ATTA CHED TO THIS VERSI O N AT THE END I S A COURT ORDER DA TED 31M AR00

T H A T A P P L IE S T O T H IS C A S E -e
D esig nat ed o n Ma r ch 3 1, 2000, f or p ub lica tio n CO RRECT ED CO PY
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 90- 149 6 J ES US A. B ARRER

A , A P P E L L A NT ,

V
. T OGO D. W EST , J R

. , S EC RET AR

Y O F V ETERA NS A FF AI RS , A PPELLEE
.

B ef o re N E B E K E R , Chie f Judge , an d KRAM ER , FARL EY, H O L D A W A Y , IV E R S , S T E IN B E RG , an d G RE E N E , Ju dge s .

O R D E R
I n a p a n e l d e c i s i o n d a t e d Oc t o be r 25 , 19 99 , the Co ur t d i s a l l o we d c l a i me d a tt o r n e yf ees and exp ens es p ursua nt

t o the Equal Access t o Jus t i ce Act ( EA JA) , 28 U

. S. C. § 2412, f or work
as so cia ted w ith th e ap pe llan t's app ea l to th e U nite d S tate s C o u rt of A pp ea ls fo r th e F ed er al C irc u it (Fed eral C ircuit

). T h e C ou rt held th at the F ed er a l C ircuit 's denial of the appe ll ant's EA JA appl i cat i on f

or t he same fe es a nd expen ses rende red t he mat t er res j udi cat a. Th e appe l l ant now m o v es fo r a fu ll C o u rt d ec isio n c o nc er nin g th is m atte r.
M ot i ons f

or a f ul l Cou rt deci si on ar e not

fa v o red. Ordi nar i lythey wi l l not be gran t ed
u nle ss su ch ac tion is nec es sa ry to se cu re o r m ain tain u nifo rm ity o f the C o u rt's d ec isio ns o r to res ol ve a ques t i on of

exce pt i onal i m port anc e. I n this appe al , the appel l ant has not shown that ei ther bas i s ex i st s t o warr ant a f ul l Cou rt deci si on. Upon consi derati on of the for egoi ng, the rec ord on appe al , and t he appel l ant ' s moti on f

or a full C ou rt decisi on, it

is
O RD E RE D th at th e m o tion fo r a fu ll C o u rt d ec isio n is D E N IE D

. DAT E D: F e b r u a r

y2 5 , 2 0 0 0 P E R C U RI A M.

KRAMER, Judge, conc u rr ing: I have r eviewe d J udg e Steinberg ' s articulate dissent, but
ne ve rt he le ss mu st take iss ue wi th i t on the fo llo wi ngg ro un ds . F ir st, Idis a g re e that th e re is c a se2

pr e c e de nt t

hat ho lds that th is C ourt

ha s juri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r a n a wa rd un de r the Eq

ua l A c c e ss t o J ustice Ac t (EAJA) for wor k done in the F eder al C ircuit duringa per iod when this Court was div e ste d o f a

ny jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he un de rl yingmatte r. Al tho ug h a n in fe rence c ou ld b e dr awn to that eff ect f rom the cited pr ece dent, none of the cited c ases dire ctl y

addre sses the jurisdictional question.
Se c on d, e ve n a ssumin gth at th e Co ur t ha s juri sd ic tio n, the dis se nt r e c og nize s th at it is a

" qu e sti on wh e the r it is a

pp ro pr iate fo r t

his Court to e xer c ise its jur isd ic tio n, " and c on c lud e s th at it is. Dissent, po st at __. I find this a curious result, i n light of the di ssent' s rec og nition that Feder al Circuit prec edent c onstrues its owns rules as conte mplating that " when attorney fee s and expenses
are authorized in connec tion with an appeal," the Feder al C ircuit should determine " the am ount of the awa rd for suc h fee s and expenses," beca use it "is in a better position . . . to determine the amount of f ees a ndex pen ses to b e a ward ed i n co nn ect io n wi th th e app eal to [ th e Feder al C ir cui t] ." Id. (qu o t i n g Gave tte v. OPM , 808 F.2d 1456, 1468 ( Fe d. Cir. 1986) (en ba nc), (em p h as i s i n dissent). I f the dissent we re to pre vail, the exact opposite proce ss would occur --the de termination would be made by a cour t (this Court) not in the best positi on to determine suc h amount. Although the dissent appea rs to sug g est that the F eder al Circuit admonition ex tends not to the actua l gr ant of a n appl i cation, but only

to the amount of the a

war d g rante d, see id. (empha siz ing the wordingin the Fe dera l Circuit's rules that it should determine the amount of fee awa rds), ther e is no esca

pe fr om the ine vit a

ble re su lt that, we re thi s Cou rt to de te rm ine that an awa rd wa s a pp ro pr iate , it

wo uld a lso have to c alculate the amount of such a war d. Third, ag ain assumingjurisdiction, for this Court to involve itself in the same wor k as that
un de rt ake n in the F e de ra l Cir c uit wo uld re qu ir e us to v iol ate the pr oh ibi te d p ra c tic e tha t " [a] r e qu e st for att orn ey s fe es s ho ul d n otres ul t i n a s econ d m ajo r l it igat io n, " Commissioner, I NS v. Jean , 4 9 6 U. S

. 1 5 4 , 1 6 3 (1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 4 61 U.S

. 42 4, 43 7 (19 83 )) . T his is
e sp e c ia lly tr ue wh e re our r e c or d d oe s not in clu de the pa rt ie s' fi lin g s in

the F e de ra l Cir c uit , interlocuto r

y o r d e r s o f th at c o urt, o r th e tr an s c r ip ti o n o f an y o r a l ar g u me n t h e ar d in th at c o urt, let alone c opies of interna l Fede ral Circuit memora nda or c onfer ence notes.
Four th, as the dissent points out, the appellant' s EAJ A application, submi tted to and denied by the Fe dera l Circuit, lim ited itself to aver ringthat t h e S ec re tary ' s liti g ation position before our Court w as not substantially justified. Thus, the appellant failed to aver that the Secr etar

y ' s position
at th e a dmi nis tr ativ e sta g e a lso wa s not sub sta nti a lly jus tif

ie d. Ne ve rt

he le ss, the F e de ra l Cir c uit in denying the appe l l an t 's EAJA petiti on befor e it held only that the Secr etar

y ' s position before the Fe dera l Circ uit wa s substantially justified. To the extent that the dissent sugg ests that the issue of substantial justi fication should nothave be en bifurc ated by the Fe deral C i rc u i t , thus requiring
c on sid e ratio n b y

our C ourt

of wh e the r the re wa s su

bs tanti a l jus tif

ic atio n at th e a dmi nis tr ativ e le ve l, it appea rs t hat any problem i n this reg ard was caused by mistakes in the appellant's application. The dissent, rather

than pena liz e the appellant for s uch mi stakes, would have him profit from them. See INS v. Je an , 496 U.S. at 159 (" The most telling a nswer to the Government' s submissi on that it may
asser t a ' substantial justi fication' de fense at multiple stage s of an a ction is the complete a bsence of any text ual support for this position. .

