Filed 2/16/24 Henreid v. Skaggs CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

PAUL HENREID,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RICHARD SKAGGS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B314741

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV20592)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul Henreid, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Raymond N. Haynes for Defendant and Respondent.

________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

After a two-day trial a jury found in favor of defendant 

Richard Skaggs on defamation and false light claims brought by 

plaintiff Paul Henreid, an attorney. As explained in greater 

detail below, Henreid sued Skaggs based on Skaggs’ 

dissemination of an e-mail containing false information regarding 

Henreid relating to criminal charges that were subsequently

expunged under Missouri law. Shortly before Skaggs published 

the false information, Henreid had resigned from the Oso Town 

Council after other council members confronted him regarding 

the alleged criminal charges. Henreid was a member of the town 

council and had served as its president. The matter received 

local press coverage. Henreid appeals, contending the trial court 

incorrectly ruled he was a public figure (or a private figure 

involved in a public matter), and that it made several evidentiary 

errors. Henreid has not carried his burden on appeal of 

demonstrating reversible error, and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2018 Henreid owned property in Neenach, an 

unincorporated community in Los Angeles County. He was a 

member and, for a time, the president of the Oso Town Council, a 

local body that advises its member of the Los Angeles County 

Board of Supervisors on issues of interest to local residents. 

During his tenure, other members of the council became aware of 

20-year-old allegations relating to Henreid when he was a law 

student that involved criminal charges, which were subsequently 

expunged under Missouri law. After members of the council
3

raised this matter with him, Henreid agreed to resign from the 

council and not to run in an upcoming council election in 

exchange for the other council members agreeing to pay for “an 

outside independent accounting firm to audit the Oso Town 

Council Foundation.” (Capitalization omitted.) The matter 

received local press coverage.

An individual named Jesse Lee expressed interest in 

running for election to fill the vacancy created by Henreid’s 

resignation, but the other council members raised concerns about 

Lee’s association with Henreid. In February 2019 Skaggs sent an 

e-mail to Lee and the other council members stating as follows:

“We are not going to be fooled again like we were by your 

compadre, Paul Henreid, who has a history of criminal

convictions. . . . We in Neenach are a trusting people and, when 

Paul Henreid assured the Members of the Board that he [had] no 

criminal convictions and no dark secrets in his past, we believed 

him and made him ‘temporary President of the Oso Town 

Council’ . . . As the administrator of the Neenach Community 

Group Facebook page, you have an obligation of trust to the 

community to be ‘totally transparent’ and to provide your identity 

and current address for the safety of one and all.” At trial, the 

jury expressly found Skaggs’ statement about Henreid was false.

Henreid filed a complaint against Skaggs based on this 

email. He alleged causes of action for defamation per se and 

invasion of privacy by false light. Henreid unsuccessfully moved 

for summary judgment, and his action was set for trial in June 

2021. Before trial, Skaggs filed a motion in limine asking the 

trial court to rule that Henreid was a public figure or,

alternatively, a private figure in a matter of public concern. A 

ruling in favor of Skaggs on that motion would essentially require 
4

Henreid to prove at trial that Skaggs’ statement was made with

actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. (See Reader’s 

Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256 (Reader’s 

Digest) [public figure]; Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 711, 747 [public concern].) The trial court granted the 

motion, but it is unclear whether it ruled that Henreid was a 

public figure or that he was involved in a matter of public 

concern. The minute order memorializing the trial court’s ruling 

is not in the record, and there was no court reporter present at 

the hearing. There was also no court reporter at the trial. 

In the absence of a reporter’s transcript, we quote the 

relevant portion of the settled statement describing the trial and 

the evidence presented by the parties.1 (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 8.137.)

“The following is a summary of the proceedings and 

testimony at the trial in this matter:

1. On April 26, 2021, Skaggs filed a motion in limine to 

determine whether Henreid was a public figure for the purpose of 

the action at issue in the trial court. That motion was presented 

and granted at the final status conference on June 8, 2021.

2. On June 8, 2021, jury selection began.

3. Testimony began on [June] 9, 2021. Henreid testified 

on [June] 9, 2021 and [June] 10, 2021. Plaintiff testified that he 

told Defendant about his expungement [under Missouri law] 

several times and advised Defendant in writing via e-mail to stop 

making defamatory statements about Plaintiff. In that 

1 On our own motion we take judicial notice of the trial 

court’s minute orders dated June 9 and 10, 2021 as these orders 

describe the evidence offered at trial and the exhibits admitted

into evidence. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), and 459.)
5

correspondence, Plaintiff provided Defendant with an official 

criminal history record from the California Department of Justice 

showing no criminal history record for Plaintiff. Plaintiff 

testified that he told Defendant that Missouri Invasion of Privacy 

is not a sex offense and that Plaintiff had no convictions for any 

sex offenses. . . .

4. On [June] 9, 2021, on cross examination, Skaggs 

sought to introduce newspaper articles [regarding the alleged 

criminal charges against Henreid] from 2018. In all, Skaggs 

requested introduction of 15 newspaper articles regarding the 

conviction from publications such as the Washington Post, CBS, 

the ABA Journal, the Associated Press and other national 

publications. The trial court allowed only two stories . . . finding 

the other article [was] ‘cumulative.’

[2]

5. The newspaper articles admitted speak for 

themselves and presented a question of fact for the jury to decide 

as to whether Henreid presented clear and convincing evidence 

that Skaggs knew his statement was false or had serious doubts 

about the truth of his statement.

6. The newspaper articles presented a question of fact 

for the jury to decide as to whether Henreid presented clear and 

convincing evidence that Skaggs knew his statement was false or 

had serious doubts about the truth of his statement.

7. Henreid offered evidence regarding the Missouri 

expungement laws, and a real estate contract that stated Henreid 

had moved to Oklahoma. The court rules those documents 

2 The trial court’s minute order dated June 10, 2021, 

identifies three (not two) news articles that were admitted in 

evidence. 
6

irrelevant to the [sic] Henreid’s claims that the statement in 

Skaggs’ email was libelous.

8. Skaggs testified on June 10, 2021, stating that, at the 

time he wrote the alleged defamatory email, he was president of 

the Oso Town Council, and wrote the email, and wrote that email 

in the execution of his duties as the president. Skaggs testified 

that Henreid had been a member of the Oso Town Council and its 

president for a period of time. Skaggs testified that the Oso

Town Council acted as a quasi-public entity advising the Los 

Angeles County Board of Supervisors on issues before the town of 

Neenach in Los Angeles County, an area of about 500 residents 

between Gorman and Lancaster California. Its monthly 

meetings [were] open to the public and covered extensively by 

local media.” (Capitalization omitted.)

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Skaggs. The jury in 

its special verdict found, among other things, that: Skaggs made 

the challenged statement; the recipients reasonably understood it 

was about Henreid; and Skaggs’ statement about Henreid was 

false. But the jury also found Henreid did not “prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that Skaggs knew the statement was false or 

had serious doubts about the truth of the statement.” The court 

entered judgment on the jury verdict, and Henreid filed a timely 

notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Henreid challenges the trial court’s ruling granting Skaggs’ 

motion in limine regarding his status as a public figure or private 

figure involved in a matter of public concern. Henreid also 

argues the court erred in excluding certain items of evidence at 
7

trial (including discovery admissions and declarations), and 

erroneously admitted two news articles regarding the past 

criminal charges against him. Henreid also filed a motion for 

sanctions against Skaggs. We address each in turn.

A. The Law of Defamation3

The elements of a claim for defamation depend on whether 

plaintiff is a public figure or a private figure in a matter of public 

concern. For a private figure, the elements for a defamation 

cause of action are “(1) a publication that is (2) false, 

(3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency 

to injure or causes special damage.” (See John Doe 2 v. Superior 

Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312.) As noted above, when a 

plaintiff is a public figure or involved in a matter of public 

concern, the law requires proof of actual malice by clear and 

convincing evidence. “If the person defamed is a public figure, he 

cannot recover unless he proves, by clear and convincing evidence

[citation], that the libelous statement was made with “‘actual 

malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” (Reader’s 

Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 256.) Similarly, if the defamation 

involves an issue of public concern, proof of actual malice is 

3 Henreid does not advance any argument on appeal 

regarding his cause of action for “right of privacy—false light.” In 

any event, “[w]hen a false light claim is coupled with a 

defamation claim, the false light claim is essentially superfluous, 

and stands or falls on whether it meets the same requirements as 

the defamation cause of action.” (Eisenberg v. Alameda 

Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1385, fn. 13; 

accord, Selleck v. Globe International, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 

1123, 1136.)
8

necessary to recover presumed or punitive damages even if the 

plaintiff is not a public figure. (See Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting 

Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 747.)

