### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 05 -00 118 -CV
Ang e la M . Bl ac kwel l , A ppe lla nt

v. Mark M. Hum ble , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF MI LAM COUNTY , 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 28,1 67 , HO NORAB LE ED MAGRE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Appellant Ang ela M. Bla ckwe ll a ppeals fr om the trial court’ s judgme nt limi ting he r
acc ess t o her children. Bla ckwe ll argues that the trial judg e should have rec used himself sua sponte, that an assig ned judge should ha ve order ed the trial judge ’s rec usal, and that the tria l court abuse d its dis c re tio n in lim iti ng he r a c c e ss to the c hil dr e n, a llo wi ngthe c hil dr e n’ s g ra ndmot he r a nd un c le to intervene , and naming them possessory conser vators. We re verse the trial cour t’s judgme nt in part
and re mand the c a us e fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

Bac kgr ound I n Oc tob e r 20 02 , the tr ia l c ourt sig ne d a fi na l de c re e g ra nti ng a div or c e to B la c kw e ll and appellee Mark M
. Humble and naming them joint manag ing conservators of t heir c hildren, Mt., a son born in June 1996, and Md., a daug hter born in Nove mber 1999. The children’ s primary place of re sidence was with Humble, a nd Bla ckwe ll had visitation rights.2 In J an u ar y 2 0 0 3 , H u mb l e f

i l e d a m o t i o nf o r e n f o r c e m e n tan d

a m o t i o nt o m o d i f

y,
asser ting that Bl ackw ell had re fused to re turn the childre n to Humble’s ca re a fter a visit and had threatened Humble in f

ront of the c hildren. Humble a sked that B lackwe ll be held in contempt for violating the divor ce de cre e and soug ht orders ba rring her f

rom speakingto him and requiringher to arra ng e for a third-par

ty to dr op off and pick up the children. A hea ring was he ld on Humble’s motion on Fe bruar

y 13. On the morning of the hear ing, Humble filed a supplemental petition asking the cour t to suspend visit ation pending a mental he alth evaluation of Blac kwell, alleg ing that Mt.’s g ra de s h a d d

ro pp e d r e c e ntl y , th a t Mt . s e e me d str e sse d, and that B la c kw e ll t old

Md . to sa y that B e tty Fr ench, the children’ s paterna l gr a n dmother and H umble’s mother, ha d “choke d her a nd kicked he r.” On Marc h 7, the trial court signe d an orde r re quiring third-par ties for pick- ups and dr op -o ff s, or de ri ngps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns of bo th c hil dr e n, and

ho ldi ngB la c kw e ll i n c on te mpt , su sp e nd inga

thi rt y -d ay ja il s e nte nc e if

B la c kw e ll c omp lie d w ith the c ourt ’s or de rs , p a id $ 3, 00 0 in attorney ’s fe es, re fra ined from inter fer ing w ith the ps y cholog ical evaluations and any rec ommended treatment, and re fra ined from c ommunicating w ith Humble except throug h the par ties’ attorne y s. On Marc h 10, Humble filed a n “ame nded supplementa l” p etition, describing more troubling be havior by

the childre n following visits wit h Bla ckwe ll. Humble alleg ed that the c hildren acte d wild and uncontrollable afte r an ex t en d ed vis it with Blackw ell and that Mt. was e x hibiting behavior simil ar to B lackwe ll’s older son, who wa s place d in an in-patient psy chiatric fac ility when he wa s six y ear s old but returned to norma l behavior afte r he was re moved from B lackwe ll’s car e. Humble asser

ted that the childre n’s troubling behavior diminis hed whe n they

were awa

y from Bla ckwe ll f

or prolong ed periods of time. Humble fea red Bla ckwe ll would plac e “ en o rmous3

pressure ” on the children when they underw ent their psy cholog ical eva luations and asked the court to suspend Bla ckwe ll’s visit ation or, alter natively , to order supe rvised visitations. On Marc h 21, five da

y s b ef o re t h e hea

ring on Humble’s motion, Blac kwell filed a motion to recuse the tr ial court judg e, Ed Mag re, beca use he and Humble ha d prac ticed law tog ether in the past. J udg e Magr e refer red the motion to J udg e B.B. Schraub, the pr esiding judge of the Third Administrative J udicial R eg ion, who denied the m otion without a hearingon Marc h 25 beca use the motion was not timely filed and did not alleg e suff icient g rounds for r ecusa l. The Mar ch 26 hea ring went for war d as schedule d, and on April 2, the trial cour t signe d an orde r limiti ng Bla ckwe ll to two supervise d t wo -h o u r visits wit h the childre n per month and or deringher not to make disparag ing
rema rks about Humble or

his family . Be cause Dr. Frank Pugliese, the psy cholog ist ini tially selec ted by the c ourt

to e va luate the c hil dr e n, wa s unav ail abl e, th e c ourt or de re d th a t D r. Da

vid Poo le evaluate t he children within three wee ks. The court set a st atus hear ing in ninety day s. On May

23, Humble sent a le tter to the trial cour t in which he stated that Dr. Poole’s “r ep o rt s wi l l be done a s soon as he g ets a bit of additional information.” On May 30, the trial cour t sent Blac kwell a letter stat i n g t h a te n c l o s e d

w i t h t h e l e t t e r

w e r e c o p i e s o f

D r . P o o l e ’ s r e p o rt s ; t h e r e p o rt s t h e m s e lve s, howeve r, ar e not included in the r ecor d.

On J une 19, Blackw ell filed a second moti on to rec use J udg e Magr e, st ating that he and Humble pr actice d law toge ther in the past and citing to r ule 18b of the rules of c ivil procedure
. Bla ckwe ll asserted that J udg e Mag re sho uld have r ecuse d himself on his own motion or on Bla ckwe ll’s first motion. J udg e Mag re a g ain ref err ed the motion to J udg e Schra ub, who assig ned it to J udg e James Clawson, J r. Humble filed a response , asser

ting that the g rounds for r ecusa l had4

been disc losed during the di vorce proce eding in October 2002 and that Bla ckwe ll had waived her rig ht to seek re cusal. F ollowing a hear ing, Judge Clawson denied B lackwe ll’s motion t o rec use. I n Aug ust 2004, Be tty Fr ench and M onty Humble, Humbl e’s br other, filed a petition in intervention seeking to be named possessory conser vators of the children. Blac kwell opposed the petition in int erve ntion, arguing that the intervenor s lacke d stan d i n g t o i n t ervene. The trial court held a hear ing in Septe mber 2004 to c onsider the petition in intervention and t o re co nsider Bla ckwe ll’s visit ation schedule . Following a hear i n g i n S eptember 2004, the trial cour

t signe d a judgme nt in J anuar

y 2005, fi n d i n g that the interve nors had ha d substantial and continued c ontact with the ch i l d re n sufficie nt to warra nt standing to interve ne under the family

code, na ming the intervenor s as possessory conser vators, and c ontinuing t o limit Bla ckwe ll’s visit ation with the
c hil dr e n to tw o s up e rv ise d v isi ts e a c h mo nth . I t is fr om t his jud g me nt t

hat B la c kw e ll a

pp e a ls.
Rec usal I n her first two issues, Bla ckwe ll argues t hat t he trial court judge should have re cused himself from the c ase sua sponte. I n her third issue, she argues the judg e should have rec used himself when she filed her motion to re cuse on J une 19, 2003, and in he r fourth issue, she conte nds that the assig ned judg e should have g rante d her June 2003 motion.

Rule 18a of the r

ules of civ i l p ro ce d u re g overns the r ecusa l or disqualification of judge s. A trial c o u rt ma y r a ise the issue of re cusal on its own motion, Esquivel v. El Paso Healthcare Sy s., Ltd. , 225 S.W .3d 83, 88 (Tex. A pp.—El Paso 2005, no pet.), or a pa rty may file a motion at lea st ten day s befor e the date of trial or a hear ing stating g rounds for the trial judg e’s r ecusa l. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(a ). The judge sha ll then either re cuse himself or ref er5

the matter to the presiding judge of the a dminist rative judicia l district, who should either consider the motion or assig n another jud ge t o hear

the motion. Tex . R. Civ. P . 18a(c ), (d) . Grounds for
rec usal of a tr ial judge include that “he or a la wy er w ith whom he previously prac ticed law ha s been a mater ial witness” in the ca se. Tex. R. Ci v. P. 18b(2)(c ).

We reviewa trial court’s dec ision on a motion t o rec use for an abuse of discre tion. McElweev. Mc

Elwee , 911 S.W .2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
. Th e e rr on e ou s d e nia l of

a mot ion to r e c use do es no t void or nu lli fy the c ourt ’s la te r r

uli ng s. In r e Uni on Pac. Re

s. Co. , 9 6 9 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 7 , 4 2 8 ( T e x. 1 9 9 8 )
. I f t h e g r o u n d s f o r r e c u s a l are fu lly disclosed on the re cord, a

party may waive he r rig ht to seek re cusal. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(5). Wit hout a prope r and timely

motion to recuse, r

ule 18a’ s mandatory p ro v i s i o n s are never trig g ere d. Be ar d v . B e ar d , 4 9 S
. W
. 3 d 4 0 , 5 1 (T ex . Ap p . —W ac o 2 0 0 1 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( qu o t i n g W right v. W right , 86 7 S. W.2 d 8 07 , 8 11 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) ); see M cElwee , 911 S.W
. 2 d at 186 (“ I f a pa rt y fa ils to c omp ly

[wit h ru le 18 a] , he wai ve s h is r ig ht t o c omp la in o f a jud g e ’s fa ilure to
rec use himself.”)
.

J udg e Ed Mag re pr esided over t he parties’ di vorce proce eding , signingthe dec ree on October 8, 2002, and exercised continuing jurisdiction ove r issues related to the children unde r the family code. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. §§ 155.001-.003 (West 2002)
. Appellee Humble is a lawy er
w h o h a s b e e n i n p r a c t i c e s i n c e 1 9 7 3 an d w h o s e f a t h e r i s a r e t i r e d t r i a l c o u rtj u d g e i nM i l a m C o u n t y. Humble testified that he a nd Mag re w ere partne rs tog et h er i n t wo d iffer ent law f irms from 1977 thr ou g h 1 98 6. Th e y

we re pa rt ne rs in t he ir ow n f ir m f or tw o o r t hr e e y e ars and

the n p art ne rs wi th
sever al other attorney s for a bout seven y ear s; the two had not bee n i n prac tice tog ether for f ifteen6

or six teen y ear s. Humble descr ibed his depar ture fr om his practice with Mag re a s “unplea sant” a nd “rather a crimonious” and “ thought f or about t en y ear s [M ag re] was pre tty unhappy about it.” Humbl e did

no t be lie ve Ma g re wo uld sh owhim

any fa vo ri tis m. At the Octobe r 2002 hear ing on the parties’ divorce , Bla ckwe ll contested whe ther a n ag ree ment betwee n the par ties should be enfor ced and i ncorpor ated into the divorc e dec ree , and the issue o f M ag re’ s impartiality arose . Bla ckwe ll testified that she had sig ned the a g ree ment under duress, e x plaining, “ Iwas fe arf ul that Mark [Humble] had alrea dy talked to the J udg e and that he’s
a lr e a dy t o l d t h e Ju d g e a

b o u t t h i s c a s e an d h a d a l r e a dy m a d e ar r an g e m e n t s f

o r t h i s c a s e an d th a t I
wou ld be lu cky

to h a ve su

pe rv ise d v isi ts w ithmy

c hil dr e n. ” She te sti fi e d, “ Iha d a lot of pe op le come to me a

nd tell me I wouldn’t g et a fair trial here and that Ibetter g et this moved out of Milam County
. ” L a

te r , during arguments about the enf orce ability

of the a g ree ment, Humble’s attorne y said:
I must say something about the s ug g estion about what’s g oing on w ith the Court and the Court’s violation of its duty that she alleg es. At that point one m u s t either be quiet about the trial c ourt or file the proper motions to bring it proper ly . . . but y ou can’ t say that a Judge is cor

rupt and then c ome and a sk for his protec tion.
Bla ckwe ll’s attorney , who is board c ertified in f amily law and ha s been lice nsed since 1986, r eplied: [F]or him to also come in and sa y that Ishould have filed a Motion to Recuse, how dare Icome in her e and try to g et justice from this Court is also preposterous. I have a bs olute fa ith

a nd c on fi de nc e in t

his Cou rt , o nc e thi s Co ur

t g e ts t o he ar wh a t th e fa c ts are . Ido n ’t h av e to fil e a Motion to Recuse if Ibelieve this Court ca n be fa ir and impartial and I

believe so, or

else I would have f

iled something diff

ere ntly
. Bla ckwe ll first a

rg ues that J udg e Mag re should have ra ised the issue sua sponte a nd
rec used himself wit hout a mot ion afte r he signe d the decree beca use it “bec ame c lear

at that hea

ring7

that the ca se would g o bey ond the issue of e nforc ing a neg otiated settlement” a

nd contends that we should reve rse the r

ulings made afte r the de cre e wa s signe d and re instate the dec ree ’s provisions. We do not ag ree that J udg e Mag re was somehow impartial enoug h to have pr esided
over a J une 2002 hea

ring on temporar

y orde rs , t h e re co rd for which is not before us, the Octobe r 2002 hear ing, a

nd the subsequent sig ning of the divorce decr ee, but not impartial e no u gh to have continued to exercise jur isdictio n o v er t h e ca se af ter the de cre e wa s finalized. At the October he ari ng , th e pa

rt ie s d isp ute d w he the r B la c kw e ll sig ne d the a g re e me nt v olu nta ri ly or un de r d ur e ss, wh ic h s he argue d wa s a t le a st i n p art du e to h e r c on c e rn s a

