J-S42016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF D.N.L.H., 

MINOR CHILD

APPEAL OF: R.H., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 865 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court 

at No(s): 021-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JANUARY 27, 2023

Appellant, R.H. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered on March 14, 

2022 granting a petition filed by D.L. (“Mother”) to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to his son, D.N.L.H. (“Child”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b). We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case:

[...] Child [was born] [i]n August [], 2012. Following [] Child’s 

birth, Mother and Father began a co-parenting relationship with [] 

Child, during which Father would occasionally stay with Mother 

and perform parental duties on behalf of [] Child. The extended 

family contacts for [] Child include Father’s own mother [] 

(hereinafter “Grandmother”), who passed away after appearing to 

provide testimony in this matter. While [] Child was still at a very 

young age, Mother entered a job training program called “job 

corps,” which required her to reside separately from [] Child for a 

period of between six and nine months. During this time, Mother 

signed paperwork directing that the public assistance she received

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S42016-22

- 2 -

on behalf of [] Child be transferred to Grandmother. Father 

continued to maintain the same level of contact with [] Child 

during this time period. 

Following Mother’s return from the job corps program, Father 

became incarcerated [] around 2015. While incarcerated, Father 

lost contact with Mother, and by extension, [] Child. Upon his 

release, Father indicated that he attempted to see [] Child each 

day until Mother filed a Protection from Abuse (PFA) [p]etition

against him. After a final PFA order was entered in January 2018, 

Father testified that he no longer had contact with [] Child out of 

an abundance of caution because he did not want to be accused 

of violating the PFA order. The PFA order did not include any 

specific custody terms, but only indicated that the parties were to 

abide by the terms of their current custody order, and that Father 

could modify those terms by petitioning the custody court. Mother 

[] married [another man (“Stepfather”)] in September 2020. The 

PFA [order] expired in January of 2021, and shortly thereafter,

[on February 19, 2021,] Mother petitioned [the trial c]ourt to 

terminate Father’s parental rights [so that, ultimately, Stepfather 

could adopt Child].

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 2-3. “The hearing on Mother’s [p]etition 

spanned several days, first taking place on July 22, 2021, then on October 13, 

2021, and finally concluding after testimony was taken on February 22, 2022.” 

Id. at 1. At each hearing, Mother and Father were represented by counsel. 

Id. The trial court also appointed both an attorney to represent Child’s legal 

interests and a separate guardian ad litem who were both present for all three 

hearings. Id. On March 14, 2022, the trial court granted Mother’s petition 

and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights. This timely appeal 

resulted.1

____________________________________________

1

 Due to a breakdown in the judicial system, Father was not properly served 

with the trial court order. As a result, the trial court granted Father additional 

time to file a notice of appeal. On July 15, 2022, Father filed a timely notice 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S42016-22

- 3 -

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) where 

[F]ather, based on all available resources and ability, exercised 

reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in his path 

and maintaining a relationship with [Child]?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where the 

evidence indicated the lack of integrity of the proposed 

adoption and the unlikelihood that the proposed adoption 

would occur[?]

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where

[Mother] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

severing the parent-child bond would not have a detrimental 

effect on [Child] and would best serve the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of [Child ?]

Father’s Brief at 4-5.

In his first issue presented, Father claims that the trial court erred by 

involuntarily terminating his parental rights under Section 2511(a) because 

“[M]other actively prevented contact between [F]ather and [Child].” Id. at 

19. Father claims that he did not understand the terms of the PFA order 

and/or the custody order that Mother subsequently obtained. Id. at 20. 

Further, Father asserts that, following the issuance of the PFA order, Mother 

____________________________________________

of appeal, and a corresponding concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 18, 2022. 
J-S42016-22

- 4 -

moved, did not disclose her new address to Father, and blocked Father and 

paternal relatives on social media. Id. at 20-21. Finally, Father contends that 

due to his “limited cognitive abilities and scarce financial resources, it was 

impossible for [F]ather to overcome the barriers to contact erected by 

[M]other.” Id. at 23. Father asserts that his status as a resident of Allegheny 

County foreclosed his efforts to secure pro bono legal services in 

Westmoreland County. Id. at 24. Father also maintains that his cognitive 

impairments prevented him from handling this matter pro se, since he lacked 

academic and computer skills needed to pursue litigation. Id. at 24-25.

We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, 

which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d

580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate 

courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 

256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d

343, 358 (Pa. 2021).

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of parental 

rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Section 2511(a) 

provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial 

court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of 

the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must then 
J-S42016-22

- 5 -

consider whether termination would best serve the child under subsection (b). 

Id. § 2511(b).

Initially, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

Our Supreme Court has stated:

Appellate review in cases involving involuntary termination of 

parental rights is limited to determining whether the trial court's 

determination is supported by competent evidence. When 

applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court 

if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial 

court's factual findings are supported by the evidence, an 

appellate court may not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it 

has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters 

not that an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of 

discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for 

the trial court's decision, the decree must stand.

Parents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions regarding 

the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot be denied 

that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent 

and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is 

an undeniable importance in a child's relationship with a biological 
J-S42016-22

- 6 -

parent. In recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination 

of parental rights, the moving party must establish the statutory 

grounds by clear and convincing evidence; that is, evidence that 

is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a trier of 

fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth 

of the precise facts in issue.

To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), the party 

seeking termination must prove that the parent by conduct 

continuing for a period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties. Parental duties are not 

defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts long have interpreted 

parental duties in relation to the needs of a child, such as love, 

protection, guidance and support. Parental duties are carried out 

through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the 

parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive actions 

undoubtedly includes communication and association. The 

performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert 

himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's 

life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable 

firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of 

preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more 

suitable time to perform parental responsibilities. Of importance 

is the General Assembly's emphasis in Section 2511(a)(1) on the 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination 

petition when evaluating a parent's conduct. Although courts are 

to avoid the mechanical application of the Adoption Act, we may 

not ignore that the General Assembly has drawn focus to the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the termination 

petition. Indeed, [our Supreme] Court addressed this aspect of 

Section 2511(a)(1) and reaffirmed that for an analysis 

thereunder, the most critical period for evaluation is the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the termination 

petition. 

When considering a request to terminate rights under Section 

2511(a)(1), a parent's failure or refusal to perform parental duties 

must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the 

case. [Our Supreme Court] has explained that:

a finding of abandonment, which has been characterized as 

one of the most severe steps the court can take, will not be 

predicated upon parental conduct which is reasonably 
J-S42016-22

- 7 -

explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the 

parent's control. It may only result when a parent has failed 

to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental 

relationship.

Decades ago, [our Supreme] Court clarified that a parent's efforts 

are always considered in light of existing circumstances. Thus, 

the focus of the inquiry is on whether, under the circumstances, 

the parent has acted with reasonable firmness in refusing to yield 

to the obstacles that have prevented the performance of parental 

duties. 

To that end, even where the evidence clearly establishes a parent 

has failed to perform affirmative parental duties for a period in 

excess of six months as required by Section 2511(a)(1), the court 

must examine the individual circumstances and any explanation 

offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the 

totality of circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the 

involuntary termination of parental rights. Consideration of the 

totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following: 

(1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the 

post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if any, 

including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact 

with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental 

rights would have on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). [To]

reiterate [] the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to [the]

mandate that courts avoid a mechanical application of the law 

regarding the termination of parental rights. The law must be 

applied with the purpose of serving the needs and welfare of each 

individual child in his or her particular circumstances. It is within 

this framework that a court determines whether a parent has 

faced barriers that prevented the parent from maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. What constitutes a barrier in the context 

of a Section 2511(a)(1) analysis is a finding within the discretion 

of the trial court, and what may constitute a barrier necessarily 

will vary with the circumstances of each case. In some instances, 

obstructive behavior by the child's custodian presents a barrier to 

the parent's ability to perform parental duties, which mitigates the 

parent's failure to maintain the parent-child relationship. In other 

instances, trial courts have found substance abuse, mental health 

issues, homelessness, joblessness, criminal charges, or a 

confluence of some or all of these issues created barriers to the 

maintenance of the parent-child relationship. In all instances, the 

trial court consider[s] the explanation offered by the parent when 

deciding whether termination of parental rights was warranted.
J-S42016-22

- 8 -

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591–593 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations, 

quotations, and original brackets omitted). 

