Filed 8/17/22 P. v. Jones CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL EUGENE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079192

 (Super. Ct. No. SCE398802)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Justin Andrew Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. 

Natasha Cortina and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Michael Eugene Jones appeals his conviction for driving under the 

influence (DUI) of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), 

driving with a measurable blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more causing 
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injury (id., § 23153, subd. (b)), and driving with a suspended license (id.,

§ 14601.1, subd. (a)). Jones argues (1) the trial court erred in finding he was 

not subject to custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 

384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) when he made incriminating statements about his 

alcohol consumption during a DUI evaluation; and (2) any portion of the 

criminal justice administration fee the trial court imposed that was unpaid as 

of July 1, 2021, should be vacated. 

We agree with the parties that any portion of the criminal justice 

administration fee that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021, should be 

vacated. As for Jones’s statements, we conclude it is unnecessary to 

determine whether there was a Miranda violation because any error would 

be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm the judgment as 

modified. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. The Collision

On the evening of December 22, 2019, Jones was driving on a highway 

in El Cajon and struck the back of G.S.’s car, causing it to run into a cement 

divider. According to witness testimony, shortly before the collision, Jones 

was driving over 100 miles per hour and weaving in and out of traffic. At one 

point, Jones also leaned his torso out of the driver’s side window and looked 

backward. 

After the crash, G.S. exited his car on the left shoulder and crossed the 

highway because he feared his vehicle might be on fire. Jones also stopped 

on the shoulder and began taking items out of his car and crossing the multilane highway. When California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Luke Murillo 

responded to the collision, he approached Jones on the highway’s left 

shoulder and asked him for identification. Officer Murillo also observed that 
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Jones had red, watery eyes, slurred speech, an unsteady gait, and the smell 

of alcohol on his breath. 

Officer Murillo was concerned for their safety while standing near the 

center median and told Jones they needed to move across the highway to the 

right shoulder. Officer Murillo also told Jones that he was not under arrest, 

but handcuffed Jones and placed him in the back of his patrol car. Once 

Officer Murillo drove them to the opposite side of the highway, he took Jones 

out of the patrol car, removed the handcuffs, and again informed Jones that 

he was not under arrest. Officer Murillo estimated that Jones was 

handcuffed in his patrol car for less than 10 minutes. 

At this point, another officer had arrived on scene. Officer Murillo

continued his investigation of the collision and suspected DUI. As part of his 

DUI investigation, Officer Murillo asked Jones whether he had any alcohol 

before driving. Jones responded that he had a 32-ounce beer and a shot of 

brandy. During a horizontal gaze nystagmus test in which Officer Murillo 

had Jones watch the tip of his finger, each of Jones’s eyes exhibited all three

signs associated with that test indicating intoxication.1 Officer Murillo did 

not advise Jones of his Miranda rights before conducting the DUI 

investigation.

Officer Murillo then arrested Jones and brought him to a nearby CHP 

office, where his blood was drawn for blood alcohol concentration (BAC) 

1 Officer Murillo testified that when he administers this test, he looks for 

“involuntary jerking of the eye,” which he identified as “nystagmus.” He 

explained that the indicators of intoxication from that test include each of the 

following three signs, which are checked in both eyes: (1) lack of smooth 

pursuit when the subject’s eyes are following the officer’s fingertip; 

(2) nystagmus at maximum deviation, or when the fingertip is at the far 

outside corners; and (3) nystagmus onset prior to 45 degrees when the 

fingertip is moved outward from the center of the subject’s nose. 
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testing. The tested sample revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.14 percent. A

criminalist with the San Diego Sheriff’s Crime Lab opined that, at the time of 

driving, Jones had a BAC between 0.12 and 0.20 percent. At the time of 

driving, Jones was impaired for the purpose of driving and his blood alcohol 

level was above 0.08 percent. 

B. Motion to Exclude Statements

Before his trial in April 2021, Jones moved to exclude his statements 

during the DUI investigation on the basis that Officer Murillo did not advise 

him of his Miranda rights. After conducting a hearing in which Officer 

Murillo testified as summarized ante, the trial court denied Jones’s motion. 

The court found that although Jones was handcuffed and placed in a patrol 

car “temporarily” for up to 10 minutes, under the “totality of the 

circumstances” his detention was not “unduly restrictive or coercive” so as to 

be custodial for Miranda purposes. 

DISCUSSION

I

Jones first argues he was subject to custodial interrogation and that 

the trial court’s admission of his statement to Officer Murillo about his 

alcohol consumption was prejudicial error. We need not resolve whether 

there was a Miranda violation here because we conclude that any potential 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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A. Standard of Review

Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes presents a 

mixed question of law and fact. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings 

when supported by substantial evidence and decide independently whether 

Jones was subject to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. 

(People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 (Davidson).)

B. Applicable Law

If a defendant makes statements while under custodial interrogation

without being advised of his rights under Miranda, his statements cannot be 

used as evidence to establish guilt. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 

420, 429 (Berkemer).) But an officer’s obligation to administer Miranda

warnings attaches only when the person questioned is in “custody.” 

(Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.) The relevant inquiry 

when considering whether interrogation was custodial is whether a 

“ ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to 

terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” (Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 

499, 509.) In making that determination, courts consider the totality of the 

circumstances, including: “ ‘(1) whether the suspect has been formally 

arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; 

(4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, 

including the nature of the questioning.’ ” (Davidson, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 972.) 

