FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY

Guidance on Meetings

Office of the General Counsel

9/1/2015
GUIDANCE ON MEETINGS

OVERVIEW

The Office of General Counsel has developed this guidance to assist parties in determining their 

respective rights and obligations during formal discussions, investigatory examinations and other 

meetings or discussions which may trigger representational rights under the Federal Service 

Labor-Management Relations Statute. 

The Statute provides for representation in two well-established instances when certain conditions 

have been met: formal discussions and investigatory examinations. The Statute also prohibits 

agencies from bypassing exclusive representatives, and dealing directly with unit employees, 

regarding grievances and other matters relating to the collective bargaining relationship.

The three sections of this Guidance address these topics by examining the Statutory authority of 

these representational rights; the scope and purpose of the rights; the types of meetings and 

discussions to which they apply; and the appropriate remedies. While this Guidance is intended 

to assist the parties in understanding this important area of law, it does not represent legal advice, 

nor should it be interpreted to predict the legal outcome in any particular case.
i

GUIDANCE ON MEETINGS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. FORMAL DISCUSSIONS................................................................. 1

A. Statutory Authority......................................................................................... 1

B. Purpose of the Right.................................................................. 1

C. Elements of a Formal Discussion................................................... 1 

1. Discussion..................................................................... 2

2. Formality....................................................................... 2

3. Participants in the Discussion............................................... 6

4. Subject Matter of the Discussion........................................... 7

a. Personnel Policy or Practice or General Condition of Employment..7

b. Grievances............................................................. 8

c. MSPB Appeals........................................................ 10

d. EEO Complaints...................................................... 11

e. Unfair Labor Practice Complaints.................................. 13

D. Notice of the Meeting.................................................................. 13

E. Union Participation in the Meeting................................................... 15

F. Remedies for Formal Discussion Violations........................................ 15

II. INVESTIGATORY EXAMINATIONS.................................................. 17

A. Statutory Authority.................................................................... 17

B. Purpose of the Right................................................................... 17

C. Elements of a Section 7114(a)(2)(B) Claim........................................ 18

1. Participants in the Meeting................................................... 18

a. Employee in the Unit................................................ 18

b. Representative of the Agency....................................... 18

c. Representative of the Union........................................ 20

2. An Examination in Connection with an Investigation................... 21

a. Governing Factors................................................... 21

b. Performance Meetings, Counseling Sessions, Desk Audits... 22

c. Physical Exams, Fitness for Duty Exams, Security Clearance 23

Interviews

3. Reasonable Belief of Discipline............................................. 24

4. Employee’s Request for Union Representation and Agency’s Response 26

D. Union Representative’s Participation at the Examination......................... 28

E. Union’s Right to Information About the Examination............................. 29
ii

F. Remedies................................................................................. 30

1. Unlawful Denial of Union Representation.................................. 30

2. Unlawful Discipline for Requesting Union Representation.............. 31

III. BYPASS.......................................................................................... 32

A. Statutory Authority...................................................................... 32

B. Scope and Purpose of the Right........................................................ 32

C. Matters Giving Rise to Bypass Violations............................................ 32

1. Grievances........................................................................ 32

2. Negotiating Directly With Employees Regarding Negotiable Conditions 

of Employment.................................................................. 34

3. Polling and Information Gathering........................................... 35

4. Disciplinary Matters............................................................ 37

5. Direct Dealings with Another Union......................................... 38

D. Defenses to Bypass Allegations........................................................ 38

E. Remedies for Bypass Violations....................................................... 39
1

I. Formal Discussions

A. Statutory Authority 

Section 7114(a)(2) of the Statute provides:

An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the 

opportunity to be represented at –

(A) any formal discussion between one or more representatives of the 

agency and one or more employees in the unit or their representatives 

concerning any grievance or any personnel policy or practices or other 

general condition of employment. 

B. Purpose of the Right

Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute was established “to provide the union with an opportunity to

safeguard its interests and the interests of employees in the bargaining unit viewed in the context 

of a union’s full range of responsibilities under the Statute.”1 By attending formal discussions, 

the exclusive representative is “assured the opportunity to hear, along with unit employees, about 

matters of interest to unit employees and be in a position to take appropriate action to safeguard 

those interests.”2 

C. Elements of Formal Discussion

In order for the section 7114(a)(2)(A) formal discussion right to exist, the following elements 

must be satisfied: (1) a discussion; (2) which is formal in nature; (3) between at least one or more 

agency representatives and one or more unit employees or their representatives; (4) concerning 

any grievance or personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment.3

The Authority examines the totality of the circumstances presented in each case, guided by the 

intent and purpose of the section.4 A failure to afford a union an opportunity to be represented at 

a section 7114(a)(2)(A) formal discussion constitutes a violation of sections 7116(a)(1) and (8) 

of the Statute. Each of the above-listed elements is discussed in greater detail below.

 

1

DOJ, BOP, FCI, Ray Brook, 29 FLRA 584, 589 (1987) (FCI Ray Brook), aff’d, AFGE v. FLRA, 865 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 

1989); see also DOD, Air Force 325th Fighter Wing, Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA 256, 259 (2011) (Tyndall AFB) (purpose of 

the provision is to “afford an exclusive representative the opportunity to be present at discussions addressing 

matters of interest to unit employees”).

2 DOD, Nat’l Guard Bureau, Tex. Adjutant General’s Dep’t, 149th TAC Fighter Group, Kelly AFB, 15 FLRA 529, 

532 (1984) (Kelly AFB).

3

INS, NY Office of Asylum, Rosedale, N.Y., 55 FLRA 1032, 1034 (1999) (INS, Rosedale).

4

FCI Ray Brook, 29 FLRA at 588-89; see also VA, N. Ariz. VA Healthcare Prescott, Ariz., 61 FLRA 181, 186 (2005) (“we 

consider these factors in view of the totality of the circumstances”).
2

1. Discussion

For purposes of section 7114(a)(2)(A), a “discussion” is a meeting between representatives of the 

agency and unit employees. There does not have to be an actual conversation, debate, or dialogue 

between agency officials and unit employees to meet the “discussion” element.5Thus, if the 

other requirements of section 7114(a)(2)(A) are met, a meeting for the sole purpose of making a 

statement or announcement is a formal discussion.6In addition, a telephone conversation may 

constitute a formal discussion.7 On the other hand, surveys of employees for informationgathering purposes have been found not to constitute a discussion.8

The Authority has further 

held that “even if a meeting does not begin as a formal discussion, it may nonetheless develop 

into or become a formal discussion.”9

2. Formality

To determine whether a discussion is “formal in nature,” the Authority examines the purpose and 

nature of a discussion, as well as several factors set forth in Authority precedent, including:

a. the status of the individual who held the discussions;

b. whether any other management representatives attended;

c. the site of the discussions [in the supervisor’s office, at the employee’s desk or 

elsewhere];

d. how the meetings for the discussions were called [formal advance notice or 

spontaneous];

e. how long the discussions lasted;

f. whether a formal agenda was established for the discussions; and

 

5 DOJ, BOP, FCI, Bastrop, Tex., 51 FLRA 1339, 1343 (1996) (FCI Bastrop).

6

Kelly AFB, 15 FLRA at 532 (1984) (holding that the “legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress 

intended to continue treating ‘discussion’ as synonymous with ‘meeting’”); see also Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA at 260.

7

SSA, OHA, Bos. Reg’l Office, Bos., Mass., 59 FLRA 875, 878-79 (2004) (SSA, OHA, Bos.), request for reconsideration 

granted as to remedy, 60 FLRA 105 (2004).

8

Kaiserlautern Am. High Sch., DOD Dependents Sch., Germany N. Region, 9 FLRA 184, 187 (1982) (questionnaire 

containing one question which a manager individually handed to unit employees to support application for school 

accreditation was not a discussion). Solicitation of employees’ views with respect to negotiable conditions of 

employment through polls or questionnaires can, however, constitute an unlawful bypass of the exclusive 

representative, as discussed more fully in the section of this Guidance addressing “Bypass”.

9

Dep’t of the Army, New Cumberland Army Depot, New Cumberland, Pa., 38 FLRA 671, 677 (1990) (New 

Cumberland Army Depot).
3

g. the manner in which the discussions were conducted.10

In some cases, the Authority has also considered “an eighth factor, namely, whether attendance 

by the bargaining unit employee was mandatory.”11

In general, the more significant the subject matter of the discussion, the less the Authority will 

rely upon the enumerated factors to establish formality. Thus, in some situations, the “purpose of 

the discussion [is] sufficient in itself to establish formality.”12 For instance, where the purpose of 

a meeting was to inform employees that they were targets of a reduction-in-force, the Authority 

found it “highly implausible” that the agency “would leave an announcement of such gravity to a 

spontaneous, causal encounter with affected employees,” and therefore concluded the meeting 

met the formality threshold “even if evidence regarding the factors did not indicate formality.”13

Formality has also been established with respect to meetings conducted for the purpose of 

interviewing bargaining unit employees in preparation for third-party proceedings, such as 

MSPB cases.14

In cases where the Authority has relied upon the enumerated factors, it has emphasized that the 

factors are not meant to be rigidly applied to each case.15 Although the outcome of each case is 

heavily dependent upon its particular facts, the following examples illustrate the conditions 

under which meetings have been found to be “formal”:

 A meeting initiated when a first-line supervisor walked to the employee’s cubicle, asking 

her to come to a conference room; attended by a member of management; lacked a 

formal agenda but had the clear purpose of discussing the employee’s placement on 

administrative leave; and lasted no more than 15 minutes.16

 

10 FCI Bastrop, 51 FLRA at 1342; Dep’t of Energy, Rocky Flats Field Office, 57 FLRA 754, 755 (2002) (DOE, Rocky 

Flats). 

11 VA, Cent. Ark. Veterans Healthcare Sys., N. Little Rock, Ark., 63 FLRA 169, 172 (2009) (VA, N. Little Rock).

12 F.E. Warren AFB, Cheyenne, Wyo., 52 FLRA 149, 156 (1996) (Warren AFB).

13 Id. at 155-57.

14 INS, Border Patrol, El Paso, Tex., 47 FLRA 170, 183 (1993) (INS, El Paso); VAMC, Long Beach, Cal., 41 FLRA 1370, 

1379-80 (1991) (telephone interview of unit employee by agency attorney in preparation for an MSPB hearing), 

enf’d sub nom., VAMC, Long Beach v. FLRA, 16 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).

15 VAMC, Richmond, Va., 63 FLRA 440, 443 (2009) (noting that the factors “are illustrative, and other factors may 

be identified and applied as appropriate”).

16 Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA at 274-75.
4

 A meeting held to mediate an EEO dispute at a neutral location away from the worksite; 

scheduled in advance; followed pre-established agenda; lasted three hours; attended by an 

attorney representing the agency; and resulted in signed settlement agreement.17

 A phone interview by an EEO investigator of an employee to obtain information about 

another employee’s EEO complaint; employee was given advance notice; conversation 

was tape-recorded; lasted 20 minutes; and resulted in a written statement.18

 A meeting conducted by an attorney on behalf of management; attended by a personnel 

officer; scheduled in advance; held in the legal offices away from the employee’s 

worksite; and with clearly defined objectives.19

 A meeting to discuss enforcement of the dress code; called by the division director in 

accordance with a letter from the acting regional commissioner; attended by several 

management officials; planned and announced in advance; and which lasted for 20-25 

minutes.20

 A meeting to advise an employee as to the nature and scope of his duties, held pursuant to 

an MSPB settlement; attended by the second-level supervisor; planned in advance by the 

supervisors; lasted approximately one hour; and for which attendance was mandatory.21

 A meeting called to discuss issues raised in a grievance conducted by a supervisor; took 

place in the supervisor’s office; scheduled in advance; attendance was mandatory; and, 

although no notes or minutes were taken of the meeting, its results were reported to the 

agency director.22

 A meeting held by a fourth-level supervisor in his office to respond to an employee’s 

grievance; attended by the second-level supervisor; planned in advance; lasted 25-30 

minutes; and for which attendance was mandatory.23

 A meeting conducted by a second-level supervisor to orient six new employees; arranged 

in advance; followed a pre-arranged plan; lasted one and a half hours; attendance was 

mandatory; and at which employees were presented an orientation package.24

 

17 Luke AFB, Ariz., 54 FLRA 716, 726 (1998) (Luke AFB), rev’d on other grounds, Luke AFB v. FLRA, 208 F.3d 

221 (9th Cir. 1999).

18 SSA, OHA, Bos., 59 FLRA at 879.

19 Luke AFB, Ariz., 58 FLRA 528, 532-33 (2003) (Luke AFB II).

20 Customs Serv., Region VIII, S.F., Cal., 18 FLRA 195, 197-98 (1985).

21 DOL, Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Admin. & Mgmt., Chi., Ill., 32 FLRA 465, 470 (1988) (DOL, Chi.).

22 INS, Rosedale, 55 FLRA at 1038.

23 SSA, Balt., Md., 18 FLRA 249, 250 (1985).

24 SSA, 16 FLRA 232, 233 (1984).
5

Where a meeting is brief, spontaneous or deals with a performance issue particular to the 

bargaining unit employee, the Authority is less likely to find that it meets the “formality” 

requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the Authority has noted that the word “formal” was 

inserted as an amendment to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 “‘to make clear that this 

subsection does not require that an exclusive representative be present during highly personal, 

informal meetings such as counseling sessions regarding performance.’”25 Applying these 

principles and the enumerated factors, the Authority has found that the following meetings did 

not constitute “formal” discussions:

 Routine, periodic counseling meetings between an employee and his first-line supervisor, 

with no other management personnel present, regarding the employee’s job 

performance.26

 A meeting between a new employee and his supervisor at the supervisor’s desk to 

introduce co-workers; was spontaneous; lasted for 20 minutes; had no prepared agenda; 

and no notes were taken.27

 A phone conversation between an EEO contractor and an employee to discuss another 

employee’s EEO complaint; interview was not scheduled in advance; was terminated by 

the employee; and was not documented by affidavit or confirming letter.28

 A meeting with an EEO Representative to discuss an employee’s EEO complaint which 

was impromptu and initiated by the employee.29

 A mandatory meeting to distribute information regarding a management survey 

concerning organizational and staffing requirements; lasted 15 minutes; and was 

conducted solely by first-level supervisor with no agenda or minutes.30

 A meeting to solicit volunteers for overtime assignments; attended by only the first-line 

supervisor; held on the shop floor; lasted 10 minutes; no prepared agenda; and no notes 

were taken of the meeting.31

 

25 Warren AFB, 52 FLRA at 156 (quoting Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations 

Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Comm. Print 1979) (Legislative History) at 957).

26 SSA, 14 FLRA 28, 28 (1984).

27 SSA, Field Operations Region II, 29 FLRA 1205, 1207 (1987).

28 SSA, OHA, Bos., 59 FLRA at 878.

29 DOE, Rocky Flats, 57 FLRA at 755 (“We note that the Authority has not previously found such impromptu, 

employee-initiated discussions to constitute formal discussions within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(A) of the 

Statute”).

30 DLA, Def. Distrib. Region West, 48 FLRA 744, 745 & n.2 (1993).

31 Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, Cal., 45 FLRA 1332, 1335-36 (1992).
6

 A meeting with five or six unit employees to announce a change in sick leave policy; 

involved only the first-line supervisor; held in the supervisor’s office; not scheduled in 

advance; and lasted no more than 10 minutes.32

 A meeting to discuss changes in the teleclaims process; not scheduled in advance; held at 

the employees’ desks; and lasted 5 minutes.33

3. Participants in the Discussion

For a union to have the right to be represented at a formal discussion, at least one agency

representative and at least one bargaining unit employee must be present. Because both sections 

7114(a)(2)(A) and 7114(a)(2)(B) use the same term “representative of the agency” and there is 

“no legislative history indicating otherwise,” the Authority has held that it is appropriate to “give 

[these] same terms the same meaning.”34 Accordingly, additional guidance on the scope of this 

term can be found in the discussion of representational rights arising from section 7114(a)(2)(B) 

in the Guidance addressing “Investigatory Examinations”.

The Statute does not require a “representative of the agency” to be a supervisor. For instance, the 

Authority has found that an attorney from the Judge Advocate General’s Office acted as the 

agency’s representative during mediation of an EEO claim.35 Similarly, it has found that outside 

contractors acted as agency representatives during formal discussions.36

A bargaining unit employee for purposes of this section of the Statute is one who included in the 

exclusive representative’s bargaining unit.37 Concluding that it is the employee’s status “at the 

time of the formal discussion that is the controlling factor for determining the applicability of § 

7114(a)(2)(A),” the Authority has held that the union had the right to be represented at an 

interview of a bargaining unit member who it listed as a witness for a grievance arbitration where 

the questions related only to the employee’s actions as an acting supervisory agent four years 

earlier.38 The union, however, is not entitled to representation at a formal meeting to discuss 

 

32 DLA, Def. Depot Tracy, Cal., 14 FLRA 475, 477 (1984).

33 SSA, Balt., Md., 15 FLRA 525, 527 (1984).

34 PBGC, Wash., D.C., 62 FLRA 219, 223 (2007).

35 Luke AFB, 54 FLRA at 730.

36 DLA, Def. Depot Tracy, Cal., 39 FLRA 999, 1013 (1991) (independent contractor providing an employee assistance 

program was a representative of the agency); SSA, OHA, Bos., 59 FLRA at 879-80 (contract EEO investigator is an 

agency representative); PBGC, Wash., D.C., 62 FLRA at 222 (same).

37 Dep’t of the Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Command, McClellan AFB, Cal., 38 FLRA 732, 734 (1990) (holding 

that “alternate supervisors” meet this condition where they “continue to be covered by the parties’ collective 

bargaining agreement” and “continue to be subject to dues withholding”).

38 DHS, Border & Transportation Sec. Directorate, Customs & Border Prot., El Paso, Tex., 62 FLRA 241, 247-49 (2007) 

(CBP, El Paso) (also noting that even if the employee’s status when he took the disputed actions was relevant, the 

record supported the “alternate finding” that he was not a supervisor, and was a bargaining unit employee, on 

that date as well).
7

settlement of an EEO complaint filed by an employee who was not in the bargaining unit 

represented by the union “at the time of the events giving rise to the complaint or at the time of 

the filing of the complaint,” even where the employee was a member of the bargaining unit at the 

time of the discussion.”39

4. Subject Matter of the Discussion

To be a formal discussion, the meeting must concern a personnel policy or practice, a general 

condition of employment, or a grievance.

a. Personnel Policy or Practice or General Condition of Employment

The phrase “any personnel policy or practices” in section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute means 

“‘general rules applicable to agency personnel, not discrete actions taken with respect to 

individual employees.’”40 The Authority has also held that “other general conditions of 

employment [are] ‘limited to those discussions (except grievance meetings) which concern 

conditions of employment affecting employees in the unit generally.’”41

Applying these criteria, the Authority has applied section 7114(a)(2)(A) rights to a meeting 

called to discuss enforcement of a dress code policy;42 to address alleged management 

interference with Statutory rights;43 to announce a change in workweek and staffing;44 to inform 

employees of a reduction-in-force;45 and to discuss implementation of a compressed work 

schedule.46

The formal discussion representation right does not apply to meetings related to discrete actions 

taken with respect to individual employees. Thus, a discussion between an employee and agency 

officials that was limited to the employee’s work assignments and job performance did not 

constitute a formal meeting,47 nor did a meeting related to an employee’s “last chance 

 

39 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 29 FLRA 660, 662-63 (1987) (NRC) (noting that the “complaint concerned matters 

which took place entirely outside the bargaining unit”).

40 AFGE Council 214, 38 FLRA 309, 330 (1990) (quoting Bureau of Field Operations, SSA, S.F., Cal., 20 FLRA 80, 

83 (1985) (SSA, S.F.), enf’d sub nom., Dep’t of the Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB v. FLRA, 949 F.2d 475 (D.C. 

Cir. 1991).

41 AFGE Council 214, 38 FLRA at 330.

42 Customs Serv., Region VIII, S.F., Cal., 18 FLRA at 197-98.

43 Dep’t of Air Force, F.E. Warren AFB, 31 FLRA 541, 552 (1988) (Warren AFB II) (meeting involved alleged 

management interference with employee picketing).

44 Kelly AFB, 15 FLRA at 530.

45 HUD, 15 FLRA 438, 439 (1984).

46 New Cumberland Army Depot, 38 FLRA at 677.

47 INS, Rosedale, 55 FLRA at 1035.
8

agreement,”48 or an oral reply meeting in response to a proposed adverse action.49 Similarly, a 

meeting limited to discussing the temporary assignment of two unit employees did not concern a 

“personnel policy or practice.” 50 The Authority has also held that the representation right does 

not apply to a meeting addressing “routine reminders of past policies and requirements.”51

On the other hand, the Authority rejected an argument that a meeting concerning a 

reorganization did not relate to a personnel policy or practice or other condition of employment 

where only two employees had actually been affected, because it was reasonably foreseeable that 

other employees would also be relocated.52 In addition, a meeting does not have to deal with a 

specific policy or practice to meet this element. For instance, the Authority has held that a 

discussion with several bargaining unit employees about a supervisor’s conduct, as well as the 

“general environment in the office, including matters involving employee morale and social 

relationships,” concerned general conditions of employment.53 A meeting that does not begin by 

addressing conditions of employment may nonetheless develop into or become a formal 

discussion.54

b. Grievances

Section 7103(a)(9) of the Statute defines “grievance” as “any complaint -

(A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of the employee;

 

48 AFGE Council 214, 38 FLRA at 330-31 (“Inasmuch as the last chance agreement meeting would involve only the 

discrete action taken with respect to an individual employee, the proposed meeting would not involve a personnel 

policy or practice or other conditions of employment within that section”).

49 FCI Ray Brook, 29 FLRA at 588-89.

50 SSA, S.F., 20 FLRA at 83; see also GPO, Public Documents Distrib. Ctr., Pueblo, Colo., 17 FLRA 927, 929 (1985)

(“The discussion did not involve conditions of employment affecting employees in the unit generally, but instead 

concerned the manner in which four specific employees in one small subcomponent of the Respondent’s 

operations were reporting their productivity”).

51 VAMC, Gainesville, Fla., 49 FLRA 1173, 1175-76 (1994).

52 Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Space and Missile Sys. Ctr., Detachment 12 Kirtland AFB, 

N.M., 64 FLRA 166, 174 (2009) (further rejecting the argument that the purpose of the meeting was merely “to 

provide information” about the reorganization, since “there is a high potential for changes to employees’ 

conditions of employment” arising from the reorganization); see also GSA, Region VIII, Denver, Colo., 19 FLRA 20, 

22 (1985) (holding that the purpose of a meeting at which employees’ work schedules were discussed “was not 

limited to the discrete application of a personnel policy, but rather involved a general discussion of that policy and 

how it was working”).

53 GSA, 50 FLRA 401, 404-05 (1995); see also New Cumberland Army Depot, 38 FLRA at 677 (“[t]he subject matter 

of safety concerns a general condition of employment”).

54 DLA, Def. Depot Tracy, Cal., 37 FLRA 952, 960 (1990) (“whether or not the meeting concerned a ‘personnel 

policy or practice’ when it began, it developed into a discussion concerning a ‘personnel policy or practice’ ... that 

concerned a general condition of employment of all warehouse employees.”).
9

(B) by any labor organization concerning any matter relating to the employment of any 

employee; or

(C) by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning – (i) the effect or 

interpretation, or a claim of breach, of a collective bargaining agreement; or (ii) any 

claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation 

affecting conditions of employment.”

The Authority interprets the term “grievance” for formal discussion purposes in light of its broad 

statutory definition.55 Grievances at both the initial and informal stages of a grievance procedure 

have been found to be “grievances” for formal discussion purposes.56 Moreover, a meeting can 

“concern” a grievance “even where it [does] not directly involve a grievant, such as where it was 

held to interview witnesses scheduled to testify in a grievance arbitration hearing.”57 The 

Authority has rejected the argument that affording union representational rights during 

interviews conducted by the agency’s attorneys would offend the attorney work product 

privilege, noting that “nothing in our decision requires an agency attorney to disclose to a union 

his or her thoughts or impressions, whether written or otherwise, resulting from the interview.”58

A matter does not have to be subject to the negotiated grievance procedure to be considered a 

“grievance.” For instance, a meeting to discuss the placement of an employee on administrative 

leave because she called security to complain of harassment was found to constitute a formal 

discussion because it concerned a “grievance” within the meaning of the Statute.59 On the other 

hand, the Authority has held that a meeting requested by an employee to present an oral reply to 

 

55 Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA at 259.

56 FCI Bastrop, 51 FLRA at 1344-45 (manager’s meeting with employee and his supervisor to direct them to “quit 

acting like children” and to go back to work concerned a grievance on grounds that it “was not simply a counseling 

session, but was in response to the Union’s efforts under the parties’ CBA to informally resolve the differences 

which were the subject of a potential grievance”); see also INS, Rosedale, 55 FLRA at 1035-37 (meeting concerned 

a “grievance” where it related to an employee’s work assignments and job performance that had been the subject 

of a counseling session and culminated in employee’s removal, and where the employer was on notice that the 

union had attempted to file an informal grievance on the employee’s behalf).

57 Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA at 260 (citing VA, N. Little Rock, 63 FLRA at 172); see also Dep’t of the Air Force, Sacramento 

Air Logistics Ctr., McClellan AFB, Cal., 35 FLRA 594, 605-06 (1990) (McClellan AFB) (same conclusion with respect to 

telephone and office interviews by agency’s counsel of union’s designated witness for an arbitration).

58 McClellan AFB, 35 FLRA at 607 (“The Respondent has not cited any provision of the Statute or its legislative 

history which demonstrates that Congress intended to exclude from the coverage of section 7114(a)(2)(A) formal 

discussions which involve interviews by agency attorneys of unit employees who are known to be scheduled to 

testify for the union in upcoming third-party proceedings.”); see also VAMC, Denver, Colo., 44 FLRA 768, 770 

(1992) (same), aff’d, VA v. FLRA, 3 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1993); CBP, El Paso, 62 FLRA at 244-47 (concerns over 

the attorney work product privilege did not justify agency’s exclusion of the union’s president as its representative at 

a pre-arbitration interview).

59 Tyndall AFB, 66 FLRA at 260 (noting, without deciding, the ALJ’s undisputed finding that the call to security 

constituted a “grievance”).
10

a proposed suspension did not concern a “grievance” because no adverse action had yet been 

taken, and the meeting did not involve application of the parties’ contractual grievance 

procedure.60 In another case, the Authority concluded that interviews of employees for the 

purpose of investigating and rendering a decision on a grievance did not constitute formal 

discussions.61

c. MSPB Appeals

The term “grievance” also encompasses statutory appeals filed by bargaining unit members,62

including MSPB appeals.63 Thus, interviews of bargaining unit employees by agency 

representatives to prepare for an MSPB hearing,64 as well as formal depositions related to MSPB 

appeals,65 constitute “formal discussions” for which the union has the right to be present. 

Settlement discussions related to a bargaining unit employee’s MSPB appeal also constitute 

“formal discussions.”66 However, MSPB hearings, and federal court hearings related to MSPB 

cases, do not constitute “formal discussions” because these proceedings “are not conducted by 

agency representatives” but are instead “controlled by administrative or Federal judges.”67

The Authority has held that an MSPB appeal filed by a supervisory or management official is not 

a “grievance” within the meaning of the Statute. In that same decision, however, the Authority 

concluded that the union had the right to representation at discussions with unit employees in 

preparation for a hearing on the claim because employees were asked whether the supervisor or 

other employees had told jokes of a sexual nature or had misused government vehicles – and 

were otherwise asked about the “atmosphere that existed in the office” – since these questions 

concerned their “conditions of employment.”68

 

60 FCI Ray Brook, 29 FLRA at 590-91.

61 SSA, 18 FLRA 42, 46 (1985) (“Here, the meetings between the management representative and the employees

were not formal discussions under the steps of the grievance procedure, but instead were examinations of unit 

employees in connection with an investigation by management for the purpose of making a decision in the 

grievance,” which the Authority concluded should instead be evaluated under section 7114(a)(2)(B)).

62 Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 533.

63 FCI Ray Brook, 29 FLRA at 589-90; NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d 1181(D.C.Cir. 1985).

64 VAMC, Denver, 44 FLRA 408, 408 (1992), aff’d, VA v. FLRA, 3 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1993); see also VAMC, Long 

Beach, Cal., 41 FLRA at 1379-80 (same conclusion with respect to telephone interviews).

65 INS, El Paso, 47 FLRA at 183-84.

66 GSA, Region 9, 48 FLRA 1348, 1355 (1994) (meeting with an employee, her attorney, and an agency 

representative to discuss settlement of an MSPB complaint that resulted in a last chance agreement constituted a 

formal discussion by its “very nature”), following remand, 53 FLRA 925 (1997); see also DOL, Chi., 32 FLRA at 471

(meeting with employee and his lawyer pursuant to an MSPB settlement to discuss the employee’s position 

responsibilities and conduct upon reinstatement constituted a formal discussion).

67 INS, El Paso, 47 FLRA at 183 n.6.

68 GSA, 50 FLRA at 404.
11

The Authority has rejected the argument that the presence of a union representative at agency 

interviews in preparation for an MSPB hearing was inconsistent with the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act or the agency’s attorney-client or attorney work 

product privilege.69

d. EEO Complaints

Formal EEO complaints constitute “grievances” within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A).70

Accordingly, settlement and mediation conferences related to EEO complaints constitute “formal 

discussions” for which the union has the right to be represented.71

It should be noted, however, that the Authority’s conclusion in this regard has not been 

uniformly adopted by the federal circuit courts. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

reversed the Authority’s conclusion on this issue, holding instead that a unit member’s EEO 

complaint was not a “grievance” because it was brought pursuant to EEOC procedures, which 

are “discrete and separate” from the grievance process. In support of this conclusion, the Ninth 

Circuit noted that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement explicitly excluded discrimination 

claims from the grievance procedure.72

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, has endorsed the Authority’s approach, 

finding that a formal EEO complaint constituted a “grievance,” even where the parties’ 

bargaining agreement explicitly excluded discrimination claims.73 The Authority has reiterated 

this position in several subsequent decisions.74

 

69 VAMC, Long Beach, Cal., 41 FLRA at 1381-82. The Authority found that neither the Privacy Act nor FOIA is 

applicable to the pre-hearing investigation. Further, it rejected the agency’s assertion, based on Upjohn v. United 

States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), that the union’s presence at the interviews would violate the attorney-client privilege 

because the employees “were not interviewed in their capacity as representatives of the [agency], nor about actions 

they had taken in the course of their official duties.” Id. at 1382. It rejected the agency’s assertion of attorney work 

product privilege for the same reasons set forth in McClellan AFB, 35 FLRA at 607-08.

70 Dep’t of the Air Force, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB, Dover, Del., 57 FLRA 304, 308 (2001) (Dover AFB)

(employee’s formal EEO complaint “that he was a victim of illegal discrimination by his employing agency is 

undeniably a complaint by [an] employee concerning [a] matter relating to [his employment], i.e., a grievance 

under the Statute’s definition”), aff’d, Dep’t of the Air Force, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB v. FLRA, 316 F.3d 280 

(D.C. Cir. 2003).

71 Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, Cal., 52 FLRA 1039, 1048 (1997) (EEO settlement conference); Dover AFB, 

57 FLRA at 308-10 (EEO mediation session); Dep’t of the Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, 64 FLRA 845, 849 (2010) 

(Davis-Monthan AFB) (EEO ADR/mediation conference).

72 Luke AFB, 208 F.3d 221 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished), reversing Luke AFB, 54 FLRA 716.

73 Dep’t of the Air Force, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB v. FLRA, 316 F.3d 280, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

74 Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 533 (“we respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination to the contrary that 

the formal discussion right ... does not apply to complaints filed under EEOC’s statutory procedure because they 

are discrete and separate from the grievance process”); SSA, OHA, Bos., 59 FLRA at 880 (noting that the Authority 

“has already addressed and resolved this issue”); Davis-Monthan AFB, 64 FLRA at 849 (“although the Ninth Circuit 
12

The Authority has rejected the argument that the union’s presence at discussions involving EEO 

complaints conflicts with EEOC regulations, the Privacy Act, the Administrative Dispute 

Resolution Act, “and other statutes and regulations that protect the confidentiality of certain 

information and records.”75 It has held, however, that a “direct” conflict of interest between the 

union’s institutional rights and the employee’s rights to confidentiality in mediation and 

settlement discussions must be resolved in favor of the employee.76 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit 

Court has “not foreclose[d] the possibility that an employee’s objection to union presence could 

create a ‘direct’ conflict that should be resolved in favor of the employee.”77

In applying these principles, the Authority has found that an employee’s objection to the union’s 

presence because it would be a “waste of time” did not “establish the requisite direct conflict,” 

where the employee testified that his objection “was not based on any concerns over 

confidentiality, privacy interests, or that the Union’s presence would disrupt the mediation 

process.”78 It has also rejected the argument that the union’s prior representation of alleged 

wrongdoers in unrelated hostile work environment claims justified excluding the union in an 

EEO mediation session.79

The right to representation also attaches to investigative interviews associated with EEO 

complaints.80 Indeed, the Authority has found representational rights related to EEO complaints 

even where the employee who filed the complaint did not designate the union as his or her 

representative in the case,81 and where the parties have excluded discrimination claims from the 

scope of their negotiated grievance procedure.82

 

agrees with the Respondent’s position ... the D.C. Circuit and the Authority have repeatedly rejected this approach 

and have held that a formal EEO complaint is a grievance within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(A)”).

75 Dep’t of Agric., Forest Serv., Los Padres Nat’l Forest, Goleta, Cal., 60 FLRA 644, 651-53 (2005) (Los Padres Nat’l 

Forest); Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 534-36.

76 Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 535 & n.13 (citing NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d 1181, 1189 n.12 (D.C.Cir. 1985)).

77 Dep’t of the Air Force, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB, 316 F.3d at 287.

78 Davis-Monthan AFB, 64 FLRA at 850.

79 Los Padres Nat’l Forest, 60 FLRA at 653; see also Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 535 n.14 (finding that the employee’s 

“demonstrated willingness to discuss her complaint with, and to seek advice from, the Union regarding proposed 

terms of the settlement agreement strongly indicates that the employee would not have objected to the Union’s 

presence at the mediation and settlement discussions on confidentiality grounds”).

80 SSA, OHA, Bos., 59 FLRA at 879-80 (interviews conducted by agency’s EEO contractor); PBGC, Wash., D.C., 62 

FLRA at 222 (EEO contractor’s interviews with eleven bargaining unit employees).

81 Los Padres Nat’l Forest, 60 FLRA at 653 (“[t]he employee’s choice of personal representative under the EEOC 

regulations does not have any bearing on the separate right of the Union to attend such mediation hearings”).

82 Id., 60 FLRA at 651 (“the statutory definition of a grievance is not dependent on the scope of a negotiated 

grievance procedure”).
13

Not all discussions related to EEO complaints, however, constitute “formal discussions.” The 

union’s representation right only applies to formal discussions of EEO complaints brought by 

employees within its bargaining unit. Thus, the right does not attach to complaints “filed by an 

employee who was not in the unit represented by the Union at the time of the events giving rise 

to the complaint or at the time of the filing of the complaint.”83 Moreover, the Authority has 

indicated that the representation right would not attach to discussions related to EEO claims at 

the “pre-complaint” counseling stage.84 In distinguishing between informal and formal 

complaints, the Authority has explained that “[u]nder EEOC regulations and directives, the 

formal EEO complaint process begins with the filing of a formal complaint after the issuance of 

the notice of right to file a discrimination complaint.”85

e. Unfair Labor Practice Complaints

Unfair labor practice complaints fall within the statutory definition of a “grievance” as it applies 

to section 7114(a)(2)(B).86 Accordingly, an interview by an agency attorney of a bargaining unit 

employee in preparation for an upcoming unfair labor practice hearing constitutes a “formal 

discussion” at which the union is entitled to be represented.87

D. Notice of the Meeting

Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute requires an agency to notify the union in advance of a 

formal discussion so the union has an opportunity to choose its own representative.88 The 

Authority has emphasized that the right to designate its own representative is “of considerable 

practical importance to the union,” insofar as it “may decide to choose a representative who 

would be unaffected by the matters to be discussed at the meeting or one who is outside the 

 

83 NRC, 29 FLRA at 662-63, 665 (noting, however, that if the settlement of the complaint “results in a change in unit 

employees’ conditions of employment, an agency is obligated to give prompt notice of the change to the exclusive 

representative of the unit employees and to provide the union with an opportunity to bargain to the extent 

required by the Statute”).

84 SSA, Field Operations, NY Region, 16 FLRA 1021, 1022 n.1 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Luke AFB, 54 FLRA 

at 729; Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, 52 FLRA at 1046 (distinguishing pre-complaint meeting at issue in 

IRS, Fresno from discussion involving formal EEO complaint in part because “at the precomplaint stage, the EEO 

counselor is prohibited from revealing the identity of a person consulting him”).

85 Los Padres Nat’l Forest, 60 FLRA at 649 (rejecting agency’s argument that complaint was not “formal” until it 

issued a letter acknowledging acceptance of the complaint).

86 Warren AFB II, 31 FLRA at 552.

87 Id. at 551-52.

88 Dep’t of the Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Ctr., McClellan AFB (McClellan AFB II), 29 FLRA 594, 605. The 

Authority affirmed this principle in CBP, El Paso, 62 FLRA at 244, further concluding that the agency’s interference 

with the union’s choice of representative was not justified under the “special circumstances” exception it has 

applied to the union’s designation of representatives under section 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute, which pertains to 

investigatory examinations. This exception is more fully discussed in the section of this Guidance addressing 

“Investigatory Examinations”.
14

direct supervisory chain of those conducting the meeting.”89 Thus, if the union has designated a 

representative for a grievance arbitration hearing, an agency violates the statute by failing to 

provide the designated representative with notice regarding its interview of a bargaining unit 

employee who is scheduled to be a witness at the hearing.90

Where a union official receives actual notice of a formal meeting, but not formal notice “as a 

union representative,” the Authority will determine whether the actual notice was sufficient to 

provide the union with the opportunity to be represented at the meeting, including the 

opportunity to designate a representative of its own choosing.91 Thus, the Authority has held that 

notice of a formal meeting provided to a union steward by virtue of his attendance at the meeting 

as an employee did not satisfy the notice requirement where the union president, who was 

normally notified of formal discussions, did not receive notice of the meeting.92 Similarly, the 

Authority affirmed an arbitrator’s finding that notice of a formal meeting to the union’s local 

representative was not sufficient where the union had a contractual right to determine whether to 

send a national or other representative to formal meetings.93 In another case, the Authority held 

that the burden of informing the union of a mediation session regarding an EEO complaint did 

not shift to the complainant bargaining unit member simply because he had chosen to be 

represented in the matter by a union representative.94

Upon receiving notice of a formal discussion, the union may waive its right to be represented at 

the discussion if the waiver is “clear and unmistakable.” Applying this standard, the Authority 

found that a union waived its statutory right to be represented at certain formal discussions 

involving unit employees when, upon being provided with detailed notice of the discussions, it 

told management that it did not need to know about these meetings. 95 On the other hand, the 

exclusion of EEO disputes from the parties’ negotiated grievance procedure does not equate to a 

waiver of the union’s interest in being represented at formal discussions involving EEO 

complaints.96

 

89 McClellan AFB II, 29 FLRA at 605.

90 Id. at 606 (holding that notice to the bargaining unit witness was not sufficient because he was “the bargaining 

unit employee involved in the formal discussion, so it is not at all clear he could have adequately represented the 

Union’s interests”); see also Dep’t of the Air Force, 63rd Civil Engineers Squadron, Norton AFB, 22 FLRA 843, 847 

(1986) (union’s interest cannot be adequately represented at a formal meeting to discuss a grievance where the 

union representative is the grievant and therefore would be “placed in the position of representing himself in his 

own grievance”).

91 McClellan AFB II, 29 FLRA at 605-06; see also GSA, Region 9, L.A., Cal., 56 FLRA 683, 685 (2000) (same).

92 Dep’t of Treasury, Customs Serv., Miami, Fla., 29 FLRA 610, 614 (1987).

93 GSA, Region 9, L.A., Cal., 56 FLRA at 685.

94Luke AFB, 54 FLRA at 722-723 n.6 (concluding that the attendance of the union representative at an earlier 

mediation session did not relieve the agency of its obligation to inform the union of future sessions).

