No. 3-09- 0175

______________________________________________________________________________ January 29, 2010 IN THE

APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2010 SAG E INF ORM

ATIO N SERV ICES ) Appe al fro m the C ircu it Co ur t of t he and ROG ER W . HURL

BERT, ) Th i rte en th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, ) Grun

dy Coun ty, Il l i noi s, Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, )

) v. ) ) No. 07-MR-17 DA VI D H EN DE RS ON , Gru n dy Cou n ty ) Supervisor o f Assessm

ents, ) Ho no r ab le

) Lance R. Pet er so n, Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McDADE d

eli vered the opi ni on of the court:

______________________________________________________________________________ Pl ai n ti f f s f i l ed a c om pl ai n t f or i n j un cti v e rel i ef i n th e c i rc ui t cou rt of Gr un dy Cou n ty pursuant t o sect ion 11 of the Ill in ois Freedom of Inf

ormation Act (Act ) (5 ILCS 140/11( a) (West 20 06 ) )
. De fen da nt filed a mo t io n t o dis miss pu r su an t t o se ct io n 2
- 61 9( a) ( 9) o f t he Co de o f Civ il Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619( a)(9) (West 2006)) o n the grounds pl ai ntif fs ’ compl ai nt is barred by se ct io n 9
- 20 o f t he Pr o pe r t y Ta x C o de ( Co de ) ( 35 I LC S 2 00 /9

- 20 ( We st 20 06 ) )
. T he cir cu it
cour t o f Grundy

County ruled that sect ion 9-20 of the Cod e contr ols, found that plainti ff s’
co mplaint is t her efo re bar re d by a co nt ro lli ng st at ut e "a void ing t he lega l effect of o r d efeat ing t he cl ai m " (7 35 I LC S 5/

2-6 19( a)( 9) (W es t 200 6)) , an d gr an ted de f en da nt’ s m oti on to d i sm i ss . F or t he r ea so ns t ha t fo llo w, we affir m.-2- BACK GROUND Pl ai n ti f f s, Sage Inf orm ati on Servi ce s a

n d R oge r W . Hurl b er t, sub m i tted a req ue st to de f en da n t, D av i d H en ders on , Gru

n dy Cou n ty su pervi sor of as se ssmen

ts, pu rsua n t to the A ct,
se ek i n g th e rea l property as se ss men ts f or G ru n dy Cou n ty . Pl ai n ti f f s’ re qu est aske d def

en da n t to de l i ve r th e data i n e l ec troni c f

orm . De f en da nt res pon de d the data

wa s a va i l ab l e f or a f eeof $2, 456 .70base d on

a f eeof 10 c en ts p er ass es sm

en t pe r pa rce l of l an d, a nd the ex i stenc e of 24,567parce l s i

n G rundy Coun ty. Pla int iffs a sk ed de fen da nt t o r ec o nsid er be ca us e t he y co nst r ue d t he fee as a d en ial o f t he ir req ue st u nd er th e A ct. 5 IL CS 140

/6( c) (W es t 200 6) ( “ Th e p urp ose f ul i m pos i ti on of a f eenot
con siste n t wi th su b se cti on s ( 6) (a) a

n d (b ) of th i s A ct sh al l b e c on si dere d a den i al of ac ce ss to publ i c re cords f

or th e p urp ose s of

j udi ci al rev i ew ”);5 IL CS 140

/10 (Wes t 200 6) ( “ [a] ny

pers on deni ed access to in

spect or co py a

ny publ ic record may

appeal the deni al by sendi ng a wri tt en
n oti ce of appe al to th e h ead of th e pub l i c b ody

