[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-5335.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 107929 

 v. : 

 

QUANTRAIL JOHNSON, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 26, 2019 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-628906-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Brandon Piteo and Tasha L. Forchione, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

David Martin King, Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant.

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Quantrail Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals his 

conviction following a bench trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
Procedural and Substantive History 

This case stems from a shooting that occurred on April 15, 2018. That 

day, Jason Gain (“Gain”) and his girlfriend Monalisa McCoy (“McCoy”) went to 

McCoy’s father’s house on Nevada Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, to do laundry. Gain 

had been staying at this house before he moved in with McCoy, and Johnson was 

staying at this house on the date of the incident. Johnson and Gain were friends, 

and McCoy met them both through her father. 

McCoy testified that she started her laundry and then went outside 

and sat in her car. Johnson came outside and asked her if she could take him to get 

some of his belongings. She told him to ask Gain if it was all right for her to do so. 

Johnson went back inside the house and, shortly thereafter, returned to McCoy’s car 

and got in on the passenger side. McCoy began to drive away and called Gain. 

Hearing that Gain was upset, McCoy turned around and went back to her father’s 

house. McCoy and Johnson went back inside the house, and Johnson began arguing 

with Gain. Gain went outside to his truck, and Johnson followed him outside to 

continue the argument. Several minutes later, Johnson came back inside. At this 

point, McCoy had called her father to come home because Gain and Johnson’s 

argument was escalating and she was nervous about what might happen. McCoy 

testified that she witnessed Johnson retrieve a shotgun from inside the house, load 

the gun, and go back outside. McCoy went to the bathroom, called her father again, 

and then heard a gunshot and proceeded to call 911. McCoy then went outside, 
where she observed Johnson standing over Gain, who had been shot and was tying 

a pair of pants around his leg to stop the bleeding. 

Gain testified that he had gone out to his truck to drink a Mike’s Hard 

Lemonade and Johnson approached him and pointed a shotgun in his face. Gain 

testified that he tried to grab the gun and then was shot in his leg. Gain testified that 

Johnson helped him tie up his leg and that McCoy drove Gain to the hospital. At the 

hospital, police interviewed Gain and McCoy. Both stated in their initial interviews 

that they did not know the identity of the person who shot Gain. At trial, Gain 

testified that he had been reluctant to tell police that his friend had shot him. McCoy 

testified that Gain told her not to identify Johnson to the police. Both identified 

Johnson as the shooter at trial. 

Johnson was arrested on May 15, 2018. On May 22, 2018, the 

Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Johnson on one count of felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), one count of felonious assault in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), one count of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited 

premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), and one count of having weapons while 

under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The first three counts carried 

one- and three-year firearm specifications. Johnson was appointed counsel, and 

pretrial hearings were held on May 31, 2018; June 11, 2018; July 2, 2018; 

July 19, 2018; July 26, 2018; and August 2, 2018. At each of these hearings, defense 

counsel requested a continuance for discovery and ongoing negotiations, and the 

trial court granted each continuance. 
On August 8, 2018, Johnson filed a pro se “notice to deny consent to 

any continuances ‘at the request of the defendant’” and a motion to dismiss. On 

August 29, 2018, the trial court overruled Johnson’s pro se motion to dismiss. On 

September 27, 2018, Johnson waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded 

to a bench trial. On September 28, 2018, the court found Johnson guilty of both 

counts of felonious assault with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and one 

count of having weapons while under disability. The court found Johnson not guilty 

of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. 

On October 29, 2018, the court held a sentencing hearing. Both 

counts of felonious assault were merged for sentencing, and the court imposed a 

sentence of three years for felonious assault, to be served consecutively to three years 

for the firearm specifications and concurrently to one year for having weapons while 

under disability, for an aggregate prison term of six years. 

Johnson now appeals, presenting six assignments of error for our 

review. 

Law and Analysis 

I. Manifest Weight 

In his first assignment of error, Johnson argues that his convictions 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Johnson challenges 

the credibility of both eyewitnesses and emphasizes that only one witness, the 

victim, actually saw the shooter. 
Unlike a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, a manifest-weight 

challenge attacks the quality of the evidence and questions whether the state met its 

burden of persuasion at trial. State v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99819, 2014-

Ohio-387, ¶ 25, citing State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio3598, ¶ 13. When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, a court reviews the entire 

record, weighing all evidence and reasonable inferences and considering the 

credibility of the witnesses, to determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d, 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

In asserting that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, Johnson argues that the police investigation in the case was lacking and 

that the eyewitness testimony was not credible. With respect to the investigation, 

any allegations of inadequate police work have no bearing on whether Johnson’s 

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. A manifest weight 

challenge looks at the quality of the evidence that the state presented at trial. A 

consideration of evidence that was not presented against Johnson at trial, regardless 

of why it was not presented, is irrelevant to our review of this assignment of error. 

