Opinion filed March 31, 2017

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

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No. 11-16-00293-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF A.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 8024-CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court entered an order in which it terminated the parental rights of

the parents of A.S. Both parents appeal; each presents a single issue challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence as to the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Termination Standards and Findings

Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2016). To determine on 

appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review 

all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether 

a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 
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was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of 

factors need be proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape 

their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These 

include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and 

physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical 

danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals 

seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote 

the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the 

agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the 

acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child 

relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the 

parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for 

termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s 

best interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(T) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 

FAM. § 161.001(b). In this case, the trial court found that the mother committed four 

of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), (N),

and (O)—and that the father committed two of those acts—those found in 

subsections (N) and (O). The trial court also found that termination of each parent’s 

rights would be in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). On appeal, 
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neither parent challenges the findings made pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1); 

however, both parents challenge the best interest findings.

Evidence and Analysis: Best Interest

The parents assert that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights 

would be in A.S.’s best interest and that the best interest of A.S. would be served by 

appointing the parents as possessory conservators. We disagree.

The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services

removed A.S. from the parents based upon domestic violence committed by the 

father against the mother and the parents’ use of drugs while A.S. was in their care. 

Both parents were arrested while the Department was at the parents’ hotel room 

investigating the initial intake. A.S. was less than three months old at that time, and 

she was placed with her maternal great aunt.

The mother, who had a history with the Department, partially complied with 

her court-ordered family service plan, and the Department attempted a monitored 

return to the mother. The monitored return, however, was unsuccessful, and the 

child was returned to the great aunt after less than three weeks. The monitored return 

ended when the mother left A.S. with the mother’s grandmother and explained that 

she “just couldn’t do it anymore.” The mother’s drug use obviously interfered with 

her ability to take care of A.S.; the mother admitted that she continued to abuse 

methamphetamine, although she testified that her drug of choice was cocaine. As a 

result of her continued methamphetamine use, the mother’s visitations were 

suspended sometime after the unsuccessful monitored return. The mother agreed 

that, at the time of trial, A.S. was where she needed to be because the mother was 

not a good candidate to be a parent to A.S. at that time, but the mother did not want 

her rights to be terminated as she hoped to find an answer for her drug problem in 

the future.
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The evidence at trial shows that the father tested positive for 

methamphetamine at the time of the removal and while this case was pending. A 

police officer who was present at the time of the removal and arrested the father for 

assault family violence testified that the father appeared to be “loaded on 

methamphetamine.” The father did not comply with his court-ordered family service 

plan, was in and out of jail during these proceedings, and did not maintain contact 

with the Department. The father did not regularly visit the child; he may have 

attended “a couple” of visits early on in this case. The father was incarcerated at the 

time of the final hearing and did not testify at trial.

A.S. had lived with her maternal great aunt for nearly all of her life; the mother 

and A.S. had even lived with the great aunt upon being released from the hospital 

after A.S. was born. According to the Department’s supervisor, the great aunt went 

“above and beyond” in this case and tried to help the mother become the parent that 

she needed to be. The great aunt even moved to Abilene and bought a house so that 

the mother would not have to travel as far to see the child and to otherwise try to 

help the mother. Ultimately, though, the great aunt feared that the mother’s 

“continuous use of drugs” rendered her incapable of being a safe caregiver for A.S. 

The great aunt believed that termination of the parents’ rights would be in the child’s 

best interest, but she also said that, if in the future the parents were “in the right 

place” and had turned their lives around, she might be willing to allow them to have 

some sort of relationship with A.S. The great aunt had a safe, stable, and loving

home and desired to adopt A.S. A.S. was bonded to the great aunt and her family. 

A.S. was doing well in the great aunt’s care and was developmentally on target.

The case supervisor for the Department believed that termination of the 

parents’ rights and adoption by the great aunt would be in A.S.’s best interest. The 

Department’s goal for A.S. was for her to be adopted by her great aunt. The child’s 
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guardian ad litem agreed that termination of the parents’ rights was in A.S.’s best 

interest.

We do not agree with the parents’ contention that the evidence was 

insufficient to show that termination of the parents’ rights would be in A.S.’s best 

interest, nor do we agree with their assertion that A.S.’s best interest would be served 

by appointing the parents as possessory conservators. A factfinder may infer from 

a parent’s past inability to meet a child’s physical and emotional needs an inability 

or unwillingness to meet a child’s needs in the future. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 

118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Additionally, a factfinder may 

infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future 

if the child is returned to the parent. Id. The parents had endangered A.S.’s wellbeing and had not demonstrated an ability to meet the child’s needs in the future.

At the time of the termination hearing, A.S. was eighteen months old and, 

thus, could not verbally express her desires. “When children are too young to 

express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with 

the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a 

parent.” Id. The evidence in this case did not indicate a strong bond between the 

parents and A.S. The father had constructively abandoned A.S., and the mother’s 

visitations had been suspended due to her drug use. A.S. had lived with her great 

aunt for all but two months of her life. A.S. was very bonded to the great aunt’s

family, and the great aunt was committed to adopting A.S., keeping her safe, and

providing her with permanency. The need for permanency is a paramount 

consideration for a child’s present and future physical and emotional needs, and the 

goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a compelling government 

interest. Id.

Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold 

that the trial court’s best interest findings are not supported by clear and convincing
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evidence. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court could reasonably have 

formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in the child’s best interest for the 

mother’s and the father’s parental rights to be terminated. We hold that the evidence 

is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest 

findings. We overrule the sole issue presented by the mother and the sole issue 

presented by the father in this appeal.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

March 31, 2017

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.