”) . D ef en da n t re sp on de d to p l ai

n ti f f s’ re qu est to reconsider the fee b

y ref errin g pla in tif fs to section 14-30 of the C ode, which provides that
asse ssment officer s may char ge a fee o f up t o 3 5 ce nt s pe r leg al-size d pa ge fo r p ro viding in formation to par ties contest in g pro pert y ass essmen

ts. Plai nti f f s f i l ed a c om pl ai nt f or i njun cti ve rel i ef . De f en da nt res pon de d that s ec ti on 9 -20of th e C ode addr es se s prop er

ty repor t ca rd re qu ests a

n d p er m i ts c h argi n g a "rea son ab l e" f ee th at, unl i ke req ues ts under the Act, i s n

ot li m i ted by the actual

cost of com pli ance. Th

e tri al court ordered t he parties

to address the reasonable ness of def endan t’s fee. The parties en

tered a stipul ation of f acts. Defen

dant asserted that section 14-30 of the Code, i n addi tion to section 9- 20, was controlli

ng, and ex

pla in ed the calcul ation of i

ts fee. Fol

lowi ng argum ents, the court ruled-3-

that se cti on 14- 30 does

not app l y be caus e i t does n ot appl y to requests f

or data i n e l ectroni

c f orm. The court found that section 9-20 of the Code controll ed pl ai ntif fs ’ request, that t he Code per mitt ed a re aso nable fee be yond a ct ual co st , a nd t hat defend ant ’s fee w as r eas ona ble unde r t he Code. AN AL YSIS Plai ntif fs argue that t he trial court er red in grantin g defendant’s m

ot ion to dismi

ss pursuant to sect ion 2-619(a)(9) becaus e the reasonabl eness of def endan t’s fee f or t he requested in form ation presen

ts a question of f

act il l-sui ted to resolution b

y a motion to dism

is s. Al though pla int iffs d isp ut e t he ap plic ab ilit y o f t he Co de t o t he ir r eq ue st , t he y as se r t t ha t de fen da nt ’s fee is
unr eas ona ble unde r a ny applicable st at ut e. Plaint iff s fur t her co nt end t hat defend ant bor e t he bu r de n t o pr o ve t he r ea so na ble ne ss o f t he fee an d t ha t de fen da nt faile d t o sa t isfy his bu r de n in t his
case. Plai

ntif fs argue that the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/1/1001 et seq . (West 2006) appli es because it i s speci fi c to plai ntif fs ’ request. See McCready v. Sec retar y of State , 382 Ill . App. 3d 789, 795, 888 N.E. 2d 702, 707 (2008) (“It is a f undam ental rule of statut ory construction that when there is a general statut ory provi si on and a sp ec i f i c s tatutor y prov i si on, ei the r i n th e s am e or in another act, t hat both relate to t he sam e subj ect, t he spe cific pro vision co nt ro ls and sho uld be applie d”). They

contend that the Code “fai le d to contempl

ate electroni c production of such
r ec o r ds ” a nd , co nse qu en t ly, “ do es no t es t ab lish a n e lec t r o nic fee co un t er pa r t fo rt he fee it expl ic itl y e stablis hes as proper for pro duction of paper copies.” Theref ore, plai ntif fs concl ude, as it r elat es t o t heir sp ecific re que st for dat a in elect ro nic for m, t he Co de “is no t as sp ecific as t he Coun tie s Code ’si

nstructi on tha

t fe es n ot exce ed 11 0% of

the actual

cost of [electroni

c] copy i ng.”-4-

Su bse ct io n ( b) o f se ct io n 5
- 11 06
. 1 o f t he Co un t ies Co de de fine s “e lec t r o nic da t a in bu lk form” and “electronic data in compi led f orm,” in relevant part , as “recor ds to w hich the public has free In ternet access .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 5 5 ILC S 5/5-1 106.1( b) (W est 200 6). The statutory lan gu ag e ma ke s c lea rt ha t “e lec t r o nic da t a in bu lk fo rm” o r“e lec t r o nic da t a in co mpile d fo rm” exi sts only

if the county provides f

ree in ternet access to t he records. The trial court found that the Counties C ode does not appl y to plai ntif fs ’ request becaus e “[d]ef endan t do es not provide inter net acc ess t o t he pu blic reco rd s at issue. ” Plaint iff s neve r a sser t t hat t he r eco rd s t hey so ught fro m defenda nt ar e “o nline public re co rd s” a s re quir ed by t he Co unt ies Co de. Plaint iff s ad mit t he Counties C ode appli

