No. 01-15-00556-CV

In the Court of Appeals for the 

First District of Texas at Houston, Texas 

___________________________________ 

In the Interest of S.R.-M.C., Child 

__________________________________ 

RAC, Sr. aka RC, Appellant 

v.

Department of Family & Protective Services, Appellee 

____________________________________ 

On appeal from the Harris County District Court 

313th Judicial District; No. 2010-08247J

____________________________________ 

 

APPELLEE’S BRIEF

____________________________________ 

VINCE RYAN 

COUNTY ATTORNEY 

State Bar #99999939 

Sandra D. Hachem (SBN 08667060) 

Sr. Assistant County Attorney 

1019 Congress, 17th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Telephone: (713) 274-5293 

Facsimile: (713) 437-4700 

Email: sandra.hachem@cao.hctx.net

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE, 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & 

PROTECTIVE SERVICES 

ACCEPTED

01-15-00556-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

10/1/2015 4:52:17 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 10/1/2015 4:52:17 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................................................................iv

REPLY POINT .........................................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................................7

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES........................................................................9

REPLY POINT ONE: The evidence sufficiently supported the court’s 

findings for termination of RC’s parental rights..................................................9

1. The Claims, the Law and Standard of Review ........................................9

2. The unchallenged finding under Subsections (O) concerning 

RC’s failure to comply with the court’s order for reunification is 

binding in this court’s review and warrants parental termination... .......12

3. The undisputed fact that the father made no effort to contact the 

child and admitted his lack of resources or ability to parent 

coupled with the fact he took no action to comply with the court 

ordered service plan, other than allowing DNA testing, supported 

the court’s finding under N. .........................................................................14

4. There was sufficient proof for the trier of fact’s finding that

termination was in the child’s best interest considering the 

evidence in support of Subsections N and O...............................................16

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..........................................................................................19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE...........................................20

Appendix........................................................................................................ attached
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2003)..................................................................14

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).. ...................................................9, 11, 18

In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.―

 Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).................................................................10

In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2013) ..............................................................18

Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 1985).............................................................9

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976).......................................................17

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002).................................................................11

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex.2009) .................................................................9

In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).....................................16, 17

STATUTES

Tex. Fam. Code An. §101.007 (West 2014)............................................................11

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001 (West 2008)......................................v, 9, 10, 13, 15

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §263.307 (West 2014)..........................................................17
iv

ABBREVIATIONS

 In this Brief, the following abbreviations will apply:

PARTIES

RC: refers to the Appellant, the Father/Respondent.

RM: refers to the Mother, the Respondent at trial.

SC: refers to the child at issue in this appeal 

APPELLATE RECORD:

CR: refers to the Clerk Record 

RR-2: refers to the 2

nd Volume of the Reporter’s Record with trial testimony.

RR-3: refers to the 3

rd Volume of the Reporter’s Record containing exhibits. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 29, 2014, the Department filed a motion to modify and suit for 

protection of the subject child (SC). CR189. A bench trial was held on May 13, 

2015. CR 103. A judgment was thereafter signed on June 2, 2015 that terminated 

the parent-child relationships of the RM (mother), and RC (Father) of SC. CR 105-

06. Per Tex. R. Civ. P. 306, the judgment as to both parents recited the predicate 

bases warranting parental termination under Subsections (N) and (O) of Section 

161.001(1) of the Family Code. Id. RC filed a timely notice of appeal. CR 114. 

The brief on behalf of RC to which this brief responds challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence for the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest, and 

the predicate finding under Subsection N. 

REPLY POINT

Reply Point: The evidence sufficiently supported the court’s findings for 

termination of RC’s parental rights. 

 

1

In this brief “CR” refers to the Clerk’s record filed in this appeal.
No. 01-15-00556-CV

In the Court of Appeals for the

First District of Texas at Houston, Texas

___________________________________

In the Interest of S.R.-M.C., Child

__________________________________

RAC, Sr. aka RC, Appellant

v.

Department of Family & Protective Services, Appellee

____________________________________

APPELLEE’S BRIEF

__________________

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

Department of Family & Protective Services, Appellee, [hereinafter 

“Department”] submits this brief in response to the brief of RC.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 26, 2012, a decree was signed concerning the subject child SC and 

her older sister EW that placed them in the Department’s sole managing 

conservatorship without terminating parental rights. CR 59. At the time the order 

was signed, SC was 4 years old and her older sister was almost 18. RR-3 p. 17. 

RC was named as one of alleged fathers in the judgment, but paternity was not 

established at that time. CR 60. The decree removed the mother as a managing 

conservator and limited her rights as a possessory conservator. CR 61. 
2

A couple years later, on July 2, 2014, the court ordered RC to remain in the 

courtroom to take a DNA test. Appendix,2 Attachment 1 (Image #61643812). That 

same month, the court ordered the parents to complete the Family Service plans 

that had already been on file for several months, since October of 2013, and the 

court attached the October plans to the court’s order. CR 71. The October service 

plans recited the Department’s concerns and goals as well as tasks for each parent 

to complete. RR-3 p. 51. 

The plan prepared for the alleged father, RC, included details about the 

Department’s concerns about the child’s family situation. RR-3 p. 52; Se also CR 

82. In particular, it described the child’s mother as violent and out of control with 

discipline methods that were disproportionately harsh. Id. It also noted that RM 

had physical altercations with her oldest child on a regular basis. Id. It noted that 

the mother had no stable residence, was living in a hotel that was not appropriate 

for the youngest child to live in, and that the mother had a history of homelessness. 

Id. The Department’s plan also expressed concern that the mother appeared 

unconcerned about SC being in a safe and protected environment. RR-3 52.

One of the general goals of the plan was for each parent to “show the ability 

to parent and protect the child.” RR-3 p. 52. In connection with that goal, the plan 

specified numerous tasks the parents should complete; and for the father, RC, in 

 

2

The appendix contains documents that did not appear in the clerk’s record, but the Department 

requested the clerk to supplement the appellate record with them.
3

particular, it required that: (1) the father maintain a positive support system that is 

safe, crime free and drug free; (2) that he submit to DNA, (3) successfully 

complete parenting classes, (4) provide his caseworker sources of income for him 

and his child by the 15th of each month and maintain stable employment for at least 

six months; (5) provide the worker with release of information forms, (6) 

participate in meetings and court hearings regarding his child and provide truthful 

information; (7) maintain stable and safe housing for at least six months (8) 

complete a psychological evaluation and (8) participate in drug/alcohol testing. 

RR-3 p. 53-54.

On September 12, 2014, the court signed an order that formally adjudicated 

RC as the child’s father.3 Appendix, Attachment 2 (Image #62545110). Trial 

commenced about nine months later: on May 13, 2015. RR-3 p. 4. Neither parent 

was at trial. The mother told her attorney she had just gotten out of the hospital 

and did not feel up to coming. RR-2 p. 13. 

The caseworker, Jamelle Gibbs, was the only witness at trial. She 

acknowledged that the mother had been named possessory conservator of the child 

since 2012 (over 3 years earlier). RR-2 p. 14-15. She noted after she was named 

possessory conservator, the Department asked the mother to participate in two 

 

3

This interlocutory order was later incorporated into the court’s final judgment. CR 111.
4

service plans, but the gist of both plans was basically the same thing: that she 

acquire stable employment and housing. RR-2 p. 15. 

The Department’s caseworker did not believe the mother showed 

compliance in her services; and, in particular, she did not take her drug tests and 

had not found housing. RR-2 p. 18-19. The caseworker did not believe she had 

completed anything from her service plan. RR-2 p. 16. She acknowledged the 

mother told her she was employed at Zone D’Erotica but she did not provide any 

pay stabs or proof of income. RR-2 p. 16. Consequently, the caseworker had no

proof that she could provide the child with a safe and stable environment. RR-2 p. 

16. In fact, she had no evidence that the mother even wanted to parent the child. 

RR-2 p. 16-27. She stated while over the years the mother had indicated she 

wanted to provide for the child, since September 2014 she continued to just tell the 

caseworker that the Agency could have her child. RR-2 p. 17. Consequently, she 

did not believe she wanted to parent the child. RR-2 p. 17.

The caseworker acknowledged that the mother’s access to the child had been 

limited by the court in an order before the present motion to modify was filed. RR2 p. 17-18. She noted that occurred around March of 2014. RR-3 p. 27. She 

indicated the court limited her access because she would tell the child not to listen 

to any other adult and the child’s behavior went in a negative direction after her 

visits. RR-2 p. 18. The mother did not do anything to reinstate her visitation and 
5

access. RR-2 p. 19. After her rights to visits and access were limited, she asked 

about her child only about four times, and the caseworker believed she essentially

abandoned the child. RR-2 p. 19.

The caseworker stated that the child’s father was living in Indianapolis, 

“India [sic.].”

4

 RR-2 p. 10. The caseworker mailed him a plan of service and went 

over it with him by phone. RR-2 p. 20. She stated he gave a DNA sample in 2014 

as required by the plan, but did not complete the plan. RR-2 p. 20-21. In 

particular, she noted he did not visit the child and never reached out to the 

Department to set up visits or phone contact. RR-2 p. 21. She also noted he did not 

provide for his child financially and never sent the child letters, gifts, support or 

clothing. RR-2 p. 21-22. He essentially abandoned her. RR-2 p. 22. 

The caseworker stated she believed the father abandoned the child, because 

it had been four years and he failed to show any interest in her whatsoever. RR-2 p. 

30. She noted he did not write the child, and did not attempt to video chat, or 

phone the child. RR-2 p. 33. Also, when the caseworker spoke with the father 

about parenting the child, he responded that he was not able to parent and added he 

was not stable. RR-2 p. 22. He stated he had a job, but was not working much and 

suggested maybe one of his sisters could get the child. RR-2 p. 22. The 

 

4

This is obviously a typo. The address of RC was in Indiana. RR-3 p. 17.
6

caseworker stated she had no evidence that he was financially able to parent the 

child or that he could provide a safe and stable home. RR-2 p. 22.

The father told the caseworker about two relatives, but she noted if she had 

not asked the father about potential relatives, her conversation with him would 

have ended there. RR-2 p. 22-23. As to the two relatives the father referred her to 

for placement, they both lived in Indiana. RR-2 p. 23. She stated that ICPC

requests were submitted for those individuals. RR-2 p. 23. However, the first 

proposed relative, an aunt, was denied, because she failed her FBI background 

check; and the second was denied due to noncompliance. RR-2 p. 23. 

