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Juli Ann Radmanesh, appellee, v. 

Kourosh C. Radmanesh, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed October 27, 2023. No. S-22-826.

1. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony: Appeal and Error. In a marital 

dissolution action, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the 

record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the 

trial judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations of alimony and property division.

2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an 

appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations 

based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the matters at issue.

3. ____: ____. When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers 

and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed 

the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.

4. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the 

reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters 

submitted for disposition.

5. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In a dissolution of marriage 

proceeding, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows a court to 

order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of 

property as may be reasonable.

6. Property Division: Alimony. The purpose of alimony is to provide for 

the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when 

the relative economic circumstances make it appropriate. The purpose 

of property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between 

the parties.

7. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an 

appellate court does not determine whether it would have awarded the 
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same amount of alimony as the trial court did, but whether the trial 

court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial 

right or just result. An appellate court is not inclined to disturb the trial 

court’s award of alimony unless it is patently unfair on the record.

8. Divorce: Alimony. In weighing a request for alimony, the court may 

consider all the property owned by the parties when entering the decree, 

whether accumulated by their joint efforts or acquired by inheritance.

9. Judgments: Appeal and Error. As a general proposition, an appellate 

court does not require a district court to explain its reasoning.

10. Alimony. The primary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for 

a reasonable period of time necessary for that individual to secure his or 

her own means of support. Ultimately, the duration of an alimony award 

must be reasonable.

11. ____. Alimony should not be used as a tool to equalize the parties’ 

incomes or to punish one of the parties. However, a disparity of income 

or potential income might partially justify an alimony award.

12. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The purpose of assigning a date 

of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is 

equitably divided.

13. Divorce: Property Division: Appeal and Error. Generally, the date 

upon which a marital estate is valued should be rationally related 

to the property composing the marital estate and the property being 

divided. The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion.

14. Property Division. Marital debt includes only those obligations incurred 

during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties. This is a flexible, 

fact-specific standard.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Stefanie 

A. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

Liam K. Meehan, of Wagner, Meehan & Watson, L.L.P., for 

appellant.

April M. Lucas, Joy Kathurima, and Tracy HightowerHenne, of Hightower Reff Law, L.L.C., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
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Funke, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Husband appeals from a decree of dissolution, arguing that 

the district court for Sarpy County, Nebraska, erred in awarding wife alimony and an equalization payment and in equally 

dividing student loans for the parties’ children. Finding no 

abuse of discretion, we affirm the decree.

II. BACKGROUND

Kourosh C. Radmanesh (Cyrus) and Juli Ann Radmanesh 

were married in 1991. During the marriage, the parties had 

twin children born in April 2000. The parties separated in or 

around August 2018. In July 2021, Juli filed a complaint for 

dissolution of marriage. The parties’ children had reached the 

age of majority by the time of the trial.

1. Trial

At the trial, Cyrus and Juli were the only witnesses. The testimony and evidence pertinent to the issues raised on appeal is 

summarized below. Additional facts will be introduced, where 

relevant, in our analysis of the parties’ arguments on appeal.

(a) Alimony

For the 4 years before the trial, Juli worked at a retail store, 

earning approximately $40,000 annually. She contributed to 

an employer-sponsored retirement plan while working in that 

position. Juli testified that her monthly expenses were approximately $4,000. Juli requested alimony of $1,000 per month for 

5 years from Cyrus.

Juli testified that she inherited approximately $160,000 from 

her father’s estate, mostly in stocks, after separating from 

Cyrus, but before the trial. She further testified that most of 

that inheritance was initially placed in a savings account, and 

the rest was placed in her checking account or used to pay 

expenses. The parties agreed that the funds in several of Juli’s 

accounts were from her inheritance.
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Cyrus testified that he was a consultant in the telecommunications industry and that he owned his own firm. He testified 

that he made between $10,000 and $140,000 per contract. He 

further testified that his income varied annually depending on 

the length and location of the contracts. For example, documentation admitted into evidence showed that Cyrus earned an 

average of $106,000 annually between 2009 and 2013, and an 

average of $20,000 annually between 2014 and 2018. Cyrus 

testified that for his most recent contract, from 2019 to 2021, 

he earned $143,000 to $145,000 annually. Cyrus testified that 

he had not worked since 2021 and that he was paying his bills 

with his savings. Cyrus further testified that he had bid for new 

contracts, but to no avail.

