IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

1
Opinion Number : 2
Filing Date : February 4, 2019 3

No. A

- 1

- CA

- 35643 4
TANYA GIDDINGS, B ernalillo 5 County Assessor , 6

Petitioner

- Petitioner , 7

v. 8

SRT

- MOUNTAIN VISTA , LLC, 9 ROBERT FOX , and LINDA FOX, 10
Respondents

- Respondents

. 11

APPEAL FRO M THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Carl J. Butkus , District Judge 13
Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C. 14 Cha r les H. Rennick 15 Marcus J. Rael, Jr. 16 Albuquerque , NM 17

for Petitioner 18
Sutin, Thayer & Browne , P.C. 19 Frank C. Salazar 20 Larry Curtis Vernon 21 Albuquerque, NM 22

f or Respondent SRT

- Mountain Vista
, LLC 23

Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC 24 Claud Eugene Vance 25 Albuquerque, NM 26
for Respondents Linda Fox and Robert Fox 27OPINION

1

VARGAS , Judge. 2

{1 } On motion of the Bernalillo County Assessor (Assessor), the district court 3

certified this appeal to resolve three issues arising from two consolidated district 4
court cases. First, we conclude the district court has appellate jurisdiction to review 5
decisions of the Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board (Board) based upon 6
the Assessor’s petitions for writs of certiorari. Second, we determine the Assessor 7

to b e an aggrieved party, entitling her to review of th e Board’s decision under Rule 8

1

- 075 (B) NMRA. Third, we hold that residential property transfers between 9
individuals or their trusts, and their wholly

- owned limited liability companies 10
constitute a “change of ownership ” as defined by NMSA 1978, Section 7

- 36

- 11
21.2(E) (201 0 ). 12

I. BACKGROUND 13

{2 } The consolidated district court cases from which the Assessor appeals arose 14
from separate and unrelated decisions by the Board regarding the properties of two 15
taxpayers. As such, we set forth the relevant factual and procedural backgrounds of 16

each case lea ding up to consolidation in the district court. 17

A. The SRT

- Mountain Vista, LLC Proceeding 18

{3 } SRT

- Mountain Vista, LLC (SRT) is a New Mexico limited liability 19
company wholly owned by The Philip J. Salley Revocable Trust (Trust) and 202

man aged by Philip J. Salley

. Prior to April 24, 2013, the SRT subject property was 1
owned by the Trust

. On that date , Salley, as trustee of the Trust, executed a special 2
warranty deed granting the subject property to SRT for purposes of refinancing the 3

propert y. 4

{4 } Following the transfer from the Trust to SRT, the Assessor valued the 5
subject property at its “current and correct” taxable value for the 2014 tax year, 6

without applying any limitations o n increased value provided for in Section 7

- 36

- 7
21.2(A)

. SRT protested the Assessor’s valuation to the Board, arguing there was no 8
“change of ownership” as defined in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E), and that the subject 9
property therefore qualified for the limitation on property value accorded by 10

Sec tion 7

- 36

- 21.2(A)

. The Board found “[t]he 2013 warranty deed clearly and 11
indisputably transferred fee ownership from the Trust to the LLC[,]” but that the 12
transfer did not constitute a “change [ of ] ownership” for purposes of Section 7

- 36

- 13
21.2(E) because “t he property had the same ultimate owner owning the property.” 14

B. The Robert and Linda Fox Proceeding 15

{5 } Robert and Linda Fox created Fox Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust
, to 16

serve as the sole owner of various LLCs

. Prior to 2013, these LLCs owned the Fox 17
subject properties

. On January 23, 2013
, and February 5, 2013, the LLCs granted 18
the subject properties to Richard and Linda Fox as joint tenants for purposes of 193

refinancing

. After refinancing the properties, Robert a nd Linda Fox granted the 1
properties back to the various LLCs that previously owned them. 2

{6 } Following these conveyances, the Assessor valued the subject properties at 3

their “current and correct” taxable values for the 2014 tax year, without regard to 4

the valuation limitation set forth in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(A)

. Robert and Linda Fox 5
protested the Assessor’s valuation to the Board, arguing that notwithstanding the 6
transfers, there was no “change of ownership” under Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E)

