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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED August 20, 2015

v No. 319484 Wayne Circuit Court LAWRENCE ROBINSON, LC No. 13-005961-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O WENS , P.J., and S AAD and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals his jury tri al conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)( v ). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 2013, Detroit Police officers witnessed defendant p articipate in what looked to be a drug deal outside a business on Harper Avenue in Detroi t. As the officers, who were driving down Harper in a marked police car, slowed down to get a better look at the participants, defendant immediately fled the s cene. A policeman got out of t he car and gave chase, repeatedly identifying himself as an offi cer and ordering defendant to sto p. 1 During the pursuit, defendant pulled a bag out of his pocket, which contained a white substan ce, and threw it over the fence of an auto-repair shop. The Michiga n State Police (MSP) later ide ntified the substance in the bag to
be cocaine.

The prosecutor charged defendant with possession of less than 2 5 grams of cocaine, in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)( v ). Defendant requested a jur y trial, and the Wayne Circuit Court empaneled a jury to hear his case. At trial, which took place in October 2013, the jury heard testimony from multiple police officers, an employee of t he auto-repair shop, and
defendant himself.

1 The police officer in question was wearing a police uniform th at included a black shirt, labeled “police” on the chest and back. The officer also wore his badg e visibly on his waist, next to his magazine and firearm.-2- Defendant denied that he had been engaged in a dr ug transaction . He claimed that he fled the scene on Harper Avenue because he did not know the police v ehicle was an actual police vehicle, and believed that, due to the car’s sudden stop, viole nce was about to ensue. 2 The jury obviously did not credit defenda nt’s version of events, and fou nd him guilty as charged. 3

At the outset of our analysis, w e take judicial notice of the f act that defendant has already been released on parole, and that his appellate counsel has acc ordingly withdrawn defendant’s appeal. MRE 201(c). De fendant, however, has raised a host of issues in his Standard 4 brief that he has asked our Court to address, irrespective of his early re lease from prison. All of these issues are poorly stated and unsupported by the record, many ar e unpreserved, and only one
merits discussion: whether defendant received ineffective assis tance of counsel for his trial attorney’s supposed “failures” to investigate defendant’s asser tions, obtain certain discovery materials, and challenge the admission of some evidence. 4

2 Defendant also devoted considerable time during his testimony to explanation of supposed video surveillance footage from a business owner near the crime scene, which he claimed
demonstrated he was not involved in a drug deal on the day he w as arrested. The video, which is not contained in the record on appeal, was viewed by the jury, and apparently is of very poor quality. According to the record available to our Court, it sh owed still images of the general area
where defendant was arrested. D efendant acknowledged that the video did not depict all of the events leading to his arrest, and a police witness stressed tha t the video did not even show the area where defendant had engaged i n the drug deal that gave ris e to the chase.

3 The trial court ultimately rese ntenced defendant after our Cou rt permitted defendant to file a motion for resentencing. See People v Robinson , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals entered August 11, 2014 (Docket No. 319484). The details of th e sentencing and resentencing were initially of import to this case, but are no longer of con sequence, because defendant’s counsel has withdrawn this argum ent due to defendant’s release from prison.

4 The additional claims raised by defendant are: (1) the police did not have probable cause to “engauge [sic] him”; (2) the police created an exigency to “eng auge [sic] him”; (3) there were unspecified deficiencies in the c omplaint issued against him; ( 4) the prosecution did not disclose certain information during discove ry; (5) the trial court impro perly denied the jury’s request for a transcript of a police witness’ s testimony; and (6) his convict ion is against the gr eat weight of the
evidence.

These assertions are incoherent ly expressed and frivolous. The police did not need probable cause to pursue defendant, beca use their observation of defenda nt’s body and hands in close proximity to another individual in a high crime area, coupled w ith defendant’s flight from their arrival, provided the basis for an investigatory stop. Moreove r, defendant’s discarding of a bag containing a drug-like substance during the pursuit provided pr obable cause to arrest him. And because the trial court did not rely on an exigent circumstance s exception to justify police conduct, defendant’s claim that evidence obtained from the chas e and arrest should be suppressed is without merit.-3- II. ANALYSIS 5

“To prove that defendant received i neffective assistance of cou nsel, he must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an ob jective standard of professional reasonableness and (2) that there is a reasonable probability t hat the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s performance.” People v Roscoe , 303 Mich App 633, 643- 644; 846 NW2d 402 (2014). Effective assistance of counsel is p resumed, and defendant bears the heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Johnson , 293 Mich App 79, 90; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). A trial attorney’s failure to call or question wit nesses or present other evidence may
constitute ineffective assistance if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v

Russell , 297 Mich App 707, 716; 825 NW2d 623 (2012).

Here, defendant claims that his trial counsel erred when couns el stipulated to an MSP analysis of the plastic bag that contained the cocaine, which r evealed no latent fingerprints. Defendant, without pointing to anything in the record that woul d sustain his assertions, says that there were fingerprints on the bag, and that his trial attorney should have refused to stipulate to the MSP analysis as a result. These claims have no merit whats oever, and are flat ly contradicted by the MSP analysis, which, again, revealed no latent fingerpri nts on the bag. As such, trial counsel’s sensible argument that the bag had no fingerprints bo lstered defendant’s claim that he did not possess or throw the cocaine.

Defendant’s other assertions about his counsel’s supposedly in effective performance are equally unavailing. Though defenda nt avers that his lawyer fai led to obtain unspecified discovery evidence regarding the police vehicle used in the sto p, he does not explain how this information would have advanced his case, nor does he indicate how it would counter the prosecution’s overwhelming evidence that defendant was pursued and arrested by police officers who arrived in a marked vehicle. Likewise, the fact that defen dant’s lawyer did not call an MSP laboratory chemist to testify as to purported discrepancies in the amount of cocaine in the evidence bag, and the amount recovered from the bag at the scen e does not show that the lawyer gave ineffective assistance. 6 In fact, testimony from the lab chemist might have harmed

In a similar vein, defendant fails to point to anything in the record that shows the complaint against him was deficient in any way. Nor is there anything in the record to substantiate defendant’s claims that the prosecution did not comply with dis covery. The trial court acted appropriately when it denied the jury’s request for a transcrip t of a police witness’s testimony, and correctly advised jurors that the court reporter could play back or repeat the testimony. And, finally, defendant does not even explain in the body of his “br ief” how his conviction was against the great weight of the evidence—likely because his con viction was not against the great weight of the evidence, whic h overwhelmingly suggested his guil t.

5 Because defendant did not raise these challenges to his attorn ey’s performance in his motion for resentencing or otherwise, our review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Payne , 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).

6 Defendant also wrongly asserts th at defense counsel’s decision not to call the MSP laboratory chemist who analyzed the cocaine violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. The chemist was actually named as a witness on the prosecution’s wi tness list, but the parties stipulated to the admission of her laboratory report in lieu of calling her as a witness at trial,-4- defendant’s case by explaining to the jury that such a discrepa ncy (if one actually existed) was a normal product of forensic analysis, and had nothing to do with defendant’s supposed innocence. In sum, defendant has utterly fa iled to demonstrate that his co unsel gave him ineffective
assistance.

Affirmed.

/s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael F. Gadola

which eliminated the need to have her as a witness. People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc , 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007).