With respect to the testimony from McCoy and Gain, Johnson 

emphasizes minor inconsistences in their testimony. While we acknowledge the 

inconsistencies in their testimony, a thorough review of the record reveals that as to 

the critical questions in this case, the witnesses provided consistent and generally 

credible testimony. McCoy testified that she saw Johnson load a gun and go outside, 
and shortly thereafter she heard a gunshot. Gain testified that Johnson shot him. 

Additionally, no evidence was presented at trial to suggest that anyone other than 

Johnson shot Gain. We do not find that any of the alleged inconsistencies in the 

witness testimony significantly undermined the witnesses’ credibility so as to have 

created a manifest miscarriage of justice. In light of the foregoing, we do not find 

that Johnson’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Johnson’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

In Johnson’s second assignment of error, he argues that certain 

statements the prosecutor made during her opening statement constituted 

misconduct and violated Johnson’s right to a fair trial. Johnson argues that the 

prosecutor mischaracterized McCoy’s testimony by stating that McCoy witnessed 

the shooting. He also argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized the nature of 

Gain’s injuries by referring to the gunshot as causing a fatal wound. In her opening 

statement, the prosecutor summarized the incident and investigation as follows: 

[T]he Court will hear from Jason Gain as well as other witnesses to this 

matter that [on] or about April 15th, 2018, he was shot in his leg by the 

defendant, Quantrail Johnson. It was witnessed by his girlfriend, 

Monalisa McCoy. And he bled out. 

Bled out. And he was driven to the hospital by his girlfriend, Monalisa 

McCoy. He had to undergo very severe surgery. Currently, had to have 

plates installed in his leg for this. 

And that victim, Jason Gain, did meet with the officers. He’s been 

cooperative through this whole process. Even provided detectives 

photographs of the defendant and named him as the person who 

administered that fatal wound. 
Johnson argues that these mischaracterizations were intentional and inflammatory. 

With respect to the description of the injury, Johnson argues that the only 

interpretation of the prosecutor’s words is that death was caused by the injury 

inflicted. 

In order to find prosecutorial misconduct, this court must determine 

that the prosecutor’s comments were improper and that they prejudiced Johnson’s 

substantial rights. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-15, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). 

During opening and closing statements, prosecutors are entitled to some latitude as 

to what the evidence will show or has shown and what inferences can be drawn. 

State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992). Further, the focus 

of our analysis is on the “fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). 

Johnson is correct that McCoy did not witness the shooting itself. 

Johnson is also correct that the shooter in this case did not inflict a fatal wound on 

Gain. We disagree that any reference to either by the prosecutor constitutes 

prosecutorial misconduct. Johnson characterizes the conduct in this case as “a 

desire to couch the matter as a murder with direct eyewitnesses.” This argument is 

undermined by the context of both the opening statement and the trial as a whole. 

The prosecutor made it clear that Gain did not die as a result of the gunshot by 

describing his injuries in detail. Further, of course, Gain’s presence and testimony 

at trial would certainly have been sufficient to negate any attempt by the prosecutor 
to make his injuries seem worse than they were. In addition, it is clear from McCoy’s 

testimony that she did not witness the shooting itself. 

Even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor’s statements were 

improper, Johnson has not shown how the statements had any impact on the trier 

of fact — in this case, the judge — let alone a prejudicial impact. Whether Gain was 

the victim of a gunshot wound and the severity of his injuries were not issues to be 

determined by the trier of fact in this case. The primary issue in this case was the 

identity of the shooter, and the state presented ample evidence that Johnson shot 

Gain. Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct that denied Johnson 

due process. Johnson’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Access to the Proceedings 

In Johnson’s third assignment of error, he argues that he was denied 

due process when the court denied him access to pretrial proceedings and granted 

continuances despite his notice to the court that he would not consent to any 

continuance. 

While a defendant “‘has a fundamental right to be present at all 

critical stages of his criminal trial[,]’” this right is not absolute. State v. White, 82 

Ohio St.3d 16, 26, 693 N.E.2d 772 (1998), quoting State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 

444, 653 N.E.2d 271 (1995), and citing State v. Meade, 80 Ohio St.3d 419, 421, 687 

N.E.2d 278 (1997). Even if a defendant has the right to be present at a given stage, 

his absence only constitutes prejudicial error where “a fair and just hearing * * * [is] 

thwarted by his absence.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 
330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Here, Johnson has not articulated any way in which his 

due process rights were particularly impacted by his absence from pretrial hearings. 

Johnson argues that because he made clear his desire to be present 

for all proceedings, the trial court’s failure to provide him access to pretrial 

proceedings is error. Johnson’s desire to be present for pretrial proceedings does 

not alone amount to prejudicial error. Therefore, Johnson’s third assignment of 

error is overruled. To the extent that Johnson also argues that his stated desire that 

the trial court not grant any further continuances has somehow violated his due 

process right to be present at pretrial proceedings, we do not see his stated desire 

relating to continuances alone leads to the trial court’s orders violating his 

constitutional or statutory rights. We will address this issue more thoroughly in the 

following assignment of error. 

IV. Speedy Trial 

In Johnson’s fourth assignment of error, he argues that he was denied 

his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Relatedly, Johnson argues that he was 

denied his right to a preliminary hearing pursuant to Crim.R. 5. 

Crim.R. 5(A)(4) provides: 

When a defendant first appears before a judge or magistrate, the judge 

or magistrate shall permit the accused or the accused’s counsel to read 

the complaint or a copy thereof, and shall inform the defendant: 

(4) Of the right to a preliminary hearing in a felony case, when the 

defendant’s initial appearance is not pursuant to indictment. 
Crim.R. 5(B)(1) goes on to provide that a preliminary hearing shall be scheduled no 

later than 10 days following the arrest, but that “[t]he preliminary hearing shall not 

be held, however, if the defendant is indicted.” Here, Johnson was arrested on 

May 15, 2018, and indicted on May 22, 2018. His indictment, which occurred before 

the 10-day time period for holding a preliminary hearing had elapsed, negated 

Johnson’s right to a preliminary hearing. 

The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and Article 1, Section 

10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy 

trial. Ohio has codified this right in R.C. 2945.71. R.C. 2945.71(C) provides that a 

person facing felony charges must be brought to trial within 270 days after their 

arrest. Where, as here, the defendant is jailed in lieu of bail awaiting trial on a 

pending charge, each day shall be counted as three days pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(E). 

R.C. 2945.72 sets forth circumstances under which the statutory time period may be 

tolled, including a continuance at the defendant’s request. 

Time began to run on May 15, 2018, when Johnson was arrested. 

Johnson was granted continuances on May 31, 2018, June 11, 2018, July 2, 2018, 

July 19, 2018, July 26, 2018, and August 2, 2018, all of which tolled his speedy trial 

time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E). On August 8, 2018, Johnson filed a motion to 

dismiss, which again tolled his speedy trial time. The court denied this motion on 

August 29, 2018, and trial began on September 27, 2018. Considering these tolling 

events, 53 days elapsed between Johnson’s arrest and trial. Pursuant to the 

statutory triple-counting provision, 159 days of the 270-day limit had elapsed. 
Therefore, Johnson was brought to trial within the statutory time period and his 

right to a speedy trial was not violated. 

Johnson also argues that the multiple continuances allowed by the 

court “at the request of the defendant” were improper because Johnson expressly 

declined to consent to any continuances and attempted to assert his right to a speedy 

trial through a pro se notice and motion. We disagree. “‘A defendant’s right to be 

brought to trial within the time limits expressed in R.C. 2945.71 may be waived by 

his counsel for reasons of trial preparation and the defendant is bound by the waiver 

even though the waiver is executed without his consent.’” State v. Shepherd, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97962, 2012-Ohio-5415, ¶ 21, quoting State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio 

St.2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978), syllabus. Further, Johnson’s notice to the trial 

court that he denied consent to any continuances was filed after numerous pretrials 

in which his counsel had requested and received continuances for the reasonable 

purpose of conducting discovery and engaging in negotiations with the state of Ohio. 

Finally, as we laid out above, even with numerous continuances operating to toll 

Johnson’s speedy trial time, he was brought to trial within the statutory period. For 

these reasons, Johnson’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In his fifth assignment of error, Johnson argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to statements 

made during the prosecutor’s opening statement and failed to move for dismissal on 

speedy trial grounds. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance at trial was seriously flawed and 

deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 687-688. 

We have determined that the prosecutor’s comments during opening 

statements did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, in part because the 

statements did not prejudice Johnson. It is entirely possible that counsel had a 

legitimate strategic reason for not objecting during opening statements. Even 

assuming arguendo that the failure to object was deficient, Johnson is unable to 

show how he was prejudiced by this. Johnson has failed to show a reasonable 

probability of a different outcome had his counsel objected. 

Similarly, we have concluded that Johnson’s right to a speedy trial 

was not violated. Therefore, his argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing 

to move for dismissal on this ground necessarily fails. For these reasons, Johnson’s 

fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

VI. Cumulative Error 

In Johnson’s sixth and final assignment of error, he argues that the 

cumulative impact of the errors in his trial amounted to a denial of due process. We 

disagree. Because none of the alleged errors prejudiced Johnson, we cannot 
conclude that he was prejudiced by their cumulative effect. Johnson’s sixth 

assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded 

to the trial court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., CONCURS; 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY