IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30238

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANTHONY JOSEPH MEAUX,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:17-CR-179-1

Before WIENER, COSTA, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Anthony Joseph Meaux appeals his conviction for 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He challenges the denial of a 

motion to suppress, contending that the warrantless search of his girlfriend’s 

car, where the gun was found in the trunk, violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The search was conducted by his parole officer, Brad Poole, pursuant to a 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 18, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/18/2020
No. 19-30238

2

condition of Meaux’s parole which allowed vehicle searches on reasonable 

suspicion that he was engaging or had engaged in criminal activity.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

conclusions on the constitutionality of the search de novo. United States v. 

Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013). We view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party, here the Government. See id. We may 

affirm the ruling “on any basis established by the record.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Meaux’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, which he drove by 

himself to a meeting with Poole, was significantly diminished by his knowing 

agreement to the parole condition imposed in accordance with state law. See

LA. R.S. § 15:574.4.2(A)(2)(i) (2015); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852

(2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119-20 (2001). Given his

diminished privacy interest, the likelihood that he would recidivate as a 

parolee, the State’s overwhelming interest in ensuring that he was 

apprehended for any crimes committed while on parole, and its interest 

promoting his reintegration into society through reduced recidivism, the 

warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful if supported by reasonable 

suspicion that Meaux was engaging or had engaged in criminal activity. See

Samson, 547 U.S. at 852-55, 857; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-21.

We conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the search based on 

the following: Poole’s possession of an active warrant for Meaux’s arrest on a 

charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle; a tip Poole received from detectives 

with the Crowley Police Department that Meaux was the suspect in a recent 

armed robbery; Poole’s knowledge of Meaux’s history of armed robbery charges

and simple robbery convictions; Poole’s long relationship with Meaux and 15 

years of experience as a parole officer; and Poole’s observation that Meaux was 

 Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/18/2020
No. 19-30238

3

uncharacteristically nervous and unusually insistent that his girlfriend pick 

up her car immediately from the parole office when Poole arrested him on the 

warrant, which caused Poole to suspect that there was evidence of a crime in 

the car. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987); United States v.

Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 

351 (5th Cir. 2004).

Contrary to Meaux’s contentions, Poole’s authority to conduct the parole 

search was not limited to the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The 

relevant condition of parole authorized a search of the “vehicle” on reasonable 

suspicion that Meaux was engaging or had engaged in criminal activity. The 

condition itself is a “salient circumstance” in determining the reasonableness 

of the search. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-20; see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 

(assessing reasonableness of the search according to terms of parole search 

condition).

Neither was Poole prohibited from relying on a secondhand tip from the 

Crowley detectives that Meaux was involved in a recent armed robbery. See 

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879-80 (determining that it is reasonable for a probation 

officer to rely on “information provided by a police officer, whether or not on 

the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search”) (footnote 

omitted); United States v. Williams, 880 F.3d 713, 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 

138 S. Ct. 2590 (2018) (noting that tips from other law enforcement officers are 

sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a probation search). Poole’s 

purpose for conducting the search was irrelevant. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 

122; United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 

We conclude that the search of the car’s trunk was a lawful parole search,

so we need not consider the reasonableness of the search on any other ground 

 Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/18/2020
No. 19-30238

4

raised by the Government or implicated by the facts. See Powell, 732 F.3d at

369. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-30238 Document: 00515349218 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/18/2020