FILED JULY 1, 2011
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 141009 MARK SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
Y OUNG , C.J. In this case, we are called upon to de termine whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requireme nt that a warrant be obtained before a residence can be entered applies to a first-resp onse firefighter answering a 911 call and, if so, whether the firefighter’s en try into defendant’s residence was reasonable in the instant case. We conclude that the community ca retaking exception applies to firefighters no less than to police officers wh en they are responding to emergency situations that threaten life or property. We also conclude th at the firefighter’s actions in this case were reasonable, thus satisfying the community caretaking exception to the warrant Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. Zahra2 requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the d ecision of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant, Mark Slaughter, resided in a townhouse in Roya l Oak, Michigan. 1 In May 2007, defendant’s neig hbor, Kathleen Tunner, saw water running down her
basement wall and over her electrical box. She also heard water flowing behind that wall, which adjoined defendant’s townhouse. 2 Tunner attempted to locate defendant by knocking on his door, but he was not home. She then ca lled her townhouse management company in a further attempt to locate defendant. After this attempt failed, Tunner dialed 911. The city of Royal Oak dispatched seve ral firefighters to the townhouse, including Lieutenant Michael Schunck. After consu lting with Tunner about her emergency call,
Schunck entered defendant’s re sidence. When he went to the basement to shut off defendant’s water and to assess whether any a dditional measures needed to be taken to prevent a fire, Schunck observed, in plain view , grow lights and several dozen plants that appeared to be marijuana. He then repo rted what he saw to the Royal Oak police.

1 Although one of the issues at defendant’s preliminary examination concerned whether defendant actually resided at the Royal Oa k townhouse, defendant admitted during his testimony at the suppression hear ing that he had lived at th e townhouse for “a year or two” before his arrest.

2 Defendant’s and Tunner’s townhouses ar e adjoining units in a single structure containing approximately 12 individual units.3 The Royal Oak Police Department dispatch ed an officer to secure defendant’s townhouse while another officer procured a search warrant. After entering defendant’s townhouse, officers seized 48 marijuana plants, grow li ghts, a watering system,
defendant’s state identificati on card, books on marijuana hor ticulture, packaging material, and other drug paraphernalia. Defendant was charged with manufacturing with the intent to deliver more than 20
but fewer than 200 marijuana plants. 3 The district court bound defendant over as charged, notwithstanding defendant’s claims that the firefighte r’s entry into the townhouse violated his Fourth Amendment ri ghts and that he did not exercise dominion and control over the seized marijuana plants. Although defendant did not a ppeal the bindover decision, he subsequently filed a pretrial motion to suppress in the circuit court. After hearing testimony and oral argument, the court granted th e motion in a written opinion an d order. The circuit court
concluded that Lieutenant Schunck “did not a ttempt to hear or see for himself what was causing the problem [that led Tunner to dial 911], nor did he a ttempt to verify the existence of running water in the wall prio r to entering the defendant’s home.” The
circuit court also observed that Schunck had indicated that “he would have entered the apartment even if he had shut off the water and/or electrical from the outside” because “he has to investigate the [911] calls to the fullest extent possible . . . .”

3 MCL 333.7401(2)(d)( ii ).4 The circuit court applied this Court’s decision in People v Tyler 4 and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Camara v Muni Court of City & Co of San
Francisco 5 in concluding that firefighters are required to procure a warrant before entering a building “to prevent a fire from occurri ng . . . .” Furthermore, it relied on the
fact that this Court’s decision in People v Davis , 6 which articulated the community caretaking exception to the F ourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, did not contain “anything related to the investigation of a possible fire hazard.” Ac cordingly, the court ruled that the firefighters could not ava il themselves of the community caretaking exception. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circu it court’s ruling in a split, unpublished decision, albeit on alternative grounds. 7 First, the majority de termined, contrary to the circuit court’s decision, that the community caretaking exception can apply to searches performed by first-response firefighters to abate a possible fire hazard. However, the majority explained that “the record permit s the conclusion that the firefighters were simply too quick to enter into defendant’s unit and failed to investigate the complaint” before entering defendant’s residence. 8 Thus, the majority concluded that “there are too

4 People v Tyler , 399 Mich 564; 250 NW2d 46 7 (1977), aff’d sub nom Michigan v Tyler , 436 US 499 (1978).

5 Camara v Muni Court of C ity & Co of San Francisco , 387 US 523; 87 S Ct 1727; 18 L Ed 2d 930 (1967).

6 People v Davis , 442 Mich 1; 497 NW2d 910 (1993).

7 People v Slaughter , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 16, 2010 (Doc ket No. 287459).

8 Id. at 5.5 many outstanding questions to c onclude whether the firefighters acted reasonably” and, therefore, that the circuit court had properly granted the motion to suppress. 9 The dissenting judge agreed with the majo rity that first-response firefighters can
avail themselves of the co mmunity caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The dissenting judge, however, concluded that the firefighters had acted reasonably in the instant case, indicating that “[t]he firefighters were faced with a possible emergency situation an d they needed to make quick judgments about what to do in order to avoid a potential fire.” 10 This Court granted the prosec utor’s application for leave to appeal and ordered the parties to brief whether (1) the actions of firefighters may fall under the “community caretaker” exception to probable cause requirements; (2) th e “emergency aid” aspect of the community caretaker exception applies in this case; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred when it held that th e firefighters were first obligated to attempt to remedy the condition for which a neighbor called by using means that did not involve entr y into the defendant’s home. [11]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error, but the application of the underlying law—the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, § 11 of the Mi chigan Constitution—is reviewed de novo. 12

9 Id. at 6.

10 Id. at 2-3 (M ETER , J., dissenting).

11 People v Slaughter , 486 Mich 1069 (2010).

12 People v Williams , 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).6 III. ANALYSIS

A. FOURTH AMEN DMENT PRINCIPLES

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees every person’s right to be free from unreasonable s earches and seizures and provides, in its entirety: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable se arches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [13] Similarly, article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution provides, in relevant part: The person, houses, papers and posse ssions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and se izures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any pers on or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, sup ported by oath or affirmation.
This Court has ruled that th e Michigan Constitution “is to be construed to provide the same protection as that secured by the Four th Amendment, absent ‘compelling reason’ to impose a different interpretation.” 14 Although the entry into de fendant’s residence was warrantless, “[u]nder the common law and agreeably to the Constitution se arch may in many cases be legally made

13 The Fourth Amendment was inco rporated to the states in Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961).

14 People v Collins , 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991), citing People v Perlos , 436 Mich 305; 462 NW2d 310 (1990), People v Chapman , 425 Mich 245; 387 NW2d 835 (1986), People v Catania , 427 Mich 447; 398 NW2d 343 (1986), People v Smith , 420 Mich 1, 23 n 16; 36 0 NW2d 841 (1984), and People v Nash , 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983).7 without a warrant. The Constitution does not fo rbid search, as some parties contend, but
it does forbid unreasonable search.” 15 While many warrantless searches are unreasonable pursuant to the warrant requirement, 16 the United States Supreme Court has articulated
several instances in which warra ntless searches are reasonable. These include searches of automobiles, 17 searches incident to cont emporaneous lawful arrests, 18 inventory searches conducted according to established procedure, 19 searches conducted during exigent circumstances, 20 and searches the police undertak e as part of their “community caretaking” function. 21 The instant case involves only the last circumstance listed—searches undertaken as part of a community caretaking function— and requires this Co urt to determine the scope of that community caretaking excep tion to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Because it is uncontested that the initial search of defendant’s residence

15 Carroll v United States , 267 US 132, 146; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925).

16 See Katz v United States , 389 US 347, 357; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967).

17 See California v Carney , 471 US 386; 105 S Ct 2066 ; 85 L Ed 2d 406 (1985).

18 See Chimel v California , 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969); Maryland v Buie , 494 US 325; 110 S Ct 1093; 108 L Ed 2d 276 (1990).

19 See South Dakota v Opperman , 428 US 364; 96 S Ct 30 92; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976).

20 See Minnesota v Olson , 495 US 91; 110 S Ct 1684; 109 L Ed 2d 85 (1990). The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is in applicable to this case. “When the police act pursuant to the exigent circumstances ex ception, they are searching for evidence or perpetrators of a crime.” Davis , 442 Mich at 24.

21 See Cady v Dombrowski , 413 US 433; 93 S Ct 2523; 37 L Ed 2d 706 (1973).8 was warrantless, we must determine whether the community caretakin g exception to the warrant requirement applies.

B. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION The United States Supreme Court first recognized the co mmunity caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in Cady v Dombrowski , which involved the constitutionality of the search of the tr unk of an out-of-town police officer’s
automobile. 22 The police officer was hospitalized after a seri ous automobile accident, and local police officers arriving on the scene of the accident direct ed that the injured officer’s vehicle be towed to a private garage . Because the private garage was unsecured, local police sought to locate an d safeguard the injured office r’s service revolver. After failing to find the revolver on the officer’s person or in the glove compartment of the vehicle, officers searched the vehicle’s trunk and discovered the revolver, along with
evidence of a murder. 23 Before addressing the legality of the se arch, the Court expl ained that police officers often perform certain duties independ ent of their duty to investigate crimes: Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal lia bility and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as co mmunity caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, inves tigation, or acquis ition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. [24]

22 Id . at 435-437.

23 Id

. 24 Id. at 441.9 In considering the case before it, the Cady Court determined that the officers had acted not to investigate a crime, but out of “concern fo r the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder remove d a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle.” 25

The Court concluded that searches conduc ted to further these community caretaking functions do not necessarily require a warran t in order to be reasonable. Once it had
determined that the search wa s not conducted pursuant to an investigation, the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search within the scope of th e officers’ community caretaking functions : the officers “were simply reacting to the effect of an accident—one of the recurring practical situations that re sults from the operation of motor vehicles and with which local police office rs must deal every day.” 26 In the end, the Court held that
the warrantless search was a reasonable exerci se of the officers’ community caretaking
functions and concluded that their search of the vehicle did not violate the Fourth
Amendment:

Where, as here, the trunk of an automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun, was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, we hold that the search was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth a nd Fourteenth Amendments. [27] This Court has recognized the community caretaking exception as applicable under Michigan law. In People v Davis , we explained:

25 Id. at 447.

26 Id. at 446.

27 Id. at 448.10 The police perform a variety of functions that are separate from their duties to investigate and solve cr imes. These duties are sometimes categorized under the heading of “c ommunity caretaking” or “police caretaking” functions. When polic e, while performing one of these functions, enter into a protected area a nd discover evidence of a crime, this evidence is often admissible. . . . * * * [A]ccording to the United States Supreme Court, the defining characteristic of community caretaking functions is that they are totally unrelated to the criminal inves tigation duties of the police. * * * Federal and state courts have in cluded a variety of police activities under the heading of comm unity caretaking functions . Courts have held that impoundment of auto mobiles and inventory searches of them, as in Cady , responding to missing vehicle complaints, investigating noise complaints, and searchin g an unconscious person for identification are community caretaking functions. [28]

28 Davis , 442 Mich at 20-23. Part of an offi cer’s community caretaking function is the rendering of emergency aid to injured persons. This Court has concluded that, in entering a dwelling to render emergency aid to a pers on inside, “[an] officer must be motivated primarily by the ‘perceiv ed need to render aid or assist ance’” and “may no t do more than is reasonably necessary to determine whether a person is in need of assistance, and to provide that assistance.” City of Troy v Ohlinger , 438 Mich 477, 484; 475 NW2d 54 (1991), quoting State v Prober , 98 Wis 2d 345, 365; 297 NW2d 1 (1980). This Court has further required entering officers to “possess sp ecific and articulable facts that lead them to” the conclusion that someone inside “is in need of immediate aid.” Davis , 442 Mich at 25-26. Proof of someone’s needing assistance need not be “ironclad,” only “reasonable.” Michigan v Fisher , 558 US ___, ___; 130 S Ct 546, 549 ; 175 L Ed 2d 410, 414 (2009). While there is no evidence that the firefighters who en tered defendant’s residence possessed specific and articulable facts th at led them to th e conclusion that someone inside was in need of immediate aid, these pr inciples are instruc tive in determining whether they believed imminent action was necessary to prev ent a threat that placed persons and property in danger.11 Davis further explained that, because “[ c]ommunity caretaking activities are varied and are performed for different reasons,” 29 not all conduct that falls within the police’s community caretaking functions can be judged equally. Indeed, shortly after issuing the Davis decision, this Court listed several a dditional types of intrusions that courts have justified pursuant to the ex ercise of community caretaking functions:

[C]ourts have in cluded a multiplicity of pol ice functions within the meaning of the community caretaking function, including entering an apartment to remove a former girlfriend following a domestic dispute, removing an intoxicated person from th e street, entering an abandon ed boat to ascertain ownership and the safe ty of the mariners, responding to a missing vehicle complaint, sear ching an unconscious person for identification, and responding to persons likely to be in need of emergency aid. [30] Accordingly, courts must consider the r easons that officers are undertaking their community caretaking functions, as well as “t he level[] of intrusion the police make while performing these functions,” when dete rmining whether a particular intrusion to perform a community caretaking function is reasonable. 31 For instance, “a police

29 Davis , 442 Mich at 25

. 30 In re Forfeiture of $176,598 , 443 Mich 261, 27 3-274; 505 NW2d 2 01 (1993) (citations omitted). In that case, this Court “decline[d] to empl oy the community caretaking exception” because “[b]oth of the officers who entered the home testif ied that the purposes of the entry were to search for intrude rs and to secure the pr emises in an effort to thwart an attempted escap e,” not to undertake any of the listed community caretaking functions. Id. at 274-275. The case’s discussion of community caretaking functions, while dicta, nevertheless illustrates that, cont rary to the dissent’s suggestion that the community caretaking exception applies on its face to only a narrow and undefined subcategory of cases involving police comm unity caretaking functions, this Court has considered several different—and unrelated—community caretaking functions when determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable.

31 Davis , 442 Mich at 25.12 inventory of a car is much less intrusiv e than a police entry into a dwelling.” 32 This is because the privacy of the home stands “‘[a]t the very core’” 33 of the Fourth Amendment and because “[i]n [no setting] is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home . . . .” 34 Thus, the threshold of reasonableness is at its ap ex when police enter a dwelling pursuant to their community caretaking functions.

C. FIREFIGHTERS AND THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION This Court asked the parties to brief wh ether the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applies to fire fighters’ actions. We conclude that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applies when a firefighter, responding to an emergency call involving a thr eat to life or property, reasonably enters a private residence in order to abate what is reasonably believe d to be an imminent threat of fire inside. Therefore, once it is determ ined that a firefighter’s entry into a private residence was an exercise of community ca retaking functions, and not an exercise of investigative functions, we must consider the reasonableness of the entry within the
context of that commun ity caretaking purpose. United States Supreme Court caselaw specifically pertaining to firefighters supports this conclusion. In Michigan v Tyler , the Court concluded that “the Fourth

32 Id.

33 Payton v New York , 445 US 573, 589-590; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980), quoting Silverman v United States , 365 US 505, 511; 81 S Ct 679; 5 L Ed 2d 734 (1961).

34 Payton , 445 US at 589.13 Amendment extends beyond the paradigmatic entry into a private dwelling by a law
enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.” 35 Indeed, “there is no diminution in a person’s reasonable expect ation of privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply because the official conducting th e search wears the uniform of a firefighter rather than a policeman . . . .” 36 The principle most relevant to this case from those decisions applying the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to firefight ers is that the Fourth Amendment applies equally to police officers and firefighters. It thus follows that if a police officer can avail himself of an exception to the warrant re quirement, a firefighter can likewise avail himself of an exception if the circumstances permit. Indeed, Tyler is premised on just that principle: that the excep tions to the warrant requirement apply no less to firefighters than to police officers who have responded to 911 calls requiring imminent action to prevent harm to persons or property. Like decisions applying the community caretaking exception to police officers’ actions, Tyler distinguished a firefighter’s commun ity caretaking functions from his investigative functions. 37 As a general rule, “official entries to investigate the cause of a

35 Michigan v Tyler , 436 US 449, 504; 98 S Ct 1942; 56 L Ed 2d 486 (1978).

36 Id. at 506; see also Camara , 387 US at 530 (“It is sure ly anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fu lly protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”).

37 Similarly, Michigan statutory law rec ognizes the same emergency/investigation distinction, providing firefighters in uniform and under supervision th e authority to “take all necessary steps and requirements to prot ect persons and proper ty until [a] dangerous condition is abated,” MCL 29.7a(2), as well as the separate authority to “investigate causes and effects related to danger ous conditions,” MCL 29.7a(3).14 fire must adhere to the warrant pr ocedures of the Fourth Amendment.” 38 Nevertheless, “it would defy reason to suppos e that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out the blaze. And once in a building for this purpose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view.” 39 In short, under Tyler , the purpose of a firefighter’s initial entry into a building is cruc ial in determining whether a warrant is required for that entry.
The Tyler Court’s application of the Fourth Ame ndment to firefighters fits directly into the purposes of th e community caretaking exception. Thus, as Cady and Tyler illustrate, we must analyze the reasonableness of the initial intr usion in light of the scope of the intrusion and the firefighter’s purpose in entering the residence. If the purpose of a firefighter’s initial entry into a private residenc e is to abate an imminent threat of fire, then a warrantless entry is lawful under the Fourth Amendment as long as it is reasonable. Contrarily, if the purpose of a fi refighter’s entry is solely to investigate a crime, then a warrant is required unless a di fferent exception to the warrant requirement applies. Tyler ’s holding and rationale lead inex orably to the conclusion that the community caretaking exception a pplies to firefighters. Therefore, we hold that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters. 40

