United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 22-50882 

In re Ken Paxton, 

Petitioner.

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 

to the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 1:22-CV-859 

Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

The panel sua sponte recalls the mandate, withdraws its previous 

opinion, In re Paxton, --- F.4th ---, 2022 WL 16921697 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 

2022), and substitutes the following: 

Believing Texas intends to enforce its abortion laws to penalize their 

out-of-state actions, Plaintiffs sued Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. 

Paxton moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs then issued subpoenas to obtain Paxton’s testimony. Paxton moved 

to quash the subpoenas, which the district court initially granted. On 

reconsideration, however, the district court changed course, denied the 

motion, and ordered Paxton to testify either at a deposition or evidentiary 

hearing. Paxton petitioned our court for a writ of mandamus to shield him 

from the district court’s order. We conclude the district court clearly erred 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

February 14, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

by not first ensuring its own jurisdiction and also by declining to quash the 

subpoenas. We therefore grant the writ. 

I.

Plaintiffs are organizations that pay for abortions and an abortion 

provider (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). They sued Paxton and other officials, 

claiming the anticipated enforcement of Texas’s abortion laws violates their 

First Amendment rights and their right to interstate travel.1

 Primarily, they 

seek to enjoin the enforcement of these laws “for any behavior undertaken 

by Plaintiffs in connection with any abortion that occurs outside the state of 

Texas[.]” Paxton promptly moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, arguing that he is entitled to sovereign immunity and that 

Plaintiffs lack standing. 

 Before the district court ruled on Paxton’s motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiffs separately subpoenaed Paxton in his official and individual 

capacities. They contended they were entitled to examine Paxton personally 

to clarify his power to enforce the challenged laws because his public 

statements—including official advisories, campaign statements, and 

tweets—allegedly contradicted his court filings on that point. Paxton moved 

to quash the subpoenas, and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiffs 

then moved for reconsideration.

On reconsideration, the district court changed course and ruled 

Plaintiffs had shown the “exceptional circumstances” necessary to subpoena 

a high-level official like Paxton. The court thought Paxton’s testimony was 

1

 Plaintiffs challenge both Texas’s pre-Roe prohibition on abortion, see Tex. Rev. 

Civ. Stat. art. 4512–.2, .6, as well as the Human Life Protection Act (HLPA), Tex. Health 

& Safety Code ch. 170A, which was enacted in 2021 and became effective upon the 

overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 

142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022) (overruling Roe).

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3 

necessary because he “possesses unique, first-hand knowledge” about his 

intentions to enforce the challenged laws. His intentions were relevant, the 

court continued, because Paxton had simultaneously publicly promised to 

enforce the laws while arguing in court that he lacked the authority to do so. 

Having “inserted himself into this dispute by repeatedly tweeting and giving 

interviews about [the challenged laws],” the court concluded that “Paxton 

alone is capable of explaining his thoughts and statements.” 

The court also determined that testifying would not unduly burden 

Paxton. While recognizing that high-level officials have significant duties, the 

court stated: “It is challenging to square the idea that Paxton has time to give 

interviews threatening prosecutions but would be unduly burdened by 

explaining what he means to the very parties affected by his statements.” 

Paxton’s “many public statements and interviews,” the court thought, 

belied the notion that testifying would burden his time. 

 Accordingly, the district court reversed its initial decision, denied the 

motion to quash, and ordered Paxton “to meaningfully confer on or before 

October 11, 2022 to agree on the particulars of Paxton’s testimony, whether 

by deposition or evidentiary hearing.” The court also stayed Plaintiffs’ 

deadline to respond to Paxton’s motion to dismiss “pending Paxton’s 

testimony.” That motion remains pending. 

 Paxton then petitioned us for a writ of mandamus and a stay of the 

district court’s order. He separately filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing 

that the order constructively denied him sovereign immunity. We granted a 

temporary administrative stay to consider the petition. We now grant it. 

II.

Federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of 

their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 

law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). One such writ is mandamus, an extraordinary 

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remedy used to correct “a judicial usurpation of power” or a “clear abuse of 

discretion.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Typically, the writ serves 

as a means of “confining the inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 

prescribed jurisdiction, or of compelling it to exercise its authority when it is 

its duty to do so.” In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) 

(quoting Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943)). 

Before the writ can issue, three conditions must be met: (1) the 

petitioner must show his right to the writ is clear and indisputable; (2) the 

petitioner must have no other adequate means of obtaining relief; and (3) the 

issuing court must be satisfied in its own discretion that the writ is 

appropriate under the circumstances. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81; In re Gee, 

941 F.3d at 157. Those stringent standards are satisfied here. 

A.

We turn first to Paxton’s asserted right to relief from the order to 

testify. Our mandamus cases distinguish a court’s discretionary and nondiscretionary duties. In re Gee, 941 F.3d at 158. For discretionary duties, “a 

clear and indisputable right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus will arise 

only if the district court has clearly abused its discretion, such that it amounts 

to a judicial usurpation of power.” Id. at 158–59 (quoting In re First S. Sav. 

Ass’n, 820 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1987)). By contrast, violating a nondiscretionary duty necessarily creates a clear right to relief because the court 

lacked authority to deviate from that duty. Ibid. 

Paxton argues he has a right to relief under each basis. He contends 

the district court violated a non-discretionary duty to ensure its own 

jurisdiction by failing to rule first on his motion to dismiss. Paxton also argues 

the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to quash. We address 

argument each in turn. 

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1. 

“A district court’s obligation to consider a challenge to its jurisdiction 

is non-discretionary.” In re Gee, 941 F.3d at 159. An appropriate jurisdictional 

challenge triggers a “duty of making further inquiry as to [the court’s] own 

jurisdiction.” Ibid. (quoting Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 448 

F.2d 658, 666 (5th Cir. 1971)). Paxton raised such a challenge by moving to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on both standing and sovereign immunity 

grounds, well before Plaintiffs subpoenaed him. The district court failed to 

rule on that motion before refusing to quash the subpoenas. Indeed, in the 

same order compelling Paxton to testify, the court stayed Plaintiffs’ deadline 

to respond to the motion to dismiss “pending Paxton’s testimony.” 

A court has a fundamental duty to examine its jurisdiction. The 

district court’s failure to do so here extends beyond a “mere jurisdictional 

error” or “mere failure to spot a jurisdictional issue.” Id. at 159. Indeed, the 

district court’s order explicitly postpones Paxton’s assertion of sovereign 

immunity pending his deposition. But sovereign immunity provides 

immunity from suit, not mere immunity from damages. Russell v. Jones, 49 

F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 

(1887) (“The very object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to 

prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of judicial 

tribunals at the instance of private parties.”). As such, we have vacated the 

perfunctory denial of a motion to dismiss predicated on sovereign immunity 

and remanded for consideration of the motion before any further litigation, 

even though the district court preferred to put off the motion until “other 

legal issues were resolved and further discovery was conducted.” Texas v. 

Caremark, Inc., 584 F.3d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Russell, 49 F.4th at 

514 (“Where sovereign immunity applies, it applies totally. Plaintiffs stop at 

the Rule 12(b)(1) stage and don’t get discovery. They don’t pass go.”). 

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Our recent decision in Carswell v. Camp, No. 21-10171, 2022 WL 

17335977 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022), withdrawing and replacing Carswell v. 

Camp, 37 F.4th 1062 (5th Cir. 2022), confirms the district court should have 

first ruled on Paxton’s assertion of immunity.2

 There, the plaintiff sought to 

depose defendants who had asserted qualified immunity, relying on the 

district court’s scheduling order that allowed limited discovery “if the 

plaintiff believes discovery is necessary to resolve the [qualified immunity] 

defense” or if discovery was in the defendant’s capacity as a “witness.” Id.

