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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re G. L. RINGEISEN, Minor. June 7, 2018

No. 340366

St. Clair Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 15-000215-NA

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The circuit court terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to his

daughter, GLR, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication

continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable

likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent). The record establishes that

respondent failed to complete any tasks in his service agreement and infrequently visited his

child. After more than two years of services, respondent still could not provide proper

care and custody in a safe and suitable environment. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

GLR was born to respondent and his girlfriend, Rebeka Wrightman, on July 19, 2011.

Young GLR’s life was chaotic. Her parents engaged in domestic violence in her presence

on September 16, 2014. Moreover, Wrightman was an alcoholic and drug user who used while

GLR was in her care. In October 2014, Wrightman placed GLR in a guardianship with her

sister, Theresa Daugherty. Over Thanksgiving, respondent and his mother, with whom he

lived, had a physical altercation. Ultimately, the Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) filed a petition to take GLR into court supervision on January 15, 2015, as Wrightman

had left the state and respondent had not seen the child since December 23. Daugherty and her

husband were named as GLR’s foster parents.

Respondent and Wrightman admitted grounds to take jurisdiction over GLR. From

the beginning of the child protective proceedings, the caseworker noted respondent’s anger. 

He immediately ignored the caseworker’s directions to arrange parenting time sessions

through her and then blamed GLR’s maternal relatives for denying him access to his child. 

Respondent was also incarcerated for a month, allegedly for failure to pay child support. In a

September 25, 2015 report, the caseworker recommended, among other things, that

respondent complete an anger management program, a domestic violence program, and

counseling. Despite that he was not incarcerated at that time, respondent did not appear at the
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September 2015 hearing. The caseworker noted that respondent “doesn’t seem to be interested

very much in this and he’s causing some trouble with all parties.” The court thereafter adopted

the caseworker’s recommendations, ordering respondent to participate in various services.

Despite that he was notified of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear at hearings 

on December 28, 2015 and March 11, 2016. Respondent had spoken to the caseworker but

would not provide his new address and did not ask about visiting GLR. Respondent declined to

start ordered services. Respondent also did not appear at a May 20, 2016 hearing and had

not contacted the caseworker in the meantime. When respondent appeared at a hearing on

August 12, he claimed that he had been incarcerated again for nonpayment of support,

explaining his absence. However, he then admitted that he was released in April. Respondent

claimed that Daugherty had prevented him from visiting his daughter. He also did not

understand that the court had already ordered him to participate in services, including anger

management. At that hearing, the court specifically ordered respondent to participate in

services and that he attend supervised visits at the DHHS given the family difficulties in this

matter.

On October 16, 2016, GLR suffered 2nd and 3rd degree burns to 32% of her body in a

household accident and was hospitalized at Children’s Hospital in Detroit. Respondent visited

his daughter at the hospital, but the staff expressed concern about his angry outbursts and

negative comments. Respondent did not appear on October 21 when he promised to stay with

his daughter overnight. Instead, respondent’s mother and grandmother arrived, took pictures

of GLR, and created a GoFundMe page seeking $50,000 to cover medical costs, despite that

GLR’s care was completely covered by insurance. Respondent arrived late to the October 28

hearing where these issues were discussed and “stormed out” midproceeding.

Respondent did not appear for a December 2, 2016 hearing and had not visited GLR in the

hospital since the last hearing. Respondent was not returning the caseworker’s calls and had

not provided proof of employment or participation in services. The court ordered that after

GLR’s release from the hospital, she would be returned to Wrightman and her family. 

Respondent also did not appear for hearings on February 24 and May 19, 2017.

On June 16, 2017, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of

respondent’s parental rights. Respondent had not seen GLR in more than six months. The

caseworker had difficulty keeping track of respondent; he changed his phone number frequently

without alerting DHHS. Respondent had only provided proof of employment for one month

during the lengthy proceedings. Respondent had completed no ordered services and continued

to behave angrily and aggressively toward the caseworker and GLR’s maternal family.

At the termination hearing, evidence was presented that respondent lived with his 

mother, a woman whom he had physically assaulted in the past. In addition, the caseworker

indicated that the home was an unsuitable placement because it was flea infested. The

caseworker observed over 10 parenting time sessions between respondent and GLR and observed

nothing of concern at those times. However, respondent’s visits were few and far between. The

caseworker also had not heard from respondent since January 3, 2017.
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Respondent contended that he had actually attended parenting classes, just not those to

which the caseworker referred him. He admitted that he attended only one of eight classes,

however, because he learned during a family team meeting that the DHHS intended to return GLR

to her mother. Respondent further asserted that he attended eight anger management classes but

he did not finish and earn a certificate. Respondent “got upset” and stopped calling the

caseworker because he “figured [he] wasn’t getting the acknowledgment that [he] was trying to

follow through with the court’s orders.” He claimed he stopped participating in services

because he “just felt like it wasn’t going to benefit [him] any.” Respondent described that he

worked 60 hours a week at two jobs and took care of his mother who suffered from multiple

sclerosis and fibromyalgia. Respondent did not explain why he failed to provide proof of 

continuing employment.

Despite repeated instruction to contact the caseworker to schedule parenting time

sessions, respondent claimed that he had not seen GLR since December because her guardians

would not allow it. Respondent did not contact the caseworker, he asserted, because nothing

“ever gets done when [he] bring[s] it to her attention.” Respondent did not raise these issues

with the court because of his “legal issues with child support and everything like that.”

Ultimately, the court terminated respondent’s rights. He now appeals.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent challenges the evidentiary support for the statutory grounds leading to

termination. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a circuit court “may terminate a parent’s parental

rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” that at least one statutory

ground has been proven by the DHHS. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612

NW2d 407 (2000). When termination is sought in a supplemental petition based on new

grounds, the DHHS must present legally admissible evidence in support. In re DMK, 289 Mich

App 246, 258; 796 NW2d 129 (2010). We review a circuit court’s factual finding that a statutory

termination ground has been established for clear error. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91;

763 NW2d 587 (2009). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the

trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80;

836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Clear error signifies a decision

that strikes us as more than just maybe or probably wrong.” In re Williams, 286 Mich App

253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).

The court terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),

and (j), which state:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182

or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and

the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . .

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no

reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable

time considering the child’s age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody 

for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering

the child’s age.

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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the

home of the parent.

The record supports that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist long past

the 182-day mark. Respondent continued to exhibit anger management issues throughout the

proceedings. Respondent did not complete anger management or domestic violence programs

and never attended counseling. Moreover, just as at the start of the proceedings, respondent still

was not consistently visiting his daughter. And respondent had not found suitable housing. 

He was still living with his mother, and their prior history of domestic violence made the

home an inappropriate placement. The DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite respondent

with his daughter, but he failed to meaningfully participate and show adequate benefit. See In

re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Accordingly, termination was

supportable under factor (c)(i).

Termination was also supportable under factor (g). A “parent’s failure to participate in

and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child

proper care and custody.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The

record is replete with examples of respondent’s failure to participate in ordered services and

refusal to deal with the caseworker so he could work toward reunification. Respondent’s

anger management issues and incidents of domestic violence with the women in his life left

respondent unable to provide proper care and custody for his child. The failure to follow

through with services means that this condition still exists and will not be rectified within a

reasonable time.

The evidence supporting termination under factor (j) was not as strong. However, the

DHHS was not required to prove that termination was supportable under this ground as only one

ground was required. Overall, respondent has not established that the court’s termination

decision was based on inadequate evidence.

III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent further contends that termination of his parental rights was not in GLR’s

best interests. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must

find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re

Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). 

“[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven

by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. The court should weigh all

the evidence available to it in determining the child’s best interests. Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-
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357. Relevant factors include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability,

[and] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality. . . .” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich

App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “The trial court may also consider . . . the parent’s 

compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, [and]

the children’s well-being while in care. . . .” White, 303 Mich App at 714. Termination may 

be in the best interests of the child, even where a parent and child are bonded, if there is “a

serious dispute on the record” regarding whether the parent has a “healthy bond” with the child. 

See In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 196-197; 646 NW2d 506 (2001), overruled in part on other 

grounds by In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 422-423 (2014).

GLR has been in the care of her maternal relatives for more than half of her life. 

Because of her serious burns, GLR will require intensive care going forward. GLR requires

therapy twice a week, laser surgery every three months, must wear burn garments 22 hours a

day, and must use special lotions, oils, and a face mask to help her heal. The child’s relatives

have been providing that care so far. As respondent stopped visiting GLR after her hospital

release and has not been involved in her recovery, he has never learned how to provide for

her. Instead, respondent has gone through these proceedings angry and resentful, ignoring

what his best for his child and choosing not to participate because he did not get enough pats

on the back. Given his failure to participate, respondent will be unable to provide a safe home

for GLR any time in the near future and the child requires a stable and permanent home. On

this record, the trial court did not err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was in the child’s best interests.

We affirm.

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens