alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Mark CARMEL, also known as Smiley, Appellant.

No. 07-1354.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 6, 2008.

Filed: May 15, 2008.

Cristian Matthew Stevens, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eastern District Of Missouri, argued, St. Louis, MO, Appellee.

Mark Carmel, Memphis, TN, pro se.

John Michael Lynch, U.S. Dept, of Justice. argued, St. Charles, MO, for Appellant.

Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Mark Carmel appeals the 120-month prison sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Carmel’s counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the appeal waiver contained in Carmel’s plea agreement is not enforceable because the agreement itself was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily. More specifically, Carmel maintains that he did not understand he was agreeing to a 120-month prison sentence.

We will enforce an appeal waiver where both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, and no miscarriage of justice would result. *See United States v. Andis,*333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Carmel knowingly and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement and appeal waiver. We note that, during the plea hearing, the court advised Carmel that he was waiving “important appeal rights,” fully quoted the terms of the appeal waiver, and referred several times to *660the “agreed 120-month sentence.” The court repeatedly asked Carmel if he understood, and each time Carmel responded, “Yes, sir.” *Cf. Blackledge v. Allison,*431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”). We also conclude that Carmel’s appeal falls within the scope of the appeal waiver, which provided that he waived all rights to appeal his sentence unless his prison term exceeded 120 months (the statutory maximum), and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. *See Andis,*333 F.3d at 891-92; *see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena,*201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in *Anders*case).

Having reviewed the record independently under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issue for appeal beyond the scope of the waiver. Therefore, we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal. We grant counsel leave to withdraw, subject to the condition that counsel promptly comply with the requirements of Part V of this Court’s Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act by advising Carmel of the procedures for filing a petition for writ of certiorari pro se.

1

. The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The State of TexasAppellee



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

January 7, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00909

- CR

Jaco b ADAME

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CR1526A Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The trial court = s certification in this appeal states that A this criminal case is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal. @ The clerk = s record contains a written plea bargain, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant; therefore, the trial court = s certification accurately reflects that the criminal case is a plea

- bargain case. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(a)(2). Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, A The appeal must be dismissed if a

certification that shows the defe ndant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record

under these rules. @ T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(d). It is therefore ORDERED that this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless appellant

causes an amended trial court certification to be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this order showing appellant has the right of appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(d); 37.1; see also

Daniels v. State

, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

C San Antonio 200 3, order). All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending our resolution of the certification issue.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 7th day of January, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Exhibit 32.2

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of **Big Cat Energy Corporation** (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period end of **July 31, 2006** as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Robert Goodale, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 27th day of September, 2006.

 
ROBERT GOODALE 
Robert Goodale 
Chief Financial Officer
1

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER REBECCA DYE

PASSENGER VESSEL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

REQUIREMENTS

DOCKET 11-16

FEBRUARY 13, 2013

Regulatory Restraint

• I believe that Government agencies should not 

increase the private sector’s regulatory 

compliance costs unless absolutely necessary.

• Our primary priority should be to reduce the 

regulatory burden on businesses and 

encourage additional job creation.

• I believe that the only effective passenger 

indemnification requirement is based on the 

risk that a cruise ship passenger will not be 

reimbursed for cruise ship nonperformance.

• I also believe that an effective system should 

take into consideration all available sources of 

indemnification.
2

• Unfortunately, the Final Rule before us today 

does not adopt a risk-based approach or 

consider all sources of indemnification.

History of Passenger Vessel Financial 

Responsibility Rules

• Since I joined the Commission in December,

2002, we have considered changes to our 

passenger vessel responsibility rules at 13 

Commission meetings and two public hearings.

• During this period, a majority of the 

Commissioners has never agreed on an 

approach to amend our passenger vessel 

financial responsibility rules.