38 Tyler , 436 US at 508.

39 Id. at 509.

40 Our decision here is expressly limited to the question whet her the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters. We leave to another day the determination whether that exception may extend to other emergency first responders.15 Application of the community caretaking exception does not pr ovide firefighters with a blank check to enter private residences; rather, it only authorizes reasonable intrusions. Because “[c]ommunity caretaking functions are varied and are performed for different reasons,” 41 reviewing courts must tailor their analysis to the specifics of a particular intrusion before determining wh ether it is reasonable. Although neither Michigan caselaw nor that of the United Stat es Supreme Court has specifically analyzed what factors affect whether a firefighter’s intr usion into a private residence is reasonable, there is ample authority within the caselaw applying specific factors in related circumstances that allows this Court to articulate the standards that both protect individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights and a llow firefighters to perform their duty to
abate serious fire hazards. As stated, the privacy of the home stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, and the zone of privacy is most clearly defined “when bounded by the unambiguous physical di mensions of an individual’s home.” 42 In determining whether firefighters acted reasona bly in entering an individual’s home, a reviewing court must first consider the fi refighters’ basis for making the intrusion— namely, whether, acting in good faith, 43 they “possess[ed] specifi c and articulable facts”

41 Davis , 442 Mich at 25.

42 Payton , 445 US at 589-590.

43 See, e.g., Colorado v Bertine , 479 US 367, 374; 107 S Ct 738; 93 L Ed 2d 739 (1987) (“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendm ent, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable ru les requiring a differe nt procedure.”).16 leading them to the conclusion that their actions were necessary to abate an imminent threat of fire inside the private residence. 44 Their belief in the nece ssity of their intrusion need not be “ironclad,” only “reasonable.” 45 Furthermore, courts must not engage in a “hindsight determination” th at an entry is unreasonable simply because no imminent
hazard actually existed. 46 Rather, courts must determine whether an entry was reasonable on the basis of the circumstances known to the firefighters at the time of entry. 47 Next, courts should consider the scope of the entry, whic h “must be limited to the justification therefor” and may not extend beyond what “is reasonably necessary to determine” whether the imminent threat of fire exists inside the private residence. 48 If firefighters do, in fact, find such a threat insi de the residence, they may “remain in [the] building for a reasonable time” to abate th e hazard and to “investigate [its] cause,”

44 Davis , 442 Mich at 25

. 45 Fisher , 558 US at ___; 130 S Ct at 549; 175 L Ed 2d at 414.

46 Id.

47 See id. This standard is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s application of the warrant requirement to administrative searches in Camara . The search conducted in Camara was one to administer “fire, he alth, and housing code inspection programs . . . .” Camara , 387 US at 533. Wh ile the administration of fire, health, and housing code inspection program s is important to public safety, the application of the warrant requirement to the “routine sy stematized inspection” involved in Camara turned in part on the fact that “[i]t has nowhere be en urged that fire, he alth, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement.” Id . As stated, the applicati on of the community caretaking exception in this case is limite d to situations in which fire fighters reasonably believe that their entry is necessary to abate an im mediate threat to persons or property.

48 See Davis , 442 Mich at 26.17 because investigating the cau se of the hazard “may be necessary to prevent its
recurrence.” 49 Finally, in determining whether a par ticular entry is reasonably necessary, firefighters are not constrained to follow the least intrusive m eans of abating the imminent threat of fire. Indeed, that firefi ghters could have abated the fire hazard “by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.” 50 Rather, reviewing courts must consider whether the means and scope of entry were themselves
reasonable under the totality of circumstances, not whether they were perfect.

D. APPLICATION Because the community caret aking exception is not a blank check fo r warrantless entry by firefighters, we apply the fore going analysis to determine whether the firefighters’ entry into defend ant’s residence was reasonable. As stated, we must first analyze the fire fighters’ basis for entering defendant’s private residence. The circuit court’s findings of fact are relevant here and are not clearly

erroneous: [Lieutenant Schunck] was called to [defendant’s townhouse], in the City of Royal Oak. The call was based upon a report of a possible electrical problem with running wate r. Upon arrival, he spoke to a neighbor [Tunner], who indicated she suspected water was running between a common wall, which shares an electri cal panel. [Schun ck] attempted to

49 Tyler , 436 US at 510. Investigating a fire can reveal “c ontinuing dangers such as faulty wiring or a defective furnace.” Id. Accordingly, the Court determined that “officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable tim e to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished.” Id. (emphasis added).

50 Cady , 413 US at 447.18 make contact with the owner of th e neighboring apartment, but was unsuccessful. If there was water running onto an electrical box, it presented a life hazard and structure fire situa tion. [Schunck] made entry into the defendant’s home to see if there wa s water running into the electrical box. . . . [Schunck] went into the apartm ent to check for running water, and shut off the electricity. It was possible . . . to shut off th e water to the entire complex from outside, but the general pr actice is to shut off the individual apartment. Upon cross-examination, [Schunck] indicated he did not see or hear any water before or after entering the ap artment. In fact, he admitted he did not find any running water in the apar tment. [Schunck] also admitted he did not shut off the water of the neig hbor, nor did he check that apartment for water or dampness. He also admitte d he did not turn off the electrical box for either apartment. [Schunck ] was not sure where the meter [was] which would have permitted him to shut off th e electricity without entering the apartment. Upon re-direct examina tion, [Schunck] indicated he was not sure if he entered [Tunner’s] apartm ent. He also indicated he would have entered [defendant’s] apartment even if he ha d shut off the water and/or electrical from the outside. He testified he has to investigate the calls to the fullest extent possible . . . . At no point did the circuit court indicate that it disbelieved Schunck’s testimony.
Schunck also testified that he shut off the wa ter to defendant’s townhouse and that he did so from the basement of defendant’s townhouse. It is clear from Schunck’s testimony that he acted in good faith. There is no indication that his entry into defendant’ s residence was pretextual, and only upon entering defendant’s basement to shut off th e water to defendant’s residence did Schunck see what appeared to be c ontraband in plain view. Of course, good faith alone is not suffi cient to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment; firefighters must “possess specific and articulable facts” leading
them to the conclusion that their imminent action is necessary to abate the threat to19 persons or property insi de the private residence. 51 In this case, Sc hunck knew of the 911
call and the information it contained. Moreov er, he spoke with Tunner, who reported that she saw water coming into her basement from the wall that she shared with defendant and that she heard water flowing behind that wall. 52 Schunck had no reason to disbelieve Tunner’s assertion, although there was no evidence that he corroborated Tunner’s statement by witnessing or hearing the water himself. Nevertheless, Tunner’s report of water leakage next to her electrical box was specific and articulab le evidence supporting
Schunck’s conclusion that his imminent acti on was necessary to abate a condition inside defendant’s residence that he reasonably belie ved was a threat to persons or property. Furthermore, the fact that the townhouse complex contained several units attached
to each other elevated the immi nence of the potential hazard. Schunck explained that the attached units were “real close together” and th at they “share[d] electrical panels in the basement at the bottom of these [common] walls.” Moreover, because a “high density” of people lived in “all [the] connected apartm ents,” Schunck explai ned that “a definite life hazard and possible structur[a l] fire type situation” ex isted. These facts further supported Schunck’s decision to enter defendant’s residence. We conclude that, in assessing whether an entry was reasonable, courts must also determine whether the scope of the entry was “limited to the justif ication therefor” or whether it extended beyond what was “reasona bly necessary” to abate the hazard inside

51 Davis , 442 Mich at 25

. 52 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the fa ct that Tunner did not immediately call 911, but instead sought to reach defendant, does not negate Schunck’s belief in the imminence of the threat of electrical fire, nor does it make that belief objectively unreasonable.20 the private residence. 53 In this case, Schun ck entered defendant’s townhouse by having
one of his crew enter the to wnhouse through a window in or der to let him enter through the front door. Moreover, Schunck shut off the water to defendan t’s townhouse from the basement, which was where Tunner believed the water was flowing and where Schunck found, in plain view, the plants he believed to be contraband. 54 Therefore, the extent of Schunck’s entry and search of defendant’s residence was limited to the area of the
residence that the available information indicated was the location of the hazard. The Court of Appeals panel determined that Schunck entered without considering alternative, less intrusive means of abating the hazard. This kind of post hoc analysis is inconsistent with the principles for asse ssing the reasonableness of entry that we announce today. Although it was possible for Schunck to turn of f the water from outside defendant’s residence, several facts led Schun ck to the conclusion th at actual entry into defendant’s residence was necessary. First, because defendant’s re sidence was physically attached to several other un its, Schunck sought to minimize disruption to defendant’s neighbors. Schunck believed that turning off defenda nt’s water from outside the unit