. . [R ]equiring courts to make a se parate findingof substantial3

justification reg arding the Government' s opposition to fee reque sts would mult iply litigation . . . [and could] spawn a ' Kaf

kaesque judicial nightmar e' of infinite litigation to r ecove r fee s for the last round of l it igat io n o ver f

ees. ")

In response to the two rea sons give n by my coll eague in Part 3E of his dissent for the collapsed " underpinnings" o f t h e p rec edingpara g raphs, I offe r the followingresponse . First, the dis s en t asser

ts that there is no issue her e as to re asonable ness of fe es and e x penses in the F eder al Cir c uit be c a us e the Se c re tary

is n ot c on te sti ngthe m he re . A s th e dis se nt p oints o ut i n Pa rt 3D , th is Court has an indepe ndent re sponsibili ty to reviewrea sonablene ss, even in the f ace of a Sec reta

rial
conce ssion. Se e Che

sse r v. W est , 1 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. 4 9 7 , 5 0 1 -0 2 (1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433; Us se ry v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t

. Ap p
. 5 1 , 5 3 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ( r u l e is not t h at Court looks no further in abse nce of supported attack on rea sonablene ss of EAJA fe es and expenses; r ather , Cou rt m ay l ook independe ntly

to see if r equeste d fee s not facia lly unrea sonable or c ontraindicated by up to 12 fac tors, i n cl u d i n g time and labor r equire d; duplicativeness of w ork; novelty and diffic ulty

of question; leg al skill necessa ry ; prec lusion of other employ ment by case ; work traditionally

done by nonattorney s; tim e limitations i mposed; amount involved and res u lts obtained; ex perie nce of attorney s). Second, the dissent implies that the approa ch advocated by my concur renc e would re quire EAJA litigation in both the Fe dera l Circuit and this Court, t hus causingtwo major litigations. The simple answe r t o this so-ca lled "a dd[ed] complexit y ," D issent, po st at __, would be to apply to the extent possi ble the unitary litigation theory

so eloquently propounded in the dissent. That means that an appellant, simply

put, will apply

for all EAJA fe es and expenses in the hig he st c ourt in which any such fe es and e x penses a

re so ug ht for, at least, all work pre viously done in any

court on be half of the EA JA a

pp lic atio n. In othe r w or ds , in pr a c tic a l te rm s, that me ans that th e F e de ra l Cir c uit is i n a much be tter position to make an awa rd for work done below it than this Court is t o make suc h an
awa rd fo r w or k d on e a bo ve it.

Infu rt h er re s p o n s e, th e d i s s en t 's co m m en t ary i nfo o tn o t e 7 o n ce aga i ns h o ws m y co l l ea gu e's predisposition, in viol ation of hi s own uni tary theory , to overc omplicate the obvious. Can ther e be any question that the appe llant ga rner ed pre vailing pa

rty status throug h his victor y i n the Fe dera l Circuit, in which that Court clear ly reve rsed this Court in r eg ard to our holdingof lac k of jurisdiction to hear the appe llant's a

ppeal a nd rema nded the unde rlying matter for further p ro ce ed i ng s on the
m e r i t s ? S

ee Shalala v. Schaefe r , 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (qu o t i n g Texas Teache rs Ass' n v. Garland Indepe ndent School Dist ., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (re mand relievingparty of adve rse de cision
satis fi e s p re va ili ngpa

rt y re qu ir e me nt b e c a

us e it r e pr e se nts " su c c e [ss] o n a ny si gnif icant i ssu e in lit ig atio n whic h a c hie ve [d] so me of the be ne fi t

. . . s ou g ht i n b ri ng ingsu it" ); Che sse r, 11 Vet.App.
at 49 9 ( a pp e lla nt p re va ili ngpa

rt y " by vir tue of Cou rt ' s r e mand " ); Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 291, 300-01 (1994) (whe re Court re mands to Boa rd, appe llant is prevailingparty ).
Ce rt a inl y , th e a

pp e lla nt re c e ive d be ne fi t fr om the a c tio n of t he F e de ra l Cir c uit

c omp are d to his situation prior to his appea l to that Court. Even assuming that the benef it must be predic ated on the appe al to this Court (not to the Feder al C ircuit from this Court), he has w on the rig ht to an appea l4

here on the merits, something he previously had been denied. This status permitted the filing of the
a pp e lla nt' s EA JA a

pp lic atio n wi thi n 30 da

y s of the fi na l jud g me nt. Ind e e d, the F e dera l C ir c uit implicitl y rec og nized that he was a preva iling par

ty when it base d its EAJ A d ecision on the
su bs tanti a l ju sti fi c atio n q

ue sti on -- an is su e that c an o nly ari se on ce th e app ella

nt b e c ome s a preva iling par

ty

. Se e Ba

za lo v . W est , 1 50 F.3d 1380, 1383 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (over ruling on other g roun d b u t upholding this Court's r uling that showingpreva iling par ty status is jurisdi ctional and
mus t be inc lud e d in

tim e ly a pp lic atio n; o nly

mus t a lle g e su

bs tanti a l ju sti fi c atio n) ; see also C o urt 's
case law showing that first criter ion in evaluatingEAJA application is prevailingparty status, e.g ., W e ie rb ac h v . W

est , 12 V e t.A

pp . 4 86 , 4 87 -8 9 ( 19 99 ); Chesser , 11 Ve t.A pp . at 49 9; Ba

za lo v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 304, 309 ( 1996), r e v 'd in p a r t o n o th e r gr o u n d s s u b n o m B az a lo v

. W

est, supra (f

ir st jur isd ic tio na l r e qu ir e me nt o f E AJA s uit is s ho wi ng of

pr e va ili ngpa

rt y status ) ; L e ma tta v . B ro wn , 8 V e t.A pp . 5 04 , 5 10 (1 99 6) (" B e c a us e thi s Co ur

t f ind s th at th e a

pp e lla nt ha s n ot s ho wn

that he is a pre vailing pa

rty . . . it is unnecess ar y
. . . t o ex amine whe ther the a ppellant has met the othe r

. . . r e qu ir e me nts " ); Sti llwe ll , 6 Vet.App. at 298-301.
STEI NB ERG, Judge , d i s s en t i n g: T h i s m at t er i s b ef o re th e C o urto nth e ap p el l an t 's
app lic a t i o nf

o r at t o r n e y f e e s an d e xp e n s e s un d e r

th e E qu a l A c c e s s t o Ju s t i c e A c t , 2 8 U

. S .C. § 241 2(d) ( EA JA) . I

vo te d to g ra

nt t he a pp e lla nt' s mo tio n f

or a fu ll Co ur

t de c isi on in t his c a se beca use the issues involved are of sig nificant importanc e, par t of the pane l opinion is inconsistent with curre nt case law, and the resultingpartial de nial of attorne y fee s and expenses wa s in error

. I. Su m m ary The position that Itake in this dissent is sum marized below: This Court has jurisdiction to consider EAJA fees a nd expenses incurre d as to repr esentation be fo re the U. S. Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit (F e de ra l Cir c uit ). Mo re ov e r, thi s Co ur t is i na b et t er

p o s i t i o nth an i s th e F ed er al C i rc u i tt o co n s i d er th e r ea s o n ab l e n e s s o f t h e S ec re t ary 's position at the administrative s tag e and, acc ording ly , to deter mine substantial justi fication as to the entire c ivil action. Under the unitary theory of EAJA lit iga

tion as specifie d in Com mi ssi on e r, IN

S v. Je an , 496 U.S. 154, 159 (1990), affirming Jean v. Nelson , 8 63 F .2 d 7 59 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 8) , th is Court is r e qu ir e d to c on sid e r a ll p ha se s a s to the c ivi l a c tio n, inc lud ingany a pp e a ls.

T h e panel opinion's use of Cal ma v . W est , 1 2 V e t

. Ap p
. 6 6 ( 1 9 9 8 ) , w a s i n c o r r e c t ; th e c a se ho lds that a

jur isd ic tio na l is su e is not sever able f

rom the re st of t h e EAJA li tigation where the Secre tary ' s administrative position was unrea sonable a nd that position precipitated the c ivil action and thus the jurisdictional issue. I t is not materia l to the EAJ A out come that the C ourt rathe r than the Secr etar

y raised that jurisdictional issue. The pa nel' s use of res judicata to se ver the Fe dera l-Circuit-re lated fe es issue wa s incorre ct and pre judicial to the appellant. The law of the case applies in these circ umstances, and that doctrine does not prec lude the Court' s consideration of EAJ A fe es and e x penses f or re prese ntation before the Fe d er al C i rc u i t i nth i s ca s e. J u s tb ec au s e t h e F ed er al C i rc u i th as d et erm i n edth atth e S ec re t ary 's5

position before the Fe dera l Circuit was substantially justified does not mean that this Court cannot consider in the c ontext of the lar g er civil a ction, as dictate d by INS v. Je an , su

pra , that portion of the appellant' s pending EAJA application to this Court that relates to his repr esentation be fore the F e de ra l Cir c uit

. II. Bac kgr ound
This order is one in a long l ine of actions i n this case , which bega n with the appellant' s Notice of Appe al to this Court from an April 11, 1990, dec ision of the Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (BV A or B oard) . The a

ppellant filed a

brief r equestingreve rsal, and the Secre tary filed a motion to remand, which the a

ppellant opposed. During the course of t his leng thy civil action, this Court, sua sponte,
c o n s i d e r e d

w h e th e r th e r e w a s a

j ur i s d i c t i o n - c o n f

e r r i n gN o t i c e o f

D i s a g r e e m e n t , f

o un d ( e r r o n e o u s l y, as it turned out) that ther e wa s not under then c urre nt la w, and on Fe bruar

y 3, 1995, dismiss ed the appea l for lac k of jurisdiction. Ba rre ra v . B ro wn , No. 90-1496, 1995 WL57790, at *2 (Ve t. App. Fe b

. 3 , 1 9 9 5 ) ( o nm o t i o nfo r r ec o n s i d er at i o n , d i s m i s s i n g fo r l ac k o f j uri s d i ct i o nb as edo nth i s C o urt 's then re cent de cision in W est v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 329 ( 1995) (e n banc) ). But see id. at 333-39 (Steinbergand Kr amer , J J ., dissenting)

. The appellant appea led to the Fe dera l Circ uit. The Fe dera l Circuit, noting that its opinion in Gran tha m v . B ro wn , 114 F.3d 1156 ( 1995), had ove rruled W est , su pra , reve rsed this Court's dismi ssal and remanded to this Court for consideration of the merits of the ca se. Barrera v. Gobe r , 122 F.3d 1030, 1032 ( Fe d. Cir. 1997). On September

3, 1997, the appe llant filed an EAJA application with the Fede ral Circuit for $11,849.42 in fee s and expenses (c overingrepr esentation before that court fr om Febr uary 1995, afte r this Court's dismissal, to t hat September 1997 EAJA application). Secre t ar y 's Response (Resp.) , Attachment ( At t ach.) 1, at 1, 3-6. He alleg ed in that application that the Secre tary ' s liti g ation position be

fo re o u r Court

was not substantially

justified. Secre tary ' s Resp., Attach. 1. The S ec re t ary o p p o s edth e ap p l i ca t i o no nth e gro un d th at th e ap p el l an t 's al l ega t i o nas t o th e S ec re t ary 's position before this Court, as we ll as befor e the F eder al Circuit, was "f actua lly inacc urate " and that his lit igation posit ion before this Court was substantially justified. Secre tary ' s Resp., Attach. 2, at 2- 3. Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit , in de nying the a pp lic atio n in a Se pte mbe r 24 , 19 97 , o rd e r, state d a s to its conclusion there only : "In view of the fac t that the [S ecr etar y ' s] position be fore [t hat] court reg arding jur isd ic tio n c oin c ide d w ith that of [the a pp e lla nt], a nd is c on sis te nt w iththe po sit ion take n b y [that]
co urt , th e p o s i t i o n

o f t h e [ S ec re t ary ] wa s 's u

b s t an t i al l y

j u s t i fi ed

. ' See28 U.S .C . § 24 12 (d) ." Ba rre ra v . W est , U.S. Fed. Cir. No. 95- 7045 (orde r Sept. 24, 1997) (f ound at Secr etar

y ' s Resp., Attach. 3). On May 15, 1998, afte r consider ing the merits of the appea l, this Court by single -judg e orde r vacated the Apr il 11, 1 9 9 0, BV A dec ision and remande d the matter f or fur ther de velopment and
rea djudication. Ba rre ra v . W est , No. 90-1496, 1998 WL 320390, at *2 (Ve t. App. May 15, 1998). The a ppellant submitted to thi s Court an EAJ A application for attorney fee s and expenses incurr ed both in this Court and in the Fe dera l Circuit, and the Court filed it o n Au gu s t 1 0 , 1998. The appellant' s basis for a ssertinga lack of subs tantial justification in the underlying me rits liti g ation was t h e Secre tary ' s position t aken by the Boa rd

. Ap p li c ati o n at 3

. T h e Se c r e ta r y f il e d a re sponse, opposing a

n awa rd of fees and expenses for the work done befor e the F eder al Circuit. The a ppellantI ni t i al l y , I not e t hat t he C our t ac t ed he r e wi t hout f i r s t f ormal l y di s po s i ng of

t he mo t i on f

or pan el 1

reco nsi d erat i o n and w i t ho ut is suance o f a n o rder o f

the p anel d el i neat i ng it s act i o n a nd p ub l i cat i o n o f that p anel act i o n, as r eq ui red b y t he C o urt ' s Int ernal O p erat i ng P roce d ures (I O P ) I V

. (b) and V I. (a), 1 0 V et

. A p p
. C D X X V I, C D X X V II

. I al s o not e t hat t he C our t ac t ed he r e pri or t o my hav i ng vot ed i n t hi s mat t er
. N ei t her was t he f ul l C our t ' s order ci r cul at ed f o r f i ve wo rki ng da y s as a prop o sed en b anc o rder af t er t he vo t e, as co nt em p l at ed by t he p roce ss set fort h in IO P V

. (a)( 5 ), 10 V et

. A pp
. at CD X X V I I , nor was t he order , as ori gi nal l y i s s ued, publ i s hed a s r equi r ed by t hat I O P ' s l as t s ent enc e. 6 filed a r eply ; he re iterate d that it was at " the administrat i v e l ev el " (t hat is, at the B oard) that the Se c re tary' s p os iti on la c ke d sub sta nti a l justi fi c atio n. Re ply at 5. Th e a pp lic atio n wa s su

bmi tte d to a pane l for dec ision, and on Oct o b er 2 5 , 1 999, that panel grante d the application in part, as to the fee s and expenses incurr ed in this Court and denied the application in par t, as to the fee s and expenses for work done at the Fe dera l Circuit. Ba rre ra v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 139, 140 (1999). The panel ther e held:

By filing his application for EAJA fe es at the Fe dera l Circuit, the appellant inv ite d s e ve ra

nc e of the matte r o f f

e e s g e ne ra

te d for th e ac tio n b e fo re that c ourt

. Up on de nyingthe a

pp e lla nt' s E AJA a

pp lication , th e F e de ra l Cir c uit imp lic itl y rec og nized this Court's sua sponte dismissal of the appellant' s appeal as a matter sever able a

nd separ ate f

rom an a ppeal on the me rits of his claim. See [ INS v. ] Jean , [4 9 6 U

. S. at 1 6 0

- 6 1 ;] Calma , [12 Ve t.A pp . at 6 9- 70 ]. T he F e de ra l Cir c uit e ff e c tiv e ly
re nd e re d ju dg me nt o n th e me ri ts o f t he a pp e lla nt' s E AJA a

pp lic atio n wi th re sp e c t to his a pp e a l of thi s Co ur t' s d ism iss a l of

his a c tio n, and

the matte r i s re

s ju dic ata

. See B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I ONAR Y 844 (6th ed. 1990) ( "F or re s judicata purpose s[, a j u d gm en t o n the merits] is one which deter mines the rig hts and liabiliti es of the parties ba sed on the ultimate fa ct" as disclosed by the issues prese nted.)

