Filed 12/3/14 P. v. Jordan CA2/8 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v. 

ANTOINE DENELL JORDAN, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B249279 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA391352) 

 APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Edmund Willcox Clarke, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. 

 Carlo A. Spiga for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney 

General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Douglas L. Wilson and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * * * * * * 
2

 In 1983, defendant and appellant Antoine Denell Jordan was convicted by jury of 

26 separate felonies as a result of a notoriously violent crime spree which included rape, 

kidnapping and robbery of women on and near the University of Southern California 

campus in 1981. He was sentenced to 44 years in state prison. Shortly after he was 

sentenced, defendant committed sodomy by force on another inmate and was convicted 

of that felony in 1985. Defendant was released on parole in 2005. Because of his many 

convictions of sex offenses, defendant was required to register as a sex offender pursuant 

to the Sex Offender Registration Act (hereafter “Act”; Pen. Code, § 290 et seq.).1

 Following his release, defendant twice committed parole violations and was 

returned to prison, each time for a period of six months. Upon his release on the second 

parole violation, defendant registered an address in Los Angeles as his residence. In late 

2011, an officer with the Los Angeles Police Department discovered defendant had been 

living for several years at different addresses, including one in Anaheim, and one in 

Fullerton. Defendant had never registered the changes of address or the multiple 

residences, or identified vehicles owned and registered by him at those addresses as 

required under the Act. Defendant told the investigating officer he did not register those 

addresses because he did not want his wife, who lived there, to be harassed as a result of 

his status as a registered sex offender. 

Defendant was thereafter charged with and convicted by jury of eight felony 

violations of the Act. The court sentenced defendant as a third-strike offender to an 

aggregate state prison term of 25 years to life, plus 16 months. Defendant contends his 

sentence is grossly disproportionate to his present offenses which were merely regulatory 

violations, and his sentence was based primarily on his past criminal record. Defendant 

argues his sentence therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel 

and unusual punishment and the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

 

1 All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 
3

Defendant further contends the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard, and abused 

its discretion, in denying his Romero2 motion. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Defendant has not raised a substantial evidence question. We therefore summarize 

only those facts and procedural issues material to our discussion, as well as some 

additional facts for context. 

In 1983, defendant was convicted by jury of 26 felonies, including several rapes 

and robberies against multiple victims, some involving the use of a deadly weapon. He 

received a 44-year prison sentence. In 1985, defendant was convicted of one count of 

sodomy by force arising from an assault on another inmate committed the day after he 

received his 44-year sentence, for which he was sentenced to an additional three years. 

Defendant was released from prison in 2005 on parole. In 2006, less than a year 

after his release, defendant was arrested and given a six-month term for failing to attend 

three sessions of a parolee outpatient program in violation of the terms of his parole. 

Then, in 2008, defendant was again arrested for violating parole based on several 

instances of violating curfew and for possession of sexually explicit material on his cell 

phone. Defendant was given another six-month term. 

 Following his release, defendant registered an address on South 2nd Avenue in the 

City of Los Angeles as his residence in February 2009, and thereafter re-registered that 

address as his residence in November 2009 and November 2010. On each of those 

occasions, defendant initialed the form acknowledging his obligation under the Act to 

report changes of address and multiple residences. 

 On November 8, 2011, defendant went to the police station near his Los Angeles 

address for his annual registration. Officer Bryan Swaim of the Los Angeles Police 

Department Sex Crimes Unit met with defendant to complete the registration, as he had 

in November of 2009 and 2010. Again, defendant registered only the Los Angeles 

 

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). 
4

address, did not indicate he had moved or had multiple residences, and did not identify or 

register any vehicles. 

 During the registration process, which included taking an updated photograph and 

fingerprints of defendant, Officer Swaim noticed defendant was wearing a “really nice” 

motorcycle jacket. He noticed defendant had never registered any vehicles in his name, 

so he asked defendant about his means of transportation. Defendant said he was riding a 

motorcycle that belonged to his brother. Officer Swaim went outside with defendant and 

took a photograph of the motorcycle and its license plate number. When they went back 

inside, Officer Swaim asked defendant again about the motorcycle. Defendant admitted 

the motorcycle belonged to him. 

 After defendant completed the registration process and left the station, Officer 

Swaim made some inquiries regarding the motorcycle. Officer Swaim discovered the 

motorcycle was registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to defendant at 

an address in the City of Fullerton which had never been registered by defendant. Upon 

further investigation, Officer Swaim discovered the following additional information that 

had never been disclosed by defendant to law enforcement during his annual registration 

appearances or at any other time: a second motorcycle and two vehicles (a Chrysler and 

a Chevrolet Suburban) registered with the DMV in defendant’s name at the Fullerton 

address; a DMV disabled placard listing defendant’s Fullerton address; a cable television 

account in defendant’s name at the Fullerton address; and another address listed with the 

DMV in the City of Anaheim (apparently another former residence). 

 Officer Swaim contacted defendant and asked him to come back to the station to 

discuss the new information. Defendant complied and, during an interview at the station, 

conceded that he “split” his time between the Los Angeles address (his sister’s 

apartment) and the Fullerton address. He said he kept some of his belongings at the 

Fullerton address and received mail there. The vehicles were also registered to him at the 

Fullerton address. Defendant said he did not report the Fullerton address because he did 

not want people coming to the door and bothering his wife on account of his status as a 

registered sex offender. Defendant explained he was in Fullerton every day but only 
5

slept there a couple nights a week. Defendant was arrested on multiple registration 

violations. 

 After his arrest, defendant registered his Fullerton address with law enforcement in 

the City of Fullerton on November 15, 2011. 

In 2012, defendant was charged, by amended information, with three counts of 

failure by a convicted sex offender to register multiple residences (§ 290.0103; counts 2, 

5 and 7), two counts of failure by a convicted sex offender to file a change of address 

(§ 290.013, subd. (a)4; counts 1 and 4), and three counts of failure by a convicted sex 

offender to provide accurate registration information (§ 290.015, subd. (a)5; counts 3, 6 

and 8). 

As to all counts, it was specially alleged defendant had suffered 27 prior felony 

convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 

1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The prior strikes included eight robberies (§ 211), one 

attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664), one kidnapping (§ 207), five attempted kidnappings 

(§§ 207, 664), three rapes (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), two rapes in concert (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 

 

3 Section 290.010 provides in relevant part: “If the person who is registering has 

more than one residence address at which he or she regularly resides, he or she shall 

register in accordance with the Act in each of the jurisdictions in which he or she 

regularly resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there.” 

4 Section 290.013, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person who was 

last registered at a residence address pursuant to the Act who changes his or her residence 

address, whether within the jurisdiction in which he or she is currently registered or to a 

new jurisdiction inside or outside the state, shall, in person, within five working days of 

the move, inform the law enforcement agency or agencies with which he or she last 

registered of the move.” 

5 Section 290.015, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “A person who is 

subject to the Act shall register, or reregister if he or she has previously registered, upon 

release from incarceration, placement, commitment, or release on probation pursuant to 

subdivision (b) of Section 290.” The statute also enumerates the information to be 

disclosed during the registration process, including “the license plate number of any 

vehicle owned by, regularly driven by, or registered in the name” of the registrant. 
6

264.1), five oral copulations (§ 288a), one attempted sodomy (§§ 286, 664) and one 

sodomy (§ 286). It was further alleged defendant had suffered five prior prison terms. 

(§ 667.5.) Defendant’s criminal history also included convictions for grand theft and 

burglary in 1980 that were not alleged as qualifying strikes. 

 Defendant pled not guilty and denied the special allegations. 

 Trial by jury began in August 2012. Officer Swaim testified to the above facts, 

and generally explained the registration process under the Act, including a sex offender’s 

obligation to register on an annual basis or within five days of any change of address, and 

to identify all locations used as a residence and vehicle information. The prosecution 

called several neighbors who testified to regularly seeing defendant at the Anaheim 

address for about a year, starting in 2009, including at a homeowners’ association 

meeting. Defendant’s audiotaped interview with Officer Swaim was played for the jury. 

 Defendant’s wife, Carmen Jordan, testified for the defense. She stated defendant 

resided at his registered Los Angeles address, which was his sister’s residence, but did 

come over to her residence in Fullerton five days a week to help take care of their two 

children while she worked. She said defendant would stay overnight sometimes on the 

weekends. She explained that only she was on the lease agreement for the Fullerton 

residence. She admitted defendant received his paychecks and some mail at the Fullerton 

address, and that their vehicles were registered there. Mrs. Jordan also conceded that 

when she was living at the Anaheim address, defendant stayed there on a similar 

schedule. A mutual friend of defendant and his sister also testified that she regularly 

visited (several times a week) at the Los Angeles address and knew defendant lived there. 

She said defendant slept on a pullout bed in the living room, and was often around to help 

her with appointments and other matters because she suffered from congestive heart 

failure. Defendant did not testify in his own defense. 

 The jury found defendant guilty on all eight counts. 

 The bifurcated jury trial on the prior strikes and prison priors took place on 

August 15, 2012. The jury found true that defendant had previously been convicted of 26 

felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, and had suffered five prison priors. 
7

The record is not clear why one of the attempted kidnapping priors alleged in the 

information was not submitted to the jury for consideration. 

 The parties submitted lengthy sentencing memoranda and the court heard 

argument over the course of two days, including a personal statement by defendant. The 

court granted the prosecution’s motion to strike the prison priors and accepted the 

prosecution’s stipulation that counts 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were properly stayed pursuant to 

section 654. 

 The court sentenced defendant as a third-strike offender and imposed a 25-to-life 

term on count 8, plus consecutive eight-month terms (one-third the midterm) on each of 

counts 1 and 3. The court imposed and stayed eight-month terms on counts 2, 4, 5, 6 and 

7. The court awarded defendant 941 days of custody credits, and imposed various fines 

and fees. 

 This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendant raises three arguments challenging the sentence imposed by the court: 

(1) the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual 

punishment; (2) the sentence violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 

Amendment; and (3) the court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether 

it had the discretion to strike any prior convictions within the meaning of the Three 

Strikes law, and otherwise abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion. We find 

no error. 

1. Eighth Amendment 

Defendant contends his state prison sentence of 25 years to life, plus 16 months, is 

grossly disproportionate to his present registration offenses in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant argues his 

violations of the Act, while felonies, are victimless and essentially “regulatory” and, as 

such, do not warrant a life sentence. 

 “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains 

a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ [Citation.]” 
8

(Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (Ewing) [affirming sentence of 25 years to 

life imposed on a third-strike offender convicted of felony grand theft for the theft of 

$1,200 worth of merchandise].) The Eighth Amendment prohibits only a sentence that is 

“grossly disproportionate” to the severity of the charged crime(s). (Ewing, at p. 21.) 

Outside the context of a capital sentence, “ ‘successful challenges to the proportionality 

of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

 In arguing his life sentence is grossly disproportionate to the registration violations 

of which he was convicted, defendant relies heavily on People v. Carmony (2005) 127 

Cal.App.4th 1066 (Carmony II) and Gonzalez v. Duncan (9th Cir. 2008) 551 F.3d 875 

(Gonzalez). 

However, Carmony II and Gonzalez are factually dissimilar. In Carmony II, the 

defendant had registered his correct address just a month before his birthday, but then 

failed to register again within five days of his birthday as required by the Act. There was 

no change of information, and his parole officer and law enforcement had his correct 

address and other information as required by the Act. The third-strike sentence was 

found grossly disproportionate because the defendant “did not evade or intend to evade 

law enforcement officers” and his violation of the Act was “technical and harmless.” 