at *2. We held that the scheduling order was an abuse of discretion because 

it allowed discovery against defendants while deferring resolution of their 

asserted immunity. Id. at *3. We explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has 

now made clear that a plaintiff asserting constitutional claims against an 

officer claiming QI must survive the motion to dismiss without any

discovery.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). In so doing, we emphasized that a 

defendant’s entitlement to immunity “should be determined at the earliest 

possible stage of the litigation.” Id. at *4 (citation omitted). The only 

exception to this rule is where the plaintiff has pleaded facts which, if true, 

would overcome immunity, but the court “finds itself ‘unable to rule on the 

immunity defense without further clarification of the facts.’” Id. at *3 

(citation omitted). Under those circumstances, the district court may allow 

discovery “narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on 

the immunity claim.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Those circumstances are not 

present here because, as explained below, no clarification of the pleaded facts 

is needed to evaluate Paxton’s immunity defense. 

2 Carswell addressed qualified immunity but is pertinent here because, like 

sovereign immunity, qualified immunity provides “immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 

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Plaintiffs insist Carswell is inapposite because their subpoenas are “to 

obtain hearing testimony,” not discovery, and because Paxton is being called 

as a “witness” with relevant knowledge, not as a party. We disagree. Even 

assuming such distinctions make any difference,3

 Paxton is a defendant, not 

a third party, and to the extent his statements are relevant to Plaintiffs’ 

claims, it is because of his status as a defendant. Moreover, Carswell already 

rejected similar arguments. The plaintiff there brought two sets of claims: 

§ 1983 claims against the individual defendants and a Monell claim against the 

county. The plaintiff tried to couch deposing the immunity-asserting 

defendants as obtaining their testimony as “witnesses” for the Monell claim, 

not as defendants for the § 1983 claim. Id. at *5. We rejected this gambit, 

explaining that it “turn[ed] qualified immunity on its head” by opening the 

defendants to deposition before adjudication of their immunity defense. Ibid. 

So too here. 

Finally, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that Paxton’s testimony is 

somehow necessary to decide jurisdiction. Whether Paxton may be sued 

under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity does not turn on 

Paxton’s campaign statements or tweets. Rather, it turns principally on 

whether Paxton “is statutorily tasked with enforcing the challenged law.” 

City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 2019). The same inquiry 

also informs the standing question. See id. at 1002. In other words, Paxton’s 

jurisdictional defenses can be assessed by reference to Texas law. His 

personal deposition answers are irrelevant, and therefore the narrow 

exception recognized by Carswell when further factual development is 

necessary does not apply. 

3 But see Russell, 49 F.4th at 515 (holding sovereign immunity barred subpoenas 

even against third-party judges because subpoenas are a “coercive judicial process” that 

“issue under the court’s authority and are enforced by court order”). 

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 The district court had a non-discretionary duty to ascertain its 

jurisdiction by ruling on Paxton’s motion to dismiss before allowing Paxton 

to be subpoenaed. See In re Gee, 941 F.3d at 159. Because the district court 

failed to do so, Paxton has a clear right to relief. 

2. 

Apart from the jurisdictional question, the district court also clearly 

abused its discretion by refusing to quash the subpoenas. “[E]xceptional 

circumstances must exist before the involuntary depositions of high agency 

officials are permitted.” In re Off. of Inspector Gen., R.R. Ret. Bd., 933 F.2d 

276, 278 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Before requiring such “apex” 

testimony, courts must consider: (1) the deponent’s high-ranking status; 

(2) the substantive reasons for the deposition; and (3) the potential burden 

the deposition would impose on the deponent. In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 

(5th Cir. 1995); see also In re Bryant, 745 F. App’x 215, 218 n.2 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(per curiam). A district court commits a “clear abuse of discretion” when it 

compels apex testimony absent extraordinary circumstances. In re FDIC, 58 

F.3d. at 1062. No such circumstances exist here. 

Only the second and third factors are disputed. As for the second 

factor, substantive need, the district court found Paxton’s testimony was 

necessary to clarify his enforcement policy due to purported contradictions 

between his court filings and public statements. It concluded testimony was 

needed from Paxton himself because he had “unique, first-hand knowledge” 

from “ha[ving] inserted himself into this dispute by repeatedly tweeting and 

giving interviews about the [challenged law].” “Paxton alone,” the district 

court thought, could “explain[] his thoughts and statements.” We disagree. 

The district court ignored the rationale for limiting apex testimony to 

exceptional circumstances. High-ranking officials—state attorneys general 

being the paradigm case—are often drawn into lawsuits. They cannot 

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perform their duties if they are not personally shielded from the burdens of 

litigation. In re Bryant, 745 F. App’x at 220–21; see also In re Stone, 986 F.2d 

898, 904 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“Obviously, high-ranking officials of 

cabinet agencies could never do their jobs if they could be subpoenaed for 

every case involving their agency.”). Accordingly, a “key aspect” of the 

analysis “is whether the [sought after] information . . . can be obtained from 

other witnesses.” In re Bryant, 745 F. App’x at 221. Where it can, apex 

testimony is justified only in the “rarest of cases.” In re FDIC, 58 F.3d at 

1062. This is not one of those rare cases. 

The district court conceded the “plain fact that lawyers at the 

Attorney General’s Office may articulate the Office’s [enforcement] 

policies.” So, by the court’s own admission, if there is a need to clarify the 

office’s enforcement policy, a representative can do so on the Attorney 

General’s behalf. The court nonetheless treated Paxton as having unique 

information merely because he made public statements about a matter that 

later became the subject of litigation. That does not follow. Paxton’s personal 

“thoughts and statements” have no bearing on his office’s legal authority to 

enforce Texas’s abortion laws or any other law. To accept the district court’s 

position would undermine the exceptional circumstances test. It is entirely 

unexceptional for a public official to comment publicly about a matter of 

public concern. If doing so imparts unique knowledge, high-level officials will 

routinely have to testify. 

Similarly, the district court erred in holding that compelling Paxton’s 

testimony would not unduly burden him. The court reasoned that if Paxton 

has time to give public statements, he has time to testify: “It is challenging to 

square the idea that Paxton has time to give interviews threatening 

prosecutions but would be unduly burdened by explaining what he means to 

the very parties affected by his statements.” Again, this reasoning would 

eviscerate the exceptional circumstances test. “High ranking government 

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officials have greater duties and time constraints than other witnesses.” In re 

United States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Those duties 

often involve communicating with the public on matters of public interest. 

The fact that a high-ranking official talks to his constituents does not ipso facto 

mean he also has ample free time for depositions. 

In sum, the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” by 

finding that exceptional circumstances justified ordering Paxton to testify. In 

re FDIC, 58 F.3d. at 1062. Paxton has therefore shown a clear and 

indisputable right to relief. 

B. 

Because mandamus is a remedy of last resort, the writ cannot issue 

unless the petitioner has no other adequate means of obtaining the relief he 

seeks. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380. Here, not only has Paxton sought the writ, he 

has also filed a separate interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs argue that this appeal 

is an adequate alternative avenue for relief, making the writ inappropriate. 

Our precedent forecloses that argument. We have held that an 

interlocutory appeal does not constitute adequate relief where the party 

opposing the writ also challenges the jurisdictional basis for the appeal. In In 

re FDIC, we issued the writ to quash notices of deposition issued to members 

of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(“FDIC”). 58 F.3d at 1057. The officials filed an interlocutory appeal while 

simultaneously seeking the writ. Id. at 1060 n.7. Notwithstanding the appeal, 

we held that that the officials had no other adequate means of obtaining relief 

because the opposing party had moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Ibid. As we explained, “[w]e do not think [the opposing party] 

can at once move to dismiss the appeal and urge that the FDIC has an 

adequate means of obtaining relief.” Ibid. We issued the writ and dismissed 

the appeal as moot. Id. at 1063 n.10. 

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In re FDIC controls here because Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss 

Paxton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On the one hand, they argue that 

Paxton should not receive the writ because he can receive relief via his appeal. 

On the other, they seek to prevent the appeal’s resolution on the merits by 

challenging our jurisdiction. Under In Re FDIC, they cannot do both. 

Paxton’s appeal is thus not an adequate alternative. 

 Paxton’s only remaining source of relief is the writ. Without it, he will 

be compelled either to submit to testifying or risk contempt charges for 

violating the court’s order. 

C. 

Finally, we exercise our discretion to decide whether to issue the writ. 

The writ is always discretionary: “Discretion is involved in defining both the 

circumstances that justify exercise of writ power and also the reasons that 

may justify denial of a writ even though the circumstances might justify a 

grant.” 16 Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, & Edward H. 

Cooper, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 3933 (3d ed. 2012); see also Duncan 

Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 311 (1917) (“Mandamus is an 

extraordinary remedial process which is awarded, not as a matter of right, but 

in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.”). We are satisfied that the writ 

should issue.

We sometimes deny the writ as a matter of prudence even when the 

district court erred, see In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345, 347 n.4 

(5th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases), but we typically do so when two conditions 

are met, neither of which is present here. First, our prudential denials involve 

a district court’s mistaken resolution of a novel or thorny question of law. 

See, e.g., In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(denying the writ where the district court “followed numerous others in 

errantly applying” the relevant legal standard); In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 

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(5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (denying the writ where “the district court, with 

the best of intentions, misapplied the law” on a legal question involving a 

circuit split); In re Kleberg Cnty., 86 F. App'x 29, 34 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying 

the writ where the district court “handled a delicate and novel legal issue but 

nevertheless [ran] afoul of controlling law”); In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 901 

(denying the writ where the district court erred as to an “important, 

undecided issue”); Landmark Land Co. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 948 F.2d 

910, 911 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying the writ after the erroneous interpretation 

of a “question of first impression”). These types of mistakes, made under 

difficult circumstances, may not rise to the level of a clear and indisputable 

error, as required for mandamus relief. See In Re JPMorgan Chase, 916 F.3d 

at 504. 

Our prudential denials also involve the kind of errors that the district 

court can correct once we have clarified the proper legal standard. For 

instance, we declined to issue the writ when the district court improperly 

delayed crime victims from exercising their statutory right to participate in 

the offender’s plea agreement process. In Re Dean, 527 F.3d at 396. Despite 

this error, we were “confident . . . that the conscientious district court will 

fully consider the victims’ objections and concerns in deciding whether the 

plea agreement should be accepted.” Ibid. Similarly, we denied the writ 

where the district court erroneously required a representative of the 

government with settlement authority to be present at all settlement 

conferences without considering more tailored measures. In re Stone, 986 

F.2d at 905. In denying the writ, we noted that “[t]he able district judge has 

indicated that he welcomes this court’s exposition of this issue, and we are 

confident that he will abide by our decision and adjust his directives 

accordingly.” Ibid.; see also In re Kleberg Cnty., 86 F. App’x at 34 (denying 

writ where the district court would have the opportunity to “reconsider its 

[error] in light of the standards we have articulated”). 

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Neither circumstance is present here. The district court’s twin errors 

occurred in areas of the law governed by well-settled standards. See In re 

Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 319 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

(suggesting that discretion counsels issuing the writ where the court reached 

a “patently erroneous result”). Moreover, the errors are ones that cannot be 

rectified as the case progresses. Paxton’s compelled testimony cannot be 

undone or corrected by the district court or a reviewing court once it occurs. 

We are therefore satisfied that, under the circumstances, we should exercise 

our discretion to issue the writ. 

III. 

The petition for writ of mandamus is GRANTED, directing the 

district court to vacate its October 4, 2022 order and grant Paxton’s motion 

to quash. Paxton’s interlocutory appeal, No. 22-50889, and motion for stay 

are DISMISSED as MOOT. Finally, our temporary stay of October 10, 

2022, is LIFTED. 

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Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I agree that the district court must resolve the question of whether the 

parties before it have standing and join in the remand for further proceedings. 

The energy driving this case is generated by its subject—not its 

complexity. Plaintiffs proceeding under § 1983 seek injunctive and 

declaratory relief—a declaration that Texas’s Human Life Protection Act 

(HLPA), among other anti-abortion statutes, cannot be enforced against 

persons assisting Texans to obtain abortion healthcare in states where 

abortion is permitted.1 HLPA makes abortion a felony unless a woman’s 

pregnancy creates a “life-threatening physical condition.”2

 The statute 

grants inter alia the Attorney General the power to enforce its terms by 

imposing a fine of “no[] less than $100,000.”3

 Plaintiffs fear that Attorney 

General Ken Paxton will pursue civil liability for assisting Texans to obtain 

abortion healthcare in states not prohibiting abortion, chilling their exercise 

of free speech and their constitutional right to interstate travel. On the extant 

record, these assertions are not fanciful. Plaintiffs’ briefs cite to statements 

assertedly made by Attorney General Paxton in media interviews, press 

releases, and twitter posts promising, among other things, “to make people 

pay if they’re going to do abortions;”4

 that Attorney General Paxton clarified 

1

 As detailed in their original complaint, Plaintiffs “seek to enjoin Defendants from 

applying Texas’s anti-abortion laws to Plaintiffs for the legal exercise of their rights.” They 

“also seek a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional, null and void the retroactive 

application of the Pre-Roe Statutes and to enjoin Defendants from applying them against 

Plaintiffs, their staff, volunteers, and/or donors for conduct that preceded the Dobbs

decision.” 

2

 Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 170A.002. 

3 Id. § 170A.005. 

4

 Several witnesses stated that they understood these statements to cover out-ofstate abortion care but could not be sure because the statements were unclear. 

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in his briefings that the State’s interest in protecting unborn Texans 

“continues whether the Texan mother seeks an abortion in Denver or Dallas, 

in Las Cruces or Lamesa.” Plaintiffs also point to statements by other state 

officials, who while lacking specific enforcement authority under state law 

nonetheless fuel a climate of fear of suit or prosecution.5

While it appears on the face of the complaint that Plaintiffs may have 

an adequate stake in providing out-of-state abortion access, their standing—

injury and redressability—here is not self-evident, and as a threshold matter 

jurisdiction must be addressed. This is rote. My colleagues go further, 

applying Carswell v. Camp’s strictures on discovery prior to the 

determination of qualified immunity to the determination of sovereign

immunity.6

 Whatever its reach, the Apex doctrine does all the work here and 

it is not apparent that discovery from the Attorney General is essential to this 

case. “Exceptional circumstances” do not exist to justify deposing a highranking official when the information desired from testimony can be obtained 

elsewhere.7

 Plaintiffs seek testimony from Attorney General Paxton while at 

the same time urging that his statements—their content and inconsistency, 

including in these proceedings—chill their constitutionally protected rights. 

It signifies that these inferences are drawn from the present record: Indeed, 

Attorney General Paxton argues to this Court that the potential liability 

Plaintiffs fear is “nonexistent,” while at the same time he argues that when 

“procurement takes the form of a bus ticket for the pregnant Texan to an 

5

 Plaintiffs cite, for example, a letter sent by a group of State legislators who 

threatened an organization with criminal liability for “reimburs[ing] the travel costs of 

employees who leave Texas to murder their unborn children.” 

6 Cf. Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022) (addressing district courts’ 

rulings on “qualified immunity” questions). 

7 In re Bryant, 745 F. App’x 215, 221 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished per curiam).

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abortion clinic, or the paying from Texas of the cost of a pregnant Texan’s 

hotel room adjacent to that clinic, it does not matter if the travel and hotel 

are in Albuquerque or Austin” for the State to have an interesting in 

protecting the unborn. 

The point is that on the record at hand a trier of fact could find there 

is sufficient evidence of an unsettling and chilling want of clarity in 

statements by officials with enforcement authority made against a chorus of 

state officials without enforcement power to allow this case to 

proceed. Those issues and the jurisdictional issue of Plaintiffs’ standing, 

including any discovery they may entail, remain for the district court. 

As for mandamus, we need only remind that Plaintiffs cannot move to 

dismiss the interlocutory appeal while also arguing that it affords the 

Attorney General another adequate means of obtaining relief,8

 as they do in 

this case. I would end the mandamus inquiry here. 

8 See In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995). 

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