Ba rre ra , 13 Vet.App. at 140

. On November 10, 1999, the appe llant filed a motion for pa nel
re c on sid e ratio n a

nd , in the a lte rn ativ e , a

mot ion fo r a de c isi on by the fu ll Co ur

t. 1

III. Discussion A. Juri sdiction T h i s C o urt h a s j ur i s d i c t i o n t o aw ar d r e a s o n a b l e at t o r n e y f e e s an d e xp e n s e s p ur s u an t to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)( F) as ame nded by section 506 of t he Feder al C ourts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L . No. 102-572, § 506, 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992). The appellant' s August 10, 1998, EA JA a pp lic atio n w a s fi led within the 30 -d ay

EA JA a pp lic atio n p e ri od

se t f or th i n 2 8 U .S. C. § 2412(d)( 1)(B ) and satisfied any jurisd i ct i o n al content re quirements that apply , beca use the
a pp lic atio n c on ta ine d th e fo llo wi ng : ( 1) A s ho wi ngthat, b y vir tue of the Court ' s r e mand , h e is a preva iling par

ty within the meaningof the EAJA; (2) a showingthat he is a pa rt y el i gi b le for a

n awa rd under the EAJA because his net worth does not excee d $2,000,000; (3) an a lleg ation that the position of the Secre tary was not substantially justified; and (4) a

n itemiz ed fe e stateme nt supported by an af fidavit from the a

ppellant' s counsel. See 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (1 )( A) , ( 1) (B ), (2 )( B ); Fr itz
v . W est , 1 3 V e t.A

pp . 1 90 , 1 95 (1 99 9) ; Che sse r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 497, 499 ( 1998); Ba zalo
v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 304, 308 ( 1996), re v 'd on othe r grou nd s sub nom . Baz alo v . W

est , 150 F.3d 1380, 1384 (F ed. Cir. 1998) (conc luding that showingof net wor th not jurisdictional requirement)

.In a d d i t i o n t o t he casel aw of t he U

. S. C o urt o f A p p eal s f o r t he Fe d eral C i rcui t (Fed eral C i rcuit ), the re is 2

cas el aw i n ot her ci r cui t s t hat s uppo r t s t he j ur i s di ct i on of a di s t r i ct cour t t o a war d EA JA f ees f or r epre s ent at i on on appeal to th e c o u rt o f ap p e a ls. See Br i nke r v

. G ui f f r i da , 79 8 F. 2d 66 1, 66 9 ( 3d Ci r
. 198 6) ( di s t r i ct cour t au t hor i zed t o s et E A JA fee s fo r co u n se l' s w o rk in b o th d istric t c o u rt a n d a p p e llate c o u rt); A t ki ns v. A pf el , 154 F. 3d 986, 989- 90 ( 9t h Ci r
. 1998) (i m p l y i ng that d i st ri ct c o urt ha d juri sdi ct i o n to award fees for rep res ent at i o n in ap p eal to U

. S. C o urt o f A p p eal s f

o r t he N inth C irc u it); Sn eede v

. Co ye , 8 5 6 F . S u p p . 5 2 6 , 5 3 3 n.6 (N .D . C a l. 1 9 9 4 ) (s a m e ). 7 As to whether

t h i s C o u rt has jurisdiction to consider EAJA fee s and expenses for repr esentation before the Fe dera l Circuit, the panel opinion in this case did not addre ss that issue. Bu t se e Ba rre ra , 13 Vet.App. at 140-41 (Kra mer, J ., concur

ring ) (conc urring in r esult but stating that he would have held t h at "t h i s Court was without jurisdiction to consider fee s g ener ated f or work done in a r eviewingcourt" ). A close rea ding of rele vant case law, howeve r, supports the view that this C o urt does have jurisdiction to consider EAJA fees a nd expenses for r epre sentation in the Fe dera l Circuit, and Iwould have so he ld in this case
. See PPG Indus. v. Celanese Poly mer Specialties Co. , 840 F.2d 1565, 1569 ( Fe d. Cir. 1988) (in re viewingan aw ard of attorney s fee s under 35 U.S.C. § 285, holdi ngthat j u ri s d i ct i on to awar d attorney fee s for a

ppellate wor

k was not
e xclu siv e do ma in o f a

pp e llate c ourt ); Oliveira v. Uni t ed S t ates , 827 F.2d 735, 738- 39 (F ed. Cir. 1987) (re versing lower court decision not to awa rd leg al expenses to a

ppellant and re manding beca use lower court " committed an er

ror of law b y interpre ting the E AJ A as not allowingthe
rec overy of expenses t hat ordinarily arise in the course of providingleg al servic es" for r epre sentation be fo re F e de ra l Cir c uit

a s w e ll a s b e fo re low e r c ourt ); Hines v. Sec. of De p't of HHS, 26 C. Ct. 114, 11 6 (1992) ( in affir

ming Spec ial Master' s awa rd of attorney

fee s under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa -15(e ), ho ldi ngthat PPG Indus ., su pra , provided " sufficie nt authority for a specia l master to awa

rd attorney [] fee s and costs for appea ls to the Fede ral Circuit" ). 2

In PPG , the Fe dera l Circuit held that " the power to a war d attorney fee s for a

ppellate wor

k is n ot t he e xclu siv e do ma in o f a n a pp e llate cou rt ." PPG Indus ., su pra ; se e als o O liv e ira , su pra
. Although ap p l i ca b le pre cede nt indicates that this Court does have jurisdiction over the disputed po rt ion of the a pp lic atio n h e re , th e fa c t th at th e re is pot e nti a l jur isd ic tio n ove r t he a pp lic atio n in

thi s Court as well as in the Fe dera l Circuit implicates the questi on whether it is appropr iate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction. I believe that it is. See Martin v. Hec kler , 7 54 F .2 d 1 26 2, 12 65 n. 6 ( 5th Cir. 1985) (" In some case s, applications for fee s and expenses should be conside red in the district court in the fir st instance. In others, we may consider the m first.") . As compar ed to the position of th e F ed er al C i rc u i t , th i s C o urti s b et t er s i tu at edt o ev al u at e th e r ea s o n ab l en es s o f t h e S ec re t ary 's position her e and to r eview the ag ency actions over which the Court has dire ct-re view jurisdiction. I nd e e d , th e l i m i t e d

n atur e o f

th e F e d e r a l C i r c u i t ' s s u b s t an t i a l

- j u s t i f i c at i o nh o l d i n gi ni ts September 24, 1997, or der - - per taining only to the Secre tary ' s position before tha t c ourt -- a ppear s to support the above c onclusion.
The F eder al C ircuit has st ated that its Rule 20 (now Rul e 47.7 of t he Rules of the U.S. Court of Appe als for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit Rules)) " contemplates that when attorne y fee s and expenses are authorized in connec tion with an appe al, the amount of the awa rd for suc h fee s and expenses shall be dete rmined by [t hat] court" beca

use "[t]he F eder al Circuit is in a better position than the boar d [t here the Merit Sy stems Protection Boa rd] to determine the amount of fe es and8

expenses to be awa

rded in c onnection with the appe al to [t hat] court". Gave tte v. OPM , 808 F.2d 14 56 , 1 46 8 ( F e d. Cir . 198 6) (e n b anc ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . A lth ou g h th e F e de ra l Cir c uit might b e in
a better position t o deter

mine the amount (that is, the re asonable ness) of a fee awa rd, that cour

t never rea ched that issue here . For the re asons that follow, this Court should have rea ched and decided that issue in its Oc tober 25, 1999, opinion in the absenc e of a command fr om the Fe dera l Circuit to the
c o n tr ar y.
B. Su bstant ial Jus tification When, as here , an EAJA application is timely filed and me ets any

applicable cont ent re qu ir e me nts , th is C ourt is required to awar d attorney

fee s "unle ss the [C ]ourt finds that the position of th e Uni ted S tat es was subs tan ti all y ju st if ied or th at s peci al c ir cum st ances mak e an aw ard u nj us t". 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (1 )( A) ; Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 291, 301 ( 1994). The a ppellant here has alleg ed, pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . § 241 2 (d)(1)(B ), that the Sec reta ry ' s position at the administ rative stag e was not substantially justified. Application at 2. The Sec reta ry , there fore , "ha s the burden of pr o v i n gth at[h i s ] p o s i t i o nw a s s u b s t an t i a l l y

j u s t i f i e d i no r d e r t o d e f e atth e a p p e l l an t ' s E A JA application"

. Sti llwe ll , su pra ; s e e a l

s o L o c h e r

v

. B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A

pp . 5 35 , 5 37 (1 99 6) ; Felton
v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 276, 279 (1994). The S ecr etar y does not contest the a

ppellant' s alleg ation that th e S ecret ary' s p os iti on

at th e a dmi nis tr ativ e sta g e wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly jus tif ie d. He argue s, ho we ve r, that no fe e s and e xpe ns e s sh ou ld b e awa rd e d f or re pr e se ntatio n b e fo re the F e de ra l Cir c uit , and he ba ses that contention on the grounds that his liti g ation position before the Fe dera l Circuit was substantially

justified, that that court expressly so found, and that ther e ar e special circ umstances that make it unjust to award those EAJA fees and e x penses. Resp. a t 5-6. The portions of the E AJ A per tinent to this inquiry

provide: (1 )( A) Exc e pt a s o the rw ise spec if ic a lly pr ov ide d b y

statut e , a

c ourt sh a ll
awa rd to a pr e va ili ng pa

rt y oth e r tha

n the Un ite d Stat e s fe e s and oth e r e xpe ns e s, in addition to any

costs awa rded pursuant to subsection (a ), incurr ed by that party in any civil action (other

than c ases soundingin tort), including pr ocee dings f or judicial revie w of a g ency action, broug ht by or ag ainst the United States in any court ha ving jurisdiction of that action, unless the c ourt finds that the position of the United States
wa s su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d o r t hat sp e c ia l c ir c ums tanc e s ma ke an a wa rd un jus t.

