NO T F OR P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0658n.06 No. 07-1220 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
In re: F REDERICK

J. SMITH, Movant ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN / BE FORE : BA TC HELD ER , C h i e f J u d g e , SU HR HEI NR IC H an d SU TTON , C ir c uit Judg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Jud g e. I n th is § 19 83 a c tio n, Pe tit ion e r F re de ri c k J. Smi th seeks an order direc ting state officia ls to produce f or DNAtesting the phy sical evide nce c ollected in the i nvestig ation underlying his state criminal conviction. We hold that the di strict court lac ked jurisdiction on the basis of the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, a nd DI SM ISS this action. I. Bac kgr ound On Marc h 9, 198 4, Smith wa s f ound g uil ty by a jur y of fi rs t- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t,
arme d robber

y , and possession of a firea rm during the commission of a felony . The prose cution’s
case consisted of the te stimony of t he complaina

nt and the admission of blood-ty pe evide nce, which indicated thatt h e a s s ai l an tp o s s es s edt y p e B b l o o d
. S m i t h , an Af

ri ca n -A m er i ca nm an , p o s s es s es t y pe B blo od , a s d oe s tw e nty

pe rc e nt o f t

he Af ri c an- Am e ri c an p op ulatio n. Th e e vid e nc e wa s te ste d in 19 84 thr ou g h a

pr oc e dure kn o wn

a s “ e le c tr op ho re sis ana ly sis ,” wh ic h is no lon g e r u se d n or g e ne ra lly
acc epted by

the scientific c ommunity
.-2-

Smit h prese nted five a libi witnesses–four family members a

nd a f ri end–who testified that Smit h was in a diff

ere nt part of De troit at or nea r the time of the of

fense
. Se e Pe op le v . S

mi th , 385 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Smith w a s se nte nc e d to tw o y e ars in pr iso n on the fe lony c on vic tio n, thi rt y to s ixty y e ars in prison for the sex offe nse, and ten t o twenty y ear s for armed robbe ry . His conviction was a ffirme d on appea l. Se e Sm ith , 3 85 N. W.2 d at 65 5. Th e Mic hig an Su prem e Cour t de nie d le a ve to a

pp e a l. Se e Pe op le v . S

mi th , No. 78173 (Mich. Sept. 28, 1986). On Novembe r 29, 2001, Smith filed a petition for writ of ha beas c orpus in fede ral district court. The district c ourt dismiss ed the ac tion based upon the one -y ear statute of limitations found i n 2 8 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See Sm ith v. Jones , N o . 0 1

- CV

- 7 4 5 0 4

- D T , 2 0 0 2 WL 3 1 8 7 5 5 1 6 ( E
. D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2002). On August 30, 2005, Sm ith filed a petition for DNA te sting in Way ne County

Circuit Court purs ua nt t o M ic h. Com

p. L aws § 7 70 .1 6. Th e statut e pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : (3 ) T h e c o urt s h al l o rd er

DN A t es t i n g i f t h e d ef

en d an td o es al l o f t h e f

o l l o wi n g: (a) Presents prima f

acie proof that the e vidence soug ht to be tested is material to the issue of the c onvicted per son’s ident i t y as t h e perpe trator of . . . the cr ime that resulted in the c onviction. (b) Establishes a ll of the following by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e: (i) A sample of identified biologica l material
. . . is a vailable f or DNA testing. (i i) Th e ide nti fi e d b iol og ic al mat eri a l . . . w a s n ot p re vio us ly su bje c te d to DN A t e sti ngor , if p revi ou sly te ste d, wi ll b e su

bje c t to DNA testingtechnolog y

that was no t available when the de fenda nt was c onvicted.-3- (iii) The identit y of t he defenda nt as the pe rpetrator of the c rime wa s a t is su e duri nghis or

he r t ri a l. Mich. Comp. L aws § 770.16(3) (2005) ( amende d 2006). Th e state tr ia l c ourt

de nie d Sm ith ’s mot ion , h old ingtha t Smit h “ fa ile d to pr e se nt p ri ma

fa c ie proof that the e vidence soug ht to be tested is materia l to the issue of identifica t i o n i n this case.” Pe op le v . S

mi th , No. 83006566-01 (O rder of the Court, date d Oct. 18, 2005). Smith did not appeal this decision. I nstead, on January

