96-302

 No. 96-302

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and 

Respondent, 

 

vs.

NORMAN ALVIN ADAMS

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lincoln,

 The Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Amy N. Guth, Lincoln County Public Defender, Libby, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Elizabeth L. Griffing, 

Assistant 

Attorney General; Bernie Cassidy, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: December 19, 1996

 Decided: July 15, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 This is an appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln 

County. On

February 22, 1996, the District Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and

order denying Defendant Adams' motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a 

search

warrant. From this judgment, Defendant Adams appeals. We affirm.

 The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the State conducted a search of

Defendant Adams' home which violated Defendant Adams' constitutional guarantees of

privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 This case arose from a search of the rented residence of Defendant Adams

(Adams) located in Libby, Montana. The search was conducted pursuant to a search

warrant issued based upon information supplied by Michael Dotts (Dotts), a man 

arrested

on September 23, 1995, in Lincoln County for assault and disorderly conduct. Upon 

his

arrest, Dotts gave the police a false name. After his arrest, Dotts advised the 

police that

he had information concerning a marijuana growing operation in Libby.

 On September 25, 1995, during his first interview with the police, Dotts told

Detective Hurtig and Detective Martin he would like to make a deal with them. 

Although

Dotts did not want the charges against him dropped, he wanted to be released on his 

own

recognizance in exchange for his information regarding the marijuana growing 

operation. 

The detectives advised Dotts that they could not guarantee him anything. Rather, 

they

told Dotts he should tell them everything he knew and explained that if his 

information

was used, they might be able to help him; but, if the information was not used, he 

would

remain in jail.

 Dotts explained, in this first interview, that he had previously lived with 

Adams'

son, Gary, but that the marijuana growing operation was in Adams' house in Libby. 

Because Dotts could not remember the address of Adams' house, he left the station 

with

the detectives and pointed out a gray house with an off-yellow roof, located on the 

corner

of Quartz Road and Rawlings Road. After returning to the station to complete this 

first

interview, Dotts told the detectives that he had helped to set up the grow operation 

in

Adams' house. He described the grow operation as a hydroponic system, where the

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plants are grown in water, with a 1000-watt converter bulb and a 400-watt, two burner

bulb used as grow lights.

 After this first interview, Detective Hurtig again went to Adams' residence,

without Dotts. He took pictures of Adams' house and two vehicles parked in front of 

the

house--a brown Mustang and a white Lincoln--vehicles which were not present when

Dotts first identified the house. Upon his return to the station, Detective Hurtig 

learned

that the State of Washington had a warrant for Dotts' arrest. Consequently, only two

hours after the first interview, Detective Hurtig conducted a second interview with 

Dotts. 

He explained to Dotts that due to the outstanding warrant, he could not release 

Dotts on

his own recognizance. Despite this, Dotts agreed to interview with Detective Hurtig 

for

a second time to describe the marijuana growing operation in Libby.

 In the second interview, Dotts again described the hydroponic marijuana 

growing

operation he helped set up and the type of plants that Adams was growing. Dotts

explained that only three weeks earlier he had been in Adams' house which Dotts

believed Adams rented under a false name. Additionally, Dotts' description of the

vehicles driven by Adams and his son, Gary, matched the description of the vehicles 

that

Detective Hurtig had previously photographed at Adams' house. Furthermore, Dotts

stated that, prior to his arrest that day, he had talked with Gary Adams who 

informed him

that "they were moving the plants" and getting ready to go to Sandpoint, Idaho. 

Shortly

after this second interview, Detective Hurtig corroborated Dotts' statement by 

locating

in the Clerk and Recorderþs office the name of the owner of the house Adams rented,

calling the owner and confirming that Adams was renting the house under his true 

name.

 Based upon Dotts' information, Detective Hurtig prepared a search warrant

application that same day (September 25, 1995) using a generic search warrant form 

that

he obtained from the Montana Department of Justice which specifically listed the 

types

of materials commonly used and found in conjunction with a marijuana growing

operation. In this application, Detective Hurtig did not use Dotts as a confidential

informant, but rather specifically identified him. Detective Hurtig explained that 

Dotts

had provided him with information about a growing operation involving over 100

marijuana plants while Dotts was held in the Lincoln County Jail due to his arrest in

Lincoln County for assault and because the State of Washington had issued a warrant 

for

his arrest. Detective Hurtig also explained Dotts' role in helping to set up the 

marijuana

growing operation in Adams' house. Furthermore, Detective Hurtig described his

personal observations of Dotts and explained how he had corroborated Dotts' 

information.

