SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2222-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES J. ROBERTS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted November 18, 2021 – Decided February 16, 2022

Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Accusation No. 03-09-1182.

James J. Roberts, appellant pro se.

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant James J. Roberts appeals from a January 6, 2020 order denying 

his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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We discern the following facts from the record. On May 12, 2003, 

defendant entered a bank and informed the teller his backpack was filled with 

explosives he would detonate unless she gave him money. The teller compiled, 

and defendant, having no vehicle, fled the scene in a stolen car after forcing out 

the occupants. 

On September 18, 2003, defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery

contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and carjacking contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1). 

Before defendant pled guilty, the trial judge asked defendant whether he 

understood that "when [he] c[a]me to court on . . . sentencing day, [he] could get 

[fifteen] years, . . . [thirty] years, or anything in between[.]" Defendant 

responded that he understood. The trial judge then asked defendant whether he 

was satisfied with counsel's assistance and whether he understood the questions 

on the plea agreement. Defendant answered in the affirmative to both questions. 

Defendant stated he was not on medication nor under the influence of any drugs 

or alcohol. 

On November 14, 2003, defendant was sentenced to fifteen years for each 

charge, to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of thirty years. 

Defendant appealed his sentence, and on May 15, 2006, this court's excessive 

sentencing panel remanded the matter for resentencing. State v. Roberts, No. A-
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3241-03 (App. Div. May 15, 2006). On June 12, 2006, the trial judge reaffirmed 

defendant's sentence. On August 29, 2006, defendant again appealed the trial

judge's decision to the excessive sentencing panel. On March 29, 2007, we 

directed the trial judge to reduce the robbery sentence from fifteen years to ten 

years. State v. Roberts, No. A-0037-06 (App. Div. Mar. 29, 2007). The trial 

judge modified defendant's sentence as directed. On July 12, 2007, the Supreme 

Court denied certification. State v. Roberts, 192 N.J. 294 (2007).

On or about November 21, 2008, defendant filed his first petition for postconviction relief (PCR), asserting ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of 

plea and sentencing. Specifically, defendant argued counsel "(1) 'coerced and 

cajoled' defendant into pleading guilty by 'misleading [him] with respect to the 

terms of the plea agreement'; and (2) provided ineffective assistance at 

sentencing by failing to assert mitigating factors including the fact that defendant 

'cooperated with authorities throughout the investigatory process, . . . [and] 

voluntarily surrendered to police.'" Defendant filed a certification claiming 

counsel advised him the sentence recommendation was for fifteen years total. 

Defendant further certified that he suffered an episode of paranoid schizophrenia 

at the time of his original sentencing. Defendant claimed his attorney was aware 

of his episode and should have requested an adjournment. Defendant argued 
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counsel's failure to address his mental health allowed defendant to make a bad 

impression in front of the judge and prejudiced him once sentencing took place 

in November 2003. 

On July 15, 2009, a PCR judge heard defendant's argument. After 

reviewing the record, including the plea form and plea colloquy between 

defendant and the trial judge, the PCR judge determined defendant failed to make 

a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel, and defendant's petition

was denied without a hearing. Specifically, the PCR judge stated that the "record 

contains numerous instances during the plea in which the [c]ourt on the record 

explained the potential sentences in detail[,]" so even if counsel misinformed 

defendant, the "extensive explanations" by the plea judge rendered the plea 

knowing and intelligent. Further, the PCR judge decided defendant's claims 

related to his mental health status at the time of sentencing were "bald assertions" 

and he did not allege facts to demonstrate counsel's deficient performance. 

Defendant appealed the PCR judge's decision, arguing he made a prima 

facie showing of ineffective assistance and the PCR judge abused his discretion 

by denying PCR without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant also filed a pro se 

supplemental brief arguing PCR counsel "failed to raise the issues of . . . 

defendant's mental health diagnosis that [he] [had] been dealing with since the 
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age of seven . . . years old." On August 11, 2011, we decided that defendant's 

arguments lacked "sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion[,]" 

and affirmed the PCR court "substantially for the reasons stated by [the PCR 

judge.]" State v. Roberts, No. A-0206-09 (App. Div. Aug. 11, 2011) (slip op. at 

13-14). We further determined there was no basis to conclude that PCR counsel 

was ineffective for failing to raise defendant's mental health issues. id. at 13. 

The only evidence of defendant's "mental history" was defendant's statement to 

a probation officer that he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia when he 

was twenty-six years old. ibid. We also noted there was no evidence defendant 

continued to suffer from paranoid schizophrenia and that the episode he allegedly 

experienced in 2003 was not supported by the record. ibid. On January 31, 2012, 

the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Roberts, 209 N.J. 232 (2012). 

On October 26, 2012, defendant's second petition for PCR was denied 

because the petition "raise[d] claims that trial and appellate counsel were 

ineffective[,]" which was not appropriate for a second petition for PCR because 

it did not rely on a new constitutional rule and had already been adjudicated in 

his first petition and on appeal. On May 21, 2015, defendant's petition for habeas 

corpus was denied by the U.S. District Court. Roberts v. Warren, No. 12-4010 

(PGS) (D.N.J. May 21, 2015).
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On June 21, 2019, defendant filed pro se what he called his "first motion 

to correct an illegal sentence." Defendant argued his sentence was illegal and 

should be corrected pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). According to defendant, "the 

court, the prosecutor, and his own counsel failed to evaluate whether the 

defendant was competent to stand trial[,]" which violated defense counsel and 

prosecution's duty to the court to ensure defendant was competent to stand trial 

and defendant's due process rights. Defendant claimed that the record alluded to 

his mental health issues, including his paranoid schizophrenia, but counsel only 

argued in favor of mitigation that defendant was in special education classes 

during his childhood and had attention deficit disorder. Further, defendant 

alleged the trial judge had evidence of intoxication and diminished capacity 

during his crimes and at the plea hearing, but the court failed to ask whether he 

was on medication. 

On January 6, 2020,

1

the court denied defendant's motion to correct an 

illegal sentence in an order and written decision. The court discussed N.J.S.A 

2C:4-4(b)(2), the statute governing competence at trial, and found that there was 

no evidence in the record indicating defendant was not competent to stand trial. 

1 The order is mistakenly dated January 6, 2019, instead of January 6, 2020.
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To the contrary, the record supported defendant's competency during the plea 

and sentencing process. For example, the court noted that

[d]fendant referred to the [j]udge as "Your Honor" . . . ; 

the defendant listened to and answered the plea colloquy 

questions appropriately; the defendant asked relevant 

questions during the colloquy; the defendant asked the 

[j]udge to clarify when he didn’t understand a question

. . . ; and the defendant was able to correct the [c]ourt 

when the [j]udge advised the defendant about a plea 

bargain without advising the defendant about his right 

to argue for less time.

Further, the court stated that defendant "voluntarily waived his right to a 

jury trial[,]" "stated he was not on any medication, drugs or alcohol[,]" and 

"understood that he would have to give a factual basis to the court[.]" This appeal 

followed. 

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT[']S MOTION TO CORRECT AN 

ILLEGAL SENTENCE PURSUANT TO R. 3:21-

10(b)(5).

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 

DEFENDANT A[N] EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN 

ACCORDANCE TO R. 3:22-10(b) ON THE MATTER.
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"As with sentencing, the scope of appellate review of a trial court's 

decision to grant or deny a [Rule] 3:21-10(b)(2) motion is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion." State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 137 (1985). Because 

"[Rule] 3:21-10(b)(2) offers extraordinary relief to" prisoners, it "must be 

applied prudently, sparingly, and cautiously." Id. at 135. A court abuses its 

discretion when its "decision is 'made without a rational explanation, 

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible 

basis.'" State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. 

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

Defendant's argument regarding the court's alleged error in failing to 

correct the sentence is barred by Rule 3:22-5. Rule 3:22-5 provides: "A prior 

adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made 

in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction 

proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in 

any appeal taken from such proceedings." "'Preclusion of consideration of an 

argument presented in post-conviction relief proceedings should be affected only

if the issue [raised] is identical or substantially equivalent' to that issue 

previously adjudicated on its merits." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 

(1997) (quoting State v. Bontempo, 170 N.J. Super. 220, 234 (Law Div. 1979)). 
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Here, defendant filed two petitions for PCR squarely presenting the issue

of whether he was competent at the time of plea and sentencing, and both were 

denied. One of these petitions was reviewed and affirmed by this court. Notably, 

we affirmed that there was no evidence of defendant's claimed mental history, 

other than his own statement that he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia 

at twenty-six. We affirmed the PCR court's finding that counsel was not 

ineffective because defendant did not show any evidence that he was incompetent 

at the time of pleading or that he did not understand the plea. Defendant is 

rehashing the argument that he was incompetent at the time of his plea after 

numerous judges have determined he was not incompetent at the time of his plea. 

Therefore, defendant is barred from arguing the same underlying issue, even 

when framed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Defendant's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing lacks

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.