95 NLRB, 46 FLRA 107, 110 (1992).

96 Dover AFB, 57 FLRA at 309-10 (noting that the union might have agreed to exclude such matters “in order to 

avoid the expenditure of resources required to process an EEO grievance to arbitration”).
15

E. Union Participation in the Meeting

The union’s right to be represented at formal discussions “means more than merely a right to be 

present,” and encompasses the right to “comment, speak and make statements,” so long as the 

representative does not take charge of, usurp, or disrupt the meeting. 97 The extent of the union’s 

participation is governed by “a rule of reasonableness, which requires that there be respect for 

orderly procedures and that the comments be related to the subject matter addressed by the 

agency representative(s) at the meeting.”98 For example, an agency violated the Statute when its 

management representative interrupted the union’s representative several times when he 

attempted to explain his understanding of new procedures related to a reorganization.99 An 

agency was also found to violate the Statute by not allowing a union representative to comment 

regarding the compressed work schedule being discussed at a formal meeting.100

A union representative is bound by confidentiality rules that apply to the meeting or proceeding, 

such as those imposed by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act or EEOC regulations.101

Moreover, when formal discussions occur in the course of statutory appeals procedures, the 

union’s institutional role is “obviously more restricted than its role in a negotiated grievance 

procedure.”102 For example, in determining the role of the union representative during 

depositions related to an MSPB complaint, the Authority relied upon federal procedural rules to 

conclude that the union had the right to be present but not to “actively participate at the 

deposition.”103 

F. Remedies for Formal Discussion Violations

To address violations of section 7114(a)(2)(A), the Authority routinely orders the respondent 

agency (1) to commence providing the union with advance notice and the opportunity to be 

represented at formal discussions; and (2) to post a remedial notice.104

 

97 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 21 FLRA 765, 767-68 (1986).

98 Id. at 768 (noting further that the Authority will “consider the purpose of the meeting ... and all of the 

surrounding circumstances in determining the extent of a union representative’s right to participate”).

99 Id.

100 New Cumberland Army Depot, 38 FLRA at 677.

101 Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 535-36 (finding no indication in the record “that the Union would have objected to or 

failed to comply with any confidentiality requirements imposed by the mediator”).

102 NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C.Cir. 1985).

103 INS, El Paso, 47 FLRA at 187.

104 See, e.g., Luke AFB II, 58 FLRA at 536; see also FAA, Airways Facilities Division, Nw. Mountain Region, Wash., 60 

FLRA 819, 821 (2005) (rejecting agency’s argument that order should not specifically reference the opportunity to 

be represented at “discussions to mediate settlement of formal EEO complaints filed by bargaining unit 

employees” on grounds that “it is appropriate to set forth this level of detail ... to ensure that the Respondent 

avoids committing a similar unfair labor practice in the future”).
16

Under limited circumstances, the Authority has also ordered the agency to repeat the meeting to 

enable the union to ask questions and make comments as if it had been given notice of the 

meeting and an opportunity to actively participate. For instance, where the agency violated the 

Statute by denying the union’s request to attend a meeting with a bargaining unit member to 

discuss his performance standards following his reinstatement pursuant to an MSPB settlement, 

the Authority required the agency, upon the request of the union, to repeat the meeting in the 

presence of the union’s representative.105 In another case, however, the Authority declined to 

order remedial training of supervisors who conducted formal discussions in violation of section 

7114(a)(2)(A) because the supervisors’ actions were not based on “ignorance of obligations 

under the Statute” – insofar as the “state of the law” was not settled at the time of the formal 

discussions – and it was not otherwise apparent how the training would effectuate the purpose 

and policies of the Statute.106

 

105 DOL, Chi., 32 FLRA at 472-73 (noting the union’s “obvious interest” in a meeting where “the job description, 

performance elements and performance standards of a position in the unit,” as well as the employee’s use of 

official time and the union’s office, were discussed).

106 VAMC, Phx., Ariz., 52 FLRA 182, 186 (1996) (also rejecting a request that the supervisors who committed the 

violations be specifically named in the posted notice).
17

II. Investigatory Examinations

A. Statutory Authority

Section 7114(a)(2) of the Statute provides:

An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the 

opportunity to be represented at –

(B) any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency 

in connection with an investigation if –

(i) the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in 

disciplinary action against the employee; and

(ii) the employee requests representation.

B. Purpose of the Right

The union’s right under the Statute to be represented at investigatory examinations is based on 

the similar right of private sector employees that was established by the Supreme Court in NLRB 

v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (Weingarten). When enacting the Statute, Congress 

modeled section 7114(a)(2)(B) after the Court's holding in Weingarten and, as a result, the term 

"Weingarten rights" is commonly used in the federal sector when referencing the union's right to 

be present at an investigatory interview. The Statute’s legislative history “demonstrates that this 

statutory requirement is intended to provide rights to Federal sector bargaining unit employees 

consistent with those” provided by the Weingarten decision.107

The Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten was based upon the premise that when an 

employee is questioned during an investigatory examination which the employee perceives may 

result in discipline, the employee "’may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the 

incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors,’” and that a 

“knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and 

save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the 

 

107 BOP, Office of Internal Affairs, Wash., D.C. & Aurora, Colo. & BOP, FCI Englewood, Littleton, Colo., 54 FLRA 1502, 

1509 (1998) (FCI Englewood), citing Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 

Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Comm. Print 1979) (Legislative History) at 926; see also NASA v. 

FLRA, 527 U.S. 229, 236 (1999) (“Congress’ specific endorsement of a Government employee’s right to union 

representation by incorporating it in the text of the FSLMRS gives that right a different foundation than if it were 

merely the product of an agency’s attempt to elaborate on a more general provision in light of broad statutory 

purposes”); cf. INS, N.Y. Dist. Office, N.Y.C., N.Y., 46 FLRA 1210, 1218 (1993) (INS, N.Y.C.) (noting “that the 

legislative history of section 7114(a)(2)(B) also reflects Congressional recognition that the right to representation 

might evolve differently in the private and Federal sectors and that NLRB decisions would not necessarily be 

controlling in the Federal sector”). 
18

interview.”108 The Court also reasoned that by attending the interview, the exclusive 

representative “protects ‘the interests of the entire bargaining unit’” and “is able to exercise 

‘vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing 

punishment unjustly.’”109 The Authority has concluded that the “purposes underlying the 

Weingarten right in the private sector – promoting a more equitable balance of power and 

preventing unjust disciplinary actions and unwarranted grievances – also apply to the right to 

representation created by section 7114(a)(2)(B).”110

C. Elements of a Section 7114(a)(2)(B) Claim

In order for the representational right under section 7114(a)(2)(B) to be triggered, the following 

elements must be satisfied: (1) the meeting must be an examination of an employee by a 

representative of the agency; (2) in connection with an investigation; (3) the employee must 

reasonably believe that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee; 

and (4) the employee must request representation.111 Each of the above-listed elements is 

discussed in greater detail below.

1. Participants in the Meeting

a. Employee in the Unit

Representational rights under section 7114(a)(2)(B) are limited to employees in an appropriate 

unit. It is the employee’s bargaining unit status at the time of the investigatory examination –

rather than his or her bargaining unit status during the events giving rise to the examination –

which determines the Weingarten right.112 The Authority has applied section 7114(a)(2)(B) 

rights to probationary employees.113

b. Representative of the Agency

In most situations, the agency representative who conducts an investigatory examination will be 

the first or second level supervisor or a manager from the same agency or organization as the 

 

108 DOJ, BOP, Safford, Ariz., 35 FLRA 431, 439 (1990) (BOP Safford) (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262-63).

109 FCI Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1509 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260-61).

110 BOP Safford, 35 FLRA at 439-40.

111 DOI, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Eugene Dist., Portland, Or., 68 FLRA 178, 181 (2015) (BLM Portland).

112 Dep’t of Navy, Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, S.C., 32 FLRA 222, 228-31(1988) (Charleston Shipyard)

(where employee was on detail to a position represented by AFGE during events giving rise to the investigation, but 

was represented by FEMTC during the examination, the employer violated the statute by refusing to allow an 

FEMTC representative to be present at the examination). The Authority distinguished this outcome from its 

decision in Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 29 FLRA 660 (1987), which was decided under section 7114(a)(2)(A).

113 VAMC, Jackson, Miss., 48 FLRA 787, 797-98 (1993) (VAMC Jackson) (“We find no basis on which to conclude 

that the employees’ status as probationers affects their statutory rights as Federal employees under section 

7114(a)(2)(B). Nothing in the Statute or legislative history indicates that the rights afforded by section 

7114(a)(2)(B) are based on an employee’s tenure status.”), rev’d on recons. on other grounds, 49 FLRA 171 (1994).
19

employee being investigated. In these types of situations, there usually is no disagreement about 

whether an agency representative participated in the meeting.

A parent agency is responsible for the actions of investigators it employs and utilizes to 

investigate its employees.114 This is true even where the investigators receive direction and 

oversight by outside entities,115 or where investigators from a separate component or a different 

regional office within the agency are utilized.116 The Supreme Court has affirmed the Authority’s 

position that an agency may be held responsible for the actions of investigators employed by its 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) when examining the agency’s bargaining unit employees, 

even though OIG investigators operate with significant autonomy within agencies. The Court 

rejected the argument that section 7114 rights do not apply to such examinations because the 

investigators are not employed by the same entity within the agency that collectively bargains 

with the union.117 The Authority has applied this principle to both civil and criminal OIG 

investigations.118

A subordinate activity can also be held responsible for the actions of investigators employed by 

another entity with the same agency so long as there is significant collaboration between the 

activity and the investigators with respect to the investigation. For example, the Authority has 

held subordinate activities responsible for the conduct of investigators from an agency’s Office 

of Special Investigations (OSI) where there was “close collaboration” during the investigation 

between the activities and the OSI, including coordination regarding interview questions and the 

sharing of results and other work product.119 Conversely, the Authority concluded that an activity 

 

114 DOL, Mine Safety & Health Admin., 35 FLRA 790, 802-03 (1990) (DOL, MSHA) (investigator from the agency’s 

Office of Inspector General acted as agency’s representative).

115 DOJ, INS Border Patrol, El Paso, Tex., 36 FLRA 41, 50 (1990) (INS, El Paso) (“Because the [Office of 

Professional Responsibility] investigators are employed by the INS, as is [the interviewed employee], and were 

questioning [the employee] regarding possible misconduct on the part of agency employees in connection with their 

work, the fact that they were questioning [the employee] under the direction and oversight of a U.S. Attorney does 

not affect our determination that they were acting as representatives of the Agency”), remanded sub nom. on other 

grounds, INS, El Paso v. FLRA, 939 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1991).

116 IRS, Wash., DC & Hartford Dist. Office, 4 FLRA 237, 245-48 (1980) (IRS, Hartford), enf’d sub nom. IRS, 

Hartford v. FLRA, 671 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also DOD, Def. Criminal Invest. Serv., DLA, 28 FLRA 1145, 

1149-50 & n.2 (1987) (holding the Department of Defense responsible for the actions of investigators employed by 

the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), a component of its OIG, even where the employees being 

interviewed were employed by the DLA, a separate component within DOD, on grounds that “[a]n organizational 

entity of an agency not in the same ‘chain of command’ as the entity at the level of exclusive recognition violates 

section 7116 of the Statute by unlawfully interfering with the rights of employees other than its own”), enf’d sub 

nom. DCIS v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988).

117 NASA, 527 U.S. at 237-43 (1999) (rejecting agency’s argument that the OIG’s independence under the Inspector 

General Act rendered the OIG’s employees incapable of acting as agency representatives).

118 DOJ, Wash., DC, 56 FLRA 556, 560 (2000) (the relationship between the Office of Inspector General and the 

agency discussed in NASA, 527 U.S. 229 does not change when a criminal matter is investigated).

119 Dep’t of Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Ctr., Hill AFB, Utah, 36 FLRA 748, 764 (1990) (Hill AFB); see also 

Lackland AFB Exch., Lackland, AFB, Tex., 5 FLRA 473 (1981) (Lackland AFB) (subordinate activity held 

responsible for conduct of OSI investigators where it worked closely with the investigators during the investigation 

and used their work product for its own purposes); but see Hill AFB, 68 FLRA 460, 464-65 (2015) (holding that 

AFOSI investigators cannot act as representatives of an agency under section 7114(a)(2)(B) by virtue of their 
20

was not responsible for the conduct of investigators from its agency’s OIG where the activity’s 

involvement was generally limited to referring the matter to the OIG and arranging the interview 

schedules, and it did not provide substantive input into the conduct of the investigation.120

An agency can also be held liable for Weingarten violations committed by investigators 

employed by a separate federal agency where it is shown that the investigators were performing 

a function of the agency by conducting the examination, and the agency exercised sufficient 

control over the investigators’ actions during the examination.121 The Authority has concluded, 

however, that investigators employed by agencies or activities excluded from coverage of the 

Statute by virtue of an Executive Order issued under section 7103(b)(1) of the Statute do not act 

as “representatives” of an agency when conducting investigatory examinations, and that section 

7114(a)(2)(B) therefore does not apply to such examinations.122

c. Representative of the Union

The exclusive representative has the right to designate its representatives when fulfilling its 

responsibilities under section 7114(a)(2)(B) and – absent “special circumstances” – an agency 

violates the Statute when it refuses to honor the union’s designation of a representative.123 The 

union has the right to choose which individual will serve as its representative at a particular 

examination, and it may designate its attorney to serve as a Weingarten representative.124

Because the representation right belongs to the union, an agency cannot cure its failure to 

provide requested union representation by instead offering to provide the employee with legal 

counsel during the examination.125

An agency may prohibit a particular representative from representing the employee if it can 

demonstrate "special circumstances" that justify precluding that particular individual from 

serving as a representative. The “special circumstances” exception, however, is narrowly 

construed “to preserve the union’s normal prerogatives.”126 Applying this standard, the Authority 

has held that an agency was justified, in order to “preserve the integrity of [the] investigation,” in 

refusing to accept the union’s designated representative because he was a witness to the incident 

 

exclusion from the Statute’s provisions pursuant to Executive Order 12,171), appeal docketed, No.15-9542 (10th Cir. 

June 9, 2015).

120 DOJ, BOP, FCI Forrest City, Ark., 57 FLRA 787, 790 (2002) (holding that sufficient level of collaboration 

requires an “active and continuing effort by the activity to be involved in the investigation”).

121 NTEU, 66 FLRA 506, 510-11 (2012) (OPM investigators acted as the agency’s representatives when conducting 

background investigations for which the agency was primarily responsible, and which OPM performed by virtue of 

authority delegated from the agency, but not when conducting suitability determinations, which is an OPM function 

independent of agency control), review denied sub nom. NTEU v. FLRA, 754 F.3d 1031 (D.C.Cir. 2014).

