In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided April 5, 2021

S20Y0631. IN THE MATTER OF JASON LEE VAN DYKE.

 PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and 

recommendation of Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt with regard 

to the Second Petition for Voluntary Discipline submitted by 

Respondent Jason Lee Van Dyke (State Bar No. 851693). In his 

petition, Van Dyke admitted that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (3) of the 

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, found at Bar Rule 4-102 (d), 

by virtue of his conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral 

turpitude related to his fitness to practice law. The maximum 

penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) is disbarment. For his 

admitted violation, Van Dyke sought an indefinite suspension until 

such time as his criminal sentence was discharged. The State Bar 

did not oppose this proposed discipline, so long as the lifting of the 
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suspension was conditioned on Van Dyke’s providing satisfactory 

evidence of the final release and discharge of his criminal sentence. 

The Special Master recommended acceptance of the proposed 

discipline under this condition. 

Van Dyke has recently notified the Court that he has been

discharged from his criminal sentence. For this reason, Van Dyke 

now requests “some alternative form of discipline . . . that is either 

a lesser form of discipline . . . or a form of discipline consistent with 

the ‘spirit’ of that which was requested by [Van Dyke].” 

Notwithstanding this development and the Special Master’s 

recommendation, we conclude that the current record does not 

support the proposed resolution, either in its original form or as 

amended in his recent filing, and we therefore reject the petition.

The relevant facts are as follows. Van Dyke, a Texas resident, 

is licensed to practice law in Texas and several other jurisdictions, 

including Georgia. In September 2018, Van Dyke called local police 

to report the theft of several items from his truck. After police 

interviewed his then-roommate, Van Dyke was arrested for making 
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a false report. Van Dyke contested the charges. By his own 

admission, Van Dyke violated the conditions of his bond while his 

charges were pending.1 

Shortly before trial, the roommate, whom the State had 

planned to call as a witness, went missing. Contending that Van 

Dyke had procured the unavailability of the witness, the State filed 

a motion seeking forfeiture by wrongdoing,

2 which was granted. Van 

Dyke then agreed to enter a plea of nolo contendere and, on 

February 26, 2019, Van Dyke entered his plea before the Denton 

County, Texas Criminal Court Number Five on one count of making 

a false report to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 24 

months’ deferred adjudication community supervision, with special 

conditions.

 

1 According to Van Dyke, he left town in violation of his bond conditions 

to attend a “waterfowl hunt” that he had scheduled before his arrest.

2 See Agee v. State, __ Ga. __ (849 SE2d 482, 487) (2020) (“‘[O]ne who 

obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right 

to confrontation[,]’” quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (IV) (126 

SCt 2266, 165 LE2d 224) (2006)).
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Upon learning of Van Dyke’s conviction,3 the State Bar 

initiated this disciplinary proceeding, see Bar Rule 4-106, and a 

special master was appointed. Before any hearing was held, Van 

Dyke filed a petition for voluntary discipline, in which he requested 

discipline ranging from a public reprimand to a six-month 

suspension. The Special Master rejected the petition, noting this 

Court’s general practice of rejecting proposed discipline that ends 

prior to the completion of a criminal sentence. See, e.g., In re 

Richbourg, 293 Ga. 576, 577 (748 SE2d 460) (2014) (rejecting 

requested discipline that would have ended before attorney’s 

probation). Van Dyke then filed this second petition. Thus, because 

of the posture of the case, no hearing has yet been held before the 

Special Master. See Bar Rule 4-227 (c) (2) (directing that special 

master consider a petition for voluntary discipline on “the record as 

 

3 A nolo plea constitutes a “conviction” under Rule 8.4 (a) (3). See Rule 

8.4 (b) (1) (ii) (“conviction” for purposes of Rule 8.4 includes a plea of nolo 

contendere); see also Rule 8.4 (b) (2) (“[t]he record of a conviction or disposition 

in any jurisdiction based upon . . . a plea of nolo contendere . . . shall be 

conclusive evidence of such conviction”). 
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it then exists”). 

In his petition, Van Dyke recites a lengthy chronology of events 

that, he claims, forms the backdrop for his arrest and supports his

claim of innocence as to the false report offense. In sum, Van Dyke

asserts that the criminal prosecution stemmed from a campaign of 

harassment waged against him by an individual who, Van Dyke

claims, has been stalking, defaming, and harassing him since 2017.

He also claims to have obtained evidence that another individual 

has confessed to the theft from his truck, though he has since, in a

supplemental filing upon inquiry by this Court, conceded that a 

petition for habeas corpus he filed in an apparent effort to vindicate 

himself has now been denied.

In addition to asserting that he did not commit the crime to 

which he entered his plea, Van Dyke notes that he has complied with 

all terms and conditions of his community supervision, including the 

payment of fines and costs and the completion of community service. 

In addition, Van Dyke states that he has participated regularly in 

therapy and that his therapist, in a report to the probation office,
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has recommended that he return to the practice of law. 

In support of his proposed discipline, Van Dyke references 

Standard 5.12 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions4 as recommending suspension where a lawyer knowingly 

engages in criminal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 

fitness but does not involve intentional interference with the 

administration of justice, false swearing, fraud, or other serious 

felonious conduct. Here, Van Dyke maintains, the criminal conduct 

alleged is not of the type that would warrant disbarment, and the 

evidence, moreover, indicates that Van Dyke did not in fact commit 

any crime. Van Dyke notes further that his conduct was unrelated 

to his representation of, and thus caused no harm to, any client. 