Additional Reasons to Oppose Final Rule

• I am opposed to raising the financial 

responsibility requirements for cruise ships, 

and I believe the Commission should not adopt 

the Final Rule today for two particular reasons.
3

• First, the Final Rule’s use of credit card receipts 

as substitute financial responsibility could 

have the unintended consequence of causing 

credit card companies to increase cruise ship 

company collateral requirements or include

holdbacks or letters of credit as protection 

against the event of nonperformance.

• This is especially a risk for smaller, U.S.-flag 

operators.

• The credit card companies strongly opposed a 

similar suggestion in Commission Docket 02-15 

regarding passenger vessel financial 

responsibility, and I believe it is unwise to 

adopt this approach without their comments 

and involvement.

• Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which is 

designed to protect our small U.S.-flag 

passenger vessel operators, requires us to take 

public comment on the factual basis 

supporting the decision to certify that a rule 
4

will not have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities.

• Our proposed rule did not include our 

reasoning and the explicit assumptions 

underlying our certification, as required by the 

Small Business Administration.

• Therefore, we have yet to obtain comments 

from small business operators on the factual 

basis supporting our decision.

• Because we failed to include the factual basis 

in the proposed rule, we must cure that 

deficiency and allow the public to comment on 

the factual basis of the certification before we 

proceed to a Final Rule.

• I believe we must at least take the time to 

address these problems and release this rule

for additional public comment.

• Thank you, Commissioner Cordero.
CERTIFICATION
OF


CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In
connection with the accompanying Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB of 4309, Inc. for
the year ending December 31, 2007, I, Paul
Poetter, Chief Executive Officer of 4309, Inc. hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:




1.
            Such
      Yearly Report of Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2007, fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
            The
      information contained in such Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB for the year
      ended December 31, 2007, fairly represents in all material respects, the
      financial condition and results of operations of 4309,
  Inc.




Date:
      March 31, 20084309,  Inc.By:
      /s/
      Paul
      PoetterPaul
      Poetter
              President/Director
#### Donald Claython FULLER, Jr., Plaintiff—Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE; et al., Defendants—Appellees. *687Michael Adame; et al., Intervenors—Appellants.

No. 06-55617.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 8, 2007.

Filed May 2, 2008.

Robert Mann, Esq., Mann & Cook, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David D. Lawrence, Esq., Franscell Strickland, et al., Orange, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Robert L. Bastían, Jr., Esq., Bastían & Dini, Los Angeles, CA, Sonia M. Mercado, Culver City, CA, for Intervenors-Appellants.

Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

In a separate memorandum disposition, we reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Defendants in *Fuller v. County of Orange,*06-55511. In light of that decision, we dismiss the appeal in *Adame v. County of Orange,*06-55617, as moot, without prejudice to the Intervenors-Appellants renewing their motion for leave to intervene before the district court.

DISMISSED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3588 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3588

   To amend chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, to include 
 disclosures made by Department of Defense contract employees to their 
  immediate employers in the provisions providing protections against 
                   reprisals for certain disclosures.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 16, 2009

   Mr. Smith of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, to include 
 disclosures made by Department of Defense contract employees to their 
  immediate employers in the provisions providing protections against 
                   reprisals for certain disclosures.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR DISCLOSURES MADE BY DOD 
              CONTRACTORS TO EMPLOYERS.

    Section 2409(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting ``the employer of the employee,'' after ``disclosing to''.
                                 <all>
```
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, April 06, 2016.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of

the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, April 06, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A16I0157. CHARLES SMITH v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2015SUCR145
#### Steven E. TARPLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lieutenant Robert FRIEND, Sergeant; Officer Lindburg, are sued in both their individual and official capacities, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 10-6155.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 23, 2011.

Decided: April 7, 2011.

Steven E. Tarpley, Appellant Pro Se. Glenn William Bell, Office of the Attorney *250General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Steven E. Tarpley seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint and subsequent Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T] he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v.*Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order denying the Rule 59(e) motion was entered on the docket on December 17, 2009, and the thirty-day appeal period expired on January 19, 2010.* Because Tarpley’s notice of appeal was undated, and the record did not otherwise reveal when he gave the notice to prison officials for mailing, we remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding on the question of whether Tarpley timely filed his notice of appeal. *See Tarpley v. Friend,*390 Fed. Appx. 235 (4th Cir.2010). The district court determined that, in the absence of a response from Tarpley, the postmark date of January 21, 2010, provided the best evidence of when Tarpley handed his notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing to the court.

After reviewing the record, as supplemented, we find no basis to disturb the district court’s finding of fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the notice of appeal was untimely filed on January 21, 2010. Because Tarpley failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 The thirtieth day was Saturday, January 16, 2010. However, taking into account the weekend and the Martin Luther King, Jr., holiday, Tarpley had until Tuesday, January 19, 2010, in which to file a timely notice of appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 26(a)(1) (explaining effect of weekend days and legal holidays).
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF

CURTIS W. MEWBOURNE / CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

OF MEWBOURNE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350

I, Curtis W. Mewbourne, Chief Executive Officer of Mewbourne Development Corporation, Managing General Partner of Mewbourne Energy Partners 07-A, L.P. (the Registrant), hereby certify that the
accompanying report on Form 10-K, for the annual period ended December 31, 2010 and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Report) by the Registrant fully complies with the requirements of that section.

I further certify that the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/ Curtis W. MewbourneName:

Curtis W. MewbourneDate:

March 31, 2011
#### COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS, INC. (now Combined Systems, Inc.), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION OF AMERICA (now Safa-riland, LLC), Defendant-Appellee, and Federal Laboratories, Inc., Defendant.

No. 2010-1216.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Nov. 8, 2010.

Douglas J. Nash, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, of Syracuse, New York, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were John D. Cook and John M. Nichols.

Jay R. Campbell, Renner, Otto, Bois-selle *&*Sklar, LLP, of Cleveland, OH, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Donald L. Otto and Mark C. Johnson.

GAJARSA, LINN, and MOORE Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is

*521Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### Ronald J. Zimmerman et al., Appellants, v Donald J. Rosiek et al., Respondents.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[666 NYS2d 69]

*1049—Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiffs contend that the award of damages for the past pain and suffering of Ronald J. Zimmerman (plaintiff) and the failure to award damages to him for future pain and suffering and to plaintiff Ellen Zimmerman on her derivative cause of action deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation. We agree.

Plaintiff sustained a herniated cervical disc, which required an anterior discectomy and a fusion with a right iliac crest bone graft. Plaintiff was unable to work for 22 months as a result of the accident and has permanent loss of flexibility of his neck. The testimony of Ellen Zimmerman concerning the loss of her husband’s services and consortium was essentially unrebutted. We therefore conclude that the award of $25,000 for past pain and suffering and the failure to award any damages for future pain and suffering and for loss of services and consortium deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation *(see,*CPLR 5501 [c]; *Peck v Tired Iron Transp.,*209 AD2d 979). Therefore, we modify the judgment by granting a new trial on damages for past and future pain and suffering and loss of services and consortium only, unless defendants, within 20 days of service of a copy of the order of this Court with notice of entry, stipulate to increase the verdict to $75,000 for past pain and suffering, $25,000 for future pain and suffering and $25,000 for loss of services and consortium, in which event the judgment is modified accordingly. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Sedita, Jr., J.—Damages.) Present—Pine, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Boehm and Fallon, JJ.
exv10w1



 





EXHIBIT 10.1




SUMMARY SHEET: 2007 DAVID G. GALLAGHER ANNUAL BASE SALARY




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Name	 	Title	 	2007 Base Salary
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	David G. Gallagher

	 	Vice President, Marketing and Sales
	 	$204,600
|                                                                                          |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date:           February      11, 2008 |   | /s/      JOSEPH J. WALLACE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|                                                                                          |   | Joseph      J. Wallace                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|                                                                                          |   | Chief      Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|                                                                                          |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                                                                                          |   | A      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been      provided to Collectors Universe, Inc. and will be retained by Collectors      Universe, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or      its staff upon request. |