. . . . (2)( D) "position of t he United States" means, i n addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil ac tion, the action or fa ilure to ac t by the ag ency

upon which the c ivil action is based . . .
28 U. S.C. §§ 24 12 (d )( 1) (A ), (2 )( D) . In a pp lying su

bs e c tio n 241 2( d) (1 )( A) in the c on te xt of a c ivi l
a c tio n th at e nc omp a sse d mu lti pl e cla ims c on sid e re d b y fe de ra l c ourt s at a ll l e ve ls, the Sup re me Court concluded that " only one threshold deter mination [of substantial justification] for the e ntire civ il act io n i s t o b e ma de. " INS v. Je an , 4 96 U. S. at 15 9; see also Je an v. Nelson , 863 F.2d at 763-B ased o n t he Fe d eral C i rcui t ' s co ncl usi o n i n D ot y v

. Uni t ed St at es , 71 F. 3d 384 , 386 ( Fed. Ci r
. 199 5), t hat 3
t hat co urt ' s " p reced ent is ful l y in acco rd" w i t h the S up rem e C o urt ' s ho l d i ng i n Com m i s s i oner, I NS v. J ean , 496 U

. S. 154, 15 9 (1990 ) , i t i s un cl ear wh y t he Federa l Ci r cui t i n t hi s ca s e di d not cons i der t he E A JA appl i cat i on not ye t r i pe f or r evi ew

- - t he ap p el l ant ' s as y et havi ng ob t ai ned no rel i ef on any matt er on ap p eal t o our C o urt f rom t he B V A de ci si o n, only t he rig h t t o se e k su c h re lief -- in v ie w o f t h e m a n d a te o f Je an t h at t h e qu es t i on a s to subst ant i al ju s t i f i ca t i on s h ou l d be
an al y ze d i n t er ms of

"on e t h r es h ol d de t er mi n at i on f or t h e en t i r e ci v i l a ct i on
. " I NS v. J ean , su p ra
.
G ivin g the a p p lica n t a se c o n d b ite a t o b ta in in g E A J A f e e s fo r h is re p re se n ta tio n in the F e d e ra l C irc u it is 4 ad m i t t ed l y s o m ewhat p rob l em at i c, especial l y co nsi d eri ng t hat hi s al l egat i o n t hat t he Se cret ary ' s p o si t i on be f or e t hi s C o urt was not subst ant i al l y jus t i f i ed was t o t al l y l acki ng i n m eri t (t o p ut it kindl y ). H o wever, he so ught those fees i n 19 9 7 , l o ng bef or e h e k n ew w h at t h e r es ol u t i on of h i s ca s e wou l d be i n t h i s Cour t or wh et h er or w h en h e wou l d be a bl e t o a ppl y f or EA JA f ee s h er e as a pre v ai l i n g par t y an d w h en t h i s Cour t w ou l d r u l e on s u ch a n a ppl i ca t i on
. As i t t u r n ed ou t , i t w as n ot
u n til m o re tha n 1 3 m o n ths a fter th e F e d e ra l C irc u it' s d e n ia l o rd e r th a t t h is C o u rt g ra n te d the E A J A a p p lica tio n in p a rt. I am u n abl e t o f

i n d t h at t h e appe l l an t ' s per h aps u n wi s e dec i s i on t o f i l e i n t h e Fe der al Ci r cu i t an E A JA a ppl i ca t i on as s er t i n g t h at t h e "pos i t i on of t h e g ov er n men t be f

or e t h e C V A

. . . w as n ot s u bs t an t i al l y j u s t i f i ed" e s t opped h i m f

r om s e e k i n g o n a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t b a s i s , p a r t o f

h i s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h i s C o u r t - - t h a t i s , o n t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y 's p o sitio n " a t t h e a d m inis tr a ti v e l e v e l" , . . . no t at the li tiga tio n lev e l, la c k e d su b sta n tial ju stif ic a tio n -- fee s fo r h is
re p re se n ta tio n b e fo re the F e d e ra l C irc u it.

I n t he s ame vei n, I am un abl e t o c oncl ude, as di d t he panel i n i t s O ct ob er 25, 199 9, opi ni on, t hat t he Federa l C i r cui t ' s t hr ee- s ent enc e Sept emb er 24, 199 7, order "i mp l i ci t l y r ecogn i zed t hi s C our t ' s s ua s po nt e di s mi s s al

. . . as a mat t er severabl e and s ep arat e f rom an ap p eal on t he m eri t s o f hi s cl ai m [and ] ef

f ect i vel y rend ered jud gm ent [adversel y ] on t he
m e rits o f the a p p e llan t' s E A J A a p p lica tio n w ith re sp e c t t o his a p p e a l o f [tha t] d ism issa l" to the F e d e ra l C irc u it. B a rrera v. W est , 13 V et

. A p p
. 13 9 , 14 0 (19 9 9 ). Such an i nf erence i s p ure s p ecul at i o n. 9 6 4 . In INS v. Je an , th e Su p r e me Co urt n o te d th at th e r e is a " c o mp le te a b s e n c e o f an y

text ual support" f

or the position that the United States " may asser t a ' substantial justi fication' de fense at m u ltiple stage s of an a ction". INS v. Je an , 4 96 U. S. at 15 9- 60 ; see also Doty v . United S ta te s, 71 F .3 d 3 84 , 3 86 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 5) ; Calma , 1 2 V e t.A pp . 6 9. Th e Court no te s, a s has the Sup re me Court, that "[s] ubsection (d) (1)( A) re fe rs t o an aw ard of fee s ' in any

civil action' without any refere nce t o s epar ate part s of th e li ti gati on , su ch as di sco very , requ est s, fees , or ap peal s. " INS v. Je an , 496 U.S. at 159. Although " [a] ny g iven civil action ca

n have nume rous phase s", the EAJA "favors treating a case as an inc lusive whole, rather than a s atomiz ed line-items"

. Id . at 161 3 Notwithstanding the Fe dera l Circuit's September 1997 action in this case , this Court has not 4 acte d in acc ordanc e with its own prec edent. In Calma , we noted that there are two exceptions to IN S v. Je an ' s unit ary c ivi l lit ig atio n the or y : (1 ) " [W]he re the c ivi l a c tio n invo lve s d ist inc t and se ve ra ble
c la ims , th is C ourt

ha s e xclu de d f

ro m an E AJA awa

rd the tim e sp e nt on su c h a tot a lly se ve ra ble c la im wher e the Secre tary has demonstrated that his position was su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d o n th e se ve ra

ble claim" ; and (2) " time sought may be excluded for a ' second se t of expenses [that] would have be en ever y bit as nece ssary

if the United States had ne ver taken an unj u stified position' on the mer its." Calma , 1 2 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 6 9 -7 0 (qu o t i n g McD onald v. W ashington , 15 F.3d 1126, 1130- 31 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). The C o urt in Calma n o t edth atth e ap p el l an th adar gu ed"th at , b u tfo r t h e S ec re t ary 's unjustified positi on on the merits at the a dminist rative le vel, the appe al to this Court a nd the ensuing litigation on the jurisdictional question would have been unne cessa ry ", a nd held:

In the instant matter, the jurisdictional issue ra i s ed u nsucce ssfully by theSee d isc u ssio n , s upr a n ot e 4. 5
10 Se c r e ta r y w a s in n o w ay a s e p ar ate c la im

o r matt e r s e v e r a b le f r o m o r un c o n necte d with the und er l y i n gmerits of the a ppellant' s service -conne ction claims that wer e rema nded by the Court. Indeed, demonstratingjurisdiction is a fundamental pa rt of any appellant' s obligation. Se e Mc Nut t v . G .M

.A .C. , 2 9 8 U

. S. 1 7 8 , 1 8 9 ( 1 9 3 6 ); B e th e a v

. D e rwinski , 2 Ve t .App. 252, 255 (1992). Onc ethe Se c re tar y takes a po sit ion lackin g ju sti fic ation a t the

ad ministrativ epha se

(or in the litigation phase), it i s re as ona ble

fo r EAJ A f e es to be pa id f

or the lit iga tio n ne c essa ry

to d e monstrate the Cou rt's ju risdiction over the ensu ing appeal

. Cf. Pe rry v . W est , 1 1 Ve t

. Ap p. 319, 333 (1 9 9 8 ) (disting uishing Court' s havingexcluded in Shaw , 10 Vet.App. at 502, fee s for litigation over fe e agree ment betwe en appellant and counse l, from litigation in Pe rry

over attorney

disqualification is sue that " bore dire ctly upon the question of whethe r there would be an a war d of E AJ A fe es at all"). Be c aus ethe circum s t ances that wou ld warran t either of these potential exceptions are not prese nt in t

his c as e and be c aus e the Se c re tar y has c onc e de d tha t his po sit ion at t he ad ministrativ ele v e l wa s no t sub sta ntia lly ju stif ied, the Cour t wil l gr ant the ap plic ation i

n f ull.
Calma , 12 Vet.App. at 68, 70 (emphasis adde d).

J ust as in Calma , th e Se c re tary' s unr e a so na ble po sit ion

at th e a dmi nis tr ativ e sta g e in t his c a se fo rc edth e ap p e l l a n tt o p urs u e th e c i v i l ac t i o n-- ap p ea l t o th i s C o urt

. C o n tra ry t o th e S ec re t ary 's
co n t en t i o n , wh et h er t h e S e c r et ary ch al l en gedo r t h e C o urti n i t i at edco n s i d er at i o no f t h e C o urt 's jur isd ic tio n a

nd wh e the r t hat matt e r wa s fin a lly de c ide d in this Court or the F e de ra l Cir c uit

sh ou ld have no be aringon whether that jurisdictional matter should be included as part of t he civil ac tion; i n ei t h ercase , the Secr etar y ' s unrea sonable adm inis trative position (at the BV A) pre cipitated the need for the ensuing litigation of the jurisdictional matter. Se e id

. at 70. Ba sed on that analy sis, I believe that the Court in this case ha s misread a nd misapplied Calma to support its conclusion that the jurisdictional matter a

rgued bef ore the Fe dera l Circuit was sever able unde r one of the exceptions to INS v. Je an that was set f orth in Calma , 12 Vet.App. at 69-70. In that reg ard a lso, Inote that the issue of seve ranc e wa s not before the Fe dera l Circuit; th e Federa l Circuit sim ply considere d, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) and F ederal C i rcuit Rule 47.7, the EAJA application that was prese nted for re

prese nta tio n be

fo re tha t c ourt

. 5

Moreove r, this Court's a pplicatio n o f t h e d octrine of res judicata in this case wa s inappropriate in the context of INS v. Je an ' s unitary EAJA li tigation theory ; where as, it is the law-ofthe-c ase doc trine that should apply , as the Sec reta ry corr ectly point ed o u t (R esp. at 9). Se e Chi u v. United States , 94 8 F .2 d 71 1, 71 7- 18 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 1) ; see also United States v. J ones , 125 F.3d 1418, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997); 18 J ames W m
. Moore e t. al., Moore's Federal Prac tice ( M o o r e 's ), ¶ 134.20[1] (3d ed. 1999) (" law of the case doctrine is conce rned w ith the ext ent to which the law applied in dec isions at various stag es of the same litigation become s the g overning principle in later stag es" ). The U .S. Cl aims Court (now the U.S. Court of F eder al C l ai m s ) h as made a holdingSee W es t ( B i l l y) v. W e st, 1 3 V e t.A p p . 2 5 , 2 9 (1 9 9 9 ); Ja ckso n v. W est , 12 V et

. A p p
. 42 2 , 42 9 (19 9 9 ) ( ho l d i ng 6
t h at c on s i der at i on of

l i t i g at i on pos i t i on was not re qu i r ed wh er e Se cr et ar y ' s admi n i s t r at i v e pos i t i on h ad bee n f ou n d t o be not su bst ant i al l y jus t i f

i ed and awar di ng f

ees b as ed on f

i ndi ng t hat S ecr et ar y ' s p osi t i on was not s ubs t ant i al l y j us t i f i ed at
a d m inistra tive sta g e ); ZP v

. Br own , 8 V et

. A p p
. 30 3 , 30 4 (19 9 5 ) ( same ). 11 fo ur sq ua re on po int :
Th is c ourt a g re e s wi th de fe nd ant t hat th e F e de ra l Cir c uit ' s d e nia l of pla int if fs ' other EAJA application influence s the instant disposition. . . . Here , law of the case , n o tr e s j u d i c at a , i s th e a p p r o p r i at e d o c tr i n e t o c o n s u l ts i n c e p l a i n t i f f s ' E A JA
a pp lic atio n to the F e de ra l Cir c uit " wa s b ut a

fu rt he r s te p in the lit ig atio n of the same case ." J

. E

. T. S

. , I n c

. v

. U n ite d S tates , 8 38 F.2d 1196, 1199- 1200 (F ed. Cir.), c e rt. denied, 486 U.S. 1057 . . . (1988).
Seravalli v. United States , 16 Cl. Ct . 424, 428 (1989). Considering , then, the application of the law-of -the-c ase doc trine, th i s C o u rt is bound there under only by those issues that have been de cided pr eviously in this case. Se e Chi u and Jones , both su pra ; M o o r e 's ¶ 134.20[ 3]. As previously discussed, the seve ranc e issue wa s not before the Fe dera l Circuit, and it thus di d not decide whether sever ance of t h e j u ri s d i ctional issue was appropr iate. The Fe dera l Circuit did determine that the Sec reta ry 's l i t i gati on position before that
c ourt was substantially justified ( and no one contends to the contra ry ), and this Court is bound by that deter mination. See Chi

se m v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 7 4 , 3 7 5 (1 9 9 5 ) ( qu o t i n g John s o n ( Anne)
v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 25, 26 ( 1994) (pe r cur iam order)); B r o w d e r v

