alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Rozain Elizabeth Casie CHITTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-2041.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 14, 2013.

Decided: Dec. 4, 2013.

Mark A. Yurachek, Mark Allen Yurachek & Associates, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Calvin Wooding Fowler, Jr., Joseph Ray Pope, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

*300Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rozain Elizabeth Casie Chitty appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On appeal, Chitty’s sole argument is that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint without providing her notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond. But under § 1915(e)(2)(B), which governs proceedings in forma pauperis, a district court is directed to dismiss a case “at any time” if the court finds that the case or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from a party who is immune from such relief. Because Chitty moved for and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauper-is, § 1915(e)(2)(B) authorized the sua sponte dismissal effected by the district court. *See Jones v. Bock,*549 U.S. 199, 214, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (noting Prison Litigation Reform Act allows sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis case for failure to state a claim, among other grounds). We therefore conclude that Chitty’s argument lacks merit,1 and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We deny Liberty University’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

1

. Chitty's brief does not contend that any of her claims did, in fact, sufficiently state a claim for relief, and we therefore do not address that issue. *See Suarez-Valenzuelo, v. Holder,*714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir.2013) (holding issues not raised in argument section of opening brief are abandoned).

2

. Even if the district court’s dismissal without prejudice would otherwise be a non-appeal-able interlocutory order, *see Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392,*10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1993), the applicable two-year statute of limitations period on Chitty’s fraud claims has passed. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (2013 Cum.Supp.). Thus, we conclude that the district court’s dismissal order is effectively final.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Marco ZAVALA-MORENO, Appellant.

No. 10-2764.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 6, 2010.

Filed: Dec. 9, 2010.

Debra K. Robinson, Special, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Glenn Alan Shapiro, Gallup & Sehaefex’, Omaha, NE, for Appellant.

Marco Zavala-Moreno, FCI Terx'e Haute Inmate Mail, Terre Haute, IN, pro se.

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, Marco Zavala-Moreno pled guilty to illegally reentering the country after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2); possessing a fireax'm while illegally in the country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5), 924(a)(2); and a forfeiture count. The district court1 sentenced him *125to 51 months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, his counsel seeks to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the sentence was too severe.

We will enforce the appeal waiver because the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the record shows the requisite knowledge and voluntariness, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (court should enforce appeal waiver and dismiss appeal where it falls within scope of waiver, both plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no miscarriage of justice would result); *see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena,*201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in *Anders*case).

Having reviewed the record independently under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues that are not covered by the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we dismiss the appeal.

1

. The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 211 (Thursday, November 2, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 50869]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-23852]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EL18-8-000]


Great Bay Solar I, LLC; Notice of Institution of Section 206 
Proceeding and Refund Effective Date

    On October 27, 2017, the Commission issued an order in Docket No. 
EL18-8-000, pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 
U.S.C. 824e (2012), instituting an investigation into whether Great Bay 
Solar I, LLC's proposed revenue requirement for Reactive Supply and 
Voltage Control from Generation Sources Service may be unjust, 
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, or otherwise 
unlawful. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 161 FERC 61,111 (2017).
    The refund effective date in Docket No. EL18-8-000, established 
pursuant to section 206(b) of the FPA, will be the date of publication 
of this notice in the Federal Register.
    Any interested person desiring to be heard in Docket No. EL18-8-000 
must file a notice of intervention or motion to intervene, as 
appropriate, with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rule 214 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.214, within 21 
days of the date of issuance of the order.

    Dated: October 27, 2017.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-23852 Filed 11-1-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of CurrencySharesSMJapanese Yen Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended October 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Nick Bonos, Chief Executive Officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Trust, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.

Date: January 14, 2010



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/S/ NICK BONOS               
|Nick Bonos*                  
|Chief Executive Officer      
|(principal executive officer)



|* | The Registrant is a trust and Nick Bonos is signing in his capacity as the principal executive officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Registrant.
|- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#### Erma FRAZIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Angela REPASS; Melissa Smith; Regina Kelly; Karol Seiler; David Repass; Salvation Army Dhq; Regina Davis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-2054.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 21, 2013.

Decided: Nov. 25, 2013.

*211Erma Frazier, Appellant Pro Se. Joan Elizabeth Winters, Joan Elizabeth Winters Law Offices, Chester, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Erma Frazier appeals the district court’s order entering judgment in favor of the remaining Appellees in accordance with the jury’s verdict on Frazier’s claim of retaliation and directing judgment in favor of the Appellees on Frazier’s claims of race and age discrimination. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court and deny Frazier’s motion to assign counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
**Exhibit      32.1 **

|                                     |                                                                                          |                                |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Date: August                5, 2005 | By:                                                                                 | /s/ Li                Xia Wang |
|                                     |                                                                                               |
|                                     | Name:                   Li Xia WangTitle:  Chief Executive                  Officer |

|                                     |                                                                                        |                              |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                                     |                                                                                        |                              |
| Date: August                5, 2005 | By:                                                                               | /s/ Peter                Mak |
|                                     |                                                                                             |
|                                     | Name:                   Peter MakTitle:  Chief Financial                  Officer |

----
#### AIRGO IP, LLC and Airgo Systems, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARVINMERITOR, INC., Pressure Systems International, Inc., and Equa-laire Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appel-lees.

No. 2007-1538.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 15, 2008.

*1024Donald R. Dunner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett *&*Dunner, L.L.P., of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief were Don 0. Burley, and Denise W. DeFranco, of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Of counsel on the brief was Daniel P. Dooley, Fellers, Snider, Blankenship, Bailey & Tippens, P.C., of Oklahoma City, OK.

Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were Edward C. DuMont, Eric R. Columbus, and Dutch D. Chung, of Washington, DC, and Noah A. Levine, of New York, NY.

Before NEWMAN, MAYER and ' SCHALL Circuit Judges.

Judgment

PER CURIAM.

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

*AFFIRMED. See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
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</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 18, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50733

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID GARCIA-APOLONIA, also known

as Roberto Trejo-Resendiz,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-02-CR-723-1-AML

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 David Garcia-Apolonia appeals the sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States

after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Garcia-Apolonia contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have
No. 03-50733

-2-

been alleged in his indictment. Garcia-Apolonia maintains that

he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple

reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence

exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be

imposed for that offense. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Garcia-Apolonia acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### YA MEI ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 13-1537.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 24, 2013.

Decided: Dec. 4, 2013.

Michael Brown, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Song E. Park, Senior Litigation Counsel, Matt A. Crapo, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ya Mei Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying her motion to reopen. We have reviewed the record and the Board’s order and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as un*328timely. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c) (2013). We therefore deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re: Ya Mei Zhang*(BIA Apr. 5, 2013). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
# It 

# .tO-e)p4-C£

FILED IN COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH DISTRICT 

### FEB 1 | 2013 SHERRY WILLIAMSON, CLERK By—___ Deputy 

## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,966 EX PARTE DANIEL SUBIA ORONA, Applicant ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. D-34,688-A IN THE 358TH DISTRICT COURT FROM ECTOR COUNTY

Per curiam. OPINION 

### Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 ofthe Texas Code ofCriminal Procedure, the clerk ofthe trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ ofhabeas corpus. Exparte 

### Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted ofcapital murder andsentenced tolifeimprisonment. TheEleventh Court ofAppeals affirmed hisconviction. Orona v. State, No. 11-10-00024-CR (Tex. App. - Eastland, November 10, 2011). 

### Applicantcontends thathis appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel failed to timely notify Applicant that his conviction had been affirmed and failed to advise him of 

### his right to petitionpro sefor discretionary review. We remanded this application to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law. .2 Appellate counsel filed written statement with the trial court. Based on that statement, the trial court has entered findings offact and conclusions oflaw that appellate counsel failed to timely notifyApplicant that his conviction had been affirmedand failedto advise him of his right to petition for discretionary reviewpro se. The trial court recommends that relief be granted. Exparte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review of the judgment of the Eleventh Court of Appeals in Cause No. 11-10- 00024-CR that affirmed his conviction in Cause No. D-34,688 from the 358th District Court ofEctor 

### County. Applicant shallfile his petition fordiscretionary review with this Court within 30 days of the date on which this Court's mandate issues.
Delivered: February 6, 2013 Do not publish
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-20-00081-CR

LADAVIOUS COBUR RAMON SMITH,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 431st District 

Court

of Denton County (F16-2486-431)

September 10, 2020

Per Curiam

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM