### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JA N U A RY 18, 200 6 S es sio n
UNITE D COLOR LAB & DIGI TAL I MAGI NG, INC.

v. U NITE D S TUD IOS

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-04-0536- 3 D. J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2005-00133-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 21, 2006

I n this case we are asked to r eview a trial court’s decision to hold the defe ndant in contempt of the

c ou rt ’s or de r. Af

te r the pla int if

f f ile d it s la ws uit

to r e c ov e r amou nts a lle g e dly owe d on c e rt a in inv oic e s, the tr ia l c ou rt or de re d the de fe nd a nt to fil e a sw orn s ta te me nt s e tti ng fo rth a ny a mou nts it believed it owe d to the p l ai n t i ff and the “ basis” for

that statement. The de fenda nt submit ted the aff idavit of its president who asserted that it owed nothing to the pla intiff and that plaintiff br eac hed the parties’ contra ct. The de fenda nt subsequently filed an answe r deny ing it owed the money and filed a counter -complaint for brea ch of contra ct, t ortious interfe renc e with contra ct, and fraud. The plaintiff filed a

petition seeking to hold the defe ndant in c ontempt of the court’s order , asserting that the af fidavit filed by

the def endant did not set forth specific f acts. The chanc ery

court g rante d the mot ion a ndfo un d the de fe nd a nt in c on te mpt of the or de r h old ing that th e a ff ida vit didno t c on ta in enoug h “deta il” as re quired by the orde r. The de fenda nt appea led to this Court. W e re verse

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t V ac at e d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
Randall N. Song stad, Memphis, TN, for A ppellant

J ohn D. Horne , Memphis, TN, for A ppelleeSee T E NN

. C O D E A NN

. 66

- 1 5

- 1 0 3 (20 0 4 ). 1

T h e re c o rd in d ic a te s the c h a n c e ry c o u rt d id no t f ile th e o rd e r u n til A p ril 2 9 , 2 0 0 4 . T h e c h a n c e llo r a p p a re n tly 2

co nveyed t he subst ance o f t he o rder t o t he p art i es at t he co ncl usi o n of t he A p ri l 15 , 20 0 4 heari ng, how ever, t he reco rd d o e s n o t c o n ta in a tr a n sc rip t o f th e he a rin g . A s a re su lt, it is i m p o ssib le to a sc e rta in th e c o u rt’s ju stif ic a tio n fo r c e rta in aspec t s o f

t he o rder.
-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

United Color L ab & Dig ital I mag ing, I nc. (hereina fter “United C olor L ab” or “Appe llee”) , a Te nnessee corpor ation with its principal pla ce of business located in Memphis, is enga g ed in the business of proc essing photogr aphic f ilm int o finished portra its. United St udios o f Am er i ca , I nc. (her einaf ter “ United Studios” or “Appe llant”), a n Ohio corpor ation, operates v ar i ous businesses thr ou g ho ut the Un ite d St a te s ta kin g ph oto g ra

ph s f or c us tom ers

. After

takin g the ph oto g ra

ph s, United Studios would send t he photogra phic fil m to United C olor L ab’s facilities in Memphis for proce ssing.

I n D e c e mb e r o f 2 0 0 3 , U n it e d Stu d io s r e f u s e d to p a y c e r tain in v o ic e s s u b mi tt ed byUnited Color L ab for

pay ment. On Dec ember 31, 2003, United Color L ab sent a letter to United Studios informing it that, if the invoices wer e not paid, U nited Color L ab intended to impose a printer’ s and bin de r’ s li e n o n th e ph oto g ra ph s su bmi tte d f

or pr oc e ssi ng

. Whe n it

fai le d to re c e ive pa y me nt, 1 United Color L ab filed a

complaint ag ainst United Studios on Marc h 18, 2004 in the Chance ry Court of Shelby Countyseekin g t o en fo rce its lien and to rec over da mag es. Ther ein, United Color L ab alleg ed that United Studios owed $65,636.68, as de monstrated by the invoices a ttached to the complaint as exhibit s.