 The caseworker stated that SC is a sweet little girl, but her parents had not 

been able to provide her with the basic things needed to thrive and live. RR-2 p. 

24. She noted the child had been in care for four-plus years, had been in numerous 

placements and deserved stability. RR-2 p. 24. 

The caseworker noted the child was at that time in a foster home where she 

had been for a year and all her physical and emotional needs were met there. RR-2

p. 12-13. The caseworker acknowledged the agency had not identified an adoptive 

placement for the child yet. RR-2 p. 25. Nevertheless, she stated if the court 

terminated the parents’ rights that would open up the pool to where she could 

actually be broadcasted to obtain permanency. RR-2 p. 25. 
7

The caseworker noted the child was diagnosed with mood disorder and 

ADHD but was responding positively to the medications to address those 

conditions. RR-2 p. 13. She stated she believed the Department would be able to 

find an adoptive home for the child once she is freed for adoption and believed it 

would be in the child’s best interest. RR-2 p. 32.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Appellant’s Brief of the Father (RC) challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support some of the findings in support of the court’s decision to 

terminate his parental rights. Namely, the brief challenges the legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings that termination was in 

the child’s best interest and that RC constructively abandoned the child for a 

finding under Subsection N. Those challenges should be overruled, because the 

evidence supported the court’s finding under N as well as the best interest finding.

Moreover, the brief does not challenge the court’s findings regarding RC’s 

failure to comply with the court order for reunification for a finding under O. That 

omission impacts this court’s review, because that unchallenged finding is binding 

in this court’s review, obviates the need for review of the challenge to Subsection 

N and provides support for the court’s finding that termination was in the child’s 

best interest. 
8

In addition, the evidence in this case is essentially undisputed in support of 

the court’s conclusion that parental termination was in the child’s best interest. 

This child has not received the basic things a child needs from a parent for the last 

four years while this child has lingered in foster care and there is no indication that 

RC ever reached out to this child. While this father complied with a court order to 

undergo DNA testing to find out his paternity, that was the extent of his efforts. 

He did not do anything else the court ordered in the plan that was created for his 

child’s benefit to try and come up with a permanent solution. 

Also, it is undisputed that the father did not believe he was able to parent 

considering his instability and the only reason the caseworker learned about

relatives from his family was because she asked him to provide that information. 

She basically indicated he was apathetic in his response to this child. He did not 

write the child, made no efforts to speak or meet with the child and did nothing to

provide emotional or financial support for this child. The caseworker was correct 

in her conclusion that he abandoned this child. 

While an adoptive home had not yet been located for this child, the 

caseworker believed there would be a greater opportunity for that option if the 

parents’ rights were terminated. Under those circumstances, the caseworker was 

correct in concluding that parental termination would provide the only plan for this

child’s best interest and hope for permanency with a family. Consequently, the 
9

evidence was essentially undisputed under these facts to support the court’s 

conclusion that parental termination was in the child’s best interest. The challenges 

to that judgment should be denied and the judgment affirmed.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

REPLY POINT: The evidence sufficiently supported the court’s findings for 

termination of RC’s parental rights.

1. The Claims, the Law and Standard of Review

It is acknowledged that the involuntary termination of parental rights is a 

serious matter implicating fundamental constitutional rights. Holick v. Smith, 685 

S.W.3d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). However, it is also acknowledged that a child’s 

emotional and physical interests cannot be sacrificed merely to preserve that right. 

See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). Consequently, there can be 

circumstances when termination of parental rights is warranted.

In this State, it is legally recognized that parental termination can be 

warranted if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent 

committed at least one of the predicate acts listed under the statutory list provided 

at section 161.001(1) of the Family Code; and (2) that termination is in the best 

interest of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (West 2014); In re 

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009). In this case, the trial court found 

parental termination warranted on clear and convincing evidence that the father

(RC) committed the predicate acts described at subsections N and O of section 
10

161.001(1) of the Family Code and that parental termination was in the child’s best 

interest. CR 114. 

In this appeal, the Appellant’s Brief challenges the legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence for the court’s finding that parental termination was in 

the child’s best interest and for the predicate act described at subsection N. 

Appellant’s Brief does not challenge the evidence in support of the predicate act 

described at subsection O. The failure to challenge the court’s finding under O is 

significant in this court’s review for three reasons. 

First, it is significant, because unchallenged predicate findings are treated as 

binding on appeal. See In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.―Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Second, since only one predicate finding is required 

to support a court’s decision to terminate parental rights that means this court need 

not review the challenge in Appellant’s Brief to Subsection N in order to affirm the 

trial court’s decision to terminate RR’s parental rights. Id. Third, because the 

finding of Subsection O is supportive of a best interest determination, this binding

finding impacts this court’s review of the challenge in Appellant’s Brief to the 

finding concerning best interest. Id.

As far as the Standard of Review for the challenge in Appellant’s Brief, it is 

acknowledged that the Family Code imposes a heightened standard of proof at trial 

described as “clear and convincing.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001 (West 
11

2008). The Family Code also specifically defines that standard to mean “the 

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm 

belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.“ 

Tex. Fam. Code An. §101.007 (West 2014). 

