[Cite as State v. Bump, 2012-Ohio-337.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsCHRISTOPHER M. BUMP 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

Case No. 11-COA-028 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Common 

Pleas Court, Trial Court Number 

 11-CRI-008 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 27, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

RAMONA FRANCESCONI ROGERS ERIN N. POPLAR 

Ashland County Prosecutor Erin Poplar Law, LLC 

110 Cottage Street, Third Floor 1636 Eagle Way 

Ashland, Ohio 44805 Ashland, Ohio 44805 

PAUL T. LANGE 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

110 Cottage Street, Third Floor 

Ashland, Ohio 44805 
Hoffman, J. 

(¶1) Defendant-appellant Christopher M. Bump appeals his sentence entered 

by the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

(¶2) On February 25, 2011, the Ashland County Grand Jury indicted Appellant 

on one count of grand theft of a vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a fourth 

degree felony; one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle, in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1), a fifth degree felony; and two counts of theft, in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1), fifth degree felonies. At arraignment, Appellant entered pleas of not 

guilty to all the charges. 

(¶3) On April 26, 2011, Appellant changed his plea to guilty on Count II, 

unauthorized use of a vehicle and Count III, theft. The State then moved to dismiss the 

remaining counts of the Indictment. 

(¶4) Via Sentencing Entry of June 24, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to ten months in prison on Count II, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and ten months on 

Count III, theft. The court ordered the terms be served consecutively. 

(¶5) Appellant now appeals, assigning as error: 

(¶6) “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE 10-

MONTH SENTENCES FOR TWO FIFTH DEGREE FELONY CONVICTIONS SUCH 

THAT THE AGREEGATE [SIC] SENTENCE EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM PRISON 

TERM ALLOWED BY OHIO REVISED CODE 2929.14(A) FOR THE MOST SERIOUS 

OFFENSE OF WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED, 12 MONTHS.” 
(¶7) The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–

Ohio–4912 set forth a two step process for examining felony sentences. The first step is 

to “examine the sentencing court's compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in 

imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law.” Kalish at ¶ 4. If this first step “is satisfied,” the second step requires the 

trial court's decision be “reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id.

(¶8) The relevant sentencing law is now controlled by the Ohio Supreme 

Court's decision in State v. Foster, i.e. “ * * * trial courts have full discretion to impose a 

prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings 

or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum 

sentences.” 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 30, 2006–Ohio–856 at ¶ 100, 845 N.E.2d 470, 498. 

(¶9) The record herein reflects Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of ten 

months for the fifth degree felony of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and on the 

fifth degree felony of theft, the court ordered Appellant also serve ten months. The 

sentences were within the statutory guidelines and parameters. 

(¶10) The record further reflects the trial court considered the purposes and 

principles of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors as required in 

Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 of the Ohio Revised Code, and advised Appellant 

regarding post release control. Therefore, the sentences are not clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. 

(¶11) Having determined the sentences are not contrary to law, we must now 

review the sentences, pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Kalish at ¶ 4; State 
v. Firouzmandi, supra at ¶ 40. In reviewing the record, we find that the trial court gave 

careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations. 

(¶12) The failure to indicate at the sentencing hearing the court has considered 

the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 does not automatically require reversal. State 

v. Reed, 10th Dist. No. 09AP–1163, 2010–Ohio–5819, ¶ 8. “When the trial court does 

not put on the record its consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, it is presumed that 

the trial court gave proper consideration to those statutes.” Id., citing Kalish at ¶ 18, fn. 

4. “The Code does not specify that the sentencing judge must use specific language or 

make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the 

applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 

2000–Ohio–302. 

(¶13) Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2010–Ohio–6320, “For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the decision of 

the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Ice [ (2009), 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 

711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517], does not revive Ohio's former consecutive-sentencing statutory 

provisions, R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A), which were held unconstitutional in 

State v. Foster. Because the statutory provisions are not revived, trial court judges are 

not obligated to engage in judicial fact-finding prior to imposing consecutive sentences 

unless the General Assembly enacts new legislation requiring that findings be made.” 

See, State v. Fry, Delaware App. No. 10CAA090068, 2011–Ohio–2022 at ¶ 16–17. 

(¶14) At the sentencing hearing in this matter, the trial court stated: 

(¶15) “In reviewing the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, I note there are a 

number of recidivism more than likely factors, and there is one recidivism less likely 
factor in that you have had no prior Juvenile Delinquency adjudications, but quite a 

history, criminal history as an adult. 

(¶16) “And the Court has considered and weighed those factors, and I am 

further finding that, in fact, you have served a prior prison term, and that it’s appropriate 

in this case after weighing the seriousness and recidivism factors, it’s finding that prison 

is consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Statutes and that you 

are not amenable to the Community Control Sanctions, because it appears to the Court 

that the prior Courts have tried just about every conceivable Community Control 

Sanction and you continue to commit crimes. 

(¶17) “I’m finding that you have the future ability to be employed, and to pay 

financial sanctions, and further finding based on your prior criminal history and the fact 

that it appears most of the types of crimes that you are committing, Mr. Bump, are not 

victimless crimes, that, in fact, your crimes are having an impact on the lives of other 

individuals, law-abiding citizens. 

(¶18) “And I am therefore finding that consecutive prison terms in this case are 

necessary to protect the public and they are not disproportionate to the nature of the 

crime.” 

(¶19) Tr. at 11-12 

(¶20) Based on the above, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 
(¶21) Appellant's sentence in the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is 

affirmed. 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Delaney, P.J. and 

Gwin, J. concur 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

CHRISTOPHER M. BUMP : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 11-COA-028 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, Appellant's sentence in the 

Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant. 

 s/ William B. Hoffman _________________

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 s/ Patricia A. Delaney _________________

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN