* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text, w e continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/3/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL O. ABEYTA, a child, through his mother, GERALDINE ABEYTA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-2260 (D.C. No. CIV-93-1082-JP) (D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUN GSTRUM, *** District Judge.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Michael Abeyta, through his mother, Geral dine Abeyta, appeals from an order of the district court affirming the f inal decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying his application f or child’s supplemental security income benefits. Michael was born on Sept ember 15, 1983, and was nine years old at the time of the hearing before the adm inistrative law judge (ALJ). He contends that he has been disabled from birth due t o prune-belly syndrome and an enlarged kidney. In an opinion that now stands as the final decision of the Secretary, the ALJ determined that Michael did have a severe impairment, but that the severity of the impairment did not meet the Lis ting of Impairments, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, nor was it of comparable severity to an impairment that would cause an adult to be disabled , seeid. § 416.924(e) and (f). We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Secretary's decision to determine whethe r it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards we re applied. Washington v.-3-

Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). On appeal, Michael essentially contends that the Se cretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Secr etary failed to consider certain evidence. We have fully considered his arguments and reviewed the record, and we conclude that the Secretary considered all relev ant evidence, that her decision is adequately supported by the evidence, and that s he applied the correct legal standards. The evidence showed that while Michael’ s impairments caused some bladder infections and fevers and limited his abili ty to participate fully in all sports activities, they did not limit his ability t o function independently, appropriately, and effectively for his age. He att ended school regularly, did well academically, and got along well with others. The evidence supports the decision that Michael is not disabled, and we therefore affi rm the denial of benefits. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Th e mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge