FILED 

OCTOBER 26, 2017 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHING TON 

DIVISION THREE 

In the Matter of the Termination of ) 

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No. 35015-1-111 

Z.K.F.t 

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

KORSMO, J. - A mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to her 

daughter, arguing that not all necessary services were provided and that it was not in the 

best interest of the child to end their relationship. We affirm. 

FACTS 

C.P. is the mother of Z.K.F. C.P. came to the attention of the Department of 

Social and Health Services (DSHS) after a referral from the local prosecutor's office. 

That office was concerned about C.P.'s mental health and the existence of severe 

domestic violence in her relationship with her boyfriend. 1 Concerns were raised that the 

tTo protect the privacy interest of Z.K.F., a minor, we use initials throughout this 

opinion. General Order of Division III, In Re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child 

Victims or Child Witnesses (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 

appellate_ trial_ courts/?fa=atc.genorders _ orddisp&ordnumber=2012_001 &div=III. 

1 The boyfriend was not the child's father. The father voluntarily relinquished his 

parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. 
No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

abuse affected her ability to care for her child and to acquire safe and stable housing. 

DSHS provided referrals for domestic violence advocacy services as well as 

mental health and housing services. A no contact order separated C.P. and her boyfriend. 

Z.K.F. alternated homes, living two weeks with each parent each month. The following 

year Z.K.F. disclosed sexual abuse by her father and DSHS began a dependency action. 

C.P. was homeless and initially could not be found. Once located, a social worker 

offered to assist with housing, but C.P. was not interested. The caseworker also tried to 

arrange visitation between C.P. and Z.K.F. The child was placed with a relative living 

out of town. C.P. did not want to travel to see her daughter, but wanted her daughter to 

travel to visit her. 

After a contested trial, the court found the child dependent. The social worker 

recommended that the court order C.P. to participate in a substance abuse evaluation, a 

mental health evaluation, a psychological evaluation, random urinalysis testing, sexual 

victimization counseling, and domestic violence victim's assessment and education. 

However, the court also determined that the evidence did not support finding that C.P. 

had drug, alcohol, or mental health problems. The court did order C.P. to participate in 

parenting education, attend a domestic violence victim assessment, and receive housing 

assistance. 

The social worker referred C.P. to local providers of the noted services. C.P. was 

able to obtain housing at Haven of Hope, but was unable to comply with the facility's 

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No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

guidelines and left after a few weeks. DSHS did not know where C.P. lived after that, 

although she maintained some contact with the caseworker. After missing several visits, 

the court suspended C.P.' s visitations with Z.K.F ., although that right was later restored. 

C.P. took part in a clinical parenting assessment that led clinical social worker 

Rebecca Springer to express concerns about C.P.'s parenting skills and style. The mother 

thrust the obligation of care-taking on the child instead of the other way around. C.P. 

declined parenting education even though Ms. Springer thought she would benefit from 

it. C.P. also underwent an assessment with a clinical psychologist. The doctor diagnosed 

C.P. with moderate or current major depression, alcohol and cannabis dependence with 

current use, and "a rule out" of posttraumatic stress disorder. The doctor, who believed 

the prognosis for C.P.'s parenting ability was poor, saw C.P. for therapy twice in 

December 2015, and again on May 11, 2016. C.P. never returned for additional therapy. 

On February 3, 2016, the court found that C.P. had failed to comply with the 

court's dependency order by not participating in parenting classes, the mental health 

assessment recommendations, or counseling for Z.K.F. 's sexual victimization. The court 

ordered additional services, including a psychological evaluation, a drug and alcohol 

evaluation, and other services. Soon thereafter C.P. missed three scheduled visits with 

Z.K.F. and visitation again was suspended. A third referral to Children's Home Society 

for weekly in-home parenting services lasting 12 to 18 weeks was attempted, but after 

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No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

only four meetings during a two month period, C.P. asked to discontinue the in-home 

education. 

Visitation was reinstated in April 2016, but lack of compliance and progress in 

parenting led the court to change the child's permanent plan to adoption. A petition to 

terminate parental rights was filed in June 2016. C.P. continued to have trouble finding a 

stable living situation through the trial in December 2016. C.P. was not present for the 

trial. The court found that while C.P. had completed the parenting and psychological 

evaluations and had participated in four parenting sessions and three therapy sessions, she 

had not completed any sessions for parents of sexually abused children, nor had she 

completed domestic violence treatment. The court further found that C.P. had a 

"chronically unstable lifestyle that is unsuitable for a child." 

Z.K.F. had been living in relative placement since April 2015, but the social 

worker believed the placement could not become permanent without adoption; the 

guardian ad litem also believed terminating parental rights was in the child's best interest. 

The court concluded that termination of C.P.'s parental rights was in the child's best 

interest and granted the termination petition. 

Written findings and conclusions of law were entered soon thereafter, formally 

terminating the parent-child relationship. C.P. promptly appealed to this court. A panel 

considered the matter without oral argument. 

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No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

ANALYSIS 

C.P. contends both that the evidence does not support the determination that all 

reasonable available services were offered or provided, and that termination of the 

parent-child relationship was not in the child's best interest. We will address those two 

contentions in the order noted. 

Services Offered 

The parties debate whether appropriately tailored services were made available to 

C.P. We agree with the trial court's assessment that they were. 