es onl y “ if a county m

ai ntain s publ ic records onli

ne.” Base d on the trial
co ur t ’s findings o f fact we ho ld t hat as a matt er of law t he Co unt ies Co de d oe s no t app ly to t he data pl ai ntif f s soug ht. Un der th e A ct, f ee s f or provi di ng publ i c i nf orm ati on a re c appe d a

t the ac tual cos t of reproduct ion of

the in form ation, “un le ss otherwis e provided b y State statut e.” 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2006) . Thus, t he i ssue is “ what ot her stat ute, if

any, pro vides an al

ternat iv e to the [Act’s] de fau lt ru le?” Th e t ria l co ur t fo und t hat t he C o de pr o vide s t hat alt er nat ive. We a gr ee . P laint iffs
ar gu e t ha t , no ne t he les s, t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in d et er mining t ha t de fen da nt ’s fee is r ea so na ble under the Code. Plai

ntif fs assert that t he Code and the A ct must be read in pari m ateria because they pertain to t he sam

e subj ect and reading the two stat utes in pari m ateria re qui re s th e c our t to construe their ref

erence to reasonabl

e fee s i n ha rmony. Thus, a “reasona

ble fee ” under the Code sho uld, plaint iff

s ar gue , be inter pr et ed t o r elat e t o t he ac t ual co st of r epr od uct ion as re quir ed by
se cti on 6( a) of th e A ct. The legislat ur e exp re ssed a clea r int ent t hat a r eas ona ble fee und er t he Co de s hou ld no t be-5-

construed to have the sam e m eani ng as a reas onabl

e fee under the Ac

t. Sect ion 6(a) of the

Act reads as foll

ows: “(a) Each pub li c body ma y c harge f ees reasonab ly

calcul ated t o r eimbu r se it s a ct ua l co st fo rr ep r o du cin g a nd ce r t ifying p ub lic
re co rd s and for t he us e, by any pers on, of t he eq uipment of t he publ i c b ody

to cop y rec ords . Such

f ee s sha l l excl ude the cos ts of any sear ch fo r a nd r eview o f the re co rd , a nd sha ll not exce ed t he actual cost of reproduc tion and certi f i cation, unless otherwise provide d by State statute . Su

ch f ee s s h al l b e i m pos ed ac cordi n g to a standard scal

e of f ees, establ

is hed an d ma de publ ic by the body i m posi ng th em .” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) 5 ILCS 140/6 (a) (W est 200 6). Section 6(a) of the A

ct expresses the l

egi slature’s in

tent t hat the Act’s f

ee provis ions

do not app l y wh en another s tatute provi

desf or the disse

m i na tion of publ i c i nf orma tion . This court
re ache d t he sa me co nclusio n in McCready , 38 2 I ll. A pp . 3d at 79 6, 88 8 N
. E
. 2d at 70 8, wh er ein it he ld t ha t “[ s] ec t io n 2
- 12 3 o f t he Ve hic le C o de [ 62 5 I LC S 5 /2

- 12 3 ( We st 20 04 ) ) ] dir ec t ly regul ates v ehi cle ti tle sea rches, w hi l e the [Act] regul

ates s earche s of

pub l i c rec ords ge

neral l y . Thus, secti on 2-123 of the Vehi cl e Code, not t he [Act], co ntrols plai ntif f' s requests.” McCready , 382 Ill . App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E .2d at 708, citing Knolls Condomi nium Ass’n . v. Harms, 20 2 I ll. 2d 4 50, 459 , 78 1 N. E. 2d 2 61, 267 (20 02) ; Her non v. E.W. Co rri

gan C onst ruc tion C o., 14 9 I ll. 2d 190 , 195, 59 5 N.E.2d

561, 56 3 (199 2). This court no ted t hat the Act and t he Vehi cle Code contain several

confl ictin g pro vi sions, in cl udin g that t he Veh

ic le Code im poses a $5 fe e for al

l s earches, wh

il e the Act i

mposes f ees-6-

based on the a

ctual cost of reproducing a nd certif yi ng records. Al

though the Vehi

cl e Code contai ne d a s peci f i c f ee wh i l e the statute at i ssue here doe s n ot, McCready

is in structive i n that, at no tim e di d this court attempt t o construe t he f ee provis ion i

n the Veh ic le Code in pari m ateria wi th the Act. McCready , 3 82 I ll. App. 3d a t 796 , 8 88 N .E .2 d at 708 . T his co ur t simply fou nd that “section 2-123 of

the Vehi cl e Code, not t he [Act], co ntrols plai ntif f' s requests.” McCready , 382 Ill. App . 3 d at 796 , 8 88 N .E .2 d at 708 . T his co ur t went on t o ho ld t hat , be cau se t he pla int iff’s co mpla int did no t alle ge a v io lat io n o f t he Ve hic le C o de , t he t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r ly di sm i sse d those

coun ts of th e pl ai ntif f ’scom plai nt b ase d on the Veh

i cle Code
. McCready , 38 2 I ll. App. 3d at 796, 888 N.E. 2d at 708. In thi s case, the Code does provide f or fees f or repro duction of records. Theref ore, under McCready , the “reasonab le fee” provisi on in the Code contro ls

pla in tif fs ’ request and the f

ee provisi on in the Act does not apply . See Sage Information Services v. King , 391 Ill . App. 3d 1023, 1032-33, 910 N.E .2d 1180, 1187 (2009) (“under section 9-20 of the P r o pe r t y Ta x Code, the ‘ reasonabl

e fee’ a sses sed by the B oa rd enco mpasse s t he elec t ro nic disseminat ion o f the propert y assessm

ents on the pro pert y record cards t hat Sage seeks. Accordingl y, *** the cost pro vi sion of section 9-20 *** applies to the subject matter o f thi s case, over t he actual-cost provision of

section 6(a) of the [A ct]”). The Co de p re clude s t he lega l effect of p laintiffs’ cau se o f act ion u nder t he Act beca use t he Code contro ls

the publ ic dis sem in ation of the i

nf ormation pl

ai ntif fs sought. See Sage Information Services , 39 1 I l l . A

pp . 3d at 1 03 2- 33 , 91 0 N .E. 2d

at 1 18 7. T

h e tr i al cou rt ordere d th

e p ar ti es “ to add re ss t he co st and r eas ona ble fee fo r t he co mput er -g ener at ed d at a, ” bas ed o n its finding t hat t he Cod e p er m i ts a re as on ab l e f

ee f or c om pu ter gen erate d data . Th

e c our t’s ord er demon strate s i

ts-7-

un ders tan di ng tha t the Code, n ot the A ct, c ontr

ol s p l ai nti f f s’ req ue st. The tri al cou rt di d n ot requi re proof of a ny addi tion al f acts to prove tha

t the Code

control s pl

ai ntif f s’ reque st. Nor, app ar ent ly, did plaint iff

s ur ge t he exist ence of a ddit ional fact s sp ecifically to c ont ra dict t he applic abi li ty of the Code to their request. Therefore, once the court det ermi ned that the Code contro ls , it should have si mpl y gran ted defen dant’s m ot ion to dismi

ss on the grounds the Code pr ec l udes th e l eg al ef f ect of pl ai n ti f f s’ ca us e of acti on un der the A ct. We re ject t he Se co nd Dist rict ’s ho lding t hat , in t his situ at ion, “[t ]he que st ion o f the reasonabl eness of the *** f

ee i s a sub stantial

factual dis pute.” Sage Information Services , 39 1 I ll. A pp . 3d at 1 03 5, 9 10 N. E.2 d a

t 11 89 . N otabl

y , that h ol di n g b y th e S ec on d D i str

i ct c on tradi cts i ts earlier, explicit stat emen

t t hat “‘“[i]t is a fundam

ental rule, wi

th no except ions, that a par ty must
re co ver , if at all, o n and a cco rd ing t o t he ca se [ it] has mad e fo r [ itse lf] by [its] plead ings. ”‘“ Sage Information Services , 391 Ill . App. 3d at 1033, 910 N.E .2d at 1187, quo ting New ton v. Aitken , 260 Ill . App, 3d 717, 718 (1994), quo ting Broberg v. Mann , 66 Il l . Ap p. 2d 13 4, 137- 38 (19 65). Despi te its recogni

tion of the f

orego in g rule, “ with n o exceptions,” the court went on to fi nd that “[a] ltho ugh S age alleged t hat t he fee e xcee ded t he ac t ual co st of c op ying, in violat ion o f the [Act] , the c om

pl ai n t esse ntially rais ed an al

le gation regardi

ng the reasonable

ness of the cha

rge [under the Code ].” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Sage Information Services , 391 Ill . App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d a t 1189. Plai ntif fs’ com plai nt did not at tempt t o st ate a cause o f action under the Code. Plai ntif fs’
co mpla int o nly so ug ht t he dis se minat io n o f pu blic in fo rmat io n u nd er t he Ac t . T he Co de co nt r o ls th e d i ss em i n ati on of th e i n f orm ati on pl ai n ti f f s s oug h t. " [W]ere v i ew

th e tr i al cou rt' s j udgm en t, not its reaso ni

ng." Forsber

g v. Edward H

ospital & Health Services , 389 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 43 4, 440.-8-

The tria l court properl

y di sm i sse d pl ai ntif f s’ com plai nt purs uan t to secti on 2-6 19(a)( 9). CONCLUSION The ci rcuit court o f Grun

dy C ounty’s order di sm

is si ng pl ai ntif fs ’ compl ai nt is aff irm ed. Affirmed. SCHMIDT, J., concurs. JUSTICE LYTTON concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the Property Tax Code controls plaintiffs’ request for property assessment records from defendant. However, I dissent from the majority’s dismissal
o f plaintiffs’ complaint and its refusal to address th e reasonableness of defendant’s fees under the Code. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that (1) plaintiffs submitted a request to defendant pursuant to th e F reedom of Information Act, (2) defendant replied to the request by demanding that plaintiffs pay $2,456.70 as a "copying charge," and (3) defendant refused to reconsider the copying charge. Plaintiffs so ug ht an order compelling defendant to release the requested information at a cost "not to exceed the actual cost of reproduction as contemplated by law." Although plaintiffs’ complaint references the Act, "the complaint essentially raised an allegation regarding the reasonableness of [defendant’s] charge." Sage Information Services
v. King , 391 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1035, 910 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (2009). The Code, which applies to plaintiffs’ record request, explicitly requires that all fees charged be "reasonable." 35 ILCS 200/9-20-9-

(West 2006). Thus, the majority erred in refusing to examine the reasonableness of defendant’s fees. Unlike the majority, I would review the trial court’s finding that the fees in this case were reaso nable a nd find that the question of reasonableness of the $2,456.70 fee is "a substantial fac tual dispute." King , 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. Summary judgment should not have been granted. In this case, plaintiffs compared the $2,456.70 fee defendant charged for reproducing the property tax records with the fees charged by other counties ($0 to $80) for similar record requests. In an attempt to justify his fees, defendant comes up with a complicated formula: he divides the total budget for his office by the total number of parcels, multiplies that number by a meaningless percentage, and then divides the result in half to reach $2,456.70. This perplexing and confusing expla na tion of defendant’s fees fails to establish that they were reasonable. Because I believe the trial court decided a controverted material issue of fact, I would reverse and remand. See King , 391 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, 910 N.E.2d at 1189. On remand, defendant would have to present evidence of (1) the amount of time and labor defendant and /or his staff spent on plaintiffs’ request, (2) the novelty and difficulty of responding to plaintiff s’ req uest, (3) the skill required to respond to plaintiffs’ request, (4) the fee customarily charged by simila rly situated counties for similar requests, (5) any time limitations imposed by plaintiffs, and (6) defendant’s actual out-of-pocket costs associated with the request.-10-

Only after obtaining such information can the trial court properly determine if defendant’s fees are reasonable.