Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 213 / Monday, November 6, 2017 / Notices 51433 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Antitrust Division 

Notice Pursuant to the National 

Cooperative Research and Production 

Act of 1993—Medical Technology 

Enterprise Consortium 

Notice is hereby given that, on 

September 29, 2017, pursuant to Section 

6(a) of the National Cooperative 

Research and Production Act of 1993, 

15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (‘‘the Act’’), 

Medical Technology Enterprise 

Consortium (‘‘MTEC’’) has filed written 

notifications simultaneously with the 

Attorney General and the Federal Trade 

Commission disclosing changes in its 

membership. The notifications were 

filed for the purpose of extending the 

Act’s provisions limiting the recovery of 

antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages 

under specified circumstances. 

Specifically, 2C4 Technologies, Inc., 

San Antonio, TX; Actuated Medical, 

Inc., Bellefonte, PA; American Type 

Culture Collection (ATCC Federal 

Solutions), Manassas, VA; Amethyst 

Technologies, LLC, Baltimore, MD; Anu 

Life Sciences, Sunrise, FL; Arteriocyte, 

Inc. d/b/a/Compass Biomedical, 

Hopkinton, MA; Charles River 

Analytics, Inc., Cambridge, MA; 

Chimerix, Inc., Durham, NC; Cole 

Engineering Services, Inc., Orlando, FL; 

Corvid Technologies, Mooresville, NC; 

Daxor Corporation, New York, NY; 

Elemance, LLC, Clemmons, NC; 

Emergent BioSolutions, Gaithersburg, 

MD; Human Biomed, Inc., South 

Burlington, VT; L–3 Applied 

Technologies, Inc., San Diego, CA; 

LifeLink Foundation, Inc., Tampa, FL; 

MalarVx, Inc., Seattle, WA; Manzanita 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Woodside, CA; 

Medtronic, Minneapolis, MN; Melinta 

Therapeutics, Inc., New Haven, CT; 

Neuroplast BV, Maastricht, 

NETHERLANDS; Platelet BioGenesis, 

Inc., Boston, MA; RegeniSource LLC, 

San Antonio, TX; Remedor Biomed Ltd., 

Nazareth lllit, ISRAEL; Roccor, LLC, 

Longmont, CO; Soar Technology, Inc., 

Ann Arbor, MI; SynDaver Labs, Tampa, 

FL; The Board of Supervisors of 

Louisiana State University and 

Agricultural & Mechanical College 

herein represented by Louisiana State 

University Health Sciences Center in 

New Orleans (LSUHSC), New Orleans, 

LA; The Medical College of Wisconsin, 

Inc., Milwaukee, WI; The Metis 

Foundation, San Antonio, TX; 

University of Iowa, Iowa city, IA; 

University of Maryland, College Park, 

MD; Vcom3D, Inc., Orlando, FL, and 

Vivacelle Bio, Inc., Chicago, IL have 

been added as parties to this venture. 

Also, Applied Medical Device 

Institute (aMDI)—Grand Valley State 

University, Grand Rapids, MI; Aptus, 

LLC, Clemson, SC; Ellipsis 

Technologies, Inc., Greenville, SC; Johns 

Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD; 

Longeveron LLC, Miami, FL; Lovelace 

Biomedical and Environmental 

Research Institute, Albuquerque, NM; 

MicroCures, Inc., Santa Cruz, CA; New 

York Institute of Technology, Old 

Westbury, NY; NGT–VC 2012 Limited 

Partnership (NGT3), Nazareth, ISRAEL; 

and Otologic Pharmaceutics Inc., 

Oklahoma City, OK, have withdrawn as 

parties to this venture. 

No other changes have been made in 

either the membership or planned 

activity of the group research project. 

Membership in this group research 

project remains open, and MTEC 

intends to file additional written 

notifications disclosing all changes in 

membership. 

On May 9, 2014, MTEC filed its 

original notification pursuant to Section 

6(a) of the Act. The Department of 

Justice published a notice in the Federal 

Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the 

Act on June 9, 2014 (79 FR 32999). 

The last notification was filed with 

the Department on June 23, 2017. A 

notice was published in the Federal 

Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the 

Act on August 15, 2017(82 FR 38708). 

Patricia A. Brink, 

Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust 

Division. 

[FR Doc. 2017–24101 Filed 11–3–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

ChipRX, L.L.C., d/b/a City Center 

Pharmacy; Decision and Order 

On August 19, 2016, the former 

Acting Administrator issued an Order to 

Show Cause and Immediate Suspension 

of Registration to ChipRX, L.L.C., d/b/a 

City Center Pharmacy (hereinafter, 

Registrant), of Hamlin, West Virginia. 

The Show Cause Order proposed the 

revocation of Registrant’s DEA 

Certificate of Registration and the denial 

of any pending application to renew or 

modify its registration, on the ground 

that its ‘‘continued registration is 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Show Cause Order, at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4) and 823(f)). 

As to the Agency’s jurisdiction, the 

Show Cause Order alleged that 

Registrant is registered as a pharmacy 

with authority to dispense schedule II– 

V controlled substances under 

Registration No. FC3015915, at the 

registered address of 8119 Court 

Avenue, Hamlin, West Virginia. Id. at 1. 

The Order alleged that this registration 

was due to expire on August 31, 2017. 

Id. 

As to the substantive grounds for the 

proceeding, the Show Cause Order 

alleged that Registrant is owned by 

George ‘‘Chip’’ Chapman and Summer 

Chapman, and that George Chapman is 

Registrant’s Pharmacist-in-Charge (PIC). 

Id. The Show Cause Order alleged that 

on June 30, 2016, DEA executed an 

Administrative Inspection Warrant 

(AIW) at Registrant based on ‘‘tips that 

PIC Chapman was frequently impaired 

and was unlawfully removing 

controlled substances from the 

pharmacy.’’ Id. at 2. The Order then 

alleged that during the inspection, DEA 

personnel interviewed PIC Chapman 

and other pharmacy employees. Id. 

With respect to the interview of PIC 

Chapman, the Show Cause Order 

alleged that he made various material 

false statements to the Investigators. Id. 

These included minimizing the quantity 

of oxycodone and hydrocodone that had 

been lost ‘‘in the last year,’’ stating that 

he had failed to reported all but one of 

the instances in which these drugs were 

‘‘lost’’ because they were ‘‘‘not 

significant’ losses,’’ by denying that he 

knew ‘‘anything further about the nature 

of the pharmacy’s losses’’ while 

‘‘claim[ing] that he was not abusing 

prescriptions drugs,’’ and stating ‘‘that 

many of his per diem or fill-in 

pharmacists were previous drug 

abusers.’’ Id. 

