IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-22

Filed 17 October 2023

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 18CRS233449-50, 18CRS233485, 19CRS6128-31

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

RAY SHAWN DANIELS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 16 May 2022 by Judge Lisa C. 

Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 October 

2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General 

Stuart (Jeb) M. Saunders, for the State.

Richard J. Costanza, for the defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Ray Shawn Daniels (“Defendant”) appeals from a final judgment entered upon 

the jury’s verdicts for: (1) assault on a law enforcement official with firearm; (2) 

assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill; (3) attempted first-degree murder; 

(4) assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury; (5) 

attempted first-degree murder; (6) possession of a firearm by a felon; and (7) ten 

counts of attempted discharge of a firearm into an occupied moving vehicle. Our 

review reveals no error.
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I. Background

Thomas Gilmore (“Gilmore”), a minor child, was waiting at a school bus stop 

with his friend during the morning of 20 September 2018. (Pseudonym used to 

protect identity of minor, per N.C. R. App. P. 42(b)). While waiting, Gilmore heard 

multiple gunshots, and he and his friend ran into a nearby convenience store. After 

entering the convenience store, Gilmore’s friend realized Gilmore was bleeding and 

had been struck by a bullet. Gilmore was transported to the hospital by ambulance, 

where it was determined a bullet entered the back of his right thigh and passed 

through his leg, injuring his thigh and scrotum. Gilmore did not see who had shot 

him, nor did he observe anyone with a firearm nearby.

That same morning, Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Deputy Corey Thompson 

(“Deputy Thompson”) was wearing his uniform and driving to an off-duty assignment

in a marked patrol vehicle. Upon reaching the four-way intersection of West Sugar 

Creek Road and Reagan Drive, he heard gunshots. On his right, Deputy Thompson 

saw a crowd of fifteen to twenty people running towards him. He made a right-hand 

turn and observed a person on the ground and a man wearing a light-colored shirt 

and blue jeans standing over him.

Deputy Thompson activated his emergency equipment and saw the man, who 

had been standing, run and jump into the passenger side of a black Cadillac stopped 

a couple of feet away. The Cadillac sped away from the area, and Deputy Thompson

initiated a chase of the vehicle. During the chase, the person occupying the front 
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passenger seat of the Cadillac began shooting a pistol at Deputy Thompson’s patrol 

vehicle. At least ten shots were fired by the shooter. Deputy Thompson slowed to

gain distance between himself and the Cadillac, so the projectiles would not hit him. 

Neither Deputy Thompson nor his patrol vehicle were struck by any bullets fired by 

the shooter inside the Cadillac. During the chase, the Cadillac reached speeds of 

“upwards of a hundred” miles per hour and weaved in and out of heavy traffic.

At one point during the chase, the Cadillac pulled into a gas station. A person, 

who was later identified by Deputy Thompson as the Defendant, attempted to exit 

the front passenger side of the Cadillac, but he realized Deputy Thompson was 

nearby. Defendant immediately re-entered the Cadillac, and the chase continued. 

After a few minutes, Deputy Thompson’s superior officer advised him to cease pursuit 

of the Cadillac. Deputy Thompson stopped his pursuit and deactivated his patrol 

vehicle’s emergency equipment. He had observed the Cadillac exit from Interstate 

85. Deputy Thompson took the same exit and patrolled the area to search for the 

Cadillac. He located the Cadillac parked in a restaurant parking lot, unoccupied.

The same morning, Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Deputy Joseph Beckham 

(“Deputy Beckham”) was on duty when he heard radio traffic indicating another 

deputy was involved in a chase. Deputy Beckham testified he activated his lights 

and sirens and drove to Interstate 85 South towards Graham Street, the suspect’s 

last known location. As he approached the area, he heard radio traffic indicating 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg police officers were chasing a suspect through an ABC store 
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parking lot. He also saw an officer pointing across the street. He observed a black 

male with dreadlocks running away from that officer.

Deputy Beckham activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency equipment and 

chased the suspect. He observed the suspect run behind a retail center and through 

some bushes. Deputy Beckham exited his vehicle, followed the suspect, and found

him hiding in the bushes in a “surrendered position.” Deputy Beckham held the 

suspect at gunpoint until other officers arrived. He handcuffed the suspect, who he 

later determined was unarmed. At trial, Deputy Beckham identified Defendant as 

the man he had arrested.

Deputy Beckham and his K-9 dog searched the immediate area for a gun. 

Other officers assisted, including Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Sergeant J.M. 

Whitmore (“Sergeant Whitmore”). The K-9 dog “found a track” and pursued it. 

Sergeant Whitmore was walking behind the dog, flipped open a green recycling bin,

and found a bulletproof vest inside. A handgun was “sandwiched” in the vest, with 

an extended magazine protruding “out [of] the butt of the gun.”

Forensic DNA testing was conducted on the firearm, which indicated a mixture 

of DNA from at least three individuals. The Defendant’s DNA was the major profile 

contributor to the mixture. The State Crime Lab’s analyst could not determine the 

identity of the other contributors. Additionally, forensic DNA testing was conducted 

on the bulletproof vest, also indicating a mixture of DNA from at least three 

individuals. Again, Defendant’s DNA was the major profile contributor to the 
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mixture, and the Lab’s analyst was unable to make any determinations regarding the 

other contributors.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer Shannon Foster collected discharged 

cartridge casings and projectiles at various locations where the shootings had 

occurred. Gene Rivera, a Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department firearm 

examiner, examined the casings and projectiles and compared them with the 

recovered handgun. He determined ten of the projectiles were fired from the 

handgun, but the remaining two projectiles were too damaged to allow an accurate 

determination of whether or not they were fired from the recovered handgun. A jury 

convicted Defendant of all charges.

During the sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated that Defendant had been 

previously convicted of the federal offense of “carjacking,” as codified at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2119. On 10 March 2009, Defendant pled guilty to Count I of the indictment, which 

tracked the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, alleging Defendant and others while:

aiding and abetting each other, did knowingly and with 

intent to cause death and serious bodily harm, take a motor 

vehicle, that is, a 1989 Chevrolet Caprice, North Carolina 

Registration WVJ-8022, that had been transported, 

shipped, and received in interstate and foreign commerce, 

from the person and presence of another by force and 

violence by intimidation[.]

Defendant did not stipulate to the finding the carjacking conviction was 

substantially similar to common law robbery. In addition to the guilty verdicts, the 

jury also found as an aggravating factor the Defendant possessed a bulletproof vest 
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during the commission of these offenses.

The trial court gave the State and Defendant the opportunity to be heard on 

the issue of whether the offenses of carjacking and common law robbery are 

substantially similar. The trial court ruled the State had satisfied its burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses are substantially 

similar. The trial court stated:

So U[.]S[.] code 18 – 18 U[.]S[.] code, sections 2119, 

the offense of carjacking is reflected in State’s motion 

Exhibit 2. The description of that, under the code, is 

whoever takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, 

shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from 

the person, or presence of another by force and violence, or 

by intimidation or attempts to do so. And I find that that 

description, those elements, are substantially similar to 

North Carolina offense of common law robbery, and that is 

reflected as a Class G felony on the worksheet[.]

The trial court’s finding resulted in the assessment of four sentencing points. 

The assessment added up to ten sentencing points total. The trial court consolidated 

three of Defendant’s offenses, including his convictions for attempted first-degree 

murder, assault on a law enforcement official with firearm, and assault with a deadly 

weapon with intent to kill, into one sentence. The trial court determined Defendant’s 

attempted first-degree murder conviction would be sentenced under a Class B-1 

felony with the addition of the sentencing enhancement. Defendant was sentenced 

as a prior record level IV offender to an active term of 300 to 372 months, with credit 

for 1,219 days served in custody.
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The trial court also consolidated all of Defendant’s other offenses into a 

separate judgment, which incorporated Defendant’s convictions for attempted firstdegree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious 

injury, possession of a firearm by a felon, and all ten counts of attempted discharge 

of a firearm into an occupied moving vehicle. Defendant’s attempted first-degree 

murder conviction was classified as a Class B-2 felony “with the sentencing 

enhancement of a B-1.” Defendant received a sentence of 300 to 372 months to run 

consecutively to his previous sentence. Defendant appeals.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court possesses jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) 

(2021).

III. Issue

Defendant argues the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined 

Defendant’s federal carjacking conviction was substantially similar to our state’s

common law robbery, which resulted in the Defendant being sentenced at a higher 

prior record level.

A. Standard of Review

“The standard of review relating to the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

whether the sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing 

hearing. However, ‘the question of whether a conviction under an out-of-state statute 

is substantially similar to an offense under North Carolina statutes is a question of 
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law’ requiring de novo review on appeal.” State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 669, 

687 S.E.2d 518, 524 (2010) (citations omitted). 

Determining “whether the out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a 

North Carolina offense is a question of law” and requires comparing the elements of 

the offenses. Id. at 671, 687 S.E.2d at 525 (citation omitted). The trial court “may 

accept a stipulation that the defendant in question has been convicted of a particular 

out-of-state offense and that this offense is either a felony or a misdemeanor under 

the law of that jurisdiction[,]” but it “may not accept a stipulation to the effect that a 

particular out-of-state conviction is ‘substantially similar’ to a particular North 

Carolina felony or misdemeanor[.]” State v. Bohler, 198 N.C. App. 631, 637-38, 681 

S.E.2d 801, 806 (2009).

B. Analysis

Our State’s sentencing statute provides guidance to determine whether a 

defendant’s conviction for an offense committed in another jurisdiction may be 

calculated in a defendant’s prior record level:

If the State proves by the preponderance of the evidence 

that an offense classified as either a misdemeanor or a 

felony in the other jurisdiction is substantially similar to 

an offense in North Carolina that is classified as a Class I 

felony or higher, the conviction is treated as that class of 

felony for assigning prior record level points. If the State 

proves by the preponderance of the evidence that an offense 

classified as a misdemeanor in the other jurisdiction is 

substantially similar to an offense classified as a Class A1 

or Class 1 misdemeanor in North Carolina, the conviction 

is treated as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor for 
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assigning prior record level points.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(e) (2021).

Our precedents define common law robbery as “the felonious, non-consensual 

taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of another by means 

of violence or fear.” State v. Porter, 198 N.C. App. 183, 186, 679 S.E.2d 167, 169-70 

(2009) (quoting State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 700, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (1982)). 

The federal carjacking statute provides:

Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 

harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, 

shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from 

the person or presence of another by force and violence or 

by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall—

(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 

than 15 years, or both,

(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 

of this title, including any conduct that, if the 

conduct occurred in the special maritime and 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 

would violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) 

results, be fined under this title or imprisoned 

not more than 25 years, or both, and

(3) if death results, be fined under this title or 

imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or 

both, or sentenced to death.

18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2018).

Both the federal carjacking statute and North Carolina’s common law robbery 

require the forceful and violent taking of property. The federal carjacking statute 
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requires the taking to be accompanied “by force and violence or by intimidation[.]” 

Id. Our State’s common law robbery statute similarly requires the taking of property 

“by means of violence or fear.” Porter, 198 N.C. App. at 186, 679 S.E.2d at 169-70

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. State v. Sanders

Defendant, relying on State v. Sanders, argues our Supreme Court has adopted 

an elements comparison test when evaluating whether a foreign conviction is 

substantially similar to a North Carolina offense. State v. Sanders, 367 N.C. 716, 

720, 766 S.E.2d 331, 334 (2014) (“The Court of Appeals has stated, and we agree, that 

‘[d]etermination of whether the out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a 

North Carolina offense is a question of law involving comparison of the elements of 

the out-of-state offense to those of the North Carolina offense.’” (citation omitted)).

Defendant argues the similarity of the federal carjacking offense and common 

law larceny fails to pass the test outlined in Sanders. In Sanders, the Supreme Court 

found the Tennessee offense of domestic assault was not substantially similar to the 

North Carolina offense of assault on a female:

[A] woman assaulting her child or her husband could be

convicted of “domestic assault” in Tennessee, but could not 

be convicted of “assault on a female” in North Carolina. A 

male stranger who assaults a woman on the street could be 

convicted of “assault on a female” in North Carolina, but 

could not be convicted of “domestic assault” in Tennessee.

Id. at 721, 766 S.E.2d at 334.
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The Court in Sanders found the two offenses were not substantially similar,

because the conduct that is criminalized in each offense was different. Id. Domestic 

assault and assault on a female both involve two different, specifically defined 

victims. Id. at 720, 766 S.E.2d at 334 (“The [Tennessee] offense thus requires that 

the person being assaulted fall within at least one of these six enumerated categories 

of domestic relationships. The offense does not require the victim to be female or the 

assailant to be male and of a certain age.”).

Here, unlike in Sanders, the elements of carjacking and common law robbery 

require similar conduct, and no elements are mutually exclusive. Both offenses share 

two essential elements: (1) there is a non-consensual taking and theft of property; 

and (2) the taking is accompanied by force, violence, fear, or intimidation. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2119; Porter, 198 N.C. App. at 186, 679 S.E.2d at 169-70. When a victim is being 

dispossessed of property, use of intimidation and force invoke violence or fear, which 

are requirements of both offenses. It is hard to envision the lack of presence or 

occurrence of any or all factors in the commission of either crime.

2. Interstate Commerce Requirement

Defendant next argues carjacking and common law robbery are not 

substantially similar because the federal carjacking offense requires the stolen 

property be connected to interstate commerce. North Carolina’s common law larceny 

does not contain an interstate commerce requirement, as that element invokes 

federal jurisdiction.
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The State relies on the analysis in State v. Graham in arguing the elements of

carjacking and North Carolina common law robbery are substantially similar. State 

v. Graham, 379 N.C. 75, 863 S.E.2d 752 (2021). The defendant in Graham, like the 

Defendant in the present case, argued “if the difference between the two statutes 

renders the other state’s law narrower or broader, ‘or if there are differences that 

work in both directions, so that each statute includes conduct not covered by the 

other, then the two statutes will not be substantially similar[.]’” Id. at 81, 863 S.E.2d 

at 756. Our Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive and concluded the 

defendant’s position “conflates the requirement that statutes subject to comparison 

be substantially similar to one other with [the] erroneous perception that the two 

statutes must have identicalness to each other.” Id. at 82, 863 S.E.2d at 756.

The Court further concluded “substantially similar” does not mean 

“literalness,” “identicalness,” or “exactitude.” Id. The Court explained:

Standing alone, neither word—“substantially” or “similar”

—connotes literalness; therefore, when these words are 

combined to create the legal term of art “substantially 

similar,” this chosen phraseology reinforces the lack of a 

requirement for the statutory language in one enactment 

to be the same as the statutory language in another 

enactment in order for the two laws to be treated as 

“substantially similar.” Yet, the dissent here—despite the 

obvious essential pertinent parallels between the Georgia 

statute and the North Carolina statute—would withhold a 

recognition that the two statutes are substantially similar 

because all of the same provisions are not common to each 

of them. In this respect, although the dissent professes 

that it understands the difference between “substantially 

similar” and identicalness, nonetheless it appears that the 
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dissent is so ensnared and engulfed by a need to see a 

mirrored reflection mutually cast between the two statutes 

that the dissent is compelled to promote this erroneously 

expansive approach.

Id. at 82-83, 863 S.E.2d at 756-57.

This Court in State v. Riley compared N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a), which 

criminalizes possession of a firearm by a felon, with its federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). State v. Riley, 253 N.C. App. 819, 820, 802 S.E.2d 494, 495-96 (2017). 

North Carolina’s offense of possession of a firearm by a felon “requires proof that (1) 

the defendant had been convicted of a felony and (2) thereafter possessed (3) a 

firearm.” Id. at 825, 802 S.E.2d at 499 The federal statute, codified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), “requires proof that (1) the defendant had been convicted of a crime 

punishable by more than one year in prison, (2) the defendant possessed (3) a firearm, 

and (4) the possession was in or affecting commerce.” Id. at 825, 802 S.E.2d at 498-

99. 

This Court held the statutes are substantially similar, even though the federal 

law contains the additional element requiring possession of the firearm “in or 

affecting commerce” to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. at 825-27, 802 S.E.2d at 498-

500. Here, as in Riley, Defendant’s argument asserting the additional element of 

interstate commerce distinguishes the crimes fails. Id.

3. Sentencing Requirements

Defendant argues the sentencing enhancements in the federal carjacking 
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statute, which are not present in North Carolina common law robbery, require this 

Court to hold the two offenses are not substantially similar. Compare 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2119(1)-(3) with Porter, 198 N.C. App. at 186, 679 S.E.2d at 169-70.

The defendant in Riley argued the federal offense of being a felon in possession 

of a firearm was not substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of possession 

of a firearm by a felon based upon the sentencing disparities between the two 

offenses. Riley, 253 N.C. App. at 826, 802 S.E.2d at 499. The federal offense required

the person to have been previously convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment 

for a term exceeding one year,” whereas the North Carolina offense required the 

person to have previously been “convicted of a felony.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted). Notwithstanding those differences, the Court found substantial similarity

existed between the two crimes:

There may be other hypothetical scenarios which highlight 

the more nuanced differences between the two offenses. 

But the subtle distinctions do not override the almost 

inescapable conclusion that both offenses criminalize 

essentially the same conduct—the possession of firearms 

by disqualified felons. Both statutes remained unchanged 

in the 2012 to 2015 time period, and despite the differences 

we have discussed, the federal offense of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm is substantially similar to the North 

Carolina offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, a 

Class G felony.

Id. at 827, 802 S.E.2d at 500.

Similarly, in Graham, the defendant argued the North Carolina and Georgia 

offenses for statutory rape were not substantially similar because of how the two
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statutes treated “the age difference between the two participants.” Graham, 379 N.C. 

at 81, 863 S.E.2d at 755. The Georgia statute provided different punishment ranges 

depending on the age of the offender and the age of the victim, “which impact[ed] the 

perpetrator’s degree of punishment.” Id. (explaining the Georgia statute provided 

“‘[a] person convicted of the offense of statutory rape shall be punished by 

imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years; provided, however, that 

if the person so convicted is 21 years of age or older, such person shall be punished 

by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years; provided, further, that 

if the victim is 14 or 15 years of age and the person so convicted is no more than three 

years older than the victim, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor’”). The 

North Carolina statute differentiated between the class of felony an offender could be 

punished under, depending on the age of the victim, the age of the offender, and the 

disparity between the victim’s and the offender’s ages. Id. at 81, 863 S.E.2d at 755-

56.

Our Supreme Court held “the statutory wording of the Georgia provision and 

the North Carolina provision do not need to precisely match in order to be deemed to 

be substantially similar.” Id. at 82, 863 S.E.2d at 756. The test in Sanders does not 

“require identicalness between compared statutes from different states and mandate 

identical outcomes between cases which originate both in North Carolina and in the 

foreign state.” Id. at 84, 863 S.E.2d at 757.

Here, the offenses are substantially similar, despite the sentencing 
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enhancements present in the federal carjacking statute, which are not present in 

North Carolina common law robbery. Id.; Riley, 253 N.C. App. at 825-27, 802 S.E.2d 

at 498-500; 18 U.S.C. § 2119; Porter, 198 N.C. App. at 186, 679 S.E.2d at 169-70. 

Defendant’s objection and argument is overruled.

4. Broader Scope

Defendant finally argues the two offenses are not substantially similar because 

the scope of North Carolina common law robbery is broader than the federal 

carjacking offense. He asserts the common law offense of larceny involves the violent 

taking of any property, while federal carjacking is limited to forcible theft of a motor 

vehicle.

In State v. Key, this Court found an out-of-state statute was substantially 

similar to a North Carolina common law offense, despite the absence of an intent

element in the sister-state’s statute. State v. Key, 180 N.C. App. 286, 293-96, 636 

S.E.2d 816, 822-23 (2006). The common law offense in North Carolina required the 

offender to have intended “to deprive the owner of his property permanently.” Id. at 

294, 636 S.E.2d at 823 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Both the 

Maryland statute and North Carolina common law larceny focused on “the 

perpetrator placing the property under his control and depriving the owner of control 

over it.” Id. at 294, 636 S.E.2d at 823. Because the two offenses had similar elements 

with respect to taking the property, this Court held the two offenses were 

substantially similar. Id.
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Here, both the federal carjacking statute and North Carolina common law 

robbery require a non-consensual taking of property under threat, force, or 

intimidation. 18 U.S.C. § 2119; Porter, 198 N.C. App. at 186, 679 S.E.2d at 169-70. 

Following the reasoning in Key, Defendant’s argument that common law robbery and 

the carjacking statute are not substantially similar, because the scope of common law 

robbery is broader, fails and is overruled. Key, 180 N.C. App. at 293-95, 636 S.E.2d 

at 822-23.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court properly concluded federal carjacking is a substantially similar 

offense to the North Carolina offense of common law robbery, a Class G Felony. 

Defendant was sentenced as a Habitual Felon at the proper prior record level and has 

not demonstrated error by the trial court’s classification to warrant re-sentencing. 

Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial errors he preserved and

argued on appeal. We find no error in the jury’s verdict or in the judgments entered 

thereon. It is so ordered.

NO ERROR.

Judges Hampson and Carpenter concur.