, 327 S.W.3d at 149 
5

(quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931)). But in the context of 

cross-examining a witness subject to pending charges, for evidence of the pending 

charges to be admissible, the proponent must establish some causal connection or 

logical relationship between the pending charges and the witness‘s vulnerable 

relationship or potential bias or prejudice for the State. See id. at 148. Here, the 

assistant M.E. had been placed on pretrial diversion for an offense that she was 

charged with months after she had performed the autopsy on the decedent.

Appellant‘s counsel acknowledged the tenuous impeachment value of this 

evidence:

I would agree that the impeachment value is not that great, especially

because she‘s a doctor just testifying through her examination of the 

body. But I believe that the -- I guess -- I guess the charge against her 

is, in fact, a crime showing, you know, moral turpitude, and I believe 

it should affect the credibility.

Appellant‘s counsel further asserted that the assistant M.E. might hope to curry 

favor with the State through her testimony while on the pretrial diversion to 

prevent a final conviction. The trial court concluded that appellant had not 

established that there was a causal connection between the assistant M.E.‘s

testimony and her having been placed on pretrial diversion. Thus, the trial court 

denied appellant‘s request to cross-examine her regarding the pretrial diversion. 

We agree with the trial court that appellant, as the proponent of the evidence, 

failed to establish any logical relationship between the assistant M.E.‘s pretrial 

diversion (her alleged ―vulnerable relationship‖ with the State) and a motive to 

provide biased trial testimony. See id. Indeed, her trial testimony was limited to 

reviewing the autopsy she performed on the decedent, and she relied largely on the 

report she had prepared at the time she performed the autopsy in January 2011. 

There is no allegation that the assistant M.E.‘s testimony at trial in any way 
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deviated from her written report, which was prepared well before she was charged 

with this felony offense or placed on pretrial diversion for it.1 The trial court did 

not act outside its discretion by appropriately limiting appellant‘s crossexamination of the assistant M.E. See Carpenter, 979 S.W.2d at 634.

Appellant‘s first issue is overruled.

B. Extraneous Offense or Victim Impact Evidence at Punishment

In his second issue, appellant asserts that Ms. Mashburn‘s testimony, 

described above, consisted of either extraneous offense or improper victim impact 

evidence. We conclude that appellant failed to preserve either of these issues for 

our review.

To preserve error for appellate review, a timely and specific objection is 

required. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). In other words, the objecting party must 

let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and do so 

clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge may do 

something about it. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

Additionally, a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or 

obtain a running objection. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003). Finally, a complaint on appeal must comport with the objection made at 

trial. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339.

Several days before Ms. Mashburn was present to testify, the State informed 

the trial court and appellant‘s counsel, outside the presence of the jury, that she 

would be testifying about the enhancing offense. The prosecuting attorney also 

 

1

Instead, appellant points to the State‘s arguments during closing in which the prosecutor 

made inferences regarding appellant‘s mens rea from the assistant M.E.‘s testimony. None of 

this argument, however, has any bearing on whether it was appropriate to impeach the assistant 

M.E. regarding the pretrial diversion.
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discussed another witness who was unavailable to testify at that time. The trial 

court asked if both witnesses were ―material to punishment,‖ and the State 

responded that they were. In response, appellant‘s counsel argued, ―I‘m going to 

have an objection to all that, because they already have the conviction. They have 

the fact that he‘s on parole, the fact that he got a 35-year sentence. It‘s cumulative 

and it‘s prejudicial. It has very little probative value.‖ He further asserted that 

these witnesses‘ testimony would consist of hearsay and violate the Confrontation 

Clause. The trial court sustained appellant‘s hearsay objection in advance, but 

stated that he needed to hear the witnesses‘ testimony before he could make any 

further rulings.

During Ms. Mashburn‘s testimony, appellant objected several times. He 

first objected to one of the State‘s questions on relevance grounds, but failed to 

obtain a ruling from the trial court.2 He made two hearsay objections, both of 

which were sustained by the trial court. He also objected to another question, 

asserting that it had been ―asked and answered,‖ which the trial court overruled. 

These were the only objections appellant asserted during Ms. Mashburn‘s 

testimony. To the extent that appellant complains that Ms. Mashburn provided 

improper victim-impact testimony, he failed to object to her testimony on that 

basis. Accordingly, he failed to preserve this part of his issue for our review 

because he did not object to the admission of any victim-impact testimony at trial. 

See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 391–92 & n.92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

 

2

The specific exchange where the relevance objection was lodged occurred as follows:

Q. What kind of person was – is Lorene?

A. She was very caring. Like I said she practically raised my kids. 

She was fun.

[Appellant‘s Counsel]: Judge, I‘m going to object. This is 

irrelevant, Your Honor, at this point.

THE COURT: All right. Well, she placed [sic] in the community. 

Bu[t] anyway, let‘s get to the point.
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(stating that appellant failed to preserve appellate complaint about admission of 

victim-impact evidence by objecting to such testimony at trial). 

After Ms. Mashburn finished testifying, she was excused, and the State 

rested its case-in-chief. Appellant‘s counsel then approached the bench to request 

a ―brief recess to put something on the record.‖ The trial court dismissed the jury, 

and appellant‘s counsel moved to strike Ms. Mashburn‘s testimony from the 

record, asserting there had 

been no tie at all on the testimony she presented to this jury in 

reference to [appellant.] . . . There is nothing to show that whatever is 

it she‘s talking about, whoever this lady is this Lorene Johnson, has 

anything to do with this defendant. 

There‘s a judgment and sentence that‘s been entered, but that is 

it. So I object. I would ask the jury be instructed to disregard the 

testimony of Ms. Mashburn because it is totally irrelevant to this case, 

Your Honor.

The trial court denied the motion, stating, ―That objection needs to be 

contemporaneous with the offer. There was no objection in front of this jury.‖ 

First, we note that there was no evidence provided by Ms. Mashburn linking 

her testimony about Lorene Johnson to appellant. Regardless of this apparent 

evidentiary deficit, we agree with the trial court that appellant failed to timely 

object to her testimony on relevance grounds or obtain a running objection on this 

basis. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to strike her testimony on the grounds presented by appellant. 

See Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (providing that 

we review a trial court‘s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion). 

Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the parties were all aware 

that Ms. Mashburn was present to testify regarding the enhancing offense, not 
9

about an extraneous offense. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 333 (―In determining 

whether a complaint on appeal comports with a complaint made at trial, we look to 

the context of the objection and the shared understanding of the parties at the 

time.‖ (emphasis added)). There is simply no indication in our record that the trial 

court or the parties were under the impression that Ms. Mashburn‘s testimony 

concerned anything other than the enhancing offense. The State informed the trial 

court and appellant before Ms. Mashburn was called to testify that she was going 

to testify about the circumstances of the enhancing offense. The date of the 

enhancing offense matched the date of the offense Ms. Mashburn described. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that appellant‘s complaint on 

appeal regarding an ―irrelevant‖ enhancing offense does not comport with the 

objection made at trial. See id. Thus, appellant has failed to preserve this issue for 

our review. See Brown v. State, 6 S.W.3d 571, 582 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. 

ref‘d). We overrule appellant‘s second issue in its entirety.

Turning to appellant‘s third issue, he asserts that, ―in the alternative,‖ he was 

entitled to a sua sponte extraneous offense instruction. But here, as discussed 

above, the parties all shared an understanding that Ms. Mashburn‘s testimony 

concerned the enhancing offense, not an extraneous offense. Cf. Clark, 365 

S.W.3d at 333. And the trial court provided the jury the following enhancement 

instruction:

The enhancement paragraph of the indictment alleges that 

before the commission of the offense for which you have found the 

defendant guilty, on July 20, 1982, in Cause No. 31,041, in the 27th 

District Court of Bell County, Texas, the defendant was convicted of 

the felony of attempted capital murder. To this allegation in the 

enhancement paragraph of the indictment the defendant has pleaded 

―not true‖.

If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the allegations set out in the enhancement paragraph of the indictment 
10

are true, you will state in your verdict that you find ―true‖ the 

allegations of the enhancement paragraph of the indictment; but 

unless you so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you 

will answer ―not true‖ to the allegations of the enhancement paragraph 

of the indictment.

Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury‘s 

finding of ―true‖ to the enhancement paragraph.