 Without consulting the Lincoln County Attorney's Office, Detective Hurtig

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presented the search warrant application on September 25, 1995, to the acting 

district

court judge who reviewed the application and signed the search warrant authorizing a

search of Adams' residence. That same afternoon, Detective Hurtig served and 

executed

the search warrant on Adams' house. The search yielded a sophisticated hydroponic

marijuana growing operation and approximately 133 marijuana plants in different 

stages

of growth. Apparently, either a search of the vehicles on the property was not

conducted or if a search was conducted, no incriminating evidence was found. 

Thereafter, Detective Hurtig arrested Adams on the charge of Criminal Production or

Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs.

 On October 5, 1995, Adams was charged with Criminal Production or

Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs pursuant to 45-9-110, MCA. Adams filed a motion

to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and the District Court 

heard this

motion on February 5, 1996. On February 22, 1996, the District Court entered its

findings of fact, conclusions of law and order denying Adams' motion to suppress. 

Subsequently, Adams entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement,

Adams plead guilty to Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs pursuant to 45-9-102,

MCA, and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of Criminal Production or Manufacture

of Dangerous Drugs. Adams reserved the right to appeal the District Court's denial 

of

his suppression motion. On April 17, 1996, Adams entered a guilty plea, 

acknowledging

that he had possessed marijuana in his home on September 25, 1995, in violation of 

the

law. On May 23, 1996, Adams was given a three-year deferred sentence with a $500.00

fine. Adams now appeals the District Court's February 22, 1996 Order denying his

motion to suppress.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the State conduct a search of Adams' home which violated Adams'

constitutional guarantees of privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and

seizure?

 On January 17, 1996, Adams filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by the

Lincoln County Sheriff's Department during the search conducted on September 25,

1995, and requested that the District Court conduct a hearing pursuant to Franks v.

Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (procedure for

challenging the truthfulness of factual statements made in an application for search

warrant). In his brief supporting his suppression motion, Adams alleged that the 

State

conducted an unreasonable search because the search warrant lacked probable cause. 

Pursuant to Adams' request in his suppression motion, the District Court conducted a

hearing on February 5, 1996, and heard the testimony of Detectives Hurtig and Martin

as well as Adams.

 Subsequently, the District Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of 

law and

order denying Adams' motion to suppress. In Conclusion of Law No. 3, the District

Court stated:

 On the facts before the Court, it cannot be said that Dotts' statements

 should have been rejected as coming from a source unworthy of belief. 

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 The Court concludes that the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office had probable

 cause to believe that drugs were present in a house they knew to be

 occupied by Adams.

 Dotts' admissions to: (1) selling the grow equipment to Adams; (2)

 assisting Adams in setting up the operation; and (3) manicuring the

 marijuana plants for Adams, are all corroborative of Dotts' statements

 regarding the presence of a marijuana grow operation in Adams' residence. 

 Furthermore, regarding corroboration, the Application states:

 "Mr. Dotts said that Norman Adams drove a white Lincoln

 with Alaska license plates, and that Gary Adams drove a Ford

 Mustang GT that was brown in color that had Montana

 license on it. This matches the two vehicles that were parked

 in front of the residence of 45 Quartz Road although I could

 not see the license plates of the vehicles. I then checked with

 the Land Classification Office in the Lincoln County

 Courthouse to find out who owned the property and found

 that it was owned by Greg and Susan Rice of Libby. I

 contacted Susan Rice and she told me that Norman Adams

 was currently renting the property from them. Mr. Dotts

 appears to be telling the truth and I was able to confirm a

 large portion of the information that he has given me. Mr.

 Dotts asked for nothing in giving me this information and I

 have offered him nothing in return for this information."

 The fact that Dotts happened to know the types of cars driven by the

 Adams and the fact that Adams was renting the residence from a doctor

 contribute little of substance to his credibility. Nonetheless, these minor

 facts, coupled with Dotts' admissions against interest, do provide some

 corroboration which further bolsters his testimony.

 Granted, the information in the Application is arguably incomplete

 or inaccurate. For instance, it is not mentioned in the Application that,

 contrary to Dotts' statement to the detectives, Adams was not renting the

 house under an alias. Nor is it mentioned in the Application that the only

 alias involved in this case was the one Dotts himself used when he was

 arrested.

 Nor is it entirely true that "Dotts asked for nothing in giving me this

 information . . ." In fact, when he first offered the information, Dotts

 made it clear he was seeking a release from custody on his own

 recognizance. Before the search warrant was actually issued, Detective

 Hurtig testified that he had received information from the State of

 Washington that Dotts was to be held in custody without bail, and he had

 conveyed this information to Dotts, but when Dotts provided the

 information which formed the basis of the Application, he was operating

 under the hope and belief that the detectives could assist him in being

 released from custody.

 These inconsistencies are troubling but not fatal. The fact remains

 that Dotts provided detailed and fresh information about criminal activity,

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 and his status as a co-conspirator in that criminal activity, coupled with his

 knowledge of certain collateral facts, establish his trustworthiness for

 purposes of the Application. The Court concludes probable cause was

 established for the search of Adams' residence.

 On appeal, Adams raises three arguments to support his contention that the 

District

Court erred by denying his suppression motion. First, pursuant to Article II, 

Section 10

of the Montana Constitution, Adams argues that we should adopt a policy of "zero

tolerance" when intentional misstatements or omissions of police officers are made in

search warrant applications. Second, pursuant to Article II, Section 11 of the 

Montana

Constitution, Adams argues that the search warrant was not supported by sufficient

probable cause due to Detective Hurtig's alleged intentional misstatements and 

omissions

in his search warrant application. Finally, Adams argues that the search warrant was

unconstitutionally overbroad because it did not state with sufficient particularity 

the items

to be seized in Adams' residence.

 Adams first argues that, based on Article II, Section 10 of the Montana

Constitution, Montana's privacy clause, this Court should abandon the procedure set 

forth

in Franks which allows a court to reevaluate the sufficiency of probable cause 

supporting

a search warrant after excising any misstatements which a defendant has proven by a

preponderance of the evidence to be intentional. In its place, Adams argues that we

should adopt a policy of "zero tolerance" which would allow a court to quash an 

entire

search warrant if the warrant's application contained intentional misstatements or

omissions. The State responds that we should not address this issue because Adams

raises it for the first time on appeal.

 Upon review of Adams' brief in support of his motion to suppress and the

transcript of the District Court hearing held February 5, 1996, we conclude that 

Adams

did not raise this theory of "zero tolerance" to support his objection to the search 

warrant

application. Therefore, because this argument is raised for the first time on 

appeal, we

will not address it. Rasmussen v. Lee (1996), 276 Mont. 84, 88, 916 P.2d 98, 100. 

Consequently, the procedure set forth in Franks is controlling in this case.

 While Adams' next argument is not clearly articulated on appeal, he appears to

alternatively rely on Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution and Franks 

to

assert that this Court should review the District Court's conclusions regarding 

Detective

Hurtig's alleged misstatements and omissions as well as the court's overall decision 

that

the search warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause. Unlike Adams' first

argument concerning our adoption of a policy of "zero tolerance," we note that Adams,

in his suppression motion, requested that the District Court hold a Franks hearing to

address Detective Hurtig's alleged misstatements and omissions. Furthermore, after 

the

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hearing held February 5, 1996, the District Court directly addressed these issues in 

its

February 22, 1996 Order, as evidenced in Conclusion of Law No. 3, set forth above. 

Consequently, because Adams raised this argument before the District Court, we will

address the merits of Adams' second argument now on appeal.

 Relying on State v. Valley (1992), 252 Mont. 489, 830 P.2d 1255; and State v.

Kaluza (1995), 272 Mont. 404, 901 P.2d 107, Adams argues that the District Court 

erred

when it denied his motion to suppress based on its determination that sufficient 

probable

cause supported the search warrant. Adams asserts that probable cause did not exist

because Detective Hurtig failed to fully corroborate all of the information provided 

by

Dotts and because his statement in the search warrant application describing Dotts 

as a

reliable informant was not based on any objective facts. Adams contends that 

Detective

Hurtig's assertion of Dotts' reliability is baseless for a number of reasons. 

First, Adams

notes that Detective Hurtig omitted from the search warrant application the fact 

that Dotts

had given a false name upon his arrest. Second, Adams claims that Detective Hurtig

misstated that Dotts did not expect to be released from jail in return for his 

information. 

Finally, Adams asserts that Detective Hurtig's statements concerning Dotts' 

reliability are

directly contradicted by Detective Martin's statements, made during Dotts' first 

interview,

that the detectives did not know him.

