alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Aurora GARCIA GARCIA, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY,* Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-70804.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 7, 2008.**

Filed April 24, 2008.

John S. Rogers, John S. Rogers & Associates, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner.

District Counsel, Office of the District Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Terri Leon-Benner, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 Michael B. Mukasey is substituted for his predecessor, Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).

**

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Aurora Garcia Garcia, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying her motion to reopen to adjust status. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review BIA denials of motions to reopen for abuse of discretion. *Franco-Rosendo v. Gonzales,*454 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir.2006). We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion and accordingly deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Garcia’s motion on the grounds that she is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 provides that an alien who “fails voluntarily to depart” during her voluntary departure period *“shall*be ... ineligible, for a period of 10 years, to receive any further relief’ including adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(l)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). We have held that the BIA may properly deny motions to reopen that are filed after the expiration of the voluntary departure period. *See de Martinez v. Ashcroft,*374 F.3d 759, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying relief where alien moved to reopen thirty days after the expiration of her voluntary departure period); *Barroso v. Gonzales,*429 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where an alien files his motion *after*his voluntary departure period has expired, the law in this circuit is clear that the BIA may properly deny the motion on that basis.”). In this case, Garcia failed to depart during her voluntary departure period, and she filed her motion to reopen forty-seven days after that period ended. She is therefore ineligible for adjustment of status.

*555The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by denying Garcia’s motion in spite of her alleged “exceptional circumstances” because Congress specifically eliminated the “exceptional circumstances” justification for failing to depart within a specified departure period. *See Serrano v. Gonzales,*469 F.3d 1317, 1318 (9th Cir.2006); *accord In re Zmijewska,*24 I *&*N Dec. 87, 92 (BIA 2007).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

***

 xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH 

	NO. 2-08-461-CV

THE ESTATE 

OF JOHN AROON SOOKMA (DECEASED)

	----------

	FROM PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	----------

	On December 9, 2009, after granting several extensions to appellant, we notified appellant that her amended brief had not been filed as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.6(a).  Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(a).  We stated that we could dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless appellant or any party desiring to continue this appeal filed with the court within ten days a response reasonably explaining the failure to timely file an amended brief.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3.  On December 30, 2009, appellant filed a response explaining her failure to timely file her amended brief and indicating that she planned to file a motion for an extension of time to file her amended brief.  On January 13, 2010, this court sent appellant an additional letter, stating that the case would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless she filed her amended brief with the court on or before Monday, January 25, 2010.  As of February 3, 2010, this court has received nothing from appellant. 

	Because appellant’s amended brief has not been filed, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b), 43.2(f).

	Appellant shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM 		

PANEL:  MCCOY, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.  

DELIVERED:  February 18, 2010
Exhibit 99.1


                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Konrad C. Kim, certify that:

1.   I have read this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Southern Group
     International, Inc.;

2.   To my knowledge the information in this report is true in all important
     respects as of June 30, 2002; and

3.   This report contains all information about the company of which I am aware
     that I believe important to a reasonable investor, in light of the subjects
     required to be addressed in this report as of June 30, 2002.

For purposes of this certification, information is "important to a reasonable
investor" if:

(a)  There is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would view the
     information as significantly altering the total mix of information in the
     report; and

(b)  The report would be misleading to a reasonable investor if the information
     was omitted from the report.

Date: August 13, 2002

                                            /s/  Konrad C. Kim
                                            --------------------------------
                                                 Konrad C. Kim, President and
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION


OF


CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with this Quarterly Report of Kingold Jewelry, Inc. (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certifies, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32.2, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant




Date: May 10, 2011
/s/ Bin LiuBin LiuChief Financial Officer and

Principal Accounting Officer
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##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 (the Report), I, David Wilson, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, created by § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  (2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: May 9, 2005
    /s/ David WilsonDavid WilsonSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Alaska Communications Systems Holdings, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6523

CARL D. NEWTON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden; UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CA-02-419-2) Submitted: July 8, 2003 Decided: October 7, 2003 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Carl D. Newton, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher Garrett Hill, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; George Maralan Kelly, III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Carl D. Newton seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, , 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Newton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40952 Summary Calendar

LINDA PIPER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:95-CV-51

- - - - - - - - - - August 28, 1998 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Linda Piper, a former employee of Kimberly-Clark Corporation (“KCC”) appeals the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of her lawsuit, alleging that she had been discriminatorily discharged because she was disabled and because she had filed a worker’s compensation claim, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Texas law. She contends that the district court erred in determining that she had failed to present qualifying summary-judgment evidence that she wasNo. 97-40952 -2- disabled withing the meaning of the ADA and failed to demonstrate

a factual dispute regarding KCC’s nondiscriminatory motive for her discharge. We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the record excerpts, and the summary-judgment record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the same reasons stated by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-19-00413-CV

HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, INC.,

Appellant

V.

WILLIAM PAUL BURCH, Appellee

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 348th District Court

of Tarrant County (348-307179-19)

January 23, 2020

Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Elizabeth Kerr__________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 299 

To provide a definition of reasonable rate for noncontiguous domestic ocean 

trade, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 13, 2021 

Mr. CASE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To provide a definition of reasonable rate for noncontiguous 

domestic ocean trade, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Noncontiguous Ship5 ping Reasonable Rate Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. NONCONTIGUOUS DOMESTIC OCEAN TRADE. 

7 Section 13701(d) of title 49, United States Code, is 

8 amended by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the fol9 lowing new paragraph: 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 299 IH

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this sec2 tion, a rate is reasonable if such rate is within 10 

3 percent of a rate set by a comparable international 

4 ocean rate index recognized by the Federal Maritime 

5 Commission.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES Of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-4328.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 22, 2013.

Decided: Dec. 9, 2013.

Robert Ratliff, Mobile, Alabama, for Appellant.

Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexander S. Maekler, Third Year Law Student, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

In 1997, Kevin Lamont Walker pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court originally sentenced Walker to 262 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, but later reduced the sentence to 120 months of imprisonment on the Government’s motion. After Walker’s release from incarceration, the district court revoked Walker’s supervised release and sentenced him to twelve months of incarceration, followed by four years of supervised release. Following his second release, the district court found that Walker had again violated the terms of his supervised release. The court revoked Walker’s supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months of imprisonment. Walker appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Walker argues that the district court improperly considered 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors that are not to be considered when determining a revocation sentence. We review a sentence imposed on revocation to determine whether the sentence was plainly unreasonable. *United States v. Crudup,*461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a district court must consider the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), “the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” *Id.*at 439 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have reviewed the record and have considered Walker’s arguments and discern no reversible error. We therefore conclude that Walker’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

*359Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We also grant Walker’s motion filed August 19, 2018 to the extent it seeks to withdraw his prior motions filed on June 4 and 6, 2013. We deny the motion to the extent that Walker seeks to file a pro se supplemental brief, and deny Walker’s November 8, 2013, motion to file a pro se reply brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


(Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)




In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended August 31, 2011 of Eco Ventures Group, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”) and pursuant to 18. U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Randall Lanham, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, that to my knowledge:




1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ RANDALL LANHAMRandall LanhamChief Executive Officer




June 18, 2012


Note:

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 35
                                   ----------


<PAGE>


                       COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP


                              OFFICERS' CERTIFICATE
                     ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE MASTER SERVICER


                                   CWMBS, INC.
                    CHL MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH TRUST 2006-OA5
               MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-OA5


      The undersigned does hereby certify that the undersigned is an officer of
Countrywide GP, Inc., general partner of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP
(the "Master Servicer"), and does hereby further certify pursuant to Section
3.16 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the above-captioned Series (the
"Agreement") that:

(i) A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and of the performance of the Master Servicer under the Agreement
has been made under my supervision; and

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects
throughout such calendar year.




/s/ Craig Baingo                                 Dated: March 14, 2007
-----------------

Craig Baingo
Executive Vice President, Finance