53 Id . at 26.

54 There is no indication that the marijuana pl ants were hidden from plain view in the basement of defendant’s residence. Accord ingly, if Schunck’s entry into defendant’s basement was lawful, then the plain view exception to the warrant requirement allowed this evidence to provide proba ble cause for the subsequent search warrant, pursuant to which were seized the marijuana plants along with other related evidence found elsewhere in defendant’s residence. See Arizona v Hicks , 480 US 321; 10 7 S Ct 1149; 94 L Ed 2d 347 (1987).21 would have shut off the water to the entire complex. Genera lly, he testified, the fire department “isolate[s] the individual problem in the apartment and shut[s] [the water] off from the inside.” Second, even if he had tu rned off the water to defendant’s residence from the outside, Schunck testified that “[t] here’s no question” he would have still entered the residence because, as an agent of the city of Royal Oak, he needed to be sure the situation was “totally safe.” Accordingl y, there is no indication that Schunck’s entry exceeded what he thought necessary to abate what he believed to be the fire hazard inside
defendant’s townhouse. On the basis of all these facts, we c onclude that Schunck acted reasonably in entering defendant’s residence pursuant to an emergency ca ll. The Fourth Amendment does not prevent firefighters responding to emergency calls from undertaking their duty to protect the public from imminent danger . However, we emphasize that the Fourth Amendment does not give firefighters a bl ank check to enter and search private residences, and we caution review ing courts to apply these prin ciples carefully in order to ensure the appropriate protection of private residences under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment strikes a careful balanc e, as seen in the in stant case, between a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy w ith his similarly reasonable expectation that emergency personnel will act swif tly to protect his residence fro m the threat to persons or property therein.
E. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT In addition to the responses made to the di ssent throughout this opinion, we offer the following general discussi on of the dissent’s criticis ms of our holding.22 One of the recurring themes of the dissent is that this opin ion does not address how the various community caretaking functions fit within the Four th Amendment. The response to this criticism is simple: this case only addresses how to apply the Fourth Amendment when a firefighter enters a private residence that he believes to be under the
imminent threat of fire. We leave all othe r variants and all other applications of the community caretaking excep tion for another day. For this reason alone, the dissent’s criticism of this opinion for “n ot wad[ing] into [the] judicial morass” of the distinctions among the community ca retaking doctrine, the emergency doctrine, and the emergency aid do ctrine is off the ma rk. Moreover, the dissent’s understanding of these doctrines is needlessly complex because it characterizes them as separate and distinct exceptions to the warrant require ment, rather than as aspects of the community caretaking exception. 55 Readers can judge for themselves whether this opinion thoroughly exam ined the law relevant to deciding this case. The central purpose of a state court of last resort is not merely to bemoan that “the scope of [the community caretaking] exception[] is far from clear,” 56 but to establish clear principles of law,

55 Post at 7. Notwithstanding the dissent’s prot estations otherwise, today’s holding is consistent with other courts’ applications of the community caretaking exception. For example, the Washington Su preme Court has determined the “community caretaking function exception to encompass not only the ‘search and seizure’ of automobiles, but also situations involving either emergency ai d or routine checks on health and safety.” State v Kinzy , 141 Wash 2d 373, 386; 5 P3d 668 (2000). Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that “[c]ourts use the term ‘community caretaking’ to uphold searches or seizures as reasonable unde r the fourth amendment when police are performing some function other than investigating the violation of a criminal statute.” People v McDonough , 239 Ill 2d 260, 269; 940 NE2d 1100 (2010).

56 Post at 6.23 consistent with the Constitution, that subsequent courts ca n apply as the facts of any particular case dictate. By contrast, the dissent would further muddle Fourth Amendment doctrine by deriving several separate exceptions to the warrant requirement based on the exercise of community caretaking functions. But if ther e is anything clear from the United States Supreme Court’s articulation of the commun ity caretaking exception, it is that actions pursuant to community caretaking functions qualitatively differ from actions pursuant to criminal investigations. This is the central basis for today’s holding. The dissent would also hold that the community caretaking exception does not apply to entry into private residences. A cent ral part of the dissent’s rationale appears to
be that because the deci sion identifying the communi ty caretaking exception, Cady v Dombrowski , “included language that sharply di stinguished automobile searches from searches of private residences,” the exception cannot encompass searches of private residences. However, the dissent can identif y no United States Supreme Court decision that rejected the application of the community caretaking exception to private residences. Indeed, the dissent admits, in its discussion of the “emergency” and “emergency aid” exceptions, that firefighters acting pursuant to their community caretaking functions may, under certain circumstances, enter a private residence.
The dissent claims that th is opinion “extinguishes th e emergency and emergencyaid exceptions to the warrant re quirement in Mi chigan . . . .” 57 Far from it. We recognize that these different aspects of the community caretaking exception apply the exception to

57 Post at 20.24 specific circumstances. Our opinion toda y merely recognizes that in all these circumstances, we must apply the sta ndard of reasonableness that governs all Fourth
Amendment cases. 58 Thus, while different circumstances will lead to different conclusions regarding the reasonabl eness of a particular search, 59 we are only constitutionally required to forbid unreasonable searches. The reasonableness of the instant entry turns on the fact that the responding firefighters believed that there existed the i mminent threat of an electrical fire in
defendant’s residence. 60 The firefighters reasonably be lieved that the danger posed an imminent threat to property or life, and th ey acted reasonably in abating that threat.

58 The United States Supreme Court has held that if no exception to the warrant requirement applies, a warrantless search is unreasonable. Katz , 389 US at 357. This proxy for what constitutes a reasonable sear ch nevertheless applies the same Fourth Amendment standard: reasonableness.

59 As the dissent points out, post at 21 n 62, the Davis Court explained that “[w]hile categorizing these different activities unde r the heading of ‘community caretaking functions’ may be useful in some respects, it does not follow that all searches resulting from such activities shou ld be judged by th e same standard.” Davis , 442 Mich at 25. When read in its context—foll owing an extensive (but not ne cessarily exhaustive) list of different community caretaking f unctions—it is clear that the Davis Court meant simply that the circumstances of each search must be taken individually to determine whether the search was reasonable. Ther e is no indication that the Davis Court meant to depart from the universal application of the reasonabl eness standard to all Fourth Amendment inquiries; rather, it sought to apply “standar ds specifically applicable to emergency aid entries.” Id. We do not disturb the standards that the Davis Court applied in that context. We simply articulate standards applicable to situations in which a firefighter enters a private residence to abate what he believe s to be an imminent threat of fire.

60 The dissent criticizes this opinion for “fail[ing] to expl ain which community-caretaking functions, beyond responding to an emergenc y or administering em ergency aid, would reasonably justify a warrantle ss entry into a home.” Post at 21. However, any such articulation would be dicta, because it w ould incorporate circumst ances not controlling in the instant case.25 IV. CONCLUSION We conclude that the community careta king exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies no less to firefi ghters than to police officers engaged in abating emergency conditions that concern th e protection of life and property. Thus, first-response firefighters may avail themselv es of the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In this case, the firefighter entered
defendant’s residence in order to abate wh at he reasonably believed was the imminent
threat of a serious electrical fire. We conclude that he act ed reasonably in doing so and that, accordingly, the circuit court and th e Court of Appeals majority erroneously suppressed the evidence he discovered in plai n view during this entry. We therefore
reverse the circuit court’s decision and th e Court of Appeals judgment and remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an or der denying defendant’s motion to suppress and for further proceedings consiste nt with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly Brian K. ZahraS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 141009 MARK SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellee.

M ARILYN K ELLY , J. ( dissenting ). In my view, the majority’s decision today extends the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amen dment warrant requirement be yond discernable limitation. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ j udgment, which affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to supp ress. However, I would do so based on a different analysis than that used by the Cour t of Appeals. Consis tently with many other courts that have considered the issue, I would hold that th e community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement cannot justify a warrantless entry into a private residence. Because the majority concludes otherwise without a sufficient legal basis for doing so, I cannot join its opinion.2 I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the United St ates Constitution protects the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 The Michigan Constitu tion contains a similar protection. 2 Both constitutional provi sions require a warrant supported by probable cause
for searches and seizures to be reasonabl e, and therefore constitutional, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. 3 A person’s home is entitled to the most heightened Fourth Amendment protection. 4 Thus, a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable. 5 It violates the Fourth Amendment unless an ex ception to the warrant requirement exists. A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT GENERALLY Exceptions to the warrant requirement generally relate to two important functions of law enforcement and other state actors: cr iminal-investigation functions and so-called “community-caretaking” functions. The excep tions for criminal-investigation functions

1 US Const, Am IV.

2 Const 1963, art 1, § 11.

3 See Katz v United States , 389 US 347, 357; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967).

4 See Silverman v United States , 365 US 505, 511; 81 S Ct 679; 5 L Ed 2d 734 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Four th Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonabl e governmental intrusion.”); see also Kyllo v United States , 533 US 27, 37; 121 S Ct 2038; 150 L Ed 2d 94 (2 001) (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, becaus e the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”).

5 See, e.g., Welsh v Wisconsin , 466 US 740, 750; 104 S Ct 20 91; 80 L Ed 2d 732 (1984), citing Payton v New York , 445 US 573, 586; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980).3 exist because sometimes obtaining a warrant is impracticable due to the need to act expeditiously when investig ating criminal activity. Such exceptions include search es incident to lawful arrests 6 and searches
conducted because of the existence of exigent circumst ances, for inst ance, when the police are pursuing a fleeing felon. 7 Neither party to this case asserts that the warrantless entry into defendant’s home o ccurred in the course of inve stigating criminal activity. Thus, none of the warrant exceptions under th e criminal-investigation umbrella justify the entry. Other exceptions to the warrant requirement further the government’s interest in protecting individuals or the general public fro m harm. These excep tions relate to the community-caretaking functions of state acto rs. They are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or ac quisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.” 8 For example, an official’s comm unity-caretaking functions justify the inventory exception to the warrant require ment, which allows searches conducted according to established police procedures. 9 Community-caretaking functions also include the administration of emergency aid, 10 which provides another exception to the warrant requirement.

6 Arizona v Gant , 556 US ___; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009).

7 United States v Santana , 427 US 38, 41-43; 96 S Ct 24 06; 49 L Ed 2d 300 (1976).

8 Cady v Dombrowski , 413 US 433, 441; 93 S Ct 2523; 37 L Ed 2d 706 (1973).

9 South Dakota v Opperman , 428 US 364, 368-372; 96 S Ct 3092; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976).

10 People v Davis , 442 Mich 1, 25; 497 NW2d 910 (1993).4 The firefighters in this case were investig ating a potential water leak and electrical problem, 11 which is “totally divorced” from any cr iminal investigation. However, several of the exceptions to the warrant requirem ent that form part of the government’s community-caretaking functions are implicated under the facts of the instant case. Yet determining that this case implicat es the community-caretaking functions of governmental actors answers only the beginning of the inquiry. As previously stated, the community-caretaking function is the foundational premise for several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Three such exceptions are significant to th is case and will be discussed herein: the general community -caretaking exception, the emergency exception, 12 and the emergency-aid exception. In discussing these exceptions, one essen tial distinction is paramount. Although all the exceptions fall under the rubric of an official’s community-caretaking functions, they involve different circumstances, and diffe rent standards are used in assessing their

11 For the reasons explained in part II(C) of this opinion, the majority’s characterization of the circumstances here as an “imminent threat of fire,” ante at 12, is inapt.

12 There is some disagreement over whether the emergency exception is justified by community-caretaking considerations or by exigent circumstances. See, e.g., State v Deneui , 2009 SD 99, ¶ 22; 775 NW2d 221, 232 (2009 ) (“Several courts have also held that the emergency aid doctrine is a subcateg ory of the community caretaker exception, while the emergency doctrine is a subcategory of the exigen t circumstances exception.”). However, in Davis , this Court made clear that th e exigent-circumstances exception involves actions pursuant to criminal investigation. Davis , 442 Mich at 24. As previously noted, it is undisputed that the entry in this case did not occur in the course of an investigation of criminal activity.5 application. 13 Thus, although the exerci se of community-caretaking functions involves many different factual circumstances, warra ntless entries pursuan t to the communitycaretaking exception are justified in only a narrow subs et of those circumstances.

B. THE “COMMUNITY-CARETAKING, ” “EMERGENCY,” AND “EMERGENCYAID” EXCEPTIONS As the majority correctly states, one ex ception to the warrant requirement is the search of a vehicle conducted as part of a police officer’s community-caretaking
functions. 14 This exception, first established in Cady v Dombrowski , is commonly referred to as the community-caretaki ng exception to the warrant requirement. 15 A related exception also involves the ex ercise of community-caretaking functions, but is grounded on the need for immediate action by police or firefighters to address

13 See id . at 25 (“Although administering emerge ncy aid is referred to as one of the community caretaking functions of the police, this should not have any effect on the law governing the emergency aid exception. While categorizin g these different activities under the heading of ‘community caretaking functions’ may be us eful in some respects, it does not follow that all searches resulting from such activities should be judged by the same standard.”).

14 Cady , 413 US at 448.

15 See, e.g., United States v Sanchez , 612 F3d 1, 4 n 2 (CA 1, 2010) (citing Cady for the proposition that “[t]he commu nity caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows the police to impound a vehicle for noninvestigatory purposes when it is reasonable to do so,” and giving as an example “to remove an impediment to traffic or to protect a vehicle from theft or vandalism”); United States v Johnson , 410 F3d 137, 143-144 (C A 4, 2005) (noting that Cady established the community-caretaking excep tion in the context of au tomobile searches).6 emergency situations. 16 This exception is sometimes subdivided into the emergency exception and the emergency-aid exception. 17 Unfortunately, the scope of these excep tions is far from cl ear. Consequently, courts across the country ha ve rendered vastly different decisions about the proper application of the community-caretaking, emergency, and emergency-aid exceptions. 18 These anomalous results stem primarily fr om conflicting nomenclature regarding the exceptions. 19 The South Dakota Supreme Court re cently summarized this confusion:
A review of the caselaw reveals a breadth of decisions discussing and applying various exceptions in cluding the emergency doctrine, the emergency aid doctrine, and the community caretaker doctrine. Some of the avowed distinctions between these three doctrines can be frail, bordering on the meaningless. Neither have they been consistently applied, thus creating contradictor y and sometimes conflicting doctrines. Some courts treat these exceptions inte rchangeably. Others declare that the community caretaker exception applies, but then use law ap plicable to one of the other exceptions, such as the emergency doctrine. [20]

16 Michigan v Tyler , 436 US 499; 98 S Ct 19 42; 56 L Ed 2d 486 (1 978) (stating that no warrant is required for firefighters to enter a residence to fight a fire in progress); Brigham City v Stuart , 547 US 398, 403; 126 S Ct 1943; 164 L Ed 2d 650 (2006) (stating that no warrant is required for police to en ter a residence “to assist persons who are seriously injured or threat ened with su ch injury”).

17 See, e.g., Deneui , 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 28; 775 NW2d at 234.

18 The majority overlooks the fact that virtually all courts and commentators recognize that a distinction exists betw een these exceptions, even if they sometimes confuse them when applying them. Thus, I ask the majority, does the need to “est ablish clear principles of law,” ante at 22, outweigh our obligation to get those principles right?

19 See, e.g., Decker, Emergency circumstances, police re sponses, and Fourth Amendment restrictions , 89 J Crim L & Criminology 433, 441-444 (1999) (hereinafter Decker, Emergency circumstances ).

20 Deneui , 2009 SD 99, at ¶¶ 21- 22; 775 NW2d at 232.7 Pursuant to Michigan v Tyler and Brigham City v Stuart , 21 it is well settled that police and firefighters may enter a private residence without a warrant in emergency circumstances. Such circumstances include, at a minimum, responding to a fire in progress and assisting injured persons in need of medical treatment. 22 However, the law remains unclear regarding the proper applica tion of the warrant exception to actions conducted pursuant to community -caretaking functions that are not in response to an emergency situation. The United States Supr eme Court has not seen fit to extend the community-caretaking exce ption established in Cady beyond the contex t of automobile searches. This, in my view, should be the st arting point for the Court’s analysis in this

case. II. ANALYSIS The majority does not wade into this judicial morass. Instead, it ignores it, proceeding as if the law is clea r and dictates its result. In so doing, it does precisely what
State v Deneui cautioned against: creating contradict ory and conflicting doctrines using inconsistent language. 23 For example, the majority proclaims th at “the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters . . . when they are resp onding to emergency situations that threaten

21 Tyler , 436 US 499; Stuart , 547 US 398.

22 It is undisputed that there was no fire in progress or injured person in need of medical treatment in this case.

23 Deneui , 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 22; 775 NW2d at 232.8 life or property.” 24 This is a correct characteriza tion of the scope of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, not of the community-caretak ing exception. However, the majority also states that, as long as the entry was “an exercise of [the state actor’s] community caretaking func tions,” courts need assess only the reasonableness of the entry. 25 This suggests that a firefighter’s entry into a residence pursuant to a community-caretaking function absent any imminent threat would be sanctioned as long as a court determines the entry was reasonable. This standard could conceivably be characterized as a wholly independent community-caretaking exception along the lines of that created by the United States Supreme Court in Cady

. However, the majority lacks an adequate legal basis for exte nding the communitycaretaking exception discussed in Cady to entries of residences generally and to the facts of this case specifically. The majority re lies almost exclusivel y on the United States Supreme Court decision in Tyler and our decision in People v Davis

. 26 As I will explain, the majority’s reliance on thos e decisions is unfortunate. Tyler is of nominal usefulness,
and Davis suggests a result opposite to that reached by the majority.

24 Ante at 1; see also ante at 21 (“The Fourth Amendment does not prevent firefighters responding to emergency calls from undertaking their dut y to protect the public from imminent danger.”).

25 Ante at 12.

26 Tyler , 436 US 499; Davis , 442 Mich 1.9 A. DOES THE COMMUNITY-CARETAKING EXCEPTION JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS ENTRIES INTO PRIVATE RESIDENCES? The majority recognizes that the privacy of the home stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unr easonable searches and seizures. But it assumes without analysis that warrantless entries into a priv ate residence to engage in community-caretaking functions are permissible if reasonable. 27 I cannot agree. The majority’s conclusion assumes, without deciding, what should be the threshold question.
1. TYLER DOES NOT SUPPORT THE MAJORITY’S HOLDING The United States Supr eme Court’s decision in Tyler did not cite or discuss Cady , the seminal case that created the community-caretaking exce ption. Nor do the words “community caretaking” appear anywhere in Tyler . Rather, Tyler is typically viewed as involving the emergency excepti on to the warrant requirement. 28 Yet the majority uses Tyler as a central basis for its holding interpreting a warrant exception that Tyler never mentioned. Reliance on a case involving on e exception to the warrant requirement to formulate the parameters of another exceptio n to the warrant requirement is erroneous. 29

27 See ante at 15.

28 See, e.g., Mincey v Arizona , 437 US 385, 392; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978) (stating that “[w]e do not question the righ t of the police to respond to emergency situations” by making warrantless entries and searches and citing Tyler ); see, generally, Decker, Emergency circumstances , pp 441-444 (1999).

29 The general rule is that “s earches conducted outside the ju dicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under th e Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz , 389 US at 357 (citations om itted) (emphasis added).10 Tyler held that “[a] burning building clearly presents an exig ency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’” 30 Courts construing Tyler have generally read this exception to the warra nt requirement narrowly, confining it to situations involving an immine nt need for police intervention to protect life or property. 31 Many courts have also noted that the critical inquiry is “whether there is a ‘true

30 Tyler , 436 US at 509.

31 As noted, the United States Supreme Court has recognized as emergencies entry to fight a fire in progress and to provide i mmediate medical treatment (also termed the “emergency aid” exception). See Tyler , 436 US 499, and Stuart , 547 US 398. Some federal and state courts have ta ken a more expansive view of what constitutes an emergency. Those courts ha ve upheld warrantless entries under this exception to locate missing persons, stop a bu rglary in progress, and to respond to gunshots fired. See, e.g., People v Wharton , 53 Cal 3d 522; 280 Cal Rptr 631; 809 P2d 290 (1991) (upholding entry of a reside nce to locate a missing individual); Carroll v State , 335 Md 723, 731-732; 646 A2d 376 (1 994) (citing federal and state cases upholding warrantless entries when the police reasonably believed that a burglary was in progress or had recently been committed ); Davis , 442 Mich at 28 (assuming without deciding that, in most cases, the sound of gunfire could jus tify warrantless entry into a motel room under the emergency-aid doctrine). By contrast, the authority supporting a warrantless entry under facts similar to those presented here is both scarce and dubious. A few ca ses have allowed warrantless entries in cases involvi ng water leaks. See State v Dube , 655 A2d 338 (Me, 1995) (holding lawful a warrantless entry to combat a plumbing emergency and stop sewage or water from leaking into apartments below); United States v Boyd , 407 F Supp 693, 694 (SD NY, 1976) (upholding a warrantless entry when water was leaking from the defendant’s apartment in to the apartment below and the officer heard water running in defendant’s apartment ). But see United States v Rohrig , 98 F3d 1506, 1520 n 6 (CA 6, 1996) (questioning Dube ’s conclusion that the warrantless entry was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v Williams , 354 F3d 497, 508 (CA 6, 2003) (“Unlike the situations in Rohrig , Boyd , and Dube where the problem the police sought to address was certain, the possible water leak in this case was onl y speculative.”).11 immediacy’ that absolves an officer from th e need to apply for a warrant and receive approval from an impartial magistrate.” 32 Thus, Tyler provides a basis for concluding that firefighters may enter onto property without a warrant under emergency ci rcumstances, such as to fight a fire in progress. However, the ma jority reads more into Tyler by concluding that it “lead[s] inexorably to the conclusi on that the community care taking exception applies to firefighters.” 33 This conclusion is simply wrong. It stretches Tyler ’s holding far beyond what that opinion actua lly said. In fact, Tyler only leads “inexorably” to the conclusion that firefighters may enter a burning building in order to fight a fire in progress.
Because Tyler did not discuss the community-car etaking exception, much less establish rules for its applicatio n, the majority should not have placed such reliance on it. Finally, as I explain later, I do not believe that the prosecution in this case established a factual record that justified a warrantless entry under any exception to the warrant requirement. 34
2. DAVIS DOES NOT SUPPORT THE MAJORITY’S DECISION
With Tyler properly limited to emer gency situations, the major ity opinion is left to relying solely on our decision in Davis . But Davis does not support it either.

32 United States v Washington , 573 F3d 279, 288 (CA 6, 2009).

33 Ante at 14.

34 See part II(C) of this opinion.12 Davis explicitly stated that its holding wa s based on the emerge ncy-aid exception, not the community-car etaking exception. 35 Thus, its discu ssion of the broader community-caretaking exception is dicta and is not binding on this Court. Nonetheless,
to the extent that Davis is informative here, it points to a result the opposite of that reached by th e majority.
Davis involved the warrantless en try of a hotel room by police officers after they received reports of gunshots be ing fired. In its discu ssion of community-caretaking functions, the Court was extremely careful to note the significant difference in privacy interests between a car and a dwelling. 36 The Davis Court ultimately held that the warrantless entry in that cas e could not be justified under the emergency-aid exception. 37
Once the Davis Court so held, it did not make an independent community-caretaking analysis to determine whether the warrantless entry could be justified on that basis.

35 Davis , 442 Mich at 9 n 4 (“ Even though we resolve this case on the basis of the emergency aid doctrine , the Court of Appeals assertio n that the community caretaker function is a subcategory of the exigent ci rcumstances doctrine requires a more general clarification of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) (emphasis added); id. at 25 (“Accordingly, we hold that wh en the police are investigati ng a situation in which they reasonably believe someone is in need of immediate aid, their actions should be governed by the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of whether these ac tions can also be classified as community caretaking activities .”) (emphasis added).

36 Id . at 25 (“Although, for example, inventory of a car and entry into a dwelling may both be categorized as ‘caret aking functions,’ it does not follow that both types of activities should be judged by the same standard. It is particularly important to note that the levels of intrusion the police make while performing these functions are different. For example, a police inventory of a car is much less intrusiv e than a police entry into a dwelling.”).

37 Cf. City of Troy v Ohlinger , 438 Mich 477, 483; 475 NW 2d 54 (1991) (upholding a warrantless entry into a home after an officer observed a man inside bleeding and not moving in order “to determine if [medical] assistance was required”).13 Hence, Davis created a sliding scale for assessi ng the reasonableness of searches undertaken on the basis of community-caret aking functions. Beca use of the greater Fourth Amendment protections afforded to residences, there are few communitycaretaking functions that would justify a warrantless search of a residence under Davis

. Only when governmental offici als act to address an emergency and their actions meet the standard for the emergency or emergency-ai d exceptions is a wa rrantless entry into a home proper. 38 Two Michigan cases, People v Toohey and People v Krezen , have discussed the community-caretaking function of police office rs in upholding autom obile searches under the inventory exception to the warrant requirement. 39 The Toohey Court surveyed the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Cady and South Dakota v Opperman

. 40 It noted that inventory searches of auto mobiles satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement if they are “c onducted pursuant to standardized police

38 Davis , 442 Mich at 25-26 (“[W]e hold that police may enter a dwelling without a warrant when they reasonably believe that a pers on within is in need of immediate aid. They must possess specific and articulable facts that lead them to this conclusion.”); see also State v Ryon , 137 NM 174, 185; 108 P3d 10 32 (2005) (“Since the privacy expectation is strongest in the home, only a genuine emergency will justify entering and searching a home without a warrant a nd without consent or knowledge.”).

39 People v Toohey , 438 Mich 265, 273-276; 475 NW2d 16 (1991) (citing Cady for the proposition that “the United States Supreme Court has determined that the impoundment and subsequent i nventory search of a ve hicle is constitutionally valid as part of the caretaking function performed by the police”); People v Krezen, 427 Mich 681, 687; 397 NW2d 803 (1986).

40 Toohey , 438 Mich at 273-277, citing Cady , 413 US 433, and Opperman , 428 US 364.14 procedure . . . .” 41 Although Toohey and Krezen discussed the community-caretaking functions of the police in impounding au tomobiles, neither d ecision discussed an independent community-caretaking exce ption to the warrant requirement. In sum, no decision from this Court ha s expressly defined th e parameters of a community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Krezen , Toohey , City of Troy v Ohlinger , and Davis all discussed the community-caretaking functions of law
enforcement officers. 42 But in none of those cases di d the Court uphold a warrantless entry or search on the basi s of the community-caretaking exception . Rather, the Krezen and Toohey decisions relied on the inventory exception. The Ohlinger and Davis decisions relied on, and fashioned a test for th e application of, the emergency-aid exception. Therefore, this Court ha s no controlling authority on point.
3. SURVEY OF OT HER JURISDICTIONS Tyler and Davis do not support, much less mandate, the majority’s result. Because there is no controlling Michigan authority, I tu rn to other jurisdic tions for guidance. Many courts have observed that the Cady decision included language that sharply distinguished automobile searches fro m searches of private residences. 43 Therefore, they

41 Toohey , 438 Mich at 275-276.

42 Krezen , 427 Mich 681; Toohey , 438 Mich 265; Ohlinger , 438 Mich 477; Davis , 442 Mich 1.

43 See, e.g., United States v Erickson , 991 F2d 529, 532 (CA 9, 1993) (“Although it involved a co mmunity caretaking function, Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a house and s earching an automobile.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).15 have limited the community-caretaking exception solely to the former. 44 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Ci rcuit joined the majority of other federal circuits and adopted this approach: We agree with the conclusion of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on this issue, and interp ret the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady as being expressly based on the dis tinction between automobiles and homes for Fourth Amendment purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justif y warrantless searches of a home. Whether that exception can ever apply ou tside the context of an automobile search, we need not now decide. It is enough to say that, in the context of a search of a home, it does not override the warra nt requirement of the Fourth Amendment or the carefully crafted and well-recognized exceptions to that requirement. [45]

44 United States v Pichany , 687 F2d 204, 207-209 (CA 7, 1982); Erickson , 991 F2d at 532; United States v Bute , 43 F3d 531, 535 (CA 10, 1994); State v Gill , 2008 ND 152, ¶ 23; 755 NW2d 454, 459 (2008); Ryon , 137 NM at 185. The United States Court of Ap peals for the Eleventh Circ uit similarly declined to allow an entry into a private residence pursu ant to the community-car etaking exception. United States v McGough , 412 F3d 1232, 1239 (CA 11, 2005). However, it is unclear whether McGough was limited to the facts before th e court or whether it established a categorical rule for searches of private residences. Several courts have cited McGough for the proposition that the Elev enth Circuit, like the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, has declined to extend the co mmunity-caretaking exception to allow warrantless searches of private homes or businesses. See, e.g., Gill , 2008 ND 152, at ¶ 17 ; 755 NW2d at 459. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has applied the community-caretaking exception to allow a warrantless entry of a home in order to abate a nuisance. See Rohrig , 98 F3d 1506. However, the Rohrig court placed great emphasis on “the fact-specific nature of this holding,” Rohrig , 98 F3d at 1525 n 11, leaving doubts about whether it was intended to be broadl y applicable. Subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions have questioned whether Rohrig stands for the proposition that the communitycaretaking exception can justify warrantless entries into privat e residences. See, e.g., Williams , 354 F3d at 508 (“[D]espite re ferences to the doctrine in Rohrig , we doubt that community caretaking will generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.”).

45 Ray v Warren Twp , 626 F3d 170, 17 7 (CA 3, 2010).16 Numerous other courts have tacitly reje cted extending the community-caretaking exception to warrantless entrie s into private residences. 46 Similarly, others have evaluated the warrantless entry under the em ergency or emergency-aid exceptions only and, finding them inapplicable, declared th e entry unconstitutional without considering a broader community-caretaking exception. 47 Cases from jurisdictions in which the cour ts have ostensibly permitted warrantless entries into private residenc es pursuant to the community-caretaking exception are also instructive. For example, in United States v Quezada , 48 the Eighth Circuit upheld a warrantless entry into the de fendant’s apartment. The Quezada Court stated that “[a] police officer may enter a residence without a warrant as a community caretaker where
the officer has a reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring his or her
attention.” 49 Thus, the warrantless entry in that case, like the entries in Tyler and Mincey v Arizona , was premised on an emergency situation, not simply that th e officer was acting

46 See, e.g., Ortiz v State , 24 So 3d 596, 615 (Fla App, 2 009) (Orfinger, J., dissenting) (“Other than situations involving the medica l emergency exception, until today, the community caretaker exception ha s not been applied in Florida as a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment to validate an entry into a residence.”).

47 See, e.g., State v Ford , 2010 VT 39, ¶¶ 11-21; ___ Vt ___, ___; 998 A2d 684, 689-692 (2010) (recognizing the existe nce of both the community-caretaking and emergency-aid exceptions, but holding an officer’s entry into a pr ivate residence unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy th e emergency-aid exception).

48 United States v Quezada , 448 F3d 1005 (CA 8, 2006).

49 Id. at 1007, citing Mincey , 437 US at 392-393 (emphasis added).17 in a community-car etaking capacity. 50 Many other cases that purportedly allowed
warrantless entries in to homes under the community-caretak ing exception similarly relied on the fact that an emerge ncy situation was involved. 51
Cases like Quezada persuasively illustrate how the law pertaining to the community-caretaking excepti on, the emergency exception, and the emergency-aid exception are often muddled. Courts often conf use a police officer’s actions pursuant to a community-caretaking function with the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, these cases also rev eal the dearth of auth ority for a communitycaretaking exception to the warra nt requirement that applies to homes independently of the emergency or emergency-aid exceptions. The majority ignores all of this and assume s, without really deci ding the issue, that community-caretaking duties can justify a warra ntless entry into a pr ivate residence. This assumption is precariously based, given the dearth of authority to support it. I would hold that, to the extent an indepe ndent community-caretak ing exception to the warrant requirement may be recognized in Mi chigan, it cannot justify a warrantless entry into a private residence. Rath er, such entries must be justif ied by another exception, such as the emergency or emergency- aid exceptions discussed in Tyler and Davis

.

50 Tyler , 436 US 499; Mincey , 437 US 385; see also Ray , 626 F3d at 176 (stating that Quezada and similar cases “do not simply re ly on the community caretaking doctrine established in Cady ”).

51 See, e.g., Deneui , 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 80; 775 NW2d at 251-252 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting) (distinguishing case s cited by the majority as gr ounded in the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions, not a broader community-caretaking exception).18 4. THE MAJORITY’S MISCONSTRUCTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS The majority’s articulation of the general lega l principles applicable to this case is generally accurate. For example, I do not dispute that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness. The problem is th at the majority opinion restricts itself to general legal principles. Indeed, a simple reason exists why the majo rity does not answer my refutation of Tyler and Davis as a basis for its hold ing or my discussion of the other caselaw: it cannot. Instead, it a ttempts to distract from this failure by dismissing my opinion as “bemoan[ing]” the state of the law in this area. 52 The majority also claims that my approach would “furth er muddle Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . .” 53 To the contrary, my analysis fully examines and evaluates th e existing nuances in Fourth Amendment doctrine recognized by courts acro ss the country, including this one. Such nuances are lost on the majority. If, as the majority asserts, my unders tanding of these nuances is “needlessly complex,” 54 so too is the understanding of co untless other judges and commentators. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the em ergency and emergency-ai d exceptions are not merely “aspects” of the community-caretaking exception. 55 As previously explained, the

52 Ante at 22.

53 Ante at 23.

54 Ante at 22.

55 See Deneui , 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 80; 77 5 NW2d at 251-252 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting) (“[T]he community caretaking function of police is an aspect of the emergency exception and emergency aid exception. The community caretaker exception , however, is an independent and broader exception to th e Fourth Amendment and has not been expansively recognized by an y authority outside of the c ontext of motor vehicles.”).19 community-caretaking functions of police and other state ac tors provide the basis for
several distinct exceptions to the warrant requi rement. These exceptions include the inventory exception, the emergency excep tion, and the emergency-aid exception. 56 Each

56 See Laney v State , 117 SW3d 854, 860-861 (Tex Crim App, 2003): The notion that officers act pursuan t to their “community caretaker functions” serves as a basis for thre e separate doctrines created by the [United States] Supreme Court: 1) the emergency aid doctrine, established in Mincey; 2) the automobile impoundment and inventory doctrine, first conceived in Cady, and later expanded upon in Opperman; and, 3) the community caretaking doctrin e, or public servant doctrine, established in Cady, and followed by this Court . . . . The common thread in each of these three excep tions to the warrant and probable cause requirements is the officer’s purpose. The emergency doctrine is not the same as the community caretaking doctrine established in Cady. The distinction between the emergency doctrine and the community caretaking doctrine, hereinafter referred to as the Cady doctrine, is a narrow, but critical one. Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that he or she must act to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” On the other hand, under the Cady doctrine, the officer “might or might not believe there is a difficulty requiring his gene ral assistance.” Therefore, while both doctrines are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her “community caretaking functions,” the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury. Additionally, the Cady doctrine deals primarily with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles (and will be limited to those circumstances except in unusual circumstances), while the emergency doctrine deals with warrantle ss entries of, but is not limited to, private residences. [Citations omitted.]20 exception is subject to a different standard for assessing whether a warrantless entry or search conducted pursuant to that exception was reasonable. 57 The majority opinion falls s hort because it creates out of whole cloth a previously unrecognized community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Its wholly unsupported decision not only to adopt that exception but to extend it to warrantless entries into private residences compounds this erro r. Moreover, the ma jority refuses to recognize that its stated standard for this ne w exception is the essence of the standard for the emergency exception to the warrant require ment. Implicit in this failure is the inevitable conclusion that, under the majority ’s new exception, warr antless entries into a home to perform nonemergency community- caretaking functions can be reasonable. 58 In sum, the majority’s opinion today (1) extinguishes the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions to the warrant requi rement in Michigan by creating a broader community-caretaking exception w ith no discernable limitation, 59 (2) exposes the perils

57 See Davis , 442 Mich at 25-26 (“[P ]olice may enter a dwelling without a warrant when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. They must possess specific and articulable facts that lead them to this conclusion.”); Toohey , 438 Mich at 284 (“To be constitu tional, an inve ntory search must be conducted in accordance with established departmental procedures, which all police officers are required to follow, and must not be used as a pretext for criminal investigation.”).

