* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 9/17/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LORRI J. HULL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-7004 (D.C. No. CV-95-118-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text, h owever, we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate partyat the time of the underlying administrative decision. -2- Plaintiff-appellant Lorrie J. Hull (claimant) appea ls from the district court’s decision upholding the Secretary’s denial of disabi lity benefits and supplemental security income. Claimant asserted that she was di sabled due to the residual effects of the amputation of her right leg above th e knee, and back and hip pain. Following the second of two hearings, the administr ative law judge (ALJ) determined, at the fifth step of the applicable fiv e-step sequential analysis, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988), that, while claimant could not re turn to her past work and could not perform a full range of sedentary work, she rem ained capable of performing sedentary jobs existing in the national economy. T he Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s determination the final de cision of the Secretary. 1 This court reviews the Secretary’s decision only to insure that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the factua l findings and that the Secretary applied the law correctly. Bean v. Chate r , 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1995). On appeal, claimant specifically argue s that the ALJ improperly discredited her complaints of disabling pain and us ed incomplete hypothetical-3-

questions to elicit testimony from the vocational e xpert upon which the ALJ then relied to deny benefits. Upon careful review of the record, we determine that the ALJ properly considered claimant’s complaints of disabling pain. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)(discussing properconsideration of complaints of disabling pain). Further, there is nothing in t his record to cause this court to question the ALJ’s pertinent credibility determinat ions. See Winfrey v. Chater , No. 95-7139, 1996 WL 444144, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996). The ALJ’s hypothetical questions asked the vocation al expert to consider the job possibilities for an individual who could p erform sedentary work, but who was further limited by her need to stand for five m inutes after sitting for thirty to forty minutes. Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in not also including in those questions her restrictions from working around movi ng machinery, heights, or vibrations, or from climbing, stooping, kneeling, b alancing, crouching or crawling. Because these restrictions would not further restrict claimant’s ability to do the sedentary work identified by the vocation al expert, the ALJ did not err in failing to include these limitations in his hypo thetical questions. See, e.g. , Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992)(“person would n ot need to crouch and would need to stoop only occasionallyto perform substantially all sedentary and light jobs, citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 8 3-14); id. (“relatively few jobs-4-

in the national economy require climbing or balanci ng,” citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-14); Armstrong v. Bowen , 648 F. Supp. 309, 311 (S.D. Tex. 1986)(restrictio ns on bending, stooping and heights did not preclude c laimant from performing sedentary work); Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-10 (by its very nature, sedentary work, which is performed primarily in seated position, entails no significant stooping); Soc. Sec. Ruling 85-15 (limitations on crawling andkneeling are of little significance in work world); id. (restrictions from working at unprotected heights and around moving machinery due to seizure disorder s would not significantly affect work ability). Claimant also argues that the ALJ failed to include the limitations resulting from her need to use crutches when ambulating witho ut her prosthesis and a cane when using her prosthesis. While use of crutches m ay further limit an individual’s ability to perform sedentary work, see , e.g. , Johnson v. Bowen , 687 F. Supp. 1284, 1299 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Kellam v. Bow en , 663 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1987), there is no indication that the us e of a cane would prevent claimant from performing the minimal standing, walk ing and carrying requirements of sedentary work, 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1 567(a), 416.967(a), see, e.g. , Gaffney v. Bowen , 825 F.2d 98, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1987)(upholding det ermination that claimant who needed cane to ambulate could per form full range of sedentary work).-5-

Therefore, because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s factual findings and because we find no legal error, we AFF IRM the denial of benefits.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Circuit Judge