NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KANDICE MARIE PRICE, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DAWN CLINGEMPEEL, DAVID SLAYDEN, Respondents/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0291 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015DO201704016

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Kandice Marie Price, Ft. Mohave

Petitioner/Appellee

David Russell Slayden, Henderson, NV

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 2-20-2020
PRICE v. SLAYDEN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

S W A N N, Chief Judge:

David Slayden appeals an order granting Kandice Marie 

Price’s petition for immediate physical custody of R.S., a minor child, under 

A.R.S. § 25-409. Slayden raises several issues on appeal that we cannot 

resolve because he failed to order transcripts under ARCAP 11. He also 

contends that (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction over him, (2) Price 

failed to provide sufficient discovery, (3) the determination of paternity was 

time-barred, (4) the superior court erred by granting Price physical custody, 

and (5) the court failed to properly authenticate text messages. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dawn Clingempeel (“Mother”) is the biological mother of 

R.S., born in May 2014. Shortly after R.S.’s birth, Mother signed several 

powers of attorney to confer parental rights to Slayden and Price. Mother 

also listed Slayden as the father on R.S.’s birth certificate.

In January 2017, Price filed a petition by a non-parent to 

establish legal decision-making authority under A.R.S. § 25-409(A), 

identifying Mother and Slayden as R.S.’s biological parents. Court-ordered 

genetic testing later determined that Slayden was not R.S.’s biological 

father. Thereafter, both Price and Slayden sought third-party legal 

decision-making authority.

After a three-day trial, the superior court granted Price’s 

petition for immediate physical custody and ordered that Slayden “have no 

access or fictive parenting time rights to [R.S.]” Slayden appeals.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, we note that Slayden failed to 

provide transcripts of the superior court’s proceedings under ARCAP 
PRICE v. SLAYDEN

Decision of the Court

3

11(b)(1).1 In the absence of a transcript, we assume that the record supports 

the superior court’s findings and conclusions. Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 

572, ¶ 33 (App. 2009).

Slayden first contends that Arizona lacks jurisdiction over 

him because he is a Nevada resident. We review de novo whether a court 

has subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 

259, 264, ¶ 17 (2017). Under the UCCJEA, the superior court can make a 

child-care determination so long as (1) Arizona was the child’s home state 

on the date of the child custody proceeding’s commencement, or was the 

child’s home state within six months before the proceeding’s 

commencement, and (2) a parent or person acting as a parent continues to 

live in Arizona despite the child being absent from the state. A.R.S. § 25-

1031(A)(1). A child’s “home state” is “[t]he state in which [the] child lived 

with a parent or person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months

immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding, 

including any period during which that person is temporarily absent from 

that state.” A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(a).

Here, the superior court properly concluded that Arizona was 

R.S.’s home state. R.S. was born in Arizona. Although Slayden and R.S. 

moved to Nevada shortly after R.S.’s birth, they moved back to Arizona 

between December 2015 and December 2016. Slayden alleges that he and 

R.S. then left Arizona in December 2016—a month before the petition was 

filed in Arizona—and have lived in Nevada ever since. After Slayden 

moved to Nevada, he did not allow Price to have any contact with R.S. At 

the time Price filed the petition in January 2017, both Mother and Price lived 

in Arizona.

Slayden also contends that Price was required to appeal the 

superior court’s denial of her request for emergency legal decision-making 

authority and petition for a temporary order for legal decision-making 

authority but failed to do so. But those denials were non-appealable orders

under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A). And they do not affect the overarching petition 

for third-party legal decision-making authority.

Next, Slayden argues that there was error pervading several

hearings, including allegedly biased statements made by the superior court, 

false allegations of prior domestic violence convictions, pretrial rulings 

1 We also note that Slayden did not seek to introduce electronic 

records of any proceedings under ARCAP 11(f).
PRICE v. SLAYDEN

Decision of the Court

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prohibiting necessary witness testimony, arbitrary time limitations on 

witness questioning, and evidence of perjured testimony. But in the 

absence of transcripts, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in 

ruling on those various issues.

Slayden further contends that the superior court erred by 

dismissing his motion to compel Price to provide discovery and to answer 

interrogatories. The superior court has broad discretion when ruling on 

disclosure and discovery matters, and we will not disturb an evidentiary 

ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Johnson v. 

Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239, 241–42, ¶ 8 (App. 2018). Here, Slayden has failed 

to show how he was prejudiced by any late disclosure. Before trial, Slayden 

conceded that his motion to compel was moot. Therefore, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to compel Price to comply with 

disclosure and discovery obligations.

Slayden also contends that the superior court erred by 

granting Price physical custody of R.S. Specifically, Slayden alleges that 

Price tampered with witnesses, has used drugs in the past, committed 

perjury and lied to law enforcement, and is unemployed and on welfare. In 

essence, Slayden asks that we reevaluate witness credibility and consider 

additional evidence not contained in the record. We decline to do so. See 

Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 92, ¶ 36 (App. 1998) (“We do not 

reweigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.”); Ashton-Blair 

v. Merrill, 187 Ariz. 315, 317 (App. 1996) (“We may only consider the matters 

in the record before us.”).

Next, Slayden contends that the superior court erred by 

allowing Price to challenge paternity because the challenge was timebarred. But a party may challenge paternity at any time after the statutorily 

defined period on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 

A.R.S. § 25-812(E). Fraud occurs “[w]hen a party obtains a judgment by 

concealing material facts and suppressing the truth with the intent to 

mislead the court.” McNeil v. Hoskyns, 236 Ariz. 173, 176–77, ¶ 14 (App. 

2014) (citation omitted); see also Alvarado v. Thomson, 240 Ariz. 12, 16–17, ¶ 

21 (App. 2016) (finding fraud when individual used a fraudulent 

acknowledgement of paternity “to obtain a birth certificate and to avoid 

court proceedings that would have required a best-interests assessment”).

Here, Mother alleged that even though she knew Slayden was 

not R.S.’s father, she listed him as the father after he demanded that his 

name be put on the birth certificate. We find persuasive the superior court’s 

reasoning that Slayden’s false acknowledgment of paternity “effectively 
PRICE v. SLAYDEN

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allowed him to adopt [R.S.] unlawfully, without Court proceedings to 

determine if Slayden was a fit and proper person to adopt, or if adoption 

was in [R.S.]’s best interest.” See Alvarado, 240 Ariz. at 17, ¶ 23 (noting that 

where parties fraudulently collude to establish parentage, the legal 

determination of paternity may be set aside as “fraud on the court”). The 

superior court therefore did not err by concluding that the use of a 

fraudulent acknowledgment of paternity was a fraud on the court, and it 

acted within its discretion by ordering Slayden to undergo DNA testing.

Slayden counters that any fraud on the court was committed 

not by him but by Mother and Price. Fraud on the court occurs when a 

party has committed some intentional act or conduct to mislead the court. 

See id. at 16, ¶ 17. Because Mother was a “party” to both the third-party 

petition and the fraudulent acknowledgment of paternity, the superior 

court did not err by finding fraud on the court.

Slayden further contends that the superior court erred by 

allowing Price to request DNA testing because she is not R.S.’s biological 

mother. See A.R.S. § 25-812(E) (“[T]he mother, father or child . . . may 

challenge a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.”). But Mother also 

challenged paternity and requested genetic testing. The court therefore did 

not err by requiring that Slayden undergo DNA testing.

Slayden contends that Price failed to properly authenticate 

text messages to prove that they were sent by him. To authenticate an item 

of evidence, “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Ariz. R. Evid. 

901(a). We review the superior court’s ruling on authentication for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 563, ¶ 74 (2014).

Here, Price introduced Facebook and text messages between 

her and Slayden. Those messages came from the Facebook account 

registered under Slayden’s name and the text messages themselves appear 

to be from Slayden’s phone number. Because Slayden failed to provide any 

evidence to show that the messages were inaccurate, doctored, or 

mislabeled, we find no abuse of discretion.

Slayden also contends that the superior court erred by 

admitting incomplete text message conversations, arguing hearsay. The 

rule of completeness provides that if one party introduces part of a recorded 

statement, an adverse party may require the concurrent introduction of other 

parts when fairness demands. Ariz. R. Evid. 106. Here, we find no error 
PRICE v. SLAYDEN

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because Slayden failed to provide the superior court with additional text 

messages that would complete the conversation.

Finally, Slayden contends that the superior court did not state 

or use Arizona rules, laws, or guidelines in its decision. We find no support 

for this argument as the superior court’s order granting Price immediate 

physical custody of R.S. cites to both case law and Arizona statutes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.