(Carmony II, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) Gonzalez involved a similar technical 

violation, in which the defendant had continued to reside at his registered address, and 

updated his information on an annual basis, but had not done so within five days of his 

birthday. (Gonzalez, 551 F.3d at pp. 884-885.) 

The facts here more squarely align with In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, in 

which our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the imposition of a thirdstrike sentence for an alleged “technical” violation of the registration requirements of the 

Act, distinguishing both Carmony II and Gonzalez. “Some defendants—as in Carmony II

and Gonzalez—who have properly registered their current address and whose overall 

conduct demonstrates a general good faith effort to comply with the sex offender 

registration requirements may commit this offense through a mere negligent oversight 

that does not adversely impact the fundamental purpose of the sex offender registration 
9

regime. Other defendants, however, may violate this statutory provision by intentionally 

failing to update their sex offender registration within five working days of their 

birthdays as part of a more general course of conduct that demonstrates a deliberate 

general unwillingness to comply with the sex offender registration requirements. In 

analyzing a cruel and unusual punishment challenge to a sentence imposed upon a 

defendant convicted of this offense, a court may not simply look to the nature of the 

offense in the abstract, but must take into consideration all of the relevant specific 

circumstances under which the offense actually was committed.” (In re Coley, at p. 553, 

italics added.) 

The defendant in In re Coley was released on parole in January 2001, but failed to 

register any address. The defendant reported a residential address to the DMV and was 

arrested there in August 2001 for having failed to comply with the Act. (In re Coley, 

supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533.) Given the defendant’s lengthy criminal history, the 

trial court imposed a third-strike sentence which the Supreme Court upheld. “Because 

the trial court found [the defendant] deliberately failed to register as a sex offender even 

though he knew he had an obligation to do so, [the defendant’s] triggering offense 

demonstrated that, notwithstanding the significant punishment that he had incurred as a 

result of his prior serious and violent felony convictions, [the defendant] was still 

intentionally unwilling to comply with important legal requirements prescribed by the 

state’s criminal laws. As a consequence, [the defendant’s] current criminal conduct and 

conviction clearly bore a rational and substantial relationship to the antirecidivist 

purposes of the Three Strikes law.” (In re Coley, at pp. 561-562.) 

 The court went on to explain that “in determining the gravity of [the defendant’s] 

conduct in evaluating an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence imposed under a 

recidivist sentencing statute, we must consider not only [the defendant’s] triggering 

offense but also the nature and extent of [the defendant’s] criminal history. [Citation.] In 

light of the particularly heinous nature of [the defendant’s] prior criminal activity 

[citation], [the defendant’s] present offense—efectting a deliberate decision by [the 

defendant’s] to refuse to comply with an important legal obligation—may properly be 
10

viewed as an indicator of potentially significant future dangerousness. Taking into 

account both the circumstances of [the defendant’s] triggering offense and [the 

defendant’s] very serious criminal history, we conclude that the 25-year-to-life sentence 

imposed upon [the defendant] does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” (In re Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 562, italics 

added.) 

 We find defendant also made a deliberate decision to refuse to comply with his 

registration obligations. Defendant intentionally did not register either the Fullerton or 

Anaheim address where he stayed on a daily basis to care for his two children, ostensibly 

because he did not want anyone to bother his wife about having a sex offender in the 

home. It is undisputed he knew of his obligations under the Act, but for at least two 

years, he deliberately registered only the Los Angeles address. He also did not provide 

any information regarding four separate vehicles he owned and drove on a regular basis, 

and lied to Officer Swaim when he was asked a direct question about his vehicle 

ownership. When considered in conjunction with defendant’s significant and violent 

criminal history, the imposition of a third-strike sentence does not offend the Eighth 

Amendment. (In re Coley, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 562; accord, Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at 

p. 29 [In weighing the gravity of a habitual offender’s present offense, the court “must 

place on the scales not only [the] current felony, but also [the offender’s] long history of 

felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the 

policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions.”].) 

2. Fifth Amendment 

Defendant also contends his sentence is primarily intended to punish him a second 

time for his past crimes and therefore violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 

Amendment. 

 Defendant’s sentence does not offend the double jeopardy clause. “Recidivism 

has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment.” (Ewing, supra, 

538 U.S. at p. 25.) The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld state recidivism statutes 

and “rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for 
11

the later offense ‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the 

earlier crimes,’ but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered 

to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’ [Citations.]” (Witte v. United 

States (1995) 515 U.S. 389, 400; accord, Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 728.) 

 Defendant’s sentence was not imposed as an additional penalty for prior crimes. 

Defendant’s sentence is the statutorily prescribed enhanced sentence for his current 

felonies which were properly considered aggravated offenses because of defendant’s 

status as a recidivist with a lengthy and serious criminal history. 

3. Romero Motion 

Finally, defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong standard in ruling on his 

Romero motion, and otherwise abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant’s 

motion, in whole or in part. 

The record belies defendant’s contention the court used an incorrect legal standard 

in denying his motion. Viewed in their totality, the court’s comments accurately reflect 

the relevant standard articulated by the Supreme Court in both People v. Williams (1998) 

17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams) and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 (Carmony I). In 

determining whether to grant or deny a Romero motion, the trial court “ ‘must consider 

whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and 

prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, 

character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in 

whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been 

convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ [Citation.] [¶] Thus, the three 

strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial 

court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its 

decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence 

that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Carmony I, at 

pp. 377-378; accord, Williams, supra, at p. 161.) 

 Further, plaintiff has failed to show that in applying this standard, the trial court 

abused its discretion. Our review of the court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion “is 
12

subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Carmony I, supra, 

33 Cal.4th at pp. 374, 376.) 

The trial court considered the “nature and circumstances of [defendant’s] present 

felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his 

background, character, and prospects.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) The 

court found to defendant’s credit that he had assumed family responsibilities and made 

efforts at employment since his release. He also noted defendant’s relative cooperation 

with authorities, but qualified that his level of “candor” at some points in the process was 

“subject to discussion.” The court also found the current offenses were notably less 

serious than defendant’s prior violent felonies. As for the remoteness factor stressed by 

defendant in his briefs, the court explained that the remoteness of his prior serious 

felonies was “somewhat undercut” by the fact defendant had been incarcerated for more 

than two decades. 

 As to aggravating factors, the court stated defendant unquestionably had a history 

of numerous and “very violent” offenses, many involving the use of weapons. The prior 

felonies occurred over a lengthy period of time, and consisted of “multiple predatory 

crimes” inflicted on multiple victims, “followed by another violent sexual offense” that 

occurred while defendant was in jail. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that: 

“[I]t’s hard to picture a more adverse set of strikes.” 

 On the current charges, the court expressed its concern defendant had made 

“misrepresentations” in statements to the media reporting on his prosecution under the 

Act, including that he was trying to avoid the “hardship of registration,” that he had been 

“sold out” by his lawyer on the earlier charges, that he had been “treated by the police 

and the court system unfairly,” and that he was, in essence, a victim. The court found the 

statements indicated defendant was remorseless. The court emphasized there was no 

evidence defendant had expressed remorse for any of his crimes. The court stated that 

“despite the mitigating factors in his favor, [defendant] does fall within the spirit of the 

Three Strikes law.” 
13

 The court plainly gave thoughtful consideration to the relevant criteria, and on 

balance, found defendant fell squarely within the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes law. 

We agree. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

 GRIMES, J. 

 We concur: 

 RUBIN, Acting P. J. 

 FLIER, J.