While acknowledging the potential harm to public confidence in the 

legal profession, Van Dyke contends that, because he did not 

actually commit any crime, “the injury is de minimis.” As mitigating 

factors, Van Dyke cites his lack of disciplinary history in Georgia; 

 

4 See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996) 

(stating that this Court looks to the ABA Standards for guidance in 

determining appropriate disciplinary sanction).
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the absence of a selfish or dishonest motive; the personal and 

emotional problems he has faced as a result of the harassment he 

claims to have suffered; his compliance with all conditions of his 

community supervision and progress in therapy; and his cooperation 

with the State Bar in this disciplinary proceeding. 

In supplemental filings submitted at the Court’s directive, Van 

Dyke avers that, as a result of his conviction, he has been suspended 

from the practice of law in Texas, as well as in the District of 

Columbia and Colorado. Each of these jurisdictions has apparently 

imposed an 18-month suspension, effective from various dates in 

May and June 2020. Each suspension included a six-month “active” 

portion, followed by a 12-month “probated” portion, during which 

Van Dyke would be permitted to practice law under certain 

conditions.5 According to Van Dyke, he has completed the “active” 

portion of his suspensions in all three jurisdictions and has been 

reinstated to practice in Texas. He apparently remains on probated 

 

5 Van Dyke has also apparently been suspended with similar conditions

by federal district courts in both the Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas.
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suspension in all three jurisdictions, with the terms of suspension 

due to expire in November and December of 2021.6 

 As referenced above, Van Dyke has recently submitted a 

supplemental filing notifying the Court that, on February 26, 2021, 

the Denton County, Texas court entered an order discharging him 

from his sentence, releasing him from deferred adjudication, and 

dismissing his case. Thus, were we at this point to accept Van 

Dyke’s petition, his suspension will have expired before it ever 

started.7 This we cannot accept, particularly because Van Dyke

remains on suspension – albeit in probated form – in three other 

jurisdictions. 

We are also troubled by several aspects of this case that, we 

believe, warrant additional fact-finding. First, we note that Van 

 

6 Although Van Dyke submitted copies of the various suspension orders, 

he has not provided documentation showing that the Texas Bar has reinstated 

him. 

7 While Van Dyke asserts that he “voluntarily stopped practicing law in 

the State of Georgia as of March 1, 2019 and . . . has not practiced law in 

Georgia since that date,” he has not met the requirements for imposition of a 

suspension nunc pro tunc. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 

SE2d 136) (2010) (discussing the requirements for a suspension to be imposed 

nunc pro tunc).
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Dyke’s conduct in the criminal proceeding reflects a level of 

disrespect for the law and legal process that warrants serious 

consideration. In his petition, Van Dyke readily admitted to 

willfully violating his bond conditions. And there remains a judicial 

determination that Van Dyke procured the unavailability of a 

witness in his criminal case. However, beyond the passing mention 

of these issues in Van Dyke’s petition, we know nothing about the 

particulars of this conduct that, on its face, demonstrates a 

disturbing lack of regard for the law and legal process. 

In addition, it appears from review of one of the abovereferenced suspension orders, issued by the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Texas, that Van Dyke was 

sanctioned by the Texas Bar in an entirely separate proceeding in 

February 2019; according to this order, Van Dyke was suspended 

from the practice of law for 12 months, from March 1, 2019 through 

February 29, 2020. It is unclear what misconduct gave rise to this 

sanction, but what is clear is that Van Dyke did not make this Court 

aware of this prior discipline. Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia Rules of 
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Professional Conduct states: “Upon being suspended or disbarred in 

another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall 

promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of 

Georgia of the discipline.” It is unclear to this Court whether Van 

Dyke complied with his obligation under Rule 9.4 (b) as to the March 

2019 suspension.8 Until that question is answered, and this Court 

is apprised of the conduct underlying that sanction, we are unable

to make any determination of an appropriate level of discipline in 

this case. 

Accordingly, we reject Van Dyke’s Second Petition for 

Voluntary Discipline and remand to the Special Master for 

additional fact-finding regarding (1) all disciplinary proceedings

 

8 This disciplinary proceeding – along with the proceeding for the 

appointment of the Special Master herein – is the only proceeding involving 

Van Dyke that has ever been docketed in this Court. Though it is perhaps

conceivable that a reciprocal discipline proceeding initiated by Van Dyke could 

still be pending before the State Disciplinary Board, were that the case, it 

would be curious that neither Van Dyke nor the State Bar has mentioned that 

fact in this matter.

In this regard, we also note a statement from the federal district court’s 

order, in reference to local court rules on reciprocal discipline: “Although Mr. 

Van Dyke claims to have disclosed to the Clerk the existence of the February 

2019 sanction, the Clerk’s Office has no record of receiving that notice.”
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involving Van Dyke, past or current and in any jurisdiction,

including but not limited to those giving rise to Van Dyke’s March 

2019 suspension by the Texas Bar; (2) Van Dyke’s violation of his 

bond conditions in the Texas criminal proceeding; (3) the basis for 

the forfeiture by wrongdoing determination; and (4) any other 

matters the Special Master deems relevant. See, e.g., In re Rigdon, 

307 Ga. 676, 678 (837 SE2d 759) (2020) (rejecting petition for 

voluntary discipline and remanding to special master for further 

fact-finding). 

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices 

concur.