J-S04006-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEFAN EVANS, SR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 696 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000357-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 23, 2018

Appellant, Stefan Evans, Sr., appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered April 13, 2017, following his entry of a guilty plea to one 

count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4), 

on January 24, 2017. We affirm.

Count two of the information, aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon graded as a second-degree felony, charged that Appellant “used a 

buck knife to cut Stefan Evans, Jr.[, his son, in the] stomach with the folding 

knife causing a deep long end laceration across the victim’s torso, 

approximately 17 inches long, also cut the victim’s hand in two locations....” 

Information, 6/20/16, at Count 2.

The trial court summarized the procedural history of the case, as 

follows:
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The charges arose from an alleged physical altercation between 

Appellant and his adult son wherein Appellant attacked his son 

with a pocket knife and cut his abdomen 17 inches. Appellant 

waived his May 24, 201[6] preliminary hearing and June 27, 

2016 formal arraignment while being represented by counsel, 

Richard Wilson, Esquire of the Bradford County Public Defender’s 

Office. A plea hearing was scheduled for August 29, 2016. On 

August 8, 2016 Appellant filed a “Waiver of Counsel” pro se 

seeking a hearing to proceed without counsel. A Grazier[1]

hearing was held on the date of the scheduled plea hearing, 

August 29, 2016. After an extensive colloquy, an Order dated 

August 29, 2016 was entered finding Appellant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived [his] right to counsel. . . . Appellant did not 

enter a plea on said date. A criminal pretrial conference was 

then scheduled for September 13, 2016. The pretrial conference 

was continued two times at Appellant’s request so that he may 

prepare for trial. Appellant also filed various motions in the 

meantime such as an Omnibus Pretrial Motion on December 16, 

2016, a Motion to Recuse and a Motion Seeking Change of 

Venue. All such motions were denied as untimely or without 

merit.

Appellant did file a Motion to Appoint Standby Counsel on 

December 19, 2016[,] which was granted and his prior counsel, 

Attorney Richard Wilson, Chief Public Defender, was appointed 

as standby counsel. At the January 18, 2017 criminal pretrial 

conference Appellant again waived counsel, but continued to 

desire standby counsel. Jury selection and trial was scheduled to 

begin January 23, 2017. On January 23, 2017 Appellant with 

standby counsel waived jury trial. An extensive colloquy was 

conducted regarding the waiver of jury trial which is similar to 

that of waiving counsel. Thereafter further colloquy was 

conducted to insure Appellant continued to waive counsel. 

Appellant decided at that time he wanted counsel and standby 

counsel, Richard Wilson, Esquire, became his counsel of record. 

Trial was to commence on January 24, 2017 at which time 

Appellant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to 

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1

 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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Aggravated Assault, 2702(a)(4) as a Felony of the Second 

degree.[2]

On February 23, 2017, Appellant again filed a “Motion to 

Waive Counsel” seeking a hearing on said Motion. He also filed a 

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on March 10, 2017. On April 10, 

2017, a Grazier hearing was held. See Trans, 4/10/17 Grazier 

Hearing, Pgs. 3-5. As Appellant had already entered a plea of 

guilty, the colloquy questions were limited to his motion to 

withdraw guilty plea and sentencing. Appellant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived counsel. See Trans. 4/10/17 Grazier Hearing 

at pg. 5. Further hearing on Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw 

Guilty Plea was held and denied by Order dated April 12, 2017. 

See Trans. 4/10/17 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, pgs. 6-10.

Appellant was sentenced on April 13, 2017 to a minimum 

of 40 months and a maximum of 96 months.[3]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on April 24, 2012 

appealing from orders entered on April 10 and April 12, 2017. 

Appellant was ordered to file a concise statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal which he initially complied with on 

May 5, 2017. Appellant’s statement seeks “review of the abuses 

of discretion and unlawful rulings exercised by” the trial court 

and refers to Orders of January 20, 2017 (denying Appellant’s 

Omnibus Motion and Motion in Limine), February 17, 2017 

(unaware of an Order with this date) and Order of April 12, 2017 

(denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea). Appellant also makes 

bare assertions that all involved in his case denied him of [his] 

right to competent counsel, right to a preliminary hearing, right 

to challenge evidence, right to confront accusers, right to 

compulsory process to obtain witnesses, right to withdraw guilty 

plea and right to trial by judge or jury. On May 9, 2017, 

Appellant filed an Amended Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained Of to include “the complaint that the court failed to 

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2

 The negotiated plea included a sentencing agreement at the “low end of 

the standard range minimum with the maximum open to the [c]ourt.” N.T. 

(Guilty Plea), 1/24/17, at 1.

3

 The minimum sentence imposed, forty months, was “the very bottom of 

the standard range,” which was “forty months to fifty-two months.” N.T. 

(Sentencing), 4/13/17, at 21.
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conduct adequate waiver of counsel colloquy’s [sic] as required 

by law.” See footnote to Appellant’s Amendment to Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/17, at 1–3. On November 20, 2017, this Court 

dismissed the appeal for Appellant’s failure to file a brief, but we reinstated it 

sua sponte on December 7, 2017, following Appellant’s November 30, 2017 

filing of “Extraordinary Writ, Constitutional Deprivation,” which we accepted 

as a timely filed brief. Order, 12/7/17.

As noted, on April 26, 2017, the trial court directed Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Appellant filed a concise statement on May 5, 2017, and an 

amended concise statement on May 9, 2017. Appellant’s statements failed

to identify sufficiently the issues to be raised on appeal. Noting this 

insufficiency, the trial court stated as follows:

Here Appellant’s Amendment to Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained sets forth that he is

“seeking review of the abuses of discretion and the 

unlawful rulings by Maureen T. Beirne, President 

Judge, as is evidenced by the Orders she issued on: 

the 20th of January 2017 (related to a Motion in 

Limine); February 17, 2017, (related to an Omnibus 

Motion; and the Order of April 12, 2017 (related to 

the Argument held on April 10, 2017 pursuant to my 

filing of a Motion to Withdraw My Induced Guilty 

Plea.”

See Appellant’s Statement filed May 9, 2017.

Although Appellant concisely identifies each ruling he 

wishes to challenge, he fails to provide “sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues.” Therefore, Appellant has waived 

any error or complaint and his sentence should be affirmed.
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Appellant also sets forth in his statement that he will show 

through documents that the judge, assistant DA and public 

defender worked in cooperation to deny him due process. He 

sets forth the rights and protections violated as:

The right to competent counsel, but fails to set forth 

how counsel was incompetent.

Failure to conduct legal and adequate waiver of counsel 

colloquy, but fails to state he did not know what he was 

doing or that it was involuntary.

Right to preliminary hearing but fails to set forth how 

this right was violated.

Right to challenge the evidence held against him, but 

fails to set forth how this right was violated.

Right to confront accusers, but fails to set forth how this 

right was violated.

Right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, but 

fails to state how this right was violated.

Right to withdraw an illegally induced guilty plea, but 

fails to set forth how this right was violated.

Right to trial by judge or jury, but fails to set forth how 

this right was violated.

These are general boilerplate allegations. Again, Appellant 

fails to concisely identify each ruling in which the listed general 

issues were raised and fails to provide “sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues.” The [c]ourt is unable to provide 

reasons for its rulings without sufficient detail as to what 

Appellant is claiming was error. Therefore, Appellant has waived 

said issues and his sentence should be affirmed.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/17, at 4–5. We concur that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statements are “too vague to allow the court to identify the issues 

raised on appeal [and are] the functional equivalent of no concise statement 

at all.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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Moreover, “[a]ppellate briefs must conform materially to the 

requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this 

Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the defect in the brief is 

substantial.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 

2017); Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Although this Court is willing to construe liberally 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special 

benefit. Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural rules 

set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.” Id.

Appellant’s brief fails to comply with multiple rules of appellate 

procedure, beginning with Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). The brief fails to include a 

Statement of the Scope and Standard of Review, a Statement of the 

Questions Involved,4 Pa.R.A.P. 2116, a Statement of the Case, Pa.R.A.P. 

2117, and a Summary of the Argument, Pa.R.A.P. 2118. Moreover, the 

argument section of the brief fails to present identifiable, cogent legal 

arguments with citation to pertinent law and/or the record, in violation of 

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4 While there is no statement of the question involved, Appellant peppers 

his argument with “questions.” For example, Appellant poses:

Question; when the tree of justice has been contaminated by 

unjustified actions of Court Officials, the fruit of that tree can not 

ripen until that injustice that contaminated the tree of justice has 

been corrected and the manifest injustices that has caused that 

contamination has been removed; Does the Superior Court 

Justices agree with this analysis?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (verbatim).
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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c), (e), and Pa.R.A.P. 2132. We find that the considerable 

defects in Appellant’s brief impair our review. Thus, for this reason as well, 

we conclude that Appellant’s issues are waived.

We further note the trial court’s reasons for its rulings, as follows:

[T]he reasons for the [c]ourt’s [o]rders of January 20, 2017[, 

relating to Appellant’s motions in limine,] are set forth in said 

[o]rders . . . . Appellant’s Omnibus Motion was untimely. 

Appellant’s Motion in Limine repeated his Omnibus Motion.

The April 12, 2017 [o]rder denying Appellant’s Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Plea was entered because there was no 

colorable demonstration such that permitting withdrawal would 

promote fairness and justice. “The proper inquiry on 

consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the 

accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the 

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would 

promote fairness and justice. The policy of liberality remains 

extant but has its limits, consistent with the affordance of a 

degree of discretion to the common pleas courts.” 