122 Hill AFB, 68 FLRA at 464-65 (because AFOSI’s exclusion from the Statute under Executive Order 12,171 

“preclude[s] finding AFOSI to be a ‘representative of the [A]gency’ under § 7114(a)(2)(B) of the Statute,” conduct 

of AFOSI investigators could not form the basis of a Weingarten violation).

123 FCI Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1512-13.

124 Fed. Prison Sys., FCI Petersburg, Va., 25 FLRA 210, 212 (1987) (FCI Petersburg).

125 Lackland AFB, 5 FLRA at 486-87.

126 FCI Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1513.
21

under investigation who had yet to be interviewed.127 An agency may also deny the union’s 

choice of representative where the representative is the subject of the investigation because “the 

subject of an investigation, unlike a witness, has a direct stake in the outcome of the 

investigation.”128 The Authority has also favorably noted NLRB precedent holding that an 

employer may deny the union’s choice of representative because the representative engaged in 

obstructive behavior during an earlier investigative examination.129

Whether an agency must postpone an examination because a particular union representative is 

not available depends upon such factors as the reason for the representative’s unavailability; the 

availability of other capable representatives; and the impact of postponing the investigation.130 

Applying these factors, the Authority has held that an agency did not violate section 

7114(a)(2)(B) when it refused to postpone investigatory interviews due to the unavailability of 

the union’s designated representatives, where the interviews were scheduled a week in advance, 

the inability of the designated representatives to attend the interviews was not caused by any 

agency action but rather “resulted from the Union’s decision to have the officers attend other 

functions,” and the agency did not otherwise interfere with the Union’s ability to designate 

another representative to attend the interviews.131

2. An Examination in Connection with an Investigation

a. Governing Factors

The right to representation under section 7114(a)(2)(B) only applies to an examination in 

connection with an investigation. Because the term "examination" is not defined by the Statute, 

the Authority examines the totality of circumstances surrounding each particular meeting and 

considers such factors as whether the meeting was: (1) designed to ask questions and solicit 

information from the employee; (2) conducted in a confrontational manner; (3) designed to 

secure an admission from the employee of wrongdoing; and/or (4) designed for the employee to 

explain his/her conduct.132

 

127 FCI Petersburg, 25 FLRA at 211. This exception does not apply, however, if the union representative’s 

examination as part of the investigation had been completed. FCI Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1513 (the “mere fact that 

the chief steward was a witness to the incident under investigation alone is not enough to warrant precluding her 

from serving as the Union’s representative,” where the agency failed to show how this would harm the integrity of 

its investigation).

128 Dep’t of Treasury, Customs Serv., Customs Mgmt. Ctr., Ariz., 57 FLRA 319, 322 (2001) (Customs Serv., Ariz.).

129 FCI Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1512 (citing N.J. Bell Tel. and Local 827, IBEW, 308 NLRB 277, 282 (1992)).

130 INS, N.Y.C., 46 FLRA at 1222-23.

131 Id. (noting, however, that a postponement "would have better served all parties' interests"); see also FCI 

Englewood, 54 FLRA at 1512 (agency not required to postpone an examination to accommodate the attendance of 

the union’s off-site designated representative where an on-site representative was available to attend the 

examination).

132 See, e.g., DOJ, BOP, Metro. Corr. Ctr., N.Y.C., N.Y., 27 FLRA 874, 879 (1987) (Metro. Corr. Ctr.) (agency sought 

information from the employee about previous statements to management and asked for explanations of 

inconsistencies); see also Dep’t of Navy, U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Ga., 4 FLRA 397, 403 (1980)

(employee questioned about absences); Lackland AFB, 5 FLRA at 485 (employee questioned about cash shortages);
22

A meeting or hearing need not be mandatory to be considered an “examination” so long as it 

constitutes the employee’s chance to be heard on the matter being investigated.133 Unlike the 

representational rights related to formal discussions, the right to representation under section 

7114(a)(2)(B) is “not contingent upon the subject matter of the examination – that is, whether it 

concerns a grievance, personnel policy or practice, or other general condition of employment.”134

An “examination” may relate to either a criminal or civil investigation.135

Moreover, an examination does not have to occur on-site, nor does it have to occur on the 

employee’s duty time, to implicate representational rights.136 An “examination” can also take 

place via telephone137 or pursuant to a request for a written response.138 The Authority has held, 

however, that an agency’s covert monitoring of an employee’s telephone conversations with a 

customer did not constitute an “examination” because “there was no direct questioning or 

examination of the employee by agency management,” and the employee did not feel compelled 

to respond to questions posed during the conversations.139 On the other hand, an employee’s 

questioning of another employee at the insistence of a special agent who was investigating the 

employee’s misconduct “plainly” constituted an “examination” where the questions were 

provided by the special agent for purposes of the investigation.140

 

FAA, St. Louis Tower, Bridgeton, Mo., 6 FLRA 678, 686 (1981) (FAA, Bridgeton) (employee questioned about use of 

abusive language).

133 AFGE, Local 1941 v. FLRA, 837 F.2d 495, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (although physician was technically not required 

to appear and answer questions at meeting of hospital’s credentials committee, the meeting constituted an 

“examination” because as a “practical matter” the physician had no choice but to attend if he wished to be heard on 

matters concerning his professional competence); VAMC Jackson, 48 FLRA at 798 (although nurses were not 

ordered to attend a standards board hearing, they were required to appear if they wished to be heard regarding their 

retention following probationary period).

134 Charleston Shipyard, 32 FLRA at 230-31 (noting further that “Congress intended that the focus of the right under 

section 7114(a)(2)(B) be on the timing of the examination and, more particularly, the employee’s need for protection 

due to the confrontational nature of the examination”).

135 DOJ, Wash., D.C., 56 FLRA at 560; see also IRS, Jacksonville Dist. & Se. Reg’l Office of Inspection, 23 FLRA 

876, 878-79 (1986) (IRS Jacksonville).

136 IRS, L.A. Dist. Office, 15 FLRA 626, 637 (1984) (a tax audit of an IRS employee that took place in an attorney’s 

office as part of an on-going investigation into employee’s misconduct was an “examination”).

137 NTEU v. FLRA, 835 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

138 INS, Border Patrol, Del Rio, Tex., 46 FLRA 363, 363 (1992) (INS, Del Rio) (rejecting argument that 

memorandum required of border patrol agent explaining circumstances of a prisoner escape did not constitute an 

“examination” because it was not confrontational).

139 IRS Jacksonville, 23 FLRA at 879-80 (further concluding that the presence of a union representative during such 

surveillance would be “utterly incongruous with the surreptitious nature of the agency’s surveillance activities”).

140 NTEU, 835 F.2d at 1450-51.
23

b. Performance Meetings, Counseling Sessions, Desk Audits

The Authority has routinely held that performance counseling sessions and other meetings 

intended to convey concerns over the quality or timeliness of an employee’s work performance 

do not constitute “examinations” within the meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(B) where they are not 

designed to elicit information from the employee, but rather to inform and counsel the employee 

regarding performance deficiencies.141 It has reached the same conclusion regarding meetings to 

announce disciplinary actions,142 as well as meetings conducted for the purpose of giving the 

employee an assignment or a test143 or as part of a non-disciplinary classification desk audit.144

However, the title of a meeting or the way management characterizes it does not control whether 

the meeting is a counseling session or an investigatory examination.145 Also, a meeting that starts 

off as a performance counseling session may turn into an examination in connection with an 

investigation depending upon the dialogue and dynamics of the meeting.146

c. Physical Exams, Fitness for Duty Exams, Security Clearance Interviews

The Authority has affirmed an arbitrator’s finding that Weingarten rights attached to an 

interview conducted with an employee to determine whether his security clearance should be 

withdrawn.147 In reaching this conclusion, it rejected the agency’s argument that section 

7114(a)(2)(B) did not apply to security clearance examinations because the Executive Order and 

federal regulation governing such examinations do not incorporate Weingarten rights into the 

security-clearance process, holding that “nothing in those authorities indicates that 

 

141 SSA, Albuquerque, N.M., 56 FLRA 651, 655 (2000) (SSA Albuquerque) (“[t]he fact that a conversation occurs 

need not automatically convert a meeting into an ‘exam’”); see also, IRS, 8 FLRA 324, 331 (1982) (meeting was not 

an “examination” and instead was “pure counseling” in nature where its sole purpose was to “highlight [the 

employee’s] deficiencies ... and tell him how to raise the level of his performance to expected standards”); Air 

Force 2750th Air Base Wing HQ, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 9 FLRA 871, 872 

(1982) (Wright-Patterson AFB) (meetings were conducted “for the sole purpose of, and were limited to, informing 

the employee of a decision already reached” that improper conduct had occurred and to counsel the employee); Air 

Force 2750th Air Base Wing HQs, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 10 FLRA 97, 99 

(1982) (Wright-Patterson AFB II) (“counseling session during which [the employee] was made aware of 

performance deficiencies without being solicited for additional information” was “remedial rather than investigatory 

in nature”); IRS, 15 FLRA 360, 361 (1984) (meeting to warn employee about making threats to co-workers is not an 

“examination” where it was not designed to “ask questions, elicit additional information, have the employee admit 

his alleged wrongdoing, or explain his conduct”). 

142 Wright-Patterson AFB, 9 FLRA at 872.

143 Dep’t of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, 7 FLRA 766, 780 (1982) meeting where employee is informed that 

his work assignment was to take a test to determine where he needed help, but where “no questions of an 

investigatory nature were asked,” is not an “examination”).

144 OPM, 20 FLRA 183, 184 (1985) (“section 7114(a)(2)(B) by its own terms does not apply to a nondisciplinary

classification desk audit”).

145 FAA, Bridgeton, 6 FLRA at 686 (meeting where employee was questioned about use of abusive language is 

investigatory examination despite being called a “counseling session”).

146 Wright-Patterson AFB II, 10 FLRA at 107; SSA, Albuquerque, 56 FLRA at 658.

147 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 65 FLRA 79, 83 (2010) (NRC) (“the plain wording of § 7114(a)(2)(B) does not 

exclude security-clearance-related examinations from the definition of ‘examination’”).
24

§7114(a)(2)(B) is inapplicable to investigatory interviews that are conducted in connection with 

security-clearance investigations.”148

The Authority has not explicitly ruled on whether a physical examination, a drug test or a car 

search can constitute an investigatory examination for purposes of section 7114(a)(2)(B).149 

Moreover, neither the Authority nor the NLRB has squarely decided whether Weingarten rights 

apply to interviews conducted in connection with physical exams, including fitness-for-duty 

examinations. The NLRB has held that a physical fitness-for-duty exam did not trigger 

Weingarten rights because it was not “part of a disciplinary procedure,” even where it was 

“promoted by personnel problems such as excessive absenteeism,” and even where the result of 

the exam “might lead to recommendations respecting the employee’s future work 

assignments.”150 It premised this conclusion, however, upon its finding that the exams were not 

confrontational, and upon the “absence of evidence that questions of an investigatory nature were 

in fact asked at these examinations,” and suggested that in a different case “it might be 

appropriate and feasible to provide union representation during the interview portion of an 

examination while excluding the representative from the ‘hands on’ physical examination.”151

The Authority has adopted a similar approach by rejecting the premise that a fitness for duty 

examination could never qualify as an investigatory interview under section 7114(a)(2)(B), and 

instead remanding an arbitrator’s decision for further factual findings “relating to whether the 

specific fitness-for-duty examination in this case was conducted in connection with an 

investigation.”152 Towards this end, the Authority noted that the arbitrator had failed to make 

factual findings “concerning the nature of the questions asked during the fitness-for-duty 

examination that would allow the Authority to determine whether they were investigatory in 

nature.”153 Because these issues were not addressed by the Authority upon its reconsideration of 

the case following its remand to the arbitrator, this issue remains unresolved.

3. Reasonable Belief of Discipline

To trigger the right to representation, an employee must reasonably believe that the examination 

may result in disciplinary action against the employee. The reasonable belief determination is 

 

148 Id. at 81.

149 The NLRB has found that a drug test conducted as part of an investigation can constitute an investigatory 

examination under Weingarten. Safeway Stores, 303 NLRB 989 (1991); see also Ralph’s Grocery Co., 361 NLRB 

No. 9 (July 31, 2014). Additionally, in DOJ, BOP, FCI, 14 FLRA 334, 351-52 (1984), the ALJ found that 

Weingarten rights apply to employee strip searches, but the Authority did not reach this issue on review of the 

decision.

150 USPS, 252 NLRB 61, 61 (1980). 

151 Id.

152 DOJ, BOP, FCC, Coleman, Fla., 63 FLRA 351, 354 (2009). 

153 Id. On remand, the arbitrator found that Weingarten did not apply because the examination was not administered 

by agency representatives, but awarded damages to the grievant because he was harassed and constructively 

discharged. The Authority set aside this decision because it exceeded the arbitrator’s authority, and did not further 

discuss the issue of whether the examination was in connection with an investigation within the meaning of section 

7114(a)(2)(B). DOJ, BOP, FCC, Coleman, Fla., 66 FLRA 300 (2011).
25

based on objective – not subjective – factors.154 The relevant inquiry is “whether, in light of the 

external evidence, a reasonable person would decide that disciplinary action might result from 

the examination.”155 An employee need not be the subject of the investigation to have a 

reasonable belief that discipline could arise from his responses to interview questions.156 

Similarly, even where the purpose of the interview is not to determine possible disciplinary 

action against the employee, the employee may still harbor a reasonable belief that discipline 

could arise from the interview where the agency admits that information obtained during the 

interview could be used for a disciplinary action.157

A reasonable belief of discipline can also be found even if the agency was not contemplating 

discipline at the time of the examination. It is the possibility, rather than the inevitability, of 

future discipline that determines the right to representation.158

In some circumstances, an express grant of immunity from possible disciplinary action is 

sufficient to cure an employee’s objective fear of discipline arising from the interview.159 Grants 

of immunity, however, do not defeat an employee’s reasonable fear of potential discipline where 

the employee has a reasonable basis for doubting the validity of the immunity.160 Moreover, even 

 

154 Lackland AFB, 5 FLRA at 485 (employee reasonably believed discipline could arise where she was informed at 

the outset of the interview that she is being investigated for cash register shortages); IRS v. FLRA, 671 F.2d 560 

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (affirming ALJ’s refusal to consider affidavit demonstrating that the employee did not actually fear 

discipline); NTEU, 835 F.2d at 1451 (employee who was asked questions by another employee at the secret behest 

of management “could not have had a reasonable apprehension of punishment”).

155 AFGE, Local 2544 v. FLRA, 779 F.2d 719, 724 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original); see also BLM Portland, 

68 FLRA at 181 (employee reasonably feared discipline even if management told him meeting was to address safety 

concerns and was non-disciplinary where other factors, including the presence of three supervisors, supported the 

reasonable belief).

156 IRS, Hartford, 4 FLRA at 250 (employee who was responsible for safekeeping and confidentiality of tax records 

of the investigated employee could have reasonably believed that discipline may result if his handling of the tax 

records was deemed improper); DOJ, OIG, Wash., D.C., 47 FLRA 1254, 1282 (1993) (although only a witness, an 

employee who was interviewed as part of an investigation could have reasonably believed that discipline would 

result if he was found to have knowledge of the misconduct of others).

157 NRC, 65 FLRA at 80 (affirming arbitrator’s finding that even if revocation of a security clearance is not a 

disciplinary action, employee could reasonably fear discipline arising from a security clearance interview based 

upon agency’s admission that “information obtained in the course of a security clearance interview could be used in 

a disciplinary proceeding”).

158 Wright-Patterson AFB, 9 FLRA at 880-81 (employee reasonably feared discipline based upon management’s 

inquiry into his misconduct, even where management was not contemplating discipline at the time of the 

interview); Dep’t of Navy, Norfolk Naval Base, Norfolk, Va., 14 FLRA 731, 747 (1984) (Norfolk) (employee had a 

reasonable belief that discipline could arise from investigation into his alleged insubordination where possible 

administrative decisions were being formulated at the time of the interview); see also AFGE, Local 2544, 779 F.2d 

at 724 (noting that “disciplinary action will rarely be decided upon until after the results of the inquiry are 

known”).

159 SSA, Albuquerque, 56 FLRA at 658 (“a grant of immunity may eliminate reasonable fear of discipline”).

160 AFGE, Local 2544, 779 F.2d at 724-26 (employee could have reasonably harbored doubts about the ability of 

Office of Professional Responsibility agents to grant him administrative immunity, where neither the employee, the 
26

where an administrative regulation places limits on the use of information obtained during an 

investigatory interview, an employee may still be found to have a reasonable fear of discipline 

arising from the interview where he is not informed of this limitation.161

4. Employee’s Request for Union Representation and Agency’s Response

The union’s right to be represented at an examination is dependent upon the employee’s request 

for representation.162 An employee's request must be sufficient to put the employer on notice of 

the employee's desire for representation but need not be made in any specific form.163 An 

employee need not repeat an otherwise sufficient request for representation throughout different 

phases of an investigatory interview.164 Absent a request by the employee for representation, 

however, the union does not have an independent right to attend the investigatory interview.165

Whether the employee has adequately requested representation depends upon the facts of each 

case. An agency should seek clarification of a statement if it is uncertain a request has been 

made. The failure to do so has been viewed as a denial which effectively prohibits the employee

from making the request clearer and forecloses further discussion to clarify the request.166

If an employee makes a valid request for representation, an agency has three options: (1) grant 

the request; (2) discontinue the interview; or (3) offer the employee the choice between 

continuing the interview without representation or having no interview and foregoing the 

 

union representative nor the disciplining officer had ever heard of such immunity; there was no “ascertainable policy 

for granting immunity”; and the employee had no way of knowing whether the grant was otherwise authorized by 

agency policy); see also BLM Portland, 68 FLRA at 181 (affirming arbitrator’s decision that employee reasonably 

feared disciplined under the circumstances “[e]ven assuming the Agency told the grievant the meeting was for safety 

concerns and was non-disciplinary”).

161 VAMC Hampton, Va., 51 FLRA 1741, 1748-49 (1996) (also noting that an independent disciplinary investigation 

could have resulted from the interview).

162 DOJ, BOP, Terre Haute, Ind., 38 FLRA 1438, 1441 (1991).

163 DOJ, BOP, Office of Internal Affairs, Wash., D.C., 55 FLRA 388, 394 (1999) (BOP, OIA) (employee who 

requests an attorney and then states “I want somebody to talk to” has sufficiently requested union representation); 

see also Metro. Corr. Ctr., 27 FLRA at 880 (employee's statement that "maybe I need to see a union rep" was a 

valid request); Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., 35 FLRA 1069, 1074 (1990) (Portsmouth) (while no 

specific format is required, the request must put the employer on notice that the employee desires representation); 

DOJ, INS & Border Patrol, Wash., D.C., 41 FLRA 154, 167 (1991) (employee’s statement that “he would like to 

speak to a lawyer or somebody to advise him” is sufficient); INS, Del Rio, 46 FLRA at 373 (“I am officially 

requesting representation” is sufficient to trigger representation rights for two other employees where employee is 

acting as spokesperson for the other employees).

164 Lackland AFB, 5 FLRA at 486-87 (employee was not required to repeat request for union representation to OSI 

agent where request was already made three times before to agency detectives); Norfolk, 14 FLRA 82, 83 (1984)

(not necessary for employee to repeat request to supervisor who later attended the examination).

165 Portsmouth, 35 FLRA at 1077 (where employee did not request representation, agency could order union steward 

to leave the examination).

166 BOP, OIA, 55 FLRA at 394 (agency “effectively foreclosed further discussion to clarify whether [the employee] 

wanted a Union representative”).
27

benefits that might be derived from the interview.167 If the agency has given an employee the 

option of continuing an interview without representation or having no interview at all, and the 

employee elects to continue without representation, the employee has waived the right to 

representation.168 Where an employee requests union representation for only one line of 

questioning, the agency does not violate the Statute by ceasing that line of inquiry but proceeding 

with questioning on other issues.169

Although an employee may waive the right to representation, the waiver must be “clear and 

unmistakable.”170 Whether an employee has waived his or her right to representation is 

determined by objective factors, and a waiver is not valid if it is coerced by agency 

representatives.171 For instance, where an employee was informed by an agency investigator that 

he might be accused of criminal misconduct and it would therefore be in his best interest not to 

have a union representative present at an interview, the employee’s subsequent waiver was 

deemed to be a product of coercion.172 Moreover, an employee’s waiver of union representation 

in a prior interview does not prospectively apply to future interviews on the same subject.173 On 

the other hand, where an employee requests union representation but then agrees to proceed with 

an interview prior to the representative’s appearance, the Authority has found that the employee 

validly waived his right to representation.174 The Authority has also found no violation of the 

Statute where the agency postponed an interview to allow the employee to obtain his union 

representative but then proceeded with the interview after the employee returned without his 

representative.175

 

167 Portsmouth, 35 FLRA at 1077; see also DOL, MSHA, 35 FLRA at 804 (employee whose request for union 

representation is denied must be offered a choice between continuing the interview without a union 

representative or having no interview).

168 DOJ, U.S. Pen., Leavenworth, Kan., 46 FLRA 820, 822 (1992) (after employee’s request for union representation 

was denied, the employee’s continued participation in the interview was uncoerced where he was told that he did not 

have to answer any questions and was free to leave); but see Metro. Corr. Ctr., 27 FLRA at 880 (employee did not 

abandon request for representation by failing to stop the investigatory interview where employee was “at no time 

informed that he could leave the room”).

169 SSA, Balt., Md., 19 FLRA 748, 748 (1985) (no violation because “when the employee indicated that, if the 

inquiry concerning his use of official time continued, he would wish to have a Union representative present, the 

Respondent’s official ceased this line of questioning”).

170 Portsmouth, 35 FLRA at 1077.

171 INS, El Paso, 42 FLRA 834, 838 (1991).

172 Id.; but see INS, El Paso v. FLRA, 939 F.2d 1170, 1175 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The mere fact that an interview would 

benefit an employee is not sufficient to render the decision to participate involuntary”).

173 BOP, OIA, 55 FLRA at 394 n. 10 (Statute affords right to representation “at each such examination”).

174 DOJ, BOP, FCI, 14 FLRA at 336 (employee waived request for representation when, after being told the union 

representative would be there in ten minutes, the employee told management it could proceed with the interview); 

Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., Rocky Mtn. Area Exch., Fort Carson, Nev., 16 FLRA 794, 802-03 (1984) (employee 

withdrew request for union representation when, after waiting for union representative who was en route, the 

employer suggested that the interview continue because it was close to quitting time and the employee merely 

shrugged and proceeded with the interview).

175 DOL, Emp’t Standards Admin., 13 FLRA 164, 164 (1983) (finding that the agency took “every reasonable step” 

to provide the opportunity for representation).
28

Where all of the elements of section 7114(a)(2)(B) have been met, an agency commits an unfair 

labor practice by disciplining an employee for requesting and insisting upon union representation 

at an investigatory interview.

176

D. Union Representative’s Participation at the Examination

The union representative at an investigatory examination has the right to take an active role. This 

includes the freedom to assist and consult with the affected employee.177 This also includes the 

right to speak or otherwise participate on the record in a formal proceeding.178 The union 

representative’s role properly includes seeking clarification of questions and suggesting other 

avenues of inquiry.179 The union representative can also elicit favorable facts from the 

employee.180 Moreover, the Authority has found that a union representative did not engage in 

impermissible conduct during an investigatory exam where he made statements for the record, 

pointed to an employee’s previous answers in a document to refresh his recollection, and 

whispered in the employee’s ear to ensure that his answer to a question was complete.181 An 

agency commits an unfair labor practice by improperly disciplining a union representative for 

attempting to effectively and legitimately assist the employee during an interview.182

An agency, however, may limit the union representative’s participation if the representative is 

interfering in its ability to achieve the legitimate objectives of the investigation or if otherwise 

necessary to ensure the investigation’s integrity.183 On this point, the Authority has favorably 

 

176 Norfolk, 14 FLRA at 748-49; VAMC, Fort Wayne, Ind., 39 FLRA 717, 721 (1991).

177 NRC, 65 FLRA at 84.

178 VAMC Jackson, 48 FLRA at 799 (“precluding the Union representative from speaking or otherwise participating 

on the record in the formal proceedings does not equate to meaningful representation”); BOP Safford, 35 FLRA at 

440 (violation where union representative told to remain silent); see also NASA, 50 FLRA 601, 609 (1995) (agency 

violated Statute by imposing ground rules on OIG examination relegating union representative to “role of a mere 

‘witness’ at the examination” and instructing the employee not to speak or look at the representative), enf’d sub 

nom. FLRA v. NASA, 120 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 229 (1999); see also Customs Serv., Region 

VII, L.A., Cal., 5 FLRA 297, 307 (1981) (Customs Serv., Cal.) (violation where a representative’s participation was 

limited to “practice” interview prior to actual taped interview); FAA, Bridgeton, 6 FLRA at 687 (union 

representative unlawfully disciplined for taking an active role during investigatory interview and for not abiding by 

an agency order to be quiet). 

179 NRC, 65 FLRA at 84 (noting that “’some interruption by way of comments [regarding] the form of questions or 

statements as to possible infringements of employee rights, should properly be expected from the employee’s 

representative’”) (quoting Customs Serv., Cal., 5 FLRA at 307). 

180 BOP, OIA, 52 FLRA 421, 433 (1996) (union representative’s role includes the “right to assist the employee in 

presenting facts”).

181 NRC, 65 FLRA at 85-86 (explaining that, “[b]y not allowing the union representative to counsel the employee 

before he answered questions and then precluding the employee from adding to his answers after he had answered 

them without assistance, the Agency did not allow the union representative to assist the employee in presenting facts 

in his own defense”).

182 FAA, Bridgeton, 6 FLRA at 687 (discipline unlawful where union representative’s actions were not of “such an 

outrageous and insubordinate nature to remove them from the protection of the Statute”).

183 NASA, 50 FLRA at 607.
29

cited the principle that an employer “’is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in 

hearing the employee’s own account of the matter under investigation.’”184 It has also 

emphasized that the “presence of a Union representative at an examination does not interfere 

with management’s right to insist that the employee be responsive, or [with] its right to decide 

the scope of the examination.”185 In addition, the union representative’s participation may be 

limited if the representative is verbally abusive or interferes with the interview by interrupting 

the employee’s answers.186 An agency may also prohibit a union representative from tape 

recording an interview if doing so would be contrary to agency policy.187

The Authority has held that, while the Statute does not grant a per se right to engage in private 

conferences outside the presence of an investigator during an investigatory examination, an 

agency should allow such conferences where they are necessary to afford the union 

representative the ability to effectively represent the employee and do not interfere with the 

integrity of the investigation.188 Conversely, where the union representative and the employee 

were allowed to confer in the conference room during 15-minute hourly breaks, the agency was 

not required to allow additional conferences outside of the interrogation room.189

Confidential communications between a union representative and an employee that occur during 

the course of representation constitute protected activity under the Statute. An agency may not 

interfere with the confidentiality of such information unless its confidentiality has been waived 

or the agency establishes an overriding need for the information.190

E. Union’s Right to Information About the Examination

Since effective representation at an investigatory examination often would be difficult or 

impossible without certain information, information requested in connection with a union's 

representation of an employee at such an investigation is relevant to a union’s representational 

responsibilities under the Statute. The right to representation includes access to information that 

will allow the union to become familiar with the employee's circumstances and to effectively 

 

184 NRC, 65 FLRA at 84 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260)

185 IRS Jacksonville, 23 FLRA at 878-79.

186 NRC, 65 FLRA at 84; see also AFGE, Local 2145, 64 FLRA 661, 664-65 (2010) (applying the “flagrant 

misconduct” test in Dep’t of Air Force, Grissom AFB, Ind., 51 FLRA 7, 11-12 (1995), to determine whether agency 

could legitimately discipline a union official for actions taken while representing a unit member during an 

investigatory hearing pursuant to section 7114(a)(2)(B)).

187 INS, San Diego, Cal., 13 FLRA 591, 604-05 (1993) (union representative could not insist upon tape recording an 

interview thereby obstructing the Office of Professional Responsibility in its conduct of the investigation), enf’d sub 

nom. INS v. FLRA, 760 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1985). 

188 DOJ, Wash., D.C., 46 FLRA 1526, 1569 (1994) (brief conference outside of hearing room did not interfere with 

the integrity of the investigation), vacated and remanded on other grounds, DOJ v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 

1994).

189 BOP, OIA, 52 FLRA at 432-35.

190 Customs Serv., Ariz., 57 FLRA at 324-25 (finding that agency had established need to question employee about 

whether union representative told him to lie during an earlier investigatory examination, where the agency had no 

other way to ascertain this information).
30

assist the employee and participate in the interview.191 In considering requests for such 

information, the Authority balances the right of a union to obtain relevant information for an 

investigatory examination against the interests of an agency in investigating and disciplining 

misconduct.192 Applying this standard, the Authority has held that a union was not entitled to 

copies of investigative reports, subpoenaed documents and other records contained in a special 

agent’s investigatory file because it was already familiar with the employee’s circumstances and 

its disclosure would have interfered with the agency’s legitimate interests.193

F. Remedies

1. Unlawful Denial of Union Representation

Remedies for violations of section 7114(a)(2)(B) include traditional posting and cease and desist 

orders. Where an agency has committed multiple violations of section 7114(a)(2)(B), the 

Authority has ordered a broad posting remedy extending to members of the bargaining unit 

beyond those who work at the site where the violations occurred.194

Where an employee’s union representative is unlawfully denied the ability to assist the employee 

in presenting a defense to the charges being investigated, the employee may have suffered an 

unjustified disciplinary action because the representative might have helped the employee to 

clarify the facts and circumstances involved in the investigation. Under these circumstances, the 

Authority has also held that a cease and desist order may not adequately recreate the conditions 

that would have existed in the absence of the Weingarten violation.195

Accordingly, where an agency has denied representation rights under section 7114(a)(2)(B) and 

disciplinary action ensued, the Authority provides the agency with an opportunity to demonstrate 

that no discipline occurred or will occur based upon the interview and that no information will be 

retained in the employee’s personnel records from the interview that could adversely affect the 

employee.196 If the agency cannot demonstrate that no disciplinary action arose from information 

obtained during the interview, then the agency may be ordered, upon the union’s and employee’s 

 

191 Id.

192 FAA, New Eng. Region, Burlington, Mass., 35 FLRA 645, 650-54 (1990).

193 Id. at 654.

194 BOP, OIA, 55 FLRA at 395 (“We note the multiple violations, combined with the fact that the investigators' work 

is not limited to one facility but rather involves assignment throughout the locations of the bargaining unit. In these 

circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the Respondent's disregard for Weingarten rights is of import to unit 

employees well beyond the facility where the violations occurred”). 

195 BOP Safford, 35 FLRA at 446-47.

196 INS El Paso, 36 FLRA at 52; see also BOP, OIA, 55 FLRA at 395 (ordering that employee is to be protected 

from future discipline based on any information obtained in the investigative interview and that his record be 

expunged of any adverse information obtained during the interview).
31

request, to repeat the investigatory interview and afford the employee full rights to union 

representation.197

After repeating the investigatory interview, the agency must then reconsider the disciplinary 

action taken against the employee without reference to or reliance upon the information obtained 

in the unlawful interview. If the agency concludes the disciplinary action was unwarranted or 

mitigating the penalty is warranted, the employee is made whole for any losses suffered to the 

extent consistent with the agency's decision. The agency is required to notify the employee of the 

results of the reconsideration, including any make-whole remedies to be afforded the employee 

and, if relevant, provide the employee any grievance or appeal rights that may exist under the 

parties' negotiated agreement, law, or regulation with respect to the agency's reconsideration.198

2. Unlawful Discipline for Requesting Union Representation

Where a disciplinary action has been taken because the employee engaged in protected activity, 

a traditional make-whole remedy is appropriate. Thus, if an employee was disciplined for 

insisting upon union representation at an investigatory interview, the Authority will impose a 

traditional make-whole remedy, which includes rescission of the disciplinary action.199 The 

Authority has also ordered an agency to rescind a suspension imposed on an employee based 

upon the misconduct of his union representative during an investigatory meeting.200 On the other 

hand, the Authority has held that “a make whole remedy will not be ordered where the 

disciplinary action taken relates solely to employee misconduct independent of the examination 

itself.”201

 

197 BOP Safford, 35 FLRA at 446; DOJ, OIG, Wash., D.C., 47 FLRA at 1264-66; VAMC Jackson, 48 FLRA at 797; BOP, 

OIA, 55 FLRA at 395.

198 Id.

199 Norfolk, 14 FLRA at 732 (reprimand expunged where based on refusal to submit to unlawful interview); Metro. 

Corr. Ctr., 27 FLRA at 884 (suspension revoked where it was based upon employee’s lawful refusal to submit 

memorandum as part of a meeting where he was denied union representation, where agency cannot demonstrate it 

would have imposed the same penalty for the incident being investigated); VAMC, Fort Wayne, Ind., 39 FLRA at 

721 (affirming arbitrator’s order revoking three-day suspension for requesting union representation during 

investigatory examination).

200 INS, San Diego, Cal., 13 FLRA at 592. 

201 Norfolk, 14 FLRA at 84 (no restoration ordered for lost wages and benefits flowing from employee’s refusal to 

obey lawful management directives).
32

III. Bypass

A. Statutory Authority

Section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute provides:

A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the 

exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents and is entitled 

to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees 

in the unit.

B. Scope and Purpose of the Right

“[O]nce a union is certified as the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of agency 

employees, the agency must ‘deal only with’ that representative concerning any matter affecting 

the conditions of employment of employees in that unit.”202 An agency violates this obligation 

when it deals directly “with either another union or with unit employees on matters that are 

within the sole authority of that exclusive representative.”203 These matters include “grievances, 

disciplinary actions and other matters relating to the collective bargaining relationship.”204

Such conduct “constitutes direct dealing with an employee, and is violative of [section] 

7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute, because it interferes with the union’s rights under [section] 

7114(a)(1) of the Statute to act for and represent all employees in the bargaining unit.”205 It also 

constitutes an independent violation of section 7116(a)(1) of the Statute “because it demeans the 

union and inherently interferes with the rights of employees to designate and rely on the union 

for representation.”206

C. Matters Giving Rise to Bypass Violations

1. Grievances

Section 7121 of the Statute sets forth the framework and requirements for negotiated grievance 

procedures. With respect to an employee’s right to representation during a grievance, subsection 

(b)(1)(C) requires that grievance procedures do the following:

(i) assure an exclusive representative the right, in its own behalf or on behalf of 

any employee in the unit represented by the exclusive representative, to present 

and process grievances; [and]

 

202 AFGE Nat’l Council of HUD Locals 222, 54 FLRA 1267, 1276 (1998) (AFGE HUD Locals 222).

203 Id.

204 DOJ, BOP, FCI, Elkton, Ohio, 63 FLRA 280, 282 (2009) (FCI Elkton) (quoting DOJ, BOP, FCI, Bastrop, Tex., 

51 FLRA 1339, 1346 (1996)).

205 Id.

206 Id.; but see AFGE HUD Locals 222, 54 FLRA at 1283 n.20 (noting that the Authority’s test for an independent 

(a)(1) violation arising from a bypass allegation differs from the National Labor Relation Board, which “generally 

does not find an independent violation of section 8(a)(1) based on the fact of direct dealings alone”).
33

(ii) assure such an employee the right to present a grievance on the employee’s 

own behalf, and assure the exclusive representative the right to be present during 

the grievance proceeding.

When a union represents an employee in grievance proceedings (either because the union filed 

the grievance on the employee’s behalf, or because the employee otherwise designated the union 

as his or her representative), an agency may not bypass the union by dealing directly with the 

employee regarding the grievance.207

The obligation to deal with the union regarding grievances applies to all steps of the negotiated 

grievance procedure. Thus, an agency violates the Statute if it does not furnish, at the same time 

as the employee, “the written decision when rendered at each step of the negotiated grievance 

procedure, or if the employee, and not the Union, is voluntarily furnished information bearing on 

the grievance.”208 The obligation also applies to an agency’s solicitation of information regarding 

the grievance,209 and discussions involving settlement of the grievance.210

In determining whether a meeting concerns a “grievance” for purposes of resolving a bypass 

allegation, the Authority has applied the same definition of “grievance” as it applies to 

allegations concerning “formal discussions” under section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute. Thus, 

where the Authority found that an agency violated section 7114(a)(2)(A) by failing to provide 

the union with an opportunity to be represented at a discussion regarding a “potential” grievance 

– which the Authority found constituted a “grievance” within the meaning of section 

7114(a)(2)(A) – it also found that the agency unlawfully bypassed the union by communicating 

directly with the employee regarding the grievance.211

An agency does not commit an unlawful bypass by dealing directly with employees regarding 

matters for which the union has no statutory right or obligation to represent the employee and the 

employee has not chosen the union to represent him or her in the matter.212

 

207 SSA, Balt., Md., 39 FLRA 298, 311 (1991) (SSA, Balt.); Dep’t of Air Force, 355th SPTG/CG, Davis-Monthan 

AFB, Ariz., 63 FLRA 635, 635 (2007) (Davis-Monthan AFB); see also SSA, OHA, 25 FLRA 571, 575 (1987) (the 

union’s statutory right “to be present during the grievance proceeding” includes the implied right to be notified when 

a grievance is filed by an employee on the employee’s own behalf, and to be served, upon request, with copies of 

documents related to the grievance) (applying predecessor to Section 7121(b)(1)(C)(ii)).

208 SSA, 16 FLRA 434, 449 (1984); see also Davis-Monthan AFB, 63 FLRA at 641 (agency bypassed union by 

delivering first step grievance response directly to unit employee).

209 SSA, Balt., 39 FLRA at 312 (agency bypassed union by sending letter to employee directing him to file grievance 

in a different forum and soliciting information regarding the grievance).

210 IRS, Memphis Serv. Ctr., Memphis, Tenn., 17 FLRA 107, 115 (1985) (IRS, Memphis) (agency bypassed union 

when it informed grievant’s husband that a previously rejected offer to settle the grievance was still available).

211 DOJ, BOP, FCI, Bastrop, Tex., 51 FLRA 1339, 1344-46 (1996).

212 GPO, 23 FLRA 35, 40 (1986) (agency did not unlawfully bypass a union by dealing directly with an employee to 

informally adjust her EEO complaint where employee “had elected to pursue her complaint of discrimination as an 

appeal under the regulatory process of the EEOC, and the exclusive representative had no statutory rights or 

obligations to represent her in that process”); see also VA, Wash., D.C., 48 FLRA 991 (1993) (adopting without 

precedential significance the ALJ’s conclusion that the agency bypassed the union by failing to provide copies of 

final decision letters to unit employees concerning their EEO complaints where the union was the employees’ 

designated representative).
34

2. Negotiable Conditions of Employment

An agency unlawfully bypasses the exclusive representative when it negotiates directly with 

bargaining unit employees regarding negotiable conditions of employment.213 Agency 

communications with unit employees can also constitute an unlawful bypass if they are designed 

to put pressure on the union to take a certain course of action.214

Applying these principles, the Authority has found that agencies unlawfully bypassed the 

exclusive representative by dealing directly with unit employees regarding the establishment of 

work schedules or hours,215 seating arrangements,216 last chance agreements,217 alternative 

selection procedures,218 and changes to agency policies.219 An unlawful bypass was also found 

where an agency issued job solicitations to unit employees for positions at new hearing centers 

prior to meeting with the union regarding the establishment of the new centers.220

Conversely, an agency was found not to have unlawfully bypassed the union by conducting an 

orientation session for new employees regarding administrative matters – even where the session 

constituted a “formal discussion” – where there was no evidence the agency attempted to “deal 

or negotiate directly with employees, or urged employees to put pressure on the Union to take a 

certain course of action, or threatened or promised benefits to employees.”221 The Authority has 

similarly held that an agency’s mere announcement of changes to a sick leave call-in procedure 

 

213 SSA, 55 FLRA 978, 982-83 (1999) (such conduct also constitutes an independent violation of section 7116(a)(1) 

because it “demeans the Union and inherently interferes with the rights of employees to designate and rely on the 

Union for representation”).

214 Dep’t of Transp., FAA, L.A., Cal., 15 FLRA 100, 104 n.3 (1984) (FAA, L.A.).

215 Air Force Accounting & Fin. Ctr., Lowry AFB, Denver, Colo., 42 FLRA 1226, 1239 (1991) (Lowry AFB)

(agency bypassed the union when a manager gave unit employees permission to develop a schedule for providing 

late office coverage to address the effects of the agency’s decision to implement a rotating work schedule); DOI, 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, Gallup, N.M., 52 FLRA 1442, 1442 (1997) (manager bypassed union by presenting unit 

employees three options to resolve a budget shortfall by reducing work hours, requiring them to choose one option, 

and agency implemented their choice without notice or bargaining with the union); FAA, L.A., 15 FLRA at 104

(agency “required unit employees to provide direct input concerning the development of a new watch schedule and 

solicited their assistance in establishing alternative schedules, one of which was adopted and put into effect” over 

the union’s objections). 

216 IRS, Kansas City Service Ctr., Kansas City, Mo., 57 FLRA 126, 129-30 (2001) (IRS, Kansas City) (agency 

bypassed the union by soliciting bargaining unit employees to develop seating arrangements for employees affected 

by decision to discontinue night-shift).

217 SSA, 55 FLRA at 982-83 (agency unlawfully bypassed the union when it negotiated a last chance agreement 

directly with an employee, on grounds that the agreement affected a condition of employment).

218 Dep’t of Treasury, ATF, Wash., D.C., 16 FLRA 528, 543 (1984) (manager bypassed union by meeting with unit 

employees regarding possible alternative selection procedures and informing them: “How do you guys want to 

handle this? It’s whatever you decide.”).

219 DOJ, INS, 14 FLRA 578, 579 (1984) (agency bypassed union by meeting with unit employees to ascertain their 

views concerning changes to housing policy).

220 SSA, ODAR, Nat’l Hearing Ctr, 66 FLRA 193, 196 (2011).

221 SSA, 16 FLRA 232, 243 (1984).
35

did not constitute an unlawful bypass, absent any indication that the supervisor “either attempted 

to negotiate or to otherwise deal directly with employees concerning the change.”222

3. Polling and Information Gathering

While agencies may not negotiate directly with bargaining unit employees regarding negotiable 

conditions of employment, they “must have the latitude to gather information, including 

opinions, from unit employees to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of [their] operations.”223

As part of its “overall management responsibility to conduct operations in an effective and 

efficient manner, an agency may question employees directly, provided that it does not do so in a 

way that amounts to attempting to negotiate directly with them concerning matters that are 

properly bargainable with their exclusive representative.”224

In determining whether a survey, poll or questionnaire constitutes an unlawful bypass, the 

Authority considers the nature of the information sought, the manner in which the survey is 

conducted, and whether the information was used in a way that would undermine the status of 

the exclusive representative. 225 It also considers the extent to which the agency has involved the 

union in the process, including whether it gave the union notice or invited the union to bargain 

regarding any proposed changes resulting from the survey.226 Applying these principles, the 

Authority has found that the following agency actions constituted an unlawful bypass:

 While considering the union’s demand to bargain a proposal to change the tour of duty 

for the night shift, the agency polled unit employees regarding their views and decided 

not to negotiate based on the results; the agency did not seek the union’s agreement to 

the polling and the union did not consent to it.227

 Manager issued memos to unit employees soliciting their views on possibly eliminating 

evening shift on weekends and then conducted a mandatory meeting for the same 

purpose.228

 

222 DLA, Def. Depot Tracy, Tracy, Cal., 14 FLRA 475, 478 (1984); see also HUD, Wash., D.C. Area Office, 20 

FLRA 374, 378 (1985) (no unlawful bypass for merely notifying employees of proposed reorganization after having 

so notified the union).

223 NTEU v. FLRA, 826 F.2d 114, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting IRS (Dist., Region, Nat’l Office Units), 19 FLRA 

353, 354 (1985)).

224 IRS, 64 FLRA 972, 977 (2010); see also NTEU, 826 F.2d at 123 (cautioning that the “search for reliable 

information may not be used as a screen behind which to subvert” the union’s role as exclusive representative).

225 IRS, 31 FLRA 832, 838 (1988); see also IRS, 64 FLRA at 977-78.

226 AFGE HUD Locals 222, 54 FLRA at 1279 (“Where an agency’s contacts with employees on matters affecting 

conditions of employment do not exclude the exclusive representative, and the agency recognizes its obligation to 

bargain only with the exclusive representative, the agency is not involved in direct dealing in violation of the 

Statute.”).

227 SSA, Balt., Md., 28 FLRA 409, 430-32 (1987) (SSA, Balt.).

228 Dep’t of Transp., FAA, 19 FLRA 893, 895 (1985) (holding that the agency was “not merely attempting to gather 

information or opinions concerning its operations but directly sought the opinions of these bargaining unit 

employees as to proposed changes in their conditions of employment”).
36

The Authority has found that the following agency actions did not constitute unlawful bypass:

 Agency conducted meetings, with the union in attendance, to receive unit employee input 

regarding work processes and suggestions for work improvements; the agency’s 

representatives did not discuss implementation of the suggestions, and the agency 

instructed supervisors that they could not commit to implement a suggestion until the 

agency’s bargaining obligations had been met.229

 Agency polled unit employees to determine if they preferred to be assigned to a new 

satellite office; the poll contained no indication that expression of intent would result in 

reassignment and did not seek employees’ opinions regarding the manner in which 

employees should be chosen for assignment; the agency advised and requested comments 

from the union, which did not object, shared the results with the union, indicated it would 

negotiate on matters related to the new office, and negotiated with the union before the 

office was opened.230

 Agency issued a memorandum to unit employees announcing a reorganization which also 

solicited employee suggestions for improving the work plan; the union was provided 

advanced notice of the reorganization and an opportunity to bargain before it was 

implemented, and the agency did not seek to negotiate with employees or use any 

information obtained from employees to undermine the status of the exclusive 

representative.231

 Agency issued a questionnaire to unit employees “merely [seeking] factual information in 

order to effectively avoid and prevent fraud and abuse” within an agency program.232

 Agency distributed a survey to employees gauging their reaction to possible use of new 

equipment and asking for recommended changes to work assignments; the agency 

notified the union in advance of its intent to distribute the survey, provided the union with 

copies, and promised to bargain with the union if it determined that changes were 

necessary as a result of the study.233

 Agency distributed questionnaires to unit employees to determine how newly 

implemented appraisal system was working for purposes of a draft report; the agency was 

“not attempting to negotiate with unit employees concerning the establishment of 

performance standards, but rather was merely seeking information as to how the existing 

standards were working.”234

 

229 IRS, 64 FLRA at 977-78.

230 IRS, 31 FLRA at 837-38.

231 SSA, Balt., Md., 20 FLRA 768, 770 (1985).

232 SSA, 20 FLRA 125, 127 (1985).

233 IRS (Dist., Region, Nat’l Office Units), 19 FLRA 353, 354-55 (1985), aff’d, NTEU v. FLRA, 826 F.2d 114 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987).

234 Customs Serv., 19 FLRA 1032, 1035 (1985), aff’d, NTEU v. FLRA, 826 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
37

 Agency distributed questionnaires to newly hired employees soliciting suggestions for 

improvements in recruitment and processing practices; even though no notice was 

provided to the union, the survey was not an attempt to negotiate directly because, among 

other things, employees were assured that the information gathered would not be 

discussed with certain management officials and there was no evidence of actual 

negotiations with the employees.235

 Agency conducted “town hall” meeting to discuss employees’ suggestions or initiatives 

for improving conditions of employment of disabled or handicapped employees; the 

agency invited the union to attend and participate.236

 Agency conducted interviews of unit employees to assess the accuracy of a case 

assignment guide; the agency was “merely attempting to gather factual information to 

determine whether its case assignment procedures were working as envisioned.”237

 Agency conducted a poll assessing the morale of unit employees in response to an 

accreditation report saying it was low; the agency was “merely gathering information to 

enable it to respond to a finding by an independent agency so that it might overcome an 

evaluation report affecting its accreditation.”238

4. Disciplinary Matters

An agency unlawfully bypasses the exclusive representative when it deals directly with a unit 

employee concerning a disciplinary matter for which the agency knows the employee is being 

represented by the union.239 The Authority has concluded, however, that an agency did not 

unlawfully bypass the exclusive representative by conducting a post-termination meeting with an 

employee represented by the union to discuss his retirement contributions, insurance, military 

service, leave and final paycheck. The meeting did not constitute a bypass because it had no 

influence or impact upon the “decision already made and tendered,” insofar as it dealt solely with 

administrative matters and neither the employee’s termination nor his appeal rights were 

discussed.240

 

235 Dep’t of Def., Office of Dependent Schs., 19 FLRA 762, 764 (1985), aff’d, NTEU v. FLRA, 826 F.2d 114 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987).

236 SSA, 19 FLRA 415, 416-17 (1985).

237 IRS (Dist., Region, Nat’l Office Unit), 14 FLRA 698, 699-700 (1984).

238 Kaiserslautern Am. High Sch., Dep’t of Def. Sch., Ger. N. Region, 9 FLRA 184, 186-87 (1982).

239 438th Air Base Group, McGuire AFB, N.J., 28 FLRA 1112, 1112 (1987) (McGuire) (agency bypassed union by 

reading notice of suspension to employee and failing to provide a copy of the decision to the union); see also Dep’t 

of Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Ctr., McClellan AFB, 35 FLRA 345, 345 (1990) (McClellan) (agency 

bypassed union by refusing to allow it to attend meetings at which bargaining unit employees were provided final 

decisions on disciplinary actions for which they were represented by union).

240 FCI Elkton, 63 FLRA at 282.
38

5. Direct Dealings with Another Union

An agency also violates its obligation to deal only with an exclusive representative when it deals 

with another union on matters within the sole authority of the exclusive representative.241 In 

determining whether an unlawful bypass arises under these circumstances, the Authority 

examines “whether the agency’s actions undermine the rights of the exclusive representative,” 

including whether the agency’s contacts with the other union “involve matters within the scope 

of the statutory authority of the exclusive representative” and whether the agency “preserve[d] 

the exclusive representative’s role in the determination of conditions of employment.”242

Applying these principles, the Authority concluded that an agency did not unlawfully bypass the 

exclusive representative by including another union on a reorganization task force.243 In that 

case, the exclusive representative was also a full participant on the task force, and any changes to 

unit employees’ conditions of employment were reliant on either (1) consensus of the task force 

as a whole, or (2) in the absence of consensus, separate bargaining between the agency and the 

exclusive representative.

D. Defenses to Bypass Allegations

The Authority has held that an agency may deal directly with bargaining unit employees 

regarding negotiable conditions of employment if it “first obtains the consent of their Union.”244

Mere notification to the exclusive representative is not enough.245 Instead, the agency must 

secure the union’s agreement. Moreover, the Authority has rejected an agency’s argument that a 

provision in the parties’ bargaining agreement committing the parties to “work together in 

minimizing the adverse impact on employees involuntarily reassigned” permitted the agency to 

deal directly with unit employees on such matters, where there was no evidence the provision 

was intended to allow the agency to bypass the union and it did not address meetings between 

management representatives and unit employees.246

The Authority has similarly rejected arguments that a union waived its right to be present at 

meetings where disciplinary decisions are delivered by virtue of bargaining agreement provisions 

that do not clearly and unmistakably waive the right,247 or by virtue of past practice where the 

 

241 AFGE HUD Locals 222, 54 FLRA at 1276.

242 Id. at 1280.

243 Id. at 1281-82 (citing Central Management Co., 314 NLRB 763, 767 (1994) and Allied-Signal, Inc., 307 NLRB 

752, 753-54 (1992)).

244 Air Force Logistics Command, Ogden Air Logistics Ctr., Hill AFB, Utah, 43 FLRA 736, 737 (1991) (Hill AFB)

(quoting Toledo Typographical Union No. 63 v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

245 Id. at 737. In Dep’t of Navy, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, Haw., 29 FLRA 1236 (1987), the 

Authority adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that the establishment and implementation of a program which involves 

employees in discussions of negotiable conditions of employment is a permissive subject of bargaining which 

cannot be implemented absent the exclusive representative’s agreement.

246 IRS, Kansas City, 57 FLRA at 129-30.

247 McGuire, 28 FLRA at 1124 (finding that language in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement must 

“constitute ... a clear and unmistakable waiver” of the right to be present); McClellan, 35 FLRA at 356 (concluding 

that the union did not “clearly and unmistakably” waive its right to be present at meetings where final disciplinary 
39

record failed to “establish a sufficient and consistent past practice to constitute a clear and 

unmistakable waiver.”248 An exclusive representative was, however, found to have “effectively 

consented” to an agency’s dealings with a unit employee regarding a last chance agreement 

where it was given a “full opportunity to negotiate over the terms” of the agreement but “did not 

evidence any interest in doing so.”249

E. Remedies for Bypass Violations

Remedies for bypass violations include traditional posting and cease and desist orders. The 

affirmative action required in these orders is typically tailored to address the particular type of 

bypass found to have occurred.250 Where an agency has been found to have bypassed the 

exclusive representative by negotiating directly with unit employees regarding a change in 

conditions of employment, and is also found to have violated the Statute by failing to give notice 

to and bargain with the union regarding the change, the Authority has additionally ordered the 

agency to rescind any agreements that resulted from the bypass and to afford the union the 

opportunity to bargain.251 Similarly, where an agency was found to have unlawfully bypassed the 

union with respect to its attempts to settle a grievance, the agency was ordered to, “[u]pon 

request, attempt to resolve [the employee’s] grievance by dealing directly” with the union.252

 

decisions are delivered to unit employees by virtue of bargaining agreement article providing employees with two 

copies of disciplinary notices).

248 McGuire, 28 FLRA at 1124.

249 Hill AFB, 43 FLRA at 737 (holding that “by its conduct, the Union evidenced the requisite consent”). 

250 See, e.g., McGuire, 28 FLRA at 1113 (ordering agency to “[f]urnish or deliver all decisions or other responses 

involving disciplinary proceedings to designated union representatives of employees at the same time as they are 

furnished or delivered to employees”); SSA, Balt., 39 FLRA at 314 (ordering agency to “[f]urnish or deliver all 

communications pertaining to grievances to designated Union representatives at the same time as they are furnished 

or delivered to employee grievants”); SSA, Balt., 28 FLRA at 410 (ordering agency to cease and desist from “dealing 

directly with [bargaining unit] employees by soliciting their opinions concerning personnel policies, practices, and 

matters affecting their working conditions”).

251 Lowry AFB, 42 FLRA at 1241.

252 IRS, Memphis, 17 FLRA at 108.