Juli, however, suggested that Cyrus was responsible for his 

unemployment. The district court admitted into evidence a 

copy of an email and text message sent from Cyrus to the parties’ children. Therein, Cyrus stated that although his current 

contract was ending, he had been offered a full-time job, contingent on his being vaccinated for COVID-19. Cyrus stated 

that he was willing to get the vaccine “if Juli suspend[ed] the 

divorce case” until the children graduated from college. Cyrus 

stated that he had communicated this to Juli, along with other 

“incentive[s]” that she would receive if she suspended the 

divorce. Cyrus further stated that if Juli did not agree, he “will 

not get the COVID19 vaccine and after 12/31/21 he will be 

unemployed and [give] no support for the family in 2022 and 

beyond.” According to Cyrus, Juli did not agree to his terms. 

Thereafter, Cyrus told his children he would be unable to provide for them because he was “volunteering” not to get the 

vaccine required for the job.

Cyrus also testified that he was 65 years old at the time of 

the trial and that he would like to work until he was 70 years 

old or older. He then confirmed that he intended to work for 

the next 5 years at least if he was able. He stated that once 

he retired, he would rely on Social Security benefits to pay 

his expenses, benefits which he expected to be approximately 
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$4,000 a month. Cyrus had not contributed to any retirement 

account, and evidence at the trial showed that his monthly 

expenses were estimated to be approximately $4,000. He also 

had other bills and miscellaneous expenses. Cyrus argued 

against any obligation for spousal support for Juli.

(b) Equalization Payment

Juli testified to her ownership and the value of multiple 

bank accounts, credit card accounts, and retirement accounts 

that were separate from an IRA holding her inherited funds. 

She also testified that she owned a vehicle. Juli requested that 

the district court divide all marital property equally. Juli also 

requested that the previously mentioned inheritance from her 

father’s estate be deemed nonmarital property and not included 

in the valuation of the marital estate.

Cyrus agreed with Juli’s classification of the inherited funds 

and did not request any of those funds nor Juli’s retirement funds.

The district court admitted into evidence a marital estate 

distribution worksheet proposed by Juli. The proposed distribution listed the value of the parties’ assets and debts. All the 

assets and debts for both parties were valued between July 4 

and November 1, 2021.

Cyrus argued that Juli’s proposed distribution of assets 

incorrectly valued his bank account. According to his testimony, as well as the proposed distribution and bank account 

statements, the account had a balance of $115,100 as of 

August 2021. However, Cyrus testified that by the time of the 

trial, the value of the account had depleted to approximately 

$52,000 because he had been unemployed and had used the 

account for expenses. Cyrus did not offer any documentary 

evidence to support his testimony that the account had been 

depleted since the divorce filing. Nor did he dispute any of 

the evidence or testimony presented by Juli about the value 

of the remainder of the parties’ marital estate. The total 

value of the proposed marital estate, as set forth by Juli, was 
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$96,403.51, and her proposed distribution via equalization 

payment was $53,200.29.

(c) Student Loan Debt

The parties testified that their children were both attending college and expected to graduate in the spring of 2023. 

The children’s college tuition was paid for by a combination 

of scholarships, grants, and federal student loans. The student 

loans were incurred in Juli’s name. Neither party introduced 

any evidence documenting the details of the loans, but both 

testified about them.

