## I LLINOIS 

## O FFICIAL 

## R EPORTS Supreme Court

Wirtz v. Qui

nn , 2011 IL 111903

Caption in Su

preme Court: W. ROCK WELL WIRTZ et al. , Appelle es, v. PAT RICK QUIN N, Governor, et al. , Appella

nts.

Docket No. 111903

Filed July 11, 2011

Held ( Note: This sy ll abu s constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by th e Reporter of Decisions for
t he conven ience o

f th e reader

. ) Video Gaming Act held not to violate the single-subject provision of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Decision Under Review Appeal from the Appellate Court for the F irst Distr ict, reported at 407 Ill. App. 3d 776 ; heard in that court on appeal from the Circu it Court of Cook Coun ty, the Ho n. Lawren ce O’Gar a, Ju dge, pr esidi ng.

Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed; circ uit court judgment affirmed.-2-

Counsel on Appeal Lisa Madigan, Attorney

General
, of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, SolicitorGeneral, and Richard S. Huszagh , Assistan

t Attorne y General
, of Chicag o, of counsel), f or appellants.

Sam Vinson, Floyd D. Per kins, Claud ette P. Mill er, Seth A . Horvat h and Patrick J. Hanlon, of Ungaretti & Harris L LP, of Chicago, for appelle es.

Marc R. Poulos, Kara M . Princip e and Melissa L. Binetti, of Countryside, for amicus curiae India na, I ll in ois, Iowa Foundation for Fair C ontra cting.

Justices JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice K ilbr ide and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judg ment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 In this appeal, plaintiffs challen ge the c onstitution ality of four public ac ts, Public Acts 96–34, 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 (e ff. July 13, 2009). The public acts at issue, comprising three substantive bills and one appropriation bill, were enacted as par t of a “capita l projec ts” plan and were signed into law by Governor Patrick Quinn on July 13, 2009. ¶ 2 The appellate court held that Public Act 96–34 violates the single subject cla use of the Illin ois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d)) , and that the three remaining public acts were invalid based on languag e making their enactment contingent on the enactment of Public Act 96–34. 407 Ill. App. 3d 776. ¶ 3 For the r

easons th at follow , we rev erse the judgmen t of the a ppellate court.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND ¶ 5 On August 25, 2009, plaintiffs, W. Rockwell Wirtz, on behalf of all taxpayers situated in the State of I

llinois, and Wirtz Bev erage Illin ois, LL

C, filed a petition pursuant to section 11–303 of the Cod

e of Civil Pr

ocedure (735 I LCS 5/1 1–303 (Wes t 2008)) i n the circuit court of Cook County for

leave to file thei r verifi ed compla

int seeking to res train

and enjoin the disbursement

of public funds by the defe ndant pub lic offic ials. I

n their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Public Acts 96–34, 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 violated various provisions of the Illin ois Constitution , includin g the sin gle subj ect cla use (Ill . Const. 197 0, art. IV, § 8(d)); the presentment

clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I V, § 9(a) ); the ef

fective -date- of-lawsclause (Ill. Const. 1970 , art. I

V, § 10); v eto procedures (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I V, §§ 9(b), (d), (e)); the1 We note that in the appellate court, plaintiffs argued that, under the “reason able ground” standar d of section 11–303, the circuit court was limited to determining

whether their com

plaint was “frivolous or malicious” ( Strat-O-Seal Manufacturing Co. v. Scott , 27 I

ll. 2d 5 63, 56 6 (1963 )) and that, at this juncture, the court cou ld not go beyon d that determination and resolve their com plaint on the merits. P

laintiffs do not pursue this a rgument he

re.

-3- separation of powers doctrine (Ill. Con st. 1970, art. II , § 1); the public-funds-for-publicpurposes clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII I, § 1(a)); the uniformity

clause (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IX, § 2); and the limitation on the subject of appropria tion bills (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I V, § 8(d)). ¶ 6 On October 20, 2009, the circuit court denied plaintiffs’ petition. The court held that all of plai nti ffs’ cla

ims faile d as a mat

ter of la w and, the

refore , there w as no “re asonable
gro und,” u nder section 11–303 of the Cod e of Civil Pr

ocedure , for allo wing pla intiffs’ complaint to go forward. 1 The circuit court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsidera tion. ¶ 7 The appellate court reversed. 407 I ll. App. 3d 776 . The court held that Public Act 96–34 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I V, § 8(d)), because the provisions in the Act do not have a natural and logical connection to the single subject of revenue. Accordingly , the court co ncluded t hat Public

Act 96–34

was void in

its

en ti re ty. The cour

t also held

that Public

Acts 96–35, 96– 37, and 96–38 could not stand because they were expressly contingent on the e nactment of Public Act 96–34. The cour t did not addre ss the re

maining constituti onal issue s raised by p laintiff

s. ¶ 8 Defend ants petitioned this court for leave to appeal as of rig ht under Su

preme CourtRule 317 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006)) or, al ternatively, as a matter of discretion under Rule 315 (I

ll. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). This court granted defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. We also granted lea ve to the I ndiana, I llinois, I owa Fou ndation f or Fair Contracting to submit an amicus curiae brief in s upport of defenda nts. ¶ 9 For

the reasons that follow, we reverse the ju dgm ent of t he a ppe ll ate cou rt. In the interest of judicial economy , rather

than remand the c ause tothe appe llate cou rt, we also address and reject the rem ainin g claims rai sed in plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly , we affirm the judgmen t of the c ircuit co

urt.

¶ 10 ANA LYSIS ¶ 11 I. Sin gle Subject Clause ¶ 12 The single s ubject c lause of the I llinois Cons titution pr

ovides, in releva nt p art: “Bills
, except bills for a

ppropria tions a nd for the

codific ation, re

vision or r

earra ngemen t of laws, shall be confined to one subject.” I ll. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d). ¶ 13 The single s ubject r ule regulates the process by which legislation is enacted, by prohibi ting a legisla

tive ena ctment fr om “clea rly embrac ing more

than one s ubject on

its face.” Arangold

Corp. v. Zehnder , 187 I

ll. 2d 341, 3 51 (1999) ; People v. Olender , 222 I ll. 2d 123, 131 (2005). One purpose of the single subject requirement is to preclude the passa ge of legislation which, standing alone, would not receive t he neces sary

votes for enactme nt.-4-

Olender
, 222 I

ll. 2d at 13 2; People v. Cervantes , 189 I ll. 2d 80, 83 (1999). This disfavored practice is known a s “lo grollin g,” or “bundling

unpopula

r legis lation with

more pal atable bills, so that the well-received bills would carry the unpopular

ones to passage.” People v. Wooter s , 188 I ll. 2d 500, 5 18 (1999) . Thus, the single s ubject r

ule “ens ures t

hat th e legislature addresses the difficult decisions it faces directly and sub je ct to pu bl ic sc ru ti ny, rather th an p assing unpopular measures on the backs of popular ones.” Johnson v. Edgar
, 176 Ill. 2d 49 9, 51 5 (1997). Another reason for the single subject rule is to promote an orderly legislative process. Woote rs , 188 I ll. 2d at 51 8. “ ‘By

limiti n g eac h bill to a single subject, the is sues p resente d by each bill can be b etter g rasped a nd more in

tellige ntly discuss ed.’ ” Johnson , 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15 (quoting Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject , 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 391 (1958)). ¶ 14 In determining wh ether a particular enactment violates the sing le subject rule, w e construe the word

“subjec t” libera

lly in favor of upholding thelegislation. Olender , 222 I ll. 2d at 132; Arangold

, 187 Ill. 2 d at 352. The subject may be as broad as the legislature chooses. People v . Boclair , 202 I ll. 2d 89, 109 (2002); Johnson , 176 Ill. 2d at 515. However, “while th e legis lature isfree to

choose su

bjects comprehensive in scope, the single subject requirement

may not be cir

cumvente d by

se lecting a topic so broad that the rule is evaded

as ‘a meaningful constitutional check on the legislature’s actions.’ ” Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 109 (q uoti ng Johnson , 176 Ill. 2d at 515-18). ¶ 15 Neither

the length of an act nor the number of provisions in an act

is determinative of

its compliance withthe single subject rule. Arangold , 187 Ill. 2d at 352; Cutinello v. Whitley
, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 423 (1994). What is dispo sitive is whether the provisions in the act have a “natural and log ical con

nection”to the single subject. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2 d at 109; Arangold
, 187 Ill. 2d at

352. Thus, a piece of legislation violates the single subject rule when it contains unrelated provisions that by no fair interpr etation have any

legitima te relat ion to the s ingle subject. Arangold

, 187 Ill. 2d at 352.

¶ 16 A. Public Act 96–34 ¶ 17 In count I of

their complaint, plaintiffs allege that Public Act 96–34 violates t he singl e subject clause. Leg

islative enactments are presumed to be constitutional ( Woote rs , 188 I ll. 2d at 505; People v. Reedy , 1 86 Ill . 2 d 1 , 9 (1 99 9) ), an d a pa rt y c h allenging the constituti onality

of a statu te bears the burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation ( Peoplev. Dabbs , 239 Ill. 2d 277, 291 (2010)). The appellate court’s finding that a sta tute is unconstitutional is re viewed de n ovo

. People v. Burdunice , 211 Ill. 2d 264, 267 (2004); People v. Sypien , 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). ¶ 18 Public Act 96–34, entitled, “An Act concerning revenue,” c ontains the following provision s. ¶ 19 Article

5 creat es the Video

Gaming Act. This legisla

tion allow s certain

license d establish ments, including establishments where alcoholic liquor is servedfor consumption, fraternal establish

ments, ve terans e stablishme

nts, and tr uck stops, to con duct v ideo ga ming. Article 5 sets forth rules for

obtaining

license s and req

uiremen ts for vide o game t

erminals

. It provide s that the Illinois Gaming Boar d is responsible for testing and approving eve ry-5-

licensedvideo game terminal. The article imposes a tax of 30% on all net income from video gaming terminals. Of the taxes c ollected, five-sixths shall be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund and one-sixth shall be depositedinto the Local Governmenta l Video Gaming Distributive Fund. ¶ 20 Arti cle 800 crea tes the Ca

pital Spen ding Ac countabi lity Law . This l aw requires th e Governor’s Office of Management and Budg et to provide quarterly reports on the status of all capital projects in the state to the Comptrolle r, the Tr easure r, the Pre sident an d Minority Leader of the Senate, and the Speaker and Minority Lea der of th e House o f Repres entative s. ¶ 21 Article 900, section 900, amends the Illinois Lottery L aw (20 IL CS 1605/1 et seq. (West 2008)) to provide that the Department of Revenue will conduct the lottery with the assistance of a private manager under a ma nagement agree

ment overseen by

the Department. Section 900 also creates a pilot program allowing individuals to purchase lottery ticke ts on the interne t. The pilot program must be conducted pursuant to a contract with a private vendor. Finally
, section 900 requires that lottery proceeds be transferred monthly to the Common School Fund in an amount eq ual to the corres ponding

month in 2009, adjusted for inflation, and that any re

maining proceeds be deposited y early into the Capital Projects F und. ¶ 22 Section 905 amends the State Finance Act (30 I LCS 105/1.1 et seq. (West 2008)) to create the Capita l Projects Fu nd a s a speci al fund in the State Treasur y. I t provide s that, subject to appropriation, the Capital Projects Fund may be used only

for cap ital projects and the payment of debt se

rvice on bonds issued for capital projects. Section 905 also requires certain transfers of money

from the Capital Projects Fundto the General Revenue Fund, and it providesthat, beginning in fiscal y ear 2010, no road fund

money s shall be

appropr iated to the Department of State Police or to the Secretary of State. ¶ 23 Sections 910, 915, 920, and 925 amendthe Use T ax Act (35 I LCS 105/1 et seq. (West 2008)), the Servi ce Use T ax Act (35 I LCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2008)), the Service Occupation Tax Act (3 5 IL CS 115/1 et

seq. (West 2008)), and the Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act (35 IL

CS 120/1 et seq. (West 2008)), respectively . These sections raise the tax rate on the sale of candy , soft drinks, and grooming and hy giene products from 1% to 6.25%. Under these amendme

nts, the Department of Revenue must make monthly deposits into the Capital Projects Fund, in a

mounts estimated to

be 80% of the net

revenue for the p receding month realized from the s ales of th

e above products

. ¶ 24 Section 930 amends the Motor Fue l Ta x La w (35 IL CS 505/1 et seq. (West 2008)) to increa se the amount of money to be tra nsferred from the Motor Fuel Tax Fund to the Grade Crossing Protection Fund. ¶ 25 Section 93 5 a me nd s t he Un iv er si ty o f Illinois Act (11 0 IL CS 305/0.01 et seq

. (West 2008)), adding a new section requiring the University of Il linois at U rbana- Champaign to conduct a study on the ef fect o n Illino is families of purchasing lottery tickets. The section
prov ides that the university shall repor t its findings to the General Assembly on or before January 1, 2011 (110 I

LCS 305/12.5 (West 2010)). ¶ 26 Section 940 amends the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 I LCS 10/1 et seq. (West

2008)), allocating responsibility for administration and enfor cement of the Video Gaming Act to the Illinois Gaming Board.-6-

¶ 27 Section 945 amends the Liquor Control Ac t of 1934 (235 IL CS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2008)), increasing the taxes on manufacturers and importing distributors of beer, wine and spirits. All of the proceeds of the additional taxes shall be d eposited into the Ca

pital Projects Fund. ¶ 28 Section 950 amends the Environmental Protection Act (415 IL CS 5/1 et seq

. (West 200 8)) to provide

that, with

one exception, “the

Underg round Stor

age Ta nk Fund is no t subject to administrative charges authorized under Section 8h of the State Finance

Act [30 IL CS 105/8h (West 2008)] that would in anyway transfer any

funds from the Underground Storage Tank Fund into any other fund of the State.” ¶ 29 Section 955 amends the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 I LCS 5/1–100 et seq . (West 2008)), increasing various motor vehicle fees and requiring tha t the proceeds of the increased fees be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund. Section 955 al so incre ases ce rtain we ight limits forveh icles and loads and, at the same time, increases fines for overweight vehicles. Th e proceeds of the additional fines are to be deposited into the Capital Projects F und. ¶ 30 Section 960 amends the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 IL

CS 5/28–1 et seq. (West

2008))
to provide that the criminal offenses of gambling and sy ndicatedgambling do not include the manufacture, distribution, orpossession of video gaming terminal s by

license d individua

ls; lotteries conducted by

a third pa

rty pursuant to a management agr eement with the state; or the purch ase of l otter y tickets throu gh the internet under the program established in section 7.12 of the Illinois Lotter y L aw. ¶ 31 Fi na ll y, article 9999, section9999, of Public Act 96–34 provides: “This Act takes effect July 1, 2009, except that the changes to ***the I llinois Vehicle Code take effect January 1, 2010; but this Act does not take effect at all unless House Bill 312 of the 96th General Assembly [enacted as Public Act 96–35], as amended, becomes law.” ¶ 32 The appe

llate court held that the single subject of Public Act 96–34 was revenue
, based

on its offic ial title, “An Act co ncernin g reve nue.” Ho wever, defenda

nts ass ert bef

ore this
court that the single sub

ject of Pu

blic Act 9 6–34 is ca

pital p ro jects. Defendants are not limited solely to the contents of the title of an a ct in offe ring a s ingl e subject rationale. Boclair
, 202 I

ll. 2d at 10 9-10; see

also Olender , 222 Ill. 2d at 140. Moreover, capital p rojects is a legitimate single subjec t, one which is not “so broad that the rule is evaded as ‘a meaning fu l constitutional check on the legislature’s actions.’ ” Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 109 (citi ng Johnson , 176 Ill. 2d at 515-18). ¶ 33 Having determined that the subjec t of capital proje cts is legitimate, we must examine the provisions in Public Act 96–34 to discern whether the y have a “natural and logical connection” to that subject. Sypien , 198 Ill. 2d at 3 38-39. In doing so, we f ind that the substantiv e provisi ons in

Public Act 96–34 clearly are connected to capital projects in that they establish increased revenue

sources to be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund. The few provision s that do no t directl y raise revenue are still related to the over all subject

of the Act in th at th ey help to implement the other provisions. “ ‘An act may include all matters
germane to a general subject, including the means re asonably

necessary

or appropriate to the accomplishment

of the legislative purpose.’ ” People e x rel. Og ilvie v. Lewis , 49 Ill. 2d 476, 487 (1971 ) (quo ting People e x rel . Gutknecht v. City of Chicago , 414 Ill. 600, 607-08-7-

(1953)). ¶ 34 For

example, the provision in article 900 , section 935, of Public Act 96–34, which authorizes a study on the eff ect of the lottery

on Illinois families, is related to the amendme nts to the Illinois Lottery

Law in article 900, including the establishment

of a pilot
program to purchase lottery

tickets on the internet. The legislature reas onably a nticipated that the amendments would re sult in ad ditional sales of lottery tickets, with the extra proceeds
to be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund. Th erefore, a study on the effect of greater numbers of people buying lottery tickets is related to the implement

ation of th

esechang es. Si mi la rl y, the amen dments to the Illinois Vehicle Code in article 900, section 955, incre asing certain vehicle weight limits, while not related to revenue, are related to the provisions increasing the fines for violations of these limits. Although the weight limits are increased, the amounts of

most of the fines are doubled, which the legislature evidently believed

would result in a net increase of revenue to be deposited into the Capital Projects Fund. ¶ 35 According to plaintiffs, even assuming that the single subject of Publ ic Act 96–3 4 is capital project s, sever

al provis ions i n the Act bear no relation to that subject because they have the eff

ect of a llocating money to the General Revenue

Fund rather than to the Capital Projects Fund. We do not find plaintiffs’ argument persuasive. ¶ 36 First, plaintiffs allege that a portion of the tax revenue ra ised from the increased

taxes on soft drinks , candy, a

nd grooming and hygiene products is directed to the Common School Fundand the General

Revenue Fund. De fendant s respondthat the r ecateg orization o f these productsfrom the 1% tax rate to the 6.25% rate re sults in 5% of the revenue gener ated by the increased rate going to the Capital Projects Fund, 1% g oing to the Local Government Fund, and 0.25% going to theCounty and Mass Transit District Fund, with no money going to the General Revenue Fund. Defendants alleg e that this allocation was necessary because “doing

a nything else with the additional 0.25% would have required a massive overha ul of th e current structure for processing the relevant sales and collecting the cor responding taxes.” ¶ 37 Seco nd ly, plaintiff s point t o article 900, section 905, of the Act, which authorizes transfers of cert

ainamounts of money from the Capital Projects Fund to the General Revenue Fund, an d als o provides that, beginning in fiscal y ear 2010, no road fund money s shall be appropriated

to the Department of State Police and to the Secretary of State. Plaintiffs argue that the amounts to be transferred to the General Revenue Fund

are much greater than, a

nd
notof fs et by, the elimination of

road fund diversions to pay for operations of the State Police and Secreta

ry of State. Defend ants dispute the figures cited by the plaintiffs and allege that the amounts of money ar

e comparable. ¶ 38 Whether

or not the plaintiffs are correct about the perc entage s g oing to the Capital Projects Fund, it is not the function of this cour t to trace the origin and destination of every d ollar amount cited in Publi c Act 96– 34. Rathe r, our ta sk is to dec ide wheth er Public Ac t 96–34, as a

whole, is devoted to a single subject and, therefore , constitutional. In doing so,

we bear in mind th at the sing

le subject rule is c onstrued liberall y a nd “is not i ntended t

o handicap the legislature by requiring it to make unnecessarily restrictive laws.” Cutinello v. Whitley
, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 423 (1994). A pply ing that principle here, w e see no p

rovision in

the Act which stands out as being constitutionally unr el a ted to the single subject of capital-8-

project s. ¶ 39 We note, also, that previous decisions of this court which have struck down legislation for vi ol ati ng t he s in gle sub jec t ru le a re d is ti ngu is hab le. In People v. Olender , 222 Ill. 2d 123, 139 (2005), a

bill in its original form amended three criminal statutes: the Canna bis and Controlled Substances Tax Act (35 IL CS 520/14.1 (West 1994)), a provision in the Criminal Code of 1961 de aling w ith the seizure and forfeit ure of ve hicles (7 20 IL

CS 5/36–1 (We st 199 4)), a nd a provision in the Unified Code of Corrections concerning r eimbursement of
expenses by c onvicte d persons to the Department of Corrections (730 I LCS 5/3–7–6, 3–12–5, 5–8–1 (West 1994)). Following theaddition of eight amendments, the bill created
two new statu

tes while amending numerous provisions in 24 other statutes, including several
tax acts, the Downstat

e Forest Preserve District Act (70 I LCS 805/18.6d (West 1994)), the Charitable Games Act (230 IL CS 30/2, 4, 5 (West 199 4)), and the Communi cable D isease Prevention Act (410 IL

CS 315/2c (West 1994)). We rejected the State’s arguments that the various provisions fit within the br oad cat egories of either “g overnmental regulation” or

“ revenu e.” Olender , 222 Ill. 2d at 140-42. There wa s no natural and logical connection betweenthe multiple provisions in the bill and either of those subjects. W e held t hat “ [t]o
sanct ion such a strained connection between this statute and the subject of r evenue t o th e State and its subdivisions would render the single subject clause a nullity .” Id. at 142. ¶ 40 In another case, People v. Reedy
, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (19 99), the bill initially addressed the single subject of the criminal insanity de fense but even tu al ly d ealt with as many as f ive
separa te legislative topics, in

volving b oth civil a

nd crimina

l matters

. Those topics included the basic duties and juri sdicti on of law enforcement officials; the burden of proof for a crimina l defendan t asserting the insanity defense; civil and criminal rules governing drug offense and drug asset forfeiture proc eedings; truth-in-sentencing law; and rules for hospital liens. Even when giving great deference to the legislature, we held that the contents of the b ill enco mpassed at least two unrelated subjects: matters relating to the c riminal justice system and matters relating to hospitalliens. Id. at 12. The State’s argument that each of the provisions fit

within the category

of “governmental matters” was not compe lling. Id . at 12. ¶ 41 Finally, in Johnson v. Edgar , 176 Ill. 2d 499, 517 (1997), the enactment was held to be

an “egregious exa

mple of the

legisla ture ig noring t

he single subjec t rule.” What started a s

an 8-page bill became a 200-pag e bill, encompassing such diverse topics as child sex offende rs, employer ea

vesdropping, and environmental impact fees imposed on the sale of fuel. Rejecting the State’s suggestion that the subjectof the bill was “public safety ,” we held, “[w]ere we to conclude tha t the many

obviously

discorda nt provisio ns *** are

nonethel ess related because of a tortured connection to a va gue notion of public safety , we would be essentia lly eliminating the single subject rule as a meaning ful constitutional check on the legislature’s actions.” Id . at 517-18. ¶ 42 In contrast to the cases described above, there a re no “sm oking g un” provisions in

Public Act 96–34 whic

h clear ly violate the intent and purpose of the single subject rule. On the Act’s face, all of theprovisions have a natural and logical connection to the single subject of capital projects. ¶ 43 Furthermore, a review of the e xte nsive l egislative debate preceding the enactment

of-9-

Publ ic Act 96–34

supports our concl

usion that the Act do es not viol ate the s ingle subjec t clause. Given that the single subject rule is intended to “reg ulate[ ] the process by whic h legislation is enacted” ( Olender , 222 Ill. 2 d at 1 31), it is useful to examine the legislative debates conducted

by the General Assembly . The following comments are represe ntative of many of the leg

islators’ remarks. Senator Cullerton, for example, stated:
“It’s been t en years si nce we’ ve had a capit al bil l. The tough est pa rt is comin g u p withthe money. *** I

t’s not easy voting

for thes e taxes. Quite fr

ankly , there’ s parts in here tha

t I would pre

fer not b e here, would–tha t would be

substitute d with

other parts. But it’s–when you

work with different parties, different–the House and Senate,
you need to have compromise. And that’s what this is. *** We have measures her e dealing with video gaming and the L ottery. We have sa

les tax–streamlined sales tax langua ge that would generate more money by coming in c onformity with the streamlinedsales tax. There are liquor taxes, and also vehicle-related tax increases that are very similar to the ones that we did ten years a go when we had a successf ul capit al bi ll.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Procee dings, May 20, 2009, a t111-12 (statements of Senator Cullerton). ¶ 44 Senator Risinger stated:

“It’s not a per

fect bill that we’ re going to be lo oking a t, but certainly it’s one that we’ve worked together and–and made ha ppen. There’s–therevenue that we’re going to talk about to fund this, if any one of us wa s going to putthis toge ther, we would probably put it together a

little different way . But there’s things in it that we like and maybe things th at we don ’t like. ** * And we’ re going to be able t o address the real needs of our infrastruct

ure tha t has been suffering for such a long period of time.” 96thIll. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 20, 2009, at 112-13 (statements of Senator Risinger). ¶ 45 Senator Dillard stated:

“Over here we’re not necessar

ily happy with all of the revenue s ources t hat are in here. *** I view capital as ver y differe nt in terms of raising new revenues than I do the operations of State government. And I have alway s supported every capital bill that’s ever

been put out here. There is one component of this particular package that I really have

trouble with. And that is the video poker side of things ** *. *** But
most importantly, I

think, like many of y

ou, I have committed to my local chambers of commerc e, my

local lab or unions, my lo cal new spapers , that I would supp ort a major capital bill. And I

intend to do that toda

y. T his State is literally falling a part.” 96thIll. Gen. Assem., Senate Pr oceedin gs, May 20, 2009, a

t 115-16 ( statemen

ts of Senator Dillard). ¶ 46 Representative Cross stated:

“I think it’s important to p oint out tha t this Bill ha

ppened b ecause

a lot of pe ople talked and a

lotof people worked together. And it’s ca lled compromise; it’s called building consensus. I don’t like all of the revenue streams. I ’mtroubled by some of them, but the re ality

is we woul d not have

passed a ny c apital B ill with out some

revenue stream causing us some angst.” 96th I ll. Gen. Assem., H ouseProceed ings,-10- May 21, 2009, at 142 (stateme nts of Representative Cross). ¶ 47 The legislative debate demonstrates that the leg islators engaged in a detailed discussion of many of the provisions in the bill. There is no evide nce that any

obviously unrelated provisions were “tacked on” to the bill at a later time. Ove rall , the debate shows that the legislators were a

ware tha t they were vo ting on so

urces of funding for cap ital impro vements to the stat e. By c ontrast, in Olender , where this cour

t struck down a bill b ecause o f logrol ling, the debate revealed that legislatorsreferred to the bill as “a short title, not *** a good piece of legislation,” and “a flaw ed, omnibus bill.” Olender , 222 I ll. 2d at 142-43. One Representative complained that there was no in-depth discussion of other, unrelated issues which were “tacked onto” the bill. Id . at 143. ¶ 48 In the

debate on Public Act

96–34, although a few legislators rema rked that they

disliked

so me of the re

venue sources, p articula

rly video g aming, t

hey also comme

nted that the bill

was reached through compromise an d with the goals of putting people back to work and improving the state’s infrastructure. We interpret these re m arks a s legitimate comp romise

on a bill which comprised a single subject. I ndeed, there is a difference between impermiss ible logr olli ng a nd the normal compromise which is inherent in the legislative
process

. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Ventur a , 632 N.W.2d 707, 713-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). A d

iverse and compl ex enactm

ent such a s Public Act 96–34 is likely to result from compromis e an d n eg ot ia ti on am on g t he me mb er s o f t he Ge ne ra l A ss em bl y. The presence of such legisl ative c ompromise does not mean that the Act violates the single subject rule. Public Act 96–34

is a const

itutionall y le giti m ate enactment genuinely encompassing one subject. Accordingly , we rever se the judg ment of the appellate court holding Public Act 96–34 unc onstitution al.