58 Thus, although the majority claims th at it is not reaching this question, see ante at 22, 24 n 60, the dicta from its opinion are loud and clear.

59 Under the majority’s new excep tion, state actors never need rely on the aforementioned exceptions, as the new community-caretakin g exception will always make their warrantless entry reasonable under such circumstances. Surely the unanimous Davis Court did not think it was wasting its time in car efully crafting a standard for applying the emergency-ai d exception.21 of distilling broad Fourth Amen dment principles from inappo site authority and without comprehensive analysis, (3) pays only lip service to United States Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the difference between the home and a vehicle, 60 (4) ignores the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that the warrant re quirement is subject only to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, 61 (5) directly contravenes Davis by applying a general reasonableness standard to all warrantless entries carried out to perform community-caretaking functions, 62 and (6) fails to explain which communitycaretaking functions, beyond re sponding to an emergency or administering emergency aid, would reasonably justify a warrantless entry into a home. 63

60 The majority acknowledges that “the thres hold of reasonableness is at its apex when police enter a dwelling pursuant to th eir community caretaking functions.” Ante at 12. However, nothing else in its analysis gives any effect to this crucial distinction.

61 Katz , 389 US at 357. The sp ecifically established and well-delineated emergency-aid exception has existed in Michig an since at least 1991, see Ohlinger , 438 Mich 477. As previously explained, there is no Michigan authority specifi cally adopting a communitycaretaking exception. Moreove r, the community-caretakin g exception established in Cady has not been specifically established, let alone well delineated, outside the context of automobile searches.

62 Davis , 442 Mich at 25 (“While categorizing th ese different activities under the heading of ‘community caretaking functions’ may be useful in some respects, it does not follow that all searches resulting fr om such activities should be ju dged by the same standard.”).

63 I agree with the majority th at there is no indication that Davis intended to depart from “the universal application of the reasonabl eness standard to all Fourth Amendment inquiries[.]” Ante at 24 n 59. But as the majority notes, Davis established a specific standard for how courts could assess reasonab leness in the emergency-aid context. The majority today applies a similar standard to assess the reasonableness of entries in emergency situations, such as to abate an imminent threat of fire. However, the majority errs when it grounds its decision in the co mmunity-caretaking exception because it gives no equivalent standard applicable to wa rrantless entries to perform nonemergency community-caretaking functions.22 B. DOES THE COMMUNITY-CAR ETAKING EXCEPTION APPLY TO FIREFIGHTERS? This portion of the majo rity’s holding is unique. 64 No jurisdiction has extended the community-caretaking exce ption to the warrant requirement to firefighters. As previously mentioned, Tyler established that firefighters are entitled to enter private residences without a warrant in emer gency situations, including fighting a blazing
fire. Stuart makes clear that police may enter homes to render emergency aid to someone
inside in clear need of medical treatment. 65 Both of these exceptions are subsumed within the broader rubric of community-caretaking functions.
Because I would not allow the commun ity-caretaking exception to justify warrantless entries into private residences by any state actors, I would not reach this issue. However, under the majority’s br oad new community-caretaking exception,

The majority claims that any such stan dard would be dictum because the only question here is whether a firefighter may enter a home to address the threat of an imminent fire. This would be an adequate response if the majority were applying the emergency exception, but not when it create s a new community-caretaking exception. Surely we need not decide the reasonablene ss of every possible emergency police officers or firefighters may encounter. However, as previously noted, the ma jority’s decision is based on a new community-caretaking exception without a standard in the ev ent of a nonemergency. The majority leaves lower courts to guess wh en other, less urgent community-caretaking functions can reasonably justif y warrantless entries and sear ches of homes. Our lower courts and the public deserve more.

64 See ante at 14 (“ Tyler ’s holding and rationale lead inexor ably to the conc lusion that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters.”).

65 I do not dispute that firefight ers, as well as police offi cers, could also invoke the emergency-aid exception to justify a warrantless entry into a home.23 firefighters and police officers may effectivel y enter private residences at any time and for virtually any reason without a warrant.
C. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE Under existing law, the firefighters in this case were permitted to enter defendant’s townhouse only to combat an ongoing emergenc y. The thin factual record precludes the
conclusion that a reasonable person could have believed that an emergency existed in defendant’s townhouse. At best, the facts esta blish that a potential fi re threat existed in the townhouse neighboring defendant’s, which belonged to Kathleen Tunner. The only facts that the firefighters res ponding to Tunner’s phone call knew when they entered defendant’s home were that (1) Tunner had ob served water running over her electrical box and (2) she thought that she heard water running between the common wall her townhouse shared with defe ndant’s townhouse. As the majority observes, Royal Oak Fire Department Lieutenant Michael Schunck testified that he di d not independently confirm that water was running in Tunner’s hom e. Hence, he did nothing to respond to the only possible emergency of which he wa s aware when he arri ved—a potential fire
hazard in Tunner’s townhouse. 66 In concluding to the contrary, the major ity discounts the legal principle that a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable. 67 The government bears

66 Even Tunner did not consider the situation in her townhouse to be an imminent hazard. She first attempted to contact her next-door neighbor and the ma nagement company to address the water issue. On ly when the management company told her there was nothing it could do did Tunner ca ll the fire department.

67 See, e.g., Welsh , 466 US at 750, citing Payton , 445 US at 586.24 the burden of proving that a “‘ carefully delineated’” excepti on to the warrant requirement applies. 68 Indeed, the facts justifying the entry in this case ar e significantly less compelling than those present in Davis . In Davis , the police had received a radio dispatch informing them that the manager at a motel had reported hearing gunshots fired in or near one of two motel rooms. The disp atcher identified two possible rooms and directed police officers to a possible witness, but did not sugge st that any person was injured. With this dispatch as their only source of information, the police arri ved at the motel and proceeded to one of the two rooms. Once there, they encountered an occupant who was unwilling to open the door. Notably, the police had not themselves h eard shots fired. No r did they interview any witnesses who heard them, not even th e desk clerk, whom the dispatcher had
identified as the source of the information. The initial source of information gave very
little detail about the situation. The record did not indicate that the police made inquiries of the manager who approached them or th at they knocked on other doors. They
encountered no circumstances that suggested that shots had in fact been fired. Under these facts, the Davis Court unanimously refused to apply the emergency-aid exception to uphold the warra ntless entry. Thus, Davis involved a situation in which g unshots had been fired—a situation specifically recognized by courts as fa lling within the emergency exception. 69 Yet the

68 Welsh , 466 US at 749-750, quoting United States v United States Dist Court , 407 US 297, 318; 92 S Ct 2125; 32 L Ed 2d 752 (1972).

69 See Decker, Emergency circumstances , pp 480-484.25 Davis Court refused to apply the exception absent police corroboration of the shots independent of the phone call. This case involves an alleged water leak and potential electr ical problem—not a scenario specifically recognized as falling within the emerge ncy exception. Just as in
Davis , however, the warrantless entry was ca rried out without any independent corroboration that water was actually leakin g and causing a potential electrical problem
in defendant’s home. If there was no water leaking, there was no electrical problem and hence no emergency or imminent threat to life or property. Therefore, there was no exception to the warrant requirement that ju stified the warrantless entry in this case. The majority concludes to the contrary by establishing a br oad, undefined new community-caretaking excepti on to the warrant requirement wholly unsupported by existing law. Indeed, the scop e of the majority’s newly creat ed exception to the warrant requirement is limitless. Finally, I question the legal significance of at least one of the facts the majority finds significant when evaluating the reasona bleness of the warrantless entry. The majority contends that because the townhous e complex contained several units attached to one another, this fact “elevated th e imminence of the potential hazard.” 70 Not so. Certainly, the fact that the townhouse comp lex has numerous attached units elevated the potential scope of the fire threat and the number of people who potentially might have been affected. But that fact is utterly irre levant to the imminence of a fire threat from water running over an electrica l box. The question of the imminence of a fire might be

70 Ante at 19.26 influenced by whether someone saw sparks flying from the bo x or saw a large quantity of water flowing over it. But the scope of the threat and the imminence of the threat are distinctly different inquiries. For these reasons, I agree with the Co urt of Appeals’ conclusion that it is impossible to determine whether the firefighter s acted reasonably in entering defendant’s apartment. Thus, I would hold that the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing that an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement justified the firefighters’ entry.
III. CONCLUSION I dissent from the major ity’s decision to extend the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement to allow en try into private residences. I would hold that firefighters, as well as police officers, may enter a private residence only pursuant to the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions . The prosecution fa iled to establish a record indicating that the firefighters in th is case reasonably believed that immediate entry into defendant’s townhouse was necessa ry to address an emergency situation. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment, but not the reasoning, of the Court of Appeals.

Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh