Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 206 / Thursday, October 26, 2017 / Notices 49665 

6By contrast, Respondent’s suspension is of 

unknown duration. 

person licensed, registered or otherwise 

permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in 

which he practices . . . to distribute, 

dispense, [or] administer . . . a 

controlled substance in the course of 

professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

802(21). Second, in setting the 

requirements for obtaining a 

practitioner’s registration, Congress 

directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General 

shall register practitioners . . . if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has 

clearly mandated that a physician 

possess state authority in order to be 

deemed a practitioner under the Act, 

DEA has held that revocation of a 

practitioner’s registration is the 

appropriate sanction whenever he is no 

longer authorized to dispense controlled 

substances under the laws of the State 

in which he practices medicine. See, 

e.g., Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036 

(2011); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 

FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. 

Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby 

Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); see 

also Hooper v. Holder, 481 Fed. Appx. 

at 828. 

As a consequence of the Board’s Final 

Decision and Order, Respondent is not 

currently authorized to dispense 

controlled substances in Massachusetts, 

the State in which he is registered. 

Because the CSA makes clear that the 

possession of authority to dispense 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which a practitioner engages 

in professional practice is a 

fundamental condition for both 

obtaining and maintaining a 

practitioner’s registration, it is of no 

consequence that the Board’s Order 

provided that he may petition to stay 

the suspension upon meeting certain 

conditions. Cf. Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. 

App’x at 828 (upholding revocation of a 

physician’s registration as based on a 

reasonable interpretation of the CSA, 

notwithstanding that the physician’s 

medical license was subject to a 

suspension of known duration); see also 

James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371, 71371– 

72 (2011).6 As of this date, Respondent 

is not currently authorized to dispense 

controlled substances in Massachusetts, 

and therefore, he is not entitled to 

maintain his registration in that State. 

Accordingly, I will order that his 

registration be revoked and that any 

pending application to renew his 

registration, or for any other registration 

in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

be denied. 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR 

0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of 

Registration No. BC6966381 issued to 

Yoon Choi, M.D., be, and it hereby is, 

revoked. Pursuant to the authority 

vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I 

further order that any application of 

Yoon Choi, M.D., to renew or modify 

this registration, or for any other 

registration in the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, be, and it hereby is, 

denied. This Order is effective 

November 27, 2017. 

Dated: October 17, 2017. 

Robert W. Patterson, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2017–23329 Filed 10–25–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Harinder Takyar, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On January 24, 2017, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause to Harinder Takyar, M.D. 

(hereinafter, Respondent) of Mesa, 

Arizona. GX 4. The Show Cause Order 

proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s Certificate of Registration 

on the grounds that Respondent does 

‘‘not have authority to handle controlled 

substances in the State of Arizona,’’ the 

State in which he is registered, and that 

Respondent’s ‘‘registration would be 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

GX 4, at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f), 

824(a)(3) and (4)). 

As to the Agency’s jurisdiction, the 

Show Cause Order alleged that 

Respondent holds DEA Certificate of 

Registration No. BT9321150 which 

authorizes him to dispense controlled 

substances in schedules II through V as 

a practitioner at the registered address 

of 9341 East McKellips Road, Mesa, 

Arizona 85207. GX 4, at 1. See also GX 

1 (Controlled Substance Registration 

Certificate) (including ‘‘Reform 

Physicians’’) and GX 2, at 1 

(Certification of Registration History) 

(9341 E McKellips Road, Mesa, AZ 

85207–8520). The Show Cause Order 

alleged that this registration expires on 

November 30, 2019. GX 4, at 1. See also 

GX 2, at 1. 

As the first substantive ground for the 

proceeding, the Show Cause Order 

alleged that Respondent is ‘‘currently 

without authority to handle controlled 

substances in Arizona.’’ GX 4, at 1. It 

alleged that, on December 21, 2016, 

Respondent ‘‘entered into an Interim 

Consent Agreement for Practice 

Restriction with the Arizona Medical 

Board’’ which ‘‘prohibited [Respondent] 

from engaging in the practice of 

medicine in the State of Arizona . . . 

until he applies to the Executive 

Director and receives permission to do 

so.’’ GX 4, at 1 and GX 3, at 5 (Interim 

Consent Agreement For Practice 

Restriction), respectively. The Show 

Cause Order alleged that Respondent 

was ‘‘still currently prohibited from 

practicing medicine in the state in 

which . . . [he is] registered with the 

DEA . . . [and] therefore, the DEA must 

revoke . . . [his] DEA . . . [registration] 

based upon . . . [his] lack of authority 

to handle controlled substances in the 

State of Arizona.’’ GX 4, at 2 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3)). 