“Actual malice” in this context means the defamatory 

statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with 

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” (New York 

Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 280.) Reckless

disregard of the truth means that the publisher “in fact 

entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the challenged 

statement. (St. Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731.) 

To show actual malice, “‘the publisher must come close to 

willfully blinding itself to the falsity of its utterance.’” (Brown v. 

Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 747.) This is “a 

subjective test, under which the defendant’s actual belief 

concerning the truthfulness of the publication is the crucial issue.

[Citation.] This test directs attention to the ‘defendant’s attitude 

toward the truth or falsity of the material published . . . [not] the 

defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff.’” (Reader’s Digest, 

supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 257.) Thus, “[t]he failure to conduct a

thorough and objective investigation, standing alone, does not

prove actual malice, nor even necessarily raise a triable issue of

fact on that controversy. [Citations.] Similarly, mere proof of ill

will on the part of the publisher may likewise be insufficient.” 

(Id. at p. 258.)

For these reasons, whether Henreid is a public figure or 

involved in a matter of public concern is “a question of law which 

is crucial to the proper resolution of [a] libel claim.” (Reader’s 

Digest, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 252.) “On appeal, the trial court’s 

resolution of disputed factual questions bearing on the public 

figure determination is reviewed for substantial evidence, while 
9

the trial court’s resolution of the ultimate question of public 

figure status is subject to independent review for legal error.” 

(Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 264; see 

Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 747 

[similar regarding public concern].)

B. The Duty To Present an Adequate Record for Review on 

Appeal

An appealing party has the burden to provide the reviewing 

court with an adequate and accurate record on appeal to 

demonstrate reversible error. (See Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 

71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1 [“It is the burden of appellant to 

provide an accurate record on appeal to demonstrate error.”].) 

Our review of this appeal is limited by the lack of an adequate 

record of the evidence and arguments, which would allow us to 

review the trial court’s rulings. 

“A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed 

correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to 

support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error 

must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 

2 Cal.3d 557, 564; see also Srithong v. Total Investment Co.

(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 721, 725, fn. 3 [“It was of course the duty of 

Srithong, as the appellant, to furnish an adequate record for 

review.”].) “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record 

is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and 

the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” (Mountain 

Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 

1051, fn. 9.)

Similarly, where a ruling is made following a hearing on a 

motion, in the absence of a record of what transpired at the 
10

hearing, we presume the trial court had before it whatever 

evidence was needed to support the ruling. (See Hearn v. 

Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201 (Hearn) [“[A]lthough 

the cornerstone of several of appellant’s arguments involves what 

occurred at a . . . hearing, appellant has not furnished a 

reporter’s transcript of those proceedings. We must therefore 

presume that what occurred at that hearing supports the 

judgment.”]; see also In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [defendant insisted he made a special rather 

than a general appearance at an unreported hearing; in the 

absence of a record “[w]e must therefore presume that 

[defendant] did not limit his objections at the . . . hearing to 

matters of jurisdiction, that he opposed [plaintiff’s] prayers for 

relief on the merits, and that he thus submitted to the court’s 

jurisdiction by making a general appearance.”]; Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.137(d)(2).)

As noted above, Henreid proceeded on a settled statement

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137), which requires “a condensed 

narrative of the oral proceedings,” “includ[ing] a concise factual 

summary of the evidence and the testimony of each witness 

relevant to the points that the appellant . . . raise[s] on 

appeal. . . . Any evidence or portion of a proceeding not included 

will be presumed to support the judgment or order appealed 

from.” (Id., rule 8.137(d)(2).)