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, 706[, 115 A.3d 

1284, 1292] (Pa. June 15, 2015). Here Appellant made no such 

colorable demonstration. Appellant made a bare assertion of 

innocence in the motion. At the hearing/argument, he 

commented that he [was] not guilty of aggravated assault but 

guilty of simple assault. Trans 4/10/17 at pg. 7–8. The facts set 

forth at the sentencing hearing supported the offense of 

aggravated assault, otherwise, the [c]ourt would not have 

accepted the plea. The Appellant entered a guilty plea the day 

trial was to commence. He then filed his petition to withdraw 

guilty plea within [one] month. Appellant’s assertion of 

innocence is not credible.[5] Throughout the proceedings, 

Appellant has wavered between requesting counsel and 

requesting to proceed self-represented. . . .

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5

 We observe, in addition, that Appellant stated at the April 10, 2017 

hearing on Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, “I have never, I 

have never tried to say I was innocent of this charge . . . .” N.T., 4/10/17, 

at 8.
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The only issue that may have been raised properly is 

Appellant’s complaint regarding adequate waiver of counsel 

colloquy. Therefore that will be addressed here.

At the August 29, 2016 [hearing,] an extensive waiver-ofcounsel colloquy was conducted, however, Appellant did not 

request this transcript. Therefore, the [c]ourt will have same 

prepared and submitted as a supplement to the record. 

Appellant answered questions about his age, educational 

background, and mental health and mental defects and 

medications. Appellant stated that he understood he had a right 

to counsel, including the right to be appointed counsel free of 

charge in the event he could not afford an attorney. The nature 

of the charges and elements of the offenses were read to 

Appellant as well as the allegations against him and he stated he 

understood. Appellant acknowledged he understood the 

maximum possible penalty for each of the offenses charged. 

Appellant also indicated he understood he would be held to the 

same procedural and evidentiary rules as an attorney, and that 

an attorney would be familiar with those rules[.] In addition, 

Appellant acknowledged he might have possible defenses that an 

attorney may be aware of that if not raised at trial could be lost 

permanently. Finally, Appellant stated he understood that he 

had many rights that he would have to assert in a timely manner 

in order to avoid losing them permanently.

Appellant complains in his [Rule 1925(b)] statement that 

“the court failed to conduct adequate waiver of counsel 

colloquy’s as required by law.” He does not state that his waiver 

was not voluntary, knowing or intelligent. However, the 

extensive colloquy is more than adequate to comply with 

Pa.R.Crim.Proc. Rule 121.

Appellant does not state which waiver of counsel colloquy 

was inadequate, but refers to the transcript of [the] hearing held 

on April 10, 2017 and April 13, 2017[.] Appellant’s complaint is 

without merit because Pennsylvania Superior [C]ourt has 

adopted the “ongoing waiver rule.” This rule provides that “once 

a[n] Appellant has made a competent waiver of counsel, that 

waiver remains in effect through all subsequent proceedings in 

that case absent a substantial change in circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

May 19, 2016). Thus the original waiver remained valid. Here 

there was no substantial change in circumstances. Appellant 

requested counsel for his trial, then entered a plea of guilty while 
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represented by counsel. Within one month[], Appellant again 

requested to proceed pro se. This does not establish a 

substantial change in circumstances.

Further, a colloquy for waiver of jury trial was conducted 

on January 23, 2017 providing Appellant with all his rights 

connected with a jury trial. The colloquy further included 

questions regarding waiver of counsel and explaining what 

standby counsel is. It was at this time Appellant requested 

counsel to represent him. On April 10, 2017, the issues 

remaining in the matter were [A]ppellant’s Motion to Withdraw 

Guilty Plea and potential sentencing scheduled for 2 days later. 

Appellant was again asked about his age, education and 

medications. Further Appellant was advised and acknowledged 

he understood that he would still be bound by all rules of 

procedure and knowledge of law that an attorney would be 

familiar with. Appellant also acknowledged he understood that if 

he failed to raise issues during his argument on Motion to 

Withdraw Guilty Plea, and if that was denied, at his sentencing in 

3 days, his right to raise such issues would be lost. These were 

the only rights Appellant needed to be advised of. He had been 

appointed counsel and was aware . . . that he could have 

counsel. He had been advised of the elements of the charges in 

the August 29, 2016 waiver of counsel proceeding and at the 

time he entered his plea of guilty. Therefore, the waiver of 

counsel colloquy at that time of the proceedings was adequate. 

To have advised Appellant of all the elements of all the charges 

against him again would have been “mere ceremony”. See i.e. 

Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 1955). This 

matter is similar to that of Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 

1056 (9th Cir. 1968) wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

found that “Appellant had not triggered the need for a new 

colloquy” where Appellant had competently waived counsel, but 

then requested appointment of counsel as indicated in initial 

waiver that said waiver was limited to that particular stage of the 

proceedings. Id. at 1057.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/17, at 6–8.

In sum, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s vague and 

imprecise Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements fail to preserve issues for review. 

See Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2002) 
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(stating that when an appellant’s Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement is too vague 

to identify a specific issue, the issue is waived). Further, Appellant’s 

appellate brief fails to provide identifiable, coherent legal arguments and 

fails to comply with our rules of appellate procedure, resulting in waiver on 

this basis, as well. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798. Finally, even if not waived, 

the denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the 

sufficiency of the colloquy to waive counsel lack merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/23/2018