IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0312

Filed January 21, 2021

CHRISTOPHER ROBY,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M. 

Fangman, Judge.

Christopher Roby appeals the denial of his application for postconviction 

relief. AFFIRMED.

Steven E. Goodlow of Goodlow Law Firm, Albia, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
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MULLINS, Presiding Judge.

In December 2014, Christopher Roby entered Alford1 pleas to numerous 

charges in two criminal cases stemming from separate events—conspiracy to 

commit intimidation with a dangerous weapon and felon in possession of a firearm 

in one case, and two counts of first-degree burglary and one count of domestic 

abuse assault by strangulation causing bodily injury in the other. The minutes of 

evidence and attachments in the second case disclosed Roby went to the 

residence of a woman and a child he shares with the woman, “broke into her 

apartment, and strangled and bit her.” The female showed police officers “where 

Roby had pried open the screen to the front window, breaking it,” and “Roby came 

through the front window [and] pushed/threw her down and strangled her by 

straddling her and placing both hands around her neck.” The female grabbed the 

child and made it to her vehicle outside. She was followed shortly by Roby, who 

opened the vehicle door and punched and bit her. At the time of the foregoing, 

there was a valid no-contact order in place between Roby and the child, which 

prohibited Roby’s physical presence in the home. The female exhibited injuries 

consistent with her report of Roby’s acts to law enforcement.

In December 2015, Roby filed an application for postconviction relief, in 

which he referenced and attached a “[d]ocument from the victim explaining the 

crime wasn’t committed.” The document, dated November 18, 2014, prior to 

 

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of 

a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition 

of a prison sentence even if he [or she] is unwilling or unable to admit his [or her] 

participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).
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Roby’s entry of his pleas and previously received by the prosecutor and defense 

counsel, provided:

I just wanted to inform you that I do not want to appear at any court 

arrangements. [Roby] did have a key that he came through the 

apartment with. We had an argument that turned into a physical fight 

inside and outside the apartment as well as in the car . . . . We 

argued back and forth for a long time until my neighbors called the 

police. I never wanted the police over to my place or to have any 

charges against [Roby]. 

In his amended application, Roby claimed, among other things, his attorney in the 

criminal proceeding was ineffective in failing to properly investigate the case and 

depose the victim.

At the postconviction-relief trial, Roby’s criminal counsel testified to his 

recollection of the letter from the victim and Roby’s knowledge of the same prior to 

entering his plea. He testified the letter, noting Roby had a key to the residence, 

was inconsequential due to the existence of a no-contact order prohibiting his 

presence in the residence at the time. Counsel confirmed his recollection of 

speaking with Roby about the letter and elements and circumstances of the crimes, 

but Roby “made the decision that he wanted to cooperate” with the State, “and he 

wanted to plead guilty and take the agreement.” Counsel added, based on trial 

strategy, he would not have deposed the victim because the letter was different 

from the victim’s initial report to law enforcement and “that would have raised 

issues with her credibility. And . . . it kind of flew in the face of some of the physical 

evidence.” In his testimony, Roby acknowledged he knew a no-contact order was 

in place and he had no right, license, or privilege to be at the victim’s residence. 

Following trial, the court denied Roby’s application for postconviction relief. 

Roby appeals. Appellate review of postconviction-relief proceedings is typically 
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for correction of errors at law, but where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

are forwarded, our review is de novo. See Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 727 

(Iowa 2017). Because Roby’s claim concerns the effectiveness of trial counsel, he

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to 

perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). We 

“may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find 

either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) 

(quoting State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2015)). 

Roby claims his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty 

following the victim’s purported recantation of her allegations. He highlights the 

victim’s statement that he had a key to the apartment, which he believes raises 

questions about “whether a factual basis could be made . . . regarding his right, 

license or privilege” to be present, and counsel was under a duty to investigate 

further and depose the victim. Upon our de novo review, we are unable to 

conclude counsel failed to perform an essential duty or Roby suffered prejudice. 

As to counsel’s performance of duties, “we will not reverse where counsel has 

made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy.” State v. 

Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). And counsel 

strategically declined to investigate the victim’s supposed recantation given its 

stark inconsistency with the victim’s initial report and the physical evidence, 

predicting credibility issues. We find this reasonable. On the issue of prejudice, 

there is no reasonable probability Roby would have insisted on going to trial had 

counsel deposed the victim. See State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Iowa 
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2006). Roby knew about the potentially exculpatory nature of the letter and still 

chose to accept the State’s plea agreement to significantly reduce his sentencing 

exposure and the potential filing of federal gun charges.

We conclude counsel was not ineffective as alleged and affirm the denial of 

Roby’s application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.