DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MICHELLE SHLIMBAUM,

Appellant,

v.

JASON M. SHLIMBAUM and JMS CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.,

Appellees.

No. 4D2023-1876

[September 25, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Mariya Weekes, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE18-008923.

Curt Sanchez and Nicole Nicolette Mace of the Law Offices of Curt 

Sanchez, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard L. Rosenbaum of Law Offices of Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort 

Lauderdale, for appellees.

CONNER, J.

The wife, Michelle Shlimbaum, appeals the trial court’s order which 

vacated prior contempt orders and money judgments on temporary 

support arrearages (the “support and enforcement orders”). The trial court 

vacated the support and enforcement orders after concluding that the 

orders were merged into the partial final judgment dissolving the marriage 

and thus became void. We agree with the wife’s arguments that the trial 

court erred on multiple fronts. Thus, we reverse the trial court and 

remand for further proceedings because the merger doctrine was 

improperly applied.

Background

After both parties petitioned for dissolution of marriage, the trial court 

entered an agreed temporary support order directing the husband to make 

monthly payments of expenses as support for the wife and minor child.1

1 The temporary support order did not differentiate between spousal support and 

child support.
2 

Approximately five months after entry of the agreed support order, the 

wife moved for sanctions, contending the husband was violating the order. 

The trial court found the husband willfully failed to pay the court-ordered 

monthly expenses and adjudicated a substantial dollar amount as support 

arrearage. The order further provided the wife was entitled to a money 

judgment for the arrearage. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a 

final money judgment for the arrearage against two of the husband’s 

business entities. 

A month later, the trial court heard the wife’s second motion for 

contempt and granted the motion. The trial court again found the 

husband willfully continued to fail to pay the court-ordered monthly 

expenses accruing after the first contempt hearing and willfully failed to 

comply with the first contempt order’s enforcement provisions. The second 

contempt order stated the wife was entitled to a money judgment for a 

substantially higher amount than the first contempt order (the new 

amount included the amount assessed in the first contempt order). 

For reasons not revealed in the appellate record, the parties decided to 

proceed with a final hearing dissolving the marriage without final 

resolution of issues of spousal and child support and equitable 

distribution. However, prior to the final hearing, the parties agreed to a 

written parenting plan resolving parental responsibility for the minor child, 

except for child support. As a result, the trial court entered what the 

parties refer to (and is titled as) a “partial final judgment.” The partial final 

judgment reserved jurisdiction on equitable distribution, alimony, child 

support, and attorney’s fees. 

Significantly, the partial final judgment stated that the trial court 

declined to merge the parenting plan into the partial final judgment: “The 

September 17, 2020 Parenting Plan is hereby ratified, approved, and 

incorporated but not merged into this Final Judgment and the parties are 

ordered to comply with all of the terms and provisions contained therein.” 

(Emphasis added). Notably, the parenting plan contained the following 

provision: “As child support has not been determined, the prior order 

regarding expenses remains in effect.” 

Several months after the trial court entered the partial final judgment, 

the wife filed her third motion for contempt. Subsequently, the wife filed 

an “urgent” motion for an interim partial equitable distribution, asserting 

that the husband had filed for bankruptcy to further divest himself of any 

assets or income with which to pay support. As a result of the wife’s 

motions, the trial court entered a second final money judgment for the 
3 

substantial support arrearage determined in the second contempt order. 

Notably, the second money final judgment was entered after the partial 

final judgment dissolving the marriage. 

Approximately two years after the trial court entered the second money 

judgment, the husband filed a memorandum of law arguing that the 

temporary support orders and enforcement orders entered before and after 

the partial final judgment were void and should be vacated. The 

memorandum argued the support and enforcement orders were merged 

into the partial final judgment and no longer enforceable because the 

partial final judgment did not incorporate the orders or reserve jurisdiction 

over the orders. Notably, the memorandum did not cite any procedural 

rule for vacating the orders. A month later, the husband filed a two-page 

motion to vacate any finding of contempt or money judgment pertaining to 

temporary support, again not citing any procedural rule. 

At the hearing on the motion to vacate, the husband made the same 

arguments as in his memorandum of law. The wife argued the partial final 

judgment was not a final determination as to child support, alimony, or 

equitable distribution. She argued that, as a result, the temporary support 

and enforcement orders did not merge into the partial final judgment. The 

trial court, however, agreed with the husband’s argument that because the 

partial final judgment did not specifically reserve jurisdiction as to the 

temporary support matters, the support and enforcement orders were 

extinguished by merger into the partial final judgment. 

The wife timely gave notice of appeal. 

Appellate Analysis 

As noted above, the husband did not cite any procedural rule in seeking 

to vacate the support and enforcement orders. The trial court likewise 

cited no procedural rule for vacating those orders. Based on the husband’s 

argument in his memorandum of law (that the support and enforcement 

orders became void when they merged into the partial final judgment) we

must therefore assume the husband and the trial court travelled under 

Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b)(4). Rule 12.540(b)(4) 

provides that the trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment or 

order when the judgment or order is void. Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b)(4).2

2 The husband did not assert any other ground for vacating the orders allowed 

by rule 12.540.
4

“The relevant portions of [Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure] 

12.540(b)(4) are identical to [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.540(b)(4), 

and motions filed under rule 12.540(b) are governed by the body of law 

applicable to rule 1.540(b).” Sanchez v. Sanchez, 285 So. 3d 969, 971 n.1 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019). “Where a final judgment is void . . . the trial court has 

no discretion and is obligated to vacate the judgment. Whether a judgment 

is void is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Vercosa v. Fields, 174 So. 

3d 550, 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Sanchez, 285 So. 3d at 972 n.4.

The wife argues on appeal that the prior support and enforcement 

orders did not merge into the partial final judgment, because the trial court 

reserved jurisdiction as to support issues, among other things, in the 

partial final judgment. Additionally, the wife argues that because the 

parties’ parenting plan, which was incorporated into the partial final 

judgment, stated that the “prior order regarding expenses” (a reference to 

the prior temporary support order) remained in effect, the final judgment 

retained jurisdiction to enforce the prior orders. Because the trial court 

did not finally adjudicate support issues, she argues the trial court erred 

in finding merger applied to the prior support and enforcement orders. 

Finally, the wife argues the husband’s motion to vacate was untimely

because the prior support and enforcement orders are not void.

The husband argues that “the Partial Final Judgment, even reserving 

jurisdiction in part, became a true Partial Final Judgment for dissolution 

of marriage purposes.” He also argues the failure to specifically 

incorporate prior support and enforcement orders into the partial final 

judgment means those orders merged into the partial final judgment and 

are no longer enforceable. Finally, the husband argues that because the 

support and enforcement orders merged into the final judgment, those 

orders also became “void” and subject to being vacated without any time 

limits.

We agree with the wife’s arguments, reject the husband’s arguments, 

and reverse for the reasons discussed below.

Generally, where a final judgment disposes of all claims in the case, 

temporary support orders merge into a final judgment and may not be 

enforced in post-judgment proceedings unless incorporated into the final 

judgment. Scott v. Scott, 643 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“It 

is well settled in Florida that a temporary support award which is not 

incorporated in the final judgment cannot be enforced by the trial court in 

post-judgment proceedings.”).
5 

As it relates to final judgments, the merger doctrine stands for 

proposition that all interlocutory orders merge into a final judgment, 

extinguishing the trial court’s authority to enter further orders regarding 

the interlocutory matters. As the Second District has explained: 

It is well established that a trial court may reconsider and 

modify interlocutory orders at any time until final judgment is 

entered. 

All interlocutory proceedings, however, are merged into and 

disposed of by the final judgment. . . . Thus, once the trial 

court’s judgment became final in this case, its inherent 

authority to reconsider and modify the interlocutory protective 

orders appears to have ceased.

Oliver v. Stone 940 So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted). In other words, the trial court loses jurisdiction to 

adjudicate matters, other than collateral matters, once an action becomes 

final by a judgment, including those matters that become final because of 

the merger doctrine. 

Because the merger doctrine, as it relates to judgments, depends on 

the finality of the judgment, our analysis turns on which matters remained 

nonfinal after the partial final judgment was entered. 

“A final judgment is one that not only adjudicates the merits of the 

cause, but that finally disposes of the pending action.” Cent. Hanover 

Bank & Tr. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 171 So. 808, 809 (Fla. 1937); 

Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 15 So. 175, 179 (Fla. 1943) (“[A] final decree is, 

generally speaking, one that determines the rights of the parties and 

disposes of the cause on its merits, leaving nothing more to be done in the 

cause as distinguished from beyond the cause—which latter phrase 

apparently refers, ordinarily at least, to such further proceedings and 

orders as may be necessary to enforce the decree . . . .”). “As a general 

rule, a final judgment is deemed to be rendered, almost as a matter of 

definition, only when the court has disposed of the entire controversy in 

question.” Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So. 2d 315, 318-19 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Notably, a reservation of jurisdiction renders the 

reserved matter interlocutory and generally makes the judgment 

interlocutory as well. Saul v. Basse, 399 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 

1981). 

Of course, a judgment may be appealable even if it does not decide all 

issues in a case. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k) specifically 
6 

authorizes appeals from partial final judgments. Rule 9.110(k) defines a 

partial final judgment as either a judgment that disposes of an entire case 

as to a party or “one that disposes of a separate and distinct cause of action 

that is not interdependent with other pleaded claims.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Additionally, a judgment may, as is the case here, be appealable 

as nonfinal order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5) (authorizing the appeal 

of “[o]rders entered on an authorized and timely motion for relief from 

judgment”). 

Trial courts presiding over dissolution of marriage actions sometimes 

employ a so-called “split procedure” where the parties wish to quickly 

dissolve the marriage for various reasons but are not prepared to address 

all related issues arising from the marriage, which may include parental 

responsibility, timesharing, financial support of children, spousal support, 

and equitable distribution. In such settings, the order dissolving the 

marriage is final and the remaining portions of the proceeding are nonfinal. 

In Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1980), the supreme court 

recognized this procedure but cautioned trial courts against employing it: 

[W]e believe trial judges should avoid this split procedure. The 

general law and our procedural rules at both the trial and 

appellate levels are designed for one final judgment and one 

appeal. Splitting the process can cause multiple legal and 

procedural problems which result in delay and additional 

expense to the litigants. This split procedure should be used 

only when it is clearly necessary for the best interests of the 

parties or their children. 

Id. at 1062. Indeed, the “split procedure” complicates the application of 

the merger doctrine to partial final judgments.3 Close attention must be 

paid to which matters are adjudicated with finality in the judgment and 

which matters remain nonfinal. 

In a dissolution setting, a judgment may resolve only the parties’ 

marital status with finality, leaving the remaining portions of the case 

nonfinal. See Galbut v. Garfinkel, 340 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 1975) 

(determining the partial judgment of dissolution of marriage and reserving 

3 This case is a prime example of the reason why the supreme court had issued 

its cautionary warning about a “split procedure” in dissolution cases. We are, 

however, cognizant that practical reasons may justify a trial court bifurcating the 

proceeding in some dissolution cases. Ultimately, we do not reach this issue on 

appeal because neither party has argued that the trial court erred in bifurcating 

the proceeding.
7

as to the remaining issues was “final insofar as the marital status of the 

parties is concerned”); Haritos v. Haritos, 193 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2016) (holding a “final judgment of dissolution was a partial final 

judgment insofar as the marital status of the parties was concerned”).

Issues not adjudicated with finality remain nonfinal.4 See, e.g., Moore 

v. Moore, 50 So. 3d 110, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (dismissing as premature 

an appeal of a judgment dissolving the marriage and resolving most issues 

except for the timesharing and parenting plan for a third child; holding the 

judgment did not constitute a final appealable order because the issues 

upon which jurisdiction was reserved were “integrally related” to issues 

that had been purportedly adjudicated with finality); see also T.H. v. Dep’t 

of Children & Families, 736 So. 2d 126, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) 

(dismissing as nonfinal an order which purported to address certain 

matters but reserved jurisdiction on an integrally related matter); Hoffman 

v. O’Connor, 802 So. 2d 1197, 1197-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“While the 

order appears final as to the issues addressed, the reservation of 

jurisdiction over related claims necessarily renders the order nonfinal.”). 

As stated above, the merger doctrine only applies to matters that have 

been adjudicated to finality. The merger doctrine does not apply to 

interlocutory matters. See Haritos, 193 So. 3d at 1053 (rejecting the wife’s 

merger argument because the trial court had not yet issued a final order 

on certain financial issues).

In this case, the sole issue adjudicated with any degree of finality was 

the dissolution of the parties’ marital status and parental responsibility 

for the minor child, except child support.5 Galbut, 340 So. 2d at 473; 

Haritos, 193 So. 3d at 1052. Yet the husband’s arguments are conclusory 

and do not address matters resolved with finality. Instead, the husband’s 

arguments focus on matters that remained unequivocally unresolved. In 

4 We recognize that dissolution caselaw frequently uses the term “partial final 

judgment” when discussing judgments dissolving a marriage but reserving 

jurisdiction as to some or all related issues of financial support and equitable 

distribution. See Bland v. Bland, 971 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). From 

time to time, such appeals are dismissed as premature. See id.; El Gohary v. El 

Gohary, 76 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1989).

5 Because the parties do not argue the issue, we do not address whether the 

parenting plan was “integrally related” to child support, rendering the parenting 

plan interlocutory. See Moore, 50 So. 3d at 110. We also decline to decide 

whether the parenting plan incorporated into the partial final judgment is 

appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k).
8 

reserving jurisdiction, the trial court specifically declined to decide, among 

other things, matters of spousal and child support, much less decide those 

matters with finality. See Moore, 50 So. 3d at 110; Hoffman, 802 So. 2d 

at 1197-98. 

The partial final judgment approved and incorporated the agreed 

parenting plan, which specifically stated that “the prior order regarding 

expenses remains in effect.” More importantly, the partial final judgment 

specifically reserved jurisdiction to enter “further Orders as may be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this Final Judgment and its 

incorporated Parenting Plan and to address equitable distribution, 

alimony, child support and attorney’s fees and as otherwise provided by 

law.” (Emphasis added). Additionally, the partial final judgment stated the 

parenting plan was not merged into “this Final Judgment and the parties 

are ordered to comply with all of the terms and provisions contained 

therein.” 

Having reviewed the partial final judgment, we determine that the 

language reserving jurisdiction, and stating the parenting plan was not 

merged, sufficiently incorporated the interlocutory support and 

enforcement orders. See Scott, 643 So. 2d at 1127. Thus, we conclude 

the trial court erred in determining the support and enforcement orders 

merged into a final judgment. Because the support and enforcement 

orders were not merged into the judgment dissolving the marriage, the 

support and enforcement orders (including the two final money judgments) 

did not become void upon the entry of the partial final judgment. 

Rule 12.540 is designed to provide relief from final judgments and final 

orders. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b) (“On motion and on such terms 

as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative 

from a final judgment, order, or proceeding[.]”). Thus, the support and 

enforcement orders (excluding the final money judgments of the 

arrearages) were not subject to rule 12.540(b) relief because those orders

were nonfinal. 

Furthermore, even if relief under rule 12.540 were appropriate for 

interlocutory matters, the husband’s motion was untimely. Under rule 

12.540(b), a motion to vacate is untimely if filed more than one year after 

the judgment or order was entered, unless the judgment or order is void. 

Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b)(5). As we have determined, the support and 

enforcement orders (including the final money judgments on the support 
9 

arrearages,6 which had all the hallmarks of finality) were not void. Thus, 

the motion to vacate was untimely as to all the support and enforcement 

orders which the husband had sought to render unenforceable. Id.

Conclusion 

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the 

support and enforcement orders and money judgments entered thereon 

were merged into the partial final judgment dissolving the marriage; (2) the 

support and enforcement orders and money judgments entered thereon 

were void due to the merger doctrine; and (3) the motion to vacate the 

support and enforcement orders and money judgments entered thereon 

should be granted. We therefore reverse the order vacating the support 

and enforcement orders and money judgments entered thereon, and we 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded with instructions. 

GERBER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. 

* * * 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

6 As to the final money judgment issued after the partial final judgment, at the 

time of its entry, the trial court presumably considered that it had jurisdiction 

over the matter.