The Show Cause Order then alleged 

that in a subsequent interview 

conducted on July 22, 2016, Chapman 

‘‘admitted that during the past year, he 

diverted oxycodone or hydrocodone 

pills equivalent to ‘200–300 mg every 

day,’ a total of approximately 25,000 

pills.’’ Id. at 3. The Order also alleged 

that ‘‘Chapman admitted that he 

routinely falsified inventory records’’ 

and that he ‘‘shredded invoice and 

supplier records, including DEA 222 

forms and electronic Controlled 

Substances Ordering System (‘CSOS’) 

records.’’ Id. The Order further alleged 

that ‘‘Chapman admitted that he had 

relapsed,’’ and told ‘‘DEA [I]nvestigators 

that he ‘couldn’t wait’ for’’ the 

expiration of the Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA) which he had 

previously entered into with the Agency 

‘‘so he could begin diverting . . . drugs 

to feed his addiction.’’ Id. The Order 

then alleged that Chapman admitted to 


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1The Show Cause Order also alleged that during 

the June 30, 2016 interview, Chapman admitted that 

he regularly used marijuana. Show Cause Order, at 

3. 

2The Government alleged that the MOA expired 

on January 12, 2015. Show Cause Order, at 3. 

3The correct citation is to 21 CFR 1301.71(a). 

abusing cocaine for the past two years. 

Id.1

The Show Cause Order also alleged 

that from January 12, 2015 2 to the 

‘‘present,’’ Registrant’s owner had 

committed numerous violations of the 

Controlled Substances Act. First, the 

Order alleged that Chapman 

‘‘unlawfully removed pills from the 

[p]harmacy.’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 829(a) 

& (b), 841(a)(1), and 844(a)). Second, the 

Order alleged that Chapman ‘‘us[ed] the 

[p]harmacy to fuel his own drug 

addiction,’’ in that he ordered 

controlled substances other than in ‘‘the 

conduct of lawful business or 

professional practice.’’ Id. (citing 21 

U.S.C. 828(e)). Third, the Order alleged 

that Registrant ‘‘failed to report losses as 

required’’ by DEA regulations. Id. (citing 

21 CFR 1301.76(b)). Fourth, the Order 

alleged that Registrant ‘‘has failed to 

maintain effective controls against 

diversion and theft.’’ Id. (citing 21 CFR 

1307.71).3 Fifth, the Order alleged that 

Registrant ‘‘has failed to maintain 

accurate inventory controls’’ in that 

‘‘Chapman routinely manipulated 

computer inventory records.’’ Id. at 4 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 827(a) & (b); 842(a)(5)). 

Sixth, the Order alleged that Registrant 

‘‘has routinely destroyed controlled 

substance ordering records’’ and that 

‘‘Chapman regularly shredded invoices 

. . . from its suppliers to conceal the 

extent of his diversion.’’ Id. (citing 21 

CFR 1305.17 and 1305.27). Seventh, the 

Order alleged that on June 30, 2016, 

Registrant ‘‘provided a [c]losing 

[i]nventory certifying that it was 

complete and accurate,’’ but that 

‘‘[b]ased on . . . Chapman’s admissions, 

this report was not complete or 

accurate.’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4)(A), 21 CFR 1304.03, 1304.04, 

1304.11, and 1304.21). 

In addition to the above, the Show 

Cause Order alleged that Chapman 

‘‘repeatedly deleted [p]harmacy video 

surveillance footage of his unlawful 

removal of controlled substances from 

the [p]harmacy,’’ that ‘‘Chapman 

frequently exhibits signs of impairment 

or intoxication while at work,’’ and that 

‘‘[w]hile impaired, [he] has incorrectly 

filled prescriptions.’’ Id. The Order also 

alleged that ‘‘[d]uring the course of the 

last year, [p]harmacy personnel have 

repeatedly identified significant losses 

in routine pill counts,’’ including a loss 

of 100 oxycodone pills ‘‘in the week 

preceding [the] June 30, 2016’’ 

inspection. Id. The Order further alleged 

that ‘‘[t]hese losses occurred on a 

regular basis’’ and involved 

‘‘oxycodone, hydrocodone, 

oxymorphone, and ADHD pills,’’ and 

that ‘‘[t]hese losses were consistently 

reported to . . . Chapman.’’ Id. 

Next, the Show Cause Order alleged 

that ‘‘[d]espite knowing . . . that DEA 

was actively investigating’’ his 

pharmacy, Chapman diverted 

oxycodone and other drugs ‘‘on least 

[five] occasions between June 30, 2016 

and August 5, 2016.’’ Id. at 5. 

Specifically, the Order alleged that 

‘‘[b]etween July 15 and July 18, 2016, 

Chapman took 64 oxycodone pills,’’ that 

‘‘[o]n July 21, 2016, Chapman removed 

oxycodone pills from a locked cabinet 

and placed an unknown number of 

loose pills in his pocket,’’ that ‘‘[o]n July 

23, 2016, Chapman entered the 

[p]harmacy outside of store hours and 

took a 100 count bottle of oxycodone 

pills,’’ and that ‘‘[o]n August 3, 2016, 

Chapman again took oxycodone pills 

from the [p]harmacy[’s] stock.’’ Id. The 

Order also alleged that ‘‘[a]t least two of 

these incidents are recorded on video 

obtained by DEA.’’ Id. 

The Show Cause Order further alleged 

that ‘‘Chapman was hospitalized for 

complications related to overdose on at 

least three recent occasions, including 

. . . on approximately April 6, 2016, 

June 17, 2016, and July 18, 2016.’’ Id. 

The Order alleged that on or about these 

dates, Chapman ‘‘tested positive’’ for 

controlled substances which included 

oxycodone at each test (as well as 

cocaine on July 18, 2016), even though 

records from the West Virginia 

Prescription Monitoring Program 

‘‘indicate that [he] did not receive any 

prescription for oxycodone or cocaine 

during the last year.’’ Id. 

Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged 

that ‘‘[o]ther [p]harmacy personnel have 

seen . . . Chapman using marijuana via 

[a] vaporizer while working at’’ 

Registrant. Id. After again alleging that 

Chapman admitted to ‘‘abus[ing] 

cocaine during the course of the last two 

years,’’ the Order alleged that 

‘‘Chapman’s possession of illicit 

controlled substances violates 21 U.S.C. 

844(a).’’ Id. 