 The State responds that Adams' reliance on Valley and Kaluza to assert that 

Dotts

was an "unreliable" informant is misplaced because, unlike in those cases, Dotts was 

not

a confidential informant. Rather, the State argues that Dotts' veracity and 

reliability were

established when he made statements implicating himself in the marijuana growing

operation. That is, the State contends that because Dotts' information concerning 

the

marijuana growing operation allegedly located in Adams' house implicated Dottsþ own

penal interests, his statements were inherently reliable, and, therefore, did not 

require

corroboration. Furthermore, the State maintains that the omissions and 

misstatements that

Adams argues Detective Hurtig made in the application for search warrant are 

immaterial

to the determination of Dotts' credibility. Finally, the State asserts that Dotts' 

basis of

knowledge was established because he provided fresh, detailed information based upon

his personal observation of the growing operation. Accordingly, the State argues 

that the

District Court properly concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable

cause, and, thereby properly denied Adams' motion to suppress. We agree. 

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 "We review the District Court's conclusions of law in ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence to determine whether the trial court's interpretation and 

application of

the law is correct." State v. Pastos (1994), 269 Mont. 43, 45, 887 P.2d 199, 201. 

Generally, probable cause must be determined from the four corners of the search

warrant application. State v. Rinehart (1993), 262 Mont. 204, 211, 864 P.2d 1219,

1223. However, the United States Supreme Court set forth an exception to this rule 

in

Franks, which allowed a defendant to challenge the truthfulness of statements made 

in an

application for search warrant. We adopted the Franks procedure in State v. Sykes

(1983), 194 Mont. 14, 20, 663 P.2d 691, 695, and we have since consistently applied

this rationale. See e.g., State v. Feland (1994), 267 Mont. 112, 882 P.2d 500; 

State v.

Mosley (1993), 260 Mont. 109, 860 P.2d 69; State v. Garberding (1990), 245 Mont.

356, 801 P.2d 583; State v. Hembd (1989), 235 Mont. 361, 767 P.2d 864 (overruled on

other grounds); State v. Wilson (1985), 218 Mont. 359, 708 P.2d 270.

 In Mosley, we described the Franks procedure as follows:

 The defendant must first make a substantial preliminary showing that a false

 statement was knowingly or intentionally made, or was made with reckless

 disregard for the truth. If defendant makes such a showing, and the

 misstatement was necessary to a finding of probable cause, a hearing must

 be held at defendant's request. When a hearing is held, the allegation of

 perjury or reckless disregard must be proved by defendant by a

 preponderance of the evidence. Once proved, the offending information

 must be excised from the warrant application. If after the egregious

 material is excised, the remaining content is insufficient to establish

 probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the

 search excluded.

Mosley, 860 P.2d at 73 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).

 Accordingly, before we address Adams' argument that the search warrant lacked

probable cause, we must first consider the effect of Detective Hurtig's alleged

misstatements and omissions on Dotts' credibility. Adams first notes that Detective

Hurtig omitted from the search warrant application the fact that Dotts had given a 

false

name upon his arrest. Second, Adams claims that Detective Hurtig misstated that 

Dotts

did not expect to be released from jail in return for his information. We agree 

with the

State that this information is immaterial to the determination of Dotts' 

credibility. 

 In Garberding, a defendant similarly argued that the district court erred by

denying him an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks based on the alleged facts 

that the

sheriff had failed to indicate in the search warrant application that the primary 

informant

was a convicted felon and had received a cash reward for his information. 

Garberding,

801 P.2d at 586. We disagreed with the defendant, concluding that these alleged

misstatements and omissions did not justify a Franks hearing. Garberding, 801 P.2d 

at

586. Rather, we concluded that this information added credit to the informant's tip

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because "[a] person of known criminal activity or a person admitting his own criminal

activity is not likely to place himself in such a dubious position unless he is 

telling the

truth." Garberding, 801 P.2d at 586.

 Here, the District Court concluded in Conclusion of Law No. 3, that upon 

review

of the misstatements and omissions regarding Dotts' use of a false name upon his 

arrest,

his expectation of release in exchange for his information about the marijuana 

growing

operation, as well as Dotts' admissions concerning his participation in the growing

operation, "it cannot be said that Dotts' statements should have been rejected as 

coming

from a source unworthy of belief." We agree. Just as in Garberding, Dotts admitted 

to

his own criminal activity, and, therefore, the information about Dotts' use of a 

false name

and his expectation of release "does not cast doubt on the reliability of his 

information." 

See Garberding, 801 P.2d at 586. Consequently, we find unpersuasive Adams'

arguments that based on Detective Hurtig's misstatements and omissions the District

Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

 Additionally, we find unpersuasive Adams' argument that Detective Hurtig's

statements in the search warrant application concerning Dotts' reliability are 

directly

contradicted by Detective Martin's statements, made during Dotts' first interview, 

that

the detectives did not know him. In response to Dotts' question, Detective Martin

explained in this first interview that he could not use Dotts as a confidential 

informant

because this was the first time he had met Dotts:

 If I put down in a search warrant I have a confidential reliable

 informant, it has to be something or somebody I know, somebody that I've

 dealt with in the past, somebody that I know has been truthful with me in

 the past and has never lied to me and so the information they're giving me

 is going to be truthful now. . . .. With you, I don't have that boat to go

 rowing in.

Contrary to Adams' argument, Detective Martin's comments do not contradict Detective

Hurtig's statements concerning Dotts' reliability. Rather, we consider these 

comments

merely an explanation why Dotts would not be used as a confidential informant. 

 Having concluded that the misstatements and omissions concerning Dotts' use of

a false name and expectation of release are immaterial to his credibility, we next 

consider

whether the District Court correctly concluded that probable cause supported the 

search

warrant. When reviewing the issuance of a search warrant, our duty is to ensure 

that the

magistrate or lower court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause

existed; our duty is not to review the lower court's determination de novo. 

Rinehart, 864

P.2d at 1223.

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 A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists should be

 paid great deference by reviewing courts and every reasonable inference

 possible should be drawn to support that determination. If a magistrate

 issues a search warrant after subjecting the application to the totality of 

the

 circumstances test, a reviewing court must presume that decision to be

 correct.

Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1223 (citations omitted).

 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, 

Section

11 of the Montana Constitution protect a person's right to be free from unlawful 

searches

and seizures by requiring that probable cause exist before a search warrant is 

issued. 

Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1222. Yet, prior to issuing a search warrant, a magistrate 

must

determine only that there is a probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal 

activity. 

Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1222. We previously adopted the "totality of the 

circumstances"

test, as set forth in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.

Ed.2d

527, to determine whether probable cause existed for issuance of a search warrant. 

State

v. O'Neill (1984), 208 Mont. 386, 679 P.2d 760. In determining probable cause under

the totality of the circumstances test, the veracity, reliability and basis of 

knowledge of

an informant remain highly relevant factors. Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1222. 

 As the State correctly contends, Adams' reliance on Valley and Kaluza to argue

that Dotts' information lacked veracity and reliability is misplaced because both 

cases

involved confidential informants or anonymous tips. See Valley, 830 P.2d 1255; 

Kaluza,

901 P.2d 107. In contrast to the informants in those cases, Dotts was not a 

confidential

informant, and, therefore, Detective Hurtig did not need to verify Dotts' 

reliability by

referencing his past conduct. Rather, Dotts' veracity and reliability were 

established

through Dotts' statements implicating himself in the marijuana growing operation. 

See

State v. Sundberg (1988), 235 Mont. 115, 121, 765 P.2d 736, 740. See also 

Garberding,

801 P.2d at 586. 

 In fact, even if Dotts had been a confidential informant, the information he

provided would have established sufficient probable cause because he admitted to 

helping

set up the marijuana growing operation in Adams' house. See Sundberg, 765 P.2d at 

740

(admissions against interest are sufficient to establish probable cause). In 

Sundberg, a

confidential informant admitted to marijuana use and stated that he had been to the

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defendant's home within the previous ten days and had seen marijuana growing there. 

We concluded that the affidavit containing this information was sufficient to 

establish

probable cause for a search warrant. In support of our conclusion, we quoted the 

United

States Supreme Court:

 Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent

 and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People do not lightly

 admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the

 form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions

 against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility--

 sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. That

 the informant may be paid or promised a "break" does not eliminate the

 residual risk and opp[r]obrium of having committed criminal conduct . . ..

Sundberg, 765 P.2d at 740 (quoting United States v. Harris (1971), 403 U.S. 573, 583-

84, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 734) (emphasis added).