. B r o wn , 5 Vet.App. 268, 270 (1993). Howeve r, that dete rmination is not dis positive of this Court's substantial-justification deter mination as to "the e ntire civil ac tion", INS v. Je an , 496 U.S. at 159. Once this Court concluded
-- a s it must have, g iven the Secr etar y ' s abstention, and thus his impli cit conce ssion ( g iven his burden of proof on this matter), on the re asonable ness of h i s ad m i n i s t rative position, see W est ( Billy)
v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 25, 28 (1999) -- t hat t he S ecr etar y had failed to meet his burden to show that h i s p o s i t i o natth e a dm i n i s tra t i v e s t age wa s s u b s t an t i al l y j u s t i fi ed , co n s i d er at i o n o f t h e S ec re t ary 's litigation positions b ecame no long er ne cessa ry
. The position of the Secr etar y not havingbeen 6 substantially

justified, the Court should thus have found t hat an awa rd of some a

mount of fee s and
e xpe ns e s w a s w a

rr ante d p ur su ant t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 24 12 (d )( 1) (A ) f or the re pr e se ntatio n p ro vid e d in the Fe dera l C i rcuit, and should then have proc eede d to consider whe ther ther e we re spe cial
c ir c ums tanc e s that wo uld make su c h an awa rd un jus t. Ac c or din g ly , the Court 's ina pp ro pr iate a pp lic atio n o f t

he do c tr ine of

re s ju dic ata

in t his c a se wa s p re

jud ic ia l to the a

pp e lla nt.
In response to the application on the matter of the c ontested fe es and e x penses, the Sec reta ry a r g u e s th at th e F e d e r a l C i r c u i t ' s d e t e r m i n at i o n " i s th e ' l aw o f th e c a s e ' an d p r e c l u d e s [thi s Co urt] f r o me n t e rt a i n i n gth e i s s u e o f an aw ar d o f E A JAf e e s b a s e d u p o nth e w o r

k d e s c r i b e d

i n[t h e E A JA application ] filed with the Fede ral Circuit." Resp. at 9. Howe ver, the Fe dera l Circuit made a deter mination only

as to the substantial justification of the Secr etar y ' s liti g ation position before that
c ourt . There is no indication whatsoever that the Fe dera l Circuit considered the q u es t ion of12

s u b s t an t i al j u s t i fi ca t i o nas t o th e "t o t al i ty o f th e ci rc u m s t an ce s " fo r th e en t i re ci v i l ac t i o n
. Al th o u gh the Fe dera l Circuit's de termination as to substantial justification of the Secr etar y ' s position before tha t c ourt

is no w the " law of the case " he re, this Court' s consideration of substantial justi fication
nece ssarily

encompa sses the larg er c ontext of the e ntire civil ac tion, including appeal s and jur isd ic tio na l matte rs and " the a c tio n o r f

a ilure to a c t by

the a g e nc y

up on wh ic h the c ivi l a c tio n is based" , 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)( D). See I NS v. Je an , 4 96 U. S. at 15 9; Calma , 12 Vet.App. at 70; Sneedev. Coye , 856 F . Supp . 526 , 532 n. 4 (N. D. Ca l. 1 99 4) ; see also Chisem , su pra (re cog nizi ng three exceptions to the law-o f- t h e-c ase doc trine, one be ing " when the e vidence at trial wa s subs tan ti all y

di fferen t fro m th at i n t he fo rm er t ri al upo n wh ich th e app ell ate cou rtbas ed i ts deci si on ", and citi n g K

o r i Corp. v. W

ilco March Buggie

s and Draglines, Inc. , 761 F.2d 649, 657 ( Fe d. Cir. 1985)). But cf

. Sneede , 856 F. Supp. at 533 n.6.
Ac c or din g ly , e ve n th ou gh th e S ecret ary 's po si ti on befo re t he Fed eral Ci rcui t w a s su bs ta nti a lly justified, se e Ba rre ra v . W est , U.S. Fed. Cir. N o. 95-7045 (orde r filed on Sept. 24, 1997) (found at Se c re tary' s Re sp ., Atta c h. 3) , th e Secret ary ha s f a ile d to c arr

y his burd e n h e re to s ho w that hi s p o s i t ion throug hout the civil action and at the ag ency level wa s substantially

justified. S

e e W e st ( Billy) , 13 Vet.App. at 28. C. Special Cir cum stances Pur su ant t o s ub se c tio n 241 2( d) (1 )( A) , the Court may no t gr ant an EA JA awa

rd to a pa rt y if "the court finds

. . . that specia l circ umstances made an awa rd unj ust." 38 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)( A).

"' Special cir cumstance s' is an aff irmative def

ense a s to which the g overnme nt bear s the burden of raisingand demonstr at i n g t hat such spec ial circ umstances militate ag ainst an EAJA awar d." Chesser , 11 Vet.Ap p
. at 502. This Court will find "specia l circumstanc es" wher e either (1) the Secre tary has prof fer ed " novel but cre dible extensions and interpretations of the la w" or " situations

' wher e equitable considerations dictate an a war d should n o t b e m ad e' ". Ib id (qu o t i n g Do ria
v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t

. Ap p . 157, 162 (1995)) . "E quitable consider ations" ha s been inter prete d predominantly

to mean that the a

ppellant has " unclea

n hands"

. Chesser , s u

pra (qu o t i n g Pe rry v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 319, 325 ( 1998)).
The Sec reta

ry does not c ontend here that the appellant has " unclea n hands" but argues that "in lig ht of equitable c onsiderations, such f ees should be e x clu d ed from any awa rd made by

the Court, pa rticularly , [si c] where the Secr etar y did not init iate litigation on the jurisdictional issue, and wher e the Sec reta

ry ' s position i n opposition was upheld and found substantially justified by

a hig her court." Resp. at 18. Howe ver, the national policy un d er l y i n gthe EAJA, to encoura g e the repr esentation of persons with claims ag ainst the United States, runs counter to that equity

argument in a ca se whe re w ithout the Secreta ry ' s orig inal unrea sonable c onduct at the a dminist rative stag e, the appellant would not have ha d to file this appeal in the f irst place. See S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 39-40 (1992) ( "obje ctive of EA J A is to e liminate f inancial de terre nts to indi viduals attempting to de fend themselves ag ainst unjustified G overnme nt a ction") ; H.R. Rep. No. 102-1006, at 25 (1992) (same) , re pr inte d in 19 92 U. S.C. C.A .N . 3 92 1, 39 34 ; see also INS v. J ean , 496 U.S. at 165 n.14 (noting that EA JA wa s inte nd e d to be ne fi t an ind ivi du a l " fo r who m c os t ma y be a de te rr e nt t o v ind ic atin gthe ir ri g hts " and

tha t "a part y wh o c ho os e s to lit ig ate an is su e a g a ins t th e Go ve rnme nt i s n ot o nly13

r e p r e s e n t i n gh i s o r

h e r o w nv e s t e d

i n t e r e s tb u ti s a l s o r e f

i n i n g an d f o r mu l at i n gp u

b l i c p o l i c y" (q uo tin g H. R. R e p. No . 9 6- 14 18 , at 12 (1 98 0) )) ; Ga v e tte , 808 F.2d at 1459-60. Ithus would have fo u n dthat the Secr etar

y ' s "spe cial cir cumstance s" de fense was a lso unavailing

. S e e Ch es s er

and Do ria , both su

pra
. D. Reasonableness of Fees and Expenses Once the Court has dete rmined that EAJA fees a nd expenses are to be awa rded, it must then deter mine what amount is " rea sonable" in the case

. See38 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) (2 )( A) ; Pe rry , 11 Vet.App. at 327. A s noted above, the Fe dera l Circ uit may be in the better position to determine the amount of fees to be awarde d for work done in that court. Howeve r, the F eder al Circuit never
rea ched that issue, and I would therefo re ha

ve proc eede d to determine at this st ag e the
re as o n ab l en es s o f t h e f

ee s cl ai m edfo r t h e w o r kd o n e t h er e, wh i chwa s es s en t i al t o th e ap p el l an t 's
su c c e ss i n th is C ourt

in o ve rt ur nin gthe Se c re tary' s e rr or

at th e a dmi nis tr ativ e le ve l.
The Sec reta

ry asser ts that his reque st f

or a r eduction of the amount to be awa rded ( that is, the
e xclu sio n o f t

he $1 1, 84 9. 42 ) m ay

a lso be pr op e rl y

take n into a c c ount b y the Court in i ts consideration of the rea sonablene ss of the re quested f ees a nd expenses beca

use the Court has considera ble discre tion in that area . Resp. at 18. Whether this i s s u e i s co n s i d ere d in the "spe cial
c ir c u ms ta n c e s " o r " r e a s o n a b le f e e s an d e xp e n s e s " c o n te xt m att e r s n o t. T h e Se c r e ta r y ' s ar g u ment fails in either c ase, a

nd he has not other

wise conte sted the re asonable ness of the $11,849.42 reque s te d b y th e a

p p e ll an t f o r th e r e p r e s e n tati o n in th e F e d e r a l Ci r c u it