16, 2007, Smit h sued Ky m Worthy , Prosecuting Attorney of Way ne Count y , M i ch i gan , an d

J u d ge P re n t i s E dwa rd s , J u d ge o f t h e W ay n e C o u n t y

C i rc u i t , i nfe d er al d i s trict court pursua

nt to 42 U.S.C . § 1983. Smit h alleg ed that his constit u tional rig hts were violated by De fe nd ants ’ r e fu sa l to or de r D NAte sti ngin h is c a se and so ug ht i nju

nc tiv e re lie f dir e c tin g the state officia ls to conduct DNA te sting. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt sua sponte deeme d Smit h’s ac ti o n as a se cond or suc cessive pe tition for habea s relief

and tran s fe rr ed the matter to this C ourt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (A) f or authorization to file a second or succe ssive habea s petition. W e held the matter in abe y ance pending the Supreme Court’s de cision in Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne , – U. S. –, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (June 18, 2009), in which the Supreme Court g rante d cer tiorari to consider

the same issue ra ised by

Smit h. T h e S u p r e m e C o u rt

d i d n o tu l t i m a t e l y d e c i d e t h i s qu e s t i o nb u ts i mp l y assumed tha t a p e ti ti o n e r c o u ld r a is e th is c la im

u n d e r § 1 9 8 3 and re a c h e d

th e u lt im a te is s u e o f

“ w h e th e r

[a petitioner] has a right under the Due Process Cl ause to obtain postconviction acce ss to the State’s evidenc e for

DNA testing .” 129 S. Ct. at 2316, 2319. The majority held that a c onvicted prisoner-4-

does not have a fr eesta

nding c onstitut ional rig ht to DNA evidenc e. 129 S. Ct. at 2322. Rather, the majority held that, at most, a prisoner may have a pr ocedu ra l due proc ess rig ht to the proper application of a

state-c reated rig ht. Id. 2319-20. II. Ana lys is As in ev e ry

c a se , w e mus t at th e ou tse t c on sid e r o ur jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

his a pp e a l. Arbaugh

v . Y & H C

or p ., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). As noted a bove, Smith did notappea l the decision of the state trial cour

t denying his motion for DNA t esting
. Thus, the question bec omes whethe r this appea l is barre d under the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. U nder that doctrine, “ l o we r federa l courts ar e prec luded from e x erc ising appellate jurisdiction over final state -cour t judgments.” Marks v

. Tennessee , 554 F .3 d 6 19 , 6 22 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) . T his i s s o “[ b]ecause [28 U.S.C.] § 1257, as long interpre ted, vests authority to reviewa state c ou rt 's judgme nt solely

in [ the Supreme] Court.” Exx on Mobil Corp. v

. Saudi B asic Indus. Corp. , 5 44 U. S. 280, 292 (2005). The S upreme Court rec ently explained that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine oc cupies “nar row g round,” na

mely , that it “is confined to ca ses of the kind from which the doctrine acquir ed its na me : c a s e s b r o ug ht b y

state -c ourt

los e rs c omp la ini ngof

inj ur ie s c a

us e d b y state -c ourt

jud g me nts rende red befor e the district c ourt proce eding s commence d and inviting district c ourt revie w a nd reje ction of those judg ments.” Exx on , 5 4 4 U. S
. at 2 84. I t does not bar “ a district cour t from
e xer c isi ngsu

bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n s imp ly be c a us e a pa rt y a tte mpt s to lit ig a te in f

e de ra l c ourt

a matter pre viously

litigated in state court.” Id. a t 29 3. “ I f a fe de ra l pla int if

f p re se nts so me ind e pe nd e nt c la im, a lbe it on e that de nie s a le g a l c on c lus ion

tha t a state c ourt

ha s r e a c he d in

a c a se to which he wa s a par

ty , then there is jurisdiction,” and Rooke r - Fel d man does not apply
. Id. (quotation omitted).-5-

This Court “has interpr eted that limitation to mean that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine a pplies only when a plaintiff complains of i njury from the state-c ourt judgme nt itself.” Carter v. Burns , 524 F.3d 796, 798 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotations marks and citation omitted). The per tinent inquiry afte r Exx on is the “sourc e of the injury ” the plaintiff a lleg es in the fe dera l complaint. McCormick v. Brave rman , 451 F.3d 382, 393 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The inquiry