Further, in Bluitt v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial 

court did not err in refusing to give a requested extraneous offense instruction 

when all of the evidence regarding the appellant‘s prior criminal behavior ―was in 

the form of prior offenses which had been subjected to judicial testing under the 

proper burden and the burden had been met.‖ 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). Here, appellant had confessed to the enhancing offense, although he 

pleaded ―not true‖ to the enhancement paragraph at trial, and was on parole for this 

offense when he committed the instant offense. Appellant does not dispute that the 

evidence admitted regarding his prior criminal behavior was in the form of a prior 

offense that had been subjected to judicial testing under the proper burden and that 

the burden had been met. See id. Accordingly, had appellant requested an 

extraneous offense instruction, the trial court would not have erred in denying his 

request because ―[g]iving such an instruction is a useless act if no unadjudicated 

offenses have been introduced.‖ Id. 

In short, the trial court charged the jury regarding the burden of proof 

regarding the enhancing offense. There is no evidence of an extraneous offense 

committed by appellant in our record warranting an extraneous offense 

instruction.3 See id.; cf. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 333. 

 

3

Indeed, if Ms. Mashburn described an extraneous offense, as appellant contends, she 

described an offense unrelated to appellant because she never testified that appellant was the 

person responsible for the injuries to Lorene. 
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Accordingly, under the specific facts of this case, we conclude that 

appellant‘s third issue is without merit, and we overrule it.

C. Court Costs

In appellant‘s fourth and final issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the trial court‘s imposition of $334 in court costs. In Johnson 

v. State, this court held that if the record does not support the assessment of a 

certain dollar amount in costs, the trial court errs in entering a specific dollar 

amount in its judgment. 389 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2012, pet. granted).

As in Johnson, it is undisputed that the record contains no bill of costs or 

any other evidence that would support the specific amount, $334, assessed in the 

judgment. See id. The clerk‘s record contains a printout of a computer screen 

from the Harris County Justice Information Management System (JIMS), entitled 

―J.I.M.S. Cost Bill Assessment,‖ identifying $334 in court costs. The printout is 

signed and dated ―11/7/12,‖ which is nearly two months after the trial court signed 

its judgment including costs. 

This court has determined that an unsigned computer screen printout from 

JIMS that does not appear to have been brought to the attention of the trial court 

judge before he signed the judgment is not an actual bill of costs as contemplated 

by article 103.001. See Jelks v. State, 397 S.W.3d 759, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed) (concluding that a computer screen printout from 

JIMS signed by an unidentified individual, when printout was not presented to the 

trial judge, could not be considered an appropriate bill of costs); Johnson, 389 

S.W.3d at 515 n.1; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.001. The JIMS document 

was signed and dated after the trial court‘s judgment was signed; thus there is 
12

evidence that it could not have been presented to the trial court before the specific 

dollar amount was included in the judgment. This JIMS document cannot be 

considered an appropriate bill of costs. See Jelks, 397 S.W.3d at 760; Johnson, 

389 S.W.3d at 515 n.1. No other evidence in the record supports the specific dollar 

amount assigned as court costs. See Jelks, 397 S.W.3d at 760; Johnson, 389 

S.W.3d at 515 n.1. 

The State argues that there are numerous provisions in the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure authorizing various court costs to be paid by a defendant when 

convicted of a felony offense. The State suggests several specific articles of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure and sections of the Local Government Code providing 

for fees that, if assessed against appellant, would add up to an amount of at least 

$334. Therefore, the State maintains, the evidence is sufficient to support the $334 

in court costs reflected in the judgment. But we have previously rejected this 

argument. In Rogers v. State, we held that to affirm the judgment for costs merely 

because a number of statutes authorize certain costs or fees that could have been 

assessed against the defendant—without regard to whether they were actually 

assessed—would be speculative. 402 S.W.3d 410, 420 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2013, pet. filed).

The trial court did not err in ordering appellant to pay court costs, as such 

costs are mandated by law, but the court did err in entering a specific dollar 

amount without any support in the record for that dollar amount. See Johnson, 389 

S.W.3d at 516. Because there is no evidence in the record to support the trial 

court‘s assessment of a specific dollar amount as court costs, we sustain appellant‘s 

fourth issue and modify the trial court‘s judgment to delete the specific dollar 

amount of costs assessed. See id.; see also Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 554–
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56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that sufficient evidence must support an 

assessment of costs in a judgment).

CONCLUSION

We have overruled appellant‘s first three issues. However, we have 

sustained appellant‘s fourth issue. Accordingly, we modify the trial court‘s 

judgment to delete the specific dollar amount of costs assessed and affirm the 

judgment as modified.

/s/ Sharon McCally

Justice

Panel consists of Justices McCally, Busby, and Donovan.

Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).