Additional factors include “whether the officer informed the person he 

or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions 

on the suspect’s freedom of movement, whether the police were aggressive, 

confrontational, and/or accusatory, and whether the police used interrogation 
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techniques to pressure the suspect.” (Davidson, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 972; see also People v. Bejasa (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 26, 35–36 (Bejasa).)

Erroneous admission of statements made in violation of Miranda is 

subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 

386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). Under Chapman, a constitutional error is harmless 

when it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 

not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id. at p. 24.)

C. Analysis

Jones argues that he was in custody during his DUI evaluation because 

a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to leave. He 

points to the fact that he was handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol 

car, citing cases noting that handcuffing is a “distinguishing feature of a 

formal arrest.” (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404–1405

(Pilster); see also Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 37 [“Defendant was 

confronted with two of the most unmistakable indicia of arrest: he was 

handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car.”].) He further asserts that 

even though Officer Murrillo advised him that he was not under arrest, 

removed the handcuffs, and released him from the patrol car before 

questioning, this did not negate his perception that he could not leave. (See 

Bejasa, at pp. 38–39 [“The removal of the restraints was not enough to 

ameliorate the custodial pressures that likely remained from the initial 

confinement.”].) 

The People argue in response that handcuffing is not in itself 

dispositive, and other factors weigh in favor of finding that Jones was not in 

custody. For example, the People note that Jones was only in the patrol car 

for less than 10 minutes and Officer Murillo subsequently removed the 

handcuffs; Officer Murillo told Jones he was not under arrest; Jones was 
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questioned on a public roadway; and the two officers present did not have 

their guns drawn. (See, e.g., In re Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 957–

961 [finding no custodial interrogation where police handcuffed minor and 

placed him in back of patrol car for about five minutes, then took him out of 

the car, removed handcuffs, and began asking questions].) The People assert 

that Pilster is distinguishable because in this case, Officer Murillo told Jones 

he was not under arrest and that they needed to move across the highway for 

safety purposes. The People further contend that Jones did not face the same 

incriminating circumstances as the defendant in Bejasa and had no reason to 

doubt Officer Murillo’s statement that he was not under arrest.

The parties also dispute whether Officer Murillo’s questioning 

constituted interrogation. The People contend that preliminary questioning

about a driver’s suspected intoxication during a routine traffic stop does not 

amount to interrogation, citing Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 435–442 and 

People v. Carter (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 127, 130–131. Jones contends that 

Officer Murillo’s questions about his drinking after a collision did constitute 

interrogation, citing Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 39–40.

We recognize that the unique facts in this case present a potentially 

close question regarding custodial interrogation under Miranda. However, 

we need not decide whether the trial court erred in admitting Jones’s 

statements about his alcohol consumption because even if any error occurred, 

it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 

p. 24.)

The evidence presented at trial included unrefuted expert testimony 

that Jones was driving impaired and had a BAC between 0.12 and 0.20 

percent at the time of the collision. Officer Murillo testified that he observed 

signs of intoxication when he first encountered Jones, including red, watery 
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eyes, slurred speech, an unsteady gait, and a smell of alcohol on his breath. 

When Officer Murillo administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Jones 

exhibited all six indicators of intoxication (three in each eye). Moreover, two 

witnesses testified that Jones appeared to be driving over 100 miles per hour

before the collision. One witness testified that Jones had his torso out of the 

driver’s side window and was weaving in and out of traffic before plowing into 

G.S.’s vehicle. Accordingly, on this record, we agree with the People that any 

error in admitting Jones’s statement to Officer Murillo regarding his alcohol 

consumption was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jones argues that admitting his statement about how much alcohol he 

consumed was prejudicial because the parties spent time litigating the issue,

and the prosecutor referenced the admission in closing argument. Jones

further contends that the jury must have deemed the case close because it 

requested a readback of G.S.’s testimony regarding the collision and his 

injuries. We disagree. The prosecutor only referenced Jones’s statement 

alongside the plethora of other evidence showing he was driving under the 

influence. The defense presented no contrary evidence. And the jury’s 

request for a readback of G.S.’s testimony does not suggest it might have had 

any reasonable doubt about Jones’s intoxication, because G.S. never even saw 

Jones’s vehicle coming and provided no information at trial about Jones’s 

driving or intoxication. Rather, the jury likely asked for a readback of G.S.’s

“account of incident” and “injury” only because injury and causation were 

elements of the charged offenses. Thus, we conclude that any Miranda error 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.

II
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Jones contends, and the People concede, that any unpaid portion of his 

criminal justice fee as of July 1, 2021, should be vacated pursuant to 

Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). We agree.

As of July 1, 2021, the statutory provision pursuant to which the trial

court ordered Jones to pay a $154 criminal justice administration fee was 

repealed (see former Gov. Code, § 29550.1), and Government Code section 

6111 became effective. That statute provides that “the unpaid balance of any 

court-imposed costs pursuant to Section 27712, subdivision (c) or (f) of Section 

29550, and Sections 29550.1, 29550.2, and 29550.3, as those sections read on 

June 30, 2021, is unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a 

judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” (Gov. Code, § 6111, subd. 

(a).)

The trial court stayed the fee, pending Jones’s successful completion of 

probation. Pursuant to Government Code section 6111, and for the reasons 

stated in People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 952, we vacate any 

balance of the costs imposed by the court pursuant to former Government 

Code section 29550.1 that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021.
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DISPOSITION

Any portion of the criminal justice administration fee imposed 

pursuant to former Government Code section 29550.1 that remained unpaid 

as of July 1, 2021, is vacated. The judgment is affirmed as modified.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.