Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 23, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00172-CV 

CAROL WARREN, Appellant 

V. 

DONALD HALLETT, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Rockwall County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. Cl1-22-0050 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Smith 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

The underlying proceeding involved a de novo appeal from the justice court 

in a forcible detainer action. Appellant Carol Warren appeals the county court at 

law’s order denying her plea to the jurisdiction and rendition of judgment for 

appellee Donald Hallett on his forcible detainer action. Because we overrule 

appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On July 11, 2011, Hallett and his wife, Teresa, signed a “Contract for Deed” 

to sell their home to Warren. The Contract set out a sales price of $100,000.00, with 
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no down payment, an 8% fixed annual interest rate, and monthly payments of 

$1,254.68, which included escrow payments for taxes and property insurance. Under 

the Contract, Warren agreed to pay the Halletts monthly payments from August 1, 

2011, until July 1, 2026, in exchange for receipt of a warranty deed once she paid all 

amounts due in full. The Contract also provided Warren with the right to possession 

of the property as long as she performed all obligations in the Contract. If the 

Contract was cancelled due to Warren’s default, the Halletts, after providing notice 

of default and three days to cure, had the right to file an action for forcible detainer. 

According to Hallett, Warren failed to pay rent for several lengthy time 

periods, including a sixty-four-month period between November 20, 2013, and 

March 13, 2019, and an eighteen-month period between June 24, 2019, and February 

26, 2021. Hallett testified he received no payments from Warren after April 28, 2021. 

On January 4, 2022, Hallett’s counsel delivered a notice of default to Warren. 

The notice provided Warren thirty days to cure the default or surrender possession 

of the property. The notice referenced Warren’s expressed interest in obtaining a 

third-party mortgage to buy the property and informed Warren that Hallett was 

willing to work with her to negotiate a “payoff / cure of the default.” The parties’ 

subsequent negotiations resulted in an agreement (the 2022 sales contract) for Hallett 

to sell the property to Warren, with Warren purchasing the property through thirdparty financing. Warren failed to close the deal and, on March 13, 2022, Hallett sent 

Warren a renewed notice to vacate the property. The March 13 Notice informed 
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Warren that she breached the 2022 sales contract by failing to close, and Hallett was 

terminating the 2022 sales contract due to that breach. The March 13 Notice also 

included a renewed thirty-day notice to vacate, which notified Warren that she 

remained in default of her payment obligations under the Contract and “must vacate 

within thirty (30) days or face a suit for eviction.” Warren refused to vacate the 

property. 

On August 5, 2022, Hallett filed a forcible entry and detainer suit against 

Warren in the justice court. On August 22, 2022, the justice court entered a judgment 

for Warren, and Hallett filed a de novo appeal in the county court at law. In the 

county court at law, Warren filed a motion to dismiss Hallett’s petition and claims 

for lack of jurisdiction. Warren contended the county court at law lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction because the Contract is an executory contract governed by 

Chapter 5, Subchapter D of the Texas Property Code for which an action for forcible 

entry and detainer is not an available remedy. Warren argued the property code 

limited Hallett’s remedy for Warren’s nonpayment to “a sale under Texas Property 

Code §5.066.” Hallett filed a response to the motion, and Warren filed a separate 

brief in support of the motion. On February 8, 2023, the county court at law held a 

hearing on the motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial on the forcible entry and 

detainer petition. 

On February 17, 2023, the district court signed an order denying Warren’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for Hallett in the de novo appeal of 
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his forcible entry and detainer action. The judgment decreed Hallett was entitled to 

judgment for immediate possession of the property and awarded him attorney’s fees 

and court costs. Warren appealed. Her notice of appeal states she is appealing 

“because Eviction is not an appropriate or available remedy in this case.” 

ANALYSIS 

Warren brings two issues on appeal. First, she contends the county court at 

law erred by rendering judgment for Hallett in the forcible detainer action because 

eviction is not a lawful remedy for breach of the Contract. Second, she contends the 

county court at law lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding because a title dispute 

remains pending in the district court. Both issues present questions of law we review 

de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 

2004) (whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that 

we review de novo); City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) 

(per curiam) (the availability of a remedy under the facts is a question of law 

reviewed de novo). We first address Warren’s challenge to the county court at law’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Warren maintains the county court at law lacked jurisdiction to determine 

right of possession because the question of possession is intertwined with the 

question of title. We disagree. 
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Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice 

court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to the county court1

for a trial de novo. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 27.031(a)(2); 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). Neither the justice court nor the county court has 

jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land. See generally Black v. 

Washington Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, 

pet. dism’d w.o.j.). “The only issue in an action for forcible detainer is the right to 

actual and immediate possession; the merits of title are not adjudicated.” Salaymeh 

v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 

no pet.) (citations omitted). A forcible detainer action is cumulative of any other 

remedy that a party may have in the courts of this state and therefore, forcible 

detainer actions in justice courts may be brought and prosecuted concurrently with 

suits to try title in district court. Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); see also Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 

705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196–

97 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also TEX. PROP.

CODE § 24.008 (“An eviction suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, 

1

 The constitutional County Court in each county is referred to simply as the county court. County 

courts at law, however, are among “such other courts as may be provided by law.” Ditech Servicing, LLC 

v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2023). They “are creatures of statute with varying jurisdiction 

individually demarcated by the Legislature.” Id. Rockwall County has two district courts, two county courts 

at law, and no constitutional county court. Rockwall County Court of Law No. 1 and County Court of Law 

No. 2 have “jurisdiction over all causes and proceedings, civil and criminal, original and appellate, 

prescribed by law for county courts.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.0003(a); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE

§§ 25.2011, 25.2012 (prescribing jurisdiction of Rockwall County Courts at Law). 
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rent, or mesne profits”). “Eviction suits include forcible entry and detainer and 

forcible detainer suits.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a) 

A forcible detainer action is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive 

means to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City 

of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). “Judgment of possession in a 

forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the 

eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate 

possession.” Id. Thus, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is not 

required to prove title, but is only required to present sufficient evidence of 

ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. See Trimble v. 

Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, 

pet. denied); see also Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (stating only issue in forcible 

detainer proceeding is right to actual and immediate possession). If, however, an 

issue of title is so intertwined with the issue of possession that a court must resolve 

the title dispute before determining which party has a superior right to immediate 

possession, then the justice court and the county court lack jurisdiction to resolve the 

matter and must dismiss the case. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 

S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 

A landlord-tenant relationship provides “an independent basis on which the 

trial court could determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the 

issue of title to the property.” Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712. The parties in a forcible 
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detainer suit are usually in a landlord-tenant relationship. Ward v. Malone, 115 

S.W.3d 267, 270–71 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, pet. denied). The 

lack of a landlord-tenant relationship, however, indicates the justice court, and 

county court on appeal, are being called upon to adjudicate title in addition to 

possession. Id. (first citing Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2002, no pet.); and then citing Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 712). 

Here, the Contract at issue is a contract for deed, which “is an agreement by a 

seller to deliver a deed to property once certain conditions have been met.” Ward, 

115 S.W.3d at 270–71 (citing Graves v. Diehl, 958 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.)). “The legal effect of the contract is the same as 

that of a deed with a retained vendor’s lien.” Id. (citing Bucher v. Emps. Cas. Co., 

409 S.W.2d 583, 584–85 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1966, no writ)).2

 Under the 

Contract, Warren was entitled to possession of the property if she promptly 

performed all obligations under it; but Hallett was not obligated to deliver legal title 

to the property until Warren paid the purchase price and the required additional 

payments in full. Warren contends the question of title cannot be separated from the 

question of possession because the Contract is a “Contract for Deed” under which a 

2 See Ferrara v. Nutt, 555 S.W.3d 227, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“An 

executory contract, or a ‘contract for deed,’ is a real-estate transaction that allows the seller of the property 

to retain title until the purchaser has paid for the property in full.”); see also De Hoyos v. Cruz, No. 04-20-

00361-CV, 2021 WL 5496353, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 24, 2021, pet. denied) (“Under 

subsection 5.079(a) of the Texas Property Code, ‘[a] recorded executory contract shall be the same as a 

deed with a vendor’s lien.’”) (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.079(a). 
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landlord-tenant relationship is lacking. Warren is correct that a forcible detainer 

action “based on a contract for deed is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant 

relationship.” See, e.g., Brown v. Kula-Amos, Inc., No. 02-04-00032-CV, 2005 WL 

675563, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, 

her contention no such relationship existed here is incorrect. 

“Generally, a justice court or county court is not required to determine 

questions of title when considering a forcible detainer suit if the contract provides 

for a landlord-tenant relationship upon default, if the contract provides that the buyer 

becomes a tenant-at-sufferance in the event of default, or if the contract provides that 

the buyer is subject to a forcible detainer suit upon default.” Brown, 2005 WL 

675563, at *3; see also Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W .2d 194, 197 (Tex. Civ. App–

Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (reasoning justice court had jurisdiction 

to consider forcible detainer suit where deed included tenant-at-sufferance provision 

in the event of default). When a contract for deed includes tenant-at-sufferance 

language, “[t]itle is a non-issue because the existence of such language in the 

contract ‘provides a basis for determining the right to immediate possession without 

resolving the ultimate issue of title to the property.’” Brown, 2005 WL 675563, at 

*3 (quoting Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)). Such is the case here. 

Section one of the “General Provisions” in the Contract between the Halletts 

and Warren states: 
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As long as Buyer promptly performs all obligations in this contract, 

Buyer has the right to possession of the property. If Sellers determine 

Buyer has not performed all obligations under this contract, Sellers will 

present a Notice to Buyer in person or in writing of same, thus ensuring 

that Buyer has not overlooked her obligations due to an unavoidable 

incident, i.e. an accident, illness, etc., and upon such Notice to Buyer, 

Buyer shall satisfy such obligation within three days to the Sellers to 

avoid default. If this contract is canceled because of Buyer’s default, 

Buyer will immediately surrender possession of the property to 

Sellers. If Buyer fails to do so, Buyer will become a tenant at 

sufferance of Sellers and Sellers shall have the right to go into any 

Justice of the Peace Court in Rockwall County, Texas, and file an 

action for forcible detainer.

(emphasis added). The Contract expressly provides that Warren will become a 

tenant-at-sufferance subject to an action for forcible detainer if the Contract is 

cancelled because of her default. This language establishes the essential relationship 

between Hallett and Warren necessary to maintain a forcible detainer suit and avoid 

the question of title. See Brown, 2005 WL 675563, at *3 (holding same contractual 

language created landlord-tenant relationship such that justice court and county court 

had jurisdiction over forcible detainer action); see also Mosely v. Am. Homes 4 Rent 

Properties Eight, LLC, No. 02-15-00200-CV, 2015 WL 9942695, at *2–3 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2015, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (because of tenant-atsufferance clause, trial court had jurisdiction to determine possession in forcible 

detainer action); Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 196–97 (same); Paselk v. Bayview Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 528 S.W.3d 790, 794 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) 

(holding trial court had independent basis to determine issue of immediate 

possession without resolving the issue of title because “the deed of trust specifically 
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provided that Paselk would be considered a tenant at sufferance in the event of a 

foreclosure sale.”); see also TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a)(2) (stating that a person 

who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible 

detainer if the person is a tenant at will or by sufferance). 

Because of the tenant-at-sufferance language, the justice court and county 

court at law could determine the issue of immediate possession without making an 

inquiry into title. See Brown, 2005 WL 675563, at *3. We conclude the county court 

at law had subject matter jurisdiction over Hallett’s action for forcible detainer. We 

overrule Warren’s second issue and affirm the order denying Warren’s motion to 

dismiss. 

II. Remedy of Eviction 

Warren also contends the judgment should be reversed because eviction is not 

an available remedy here. She maintains Texas Property Code Chapter 5, Subchapter 

D controls this question because the Contract is an executory contract recorded in 

the county deed records. According to Warren, that subchapter of the property code 

restricts a seller’s remedies for default to a sale pursuant to section 5.066 and, thus, 

prohibits forcible detainer actions. See TEX. PROP.CODE §5.066 (“Equity Protection; 

Sale of Property”). We again disagree. 

Texas Property Code Chapter 5, Subchapter D, governs executory contracts 

for the conveyance of real property, including contracts for deeds. See TEX. PROP.

CODE §§ 5.061-.87; see also White v. Calvache, No. 05-17-00127-CV, 2018 WL 
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525684, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing 

that Subchapter D applies to an “executory contract,” such as a contract for deed) 

(first citing Reeder v. Curry, 294 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. 

denied), and then citing Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 627 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2012, pet. denied)). When Chapter 5 applies, the section restricts a seller’s remedies 

for breaches and imposes specific obligations on the seller. See, e.g., TEX. PROP.

CODE § 5.063 (contents of required notices); § 5.064 (requiring notice and 

opportunity to cure as predicates for rescission, forfeiture, and acceleration 

remedies); § 5.065 (right to cure); § 5.069 (seller’s disclosure requirements); § 5.076 

(seller’s recording requirement); § 5.077 (annual accounting statement required of 

seller). 

Warren relies on section 5.066 to support her contention that eviction is not 

an available remedy here. That section provides: 

(a) If a purchaser defaults after the purchaser has paid 40 percent or 

more of the amount due or the equivalent of 48 monthly payments 

under the executory contract or, regardless of the amount the purchaser 

has paid, the executory contract has been recorded, the seller is granted 

the power to sell, through a trustee designated by the seller, the 

purchaser’s interest in the property as provided by this section. The 

seller may not enforce the remedy of rescission or of forfeiture and 

acceleration after the contract has been recorded. 

(b) The seller shall notify a purchaser of a default under the contract 

and allow the purchaser at least 60 days after the date notice is given to 

cure the default. The notice must be provided as prescribed by Section 

5.063 except that the notice must substitute the following statement: 

NOTICE 
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YOU ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH THE TERMS OF 

THE CONTRACT TO BUY YOUR PROPERTY. 

UNLESS YOU TAKE THE ACTION SPECIFIED IN 

THIS NOTICE BY (date) A TRUSTEE DESIGNATED 

BY THE SELLER HAS THE RIGHT TO SELL YOUR 

PROPERTY AT A PUBLIC AUCTION. 

(c) The trustee or a substitute trustee designated by the seller must post, 

file, and serve a notice of sale and the county clerk shall record and 

maintain the notice of sale as prescribed by Section 51.002. A notice of 

sale is not valid unless it is given after the period to cure has expired. 

(d) The trustee or a substitute trustee designated by the seller must 

conduct the sale as prescribed by Section 51.002. The seller must: 

(1) convey to a purchaser at a sale conducted under this 

section fee simple title to the real property; and 

(2) warrant that the property is free from any 

encumbrance. 

(e) The remaining balance of the amount due under the executory 

contract is the debt for purposes of a sale under this section. If the 

proceeds of the sale exceed the debt amount, the seller shall disburse 

the excess funds to the purchaser under the executory contract. If the 

proceeds of the sale are insufficient to extinguish the debt amount, the 

seller's right to recover the resulting deficiency is subject to Sections 

51.003, 51.004, and 51.005 unless a provision of the executory contract 

releases the purchaser under the contract from liability. 

(f) The affidavit of a person knowledgeable of the facts that states that 

the notice was given and the sale was conducted as provided by this 

section is prima facie evidence of those facts. A purchaser for value 

who relies on an affidavit under this subsection acquires title to the 

property free and clear of the executory contract. 

(g) If a purchaser defaults before the purchaser has paid 40 percent of 

the amount due or the equivalent of 48 monthly payments under the 

executory contract, the seller may enforce the remedy of rescission or 

of forfeiture and acceleration of the indebtedness if the seller complies 

with the notice requirements of Sections 5.063 and 5.064. 

TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.066. 
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Neither that provision nor any provision of Subchapter D expressly prohibits 

an owner or seller from pursuing a forcible detainer action to evict the purchaser. 

See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 5.061-.87. The terms “eviction,” “forcible detainer,” and 

“forcible entry” are not found in Subchapter D. See id. Similarly, the authorities cited 

by Warren do not imply or hold that eviction is a remedy unavailable to the seller 

when a buyer defaults on a recorded, executory contract. Subchapter D did not 

prohibit Hallett from prosecuting and prevailing on the forcible detainer action. 

We have already concluded the Contract’s tenancy-at-sufferance clause 

allowed the trial court to determine the issue of possession without adjudicating the 

issue of title. See Brown, 2005 WL 675563, at *3; see also Hinojosa v. Fin. of Am. 

Reverse, LLC, No 04-19-00787-CV, 2021 WL 1199045, at *2 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Mar. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Based on evidence of a landlord-tenant 

at sufferance relationship, the issue of possession may be determined independent 

of title, even if a tenant at sufferance challenges the [underlying agreement].”). The 

county court at law’s jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action is, therefore, not 

at issue. 

Warren’s arguments concerning the applicability of Subchapter D relate to the 

question of title, not to the question of possession decided by the county court at law. 

E.g., Lugo v. Ross, 378 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) 

(concluding justice court had jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer suit 

regardless of whether Subchapter D would apply in title dispute because “there was 
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no title dispute to be resolved” in the justice court); cf. Reeder, 294 S.W.3d at 856 

(noting “[i]f the purchaser defaults under the [executory] contract, the seller is 

entitled to possession of the property”) (citing Stevenson v. Lohman, 218 S.W.2d 

311, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1949, writ ref’d)). The parties may litigate the 

applicability of Subchapter D and the impact, if any, of those provisions on Hallett’s 

right to title in the district court. But under this record and considering our conclusion 

the county court at law had jurisdiction over the eviction case, we hold Subchapter 

D did not prohibit Hallett from prosecuting the forcible detainer action. See Reeder, 

294 S.W.3d at 856. We overrule Warren’s first issue. 

Further, Hallett presented sufficient evidence of ownership to establish a 

superior right to possession without relying upon the ultimate resolution of title. 

During the forcible detainer proceedings, Hallett presented (1) the Contract 

containing a tenancy-at-sufferance clause; (2) undisputed proof of Warren’s default, 

(3) proof of his demand for Warren to vacate the property, and (4) Warren’s refusal 

to vacate the property. These documents showed Warren was a tenant at sufferance 

who had refused to surrender possession, satisfying the elements of a forcible 

detainer action. See Gardocki v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, No. 14-12-00921-CV, 2013 

WL 6568765, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2013, no pet.). 

Under this record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting Hallett immediate 

possession of the property. To the extent Warren challenges the determination of 

possession, we overrule that challenge. 
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CONCLUSION 

The county court at law had subject matter jurisdiction over the forcible 

detainer action and rendered a judgment for Hallett permitted under Texas law. 

Accordingly, we overrule Warren’s appellate issues and affirm the order denying 

Warren’s plea to the jurisdiction and the judgment in favor of Hallett on the forcible 

detainer claim. 

230172F.P05 

 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CAROL WARREN, Appellant 

No. 05-23-00172-CV V. 

DONALD HALLETT, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 1, Rockwall County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CI1-22-0050. 

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Nowell and Smith 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order 

denying appellant’s plea to the jurisdiction and judgment of the trial court are 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee DONALD HALLETT recover his costs of 

this appeal from appellant CAROL WARREN. 

Judgment entered this 23rd day of February 2024.