In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, the State first must establish the 

six elements ofRCW 13.34.180(1).2 The trial court then must find by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence that the parent is currently unfit. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 

908, 918, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). "' Clear, cogent, and convincing' means highly 

probable." In re Welfare of MR.H, 145 Wn. App. 10, 24, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). The 

trial court's findings are entitled to great deference on review and those findings will be 

upheld when supported by substantial evidence. In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 

918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). Substantial evidence is that sufficient to persuade a fair2 The State must present evidence establishing that ( 1) the child has been found to 

be dependent, (2) the court has entered a dispositional order, (3) the child has been removed 

from the custody of the parent for at least six months, ( 4) all the necessary services have 

been afforded to the parent to correct the parental deficiencies, (5) there is little likelihood 

of remedying the parental deficiencies, and (6) continuation of the parent-child relationship 

clearly diminishes the child's prospects of permanent placement. RCW 13.34.180(1). 

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No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination of Z.K.F. 

minded, rational person of the truth of the evidence. World Wide Video, Inc. v. City of 

Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 387, 816 P.2d 18 (1991). 

The fourth statutory factor is the one at issue in this appeal: 

That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136[3

1 have been expressly and 

understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably 

available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable 

future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided. 

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). It also is the State's burden to establish this factor, as with all six 

of the§ 180 factors, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i). 

When a parent has unique needs, DSHS must offer services tailored to meet the 

parent's unique needs. In re Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 850, 644 P.2d 1245 (1983); In re 

Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644,651, 102 P.3d 847 (2004). DSHS, "however, is 

not required to offer services when a parent is unable to benefit from the services." In re 

Welfare of S.J., 162 Wn. App. 873, 881, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). Further, "even where the 

State inexcusably fails to offer a service to a willing parent ... termination is appropriate 

if the service would not have remedied the parent's deficiencies in the foreseeable 

future." In re Dependency of TR., 108 Wn. App. 149, 164, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001). 

3 RCW 13 .34.136 requires the creation of a permanency plan for determining the 

child's future living situation. The permanency plan is developed in conjunction with the 

dependency action. RCW 13.34.136(1). 

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No. 35015-1-111 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

Here, the mother claims that several necessary services were not provided, or were 

not provided together. However, the record reflects that all necessary services were, in 

fact, provided. RCW 13 .34.180(1 )( d) only applies to services ordered by the trial court in 

the dependency action. RCW 13.34.136. Thus, the mother's unrequited requests for a 

rental car, drug treatment in Malibu, California, and on-line courses, all are without merit 

because the dependency judge never ordered such services. 

C.P. also argues that the court did not timely order psychological and substance 

abuse evaluations and treatment, and also failed to order them in a co-occurring manner. 

The issue first came up during the dependency hearing, with C.P. opposing the social 

worker's requests that she be evaluated and treated in both of those areas. The trial court 

found the evidence insufficient to order the evaluations. It was only after C.P. requested 

treatment that the court had a basis for reconsidering the issue and ordering the services. 

At that point, the evaluations were conducted and the treatment ordered. The services 

were as timely provided as C.P. allowed them to be. 

She also argues that the psychological and substance abuse services needed to be 

co-occurring, but she can cite to nothing in the record that would support her claim. The 

services were occurring during the same time period, but if they needed to be conducted 

in some other manner than they were offered, some type of evidence from a therapy 

provider would be necessary to establish why the current efforts were failing. There 

simply is nothing to support this contention. 

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In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

Similarly, C.P. insists she was cognitively impaired and not treated appropriately, 

but the evidence simply does not bear her theory out. She was seen by two psychologists 

who managed to find other mental health problems, but made no findings of cognitive 

impairment. This contention is without merit. 

DSHS offered all court-directed services in the appropriate manner. C.P. declined 

to participate in several of them and only occasionally participated in other services. 

Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the trial court's determination that all 

ordered services were provided. 

Best Interest of the Child 

C.P. also argues that termination of the parent-child relationship was not in the 

best interest of Z.K.F. The evidence supports the trial court's contrary determination. 

IfDSHS meets its burden as to the six termination factors ofRCW 13.34.180(1), 

then "the trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in 

the best interests of the child." MR.H, 145 Wn. App. at 24 (citing RCW 13.34.190(2)); 

In re Dependency of K.NJ., 171 Wn.2d 568, 576-577, 257 P.3d 522 (2011) (citing RCW 

13.34.190(l)(b)). C.P. primarily argues that because she did not receive all necessary 

services, then automatically the best interest of the child standard was not satisfied. Since 

we have rejected her argument about necessary services, this derivative argument is 

without merit. 

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No. 35015-1-III 

In re Termination ofZ.K.F. 

Moreover, the record supports the best interest determination. At the time of trial, 

Z.K.F. was seven and had lived with the same family member for the last 20 months. 

She had not seen her mother for two months, and only sporadically before that. C.P. was 

still not in a position to care for herself, let alone raise a child. The prognosis for C.P. 

becoming even a minimally adequate parent was poor. The social workers and the 

guardian ad litem all believed that adoption was in the child's best interest to allow her to 

integrate into a stable home. There was no competing evidence suggesting otherwise. 

The evidence supports the trial court's determination that the child's best interest 

was served by terminating the mother-child relationship. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

j 

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