The c hance llor conducte d a hea ring on April 15, 2004, and he subse quently enter ed an or der 2

app oin tin g a

Spe c ia l Mas te r with ac c ou nti ng e xpe ri e nc e to i nv e sti g a te the fi na nc ia l r e c or ds of bo th p ar t i es an d d et er m i n e a n y am o u n t s o we d

. Fu rt h er , t h e c h an ce l l o r o rd er ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:

4. Prior to the close of busine ss on Thursday , April 22, 2004, [Unit ed Studios] shall file with t h e Court a sworn state ment or statements setting forth the a mounts [ Uni ted Studios] believe the y
ow e to [Un ite d Col or L ab], tog e the r wi th the ba sis the re fo r, a s w e ll as any amounts that [Unit ed Studios] believe the y m ay be owe d by [Unit ed Color L ab], toge ther with the ba sis therefor

. 5. Fa ilure of the pa

rties to comply

with the terms and provisions of this Order

shall be a bas is for the Court to entertain its contempt power

.-3-

On April 22, 2004, in an a ttempt to co m p l y wi t h the cha ncery court’s or der, U nited Studios

su bmi tte d th e a ff

ida vit of its pr e sid e nt, De a n N e lso n, wh o s ta te d a s f oll ow s:
[Unit ed Studios] owe[s] [U n i t ed Color L ab] nothing on the invoices attac hed to the Compliant. The amounts listed have be en g reatly exagg erated, include c harg es for work that wa s never done or delivere d as a result of [Unit ed Color L ab’s] tortious c onduct,

. . . and [Unit ed Studios ] intend[s] to pursue a Counter claim ag ainst [Unit ed Color L ab] . . . for dama g es for brea ch of c ontrac t . . . and for tortious interfe renc e in a c ontrac t . . . .

. . . .
On or about Dec ember 15, 2003, [Unit ed C olor L ab] faxed a letter to me d em an d i n g pay ment [on t he invoices]. This demand constituted a bre ach of

the contra ct by

which [United Color L ab] had proce ssed film for United Studios

. The invoice s for whic h pay ment was de manded we re w ithin terms, as established by the cour se of dealing of the pa

rties over many y ear s, and paym ent w as not yet due . I n ad dit ion , the tot a l of the inv oic e s w a s a

pp ro xima te ly

do ub le the a mou nts wh ic h sh ou ld ha ve be e n o n th e inv oic e s. Th e se a mou nts
wer e incr ease d as a result of overc harg ing, w hich [United Color L ab] ha d b e e n c a ug ht d oin g be fo re , a ndby simply makin g up c ha

rg e s. I n th is s a me le tt e r , [U n it e d Co lo r L ab ] s tate d th a t [i t] had approximately

one thousand spec ial order s that [Uni t ed C o lor L ab] would not proce ss or ship until this pa y ment was re ceive d. [Unit ed Col or L ab] w a s aw are that fa mil ie s hada lr e a dy pa id [U nit e d Stud ios ] for these specia l or ders, and that failure to deliver these order s during the ho lid a y se a so n wo uldc re a te the app e aranc e that [Un ite d Stud ios ] d o es n ot deliver the f

amily portraits that customer s have pa id for . . . . [Unit ed Studios] responde d to the . . . letter by demanding that [Unit ed C o l o r L ab] process a nd invoice United Studios for the

app ro xima te on e tho us a ndsp e c ial o r d e r s , th at [U n i te d Stud ios ] wo uld immediately

pay for the spe cial orde rs, and r esolve the dispute . . . by auditing the invoices. [Unit ed Color L ab] de clined to do so, and ref used to return the unproc essed f ilm so i t co u ld be proc essed elsewhe re.

. . . As a re su lt of [Un ite d Colo r L ab’ s] bre a c h of the c on tr a c t, [Unit ed Studios] had t o immediately make other

arr ang ements for proce ssing of their customers’ family portraits. The e x p enses incurre d by [Unit ed Studios ] to issue ref unds to c ust o m er s , reshoot portraits, proc ess the re shoots, and deliv er the portraits to the

c us tom e rs is i n e xce ss o f $5 0, 00 0. 00

. My bo ok ke e pe rs a nda c c ou nts-4- are now wor king to pr ovide the Court with as ac curate a f igur e as possible, as quickly

as possible.
(e mph a sis in or ig ina l)

. On the sa me da y that Un ite d Stu dio s su bmi tte d Mr

. Ne lso n’ s a ff ida vit , it a lso filed a motion to dismis s United Color L ab’s c omplaint for lack of persona l jurisdiction.
On May 27, 2004, United Color L ab filed a “Petition f or Scire Fa cias” seeking to hold United Stu dio s in c on te mpt

of the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt ’s or de r, a lle g ing that Mr . N e lso n’ s a ff i d a v i t c on ta ine d o nly conclusory

statements and f

ailed to offe r spec ific fa cts reg arding the invoices a tt ac h ed t o United Color L ab’s c omplaint. Specifically , United Color L ab asse rted that the c hanc er ycourt’s or der require d United Studios t o document and itemize its positi on reg arding the i n v o ices. On June 7, 2004, United Studios filed its answe r in this case de ny ing liability on the invoices a nd submitt ed a

c ou nte r- c ompl aint

fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t, t ortio us int e rf e re nc e wi th a

c on tr a c t, andfr a ud . It a lso withdrew its motion to dis miss and waived a ny arg uments rela ting to a lack of persona l jurisdiction.

The c hance llor conducte d a hearing on United C olor L ab’s pe tition on J une 8, 2004. At the hearing, c ounsel fo r Un i ted Studios arg ued that Mr. Ne lson’s aff idavit complied with the court’s order and stated tha t, give n the infan cy of the litigation, it presently could not asce rtain the e x act
a mou nt tha t ma y

be ow e d. I n r e sp on se , th e c ha nc e llo r s ta te d a s f oll ow s:

The Court finds that indee d this petition is well taken and that the def endant is g uiltyof civil contempt. . . . Th e Cou rt ’s int e rp re ta tio n of that or de r is the sa me no w a s it

was at the tim e that th is C ou rt me t w ith su c h c apa

ble la wy e rs in

c h a mb e r s a n d th a t w a s d e tail

. B a s is me a n s d e tail

. T h ere was no de ta il. There fore I

find the def

endants g uiltyof conte mpt. The Court will prevent them fr om providing any additional information to show the ba sis of the ir state me nts a nd a ll inf e re nc e s the re of

that othe rw ise

wo uldha ve be e n p re se nte d b y the m sh ou ld b e a dv e rs e ly to the m.

There afte r, the chance llor enter ed an order finding United S tudios in civil contempt of the pre vious order “due to the f

act that the A ffid av i t o f De an Nelson filed by [Unit ed Studios] did not have enoug h ‘deta il’ to satisfy ‘the basis there fore [si c].’” The court further noted that United Studios had not produce d any

documents to the Specia l Master to support its position and, as a r esult, order ed that it “ be pr e ve nte d f

ro m pr ov idi ng a ny

a dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n to sh ow the ba sis of the ir state me nts
a nda ll i nf e re nc e s th e re of that othe rw ise wo uld ha ve be e n p re se nte d b y the m sh ou ld b e a dv e rs e ly to them.”

United Studios subs equently soug ht an interlocutory

appea l, which the trial court de nied. On November

8, 2004, the Special Ma ster filed he r report with the chancery court finding that United Col or L a b w a s e nti tle d to $5 5, 99 9. 66 . U nit e d St ud ios fi le d a n o bje c tio n to the re po rt c iti ng its inabilityto provide evidence in support of i ts position due to t he chancery court’s c ontempt order.-5-

After United Color L ab filed a motion to confir m the Special Master ’s re port, the cha ncery court
e nte re d a “ F ina l Judg me nt” on Janu ary 4, 20 05 a wa rd ing Un ite d Colo r L ab $55 ,9 99 .6 6 in da ma g e s.

United Studios t imely

filed a notice of appeal t o this Court prese nting the issue of whe ther the cha ncery

court a bused its discretion when it f ound United Studios in c ivil conte mpt of the court’s

or de r f or re vie w. Af

te r r e vie wi ng the re c or d, we re ve rs e the de c isi on of the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt

.
II. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Every court in this state is empower ed to punish for contempt. T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 16-1-103 (1994 & Supp. 2005). This power is, howe ver, limited to conduct de lineated by sta t u t e, which includes the “ willful disobedience . . . to any lawful writ, process, orde r, rule, de cre e, or c ommand” of the court. Id. § 2 9- 9- 10 2 ( 20 00 ); se e als o Bl ac k v . Bl ount , 938 S.W .2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that the ac ts for which a trial court ma y hold a per son or entity in contempt are limit ed by statute). “Civil contempt occ urs when a person ref uses or fails to c omply with a court order a nd a contempt action is broug ht to enforc e priva te rig hts.” Black
, 9 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 3 9 8 (c i t i n g Robin son v. Air Drauli cs Eng’g Co. , 377 S.W .2d 908, 911 (T en n

. 1 9 6 4 )) . “The court of a ppeals a lso has appellate jurisdiction over civil or criminal contempt arising out of a c ivil matter.” T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 16-4-108( b) (1994 & Supp. 2005).

“De termining whether

its order ha s been f

o l l o wed is the pre rog ative of the trial court, a nd is uniquely wi t hin the trial court’ s discretion.” She rro d v . W ix , 8 49 S.W. 2d78 0, 78 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1992) (c itations omi tted). Acc ording ly , we r eview a trial court’ s finding of

contempt under

the less rig orous abuse of discre tion standard of r eview. Haw k v . Ha wk
, 855 S.W .2d 573, 583 (Tenn. 19 93 ); Whit e v. V

anderbilt Un iv. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). D iscretionary decisions re quire the trial court to take into consider ation the fa cts and a pplicable law , Ballard v. Herzke , 9 24 S.W. 2d65 2, 66 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) , th us we re vie w s uc h d e c isi on s a s f oll ow s: Appellate c ourts will set aside a discr etionary decision only when the trial court has misconstrued or misapplied the controlling leg al principles or ha s acte d inconsist entl y with the substantial weig ht of the evidenc e. S ee Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, I nc. , 4 S.W .3d at 695. Th us , a tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio na

ry de c isi on shou ld be re vie we d to determine: (1) whe ther the f actua l basis for the de cision is supported by the evidenc e, (2) whether the t rial court identified and a pplied the applicable leg al principles, a nd (3) whether the trial court’ s decision is within t he ra ng e of a cce ptab l e al terna tives. See B IF v. Se rvice Constr. C o. , 1988 Tenn. App. L EXI S 4 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 WL

72409, at *3. Ap pe ll a t e c o u r t s s h o u l d p e r m i t a d i s c r e t i o n ar y d e c i s i o n t o s t a n d if

rea sonable judicial minds can dif fer conce rning i t s s o u ndness. See Ove rstreet v. Shone

y’s, I nc. , 4 S.W .3d at 695.-6-

Whit e , 2 1 S. W.3 d a t 22 3; see also State ex rel. V aughn v. Kaatrude
, 2 1 S. W. 3 d 2 4 4 , 2 4 8 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ). “ Th e abu se of dis c re tio n sta nd ard do e s n ot p e rm it the app e llate c ou rt to s ub sti tut e its judgment for

that of the trial c ourt.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Myint v. Alls tate Ins. C

o. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998) ).

III

. A N A L Y SIS

I n o rd e r t o f

inda pa rt y in c ivi l c on te mpt

of a n o rd e r, the tr ia l c ou rt

mus t ma ke a thr e sh old finding that the party

violating the or der e ng ag ed in willful conduct. Ahe rn v . Ahe rn , 15 S.W .3d 73 , 7 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Haynes v. Haynes , 904 S.W .2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Willful

c on du c t c a n b e de fi ne d a s f oll ow s:

