alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Federal Maritime Commission","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov","author_name":"Catie-Megan Moran","author_url":"https:\/\/www.fmc.gov\/author\/cmoranfmc-gov\/","title":"Commissioner Mario Cordero’s Remarks at the Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"tRcIEqqopS\"><a href=\"\/commissioner-mario-corderos-remarks-at-the-transportation-research-board-92nd-annual-meeting\/\">Commissioner Mario Cordero’s Remarks at the Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"\/commissioner-mario-corderos-remarks-at-the-transportation-research-board-92nd-annual-meeting\/embed\/#?secret=tRcIEqqopS\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“Commissioner Mario Cordero’s Remarks at the Transportation Research Board 92nd Annual Meeting” — Federal Maritime Commission\" data-secret=\"tRcIEqqopS\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(c,l){\"use strict\";var e=!1,o=!1;if(l.querySelector)if(c.addEventListener)e=!0;if(c.wp=c.wp||{},c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage);else if(c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if(!t);else if(!(t.secret||t.message||t.value));else if(\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret));else{for(var r,s,a,i=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),n=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=0;o<n.length;o++)n[o].style.display=\"none\";for(o=0;o<i.length;o++)if(r=i[o],e.source!==r.contentWindow);else{if(r.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message){if(1e3<(s=parseInt(t.value,10)))s=1e3;else if(~~s<200)s=200;r.height=s}if(\"link\"===t.message)if(s=l.createElement(\"a\"),a=l.createElement(\"a\"),s.href=r.getAttribute(\"src\"),a.href=t.value,a.host===s.host)if(l.activeElement===r)c.top.location.href=t.value}}},e)c.addEventListener(\"message\",c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",t,!1),c.addEventListener(\"load\",t,!1);function t(){if(o);else{o=!0;for(var e,t,r,s=-1!==navigator.appVersion.indexOf(\"MSIE 10\"),a=!!navigator.userAgent.match(\/Trident.*rv:11\\.\/),i=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),n=0;n<i.length;n++){if(!(r=(t=i[n]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\")))r=Math.random().toString(36).substr(2,10),t.src+=\"#?secret=\"+r,t.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",r);if(s||a)(e=t.cloneNode(!0)).removeAttribute(\"security\"),t.parentNode.replaceChild(e,t);t.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:r},\"*\")}}}}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n"}
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Bobby Ray HUNT, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 10-4063.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 17, 2010.

Decided: Dec. 8, 2010.

Paul K. Sun, Jr., Ellis & Winters, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Rudy E. Renfer, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Bobby Ray Hunt pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The district court found that Hunt qualified as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), and sentenced Hunt to the statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 180 months. Hunt appeals, challenging the finding that he is an armed career criminal. Finding no error, we affirm.

Hunt first argues that the district court erred in finding that he was an armed career criminal based on his prior North Carolina convictions for possession with intent to deliver and delivery of controlled substances. Hunt correctly concedes, however, that his argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in *United States v. McNeill,*598 F.3d 161 (4th Cir.2010), *petition for cert. filed*(U.S. July 2, 2010) (No. 10-5258), and we may not overrule this *838court’s binding precedent. *United States v. Simms,*441 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir.2006) (“A decision of a panel of this court becomes the law of the circuit and is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by a subsequent en banc opinion of this court or a superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, this claim fails.

Hunt next argues that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by sentencing him above the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum based on his prior convictions. Again, Hunt correctly concedes that his argument is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court precedent. See *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); *see also United States v. Cheek,*415 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir.2005) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment (as well as due process) does not demand that the mere fact of a prior conviction used as a basis for a sentencing enhancement be pleaded in an indictment and submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Therefore, this claim also fails.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Stephen Richard MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Mark NOOTH, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-35984.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 3, 2010*

Filed Nov. 18, 2010.

Nell Brown, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Portland, OR, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, AGOR-Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, OR, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: ALDISERT,** W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

 The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM ***

Stephen Richard Miller appeals from the District Court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for Habeas Corpus. Miller presents a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, contending that the Oregon post-conviction court unreasonably applied the clearly established law of *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We affirm.

Miller contends that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel (1) failed to request a lesser-included offense jury instruction and (2) failed to communicate properly with him regarding that decision. We have found *292ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a jury instruction in situations in which there was not even a plausible strategic explanation for counsel’s failure to request the instruction. *E.g., United States v. Alferahin,*433 F.3d 1148, 1161 (9th Cir.2006). Here, in comparison, not only is there a plausible explanation, there is an actual explanation: one of the attorneys averred that, after consulting with Miller, they jointly made a strategic decision to pursue an “all-or-nothing” approach to obtain an outright acquittal. Such an approach was compatible with the law and the evidence presented at trial. Regarding the alleged failure to communicate, Miller has offered no evidence to rebut the post-conviction court’s factual finding that the decision to forgo requesting a lesser-included offense instruction was jointly made by Miller and his counsel. Accordingly, we hold that Miller was not denied effective assistance of counsel.

Because we determine that counsel’s performance was not deficient, we do not reach *Strickland’s*prejudice prong. *See, e.g., Butcher v. Marquez,*758 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir.1985).

We hold that the Oregon post-conviction court did not unreasonably apply the clearly established law of *Strickland v. Washington,*and we therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of Miller’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Edward Paul VERDIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-30562

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 29, 2011.

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, J. Collin Sims, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Angela Barbera Odinet, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Edward Paul Verdin appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to mail fraud and money laundering. He argues that the district court clearly erred in applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(14)(B)(i) based on a finding that he substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution.

We review the district court’s application of the enhancement for clear error. *United States v. Juarez,*626 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir.2010). The Government presented unrebutted evidence that Verdin misrepresented the amount of the institution’s reserves, leading to the payment of a dividend that placed the institution in a dire financial position from which it could not recover. This testimony, among other testimony from the witness called by the Government, thus supported a finding that the financial institution was rendered insolvent substantially on account of Verdin’s actions, warranting the enhancement. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment (n,12(A)); *cf. United States v. Blocker,*104 F.3d 720, 736-37 (5th Cir.1997).

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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# EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report
of CurrencySharesSM Canadian Dollar Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Carl G. Verboncoeur, Chief
Executive Officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Trust, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

1.    
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2.    
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.

Date: January 25, 2008

/s/ Carl G. VerboncoeurCarl
G. Verboncoeur*Chief Executive Officer(principal executive officer)

*The Registrant is a
trust and Carl G. Verboncoeur is signing in his capacity as the principal executive
officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Registrant.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Verbena Pharmaceuticals Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert Schneiderman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Robert Schneiderman

Robert Schneiderman

Principal Executive Officer

Principal Financial Officer

August 27, 2008
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3557 

To provide an emergency cost-of-living increase for Social Security benefits 

for 2010. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2009 

Mr. JONES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To provide an emergency cost-of-living increase for Social 

Security benefits for 2010. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EMERGENCY COST-OF-LIVING INCREASE FOR 

4 SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR 2010. 

5 Notwithstanding any provision of section 215(i) of 

6 the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)) to the con7 trary— 

8 (1) for purposes of such section 215(i), the ap9 plicable increase percentage (as defined in section 

10 215(i)(1)(C) of such Act) with respect to the base 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3557 IH

1 quarter (as defined in section 215(i)(1)(A)(i) of such 

2 Act) in 2009 shall be deemed to be equal to the av3 erage of the 10 applicable increase percentages (as 

4 so defined) with respect to the base quarters (as so 

5 defined) in the 10 calendar years preceding 2009 

6 (rounded to the nearest one-tenth of 1 percent); and 

7 (2) for purposes of such section 215(i) (and any 

8 provision of law cross-referring to such section 

9 215(i) or otherwise providing for increases based on 

10 increases occurring under such section 215(i)), the 

11 increase under section 215(i)(2)(A)(ii) of such Act 

12 resulting from the application of this section shall be 

13 deemed to be an increase under such section 215(i) 

14 and not a general benefit increase. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JOHN RASPATELLO,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 56 WAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of January, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED. The Counsel’s Second Petition for Leave to Withdraw Appearance is 

GRANTED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                              51
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    51
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      51
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                3
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                          37
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        51
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     1
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 (1)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

JOHNNY COLLINS,

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 89 MAP 2016

Appeal from the Order o f the

Commonwealth Court dated,

August 8, 2016 at No. 330 MD 2016.

ORDER

PER CURIAM DECIDED: March 28, 2017

AND NOW , this 28 th d ay of March, 2017

, we AFFIRM the Order of the

Commonwealth Court.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Each of the undersigned
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, in his capacity as an officer of Community Bancorp Inc. (the Company) that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of such period and
the results of operations of the Company for such period.



|                     |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: August 6, 2004 |  | /s/ Michael J. Perdue                
|                     |  | Michael J. Perdue                    
|                     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer



|                     |  |                                            
|-------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------
|Date: August 6, 2004 |  | /s/ L. Bruce Mills, Jr.                    
|                     |  | L. Bruce Mills, Jr.                        
|                     |  | Sr. Vice President, Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
Community Bancorp Inc. and will be retained by Community Bancorp Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**Exhibit
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Ventiv Health, Inc. (“the Company”) on
      Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John R. Emery, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and to
      the
      best of my knowledge and belief, that:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of
      the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




By:
            
            /S/    JOHN
                R. EMERY**John
                R. Emery**
              **Chief
                FinancialOfficer**




August
      9 ,
      2005








A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      Ventiv Health, Inc. and will be retained by Ventiv Health, Inc. and furnished
      to
      the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.