[focuses on] the source of the injury

the plaintiff alle ges i n the fe dera l compl ai n t . I f the sourc e of the injury is the state cour

t decision, then the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine w ould preve nt t h e d is tric t c o u

r t f r o m assertingjurisdiction. I f there is s o m e o ther sourc e of injury , such as a third party ' s actions, then the pla int if f a sse rt s an in de pe nd e nt c la im. Id. See also Lawrence v. W elch , 531 F.3d 364, 368- 69 (6th Cir. 2008), reh’g e n banc denie d , Fe b. 9, 2009, petition for cert. filed , 78 U.S.L .W. 3058 (J uly 9 , 2 0 0 8 ) (N o . 0 9-48) ( same). Se e als o Ha mi lto n v . H

e rr , 540 F.3d 367, 372 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (st ating that “what the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine pr imarily

bars a re c laims that se ek relief from injury ‘ca used by ’ the state c ourt judg ment”; internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). The doc trine does not apply to para llel state and fe dera l liti g ation, Marks , 554 F.3d at 622 (c i t i n g Exx on , 544 U.S. at 292), nor t o “judicial re view of e x ecutive a ction, including de cisions by state administrative a g en[cies],” id. (q u o t i n g Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Se rv. Comm’n , 535 U.S. 635, 64 4 n .3 (2 00 2) ), or

to c la ims of

improper

c on du c t by

thi rd pa rt ie s in c onne c tio n w iththe state proce eding s, see Todd v

. W eltman, W einberg & Reis Co. , 434 F.3d 432, 437 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (alleg ing that the plaint i ff ’s harm was ca used by the def endant’ s false a ffidavit, not by the state c ourt’s decision in the g arnishment proc eeding s). And it “does n o t p ro h ibit federa l district courts from exercising jurisdiction where t h e plainti ff’ s claim is merely a g ener al cha lleng e to the constitutionalit y

of the state la

w applied in the state action, ra ther than a

challeng e to the law’ sAs we r ece ntly observe d in simil ar case, Smith cannot “use the statutory skeleton of f

eder al 1 c ivi l r ig hts law t o a

pp e a l to the dis tr ic t c ourt and ult imate ly ov e rt ur n th e de c isi on

of the state c ourt s. This is the pre cise ty

pe of state -cour

t reve rsal prohibited by

the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine. A s such, i ti s a d i r e c t a t t a c k o n a

s t a t e c o u rtj u d g m e n tan d t h e r e f o r e b ar r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman .” Briscoe v

. Jack son , 285 F. App’ x 205, 207 (6th Cir. J une 27, 2008). -6- application in a pa

rticular state ca se.” Carte r , 524 F.3d at 798 (internal quotations marks a nd citation omitted). I n his § 1983 complaint, Sm ith alleg es first that De fenda nts’ failure to comply

with Mich. Co mp . L aws § 7 70 .1 6 v iol a te d h is r ig ht t o d ue pr oc e ss o f l a

w u nd e r t he F if th a nd F ourt e e nth Amendments, and second, that Def endants’ “fa ilure/ref

usal to a llow D NA testing of cr i t ical bio log ic a l e vid e nce vio late s Pla int if f’ s p ro c e dura l and

su bs tanc e Du e Pr oc e ss c la us e ri g hts g uara nteed by the 14th Amendment.” T he g rava men of Smith’s § 1983 compl ai n t , t hen, is that Def en d an t s ’ violated his constitutional rights by deny ing the statutory

DNA testing . Thus, the “sourc e of the injury ” in this case is the state t ri al court order that denied Smith acce ss to DNA testing. That is, by

complaining that the state trial c ourt wrong fully denied him the DNA e vidence beca use re jection of his petition was improper –but not complaining that the statute itself is flawe d– Smit h is “complaining of an i n j u ry caused by

the state-c ourt judg ment and see king r eview a nd
r e j e c t i o n o f t h a t j u d g m e n t , ” w h i c h i s c l e ar l y b ar r e d b y Rooke r-Feldman
. Exx on , 544 U.S. at 291. 1 See also Carter , 524 F .3 d at 799 (h old ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y dis mis se d th e pla int if

f’ s a sapplied challeng e to t he constitutionality of the Te nnessee collater al re view statutes under Ro ok e rFeldman ); cf. id. at 798-99 (holding that the district court e rre d in dismi ssing the pla intiff’s fa cial challeng e to the constitutionality of the Te nnessee collater al re view statutes). Even if Smit h’s civil rig hts claim presents an independent basis for the exercise of fede ral court revie w, it f

ails for se vera l rea sons. First, the Supreme Court held in Osborne that there is no-7-

fre estanding substantive due proce ss r ight to DNA testing
. Osborne , 129 S. Ct. at 2322. S econd, a ny p rocedural due proce ss claim is also untenable be cause Michig an’s statutory scheme is more compre hensive than the s tate procedure s sanctioned by the Osborne Court. Cf. id. at 2320 (“ We see
no th ing ina de qu a te a

bo ut t he pr oc e dure s A la sk a

ha s p ro vid e d to vin dic a te its state ri g ht t o po stc on vic tio n re lie f in g e ne ra l, a nd no thi ngina de qu a te a

bo ut h owtho se pr oc e dure s a pp ly to t ho se who s eek acc ess t o DNA evidence .”). Third, s uch federa l claims likely would be foreclose d under res judicata principles, see D ist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Fe ldman , 460 U.S. 462, 487-88 (1 98 3) (l e a vin g op e n q

ue sti on of wh e the r d oc tr ine of

re s jud ic a ta fo re c los e s lit ig a tio n o n e le me nts of fe de ra l c omp la int s at is su e ); Howard v. W hitbeck, 382 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2004) (statingthat “eve n w h e r e a

g e n e r a l c o n s ti tuti o n a l att a c k is mo u n te d , th e s tate p r o c e e d in g s ma y f o r e c lo s e the fe d era l claim under the doctrine of res judicata”) , and applica ble immunity

doctrines, s e e W

ill v. Michigan De

pt. of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a suit a g ainst a state o ff icial in h is o r h e r of

fi c ia l c a pa c ity is a su it a g a ins t the state its e lf and no t c og niza ble un de r § 19 83 ); Dixon v. Clem , 492 F.3d 665, 674 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (noting that judicial immuni ty protec ts the j u d i cial fu nc tio n b y a ff or din g a bs olute immun ity

); Pu se yv . City of You ng

sto wn , 1 1 F .3 d 6 52 , 6 57 -5 8 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (holding that prosec utors have a bsolute immuni ty). We r e c og nize tha

t th e Se c on d Circuit ha s r e a c he d a dif fe re nt c on c lus ion

on vir tua lly indisti ng uishable fa cts. Se e Mc Kith e n v . B ro wn , 481 F.3d 89 ( 2d Cir. 2007) . After being convicted of attempted murder and related char g es, McKithen soug ht D NA testing in Q ueens Coun t y Court purs ua nt t o a Ne w Yo rk statut e wh ic h pr ov ide d that “ the c ourt sh a ll g ra nt t he a pp lic a tio n o f f

or e ns ic DNA testing of such e vidence ” if ther e existed “a re as on ab le prob ab il ity ” that with the evide nce “the ve rdict would have been more favorable to the defe ndant.” Id. at 94 (quoting N.Y. Crim. Proc.The Sec ond Circuit interprete d Ex x on Mo bil

as re quiring a plaintiff to c o mp la in of “a n injury 2 c a us e d b y a state -c ourt

jud g me nt, ” and ex plai ne d th a t “ ‘a fe de ra l su it c omp la ins of inj ur y fr om a state-c ourt judg ment, even if it appear s to complain only of a third pa

rty ’s ac tions, when the th i rd party ’s ac tions are pr oduced by a state- court judg ment and not simply ratified, a cquiesc ed in, or lef t unpunished by

it.’” McKithen , 4 8 1 F. 3 d at 9 7 (qu o t i n g Hoblock v . Albany County Bd. of Elections , 422 F.3d 77, 88 ( 2d Cir. 2005)). In McCormick , we c hara cter ized the Second Cir cu i t ’s t est as “a simil ar inquiry” to that of “ the s ource of the injury” test we adopted in McCormick
. See M cCormick, 451 F.3d at 393-94 (borrowing the “source of the i njury ” test from a Four th Circuit decision, Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp. , 434 F.3d 712 ( 4th Cir. 2006)). I ndeed, w e think the conc lusion reac hed in McKithen is in c o n s is te n t w it h the Second 3 C i rc u i t ’s d ec i s i o nin Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87-88. Hoblock illust rate d the diffe renc e betwe en a ba rre d claim and a v ali d claim under Rooke r-Feldman with two examples. The barr ed cla im involved a -8- L aw § 4 4 0
. 3 0 ( 1