The heightened standard of proof at trial requires an appellate court to 

consider that standard when reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at p. 25 (Tex. 2002) (“burden of proof at trial 

necessarily affects appellate review of the evidence.”); In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 

S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002). In that connection, both legal and factual 

sufficiency challenges consider the standard of proof for clear and convincing 

evidence by considering whether the evidence is such that a fact-finder could

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's 

allegations. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at p. 25 (Tex. 2002); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 

at pp. 265-66; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 101.007 (West 2014).

In In re J.F.C. the Supreme Court explained, in light of the identical 

inquiries made to the clear and convincing standard, the distinction between legal 

and factual sufficiency when the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence 

may be a fine one in some cases, but clarified that there is a distinction in how the 

evidence is reviewed. 96 S.W.3d at p. 266. The court explained that in a legal 

sufficiency review, a court should look at all of the evidence in the light most 
12

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have 

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true, giving appropriate 

deference to the trier of fact. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals 

must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have 

found to be clear and convincing and with respect to disputed evidence, a court 

should consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder 

could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light 

of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not 

have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not 

reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient. 96 S.W.3d at pp. 266-67.

2. The unchallenged finding under Subsections (O) concerning RC 

failure to comply with the court’s order for reunification is binding in 

this court’s review and warrants parental termination.

As already discussed, the trial court’s finding under Subsection O is not 

challenged in this appeal and, as such, it is binding in this court’s review of this 

appeal. Nonetheless, the facts entailed in that finding should be briefly mentioned 

to emphasize its importance in review of the trial court’s decision to terminate 

RC’s parental rights. 

Subsection O involves a finding that the parent failed to comply with the 

provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for 
13

the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or 

temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective 

Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the 

parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. 161.001(1)(O) (West 2008). The facts related to this finding in this case 

should be considered because they illustrate an important reason why the court 

correctly determined parental termination was warranted.

Namely, as explained in the service plan ordered in this case, its purpose was 

to help RC provide his child with a safe environment within a reasonable period of 

time and warned that failure to do so could result in termination of parental rights. 

RR-3 p. 56. In this regard, the specific goals listed for both parents involved the 

parents showing their ability to parent the child with appropriate resources, as well 

as extending appropriate affection and demonstrating the ability to bond with the 

child. RR-3 p. 52-53. The tasks in the plan supported those goals by requiring the 

parents to maintain positive support systems, learn parenting skills, provide proof 

of adequate income, participate in court hearings and meetings regarding the child, 

and maintain a safe and stable home where the child could live. RR-3 p. 53-54. 

The caseworker confirmed she went over the service plan with the father on 

the phone; therefore, RC would have known that doing things that would show his

ability and willingness to assume the responsibilities of a father-daughter 
14

relationship was essentially what was being asked of him. RR-2 p. 20. However, 

by the time of trial, the father did not complete anything ordered in that plan except 

for the DNA testing to confirm his paternity. RR-2 p. 20-21. In addition, it does 

not appear he wanted to work on this situation, because when he was asked 

whether he wanted to parent his child, he merely stated that he was not able to 

parent his child and talked about his lack of stability. RR p. 22. The caseworker 

acknowledged she had no evidence to indicate he had stability, but that really did 

not explain why he was unwilling to work on doing anything that would help his 

child. Consequently, the evidence indicated he simply was apathetic about the 

situation of this young child and that proved he had an inappropriate parental

relationship. Such evidence provided pivotal support for the court to find a 

predicate basis warranted termination of RC’s parental rights and supported the 

court’s finding as to best interest as well. Consequently, the court’s finding on this 

unchallenged ground includes important facts relevant to review in this appeal.

3. The undisputed fact that the father made no effort to contact the child 

and admitted his lack of resources or ability to parent coupled with the 

fact that he took no action to comply with the court ordered service 

plan, other than allowing DNA testing, supported the court’s finding 

under N.

As already mentioned, because there is no challenge to the predicate finding 

under O, the finding under N need not be considered. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 

355 (Tex.2003). Nonetheless, the facts in support of that finding are equally 
15

important in illustrating why the court found parental termination warranted. 

Therefore, it shall be addressed.

Section 161.001(1)(N) of the Family Code provides a predicate basis for 

parental termination on clear and convincing proof that the parent: 

constructively abandoned the child who has been in the permanent or 

temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Protective 

and Regulatory Services or an authorized agency for not less than six 

months, and: 

(i) the department or authorized agency has made reasonable efforts to 

return the child to the parent; 

(ii) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant 

contact with the child; and 

(iii) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with 

a safe environment. 

Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(N) (West 2008). 

The evidence in this case provided undisputed proof in support of all of the 

elements of proof required for this finding, because:

1. It was undisputed that the child was in the Department’s temporary or 

permanent managing conservatorship for approximately four years. RR2 p. 24.

2. It was undisputed that the Department made reasonable efforts to return 

the child to RC by administering a family service plan for him during 

these proceedings and ensuring he would be ordered to submit to DNA 

testing in that plan. RR-2 p. 20; RR-3 p. 51; In re G.S., slip op. at p. 11, 

No. 14-14-00477-CV (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet. h.) 

(mem. op.) (“Implementation of a family service plan by the Department 

is ordinarily considered a reasonable effort to return a child to its 

parent.”).

3. The evidence was undisputed that RC did not reach out to contact the 

child or make arrangements to visit or phone, did not financially provide 

for the child or ever send letters or gifts. RR-2 p. 21-22.
16

4. The evidence was undisputed that RC stated he was not able to parent, 

talked about his lack of stability and the caseworker had no evidence he 

was employed or had the financially ability to support the child. RR-2 p. 

22. 

Appellant’s Brief essentially claims this evidence is insufficient because the 

Department did not do enough to encourage the father considering he was out of 

state and lacked stability. Nevertheless, the Department did make efforts by 

assuming the responsibility of caring for his child while offering him a plan over 

several months for him to show a willingness to care for his child’s needs. While 

the father obviously had barriers caused by his geographic location and financial 

circumstances, those barriers were within his control. In addition, those barriers 

did not explain why he did not at least try to phone the child or send letters or gifts. 

The record shows that RC simply did not do anything to demonstrate he cared. 

And as correctly observed by the caseworker, it had been too long a time for this 

child to have to wait to be cared by a parent when neither parent demonstrated the 

willingness or ability to do so. The evidence in this case was conclusive as a matter 

of law that RC constructively abandoned this child.

4. There was sufficient proof for the trier of fact’s finding that 

termination was in the child’s best interest considering the evidence in 

support of Subsections O and N.

A strong presumption exists that the best interest of the child is served by 

keeping the child with its natural parent. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Nevertheless, when a child comes
17

into care because a parent is neglectful to the child’s basic needs, the parental 

presumption cannot prevail over the child’s safety. In that connection, Section 

263.307(a) provides a prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe 

environment is presumed in a child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 

263.307(a) (West 2014). Section 263.307(b) of the Family Code lists a number of 

factors a court may consider in deciding a parent’s willingness to provide a child 

with a safe environment and, those factors consider issues such issues as parental 

drug use and the willingness to cooperate with the Department for reunification, 

factors relevant in this case. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 263.307(b) (8) & (10).

In addition, the Supreme Court has articulated a number of factors that can 

also be considered in determining the best interest of the child. Those factors 

include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future physical and 

emotional needs of the child; (3) the present and future emotional and physical 

danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; (5) the 

programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best 

interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking 

custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions 

of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not 

appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams,

544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.1976); In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230. 
18

1. Needs and Dangers

As already discussed, there was conclusive proof that RC constructively 

abandoned his child and had not provided for this child financially or emotionally. 

Such apathy not only shows RC would not ever provide for this child’s needs, but 

endangered his child’s emotional security and stability. This provided conclusive

support for the court’s finding that parental termination was in the child’s best 

interest.

2. Stability and Compliance with Services

As already discussed, there is undisputed evidence that RC failed to comply 

with his service plan and that supported the court’s finding under Subsection O. 

This same evidence supports the court’s best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 27-28; See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (noting 

reasons supporting finding under Subsection O may also support best interest 

finding.). On the relevant evidence under O, as discussed above, the court had 

conclusive proof to find RC lacked stability or willingness to comply with a plan to 

obtain stability and that evidence supported the finding that parental termination 

was in the child’s best interest.

3. Child’s Desires and Proposed Placement

It was undisputed that the child was in Department care for over four years 

and RC had not done anything to personally assume responsibility for the child or 
19

acquire an emotional attachment with the child. Also, RC admitted he could not 

parent and lacked stability, and did not do anything during this case to show he had 

interest in changing that situation. In the meantime, the child remained in foster 

care and while the caseworker acknowledged an adoptive home had not been 

found, she believed there could be an opportunity if parental rights were 

terminated. Given these facts, the child’s obvious desire to be a child loved in a 

stable and permanent home weighed in favor of parental termination.

In conclusion, the record in this case conclusively establishes that parental 

termination was in the child’s best interest, primarily based on the same evidence 

that supported the court’s findings under Subsections N and O. As there was no 

disputed evidence of any significance to outweigh that conclusion, the trial court’s 

findings should be affirmed. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Department requests that 

this court affirm the trial court’s judgment and for such other and further relief to 

which it may be entitled in law or in equity.

Respectfully submitted,

VINCE RYAN

COUNTY ATTORNEY

By: /s/ Sandra Hachem 

Sandra Hachem State Bar 08667060

Sr. Assistant County Attorney

1 1019 Congress, 17th Floor

Houston, Texas 77002
20

Phone: 713/274-5293; Fax: 713/437-4700

Email: sandra.hachem@cao.hctx.net

Attorney for Appellee,

Department of Family & Protective Services

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this the 1st day of October, 2015 a true and correct 

copy of the foregoing brief was sent to all parties to this appeal by sending a copy 

by electronic transmission to the Appellant (RC) care of his attorney of record, 

Donald Crane at donmcrane@gmail.com, and to the Attorney and Guardian Ad 

Litem for the Child, Sylvia Escobedo, at her fax number: 713/583-4877.

/s/ Sandra Hachem 

Sandra Hachem

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE

This is to certify, pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), that the foregoing 

computer generated brief consists of no more than 15,000 words, excluding the 

caption, identify of parties and counsel, table of contents, index of authorities, 

statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of procedural 

history, signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance and 

appendix. Relying on the word count of the computer program used to prepare this 

document, the number of words, subject to count under the rules, is 4,674 words.

/s/ Sandra Hachem

Sandra Hachem
21

No. 01-15-00556-CV

In the Courts of Appeals for the

First District of Texas at Houston, Texas

___________________________________

In the Interest of S.R.-M.C., Child

__________________________________

RAC, Sr. aka RC, Appellant

v.