Here, in involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(1), the trial court opined:

The evidence presented [] indicated that [] Child had not seen 

Father since some time in 2017,

[2] prior to Mother obtaining a 

three-year [PFA] order against him on January 24, 2018. The 

consent order entered on the PFA specifically states that the 

parties are to follow the current custody order and that, if Father 

wishes to modify the terms of the custody order, he was to utilize 

the court system. Father discontinued any contact with [] Child 

from that point forward. 

Father’s argument on this point is that Father did everything in his 

power to maintain a relationship with [] Child but was 

stone-walled by Mother, thus, the fact that he had not maintained 

contact with [] Child or performed parental duties should not be 

held against him. Father testified extensively as to his learning 

disabilities creating difficulty for him to read and comprehend the 

various court orders pertaining to the custody of [] Child, but 

Father also indicated that he and [Grandmother] with whom [] 

Child resided on a temporary basis, were previously afforded some 

type of custody while Mother participated in her job corps 

program. He testified as to his reliance on family members and 

paramours to keep him informed, especially after Mother obtained 

a PFA against him. He also testified that neither the Allegheny 

County court staff nor anyone in his personal life explained the 

terms of the PFA order and whether it had an impact on his 

custodial rights. He stated that he was unaware of where Mother 

resided after the PFA was entered, but this is not uncommon in 

custody matters involving instances of abuse. Mother also 

testified that she blocked Father on social media platforms 

because she did not want him to have contact with her while the 

PFA was in effect. 

____________________________________________

2

 We reiterate that Child was born in August, 2012. As such, Child was 

approximately five years old the last time Father saw him.
J-S42016-22

- 9 -

The closest that Father came to taking any action on his own was 

to ask Mother’s brother and other people in his social circle if they 

could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to resume 

having contact with [] Child. While this may be considered 

minimal effort by Father, the notion that Father did everything in 

his power to overcome Mother’s efforts to keep [C]hild from him 

was not established by the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 4-5.

We agree with the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(1). Here, while the trial court focused 

on the six-month period preceding the filing of Mother’s petition, it carefully 

considered Father’s failure or refusal to perform parental duties in relation to 

the circumstances of the case. Here, there is no dispute that Father has not 

seen or contacted Child since 2017. Father has simply not carried out 

parental duties such as providing love, protection, guidance and/or support

through affirmative actions such as communication and association to develop 

and maintain the parent-child relationship. The trial court considered Father’s

testimony regarding his learning disabilities and Father’s argument that he 

relied extensively on family members to keep him informed. See id. at 4-5. 

Ultimately, however, the trial court determined that Father put forth “minimal 

effort” when his only action “was to ask Mother’s brother and other people in 

his social circle if they could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to 

resume having contact with Child.” Id. at 5. The trial court also examined 

the purported barriers that prevented Father from maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. While Mother filed a PFA against Father which 

created a barrier for him, the trial court determined that Father did relatively 
J-S42016-22

- 10 -

little to overcome that barrier. Moreover, we note that there is no dispute 

that Mother obtained a PFA against Father based upon his own conduct. See

N.T., 7/22/2021, at 74 (Mother testified that she filed a PFA petition when 

Father “found out that [she] was messing with someone else [and Father] 

sent some guy to [her] house to shoot [her] house up” while she was at home 

with her children, but that the plan was later aborted). Such conduct is 

neither reasonably explained nor beyond Father’s control. Father has simply 

failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship

and, instead, created his own impediments to having a relationship with Child. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err 

as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(1).

Father’s next two issues pertain to the trial court’s application of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) and, therefore, we will examine them together. First,

Father asserts that “[a]lthough [S]tepfather is willing to adopt [Child], the 

integrity of the proposed adoption is lacking[,]” and, therefore, the trial court 

erred by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b). Father’s Brief, at 28. Father avers that Stepfather has been married 

three times, including his current marriage to Mother, and has engaged in 

“adulterous affairs” and “open sexual relationships” in the past. Id. at 28-

29. Father also contends that Mother and Stepfather began their relationship

when Stepfather was still married to his second wife, there is a 36-year age 

difference between Mother and Stepfather, they “have little in common,” and 
J-S42016-22

- 11 -

it “appears [S]tepfather and [M]other entered into this marriage as an aid to” 

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights. Id. at 30-31. In summation

regarding the proposed adoption, Father argues:

[The] trial court should be concerned with not only whether the 

adoption will occur, but whether the family unit will remain intact 

in the future. Stepfather’s lack of respect for the sanctity of 

marriage and a strong proclivity to move from relationship to 

relationship calls into question the integrity of the proposed 

adoption. If [S]tepfather moves on from his current relationship 

with [M]other, like he has done with so many other relationships 

in the past, [Child] will be left without a father for a second time.

Id. at 30-31. In his third issue presented, Father claims the trial court erred 

as a matter of law or abused its discretion in generally applying Section 

2511(b) because Mother failed to prove that severing the bond between Father 

and Child would not have a detrimental effect on Child. Id. at 32-36. Father 

argues that Child’s preference was not considered and that the trial court 

failed to consider testimony from the court-appointed guardian ad litem who 

“did not believe that terminating [F]ather’s parental rights would be in the 

best interests of the minor child.” Id. at 36.3 

This Court has previously determined:

A petition to terminate a natural parent's parental rights, filed by 

one natural parent against the other under Section 2512(a)(1), is 

cognizable only if an adoption of the child is foreseeable. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b); In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 

1107 (Pa. 2011); see also In re B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 154 (Pa. 

1977) (stating petition filed by one biological parent for 

involuntary termination of other biological parent's parental rights 

____________________________________________

3 We note that neither the guardian ad litem nor Child’s counsel filed a brief 

in this case.
J-S42016-22

- 12 -

can survive only “in connection with a plan for adoption”; affirming 

denial of biological mother's petition for involuntary termination of 

biological father's parental rights, even upon proof of natural 

father's abandonment of child, absent mother's plan to have child 

adopted by step-parent or any other person). Even when a 

Section 2512(a)(1) petition might satisfy the statutory 

requirements for termination, a court still cannot grant the 

petition without a corresponding plan for an anticipated adoption 

of the child. In re Adoption of L.J.B., supra at 228, 18 A.3d at

1107. See In re Adoption of J.F., 572 A.2d 223, 225 (Pa. Super. 

1990) (construing language in subsection (b), albeit under a prior 

version, to mean that biological parent may not petition to 

terminate other biological parent's parental rights unless adoption 

is planned). A “contemplated adoption” is required in this context 

because Section 2512(a)(1) was not designed as a punitive 

measure to penalize an ineffective or negligent parent. In re 

B.E., supra at 156.

In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Involuntary termination under Section 2512(a)(1),

is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide 

a means for changing the surname of the child. Rather, the 

purpose of involuntary termination of parental rights is to 

dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption 

when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the 

continuing needs of the child.

Once a natural parent's rights are terminated, the concomitant 

adoption fosters a new parent-child relationship. Such a rule is 

sound because termination of the natural parent's rights prior to 

adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for purposes of 

protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit.

In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1107–1108 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations, quotations, original brackets, and footnotes omitted). “Strict 

compliance with the Adoption Act is a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction 

to hear a petition to terminate parental rights in connection with a proposed 
J-S42016-22

- 13 -

adoption.” In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284–1285 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citation omitted). 

Moreover,

[a]ssuming the termination pleading meets threshold 

requirements, the court proceeds with the two-part test for 

termination of parental rights under Section 2511 of the Adoption 

Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The initial focus is on the conduct 

of the parent whose rights are at issue.

* * *

The second prong of the test [under Section 2511(b)] centers on 

the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). “A proper Section 2511(b) analysis 

focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920 (Pa. Super.

2008), appeal denied, 970 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2009). The court 

should examine intangibles such as “love, comfort, security, and 

stability” when determining the needs and welfare of the child. 

Id.

Current case law indicates that while an averment of a 

contemplated adoption might be sufficient to obtain a hearing on 

the termination petition, at the termination hearing the petitioning 

parent must demonstrate the planned adoption is also in the 

child's best interests, before the court will terminate the parental 

rights of the responding parent. See In re Adoption of L.J.B., 

supra at 1110–1111 (implying no gain to child or society is 

achieved by terminating one parent's rights to permit adoption by 

another who is unwilling or unqualified to adopt). Thus, as part 

of its Section 2511(b) analysis of the needs and welfare of the 

child in this context, the court must address and evaluate the 

“proposed adoption” that was averred in the termination petition. 

See generally id.

Id. at 1287 (brackets added).

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 
J-S42016-22

- 14 -

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). “When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to 

use expert testimony. [Instead, s]ocial workers and caseworkers can offer 

evaluations as well.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Further,

in addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with [an adoptive] parent. 

In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Above all else . . . adequate 

consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s 

own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination 

of parental rights.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

“We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate 

support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious 

disregard for competent and credible evidence.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 

901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “The trial court, not 

the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility 

of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony.” Id. (citations 

omitted). “In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

On Father’s two issues related to Section 2511(b), the trial court found:
J-S42016-22

- 15 -

[]Father [contends] that the proposed adoption of [Child] would 

be suspect[.] Father points to Stepfather’s history of courting 

younger women but not maintaining a longstanding relationship

with them before ending the relationship in pursuit of another. 

Even if the [c]ourt did agree that Stepfather’s relationship history 

suggests what Father contends, the [c]ourt cannot speculate as 

to how long the current marriage between Mother and Stepfather

will last. According to the testimony presented, the parties intend 

to form an intact family, and the [c]ourt judged this testimony to 

be credible. [...] In this matter, the [c]ourt found the evidence 

regarding the legitimacy of the intentions of Mother and 

Stepfather to move forward with the adoption process for [] Child 

to be credible.

Father’s second point is also unpersuasive, in that Mother was able 

to establish that [] Child and Father have not had significant 

contact since prior to the filing of the PFA [petition] in 2018. 

Regardless of the reasons Father espoused for not pursuing a 

relationship with [] Child, the fact remains that for over four years, 

[] Child did not participate in building and maintaining a 

parent-child bond with Father. To say that would be detrimental 

to sever such bond would imply that one exists at all. Possibly the 

strongest evidence of this fact is that [] when [] the paternal 

grandmother to [] Child [] passed away in between scheduled 

hearing dates, Mother testified that she had asked [] Child if he 

wished to attend [her funeral], and he declined to do so. [] Child 

did not express any desire to contact Father or even any concern 

for Father’s emotional well-being following the passing of the 

paternal grandmother. As such, the [c]ourt found that no 

beneficial bond exists between [] Child and Father.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 6.

Upon our review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern 

no trial court abuse of discretion or error of law in involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). Mother and Stepfather 

testified at length about their intent for Stepfather to adopt Child. The trial 

court found this testimony credible and in Child’s best interest, and we will not 

usurp those determinations. While Father suggests that the trial court should 
J-S42016-22

- 16 -

have examined whether the family unit will remain intact in the future, the 

court was only required to address and evaluate the proposed adoption and 

the best interest of Child, which it did. Furthermore, as the trial court noted, 

it would be mere speculation to guess how long the current marriage between 

Mother and Stepfather will last. Additionally, there was no evidence of any 

bond between Father and Child and, therefore, it was reasonable for the trial 

court to infer that no bond exists. Whereas, in contrast, there was evidence 

that Stepfather provides financial, educational and emotional support for Child 

and that they are bonded. Father’s own feelings of love and affection for Child, 

alone, do not prevent termination of his parental rights. Accordingly, Father’s 

last two appellate issues lack merit. For all of the foregoing reasons, it was 

proper for the trial court to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2023