- a ) ( a ) ( e mp h a s e s a d d ed in McK ithen )). In his feder al § 1983 claim, McK ithen claimed that the district attorney violated hi s constitutional rig ht to post-conviction acc ess for D NA testing and soug ht injunctive relief direc ting testing of the kni fe alleg edly used to commit the crime. Id. The district cour

t dismi ssed on the basis of R o o k e r - F e ld m an . Id. at 95
. Th e Se c on d Ci rc uit
reve rsed, r easoningthat beca use the injury

for whic h McKithen soug ht fede ral c ourt redr ess “e x isted in i ts e xac t f

or m pr ior to t he state -c ourt

jud g me nt, ” it c ou ld n ot b e “ an in jur y ‘c a us e d b y ’ t he state court.” Id. at 98. Instead, the injury was “ proper l y u n d er s t o od to have be en simply ratified, acquie sced in, or le ft unpunished by [t he state co u rt ].” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 We disag ree with this reasoning . I n our view, the “injury ” in McKithen , as we ll as the injury in this case , did not in fac t exi st until the state prisone r wa s denied the r equeste d DNA testingby the state court under the applicable state statutes. Cf. McCormick, 4 51 F .3 d at 39 5 ( ho ldi ngtha t pr ob a te court’s or der of

rec eiver ship violated the plaintiff’s c onstitut ional rig hts as an unlawf ul seizure and was ba rr ed b ecause “ the count alleg es that the state c ourt order itself was illeg al and ha

rmed [the plaintiff]”). For

this reason, we decline to a dopt the Second Circuit’s appr oach in this ca se. 3state-c ourt dec ision, based purely on state law, that terminated a fathe r’s pare ntal rig hts a nd order ed the state to take custody

of his son. I f the father sued in f eder al cour

t for re turn of h i s s o n o n the g rounds that the state judgme nt violate d his f eder al substantive due proc ess rig hts, his complaint was of an inj ur

y c a us e d by the state -c ourt

jud g me nt. Th e va lid

c la im i nv olv e d a

pla int if f who su e d h is employ er in state c ourt for violating both state anti-discrimination and Title VI Ilaws and lost. I f that pla int if f s ue d in fe de ra l c ourt br ing ing the same su it, he wo uld no t be a lle g inginj ur y fr om t he state judgme nt, beca

use the a lleg ed injury

was ba sed on the e mploy er’ s discrimination. I n our view, the injury in McKithen and the c ase sub judice rese mbles the forme r example and not the latter
. -9- III. Conclusi on F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th is a pp e a l is DISMISSE D w ithout prejudice to Smi th returning to t he state c ourt

to r e vis it the iss ue po st- Osborne
.-10-

SUTTO N, Circuit Judge , concur ring in part and dissenting in par t. Iag ree with one aspe ct of the majority ’s dec ision (its rejection of the me rits of this appeal) but not the other (its conc lusion that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine strips the f eder al cour

ts of jurisdiction to hear the c ase)
. I n eig hty -six y ears, the Supreme Court ha s enfor ced the Rooke r-Feldman limit on the jurisdiction of

the fe dera l courts just twice. See Dist. of Columbia C t. of App. v. Feldman , 4 60 U. S. 46 2 ( 19 83 ); Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Court’s most rece nt applications of the doc trine sug g est that may be it—that, if the par

ty ’s name is not Rooker or Fe ldman, or if the
case does not prese nt a vi rtually identical cha lleng e, it is unlikely that the doctrine strips the fede ral courts of jurisdiction to hea r the c laim. See E

x x o n M o b il Co r p . v . S a u di B a s ic I

n dus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 287 (2005) (“ Since Feldman , this Court has never a pplied Rooke r - Feldman to dismi ss an
a c t i o nf o r w an to f j u r i s d i c t i o n . ” ); se e als o L an c e v . D e nn is , 5 46 U. S. 4 59 , 4 64 (2 00 6) ; id. at 468 (Stevens, J., di ssenting on non- Rooke r - Feldman gro u n d s ) ( s t at i n g Ex x on -M ob il “fina lly interre d the
so-ca lled ‘ Rooke r - Feldman doctrine’ ”). The idea behind Rooke r-Feldman is that 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the statute that g ives the United States Supreme Court authority to reviewfinal dec isions of the state courts, by implication denies fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt s juri sd ic tio n— and fe de ra l court s of ap pe a ls jur isd ic tio n— ov e r c ha lle ng e s to state-c ourt judg ments. See E xxon , 544 U.S. at 283

