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******************************************************TERRELL STATON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (SC 19309)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued September 9—officially released October 6, 2015 Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III , state’s attorney, and Angela Macchiarulo, senior assistantstate’sattorney, forthe appellee (respondent).Opinion PER CURIAM. This case raises the question of whethercounseldeliveredineffectiveassistancebyfailingtorequestacontinuance orobtainacapiastosecure the testimony of a witness. The petitioner, Terrell Staton, appeals from the judgment ofthe Appellate Court dismissing his appeal from the habeas court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 Staton v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 148 Conn. App. 427, 435, 84 A.3d 947 (2014). The petitioner claims that his trial counsel, Jennifer Tunnard, rendered ineffective assistance at his criminal trial because she chose not to pursue questioning of a potential exculpatory witness, Warren Battle. We disagree and, accordingly, affirmthe judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts and procedural background are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was convicted ofreckless endangermentinthe second degreeinviolation of General Statutes § 53a-64, interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a167a, operating an unregistered vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-12 (a), improper use of a marker inviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 14-147 (c), and failing to obey a traffic signal in violation of General Statutes § 14-301. Id., 429. In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that Tunnard had rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to request a continuance or to obtain a capias to secure the testimony of Battle, who would have testified that he, instead of the petitioner, wasthe driverofthe carinvolvedintheincident. Id. At the habeas trial, the court heard testimony from thepetitioner,Tunnard, Battle, andOfficerMichaelPederson ofthe Danbury Police Department, who initially observed and followed the petitioner after the events in question. Id., 433–34. Subsequently, the court denied the petition, concluding that Tunnard’s decision to do without Battle’s testimony was reasonable and that the petitioner had not been prejudiced by the lack of Battle’s testimony at the criminal trial. Id., 430.
On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish the prejudice prong for ineffective assistance of counsel underthe test enunciated inStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Staton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 148 Conn. App. 433. The Appellate Court stated that,

as the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, the habeascourtcouldhavefoundthatBattle’sinconsistent testimony and lack of recall would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding in light of Pederson’s testimony. Id., 433–34. Consequently, the Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. Id., 435. Thereafter, this court granted certification to appeal,limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the petitioner’s habeas appeal on the ground that he had failed to satisfythe prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 687]?’’ Staton v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 311 Conn. 942, 89 A.3d 352 (2014). ‘‘Our examination ofthe record and briefs and our consideration of the arguments of the parties persuade us that thejudgment ofthe Appellate Court should be affirmed. Because the Appellate Court’s well reasoned opinion fully addresses the certified issue, it would serve no purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. We therefore adopt the Appellate Court’s opinion as the proper statement of the issue and the applicable law concerning that issue.’’ Recall Total Information Management, Inc. v. FederalIns. Co., 317 Conn. 46, 51, 115 A.3d 458 (2015).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

1 The habeas court also denied the petitioner’s request for certification to appeal.