“Willfulness ” d o es not requir e the sa me standar d of culpability re q u ired by

the pena l code. G. T. v . A do pti on of A .E

.T. , 725 So. 2d 404, 409 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Nor does it r equire malevolenc e or ill will. In re Adoption of a Minor , 343 Mass. 292, 17 8 N .E .2 d 2 64 , 2 67 (M a ss. 19 61 ). Willf ul c on du c t c on sis ts o f a c ts or fa ilures to act that a re intentional or voluntary ra t h er than

acc idental or inadve rtent. In re M azzeo , 131 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 19 97 ); United States v. Phillips , 19 F.3d 1565, 1576 (11th Cir. 1994); I n r e A do p t i o n o f E a rh ar t , 117 Ohio App. 73, 190 N.E.2d 468, 470 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 61 ); Mey er v. Skyline Mobile Home s , 99 I daho 754, 589 P.2d 89, 96 (I daho 1979). Conduct is “ willful” if it is the produc t of fr ee w ill rather than c oerc ion. Thus, a per son acts “w illfully ” if he

or sh e is a fr e e a g e nt, kn ow s w hat he or sh e is do ing , a nd int e nd s to d o wh at h e o r s h e i s d o i n g.

In re Ado pti on o f M uir , No. M2002-02963-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 831, at *14–15 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. No v. 25 , 2 00 3) ; see also B LACK ’ S LAW D I C TI ONAR Y 15 93 (7 th e d. 19 99 ). On app e a l, United Studios arg ues that, by supp l y i n g t he af

fidavit of Mr. Ne lson, it compli ed with the trial court’s or der a nd cannot be found to ha ve eng ag ed in w illful disobedienc e of tha t order. We a g ree

. To properly

evaluate the trial c ourt’s finding of conte mpt based on a pe rce ived violation of a prior or der, w e n ec es s arilymust beg in with the order itself. T he April 29, 2004 order r equire d Un ite d Stud ios to ( 1) su bmi t a sw orn st ateme nt s ta tin g the a mou nts , if a ny , it be lie ve d it

ow e d to United Color L ab and the basis for that statement, and ( 2) submit a sworn stateme nt stating the amounts, if any , it be lieved that United Color L ab owed it and the basis for that statement. At the hearing on U nited Color L ab’s pe tition for contempt, the cha ncellor state d that, at the time he e ntere d the or de r, he int e nd e d f

or “ ba sis ” to m e a n “ de ta il. ” I n th e or de r f ind ing Un ite d Stud ios in c on te mpt , the c ha nc e llo r s ta te d th a t Mr

. Ne lso n’ s a ff ida vit “ did no t ha ve e no ug h ‘d e ta il’ to sa tis fy ‘the ba sis there fore [si c].”“A def end ant shal l ser ve an answer wi t hi n 3 0 d ays af t er t he ser vi ce o f

t he summ o ns and co m p l ai nt upo n t he 3
defendan t

. ” T E NN

. R. C IV

. P. 12. 01 ( 2005)

. “ T h e s er v i ce of a mot i on pe r mi t t ed u n der t h i s r u l e al t er s t h es e per i ods of tim e ” so th a t, in the e v e n t th e tr ia l c o u rt d e n ie s the m o tio n , th e d e fen d a n t h a s fif te e n d a ys a fter no tice o f suc h a c tio n in

w h ic h to fi le a n a n sw e r. Id. U n ited S tud io s fil e d its m o tio n fo r la c k o f p e rs o n a l ju risd ic tio n p u rs u a n t t o T e n n e sse e R u le

o f C i vi l P roce d ure 12

. 0 2 (2) on A p ri l 22 , 20 0 4 , and whi l e i t subseq uent l y f i l ed an answer wai vi ng pe rs o nal jur i sdi ct i o n,
n o a n s we r w as du e at t h e t i me of t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s or der , w h i ch w as n ot e n t er ed u n t i l Apr i l 29, 2004.

