IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 23, 2021 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEMONTEZ D. WATKINS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2017-C-1811 Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge

No. M2020-00035-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Demontez D. Watkins, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal 

Court jury of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted first degree premeditated 

murder, a Class A felony; second degree murder, a Class A felony; attempted especially 

aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and two counts of employing a firearm in the 

commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) 

(first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder); 

39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery); 39-17-1324(b)(1), (2) (2018) 

(employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony); 39-12-101 (2018) 

(criminal attempt). The trial court merged the first degree felony murder and second degree 

murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven years. On 

appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions, (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding probabilistic 

genotyping regarding DNA evidence, (3) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

his pretrial statement, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence because the chain of custody 

was not adequately shown, and (5) the court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We 

affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA 

MCGEE OGLE and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Martesha L. Johnson, District Public Defender; Jeffrey A. DeVasher (on appeal), Patrick 

Hakes (at trial and on appeal), Kristin Neff (at trial), and Jessica Dragonetti (at trial), 

Assistant District Public Defenders, for the Appellant, Demontez D. Watkins.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; T. Austin Watkins, Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; Doug Thurman and David 

12/16/2021
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Orlando Jones, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

The Defendant’s convictions relate to the homicide and attempted especially 

aggravated robbery of Reginald Ford, Sr.

1

and other offenses occurring 

contemporaneously. The Defendant was indicted with codefendants Davonta Jewan 

Sherrill, Rolandus Latraye Denzmore, and Troyvonte Deshawn Watkins, but the Defendant 

was tried separately. 

At the trial, Cheressa Miller, the victim’s wife, testified that she and the victim lived 

with their children in a duplex. She said the victim had two children from other 

relationships. She said that on the night of August 5, 2015, the victim had been at work 

and that she expected him to come home after work. She said she heard banging noises 

around midnight. She said her son ran into the room and said the victim had been shot. 

She said she went outside to the victim, who was lying on his back with his right foot in 

his car and who had been shot in the head. She said she administered CPR and called the 

police. She said that the victim was not known to carry a gun and that she did not think he 

had a gun that night. 

Linnea Harris testified that she and the victim had a child together and that she saw 

the victim on the night of August 5, 2015. She said that after they were together, they had 

a telephone conversation and that she knew he reached his house because she heard his car 

door open and dinging sounds. She said that during their conversation, the victim suddenly 

said, “I ain’t got nothing, I ain’t got nothing.” She said he sounded panicked. She did not 

hear other voices or any threats in the background. She said she heard gunshots ten to 

twelve seconds later. She said she called the victim’s cousin, Tony, and 9-1-1.

Ms. Harris testified she had never heard the names of the Defendant or the 

codefendants in her conversations with the victim.

Demetria Lavender testified that in August 2015, she lived in the duplex which was 

part of the same building where the victim and his family lived. She said she lived with 

Derek Mitchell, who was her husband, and their three children. She said her seven-yearold child and her thirteen-year-old child were asleep in a bedroom which had a window 

facing a parking lot. She said her husband woke her about an hour after she went to bed

and asked if she had heard a noise that sounded like gunshots. She said her husband 

activated their home alarm system and that she heard Ms. Miller screaming outside. Ms. 

Lavender said she noticed bullet holes in the curtains, dresser, headboard, a pillow, and 

 

1 We will refer to Mr. Ford as “the victim.” We intend no disrespect to the other individuals who were the 

victims of the attempted first degree premeditated murder convictions.
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walls of the bedroom in which the seven-year old and the thirteen-year old had been 

sleeping. She said hallway walls, the kitchen, and the laundry room door were also 

damaged by the gunfire. Photographs of the damage in the bedroom were received as 

exhibits.

Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPD) Officer Chase Burnett testified 

that he was dispatched to the victim’s address around 12:05 a.m. on August 6, 2015. He 

said that when he arrived, he saw the victim lying on his back on the ground with one leg 

“hanging out of a maroon Dodge Charger.” Officer Burnett recognized the victim as a 

civilian employee of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Department. Officer Burnett said the 

victim had a gunshot wound to the head and was not breathing or conscious. He said that 

he and other officers found about nine shell casings about twenty feet from the victim’s 

body. He identified photographs of the area where the shell casings were found, and the 

photographs were received as exhibits. He agreed that he did not state in his report that the 

victim’s pockets had been “turned out.”

MNPD Crime Laboratory forensic scientist Christina Dradt testified that she went 

to the scene around 1:30 a.m. on August 6, 2015. She said she collected evidence and 

prepared a diagram of the scene. The diagram was received as an exhibit. She said that

four cars were in a parking lot, that fourteen nine-millimeter bullet cartridge casings were 

found behind a red Mustang near an alley, that another car had two bullet “strike marks,” 

and that a bullet projectile was lodged in a building’s exterior wall. She said the victim lay 

face-up on the driver’s side of a car with his right leg partially inside the car. She said 

Officer McClendon photographed the scene, and she identified evidentiary items depicted 

in the photographs. She said hair found at the scene was in a braid or dreadlock style. Ms. 

Dradt said she went inside the residence, where she observed evidence of gunfire.

MNPD crime scene investigator Justin Cregan testified that he went to the scene on 

August 6, 2015, where he saw a “couple” of cars in the parking lot. He said the victim was 

on the driver’s side of one of the cars. He said the victim’s car and the fascia of the house 

contained bullet strikes. The house’s window facing the parking lot had bullet holes. 

Inside the residence, which other evidence showed to be Ms. Lavender’s, Investigator 

Cregan observed two bullet projectiles, which were collected as evidence. 

Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County Medical Examiner Feng Li, M.D., an 

expert in forensic biology, testified that he performed the autopsy of the victim’s body. Dr. 

Li stated that a bullet entered the victim’s body at the left earlobe; traveled into the ear 

canal, brain, and cerebellum; and did not exit the victim’s head. Dr. Li identified two bullet 

fragments that were recovered from the victim’s head. Dr. Li said the victim had a “powder 

tattoo” on the victim’s head, which was caused by a gunshot burying gunpowder in human 

skin, which caused Dr. Li to conclude that the victim had suffered an intermediate range 

gunshot wound. Dr. Li said he wore gloves when he removed the victim’s clothing. Dr. 
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Li’s report was received as an exhibit and reflected that the victim’s cause of death was a 

“gunshot wound of the head” and that the manner of death was homicide.

MNPD Crime Laboratory employee Donald Carman, an expert in firearms and 

toolmark identification, testified that he examined evidentiary items collected in this case, 

which included a fired metal bullet jacket, fourteen fired nine-millimeter cartridge casings, 

several bullet fragments, and two nine-millimeter bullets. He said bullet fragments

recovered by the medical examiner were .40 caliber. He said that all of the nine-millimeter 

cartridge casings had been fired from the same gun and noted that the bullets had been 

made by two different manufacturers. He said the firing pin impressions on the casings 

were consistent with their having been fired from a gun manufactured by Glock. He said 

the .40-caliber bullet fragments recovered by the medical examiner had markings which 

were consistent with the bullet having been fired from a Smith & Wesson gun.

MNPD Crime Laboratory DNA Analyst Julie Ellis, an expert in forensic serology 

and DNA analysis, testified that she received the Defendant’s buccal swab containing his 

DNA, a sample of the victim’s blood, and the victim’s pants. Ms. Ellis stated that both 

front pockets and the back right pocket were “partially pulled out.” She said she swabbed 

the inside of the right front pocket to collect DNA evidence. She said that after analysis of 

the items by another individual in the laboratory, she prepared a disc containing data related 

to the samples and the analysis.

Ms. Ellis testified that trace DNA referred to DNA evidence which was sometimes 

created when a person had limited contact with a surface. She said that trace DNA evidence 

might remain on a surface for a year. She said it was possible for a person to leave trace 

DNA evidence on clothing. She said DNA secondary transfer may occur when a person 

touches an object previously touched by another person, whereby the first person’s DNA 

is transferred upon the second person’s contact with the object. She said that the crime 

laboratory was accredited and that its analysts underwent proficiency testing to ensure that 

they followed procedures and performed their analysis correctly. She said laboratory 

documentation showed that the proper procedures were followed in the present case.

Ms. Ellis testified that she never received known DNA profiles for the codefendants.

MNPD Crime Laboratory employee Benjamin DeBlanc, an expert in forensic DNA 

analysis, testified that every person, other than identical twins, had unique DNA. Relative 

to the present case, he said he developed DNA profiles from the samples collected from 

the Defendant and the victim. Mr. DeBlanc said he analyzed a sample from the victim’s 

pants pocket and concluded that it was a mixture from at least four individuals and that it 

was too complex for the Metro laboratory to determine the identity of any single 

contributor. He said that another person in the laboratory reviewed his analysis and reached 

the same conclusions. Mr. DeBlanc testified that the complexity of the mathematics 
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involved in DNA comparisons from a sample of four or more contributors was too complex 

for human calculations and that he recommended that Investigator Frank contact

Cybergenetics, a company that could complete the analysis using probabilistic genotyping 

computer technology. 

Jennifer Hornyak, a Cybergenetics employee and expert in forensic DNA and 

probabilistic genotyping, testified that her employer was a biotechnology company that 

developed “computer systems that interpret DNA.” She said the company was privately 

owned and worked with both prosecutors and defense attorneys.

Ms. Hornyak testified that Cybergenetics had developed TrueAllele software, which 

was used for forensic DNA analysis. She said TrueAllele was first used in a criminal case 

in 2009 and that “TrueAllele results have been produced in forty-three states as well as 

federal and foreign courts.” She said TrueAllele had been used to help identify remains of 

2700 victims in the World Trade Center attack. 

Ms. Hornyak testified that TrueAllele was based upon mathematical probabilities 

that had been “around since the late 1700s” and statistical computing that had “been around 

since about the 1950s,” and that the two had been applied in combination to forensic DNA 

analysis for about ten years. She said that a human “can only look at so much before 

[forensic DNA analysis] gets too complex” and that computers were capable of more 

complex analysis. She said the ability of TrueAllele software to analyze DNA and DNA 

mixtures had been tested in thirty-six validation studies, seven of which had been peer 

reviewed and published in journals. She said one validation study showed the software’s 

reliability for mixtures containing the DNA of up to ten unknown contributors. She said a 

validity study examined the error rate and reliability of the subject of the study. She said 

eight crime laboratories currently used TrueAllele software in their regular casework. She 

thought about seven laboratories used the software at the time of the analysis conducted in 

the present case. She said other probabilistic genotyping software products existed and did 

not know Cybergenetics’ market share.

Ms. Hornyak testified that MNPD Detective Jason Frank contacted Cybergenetics 

to perform DNA analysis relative to this case. Using a visual presentation, she explained 

the process of DNA analysis. She said that the evidence submitted by Detective Frank was 

analyzed in twenty-two DNA locations for matches against known samples. She said 

TrueAllele analyzed the peaks in the data from the DNA mixture collected from the 

victim’s pants pocket to determine the number of contributors and the DNA profile for 

each. She said TrueAllele analyzed hundreds of thousands of possibilities to determine the 

best explanation for the DNA profiles of the individual contributors to the DNA mixture. 

She said that during this stage of the analysis, the DNA profiles of the known individuals 

were not entered into TrueAllele. Thus, TrueAllele completed this portion of the analysis 

without information regarding the DNA profiles of known individuals. She said the DNA
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profiles of the known individuals were later input into TrueAllele for comparison with the 

DNA profiles identified in the TrueAllele analysis of the DNA mixture.

Ms. Hornyak testified that TrueAllele analysis showed that a match between the

DNA mixture from the pants and the Defendant’s DNA profile was 470,000 times more 

probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated African-American male and that the 

error rate for the Defendant’s DNA being a match was one in 6.1 million. In other words, 

the odds of the DNA from the mixture identified as the Defendant’s belonging to another 

person was one in 6.1 million. She said a match between the DNA from the mixture from 

the pants and the victim’s DNA profile was 204 trillion times more probable than 

coincidence. Ms. Hornyak said her report was reviewed by three other analysts, one of 

whom was Dr. Mark Perlin, the chief scientific officer of Cybergenetics. She said 

Cybergenetics did not receive known DNA profiles for anyone other than the Defendant 

and the victim.

William Watson, Ph.D., a defense witness called out of order and an expert in DNA 

forensic analysis, testified that he had training and experience with TrueAllele software 

from his former employment as a laboratory director for Orchid Cellmark’s Nashville 

office. He acknowledged that he was not an expert in probabilistic genotyping. He said 

that he did not analyze the evidence in this case but that he had reviewed the MNPD Crime 

Laboratory’s analysis. His review showed that the laboratory followed generally accepted 

scientific principles. He concluded from his review of the data that the DNA mixture from 

the khaki pants contained the DNA of at least five people. He said the laboratory’s records 

reflected that an analyst initially determined the mixture contained the DNA of at least 

three people and that an analyst later determined the mixture contained the DNA of at least 

four people. Dr. Watson said reanalysis of complex mixtures was common. He said Mr. 

DeBlanc’s report of the mixture containing the DNA of at least four people was “reported

that way . . . because of the requirement in [the MNPD Crime Laboratory] manual.” Dr. 

Watson said he did not mean that Mr. DeBlanc’s analysis was flawed. Dr. Watson said 

that Cybergenetics tested various “iterations” and that the testing they did, which assumed 

the DNA mixture had four contributors, was “wrong.” Dr. Watson said that about thirty 

percent of the DNA in the mixture was likely from a female. He said he could not identify 

the number of males and number of females whose DNA was in the mixture.

Dr. Watson testified that he could not determine from his review the assumptions 

made by Cybergenetics in calculating the likelihood ratio for the match between the 

Defendant’s DNA and the DNA mixture from the khaki pants. He did not know whether 

Cybergenetics had used a restrictive analysis method or a broad analysis method.

Dr. Watson testified that if two suspects were half-brothers, testing and obtaining a 

DNA profile for both would be “the only way to determine” whether a profile from a 

mixture matched one of the suspects. He said this was generally true of related individuals, 
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such as cousins. He said the likelihood ratio is calculated based upon the likelihood of a 

match to any unrelated individuals.

Dr. Watson testified that primary transfer DNA was left when a person touched an 

object. He said that DNA could also be transferred to a second person when the second 

person touched an object previously touched by a first person.

Dr. Watson testified that Dr. Perlin had “developed one of the better known software 

packages for doing this type of analysis.” Dr. Watson agreed he had a degree in molecular 

biology but did not have a computer science degree. He said he knew Dr. Perlin had a 

computer science degree and was a medical doctor. Dr. Watson said that seven of the 200 

to 300 state forensic testing laboratories in the United States used software from 

Cybergenetics.

Ms. Hornyak was recalled by the State and testified that Cybergenetics used the data 

it received from the MNPD Crime Laboratory using assumptions of four, five, six, and 

seven contributors to the DNA mixture. She said that after reviewing the data, they 

concluded that the DNA from more than four people was present and that at least six 

contributors were likely. She said the likelihood ratio was generated based upon the 

assumption of six contributors. She said the likelihood ratio was based upon multiple 

computer “runs” for the given assumption regarding number of contributors and was the 

“number in the middle from each of those independent runs.”

Codefendant Davonta Sherrill testified that he had not been promised anything in 

exchange for his testimony but that he hoped the State would consider his cooperation in 

the Defendant’s trial when resolving Mr. Sherrill’s charges. Mr. Sherrill said that 

codefendant Troyvante Watkins and the Defendant were brothers and that Mr. Sherrill was 

their cousin. Mr. Sherrill said he was not related to codefendant Denzmore. Mr. Sherrill 

described his height as 6ʹ3′′ and the Defendant’s height as 5ʹ0′′.

Mr. Sherrill testified that on the night of the incident, which he agreed was “August 

5th or 6th,” he drove a white Chrysler in which codefendant Watkins was a passenger to 

the victim’s address because he and the codefendants wanted to “contact Michael’s uncle,” 

whose name Mr. Sherrill did not know. Mr. Sherrill said that he had not known the victim 

at the time. He said the Defendnat and codefendant Denzmore arrived at the same time in 

a separate car that was “the same kind.” Mr. Sherrill said they all had handguns in their 

pockets: he had a Ruger 380; the codefendant Watkins and codefendant Denzmore each 

had a nine-millimeter; the Defendant had a .40-caliber. Mr. Sherrill said they arrived 

around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., that they parked in a college parking lot, that he tried to call 

Michael’s uncle, and that he did not see anyone outside. Mr. Sherrill said that they walked 

up a hill in an alley to “a certain spot” and that he was still unable to reach Michael’s uncle. 

Mr. Sherrill said he was unable to see the parking lot that corresponded with the victim’s 
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address. Mr. Sherrill said that the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore walked further 

up the alley with their guns out of their pockets, that he and codefendant Watkins remained 

in the “spot,” and that the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore were gone for a few 

minutes. Mr. Sherrill said that he and codefendant Watkins were “basically ready to go” 

because Mr. Sherrill had been unable to contact Michael’s uncle. Mr. Sherrill said that 

when the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore returned, codefendant Denzmore “stated 

that it was a n----- sitting in the car and to wait for them because they fixing to rob him.” 

Mr. Sherrill described the Defendant as “kinda . . . like agreeing with him” when 

codefendant Denzmore made the statement. Mr. Sherrill said that codefendant Denzmore 

“was kind of . . . gassing it up” and that the Defendant told Mr. Sherrill and codefendant 

Watkins to wait for him. Mr. Sherrill said, “We basically told them y’all b---s------.” Mr. 

Sherrill said he and codefendant Watkins walked back to the car. Mr. Sherrill stated that 

the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore walked up the hill a second time, that Mr. 

Sherrill heard gunshots and breaking glass as he and codefendant Watkins were getting 

into the car. Mr. Sherrill said he and codefendant Watkins left in the car. Mr. Sherrill said 

he had not seen who fired the shots. Mr. Sherrill agreed that he did not see the Defendant 

shoot a gun and kill the victim, that he did not see the Defendant go through the victim’s 

pants pocket, and that he and his codefendants did not go to the scene to rob, hurt, or kill 

anyone.

Mr. Sherrill agreed that he was at Hallmark Apartments, near his grandmother’s 

house, on August 4, 2015. He agreed that he was at Hallmark Apartments to sell marijuana 

to Mike Cotton. Mr. Sherrill was unsure if Mr. Cotton’s uncle’s name was Derek Mitchell. 

When asked if Mr. Cotton was supposed to provide a gun in exchange for the marijuana, 

Mr. Sherrill stated that Mr. Cotton had told Mr. Cotton’s uncle the exchange was marijuana 

for a gun but that, according to Mr. Sherrill, the exchange was to be marijuana for cash. 

Mr. Sherrill agreed that Mr. Cotton brought a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson gun to the 

exchange. Mr. Sherrill said that it was his understanding that the gun belonged to Mr. 

Cotton’s uncle. 

Mr. Sherrill agreed that codefendant Denzmore was with him at Hallmark 

Apartments, that codefendant Denzmore had a nine-millimeter Glock with him, and that 

Mr. Cotton and Mr. Mitchell arrived. Mr. Sherrill agreed that Mr. Cotton showed him the 

.40-caliber gun and asked to see the marijuana, but Mr. Sherrill denied that he stole the .40-

caliber gun. Mr. Sherrill agreed he “ended up with” the .40-caliber gun after Mr. Cotton 

dropped it in a struggle. Mr. Sherrill acknowledged that he left the meeting with the 

marijuana and the .40-caliber gun. He said he had seen Mr. Cotton’s uncle and another 

person when Mr. Cotton ran away. Mr. Sherrill agreed that after this incident, Mr. Mitchell 

threatened Mr. Sherrill’s grandmother’s house and threatened to kill Mr. Sherrill. Mr. 

Sherrill agreed that Mr. Mitchell called him at least four times, that codefendant Denzmore 

was with Mr. Sherrill for at least one of these calls, and that codefendant Denzmore told 
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Mr. Sherrill, “I got it.” Mr. Sherrill denied calling Mr. Mitchell and stating, “[T]he murder 

game is on.”

Mr. Sherrill testified that he spoke with Detective Frank on August 10, 2015. Mr. 

Sherrill agreed that in the interview, he denied being “at that location.” He said that at the 

time, he was trying to “save” himself because he “didn’t have nothing to do with it.” He 

agreed he met with Detective Frank again on August 12, at which time he identified the 

Defendant in a photograph lineup and told Detective Frank the caliber of the handgun the 

Defendant had on the night of the incident. Mr. Sherrill identified the Defendant in the 

courtroom. 

Mr. Sherrill acknowledged that in his August 10 interview with Detective Frank, he 

told Detective Frank that he “went to the deal for a .40 Smith & Wesson.” Mr. Sherrill 

said, “I [just told] them what they wanted to hear so I could go.” Mr. Sherrill said he did 

not take the gun from Mr. Cotton. Mr. Sherrill claimed that he picked up the gun after Mr. 

Cotton dropped it. Mr. Sherrill said he did not give Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Cotton the 

marijuana. Mr. Sherrill said that in the first interview, he had not told the officers that he 

did not know anything about a robbery involving the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson. Mr. 

Sherrill stated that he had been the victim in that situation. He said he told the police he 

did not know anything about a murder and had not been at the scene. He agreed he had 

been untruthful when he told the police in the first interview that codefendant Denzmore 

had dropped him off “out west” and that he had been at a recording studio on the night the 

victim was shot.

Mr. Sherrill testified that he was taken into custody after the August 10 interview 

and that he was brought from the jail for the August 12 interview. Mr. Sherrill agreed that 

in the second interview, he told Detective Frank that on August 4, the .40-caliber Smith & 

Wesson “ended up on the ground” and that eventually, he got it. Mr. Sherrill agreed that 

he first said in the second interview that no one had the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson from 

the April 4 incident at the scene on the night of the victim’s shooting, that he later stated 

he did not remember who had it, and that he eventually said the Defendant had it. Mr. 

Sherrill agreed that when he was asked in the August 10 interview about $380 he had at an 

unspecified time, he said that the Defendant had the money but later acknowledged he was 

the person with the money. He agreed that he provided information about the guns he and 

the codefendants had on the night of the victim’s shooting. Mr. Sherrill said he did not tell 

the officers where to find the gun he had that night. He agreed he told the officers that the 

Defendant did not carry a gun regularly. Mr. Sherrill agreed that he never told the officers 

that the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore told him to “hold up” in order for the 

Defendant and codefendant Denzmore to rob the victim.

Regarding the night of the victim’s shooting, Mr. Sherrill testified that he and his 

codefendants went to the scene because Mr. Sherrill had a prior conversation in which Mr. 
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Mitchell agreed to buy the gun Mr. Sherrill had taken from Mr. Cotton on August 4. Mr. 

Sherrill said he went without the gun because he first wanted to determine whether Mr. 

Mitchell was serious about the transaction. Mr. Sherrill said that Mr. Mitchell’s mother 

and Mr. Sherrill’s grandmother lived in the same apartment complex and that if Mr. 

Mitchell proved to be serious about the transaction, they could make the exchange at the 

apartment complex.

MNPD Detective Jason Frank testified that on August 6, 2015, he went to the scene 

where the victim was shot. He said he saw a red Dodge Charger with the driver’s door 

open. He said the victim’s body lay outside the car except for one leg still in the car. 

Detective Frank said he saw cartridge casings at the scene, bullet strike marks on a duplex, 

and bullet holes in windows. He said he spoke with the victim’s wife, the victim’s son, 

Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Mitchell’s wife or girlfriend. He said Mr. Mitchell lived in one of 

the duplexes. He said that in the following days, he spoke with Ms. Harris, who had dated 

the victim previously.

Detective Frank testified that on August 12, 2015, he obtained the victim’s clothing, 

including the khaki pants, from the medical examiner and took them to the Metro Police 

Department’s property room. He said that he had not interviewed the Defendant before he 

retrieved the pants and that he interviewed the Defendant on August 17. 

Detective Frank testified that on August 12, 2015, codefendant Sherrill identified 

the Defendant in a photograph lineup. Detective Frank said that codefendant Sherill stated 

that the person he identified showed him a .40-caliber gun at the scene on the night of the 

victim’s shooting. 

Detective Frank testified that he interviewed codefendant Denzmore and the 

Defendant on August 17, 2015. He identified a disc containing a recording of the 

Defendant’s interview and a transcript, and they were received as exhibits. The recording 

was played for the jury.

In the Defendant’s interview, Detective Frank told the Defendant that an eyewitness 

had identified him and that the police had “some footage” from the alley. Detective Frank 

stated that he wanted the Defendant to tell him what happened on August 6 and that he 

believed it was related to a gun robbery on August 4. The Defendant denied that he owned

a gun and that he fired a gun or shot anyone on August 6, but he later said he shot once in 

the air, heard gunshots, and ran. The Defendant agreed to provide a DNA sample. The 

Defendant asked repeatedly to view the video recording that Detective Franks claimed to 

have. The Defendant agreed that the “intent . . . was to go over here . . . and scare this guy 
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so that he would leave Smiley2alone . . [because] the beef was between him and Smiley 

not [the Defendant] and him.” 

Detective Frank acknowledged that, in an effort to make the Defendant “talk,” 

Detective Frank falsely told the Defendant that a video recording of the incident existed. 

Detective Frank agreed he also falsely told the Defendant that a witness had identified the 

Defendant.

Detective Frank testified that he collected a DNA sample from the Defendant. 

Detective Frank said he requested ballistics testing on the bullet removed from the victim’s 

body during the autopsy and on cartridge casings recovered from the scene. He said that 

he had information that a .40-caliber gun and a nine-millimeter gun were used during the 

incident but that the weapons were not recovered during the investigation. He said that 

after he learned the MNPD Crime Laboratory could not identify the four or more 

individuals who contributed to the DNA mixture on the victim’s pants, he sent the 

“standards” collected from the pants and the Defendant’s DNA to Cybergenetics for 

analysis. 

Detective Frank testified that a purse found in a trash can at the scene was 

determined to be unrelated to the present case and that testing of items related to Reginald 

Ford, Jr., were determined to be unrelated to the present case. Detective Frank said that no 

blood was found on the victim’s car and that the investigation did not establish that the 

victim had a prior relationship with or knowledge of the Defendant and the codefendants.

Detective Frank testified that the victim lived in the front of a duplex at the scene 

and that Mr. Mitchell lived in the back. He agreed he saw bullet holes in the back of the 

duplex and agreed that fourteen nine-millimeter cartridge casings were recovered. He 

agreed that the Defendant had not fired the nine-millimeter weapon and that the victim had 

been killed by a .40-caliber bullet. Detective Frank agreed that no .40-caliber casings were 

recovered. He acknowledged, however, that it had been raining when the police searched 

the alley at the scene, that water had run down the hill in the alley, and that they thought at 

the time that they were searching for nine-millimeter casings. He agreed that he returned 

to the scene later to look for .40-caliber casings but that he did not find any.

Detective Frank agreed that in the course of the investigation, he learned about the 

“preceding robbery” involving “Sosa3and Smiley” having taken a .40-caliber Smith & 

Wesson gun. Detective Frank agreed that the investigation of this robbery led him to 

 

2 Other evidence showed that codefendant Sherrill was known as Smiley.

3 Other evidence showed that Sosa was codefendant Denzmore’s nickname.
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codefendants Denzmore and Sherrill and that, to his knowledge, the Defendant had no 

involvement. Detective Frank agreed that he interviewed codefendants Denzmore and 

Sherrill twice before speaking to the Defendant and that he never interviewed codefendant 

Watkins.

Detective Frank agreed that in codefendant Sherrill’s August 10, 2015 interview, 

codefendant Sherrill made statements that Detective Watkins later determined were untrue. 

Detective Watkins agreed that codefendant Sherill stated that “the original deal was trading 

a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber for some marijuana.” 

Detective Frank agreed that he knew the Defendant and codefendant Sherrill were 

cousins and that the Defendant and codefendant Watkins were brothers. Detective Frank 

agreed that he did not obtain DNA samples from codefendants Sherrill, Watkins, and 

Denzmore. Detective Frank said the decision to submit the victim’s khaki pants for DNA 

testing was made based upon the information received during the investigation. He said 

the cartridge casings were not submitted because the act of firing a bullet results in any 

DNA and fingerprint evidence on a bullet being burned away.

Rolandus Denzmore testified that he was charged as a codefendant in the present 

case. He agreed that he had not been promised anything in exchange for his testimony but 

hoped the prosecution would consider his cooperation.

Mr. Denzmore testified that on the night of August 5 and 6, 2015, he had been with 

the Defendant, codefendant Watkins, and codefendant Sherrill at a location which other 

evidence showed was on the victim’s street. Mr. Denzmore said that he drove a white 

Chrysler Sebring with the Defendant as his passenger and that codefendants Sherrill and 

Watkins arrived in Mr. Denzmore’s other white Chrysler Sebring. Mr. Denzmore said they 

parked, saw the victim drive up the alley, talked as they sat in the cars, and waited. Mr. 

Denzmore said that he, the Defendant, and codefendants Watkins and Sherrill walked up 

the hill in the alley and saw the victim sitting in his car. Mr. Denzmore said that he had 

not known the victim before that night. Mr. Denzmore said that on the night of the 

shooting, he had a Glock 17 nine-millimeter gun, that codefendant Watkins had a ninemillimeter handgun, that codefendant Sherrill had a .380-caliber gun, and that the 

Defendant had a .40-caliber gun. Mr. Denzmore said he and the Defendant walked to the 

parking area where the victim was sitting in his car. Mr. Denzmore said they had not yet 

called Mr. Mitchell and that he “figured” they were going to tell the victim to go inside 

before they called Mr. Mitchell. 

Mr. Denzmore testified that he stood about five yards from the victim’s car and that 

the Defendant, codefendant Watkins, and codefendant Sherrill stood next to him. Mr. 

Denzmore said he saw a man “raise up [out of the victim’s car] and kind of lunge towards” 

the Defendant. Mr. Denzmore said he heard a gunshot and saw the man and the Defendant 
-13-

“go down.” Mr. Denzmore said that he saw a porch light come on and that he “panic fired” 

his nine-millimeter gun about ten times at “[t]he house.” Photograph exhibits show that 

Mr. Denzmore fired multiple shots into a window of a bedroom where other evidence 

showed two children were sleeping. Mr. Denzmore agreed he could have fired fourteen 

times. He said he and the Defendant were the only people who fired guns that night. 

Mr. Denzmore testified that after he fired his gun, he returned to his car. He said he 

and the Defendant left together and went to East Nashville. He agreed that the police tried 

to stop them “for something else,” that he drove fast to get away, and that they threw their 

guns “out the window.” He agreed he was arrested that night. He said he did not recall 

having called codefendant Sherrill from the jail to have codefendant Sherrill look for the 

discarded guns, but Mr. Denzmore agreed he might have done so. He said he returned later 

to look for the guns but did not find them.

Mr. Denzmore said that in a conversation with the Defendant after the incident, the 

Defendant stated he “went into [the victim’s] pockets and found a lighter and a piece of 

paper.” Mr. Denzmore said he had not seen the Defendant go into the victim’s pockets. 

Mr. Denzmore acknowledged he had not told Detective Franks about the Defendant’s 

having said he found a lighter in the victim’s pocket. Mr. Denzmore agreed that when he 

met with Detective Frank a week or two later, Mr. Denzmore identified the Defendant from 

a photograph lineup. 

Mr. Denzmore agreed that in August 2015, he often stayed with codefendant Sherrill 

in codefendant Sherrill’s grandmother’s apartment. Mr. Denzmore agreed that 

codefendant Sherrill did not have a gun at the time but that codefendant Sherrill sometimes 

possessed Mr. Denzmore’s nine-millimeter gun. Mr. Denzmore acknowledged that 

codefendant Sherrill “probably” used Mr. Denzmore’s gun to take Mr. Cotton’s .40-caliber 

Smith & Wesson gun about two days before the incident in the present case. Mr. Denzmore 

agreed that he had been aware codefendant Sherrill had marijuana inside a City Gear bag. 

He said he did not know the quantity of the marijuana and agreed he previously told 

Detective Frank that it was less than one pound. 

Regarding the prior incident involving Mr. Cotton, Mr. Denzmore agreed that he 

had been at codefendant Sherrill’s grandmother’s apartment with codefendant Sherrill, that 

Mr. Denzmore went outside to talk to a girl, and that Mr. Cotton arrived “to buy some 

weed.” Mr. Denzmore agreed that he saw Mr. Cotton run out of the apartment and that 

codefendant Sherrill came out of the apartment with Mr. Denzmore’s nine-millimeter gun 

and a black and silver Smith & Wesson gun. Mr. Denzmore agreed that he saw Mr. 

Mitchell “watching the whole time,” but Mr. Denzmore said he had not known Mr. 

Mitchell’s identity at the time. Mr. Denzmore agreed that Mr. Mitchell was Mr. Cotton’s 

uncle. Mr. Denzmore agreed that after this incident, codefendant Sherrill began receiving 
-14-

threats by telephone. Mr. Denzmore said he had not been present for the telephone calls. 

Mr. Denzmore said codefendant Sherrill knew where Mr. Mitchell lived.

Mr. Denzmore testified that he, the Defendant, codefendant Sherrill, and 

codefendant Watkins decided to “squash the beef” by going to Mr. Mitchell’s house. Mr. 

Denzmore said they wanted to end the disagreement, that they were “[n]ot necessarily” 

going to Mr. Mitchell’s house to scare Mr. Mitchell, and that they were not going to “shoot 

up” the house. 

Mr. Denzmore agreed that in his interviews with Detective Frank, he stated that the 

victim was shot with the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson gun taken in the robbery of Mr. 

Cotton, that it was not the Defendant’s gun, that the Defendant did not load it, and that the 

Defendant’s fingerprints would not be on it. Mr. Denzmore agreed that codefendant 

Sherrill had possessed the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson gun that night. Mr. Denzmore 

acknowledged that when he shot the nine-millimeter gun, he knew he was shooting at Mr. 

Mitchell’s house. Mr. Denzmore said Mr. Mitchell lived in the unit in the back of the 

house, next to the alley.

Mr. Denzmore agreed that he felt pressured to provide information during his 

interviews, that he was in jail at the time of the interviews, and that he wanted to go home. 

He agreed that after he was charged and had posted bond in the present case, he removed 

his ankle monitor and failed to appear for a court date and that he had to be captured by 

“bounty hunters” about five months later. He agreed that he had been in jail without bond 

since then and that he hoped his testifying would result in his release from jail.

Michael Cotton testified for the defense that in August 2015, he knew codefendants 

Sherrill and Denzmore as Smiley and Sosa, respectively. Mr. Cotton said that he had a 

planned transaction with codefendant Sherrill to trade Mr. Cotton’s gun for a pound of 

marijuana at codefendant Sherrill’s grandmother’s house. Mr. Cotton said that after he 

arrived for the transaction, codefendant Sherrill showed him marijuana, that it was less than 

one pound, and that Mr. Cotton was going to walk out. Mr. Cotton said codefendant 

Sherrill “put a gun to” Mr. Cotton’s stomach and said, “I’m gonna need that, Mike, I’m 

gonna need that for real, come on.” Mr. Cotton said codefendant Sherrill told codefendant 

Denzmore to “crack [Mr. Cotton] up side the head” because Mr. Cotton initially was not 

going to surrender his .40-caliber gun. Mr. Cotton said he gave codefendant Sherrill the 

gun, fled, and told his uncle what happened. Mr. Cotton said he gave codefendant Sherrill’s 

telephone number to Mr. Cotton’s uncle.

After receiving the evidence, the jury found the Defendant guilty of first degree 

felony murder of the victim in the commission of or attempt to commit theft, second degree 

murder of the victim, attempted especially aggravated robbery of the victim, two counts of 

attempted first degree premeditated murder of Ms. Mitchell’s two minor children, and two 
-15-

counts of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony. After the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the first degree felony murder and second degree 

murder convictions. The court imposed a life sentence for first degree felony murder and 

Range I sentences as follows: twenty-one years for each of the two convictions for 

attempted first degree murder, six years for each of the two convictions for employing a 

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and ten years for the conviction for 

attempted especially aggravated robbery. The court imposed the sentences for attempted 

first degree premeditated murder concurrently with each other but consecutively to the first 

degree felony murder sentence. It imposed the sentences for employing a firearm during 

the commission of a dangerous felony concurrently with each other but consecutively to 

the sentences for attempted first degree murder. It imposed a ten-year sentence for 

attempted especially aggravated robbery, to be served concurrently with the first degree 

felony murder sentence. The effective sentence was life plus twenty-seven years. This 

appeal followed.

I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 

(Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate 

courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility 

of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are resolved by the 

trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676 

S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

“A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a 

combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. 

Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether 

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)).

“Identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime.” State v. Rice, 184 

S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006). Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 

establish the perpetrator’s identity. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). The 

identity of the perpetrator is a question of fact for the jury to determine. State v. Thomas, 
-16-

158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005). “The jury decides the weight to be given to 

circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the 

extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt[.]’” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 662 

(quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). 

A. First Degree Felony Murder & Second Degree Murder

The Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his merged 

convictions for first degree felony murder and second degree murder of the victim. The 

Defendant argues that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 

the perpetrator of the crimes and because his convictions rest solely upon the 

uncorroborated testimony of his accomplices. The Defendant also argues that the evidence 

is insufficient to support his first degree felony murder conviction because the evidence 

failed show that he committed the predicate felony of robbery or attempted robbery. The 

record reflects, however, that the indicted predicate felony in the present case was theft or 

attempted theft. We will consider the sufficiency of the evidence of the offenses of which 

the Defendant was charged and convicted.

1. First Degree Felony Murder

As relevant to this appeal, first degree felony murder is “[a] killing of another 

committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any . . . theft[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-

202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended). “A person commits theft of property if, with 

intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control 

over the property without the owner’s effective consent.” Id. § 39-14-103(a) (2018). 

A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability 

otherwise required for the offense:

(1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that 

would constitute an offense, if the circumstances 

surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them 

to be;

(2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the 

offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result 

without further conduct on the person's part; or

(3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a 

result that would constitute the offense, under the 

circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person 
-17-

believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a 

substantial step toward the commission of the offense.

Id. § 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018).

“[A] conviction may not be based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an 

accomplice.” See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Bigbee, 

885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994); Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886 (Tenn. 2013). In order for 

accomplice testimony to be adequately corroborated:

[T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the 

accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not 

only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is 

implicated in it; and this independent corroborative testimony must also 

include some fact establishing the defendant’s identity. This corroborative 

evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate, 

in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet the 

requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the 

defendant with the commission of the crime charged. It is not necessary that 

the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence. 

Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 803 (quoting State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1992) (citations omitted)); see Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that 

codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore had been involved in a planned drug deal with Mr. 

Cotton days before the victim’s death. An altercation occurred during the purported drug 

deal, during which codefendant Sherrill took Mr. Cotton’s .40-caliber gun. Mr. Mitchell, 

who was Mr. Cotton’s uncle, threatened codefendant Sherrill after the gun was taken. On 

the night of the victim’s shooting, the Defendant and his codefendants went to the area 

where Mr. Mitchell lived in a duplex to find Mr. Mitchell. When the Defendant and 

codefendants were unable to find Mr. Mitchell, codefendant Denzmore and the Defendant 

hatched a plan to rob the victim, who was seated in his car outside the duplex. The 

Defendant fired a single .40-caliber bullet from the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson handgun 

codefendant Sherrill had taken in the earlier purported drug deal. After the victim was on 

the ground, the Defendant went through the victim’s pockets.

The record reflects that codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore testified that the 

Defendant was with them during the offenses and that they, the Defendant, and codefendant 
-18-

Watkins were armed. Codefendant Sherrill testified that codefendant Denzmore stated at 

the scene that he and the Defendant were going to rob a man who was sitting in a car and 

that the Defendant’s mannerisms indicated the Defendant agreed to the plan. Codefendant 

Sherrill stated that the Defendant told codefendants Sherrill and Watkins to wait while they 

committed the robbery. Codefendant Sherrill said that he and codefendant Watkins were 

walking to a car when they heard gunshots and breaking glass. Codefendant Denzmore 

testified that the Defendant walked to the victim’s car, that the victim lunged at the 

Defendant, and that codefendant Denzmore heard a gunshot and saw the Defendant and 

the victim go down. In his pretrial statement, the Defendant admitted that he was at the 

scene with his codefendants, that he was armed with a gun he obtained from codefendant 

Sherrill, and that he fired a shot, despite denying that he shot the victim. The Defendant 

said in his statement that he had gone to the scene because he and the codefendants wanted 

to scare a man into leaving codefendant Sherrill alone. Additional evidence showed that 

codefendant Sherrill had been involved in a dispute with Mr. Mitchell about a gun 

codefendant Sherrill took in an encounter that he and codefendant Denzmore had with Mr. 

Cotton days earlier. Mr. Mitchell lived in a duplex at the scene. Forensic evidence showed 

that the Defendant’s DNA was identified as a probable match with a DNA profile collected 

from the victim’s pants pocket. Codefendant Denzmore testified that the Defendant told 

him after the shooting that the Defendant had gone through the victim’s pants pockets. A 

forensic analyst testified that some of the victim’s pants pockets were turned out or partially 

turned out. Codefendant Denzmore testified that the Defendant had a .40-caliber weapon 

on the night of the incident, and remnants of a .40-caliber bullet were recovered during the 

victim’s autopsy.

The testimony of codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore, which inculpated the 

Defendant in a plan to rob the victim, in possessing and firing a gun, and in rifling through 

the victim’s pockets, was corroborated by the DNA evidence from the victim’s pants and 

the .40-caliber bullet remnants recovered during the autopsy. Although the Defendant said 

in his pretrial statement that he went to the scene with the codefendants to scare Mr. 

Mitchell and that he shot once in the air and fled when he heard other gunshots, the jury 

was free to discredit his testimony and to credit the other evidence pointing to his guilt. 

This court will not invade the province of the trier of fact by reassessing the credibility of 

witnesses and reweighing the evidence. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; Sheffield, 676 

S.W.2d at 547.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to show 

that the Defendant possessed the intent to commit a theft and that the victim was killed 

during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the theft. The felony murder statute 

merely requires that a defendant have the requisite intent to commit the predicate offense 

and that a killing occur during the commission of the predicate offense. See T.C.A. § 39-

13-202(a)(2); State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. 1999). Thus, the evidence is 

sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. 
-19-

In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the Defendant’s argument that the

evidence is insufficient to support his first degree felony murder conviction because the

trial court erred in admitting evidence of his pretrial statement and of the DNA analysis 

identifying him as a probable contributor to the DNA mixture collected from the victim’s 

pants pocket. For reasons stated elsewhere in this opinion, the trial court did not err in 

admitting this evidence. In any event, a review of the sufficiency of the evidence 

necessarily includes all of the evidence admitted at the trial, whether admitted within the 

trial court’s discretion or admitted in error. See, e.g., State v. Longstreet, 619 S.W.2d 97, 

100-01 (Tenn. 1981).

2. Second Degree Murder

As relevant here, second degree murder is the unlawful and knowing killing of 

another. T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended). Viewed in the light most 

favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant approached the victim and 

shot him in the head at close range. The act of shooting someone in the head at intermediate

range is reasonably certain to cause the result of death. See id. § 39-11-106(a)(20) (2018) 

(subsequently amended) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s 

conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 

result.”). For the reasons we have stated above, the rational jury could credit the evidence 

that the Defendant was the person who shot the victim and that adequate corroboration 

existed for the testimony of codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore.

The evidence is sufficient to support first degree felony murder and second degree 

murder convictions for the homicide of the victim.

B. Attempted First Degree Premeditated Murder

Relative to his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder of the 

two children inside the duplex, the Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that he was criminally responsible for the conduct of codefendant 

Denzmore, whom the evidence shows fired multiple shots into the Mitchell residence. 

Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that 

codefendant Denzmore committed the acts with premeditation.

First degree premeditated murder is the unlawful, intentional, and premeditated 

killing of another. Id. §§ 39-13-201 (2018), 39-13-202(a)(1). In the context of first degree 

murder, intent is shown if the defendant has the conscious objective or desire to cause the 

victim’s death. T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(18) (2018) (subsequently amended) (defining 

intentional as the “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
-20-

result”); State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 790-91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). “It is not 

necessary that the purpose to kill preexist in the mind of the accused for any definite period 

of time.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(d). The element of premeditation is a question for the jury 

which may be established by proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing.” State v. 

Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 108 (Tenn. 2006). As a result, the jury “may infer premeditation 

from the manner and circumstances of the killing.” State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 408 

(Tenn. 2005); see State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Our 

supreme court has provided a list of factors which “tend to support the existence” of 

premeditation and deliberation. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. The list includes the use 

of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the particular cruelty of the killing, 

declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill, evidence of procurement of a weapon, 

preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime, and calmness immediately 

after the killing. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541-42 (Tenn. 1992); State v. 

West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1997)). 

“Criminal responsibility, while not a separate crime, is an alternative theory under 

which the State may establish guilt based upon the conduct of another.” Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d at 386 (quoting State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)).

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct 

of another, if: 

. . . 

(2) Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or 

to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, 

aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense[.]

T.C.A. § 39-11-402 (2018). For a defendant to be convicted of a crime under the theory 

of criminal responsibility, the “evidence must establish that the defendant in some way 

knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted its 

commission.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386; see State v. Maxey, 898 S.W.2d 756, 757 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the 

Defendant and his codefendants each armed themselves with guns and went to the scene 

looking for Mr. Mitchell, who was the victim’s neighbor. The Defendant and the 

codefendants either planned to sell a gun to Mr. Mitchell that codefendant Sherrill had 

taken from Mr. Mitchell’s nephew, Mr. Cotton, a few days earlier, or they planned to scare 

Mr. Mitchell, who had endeavored upon an intimidation campaign directed at codefendant 

Sherrill. Codefendant Denzmore had been present for codefendant Sherrill’s earlier 

encounter with Mr. Cotton, although codefendant Denzmore had been outside the 
-21-

apartment where it occurred, and codefendant Denzmore was aware of Mr. Mitchell’s 

threats to codefendant Sherrill after the gun was taken. While searching for Mr. Mitchell, 

the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore saw the victim sitting in his car. Codefendant 

Denzmore announced a plan to rob the victim. The Defendant indicated his agreement and 

told the other codefendants to wait while he and codefendant Denzmore committed the 

robbery. Codefendant Denzmore testified that he heard a gunshot, that he saw the 

Defendant and the victim “go down,” that he saw a porch light come on, and that he “panic 

fired” his gun about ten times at “[t]he house” but might have fired fourteen times. 

Photograph exhibits show that codefendant Denzmore fired multiple shots into a window, 

and other evidence showed that two children were in the bedroom. Codefendant Denzmore 

testified that he and the Defendant were the only people who fired a gun that night and that 

they disposed of their weapons as they fled the scene.

From this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that codefendant Denzmore went 

to the scene armed with a handgun with the intent to provide protection to codefendant 

Sherrill, who planned to resell to Mr. Mitchell the gun codefendant Sherrill had recently 

taken from Mr. Cotton, or with the intent to otherwise intimidate Mr. Mitchell. Once they 

arrived and were unable to find Mr. Mitchell, codefendant Denzmore and the Defendant 

developed the plan to rob the victim. They approached the victim, and the Defendant shot 

the victim in the head. Codefendant Denzmore heard the gunshot and saw a light come on, 

and he fired his gun at least ten times into an occupied bedroom in the duplex as the 

Defendant went through the victim’s pockets. Although codefendant Denzmore claimed 

he “panic fired” his gun, the jury could have rejected his credibility on this point and have 

inferred, given codefendant Denzmore’s repeated firing into a residence that he knew was 

occupied due to his having seen the light come on, that he fired the shots in order to 

facilitate the Defendant’s efforts to commit a theft from the victim, to prevent the person 

who turned on the light from coming outside or seeing that events transpiring outside, and 

to allow himself and his companions to escape after the homicide. The jury could also 

infer from the evidence that codefendant Denzmore fled the scene and threw his gun out 

the window during the escape in order to conceal his involvement in the crimes he had just 

committed.

The Defendant’s common intent in this endeavor is shown by the evidence that the 

Defendant and the codefendants armed themselves and went to the scene to locate Mr. 

Mitchell, that the Defendant agreed with and acted on codefendant Denzmore’s 

announcement of a plan to rob the victim, that the Defendant told codefendants Sherrill 

and Watkins to wait while the Defendant and codefendant Denzmore committed the 

robbery, that the Defendant fled the scene with codefendant Denzmore after both had fired 

their guns in furtherance of the criminal acts, and that the Defendant and codefendant

Denzmore discarded their weapons while fleeing together.
-22-

The evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for attempted first 

degree murder.

C. Attempted Especially Aggravated Robbery

In the same vein as his arguments for first degree felony murder and second degree 

murder, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of 

attempted especially aggravated robbery of the victim because the State failed to establish 

his identity as the perpetrator and because the conviction rests upon uncorroborated 

testimony of accomplices.

Especially aggravated robbery is defined as robbery “[a]ccomplished with a deadly 

weapon . . . [w]here the victim suffers serious bodily injury.” T.C.A. 39-13-403(a)(1), (2)

(2018). Robbery is defined as the “intentional or knowing theft of property from the person 

of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Id. 39-13-401(a) (2018).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the 

Defendant and his codefendants armed themselves and went to the scene in search of Mr. 

Mitchell. Although they failed to locate him, they embarked upon an alternate plan to rob 

the victim. The Defendant indicated his agreement with the plan when it was announced 

by codefendant Denzmore, told the other codefendants to wait, approached the victim, shot 

the victim in the head, and rifled through the victim’s pockets. As we have stated above, 

the State provided sufficient evidence of the Defendant’s identity and to corroborate the 

testimony of codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore. The evidence is sufficient to support 

the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

D. Employing a Firearm During the Commission of a Dangerous Felony

The Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of 

of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony because the State failed 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the predicate offenses, attempted 

first degree premeditated murder.

As relevant to this case, “It is an offense to employ a firearm or antique firearm 

during the . . . [c]ommission of a dangerous felony [or] [a]ttempt to commit a dangerous 

felony[.] Id. § 39-17-1324(b)(1), (2) (2018) (subsequently amended). Viewed in the light 

most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant possessed a firearm 

when he acted with criminal responsibility for codefendant Denzmore’s shooting into an 

occupied duplex. We have concluded previously that the evidence is sufficient to support 

the Defendant’s attempted first degree murder convictions. Likewise, the evidence is 

sufficient to support the convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a 

dangerous felony.
-23-

The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

II

Admissibility of Expert Testimony

The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

exclude evidence related to the DNA evidence. The record reflects that the State obtained 

evidence which showed, through probabilistic genotyping DNA analysis, that the DNA 

mixture collected from the victim’s pants pocket contained DNA that was 470,000 times 

more likely to have come from the Defendant than from an unrelated person. The parties 

engaged in substantial pretrial litigation regarding the State’s proposed evidence. The 

Defendant sought exclusion of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Evidence 104, 

702, and 703; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 573 (1993); and 

McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997). The trial court 

denied the motion to exclude the evidence. The Defendant argues in his brief that the 

evidence should have been excluded because (1) probabilistic genotyping and its use of a 

likelihood ratio are “not foundationally valid” and do not substantially assist the trier of 

fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue, (2) the TrueAllele 

software used to generate the analysis is not reliable because it was not properly validated 

in this case, and (3) the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice. At oral argument, the Defendant further refined his 

argument. Defense counsel argued, “[The Defendant] is not arguing that probabilistic 

genotyping is not valid in certain circumstances. Indeed it is.” Rather, counsel argued, the 

issue before this court was how many contributors could be involved in a mixture before 

the science became unreliable. The State counters that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the evidence. Our research reflects that the question of the 

admissibility of probabilistic genotyping evidence is one of first impression for a 

Tennessee appellate court.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 provides the following foundation for the 

admission of expert testimony:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Rule 703 provides, “The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or 

inference if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.” In McDaniel, 
-24-

our supreme court listed the following nonexclusive factors a trial court may consider “in 

determining reliability” of proposed expert testimony: 

(1) whether scientific evidence has been tested and the methodology with 

which it has been tested; 

(2) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review or publication; 

(3) whether a potential rate of error is known; 

(4) whether . . . the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific 

community; and 

(5) whether the expert’s research in the field has been conducted 

independent of litigation.

955 S.W.2d at 265. Our supreme court has also said that, in assessing the reliability of an 

expert’s methodology, a trial court may consider the expert’s qualifications and the 

connection between the expert’s knowledge and the basis of his or her opinion. See Brown 

v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 274-75 (Tenn. 2005). “[Q]uestions regarding the 

admissibility, qualifications, relevancy and competency of expert testimony are left to the 

discretion of trial court.” McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 263; see State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 

557, 562 (Tenn. 1993). An appellate court may disturb the trial court’s ruling only if the 

trial court abused or arbitrarily exercised its discretion. McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 263-64; 

see State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000).

As regards expert evidence of DNA analysis, our legislature has recognized the 

general trustworthiness and reliability of such evidence by enacting a statute providing for 

its admissibility: 

(a) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, 

“DNA analysis” means the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid 

(DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA 

from another biological specimen for identification purposes.

(b)(1) In any civil or criminal trial, hearing or proceeding, the results 

of DNA analysis, as defined in subsection (a), are admissible in evidence 

without antecedent expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a 

trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics in an 

individual’s genetic material upon a showing that the offered testimony 

meets the standards of admissibility set forth in the Tennessee Rules of 

Evidence.
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(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting any 

party in a civil or criminal trial from offering proof that DNA analysis does 

not provide a trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics 

in an individual’s genetic material, nor shall it prohibit a party from crossexamining the other party’s expert as to the lack of trustworthiness and 

reliability of such analysis.

(c) In any civil or criminal trial, hearing or proceeding, statistical 

population frequency evidence, based on genetic or blood test results, is 

admissible in evidence to demonstrate the fraction of the population that 

would have the same combination of genetic markers as was found in a 

specific biological specimen. For purposes of this subsection (c), “genetic 

marker” means the various blood types or DNA types that an individual may 

possess.

T.C.A. § 24-7-118 (2017) (formerly codified at § 24-7-117). 

As we have stated, the issue of the admissibility of DNA analysis involving 

probabilistic genotyping is one of first impression in Tennessee. The Defendant 

acknowledges that evidence of DNA analysis is generally admissible pursuant to Code 

section 24-7-118 but argues that the statute “narrowly defines” DNA analysis in a manner 

that includes “‘traditional’ DNA analysis” involving comparison of a known DNA sample 

with “a single-source sample or simple mixture of two individuals where one of the 

contributors is known” and does not contemplate “the subsequent statistical analysis of the 

[MNPD Crime Laboratory’s] findings by a computer program like TrueAllele.” We are 

unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument. The record reflects that the initial processing 

of the DNA evidence was completed by the MNPD Crime Laboratory and that Mr. 

DeBlanc and another, unnamed individual separately concluded that the computations 

required for further analysis of the mixture were beyond human capacity and that computer 

analysis was needed. Cybergenetics used TrueAllele’s established mathematical and 

statistical methodology to complete the computations. 

The trial court conducted lengthy hearings regarding the admissibility of the DNA 

evidence developed through probabilistic genotyping. After receiving the evidence, the 

court engaged in a McDaniel analysis and determined that the evidence was admissible. 

We will summarize the evidence from the hearing, to the extent it is relevant to the issue 

raised on appeal.

Dr. Mark Perlin, a medical doctor with Ph.D. degrees in mathematics and computer 

science and the Chief Scientific Officer of Cybergenetics, testified as an expert in DNA 

evidence interpretation, likelihood ratios, and computer science. He said that TrueAllele 
-26-

was a Cybergenetics “computer system that conducts a mathematical analysis using 

software to derive identification information from DNA evidence” in a type of analysis 

called probabilistic genotyping. Dr. Perlin testified at length about the biological 

underpinnings of DNA evidence and the process of human DNA analysis. According to a 

document offered as an exhibit to Dr. Perlin’s testimony, 

Probabilistic genotyping refers to the use of biological modeling, 

statistical theory, computer algorithms, and probability distributions to 

calculate likelihood ratios (LRs) and/or infer genotypes for the DNA typing 

results of forensic samples (“forensic DNA typing results”). Human 

interpretation and review is required for the interpretation of forensic DNA 

typing results in accordance with the FBI Director’s Quality Assurance

Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories. Probabilistic genotyping 

is a tool to assist the DNA analyst in the interpretation of forensic DNA 

typing results. Probabilistic genotyping is not intended to replace the human 

evaluation of the forensic DNA typing results or the human review of the 

output prior to reporting.

A probabilistic genotyping system is comprised of software, or 

software and hardware, with analytical and statistical functions that entail 

complex formulae and algorithms. Particularly useful for low-level DNA 

samples (i.e., those in which the quantity of DNA for individuals is such that 

stochastic effects may be observed) and complex mixtures (i.e., multicontributor samples, particularly those exhibiting allele sharing and/or 

stochastic effects), probabilistic genotyping approaches can reduce 

subjectivity in the analysis of DNA typing results. Historical methods of 

mixture interpretation consider all interpreted genotype combinations to be 

equally probable, whereas probabilistic approaches provide a statistical 

weighting to the different genotype combinations. Probabilistic genotyping

does not utilize a stochastic threshold. Instead, it incorporates a probability 

of alleles dropping out or in. In making use of more genotyping information 

when performing statistical calculations and evaluating potential DNA 

contributors, probabilistic genotyping enhances the ability to distinguish true 

contributors and non-contributors. A higher LR is typically obtained when 

evaluating a person of interest (POI) who is a true contributor to the evidence 

profile, and a lower LR is typically obtained when the POI is not a true

contributor. While the absence of an allele or the presence of additional 

allele(s) relative to a reference sample may support an exclusion, 

probabilistic genotyping approaches allow inclusion and exclusion 

hypotheses to be considered by calculating a LR in which allele drop-out and 

drop-in may be incorporated.
-27-

Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, SWGDAM Guidelines for the 

Validation of Probabilistic Genotyping Systems, at 2 (2015).

Dr. Perlin testified that validation studies regarding the reliability of TrueAllele had

been conducted by Cybergenetics, crime laboratories, or collaboratively by Cybergenetics 

and crime laboratories. He said that thirty-six such studies existed, that seven had been 

peer reviewed and published in journals, and that one of the peer-reviewed, published 

studies had been conducted independently of any involvement by Cybergenetics. He said 

that TrueAllele conformed with standards published by the Scientific Working Group on 

DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM). Dr. Perlin said that TrueAllele and the 

mathematical computation and algorithms it used were generally accepted in the scientific 

community, that TrueAllele was used routinely in eight laboratories’ case work, and that 

evidence derived from using TrueAllele had been the subject of “over fifteen admissibility 

rulings” in courts in the United States. He said that TrueAllele’s source code was available 

for review under secure conditions, that review would take about ten years, and that 

validation of the software could be accomplished within one to two hours by testing the 

software with known samples.

Regarding the reliability of TrueAllele to analyze mixtures containing DNA from 

multiple contributors, Dr. Perlin testified that validation studies existed for mixtures 

containing DNA from two, three, and four persons. He said the FBI had validated its 

probabilistic genotyping system for use on mixtures containing up to five contributors. In 

addition, Dr. Perlin said that a validation study for up to seven contributors had been 

conducted and that publication of the study was forthcoming at the time of the hearing.

Nathaniel Adams, a Systems Engineer with Forensic Bioninformatic Services, 

testified as a defense expert in computer science as applied to forensic DNA. He held a 

bachelor’s degree in computer science and was working to complete his master’s degree. 

He was critical of TrueAllele as not complying with the Institute of Electronic Engineers 

(IEEE) verification and validation standard for software systems. He noted, as well, that a 

President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report from two 

years earlier4stated that probabilistic genotyping was appropriate for analyzing mixtures 

of three or fewer DNA contributors, provided that the minor contribution was no less than 

20%. Mr. Adams stated that the report said that further study was needed to establish the 

propriety of using probabilistic genotyping systems on mixtures containing more than three 

contributors or with lower-level contributions. Mr. Adams noted that human input 

regarding the number of contributors and the choice of whether or not to apply the 

differential degradation filter could affect TrueAllele’s output. In addition, Mr. Adams 

expressed concern about “bugs” documented in the TrueAllele “wiki,” or “change log,” 

 

4

 The record reflects that the hearing took place in October 2018.
-28-

some of which reflected significant or critical issues with the software. He said that number 

of identified bugs caused him concern that undetected bugs might exist. He advocated for 

a “ground up” review of any probabilistic genotyping software to determine whether the 

system operated “within its expected bounds.” Regarding TrueAllele, he acknowledged 

that he had not reviewed its source code and said that the more lengthy a review, the more 

productive it could be. He said that a “thorough verification and validation process” 

following IEEE standards would take one and one-half to five years but that a shorter 

review, “on the order of hours or days” could nevertheless be helpful.

Mr. Adams testified that, in his opinion based upon review of the material he had 

been provided, which included validation studies involving DNA mixtures from four to 

seven contributors, he “would question the reliability of [TrueAllele] to deliver the 

underlying intent.” In his opinion, the validation studies were insufficient to ensure 

reliability because little attention had been given to determining whether TrueAllele 

“follow[ed] all of its claimed steps.” 

Mr. Adams agreed that Dr. Perlin was “basically a world-renowned expert” in 

probabilistic genotyping and that probabilistic genotyping was generally accepted in the 

scientific community, with TrueAllele being among the available probabilistic genotyping 

software programs.

Dr. Perlin was recalled after Mr. Adams’ testimony and stated that he was unaware 

of any standards in the forensic scientific community with which Cybergenetics was 

noncompliant. Dr. Perlin stated that IEEE standards were not legal or scientific standards 

and that they were “created in order to facilitate communication for large software projects, 

often involving thousands of programs in different locations.” He said that software 

products such as TrueAllele were created by two or three programmers working closely 

together. He noted, as well, that IEEE had said that its standards might not be appropriate 

for smaller entities. He said that the TrueAllele bugs about which Mr. Adams had 

expressed concern were identified during Cybergenetics’ internal testing of TrueAllele and 

that the bugs had been resolved before the software was delivered to customers.

After receiving the testimony and the voluminous documentary and audiovisual 

exhibits, the trial court entered its order denying the Defendant’s motion to exclude the 

evidence. As we have stated, the court conducted an analysis pursuant to the Rules of 

Evidence and McDaniel.

Our analysis begins with the question of whether the proper analysis of the question 

of admissibility of probabilistic DNA evidence involves Code section 24-7-118, or whether 

the statute does not apply and, instead, the full McDaniel analysis is proper. In that regard, 

we observe that despite the lack of guidance in Tennessee specific to probabilistic 
-29-

genotyping evidence, our supreme court has had the opportunity to consider whether Code 

section 24-7-118 applies to different scientific methods of DNA analysis.5 

To date, our supreme court has resisted efforts to limit application of the DNA 

admissibility statute to only certain types of DNA analysis. In applying the statute to 

evidence involving polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis of DNA evidence, our 

supreme court has said that the evidence is admissible pursuant to the statute but that the 

parties “are nevertheless allowed to offer proof that DNA analysis is not trustworthy and 

reliable” and that such evidence “will go to the weight, not the admissibility, of DNA 

evidence.” State v. Begley, 956 S.W.2d 471, 478 (Tenn. 1997) (“For example, a party can 

challenge the reliability of a particular test in any given case by a showing of sloppy 

handling of samples, failure to train the personnel performing the testing, failure to follow 

protocol, and the like.”); see State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 336 (Tenn. 2005). In a case 

involving mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), the supreme court held that the plain language of 

the statute compelled a conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s 

request for a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of DNA evidence. See Scott, 33 S.W.3d 

at 756-59 (“Because the very purpose of a McDaniel hearing is to determine the reliability 

of scientific or technical evidence, it would make little sense for this Court to require such 

a hearing for evidence that is statutorily admissible without antecedent testimony that it is 

a reliable method of identification.”). A panel of this court has applied the statute to a 

question of admissibility of restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) DNA 

analysis and associated statistical probability evidence. See State v. James Thomas 

Manning, No. M2004-03035-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 163636, at *3-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Jan. 24, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 1, 2006).

We acknowledge that the science regarding DNA analysis is advancing. However, 

the plain language of the DNA admissibility statute is clear, and our supreme court has 

 

5 For example, in the PCR method, the DNA sample is processed with an enzyme and heating 

treatment in order to “amplify” the DNA before it is compared to a known sample to determine if both 

contain the same pattern. State v. Begley, 956 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. 1997). The RFLP method involves 

enzymatic fractionalization of DNA molecules and comparing the length and location of the fragments 

between a known sample and a specimen. Id. MtDNA analysis involves the examination of cellular 

mitochondria, which comprises only a portion of a cell and is heritable from a person’s mother. State v. 

Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tenn. 2000). Unlike traditional DNA analysis involving a comparison of a 

known sample with an unknown specimen to determine if a match between the two exists, mtDNA analysis 

is more a tool of exclusion than one of inclusion because maternal relatives share the same mtDNA. Id. YSTR DNA analysis involves the examination of the Y chromosome, which only men have, and is identical 

for all men of the same paternal lineage. Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d, 36, 45 n.13 (Tenn. 2011) (citing 

David H. Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence, 209 (2010)). 
-30-

enforced it accordingly: Evidence of DNA analysis involving comparison of a human 

biological specimen with another biological specimen for identification purposes is 

admissible, and no foundational testimony regarding trustworthiness and reliability is 

required, provided the evidence is otherwise admissible in accord with the Tennessee Rules 

of Evidence. See T.C.A. § 24-7-118(a), (b)(1). While a party may cross-examine a DNA 

expert about the trustworthiness and reliability of the evidence, such evidence goes to the 

weight to be afforded the evidence, not to its admissibility. See id. at (b)(2). The statute 

makes no distinction as to the admissibility of various methods of DNA analysis, and to 

date, our supreme court has not recognized any exceptions to our legislature’s broad rule 

relative to the admissibility of DNA analysis evidence. As an intermediate appellate court, 

we are compelled to follow the statutes promulgated by our legislature and are guided by 

our supreme court’s prior interpretations of those statutes.

As applied to the facts of this case, Code section 24-7-118 provides for the 

admissibility of DNA evidence regarding identification, and the record reflects the trial 

court’s finding that the probabilistic genotyping evidence offered by the State was relevant 

and material to the question of the Defendant’s identity as a perpetrator of the crimes. See 

Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. The court’s findings addressed the requirement of Rule 702 that 

the evidence must substantially assist the trier of fact. With respect to these matters, the 

court stated:

Here, the Court finds the TrueAllele analysis relevant under Rule 401 

because it tends to identify the Defendant as a participant in the aggravated 

robbery. The State’s proposed expert, Dr. Mark Perlin, was shown to be 

extensively qualified, by education and experience, in the fields of DNA 

interpretation and computer science. His testimony would substantially 

assist the jury to understand the complex genotyping evidence.

Although Dr. Perlin ultimately did not testify at the trial, the court accepted Cybergenetics

employee Jennifer Hornyak as an expert in forensic DNA and probabilistic genotyping at 

the trial. As our supreme court has recognized, the requirement of Rule 703 that the 

evidence be trustworthy has been addressed by Code section 24-7-118’s acceptance of 

DNA identification evidence as trustworthy and reliable. See Begley, 956 S.W.2d at 477.

We conclude that based on our supreme court’s decisions analyzing Code section 

24-7-118, probabilistic genotyping DNA analysis is “DNA analysis” encompassed by the 

broad language of the statute. As a result, there is no threshold admissibility requirement 

pursuant McDaniel for admission of DNA analysis which utilizes probabilistic genotyping

and otherwise meets the standards of admissibility set for in the Tennessee Rules of 

Evidence. The record reflects that the court considered and made findings relative to the 

relevant Rules of Evidence, and those findings are supported by the record. We conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
-31-

The Defendant argues that the evidence of the likelihood ratio should have been 

excluded pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 because its probative value was 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He argues that the likelihood 

ratio evidence was too difficult for the jury to understand without misinterpretation. As 

we have stated, the trial court found that the probabilistic genotyping evidence would 

substantially assist the trier of fact, and Code section 24-7-118 provides for the 

admissibility of DNA identification evidence. The record reflects that the likelihood ratio 

is a component of probabilistic genotyping DNA identification evidence and that it 

explains the relative strength or weakness of the association between the known sample 

and the unknown mixture. Thus, it is an integral part of the probabilistic genotyping DNA 

identification evidence. The question of whether the likelihood ratio evidence’s probative 

value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice is answered by the trial court’s finding that

the probabilistic genotyping evidence was relevant, probative, and would substantially 

assist the trier of fact. We conclude after a review of the record and the relevant law that 

Rule 403 did not bar the admission of the likelihood ratio evidence.

We note that the Defendant has not alleged that he was prevented from crossexamining the State’s experts about the trustworthiness and reliability of the DNA 

evidence. See T.C.A. § 24-7-118. In his brief, the Defendant argues that TrueAllele has 

not been shown to be reliable and trustworthy for DNA analysis for complex mixtures 

involving as many as seven contributors or for mixtures that may involve related persons. 

The record reflects that the defense thoroughly explored these issues at the trial, both on 

cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and through the testimony of a defense expert. 

As contemplated by the statute, the weight and credibility to be afforded to the DNA 

identification evidence was placed before the jury. The Defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this basis.

III

Denial of Motion to Suppress

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

his pretrial statement. He argues that the statement was not knowingly and voluntarily 

given because it was given after “coercive promises of leniency and false claims about the 

evidence against him.” 

At the suppression hearing, Detective Frank testified that he interviewed the 

Defendant on August 17, 2015. Detective Frank said that the Defendant appeared 

voluntarily for the interview. Detective Frank agreed that he had interviewed codefendants 

Sherrill and Denzmore before the Defendant’s interview. Detective Frank said he knew 

from his earlier interviews with codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore that a homicide and 

robbery occurred after codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore went to a location where they 
-32-

planned to scare a person whom they had robbed a couple of nights earlier. Detective 

Frank said codefendant Denzmore stated that the Defendant had been present and had 

killed the victim. Detective Frank recalled that codefendant Sherrill had stated, “[O]nce 

they got there and saw [the victim], . . . they decided that they would attempt to rob him 

while they were there.” Detective Frank said codefendant Sherrill stated that the Defendant 

had “[t]he gun that was taken during the [earlier] robbery, which was a Smith and Wesson 

forty caliber handgun.” Detective Frank said that at the time of the Defendant’s interview,

Detective Frank had not known the caliber of the bullet with which the victim had been 

shot.

Detective Frank testified that codefendant Denzmore had said in his interview that 

when codefendant Denzmore realized the victim had been shot, codefendant Denzmore 

had asked the Defendant why he shot the victim and that the Defendant had responded that 

it had been an accident which occurred when the Defendant “went to hit [the victim] in the 

head, and the gun went off.” Detective Frank said codefendant Denzmore stated that the 

Defendant had said he had gone through the victim’s pockets “looking for something to 

get from him” but only found a lighter and a piece of paper.

Detective Frank testified that the Defendant had not been in custody at the time of 

the Defendant’s interview. Detective Frank said that the Defendant was advised of his 

Miranda rights and that the Defendant signed a written waiver of those rights. Detective 

Frank said that the Defendant was not handcuffed and was free to leave and that the 

Defendant was not arrested at the end of the interview. Detective Frank said the Defendant 

agreed to provide a DNA sample. The Miranda waiver and the written waiver related to 

the DNA sample were received as exhibits. Detective Frank said that the Defendant was a 

high school graduate and “was getting ready to graduate [from] college.” Detective Frank 

said he did not yell at the Defendant during the approximate one-hour interview. Detective 

Frank said the Defendant never asked to stop the interview, to consult with an attorney, or 

to leave.

Detective Frank testified that although the Defendant did not admit during the 

statement that he killed the victim, the Defendant admitted he had a .40-caliber gun and 

fired it in the air on the night of the victim’s death. When asked about his having told the 

Defendant, “I want to help you out, but if you’re not honest with me I can’t help you out,” 

Detective Frank said that he wanted the Defendant to be forthcoming and that Detective 

Frank would tell the district attorney “the basis of what happened out there” if the 

Defendant said the shooting had been an accident. Detective Frank said that based upon 

codefendant Denzmore’s statement, Detective Frank thought at the time that the shooting 

had been accidental. 

Detective Frank acknowledged that he falsely told the Defendant that a video 

recording of the shooting existed and that he used information from codefendants Sherrill 
-33-

and Denzmore to create the false impression a video recording existed. Detective Frank 

said that the Defendant asked to see the recording and that Detective Frank falsely told the 

Defendant that he did not have the capability to play the recording in the interview room. 

Detective Frank said, however, that the Defendant “never based his statements off of me 

saying I had the video.” Detective Frank said the Defendant never stated that he shot the 

victim but that it had been an accident. Detective Frank agreed that the Defendant admitted 

he had discarded the gun he had on the night of the shooting. Detective Frank 

acknowledged that he knew at the time of the Defendant’s interview that the district 

attorney’s office might charge felony murder in the case, as the occurrence of an accidental 

death was immaterial to the crime of felony murder. Detective Frank agreed that he asked 

the Defendant about facts that Detective Frank had learned in the interviews of 

codefendants Sherrill and Denzmore and that the Defendant did not admit involvement 

other than having been present and having shot a gun “in the air.”

Detective Frank testified that he attempted to interview the Defendant a second time, 

after the Defendant had been arrested, but that the Defendant invoked his rights and did 

not agree to another interview.

The video recording of the interview was received as a defense exhibit. We have 

reviewed the recording, and it reflects the following regarding the question of whether the 

statement was knowingly and voluntarily given: The Defendant, Detective Frank, and 

another police officer spoke in a small room. Detective Frank advised the Defendant of 

his Miranda rights and told the Defendant he was not in custody or under arrest. The 

Defendant indicated his understanding and agreed to waive his rights and speak to the 

officers. The Defendant signed the written waiver of rights. The substance of the interview 

regarding the crimes was consistent with Detective Frank’s testimony. Detective Frank 

made repeated claims about what he had seen on the purported video recording and 

suggested that the victim had been shot accidentally. Detective Frank also suggested that 

self-defense might have been involved. Detective Frank claimed that a neighbor had 

identified the Defendant. During the interview, the Defendant agreed to provide a DNA 

sample, and Detective Frank advised him of his rights regarding the collection of the 

sample. The Defendant signed the written waiver.

After receiving the evidence, the trial court filed a written order denying the motion 

to suppress. The court found that the Defendant was not in custody and was free to leave 

when the interview ended, that the Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of 

an intoxicant or otherwise impaired, and that the Defendant did not ask for an attorney or 

to end the interview. The court noted that the Defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda

rights and consented to provide a DNA sample. Upon review of the totality of the 

circumstances, the court found that neither Detective Frank nor Detective Chouanard, the 

other officer present, made promises or offers to the Defendant and did not threaten or 

coerce the Defendant. The court found that the Defendant’s will was not overborne such 
-34-

that his statement was involuntary. The court also found that although Detective Frank 

made false statements about having a video recording of the incident, the information he 

represented he learned from the recording was based on interviews with codefendants 

Sherrill and Denzmore, and that it was insufficient to overbear the Defendant’s will and to 

render the statement involuntary.

A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal 

unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 

1996); State v. Jones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Questions about the 

“credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of 

conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” Odom, 

928 S.W.2d at 23. The prevailing party is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that 

evidence.” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 

515, 521 (Tenn. 2001). The trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings is a 

question of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 

(Tenn. 1997). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may 

consider the trial evidence as well as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 

See State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998); see also State v. Williamson, 

368 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tenn. 2012).

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which applies to the states 

via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Similarly, Article 

I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution states that “in all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Tenn. Const. Art. I, 

§ 9. “The test of voluntariness for confessions under Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of 

voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 

1996); see State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 763 (Tenn. 2008). To be considered 

voluntary, a statement must not be the product of “any sort of threats or violence, nor 

obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any 

improper influence.” State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting 

Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). A defendant’s subjective perception 

is insufficient to establish the existence of an involuntary confession. Id. The essential 

inquiry is “whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to 

overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely selfdetermined [.]” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Rogers v. 

Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)). A confession is involuntary if it is the product of 

coercive state action. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986). “The 

State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 695 (Tenn. 2016).
-35-

In determining whether a confession is voluntary, a trial court examines the totality 

of the circumstances, which encompasses “both the characteristics of the accused and the 

details of the interrogation.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting 

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000)). Relevant circumstances include 

the following:

[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the 

extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged 

nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before 

he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of 

his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing 

him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused 

was injured, intoxicated[,] or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the 

statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical 

attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the 

suspect was threatened with abuse.

State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting People v. Cipriano, 429 

N.W.2d 781, 790 (Mich. 1988)).

On appeal, the Defendant argues that his admissions of having been present at the 

scene and having fired a gun were coerced by Detective Frank’s false statements regarding 

the existence of a video recording and an eyewitness identification, false statements about 

what was shown on the alleged recording, statements that Detective Frank wanted to “help 

out” the Defendant but needed the Defendant to be honest, and statements that Detective 

Frank thought the shooting had been accidental. The State responds that the record 

supports the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the Defendant’s statement.

The record reflects that the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in 

ruling on the motion to suppress. To that end, the record reflects that the Defendant was a 

high school graduate with additional education, that the interview was slightly less than 

one hour long, that the Defendant was not in custody and appeared voluntarily for the 

interview, that he showed no signs of impairment or distress during the interview, that the 

interview was conversational and did not involve threats. The Defendant was advised of 

his Miranda rights, and he signed a written waiver. Detective Frank told the Defendant 

that he was not in custody or under arrest, and Detective Frank testified that the Defendant 

was not arrested at the end of the interview. Later during the interview, the Defendant

agreed to provide a DNA sample and signed the waiver for collection of the sample. 

Throughout the interview, the Defendant never tried to end the questioning, nor did he ever

ask for an attorney. 
-36-

This court has said that misrepresentations and promises of leniency may render a 

statement involuntary. State v. Phillips, 30 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) 

(affirming the trial court’s suppression of a defendant’s inculpatory statement obtained 

after misrepresentations by a Department of Children’s Services investigator, the 

defendant’s repeated denials of wrongdoing, statements by the investigator that law 

enforcement would become involved unless the defendant confessed, and promises of 

specific treatment conditioned upon the defendant’s full confession). In the present case, 

the trial court found that the facts did not show that the Defendant’s will had been 

overborne by Detective Frank’s misrepresentations and statements he might “help out” the 

Defendant by presenting any mitigating facts, such as that the shooting had been accidental, 

to the district attorney. Although Detective Frank falsely told the Defendant that a video 

recording existed and that an eyewitness had identified the Defendant, Detective Frank’s 

false representations about what he had learned from viewing the purported recording were 

based upon factual information gathered in the interviews of codefendants Sherrill and 

Denzmore. The trial court concluded that the State showed by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the Defendant’s statement had been voluntarily given, and the record 

supports the court’s determination. 

The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The Defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this basis.

IV

Chain of Custody

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence 

from the victim’s pants because the State failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody 

for the pants. He argues that the State failed to show how the pants were transported from 

the MNPD’s evidence room to the TBI Laboratory. The State counters that it presented 

sufficient proof to authenticate the evidence.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901 states that evidence must be authenticated in order 

to be admissible. Evidence is authenticated by providing proof “sufficient to the court to 

support a finding by the trier of fact that the matter in question is what its proponent 

claims.” Tenn. R. Evid. 901(a). “[W]hen the facts and circumstances that surround 

tangible evidence reasonably establish the identity and integrity of the evidence,” it should 

be admitted. State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 296 (Tenn. 2008). In order to prove the 

reliability of tangible evidence, the State must prove “an unbroken chain of custody.”

Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760 (internal citation omitted). Relative to the State’s burden in 

proving the chain of custody, our supreme court has said:
-37-

Even though each link in the chain of custody should be sufficiently 

established, this rule does not require that the identity of tangible evidence 

be proven beyond the possibility of all doubt; nor should the State be required 

to establish facts which exclude every possibility of tampering . . . . An item 

is not necessarily precluded from admission as evidence if the State fails to 

call all of the witnesses who handled the item . . . . [If] the State fails to offer 

sufficient proof of the chain of custody, the “evidence should not be admitted 

. . . unless both identity and integrity can be demonstrated by other 

appropriate means.” Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760 (quoting Cohen, et al., 

Tennessee Law of Evidence § 901.12, at 624 (3rd ed. 1995)).

Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 296. This court reviews chain of custody determinations for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. at 295.

At the trial, witnesses were called out of order due to scheduling issues, and the 

victim’s pants and evidence about the DNA testing related to the pants were introduced 

before the chain of custody had been fully explored. We will recount the relevant evidence 

and objections in the order in which they were received at the trial.

MNPD Crime Laboratory employee Ms. Dradt testified that all evidence collected 

for a case was labeled with a bar code and central complaint number, after which the 

evidence was taken to the “property room,” which was the location “where all the evidence 

is stored.” She said the property room was in a secured building that was “locked down.”

Medical Examiner Dr. Li testified that the victim’s body was clothed in pants when 

the body was received for the autopsy on August 6, 2015. The autopsy report states that 

the body had been transported from the scene to the Center for Forensic Medicine for the 

autopsy. Dr. Li stated that the usual practice was for either himself or an assistant to 

remove clothing from a body, dry and pack the clothing, and “submit it for evidence.” He 

said the police typically picked up the clothing. When asked whether he knew if the 

clothing was picked up by police in this case, he said his report did not reflect whether it 

was, but he said, “I am sure this is standard procedure.” He said that his office kept records 

regarding the release of evidence to the police and that a technician typically released 

evidence to the police.

MNPD Crime Laboratory employee Ms. Ellis testified that Detective Frank 

submitted requests for DNA testing of the victim’s pants on August 4 and 18, 2015. Before 

Ms. Ellis was asked to identify the pants, the prosecutor addressed defense counsel: “Mr. 

Hakes, this would have actually been introduced through Mr. Frank, but if you have no 

objection, I’ll do it now.” Defense counsel responded, “There’s no objection.” The record 

reflects that Detective Frank had not yet testified. Ms. Ellis identified the pants, which 

were packaged in a bag with evidence tape and which contained her initials. The pants 
-38-

were received as an exhibit. When asked if she had been the person who received the pants 

when they entered the laboratory, Ms. Ellis stated that she had not been but that she 

understood the procedure to be the following: “[O]nce a request is approved, the evidence 

is then asked to be brought over from a property and evidence room to our crime lab, and 

it is accepted into the evidence receiving unit. They then put unique identifiers on there 

for us to know which case it goes with.” When asked if documentation would show “where 

the pants would’ve been for each time they moved,” she responded, “Yes.” During her 

testimony, Ms. Ellis identified her forensic biology report, which was received as an 

exhibit. The document was addressed to Detective Frank as the “submitting officer” and 

listed several items received and analyzed by the laboratory, including the victim’s pants.

After other witnesses testified about DNA analysis evidence related to the victim’s 

pants, defense counsel moved to strike the evidence and provided the following 

explanation:

[W]e’ve heard that the pants moved in this way. They went from [the victim] 

right on his body to the [Medical Examiner]’s Office. [Dr]. Feng Li testified 

that they were removed at the M.E.’s Office. From there, we do not know 

who picked them up and how they got to the crime lab. The chain is broken. 

We don’t know anything about how the first analyst, Ms. Julie Ellis, obtained 

those pants from the . . . Evidence Receiving Unit.

The prosecutor responded that a written record existed “that the defense has had for a long 

time” which showed that Detective Frank picked up the pants from the medical examiner’s 

office. The prosecutor said he thought Detective Frank “can make that chain” in his 

upcoming testimony. The prosecutor said that he understood the pants had been taken from 

the property room to the MNPD Crime Laboratory and that “if we needed to track down 

who that person is who gets it from the property room to the crime lab, we can try to do 

that.” The prosecutor noted, however, that the defense had “known about this and [had] 

not raised it.” The trial court noted that witnesses had been called out of order and denied 

the objection, noting, “[I]f we need to bring somebody in from the property room or the 

certified records from the property room, we will do so.”

Thereafter, Detective Frank testified that he picked up the victim’s clothing from 

the medical examiner’s office on August 12, 2015. He identified the transfer receipt

showing that he took possession of the victim’s property, including a pair of khaki pants. 

He acknowledged his signature on the transfer receipt. He said that when he received 

evidence from the medical examiner, he created a MNPD Property Sheet and “log[ged] it 

into [the] property room where it’s kept for safe storage.” He agreed that after he picked 

up the evidence in the present case, he labeled it and took it to the property room. He said 

the evidence was in his possession while he completed these tasks. At the conclusion of 

Detective Frank’s direct examination, the court inquired whether the prosecutor wanted to 
-39-

introduce as exhibits “some documents” the prosecutor had shown to Detective Frank. The 

prosecutor stated, “Unless there would be any chain of custody objections, I don’t see a 

need to do that,” to which defense counsel responded, “No. I thought you were going to 

ask him about the transcript [of the Defendant’s pretrial statement].” The court said, “No. 

No. I’m asking about the ones he showed from the M.E.’s Office, the ones that Dr. Li 

referred to and he signed.” One of the defense attorneys stated, “That’s fine.” The 

prosecutor mentioned the “swabs,” and one of the defense attorneys said, “That’s fine.” 

The same defense attorney then stated that the only issue was with the transcript of the 

Defendant’s interview and that the defense did not “want that to go back with the jury.” 

The court assured defense counsel that the transcript would not be provided to the jury 

during deliberations and said, “I was interested [if there] is . . . still an objection to the chain 

of custody such that that needs to be put into evidence?” One of the defense attorneys 

responded, “I don’t think so.”

The defense next raised the issue in the motion for a new trial, in which it alleged 

that the trial court erred in denying the “Motion to Withdraw [the Victim’s] Pants as an 

Exhibit.” At the hearing on the motion, the defense did not offer argument. The prosecutor 

stated that the defense had received a “receipt from the medical examiner” showing that 

Detective Frank had picked up the victim’s pants from the medical examiner, and the 

receipt was received as a hearing exhibit. In denying the motion for a new trial, the court 

found that the chain of custody had been properly established “through the evidence 

provided in discovery and the witness testimony of Detective Frank, Dr. Feng Li, Julie 

Ellis, and Benjamin DeBlanc.”

The record reflects that the State offered a combination of evidence directly related 

to the transfer of the victim’s pants from one custodial entity to another as well as standard 

practices evidence regarding the receipt and transfer of evidence from the medical 

examiner’s office, the MNPD Crime Laboratory, and Detective Frank. Although the State 

did not offer evidence which directly addressed the transfer of the pants from the evidence 

room to the Crime Laboratory, (1) Dr. Li testified about the standard procedures for 

collecting, packaging, storing, and releasing the evidence to the police; (2) Detective Frank 

testified about his procedure for receiving evidence from the medical examiner, 

documenting it, and “logging” it in to the property room; (3) Ms. Ellis testified about the 

general practice of the evidence remaining secured in the property room and being brought 

to the crime laboratory once a testing request was approved; (4) Ms. Ellis’s report listed

Detective Frank as the “submitting officer” for evidentiary items, including the victim’s 

pants; and (5) Ms. Ellis also testified that documentation was created to record the transfer 

of evidence from one place to another. No evidence at the trial suggested any deviation 

from these procedures or any irregularity with the integrity of the evidence. The defense 

raised a challenge to the chain of custody at the trial, and the prosecutor and the court stated 

that an additional witness could be called if necessary. After further evidence was received 

from Detective Frank, however, the defense indicated it had no further objections to the
-40-

chain of custody issue. The State cannot be faulted for not calling an additional witness 

regarding the transfer of the victim’s pants between the medical examiner’s office and the 

crime laboratory, given the circumstances. In any event, Detective Frank’s and Ms. Ellis’s 

testimony adequately explained the process. When the defense resurrected the chain-ofcustody issue at the motion for a new trial, the trial court concluded that the State had 

reasonably authenticated the evidence by proving an adequate chain of custody. The record 

supports the court’s determination. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

and later refusing to strike the evidence. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this 

basis. 

V

Consecutive Sentencing

In this final issue, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

in imposing partially consecutive sentences. The record reflects that the Defendant’s 

sentences consisted of the following: a life sentence for first degree felony murder, with 

which the second degree murder and its attendant twenty-five-year sentence had been 

merged; twenty-one-year sentences for each of two counts of attempted first degree murder 

followed by six years for each of his two convictions for employment of a firearm in the 

commission of a dangerous felony, as required by law, with the effective twenty-sevenyear sentences for attempted first degree murder and the firearms offenses to be served 

consecutively to the life sentence; and ten years for attempted aggravated robbery, to be 

served concurrently to the first degree felony murder conviction. The Defendant 

acknowledges that the firearms offenses were statutorily required to be imposed with 

consecutive service to the attendant attempted first degree murder offenses, but he 

challenges the imposition of consecutive service for the effective twenty-seven-year 

sentences for attempted first degree murder and the firearms offenses sentences with the 

life sentence.

This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence within the appropriate 

sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of 

reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must 

consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, 

the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature 

and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement 

factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to 

sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any statement that the defendant 

made on his own behalf, and the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. State v. Ashby, 

823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (citing T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103, -210; State v. Moss, 727 

S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); 

see T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2019).
-41-

Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range 

sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our 

Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706-07. “[A] trial court’s misapplication of an 

enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial 

court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. at 706. “So long as 

there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as 

provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld 

on appeal. Id.

The abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness standard also applies 

to the imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tenn. 

2013). A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to impose consecutive 

service. Id. A trial court may impose consecutive sentencing if it finds by a preponderance 

of the evidence that one criterion is satisfied in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

115(b)(1)-(7) (2019). In determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, though, a 

trial court must ensure the sentence is “no greater than that deserved for the offense 

committed” and is “the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which 

the sentence is imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(2), (4) (2019); see State v. Desirey, 909 

S.W.2d 20, 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court received as an exhibit the transcript of the 

January 23, 2019 bond revocation hearing, at which the trial court revoked the Defendant’s 

bond for the present offenses for several days and imposed additional conditions upon 

rerelease. The court made its determination after receiving evidence that the Defendant, 

who did not have a driver’s license, had been stopped for speeding and had been charged 

with unlawful weapon possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor 

marijuana possession. The evidence at the hearing also showed that the Defendant had a 

positive drug screen for marijuana and that he admitted using both marijuana and Lortab, 

the latter of which he obtained from a family member. The transcript of a bond reduction 

hearing was also received as an exhibit at the sentencing hearing, but it has not been 

included in the appellate record.

The presentence report was received as an exhibit and reflected that the Defendant 

was twenty-three years old at the time of sentencing, had one child, had completed high 

school, and had been enrolled in technical schooling until his arrest in the present case. 

The Defendant reported that he began smoking four to five marijuana “blunts” per day at 

age twelve and that he had used marijuana until his incarceration in the present case. His 

employment history included furniture assembly and food service. He had no prior 

criminal convictions. The Strong-R Risk Assessment attached to the presentence report 

reflected that the Defendant was at moderate risk of reoffending.
-42-

The Defendant’s mother testified that the Defendant had had a minor juvenile 

charge but that it had been “nothing.” She said the Defendant was a hard worker and had 

begun full-time employment upon high school graduation. She said the Defendant was an 

excellent father to his daughter. She said the Defendant had obtained a student loan in 

order to attend technical school to learn to be a mechanic and that he had been a good 

student. She identified photographs of the Defendant and some of his family members, 

which were received as exhibits.

In an allocution, the Defendant stated: He was sorry for having been “around 

activity that may have lead [sic] to [the victim’s] death” and for having caused stress to his 

family. He said he was sorry he had gone from being a hard worker with a “clean record” 

to a criminal defendant because he “chose to be around” a family member and a friend. He 

said he planned to use his time in prison to attend programs that would help him be a better 

human being and that he would like to be an advocate to steer others from criminal activity.

After receiving the evidence, the trial court found enhancement factors based upon 

the Defendant’s prior history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, his having been 

a leader in the offenses involving two or more criminal actors, and the particular 

vulnerability of the child victims. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (3), (4) (2019). The court 

applied these factors to the convictions for attempted first degree murder and attempted 

especially aggravated robbery. The court did not apply any mitigating factors. See id. § 

40-35-113 (2019). The court found that the Defendant was a dangerous offender whose 

behavior indicated little to no regard for human life and that partial consecutive sentencing 

reasonably related to the seriousness of the offenses and was necessary to protect the public 

from further criminal conduct committed by the Defendant. See id. § 40-35-115(b)(4) 

(2019). In making this finding, the court noted the facts of the offense included the victim’s 

having said he did not have “anything” and having nevertheless been shot in the head, the 

Defendant’s having rifled through the victim’s pockets, the shooting into the bedroom 

where two children slept, and the Defendant’s subsequent gun possession in the events 

which led to the bond revocation.

On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the court’s application of enhancement 

factors or its decision not to apply any mitigating factors. He focuses solely on the trial 

court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing based upon its finding that he was a dangerous 

offender. He argues that proof he committed multiple dangerous crimes, standing alone, 

is insufficient to support a dangerous offender finding. He argues, as well, that a sentence 

of life plus twenty-seven years is greater than the sentence deserved for the crimes and is 

not the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is 

imposed. 
-43-

In order to impose consecutive sentences on the basis that a defendant is “a 

dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no 

hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high,” a trial court 

must also find that the sentences “are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses” 

and “are necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal acts” by the 

defendant. State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995); see State v. Moore, 942 

S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). 

The record reflects that the trial court made the appropriate Wilkerson findings to 

support its determination that the Defendant was a dangerous offender. The evidence 

shows that Defendant and his codefendants went to the scene armed, that they decided to 

rob the victim after they were unable to contact Mr. Mitchell, that the victim protested that 

he did not have anything, that the Defendant nevertheless shot the victim, that the 

Defendant searched the victim’s pockets for money while codefendant Denzmore shot into 

the nearby duplex when he saw a light turn on, and that the Defendant and codefendant 

Denzmore discarded their guns as they fled the scene. While on bond for these offenses, 

the Defendant was arrested for new offenses, including possession of a handgun. We 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Defendant 

was a dangerous offender and that the effective sentence was appropriate for the offenses 

and to protect the public from the Defendant’s future criminal conduct. The Defendant is 

not entitled to relief on this basis.

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the 

trial court are affirmed.

 _____________________________________

 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE