# I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E E L E V E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

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O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant of possession of more than one g ram but less than four g rams of

methamphetamine in a

drug -fr ee zone and, beca use of two e nhance ment alleg ations and the drug

fre e-zone alleg ation, assessed a sentenc e of seventy -five y ear s in prison. Appellant appea led to the 1

U n d e r t h e C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s A c t

, a p e r s o n c o m m i t s a t h i r d

- d e g r e e f e l o n y i f t h e p e r s o n k n o w i n g l y o r 1

i n t e n t i o n a l l y p o s s e s s e s m o r e t h a n o n e g r a m b u t l e s s t h a n f o u r g r a m s o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e l i s t e d i n P e n a l t y G r o u p

1 ( i n c l u d i n g m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e )

. T E X

. H E A L T H & S A F E T Y C O D E A N N

. § 4 8 1

. 1 1 5 ( a )

, ( c ) ; i d

. § 4 8 1

. 1 0 2 ( 6 )

. I f a p e r s o n

c o m m i t s t h i s o f

f e n s e “ i n

, o n

, o r w i t h i n 1

, 0 0 0 f e e t o f t h e p r e m i s e s o f

. . . a p l a y g r o u n d

. . . , ” t h e m i n i m u m

c o n f i n e m e n t o r i m p r i s o n m e n t i s i n c r e a s e d b y f i v e y e a r s

, a n d t h e m a x i m u m c o n f i n e m e n t i s d o u b l e d

. I

d

. §

4 8 1

. 1 3 4 ( b )

, ( c )

. T h e a r e a i n w h i c h a p p e l l a n t w a s a r r e s t e d i n S t e v e n s o n P a r k i s w i t h i n 1

, 0 0 0 f e e t o f a p l a y g r o u n d

.

## 2

Eleventh Court of Appea ls, contending that the trial court committed reve rsible err or when it denied

his motion to make an i n d ep en dent examination of the alleg ed methamphetamine. The court of

appea ls overr

uled this issue. Ehrke v. State

, No. 11-11-00248- CR, 2013 Tex. App. L EXI S 12294,

at **10, 12 (T ex

. Ap p .–Eastland S ept. 30, 2013) (mem. op., not desig nated for publ ication). This

Court gr anted a

ppellant’s petition for discr etionary revie w. We reve rse a

nd rema nd.

I. F acts

Appellant was seen rummag ing throug h a trash can. As the office r approa ched, he noticed

that, despite the cold J anuar y tempera tures, appe llant was we t. He wa s also restless and talkative,

had tr o u b l e standing

, smelled of alcohol, and appea red to be under the influence of a drug

. The 2



## office r determined t hat he had probable cause to arrest appe llant for publi c int ox ication and, once

his backup arr ived, they attempted to restra in appellant. During the strug g le, appellant discarde d a

crumpled cig are tte pack that he had clenc hed in his hand. The office rs subdued appellant, retrie ved

the cig are tte pack, a

nd found what appea

red to be methamphetamine inside. The substanc e found

[ S T A T E ] : O f

f i c e r C o l l i n s

, h a v e y o u h a d a n y s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g t o w a t c h f

o r p e o p l e t h a t w e r e o n 2

m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e s ?

[ O F F I C E R ] : Y e s

, I h a v e

. [ S T A T E ] : A n d d u r i n g t h a t t i m e y o u ’ v e b e e n o n t h e s t r e e t

, h a v e y o u e n c o u n t e r e d o t h e r p e o p l e t h a t h a v e

b e e n o n m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e s ?

[ O F F I C E R ] : Y e s

. [ S T A T E ] : A n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y h o w m a n y t i m e s h a v e y o u e n c o u n t e r e d p e o p l e t h a t h a v e b e e n o n

m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e ?

[ O F F I C E R ] : O n c e a w e e k w o r k i n g i n t h a t a r e a

. [ S T A T E ] : A n d w a s p a r t o f y o u r b e l i e f a b o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t

– d i d t h a t g o i n t o y o u r d e v e l o p m e n t o f w h a t y o u

b e l i e v e d w a s y o u r a b i l i t y a n d a u t h o r i t y t o a r r e s t t h e D e f e n d a n t ?

[ O F F I C E R ] : Y e s

, I b e l i e v e h e s h o w e d s i g n s a n d s y m p t o m s o f b e i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f d r u g s a n d

a l c o h o l

.

. . .

[ S T A T E ] : N o w

, y o u w e r e s a y i n g t h a t y o u t h o u g h t t h a t

– w h a t w e r e y o u s a y i n g a b o u t y o u r b e l i e f a s f a r a s

t h e D e f e n d a n t a n d m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e s w e r e c o n c e r n e d ?

[ O F F I C E R ] : O k a y

. M e t h a m p h e t a m i n e a l s o c r e a t e s a r e a c t i o n c a l l e d h y p e r t h e r m i a

, w h i c h i t r a i s e s y o u r

b o d y t e m p e r a t u r e t o d a n g e r o u s l e v e l s

, a n d o n t h e s t r e e t t h e y c a l l i t “ b u r n i n g u p

, ” a n d t h e y ’ l l d o w h a t e v e r t h e y c a n t o

c o o l t h e m s e l v e s d o w n

, i n t h i s i n s t a n c e m a y b e j u m p i n g i n t o a c r e e k a t S t e v e n s o n P a r k

. I I I R R 1 9 1

- 9 4

.

## 3

in the cig are tte pack was tested by the Texas Depa rtment of Public Safety (DPS) labora tory in

Abilene. The labora tory manag er, who was a fiftee n-y ear employ ee of the labora tory

, tested the

substance a

nd deter mined that the substance was 1.6 g rams of me thamphetamine.

On J une 16, 2014, the trial court g rante d appellant’ s motion to adopt all motions and rela ted

o rd er s fi l ed in the previous cause number. Supp. CR 8. Wit h this order

, the court adopted

appellant’ s ear lier Motion to I nspect, Ex amine, and Test Phy s i ca l E v i d ence, in which appellant

reque sted that the 1.6 g rams of the substance al l ege d to contain methamphetamine be tested to

deter mine weig ht and composition. Id

. at 52-53. The trial court denied the motion, finding that “the

d efendant has not shown a particularized need for independent scientific testing, or that the result

of a scientific test would chang e based on who perf ormed the test, or that an independ en t ex pert

would be a signific ant fac tor at trial.” Id

. at 80. The court noted, howeve r, that it was “re quired to

allow def endant’ s counsel to inspect a nd examine any

alleg ed contr olled substance.” Id

.

On Februa

ry 14, 2011, at a pretria l hear ing, appellant’s counsel ag ai n ra ised his motion to

inspect and arg ued that the weig ht of 1.6 g rams was close enoug h to .99 g rams, the threshold for a

lower punishment, to justify independe nt testing. I I RR 22. Th e s t at e arg ued that appellant was

require d to articula te a particula rized need a

nd that he had f

ailed to do s o. Id

. On J uly 21, 2011, 3

“ [ D E F E N S E C O U N S E L ] : W e l l

, I ’ d l i k e t o h a v e t h a t e x a m i n e d a s t o w e i g h t a n d a s t o c o n t e n t o f t h e 3

a l l e g e d s u b s t a n c e t h a t ’ s t h e r e

. I t h i n k w e h a v e a n i n d e p e n d e n t

– S o u t h w e s t e r n I n s t i t u t e o f F o r e n s i c s i s o u r

u n d e r s t a n d i n g

– w e ’ v e u s e d t h e m b e f o r e f o r t h e D e f

e n s e

, a n d t h e S t a t e h a d n o p r o b l e m w i t h i t

. S o w e ’ d a s k t h a t w e

b e a l l o w e d t o d o t h a t

.

. . .

[ S T A T E ] : Y o u r H o n o r

, I t h i n k t h e y h a v e t o a r t i c u l a t e a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d n e e d

. I d o n ’ t t h i n k i t ’ s a n a b s o l u t e r i g h t t o

h a v e a s e c o n d a r y i n s p e c t i o n

. I t h i n k t h e r e ’ s b e e n s o m e c a s e s r e c e n t l y t h a t c a m e o u t a n d s a i d t h a t

. A n d s i n c e t h e r e ’ s

n o t h i n g i n t h e m o t i o n t h a t s h o w s a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d n e e d o r a n y t h i n g t h a t c a s t s d o u b t o n t h e l a b t h a t ’ s b e e n p r o v i d e d

,

t h a t w e w o u l d o p p o s e t h a t

.

. . .

[ D E F E N S E C O U N S E L ] : W e l l

, w e j u s t s a y t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

, a n d

## 4

appellant’ s counsel stated on the rec ord th at t h e court had overr uled the motion to inspect, asked

o nce ag ain that the trial court rec onsider the motion, and offe red to pay the cost h i m s el f o r h av e

appellant’ s family pay

. Supp. RR 12-13. Be fore trial beg an on Aug ust 1, 2011, appellant’ s counsel

stated on the re cord tha t his mot ion to reconsider was de nied. I I I RR 6.

At trial, a DPS chemist testified that, to identify the s ubstance

, he first did a color test. I V

RR 64. After the c olor test, he used infr are d spectrosc opy to confirm the orig inal finding

. Id . To

deter mine the weig ht of the substance, he weig hed a small plastic bag

, then weig hed the small plastic

bag with the substance in it, then subtracte d the weig ht of the small plastic bag from the total weig ht.

Id

. Hi s final deter

minations wer e that the substance weig hed 1.6 g rams and contained

methamphetamine. Supp. CR 54.

II. Court of App eals’s De cision

The court of appea ls held that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’ s “re quest

to appoint an expert to make an independe nt examination of the substance discovere d in the cig are tte

pack.” Ehrke v. St at e

, 2 0 1 3 T ex

. App. L EXI S 12294, at **10, 12. An i ndige nt defe ndant has a 4



## rig ht to a state-pr ovided expert witness only when the defe ndant has “made a preliminary threshold

showing with fac ts or evidenc e that the e x pert’s te stimony will likely

be a significa

nt fac tor in his

defe nse or the State’s prosec ution.” Id. at *11. Beca use appellant did not provide information

showing a particula

rized need for appointment of a chemist or how an independe nt chemist would

l o o k i n g a t t h e a m o u n t o f w e i g h t

, t h e c l o s e n e s s t o w h a t t h e w e i g h t a n d

– r i g h t n o w t h e r e ’ s n o t h i n g b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o f

w h a t h a s b e e n d o n e a s f a r a s t e s t i n g

, s o w e ’ d r e q u e s t i t

. ” I I R R 2 1

- 2 2

.

W h i l e t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s h o l d i n g i s c o r r e c t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a n e x p e r t t o r e t e s t t h e 4

s u b s t a n c e

, i t d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e f i r s t i s s u e o f w h e t h e r a p p e l l a n t h a d t h e r i g h t t o “ i n s p e c t ” t h e s u b s t a n c e w i t h o u t “ a

p r e l i m i n a r y t h r e s h o l d s h o w i n g w i t h f a c t s o r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e e x p e r t ’ s t e s t i m o n y w i l l l i k e l y b e a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n

h i s d e f e n s e o r t h e S t a t e ’ s p r o s e c u t i o n

. ” E h r k e v

. S t a t e

, N o

. 1 1

- 1 1

- 0 0 2 4 8

- C R

, 2 0 1 3 T e x

. A p p

. L E X I S 1 2 2 9 4

, a t

* * 1 0

- 1 2 ( T e x

. A p p

. – E a s t l a n d

, S e p t

. 3 0

, 2 0 1 3 ) ( m e m

. o p

. , n o t d e s i g n a t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n )

.

## 5

arr ive at a materia lly differ ent result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ref using to appoint

a che mist. Id. at *12.

III. Gr ound s for Review

We g rante d one of appellant’ s g rounds for revie w. T h at ground asser ts that the court of

appea ls err ed in finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing appellant’ s motion

to inspect the alleg ed methamphe tamine. That g round comprise s two issues: 5



## (1) whether a defe ndant ch ar ged wi th possession of a controlled substance has a rig ht to

inspection of the c ontrolled substance by an indepe ndent expert and,

(2) whether the s t at e is require d to pay for an indige nt defe ndant’s inspection of the

controlled substanc e by

an indepe ndent expert.

We hold that, while the trial court is require d to permit a defe ndant in a controlled-substanc e

case to have an indepe ndent expert ana ly ze the controlled substanc e, the tria l court is not require d

to appoint such an expert for an indige nt defe ndant, absent a preliminary showing of a signi fica nt

issue of fa ct.

IV. Analysis

Sub-issue I

—Right to I ndepende nt Testing

Under the applicable 2009 version of Texas Code of C riminal Procedur e Article 39.14(a)

,

“[u] pon motion of the defe ndant showing g ood cause there for and upon notice to the othe r par ties

. . . the court in w hich an action is pe nding shall order the State befor e or dur ing tr ial of a c riminal

action there in pending or on trial to produce and permit the inspection

. . . [of] evidenc e materia l to

A s w o r d e d i n a p p e l l a n t ’ s p r o s e p e t i t i o n

, t h e i s s u e i s w h e t h e r “ [ t ] h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t 5

t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e [ i t s ] d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g p e t i t i o n e r ’ s m o t i o n f o r i n d e p e n d e n t c h e m i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e

c o n t r a b a n d w h i c h w a s t h e l y n c h p i n o f t h e s t a t e ’ s c a s e

. T h e r e b y d e n y i n g p e t i t i o n e r o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o b o t h

a f a i r t r i a l a n d e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l

. ”

## 6

any matter involved in the action and which are in the possession, custody or control of the State or

any of its ag encie s.” The burden is on the defe ndant to show g ood cause befor e a court must issue

an order for production and inspection. Massey v. State

, 933 S.W .2d 141, 153 (Tex. Crim

. Ap p

.

1996). Howeve r, if the evidenc e soug ht is “mater ial to the Def ense of the acc used,” the trial court

is require d to permit inspection. Quinones v. State

, 592 S.W .2d 933, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

Evidence is materia l if its omission w ould c rea te “a rea sonable doubt tha t did not othe rwise exis t

.

. ..” United States v. Agurs

, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). The rig ht to inspect the alleg ed controlled

substance is a

bsolute–it requires no f

urther show ing be y ond an initial timely reque st. 6



## This Court’s decisions addre ssing this issue make it clea r that, if a defe ndant in a controlledsubstance case asks to inspect the alleg ed controlled substance, the cou rt m u s t p ermit inspection,

even without a showing o f go o d cause

, beca use the substance is materia l to the defe nse of the

acc used. See McBride v . State

, 838 S.W .2d 248, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (def endant charg ed

with possession of coca ine had rig ht to i n d ep endent inspection of coca ine); Terrell v. State

, 521

S.W .2d 618, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (trial court’s failure to g rant defe ndant ’s motion for

discovery seeking independe nt chemica l analy sis of alleg ed controlled substance was reve rsible

err or); Detme ring v. State

, 481 S.W .2d 863, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (trial court reve rsibly err ed

by not permitting defe ndant in L SD-possession case to perfor m a che mical ana ly sis of the L SD).

Evidence is indispensable when its “exclusion from evidenc e would [] aff ect the essential proof that

appellant committed an offe nse.” Quinones

, 592 S.W .2d at 943. The McBride court rea soned that

the evidenc e of the drug itself is indispensable to the state; excluding the controlled substance would

S e e T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. a r t

. 2 8

. 0 1

, § 2 ( “ W h e n a c r i m i n a l c a s e i s s e t f o r s u c h p r e

- t r i a l h e a r i n g

, a n y 6

s u c h p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s n o t r a i s e d o r f i l e d s e v e n d a y s b e f

o r e t h e h e a r i n g w i l l n o t t h e r e a f t e r b e a l l o w e d t o b e r a i s e d

o r f i l e d

, e x c e p t b y p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e c o u r t f o r g o o d c a u s e s h o w n ; p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l h a v e s u f

f i c i e n t

n o t i c e o f s u c h h e a r i n g t o a l l o w h i m n o t l e s s t h a n 1 0 d a y s i n w h i c h t o r a i s e o r f i l e s u c h p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s

. ” )

.

## 7

aff ect the essential proof that a defe ndant posses s ed a co n t rolled substance—it is “nec essar ily

m at er i al t o t h e defe nse of the acc used.” 838 S.W .2d at 251. There fore

, in a case that alleg es

possession of a controlled substanc e, a tr ial court must permit inspection of the a lleg ed contr olled

substance, a

nd a trial c ourt that fails to do so has committed reve rsible er ror. Id.