Juli testified that she applied for the loans on behalf of 

the children and that she took out the loans in only her name 

because she was the one who helped the children with their 

college applications and facilitated their education. Juli further 

testified that the loans were initially incurred in July 2018 

before the children started school, and every July thereafter, 

most recently in 2022. She also testified that before she took 

out the first loans in 2018, she and Cyrus had a conversation 

about the loans and that Cyrus agreed to incur the loans. She 

further testified that for the next couple years, she and Cyrus 

had similar discussions about incurring more student loans 

before each school year, but that for the final year, she applied 

for the loans without conferring with Cyrus. However, Juli 

testified that it was her understanding based on her earlier discussions with Cyrus that he knew the loans would be taken out 

each year if there was a remaining balance on their children’s 

school tuition after their scholarships and grants were applied. 

Juli testified that there was $110,000 in student loan debt and 

requested that the debt be divided equally between Cyrus 

and her.

Cyrus conversely testified that Juli “didn’t consult with 

[him]” about the student loans, but, rather, she “went and just 

applied for it.” Cyrus testified that Juli did not tell him that 

she had obtained the loans until after the fact. Cyrus stated 

that he wanted his children to be “accountable” for their own 
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education by paying off their own loans after they graduated. 

At the same time, Cyrus testified and provided documentary 

evidence to show that he regularly sent money to both children 

for school-related expenses. He further explained that he paid 

for his son’s room and board—approximately $20,000 annually—directly to the college. Cyrus ultimately stated that he 

believed Juli should be entirely responsible for the student 

loans because she did not consult with him “in the beginning” 

and “she didn’t get [his] opinion.”

2. District Court Decree

The district court entered a decree of dissolution on October 

5, 2022. The decree stated that “[t]he Court was able to assess 

the credibility of the parties and the weight to be given to their 

testimony . . . . The Court ultimately give[s] greater weight to 

the testimony of [Juli].”

As relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the decree ordered 

that Cyrus pay Juli alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month 

for 60 months. In support of the alimony award, the decree 

stated the following:

The evidence showed that [Cyrus] contemplated his 

unemploy[ment] as a means to thwart these proceedings 

. . . . There was no evidence received to show [Cyrus] 

was unable to work at this time nor any evidence to 

show that he . . . attempted to find work. He did, however, testify that at 65 years old, he intends to work for 

the next five years before he considers retirement when 

he will collect social security. As such, the Court finds 

that alimony is appropriate in this case and that [Cyrus] 

has the ability to pay.

The decree also ordered that Cyrus pay Juli $53,200.29 

as an equalization of the parties’ nonretirement assets. The 

decree further ordered that each party keep the personal property in his or her possession and that Juli was awarded 

the video games located in a storage unit. The court also 

adopted and attached to the decree Juli’s proposed marital 
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estate distribution. Finally, the decree ordered that the student 

loans incurred in Juli’s name were “taken out by the parties 

for the benefit of [their] children” and will be equally divided 

between the parties.

3. Cyrus’ Motion to Alter 

or for New Trial

Cyrus timely filed a motion to alter the judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. Juli objected, and at a hearing on 

the matter, Cyrus raised several of the arguments that he now 

raises on appeal. The district court denied the motion.

Cyrus appealed, and we moved the case to our docket. 1

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Cyrus assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) 

awarding Juli alimony, (2) awarding Juli a $53,200.29 equalization payment, and (3) classifying the student loans incurred 

for the parties’ “adult children” as marital debt subject to 

equal division.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-3] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court 

reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether 

there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 2 This 

standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations 

of alimony and property division. 3 In a review de novo on 

the record, an appellate court is required to make independent 

factual determinations based upon the record, and the court 

reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the 

matters at issue. 4 When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).

2 See Karas v. Karas, 314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473 (2023).

3 Id.

4 Id.
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trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one 

version of the facts rather than another. 5

[4] A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or 

rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in 

matters submitted for disposition. 6

V. ANALYSIS

[5] Cyrus’ appeal raises issues of alimony and the classification and division of property following the dissolution 

of the parties’ marriage. In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) allows a court 

to order payment of such alimony by one party to the other 

and division of property as may be reasonable. 7 What constitutes a reasonable alimony award and division of marital 

property depends on the facts of each case, but to make that 

determination, a court may consider, among other things, the 

circumstances of the parties, the duration of the marriage, 

and the history of the contributions to the marriage by each 

party, including contributions to the care and education of 

the children. 8

[6] While the criteria for reaching a reasonable alimony 

award and division of property may overlap, the two serve different purposes and are to be considered separately. 9 Section 

42-365 explains that “[t]he purpose of alimony is to provide 

for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the 

other when the relative economic circumstances . . . make 

it appropriate.” Conversely, “[t]he purpose of property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the 

5 Parde v. Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023).

6 Karas, supra note 2.

7 See id.

8 See § 42-365.

9 See id.
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parties.” 10 With these principles of reasonableness and equity 

as our guide, we turn to Cyrus’ assignments of error.

1. Alimony

Cyrus argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

awarding Juli alimony because it failed to consider Juli’s recent 

inheritance, Cyrus’ age, and generally Juli’s lack of a need for 

alimony as compared to Cyrus’ ability to pay. We find no abuse 

of discretion here.

[7] In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court 

does not determine whether it would have awarded the same 

amount of alimony as the trial court did, but whether the trial 

court’s award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial right or just result. 11 Further, an appellate court is not 

inclined to disturb the trial court’s award of alimony unless it 

is patently unfair on the record. 12 Again, the ultimate criterion 

is one of reasonableness. 13

(a) Juli’s Inheritance

[8] Cyrus claims that the inheritance Juli received after 

the divorce filing, but before the divorce decree, should have 

precluded her from being awarded alimony. Cyrus is correct 

that although property accumulated and acquired by a spouse 

through an inheritance should generally not be considered 

property part of the marital estate, 14 a court can certainly 

consider inheritance when deciding to award alimony. 15 As 

stated previously, the division of marital property and the 

award of alimony are separate inquiries under § 42-365. The 

fact that property is inherited and therefore excluded from 

division in a dissolution proceeding does not prevent the 

10 Id.

11 Karas, supra note 2.

12 Dooling v. Dooling, 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019).

13 Id.

14 See id.

15 See Ainslie v. Ainslie, 249 Neb. 656, 545 N.W.2d 90 (1996).
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income it generates from being considered when determining 

alimony. 16 In weighing a request for alimony, the court may 

consider all the property owned by the parties when entering the decree, whether accumulated by their joint efforts or 

acquired by inheritance. 17

We take Cyrus’ argument that the district court did not 

“consider” or “acknowledge” Juli’s inheritance in awarding 

alimony 18 to mean either that the decree was silent as to the 

inheritance or that the district court failed to give the inheritance adequate weight as compared to the other reasons for 

awarding alimony. Neither argument has merit.

[9] Although the decree does not state that the district court 

considered Juli’s inheritance in awarding her alimony, neither 

does it state that the inheritance was disregarded. Generally, 

we do not require a district court to explain its reasoning. 19

The parties spent considerable time at the trial testifying about 

Juli’s inheritance. They also offered numerous exhibits showing the balance of several of Juli’s accounts, some of which 

the parties agreed derived from her inheritance. As such, we 

do not find anything in the record to suggest that the district 

court was not cognizant of Juli’s inheritance when it awarded 

her alimony.

As to the weight given to Juli’s inheritance, Juli testified 

that she received $160,000 in inheritance from her father’s 

estate and that approximately $120,000 of inherited funds 

were initially placed in a savings account before being divided 

among different retirement and bank accounts. However, the 

record is unclear as to exactly how much of the inherited funds 

Juli had in which accounts and whether the accounts that held 

inherited funds generated income. Upon our review of the 

record, the most that can be said is that at or near the time of 

16 See id.

17 Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874 N.W.2d 17 (2016).

18 See brief for appellant at 15.

19 Brumbaugh v. Bendorf, 306 Neb. 250, 945 N.W.2d 116 (2020).
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the divorce proceedings, Juli had as much as $39,000 in inherited funds in her checking account, $37,000 in inherited funds 

in her IRA account, and $35,000 in inherited funds in one of 

her savings accounts.

While those inherited funds were assets, there was no evidence presented that the funds actively generated income or 

could have been readily accessed or liquidated by Juli. Taking 

into consideration the limited evidence concerning Juli’s inheritance, we find the statutory factors relevant to an award of 

alimony support the trial court’s determination.

(b) Cyrus’ Age

Cyrus also argues that the district court erred in awarding 

Juli alimony because of his “advanced age.” 20 In doing so, 

Cyrus contends that the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ decision 

in Kramer v. Kramer 21 stands for the proposition that alimony 

cannot be ordered to be paid by an individual over 62 years of 

age. Cyrus’ reliance on Kramer is misplaced.

The court in Kramer did not hold that alimony could never 

be awarded beyond age 62; instead, it held that a divorce 

decree awarding lifetime alimony was unreasonable under the 

circumstances of that case and that the award should be 

reduced to a 15-year term. 22 Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself 

clarified some years later in an unpublished opinion that “th[e] 

reliance on Kramer for the proposition that alimony should 

not be awarded after the obligor reaches 62 years of age is 

improper.” 23 We agree.

[10] This court has never suggested that there is an age at 

which a party to a divorce is too old to pay alimony. Rather, 

the terms of an award of alimony depend on what is reasonable under the circumstances of each case. We have held that 

20 See brief for appellant at 14.

21 Kramer v. Kramer, 1 Neb. App. 641, 510 N.W.2d 351 (1993).

22 See id.

23 Paschall v. Paschall, No. A-12-668, 2013 WL 5366330 at *3 (Neb. App. 

July 16, 2013) (selected for posting to court website).
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the primary purpose of alimony is to assist an ex-spouse for 

a reasonable period of time necessary for that individual to 

secure his or her own means of support. 24 Ultimately, the duration of an alimony award must be reasonable. 25 We find that 

the 5-year duration of alimony here qualifies as such. While 

Cyrus will be 70 years old when his alimony obligation terminates, he testified that he “would like to work up to . . . maybe 

70 plus,” then confirmed he “intend[ed] to work for the next 

[5] years at least” if he was able.

(c) Juli’s Need for Alimony Versus 

Cyrus’ Ability to Pay

As to Cyrus’ argument that the district court erred in awarding Juli alimony because it failed to consider Juli’s lack of a 

need for alimony as compared to Cyrus’ ability to pay, we disagree. Specifically, we do not find that the district court’s order 

of alimony was an improper attempt to equalize the parties’ 

income, as Cyrus asserts.

[11] Alimony should not be used as a tool to equalize the 

parties’ incomes or to punish one of the parties. 26 However, 

a disparity of income or potential income might partially justify an alimony award. 27 The district court found a significant 

disparity in the incomes here. We find no abuse of discretion 

in that conclusion.

Cyrus testified that he could earn up to $140,000 per contract. While his work appeared to have some income volatility, it is also apparent that his earning potential was several 

times that of Juli’s. Over the past 20 years, Cyrus made more 

than $100,000 per year numerous times. For Cyrus’ most 

recent contract, he earned $143,000 to $145,000 annually. 

24 Karas, supra note 2; Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13, 911 N.W.2d 582 

(2018).

25 Wiedel, supra note 24.

26 See Karas, supra note 2; Simons v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 978 N.W.2d 

121 (2022).

27 Simons, supra note 26.
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Additionally, Cyrus testified that his monthly expenses were 

approximately $4,000. Juli, on the other hand, earned approximately $40,000 annually, and her monthly expenses were also 

approximately $4,000. As such, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it found that Cyrus should pay alimony to 

Juli in the amount of $1,000 per month for 5 years.

Relatedly, we find no merit in Cyrus’ argument that he is 

unable to pay alimony because he was unemployed for the 

6 months preceding the trial. The district court found that 

Cyrus’ unemployment was voluntary and that he attempted to 

use a job offer as leverage for Juli to “suspend” the divorce 

proceedings. We have no basis to disagree. Cyrus argues on 

appeal that he chose to not take the job offer because he did 

not want to receive the COVID-19 vaccine required by the 

employer. However, the record shows that Cyrus communicated to both Juli and the parties’ children that he was willing to “proceed with taking [the] vaccines to stay employed 

. . . if Juli suspend[ed] the divorce case,” among other terms. 

When Juli did not agree to Cyrus’ terms, Cyrus communicated 

that he was “volunteering” to decline the vaccine and that he 

would be unemployed and unable to provide for the family in 

the future. Based on this evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding that Cyrus “contemplated his 

unemploy[ment] as a means to thwart these proceedings.”

We similarly find no merit in Cyrus’ remaining arguments 

about Juli’s lack of a need for alimony and his inability to pay. 

As stated previously, we do not determine whether we would 

have awarded the same amount of alimony that the district 

court did, but we instead only determine whether the alimony 

award was an abuse of discretion. 28 The alimony award here 

was reasonable, not an abuse of discretion, and we are not 

inclined to disturb it. 29

28 See Karas, supra note 2.

29 See, id.; Dooling, supra note 12.
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2. Equalization Payment

Cyrus next argues that the district court erred in ordering 

him to pay Juli a $53,200.29 equalization payment. He contends that the court failed to credit him for the reduction in his 

portion of the marital estate in the time between the divorce filing and the trial and that the video games in storage that were 

awarded to Juli had not been included in her proposed marital 

distribution. We find no abuse of discretion here.

(a) Valuation Date

The district court valued Cyrus’ bank account approximately 

1 month after the date of the divorce filing. Cyrus argues that 

the court should have instead valued the account at the date of 

the trial and that when it did not, it failed to properly credit 

him for the reduction in his portion of the marital estate.

[12,13] The purpose of assigning a date of valuation in a 

dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is equitably divided. 30 It is well settled that, generally, the date upon 

which a marital estate is valued must be rationally related to 

the property composing the marital estate and the property 

being divided. 31 We have declined to tie the hands of the 

district court and mandate that it must use only one particular valuation date in equitably dividing the marital estate. 32

The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion. 33

Cyrus’ bank account was valued at $115,100 on August 

11, 2021, a date and value that was supported by evidence 

admitted at the trial. Cyrus did not dispute the account’s value 

on the valuation date; he only testified that since then, the 

account had depleted to a lesser amount. However, Cyrus did 

30 Karas, supra note 2.

31 See, id.; Dooling, supra note 12; Rohde v. Rohde, 303 Neb. 85, 927 

N.W.2d 37 (2019).

32 See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 31.

33 Eis v. Eis, 310 Neb. 243, 965 N.W.2d 19 (2021).
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not introduce bank statements or other evidence to support 

his assertion.

In both Karas v. Karas 34 and Dooling v. Dooling,

 35 for 

example, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing a spouse’s marital asset on one date, despite the 

spouse’s argument that a different valuation date more accurately reflected the lesser value of the asset, when the spouse 

did not offer evidence of that asset’s lesser value on that date 

to the court. We reach the same conclusion here and find that 

Cyrus failed to adequately offer evidence of the account’s 

value at or near the trial date.

Further, all the parties’ assets and debts were valued between 

July and November 2021, not just Cyrus’ account. We decline 

to single out Cyrus’ most valuable marital asset and hold that 

the district court should have valued it as of another date. The 

district court’s valuation date was rationally related to Cyrus’ 

account, as well as the other property in the parties’ marital 

estate. We thus cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the 

district court to value Cyrus’ account near the divorce filing.

(b) Video Games

There was also testimony from both parties about a storage unit that held various items, including video games that 

the parties valued at approximately $30,000. Cyrus paid for 

the monthly costs of the storage unit, and although he testified that he would rather Juli be responsible for the costs and 

items of the storage unit, save his personal property and their 

children’s property, he also testified that he would continue 

paying for the unit if Juli did not want any of the household 

property in it. Juli testified that Cyrus could have everything 

in the storage unit besides their son’s video games, which she 

requested that she be awarded so that she could deliver them 

to their son.

34 Karas, supra note 2.

35 Dooling, supra note 12.
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Cyrus is correct that the contents of the storage unit were 

not included on the proposed marital distribution worksheet. In 

fact, the only mention of the storage unit in the district court’s 

decree was that Juli was awarded the video games in the unit 

and that she was responsible for transporting them. It is clear 

from the parties’ testimony, however, that the video games were 

intended for their son and that Juli planned to deliver them to 

him. Cyrus’ argument that the value of the video games was 

to Juli’s benefit and should have reduced the equalization payment is without merit.

3. Student Loan Debt

Cyrus lastly argues that the district court erred in classifying 

the student loans incurred for the parties’ children as a marital 

debt that was to be equally divided between the parties. Again, 

we find no abuse of discretion.

Cyrus argues that the student loans should not have been 

classified as marital debt because the loans were taken out for 

the benefit of their children, rather than the parties’ benefit. He 

contends that the student loans here are akin to loans taken out 

by one party to a divorce for that party’s own benefit and that 

Juli should be entirely responsible for the loans. Juli disagrees 

and argues that the student loans were incurred for the benefit 

of the parties and thus should not be treated differently than 

any other debt incurred during the marriage.

Cyrus relies on two cases from the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals to support his contention that student loans are to be 

considered marital debt only if the loans are disbursed for the 

benefit of the marriage. In Walker v. Walker,

 36 the Court of 

Appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding student loan debt incurred during the marriage to be nonmarital where the parties disputed the extent to 

which the student loans were used for joint marital interests 

or the obligor’s education. Specifically, the appellate court 

36 Walker v. Walker, 9 Neb. App. 694, 618 N.W.2d 465 (2000).
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held that equity required the wife to take with her the student 

loan debt incurred when she obtained her law degree, as she 

took with her all the benefit of the degree. 37

In Wright v. Wright,

 38 the Court of Appeals similarly held 

that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not 

divide student loan debt incurred by a spouse to further his 

education. The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence to determine an equitable amount to attribute as marital 

debt because some of the debt was used to finance the education and some of the debt was used to pay the parties’ bills. 

The appellate court agreed that the record was insufficient to 

determine how much of the debt was marital. 39

Although Walker and Wright considered whether certain 

student loan debt was marital debt, neither case is directly 

on point with the facts of this case. The student loan debts 

incurred in those cases were debts incurred for the education 

of one of the parties in the divorce and not for the parties’ children. Additionally, there was no evidence in those cases as to 

an agreement of the parties concerning the debt. As such, the 

two cases offer limited guidance in determining the issue now 

before us.

[14] Generally, all property accumulated and acquired by 

either spouse during a marriage is part of the marital estate. 40

Exceptions include property that a spouse acquired before 

the marriage, or by gift or inheritance. 41 Debts, like property, should be considered in dividing marital property upon 

dissolution. 42 It is well settled in Nebraska that marital debt 

includes only those obligations incurred during the marriage 

37 Id.

38 Wright v. Wright, 29 Neb. App. 787, 961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).

39 Id.

40 Karas, supra note 2.

41 Dooling, supra note 12.

42 See, Carter v. Carter, 261 Neb. 881, 626 N.W.2d 576 (2001); Anderson v. 

Anderson, 27 Neb. App. 547, 934 N.W.2d 497 (2019).
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for the joint benefit of the parties. 43 This is a flexible, factspecific standard. 44

As summarized previously, there was competing evidence 

at the trial as to whether the parties agreed to, or at least 

discussed, incurring the student loans for their children. Juli 

testified that before she incurred the loans, she and Cyrus discussed the loans, and that Cyrus expressly agreed to them. She 

further testified that she had similar discussions with Cyrus 

every year, except the year immediately prior to the divorce, 

before she renewed the student loans. Cyrus conversely testified that no such discussions were had and that he did not 

agree to the loans and did not know about them until after 

the fact.

The district court heard this competing evidence and determined that Juli’s testimony was more credible. In doing so, 

the court concluded that the parties agreed to incur the student loan debt during the marriage. We give weight to that 

factual finding.

In our earlier decisions dealing with classifying a debt as 

marital, the facts of each case and whether the party claiming 

the debt was nonmarital offered sufficient evidence at trial to 

satisfy that party’s burden of proof is what drove the analysis. 

Where there was no evidence, or competing evidence, as to 

whether the parties agreed to incur a debt during the marriage 

for their joint benefit, we have given weight to trial courts’ 

credibility assessments and generally found no abuse of discretion in their factual findings. 45 Again, when evidence is in 

conflict, the appellate court considers and may give weight 

43 Karas, supra note 2; Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb. 196, 964 N.W.2d 

694 (2021); Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018); 

Millatmal v. Millatmal, 272 Neb. 452, 723 N.W.2d 79 (2006); Mathews 

v. Mathews, 267 Neb. 604, 676 N.W.2d 42 (2004).

44 Vanderveer, supra note 43.

45 See, e.g., Karas, supra note 2; Kauk v. Kauk, 310 Neb. 329, 966 N.W.2d 45 

(2021); Vanderveer, supra note 43; Fetherkile, supra note 43; Millatmal,

supra note 43; Mathews, supra note 43.
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to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses 

and accepted one version of facts rather than another. 46 As 

such, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s division of the student loan debt.

With that determination being made, we note that, as a general rule, absent agreement of the parties, a Nebraska district 

court cannot order a party to pay child support beyond the age 

of majority. 47 Nothing in this opinion should be understood to 

condone the unilateral incurring of postseparation indebtedness 

as a subterfuge to evade this principle.

Cyrus’ further argument that the student loan debt could 

have been treated as a nonmarital debt because it was incurred 

after the parties separated is without merit. To the contrary, we 

have expressly declined to adopt a rule requiring that debts 

must be incurred before separation to be considered marital. 48

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in awarding alimony and the equalization payment and in equally dividing the student loan debts between 

the parties.

Affirmed.

46 Parde, supra note 5.

47 Carlson v. Carlson, 299 Neb. 526, 909 N.W.2d 351 (2018). See, Johnson 

v. Johnson, 308 Neb. 623, 956 N.W.2d 261 (2021); Windham v. Kroll, 

307 Neb. 947, 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020); Wood v. Wood, 266 Neb. 580, 667 

N.W.2d 235 (2003); Foster v. Foster, 266 Neb. 32, 662 N.W.2d 191 (2003); 

Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N.W.2d 159 (1999); Zetterman v. 

Zetterman, 245 Neb. 255, 512 N.W.2d 622 (1994). See, also, Henderson 

v. Henderson, 264 Neb. 916, 653 N.W.2d 226 (2002); Kimbrough v. 

Kimbrough, 228 Neb. 358, 422 N.W.2d 556 (1988); Meyers v. Meyers, 222 

Neb. 370, 383 N.W.2d 784 (1986); Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 

107 N.W.2d 407 (1961); Moore v. Bauer, 11 Neb. App. 572, 657 N.W.2d 

25 (2003); Boamah-Wiafe v. Rashleigh, 9 Neb. App. 503, 614 N.W.2d 778 

(2000).

48 See Vanderveer, supra note 43.