As the second substantive ground for 

the proceeding, the Show Cause Order 

alleged that the Arizona Attorney 

General’s Office and the Pinal County 

(Arizona) Task Force ‘‘initiated an 

investigation of . . . [Respondent’s] 

medical practice after receiving 

information from a cooperating source 

that . . . [he] routinely prescribed large 

quantities of oxycodone, a Schedule II 

controlled substance, without 

performing an examination.’’ GX 4, at 2. 

After summarizing two law enforcement 

officers’ undercover visits to 

Respondent’s medical practice, the 

Show Cause Order alleged that, 

concerning the first undercover officer, 

Respondent prescribed schedule II and 

IV controlled substances ‘‘after 

conducting only a cursory medical 

examination[, or no physical 

examination but falsely documenting a 

full physical exam] . . . without 

inquiring about whether the agent 

experienced sleeplessness, anxiety, or 

panic[, and without] . . . properly 

execut[ing] . . . a prescription . . . as 

required by 21 CFR 1306.05(a) by not 

listing the full address of the patient on 

the face of the prescription . . . [or] 

maintain[ing] an adequate patient 

chart.’’ GX 4, at 2–3. 

Concerning the second undercover 

officer, the Show Cause Order alleged 

that Respondent prescribed a schedule 

II controlled substance the first time 

‘‘despite the agent informing . . . 

[Respondent] that he felt no pain during 

. . . [Respondent’s] brief examination of 

him . . . [, and a second time without] 

conduct[ing] a physical exam . . . and 

falsely documenting a full physical 


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exam.’’ GX 4, at 4. The Show Cause 

Order concluded that Respondent 

‘‘unlawfully prescribed controlled 

substances to undercover law 

enforcement officers for other than a 

legitimate medical purpose and outside 

the usual course of professional 

practice’’ in violation of Federal and 

State law, and violated Arizona medical 

practice standards when he ‘‘failed to 

maintain appropriate patient records 

that supported the prescribing of 

controlled substances and . . . failed to 

conduct an appropriate physical 

examination, or establish a . . . doctorpatient relationship before prescribing a 

controlled substance.’’ GX 4, at 2 (citing 

21 CFR 1306.04(a), Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32– 

1401.27(e), (j), (q), and (SS), and Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 32–901(15)). 

The Show Cause Order notified 

Respondent of his right to request a 

hearing on the allegations or to submit 

a written statement while waiving his 

right to a hearing, the procedures for 

electing each option, and the 

consequences for failing to elect either 

option. GX 4, at 5 (citing 21 CFR 

1301.43). The Show Cause Order also 

notified Respondent of the opportunity 

to submit a Corrective Action Plan. GX 

4, at 5 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated February 22, 2017, 

Respondent, by his counsel, asked the 

Administrative Law Judge for ‘‘an 

extension of 30 days within which to 

file a written request for hearing 

concerning the Order to Show Cause.’’ 

GX 5. The letter alleged that ‘‘good 

cause’’ supported the request because 

Respondent’s counsel ‘‘has only 

recently been retained,’’ the ‘‘discovery 

concerning the listed allegations is 

voluminous,’’ and counsel ‘‘needed 

[time] to gather necessary information 

concerning the allegations . . . and 

more effectively complete the request 

for hearing letter.’’ Id. By Order dated 

March 1, 2017, the Chief Administrative 

Law Judge, John J. Mulrooney, II, 

granted an ‘‘enlargement of the time 

allotted to request a hearing . . . to the 

extent (but only to the extent) that, if the 

Respondent elects to request a hearing, 

he must do so no later than March 17, 

2017.’’ GX 6, at 2 (Order Granting in 

Part the Respondent’s Request for an 

Extension of the Time to File a Request 

for Hearing). 

By Motion dated March 27, 2017, the 

Government requested that further 

proceedings be terminated because ‘‘[a]s 

of the date of this filing, Respondent has 

not notified this tribunal or Government 

counsel of any request for hearing.’’ GX 

7, at 2 (Government’s Motion for 

Termination of Proceedings). By Order 

dated April 3, 2017, the Presiding Judge 

issued an Order Terminating 

Proceedings, finding that ‘‘no request for 

a hearing was filed.’’ GX 8 (Order 

Terminating Proceedings). 

I find that the Government’s service of 

the Show Cause Order on Respondent 

was legally sufficient, that the 

Respondent did not timely request a 

hearing, and that Respondent has 

waived his right to a hearing and his 

right to submit a written statement. 21 

CFR 1301.43(d). I therefore issue this 

Decision and Order based on the record 

submitted by the Government. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). 

Findings of Fact 

Respondent’s DEA Registration 

Respondent currently holds DEA 

practitioner registration BT9321150 

authorizing him to dispense controlled 

substances in schedules II through V at 

the address of Reform Physicians, 9341 

E McKellips Road, Mesa, AZ 85207– 

8520. GX 1. This registration expires on 

November 30, 2019. Id. 

The Investigations of Respondent and 

the Status of Respondent’s State 

Licenses 

On December 21, 2016, Respondent 

and the Executive Director of the 

Arizona Medical Board (hereinafter, 

‘‘Board’’) signed an ‘‘Interim Consent 

Agreement for Practice Restriction.’’ GX 

3. Pursuant to the Interim Consent 

Agreement for Practice Restriction, 

Respondent elected to relinquish all 

rights to a hearing and to appeal, and 

agreed not to dispute, but did not 

concede, its allegations. GX 3, at 6, 4, 

respectively. It contained the allegations 

that Respondent ‘‘deviated from the 

standard of care’’ for one patient by 

‘‘failing to substantiate and justify a 

reason for prescribing opioids to . . . 

her[,] to acknowledge and deal with 

aberrant behavior manifested by 

frequent Emergency Room . . . visits 

usually for overdoses and 

documentation [sic] cocaine use[,] . . . 

to utilize urine drug screens[,] . . . to 

access [the patient’s] Controlled 

Substance Prescription Monitoring 

Program (‘‘CSPMP’’) profile to monitor 

[the patient’s] prescription medication 

use[, and] . . . by performing trigger 

point injections without identifying 

physical trigger points on examination, 

usually with a concomitant IM injection 

of Toradol.’’ GX 3, at 2. The Interim 

Consent Agreement for Practice 

Restriction contained the allegation that 

this patient ‘‘experienced actual harm as 

Respondent caused or contributed to her 

abuse and apparent addiction of 

controlled substances.’’ Id. 

The Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction also contained 

allegations that Respondent deviated 

from the standard of care for another 

patient ‘‘by failing to substantiate and 

justify a reason for prescribing opioids 

to . . . [her], failing to monitor his 

opioid prescribing, failing to access the 

CSPMP, and failing to utilize urine drug 

screens.’’ GX 3, at 3. Those allegations 

included that Respondent ‘‘failed to 

identify aberrant behavior including 

frequent ER visits, and claims of lost or 

stolen medications and requests for 

early refills.’’ Id. According to the 

allegations, Respondent’s patient 

‘‘experienced actual harm in that 

Respondent either created an addictive 

state or contributed to a pre-existing 

addictive state.’’ Id. 

The Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction contained 

allegations concerning a third patient of 

Respondent’s. Those allegations 

included that ‘‘Respondent deviated 

from the standard of care for . . . [the 

patient] by failing to identify a source of 

pain for . . . [him], and failing to 

demonstrate that the prescribing of 

opioids met the goals of reduction of 

pain and improvement of function.’’ Id. 

Additional allegations concerning the 

third patient were that ‘‘Respondent 

failed to monitor his opioid prescribing, 

failed to access the CSPMP and failed to 

utilize urine drug screens until April of 

2016.’’ Id. According to the allegations, 

Respondent’s patient ‘‘experienced 

actual harm in that Respondent ignored 

abnormal urine drug screens and 

aberrant behavior,’’ and faced the 

‘‘potential for harm’’ due to 

‘‘inappropriate medication prescribing, 

including side effects such as sedation, 

gastrointestinal dysfunction, cognitive 

impairment, respiratory depression, 

insomnia and addiction.’’ GX 3, at 3–4. 

The Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction explicitly stated that 

Respondent agreed not to dispute its 

allegations ‘‘[f]or the purposes of 

entering this Interim Consent 

Agreement and for these purposes 

only.’’ GX 3, at 4. It also stated that 

Respondent did ‘‘not concede these 

allegations and this Interim Consent 

Agreement is not intended for use in 

any subsequent proceeding, either civil 

or criminal, as evidence of any kind.’’ 

Id. 

The Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction’s Interim Order 

prohibited Respondent from engaging in 

the practice of medicine in the State of 

Arizona ‘‘until he applies to the 

Executive Director and receives 

permission to do so.’’ GX 3, at 5 (citing 

A.R.S. § 32–1401(22)). The Interim 

Order stated that Respondent may 

request release and/or modification of 

the Interim Consent Agreement for 


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Practice Restriction in writing 

accompanied by ‘‘information 

demonstrating that he is safe to practice 

medicine, including having successfully 

completed a competency evaluation at a 

facility approved by the Board or its 

staff.’’ GX 3, at 5. Among other things, 

the Interim Order also stated that it is 

not a ‘‘final decision by the Board,’’ is 

‘‘subject to further consideration,’’ and 

‘‘[o]nce the investigation is complete, it 

will be promptly provided to the Board 

for its review and appropriate action.’’ 

Id. The Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction was ‘‘effective on 

the date signed by the Board’s Executive 

Director,’’ December 21, 2016. GX 3, at 

5, 8–9. Respondent entered into the 

Interim Consent Agreement for Practice 

Restriction voluntarily. GX 3, at 6. He 

understood that ‘‘any violation of this 

Interim Consent Agreement constitutes 

unprofessional conduct under A.R.S. 

§ 32–1401(27)(r).’’ GX 3, at 8. 

On May 9, 2017, the DEA Diversion 

Investigator assigned to the 

investigation of Respondent’s medical 

practice (hereinafter, DI) signed a 

Declaration. GX 9. According to that 

Declaration, the DI ‘‘confirmed’’ with 

the Senior Investigator for the Board 

that ‘‘the current prohibition on . . . 

[Respondent’s] practice of medicine also 

includes a prohibition on his 

authorization to handle controlled 

substances.’’ GX 9, at 2. Further, as of 

April 24, 2017, the Declaration stated 

that the Board’s Senior Investigator 

informed the DI that Respondent 

‘‘remains prohibited from practicing 

medicine in Arizona, pending 

revocation proceedings currently before 

the Board.’’ Id. 

As found above, Respondent waived 

his right to a hearing and to submit a 

written statement while waiving his 

right to a hearing concerning the Show 

Cause Order. Accordingly, there is no 

evidence to refute the allegations of the 

Show Cause Order. I, therefore, find that 

Respondent currently is prohibited from 

engaging in the practice of medicine, 

and currently is without authority to 

dispense controlled substances, in 

Arizona, the State in which he is 

registered. 

Discussion 

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the 

Attorney General is authorized to 

suspend or revoke a registration issued 

under section 823 of the Controlled 

Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA), 

‘‘upon a finding that the registrant . . . 

has had his State License or registration 

suspended [or] revoked by competent 

State authority and is no longer 

authorized by State law to engage in the 

. . . dispensing of controlled 

substances.’’ With respect to a 

practitioner, the DEA has also long held 

that the possession of authority to 

dispense controlled substances under 

the laws of the State in which a 

practitioner engages in professional 

practice is a fundamental condition for 

obtaining and maintaining a 

practitioner’s registration. See, e.g., 

James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71,371 

(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. 

Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Bourne 

Pharmacy, Inc., 72 FR 18,273, 18,274 

(2007) (‘‘Under the Controlled 

Substances Act . . . , it is irrelevant that 

Respondent’s state registration is being 

held in escrow pending state 

proceedings. Under the Act, a 

practitioner must be currently 

authorized to handle controlled 

substances in ‘the jurisdiction in which 

[it] practices’ in order to maintain its 

DEA registration.’’); Anne Lazar Thorn, 

M.D., 62 FR 12,847, 12, 848 (1997) (The 

‘‘controlling question’’ is ‘‘whether the 

Respondent is currently authorized to 

handle controlled substances in the 

state.’’); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 

43 FR 27,616 (1978). 

This rule derives from the text of two 

provisions of the CSA. First, Congress 

defined the term ‘‘practitioner’’ [to] 

mean[ ] a . . . physician . . . or other 

person licensed, registered, or otherwise 

permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in 

which he practices . . . , to distribute, 

dispense, [or] administer . . . a 

controlled substance in the course of 

professional practice . . . .’’ 21 U.S.C. 

801(21). Second, in setting the 

requirements for obtaining a 

practitioner’s registration, Congress 

directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General 

shall register practitioners . . . if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has 

clearly mandated that a practitioner 

possess State authority in order to be 

deemed a practitioner under the CSA, 

the DEA has held repeatedly that 

revocation of a practitioner’s registration 

is the appropriate sanction whenever he 

is no longer authorized to dispense 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices. See, 

e.g., Hooper, supra, 76 FR at 71,371–72; 

Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 

39,130, 39,131 (2006); Dominick A. 

Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104, 51,105 (1993); 

Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11,919, 11,920 

(1988); Thorn, supra, 62 FR at 12,848; 

Blanton, supra, 43 FR at 27,616. 

Under Arizona law, a ‘‘doctor of 

medicine’’ is a ‘‘natural person holding 

a license, registration or permit to 

practice medicine pursuant to this 

chapter.’’ A.R.S. § 32–1401(10) (2017). 

See also A.R.S. § 32–1401(21) (2017) (A 

‘‘physician’’ is a ‘‘doctor of medicine 

who is licensed pursuant to this 

chapter.’’) The ‘‘practice of medicine’’ 

means ‘‘the diagnosis, the treatment or 

the correction of or the attempt or the 

claim to be able to diagnose, treat or 

correct any and all human diseases . . . 

by any means, method, devices or 

instrumentalities . . . .’’ A.R.S. § 32– 

1401(22) (2017). ‘‘Medicine’’ means 

‘‘allopathic medicine as practiced by the 

recipient of a degree of doctor of 

medicine.’’ A.R.S. § 32–1401(19) (2017). 

‘‘Restrict’’ means ‘‘taking a disciplinary 

action that alters the physician’s 

practice or professional activities if the 

board determines that there is evidence 

that the physician is or may be 

medically incompetent or guilty of 

unprofessional conduct.’’ A.R.S. § 32– 

1401(23) (2017). Further, a physician 

who ‘‘wishes to dispense a controlled 

substance . . . shall be currently 

licensed to practice medicine in 

Arizona.’’ Arizona Medical Board 

Licensure, R4–16–301 (2017). 

‘‘Dispense,’’ under Arizona law, means 

‘‘the delivery by a doctor of medicine of 

a prescription drug or device to a 

patient . . . and includes the 

prescribing, administering, packaging, 

labeling and security necessary to 

prepare and safeguard the drug or 

device for delivery.’’ A.R.S. § 32– 

1401(9) (2017). 

In this case, the Arizona Medical 

Board and Respondent entered into an 

‘‘Interim Consent Agreement for 

Practice Restriction’’ which prohibits 

Respondent from engaging in the 

practice of medicine in the State of 

Arizona ‘‘until he applies to the 

Executive Director and receives 

permission to do so.’’ GX 3, at 5 (citing 

A.R.S. § 32–1401(22)). Further, the 

unrefuted DI Declaration stated that 

‘‘the current prohibition on . . . 

[Respondent’s] practice of medicine also 

includes a prohibition on his 

authorization to handle controlled 

substances.’’ GX 9, at 2. Consequently, 

Respondent is not currently authorized 

to handle controlled substances in the 

State of Arizona, the State in which he 

is registered and, therefore, he is not 

entitled to maintain his DEA 

registration. Thorn, supra; Blanton, 

supra. Accordingly, I will order that his 

registration be revoked and that any 

pending application for the renewal or 

modification of his registration be 

denied. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3). 

Order 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me 

by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR 

0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of 

Registration BT9321150 issued to 


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1 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance 

Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 

5 The Founders’ Constitution 82 (Philip B. Kurland 

& Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 

Harinder Takyar, M.D., be, and it hereby 

is, revoked. I further order that any 

pending application of Harinder Takyar, 

M.D., to renew or modify this 

registration, as well as any other 

pending application by him for 

registration in the State of Arizona, be, 

and it hereby is, denied. This order is 

effective November 27, 2017. 

Dated: October 18, 2017. 

Robert W. Patterson, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2017–23338 Filed 10–25–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

[OLP Docket No. 165] 

Federal Law Protections for Religious 

Liberty 

AGENCY: Department of Justice. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: This notice provides the text 

of the Attorney General’s Memorandum 

of October 6, 2017, for all executive 

departments and agencies entitled 

‘‘Federal Law Protections for Religious 

Liberty’’ and the appendix to this 

Memorandum. 

