COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

TONY ORLANDO HUGHES 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2696-99-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 SEPTEMBER 12, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Christopher W. Hutton, Judge 

 Charles E. Haden for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Tony Orlando Hughes, appellant, was convicted of possessing 

marijuana with the intent to distribute it within 1,000 feet of 

school property, in violation of Code § 18.2-255.2. On appeal, he 

contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. 

We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

FACTS 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) 

(citation omitted). 

 So viewed, the evidence proved that Sergeant Donnie Jordan 

of the Hampton University Police Department initiated a lawful 
traffic stop of a vehicle driven by appellant on Hampton Harbor 

Avenue. Hampton Harbor Avenue, which leads directly to the 

University library, is approximately ten yards wide and is 

bounded on three sides by Hampton University property. The 

property consists of retail shops and residential apartments. 

 During the course of Jordan's investigation, he discovered 

that appellant's license was suspended. As a result, Jordan 

advised appellant that he could not drive the vehicle. The 

police subsequently recovered from either Jordan or the vehicle 

two handguns, a bag containing marijuana, and another bag 

containing $5,500 in cash. 

ANALYSIS 

 Appellant's argument is two-fold. First, he contends Code 

§ 18.2-255.21 does not apply because the property surrounding the 

location of his arrest, although owned by Hampton University, is 

 1

 At the time of the offense, the statute read, in pertinent 

part: 

A. It shall be unlawful for any person to 

manufacture, sell or distribute or possess 

with intent to sell, give or distribute any 

controlled substance, imitation controlled 

substance or marijuana at any time while (i) 

upon the property, including buildings and 

grounds, of any public or private 

elementary, secondary, or post secondary 

school, or any public or private two-year or 

four-year institution of higher education; 

(ii) upon public property or any property 

open to public use within 1,000 feet of such 

school property . . . . 

Code § 18.2-255.2. 

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not property of a "school" as contemplated by subpart (i) of the 

statute because the property is not used for educational 

purposes. Second, he argues the street where he was stopped is 

not "property open to public use" under subpart (ii) of the 

statute because the evidence did not show that children 

congregated on the property. 

 In evaluating appellant's arguments, we are mindful that 

Code § 18.2-255.2 is a penal statute and, as such, "must be 

strictly construed against the state and limited in application 

to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute." 

Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 

(1983). But, "a statute should never be construed so that it 

leads to absurd results." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). Moreover, "words and 

phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and 

usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly 

manifest." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 

S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994) (citing Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 

199, 93 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1956)). 

I. 

 Appellant contends that "property, including buildings and 

grounds," as used in subpart (i) of the statute, means property 

used for educational purposes, or a "campus" as that term is 

commonly used. Here, appellant notes, Jordan testified that the 

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property surrounding the site of the arrest is not part of 

Hampton University's "campus." 

 Even if we accept for the sake of argument that the words 

"buildings and grounds" refer only to property used for 

educational purposes or a "campus," the statute does not limit 

the word "property" to that term. The statute merely states 

that "buildings and grounds" are "include[ed]" in the definition 

of "property." 

 Here, it is clear that the arrest took place within 1,000 

feet of Hampton University property. If the word "property" is 

to be given a definition other than its normal meaning, then it 

is the job of the General Assembly to do so. The statute we 

review in this case contains no such limitation. 

II. 

 Appellant also contends the street where he was stopped is 

not "property open to public use" under subpart (ii) of the 

statute, as, he alleges, that term was defined or limited by us 

in Smith v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 620, 496 S.E.2d 117 

(1998). In Smith, we emphasized that the property upon which 

the defendant was arrested was "open to public use" because the 

evidence showed that the property was "the type of place where 

school age children congregate." Id. at 626, 496 S.E.2d at 120. 

 Again, even if, for the sake of argument, we accept 

appellant's interpretation of our decision in Smith, appellant's 

argument fails. Appellant does not recognize the complete 

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language of subpart (ii) of the statute. That language provides 

that an offense occurs if the controlled substance is possessed 

"upon public property or any property open to public use" that 

is within 1,000 feet of school property. (Emphasis added.) 

Here, the evidence showed, and appellant concedes in his brief, 

that he was "stopped on a public thoroughfare." Thus, because 

subpart (ii) of the statute is written in the disjunctive, the 

conviction stands because appellant possessed the drugs on 

"public property." We need not decide whether appellant was 

stopped on "property open to public use." 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

Affirmed.

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