. I f a pa rty wishes to challeng e a state-c ourt judgme nt, it mus t seek re view in the U.S. Supreme Court, not in the f eder al district courts. Id. In Ex x on Mo bil , the Court confine d the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine to a “nar row g round,” na

mely “ca ses broug ht by

state-c ourt lose r s c o mp la in in g o f in ju r ie s c a u s e d by state-c ourt judg ments rende red be fore the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr oc e e din g s c omm e nc e d a nd inv iti ngdis tr ic t c ourt

re vie w a nd re je c tio n of tho se claims.” Id. at 284. Smith’s claims do not occupy this “narr ow g round.”-11-

I nvoking substantive and procedura l due process, S mith complains that Michig an has de nied him acce ss to DNA evidence, which implicates his “liberty interest in demonstratinghis innocence with new evide nce unde r state law ,” Dist. Atty’ s Office for theThird Judicial Dist. v. Osborne , __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319 (2009). Smit h’s substantive due proc ess cha lleng e does not satisfy Rooke r-Feldman ’s re qu ir e me nts
. He a sse rt s a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o r e -t e st e vid e nc e fr om h is tri a l,
us ingthe n- un a va ila

ble DN A t e sti ngte c hn iqu e s— a ri g ht t he State of

Mic hig an r e fu se s to g ra

nt h im. The state- court judgment, howe ver, did not cr eate or ca use this injury ; the State of Michig an (throug h its prosecutors) did. The state court “simply ratified, acquie sced in, or left unpunished” the State’s re fusal to allow him acc ess to new DN A testing
. Mc Kith e n v . B ro wn , 481 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Rooke r - Feldman does not cover this substantive due pr oc e ss c la im, and

tha t by its e lf sh ow s th a t th e dis tr ict co ur t ( and we ) h a ve jur isd ic tio n o ve r t his
case . Smith’ s p ro c e du

ra l du e pr oc e ss c ha lle ng e a lso exce e ds Rooke r-Feldman ’s limited gr asp. F a ir ly c on str ue d, Smith’ s pro se paper s pres en t an as- applied cha lleng e to the ade quacy of Michig an’s pr ocedur es for obtaining post-c onviction acc ess to DNA and to the actions of the Way ne County Prosecutor’ s Offic e in applying those proce dures, not a c halleng e to the state-c ourt judg ment itself. See R.1 ¶¶ 42, 44–45. Osborne e xplic itl y c on te mpl a te d th is ty

pe of c ha lle ng e in D NA -a c c e ss
case s, see O

sborne , 129 S. Ct . at 2322, and I do ub t th e Cou

rt inv ite d w hat Rooke r-Feldman pr e ve nts
. Whil e Ic ann ot e mbr a c e the ma jor ity ’s ju ri sdic tio na l r

uli ng s, Ia g re e wi th m

uc h o f i ts alternative ruling on the merits. Under Osborne , Sm ithha s n o s ub sta nti ve du e pro cess ri ght to
acc ess evidenc e from his criminal trial a nd subject it to DNA testing
. See id. And his proce dural due proc ess claim fares no better beca use Mi chig an provides a more comprehe nsive proce dure f or-12-

acc essing evidenc e for

DNA testing than the Alaska scheme upheld in Osborne
. See id. at 2320–22; see also Mich. Comp. L aws § 7 7 0
. 1 6 . I t is not t rue, how ever , that sovere ign, pr osecutoria l or judicial immunit y

“likely ” immuniz es the de fenda nts from the for

war d-lookin g i n

j u nctive re lief Smith s e e ks e ve n if

he ha d a mer ito ri ou s c la im. Ma j. O p. a t 7; se e als o R.1 at 11. These doc trines shield officia ls f

rom damag es suits, not forwa rd-looking injunctions. See P ulliam v. Allen , 4 66 U. S. 522, 541–42 (1984) (

judicial immunit y

); Su p. Ct. of V

a. v . Co ns um e rs Un ion of the Un ite d S tates, Inc. , 446 U.S. 7 1 9 , 7 3 7 (1980) ( prosec utorial immunit y ); Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) ( sovere ign immunity).