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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39276

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JANET PALMA,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 575

Filed: August 3, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to modify judgment of conviction, vacated, and case 

remanded.

Kohler Law Offices, P.A.; Jay A. Kohler, Idaho Falls, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LANSING, Judge

Janet Palma appeals from an order denying her motion to amend her judgment of 

conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. We vacate the district court’s order and remand for 

further proceedings.

I.

BACKGROUND

Palma pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and was sentenced on November 18, 1996,

to a unified term of three years’ imprisonment with one year fixed. The district court suspended 

the sentence and placed Palma on probation. Under the terms of her probation, Palma was 

required to complete fifty hours of community service and graduate from high school or obtain a 

GED in addition to various other requirements. Prior to the expiration of her probation, Palma 

was permitted to have her supervision transferred to the state of Arizona via an interstate 

compact. 
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On November 13, 1999, a probation officer with the Idaho Department of Correction

(IDOC) wrote a letter to the court indicating that Palma had completed some, but not all, of the 

terms of her probation. Because the IDOC anticipated that the “expense of violating Ms. Palma 

and attempting to return her to the state of Idaho would no doubt be greater than the completion 

of a GED, and Community Service,” it recommended that Palma “be granted an unsatisfactory 

discharge from probation.” On December 2, the district court entered a discharge order stating 

that Palma “has unsatisfactorily complied with all of the terms and conditions of her said 

probation; and that she is now entitled to be discharged and fully released therefrom.”1 

In May 2011, Palma filed a motion requesting an amendment of the judgment of 

conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.2

 The court denied Palma’s motion after concluding 

that “Palma’s case has already seen the utilization of Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1), albeit by 

motion of the State,” and that her “failure to appeal the unsatisfactory discharge in the Discharge

Order waived her current attempt to amend the Judgment by means of Idaho Code § 19-

2604(1).” Palma appeals and asserts that the district court erred by concluding that Palma 

waived her ability to seek relief under Section 19-2604.

II.

ANALYSIS

Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1) currently provides:

(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been 

withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that:

(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any 

probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of 

the terms or conditions of probation

. . . .

the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for 

continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public 

interest . . . amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the 

state board of correction to “confinement in a penal facility” for the number of 

days served prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be 

a misdemeanor conviction.

 

1 Palma contends that she never received notice of the discharge order.

2 Palma erroneously requested the relief pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 19-2605(2) and 

19-2604(2). However, the State conceded that the court had authority and discretion to grant the 

relief Palma requested under Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1).
3

Whether a defendant is entitled to relief under Idaho Code Section 19-2604 rests within 

the discretion of the district court. State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 753, 9 P.3d 1217, 1219 

(2000); State v. Hanes, 137 Idaho 40, 41, 44 P.3d 295, 296 (Ct. App. 2002); Housley v. State, 

119 Idaho 885, 887, 811 P.2d 495, 497 (Ct. App. 1991). When a trial court’s discretionary 

decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: 

(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 

lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 

standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 

decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 

(1989). We conclude that the district court here did not act consistently with applicable legal 

standards.

The issue in this appeal is whether Palma’s “unsatisfactory” discharge from probation or 

her failure to appeal the discharge order precluded her from seeking an amended judgment under 

Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1). The State concedes that the discharge order, made pursuant to 

the IDOC’s request for an unsatisfactory discharge, “had no bearing on whether Palma could 

request amendment of her judgment” from a felony to a misdemeanor. The State also concedes 

that the district court erred by concluding that Palma waived her right to seek relief under 

Section 2604(1) by not appealing the discharge order. We agree with both of the State’s 

concessions.

It appears that the district court treated the 1999 discharge order as a finding of a 

probation violation. In doing so, the district court erred. The discharge order does not identify 

terms or conditions, if any, that Palma allegedly violated. Instead, it ambiguously states that 

Palma “has unsatisfactorily complied with all the terms and conditions of her said probation; and 

that she is now entitled to be discharged and fully released therefrom.” More importantly, the 

court’s comment that Palma had unsatisfactorily complied with the terms of her probation was 

made ex parte, based solely on the probation officer’s unsworn letter, and not as part of formal 

proceedings in which Palma had an opportunity to participate or contest the allegations. The 

State made no attempt to prove a probation violation, preferring instead to avoid the cost of 

formal probation violation proceedings, so there was no actual evidence presented upon which a 

finding could have been based. Because there was no formal determination of a probation 
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violation, the unappealed order does not preclude relief under Idaho Code Section 19-2604 for 

Palma.

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The discharge order also did not constitute a prior utilization of Idaho Code Section 19-

2604(1) in this case, for it did not address the type of relief contemplated by that statute. 

Section 19-2604(1) provides an avenue for relief if “sentence has been imposed but suspended, 

or if sentence has been withheld, upon application of the defendant.” I.C. § 19-2604(1) 

(emphasis added). The 1999 order of discharge was not entered “upon application of the 

defendant,” and was not based upon invocation of Section 19-2604(1). 

Our opinion that Palma did not waive the right to seek relief does not intimate any view 

as to whether she should be granted the requested relief. In making that determination, the 

district court must consider the factors set forth in the applicable statute, including whether an 

amended judgment would be compatible with the public interest. Palma will bear the burden to 

show that relief should be granted.4 Hanes, 137 Idaho at 42, 44 P.3d at 297. 

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court’s order and remand for further 

proceedings.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.

 

3 Because we conclude that failure to appeal from the discharge order did not waive 

Palma’s right to request relief, we do not address her assertion that she was unable to appeal the 

order as a result of lack of notice.

4 The State suggests that the current version of Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1) does not 

apply to Palma’s motion. That is an issue to be addressed by the district court on remand. We 

note that when the district court discharged Palma from probation in 1999, Section 19-2604(1) 

permitted setting aside a judgment of conviction if several conditions were met, including that 

“the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed 

on probation.” I.C. § 19-2604(1) (1997). That statute was amended, effective July 1, 2011, to 

permit a district court to either set aside or amend a judgment of conviction if several conditions 

are satisfied, including a showing that “The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, 

in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions 

of probation,” 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 187, § 1 at 537. Thus, only the amended statute 

permits a court to amend the judgment, as Palma requested, and it establishes a more lenient 

standard for relief.