SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

PAUL R. WALLACE

JUDGE

LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER

500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801

(302) 255-0660

Submitted: February 10, 2022

Decided: March 9, 2022

Mr. David R. Wright

SBI# 158184

James T. Vaughn Correctional Center

1181 Paddock Road

Smyrna, DE 19977

RE: State v. David R. Wright

I.D. No. 0802023870

Request for Certificate of Eligibility under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)

Dear Mr. Wright:

The Court has received your filing dated February 5, 2022, through which 

you request, pro se, a certificate of eligibility to seek review of your sentence under 

Title 11, Section 4214(f).1 In short, you suggest that the Court should grant you a 

certificate of eligibility because you believe others who have received one may have 

served a shorter period of time than you have thus far.2 That may indeed be true. 

But pointing out that simple fact does nothing to satisfy the exacting requirements 

for § 4214(f) eligibility in your individual case.

3

 And so, for the sake of 

completeness, the Court has reviewed: your request; the record in your case; and, 

the applicable law and Court rules. 

You are serving a habitual criminal sentence for each of your five felony 

convictions in this case, at least three of those are clearly for violent felonies—

1 D.I. 104

2

Id. (citing State v. McDougal, 2020 WL 4384088 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2020)).

3

See State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282, at **1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), aff’d, 2019 

WL 2157519 (Del. May 16, 2019) (describing the requirements that must be met before the 

Court will issue a certificate of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)).
State v. David R. Wright

I.D. No. 0802023870

March 9, 2022

Page 2 of 4

Robbery First Degree (S08-02-1094I), Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 

Commission of a Felony (PDWDCF) (S08-02-1095I), and Kidnapping Second 

Degree (S08-02-1098I).4 Prior to sentencing, the State had moved to have your 

habitual criminal status applied to each of your five convictions, including those 

three violent felonies just mentioned.

5

 And the Court granted that motion.6 That 

means at least the first 65 years of your 74-year imprisonment term were required 

to be imposed under then-extant 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).7 And the effective date of 

that sentence is no earlier than January 9, 2009.

8

 

Under § 4214(f), a habitual criminal serving a sentence under the pre-2016 

Habitual Criminal Act is eligible for sentencing relief only “after the person has 

4 Sentencing Order, State v. David R. Wright, ID No. 0802023870 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 

2009) (D.I. 34).

5 Habitual Criminal Petition, State v. David R. Wright, ID No. 0802023870 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Jan. 6, 2009) (D.I. 32). 

6 D.I. 33. 

7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2007) (providing for a minimum mandatory sentence 

equal to the statutory maximum for each violent Title 11 triggering felony); id. at §§ 832, 

4201(c) and 4205(b)(2) (maximum sentence for first-degree robbery, a violent class B felony, 

was 25 years at Level V at the time of this your crimes); id. at §§ 1447, 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2) 

(maximum sentence for PDWDCF, a violent class B felony, was 25 years at Level V at the 

time of this your crimes); id. at §§ 783, 4201(c) and 4205(b)(3) (maximum sentence for the 

violent class C felony of second-degree kidnapping was, at the time of your crimes, 15 years 

at Level V); and, id. at § 3901(d) (providing at the time of your crimes that no sentence of 

confinement for any crime could be made to run concurrently with any other sentence of 

confinement imposed). 

Where the State files a substantively adequate motion for application of one’s habitual offender 

status and that motion becomes the basis for a finding of the existence of his habitual offender 

status, this Court must apply that habitual offender status to each specific count—no more or 

no less—advanced by the State. Kirby v. State, 1998 WL 184492, at *2 (Del. Apr. 13, 1998); 

Reeder v. State, 2001 WL 355732, at * 3 (Del. Mar. 26, 2001); Hawkins v. State, 2002 WL 

384436, *2 (Del. Mar. 6, 2002); Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 1343761, at *2 (Del. June 18, 

2002).

8 Sentencing Order, at 1. The Court notes you were sentenced in another habitual criminal 

case just months earlier. Sentencing Order, State v. David R. Wright, ID No. 0801021840 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008) (D.I. 11). 
State v. David R. Wright

I.D. No. 0802023870

March 9, 2022

Page 3 of 4

served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence 

otherwise required by th[e current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act] or the 

statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is greater.”9 And, under the 

current provision of the Habitual Criminal Act that appears to apply to you— 

§ 4214(c)—the resulting habitual criminal portion of your sentence would be the 

same: a minimum mandatory term of 65 years of unsuspended imprisonment.10 So 

you are not eligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) because you do not meet 

the statute’s time-served eligibility requirement.11 

9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(f) (2021).

10 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(c) (2021) (habitual criminal sentenced for a triggering 

fourth felony, when that felony is a Title 11 violent felony and at least one of his priors was a 

Title 11 violent felony, must receive the statutory maximum for that triggering Title 11 violent 

felony); see also Hawkins, supra. (this Court must apply one’s habitual status to each triggering 

conviction upon which the State moves in its petition); see also Fountain v. State, 139 A.3d 

837, 842-43 (Del. 2016) (changes to § 3901(d) that might now allow some concurrent 

sentencing for multiple convictions arising out of same criminal conduct do not 

apply retroactively to inmates convicted and sentenced before 2014 Amended Sentencing 

Act’s effective date—July 9, 2014); State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257, 264 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019) 

(same for changes to § 3901(d) wrought by the 2019 Amended Sentencing Act).

Given the posture of this request, the Court could not and need reckon your definitive 

categorization under the current Habitual Criminal Act. See Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282, at *2

(“Occasionally . . . because statutory tiering under the revised Habitual Criminal Act is based 

on considerations such as whether a predicate felony conviction was for a Title 11 violent 

felony—something that was of no moment to the State when filing, nor the Court when 

granting a habitual criminal petition under the old law—the Court must . . . conduct a more 

searching inquiry into the inmate’s conviction history.”). But just a passing examination of 

the habitual criminal petitions filed around the time of your sentencing (Case ID Nos. 

0801021840 and 0802023870) reveals that on your best day under current law, you would have 

to serve a minimum mandatory term of 371⁄2 of unsuspended imprisonment. See, e.g., DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(c) (2021) (one sentenced under that current provision must receive 

a minimum sentence of not less than one-half the statutory maximum penalty otherwise 

provided for each triggering Title 11 violent felony moved for in the State’s habitual criminal 

petition). 

11 State v. Harris, 2022 WL 472518, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022) (inmate must meet 

both the type-of-sentence and the time-served requirement to be eligible for review under 

11 Del. C. § 4214(f)); id. at *4 (explaining analysis under the time-served requirement).
State v. David R. Wright

I.D. No. 0802023870

March 9, 2022

Page 4 of 4

Therefore, your request for a certificate of eligibility under Del. Super. Ct. 

Spec. R. 2017-1(c) is DENIED, with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

cc: Criminal Prothonotary – Sussex County

Honorable Craig A. Karsnitz

David Hume, IV, Chief Prosecutor, Sussex County