C. Henreid Does Not Meet His Burden of Demonstrating the 

Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion in Limine

Henreid contends the trial court erred by granting Skaggs’

motion in limine deeming Henreid either a public figure or a 
11

private figure involved in an issue of public interest.4 The effect 

of this ruling, of course, was to require Henreid to prove at trial

by clear and convincing evidence that Skaggs acted with actual 

malice when he published the defamatory statement regarding 

Henreid. Based on the record before us, we conclude Henreid has 

not demonstrated the trial court erred. 

Henreid forfeited the issue on appeal because the record 

does not reflect he filed an opposition to Skaggs’ motion in 

limine.

5 “As a general rule, failure to raise a point in the trial 

court constitutes [a] [forfeiture] and appellant is estopped to raise 

that objection on appeal.” (Redevelopment Agency v. City of 

Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 167.) A party who fails to 

oppose a motion cannot challenge the order granting the motion 

for the first time on appeal. (See Ferris v. Gatke Corp. (2003) 

107 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1225, fn. 7 [party forfeited challenge to 

nonsuit motion by failing to object at the time the motion was 

made; “Assuming it was error . . ., it was error invited by 

counsel’s silent failure to timely bring any objection to the trial 

judge’s attention before she had ruled.”].)

4 It is unclear which of these alternatives the trial court 

adopted. Henreid refers to an order deeming him a public figure, 

while Skaggs refers to an order deeming Henreid a “limited 

public figure in the community of Neenach” or “a Private 

Individual in a Matter of Public Concern.” For present purposes

the difference is immaterial because both require clear and 

convincing evidence of actual malice.

5 Skaggs’ appendix includes his motion in limine but does not 

include the evidence presented in support of the motion. No 

document labeled opposition to defendant’s motion in limine is 

listed in the trial court’s docket.
12

As noted above, Henreid also failed to present a sufficient 

record for us to review the challenged order. (See Mountain Lion 

Coalition, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1051, fn. 9; see also Hearn, 

supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1201 [absent adequate record trial 

court order presumed correct]; In re Marriage of Obrecht, supra, 

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 9 [similar].) The parties’ settled statement 

provides only that, “Skaggs filed a motion in limine to determine 

whether Henreid was a public figure for the purpose of the action 

at issue in the trial court. That motion was presented and 

granted at the final status conference on June 8, 2021.” Neither 

the clerk’s transcript prepared at Henreid’s direction, nor the 

appendix filed on appeal, includes the evidence the trial court 

had before it when it granted the motion in limine.

6 In the 

absence of any showing of what evidence was before the trial 

court, we presume the record supported its decision to grant the 

motion and deem Henreid either a public figure or a private 

figure in a matter of public concern.7

6 Even if Khawar requires an independent review of the trial 

court’s ruling, our review is limited by Henreid’s failure to 

present an adequate record on appeal. (Cf. Eghtesad v. State 

Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411 [declining 

to review whether demurrer was properly sustained; “[a]lthough 

our review is de novo, it remains the burden of the 

plaintiff/appellant ‘to show either that the demurrer was 

sustained erroneously or that the trial court’s denial of leave to 

amend was an abuse of discretion.’”].)

7 At oral argument, Henreid argued he had introduced 

evidence that showed he was neither a public figure nor a private 

figure involved in a matter of public concern. These record

citations do not change our conclusion because they are to

documents that were not submitted in opposition to the motion in 

limine, or are to Henreid’s legal arguments, which are not 
13

In any event, to the extent the settled statement can be 

deemed to include the evidence before the trial court when it 

ruled on the motion in limine, it supports the trial court’s ruling,

and we are obliged to presume the evidence before the court 

supported the challenged ruling. The settled statement provides 

that, “Skaggs testified that Henreid had been a member of the 

Oso Town Council and its president for a period of time. Skaggs 

testified that the Oso Town Council acted as a quasi-public entity 

advising the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on issues 

before the town of Neenach in Los Angeles County, an area of 

about 500 residents between Gorman and Lancaster, California. 

Its monthly meetings open [sic] to the public and covered 

extensively by local media.” (Capitalization omitted.)

Henreid’s position as a town council member and former 

president is sufficient for the trial court to have determined 

Henreid was a public figure. (See Ghafur v. Bernstein (2005) 

131 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1237 [school board member was public 

figure because “[t]he designation applies where the individual’s 

‘position in government has such apparent importance that the 

public has an independent interest in the qualifications and 

performance of the person who holds it’”]; Kahn v. Bower (1991) 

232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1613 [social worker]; Gomes v. Fried (1982) 

136 Cal.App.3d 924, 934 [police officer]; Weingarten v. Block

(1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 129, 139 [former city attorney].)

Henreid also fails to demonstrate it would have been error 

for the trial court to determine he was a private individual 

involved in a matter of public concern regarding the candor and 

evidence. (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 176 [“It is 

undeniable that the argument of counsel does not constitute 

evidence.”].)
14

qualifications of those serving on the town council, particularly 

given the upcoming election of Henreid’s replacement and 

Henreid’s own handwritten note resigning from the council upon 

an audit of the council. Whether something is an issue of public

interest is ““‘construed broadly.”’” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 

147 Cal.App.4th 13, 23.) “Although matters of public interest 

include legislative and governmental activities, they may also 

include activities that involve private persons and entities.” 

(Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 

650-651.) It even encompasses “‘activity between private 

people.’” (Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher 

Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 465 [communications 

relating to dispute between volunteer basketball coach and

parent-teacher organization involved issue of public interest].)

Henreid relies on Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 

471 (Grenier), to argue he was neither a public figure nor 

involved in an issue of public concern. In Grenier, a pastor and 

his wife sued to recover damages for defamatory statements 

accusing the pastor of child abuse. (Id. at pp. 477-478.) 

Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion. (Id. at p. 479.) The trial 

court found that child abuse was a matter of public concern and 

that the pastor was a limited public figure by virtue of his 

writings and religious broadcasts, but denied the anti-SLAPP 

motion because plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of 

prevailing on their claims. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed 

the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, but reversed the trial 

court’s ruling the pastor was a limited public figure. (Id. at 

pp. 484-485, 487.) The court reasoned that although the pastor 

“thrust himself into the public eye as an expert on the Bible and 

its teachings,” that was not sufficient to make him a limited 
15

public figure on issues relating to morality of private conduct 

because that “would be equivalent to holding that being a 

member of the clergy makes one an all-purpose public figure.” 

(Id. at p. 485.) Grenier does not help Henried. Even if Henreid 

was not a limited public figure as president of the Oso Town 

Council, Grenier has no bearing on his status as a private figure 

in matters of public concern involving the leadership and finances 

of the Council. 

Further, Henreid’s argument that because he sold his 

property in Neenach and moved out-of-state before the date 

Skaggs sent his email means he was not a public figure or had no 

connection to a public issue is unpersuasive. In Cabrera v. Alam

(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077, the plaintiff was a past president of 

a homeowner’s association who had also sold her home and was 

“not a resident, a member of the [homeowner’s] association, a 

member of the association’s board of directors, or a candidate for 

election” to the board when defendant falsely accused plaintiff of 

defrauding the organization. (Id. at p. 1085.) The appellate court 

held plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure by “thrust[ing] 

herself into the controversy surrounding the election of” the 

board, and that plaintiff’s complaints the board was being 

mismanaged related to an issue of public interest. (Id. at 

p. 1082.) As in Cabrera, the fact that Henreid no longer resided 

in Neenach does not mean he was not a public figure or involved 

in a public controversy at the time Skaggs sent his e-mail, 

particularly because the evidence before the trial court 

included—at a minimum—his prior involvement with the Oso 
16

Town Council and complaints relating to financial 

mismanagement requiring an audit.

8

D. Henreid Does Not Meet His Burden of Demonstrating the 

Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Its Evidentiary Rulings

Henreid challenges several evidentiary rulings made by the 

court during trial. We review decisions regarding admission of 

evidence for abuse of discretion. (See Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 

2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446-447; Pannu v. Land Rover North America, 

Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317.) We must also consider 

Evidence Code section 354, which provides that, “A verdict or 

finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 

based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion 

of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the 

error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors 

complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

9 Under that 

8 Henreid asserts the trial court erred when it instructed the 

jury that it in order to find for Henreid, it had to find that he 

proved actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. But he 

presents no argument the jury instructions themselves were 

erroneous. Henreid forfeited his argument relating to the jury 

instructions by not supporting it with legal argument or citations 

to supporting authority or the record. (See Sehulster 

Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc./Obayashi Corp. (2003) 

111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [argument not supported 

“with citation to law or the evidentiary record . . . is equivalent to 

a concession”].) But even if we were to reach the argument, it 

would fail for the same reasons as Henreid’s attack on the ruling 

granting the motion in limine.

9 Article VI, section 13 of our state’s Constitution, provides in 

relevant part that, “No judgment shall be set aside, . . . in any 

cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the 
17

standard, “[t]he trial court’s error in excluding evidence is 

grounds for reversing a judgment only if the party appealing 

demonstrates a ‘miscarriage of justice’—that is, that a different 

result would have been probable if the error had not occurred.” 

(Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 

1480.)

1. Skaggs’ discovery responses and declarations were 

properly excluded at trial

Henreid argues the trial court wrongly excluded “discovery 

admissions” by Skaggs and declarations Skaggs submitted in 

opposition to Henreid’s summary judgment motion. There was 

no error. The trial court’s June 10, 2021 minute order reflects it

admitted into evidence Henreid’s requests for admission and 

Skaggs’s responses.

Henreid’s contention the trial court erred by excluding 

declarations from “the recipients of Skaggs’ e-mail . . . attached 

to” Skaggs’ summary judgment motion is unpersuasive. The 

court’s minute orders do not reflect that Henreid offered these 

declarations into evidence. Henreid cannot challenge the trial 

court’s failure to admit such evidence in the absence of any 

indication he sought to introduce it. In any event, the trial court 

would not have abused its discretion even if it had refused to 

admit the declarations at trial. “It is well established . . . that 

declarations constitute hearsay and are inadmissible at trial, 

subject to specific statutory exceptions, unless the parties 

improper admission or rejection of evidence, . . . unless, after an 

examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court 

shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted 

in a miscarriage of justice.”
18

stipulate to the admission of the declarations or fail to enter a 

hearsay objection.” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 

1337, 1354; see Rowan v. City & County of San Francisco (1966) 

244 Cal.App.2d 308, 314, fn. 3.)10

Henreid further argues the failure to admit this evidence 

meant the jury unnecessarily spent time deliberating regarding 

these issues and then “rushed to judgment.” Henreid posits that 

had the jury considered the excluded evidence, “they probably 

would have ruled differently on the questions with a heightened 

burden of proof resulting from the determination that [Henreid] 

was a public figure.” This contention is speculation that we 

cannot accept. “No speculation can determine the basis upon 

which the jury reached its verdict.” (Kovacs v. Sturgeon (1969) 

274 Cal.App.4th 478, 487.)

2. The newspaper articles were properly admitted

Henreid argues the trial court wrongly admitted news 

articles regarding his past charges. The trial court’s June 10 

minute order reflects three such articles were admitted in 

evidence: a U.S. News article from February 2018 describing the 

charges for which Henreid was indicted in 1998; a Washington 

Post article from the same time period and with similar content;

and an August 1999 article from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

describing Henreid’s plea deal and sentence. Henreid concedes 

the exhibits were admitted “for the limited purpose of showing 

10 For the reasons discussed above, in the absence of a record 

of the court’s evidentiary rulings, we must assume Skaggs made 

an appropriate hearsay objection that was sustained by the trial 

court.
19

the Defendant’s state of mind when he made his defamatory 

statements and what he relied upon.”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

this evidence for the limited purpose of allowing Skaggs to testify 

that he believed the truth of what he stated in his e-mail. (See 

Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 774 [“evidence is 

“‘capable of being admitted at trial’” if it is “‘competent, relevant 

and not barred by a substantive rule”’”]; see also Hart v. Keenan 

Properties, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 442, 447 [“‘When evidence that 

certain words were spoken or written is admitted to prove that 

the words were uttered [or written] and not to prove their truth, 

the evidence is not hearsay. [Citations.] “The first and most 

basic requirement for applying the not-for-the-truth 

limitation . . . is that the out-of-court statement must be offered 

for some purpose independent of the truth of the matters it 

asserts.”’”].) 

