1

Filed 10/19/20 AlSayyad v. Superior Court CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NEZAR ALSAYYAD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

ALAMEDA COUNTY,

Defendant and Respondent;

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 

OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and

Respondents.

 A157389

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG18922143)

Plaintiff Nezar AlSayyad filed a petition for writ of administrative 

mandamus directed to real parties in interest, Regents of the University of 

California and Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, seeking 

to reduce the term of his suspension from employment at the university. 

Pursuant to the university’s policy on faculty conduct and the administration 

of discipline (University Policy), a subcommittee of the Academic Senate 

Committee on Privilege and Tenure (P&T Committee) conducted a three-day 

disciplinary hearing and found that AlSayyad had engaged in conduct 

violating sections of the university’s code of conduct for faculty (Faculty Code 
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of Conduct) regarding sexual harassment of a student and unprofessional 

conduct toward colleagues.

The University Policy provides that the P&T Committee may make 

recommendations regarding proposed disciplinary sanctions but that the 

chancellor retains the sole discretion to impose various types of discipline on 

faculty members, including suspension and termination. Pursuant to that 

University Policy, the P&T Committee recommended a one-year suspension 

for AlSayyad, but Chancellor Carol Christ imposed a three-year suspension.

AlSayyad’s petition did not challenge the process of the P&T 

Committee’s hearing, the findings made by the P&T Committee, or the 

disciplinary procedures outlined in the University Policy. Instead, AlSayyad 

argued that Chancellor Christ’s decision to impose a three-year suspension 

violated principles of procedural fairness because it was based on her own 

factual findings, which she made without personally observing the testimony 

of witnesses to assess their demeanor and credibility. AlSayyad also argued 

that Chancellor Christ’s role in the administrative process violated principles 

of procedural fairness because she both brought the charges against 

AlSayyad and made the final decision on those charges. Finally, AlSayyad 

argued that the three-year suspension was an abuse of discretion because 

Chancellor Christ did not sufficiently explain her decision and because the 

penalty was excessive as a matter of law. The trial court denied the petition. 

AlSayyad appeals. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

AlSayyad became a professor of architecture at the University of 

California, Berkeley, in 1985. He became tenured in or around 1994. In 

March 2016, a graduate student submitted a written complaint regarding 

AlSayyad to the chair of the department of architecture. The complaint 
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alleged that AlSayyad had engaged in multiple incidents of sexual 

harassment of the student, including touching her on the thigh in October 

2013. It also alleged that AlSayyad told the student that he had fought 

against other professors so the student would pass her May 2014 Ph.D. oral 

qualifying exam. The complaint alleged that AlSayyad had criticized other 

faculty members to the student as a way to isolate her and establish himself 

as her supporter and protector.

A. Investigation

Shortly after the complaint was filed, the university retained a law firm 

to investigate the complaint. The firm interviewed witnesses (including 

AlSayyad and the student), reviewed documents, and issued a confidential 

investigation report (CI Report) on October 5, 2016. The CI Report found 

that AlSayyad had engaged in escalating personal behavior with the student, 

including the physical touching of her thigh. It also found that AlSayyad’s 

communication pattern with the student had caused her to feel intimidated, 

isolated and reliant upon him. Specifically, it found that AlSayyad had 

referred to other faculty members as “ ‘vultures’ ” in an email to the student 

and had told the student that other faculty members were skeptical of her 

scholarly abilities. The CI Report concluded that there was sufficient 

evidence to refer the matter to Vice-Provost for the Faculty Benjamin 

Hermalin.

In November 2016, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the disciplinary 

procedures in the Faculty Code of Conduct, Vice-Provost Hermalin appointed 

two faculty investigators to determine whether there was probable cause to 

institute disciplinary proceedings against AlSayyad by filing a complaint 

with the P&T Committee. The faculty investigation included an in-person 

meeting with AlSayyad, a telephone interview with the student, and review 
4

of the CI Report as well as additional documents. On March 15, 2017, 

pursuant to paragraph 5 of the disciplinary procedures in the Faculty Code of 

Conduct, the faculty investigators sent a letter to AlSayyad notifying him of 

their intent to report that there was probable cause AlSayyad engaged in 

faculty misconduct. The faculty investigators issued their report (FI Report) 

on April 19, 2017, finding that AlSayyad’s touching of the student’s thigh in 

October 2013 had occurred as the student alleged. The faculty investigators 

also found that the incident could be interpreted as an attempt to transition 

into a romantic or sexual relationship, and thus AlSayyad’s subsequent 

criticisms of other faculty could constitute “ ‘grooming’ ” of the student. The 

FI Report concluded that there was probable cause that these actions did 

take place and that AlSayyad was in violation of the Faculty Code of 

Conduct.

On May 3, 2017, pursuant to paragraph 7 of the disciplinary procedures 

in the Faculty Code of Conduct, then-Interim Executive Vice-Chancellor and 

Provost (EVCP) Carol Christ1 sent a letter to AlSayyad notifying him of her 

intent to lodge a complaint with the P&T Committee and propose his 

dismissal as the appropriate disciplinary sanction. The letter also advised 

AlSayyad that he could request mediation prior to the submission of charges 

to the P&T Committee. The letter was sent in accordance with university 

policy requiring that the EVCP provide such notice to a faculty member 

accused of misconduct.

B. Complaint

On June 8, 2017, Vice-Provost Hermalin filed a complaint against 

AlSayyad with the P&T Committee. The complaint alleged four violations of 

1 Christ became Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, 

shortly thereafter.
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the Faculty Code of Conduct: (1) sexual harassment of a student (charge 1); 

(2) use of position or powers as a faculty member to coerce the judgment or 

conscience of a student for arbitrary or personal reasons (charge 2); 

(3) serious violation of the University of California Policy on Sexual Violence 

and Sexual Harassment (charge 3); and (4) failure to show due respect for 

opinions of colleagues and strive to be objective in the professional judgment

of colleagues (charge 4). The complaint recommended that AlSayyad be 

dismissed from his employment at the university.

C. P&T Hearing and Report

In November 2017, pursuant to University of California Bylaws of the 

Academic Senate, bylaw 336(D)(8), the P&T Committee conducted a threeday disciplinary hearing to determine whether the four charges against 

AlSayyad were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The parties 

submitted 145 exhibits in total. Sixteen witnesses were examined, including 

AlSayyad and the student. After the hearing, the P&T Committee issued a 

report finding clear and convincing evidence to support charge 1, charge 3, 

and charge 4. It did not find clear and convincing evidence to support 

charge 2.

On charge 1, the P&T Committee found the claim that AlSayyad 

touched the student’s thigh in October 2013 to be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence and that the gesture created “ ‘an environment that a 

reasonable person would find to be intimidating or offensive.’ ” (Boldface 

omitted.) It also found that while some of the other incidents alleged by the 

student were corroborated—for example, hugging the student before her May 

2014 oral qualifying exam and referring to her as a “ ‘bright woman’ ”—and 

“could be taken as chauvinistic and culturally insensitive,” the evidence did 
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not clearly and convincingly support the claim that these other incidents 

involved sexual harassment.

On charge 2, the P&T Committee found that the evidence did not 

clearly and convincingly support the claim that AlSayyad used his power to 

coerce the judgment or conscience of the student for arbitrary or personal 

reasons.

On charge 3, the P&T Committee referred to its findings on charge 1 

and found clear and convincing evidence to support the claim that AlSayyad 

“seriously” violated the University of California Policy on Sexual Violence 

and Sexual Harassment by touching the student’s thigh in October 2013.

On charge 4, the P&T Committee found that clear and convincing 

evidence of AlSayyad’s unprofessional conduct toward his colleagues in his 

email to the student where he referred to two other professors as 

“ ‘vultures.’ ”

In addition to factual findings, section III of the University Policy 

provides that the P&T Committee may make “recommendations to the 

Chancellor regarding proposed disciplinary sanctions.” In accordance with 

this University Policy, the P&T Committee recommended that AlSayyad be 

suspended for one year without pay, that a letter of censure be placed in his 

personnel file, that he undergo sensitivity training, and that he engage in a 

process of reconciliation with members of the architecture department.

After the P&T Committee issued its report, AlSayyad submitted a 

response letter to Chancellor Christ on March 9, 2018.2 In this letter, 

AlSayyad referred to his email describing his colleagues as “ ‘vultures’ ” as “a 

mistake for which I apologize . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) The letter also stated 

AlSayyad’s continued position that his touching of the student’s thigh in 

2 The letter is erroneously dated March 9, 2017.
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October 2013 “would not suffice to prove a case of sexual harassment.” 

(Boldface omitted.)

D. Chancellor Decision

While the P&T Committee may make recommendations regarding 

disciplinary sanctions, section II of the University Policy provides that the 

chancellor retains the sole discretion to impose various types of discipline on 

a faculty member, including suspension and termination. Paragraph 4 of 

section II states: “Authority for the suspension of a faculty member rests 

with the Chancellor and may not be redelegated.”

On August 13, 2018, Chancellor Christ sent a letter to AlSayyad with 

her disciplinary decision. It stated that Chancellor Christ had “carefully 

reviewed” the P&T Committee report; AlSayyad’s March 9, 2018 letter; and 

“other documentation associated with the case, including exhibits, briefing by 

the parties, and the lengthy transcript of the hearing.”

Chancellor Christ’s letter summarized the findings of the P&T 

Committee on charges 1 through 4. Regarding charges 1 and 3, the letter 

states: “[M]y comprehensive assessment of the P&T Committee’s report and 

the evidence in this case leads me to conclude that these violations of [the 

Faculty Code of Conduct] were quite serious, and that your intention about a 

sexual or romantic relationship is not germane in determining whether there 

was a pattern of sexual harassment.”

The letter then states: “Based on my review of the evidence, I also find 

that your attempts to isolate the complainant from other faculty members, 

mischaracterization of what occurred in her oral qualifying exam, and effort 

to establish yourself as her most important supporter, [sic] were examples of 

using your power for personal gain.”
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The letter continues: “In considering the evidence in its totality, 

including the findings and recommendations of the P&T Committee, with 

which I generally concur, I find that your pattern of unwelcome, 

manipulative and divisive behavior was harmful to students and other 

faculty, and your continuing failure to accept responsibility for the impact of 

your behavior is troubling. My significant experience as a tenured faculty 

member and campus leader at the highest levels leads me to believe that a 

more serious sanction than what the hearing panel recommends is required 

in this matter. As a result, I am imposing the following discipline: a letter of 

censure and a three-year suspension without pay . . . . Should you elect to 

retire during the term of the three-year suspension, I will seek curtailment of 

your emeritus status under the terms of the suspension for the duration of 

the suspension.” AlSayyad retired from the university with a retroactive 

date of July 31, 2018.

E. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate

On September 25, 2018, AlSayyad filed a petition for writ of 

administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 

in the Superior Court of Alameda County. The petition sought, among other 

things, a reduction in AlSayyad’s suspension from three years to one year.

AlSayyad’s petition did not challenge the process of the P&T 

Committee’s hearing, the findings made by the P&T Committee, or the 

disciplinary procedures outlined in the University Policy. Instead, AlSayyad 

argued that a writ was appropriate for three reasons: (1) Chancellor Christ’s 

decision to impose a three-year suspension violated principles of procedural 

fairness because it was based on her own factual findings, which she made 

without personally observing the testimony of witnesses to assess their 

demeanor and credibility; (2) Chancellor Christ’s role in the administrative 
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process violated principles of procedural fairness because she both brought 

the charges against AlSayyad and made the final decision on those charges; 

and (3) the three-year suspension was an abuse of discretion because 

Chancellor Christ did not sufficiently explain her decision and the penalty 

was excessive as a matter of law.

F. Order Denying Petition

The trial court denied the petition, concluding that none of the three 

grounds had merit. It explained that Chancellor Christ’s August 13, 2018 

letter reflected that she reviewed the evidence and the P&T Committee’s 

factual findings in reaching her decision. And while Chancellor Christ 

considered the facts “in a different light,” her decision was still based on the 

evidence and the P&T Committee’s factual findings. Chancellor Christ did 

not reach conflicting findings of fact regarding any contested issue that 

depended on the credibility of witnesses, “e.g., the incident in which 

AlSayyad touched his student’s thigh.” Accordingly, Chancellor Christ did 

not make any credibility determination without the benefit of live testimony 

that denied AlSayyad a fair administrative proceeding.

The trial court also explained that there was no dispute that the choice 

of AlSayyad’s discipline was left to Chancellor Christ’s discretion or that the 

three-year suspension was within the parameters of the relevant regulations. 

Accordingly, the trial court found that the three-year suspension was not an 

abuse of discretion.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The role of an appellate court in reviewing a school disciplinary 

decision on a petition for writ of administrative mandamus is the same as 

that of the trial court. (Doe v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 
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Cal.App.4th 221, 239.) Our inquiry on such a petition extends to questions as 

to whether there was a fair administrative proceeding and whether there was 

any prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b); see 

Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1730 

[explaining that the “fair trial” requirement of Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, 

subd. (b) is equivalent to a prescription that there be a fair administrative 

proceeding].)

We review a question regarding the fairness of an administrative 

proceeding de novo “ ‘because the ultimate determination of procedural 

fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” (Doe v. University of Southern 

California, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 239, quoting Nasha v. City of Los 

Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) In the context of a school 

disciplinary process, fairness does not compel a particular rigid procedure, 

but instead may be satisfied by proceedings that afford the accused a full 

opportunity to present his or her position and defenses. (Doe v. Regents of 

University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1103–1104.)

We also review a question regarding abuse of discretion in the 

imposition of a particular penalty by an administrative body de novo. 

(Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 627.) 

Abuse of discretion “is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the 

manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the 

findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) Under this standard, we do not substitute our discretion 

for that of the administrative body regarding the degree of the penalty 

imposed. (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46–47.) 

“It is only in the exceptional case, when it is shown that reasonable minds 
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cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an abuse of discretion is 

shown.” (Id. at p. 47.)

In this appeal, AlSayyad makes the same three arguments as in the 

trial court. First, AlSayyad argues that Chancellor Christ’s decision violated 

principles of procedural fairness because she acted as a fact finder but did not 

personally view the testimony and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 

Second, AlSayyad argues that Chancellor Christ’s role in the administrative 

process violated principles of procedural fairness because she both brought 

the charges against AlSayyad and made the final decision on those charges. 

Third, AlSayyad argues that the three-year suspension was a prejudicial 

abuse of discretion because Chancellor Christ did not sufficiently explain her 

decision and the penalty was excessive as a matter of law. We address each 

argument in turn.

I. FAIRNESS AND CHANCELLOR AS FACT FINDER

AlSayyad first argues that Chancellor Christ’s decision to impose a 

three-year suspension violated principles of procedural fairness because she 

made findings of fact without having personally observed the testimony of 

witnesses to assess their demeanor and determine their credibility. To 

support his argument, AlSayyad relies on a series of cases involving student 

disciplinary decisions for sexual misconduct at private and public 

universities.

In Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 

1058, 1063–1064, a student filed a petition for writ of administrative 

mandate seeking to challenge his one-year suspension based on a finding that 

he had engaged in nonconsensual sex with a female student from a 

neighboring college. That finding had been made by a review committee 

consisting of a third party investigator retained by the school and two 
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members of the faculty or staff. (Id. at pp. 1061–1063.) The school’s 

grievance procedures did not require the female student to appear in front of 

the committee and did not provide for any questioning of either student by 

the committee or the parties themselves. (Id. at p. 1063.)

The appellate court concluded that these procedures deprived the 

accused student of a fair hearing. (Doe v. Claremont McKenna College, supra, 

25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1065–1066.) It identified “a set of core principles 

applicable to cases where the accused student faces a severe penalty and the 

school’s determination turns on the complaining witness’s credibility.” (Id. at 

p. 1070.) The appellate court articulated one such principle: “[T]he 

complaining witness must be before the finder of fact either physically or 

through videoconference or like technology to enable the finder of fact to 

assess the complaining witness’s credibility in responding to its own 

questions or those proposed by the accused student.” (Ibid.) While the school 

contended that this principle did not apply because the case was not “ ‘a true 

he-said-she-said credibility contest,’ ” the appellate court rejected the 

argument. (Id. at p. 1071.) It reasoned that given there were no first-hand 

witnesses, the committee’s finding of nonconsensual sex relied on the 

complainant’s testimonial evidence and “certainly” turned on her credibility. 