McB ride was found unconscious with coca ine in his pocket, and he asser ted that the person

who had beate n and robbed him left the coca ine to avoid prosec ution for the robber y

. Id. at 251 n.7.

He arg ued that, if a chemica l a naly sis showe d a low conce ntration of coca ine, it would support his

defe nsive theory that he did not have the requisite mens rea for possession beca use the coca ine was

planted. Id. The broad lang uag e in McBride also sug g ests that the rig ht was intended to be

7



## absolute, with no further inquiry into g ood cause

. See id. at 251 (“B ased on these holdings, we find

that a criminal defe ndant has a right t o inspect evidence indispensable t o t h e S tate’s case beca use

that evidenc e is nec essar ily materia l to the defe nse of the a ccuse d.”). 8



## Finally

, the only case s that rely on Article 39.14(a) and uphold a trial cou rt ’s denial of a

timely motion to inspect a controlled substance involve situations in which either the orig inal testing

of the substance used up the entire sample or the reque st was not timely

. See, e.g., Bell v. State

, 866

S.W .2d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (appe llant was not entitled to inspect st



## coca ine beca

use it was consumed during analy sis by police labora tory ); Scott v. State

, 825 S.W .2d

O t h e r c a s e s t h a t u p h e l d a d e f e n d a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e m a d e 7

n o f u r t h e r i n q u i r y i n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s n e e d a f

t e r t h e i n i t i a l r e q u e s t w a s m a d e

. M e n d o z a v

. S t a t e

, 5 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 3 9 6

,

3 9 8 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 7 9 ) ; D e t m e r i n g

, 4 8 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 8 6 4 ; T e r r e l l

, 5 2 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 6 1 9

.

T h e c u r r e n t v e r s i o n o f A r t i c l e 3 9

. 1 4 ( e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1

, 2 0 1 4 ) r e m o v e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a d e f e n d a n t 8

s h o w g o o d c a u s e

. S e e T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. A N N

. a r t

. 3 9

. 1 4 ( “ S u b j e c t t o t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s p r o v i d e d b y S e c t i o n

2 6 4

. 4 0 8

, F a m i l y C o d e

, a n d A r t i c l e 3 9

. 1 5 o f t h i s c o d e

, a s s o o n a s p r a c t i c a b l e a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a t i m e l y r e q u e s t f r o m t h e

d e f e n d a n t t h e s t a t e s h a l l p r o d u c e a n d p e r m i t t h e i n s p e c t i o n a n d t h e e l e c t r o n i c d u p l i c a t i o n

, c o p y i n g

, a n d

p h o t o g r a p h i n g

, b y o r o n b e h a l f o f t h e d e f e n d a n t

, o f

. . . e v i d e n c e m a t e r i a l t o a n y m a t t e r i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c t i o n a n d

t h a t a r e i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n

, c u s t o d y

, o r c o n t r o l o f t h e s t a t e o r a n y p e r s o n u n d e r c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e s t a t e

. ” )

.

## 8

521, 523-25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref ’d) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by ref using

to g rant defe ndant’s motion to inspect beca use defe ndant filed his motion only a few minutes befor e

the pre- trial hear ing)

. Once a defe ndant in a controlled-substanc e case makes a time l y re q u es t to

inspect the controlled substance, the defe ndant is entitled to have the substance inspected by his or

her own chemist. Me n d oza v. State

, 583 S.W .2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). But does

“inspec t” include “ analy

ze”? That question was a ddresse d in Detme ring

.

We are met at the outset with the quest i o n o f whether the trial court err ed in

overr uling the Appellant’s motion to “examine and inspect all drug s or potions which

are desig nated by the penal statute as dang erous drug s and which the State of Texas

intends to introduce into evidenc e in this case and which is now in the possession of

the District Attorney .” This motion was filed approximately two (2) months prior 9



## to the trial date. The trial court r esponded to such motion in part a s follows:

“I t is further specific ally order ed that a v i s ual examination only is

being order ed by

this Court.”

Appar ently the trial court g ave a literal interpre tation to the word “inspec tion” found

in Article 39.14, V.A .C.C.P

.

I n his Special Commentary on Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., our prese nt Presiding

J udg e [Onion] said that, “I f it is known that the State is pla nning to ba se its case on

a finge rprint, bul let, pistol or rifle, book or record, the defe ndant can have his own

expert examine the same under the safe g uards provided.” Although J udg e Onion did

not discuss drug s and althoug h the L eg islature did not name drug s as one of the items

which could be “examined” under the discovery stat u t e, i t is clea r that such is a

proper interpre tation of the statute. See also Wil lson's Criminal For ms, 7th Edition,

Section 2530. There for e, we interpre t the word “inspec tion” to mean more than a

visual examination of an object. Where the item on which the State bases its case is,

for example, a d rug, a visual examination would not alway s divulge any thing of

probative va lue.

I t follows that the trial court reve rsibly err ed when he later denied the Appellant' s

motion to “spec ifically instruct the Distri ct At t orney that inspection of such drug s

shall include the rig ht of the defe ndant to perf orm a chemica l analy sis on eac h varie ty

T h e i n t e r n a l f

o o t n o t e s t a t e s

, “ T h e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e d o e s n o t i n v o l v e a m o t i o n b y a n a c c u s e d 9

f o r t h e c h e m i c a l a n a l y s i s o f d r u g s m a d e b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r 's c h e m i s t

, s e e F e e h e r y v

. S t a t e

, T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. , 4 8 0

S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 9 ( 1 9 7 2 ) [ s i c ]

, w h i c h t h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t o b e t h e w o r k p r o d u c t o f t h e S t a t e

. ”

## 9

of drug s which the State intends to introduce into evidenc e in this case

, said analy sis

is to be made by a qualified chemist in Dallas County

, Texas, in whateve r labora tory

it is desig nated by the District Attorney and in the prese nce of whateve r witness the

District Attorney

desires.”

For the re asons stated, the judg ment is rever sed and the cause rema nded.

Detme ring , 481 S.W .2d at 864. 1 0



## I n the prese nt case

, appellant timely filed a motion to inspect, examine, and test phy sical

evidenc e and reque ste d t h at t h e state produce the substance alleg ed to be 1.6 g rams of

methamphetamine and submit it to a specific fore nsic instit ute for testing. I n both the motion and

the pretria l hear ing on the motion, appellant reque sted that the substance be tested both as to weig ht

and composition. The trial court noted that it was “re quired to allow defe ndant’s counsel to inspect

and examine any alleg ed controlled substance.” But the t ri al court also denied the motion, 1 1

A r t i c l e 3 6

. 1 4 h a s b e e n a m e n d e d m u l t i p l e t i m e s

, b u t n o t u n t i l 2 0 1 3 d o w e h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e 1 0

m e a n i n g o f “ i n s p e c t i o n ” t h a t w a s i n t e n d e d b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

. S e n

. C o m m

. o n C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e

, B i l l A n a l y s i s

, T e x

.

S

. B

. 1 6 1 1

, 8 3 r d L e g

. , R

. S

. ( 2 0 1 3 )

. M u c h o f t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e e n a c t e d v e r s i o n o f t h e b i l l r e f e r s t o w r i t t e n

d o c u m e n t s a n d r e c o r d e d s t a t e m e n t s

, w i t h p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e b e i n g l u m p e d i n t o “ i t e m s

. ” T h e “ S e c t i o n b y S e c t i o n

A n a l y s i s

, ” s t a t e s

,

S e c

. 1

. D I S C L O S U R E B Y T H E S T A T E

. ( a ) R e q u i r e s t h e a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e s t a t e

, s u b j e c t

t o t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s p r o v i d e d b y A r t i c l e 3 9

. 1 5 ( D i s c o v e r y o f E v i d e n c e D e p i c t i n g o r D e s c r i b i n g

A b u s e o f o r S e x u a l C o n d u c t b y C h i l d o r M i n o r )

, b e g i n n i n g n o l a t e r t h a n 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l

a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e d e f

e n d a n t

, t o d i s c l o s e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o u n s e l a n d p e r m i t i n s p e c t i o n

,

p h o t o c o p y i n g

, a n d p h o t o g r a p h i n g o f t h e f o l l o w i n g m a t e r i a l a n d i n f o r m a t i o n i n p o s s e s s i o n

,

c u s t o d y

, o r c o n t r o l o f a l l l a w e n f o r c e m e n t a g e n c i e s

, i n v e s t i g a t o r y a g e n c i e s

, a n d p r o s e c u t o r s ’

o f f i c e s

, a n y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y

, o r a n y n o n

- g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y c o n t r a c t i n g f o r w o r k w i t h

a n y g o v e r n m e n t e n t i t y i n v o l v e d i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e c r i m e s a l l e g e d o r i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f

t h e d e f e n d a n t

,

. . .

( 7 ) a n y p h y s i c a l o r d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e r e l a t e d t o t h e c a s e c h a r g e d t h a t w a s o b t a i n e d

f r o m o r t h a t b e l o n g s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t o r t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e s t a t e i n t e n d s t o u s e

a g a i n s t t h e d e f

e n d a n t i n t h e c a s e c h a r g e d a n d

, o n a s h o w i n g o f m a t e r i a l i t y b y t h e d e f e n d a n t

, t h e

o p p o r t u n i t y t o t e s t t h a t e v i d e n c e ;

. . . .

A n o t h e r s e c t i o n o f t h e e n a c t e d b i l l a u t h o r i z e s a c o u r t t o “ o r d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o p a y c o s t s r e l a t e d t o d i s c o v e r y u n d e r

t h i s a r t i c l e

. . . . ” A r t

. 3 9

. 1 4 ( l )

.

T h e t r i a l c o u r t i n D e t m e r i n g r e s p o n d e d i n a s i m i l a r f a s h i o n : “ I t i s f

u r t h e r s p e c i f

i c a l l y o r d e r e d t h a t a 1 1

v i s u a l e x a m i n a t i o n o n l y i s b e i n g o r d e r e d b y t h i s C o u r t

. ” 4 8 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 8 6 4

.

## 10

explaining that “the defe ndant has not shown a particula rized need for independe nt scientific testing,

or that the result of a scientific test would chang e based on who perf ormed the t est, or that an

independe nt expert would be a signific ant fac tor at trial.” Supp. CR 80. This is not the appropr iate

standard; the sta

ndard he re is the mate riality of the e vidence

.

Appellant’s counsel later asked the court to rec onsider its denial of the motion, stating that 1 2



## he understood the state would not pay but that either he or appe l l ant’s family would pay for the

testing. Shortly befor e the trial beg an, appellant’ s counsel stated on the rec ord that the court had

1 3



## denied the motion.

The trial court too narr owly interpre ted the meaning of “inspec tion” under Article 39.14(a)

.

Whil e the trial court acknowledg ed that it was re quired to allow a ppellant’s counse l to look at t he

methamphetamine, it did not allow appellant to have t h e methamphetamine analy zed by an

independe nt chemist. See Detme ring

, 481 S.W .2d at 864 (explaining how a t ri al co urt err ed by

restric ting “inspec tion” in Arti cl e 39.14(a) to “visual examination”). The rig ht to pay for an

independe nt chemist to analy ze the controlled substance in a controlled-substanc e case is absolute.

McBride

, 838 S.W .2d at 251

. The trial court erre d in holding that appellant was require d to meet

a mi nimum threshold s howing in order to be permitted to have an i ndepende nt expert analy ze the

alleg ed methamphetamine, there by ref using to permit appellant’ s counsel to obtain an independe nt

T h e f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l n e e d e d t o b r i n g u p t h e m o t i o n a g a i n a n d o f f e r t o p a y f

o r t h e t e s t i n g 1 2

s u g g e s t s t h a t

, w h e n t h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t i t m u s t p e r m i t a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l t o i n s p e c t t h e m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e

, i t d i d n o t

m e a n t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l w a s a u t h o r i z e d t o h a v e t h e m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e t e s t e d b y a n o t h e r c h e m i s t

.

T h e s t a t e a r g u e d

, w i t h r e g a r d t o a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l p a y i n g f o r t h e i n d e p e n d e n t t e s t i n g

, t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s 1 3

“ e i t h e r i n d i g e n t o r h e ’ s n o t

. I m e a n

, w e c a n ’ t h a v e h y b r i d i n d i g e n c y

, h a v e h i m p a y i n g f o r p a r t o f h i s d e f

e n s e a n d n o t

t h e o t h e r

, a n d I d o n ’ t u n d e r s t a n d h o w [ a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l ] c a n s a y

, I c a n p a y f o r t h a t b u t I ’ m s t i l l g o i n g t o b e c o u r t

a p p o i n t e d a n d b i l l t h e C o u n t y

. ” S u p p

. R R 1 3

. T h i s a r g u m e n t i s w i t h o u t m e r i t b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t w o u l d n o t b e p a y i n g

f o r t h e t e s t i n g ; e i t h e r h i s a t t o r n e y o r h i s f a m i l y w o u l d p a y

. S e e G a r c i a v

. W h i t e

, 3 5 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3 7 3

, 3 7 7 ( T e x

. C r i m

.

A p p

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( C o c h r a n

, J

. , c o n c u r r i n g ) ( “ T h e f a c t t h a t a n a t t o r n e y h a s v o l u n t e e r e d t o r e p r e s e n t a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t o n

a p r o b o n o b a s i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t i n d i g e n t

. . . . ” ) ( C o c h r a n

, J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

.

## 11

analy sis of the methampheta mine. We sustain appellant’s g round of r eview a s to sub-issue I

.

Sub-issue I I

—I ndige nt Defe ndant’s Rig ht

To a Court-a

ppointed Ex pert for

Chemical Ana ly sis

Be ca u s e we have established the rig ht to have an independe nt analy sis of the drug in a

controlled-substanc e case, the issue become s whether the t rial court d en i ed ap p ell ant due proce ss

and eff ective assistance of counsel by ref using to appoint an independe nt chemist to rete st the weig ht

and composition of the substance. The Supreme Court has rec og nized that an indige nt defe ndant 1 4



## has a constitutional rig ht to a co urt-appointed expert in some circ umstances. See, e.g., Ake v.

Oklahoma

, 470 U.S. 68, 74-77 (1985) (bala ncing the private interest aff ecte d by state’s action, the

g overnme ntal interest aff

ecte d if the safe g uard is provided, the probable value of the safe g uard, and

the risk of “er

roneous depriva tion” if the safe g uard is not provided). This Court has extended Ake

to an indige nt defe ndant’s acc ess to a chemist for chemica l analy sis of the alleg ed drug in a

controlled-substanc e case

. McBride

, 838 S.W .2d at 252 (“[W] hen the case is rea sonably cer tain to

proce ed to trial, the t rial j udg e shoul d, upon reque st, permit inspection of the substance alleg ed in

the indictment.”). Under Ake

, for meaning ful acc ess to justice

, a defe ndant must have “ac cess to 1 5



## the ra w mater ials integ ral to the building of an e ffe ctive def ense.” 470 U.S. at 77.

Whil e the a

ppointment of an expert may be re quired in some circ umstances, the state does

A f t e r t h e f i r s t d e n i a l o f t h e m o t i o n t o i n s p e c t

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s a t t o r n e y o f f e r e d e i t h e r t o p a y f

o r t h e a n a l y s i s 1 4

h i m s e l f o r h a v e a p p e l l a n t ’ s f a m i l y p a y f

o r t h e a n a l y s i s

. S u p p

. R R 1 2

- 1 3

.

I n M c B r i d e

, i t w a s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e q u e s t w a s f o r a p p o i n t m e n t o f a n i n v e s t i g a t o r

. 8 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 5 0 1 5

( u s i n g a “ M o t i o n f

o r t h e A p p o i n t m e n t o f a n I n v e s t i g a t o r / C h e m i s t ” )

. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r

, i t i s u n c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e

o r i g i n a l m o t i o n r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e s t a t e a p p o i n t a n i n v e s t i g a t o r o r s i m p l y r e q u e s t e d p e r m i s s i o n t o h i r e a n

i n v e s t i g a t o r

. S u p p

. C R 5 2 ( u s i n g a “ M o t i o n t o I n s p e c t

, E x a m i n e

, a n d T e s t P h y s i c a l E v i d e n c e ” )

. H o w e v e r

, w h i l e n o t

e x p l i c i t l y r e q u e s t i n g t h e s t a t e p a y f o r t e s t i n g

, t h e m o t i o n l i k e l y q u a l i f i e d a s a n A k e m o t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e r e f e r e n c e s

t o t h e r i g h t t o e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l a n d d u e p r o c e s s

. T h e o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n s u p p o r t s t h i s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

, b e c a u s e i t r e f e r s t o t h e “ s i g n i f

i c a n t f a c t o r a t t r i a l ” a n a l y s i s t h a t i s r e l e v a n t t o w h e t h e r a c o u r t i s

r e q u i r e d t o a p p o i n t a n e x p e r t

.

## 12

not n ee d to “purc hase for the indige nt defe ndant all the assistance that his wea lthier counter part

might buy

. . ..” Id

. The burden is on the defe ndant to provide concr ete rea sons for why the expert

should be appointed. Ex parte Jimene z

, 364 S.W .3d 866, 877-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). I n both

Ake and McBride

, “the defe ndant made a preliminary showing of a signific ant issue of fac t on which

the State would prese nt exp er t t estimony

, and which the knowledg e of a lay jury would not be

expected to encompa ss.” Jack son v. State

, 992 S.W .2d 469, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “I n case s

holding that a sufficie nt showing was not m ad e u n der Ake

, the defe ndant ty pically has failed to

support his motion with aff idavit s o r o t h er evidence in support of his defe nsive theory

, an

explanation as t o wh at h is defe nsive theory was and why expert assistance would be helpful in

establishi n g t h at theory

, or a showing that there was a rea son to question the State’s expert and

proof.” Rey v. State

, 897 S.W .2d 333, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Whil e the lang uag e in McBride

is expansive, the McBride court did acknow ledg e that “to hold that an indige nt def endant has an

absolute rig ht to inspect t he subst ance alleg ed in the i ndictment, in all case s, could undul y tax t he

financ ial resour ces of the County .” 838 S.W .2d at 252. This holding assumes that the cost of the 1 6



## second a naly sis will fall on the state. Our cases hold that, while a defe ndant has an absolute rig ht

to inspect t he al l ege d controlled subst ance

, a defenda nt does not have an absolut e right t o a st ateappointed expert.

Her e, appellant’ s motion failed to make a preliminary showing of a signific ant issue of fac t–

it provided no concr ete rea soning for why appellant neede d an independe nt chemica l analy sis of the

methamphetamine. Cf. Rey

, 897 S.W .2d at 340-41 (appe llant soug ht expert in patholog y to develop

A s e x a m p l e s o f w h e n t h e r i g h t w o u l d n o t a p p l y

, t h e c o u r t l i s t s c a s e s t h a t w e r e d i s m i s s e d b y t h e s t a t e o r 1 6

n o

- b i l l e d b y t h e g r a n d j u r y

. M c B r i d e

, 8 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 5 2

. B y u s i n g t h e l a n g u a g e “ f o r e x a m p l e

, ” t h i s C o u r t d i d n o t

a p p e a r t o i n t e n d t h e l i s t t o b e e x h a u s t i v e

.

## 13

his t h eo ry t h at h e could not have fore seen that his actions would result in death of the dece ased,

which conflicte d with opinion of patholog ist who conducte d the autopsy ). I n the pretria l hear ing on

the motion, appellant reque sted an inspection in order to verify both that the substance was actua lly

methamphetamine and t h at t h e weig ht was 1.6 g rams; if the weig ht wer e less than 1.0 g rams, the

punishment r ang e would be signific antly lower. I I RR 21-22. I n asser ting that the weig ht mig ht 1 7



## be over 40% less than that the DPS chemist measure d, appellant did not set forth any rea son to doubt

the analy sis by the orig inal chemist or that the substance was methamphetamine, nor did he explain 1 8



## how an expert was needed to prepa re for hi s defe nse. S

ee Taylor v. Stat e

, 939 S.W .2d 148, 152 1 9



## (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“I f appe llant demonstrated the c omplex ity of the issues involved and the

importance of t he requested ex pert testim ony vi s -a -vi s a viable defe nse, t hen he would have been

en titled to a DNA expert.”). Appellant failed to make a preliminary showing of a materia l i s s u e

sufficie nt to require the court to appoint an independe nt expert to verify the weig ht and composition

I n a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l ’ s w o r d s

, “ W e j u s t s a y t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e 1 7

d o u b t

, a n d l o o k i n g a t t h e a m o u n t o f w e i g h t

, t h e c l o s e n e s s t o w h a t t h e w e i g h t a n d

– r i g h t n o w t h e r e ’ s n o t h i n g b e f o r e

t h e C o u r t o f w h a t h a s b e e n d o n e a s f a r a s t e s t i n g

, s o w e ’ d r e q u e s t i t

. ” I I R R 2 2

.

A s e x p l a i n e d b y A k e

, a t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d i s i n t e r e s t e d e x p e r t d o e s n o t f u l f i l l t h e r o l e o f a p s y c h i a t r i s t a s t o a n 1 8

i n d i g e n t d e f

e n d a n t

. S e e D e F r e e c e v

. S t a t e

, 8 4 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 0

, 1 5 9 ( T e x

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( u n d e r A k e

, a n e x p e r t i s

a p p o i n t e d t o “ p r o v i d e t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e a c c u s e d

, t o h e l p e v a l u a t e t h e s t r e n g t h o f h i s d e f e n s e

, t o o f

f e r h i s

o w n e x p e r t d i a g n o s i s a t t r i a l i f i t i s f a v o r a b l e t o t h a t d e f

e n s e

, a n d t o i d e n t i f

y t h e w e a k n e s s e s i n t h e S t a t e ’ s c a s e

, i f

a n y

, b y t e s t i f

y i n g h i m s e l f a n d / o r p r e p a r i n g c o u n s e l t o c r o s s

- e x a m i n e o p p o s i n g e x p e r t s

. ” )

. B u t

, i f a d i s i n t e r e s t e d

e x p e r t s h o w s t h a t a d e f e n s e e x p e r t w i l l n o t b e a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n t h e c a s e

, A k e m a y n e v e r b e t r i g g e r e d

. I d

. a t 1 5 9

.

I n a r e c e n t T h i r d C o u r t o f A p p e a l s c a s e

, t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t ’ s r e q u e s t f

o r a n 1 9

e x p e r t t o d e v e l o p a d e f e n s e r e g a r d i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f d r u g d o g s i n a p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i j u a n a c a s e

. R i v e r s v

. S t a t e

,

N o

. 0 3

- 1 1

- 0 0 5 3 6

- C R

, 2 0 1 3 T e x

. A p p

. L E X I S 4 9 1 8

, a t * 1 ( T e x

. A p p

. – A u s t i n

, A p r i l 1 9

, 2 0 1 3

, n o p e t

. ) ( m e m

. o p

. ,

n o t d e s i g n a t e d f

o r p u b l i c a t i o n )

. T h e c o u r t

, i n h o l d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d n o r i g h t t o s u c h e x p e r t

, c o n s i d e r e d t h a t

d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t p r o v i d e a n y i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e x p e r t ’ s f i e l d o r t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e

i s s u e

. I d

. a t * 1 2

- 1 3

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t “ d i d n o t e x p l a i n o r p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e n a t u r e o f d r u g

- d o g

t r a i n i n g a n d f

i e l d p e r f o r m a n c e o r w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g d r u g

- d o g a l e r t s ” s o t h e t r i a l c o u r t

“ c o u l d n o t e v a l u a t e t h e p r o b a b l e v a l u e o f e x p e r t a s s i s t a n c e o n t h e i s s u e

. ” I d

. a t * 1 3

.

## 14

of the a lleg ed contr olled substance. 2 0



## Appellant also failed to prese nt any information with reg ard to “how important the scientific

issue is in the case

, and how much help a defe nse expert could have g iven.” Rey

, 897 S.W .2d at 338

(explaining that both psy

chiatrists and patholog ists re ly on the scienc e of medicine, which “elude s

mathematic prec ision”). “The nature of an expert’s field and the importance and complexit y of the

issue will bear direc tly upon whether the appointment of an expert will be helpful

. ” Id

. ; see also

Taylor

, 939 S.W .2d at 152. Appellant has prese nted no evidenc e that th e t es t s we re improperly

perf ormed or that the evidenc e indicated that the expert’s results had been questioned. See, e.g., Ex

parte Coty

, 418 S.W .3d 597, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (consider ing appli ca n t ’s writ of habeas

corpus all egi n g that “due to Salvador’s misconduct and the fac t that the evidenc e was in the sole

custody of Salvador f

or a pe riod of time, he wa s entitled to relief.” ). 2 1



## Creating an absolute rig ht for the de fenda nt to state-funde d independe nt chemica l analy sis

in all controlled-substanc e case s would unduly burden the state–there must be s o m e preliminary

showing of a signific ant i ssue of fac t to require the c o u rt to appoint an ex pert. The trial court did

not abuse its discretion in deny ing ap pellant’s motion as it was rela ted to appointment of an

independe nt expert. W e over rule a ppellant’s g round as to sub-issue I I

.

V. Conclusion

We hold that the trial cour t properly ref used to appoint an e x pert to e x amine the substance

I n Q u i n o n e s

, t h i s C o u r t d e s c r i b e d t h e r i g h t t o a c o u r t

- a p p o i n t e d i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e r t t o e v a l u a t e t h e d r u g s 2 0

i n a d r u g p o s s e s s i o n c a s e a s a b s o l u t e

. 5 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 9 4 2

. T h e C o u r t c i t e d t o T e r r e l l a n d D e t m e r i n g t o s u p p o r t t h i s

a s s e r t i o n

, b u t n e i t h e r T e r r e l l n o r D e t m e r i n g d e a l t w i t h i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t s s e e k i n g a p p o i n t m e n t o f a n e x p e r t

. B o t h

c a s e s d e a l t w i t h t h e r i g h t t o i n s p e c t t h e s u b s t a n c e i n a c o n t r o l l e d

- s u b s t a n c e c a s e

, n o t t h e r i g h t o f a n i n d i g e n t

d e f e n d a n t t o h a v e a c o u r t

- a p p o i n t e d e x p e r t r e

- a n a l y z e t h e s u b s t a n c e

.

B e f o r e h e w a s s u s p e n d e d f o r m i s c o n d u c t

, J o n a t h a n S a l v a d o r w a s a l a b o r a t o r y t e c h n i c i a n a t H o u s t o n ’ s 2 1

C r i m e L a b w h o h a d w o r k e d o n n e a r l y 5

, 0 0 0 c a s e s d u r i n g h i s e m p l o y m e n t

. E x p a r t e C o t y

, 4 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 9 8

.

## 15

at issue, but that it abused its discretion in deny ing both inspection and testing a t a p pellant’s expense.

The judgme nt of the court of appea ls is reve rsed, and the case i s re m an ded to the trial court for

p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n

.

D e l i v e r e d : A p r i l 2 2

, 2 0 1 5

P u b l i s h