DATES: This notice is applicable on 

October 6, 2017. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jennifer Dickey, Counsel, Office of Legal 

Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 

Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, 

D.C. 20530, phone (202) 514–4601. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

President instructed the Attorney 

General to issue guidance interpreting 

religious liberty protections in federal 

law, as appropriate. Exec. Order 13798, 

§ 4 (May 4, 2017). Pursuant to that 

instruction and consistent with the 

authority to provide advice and 

opinions on questions of existing law to 

the Executive Branch, the Attorney 

General issued the following 

memorandum to the heads of all 

executive departments and agencies on 

October 6, 2017. 

Dated: October 20, 2017. 

Beth Ann Williams, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Policy. 

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXECUTIVE 

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 

FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

SUBJECT: Federal Law Protections for 

Religious Liberty 

The President has instructed me to 

issue guidance interpreting religious 

liberty protections in federal law, as 

appropriate. Exec. Order No. 13798 § 4, 

82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017). 

Consistent with that instruction, I am 

issuing this memorandum and appendix 

to guide all administrative agencies and 

executive departments in the execution 

of federal law. 

Principles of Religious Liberty 

Religious liberty is a foundational 

principle of enduring importance in 

America, enshrined in our Constitution 

and other sources of federal law. As 

James Madison explained in his 

Memorial and Remonstrance Against 

Religious Assessments, the free exercise 

of religion ‘‘is in its nature an 

unalienable right’’ because the duty 

owed to one’s Creator ‘‘is precedent, 

both in order of time and in degree of 

obligation, to the claims of Civil 

Society.’’ 1 Religious liberty is not 

merely a right to personal religious 

beliefs or even to worship in a sacred 

place. It also encompasses religious 

observance and practice. Except in the 

narrowest circumstances, no one should 

be forced to choose between living out 

his or her faith and complying with the 

law. Therefore, to the greatest extent 

practicable and permitted by law, 

religious observance and practice 

should be reasonably accommodated in 

all government activity, including 

employment, contracting, and 

programming. The following twenty 

principles should guide administrative 

agencies and executive departments in 

carrying out this task. These principles 

should be understood and interpreted in 

light of the legal analysis set forth in the 

appendix to this memorandum. 

1. The freedom of religion is a 

fundamental right of paramount 

importance, expressly protected by 

federal law. 

Religious liberty is enshrined in the 

text of our Constitution and in 

numerous federal statutes. It 

encompasses the right of all Americans 

to exercise their religion freely, without 

being coerced to join an established 

church or to satisfy a religious test as a 

qualification for public office. It also 

encompasses the right of all Americans 

to express their religious beliefs, subject 

to the same narrow limits that apply to 

all forms of speech. In the United States, 

the free exercise of religion is not a mere 

policy preference to be traded against 

other policy preferences. It is a 

fundamental right. 

2. The free exercise of religion includes 

the right to act or abstain from action 

in accordance with one’s religious 

beliefs. 

The Free Exercise Clause protects not 

just the right to believe or the right to 

worship; it protects the right to perform 

or abstain from performing certain 

physical acts in accordance with one’s 

beliefs. Federal statutes, including the 

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 

1993 (‘‘RFRA’’), support that protection, 

broadly defining the exercise of religion 

to encompass all aspects of observance 

and practice, whether or not central to, 

or required by, a particular religious 

faith. 

3. The freedom of religion extends to 

persons and organizations. 

The Free Exercise Clause protects not 

just persons, but persons collectively 

exercising their religion through 

churches or other religious 

denominations, religious organizations, 

schools, private associations, and even 

businesses. 

4. Americans do not give up their 

freedom of religion by participating in 

the marketplace, partaking of the 

public square, or interacting with 

government. 

Constitutional protections for 

religious liberty are not conditioned 

upon the willingness of a religious 

person or organization to remain 

separate from civil society. Although the 

application of the relevant protections 

may differ in different contexts, 

individuals and organizations do not 

give up their religious-liberty 

protections by providing or receiving 

social services, education, or healthcare; 

by seeking to earn or earning a living; 

by employing others to do the same; by 

receiving government grants or 

contracts; or by otherwise interacting 

with federal, state, or local governments. 

5. Government may not restrict acts or 

abstentions because of the beliefs they 

display. 

To avoid the very sort of religious 

persecution and intolerance that led to 

the founding of the United States, the 

Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution 

protects against government actions that 

target religious conduct. Except in rare 

circumstances, government may not 

treat the same conduct as lawful when 

undertaken for secular reasons but 

unlawful when undertaken for religious 

reasons. For example, government may 

not attempt to target religious persons or 

conduct by allowing the distribution of 

political leaflets in a park but forbidding 

the distribution of religious leaflets in 

the same park. 


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