¶ 49 B. Public Act 96–37 ¶ 50 In count I

of their c omplaint, plaintiff s also contend that Public Act 96–37, entitled“An Act concer ning g overnme

nt,” viola tes the single

subject rule. Pub. Act 96–37 (eff. July 13, 20 09). The o fficial

short title

of the Ac t is the “F

Y2010 Bu dget I

mplementa

tion (Capital) Act,” an d i ts st at ed pu rp os e i s “ to ma ke ch an ge s i n s ta te pr og ra ms th at ar e n ec es sa ry t o implementthe Governor’s Fiscal Year 2010 budg et recommendations concerning ca pital.” Id. Among other things, Public Act 96–37 authorizes grants and expenditures to not-forprofit hosp itals, hea lth centers, libraries, parks, and college s; makes changes to the lottery provisions in Public Act 96–34, inclu ding those pertaining to the private manage r of the lottery ; makes c hange s to the ce ntral co mmunicati ons sy stem for v ideo ga ming and adds a

severa bility provision

to the Vide o Gaming

Act; adds f

elony offe

nses for violations of the Video Gaming Act; clarifies that increased taxes created unde r Public Act 96–34 will be deposited into the Capital Projects Fundwhile existing taxes will continue to be deposited into the General Revenue Fund ; req uires financial disclosures in car rental contra cts; certifies

a pilot river edge redevelopmen t zone in Elg in; amends provisions of the General Obligations BondAct; implements an urban weatherization program; provides for pe nsion benefits to the Illin ois Gaming

Board; and adds Illin ois Gaming Board p eace of

ficers. ¶ 51 During the Senat e debate for Hous e Bill 242

4, Se nator Trotter describ ed the bill as-11-

follows:
“As amended, House Bill 2424 creates various Acts and amends other Acts in order
to implement the capital budget. Specifically , it adds language to implement funding for sa fe ty n et ho sp it al s, do wn st at e h os pi ta ls , c om mu ni ty he alth fac ilities, pu blic librarie s, parks, private colleges, scho ol const ruction. It also amends the Video Gaming Act to pro vide fur th er s afe gua rds aga in st th e po ten ti al a bus e of th e Ac t. It amends the Illinois Lottery Law to address the

transition to the selectio n of a pri vate manager , the man age r’s use of t he c urr ent dep art men t’s emp lo yee s erv ice s. It requires private

managers to hire

Lottery employees. And, a

gain, there’s many

issues and–many

Acts that are amended.” 96 th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2009, at 169-70 (statements of Senator Trotter). ¶ 52 Plaintiffs contend that Public Act 96–37 “creates entirely new act s, launch

es wholly new p rogra ms, and initia

tes laws t

hat have nothing t

o do with imp lementat

ion of the

St at e budget.” However, there is no authority to support the propo sition that a budget implementation bill may only makes chang es to existin g prog rams and may not crea te new progra ms. After much consideration, we find that all of the provisions in Public Act 96–37 bear a natural and logical connection to the single subject of implementation of the state’s capital budget. ¶ 53 In support of the ir single subject c laim, plaintiffs point to only one spec ific provision which they arg

ue is not relevant to the implementation of the state budget. That provision allows car rentalcompanie s to includ e a sepa rately stated mandatory sur

charge in car renta

l
agree ments to recover increased costs for ve hicl e licenses. Pub. Act 96–37 (eff. July 13, 2009) (ame ndin g 6 25 IL

CS 5/6–305.3 (West 2008)). Contrary to plaintiffs’ arg ument, we find the car

rental f ee provi sion to be directly r elated to the incr eased ve hicle registration fees imposed by Pu

blic Act 96–34, and thus related to the legislative purpose of implementing the state’s capital budget. “I n enacting a bill, the legislature may provide the means necessary
to accomplish the legislative purpose.” Cutinello v. Whitley , 16 1 Ill. 2d 409, 424 (1994). Moreover, as with Public Act 96–34
, there is no evidence in the legislative debates of obstruction of an inf

ormed dis cussion of

the provi sions in

the bill. Accordingly , we find no single subject violation in Public Act 96–37.

¶ 54 C. Public Act 96–38 ¶ 55 Public Act 96–38, entitled “An Act concerning gover

nment,” changes various provisions in Public Ac t 96–34, inc luding th e effe ctive da

te o f some of the tax increases. Public Act 96–38 also amends and adds several provisions to the Video Gaming Act, enacted as part of Public Act 96–34. Specifically, Public Act 96–38 modifies residency r equirements for licenses under the

Video Ga

ming Ac t; sets for

th licensing req

uireme nts for operators of video gaming terminals and adds criminal penalties; and se ts forth vari ou s other rules and restrictions concerning the Video Gaming A ct. During the debate in th e House, Representatives referred to the bill as a “clean- up Bill for the revenue portion” of the capital
progra m, in order

to “make[ ] those revenues and the streams that were placed in [Public Act 96–34] work bet

t erfor the D epartme

nt of Reve

nue and th

e retail ers who w ill have to-12-

implementthem *** and the Secretary of State.” 96thIll. G

en. Asse m., House

Proceed ings, June 30, 2009, a

t 39-40 (s tateme nts of

Representatives Eddy

and Mautino). During the debate in the Sena

te, Senat or Sulliva n descri bed the bi ll as follo ws: “Senate Bill 349 amends the Video Gaming Act to pro vide fur

ther saf eguar ds aga inst potential abuses of

the Act. It also amends the L iquor Control Act to increase the tax
rate for alcoholic cider beverag es. These are recommendations of the De partment of Revenue with reg ard to the capital b ill that re ce nt ly passed. * ** I w ill say that this actually tighten s up and fu

rther re stricts an d puts additional safeguards into the previous passed le gislatio n.” 9 6th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 2009, at 44-45 (statements of Senator Sullivan). ¶ 56 Plaintiffs all ege in cou nt I of their complaint that Public Act 96–38 violates the single subject rule because two of

the provisions in the act relate to neither revenue nor ca pital project s. Ac cord ing to plaintiffs, the amendment to the Video Gaming Act providing that licensedterminal operators and licensed es ta blishments must split the profits of video gaming 50/50 “notwithstanding any a greement to the contrary ” on l y a ffects t he priva te parties who stand to benefit from video gaming. Plaintiffs also arg ue t hat the provision changing the residency

requirement for video gaming licensing is unrelated to the subject of

revenue or capit al proje cts. ¶ 57 As with Public Act 96–37, we find no violation of the single subject rule in Public Act 96–38. All

of the Ac t’s provis ions rela te to cap ital projects. The s ubject of capital p rojects properl y encompasses financing for the pr ojects authorized by the leg islation. Having created the Video Gaming Act in Public Act 96–34, it was per missible f or the le gislatu

re to enact a separa te bill relating to aspects of video gaming w hich remained

unaddressed by

the previous bill. Accord

ingly , we aff

irm the judgment of the circuit court with respect to count I of plaintiff s’ compla int.

¶ 58 D. Contingen cy Prov isions ¶ 59 Plaintiffs allege in count V

of their complain t that the c ontinge

ncy provision s in Public Acts 96–34, 96–35, 96–37, and 96–38 violate th e sin gle subjec t clause. Section 9999 of Public Act 96–34 states that “this Act does not take effect at all unless House B ill 312 of the 96thGeneral Assembly

[Public Act 96–35], as amended, becomes law.” Public Act 96–35, the e nactment dealing with appropriations, states that it “does not take eff ect at all unles s House Bill 255 of the 96th General Assembly [Public Act 96–34], as amended, becomes law.” Both Public Act

96–37 and Public Act 96–38 include provisions stating that various parts of those a

cts will ta

ke effect “[i]f an d only

if Hous e Bill 255 of the 96th General Assembly [Public Act 96–34] becomes law.” Plaintiffs allege that the contingency provisions in all four bills essentially transform them into “one bill,” thereby violating the single subject rule and render ing the a cts uncon stitutiona

l. ¶ 60 We find no constitutional infirmity in any of the contingency

claus es challenged

by plaintiff s. In I lli nois, the General Assembly may lawfully

enact a statute, the operation of which is dependent upon a contingent eve nt

. City of Chicago v. Centra l National Ba nk in Chicago
, 5 Il l. 2d 164, 1 72 (1955) ; Zisook v. Maryland-Drexel Neighborhood-13-

Redevelopment

Corp. , 3 Ill . 2d 570, 58 1 (1954); People e x rel. Thom

son v. Bar

nett , 344 I

ll. 62, 72 (1931) ; Home Insurance Co. v. Swige rt , 104 Ill. 653 (1882). Whether the enactment of a statut e may

be contin gent on

the enactment of a

nother st atute is a n issue of

first impression i n Illinoi s. However, nothing in our constitution prohibits making a piece of legisla tion contingent on

a separ ate legislative e

nactmen t. ¶ 61 Courts in other jurisdictions have uph eld the le gislatu

re’s au thority to declare that an

act becomes effective only

upon the enactment of a separate act. See In r e R. W.
, 588 So. 2d 499, 500 (Ala. Civ . App. 199 1); People v. Sterling Refining Co. , 261 P. 1080, 1085 (Cal. Dist . Ct. App. 1927); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor , 239 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla . 1970); Shehane

v. Wimb ish , 131 S.E. 104, 105 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925); State v. Reado , 295 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 1974); State ex rel. De Woody v. Bixler , 25 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ohio 194 0) ; Marr v. Fisher
, 187 P.2d 966, 969-70 (Or. 194 7); Johnson v. State , 60 P.2d 681, 682 (Wash. 1936). Th e only restric tion whi ch has be en impose d on the pr actice of ty ing tog ether tw o statutesin this manner i s that ther

e be a re asonable

relation ship between the sta tutes: “Appropriations may constitut io nally be made c ontinge

nt upon mat

ters or e vents

reasona bly related to the subject of

the appropriation, but may not be made to depend
upon entirely

unrelated events. For

example, an appropriation to a university might be contingent upon t

he reg istr ation of a

minimum numb er of stu dents who could benefit from the appropriation or co nt ingent upon t he sta te reve nues r eachin g a certain level. Th ere is no constitutional impediment to an appropriation being made contingent

upon another bill, reasonably related to the appropriation and where there is a direct and

relative interdependence betwee n them, becoming law.” In re Adv isory Opinion to the Governor , 239 So. 2d at 9. ¶ 62 The public acts in the instant case clearly are reasonably

related to one another

in that they are associated with raising funds for capital p rojects, establishing capital projects, and appropriating funds to th ose projects. I n light of

that r elationship, we hold that the contingency

provisions in the acts do not violate the single subject rule. Each bill was
separa tely enacted, in accordance with the I llinois Constitution; therefore, we cannot say that the conti ngenc y pr

ovisions tr

ansform ed the acts into a sin gle ac t for pur poses of t he singl e subject rule. Nor do the contingency

provisions represent improper logrolling, as plaintiffs contend. The practicalities of implementing a large and complex ca

pital proj ects pro gram, while comply ing with constitutional guidelines, necessitated that the legislature se parate the various part s of th e prog

ram into se

parate bills. At the

same time , it makes l

ittle sens e to raise taxes to fund capita

l progr ams withou

t appropr iating th e money toward those prog

rams, and v ice ver sa. The Su

preme Cou

rt of Flo rida re cognize d this inter relation ship when

it upheld three tax statutes which were made contingent upon the enactment of each of the other acts. The court explained: “[The Florida

Revenue Act of 19 49] is a law

which emb

races but one subject and
matters properly c onnected therewith. The fact that it is an act

which was passed as part and parcel of a comprehen sive tax pro gram devised by the legislature in the exercise of its law -making

power, makes it no ne the le ss a sing le la w within the purview of [the single subject rule]***. *** A legislative program of such magnitude

ma y necess arily involve sever al subjects before the ultimate end effect c an be-14- accomplished. It was essential, therefore, in enacting its prog ram that the legislature provide a separ

ate law for each subject with which it dealt. I t had no alternative and it ca nnot be sa

id that it violated [the single subject rule] for actually it complied meticulou sly with the require ments of that c onstitutional provision.” Gaulden v. Kirk
, 47 So. 2d 567, 575 (Fla. 1950). ¶ 63 We agree with

this reasoning and hold that thecontingency provisions in the acts do not violate the single subject rule. We therefore af fi rm the jud gment of

the circuit court with
respec t to count V

of plainti ffs’ co mplaint. ¶ 64 We note that the appellate court below held that the contingency provisions in Pu blic Acts 9 6–35, 96–37, a nd 96–38 render the acts invalid. That holding was not based on the constituti onality

of those acts, however, but on the court’s conclusion that Public Act 96–34 violated the single subject rule and was, therefor e, void in its entirety. Under the appella

te court’s reas oning, the remaining public acts, which were conting ent on the enactment of Public Act 96–34, could n ot s tand. Because w e find no v iolation of

the sing le subject rule in any of the ch alleng ed acts, the other acts ar e not inva lid on this ba sis.

¶ 65 II . Presentment Clause, Effective-Date-of-L aws Clause, Veto Procedures, Separation of Powers ¶ 66 In count VI of

their complaint, plaintiffs further allege that the provisions tying

together Public Acts 96–34 and96–3 5 violate the presentment clause (I ll. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 9(a)), the effective-date -of-laws clause (I ll. Const. 1970, art. I

V, § 10), v eto procedu

res (I ll. Const. 1970, ar

t. IV , §§ 9(b), (d), (e )), and t he separ ation of p owers do ctrine ( Ill. Co nst. 1970, art. II, § 1) . Pla inti ffs’ co ntent ions are una vaili ng. ¶ 67 The pre sentment clause states: “Every bill passed by the Gene

ral Assembl y sh all b e presented to the Governor within 30 calendar day s after its passage. The foreg oi n g requirement

shallbe judi ciall y enforceab le. If th e Gover nor ap prove s the b ill, he sha ll si gn it and it shall beco me law.” Ill . Const. 1970, art. IV, § 9(a). Plaintiffs arg ue that the presentment

clause contemplates a single bill rather than a g roup of bills, and that a bill must become effective upon

being signed by

the Governor. Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive. The pre sentment c lause doe s not manda te that, once the bill is signed by the Governor, the bill must take e

ffect im mediatel y. I t simply st ates that the bill “shall become law.” The General Assembly

h as the au

thority to direc t the date

upon which an act s hall take effec t. Peopleex rel. Thomson v. Barnett , 344 Ill. 62, 72 (1931). The bills in the instant case do not violate the presentment clause. ¶ 68 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the effective-date-of-law s clause a lso fails. The effectivedate-of -laws cl ause sta

tes: “The General Assembly

shall provide by law

for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to June 1 of a calenda r y ear. The Gener

al Assemb ly

may provide for

a different effective date in any

law passed prior to June 1. A bill passedafter May 31 shallnot becom

e effective prior to June 1 of the next calendar ye ar unless the General Assembly by t he vote of three-fifths of the members elected to ea ch house provides for an earlier effective date.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I V, § 10.-15-

¶ 69 Plai ntiffs contend that, whe n the constitution states that a bill passed under certain circumstances shall take effect on a certain date, the legislature cannot chang e the date absent
passag e, prese

ntment, a nd enac tment of a

subseque nt bill. ¶ 70 We find no vio lation of t he effective-d ate-of

-laws cl ause. B oth Public A ct 96–3 4 and 96–35 were passed

by more than three-fifths of the members elected to ea ch house and thus fi twithin the exception in the effective-date-of-laws clause . Both bills took eff ec t immediately upon becoming law on July 13, 2009. ¶ 71 Fi na ll y, plaintiffs argue that the contingenc y provisions negate the Gove rnor’s a bility to veto laws, in violation of the veto procedures establish ed in the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IV, §§ 9(b), (d), (e)), and the separation of powe rs doctrine (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I I, § 1). They ar gue that tying the

legislation together in this manner represe nts an unconstitutional effort by the legisla tive bra nch to con

trol or de prive the executive

branch o f its veto

powers. ¶ 72 We reitera

te that ea ch of th e bills at issue was enacted separately and that the tying provisions did not tra

nsform the

bills into a

si ngle bil l . Therefore, the Governor wa s not prohibited from using his veto power s in accord ance with the Const itution. We a

lso

reco gniz e the practical need for the legislature to separate the various parts of the ca pital
program into sepa

rate bill s while al so ty

ing the r evenue sourcestogethe

r with the

ir corresponding appropriations. See also In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor
, 239 So. 2d 1, 9-10 (F la. 1970) (finding

that the le gislatu

re did not interfe re with the gove

rnor’s v eto power where it made an a

ppropria tion bill contingent upon another reasonably related bill). Ac co rd in gl y, we hold that the t ying provisions in Public Acts 96–34 and 96–35 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or run afoul of co nstit

ution al ve to pro cedu

res. We thereforeaffirm t

he judg ment of the circu it court w ith respe ct to coun t VI o f plaintif

fs’ complain t.