-7- I t i s a w e l l e s t ab l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e o f o u r ap p e l l a t e j u r i s p ru d e n c e t h a t “ [a ] c o u r t s p e a ks on ly thr ou g h its wr itt e n judg me nts , duly e nte re d upo n its minu te s. Th e re fo re , no ora l pr on ou nc e me nt i s of any eff ect unless and until made a part of a written judgme nt duly enter ed.” Sparkle Laun dry & Cleaners, Inc. v. Kelton , 5 95 S.W.2d 88, 9 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 9) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Lewis v. Brooks , 66 S.W.3 d 883 , 886 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; City of Newport v. Masengill A uction Co. , 19 S.W. 3d 78 9, 79 5– 96 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) ; Evans v. Perkey
, 647 S.W .2d 636, 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). When interpre ting a trial court’s order, we cannot rely on oral stateme nts made fr om the benc h , as t h ey

are of no ef

fec t unless they

have be en incor

porate d into the court’s orde r or judgme nt. DLLP, LLC v. In t’l Creative Mgm t., Inc. , No. E2002-02452-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. Ap p. LEX I S 45 2, a t *6 –7 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Jun e 25 , 2 00 3) (n o p e rm . a pp . f ile d) ; City of

Ne wpo rt , 19 S.W .3d at 795–96. “Rathe r, we must look onl y to the lang uag e of tha t order, at least to the extent that the lang uag e is clea

r and una mbiguous.” DLLP, LLC , 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 452, at *6–7.

Th e re is n oth ing in the ini tia l or de r w hic h re qu ir e d U nit e d Stud ios to s up ply , in de ta ile d f or m, the re as o n s fo r M r. Nelson’s a ssertions in his affidavit. Withi n the time permitted by the orde r, Un ite d Stud ios su bmi tte d th e a ff ida vit of its pr e sid e nt, Mr . N e lso n, se tti ng fo rth th e re a so ns wh y it felt it did not owe the money soug ht by United Color L ab. The trial court’ s subsequent interpr etation of that orde r is of no ef

fec t. Had the tria l court wished f or Unit ed Studios to suppl y a deta iled explanation of its posi tion (i.e. produce documents or other materia ls) in this case, it could have state d a s muc h in the or de r. We f indthat th e a ff

ida vit su bmi tte d b y

Un ite d Stud ios c omp lie d w ith the orde r by

stating the basi s for its position in t his case. A ccor dingly , United Studios di d not willfullyviolate the cha ncery court’s or der.

There are additional rea sons for our de cision in this case. United Col or L ab ar g ues that it was pr op e r f or the c ha nc e llo r t o impo se sa nc tio ns a g a ins t U nit e d Stud ios sin c e Un ite d Stud ios faile d to

c oo pe rate wi th d isc ov e ry . We fi ndthi s a rg ume nt t o b e tot a lly

la c kin g in m e ri t.

Un ite d Co lor

L ab f ile d it s c omplai nt in this c a se on Ma rc h 1 8, 20 04 . T he c ha nc e llo r h e ld

a he ari ng on Ap ri l 15 , 2 00 4, a ft e r wh ic h it or de re d Uni te d Stud ios to sup ply the sw orn s ta te me nts at issue. On Ap ri l 2 2 , 2004, United Studios filed a motion to di smiss t he complaint for lack of persona l jurisdiction. Thus, no answe r to the complaint was due at the time the chancellor or dere d United S tudios to di sclose the information. United Color L ab see ms to sugg est that the orde r at 3 issue constitutes an orde r t o compel discove ry . Yet, we have no tr anscript of the April 15, 2004 he ari ng , th e re fo re , w e c a nn ot a sc e rt a in the c ha nc e llo r’ s r eas on s f or or de ri ng Un ite d Stud ios to provide the ba sis for its positi on reg arding the amounts alleg edly owed. Rule 37 of the Tenne ssee Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e du re do e s a llo w fo r the imp os iti on of pe na lti e s w he n a

pa rt y fails to c oo pe rate in the discovery

proce ss. “A party , up on re as on ab le no tic e to oth e r p ar tie s and all per son aff ecte d-8-

here by , may

apply for an orde r compe lling discove ry . . . .” T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 3 7. 01 (2 00 5) (e mph a sis added) . I f a pa

rty fails to comply

with an order

direc ting that pa

rty to comply

with discovery , “the

c ou rt in w hic h th e a c tio n is pe nd ing ma y make suchor de rs in r e g ardto the failu re a s a re jus t,” to inc lud e “ [a]n or de r r e fu sin g to a llo w the dis ob e die nt p art y to s up po rt or op po se de sig nate d c la ims or def enses, or prohibiting that party from int roducing desig nated matters in evidence .” T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 37.02 (2005). Nowher e in the order at issue do we find any mention of an application for an order compelling discovery

. Nor does the order ref ere nce any failure on the part of United Studios to comply with any discovery

reque st submit ted by

United Color L ab.

Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 26.01 sets forth the methods of discovery to include ora l depositions, written depositions, written interrog atories, pr oduction of doc u ments, phy sical and mental examinations, and reque sts f or admissions. Eac h of these methods of discovery are discussed more fully

in T en n es s ee Rules of

Civil Procedur e 27 throug h 36. Had United Color L abs wished to o bta in c e rt a in in for ma tio n f ro m U nit e d Stud ios re g ard ing the de bt a lle g e dly ow e d, it c e rt a inl y could have submitt ed a discovery reque st to United Studios , even thoug h no answe r wa s due at the time. See , e.g. , T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 30.01 (2005) ( noting that a party may , with leave of

court, take the te sti mon y of a pe rs on a ft e r the c omm e nc e me nt of a n a c tio n bu t be fo re the e xpir ati on of t he thirty da y s in whic h the de fe nd a nt ma y fi le a n a ns we r) ; T EN N

. R. C IV

. P

. 3 4

. 0 2 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a ta p ar t y, without requesting leave of court, may serve upon a def

endant, “with or afte r ser vice of the summons and complaint,” a reque st f or the production of certain items, “ except that a def endant may

serve a response within 45 day s after s er v ice of the summons and complaint.”). N owher e in the re cord befor e thi s Court do we find any discovery reque sts submitt ed byeither pa rty . Nor do we find any mention of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Pr o ce d u re 37 or an a lleg ed violation of discovery in United Color L ab’s pe tition for contempt. I nstead, United Color L ab mer ely stated in its petition t hat United Studios “fa iled to make any specific fac tual statements reg arding invoices that had been f urnished to them by

the Plaintiff.”

Re g ard ing a

c ou rt ’s us e of

its c on te mpt

po we r, ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s st a te d a s f

oll ow s:

Whil e th e p o w e r to p u n is h f o r c o n te mp t may a n d s h o u ld be

us e d in a n a

pp ro pr ia te case, i t sh ou ld n ot b e us e d u nle ss the c a se
c le arl y c a lls fo r its e xer c ise

. Th e po we r sh ou ld be e xer c is ed o nly when ne cessa

ry to preve nt actual, dire ct obstruction of, or interfe renc e with, the administration of justice.

Robin son v. Air Drau lics Eng’g Co., I nc. , 377 S.W .2d 908, 911–12 (Tenn. 1964) . Discre tionary decisions require the trial court to vie w the fac ts in light of the applicable leg al principles. Bal lar d v. Herzke
, 924 S.W .2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996). Ba sed on the fact that United S tudios submitt ed an aff idavit setting forth its posi tion and the basis for that position as require d by the lang uag e of the

or de r, a n a ns we r w a s n ot y e t du e fr om U nit e d Stud ios wh e n the tr ia l c ou rt e nte re d the or de r du e to the pending motion to di smiss for lack of pe rsonal jurisdiction, and United Studios never re ceive d a discove ry

reque st from United Color L ab pursua nt to the Tennessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, w e ho ld tha t th e c ha nc e llo r a bu se d h is d isc re tio n in fi nd ing Un ite d Stud ios in c on te mpt

.-9- IV. C ONCL US I ON

F or the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e fi ndthat th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt abu sed its dis c re tio n in finding the Appellant in c ontempt of a prior order

. As a re sult, we must vacate the final judg ment enter ed by

the cha ncery

court a nd rema nd this case f or further proc eeding s. Costs of this appea l are to be taxed to the Appellee, U n i t ed Color L ab & Dig ital I mag ing, Inc., for which execution may i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE