18-206 

Ni v. Barr 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A206 085 178

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th day of November, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

ROBERT D. SACK, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

HUI NI, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 18-206 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: David A. Bredin, Esq., 

Flushing, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Siu P. Wong, Trial Attorney, 

Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration 

Litigation; Joseph H. Hunt, 

Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Division; United States Department 

of Justice, Washington, DC. 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Hui Ni, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of a December 28, 2017 

decision of the BIA affirming an April 19, 2017 decision of 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Hui Ni, No. A206 085 178 (B.I.A. Dec. 28, 

2017), aff’g No. A206 085 178 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 19, 

2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case, to which we refer 

only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition 

for review. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 

The applicable standards of review are well established. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 

76-77 (2d Cir. 2018). 
3 

 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s 

. . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal 

consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of 

such statements with other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 

it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 

162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 

 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 

that Ni was not credible. Ni alleged past persecution in China 

stemming from his practice of Christianity. In finding his 

allegations not credible, the agency reasonably relied on 

Ni’s inconsistent statements about the type of church he 

attended in China and how long he was detained after each 

alleged arrest. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 

Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67. During his credible fear 

interview, when asked what type of church he attended in 

China, Ni identified it as an underground church, and he 

stated that he was arrested about seven times and detained 
4 

for two or three nights after each arrest. But his application 

and testimony differed in that, in those contexts, he stated 

that he had attended a government-sanctioned church from 2006 

to 2012, and had been detained for varying lengths of time 

(from one night to one week) after each arrest. Contrary to 

Ni’s claim, he was asked at his credible fear interview what 

kind of church he attended, not generally whether he attended 

church. See Admin. R. at 506 (Transcript of Credible Fear 

Interview). And the IJ reasonably concluded that Ni’s 

omission of any mention of six years of attendance at a 

government-sanctioned church was significant because it was 

a fact that one would expect to be disclosed. See Hong Fei 

Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79 (weight given to an omission depends, 

in part, on whether “facts are ones that a credible petitioner 

would reasonably have been expected to disclose under the 

relevant circumstances”); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a 

plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (emphasis 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
5 

 While Ni advances the claim that the officer at his 

credible fear interview misunderstood his statements, the IJ 

reasonably found that the record of his interview “displays 

the hallmarks of reliability.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 

715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009). That finding rested on the 

observations that the interview was memorialized in a typed 

question and answer format, indicating a close to verbatim 

record; the interview included questions designed to elicit 

an asylum claim, such as why Ni left China and what he 

believed would happen upon his return; and Ni was responsive 

to the questions during the interview, which was conducted 

through a Mandarin interpreter. See id. 

 Having questioned Ni’s credibility, the agency 

reasonably relied further on Ni’s failure to rehabilitate his 

testimony with corroborating evidence that the agency 

expected to be available. “An applicant’s failure to 

corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, 

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 

been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). As the IJ found, Ni did not 

corroborate his attendance at church in China or his arrests 
6 

in China. Although Ni asserts that he should have had more 

time to obtain a corroborating letter from his mother and 

explains that the one fellow church member that he asked for 

a letter did not provide one, he had four years before his 

hearing to obtain evidence and he does not allege that such 

letters were unavailable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No 

court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact 

with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . 

. . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of 

fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 

evidence is unavailable.”). The IJ was not required to give 

significant corroboratory weight to a certificate showing 

Ni’s 2006 baptism in China, because it confirmed neither Ni’s 

attendance at an underground church nor his arrests. See Y.C. 

v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the 

agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s 

documentary evidence.”). 

 Given the inconsistencies between Ni’s statements and 

the absence of any corroboration of his attendance at an 

underground church or his arrests, we conclude that the 

agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by 

substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu 
7 

Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. That 

determination is dispositive of Ni’s requests for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

requests rest on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. 

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. Ni’s motion for stay of removal is DENIED as moot. 

All other pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court