alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
32





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officers of Bay National Corporation
(the “Company”) each certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the Company’s
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and that the information contained in that Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.








/s/ Hugh
W. Mohler





Hugh W.
Mohler


Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer


May 14,
2009




















/s/ David
E. Borowy





David E.
Borowy


Executive
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


May 14,
2009





This
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure
document, and may not be disclosed, distributed or used by any person for any
reason other than as specifically required by law.





























39
#### Richard J. GLAIR, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 06-55886.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008 *.

Filed May 2, 2008.

Richard J. Glair, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

Heather E. Davis, Esq., Melody Bormaster Los Angeles City, Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Richard Glair appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that officers of the Los Angeles Department of Animal Services unlawfully searched his home and seized his dog. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We re*661view de novo, *Boston Mut. Ins. v. Murphree,*242 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir.2001), and we affirm.

Glair contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and was based on omissions and misleading statements by the officers. We disagree. Considering the totality of the circumstances and in particular the report by Officer Gonzalez, the district court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause for the warrant existed. *See Illinois v. Gates,*462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The record supports the district court’s conclusion that Glair failed to raise a triable issue as to the validity of Officer Gonzalez’s report. *See Hervey v. Estes,*65 F.3d 784, 790 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that on summary judgment a “substantial showing” is required that the officers “made deliberately false statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in the affidavit.”).

Glair’s remaining challenges to the validity of the warrant, including that the conditions in his apartment were insufficiently serious to constitute a violation, that not all of the officers repoi’ted a smell, that the issuance of the warrant was to punish Glair for not agreeing to a warrantless inspection, and that the warrant lacked a legal basis, are unpersuasive.

Glair also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the seizure of the dog was objectively unreasonable. We disagree. The photographic evidence obtained during the search gave the district court an objective basis to consider “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” *Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Considering this photographic record, the district court properly determined that Glair failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the seizure was objectively unreasonable.

Glair’s remaining contentions, including those regarding the scope of Los Angeles Municipal Code § 53.10(a), judicial bias, and alleged mistakes in the magistrate judge’s report, are also unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Order entered February 4, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01065-CR

ARTHUR FRANKLIN MILLER, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-81265-2013

ORDER

Before the Court are two motions filed by appellant on January 29, 2015. 

The Court GRANTS Appellant’s Motion to Permit Current Counsel to Withdraw on 

Appeal and Substitute New Counsel on Appeal. We DIRECT the Clerk to remove Lori 

Ordiway as appellant’s attorney of record, and to substitute H. Jay Ethington, Cody L. Skipper, 

and Mark H. Nancarrow as attorneys of record for appellant.

The Court DENIES Appellant’s Motion for Court to Reconsider Setting Appeal for 

Submission Without Oral Argument. The appeal will be submitted without oral argument on 

March 31, 2015, to a panel consisting of Justice Lang, Justice Stoddart, and Justice Schenck, per 

the Clerk’s Notice of January 15, 2015 in this cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 39.8.
/s/ DOUGLAS S. LANG 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
Exhibit
32





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officers of Bay National Corporation
(the “Company”) each certifies, to the best of his knowledge, that the Company’s
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and that the information contained in that Form 10-Q
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.








/s/ Hugh
W. Mohler





Hugh W.
Mohler


Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer


May 14,
2008




















/s/ Mark
A. Semanie





Mark A.
Semanie


Executive
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer


May 14,
2008





This
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure
document, and may not be disclosed, distributed or used by any person for any
reason other than as specifically required by law.
CERTIFICATION                                                       Exhibit 31.1

I, Scott R. Oglum, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Theater Xtreme
Entertainment Group, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
we have:

         (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

         (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer's board of directors;

         (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

         (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's
internal controls over financial reporting.

Dated: March 14, 2005

                                      /s/ Scott R. Oglum
                                      ------------------
                                      Scott R. Oglum
                                      Chief Executive Officer


<PAGE>
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, by Executive Order 13094, the President amended Executive Order 12938 to respond more effectively to the worldwide threat of proliferation activities related to weapons of mass destruction. On June 28, 2005, by Executive Order 13382, the President, among other things, further amended Executive Order 12938 to improve our ability to combat proliferation activities related to weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons must continue beyond November 14, 2017. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended by Executive Orders 13094 and 13382.

                    This notice shall be published in the                     *Federal Register*                     and transmitted to the Congress.                

[FR Doc. 2017-24466

Billing code 3295-F8-P
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 

KEVIN LONELL SQUAIR, 

Petitioner, 

v. Case No. 5D18-874

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondent. 

________________________________/ 

Opinion filed April 6, 2018 

Petition for Belated Appeal

A Case of Original Jurisdiction. 

Michael A. Graves, Public Defender, 

Brooksville, and Eric R. Tippin, Assistant 

Public Defender, Brooksville, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM. 

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed 

with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the June 21, 2017 

judgment and sentence rendered in Case No. 15-CF-001809, in the Circuit Court in and 

for Hernando County, Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). 

PETITION GRANTED. 

SAWAYA, EVANDER and BERGER, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chris JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-10377

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 8, 2010.

Robb D. Catalano, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Chris Jackson, Federal Correctional Institution Seagoville, Seagoville, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Chris Jackson, federal prisoner # 06914-089, was convicted by a jury of one count of possession with intent to distribute 30 grams of cocaine, one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. Following amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines reducing the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, Jackson filed a motion for a sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The court granted the motion and reduced Jackson’s sentence on the drug possession count to 137 months, within the amended range of 110 to 137 months.

Jackson now appeals. He argues that the district court’s statement that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was insufficient; that the court failed to give sufficient consideration to the § 3553(a) factors, particularly his postsentencing rehabilitation efforts; that because the Guidelines are advisory after *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court had authority to reduce his sentence below the amended range; and that his resulting sentence was unreasonable.

Jackson’s arguments are without merit. A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a full re-sentencing subject to the mandates of *Booker. Dillon v. United States,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2691-94, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010); *United States v. Doublin,*572 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 517, 175 L.Ed.2d 366 (2009). We review for abuse of discretion *920rather than under the *Booker*reasonableness standard, and we find none. *See United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 671-72 (5th Cir.2009), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3462, 177 L.Ed.2d 1064 (2010). The district court expressly stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors and Jackson’s postsentencing conduct. This was sufficient. *See id.*at 673-74. Further, as the court had no obligation to reduce Jackson’s sentence at all, it did not abuse its discretion by failing to reduce it further within the amended guidelines range. *See id.*at 673. Finally, the district court had no authority to reduce Jackson’s sentence below the amended range. *See Doublin,*572 F.3d at 238.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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#### KYOCERA WIRELESS CORPORATION, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellee. In re Kyocera Wireless Corporation, Petitioner.

No. 2008-1301.

Misc. No. 872.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 16, 2008.

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

*ORDER*

Kyocera Wireless Corporation (1) petitions for a writ of mandamus compelling the International Trade Commission (ITC) to rule immediately on Kyocera’s petition for review of Order No. 62, which denied Kyocera’s motion for leave to intervene, (2) moves for a stay, pending appeal, of enforcement proceedings before the ITC, (3) moves for a stay, pending the mandamus petition, of enforcement proceedings before the ITC until two business days after the ITC disposes of Kyocera’s petition for review, and (4) moves to expedite briefing and oral argument.

The ITC initiated an investigation and determined that certain baseband processor chipsets made by Qualcomm Incorporated violate Broadcom Corporation’s patent. Qualcomm subsequently developed redesigned chipsets. In response to a complaint filed by Broadcom, the ITC instituted an enforcement proceeding concerning the redesigned chipsets. Kyocera and other companies who incorporate Qualcomm chipsets into their products moved for leave to intervene in the enforcement proceeding. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the motions. Kyocera petitioned the ITC for review of the ALJ’s order and requested that the ITC stay proceedings pending review. Kyocera states that the ITC has not yet ruled on its petition for review. On April 15, 2008, Kyocera appealed the ALJ’s order denying its motion for leave to intervene and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the ITC to rule on its petition for review no later than April 17, 2008. Kyocera further requests that the court stay the ITC proceedings pending appeal and pending the mandamus petition.

Essentially, Kyocera’s motions to stay request that the court enjoin the ITC from proceeding in the underlying case. The court is satisfied that Kyocera has not made a showing sufficient to justify that extraordinary relief. Furthermore, the court determines that Kyocera has not shown that mandamus relief is warranted.

Kyocera’s motion to expedite is premised on the court granting the motion to stay the ITC’s enforcement proceedings. Because the court denies that motion, expediting this appeal is not warranted. *976Kyocera may, of course, self-expedite by filing its briefs prior to the due date.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

(2) The motion for a stay, pending disposition of the mandamus petition, is denied.

(3) The motion for a stay, pending appeal, is denied.

(4) The motion to expedite is denied.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-10340 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus EPIFANIO BENITEZ, also known as Epi, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

(97-CR-408-16)

-------------------- December 9, 1999 Before POLITZ, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Defendant-Appellant Epifanio Benitez appeals his jury-trial
conviction for use of a telephone to facilitate a drug-trafficking
offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). He avers that the
district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment on speedy-tr ial grounds. We have reviewed the record and the briefs on appeal and hold that the district court did not

err in denying the motion to dismiss. U nited States v. Bermea , 30 F.3d 1539, 1566 (5th Cir. 1994).2

Benitez also argues that the district court erred in holding
him accountable for 300 pounds of marijuana. We find that the
district court’s drug-quantity calculation was not clearly

erroneous. U nited States v. Alford , 142 F.3d 825, 831 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 514 (1998).

AFFIRMED.