¶ 73 II I. Pub lic FundsClause ¶ 74 In count II

of their complaint, plaintiffs allege that thevideo gaming and lottery private
manager provisions in Public Acts 96–34, 96–37, and 96–38 violate article VII I, section 1(a), of th e Il li no is Co ns ti tu ti on of 19 70 (t he pu bl ic fu nd s c la us e) : “ Pu bl ic fu nd s, pr op er ty o r credit shall be used only f or public purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI II , § 1(a). ¶ 75 Article

5 of Public

Act 96–34

create s the Video Gam ing Act, which allows certain licensedestablish

ments toconduct v

ideo ga ming and imposes a

30% tax on a

ll net incom

e from video gaming

terminal s. Pub. Act

96–34 (eff. July

13, 2009) ; see also

Pub. Acts 96–37, 96–38 (eff. July 13, 2009) (ame nding the Video Gaming Act). The am endments to the Illin ois Lottery

Law in article 900, section 900, of Public Act 96–34, and article 60, section 60–10, of Public Act 96–37 provide, in part, that the Department of Revenue “sha ll conduct the lottery with the a ssi stance o f a priva te manag er under

a manag ement ag

reemen t at all times in a manner consistent with [federal law].” Pub. Acts 96–34, 96–37 (eff. July 13, 2009) (amendi ng 20 I

LCS 160 5/2 (West 20 08)). Ac cording to plaintif

fs, these provision s violate federal laws criminalizing the promo tion and a

dvertise ment of lot

terie s in i nterstat

e

commerce. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301 through 1304, 1953(a) (2000). Plaintiffs then arg ue, with no citation to authority, that “beca use the pro grams c onstitute illegal gambling under feder al-16-

law, expending State funds to establish them viola tes the Con stitution’ s command that public funds be used only for

public purposes.” We disagree. ¶ 76 Plaintiff

s’ premise that the programs are

illegal is questionable. First, video gaming does
notappear

to fit within the definition of a “lottery”under federal law, which means the Video Gaming Act is not subject to the fe deral c

riminal g ambling

laws rel ied on by plaintiff s. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1307(d), 1953(e). Secondly , from our review of the legislation, it appears that the amendme nts t o the Illinois Lottery Law in Public Acts 96–34 and 96–37 were dr afted withthe goal of

conform ing with t he fede ral gui delines f

or lotter ies condu cted by

a state acting under

the authority of state law . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1307(a)(1), (b)(1), 1953(b)(4); see also Scope of Exemption Under Federal Lotter y Statutes for L

otteries Conducted by

a State Acting Un der th e Authority of State L aw, Op. O.L.C. (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/state-conducted-lotteries101608.pdf. ¶ 77 In an y e vent, even if plaintiffs are correct that the video g aming and lottery private
manager provisions violate federal criminal law, it does not follow that these provisions violate the public

funds cla

use in the constituti on. Whethe

r an ena ctment comp lies with federal law is notthe test for deciding whether the ena ctment runs afoul of

the public funds clause. ¶ 78 The pr incip les re gardin g a public pur

pose unde r articl e VI

II , section 1(a), a re well settled. To establish that a statute is unconstitutional, “ ‘facts mus t be alleged indicating that governmentalaction ha s been ta ken which direct

ly b enefits a

private interest without a corresponding public benefit.’ ” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias , 231 Ill. 2d 62, 85 (2008 ) (quo ting Paschen v. Village of Winnetka , 73 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028-29 (1979)). “This court has long recognized that what is for the public good and what are public purposes

are questions whi ch th e legislature must in the first instance decide.” In re Marriage of Lappe
, 176 Ill. 2d 414 , 429- 30 (19 97) (ci ting People e x rel. City of Salem v . McMac

kin
, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 355 (1972), and Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority
, 399 Ill. 579, 588 (1948)). “In making t

his de termination, the legislature is vested with a broad discretion, and the judgment o f the leg is lature is to be accepted in the absence of a clear showing that the purportedPublic purpose is butan evasion and that the purpose is, in fact, private.” Id . at 430 (citing Salem , 53 I

ll. 2d at 355, People e

x rel. Mc David v. Barrett , 370 Ill. 478, 482 (1939), and Hagler v . Small , 307 Ill. 460, 474 (1923)). ¶ 79 “This court has recognized that ‘[t]he execution of a public purpose which involves the expenditure of money

is usually

att ended wi th private benefits.’ ” Id. at 436-37 (quoting Hagler
, 307 I

ll. at 473) . “If the prin

cipal pur pose of th e enact ment is pub lic in natu

re, it is irrelevant that there will be an incidental benefit to private interests.” Id. at 437 (citi ng Salem
, 53 Ill. 2d at 355, and People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Authority , 14 I ll. 2d 230, 236 (1958)). ¶ 80 Plaintiffs do not allege that either the video gaming or lottery manager provisions benefit

a priva te int erest without a corresponding public benefit, or that the le gislature’s stated
purpose for the enactments is an evasion and that the purpose is, in fact, private. The purpose of the Video Gaming Act is to increase reve nue to the state, undoubtedly a public pur pose. With regard to the lottery

provisions, although the private manager of the lottery

may rec eive-17-

up to 5% of lottery

profits as compensation (Pub. Act 96–37 (eff. July 13, 2009) (ame nding 20 IL CS 1605/9.1 (West 2008)), this does n ot nega te the public

purpose o f the pro visions. Where an enactment authorizes the expenditureof public funds pur suant toa public purpose,

an “incidental benefit to private interests” does no t cause the enactment to be unconstit utional. S ee L appe , 176 Ill. 2d at 437. We find no violation of the public funds clause. Accordingly , we affirm the judgment of the circuit cour twith resp ect to count II

of plaintiff s’ compla int.

¶ 81 IV. U niformity Clause ¶ 82 Article

IX, s ection 2, of the I

llinois Cons titution (th

e unifor mity clause) , provide s: “In any law

classify ing the s ubjects o

r object s of non-property

taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed uniformly.” I

ll. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 2. The uniformity clause is a “ specific limitation on the General As se mb ly i n the exercise of its taxing power.” SearlePharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
, 117 Ill. 2d 454, 466-67 (1987). The clause requires that a tax classification be based on a real and substantial difference

between the persons taxed and those not taxed, and bear some r easo nable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder
, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003). ¶ 83 A taxpayer raising a uniformity challeng e “is not required to provethat every conceiv able explanation for the tax is unreasonable. Rather, the taxing body must ‘produce a justification for its classifications.’ ” Id . at 15 6 (quo ting Geja’s Cafe v. Me tropolitan P ier &Exposition Authority
, 153 I

ll. 2d 239, 248 (1992)). This does not mean, however, that the taxing body has an evidentiary

burden or is required to produ ce f acts to justify the classifica tion. Arangold
, 204 Ill. 2d at 156. The court’s inquiry regarding the pro ffere d just ificatio n is
narrow, and “[i]f a s e t of facts ‘can be reasonably conceived that would sustain it, the classification must

be upheld.’ ” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias , 231 Ill. 2d 62, 73 (2008 ) (quo ting Geja’s Ca fe , 153 Ill. 2d at 24 8). Once the taxing body has offered a justification for the classification, theplaintiff then has the burden to persuade the court that the defenda

nt’s explan ation is ins ufficie nt as a ma

tter of la w or unsup

ported by the fac ts. Arangold
, 204 Ill. 2d at 156; Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Manna , 227 Ill. 2d 128, 136-37 (2007). ¶ 84 Article

900, section 945, of

Public Act 96–34 amends section 8–1 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (2 35 IL