Department of Family & Protective Services, Appellee

____________________________________

Appendix

Order for DNA testing.........................................................Attachment 1

Order Determining Paternity.................................................Attachment 2
Tab 1

Order for DNA testing
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 61643812 - Page 1 of 1

JAMELLE GIBBS 182-3 

TIFFANY DIXON 182-3 

:"',. ,~!Oc;, i\ f:~ ~I, ~\ ~ /fj\ fAUSE NO. 2010-08247J ! "\' --. '\' '1 i\ '. 'i;,:, ~~-~~ 

IN THE INTEREST OF~-; t\Y~::-d \l \\ '''~ F I .L E D 

Chrrs Daniel 

District Clerk 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

S R -M C JU 

Time: -"""j:i;';~~f:h,-.-l.--

~SCOUNTY,TEXAS 

CHILD BY ___ """n":::~~~--..113TH JUDICIAL JUVENILE DISTRICT 

ORDER FOR DRUG / ALCOHOL / D.N.A. SCREENING 

The following person(s) are ORDERED to: 

[XX] Report in person IMMEDIATELY to: Avertest c/o National Screening Center2525 Shadel and Ave.; Building 30, Door II 

/ Indianapolis, IN 462 I 9- I 787,3 I 7-353-3395 

['vj Remain in the Courtroom; 

[ ] Allow National Screening Center to collect sample at ________________________ _ 

Each individual is ORDERED to remain in their respective location until samples have been drawn. Each individual named herein is ORDERED to 

provide such personal sample(s) as may be necessary for National Screening Center to perform the ORDERED Drug / Alcohol / D.NA screening as 

follows: 

NAME: DOB TDL/ID/SS# 

I. R A C XXX-XXRelationship ALLEGED FATHER ofS R -M C

(UDS = Urine Drug Screen; ETG = Alcohol Test; HAIR = Hair Follicle Drug; D.N.A. Paternity Testing; z'T. = Zero Tolerance) 

It is further ORDERED that: ] Each party named above is responsible and shall pay for each test administered 

TEST 

I IUDS 

I I HAIR 

IXXI D.N.A. 

I IETG 

I z'T. 

I K2. 

I Bath Salts 

[XX] The costs of the test shall be paid as follows: _HUDA:URR~IS.!...C:::.O~UN~T....!Y _________ _ 

The COURT reserves the right to re-allocate the costs of the test(s) between the parties. It is ORDERED that as soon as the results of the 

test(s) are available, National Screening SHALL fax OR deliver the results, with CASE NUMBER, to the 313th District Court at FAX # 

713-222-4845 for filing with the court under seal. National Screening shall also provide the PRINTED NAME of the person transmitting 

the FAX results, the method(s)'by which the person tested was identified and the date and time the sample was taken. 

SIGNED ON: ____________ _ 

JUD E 
In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated



documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal



please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

Chris Daniel, DISTRICT CLERK

I, Chris Daniel, District Clerk of Harris 



County, Texas certify that this is a true and 



correct copy of the original record filed and or 



recorded in my office, electronically or hard 



copy, as it appears on this date. 



Witness my official hand and seal of office

Certified Document Number: 61643812 Total Pages: 1

this October 1, 2015
Tab 2

Order Determining Paternity
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 62545110 - Page 1 of 5

F I LED ",~\-'f. Chris Daniel IJ· e.... 

District Clerk Y . -,J 

JAMELLE GIBBS 182-3 

TIFFANY DIXON 182-3 

o.RJGINAL SEP ~4 2014 ~ T1me:_...,.,....-:--:=---.--=:-:--- Harris County, Texas 

By __________ -=~~----~----

Deputy 

CAUSE NO~ 2010-08247J 

IN THE INTEREST OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

S R -M C HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

CHILD 313TH JUDICIAL JUVENILE DISTRICT 

ORDER ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE 

On September 12, 2014, a hearing w p to Family Code, Chapter 160, to 

determine the parentage of the child S R -M C . 

1. Appearances 

1.1. The Department of Family and Protective Services (''the Department") appeared 

through JAMELLE GIBBS, caseworker, and by attorney and announced ready. 

1.2. Respondent MOTHER R M M A R

M K AKA R M M K

M

o appeared in person and annoU:I1ced ready. 

o appeared through attorney of record and 

announced ready .. 

o appeared In person and through attorney of record _____________________________________________ and announced ready. 

o waived issuance and service of citation by waiver duly filed. 

o agreed to the terms of this order as evidenced by signature below. 

~lthough duly and properly notified, did not appear and wholly made default. 

o was not notified, and did not appear. 

1.3. Respondent ALLEGED FATHER R A C AKA 

R C . 

o appeared in person and announced ready. 

o appeared through attorney of record and 

announced ready. 

o appeared In person and through attorney of record 

_______________ --:-_---:-_-:--_ and announced ready. 

o waived issuance and service of citation by waiver duly filed. 

o agreed to the terms of this order as evidenced by signature below. 

~though duly and properly notified, did not appear and wholly made default. 

o was not notified, and did not appear. 

RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM 

This ins1rument is of poor quality 

~O=-rd':'"'"er-=Es-:-ta-:-:blish:-:-:-ing-::P:-are-n:-tag-e---------------------- at the time of imaging. 2010'{)8247J 1 313th 

Page 1 Amanuensis 4.0 
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 62545110 - Page 2 of 5

1.4. Respond t ALLEGED FATHER D M

o appe d in person and announced ready. 

o appear through attorney of record and 

announc d ready: 

o appeared In person and through att ey of record 

____ ~------- and announced ready. 

o waived iss e and service of citation by waiver duly filed. 

o agreed to the te s o this order as evidenced by signature below. 

~though duly and properly notified, did not appear and wholly made default. 

'--El was not notified, and did not appear. 

1.5. SYLVIA YVONNE ESCOBEDO, appointed by the Court as Attorney and 

Guardian Ad Litem of the child the subject of this suit, 

~peared and announced ready. 

/0 ;greed to the terms of this order. 

o agreed to the terms of this order, but did not appear 

o although duly and properly notified, did not appear. 

1.6. Also Appearing _____________________ _ 

2. The Child 

This parentage order adjudicates parentage of the following child: 

Name: S R -M C

Sex: 

Date of Birth: 

3. Findings: Alleged Father R A C AKA R

C

3.1. R A C AKA R C Established as 

Father of 

the Child S R -M C

3.1.1. The Court finds that the es exclude R A

C AKA R C as the father, and that he has 

at cent probability of paternity, using a prior probability of 

0.5, as calculated by using the combined paternity index obtained in the 

testing and a combined paternity index of at least 100 to 1 wi

the child S R -M C born on 

to R M M / 

Order Establishing Parentage 201~8247 J I 313th 

Page 2 Amanuensis 4.0 
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 62545110 - Page 3 of 5

3.1.2. S THE ORDERED that R A C , 

AKA R C is, and he is hereby adjudicated as the 

father of the child S R -M C . 

3.1.3. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the child to limit the rights 

and duties of each parent appointed as a temporary possessory 

conservator. 

SIGNEDthis __ dayof SEP 0 92014 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Vince Ryan 

Harris County Atto 

SPN# 9 999 

Atri la 8. S ·ckling 

Assistant County Attorney 

2525 Murworth Drive, Suite 300 

Houston, Texas 77054-1603 

State Bar # 24062183 

email: 

phone: 

fax: 

amelia.strickling@cao.hctx.net 

713-578-3900 

713-578-3995 

Order Establishing Parentage 

Page 3 

,2014. 

~ ~ JUDGE SIDiNG' 

2010-00247 J 1 313th 

Amanuensis 4.0 
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 62545110 - Page 4 of 5

'A 

7#' 

&OMOSOMAL lA~s +BOde~TeCMOI09)',. 

1825 W CREST LANE 

PHOENIX, AZ 85027 US.A. 

+ 1:623.434;0292(0) 

+ 1.623.321:6118 (F) 

·www.chromosomal-labs.Com 

wyvw.l:lOdetech.com 

For ReportConsultation Please Contact: 

National Screening Ceht.er 

407 F;3nnirl Street 

Houston.lX77002 

713~226~ 7847 

TPA.Cc:lse NO TPA,GASE # 

Logged 7/11/2014' 

Case;No. PL 14-0991'5 

HIIlIIlUlllllllmOllllHlOIlmll unu 

P a t ernuy "t R ·e po rtL '. .~gCl. IT es t 

No. Name Relationship Race/Ethriiclty Collected 

14~11663 .' S C Child - 7/9/20t4 

14-08913 R C .. Alleged Father Black 7/812014 

LOci 

14·11663 ..... " 14.()8913 ; Patemity 1----.~A':":'IIf)-:I.....,e-:A.....,·. ---..;.,r'-'-'...;.;....-A~I::-le-:-le-=B--+-----A~lIe.:::-le'"""· . ~A.;.;,; . ...;.;....~~-,.'-~A~II=-"'e':-Ie-:B~··------t Index (Pi) 

08S1179 "131615165.31 .. 

D21S11 27~.1 28 33.1192 

D7S820 911' 9 10' , 1 ~57 

CSF1PO ... 

03S1358 17 18 15184.39 

THO,1 8_9.3. 8 9;3 '3.67 

013S317 .. 1112 11 '. 2.09 

0016S539' 913.1} -131.5 

02S1338 20. 2220 225.59 

Ot9S433 ' 13 ····13,2 1314.2 0.838 

vWA 17175:39 

TPOX 8 7.8 1.35 

018S51 17 17 18 3.01 

AMEL x_ X Y 1 

05S818 12 1310 13 1m 

FGA 19 25 ',19 '214.51: 

Combined Paternity Index .. 3.132;000 

Probability >99.999% 

Interpretation: T~~, r~~ults il'ldicate that the. $lIeged: father cannot be excluded as the biological father of the child. The reported 

probability as compared to 'anunreiated,untested man of the same race. is calculated assuming aprlor probability of O~5. . 

Chrom()somal Labs:~ Bode Technology is anAABBAccredited Relationship Testing ,Facility. 

STATE OFARIZONA 

COUNTY OF MARICOPA . 

ACknOWledg~; ". "'- m~r /> 114 

[ /I~a/~ 

Notary Public 

PL 14~09915 Page 1 of 2 

." '." . . . . . . _.1\ SOlubonPoint: Internatioral,lnc. (o~lp~ny •• wW1'I.s01l!tion'pOinUntLc:um, . . New YcrK. \\,.shlng!D~, DC .• ,tartor). LEne>,'. PhlX'IIiX • ~lI1'DI'.'go '.Uaf.,;]r;(1 .'.Da.I'JS·' ("I(~'9i) •. L0~ I\ng':":'" .~dn t'rilllu;r.;o • Pdlm Beacri • Londan·. Jubi! • R'.yadh· 
For Official Governmental Use Only - Do Not Disseminate to the Public: 62545110 - Page 5 of 5

Relationship Testing - Ca$e Natrcdive 

Analytical Platform 

Paterriity testresults and conclusions:ar~founded in stati,stics and probabilities, The greater'the number of g~netic 

markers examined; the greater the strength oft~e genetic evidence andhencethegreaterlhe reliabilityo!the'finalresult. 

Chror'[1osomal Labs • Sope Techr;lOlogy tests a minimum oft6 DNA markers in routine relationship testing, The 16 

mark~r technology can achieve a probability of identity of 1in 40 quintillion,or 1 in 40,000,000,000,000;000,000~ 

Pat~rnity ,laws Jend'to'Vary from state to :state, The following web link provides a nice synopsis ,for manystates~ 

http://lawdigest.uslegaLcom/paternitylgeneraL' '" """ , 

Amended Reports 

Reports documerited a?;?lJP(3rsedinga,nother report have beer\, Clmended and may hayechange!) to test, results;,and/or 

conclusions, 

Extended Testing 

For the, majority of pat ern it ycases, the 16 genetic markerpanelismore:than adequate, However, spedal circumstances 

can require ,extended testing to obtain a statistically desirable result. This typically occurs when there is;asingle,genetic 

mutati6rlodhem6thefis noiincluded ,in the test. Extended testing: options can include testing the mother, adding more 

autosomaFgenetic: loci,orY chromosome 'testing; if the child is a male, During,case ~review our doctors ma,y determine 

that exterided testing is necessary or statistically useful, and will make recommendatimls for extended tests that are lik(3ly 

to be the,m6stproductive~ ,'" 

Moth~rless Testing 

In,relati6nship testing, every effort sll,ouldbe:ma(j(3 !p ,testlhe mother when she is, available, DNA testing ,of. tile mother, 

even if maternity is no! disputed, impTPves the,'chance of obtaining' COnclusive results and is a quality control check for 

both' th~ scientific, and legal qommunity; !oensure, the,co,rrectchildwastested, Whilft motherless paternity testing is a 

relatively cOrnrT)On practice, it can present a number of problems; ranging from inconclusive results, or in the cas,e of 

incest or rela!e,crallegedfathers, a f~lseinclusion, " 

Y:;ChromosomeTesting in R,elationship Studies 

The Y chrQrT)psome is male specific and passes thrOUgh generations unchange.d from father 10 son, In circumstances 

where an alleged father i$: unavailable for testing oris' deceased, a, male child can be tested against any-' humbe(ofhis 

male relatives including, out not limited to,othednown male child rEm, brothers and half brothe(s with the same fathef:;. 

uncles; a grandf(lther, and grandfather'sibrothers, 'Since the Ychromosome is only found in m'ales, this type of testing is 

notu$~ful for femaleoffsprin~, This testis alSO'riof appropdaleforpaternity in circumstances Where there are two related 

aJleg~d fathers. 

Genetic··,lnconsistencies(IVILitatiOrts) 

Genetic inconsisterities(mutations) are naturally occurringmismcilches between a 'Child and .the alleged parent The' 

freqUencies of. these naturally occurring mismatches are' fact6red:int6the ·finalcombinedpaternity index, Due to the 

nature of these calculations, the statistical value 6f the result is significaritly reduced; therefore some degree of extended 

testing IS requiredJoobtaih aGonciusive·result .. . . . 

Result.h'terpret,Cltion~'Relations~ip Studies 

the results of siblingship; aVuncular and grand paternity testing c:lre, gen~rally rep:orted as the likelihood, in support of or 

againslanallege'd relationship, While interpretation' ofthe strength onhe statisti.c:alvalue can be variable,andshould; 

ultimately be considered ih;context with all case circumstances; the table below slimmarizes Ruolished interpretative' 

criteria for use as a guide, . 

. . .. 

Combined Likelihood Ratio Probability ·..Value ofEvldencelrl.Support ofHvpothesis 

<OAO' ... ~ .... .. 

... <.:28:6% Genetic evidence d6es riot supp6rthvp6thesis 

.. 0.40tol,6 28;6'% to 61 ,5% .....Neutral ~ Inconclusive .. 

>t,6J6JO .6t;6% t6'90,90% LimitedSuppo"rt' 

;':10 to 100 ··90:91.%·t099,00% Moderate Support", 

>100to 1000 99,01% ·:99,90% .StrongSUQQor\ ... 

>1,000 >99,90% ... 

.. VeJYStron~SuJ2!:l.ort .. -

Page'2of2 0613.1 4 Rev 11 Case Narrative 
In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated



documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal



please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com

HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

Chris Daniel, DISTRICT CLERK

I, Chris Daniel, District Clerk of Harris 



County, Texas certify that this is a true and 



correct copy of the original record filed and or 



recorded in my office, electronically or hard 



copy, as it appears on this date. 



Witness my official hand and seal of office

Certified Document Number: 62545110 Total Pages: 5

this October 1, 2015