(Ibid.)

This principle was subsequently applied in Doe v. Allee (2019) 30 

Cal.App.5th 1036, 1039 (Allee), where a student filed a petition for writ of 

administrative mandate seeking to challenge his expulsion based on a finding 

that he had engaged in nonconsensual sex with another student at the 

University of Southern California. The university’s disciplinary procedures 

did not provide for any hearing or opportunity for the accused student to 

challenge the veracity of any witness against him. (Id. at p. 1057.)
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The appellate court concluded that the accused student was denied a 

fair hearing. (Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069.) It reasoned: “ ‘ “A 

decision relating to the misconduct of a student requires a factual 

determination as to whether the conduct took place or not.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 

1065.) In Allee, the investigator determined that the two students had 

conflicting accounts of the incident that could not be reconciled. (Id. at p. 

1053.) The appellate court concluded that in such circumstances where there 

are competing narratives regarding an incident, “some form of in-person 

questioning” is required to enable the fact finder to observe the witnesses’ 

demeanors. (Id. at p. 1066.)

AlSayyad argues, and real parties in interest explicitly assume for 

purposes of this analysis, that the principle from Doe v. Claremont McKenna 

College applies here. Applying this principle, AlSayyad argues that he was 

entitled to have the fact finder assess the credibility of all the witnesses in 

his case, “especially” the credibility of the student and himself. He argues 

that Chancellor Christ violated this principle of fairness by making factual 

findings without being able to personally assess witness credibility. 

Accordingly, our determination of whether this fairness principle was 

violated turns on the question of whether Chancellor Christ made any 

findings of fact and, if so, whether those findings triggered a requirement 

that Chancellor Christ personally observe the witnesses to determine their 

demeanor and credibility.3

3 Real parties in interest argue that the trial court made a 

“foundational factual finding[]” that Chancellor Christ did not act as a fact 

finder and that the trial court’s finding should be reviewed for substantial 

evidence. We do not find the argument persuasive. The trial court found 

that Chancellor Christ did not “reach[] conflicting findings of fact regarding 

any contested issue that depends on the credibility of witnesses.” We 

conclude that this was not a foundational finding of fact but instead 
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AlSayyad points to four statements in Chancellor Christ’s August 13, 

2018 letter as evidence that Chancellor Christ made her own findings of fact 

that were contrary to the findings by the P&T Committee and required her to 

make credibility determinations regarding the witnesses. We address each 

argument in turn.

A. Intention Not Germane to Sexual Harassment

Chancellor Christ’s letter states, with regard to AlSayyad’s violations of 

the Faculty Code of Conduct regarding sexual harassment, that the 

Chancellor concluded the violations were “quite serious” and that AlSayyad’s 

“intention about a sexual or romantic relationship is not germane in 

determining whether there was a pattern of sexual harassment.” AlSayyad 

argues that this statement suggests that Chancellor Christ made a factual 

finding that AlSayyad engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment, contrary to 

the P&T Committee’s finding that AlSayyad’s touching of the student’s thigh 

in October 2013 was the only incident amounting to sexual harassment.

We disagree. As a preliminary matter, Chancellor Christ’s letter 

explains that the P&T Committee “did not find [AlSayyad] to have engaged 

in a pattern of sexual harassment” and that Chancellor Christ “generally 

concur[red]” in the P&T Committee’s findings. Moreover, as AlSayyad 

concedes, Chancellor Christ’s statement that AlSayyad’s intention was not 

germane accurately summarizes the university’s standard for sexual 

harassment. Section II, subsection B.2 of the University of California Policy 

on Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment defines sexual harassment as 

answered the question of whether AlSayyad was denied a fair administrative 

proceeding. (See Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1434, 

1443 [explaining that questions as to procedural fairness are “essentially 

questions of law”].)
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“unwelcome sexual advances,” regardless of the perpetrator’s intent to enter 

into a sexual or romantic relationship.

Nor are we persuaded by AlSayyad’s argument that the inclusion of the 

phrase “I also find” in the next sentence of the letter suggests that Chancellor 

Christ made a finding that AlSayyad engaged in a pattern of sexual 

harassment. As described above, Chancellor Christ’s statement of the 

standard regarding a pattern of sexual harassment was immediately 

preceded by her conclusion that AlSayyad’s violations were “quite 

serious . . . .” Chancellor Christ’s letter does not support the logical leap 

AlSayyad asks us to take: that this statement of the standard somehow 

evidences a factual finding that AlSayyad engaged in a pattern of sexual 

harassment. We conclude that this statement accurately reflected the 

university’s standard regarding sexual harassment, and was not a factual 

finding.

B. Pattern of Unwelcome, Manipulative and Divisive Behavior

Chancellor Christ’s letter states: “I find that your pattern of 

unwelcome, manipulative and divisive behavior was harmful to students and 

other faculty, and your continuing failure to accept responsibility for the 

impact of your behavior is troubling.” AlSayyad argues that this statement 

indicates that Chancellor Christ made a factual finding contrary to the P&T 

Committee’s findings on sexual harassment.

Again, we disagree. Chancellor Christ stated that AlSayyad engaged in 

a “pattern of unwelcome, manipulative and divisive behavior,” not that he 

engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment. Chancellor Christ also described 

a pattern of behavior that was harmful to both students and “other 

faculty . . . .” Accordingly, the statement is more appropriately interpreted as 

a characterization of AlSayyad’s behavior and the P&T Committee’s findings 
16

regarding that behavior: that AlSayyad engaged in sexual harassment 

against a student and engaged in unprofessional conduct toward his 

colleagues. We conclude that this statement was a characterization of the 

behavior as found by the P&T Committee, not a factual finding by Chancellor 

Christ.

C. Mischaracterization of May 2014 Exam

Chancellor Christ’s letter states: “Based on my review of the evidence, 

I also find that your attempts to isolate the complainant from other faculty 

members, mischaracterization of what occurred in her oral qualifying exam, 

and effort to establish yourself as her most important supporter, [sic] were 

examples of using your power for personal gain.” AlSayyad argues that 

Chancellor Christ’s statement shows that she made a factual finding that 

AlSayyad mischaracterized what occurred in the student’s May 2014 oral 

qualifying exam, contrary to the P&T Committee’s finding that the evidence 

“does not clearly and convincingly show that Professor AlSayyad made false 

comments to [the student] after the exam.”

At the P&T Committee hearing, the student testified that after her 

May 2014 oral qualifying exam, AlSayyad told her that two professors 

thought she should not have passed but that AlSayyad fought for her. 

Another professor who also served as an examiner testified that the student 

subsequently followed up on the issue, and that professor responded to her 

that while the exam went well, one examiner thought that in some respects 

her answers had only glossed the surface of an issue. AlSayyad then testified 

that he told the student there had been a mixed reaction to her performance. 

He also testified that it was standard for him to tell students “ ‘I will save 

you’ ” as a way to explain how he can ask the type of questions during an oral 

qualifying exam that allow students to show their knowledge.
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Handwritten notes from the exam committee chair were also 

introduced into evidence. The notes reflected that the first faculty member 

had assessed the student as “glib” and that the student had done less well on 

a particular section of the exam. The notes also reflected that the second 

faculty member thought the student had gotten some things “wrong,” “mixed 

up” terminology, and had some problems.

Based on this evidence, the P&T Committee concluded that while 

AlSayyad’s comments “may have been indiscreet” and “seem to have upset” 

the student, the comments appeared to align with the examiners’ 

assessments of the student’s performance. Because the P&T Committee 

determined that the evidence did not “clearly and convincingly show” that 

AlSayyad’s comments were false, it concluded that the evidence “does not 

clearly support a charge that Professor AlSayyad used his powers to coerce 

[the student’s] judgement [sic] for arbitrary or personal reasons.”

Chancellor Christ’s statement regarding AlSayyad’s

“mischaracterization of what occurred in her oral qualifying exam” does not 

show that she rejected the P&T Committee’s factual finding that AlSayyad’s 

comments appeared to align with the examiners’ assessments. Nor does it 

show that she made a contrary factual finding that his comments as to their 

assessments were false. Instead, the letter shows that Chancellor Christ 

came to a different conclusion regarding how AlSayyad had characterized his 

impact on the exam outcome to the student: that she had passed because he 

had fought for her or saved her. Having reached that conclusion, she then 

refers to that mischaracterization as one of the “examples of using your 

power for personal gain.”

Accordingly, we conclude that this statement constituted a conclusion 

regarding AlSayyad’s comments regarding his impact on the student’s exam, 
18

not a factual finding by Chancellor Christ or a rejection of the P&T 

Committee’s factual finding that his comments regarding the other 

examiners’ assessments were accurate.

D. Power for Personal Gain

AlSayyad’s fourth argument relies on the same statement in Chancellor 

Christ’s letter: “Based on my review of the evidence, I also find that your 

attempts to isolate the complainant from other faculty members, 

mischaracterization of what occurred in her oral qualifying exam, and effort 

to establish yourself as her most important supporter, were examples of 

using your power for personal gain.” AlSayyad argues that Chancellor Christ 

made a factual finding that AlSayyad was “using [his] power for personal 

gain,” contrary to the P&T Committee’s finding on charge 2: that “[t]he 

evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that Professor AlSayyad 

used his power as a faculty member, qualifying exam committee member, or 

as chair of the graduate program, to coerce the judgment or conscience of [the 

student] or other students for arbitrary or personal reasons.”

We disagree, as the statement is again more appropriately interpreted 

as a conclusion regarding AlSayyad’s behavior. To the extent it refers to 

AlSayyad’s attempt to isolate the student and establish himself as her most 

important supporter, it reflects findings by the P&T Committee regarding 

that behavior. For example, the P&T Committee found that AlSayyad had 

sent the student an email describing “two vultures in the architecture 

program who have target it [sic] you.” To the extent it refers to AlSayyad’s 

mischaracterization of the student’s oral exam performance, Chancellor 

Christ’s statement does not run afoul of fairness requirements for the reasons 

discussed above. In total, the statement shows that Chancellor Christ 
19

reached a different conclusion regarding AlSayyad’s use of power for personal 

gain. But that conclusion, in and of itself, is not a factual finding.

In sum, Chancellor Christ’s statements did not constitute findings of 

fact and did not require Chancellor Christ to personally assess witness 

demeanor or credibility. We conclude that Chancellor Christ’s statements do 

not support any violations of procedural fairness.

II. FAIRNESS AND CHANCELLOR AS CHARGER AND DECIDER

AlSayyad argues next that Chancellor Christ’s role in the 

administrative process violated principles of procedural fairness because she 

brought the charges against him and made the final decision on those 

charges. As a preliminary matter, the argument fails because Chancellor 

Christ did not bring the charges against AlSayyad. After the initial 

investigation by an outside firm, the matter was referred to Vice-Provost 

Hermalin, who then managed the faculty investigation. Pursuant to the 

university’s disciplinary procedures, the faculty investigators sent AlSayyad 

the March 15, 2017 letter notifying him of their intent to report a 

determination of probable cause. As required by those same procedures, 

Chancellor Christ then sent AlSayyad the May 3, 2017 letter. The letter 

notified AlSayyad of her intent to lodge a complaint and propose his 

dismissal as the appropriate sanction, based on the faculty investigators’ 

report and their recommendation that the P&T Committee have the ability to 

recommend the maximum sanction of dismissal. The letter also advised 

AlSayyad that he could request mediation prior to the submission of charges 

to the P&T Committee. The content of the letter thus shows that Chancellor 

Christ was involved as required by the university’s procedures to provide 

notice to AlSayyad; it does not support AlSayyad’s proposition that she 

played the role of charger in this process. Vice-Provost Hermalin, not 
20

Chancellor Christ, charged AlSayyad by filing the complaint with the P&T 

Committee.4

Moreover, the circumstances in which courts have found a violation of 

procedural unfairness on this basis provide a stark contrast to Chancellor 

Christ’s role here. In Allee, for example, the appellate court determined that 

the University of Southern California’s disciplinary procedures violated the 

requirements of fundamental fairness because no in-person hearing was 

required under those procedures; the Title IX investigator “interviews 

witnesses, gathers other evidence, and prepares a written report in which the 

investigator acts as prosecutor and tribunal, making factual findings, 

deciding credibility, and imposing discipline.” (Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1068.) The appellate court concluded that a single individual could not 

serve as the fact finder in such circumstances, given the “overlapping and 

conflicting capacities” as investigator, prosecutor, and sentencer. (Id. at p. 

1069.) Unlike Allee, the university’s disciplinary process here included an 

initial investigation by an outside firm, a faculty investigation, a disciplinary 

hearing by the P&T Committee, and a decision by Chancellor Christ. 

Evidence was independently reviewed at each of these stages. For these 

reasons, we conclude that Chancellor Christ’s role in AlSayyad’s disciplinary 

process does not support any violation of fundamental fairness.

III. PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Finally, AlSayyad argues that the three-year suspension imposed by 

Chancellor Christ constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion for two 

4 Real parties in interest argue that the trial court made a finding that 

AlSayyad was charged by Vice-Provost Hermalin and that the trial court’s 

finding should be reviewed for substantial evidence. We do not find the 

argument persuasive as the fact appears to be contained in the background 

section of the order and does not reflect any finding from the trial court.
21

reasons: (1) Chancellor Christ did not sufficiently explain her decision; and 

(2) the penalty was excessive as a matter of law. Neither argument is 

persuasive.

As to the first argument, Chancellor Christ’s August 13, 2018 letter 

contains a detailed explanation for her decision to impose a three-year 

suspension. It states: “In considering the evidence in its totality, including 

the findings and recommendations of the P&T Committee, with which I 

generally concur, I find that your pattern of unwelcome, manipulative and 

divisive behavior was harmful to students and other faculty, and your 

continuing failure to accept responsibility for the impact of your behavior is 

troubling. My significant experience as a tenured faculty member and 

campus leader at the highest levels leads me to believe that a more serious 

sanction than what the hearing panel recommends is required in this 

matter.” AlSayyad offers no authority to support his argument that such an 

explanation is insufficient. In Doe v. Regents of University of California, 

supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107, the appellate court determined that the dean 

had sufficiently explained her decision to increase a student’s suspension for 

sexual misconduct by informing the student that she had “ ‘reviewed the 

Hearing Report, applicable statements submitted by both parties, your 

student conduct record, and the University’s Sanctioning Guidelines . . . .’ ” 

Here, Chancellor Christ’s letter makes clear that she not only reviewed the 

relevant materials, but also contemplated the violations found by the P&T 

Committee, the seriousness of the misconduct, the harm caused to the 

students and faculty, and her experience as a faculty member and campus 

leader. We conclude that Chancellor Christ sufficiently explained her 

decision to impose a three-year suspension.
22

As to the second argument, AlSayyad does not dispute that Chancellor 

Christ had the discretion to depart from the P&T Committee’s 

recommendation. He also does not dispute that the three-year suspension 

was within the parameters of potential penalties. Instead, AlSayyad argues 

that the penalty was “grossly excessive” because it was based on Chancellor 

Christ’s unsupported factual finding that AlSayyad had engaged in a pattern 

of sexual harassment. As described above, we reject AlSayyad’s argument 

and conclude that Chancellor Christ made no such factual finding. Again, 

Chancellor Christ’s letter makes clear that she decided to impose a three-year 

suspension based on the “evidence in its totality, including the findings and 

recommendations of the P&T Committee”; the “unwelcome, manipulative and 

divisive behavior” that “was harmful to students and other faculty”; and her 

“significant experience as a tenured faculty member and campus leader at 

the highest levels . . . .” Her decision is not an exceptional case where 

“reasonable minds cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty . . . .” (Deegan 

v. City of Mountain View, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) We conclude that 

the three-year suspension was not a prejudicial abuse of discretion.5

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

5 Given our conclusion, we need not address real parties’ argument that 

AlSayyad’s petition improperly sought the reduction of his suspension to one 

year, instead of seeking to set aside the university’s decision and remand for 

reconsideration.
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_________________________

Jackson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Siggins, P. J.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

A157389/AlSayyad v. Superior Court (Regents of U. of Cal.)