CS 5/8–1 (West 2008)) to impose a tax increase on distributors of beer, wine and spirits. In addition to previously existing taxes, the provision adds a new tax of 4.6
cents per gallon on distributors of beer, 66 cents per g allon on distributors of wine, and $4.05
per gallon o n distrib utors of spirits. In count I II of their complaint, plaintiffs contend that there is “no expressed or sustainable rationale whatsoever for the huge dif ference in the gallon age taxes as between the categories of beer, wine and spirits” and, therefore, the tax increases in article 900, section 945, violate the uniformity clause. We disagree. ¶ 85 Plai ntiff s ackn owled ge that the percentage of alc ohol is higher by volume in wine than in beer, a nd hi gh er i n spirits than in both beer and wine. It is well established that hig her-18-

taxes may

be constitutionally impos ed on alcoholic beverages that ha ve a higher alcohol

co ntent, based on the ra

tionale th at bever

ages w ith a higher alc ohol conte nt contrib ute to various societal ills and higher taxes on those beverages promotes tempe rance. See Timm v. Harrison
, 109 Ill. 593, 600-01 (1884) (holdi ng, under the constitution of 1870, that “[t]he line of division into classes here made, based upon the sale of malt liquors as distinguished from more intoxic ating dr

inks, if viewed a s for taxat

ion, is a quite na

tural an d a reas onable one, and not out of harmony , in our view, with any fe ature of the constitution in respect of taxation”); Federated Distributors, Inc. v. Johnson , 125 I ll. 2d 1, 19-20 (1988) (recognizing the validity of taxing “lower alcohol l evel pro ducts at lower rates”); see also, e.g. , Imaginar y Images, Inc. v. Evans , 612 F.3d 736, 746- 47 (4th Cir . 2010); Horton v. Cook , 538 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). ¶ 86 Relying on Wexler v. W irtz Corp.
, 211 Ill. 2d 18 (2004), p laintiff s maintain

that it cannot be assum ed that the taxes in article 900, section 945, which are imposed on liquo r distributo rs, are pas se d on t o either retaile rs or con sumers. T

hus, acc ording t

o plaintif fs, d espiteth e long- standing principle that higher taxes may

be impose d on beve

rageswith higher alcohol content, “ in the wake of Wexler,” temperance cannot be a suff icient justi fica tion f or the tax. ¶ 87 In Wexler, this cour t held tha t an ind ivid ual co nsum er lack ed sta ndin g to cha llenge a liquor tax im pos ed o n a d is tri but or o f al coh ol ic b eve rag es. In so holding we noted that, even though evidence showed that the distributor had raised its prices to offset the tax increase, and that cos t may have been p assed on to consu mers, that f act di d not change t he “lega l
status of the parties.” Id . at 27. Even if consumers paid a hig her pric e, they

could not l egally be considered the payers of the challenged tax because the distributo r “was th e only entity under a legal obligation to remit the tax to the state, and it was the only entity that

actually paid the tax.” Id . Contrar

y to plaintiff s’ assertions, nothing in Wexler precludes the General Assembly from assuming, for purposes of promoting the goal of temperance, that increases in wholesa

le liquor t axes norma

lly will result in increa sed pric es for r etail con sumers. ¶ 88 Plaintiffs a lso conte nd that the

new tax ra

tes in article 900, section 945, ar e unconstitutional b e cause they do not follow proportionally with the alcohol content in the bever ages. That is, according to plaintiffs, if the alcohol content in wine is 2 to 3 time s greater by volume than in beer, the n the tax must be only 2 to 3 times gre ater, and if the alcohol content i n spirits is 8 times greater than in beer, then that tax must be only 8 times greater. But the uniformity clause does not im

pose such a strict p roportio nality

require ment.

“ ‘Rather, the uniform ity clause was de signed to enforce minimum standards of

reasona bleness and fairness as between gr oups of taxpayers.’ ” Arangold Corp. , 204 Ill. 2d
at 153 (quoting Geja’s Ca

fe , 153 Ill. 2d at 252). The tax classifications in article 900, section 945, meet that standard. ¶ 89 Temperance is a legitimate public g oal andthe classifications established in articl e 900, section 945, are in furtherance of that goal. Because the leg

islature’s judgment onthis subject is not a matter that may be f

actually re

futed ( Empress

Casino , 231 I

ll. 2d at 75 ), plainti ffs’ uniformit y clause c laim was p

roperly rejected by

the circuit court as a matter of law

. DeW oskin v. Loew’s Chicago Cinema, Inc. , 306 Ill. App. 3d 504, 523 (1999). Ac co rd in gl y,

we affirm the judgment of the circuit court with respect to count II I of plaintiff s’ complain

t.-19-

¶ 90 V. Substan tive L aw in an A

ppropria tion Bill ¶ 91 Article IV, section 8(d), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution states that “Appropriationbills shallbe limited

to the subj ect of a

ppropria tions” (I ll. Const. 19 70, art. IV, § 8(d)). The reason for this limitation has been explained:

“History tells us tha

t the ge neral a ppropria tion bill present s a special temptation for the attachment

of rider s. It i s a nece ssary and ofte n popular bill which is c ertain of passage. If a rider c an be attached to it, the rider can be adopte d on the merits of the general appropriation bill without having to depend on its own merits for adoption.” Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Sub ject , 4 2 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 413 (1958). Primarily because of this concern, “an appr opriation bill may

not conta in substantive law.” Board of Trustee s of Commun ity Colleg e Distric t No. 508 v. Burris , 118 Ill. 2d 465, 477-78 (1987); see also People e

x rel. Kirk

v. Lindbe rg , 59 Ill. 2d 38, 42-43 (1974) (noting that the inclusion of

provision s other th an appro priationsin an appr

opriation bill may effec tively nullify the gove

rnor’s veto power). ¶ 92 However, although an appropriation bill is limitedto the subj ect of a ppropria tions, this limitation is not applied in a“strict, literal sense.” 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 423. An a ppropriation bill may in clude conditions that “restrict and qualify ” an appropriation and that must be fulfilled before the authorized funds are spent. Benjamin v. Devon Bank , 68 Ill. 2d 142, 148 (1977). “[T]he app

ropriati ons act is not limited to a bare

statemen

t of the a

mounts appropriated

and the pur

p oses or objects of the appropriation. Provisions that are an incidental and necessary

regulation of the e xpenditu re of the money appropriated may

be included.” 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 423. ¶ 93 In count I

V of their complaint, plaintiffs maintain that Public Act 96–35, which contains appropriations for capital pr oj ects, also contains several provisions that do not merely restrict

or qualify an appr

o pri ation but, instead, create substantive law in violation of article I V, section 8(d). Before addr

essing these provisions, we cl arify the natur e of plai ntiffs’ a

rgumen t. ¶ 94 Plaintiffs’ challenge to Public Act 96–35 is directed to the Act in its entirety. They

assert that the “inclusion of any substantive law authority in [an appropriation] bill invalidates the entire bill.” Thus, according to plaintiffs, if any single provision in Public Act 96–35 contains substantive law, then the e ntire ac t is invalid

and furt her, bec ause the

effec tiveness of Public Act 96–34 is conti ngent upon Public Act 96–35 becoming law, Public Act 96–34 falls as well. The premise o f plaintif

fs’ arg ument is no t corre ct. ¶ 95 A claim that substantive law is contained in an appr

opriation bill may be contra sted with

a single subject challenge. I

t is generally

held that when an a

ct conta ins two or m

ore subjects in violation of the single subject rule, the reviewing c ourt cannot choose which subject is the “right” one and

eliminate the other . Such a de

terminat ion would “ inject[ ] the courts more deeply than they should be into the legislative process.” Litchfield Eleme n tary School District No. 79 v. Babbitt , 608 P.2d 792, 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 19 80); Power, Inc. v. Huntley
, 235 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash. 1951) (when an act embraces two subjects it is impossible for a
court to choose

betw een the two ). La

rgely for this r

eason, a single s ubject challeng e is-20-

directed toward the act as a whole. Beca use there is no “right” subject that the court can look to, “ ‘[t]here isno one pr

ovision or featur e of the a ct that is c

halleng ed as unc onstitution al, such that the defect could be remedied by a subsequent amendment which simply deleted or altered that provision or feature. ’ ” People v. Olender , 222 Ill. 2d 123, 145-46 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Edgar , 176 I ll. 2d 499, 5 11-12 (19 97)); Litchfield , 608 P.2d at 804 (“Since the enactment in question is infected by reason of

the combination of its various elementsrather

than by any

invalidity of one component, the otherwise salutary

principle of

severance and part ial saving s of valid

portions does not ap

ply ”); Huntley , 235 P .2d at 178 (when an act embra ces “ ‘t w o distinct objects, when the constitution says it shall embrace butone, the who le act mus t b e treated as void’ ” (quoting 1 Walter Carring ton, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 308 (8th ed. 1927))). ¶ 96 The same is not true w ith respe ct to a cla im that an a

ppropria tion bill c ontains a substantive law provision. The “right ” subject in

an appro priation b ill is appropriations, as the constitution itself states. Thus , in an appropriation bill, a provision that contains substantive law is “ ‘one provision or feature’ ” ( Olender , 22 2 Ill. 2d at 146 (quoting Johns on , 176 I ll . 2d at 512 )) that isconstituti onally impermiss ible, and

the appr opriate remedy is to strike that provision from the act. See People e x rel. Kirk

v. Lindbe rg , 59 I

ll. 2d 38, 42 (1974); Devon Bank , 68 Ill. 2d 142; see also, e.g. , Department of Educa tion v. Lew is
, 416 So. 2d 455, 463 (Fla. 1982). Only if the substantive provision cannot be severed will the

ac t b e s tr uc k i n i ts en ti re ty. ¶ 97 With this under stand ing, we turn to plaintiffs’ claims. Article 140, section 99, of Public Act 96–35 states that the Act does not become effect ive unless Public Act 96–34, as amend ed, becomes law. Plaintiffs contend this contingen cy provision eff ectively incorpor

ates all of Public Ac t 96–34, with its numerous substantive law provisions, into Public Act 96–35 and, therefore, that these substantive provisions are invalid. We disag ree. ¶ 98 Alth ough the effectiveness of Public Act 96–35 is contingent on Public Act 96–3 4 becoming law, this does not mean that the provisions of Public Act 96–34 are par t of Public Act 96–35 within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against including substantive law. Indeed, as we discusse d previously (see section I(D), supra ), it is per missible to make

an appropriation bill contingent upon the passage of other, reasona bly related

legislation. In

re Advisory Opinion to the Governor , 239 So. 2d at 9; Colton v. Branstad , 372 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1985) (“ it is well established t hat ap propriations may be made contingent upon matters or events reasonably related to the subject of

the appropriation”). Accordingly , we reject plaintiffs’ contention that Public Act 96–34 is effectively and improperly incor

porated into Public Act 96–35. ¶ 99 Plaintiffs also identify severa l other provisions that are, in fact, contained within Public Act 96–35 and that, in pla

intiffs’ view, co nstitute su bstantive law. Plain

tiffs fir st point to article 100, section 30, of Publ ic Act 96–35. This provision reappropriates funds from the Build I llinois Bond Fund to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency for g rant s fo r wastewater-compliance

progra ms, and sta

tes that “ [t]hese gr

ants are limited to projects for which the local government provides at least 30% of the pr oject cost[, t]here is an approved

c omplia nce plan, and there is an enforceable c ompliance schedule prior to grant awa rd.” Plaintiffs contend that this provision constitutes substantive law because it adds restrictions-21-

for waste water- compl iance gr ants not found in the Illinois Environmental Protection Act itself (415 IL

CS 5/4(t) (West 2008)). ¶ 100 Plaintiffs also point to article 61, sec tion 10, a nd artic le 5, sec tion 15, of Public Act 96–35. Article 61, section 10, states that, with respect to appropriations to the Illin ois Emergency

Management Agency

for safety and security improve

ments at higher education facilities “[n]o contract shall be entered into or obligation incurred for any expenditures from appropriations in Section 5 of this Article until after the purposes and am ounts have been approved in writing by the Gove

rnor.” Similarly, article

5, section 15, which reappropriates funds to the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, states that “[n]o contract shall be entered into or obligation incurred for any expenditures from appropriations in Sections 5 and 10 of this Article

until afte

r the pur poses and

amo un ts have been approved in writing by the Governor.” Plaintiff

s maintain

that both these provisions alter substantive law by requiring the Governo

r’s appr oval for the expend

itures, a require ment not fo

und in th e underlying

ena bling statutes for the Illinois Emerge ncy Manag ement Agency or the Office of th e Archite ct of the

Capitol. ¶ 101 Finally , plaintif fs’ point t o article 50, section 25. This provision states that the “sum of $310,000,000, or so much there of as may be necessary , is appropriated from the Transportation Bond Ser ies A Fund to th e Dep artment of Transportation for [various project s] as appro ximated bel ow.” The provision then lists a

dollar a mount for 10 geog raphic districts and a dollar amount for “engineer ing.” Plaint iffs c ontend that the phrase “as

ap proximated below” impermissibly deleg ates to the Director of the Department of Transportation the job of appropriating money and, thus, constitutes invalid substantive law. ¶ 102 Defend ants, in response, initially contend that plaintiffs’ c laims regarding the foregoing provisions are m

oot. W e agree . Plaintiff

s’ compla int is broug

ht pursua nt to section 11–303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 IL CS 5/11–303 (West 2008)), which permits an “action
to restrain and

enjoin the disbursement of public fu nds by any office r or off icers of the State government.” See 735 IL

CS 5/11–301 (West 2008). As defendants point out, the 2009 fiscal
year is over, a

nd the app

ropriati on author

it y cr eated by Public Act 96–35 has lapsed. See West Side Organization Health Services Corp. v. Thompson , 79 Ill. 2d 503, 506 (1980). T his
court cannot enjoin the legislature from appropriating funds pursuant to the provisions cited by plaintiffs because those provisions are no lo nger in effec t. Beca

use this court cannot grant effectiverelief, plaintiffs’ claims regarding the challenged provisions are moot. F elzak v. Hruby , 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392 (2007). ¶ 103 Plaintiff

s, however , ask us to invoke the public inte

rest exce ption to th e mootness doctrine. The crit

eria for invoking the public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an author itative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will generally recur. In re A Minor
, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989). We note that the provisions challenged by plaintiffs continue

to be emplo yed by the Gene ral As sembl y in curren t bud ge t legi slation. See 97th Ill. Gen. A ssem., Senate Bill 2414, 2011 Sess., article 1, section 20 (Governor’s ap proval fo r Architect of the Capitol contracts); article 10, section 20 (“approximated below” language); article 13, section 10 (Governor’s approval for Emergency

Management Agency

contracts); article 22, section 35 (restrictions on wastewater-compliance gr ants). Given this fact and the-22-

clear pu bl ic na tu re of

th e i ss ue s p re se nt ed , a s w el l a s t he de si ra bi li ty o f a resolution of the questions present

ed, we c onclude t

hat the c riteria of the pub lic interest exception have been met. See, e.g. , Colton , 372 N.W.2d at 187. ¶ 104 Turning to the mer its , in support of their claim that the restrictions on g rants fo r wastewater-compliance

found in article 100, se ction 30, amount to unconstitutional substantive law, plaintiffs rely pr imarily on this court’s decision in Benjamin v. Devon Bank
, 68 Ill. 2d 142 (1977). I

n that case, a statute authorized the Director of the De partment of Labor, in his discr

etion and with the a pproval o f the Gov ernor, t o open branch

offices outside Springfield. Id. at 148. After the Director entered into a lea se for an unemployment

insurance office locatedin Chicago, the General Assembly included a

provision in an appr opriation bill which stated that none of the Department’s appropriated funds could be used to open or staff

an unemploy ment insuran ce office “located within 500 feet of a school in any city

with a population over 1,000,000.” (Inter nal quo tati on marks omitted.) Id . at 143. F inding th is provision to be unconstitutional substantive law, this court “agree[d] that the General Assembly may restrict a

nd qualify the use to which funds appropriated may be put” but

held that, in this case, the contested provision impermissibly “placed an additional limitation on the location of a

branchoffice, and this cannot be done in an appropriation bill.” Id . at 148. ¶ 105 The statu tory provision at issue in Devon Bank differssignific antly

from art ic le 100
, section 30. The provision in Devon Bank was targeted

to a sing le lease. I

t was an a ttempt to overturn an action taken by the executive branch, which was authorized by statute, throu gh the use of a legislative rider. This is the ty pe of unreasonable legislative maneuve r th e constitutional prohibition on including substantive law is intended to prevent. In contra st, the restric tio ns in article 100, section 30, are not targeted to a ny single wa stewater project but

are applicable to all grants for which money has been appropriated under that provision. Further, there is no indication that the legislature, by including a rticle 100, section 30, was attempting to overturn previous decisions made by the executive branch that were authorized by gener al laws. We

conclude that arti cle 100, s ection 30 , contain s reasonable restrictions on an appropriation that do not constitute substantive law. ¶ 106 We similarly find no con stitutional problem with artic le 61, section 10, or article 5, section 15, the provisions which require the Governor’s approval bef ore expenditures from the appropriations may

be made. Case law

recog nizes a

distinction between appropriations and expen ditures, and the pr evailing view is that

provisions which authorize the executive branchto control the expenditure of the amounts appropriated by the legislature may

be included in an appropriation bill. See State ex rel. Holm es v. Stat

e Board of Finance , 367 P.2d 925, 929-30 (N.M. 1961) (and cases cited therein). We a gree and hold that neither article 61, section 10, nor article 5, section 15, contains impermissible substantive law. ¶ 107 Finally, we r

eject plaintiffs’ contentionthat the phrase “as approximated below” found in art i cle 50, section 25, improperly delegates to the Director of the De partment of Transportation the job of appropriating money. I n support of their c ontention , plaintif fs cite this court’s decision in County of Co ok v. Ogi lvie , 50 I ll. 2d 379 ( 1972). I

n that ca se, this
court held unconstitutional a statute which allowed t he Depa rtment of Public Aid, with

the
consent of the Go vernor, to “rea

pportion t he amount s appropr

iated in th is section among the several subdivisions of distributive expenses herein designated as the need ther efor arises.”-23-

Id. at 384. No such provision allowing reapportionment is found in article 50, section 25. ¶ 108 The “as appro ximated below” language simply acknowledges the fact that the completio n of some of the projects authorized by article 50, section 25, may notrequire all the funds that have been ap

propria ted. The provisi on itsel f makes this clear by stating that the sum of $310,000,000, “or so much thereof as may be necessary ,” is appropriated for the various project s. We find not

hing co nsti tution ally impermissible about the inclusion of the “as approximated below” language. ¶ 109 Because we find no constitutional infirmity with respect

to the provisions challenged by plaintiff s, we affi rm the judg

ment of the

circuit c ourt with r

espect t o count I V of plain

tiffs’ complain t.

¶ 110 CONCLUSIO N ¶ 111 For

the foregoing reasons, the judg ment of the ap pellate c ourt is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 112 Appellat

e court j udgmen

t rever sed; ¶ 113 circuit court judgment affirmed.