bo ut a ba c k- ro om d e a l be tw e e n H umb le and Judge Ma g re. D espite those conc erns, howeve r, Bla ckwe ll’s boa rd-c ertified and experienc ed
a tto rn e y state d s he did

no t do ub t t he ju dge’s abi lity to b e fa ir and did no t w ant t o f

ile a mot ion to
rec use. Even if

we we re to a ssume that J udg e M agr e had an absolute duty to raise the issue of
rec usal on his own motion, Blackw ell s t at ed s h e d i d not wish to have the judg e re cused, a nd B la c kw e ll h a s no t c ite d any a uth or ity that w ou ld r e qu ir e Judg e Ma g re to i ns ist on re c us inghim se lf
ov e r t he pa rt ie s’ wi sh e s. We o ve rr

ule B la c kw e ll’ s f

ir st t wo iss ue s. Turning next t o Bla ckwe ll’s argument that her moti on should have be en g rante d and that J udg e Mag re should have rec used himself when she filed the motion, we note that B lackwe ll’s testimony shows she wa s awa

re of Humble’s relationship with J udg e Magr e well befor e the Oc tober 2002 hear ing. Despite this knowle dg e, Bla ckwe ll did not file a motion to recuse be fore the dec ree
wa s si g ne d. Al tho ug h s he te sti fi e d th a t sh e wo rr ie d th a t H umb le ha d wor ke d o ut a n a g re e me nt w ith J udg e Mag re be fore trial, when H umble ra i s ed the issue of the judg e’s impar

tiality , Bla ckwe ll’s attorney stated in no unce rtain terms that she did not wa nt to file a motion to recuse and believe d8

J udg e Mag re w ould be fa i r an d i m p artial. Her motion was filed f ive months later, in late Ma rch 2003, one month a fter the trial court modified its divorc e decr ee and held Bla ckwe ll in contempt for vio la tin g the de c re e , a

nd wa s in su ff

ic ie nt u nd e r r ule 18 a be c a us e it d id not

state g ro un ds fo r r e c us a l. See Tex. R. C i v . P. 18a. Neve rtheless, Judge Ma g re r efe rre d the motion to J udg e Schra ub, who denied it, finding it was untimely filed and f

ailed to alleg e suff

icient g rounds for r ecusa l. Three months later, in J une 2003, B lackwel l fi l ed a se cond motion, asserting Humble’s and Judge Mag re’ s work re lationship as gr ounds for re cusal a nd stating that J udg e Mag re
s h o u l d h av e r ec u s ed

h i m s el f o nh i s o wn m o t i o n . J u d ge M agr e aga i n re fe rr ed t h e m o t i o nt o J u d ge Sc hr a ub , w ho a ssi g ne d J ud g e Cla ws on to c on sid e r t

he mot ion . In July

20 03 , Jud g e Cla

ws on he ld a hea ring and conside red the lang uag e of r ule 18b, including its provision stating that parties may waive the ir rig hts to seek rec usal. He noted his discomfor t with the way

the rules a

re w ritten, but
c on c lud e d, “ Th e str

uc tur e of the statut e s, I thi nk , . . . is su c h th a t y ou have to c on c lud e that th e ru le contemplates that this can be wa ived and if you g o with that inter pretation then it has be en wa ived and I would there fore overr

ule the Motion to Recuse Judge Ma g re.” Bla ckwe ll’s J une 2003 motion was filed a y ear afte r the first hea

ring in the case and eig ht months after the de cre e was signe d. The prior relationship betwe en Humble and Judge Mag re
w a s w e l l kn o w nan d

w a s d i s c u s s e d

i n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 2
. T h u s , t h e J u n e 2 0 0 3 m o t i o nw a s u n t i m e l y. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 8a (a ), 18 b( 5) ; Be ar d , 4 9 S
. W
. 3 d at 51. Fur ther, B lackwe ll’s trial counsel expli citly stated that she did not question J udg e Mag re’ s impartiality and did not want to have the jud g e r e c u s e d
. H a v in g r e v ie w e d th e r e p o rte r ’ s r e c o r d s f r o m th e O c to b e r 2 0 0 2 and J uly 2003 hear ings, we cannot hold that J udg e Clawson abuse d his discretion in denying B lackwe ll’s motionI n his “supplementa l” petit ion, Humble s et out various alleg ations relate d to Blac kwell’s 1 tr e a tme nt of

the c hil dr e n a

nd the c hil dr e n’ s b e havio r f oll ow ingan e xten de d v isi t w ithB la c kw e ll. He state d th a t si nc e his se pa ratio n f ro m B la c kw e ll, c ir c ums tanc e s h a d ma te ri a lly and su bs tanti a lly chang ed in that B lackwe ll was no long er be ing cooper ative with Humble or comply ing w ith the trial court’s order s. Humble alleg ed that B lackwe ll had beg un threatening him “with vag ue re velations about his shor

tcomings,” arbitra

rily moving pick-up and drop-of f times r elated to visitation , and “flying in to [sic] a ra g e about small thing s.” 9 to r e c us e . L ike wi se , we cann ot ho ld that Judg e Ma g re , w ho we have he ld d id n ot a bu se his discretion in not rec using himself sua spon t e, was lega lly

obligated to rec use himself once Bla ckwe ll’s untimely

motion to recuse wa s filed. We overr ule Blackwe ll’s third and four th issues
on a pp e a l.
Blackw ell’s Acc ess to HerChild ren

On April 2, 2003, the trial c ourt signe d an orde r modifying the provisions gove rning po sse ssi on

of the c hil dr e n. Th e c ourt

fo un d “ that th e ma te ri a l a lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d in [H umb le ’s ] Am e nd e d Su

pp le me nta l Pe tit ion

are tr ue and tha t th e re qu e ste d mod if

ic a tio ns are in t

he be st i nte re st of the c hildren” and orde red B lackwe ll’s visitations restric ted to supe rvised two-hour visits on t he 1 first and third Wednesda

y s of ea ch month. I n its final j udg ment, signe d J anuar y 25, 2005, the trial court c ontinued those same modified pr ovisions. I n her f ifth issue, Blac kwell contends that the trial
c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

re str ic tin g he r a c c e ss t o a nd po sse ssi on

of he r c hil dr e n. B la c kw e ll argues that the c ourt abused its discre tion by modify ing its decr ee be cause Humble did not show a chang e in the par

ties’ circ umstances that would justify the modification. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101 (West Supp. 2007). She f urther contends the c ourt abused its discre tion in incorporating the modified visitation into i ts final judgme nt issued on J anuar y 25, 2005.The standa rd for modify ing a

joint manag ing c onser vatorship is less stringe nt than that 2 applied for

modify ing a

sole manag ing c onservatorship. Echols v. Olivare z , 8 5 S. W. 3 d 475, 478 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). See I n re J.R.D

. , 169 S.W .3d 740, 746-52 (Tex
. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (Pury ear , 3 J ., concur ring ) (a rg uing that standards of r eview a pplied to conservatorship issues are inc onsistent wi th c on sti tut ion a l natur e of pa re nta l rig hts and arguin g that cle ar- and -c on vin c ingsta nd ard sh ou ld be applied)
. 10

To obtain a modification of a joint manag ing c onservatorship, a par ty must show (1) a
ma te ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s and

(2 ) t hat th e c ha

ng e wo uld

be in t he c hil d’ s b e st int e re st. Id . We reviewa trial c o u rt ’s m o d i fi cation of a joint manag ing c onservatorship for an 2 abuse of discretion. E c h o ls v . O li v a r ez , 8 5 S.W .3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

3 “The trial court is in the best position to obser ve the demea

nor and persona lities of the witnesses and can ‘fee l’ the forces, powers, and influence s that cannot be discerne d by mere ly rea ding the rec ord,”
and we wi ll n ot f

ind an a bu se of dis c re tio n pr ov ide d so me su bs tanti ve , pr ob a tiv e e vid e nc e su pp or ts the cour t’s decision. Id . When a

pply ing the abuse- of-discr etion standard to a trial court’ s decision to modify its provisions related to posse ssion a nd custody of children, w e ask f irst whether

the trial court ha d sufficie nt information on which to ex erc ise its discretion, applying a traditional sufficie ncy revie w, and if so, whe ther it ac ted re asonably in the application of its discre tion. Id . at 477-78.
Fa c tua l Su mm ar

y B e tw e e n F e br

ua ry 20 03 and

Se pte mbe r 2 00 4, the tr ial cou rt held f our h e ari ng s in which evide nce r eleva

nt to Humble’s motion to m odify was introduce d. We have c are fully revie wed t h e t ra n s cr i p t s fr o m al l o f t h e h ea ri n gs an d wi l l co n d en s e t h e t e s t i m o n y fr o m t h e v ar i o u s h ea ri n gs into a brief summar

y to assist in our review of the t rial court’s ruling
. Some of the testimony was11

about the par

ties’ pre -divorce conduct or about B lackwe ll’s three olde r ch i l d ren, w ho are not part of th is p r o c e e d in g . We r e c o g n iz e th a t e v id e n c e o f p r e - d iv o r c e c o n d u c t is n o t b y it s e lf r e le v a n t or admissible to obtain a modi fication, but such evidence may be offere d to corr oborate alleg ations and evid ence of similar conduc t since the de cre e. Hollon v. Rethabe r , 643 S.W .2d 783, 784 (T ex . Ap p . — S an An t o n i o 1 9 8 2 , n o wr i t ) ( qu o t i n g W ils on v . E lli ott , 73 S.W . 946, 947 (Tex. 1903)).

1. Evidence of pre-divorc e conduct or related to Blackwell’s older children Humb le te s ti f

ie d th a t d

u r in g th e ir ma

r r ia g e , B la c kw e ll to ld h im s h e h ad bee n diag nosed with border line persona lity disorder. H e also testified that E.B ., Bla ckwe ll’s oldest son, ha d be e n dia g no se d with op po sit ion a l def iant d iso rd e r a

nd wa s a da ng e ro us c hil d a

nd c omm itt e d to a psy chiatric hospital for a month whe n he wa s six y ear s old. Humble and anothe r witness testified th at on ce E. B . w a s p la c e d w ithhis bio log ic a l f a the r, he tur

ne d in to “ a

wo nd e rf ul c hil d. ” Humbl e t h o u gh t B l a c k w e l l ’ s t w o o lde r d a

ug hte rs we re anti -s oc ia l or so c iop a thi c . A nd

y and Son dr a An dr e ws , Humbl e ’s ne ig hb or s, te sti fi e d a bo ut se ve ra l inc ide nts duri ng the marr ia g e wh e n th e y saw B la c kw e ll
ne g le c t or ig no re Mt. , w ho wa s lef

t to c ro ss a bus y

ro a d o r p lay

on a be a c h b y him se lf . B la c kw e ll de nie d b e ingdia g no se d w itha bo rd e rl ine pe rs on a lity , e xpla ini ngthat du ri ngg ra du a te sc ho ol a classmate dia g nosed her

with features of bor derline pe rsonality
.
2. Evidence re lated to post-divorce c onduct

As ke d w hat c ir c ums tanc e s h a d c ha ng e d s inc e t

he div or c e de c re e wa s si g ne d, Humbl e said, “This continued poisoning of the children.” Humble said that B lackwe ll’s neg ative re marks
we r e v e r y u n h e a lt h y f o r th e c h il dr e n . M t. h a d a s k e d H u mb le w h y h e h a d “ r u n M a ma o u t o f the12

house” or “[i] nto the Street” a

nd told Humble that he could do whateve r he wanted to at B lackwe ll’s house. Md. had be g un “par roting ” thing s such as, “ Your [sic] going to die in six teen y ear s,” and, “I can’ t smell alcohol, Daddy , but Mama ca n.” When Humbl e asked why Md. had abr

uptly decide d she di sliked one of Humble’s friends with whom she had been c lose, Md. said, “Howdo Iknow who I ’m su pp os e d to be lie ve , I ’m on ly fo ur ? ” Humbl e te sti fi e d th a t th e c hil dr e n w e re havin g ba d d re a ms about B lackwe ll, that Mt. w as unhappy and withdra wn, that Mt.’s g rade s were declining , and that Mt. ha d s tart e d to sh owop po sit ion a lly de fi ant b e havio r s imi lar to that e xhibi te d b y E. B . H umb le said that afte r the c hildren re t u rn ed home a fter a long visit with Blac kwell, their “ behavior s were astounding ly

bad.” H e also testified that Blac kwell told Md. to li e about be ing a bused by Fr ench: [Mt. ] sa id [M d. ] lie d w he n s he sa id t hat N ana ha d c ho ke d a

nd kic ke d h e r[], he sa id “That’s a lie, bec ause that didn’t happen” and [Md.] ver y p ro mptly said “Da ddy , I didn’t lie, Mama told me to say that.”
After Bla ckwe ll’s visit ations had been l i m i t ed to t wo supervise d visits a month, Humble testified that Mt.’s mood had improved, he had g ained we ight a nd self-c onfidenc e, he ha d imp ro ve d in

his re a din g a

bil ity , a nd he no lon g e r h a d d isc ipl ine iss ue s at sc ho ol or a t ho me . H umb le also said Md. was doingwell and wa s well-adjusted a nd happy
. Af te r B lac kwe ll re po rt e d F re nc h’ s a lle g e d a bu se of Md ., the po lic e c a lle d Ch ild Protective Servic es to investigate. Casewor ker Shannon Soechting interviewed Md., w ho said that she fe lt safe at Humble’s and F renc h’s houses. Mt. told Soechting that Fre nch neve r hit him or Md., Fr ench de nied the alleg ations and appe are d to Soechting to be truthful, and Soechtingruled out the alleg ations. Fre nch testified that she was a retire d reg istered nur se and w as ver y close wi t h the13

children. F renc h denied c hoking or kicking Md. and testified that shortly afte r the divorc e, Md. said, “Mother sa y s y ou’re a stink-hea d.” Don Humble, H umble’s father a nd Fr ench’ s ex-husband, testified that while he w as ca ring for the c hildren re cently , Md. said, “I hate Nana [Frenc h]. Na na hurts me.” She then tur

ned to him and said, “I

don’t like y ou, y ou hit me.” Don told her she kne w that was not true, a

nd Md. “starte d g igg ling a bout it,” as if it were a joke. Dar nesha M cG reg or, who ba by sat for the children, ne ver sa w B lackwe ll hurt the children or

fig ht with Humble, but testified tha t Blac kwell told her that B lackwe ll told M d. that “Gr andmama [Fr ench] is mean and she hit you.” McG reg or fur ther testified that since the divorc e, Bla ckwe ll said neg ative thing s about Humble in f ront of the children. Andy Andre ws, who wa s the former principal of Mt.’s sc hool, testified that Mt. became “ve ry withdrawn” afte r t he divorc e and that Mt.’s teac her thought Mt
. neede d “some he lp, some intervention, possibly some counseling .” Bla ckwe ll testified that she marr ied Kenda ll Hightowe r i n J une 2003. Althoug h she filed for divorce in J une 2004, the di vorce proce eding was on hold while s he and Hig htower trie d to w or k o ut t he ir marr ia g e . B la c kw e ll t e sti fi e d th a t H ig hto we r i s b ipo lar a nd ha s mo od

sw ing s, which ar e moder ate d by

medication, but when he stops taking his medication, he become s very
err atic. Aske d whether

it was safe to allow Hig htower a round the c hildren, she sa id, “I don’t know—y ou know, when these incidents occ urre d, Idon’t know if he w as on his medication. . . . When he’s on his me dication, Idon’t know that there ’s a pr oblem.” B lackwe ll said that if the court order ed her

not to allow Hightowe r ar ound Mt. and Md., she would comply and that Hig htower ha d
never been violent towa

rd her or her children. The trial court admitted into evidence a number of email communications fr om Hightowe r to various pe ople, including Bla ckwe ll, Hu m b l e, and14

Humbl e’ s at torney . Many of the e mails were violent and threatening in tone, and Hig htower thr e a te ne d to hunt do wn se ve ra l men he tho ug ht we re be havin g ina pp ro pr ia te ly

tow ard B la c kw e ll
a nd thr e a t e n e d

t o k i l l o n e m ani np art i c u l ar . I no t h e r e m a i l s , h o w e v e r , H i g h t o w e r s a i d h e w ou ld
never har m an y o n e an d th a t h e w a s in c o n tr o l o f h im s e lf
. B la c kw e ll te s ti f

ie d th a t ma ny

of the threatening statements wer e made while Hig htower w as off his medication. Bla ckwe ll believed Fre nch had hit, choked, and ki cked Md. and said that Fr ench ha d beate n and choke d Humble when he was a chi l d
. Blackwe ll’s oldest child testified that she had never seen violenc e betwe en her mother and H ightowe r and that she did not think Mt . and Md. would be in da

ng er if Bla ckwe ll ha d more visitation. One of Bla ckwe ll’s c oworke rs and one of her fr ie nd s te sti fi e d th a t B la c kw e ll w a s a g oo d, a tte nti ve pa

re nt and that the y ne ve r s aw i na pp ro pr ia te behavior or hea rd her disparag e Humble in fr ont of the childre n. Psy c ho log ist

Cha rl e s Pie rc e te sti fi e d a

bo ut b or de rl ine perso nal ity dis or de r a

nd its sy mptoms i n g ener al and sa id that a par ent with t h e d i s order would cy cle be tween a ffe ction and ang er or neg lect, which w ould confuse a nd harm a ch i l d
. Dr. P ierc e also re viewed H ightowe r’s medical r ecor ds, which showed that Hig htower stopped taking his medications beca use he be lieved he wa s w e ll, he c ou ld n ot af fo rd the m, he did no t like the se xua l dy sf un c tio n the y c a

us e d, and “ his wife ha d asked him to stop taking the medications beca use of the sexual dy sfunction.” Pierc e noted Hig hto w e r ’ s p ar a

n o id d e lu s io n s a n d

h o mi c id a l t

h r e a ts an d

s a id H ig h to w e r

“ w o u ld b e d an g e rous around any one who set off that mood in that kind of conditi on.” Dr . Pierce did not treat or e x amine the childre n , and although the r ecor d ref lects that Dr. Poole e valuated the children a nd produce d repor ts for the trial court and the parties, his r eports are not contained in the r ecor d, mentioned by15

the par ties in any hear ings, or ref

ere nced by

the trial cour

t’s later or ders. Indeed, the rec ord does not
re fl e c t w he the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

re a d o r c on sid e re d th e re po rt s in re a c hin g its de c isi on s. Change of Circumstances We ask first whethe r the trial c ourt had substantive and probative e vidence on which to base its decision that t he parties’ circumstance s had cha ng ed so as to justify

a modification of the
conser vatorship provisions. Se e Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477-78. Although severa l witnesses testified that Bla ckwe ll was a g ood, attentive mother w ho never abused he r childre n, there was a lso testimony that si nc e the div or c e , she ha d ne g le c te d the c hil dr e n an d disp ara g e d Hum ble and his fa

mil y in t he ir prese nce, w hich conf

used and de presse d the childre n. See I n re Marriage of Chandler , 914 S.W .2d 252, 254 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, no wr i t ) (p oisoning c hild’s mind aga inst parent ca n be g rounds for modific ation). F urther, she had mar ried a man who is bip o l ar an d who made violent threats toward her

and people he per ceive d wer e interf eringwith t heir re lationship. See In re C.Q.T.M. , 25 S.W .3d 7 3 0 , 7 3 4 (T ex. App.—W aco 2000, pe t. denied) ( rema rriag e and ste ppare nt’s conduct a

nd abilities ma

y be considere d in modific ation proce eding ). There was e vidence that since the divorc e, the c hildren’s be havior, school perf ormanc e, and moods ha d suffe red a nd that both children e x hibited behavior showingth at Blackwe ll had manipulated them into saying ba d things about Humble and his mother. The trial court a s fac t-finder was oblig ated to conside r all the evidenc e and r esolve a

ny evidentiar

y conflicts. See Lill ey v. Lilley , 43 S.W .3d 703, 705 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). The trial court did not abuse its discr etion in determining that ther e wa s e vid e nc e fr om w hic h it c ou ld c on c lud e tha

t th e c ir c ums tanc e s h a d c ha ng e d a nd that a modification would be in the c hildren’s be st interests. See T e x. F a m. Co d e A n n . § 1 5 6
. 1 0 1
. WeWe be ar in mind the distinction betwee n possession and ac cess. See In re L.L.M. , No. 03- 4 04-00452-CV, 2 0 0 5 Tex. App. L EXI S 7191, at *34 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2005, no pe t.) (mem. op.) ( acc ess allows conse rvator to visit and com m u n i ca t e with child; possession allows c on se rv a tor

to e xer c ise c on tr ol o ve r c hil d to e xclu sio n o f o the rs ); se e als o Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.135 (West 2002) (“Joint m anag ing con s er v at o rship does not requir e the a war d of equa l or near ly equal peri o d s of phy sical possession of and a cce ss to the child to each of the joint conser vators.”)
. 16 next consider whether the trial court proper ly exercised its discretion in determining the re strictions it p la c e d o n B la c kw e ll’ s p os se ssi on and a c c e ss.
Restrictions on Blackwell’s Possession Bla ckwe ll arg ues on appe al that the re strictions placed on h er ar e “dr aconia n,” “usually rese rved for m others who ha ve burne d or sca lded a c hild, broke[n] a child’s limb, beate n a child, exposed a c hild to narcotics and dang erous [drugs], sex ually abused the child or allowe d a boy friend to do so.” S h e ar gu es t hat there is no evidence to justi fy the re strictions, other than the trial court’ s “simply

doing f or his ex-partner , whateve r the e x -par tner a sks him to do.” Ce rt a inl y , th e re wa s e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in thi s cas e on

wh ic h th e tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld have de termined that the c hildren’s be st interests would be served by restric ting B lackwe ll’s po sse ssi on

and a c c e ss. Howeve r, this rec ord lac ks findings that wo u l d all ow us to determine

4 wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

a pp ro pr ia te ly

e xer c ise d it s d isc re tion i n im po sin g the se ve re lim its that it chose. The ref

ore, w e mus t reve rse the portion of t he judgment t hat denies Blac kwell’s possession
and lim its he r a c c e ss t o tw o s up e rv ise d vis its a mon th a nd re mand the c a se fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s. I t is l ef t t o a t ri al cour

t’s discretion to establish the ter ms and conditions of
conser vatorship. In re L.M.M. , N o . 0 3

- 0 4

- 0 0 4 5 2

- CV , 2 0 0 5 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 7 1 9 1 , a t * 2 8

- 2 9 ( T e x.The natura l r ight betwee n pare nts a nd children is of

constitutional dim ension. See H olley 5 v. Adams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976). Bla ckwe ll raises a c onstitut ional argument on appea l but did not raise it before the trial cour t. There fore , we will not a ddress it. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1; Car riz ale s v . Te x . D e p’ t P ro te c tiv e & Re

gu lator ySe rv s. , 5 S.W. 3d

92 2, 92 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 1999, pet. denied) (constitutional challeng e not ra ised in trial court is waive d on appea l). 17 App.—Austin Aug . 31, 2 0 0 5 , n o pet.) (me m. op.). The tria l court has the a uthority to determine fr e qu e nc y and duratio n of vis its and to pla c e any ne c e ssa ry lim itatio ns and

sa fe g ua rd s o n v isi ta tio ns . Id. at *29. The c hild’s best interes t i s t he primar y considera

tion in deciding to limit a pare nt’s possession of and acc ess to he r child, Ditraglia v. Romano , 3 3 S. W.3 d 8 86 , 8 89 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 2000, no pet.), and the family code expresses a strong presumption that it is g ener ally i n a c hild’s be st int e re st t o h a ve sig nif ic ant c on ta c t w ithbo th p are nts
. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131 5 (West 2002), § 153.137 (West Supp. 2007). Absent a findingof family v i o l en ce , a trial court consideringan orig inal proce eding conce rning conser vatorship should a

ppoint both pare nts a s joint
m an a g i n g c o n s e r

v a t o r s u n l e s s t h e c o u rtf

i n d s s u c h a

p p o i n t m e n t“ w o u l d

s i g n i f i c a ntl y i m pair the child’s phy sical hea lth or emotional development.” Id . § 15 3. 13 1; se e In reV. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000) (cha

pters 153 (g overningoriginal proce eding s) and 156 ( g overningmodification proce edings ) are “distinct statutory scheme s that involve differ ent issues” a nd impose differ ent standards a

nd burdens of

proof, a nd chapte r 153 pre sumptions are not ca rried ove r into chapte r 156). Chapter 153, which g overns or igina l custody proce eding s, provides that a tria l court is to be g uided by

a pre sumption t hat t he standa rd possession order

provides the “ minimum amount of time for posse ssion of a child by a par ent named a s a j o int manag ing c onservator,” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.137, althoug h the court is not require d to order sta ndard posse ssion. As we discusse d in In re L.M.M. , if the cour t decides in a

modification proce eding that standardWe rec og nize that section 156.101 of the family code doe s not specifica lly require a trial 6 court to make written findings of best interest in a modi fication proce eding
. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101 (West Supp. 2007). Howeve r, section 156.101 bars a trial c ourt from modifying a custody order unless the modification is in the child’s best intere st. Id . Ba sed on our revie w of the r ecor d and without more e x plicit findings and e x planation by the trial cour

t, we do n o t b el i ev e we can proper ly evaluate the modification and re strictions the court plac ed on B lackwe ll’s contact with her c hil dr e n in

lig ht o f t he c ourt ’s fi nd ingth a t it

wa s in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st f or B la c kw e ll t o rema in a joint manag ing c onservator. 18 possession is not i n the child’s best intere st, it m ay deny p o ssession and ac cess or cra ft an orde r placingrestric tions on possession or acce ss that wi l l eliminate the dang er pose d to the child’s phy sical or e motional well-being . 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 7191, at *29 (quoting In re W alt e rs , 3 9 S
. W
. 3 d 2 8 0 , 2 8 6 ( T e x . A p p . — T e x ar k an a 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t
. ) )
. A c o u rt m a y n o t , h o w e v e r , d e n y a
c on se rv a tor ’s ri ghts of po sse ssi on and a c c e ss a bs e nt a fi nd ingtha

t po sse ssi on

and a c c e ss w ou ld endang er the child’s welf are , and “a

ny limit ations on such rig hts cannot excee d that [si c] require d to protect the c hild’s best interest.” Id . at *29-30.

Un de r t he tr ia l c ourt ’s mod if

ie d judg me nt, B la c kw e ll r e ta ins lim ite d r ig hts of a c c e ss to Mt. and Md., but she has bee n denied possession. Se e id . at *34. Althoug h we r ecog nize that the tr ia l c ourt did no t a lto g e the r d e ny

B la c kw e ll’ s r ig ht t o acce ss t o th e c hil dr e n, wh ic h w e wo uld scrutinize closely

to be sure w as supported by “extreme g rounds,” see Allison v. Allison , 660 S.W .2d 134, 137 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ), the severe limit s place d on her c ontact with her children still require our ca ref ul review
. The t ri al court did not make a nd Bla ckwe ll did not request finding s of fa ct, which g ener ally results in our making implied findi n gs s upported by the re cord. See Niskar v . Niskar ,

6 1 3 6 S
. W
. 3 d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.). Howe ver, by continuing B lackwe ll’sThe tempora ry order that first limit ed B lackwe ll’s visit ation stated that the trial court found 7 “that the materia l a lleg ations contained in the Amended Supplemental Petition ar e true and that the reque sted modifications are in the best interest of the children.” 19 a pp oin tme nt a s jo int mana g ing c on se rv a tor in the or de rs in q ue sti on he re , th e tr ia l c ourt

imp lie dly found that her possession of or acc ess to the childre n would not significa ntly endang er the ir phy sical or emotional we lfare
. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 53 .1 31 (a ); Ro os th v. Ro os th , 889 S.W .2d 445, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (appointment of pa rty as poss essory
conser vator sho we d i m plied finding that party ’s “possession or a cce ss to the children would not endang er the phy sical or e motional welfar e of the children” ). The tr ial court’s denial of B lackwe ll’s possession and its severe restric tions on her ac cess to the c hildren g ive rise to impli ed finding s that conflict with those ar ising fr om her c ontinued status a s a joint manag ing c onservator of the c hildren. 7

Th e re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on that so me limit ations on Blac kwell’s possession and a cce ss would be in the children’s best interests. Howe ver, the duration and sever ity

of the re strictions and the diffic ulty Bla ckwe ll will face in see king f uture mod if ic a tio ns tha

t mi g ht a llo w he r mor e c on ta c t w ithhe r c hil dr e n c a us e us so me c on c e rn . Wh ile the trial cour

t may have be lieved that the e vidence justified t h e seve re r estrictions it placed on Black wel l, t

ho se re str ic tio ns se e m in c on sis te nt w iththe c ourt ’s de c isi on to m a int a in h e r a s a manag ing c onservator, and we are left to speculate about what, in fact, it did believe. B eca use the trial court made no finding s of fa ct and be cause the implied findings that springfrom t h e cour t’s deter minations a

re in c onflict, we are unable to disc ern what g uiding r ules and princ iples the court applie d an d w h e th e r th e c o u rt a

p p r o p r iate ly

e xe r c is e d

it s d is c r e ti o nin

d e n y in g B la c kw e ll’s possession and limiti ng her a cce ss to her childre n.20 We rec og nize that B lackwe ll did not ex plicitly raise the issue of best intere st in her appellate brief. Howeve r, she attac ks the modification g lobally , and in dec iding to modify a par ent’s contac t with her childre n, the childre n’s best intere sts must alway s be the trial c ourt’s primar y
conce rn. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 56 .1 01 (m od if ic a tio n of e xistin g c on se rv a tor sh ip o rd e r) ; see also L.M.M. , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 7191, at *29 (c ourt may limit possession and ac cess if standa rd po sse ssi on

wo uld e nd ang e r c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st) . We sh are the dis se nt’ s c onc e rn s a nd a g re e that, g ener ally , we should defe r t o the trial cour t’s judgme nt in reviewingmodification order s. Howeve r, beca use the trial c ourt impo s ed s t ri ct restric tions on Blackw ell’s contac t with her childre n, which
we m u s t co n s ider c are fully , we c annot ig nore the issue of best intere st and ca nnot ignor e the f

act that, w ith ou t so me e xplanatio n, the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de rs wo uld se e m to be ba se d o n c on fl ic tin g be st interest finding s. Un d er these c ircumstance s and g iven the passa g e of time since the trial cour t restric ted Blackwe ll’s contac t with the children, we believe that remand, which w ill allow the trial
c ourt to c on sid e r t

he pa rt ie s’ c ir c ums tanc e s ane w, a s w e ll a s a dd iti on a l te sti mony and any a va ila ble evidenc e about the c hildren’s psy cholog ical conditions, is the best solution. Remand will g ive the court the oppor

tunity to resolve some of the conf licts that we have discussed and to e nsure that the
re str ic tio ns pla c e d o n B la c kw e ll a re ind e e d in the c hil dr e n’ s be st int e re sts and do no t e xce e d th os e require d to protect the c hildren. See L.M.M

. , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 7191, at *29-30. We theref ore
reve rse the por

tion of the judg ment restric ting B lackwe ll’s visit ation and re mand the ca se to the trial court for further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. See H opkins v. Hopk

ins , 853 S.W .2d 134, 1 3 8

- 3 9 ( T e x . A p p . — C o r

p u s C h r i s t i 1 9 9 3 , n o w r i t ) ( “ A s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s f i n d i n g s ar e c o n t r a d i c t o r

y,
. . . we r emand the case to the trial court so that it may deter mine whether

appellant’ s acc ess to theI n 2005, the leg islature ame nded sec tion 102.004 to add a further condition on someone 8 seekingto intervene and see k possessory conser vatorship. Under the amende d statute, a g randpa rent or a pe rson with signific ant past contac t ma y intervene in a pending suit only if there is “satisfac tory proof . . . that a

ppointment of a par ent as a s o l e m an ag ing c onservator or both par ents as joint manag ing c onservators would signific antly impair” the c hild. See Act of May 29, 2005, 79th L eg ., R. S. , c h
. 9 1 6 , § 3 , 2 0 0 5 T e x. G e n . L aw s 3 1 4 8 , 3 1 4 9 ( e f f e c ti v e Ju n e 1 8 , 2 0 0 5 , c u r

r e n t ve r s io na t T e x. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(b) (West Supp. 2007)). These proce eding s wer e underway befor e the amende d statute’s effec tive date, thus, we apply the ver sion in effe ct at the time. Id
. at 3155, § 25. Be cause the l ang uag e refer ence d above was not chang ed by the amendme nt, we cite to the c urre nt version. See Act of A

pr. 6, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. L aws 113, 125. 21 childr e n is in th e c h il dr e n ’ s b e s t in te r e s t, an d if s o , w h a t li mi tati o n s to a p p e ll an t’ s rig hts as possessory

conser vator a re in the c hildren’s be st interest.”).

Interve nors I n h er si x th and

fi na l is su e , B la c kw e ll c omp la ins that th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in allowing the childre n’s g randmother and uncle to intervene and in appointing them as possessory

conser vators of the children. A non-par ent may not f ile an orig inal suit see king to be nam ed p o s s essory
c on se rv a tor , but a

g ra nd pa re nt o r o the r p e rs on

wh o th e tr ia l c ourt

fi nd s h a s h a d s ub sta

nti a l pa st
c o n t a c tw i t h a c h i l d m ay b e g r an t e d l e a v e t o i n t e r v e n e i na p e n d i n g s u i tc o n c e r

n i n g c h i l d

c u s t o dy. Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 102.004(b) (West Supp. 2007). We revie w a trial court’s de cision to allow 8 a petition in intervention for a n abuse of

discretion. M

c Cor d v . W

att s , 777 S.W .2d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ).

W h e n F r e n c h w a s a s k e d a b o u t h e r p e t i t i o n i n i n t e r

v e n t i o n , s h e s a i d s h e w an te d to have de fined leg al rig hts to the children. Aske d whether she wa s having trouble see ing the children and what the purpose of

her pe tition was, she answe red that she was ab l e t o s ee the childre n and22

wa nte d to se e the m hav e he a lth y de ve lop me nt. She a g re e d w he n a sk e d w he the r s he wo uld wa nt t o raise the children should a ny thing happen to H umble, saying, “I fee l like I ’m compete nt and I think that would be in the childre n’s best intere st.” Monty Hu m b l e, Humble’s brothe r, testified that he wanted to have def

ined leg al rig hts to the children to p rot ect them. He testified that he ha d “see n them regularly

during their lives.” He said that the “curre nt purpose” of his petition was to be name d
c o- po sse sso ry

c on se rv a tor , n ot t o b e name d a futur e mana g ing c on se rv a tor , bu t that he “ wa nt[e d] to be a va ila ble if Mark is un a va ila

ble .” He te sti fi e d that “ the ke y iss ue is w he the r t

he c hil dr e n c ou ld visit us without Ma

rk prese nt a

nd whether we would be able to take ca re of them during that time.” We ag ree with Bla ckwe ll that Monty Humble did not show that he had “ substantial past contac t” with the childre n. Monty t es t i fi ed o n l y that he had “ seen the m regularly .” Without
mor e , th is doe s n ot s ho w s ub sta nti a l pa st c on ta c t su ff

ic ie nt t o w arr ant h is i nte rv e nti on , e sp e c ia lly in this case in which both par ents are living and pre sent and ther e is no testimony that the childre n
are a t risk liv ing wi th Humbl e . Th e re fo re , ba se d on th e me a g e r f a c ts p re se nte d w ithre g ard to M on ty Humbl e ’s re la tio ns hip wi th t he c hil dr e n, we ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in a llo wi nghim

to intervene and in appointing him as a possessory conser vato r. W e re verse that portion of the jud g me nt. As for F renc h , b a s e d o n th e e v id e n c e a

b o ut t he post-divorc e cir cumstance s, we c annot hold that the trial court a

bused i ts discretion in allowing her to intervene
. She fre quently car ed for the chil dr e n , li v e d n e ar

b y , an d s p e n t a g r e a t d e a l o f ti me w it h th e f a mi ly , an d th e tr ia l court
r e a s o n a b ly c o u ld h a v e d e te r

mi n e d th a t s h e s h o w e d s u

b s ta n ti a l pa s t c o n ta c t w it

h th e c h il dr e n . We23

must then consider whe t h er t h e trial court abused its discre tion in naming her possessory
conser vator. I f a c hild’s manag ing c onservator dies or is inc apac itated and the rig ht to possession of the c hil d is no t g ov e rn e d b y an o rd e r, a

pa re nt ha s su

pe ri or ri g hts of po sse ssi on ov e r a no n- pa re nt. See I n re P.D.M

. , 117 S.W .3d 453, 459-60 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied) (de ath of manag ing c onservator ends conse rvatorship orde r for possession purposes, a n d i f m anag ing
conser vator pa rent dies, “someone must take immediate posse ssion of the children, a nd the possess ory

conser vator pa rent’s r ight of immediate po sse ssi on is s up e ri or

to o the rs ’ r ig hts ” ); se e als o T e x . F a m . C o d e A n n . § 1 5 7
. 3 7 6 ( W e s t 2 0 0 2 )
. If a c o u rta p p o i n t s a m an a g i n g c o n s e r

v a t o r , i t“ m a y” appoint one or more possessory conser vator as we ll. Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 153.006 (West 2002). Humble testified that he w anted his mother a nd brother to have le g al rig hts to care for the c hildren in ca se any thing ha ppened to him and that he did not wa nt Blac kwell eve r to have primary custody over the children. H e wor ried that if Hig htower was “fe d” an ide a about the mur der of a pro min e nt m an in

a sma ll t ow n a

nd the n to ld t

hat H umb le wa s “ lik e ly

to k ill ” Hi g hto we r, “ it doesn’t take too much to fig ure out that A plus B is may be going to equal C. I t’s sort of like sending him at m e like a Manc hurian Candidate or something .” Humble e ssentially argued that he f

ear ed Hig htower would try

to kill or hurt him and that he wanted his mother a nd brother to be appointed possessory

conser vators to ensure that someone other than B lackwe ll would care for the c hildren. Fr ench a nd Humble testified that F re n ch had a c lose relationship wit h the childre n and spent sig nificant amounts of time with them. Frenc h, a re tired nur s e, helped Humble make health-c are decisions and sometimes took the childre n to the doctor. She also baby sat and helpe d24

car e for the childre n. Fur

ther, Humble te stified that he fe are d Hig htower c ould be dang erous if he was led to be lieve that Humble wa s a threat. There was testim o n y ab out Hightowe r’s menta l instabilit y and about how the children suf fer when in B lackwe ll’s car e for long pe riods of time. Bla ckwe ll and Humble are both named joint manag ing c onservators and, ther efor e, the trial cour

t’s judgme nt does not run af oul of section 153.131’s presumption that it is in a child’s best interest for her pa

rent or pa rents to be a

ppointed manag ing c onservator. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 3. 13 1( b) (We st 20 02 ). B e c a us e Humbl e and B la c kw e ll are joi nt m ana g ingc on se rv a tor s, the co u rt had the powe r to appoint one or mor e possessory conser vators. Se e id . § 153.006. Although this ca se diffe rs from most ca ses involving the a ppointment of non-par ent possessory
conser vators, we cannot hold that the tria l court abuse d its discretion in deciding that it was in the children’ s best interest to name F renc h as possessory conser vator. See Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 371-72 (Te x . 1976) (discussing fac tors to be consider ed in deter mining child’s best interest); In re M .A.M. , 35 S.W .3d 788, 790 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2001, no pet.) (disc ussing a pplication of Holley fac tors in conservatorship dispute betwee n potential adop t i v e pare nts and materna l g randmother ). F ur

the r, in t he pr e se nt c ir c ums tanc e s, F re nc h’ s a pp oin tme nt h a s n o p ra c tic a l e ff e c t. Should som ething happen to Humble, the trial c ourt would then have to determine howto best serve the childre n’s best intere sts in deciding how t o allocate their care be tween B lackwe ll and Humble, consideringthe s ituation prese nted at that time. Considering the evidenc e pre sented by this case, we cannot hold that the tria l court abuse d its discretion in naming F renc h possessory conser vator.25 Conclusion We have he ld that the trial court did not err by failing to r ecuse itself sua sponte or upon Bla ckwe ll’s untimely motion, that the assigned court did not err in denying B lackwe ll’s motion to rec use, and that the trial court did not er r in allowing Fr ench to inter vene a nd in naming he r a possessory

conser vator. I t was er

ror, howe ver, to a llow Monty Humble to intervene and see k to be named possessor

y conser vator. F inally , we c annot ad eq u at ely revie w the trial c ourt’s seve re restric tion o n Bl ackw ell’s possession of and a cce ss to her childre n. There fore , we r ever se the portions of the trial cour t’s judgme nt appointing Monty Humbl e as p o s sessory

conser vator a nd restric ting B lackwe ll’s acc ess. We rema nd the ca use to the trial cour

t for fur ther proc eeding s relate d to Blac kwell’s possession of a nd acc ess to her c hildren.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson; Concurringand Dissenting Opinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med in part; Rever sed and Rema nded in par

t Filed: De cembe r 14, 2007