IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

TIMOTHY J. GODDARD, an individual, Appellant/ Cross-Respondent,

CSK AUTO, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Respondent/ Cross-Appellant. No. 68336-5-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: October 14. 2013 Spearman, A.C.J.

— The central issue in this appeal is whetherTimothy 

### Goddard, aftervoluntarily resigning from CSK Auto, Inc., was obligated to repay 

### the company for relocation costs. Goddard sued CSK after CSK, citing a 

### promissory note relating to relocation expenses, withheld a portion of his last 

### paycheck. CSK counterclaimed, seeking recovery of additionalrelocation expenses under various theories, including breach of the promissory note, and 

### alleging Goddard had violated a restrictive covenant bysoliciting CSK employees after he resigned. The trial courtruled that CSK was entitled to recover some of the relocation expenses, dismissed CSK's counterclaim for breach of a non 

### solicitationagreement, and enteredjudgmenton CSK's breach ofcontract counterclaim and its requestfor attorney's fees. Goddard appeals, contending the trial court erred indismissing his claims and granting summaryjudgment onNo. 68336-5-1/2 CSK's counterclaim for breach ofthe promissory note. He also contends the amount ofthe award ofattorney's fees to CSK was unreasonable. CSK cross appeals, contending the trial court erred in ruling that CSK was not entitled to
recover all ofthe relocation expenses and dismissing CSK's counterclaim for breach ofthe non-solicitation agreement. We affirm in all respects. FACTS Goddard began working for CSK, an Arizona-based auto parts retailer, in 1984. Inearly 2008, when his position was eliminated, he agreed to accept a 

### demotion to regional vice-president and move from Arizona to the Seattle area. The effective date of his transferwas January 28, 2008. Under CSK's Relocation 

### Policy, Goddard was required to repay relocation expenses if he voluntarily 

### resigned within 12 months "following the acceptance of a relocation.. .." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 581. CSK also presented him with an Interim Promissory Note 

### ("Promissory Note"), which wasexecuted on February 15, 2008.1 Underthe

1Thenote states, in part: FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned Maker [Goddard] promises to pay to the order of CSKAUTO, INC.... the estimated relocation sum of Two Hundred ThirtySeven Thousand seven hundred fifty dollars and fifty cents, ($237750.50 adjusted for actual relocation payments made to or for the Maker, without interest, on or before thirtydays of the first to occurof the maker: 1.) terminating employment with the company within twoyears from the effective date oftransfer.... Maker hereby authorizes CSK Auto, Inc. to withholdsuch sum as may be necessary to repay this note from Maker's finalpaycheck and/or any other payment due Makeras a result of Maker's employment at CSK Auto, Inc. subjectto final audit and final promissory note. CP at 84.No. 68336-5-1/3 Promissory Note, Goddard promised to repay relocation expenses ifhe terminated his employment "within two years from the effective date oftransfer

.. .." ]d The relocation process apparently took several months. CSK ultimately 

### paid $360,982.10 to relocate Goddard and his family. During Goddard's relocation, CSK was in merger discussions with O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. (O'Reilly). On March 31, 2008, CSK presented Goddard with a Severance Agreement, whose purpose was to "fosterthe continuous employment of key management personnel" given a possible change ofcompany control. CP at 86. Under the agreement, Goddard would be entitled to severance benefits for six months if his employment were terminated by CSK without cause 

### orby Goddard forgood reason.2 His annual salaryat thetime was $177,000. The agreement also contained restrictive covenants, including a non-solicitation agreement. On May 16, CSK presented Goddard with a LetterAgreement 

### assuring him he would continue to receive relocation benefits notwithstanding any change incompany control. The LetterAgreement stated that "fromand after the consummation ofthe Change in Control and untilthe completion ofyour 

### permanent relocation," CSK would reimburse relocation expenses on terms, in any event, no less favorable than the Relocation Policy. CSK was acquired by O'Reilly on July 11 and became its subsidiary.



### 2Severance benefits included accrued vacation and basesalarycontinuation in accordance with normal payrollpractices for six months after termination, with continuation of benefits.No. 68336-5-1/4 

### InAugust 2008, Goddard participated in a meeting withother regional vice presidents. Atthe meeting, O'Reilly's management acknowledged the Severance Agreement and gave the regional vice presidents the option to resign and be compensated under that agreement. Ted Wise, O'Reilly's co-president, then 

### offered Goddard a regional manager position, with a starting pay of$145,000. Wise informed Goddard that if he stayed, he would have to sign a Voluntary Rescission of Severance Agreement ("Rescission Agreement"). CP at 59. Goddard accepted the position, as reflected in an Offer of Employment signed on 

### August25, 2008, andsigned the Rescission Agreement.3 Underthe Rescission Agreement, CSK agreed, in consideration for Goddard's continued employment after the merger, to accelerate the payment of the severance benefits described in the Severance Agreement despite the fact that his employment would continue. Goddard would receive the payment on July 1, 2009 only ifhe was employed on that date or, if not employed, had not voluntarily resigned. The Rescission Agreement generally rescinded the Severance Agreement but retained the latter's restrictive covenants. Italso contained release provisions: Section 5(b) ("release provision") released Goddard and Section 5(a) released CSK. CSK remitted to Goddard the payment described inthe Rescission 

### Agreement several weeks early, on June 12,2009.4 Goddard voluntarily resigned
3Goddard believes he signedtheRescission Agreementaround the sametime he signed the Offer of Employment inAugust 2008. 4Thepaymentamounted to$88,500.
4No. 68336-5-1/5

on July 2 and began working as a regional managerfor AutoZone, CSK's competitor, on July 6. On July 8, Jack Morefield, director of human resources/payroll for CSK, informed Goddard by letter: On February 15, 2008 you signed an Interim Promissory Note for the estimated relocation expenses related to your move to the Seattle area. .. . Due to your voluntary resignation before completing 2 years of employment after the effective date of your transfer, the note is now due and payable. CP at 111. CSK offset most of Goddard's final paycheck underthe terms ofthe Promissory Note, paying him $615.60 in salary to comply with minimum wage 

### obligations.5 Overthe next few months, three district managers left CSK to work for AutoZone. Goddard was involved in recruiting them. CSK employee Derek Reid met with Goddard. CSK offered Reid a $5,000 annual salary increase and persuaded him to stay. On August 28, 2009, Goddard filed a complaint against CSK, seeking 

### recovery oftheamounts itdeducted from his final paycheck.6 CSK counterclaimed, seeking recovery of additional relocation expenses and an

5Butforthe offset, Goddardwould have been paid the gross amount of$28,976.98 (including salary and accrued vacation pay). 6Heasserted claims for (1) failure to paywages; (2) breach ofcontractand breach of promise ofspecific treatment; (3) willful withholding ofwages subjectto double damages under RCW 49.52.070; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) attorney's fees under RCW 49.48.030.No. 68336-5-1/6 

### injunction related to therestrictive covenants.7 Theparties agreed to an injunction regarding further breaches ofthe restrictive covenants. They conducted discovery and filed motions for partial summaryjudgment on July 22, 

### 2011.8 Goddard's main argument as towhy he was notobligated torepay any relocation expenses was that the release provision inthe Rescission Agreement released him from any obligations under the Promissory Note. The trial court entered an order ruling that the release provision covered only matters that occurred before the signing ofthe Rescission Agreement and that Goddard's obligation to repay relocation expenses did not occur until afterward. Italso ruled that the Rescission Agreement excluded employment matters, including the parties' agreement regarding relocation expenses. Goddard moved for reconsideration. The court then entered an order (1) granting 

### CSK's motion for summaryjudgment on its counterclaim for breach ofthe Promissory Note and denying Goddard's motion for reconsideration on that issue 

### and (2) denying CSK's motion for summaryjudgmenton its counterclaim for breach of the non-solicitation agreement. On November 2, 2011, the trial court entered a final summaryjudgment 

### order. Itgenerally affirmed its prior rulings but also ruled thatthe Letter

7Itscounterclaims were for (1) breach of the Promissory Note and/orRelocation Policy; (2) breach ofrestrictive covenants under the SeveranceAgreement and Rescission Agreement; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) attorney's fees under the Promissory Note. 8Goddard moved forpartial summaryjudgmentonliability and soughtdismissal ofCSK's counterclaims for breach of the Promissory Note and/or Relocation Policy and unjust enrichment. CSK moved for dismissal of all of Goddard's claims and summaryjudgmenton liabilityas to its counterclaims for relocation expenses, unjust enrichment, and breach of the non-solicitation agreement. 6No. 68336-5-1/7 

### Agreement precluded CSK from recovering expenses paid afterthe merger. It dismissed the parties' claims for unjust enrichment. The parties reached a 

### stipulation on the amount ofrelocation-related damages ($181,166.64) CSK could recover under the November 2 order. CSK moved for attorney's fees, citing 

### a provision inthe Promissory Note. The trial court awarded attorney's fees to CSK inthe amount of$76,060 and entered a total judgment of$257,226.64. 

### Goddard appeals and CSKcrossappeals.9
DISCUSSION 

### The issues before us are (1) whetherthe release provision released 

### Goddard from his obligations under the Promissory Note; (2)whether CSK was entitled to relocation expenses paid afterthe merger; (3) whether CSK's counterclaim for breach ofthe non-solicitation agreement was properly 

### dismissed; and (4) whether the award of attorney's fees to CSK was reasonable. We review de novo a trialcourt's summaryjudgmentorder, engaging in 

### the same inquiry as the trial court. Jones v. AllstateIns. Co., 146 Wn.2d291, 300, 45 P.3d 1068 (2002). Summaryjudgment is appropriate when there is no 

### genuine issue ofmaterial fact and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. CR 56(c). We consider the facts and allreasonable inferences in
9Goddard does notappeal thedismissal ofhis unjustenrichmentclaim.CSKcross appeals thetrial court'sdenial ofsummaryjudgmenton itscounterclaims for breach ofthenon solicitation agreement and unjustenrichment. Partiesgenerally may not appeal a denial of a motion forsummaryjudgment. Tapps Brewing. Inc. v. City of Sumner, 106Wn. App. 79, 82, 22 P.3d 280(2001)) (citations omitted). However, the parties agree that thetrial court's orders had the effect ofdismissing CSK'scounterclaims, and Goddard does not argue that CSK may not cross appeal these issues. Therefore, we treat them as properly before us. See also RAP 2.2(a)(3) ("fa]ny written decision affecting a substantial right in acivil case thatin effect determines the action and
... discontinues the action" may be appealed).No. 68336-5-1/8 the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party. Right-Price Recreation. LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmtv. Council. 146 Wn.2d 370, 381, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). Effect of Release Provision on Goddard's Reimbursement Obligations 

### The parties agree that Missouri law governs the interpretation ofthe 

### release provision underthe Rescission Agreement's choice-of-law provision. CP 550. Under Missouri law, the interpretation ofrelease agreements is governed by 

### the same principles used in interpreting any contract. Liouidation of Professional Medical Ins. Co. v. Lakin, 88 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Mo. App. 2002). 

### The cardinal rule inthe interpretation of a contract is to ascertain 

### the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention. If there is no ambiguity, then the intention ofthe parties should be determined from the contract alone. A contract is ambiguous only 

### if itsterms are susceptible to more than one meaning so that 

### reasonable persons may fairly and honestly differ in their construction ofthe terms. Ifthere is no ambiguity, then the court need not resort to construction of the contract, and instead intent is determined from the four corners ofthe contract. 

### jd. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

### "Ageneral release uses language such as 'from any and all claims,
causes of action orliability of any sort whatsoever!,] 'from any and all liability,' 'of whatever name or nature,' and 'any other matterwhatsoever involving my 

### relationship with [theentity].'" Anderson v. Curators ofUniversitv ofMissouri, 103 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Mo. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

### Itdisposes of the entire subject matterinvolved. \± at 398-99; Goldring v. Franklin Eguitv Leasing Co., 195 S.W.3d 453, 456-57 (Mo. App. 2006). A 

### "general release which is notrestricted by its terms toparticularclaims or

8No. 68336-5-1/9 demands will ordinarily be regarded as embracing all claims or demands which had matured at the time of its execution." Daniels v. Tip Top Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Mo. App. 1966) (quoting Williams v. Riley, 243 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Mo. App. 1951)) (emphasis added). The release provision in this case states: The Company hereby agrees not to pursue or further any action, cause of action, right, suit, debt, compensation, expense, liability, contract, controversy, agreement, promise, damagejudgment, demand or claim whatsoever at law or in equity whether known or unknown which the Company ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon or by any reason ofany matter, cause 

### or thing (collectively "Company Claims") whatsoever occurring up to and including the date Executive signs this Rescission Agreement 

### against Executive and hereby releases, acquits, and forever absolutely discharges Executive ofand from all ofthe foregoing, exceptwith respectto the obligations ofExecutive setforth in this Rescission Agreement. CP at 549. 

### Goddard argues that the plain language ofthe release provision released him from all debts, expenses, obligations, and contracts that CSK had as ofthe date the Rescission Agreementwas executed, which included the Promissory Note and the Relocation Policy as referenced inthe LetterAgreement. CSK 

### argues that the release provision did not cover non-matured claims and that CSK's claim for reimbursement underthe Promissory Note and the Relocation 

### Policy did not occur untilGoddard resigned. We agree with CSK. The release provision contains broad language, likethat of a general release. However, it did not release Goddard from his duty to repay underthe 

### terms ofthe Promissory Note because the duty—and CSK's claims undertheNo. 68336-5-1/10 note—did not mature until after the Rescission Agreement was signed. The release provision applied to all actions, debts, etc. which CSK had or could have for any "matter, cause or thing .
.. whatsoever occurring up to and including the date" Goddard signed the Rescission Agreement. CSK's claims underthe Promissory Note had not matured when the Rescission Agreement was executed; the basis for its claims did not exist until July 2, 2009, the day Goddard resigned. Goddard does not argue that his duties under the Promissory Note 

### matured before the signing ofthe Rescission Agreement. Instead, he contends that a non-matured duty can be subjectto the terms of a release, citing 

### RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTS §284, CMT. (a) (1981)10 in support. But comment (a) distinguishes between a release and a promise to discharge a duty inthe future: "A purported release of a duty that is revived on the occurrence of a condition is not a release but a contract not to sue." The release provision did not 

### make a promise not to sue for non-matured claims, but ratherwas limited to
10 Comment (a)(1981) provides, in pertinent part:
a. Nature ofrelease. Although no particularform is required for an agreement to discharge a duty, the term "release" has traditionally been reserved for a formal written statementby an obligee that the obligor's duty is discharged. That usage is preserved in this Section. No special words are required and the writing may state, for example, that itreleases the obligor, that itreleases the obligor's duties or that itreleases the obligee's rights. It must, however, take effect immediately or on the occurrence of a condition. A promise to discharge in the future an existing duty merely creates a new duty that can itself be discharged by the parties. Such a promise is not a release. The duty that is released need not be matured. A purported release ofa duty that does not vet exist, however, is not a release but a promise to discharge a duty in the future. See Illustration 3. A purported release ofa duty that is revived on the occurrence ofa condition is not a release but a contract not to sue. (Emphasis Goddard's). 10No. 68336-5-1/11 things "occurring up to and including the date ofthe Rescission Agreement. CSK did not make a promise to discharge, inthe future, a duty that did not yet exist, or promise not to sue for non-matured claims. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Goddard's claims seeking the amounts offsetfrom his final paycheck and properly granted partial summary 

### judgmenttoCSKfor relocation costs the company paid beforethemerger.11 Relocation Expenses after Merger CSK contends the trial court erred in ruling that CSK was not entitled to 

### relocation expenses it paid afterthemerger.12 Itcontends the LetterAgreement did not preclude it from recovering expenses paid afterthe merger and that it was, in any event, entitled to recoverthose expenses underthe Relocation Policy

or under an unjust enrichment theory. I. Effect of Letter Agreement The LetterAgreement provides, in pertinent part: 

### The Company agrees that if, prior to completion ofyour permanent relocation to the Seattle, Washington area, the Company enters into an agreementthat, ifconsummated, would result in a Change in Control.
. . then from and afterthe consummation ofthe Change in Control and untilthe completion of your permanent relocation to the Seattle, Washington area (including the purchase of a new home inthe Seattle, Washington
11 Becausethe releaseprovision did notreleaseGoddard from his obligations underthe Promissory Note, his claims forexemplary damages and attorney's fees forwillful withholding under RCW 49.52.050 and RCW 49.52.070 were also properly dismissed. The Promissory Note permitted CSK to withhold amounts from his final paycheck. As for the trial court's ruling that the the Rescission Agreement excluded employment matters, including the parties' agreement regarding relocation expenses, we do not reach it given the basis for our decision. 12 CSKseeks the additional principal amount of$191,084, plusinterest. 11No. 68336-5-1/12 area), the company (and any successorthereto) will continue to reimburse you for relocation, home sale and purchase, and temporary living expenses (including the temporary housing currently provided to you) on terms no less favorable than those provided to you priorto the consummation ofthe Change in Control, and in any event, no less favorable than the CSKAuto, Inc. Relocation Policy as in effect and applicable to you prior to the Change in Control. CP at 598. The LetterAgreement informed Goddard that "from and afterthe consummation ofthe Change in Control and untilthe completion ofyour permanent relocation," CSK would reimburse relocation expenses on terms, in 

### any event, no less favorable than the Relocation Policy. The Relocation Policy provides that "[i]fa relocated associate voluntarily terminates his/heremployment withintwelve (12) calendar months followingthe acceptance of a relocation, he/she will be required to refund all or part ofthe monies extended to him/her by 

### the company or its agents." CP at 581. The Promissory Note, on the other hand, required Goddard to repay relocation expenses if he resigned within two years from the effective date oftransfer. The former term is more favorable to Goddard 

### than the latter, so the Relocation Policy term governs the repayment ofexpenses 

### paid afterthe merger. And underthe Relocation Policy, Goddard's repayment 

### obligations expired bythe time he resigned on July 2, 2009; his termination was

more than 12 months after the effective date of his transfer, January 28, 2008. 

### CSK argues thatthe intent ofthe LetterAgreement was to simply maintain the status quo and ensure that CSK did not impose less favorable relocation 

### terms after the merger. Butwhether itwas CSK's subjective intent to maintain the

12No. 68336-5-1/13 status quo, the LetterAgreement makes no reference to the Promissory Note and its language is plain. Itstates that "in any event" Goddard would, afterthe merger, be reimbursed on terms no less favorable than those contained in the Relocation Policy. We focus on the parties' objective manifestations of intent ratherthan their unexpressed subjective intent. Hearst Communications, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.. 154 Wn.2d 493, 503-04, 115 P.3d 262 (2005). The trial court properly applied the LetterAgreement. II. Relocation Policy CSK also argues that itwas permitted underthe Relocation Policy to
recover certain expenses (those paid in the 12 months prior to termination), independent ofthe Promissory Note. CSK does not contest Goddard's assertion that the date of his "acceptance of a relocation" was January 28, 2008. Instead, it relies on the provision in the Relocation Policy that states, "[i]n all cases where there is a question of interpretation of policy, the decision of [the] Relocation Services SeniorTravel Manager shall prevail." CP at 581. Itcontends the only declarant with knowledge ofthe meaning ofthe policy language is Jack Morefield, who explained that the language creates a rolling 12-month obligation period requiring Goddard to repay relocation payments accepted by him or made by CSK on his behalfinthe 12-month period prior to termination. But the Relocation Policy language is unambiguous. There is no debatable question, and

we need not give effectto Morefield's interpretation.

13No. 68336-5-1/14
III. Unjust enrichment CSK contends, in the alternative, that itwas entitled to recover relocation expenses paid afterthe merger under an unjust enrichmenttheory. We disagree. "Unjust enrichment is the method of recovery for the value ofthe benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions offairness andjustice 

### require it."13 Young v. Young. 164Wn.2d 477, 484, 191 P.3d 1258(2008) (emphasis added). Unjust enrichment does not apply where there is a valid contract governing the rights and obligations ofthe parties. Here, there were specific agreements (the Promissory Note and Relocation Policy) governing the extent to which CSK could recover relocation expenses. CSK's Counterclaim for Breach of Non-Compete Agreement 

### CSK cross appeals the trial court's dismissal of its counterclaim for breach ofthe non-solicitation agreement. Goddard does not dispute that he solicited Reid afterjoining AutoZone. He only argues that the agreement did not apply at the time he solicited Reid and that CSK did not suffer damages. Section 5 ofthe Severance Agreement, incorporated into the Rescission Agreement, provides: 

### 5.2 Agreement Not to Compete/Non-Solicitation 

### (a) While employed bythe Company and during the Severance Period followingthe Executive's termination ofemployment under circumstances entitling the Executive to the Standard Severance Benefits (the "Non-Compete Period"), the Executive shall not 

### 13 Unjustenrichmentis anequitable remedy sounding in quasi-contract, andits elements are: (1) the defendant receives a benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the plaintiffs expense, and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment. Young. 164 Wn.2d at 484-85. 14No. 68336-5-1/15 become engaged in a managerial or executive capacity for, or consultantto, Auto Zone, Inc., The Pep Boys - Manny, Moe &Jack, O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., Advance Stores Company, Incorporated, or DiscountAuto Parts, lnc.[;] (b) During the Non-Compete Period, the Executive shall not, directly or indirectly, hire or attempt to hire any employee ofthe Company. CP at 90. CSK argues that this court must square the Rescission Agreement's retention of Section 5 ofthe Severance Agreement with the Rescission Agreement's contemplation of paying Goddard a pre-termination, lump-sum payment, and thus read into Section 5.2(a) a post-termination non-compete period of six months (following the date he was paid the "severance" benefits on June 12, 2009). Itnotes the "Severance Period" had been defined in paragraph 2.2(b) ofthe Severance Agreement as "the longer of (i) six months or (ii) one week for every fullyear [Goddard] was employed by the Company and its Affiliates prior to the date [Goddard's] employment was terminated," and that Goddard's severance period was six months. CP at 88. We conclude the non-solicitation agreement was not ineffectwhen Goddard solicited Reid. The plain language of Section 5.2(a) states that the 

### restriction applied "during the Severance Period following [his] termination of employment under circumstances entitling [him] to the Standard Severance Benefits." CP 90. When Goddard resigned in July 2009, he was not entitled to
severance benefits. Thus, there was no post-termination non-compete period 

### during which Goddard was prohibited from soliciting CSK employees. The plain language controls. 15No. 68336-5-1/16 Award ofAttorney's Fees to CSK Below The reasonableness ofan attorney fee award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gander v. Yeager, 167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282 P.3d 1100 (2012). 

### The party challenging the award bears the burden ofdemonstrating thatthe 

### award was clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable. In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 563, 918 P.2d 954 (1996) (internal citation omitted). Goddard contends the amount ofthe trial court's award of attorney's fees 

### toCSK ($76,060)14 was unreasonable. Specifically, he contends thecourt awarded fees for duplicative work with respect to his deposition, the summary 

### judgment hearing, and the mediation. First, he points out that Ronald Pollybilled 13.2 hours to prepare for and take his deposition while Matthew Boyd billed 14.3 

### hours to prepare for it. He suggests that both billed for attending the deposition. CSK responds thatthere was no duplication in the tasks to prepare for the deposition and correctly notes that only Pollybilled to attend it. While it is 

### impossible to verify whetherthere was duplication in the tasks (the timeentries
are not specific), we agree with CSK because Goddard does not argue that the total time billed for the mediation was unreasonable. Next, Goddard contends itwas duplicative for Boyd and Polly to prepare 

### for and attend the summaryjudgment hearing (18 and 6.9 hours, respectively). 

### CSKresponds that given the critical nature of a summaryjudgmenthearing and the multiple claims, itwas reasonable that two attorneys prepared forit. We

14 The trial court arrived at this amount after discounting entries forone attorney by 16.3 hours. 16No. 68336-5-1/17 agree with CSK; Goddard does not show that the total amount oftime spent was excessive. Goddard contends time spent on mediation was excessive, noting that Boyd billed 2.3 hours to draft the mediation statement, 12 hours to prepare (including travel), 6 hours to attend, and 9 hours to return. Polly billed 3.4 hours to prepare and assistwith mediation. Incontrast, he notes, his counsel spent a total of 5.5 hours related to mediation. Goddard argues that CSK's attorneys spent more time than his did, thus they were unreasonable. But he does not show that any time entries of CSK's attorneys were unreasonable. Finally, Goddard takes issue with CSK's retention of Georgia counsel, 

### Polly and Boyd, which required retention of local counsel. He cites no authority to show that a party may not requestfees for out-of-state and local counsel. He points out that local counsel billed 1.2 hours for consultation on court rules governing a witness deadline while Boyd billed4.3 hours the same day for 

### revising the witness listand conferring with local counsel. He points out that CSK sought billing for Georgia counsel to become admitted pro hac vice. But he does
not show that these were unreasonable items for which to bill. Attorney's Fees on Appeal 

### Both parties request attorney's fees on appeal under RAP 18.1. Goddard 

### cites RCW49.52.07015 and equitableprinciples. CSK cites the Promissory Note

15 RCW49.52.070 provides that theemployershall beliable for aviolation ofRCW 49.52.050 for amounts to include "costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney's fees." 17No. 68336-5-1/18 and equitable principles. Because neither party prevails on appeal, we do not award fees. Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: 

### sY)<J^> 

# MS. 

# Lii 'QjA^Oi t^

18