Henreid argues at length the newspaper articles should not 

have been admitted to show what Skaggs believed to be true 

because “they do not state directly or indirectly what the 

defamatory statement states. They state the opposite, i.e., that 

charges were dismissed and were not convictions as the Skaggs 

e-mail stated.” But as noted above, Skaggs was entitled to offer 

the articles to show his state of mind. And we discern no 

prejudice to Henreid because the jury agreed with him that the 

e-mail statement made by Skaggs was false.

Henreid next contends the articles were admitted during 

Skaggs’ cross-examination of Henreid and went beyond the scope 

of his direct examination, purportedly in violation of Evidence 
20

Code section 773, subdivision (a).11 The settled statement 

establishes that Henreid testified on direct examination 

regarding his criminal history and thus cross-examination 

questions (or documents) going to his arrest and sentencing were 

within the scope of his direct examination. The trial court has 

wide discretion to control examination of witnesses, including 

“discretion to permit the cross-examiner to go beyond the scope of 

the direct examination.” (People v. James (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 

876, 887.)

Henreid’s final contention is that admitting the two articles 

violated Missouri’s expungement statute, which provides that “no 

such inquiry shall be made for information relating to an 

expungement.” (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.140.8.) There are at least 

two problems with this argument. First, the defamation trial 

was in California, not Missouri. California’s Evidence Code, not 

the Missouri expungement statute, governed the admissibility of 

evidence in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 300; Hewitt v. Superior 

Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 923, 927 [“[T]he Evidence Code applies 

to every evidentiary hearing in the state courts.”].) Second, the 

Missouri statute only addresses the confidentiality of “records 

and files maintained in any administrative or court proceeding in 

a municipal, associate, or circuit court for any offense, infraction, 

or violation ordered expunged under this section.” (Mo. Rev. 

Stat. § 610.140.8.) The news articles are not administrative or 

court records. Henreid has not shown any error, let alone 

prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice. 

11 Evidence Code section 773, subdivision (a), provides, “A 

witness examined by one party may be cross-examined upon any 

matter within the scope of the direct examination by each other 

party to the action in such order as the court directs.”
21

E. Henreid’s Appellate Motions 

In this court, Henreid filed a motion for sanctions against 

Skaggs’ counsel, which includes a request for unspecified 

redactions in the record before us. At oral argument, Skaggs’ 

counsel conceded the trial court ordered certain statements 

struck from the record in postjudgment briefing. The motion for 

sanctions is denied. Henreid moved for sanctions under 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a), but he has not 

demonstrated that Skaggs’ counsel violated that rule by 

“(1) Taking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay;

(2) Including in the record any matter not reasonably material to 

the appeal’s determination; (3) Filing a frivolous motion; or

(4) Committing any other unreasonable violation of these rules”

in this court. Henreid also moved under rule 8.278(a)(5), but that 

rule relates to “Costs on Appeal” and does not provide a basis for 

sanctions.12 The request for redactions is denied without 

prejudice to filing a procedurally proper motion under rule 8.46.

13

12 Additionally, the litigation privilege supports denial of

sanctions. (See Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b); Friedman v. Knecht

(1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 455, 460 [“‘An attorney at law is absolutely 

privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another . . . 

in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of a 

judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has 

some relation thereto.’”]; RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet 

Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 435 [litigation 

privilege “is absolute, providing a defense to all torts except 

malicious prosecution and applying ‘to all publications, 

irrespective of their maliciousness.’”].)

13 We deny the accompanying request for judicial notice as 

moot. 
22

Henreid separately filed a motion to recuse Presiding 

Justice Perluss. That motion is denied as moot because the 

Justice is not assigned to the panel on this case. In any event, we 

are compelled to admonish Henreid for his inappropriate ad 

hominem attacks on a justice of this court in his motion, and for 

his similar attacks on the trial judge in this case throughout his 

appellate briefs. Such personal attacks on bench officers are 

“inexcusable.” (Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 

1176.) As an attorney and an officer of the court, Henreid has a 

duty to “maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and 

judicial officers.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (b).)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The motion for sanctions is 

denied, and the motion to recuse is denied as moot. Skaggs is 

entitled to his costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

FEUER, Acting P. J. EVENSON, J. *

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.