 Here, Dotts' credibility also is sufficient to support a finding of probable 

cause to

search. First, Dotts was not used as a confidential informant. Second, as the 

District

Court noted, Dotts admitted selling marijuana growing equipment to Adams; assisting

Adams in setting up the operation; and manicuring marijuana plants for Adams. Based

on this information, the District Court correctly concluded that "[Dotts'] status as 

a coconspirator in that criminal activity, coupled with his knowledge of certain 

collateral

facts, establish his trustworthiness for purposes of the Application [for Search 

Warrant]." 

Despite Adams' arguments to the contrary, Detective Hurtig did not need to include

additional information in the search warrant application concerning Dotts' past 

conduct

to establish Dotts' reliability or veracity.

 Nonetheless, Adams also contends that Detective Hurtig failed to fully 

corroborate

Dotts' information. Specifically, Adams asserts that Detective Hurtig needed to more

fully corroborate Dotts' information than just verifying that Dotts could properly 

identify

Adams' house and the vehicles that Adams and his son drove as well as verifying that

Adams rented the identified house. Yet, corroboration of an informant's information

through other sources is only necessary when the information is hearsay or the 

informant

is anonymous. Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1224. Here, Dotts personally observed the

marijuana growing operation in Adams' house and he was not used as an anonymous

informant. Consequently, corroboration of Dotts' information was not necessary. See

Rinehart, 864 P.2d at 1224. 

 In sum, we conclude that Detective Hurtig's misstatements and omissions were

immaterial to the determination of Dotts' credibility. Furthermore, we conclude that

Dotts' admissions against interest regarding his participation in setting up the 

marijuana

growing operation, without any further corroboration, provided the District Court 

with

a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause supported the search 

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warrant. 

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court properly denied Adams' motion to 

suppress.

 Finally, Adams argues that the search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad

because it did not state with sufficient particularity the items to be seized in 

Adams'

residence. At the conclusion of the February 5, 1996 suppression hearing, Adams

informed the District Court that he would file a supplemental brief raising the 

issue that

the search warrant was overbroad. Adams acknowledges that he failed to file this

supplemental brief "for reasons contained outside of the court record." Upon review 

of

the record, we also note that no record of Adams' objection concerning the search

warrant's overbreadth was made. However, the District Court did address this issue 

in

its February 22, 1996 decision. Conclusion of Law No. 4 states in pertinent part:

 [Adams] raised a question about the scope of the search permitted by

 the Search Warrant. Specifically, [Adams] objects that Detective Hurtig

 was authorized to search the vehicles as well as the residence itself. . . ..

 In this case, however, because no search of the vehicles was apparently

 conducted, or if one was, no incriminating evidence was located in the

 vehicles, there is no basis to object to the search.

 Now on appeal, Adams raises this issue concerning the search warrant's

overbreadth, but he does not argue that authorization for a search of the vehicles 

was

overbroad, rather he argues that the search warrant application and the search 

warrant

were standardized forms enumerating "all the various things that any person, 

including

those engaged in ordinary legal activities, might legitimately have in their homes or

offices." Therefore, Adams contends that because the search warrant did not specify 

with

sufficient particularity the items to be seized in Adams' residence, it was

unconstitutionally broad. Additionally, Adams asserts that despite his failure to 

file his

supplemental brief, the District Court did consider and rule upon the overbreadth 

issue

in its Memorandum in Support of the Order filed jointly with its February 22, 1996

decision.

 The State responds that we should not address this issue because Adams raises 

it

for the first time on appeal. Referring to the District Court's Conclusion of Law 

No.

4, the State contends that while it appears that Adams objected to the breadth of the

search warrant, he only did so to the extent the search warrant authorized the 

search of

the vehicles. The State asserts that Adams never objected to the search warrant on 

the

grounds that the warrant did not state with sufficient particularity the items to be 

seized

within the residence. Consequently, the State argues that Adams raises a new theory 

for

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his objection concerning the search warrant's overbreadth for the first time on 

appeal,

and, therefore, we should not address this issue. We agree.

 A party may not change his theory on appeal from that advanced in the district

court. State v. Henderson (1994), 265 Mont. 454, 458, 877 P.2d 1013, 1016. Upon

review of Adams' brief in support of his motion to suppress evidence and the 

transcript

of the District Court hearing held February 5, 1996, we conclude that Adams did not

raise this theory to support his objection to the breadth of the search warrant. 

Consequently, we will not address the merits of this argument.

 In sum, we hold that the District Court had a substantial basis for 

concluding that

probable cause supported the search warrant, and, therefore, the District Court 

properly

denied Adams' motion to suppress.

 Affirmed.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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