. The 7
Board found “[t]he 2013 warranty deeds clearly and indisputably transferred fee 8
ownership from the LLCs to [Robert and Linda Fox] and back to the 9
LLCs/Trusts[,]” but that the transfers did not constitute “changes of ownership” 10
within the meaning of Sec tion 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) “because in each case the property had 11
the same ultimate owners owning the same proportion of each property.” 12

C. The District Court Proceedings 13

{7 } After the Board issued its decisions in both cases, the Assessor filed 14
petitions for writs of certiorari in the district court , seeking reversal of the Board’s 15

decisions on the grounds that they were arbitrary and capricious and not in 16

accordance with the law

. Additionally, the Assessor successfully moved to 17

consolidate both cases

. 18

{8 } SRT and Robert and Linda Fox (collectively, Respondents) moved to 19

dismiss the Assessor’s petition, arguing the Assessor lacked the right to appeal the 204

Board’s decision under NMSA 1978, Section 7

- 38

- 28(A) (2015) (prov iding that 1
“[a] property owner may appeal an order made by a hearing officer or a county 2

valuation 35

protests board”), and Addis v. Santa Fe C oun ty Valuation Protests B oar d , 1977

- 1

NMCA

- 122, ¶ 6, 91 N.M. 165, 571 P.2d 822 (holding that
, for purposes of NMSA 2

1953, Section 72

- 31

- 28(A) (1973) ( recompiled and amended as Section 7

- 38

- 28)
, 3
“[t]he county assessor may not appeal the order of the [valuation protests board]; 4
only the property owner may appeal”)

. Anticipating the Assessor’s intent to invoke 5
the district court’s power to issue writs of certiorari under Article VI, Section 13 of 6
the New Mexico Constitution, Respondents further argued the Assessor had not 7
made the prima facie showing of entitlement to relief required on direct appeal

. 8
Finally, Robert and Linda Fox argued the district court lacked original jurisdiction 9
under Article VI, Section 13 to hear a property tax matter invoking a constitutional 10

claim because the Assessor raised no such claim

. 11

{9 } Without rul ing on the Assessor’s petition or Respondents’ motions to 12
dismiss, the district court granted the Assessor’s motion for certification to this 13
Court to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the district court has jurisdiction 14
to review the Assessor’s pe tition under Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico 15
Constitution; (2) whether the Assessor may seek review under Rule 1

- 075; and (3) 16
whether the transfers at issue constitute “changes of ownership” for purposes of 17

Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E)

. We accepted certif ication from the district court. 186

II. DISCUSSION 1

A. T he District Court Has Jurisdiction 2

{1 0 } The threshold issue raised by the parties is whether the district court has 3
jurisdiction to review the Assessor’s petition for writ of certiorari. The Assessor 4

contends the district court has appellate jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 13 of 5

the New Mexico Constit ution , a premise Respondents refute. The question of 6
whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law we revi ew de novo. 7
Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2007

- NMSC

- 055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. 8

{1 1 } Article VI, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution grants appellate 9
jurisdiction to the district court in “ cases originating in inferior c ourts and tribunals 10
in their respective districts

. . ., and supervisory control over the same [,] ” and 11
confers upon the district court the “ power to issue writs of

. . . certiorari

. . . in the 12
exercise of their jurisdiction; provided that no such writs shall issue directed to 13
judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction.” Id

. 14

{1 2 } “A writ of certiorari lies when i t is shown that an inferior court or tribunal 15
has exceeded its jurisdiction or has proceeded illegally , and no appeal or other 16
mode of review is allowed or provided.” Zamora v. Vill. of Ruidoso Downs , 1995

- 17

NMSC

- 072, ¶ 17, 120 N.M. 778, 907 P.2d 182 ( omissi on, internal quotation 18
marks, and citation omitted) . Our Supreme Court “has long held that certiorari is 19
the appropriate process to review the proceedings of bodies acting in a judicial or 207

quasi

- judicial character[.]” Id

. ¶ 18 ( omission, alterations, inter nal quotation marks, 1
and citation omitted) ; See Rule 1

- 075(A) (“This rule governs writs of certiorari to 2
administrative officers and agencies pursuant to the New Mexico Constitution 3
when there is no statutory right to an appeal or other statutory right of review.”). 4

C ounty valuation protests board s are quasi

- judicial bodies. See Addis , 1977

- 5

NMCA

- 122, ¶ 5 (“The [ valuation protests board ] is a quasi

- judicial body.”). In the 6
absence of a direct right to appeal from an adverse valuation protests board 7

determina tion, or other mode of review on behalf of a county assessor, we agree 8
with the Assessor that certiorari is the appropriate means of determining whether 9

the B oard exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded illegally in the underlying agency 10
proceedings

. See Ru le 1

- 075(G)(2) ( requiring the district court to issue a writ of 11
certiorari to review an agency action where several preconditions are met, 12
including that “the petitioner does not have a right to review by appeal.”); Rainaldi 13
v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. , 1993

- NM SC

- 028, ¶ 8, 115 N.M. 650, 857 P.2d 761 14
(explaining that “certiorari may be the only method available for reviewing the 15
actions of a state board where no statutory review is provided”). 16

{1 3 } It need be emphasized that, pursuant to Section 7

- 38

- 28(A)
, “ [a] property 17

owner may appeal an order made by a

. . . county valuation protests board by filing 18
an appeal pursuant to the provisions of [NMSA 1978,] Section 39

- 3

- 1.1” (1999) 19
(e mphasis added); see § 39

- 3

- 1.1 (A) (“The provisions of this section shall apply 208

only to judicial review of agency final decisions that are placed under the authority 1

of this section by specific statutory referen ce .” (emphasis added)). Indeed, 2
interpreting a prior version of Section 7

- 38

- 28, we squarely held that “ [t]he county 3
assessor may not appeal the order of the [valuation protests board]; only the 4
property owner may appeal.” Addis , 1977

- NMCA

- 122, ¶ 6 ; see NMSA 1953
, § 72

- 5

3 1

- 28(A) (1973) (“A property owner may appeal an order made by

. . . a county 6
valuation protests board[.]”). W e view the unavailability of a direct appeal on the 7

Assessor’ s behalf as an essential element of her right to pursue a writ of certiorari, 8
and not, as Respondents would have it, a s an absolute bar to the issuance of such a 9

writ. Respondents having cited no direct authority supporting their contrary 10
proposition, we must assume that no such authority exists. In re Adoption of Doe, 11

1984

- NMSC

- 024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. 12

B. The Assessor Is a n Aggrieved Party Under Rule 1

- 075 (B) 13

{1 4 } Having concluded the Assessor may seek judicial review of the Board’s 14

decision by way of a petition for writ of certiorari to the district court, we next 15

address whether the Assessor is an “aggrieved party” as required by Rule 1

- 16

075 (B) , which “governs writs of certiorari to administrative officers and agencies 17
pursuant to the New Mexico Constitution when there is no statutory right to an 18
appeal or other statutory right of review.” Rule 1

- 075(A). 199

{1 5 } Rule 1

- 075 (B)(1) provides that “[a]n aggrieved party may seek review of a 1
final decision or order of an agency by

. . . filing a petition for writ of certiorari in 2
the district court[.]” The rule further requires that the district “ court shall issue a 3

wr it of certiorari to review the action of the agency if

. . . the petition makes a 4
prima facie showing

. . . that the petitioner is entitled to relief[.]” Rule 1

- 075(G)(2). 5
Respondents argue the Assessor is not an aggrieved party under the rule and 6

therefor e cannot make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief

. 7

{1 6 } Generally speaking, an aggrieved party is “a party whose interests are 8
adversely affected.” State v. Nehemiah G. , 2018

- NMCA

- 034, ¶ 15, 417 P.3d 1175 9
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied , 2018

- NMCERT

- ___ 10
(No. S

- 1

- SC

- 36974, Apr. 26, 2018). In support of their argument that the Assessor 11
is not an “aggrieved party” and ther efore lacks standing
, Respondents cite to State 12

ex rel. Overton v. N

ew M exico State Tax Comm ission , 1969

- NMSC

- 140, ¶ 10, 81 13
N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613 ( stating, in the context of an action for declaratory 14
judgment
, that the county assessor “has no personal stak e in the matter”)

. Overton 15
held that a county assessor did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment 16
action challenging the consti tutionality of a tax

- exemption statute because no 17
justiciable controversy was present. See i d . ¶¶ 1, 10, 19. However , as our Supreme 18

Court has since clarified, Overton ’s holding is properly limited to the facts in that 19
declaratory judgment action , and does not preclude review of a j usticiable 2010

controversy arising from a taxpayer’s “claim of entitlement to a tax exemption .” 1

See El Castillo Ret. Residences v. Martinez , 2017

- NMSC

- 026, ¶ 18, 401 P.3d 751. 2
Similar to the situation presented in El Castillo , a justiciable controversy exists 3
here regarding Respondents’ claim of entitlement to the benefit of the limitation on 4

valu ation increase s set out in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2 (E), a claim which , as was true of 5
the claim presented in El Castillo , is not theoretical in nature and in whose 6

outcome the Assessor “does have an interest.” Id

. See NMSA 1978, § 7

- 36

- 2(A) 7
(1995) (“The county assessor is responsible and has the authority for the valuation 8
of all property subject to valuation for property taxation purposes in the 9
county[.]”) ; NMSA 1978, § 7

- 36

- 16(A) (2000) (“County assessors shall determine 10
values of property for property taxati on purposes[,]

. . . implement a program of 11
updating property values so that current and correct values of property are 12
maintained[,] and shall have sole responsibility and authority at the county level 13
for property valuation maintenance[.]”); see also Rob inson v. Bd. of Comm’rs of 14
Cty. of Eddy , 2015

- NMSC

- 035, ¶¶ 10

- 11, 360 P.3d 1186 (“The Property Tax 15

Code

. . . makes a general grant to county assessors of authority over valuation of 16

property.

. . . Clearly, the Legislature has reposed in county assessors the 17
responsibility for maintaining a program of updating property values to reflect 18
current and correct values of property.” (internal quotation marks and citation 19
omitted)); cf. Addis , 1977

- NMCA

- 122, ¶ 5 (concluding that the county assessor, as 2011

the party defending the valuation of property, is the adversarial party to the 1
aggrieved property owner). It is the Assessor who is in the best position to 2
challenge the Board’s decision limiting her authority in instances where residential 3
properties are transferre d between individuals or their trusts and the LLCs created 4
to hold title to those properties. See El Castillo Ret. Residences , 2017

- NMSC

- 026, 5
¶ 18 (concluding that the a ssessor has an interest in the outcome of a taxpayer’s 6

claim of entitlement to a tax ex emption). We therefore conclude the Assessor is an 7
aggrieved party under both Rule 1

- 075 and our standing jurisprudence in light of 8
the facts and posture of this case. 9

C. The Transactions at Issue Constitut e Changes of Ownership Under 10 Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) 11

{1 7 } Respondents next argue the Assessor failed to make a prima facie showing 12

of entitlement to relief because she did not show the transfers at issue constituted 13
“changes of ownership” for purposes of Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) such that the Board’s 14
decision was not in accordance with the law or was arbitrary, capricious, or 15

fraudulent

. To determine whether the Assessor’s petition makes a prima facie 16
showing of entitlement to relief, we must first resolve the legal questions raised in 17

the Assessor’s petitions

. 18

{1 8 } Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(A) sets forth limitation s on the percentage by which the 19

value of residential property may be increased from the prior tax year. The statute 20
exempts from th o se valuation limitation s the “ valuation of a residential property in 2112

any tax year in which

. . . a change of ownership of the property occurred in the 1
year immediately prior to the tax year for which the value of the property for 2

property tax ation p urposes is being determined[.]” Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(A)(3)(a). The 3
statute further defines a “change of ownership”: 4
As used in this section, “change of ownership” means a transfer to a 5 transferee by a transferor of all or any part of the transferor’s legal or 6 equitable ownership interest i n residential property except for a transfer: 7
( 1) to a trustee for the beneficial use of the spouse of the 8 transferor or the surviving spouse of a deceased transferor; 9 ( 2) to the spouse of the transferor that takes effect upon the 10 death of the transfero r; 11 ( 3) that creates, transfers or terminates, solely between spouses, 12 any co

- owner’s interest; 13 ( 4) to a child of the transferor, who occupies the property as 14 that person’s principal residence at the time of transfer; provided that 15 the first subsequent ta x year in which that person does not qualify for 16 the head of household exemption on that property, a change of 17 ownership shall be deemed to have occurred; 18 ( 5) that confirms or corrects a previous transfer made by a 19 document that was recorded in the real e state records of the county in 20 which the real property is located; 21 ( 6) for the purpose of quieting the title to real property or 22 resolving a disputed location of a real property boundary; 23 ( 7) to a revocable trust by the transferor with the transferor, th e 24 transferor’s spouse or a child of the transferor as beneficiary; or 25 ( 8) from a revocable trust described in Paragraph (7) of this 26 subsection back to the settlor or trustor or to the beneficiaries of the 27 trust. 28

Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E). 29

{1 9 } The question of whether the property transfers at issue constitute “changes 30
of ownership” is one of statutory interpretation. “The meaning of language used in 3113

a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.” Baker v. Hedstrom
, 2012

- 1

NMCA

- 073, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 400 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 2
Rayellen Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Props. Review Comm

. , 2014

- NMSC

- 006, ¶ 16, 3
319 P.3d 639 (explaining that although the court generally defers to an agency’s 4
interpreta tion of an ambiguous statute or regulation when the agency is charged 5
with administering it and the statute or regulation implicates the agency’s 6
expertise, “we will not defer to the agency’s

. . . statutory interpretation, as this is a 7

matter of law that we review de novo” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 8
citation omitted) ). “The principal objective in the judicial construction of statutes is 9
to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Baker , 2012

- NMCA

10
073, ¶ 10 (alteration, i nternal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “We rely on 11
rules of construction as aids in determining legislative intent[.]” Id. 12

{20 } “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to 13
the wording of th e statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing 14
that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must 15
give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 16

United Rentals N

w. , Inc. v. Ye arout Mech., Inc. , 2010

- NMSC

- 030, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 17

426 , 237 P.3d 728 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); see 18

NMSA 1978, § 12

- 2A

- 19 (1997) (“The text of a statute or rule is the primary, 19
essential source of its meaning.”). “We will n ot depart from the plain wording of a 2014

statute, unless it is necessary to resolve an ambiguity, correct a mistake or an 1
absurdity that the Legislature could not have intended, or to deal with an 2
irreconcilable conflict among statutory provisions.” Regents o f the Univ. of N.M. v. 3
N.M. Fed’n of Teachers , 1998

- NMSC

- 020, ¶ 28, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236. 4
Furthermore, “we will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not 5
there, particularly if it makes sense as written.” Id. (internal quotation mar ks and 6
citation omitted). 7

{ 2 1 } Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) expressly carves out eight exceptions to the definition 8
of “change of ownership,” none of which include transfers between individuals or 9

their trusts and LLCs formed to hold title to their properties. Further, contrary to 10
Respondents ’ position at oral argument, nothing in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) indicates 11
that the Legislature intended to provide a non

- exhaustive list of definitional 12
exceptions that included other unenumerated types of tr ansfers. Compare NMSA 13

1978
, § 14

- 2

- 1(A) (2011) (providing that “[e]very person has a right to inspect 14
public records of this state except [eight specifically enumerated exceptions]” 15
(emphasis added) ), with NMSA 1978, § 30

- 31

- 6(C)(19) (201 8 ) (designating as 16
Schedule I controlled substances “synthetic cannabinoids, including ” eleven 17
specifically enumerated synthetic cannabinoids (emphasis added) ), and Rule 11

- 18
404(B)(2) NMRA (providing that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act “may be 19

admi ssible for another purpose, such as proving” nine permitted uses (emphasis 2015

added) ). Had the Legislature intended the list of exceptions provided in Section 7

- 1

36

- 21.2(A) to be non

- exclusive, it presumably would have included appropriate 2
language to that eff

ect, as is found in the examples cited above

. Given the plain 3
language of the statute, and the conspicuous absence of any limiting language, we 4
are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to include exceptions to its 5
definition of “change of ownership” beyond those exceptions expressly delineated

. 6

See Baker , 2012

- NMCA

- 073, ¶ 30 (explaining that “the canon of statutory 7

construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius [means] the inclusion 8
of one thing implies the exclusion of another”). Accord ingly, we conclude that a 9

transfer of residential property between an LLC’s members and the LLC itself 10
constitutes a “a change of ownership” within the meaning of Section 7

- 36

- 11
21.2(A)(3)(a)
, subjecting the property to a valuation based upon its “current an d 12

correct value [,]” regardless of whether the proportional beneficial interests remain 13

intact. This conclusion is consistent with both the distinct legal status afforded to 14

an LLC, see NMSA 1978, § 53

- 19

- 10(A) (1993) (“A limited liability company 15
formed pursuant to the Limited Liability Company Act is a separate legal entity.”), 16

and the Legislature’s broad definition of “change of ownership” as a transfer “of 17
all or any part of the transferor’s legal or equitable owner ship interest[

. ]” 18

Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) (emphasis added)

. 1916

{22 } Respondents, however, argue that applying the plain language of Section 1

7

- 36

- 21.2(E) would result in an absurdity not intended by the Legislature

. In 2
particular, Respondents argue that a literal application of the statute would remove 3
the statutory limitation on valuation increases whenever a homeowner refinances, 4
grants an easement over, incurs a lien on, or in any way conveys a legal or 5
equitable o wnership interest in his or her property

. Respondents Robert and Linda 6

Fox urge us to follow the lead of California and Oklahoma, which have exempted 7
similar transfers from their equivalent definitions of “change of ownership” for 8
purposes of their respect ive counterpart limitations on property valuation increases. 9

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 462.180(b)(2) ( West 2018) ; In re Assessments for the 10
Year 2005 of Certain Real Prop. Owned by Askins Props., L.L.C.
, 2007 OK 25, ¶ 11

16, 161 P.3d 303

. However, the Ca lifornia exemption of such transfers from its 12

definition of “ change of ownership ” is founded upon a n express statutory provision 13

to that effect
, a delineated exemption not present in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E). See Cal. 14

Rev. & Tax. Code § 62(a)(2) ( West 2018) (exempting from “ change of ownership ” 15
“[a]ny transfer between an individual or individuals and a legal entity or between 16
legal entities

. . . that results solely in a change in the method of holding title to the 17
real property and in which proportional owne rship interests of the transferors and 18
transferees, whether represented by stock, partnership interest, or otherwise, in 19
each and every piece of real property transferred, remain the same after the 2017

transfer”). With respect to the Oklahoma exemption, that s tate’s Supreme Court 1

has held that such transfers are exempt based on constitutional and statutory 2
provisions textually distinct from Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E). Askins Props., L.L.C.
, 3
2007 OK 25, ¶ 9 . While Article 10, Section 8 (B) of the Oklahoma Constitution 4
excludes property that is “transferred, changed or conveyed to another person” 5

from limitation s on value increases, there is a n implementing statutory provision, 6
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2802.1(A)(1), (4)(g) (2002, amended 2014) , found 7

constitutional in Aski ns , which specifically exempts property that “is transferred 8
from a person to a

. . . limited liability company

. . . of which the transferor

. . . [is] 9
the only owner[

. ] ” Thus, little g uidance is provided by those states ’ jurisprudence 10

and statutes

. See generally State v. Office of Pub

. Def

. ex rel. Muqqddin , 2012

- 11

NMSC

- 029, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 622 (“[W]hen relying on [out

- of

- state] authority we 12
must ensure that another court is not relying on language that is absent from our 13
statute or that the language of the statute differs so greatly from ours that it serves a 14
different purpose.”). 15

{23 } To the extent that Respondents argue that a strict application of the plain 16
language of Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) leads to an absurd result here in the form of a tax 17

increase even though only the method of h olding title to property changed , not the 18
identity of the individual owners , that is a matter to be addressed by the 1918

Legislature, not the courts. 1 We therefore conclude the transfers at issue constitute 1
“changes of ownership” as contemplated by the Legislature. 2

1 We note the Legislature considered, but did not pass, a bill in 2015 that would have included the transfers at issue in Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E)’s list of exception s

. See H.B. 247, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015) (adding as an exception to “ changes of ownership ” a transfer “that only changes the manner of holding title and does not change the proportional beneficial interests in the residential property held before the tr ansfer”); cf. State ex rel. King v. Lyons , 2011

- NMSC

- 004, ¶¶ 9, 47

- 50, 149 N.M. 330, 248 P.3d 878 (noting that “the Legislature

. . . is well informed about the law and that its legislation is usually intended to change the law as it previously existed[,]” and explaining that the voters’ rejection of a constitutional amendment authorizing the Land Commissioner to exchange public lands reflects “the lack of legal authority to conduct unrestricted land exchanges” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted ) ). But cf. State ex rel. Udall v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. , 1994

- NMCA

- 094, ¶ 20, 118 N.M. 507, 882 P.2d 548 (“Under our system of government, law is not made by defeating bills or proposed constitutional amendments.”), rev’d on other grounds , 1995

- NMSC

- 07 8
, 12 0 N.M. 786, 907 P.2d 190

.19

D. The Assessor Made a Prima Facie Showing of Entitlement to Relief

{24 } Having resolved in favor of the Assessor t h e questions of law upon which 1

her petitions are based, we turn now to the sufficiency of her showing of 2

entitlement to relief under Rule 1

- 075(G) (2) (requiring the district court to issue a 3
writ of certiorari if, among other things, the petition “makes a p rima facie showing 4

that

. . . the petitioner is entitled to relief”). We observe initially t hat “review by 5

certiorari will lie when it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has exceeded 6
its jurisdiction or has proceeded illegally
, ” Regents of University of New Mexico v. 7
Hughes , 1992

- NMSC

- 049, ¶ 19, 114 N.M. 304, 838 P.2d 458
, with the term 8
“illegally” properly interpreted to be synonymous with “arbitrary, unlawful, 9
unreasonable, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence.” Id

. ; see Rule 1

- 10
075(R) (explaining that the district court shall determine whether the agency’s 11
action was (1) fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious; (2) not supported by substantial 12
evidence in the record; (3) outside the scope of the agency’s authority; or (4) 13

otherwise not in accordance with the law); Zamora , 1995

- NMSC

- 072, ¶ 17 14
(explaining that “[j]udicial review of administrative action requires a determination 15
whether the administrative decision is arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable, 16
capricious, or not based on substa ntial evidence” (omission, internal quotation 17
marks, and citation omitted) ); N.M. Regulation & Licensing Dep’t v. Lujan , 1999

- 18

NMCA

- 059, ¶ 8 , 127 N.M. 233, 979 P.2d 744 ( “[A]n agency’s decision is not in 1920

accordance with the law if the decision or action tak en by the agency was based on 1
an error of law.”) ; High Ridge H inkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque
, 1994

- 2

N MCA

- 139, ¶ 31, 119 N.M. 29, 888 P.2d 475 (“The district court should have 3
granted t he writ [of certiorari] if the [c]ity [c] ouncil had acted ill egall y, as would 4
be the case if the [c] ouncil’s interpretation of the zoning code was incorrect.) 5
(citation omitted). 6

{25 } The Board determined that the real property transfers at issue were not 7
“changes of ownership” for purposes of Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E) because the 8
properties had the same “ultimate” owners

. However, as we have stated above, the 9

Board’s conclusion was clearly erro ne ous since the underlying transfers constituted 10
“changes of ownership” as that term is defined by the plai n language of the statute. 11
Accordingly, the Board’s decisions in both cases were not in accordance with the 12

law
, and the Assessor has satisfied the requirement of Rule 1

- 075(G)(2) that she 13
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. We therefore n eed not address 14
whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. 1521

III. CONCLUSION 1

{26 } Having concluded the district court has jurisdiction, the Assessor may seek 2

review of the Board’s decision under Rule 1

- 075, and the transfers at issue 3
constitute “changes of ownership” for purposes of Section 7

- 36

- 21.2(E), we 4

remand to the district court with instructions to vacate the Board’s decisions and 5

remand the matter s to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this 6

op inion. 7

{ 27 } IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

_ _____ ________________________ 9 JULIE J. VARGAS , Judge 10

WE CONCUR: 11

___________________________ ___ __ 12 M. MONICA ZAMORA , Chief Judge 13

_____________________________ ___ 14 J. MILES HANISEE , Judge 15