. F o r a ll o f th e pre ceding
re a so ns , th e Court

sh ou ld h ave awa

rd e d the a pp e lla nt' s a pp lic atio n fo r EA JA fe e s and e xpe ns e s in full. See Che

sser , 11 Vet.App. at 501-02 (holding that Court w ill g ener ally g rant re quested amount of EA JA f

e e s " wh e re the ho ur s c la ime d a re no t ( 1) unre a so na

ble on the ir fa c e , ( 2) oth e rw ise contra indicated by

the fa ctors itemized in He ns le y[ v . Ec k e rh ar t ], 4 6 1 U

. S. [4 2 4 , ] 4 3 0 n
. 3 [( 1 9 8 3 ) ],
or Us se ry [ v . B ro wn , 1 0 V e t.A pp . 5 1, 54 (1 99 7) ], f

or me a suri ngre a so na

ble ne ss, or

(3 ) p e rs ua siv e ly opposed by

the Secr etar

y ")

. E. C

onc urring

Sta tement The c oncurr ing statement of my colleague, J udg e Kramer, has a c erta in logica l appea l. Upon
c los e sc rutiny , ho we ve r, its c on c e ptu a l un de rp inn ing s c ru mbl e . A s to the c on c e ptu a l po int tha t th is Court is not well s ituated to rule on fe es for repr esentation before the Fe dera l Circuit, the concur ring statement offe rs no sug g estion as to how such a fee application could be adjudicate d in such a wa y as to avoid " ' a sec ond major litiga ti on' ". INS v. Je an , 4 9 6 U. S

. at1 6 3 (qu o t i n g Hensley , 4 61 U. S.
at 43 7) . Wo uld my c on c ur ri ng c oll e a g ue , fo r e xamp le , h ave an E AJA a pp lic atio n b e ma de fi rs t to this Court i n order

for us to make a determination as t o substantial justi fication at the administrative (B VA) stag e and at the litigation stag e in this Court, and then, if this Court were to find a lack of
su bs tanti a l ju sti fi c atio n at e ith e r s ta g e , h ave the a pp e ll ant a

pp ly to t he F e de ra l Cir c uit

fo r i t to deter mine the re asonable ness of fe es and e x penses f or the re prese ntation provided there ? I f not , howT h e c o n c u rr ing s ta te m e n t ( in its p e n u lti m a te p a ra g ra p h ) a p p a re n tly e n v isio n s tha t an E A J A a p p lica tio n sh o u ld 7 h av e bee n f

i l ed i n t h e Fe der al Ci r cu i t , r at h er t h an i n t h i s Cour t , at t h e en d of t h e mer i t s l i t i g at i on ( bef or e t h e ex pi r at i on o f 3 0 d a ys fo llo w ing issu a n c e o f o u r C o u rt' s fina l ju d g m e n t). See 38 U

. S. C. § 2412( d) ( 1) ( B ) ; U

. S. V ET

. A PP

. R. 3 9 (a). T h a t cle a rly w o u ld no t wo rk b e c a u se the F e d e ra l C irc u it c e a se d to ha v e a n y ju risd ic tio n o v e r th is c a se in a p p ro x im a te ly O c to b e r 1 9 9 7 a fter it issu e d m a n d a te o n it s ju risd ic tio n a l re v e rs a l o n O c to b e r 1 , 1 9 9 7

. A n y E A J A a p p lica tio n w o u ld t hu s ha ve been un t i mel y un l es s s ubmi t t ed t o t he Federa l Ci r cui t wi t hi n 30 day s af t er it s fi n a l ju d g m e n t wa s e n te re d -- at a t i me whe n n o m er i t s adj udi cat i on ha d occ ur r ed on t he mat t er s appeal ed t o u s and at a t i me whe n i t woul d hav e been i mp os s i bl e t o d e t e r mi n e i f t h e a pp e l l a n t w a s a pr e v a i l i n g pa r t y , a n d w h e t h e r t h e a mo u n t c l a i me d w a s r e a s on a bl e , i n t e r ms o f t h e c ivil li tiga tio n o u tc o m e , a m a tter th a t w a s the n u n k n o w n -- a n d , if su b m itt e d th e re a fter tha t p o int, w o u ld no t o n ly hav e bee n j u r i s di c t i on a l l y i n v a l i d u n de r t h e EAJ A, 28 U

. S. C. § 24 12 ( 1) ( B ) , bu t w ou l d a l s o h a v e be e n f i l e d when juri sdi ct i o n was back in th is C o u rt a n d no lo n g e r in the F e d e ra l C irc u it.

In it s la st p a ra g ra p h , t h e c o n c u rr e n c e sh ift s g ro u n d a n d a p p e a rs to c o n te m p la te a n E A J A a p p lica tio n fi le d w ithin 30 day s af

t er t h e Fe der al Ci r cu i t ' s f i n al j u dgm ent on its re ve rs al opi ni on, an d as s er t s t hat t he appel l ant woul d be a p revai l i ng pa rt y t here unde r preced ent p rovidi ng t hat t he ap p el l ant m ust have achi eved s uccess " o n any s i gni f i cant i ss ue i n li t i gat i o n w hi ch achi eve[d ] som e o f the b enef

i t

. . . s o ught i n bri ngi ng s ui t " , quo t i ng Sh al al a v. Scha ef er , 509 U

. S. 292, 3 0 2 (19 9 3 ) ( q uo t i ng T

e x a s S ta te Te a c h e rs A ssn . v . G a rla n d In d e p e n d e n t S c h o o l D ist. , 4 8 9 U

. S. 78 2 , 79 1

- 9 2 (19 8 9 ))

. It req ui res l i t t l e an al y s i s t o s ee t h at w i t h h i s w i n i n t h e Fe der al Ci r cu i t t h e appe l l an t h ad n ot y et a ch i ev ed any of t he b enef i t t hat he had s o ught i n ap p eal i ng t he B V A de ci si o n t o our C o urt

. So m e o f t hat be nef

i t cam e o nl y af

t er o ur Co urt
ex er ci s ed j u r i s di ct i on a n d r ema n ded t h e ca s e t o t h e B oar d. 14 would the proc ess he envisions work? I f so, there would be two EAJA application litigations, and 7 there would appea

r to be a signific ant risk that such a n application to the F eder al Circuit would run afoul of the jurisdictional filing de adline. Se e Baza lo , 1 5 0 F. 3 d at1 3 8 3 (c i t i n g J.M.T. Mac h. Co. v. United States , 826 F.2d 1042, 1047 (F ed. C ir. 1987)). W hat then? In sum, while prese nting the illusi on of proposinga simplified proce ss, the concur ringstatement would i n rea lity only add complexit y . There is no easy answe r her e.

IV. Conclusion

In view of the fore g oing disc ussion, Ibelieve that the matters involved ar e of e x ceptional importance and should be de alt with by the full Court, a

nd that the pane l opinion here wa s in error in partially

denying the EAJA fees and e x penses soug ht -- those for repr esentation in the Fede ral Cir c uit

.15 De sig na te d fo r e le c tro nicpu bli c ati on on ly
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O

. 90-1496
J ESU S A. B A RRERA , A PP EL L ANT ,

V

. T OGO D. W EST , J R ., S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE

.

Be fore NEB EKER, Chief Judge, and KRAMER, FA RL EY, HOL DAWAY, IVERS, STEI NB ERG, and GREENE, J ud ge s.
O R D E R
A corr ecte d copy of the full Court’s Fe bruar y 25, 2000, per c uriam orde r, with conc urre nce by J udg e Kr amer

and dissent by

J udg e Steinberg , was issued today and desig nated f

or publication in the Ve te ra ns Ap

pe als Re po rte r. I t is
ORDERED that the Court’s Mar ch 7, 2000, order , havingbeen r ender ed moot, is revoked.
DATED: Ma

rch 31, 2000 FOR THE COURT:

ROBERT F . COMEAU Clerk of the Court Copies to:

Kenne th M. Carpenter , Esq. P.O. Box 2099 Topeka , KS 66601-2099
Gene ral Counsel (027) Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs 810 Ver mont Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20420