Based on his ‘‘preliminary finding 

that controlled substances were diverted 

from [Registrant] on numerous 

occasions in connection with serious 

misconduct involving concealment, 

falsification of inventory records, 

circumvention of security controls, and 

misuse of [its] [r]egistration to order 

controlled substances for purposes other 

than the conduct of lawful business or 

professional practice,’’ the former 

Acting Administrator concluded that 

Registrant’s registration ‘‘is inconsistent 

with the public interest.’’ Id. at 6. The 

former Acting Administrator also made 

the ‘‘preliminary finding’’ that 

Registrant’s ‘‘continued registration 

during the pendency of these 

proceedings would constitute an 

imminent danger to the public health 

and safety because of the substantial 

likelihood . . . that death, serious 

bodily harm or abuse of controlled 

substances will occur in the absence of 

this suspension.’’ Id. The former Acting 

Administrator thus concluded that 

Registrant’s continued registration 

during the pendency of the proceeding 

‘‘constitutes an imminent danger to the 

public health and safety’’ and 

suspended its registration ‘‘effective 

immediately.’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 

824(d)). The former Acting 

Administrator’s Order also authorized 

the seizure or placement under seal of 

Registrant’s controlled substances. Id. 

The Show Cause Order notified 

Registrant of its right to request a 

hearing on the allegations or to submit 

a written statement while waiving its 

right to a hearing, the procedures for 

electing either option, and the 

consequence of failing to elect either 

option. Id. (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). On 

the same day it was issued, a DEA 

Diversion Investigator personally served 

the Order to Show Cause and Immediate 

Suspension of Registration on 

Registrant’s pharmacy manager at which 

time the Investigators took custody of 

Registrant’s controlled substances and 

Certificate of Registration. GX 3, at 

2 ¶ 7. 

According to the Government, since 

the date of service of the Order, 

Registrant has neither requested a 

hearing nor submitted a written 

statement while waiving its right to a 

hearing. Request for Final Agency 

Action, at 1–2. Based on the 

Government’s representation, I find that 

more than 30 days have now passed and 

Registrant has neither requested a 

hearing nor submitted a written 

statement while waiving its right to a 

hearing. I therefore find that Registrant 

has waived its right to a hearing or to 

submit a written statement and issue 

this Decision and Order based on 

reliable and probative evidence 

submitted by the Government. See 21 

CFR 1301.43(e). I make the following 

findings. 

Findings of Fact 

Registrant is a limited liability 

company organized under the laws of 

West Virginia; it owns and operates City 

Center Pharmacy, a retail pharmacy 

located at 8119 Court Avenue, Hamlin, 

West Virginia. GX1; GX 3, at 1. 


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4According to the MOA, in the spring of 2009, 

Chapman injured his back and was prescribed 

oxycodone and hydrocodone. GX 3, Appendix 3, at 

1–2. As his pain increased, Chapman began using 

more drugs than were prescribed and stole several 

hundred tablets from his employer. Id. at 1. 

Chapman, however, reported his drug problem to 

his employer and entered into a recovery contract 

with the West Virginia Pharmacy Recover Network 

(PRN), which required that he attend Narcotics 

Anonymous/Alcoholics anonymous meetings, 

provide random drug screens, and see an addiction 

psychiatrist. Id. at 2. At the time he entered into the 

MOA, he had successfully completed the PRN’s 

requirements and was ‘‘under contract for an 

additional three year period.’’ Id. 

According to the records of the West 

Virginia Secretary of State, George 

Chapman and his wife Summer 

Chapman are member-officers of the 

company. GX 3, Appendix 2, at 2. 

George Chapman is the Pharmacist-inCharge (PIC). GX 3, at 2; see also id. at 

Appendix 3. 

Registrant previously held DEA 

Certificate of Registration No. 

FC3015915, pursuant to which it was 

authorized to dispense controlled 

substances in schedules II through V as 

a retail pharmacy at the above address. 

GX 1. This registration expired on 

August 31, 2017. Id. According to the 

registration records of the Agency (of 

which I take official notice, see 5 U.S.C. 

556(e)), Registrant did not file a renewal 

application. However, according to the 

declaration of the Diversion 

Investigator, upon service of the 

Immediate Suspension Order, the 

Government took custody of Registrant’s 

controlled substances. GX 3, at 1. 

In 2009, Chapman, who was then 

employed at a hospital pharmacy, was 

convicted of a misdemeanor offense of 

embezzling controlled substances from 

his employer and placed on probation.4

GX 3, Appendix 1, at 1–2. Chapman, 

who pled guilty to the charge, was 

placed on probation for a period of one 

year. Id. at 1. Thereafter, Chapman 

applied for a retail pharmacy 

registration in schedules II through V, 

and was allowed to enter into an MOA, 

which became effective on January 12, 

2012, and remained in effect for a 

period of three years, after which 

Registrant’s Registration became 

unrestricted. GX 3, Appendix 3, at 1–4. 

The Investigation of Registrant 

In June 2016, a DEA Diversion 

Investigator (DI) assigned to the 

Charleston, West Virginia Resident 

Office received ‘‘multiple tips’’ that 

George Chapman ‘‘often appeared 

impaired at work.’’ GX 3, at 2. The DI 

initiated an investigation and 

determined that Chapman had 

previously pled guilty in state court ‘‘to 

embezzling and abusing approximately 

800 hydrocodone and oxycodone pills 

from approximately June through 

October 2009.’’ Id. He also determined 

that Chapman had, as a condition of 

obtaining a registration for the 

pharmacy, entered into an MOA with 

the Agency. Id. 

The DI obtained an Administrative 

Inspection Warrant (AIW), and on June 

30, 2016, he, accompanied by other 

Investigators, executed the AIW at 

Registrant. Id. According to the DI, 

‘‘[t]he [p]harmacy’s inventory records 

were found to be so incomplete and 

unreliable that no formal audit using the 

. . . records could be completed.’’ Id. 

The DI further stated that during the 

inspection, Chapman ‘‘admitted that 

[the] electronic inventory records had 

been repeatedly manipulated’’ and the 

‘‘records were otherwise so disorganized 

that conducting a reliable on-site audit 

was impossible.’’ Id. 

The DI further stated that during the 

inspection, ‘‘several [p]harmacy 

[employees] uniformly reported to [him] 

that . . . Chapman regularly came to 

work impaired’’ and ‘‘[s]everal 

employees also reported that pills were 

regularly missing from the [p]harmacy 

during the last year.’’ Id. 

One pharmacy employee told the DI 

that on occasions when a ‘‘per diem 

[p]harmacist’’ was working at 

Registrant, Chapman came to the 

pharmacy, ‘‘asked to use’’ the 

employee’s computer, after which he 

‘‘open[ed] the locked cabinet’’ in which 

the oxycodone was kept and [took] a 

100 count wholesale bottle of 

oxycodone 15 mg’’ out of the cabinet, 

then ‘‘went to his office’’ and 

subsequently ‘‘left the pharmacy.’’ Id. at 

3. The employee told the DI that she 

subsequently opened the cabinet to 

confirm that the bottle was missing; she 

also ‘‘attempted to review the 

surveillance video’’ only to find that ‘‘it 

had been deleted.’’ Id. The employee 

also told the DI that she checked the 

computer inventory records and found 

that 100 pills of oxycodone 15 mg had 

been removed from the count of drugs 

‘‘on hand.’’ Id. 

The same employee told the DI ‘‘that 

the [p]harmacy regularly experiences 

inventory losses’’ and had been 

experiencing them ‘‘for more than a 

year.’’ Id. The employee told the DI that 

on the very day that the AIW was 

executed, her comparison of the 

computer inventory and the actual 

count of drugs on hand found that 107 

dosage units of hydrocodone 10 mg 

were missing. Id. The employee also 

told the DI that in the weeks prior to the 

AIW, one bottle of oxycodone 20 mg 

and one bottle of oxycodone 15 mg went 

missing. Id. 

The employee further told the DI that 

Chapman was impaired at work on an 

almost daily basis and that he would 

‘‘spend the majority of his day asleep in 

his office.’’ Id. She also told the DI of 

an instance in which Chapman ‘‘had 

incorrectly filled a prescription’’ which 

she corrected and that ‘‘she saw 

Chapman using a vaporizer at work to 

smoke marijuana regularly.’’ Id. 

According to the DI, following the 

AIW, the same employee ‘‘reported to 

[him] multiple other instances where 

. . . Chapman had stolen oxycodone’’ 

from Registrant; the employee stated 

that these incidents occurred on July 18 

and 23, as well as August 3, 2016. Id. 

The employee also took a photograph 

showing Chapman ‘‘passed out at his 

desk on July 18, a day when he was . . . 

taken to the hospital’’ because he 

overdosed. Id. at 3–4. According to the 

employee, on that day, ‘‘64 oxycodone 

pills were missing compared with a 

physical pill count conducted on July 

15, 2017.’’ Id. at 4. The DI subsequently 

subpoenaed the photo; the Government 

submitted the photo as part of the 

evidentiary record. Id. at 3; see also 

Appendix 4. 

During the AIW, the DI also 

interviewed Chapman. GX 3, at 3. 

During the interview, Chapman stated 

that the ‘‘[p]harmacy had destroyed 

approximately 70 Percocet pills 

sometime in the past and that . . . he 

had adjusted the ‘inventory book’ so 

that the records would reflect the 

physical inventory.’’ Id. Chapman 

admitted, however, that he did not 

report ‘‘this shortage’’ to DEA. Id. He 

also maintained he had ‘‘attempted to 

report a loss of 100 pills to DEA but did 

not attempt to report other losses either 

to DEA or local law enforcement 

because he considered them ‘not 

significant.’ ’’ Id. Chapman further 

represented ‘‘that 10–15 oxycodone or 

hydrocodone pills would be missing 

from the [p]harmacy . . . perhaps 15–20 

times in the prior year’’ and that ‘‘there 

was a total loss of perhaps 300 

oxycodone and hydrocodone pills.’’ Id. 

at 3–4. Chapman stated that ‘‘on those 

occasions when he found a pill shortage 

in the physical inventory as compared 

with the computer records, he adjusted 

the computer inventory to reflect the 

losses.’’ Id. However, ‘‘Chapman 

admitted that he did not report a loss for 

any of these losses.’’ Id. at 4. 

During the interview, ‘‘Chapman 

denied that he was abusing 

prescriptions drugs’’ and stated ‘‘that 

his fill-in pharmacists were previous 

drug abusers he had hired from a West 

Virginia Pharmacy Board facilitated 

drug rehabilitation program.’’ Id. 

Chapman also ‘‘denied knowing 


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5While in his declaration, the DI stated that 

Chapman was admitted to the hospital on June 17, 

2016, the records clearly show that this occurred on 

June 17, 2015. Appendix 6B. 

6The DI also obtained a copy of court records 

showing that on September 8, 2016, Chapman 

entered into a guilty plea to a state court 

information which charged him with the felony 

offense of ‘‘Obtaining Possession of a Controlled 

Substance by Fraud.’’ GX 3, at 6. 

anything further about the nature of the 

[p]harmacy losses of’’ controlled 

substances. Id. 

During the June 30 interview, 

Chapman also admitted that he ‘‘us[ed] 

marijuana illegally.’’ Id. at 4. He told the 

DI that ‘‘he uses an electronic cigarette 

or vaporizer device as a delivery 

mechanism for his marijuana.’’ Id. 

On July 19, 2016, the DI and a TFO 

served a search warrant on the CabellHuntington Hospital for Chapman’s 

records. Id. at 5. The records show that 

on June 17, 2015,5 as well as April 6 and 

July 18, 2016, ‘‘Chapman was admitted 

. . . due to complications from an 

overdose.’’ Id. at 5. Chapman underwent 

urine drug tests on each occasion, with 

the June 17, 2015 and April 6, 2016 test 

results showing that he was ‘‘positive 

for opiates including oxycodone’’ and 

the July 18 test results showing that he 

‘‘was positive for’’ both cocaine and 

oxycodone. Id. The records for both the 

June 17, 2015 and April 6, 2016 

admissions document that Chapman 

stated ‘‘that he had taken Percocet prior 

to being admitted.’’ Id. See also 

Appendix 6A, at 2 (April 6, 2016 

discharge summary) (‘‘discussed his 

urine tox screen with him and he states 

he took 1⁄2 percocet’’); Appendix 6B, at 

15 (June 17, 2015 discharge summary: 

‘‘The pt. denied taking anything other 

than Percocet several days prior to 

admission.’’) 

According to the DI, he queried the 

West Virginia Prescription Monitoring 

Program (PMP) to determine what 

prescriptions Chapman had been issued. 

GX 3, at 5. The query showed that 

‘‘Chapman had filled prescriptions for 

Tramadol and one prescription for 

hydrocodone in March 2016.’’ Id. The 

query showed no prescriptions for other 

drugs. Id. 

On July 21, 2016, the DI received 

another report from a pharmacy 

employee that Chapman had again taken 

oxycodone from the pharmacy. Id. at 4. 

The next day, the DI, along with a Task 

Force Officer and a Pharmacy Board 

Investigator again interviewed 

Chapman. Id. During the interview, 

‘‘Chapman admitted that he had been 

diverting . . . 200 to 300 milligrams 

every day [of] oxycodone or 

hydrocodone’’ for his ‘‘personal use’’ 

and had done so ‘‘for approximately 

[one] year.’’ Id. Chapman admitted that 

he ‘‘alter[ed] the [p]harmacy’s computer 

and inventory records’’ and that he 

‘‘shredd[ed] invoices from suppliers and 

destroy[ed] DEA 222 Forms and CSOS 

records.’’ Id. He ‘‘also admitted that he 

had been using cocaine during the past 

two years,’’ as well as that ‘‘his 

addiction was so strong that he couldn’t 

wait for [the] MOA . . . to expire so that 

he could begin using his . . . 

[r]egistration to fuel his . . . addiction.’’ 

Id. 

On July 23, 2016, the DI received 

another report from the employee that 

Chapman had taken drugs from the 

pharmacy, in particular, a 100-count 

bottle of oxycodone. Id. at 4. On August 

3, 2016, the DI received still another 

report from the employee that Chapman 

had taken narcotics from the pharmacy. 

Id. at 5. 

The DI also attempted to conduct an 

audit of the pharmacy. Id. While the DI 

subpoenaed the records from the 

pharmacy’s suppliers and was able to 

determine the total amount of drugs that 

the pharmacy had obtained, according 

to the DI, ‘‘the [p]harmacy’s internal 

records were so unreliable as to make an 

accurate count impossible.’’ Id. Based 

on the records he obtained from just one 

supplier, the DI found that Respondent 

could not account for 20,000 pills of 

oxycodone 30 mg and hydrocodone 10 

mg. Id. The DI noted that Chapman had 

also admitted to diverting oxycodone 15 

mg. Id. 

The DI also obtained a search warrant 

for the pharmacy’s video surveillance 

records; these videos were submitted as 

part of the record. Id. According to the 

DI, these videos show ‘‘Chapman 

entering the pharmacy and removing 

pills on two separate occasions,’’ 

including one during which Chapman 

‘‘plac[ed] an unknown number of loose 

pills into his pocket,’’ and another, 

during which Chapman removed a pill 

bottle from a locked storage cabinet. Id. 

at 5–6. In addition, the DI obtained 

photographs showing the various areas 

of the pharmacy and the location of the 

locked cabinet.6 Id. at 6. One of the 

videos does show a person opening a 

locked cabinet at the pharmacy counter, 

removing a plastic bottle from the 

cabinet, and leaving the pharmacy. 

Finally, the DI stated that ‘‘[i]f 

Chapman had been candid about his 

role in the diversion of controlled 

substances during the June 30 AIW, I 

and my DEA colleagues would have 

pursued immediate criminal action 

against Chapman. We would also have 

been able to take additional steps— 

including seeking immediate 

administrative sanctions—to prevent 

additional diversion of controlled 

substances from the [p]harmacy.’’ Id. 

Discussion 

Mootness 

As found above, the registration at 

issue in this proceeding expired on 

August 31, 2017. According to the 

registration records of the Agency, 

Chapman has not filed either a renewal 

application or a new application for the 

pharmacy. Accordingly, there is neither 

a registration to revoke nor an 

application to act upon. 

While ordinarily these facts would 

render this proceeding moot, see Ronald 

J. Riegel, 63 FR 67132, 67133 (1998), 

simultaneously with the issuance of the 

Show Cause Order, the former Acting 

Administrator ordered that Registrant’s 

registration be immediately suspended. 

Pursuant to the authority granted by 21 

U.S.C. 824(f), the former Acting 

Administrator authorized the seizure or 

placement under seal of the controlled 

substances possessed by Registrant 

pursuant to its registration. As found 

above, the Government seized various 

controlled substances pursuant to the 

Immediate Suspension Order. GX 3, 

at 2. 

Under section 824(f), ‘‘[u]pon a 

revocation order becoming final, all 

such controlled substances’’ which have 

been seized or placed under seal ‘‘shall 

be forfeited to the United States’’ and 

‘‘[a]ll right, title, and interest in such 

controlled substances shall vest in the 

United States upon a revocation order 

becoming final.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(f). DEA 

has previously held that a registrant, 

who has been issued an immediate 

suspension order, cannot defeat the 

effect of this provision by allowing its 

registration to expire. See Meetinghouse 

Community Pharmacy, Inc., 74 FR 

10073, 10074 n.5 (2009); RX Direct 

Pharmacy, Inc., 72 FR 54070, 54072 n.4 

(2007). Thus, this proceeding presents 

the collateral consequence of who has 

title to the controlled substances that 

were seized. Accordingly, I hold that 

this case is not moot and proceed to the 

merits. 

The Merits 

Under the CSA, ‘‘[a] registration 

pursuant to section 823 of this title to 

manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 

controlled substance . . . may be 

suspended or revoked by the Attorney 

General upon a finding that the 

registrant . . . has committed such acts 

as would render [its] registration under 

section 823 of this title inconsistent 

with the public interest as determined 

under such section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(4). In the case of a retail 


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7 In short, this is not a contest in which score is 

kept; the Agency is not required to mechanically 

count up the factors and determine how many favor 

the Government and how many favor the registrant. 

Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses on protecting 

the public interest; what matters is the seriousness 

of the registrant’s or applicant’s misconduct. Jayam 

Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 462 (2009). Accordingly, 

as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, findings under 

a single factor can support the revocation of a 

registration. MacKay, 664 F.3d at 821. 

8The Government submitted no evidence as to 

Factor One. As to Factor Three, the Government 

submitted evidence that after issuance of the Show 

Cause Order, Chapman pled guilty in state court to 

Obtaining Possession of a Controlled Substance by 

Fraud. While the evidence also includes a PostConviction Procedural Order but not a Judgment, 

the Government did not allege Chapman’s 

conviction for this offense as grounds for the 

proceeding. However, even if a Judgment has been 

issued, the Government did not provide him with 

notice that it intended to rely on either Factor Three 

or 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). Thus, I consider Chapman’s 

guilty plea only as additional evidence to support 

the allegations (not that such evidence is needed). 

In its Request for Final Agency Action, the 

Government did not address the applicability of 

Factor Two (the Registrant’s experience in 

dispensing controlled substances) to the various 

acts of misconduct that were alleged and proved. As 

explained in this Decision, the record establishes 

that Registrant engaged in the unlawful distribution 

of controlled substances and committed various 

recordkeeping violations. These acts of misconduct 

are relevant in assessing both Registrant’s 

compliance with applicable laws related to 

controlled substances as well as its experience in 

dispensing controlled substances. 

9Under a DEA regulation, a pharmacy is also 

allowed to distribute a small quantity of controlled 

substances to another practitioner ‘‘without being 

registered to distribute,’’ provided that ‘‘[t]he 

practitioner to whom the controlled substance is to 

be distributed is registered under the Act to 

dispense that controlled substance.’’ 21 CFR 

1307.11(a). Those distributions cannot, however, 

exceed, on a ‘‘calendar year’’ basis, ‘‘5 percent of 

the total number of dosage units of all controlled 

substances distributed and dispensed by the 

practitioner during the same calendar year.’’ Id. 

Chapman’s distribution of controlled substances to 

himself does not come within this exemption. 

pharmacy, which is deemed to be a 

practitioner, see id. § 802(21), Congress 

directed the Attorney General to 

consider the following factors in making 

the public interest determination: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

Id. 

‘‘[T]hese factors are . . . considered 

in the disjunctive.’’ Robert A. Leslie, 

M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). It is 

well settled that I ‘‘may rely on any one 

or a combination of factors, and may 

give each factor the weight [I] deem[ ] 

appropriate in determining whether’’ to 

suspend or revoke an existing 

registration. Id.; see also MacKay v. 

DEA, 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011); 

Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 

482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while I 

am required to consider each of the 

factors, I ‘‘need not make explicit 

findings as to each one.’’ MacKay, 664 

F.3d at 816 (quoting Volkman, 567 F.3d 

at 222); see also Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482.7

Also, pursuant to section 824(d), 

‘‘[t]he Attorney General may, in his 

discretion, suspend any registration 

simultaneously with the institution of 

proceedings under this section, in cases 

where he finds that there is an 

imminent danger to the public health or 

safety.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(d)(1). Congress 

has defined ‘‘the phrase ‘imminent 

danger to the public health or safety’ [to] 

mean[ ] that, due to the failure of the 

registrant to maintain effective controls 

against diversion or otherwise comply 

with the obligations of a registrant 

under [the CSA], there is a substantial 

likelihood of an immediate threat that 

death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of 

a controlled substance will occur in the 

absence of an immediate suspension of 

the registration.’’ Id. § (d)(2). 

Under the Agency’s regulation, ‘‘[a]t 

any hearing for the revocation or 

suspension of a registration, the 

Administration shall have the burden of 

proving that the requirements for such 

revocation or suspension pursuant to 

. . . 21 U.S.C. 824(a) . . . are satisfied.’’ 

21 CFR 1301.44(e). In this matter, I have 

considered all of the factors and find 

that the Government’s evidence with 

respect to factors four and five,8

establishes that Registrant, through its 

owner, has committed acts which 

render its registration ‘‘inconsistent 

with the public interest’’ and which 

support the suspension of its 

registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). I 

further find that the Government’s 

evidence establishes that Registrant’s 

misconduct satisfies the imminent 

danger standard of 21 U.S.C. 824(d), in 

that, Registrant’s failure ‘‘to maintain 

effective controls against diversion or 

otherwise comply with the obligations 

of a registrant under’’ the CSA created 

‘‘a substantial likelihood of an 

immediate threat that . . . abuse of a 

controlled substance will occur in the 

absence of an immediate suspension of 

[its] registration.’’ 

Factor Four—Compliance With 

Applicable Laws Related to Controlled 

Substances 

As found above, the evidence shows 

that Chapman, Registrant’s PIC, was 

diverting narcotic controlled substances 

from the pharmacy’s stock for his own 

misuse. This evidence includes: (1) The 

videos showing him unlocking the 

cabinet in which controlled substances 

were stored, removing a bottle of 

medication, and leaving the pharmacy; 

(2) the statements of a pharmacy 

employee to the DI as to various 

instances in which oxycodone went 

missing, including the July 18, 2016 

incident, when he passed out at his desk 

and was hospitalized; (3) the UDS 

results for the various hospitalizations 

including the July 18, 2016 positive 

result for oxycodone (which was also 

positive for cocaine); (4) his subsequent 

admission to Investigators during the 

July 21, 2016 interview that he had been 

diverting 200 to 300 milligrams every 

day of oxycodone or hydrocodone for 

approximately one year; (5) the DI’s 

finding that at least 20,000 dosage units 

of oxycodone 30 mg and hydrocodone 

10 mg could not be accounted for; and 

(6) the DI’s statement that his query of 

the state PMP showed that Chapman 

had filled only prescriptions for 

tramadol and one hydrocodone 

prescription in March 2016. 

Under the Controlled Substances Act, 

it is ‘‘unlawful for any person 

knowingly or intentionally to possess a 

controlled substance unless such 

substance was obtained directly, or 

pursuant to a valid prescription or 

order, from a practitioner, while acting 

in the course of his professional 

practice, or except as otherwise 

authorized by this subchapter.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 844(a). While Chapman, as the 

PIC of a registered pharmacy, was 

authorized to order controlled 

substances for the pharmacy and to 

possess controlled substances in his 

capacity as the Registrant’s PIC, he was 

generally authorized to do so only for 

the purpose of dispensing the controlled 

substances to patients ‘‘pursuant to the 

lawful order of a practitioner,’’ i.e., a 

prescription.9 See 21 U.S.C. 822(b) 

(‘‘Persons registered by the Attorney 

General under this subchapter to . . . 

dispense controlled substances . . . are 

authorized to possess . . . distribute, or 

dispense such substance . . . to the 

extent authorized by their registration 

and in conformity with the other 

provision of this subchapter.’’) 

(emphasis added); id. § 823(f) (‘‘The 

Attorney general shall register 

practitioners (including pharmacies, as 

distinguished from pharmacists) to 

dispense . . . .’’). id. § 802 (‘‘The term 

‘dispense’ means to deliver a controlled 


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10Factor Five does not require that the 

Government prove an actual threat to public health 

or safety and thus, the Government is not required 

to identify any specific instance in which a 

practitioner’s (or its employee’s) self-abuse created 

an actual threat to the health and safety of its 

patients. 

substance to an ultimate user . . . by, or 

pursuant to the lawful order of, a 

practitioner’’); see also 21 CFR 

1300.01(a) (‘‘Prescription means an 

order for medication which is dispensed 

to or for an ultimate user but does not 

include an order for medication which 

is dispensed for immediate 

administration to the ultimate user 

. . . .’’). As Registrant’s PIC, Chapman 

was not authorized to then distribute 

the controlled substances to himself. 

Moreover, because under West Virginia 

law, a limited liability company has 

legal personality (see West Va. 

§ 841(a)(1)) and Chip RX, L.L.C., held 

the registration, it unlawfully 

distributed controlled substances to 

Chapman in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

841(a)(1) (‘‘Except as authorized by this 

subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any 

person knowing or intentionally . . . to 

distribute . . . a controlled substance.’’). 

The evidence also shows that 

Registrant (and Chapman) violated the 

CSA by failing maintain ‘‘a complete 

and accurate’’ record of each such 

[controlled] substance . . . received, 

sold, delivered or otherwise disposed of 

. . . .’’ 21 U.S.C. § 827(a)(3). 

Specifically, Chapman admitted that he 

shredded invoices from suppliers. See 

id., see also 21 CFR 1304.04(a) 

(requiring that records be kept ‘‘for at 

least 2 years from the date of such 

inventory or records’’); id. § 1304.22(c) 

(incorporating 21 CFR 1304.22(a)(2)(i), 

(ii), (iv), (vii), (ix)). Indeed, Registrant 

was required to maintain records of its 

distribution to Chapman. 

Moreover, Chapman admitted that he 

destroyed both schedule II order forms 

and CSOS (Controlled Substance 

Ordering System) electronic records. 

Chapman’s admission establishes that 

Registrant violated 21 U.S.C. 828(c)(2), 

which requires that a purchaser of a 

schedule II controlled substance retain a 

duplicate copy of a DEA Order Form ‘‘if 

such order is accepted’’ by a supplier 

and ‘‘preserve such duplicate for a 

period of two years and make it 

available for inspection or copying.’’ 

Chapman’s admission also establishes 

that Registrant violated section 828(c)(2) 

by failing to maintain CSOS records. See 

also 21 CFR 1305.27(a) (‘‘A purchaser 

must, for each order filled, retain the 

original signed order and all linked 

records for that order for two years.’’). 

Thus, the evidence with respect to 

Registrant’s compliance with applicable 

laws related to controlled substances 

establishes that Registrant committed 

numerous violations of the CSA by 

unlawfully distributing controlled 

substances to Chapman in violation of 

21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); it also shows that 

Registrant and Chapman violated the 

recordkeeping provisions of 21 U.S.C. 

827(a)(3), as well as provisions requiring 

the maintenance of schedule II order 

forms. 21 U.S.C. 828(a)(2). Finally, the 

evidence also shows that Registrant’s 

principal and PIC violated 21 U.S.C. 

844(a) by obtaining controlled 

substances other than by means 

‘‘pursuant to a valid prescription . . . 

from a practitioner, while acting in the 

course of his professional practice, or 

except as otherwise authorized by’’ the 

CSA. 

Factor Five—Such Other Conduct 

Which May Threaten Public Health and 

Safety 

The Agency has also long held that 

self-abuse of a controlled substance 

constitutes such other conduct which 

may threaten public health and safety. 

See Tyson D. Quy, 78 FR 47412 (2013); 

Tony T. Bui, 75 FR 49979 (2010); 

Kenneth Wayne Green, Jr., 59 FR 51453 

(1994); David E. Trawick, 53 FR 5,326 

(1988). While Registrant is not an 

individual but rather a limited liability 

company, the Agency has long held that 

the misconduct of an entity’s principal 

is properly considered in determining 

whether to revoke the entity’s 

registration. See G & O Pharmacy of 

Paducah, 68 FR 43752, 43753 (2003). 

That Chapman’s personal abuse of 

controlled substances, which includes 

his abuse of cocaine, narcotics, and 

marijuana on the job, may have 

threatened public health and safety is 

indisputable given the evidence that he 

incorrectly filled a prescription and 

pharmacy staff had to correct his error.10

The Government also alleged that 

Chapman made several materially false 

statements to agency Investigators. As 

recognized by the Sixth 

Circuit,’’[c]andor during DEA 

investigations, regardless of the severity 

of the violations alleged, is considered 

by the DEA to be an important factor 

when assessing whether a 

[practitioner’s] registration is consistent 

with the public interest.’’ Hoxie v. DEA, 

419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2005). To be 

actionable, the Government is required 

to show that the statement was false and 

material to the investigation. See Roy S. 

Schwartz, 79 FR 34360, 34363 n.6 

(2014); Belinda R. Mori, 78 FR 36582, 

36589 (2013). 

As the Supreme Court has explained, 

a false statement is material if it ‘‘ ‘has 

a natural tendency to influence, or was 

capable of influencing the decision of 

the decisionmaking body to which it 

was addressed.’ ’’ Kungys v. United 

States, 485 U.S. 755, 770 (1988) (quoting 

Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 

699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). The Court has 

further explained that: 

it has never been the test of materiality that 

the misrepresentation . . . would more likely 

than not have produced an erroneous 

decision, or even that it would more likely 

than not have triggered an investigation. 

Rather, the test is whether the 

misrepresentation . . . was predictably 

capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural 

tendency to affect, the official decision. 

485 U.S. at 770–71. ‘‘It makes no 

difference that a specific falsification 

did not exert influence so long as it had 

the capacity to do so.’’ United States v. 

Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 234 (1st 

Cir. 1985). 

The evidence establishes that 

Chapman made several materially false 

statements to the Investigators. First, 

Chapman told the Investigators during 

the June 30, 2016 interview that ‘‘10 to 

15 oxycodone or hydrocodone pills 

would be missing from the [p]harmacy 

. . . perhaps 15–20 times in the prior 

year’’ and that Registrant had ‘‘a total 

loss of perhaps 300 oxycodone and 

hydrocodone pills.’’ Second, during the 

June 30, 2016 interview, Chapman 

‘‘denied that he was abusing 

prescription drugs’’ and attributed the 

diversion to fill-in pharmacists he 

employed who were previous drug 

abusers and were hired through a State 

Board rehabilitation program. He also 

‘‘denied knowing anything further about 

the nature of the [p]harmacy’s losses’’ of 

controlled substances. 

Chapman’s statements regarding the 

scope of the diversion of drugs from 

Registrant were false because the 

diversion was far more extensive than 

what he claimed during the June 30 

interview, as he ultimately admitted 

during the July 22, 2016 interview, 

when he acknowledged diverting 200 to 

300 milligrams per day of oxycodone or 

hydrocodone for personal use. So too, 

his statements during the June 30 

interview in which he denied that he 

was abusing drugs, as well as that he 

knew anything further about the nature 

of the pharmacy’s losses, were also false 

as he ultimately admitted during the 

July 22 interview that he was abusing 

narcotic prescription drugs and was 

diverting large quantities on a daily 

basis. 

I further conclude that these 

statements were capable of influencing 

the decisionmaking process of the 

Agency because Chapman attempted to 

minimize the scope of the criminal 

conduct that was occurring at 


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Registrant, both with respect to the 

volume of drugs being diverted and by 

denying that he was engaged in 

diverting and abusing the controlled 

substances. As explained above, 

Registrant’s and Chapman’s misconduct 

in diverting drugs, which the latter 

personally abused, was actionable 

misconduct under both Factor Four 

(compliance with applicable laws 

related to controlled substances) and 

Factor Five (other conduct which may 

threaten public health and safety). As 

the DI explained, had Chapman been 

candid during the June 30, 2016 

interview, he and his colleagues ‘‘would 

have pursued immediate criminal action 

against Chapman’’ as well as 

administrative action against Registrant. 

Indeed, Chapman’s subsequent 

admissions during the July 22, 2016 

interview supported both criminal 

charges against Chapman and the 

Immediate Suspension Order. 

Accordingly, I conclude that the 

evidence with respect to Factor Five 

establishes that Registrant’s principal 

was abusing controlled substances and 

that he made several materially false 

statements to DEA investigators. I also 

conclude that these acts constitute 

actionable misconduct which may 

threaten public health and safety. 

Summary of Factors Four and Five and 

Imminent Danger 

As found above, the Government’s 

evidence establishes that Registrant 

unlawfully distributed controlled 

substances to Chapman and failed to 

maintain required records. The evidence 

also establishes that Registrant’s 

principal and pharmacist in charge 

unlawfully possessed controlled 

substances, destroyed records that 

Registrant was required to maintain, 

abused controlled substances and made 

materially false statements to DEA 

Investigators. I therefore find that 

Registrant has committed such acts as to 

render its registration inconsistent with 

the public interest. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). 

For purposes of the imminent danger 

inquiry, these findings also support the 

conclusion that Registrant has ‘‘fail[ed] 

. . . to maintain effective controls 

against diversion or otherwise comply 

with the obligations of a registrant 

under’’ the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 824(d)(2). 

Also, the evidence that Chapman was 

diverting 200 to 300 milligrams of 

narcotics per day, which he then abused 

(along with the evidence showing that 

he was hospitalized for an overdose on 

multiple occasions), establishes that 

there was ‘‘a substantial likelihood of an 

immediate threat that death, serious 

bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled 

substance [would] occur in the absence 

of the immediate suspension of 

[Registrant’] registration.’’ Id. I therefor 

affirm the issuance of the Immediate 

Suspension Order. 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(f), ‘‘[u]pon 

a revocation order becoming final, all 

. . . controlled substances’’ seized 

pursuant to a suspension order ‘‘shall be 

forfeited to the United States’’ and ‘‘[a]ll 

right, title, and interest in such 

controlled substances shall vest in the 

United States upon a revocation order 

becoming final.’’ As the Agency has 

previously held, a registrant cannot 

defeat the effect of this provision by 

allowing its registration to expire.’’ 

S & S Pharmacy, Inc., d/b/a Platinum 

Pharmacy & Compounding, 78 FR 

57656, 57659 (2013) (citing 

Meetinghouse Community Pharmacy, 

Inc., 74 FR 10073, 10074 n.5 (2009); RX 

Direct Pharmacy, Inc., 72 FR 54070, 

54072 n.4 (2007)). Registrant had the 

right to challenge the Immediate 

Suspension Order before the Agency but 

chose not to. And had Registrant not 

allowed its registration to expire, I 

would have revoked it. 

Accordingly, I will order that the 

controlled substances seized pursuant to 

the Immediate Suspension Order be 

forfeited to the United States. 21 U.S.C. 

824(f). I will also declare that ‘‘[a]ll, 

right, title, and interest in’’ the 

controlled substances that were seized 

pursuant to the Suspension Order have 

vested in the United States. Id. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and (d), as well as 

28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that the Order 

of Immediate Suspension issued to Chip 

RX d/b/a City Center Pharmacy be, and 

it hereby is, affirmed. Pursuant to the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

824(f), I order that all controlled 

substances seized pursuant to the Order 

of Immediate Suspension be, and they 

hereby are, forfeited to the United 

States. Pursuant to the authority vested 

in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(f), I also declare 

that all right, title, and interest in all 

controlled substances seized pursuant to 

the Order of Immediate Suspension be, 

and they hereby are, vested in the 

United States. This Order is applicable 

December 6, 2017. 

Dated: October 31, 2017. 

Robert W. Patterson, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2017–24093 Filed 11–3–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. DEA–392] 

Bulk Manufacturer of Controlled 

Substances Application: Cerilliant 

Corporation 

ACTION: Notice of application. 

DATES: Registered bulk manufacturers of 

the affected basic classes, and 

applicants therefore, may file written 

comments on or objections to the 

issuance of the proposed registration on 

or before January 5, 2018. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments should 

be sent to: Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Attention: DEA Federal 

Register Representative/DRW, 8701 

Morrissette Drive, Springfield, Virginia 

22152. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Attorney General has delegated his 

authority under the Controlled 

Substances Act to the Administrator of 

the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), 28 CFR 0.100(b). Authority to 

exercise all necessary functions with 

respect to the promulgation and 

implementation of 21 CFR part 1301, 

incident to the registration of 

manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, 

importers, and exporters of controlled 

substances (other than final orders in 

connection with suspension, denial, or 

revocation of registration) has been 

redelegated to the Assistant 

Administrator of the DEA Diversion 

Control Division (‘‘Assistant 

Administrator’’) pursuant to section 7 of 

28 CFR part 0, appendix to subpart R. 

In accordance with 21 CFR 

1301.33(a), this is notice that on May 23, 

2017, Cerilliant Corporation, 811 

Paloma Drive, Suite A, Round Rock, 

Texas 78665–2402 applied to be 

registered as a bulk manufacturer of the 

following basic classes of controlled 

substances: 

Controlled substance Drug code Schedule 

ADB-FUBINACA (N-(1-amino-3,3-dimethyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-)4-fluorobenzyl)-1-H-indazole-3-carboxamide) ............ 7010 I 

MDMB-FUBINACA (Methyl-2-(1-(4-fluorobenzyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamido)-3,3-dimethylbutanoate) ....................... 7020 I 

MAB-CHMINACA (N-(1-amino-3,3dimethyl-1-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-(cyclohexylmethyl)-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide) ......... 7032 I 


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