Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-901 | October 20, 2020 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of:

J.C. and G.P. (Minor Children),

 and

A.P. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

 and

October 20, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JT-901

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court Juvenile Division

The Honorable Mark A. Jones, 

Judge

The Honorable Ryan Gardner, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

49D15-1908-JT-740 and 49D15-

1908-JT-741
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-901 | October 20, 2020 Page 2 of 15

Child Advocates, Inc.,

Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] A.P. (Mother) appeals from the involuntary termination of her parental rights 

to two of her minor children. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the termination.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Mother suffers from an opioid addiction, which has left her homeless and 

unemployed. She has not had custody of her four minor children since they 

were removed from her care in March 2018. This termination case involves her 

two youngest children, J.C. (born in April 2010) and G.P. (born in October 

2015). Her older children are in the care and custody of their father.

[4] On March 9, 2018, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) took all 

four children into emergency custody. In the CHINS petition filed a few days 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-901 | October 20, 2020 Page 3 of 15

later, DCS alleged, among other things, that: (1) Mother had failed to provide 

her children with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment with 

necessary supervision; (2) she was using illegal drugs that seriously hindered her 

ability to care for the children; (3) she has a history of substance abuse and was 

previously found in the backyard of her home where she overdosed; (4) on or 

about March 9, 2018, the children were getting ready for school and found 

Mother overdosed on the bedroom floor; and, (5) Mother tested positive for 

cocaine and benzodiazepines following this recent incident. The children were 

all placed in the care of their maternal great grandmother.

[5] At a fact finding hearing on May 31, 2018, Mother admitted that the children

were CHINS and that she “would benefit from services to obtain and maintain

sobriety.” Exhibits at 20. By agreement of the parties, the trial court entered a

dispositional order that same day. The court ordered Mother to engage in

home-based case management and therapy, complete a substance abuse

assessment and follow all treatment recommendations, and submit to random

drug screens.

[6] By the CHINS review hearing in September 2018, Mother had completed a

substance abuse assessment in June and was scheduled to start outpatient

treatment after the hearing. Mother was struggling with services but partially

engaged. J.C. and G.P. remained in their maternal great grandmother’s home,

and the older children had been placed on a trial home visit with their father.
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[7] Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from her outpatient drug treatment 

program on December 1, 2018 due to sporadic attendance and positive drug 

screens. At that time, her addictions counselor recommended that she be 

referred for detox and residential treatment. Mother, however, did not believe 

she needed in-patient treatment for her addiction issues.

[8] Between May and December 2018, Mother inconsistently engaged in services 

with her home-based caseworker, Regna Yates, and made no progress toward 

her goals. According to Yates, “[Mother] would be clean, and then she 

wouldn’t be clean.” Transcript at 108. Mother started going to a clinic to legally 

obtain suboxone, an opiate blocker, but then stopped due to lack of funds and 

insurance. Mother was unemployed and had no income. Yates delayed closing 

out services for some time in an attempt to “fight for [Mother] and encourage 

her to do what she needed to do,” but she ultimately had to close services in 

December 2018 due to Mother’s continued noncompliance. Id. at 110. Yates 

encouraged Mother to enter a detox program, but Mother refused.

[9] Sydney Staten, the family case manager (FCM) since October 2018,

experienced inconsistent contact, and often no contact, with Mother over the 

course of the CHINS case. Mother had a pattern of contacting FCM Staten to 

discuss or reinstate services, and then FCM Staten would not hear from Mother 

again and Mother would not engage with the referred service providers. This 

pattern resulted in FCM Staten having to re-refer services for Mother at least 

three times in 2019 (January, May, and December). The inability to keep 

service providers on the case also made holding child and family team meetings 
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nearly impossible. Over the course of the CHINS proceedings, Mother 

submitted to no drug screens for FCM Staten and successfully completed no 

services. Additionally, Mother attended none of the CHINS hearings in 2019.

[10] At the CHINS permanency hearing on July 11, 2019, the court changed the 

permanency plan to adoption for J.C. and G.P.1

 The court noted that the case 

had been open since March 2018 and that Mother was not participating in 

services and had not addressed her substance issues. Shortly thereafter, J.C. 

and G.P. were placed with their respective paternal grandmothers, where they 

have each remained. These are preadoptive placements.

[11] On August 26, 2019, DCS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of the 

parent-child relationship between Mother and J.C. and G.P., as well as between 

the children and their respective fathers. Mother had no engagement with 

services after the plan changed to adoption, and she did not exercise supervised 

visitation through a DCS provider after July 5, 2019.

2

 

[12] Mother contacted FCM Staten at the end of 2019 and acknowledged that she 

was struggling with sobriety. FCM Staten looked into inpatient treatment for 

1 By this time, custody of the two older children had been granted to their father, and the CHINS case had 

been closed with respect to them.

2 Alexis White provided Mother with homebased services and supervised visits starting on April 25, 2019. 

The services went well for about two months until Mother informed White on July 5, 2019, that she had a 

warrant out for her arrest for violating home detention. In fact, the warrant had been issued on May 14, 

2019, and Mother was arrested on August 13, 2019. Mother never responded to White again, nor did 

Mother respond to a subsequent provider referred for supervised visits in November 2019. The criminal case, 

to which Mother pled guilty in February 2019, was for Level 6 felony obtaining a controlled substance 

(Percocet) by fraud or deceit. She completed her sentence on community corrections in October 2019.
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Mother at VOA but there were no available beds. Mother informed FCM 

Staten that she now had insurance, so FCM Staten encouraged her to seek 

treatment on her own outside of this unavailable DCS provider.

[13] The factfinding hearing in the termination case was held on January 15 and 

February 19, 2020. Mother testified on both days. On the first day, she 

acknowledged that she had a history of daily drug use and that she had illegally 

used prescription drugs as recently as two weeks earlier. She also testified that 

she was not engaged with services through DCS, had no home of her own, and 

was unemployed. Mother claimed, however, that she was starting a job at KFC 

the next day and that she had just completed a detox program two days before 

the hearing. The inpatient detox treatment at Valle Vista, for which Mother 

provided no documentation, was from January 9 to January 13, and, according 

to Mother, she was scheduled to start therapy and obtain more suboxone on 

January 24. Mother claimed that this time was different and stated: 

I am tired. I am just ready to get my life together, get a job and 

get my kids, that is all I want is a second chance. I know this 

case has been going on for almost two years. I mean nobody is 

perfect. I have been going through a lot.

Id. at 68-69. 

[14] On the second day of the hearing, Mother testified that she completed a 

substance abuse assessment with Journey Road on January 24 and attended an 

individual therapy session in February, though she could not recall that date or 

when her next appointment was scheduled. Mother provided no verification to 
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DCS or the court regarding these services or her claimed sobriety. Regarding 

employment, Mother indicated that she had quit her job with KFC in January 

after about a week and that she was scheduled to start orientation at the Finish

Line warehouse the day after this hearing. Mother had no details regarding her 

hourly pay. Additionally, Mother indicated that she had moved again (now 

living with a family member) since the last hearing date.

[15] FCM Staten, several service providers, and the GAL also testified in this case. 

In addition to Mother’s noncompliance with services, as set out in detail above, 

FCM Staten testified that there was no reason to believe that Mother’s recent 

amenability to treatment would not end the same way as it has in the past. She 

noted that over the history of this case Mother has never been able to follow 

through in the long run. FCM Staten opined that termination of parental rights 

was in J.C. and G.P.’s best interests. The plan following termination was for

J.C. and G.P. to be adopted by their respective paternal grandparents, with 

whom they had been living for about eight months and thriving.

[16] Similarly, the GAL, who had been on the case since March 2018, testified that 

in his opinion, termination was in the children’s best interests. The GAL 

noted, specifically, Mother’s inability to provide permanency for the children

after nearly two years, her failure to engage in services, and her inability to 

maintain sobriety. The children were doing well in their respective preadoptive, 

relative placements, and the GAL and FCM Staten did not believe that giving 

Mother additional time would result in reunification with her. Additionally, 

J.C.’s home-based therapist, Elizabeth Saterlee, opined that permanency was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-901 | October 20, 2020 Page 8 of 15

particularly important for J.C. and that J.C. would suffer additional trauma if 

she were to be taken from her current preadoptive home with her paternal 

grandmother.

[17] On March 20, 2020, the trial court entered its order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights with respect to J.C. and G.P. The parental rights of the 

children’s fathers had already been terminated, J.C.’s by default and G.P.’s by 

consent. Mother now appeals. Additional information will be provided below 

as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[18] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 

(Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

most favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004), trans. denied. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess 

the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. In light of the applicable clear and convincing 

evidence standard, we review to determine whether the evidence clearly and 

convincingly supports the findings and whether the findings clearly and 

convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628.

[19] We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise 

their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 

Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for 

the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those 

of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In

re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating 

parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id.

[20] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other 

things, that one of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services[.]

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. DCS must also prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child and that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. 

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C), (D); I.C. § 31-37-14-2. 
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[21] On appeal, Mother initially challenges the trial court’s conclusions with respect 

to I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). We observe that I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) 

is written in the disjunctive and, thus, requires the trial court to find only one of 

the three requirements of the subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See 

In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. Though the trial court found two of the 

requirements satisfied in this case, we will focus our review on the trial court’s 

determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the children’s removal and/or continued placement outside 

Mother’s home will not be remedied.

[22] In making such a determination, the trial court is tasked with judging a parent’s 

fitness to care for their child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed circumstances. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 

392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court also 

must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to 

determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the 

child. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a 

child’s removal for purposes of determining whether a parent’s 

rights should be terminated, “but also those bases resulting in the 

continued placement outside the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 

798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A court may 

properly consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, 

drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide 

support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. 

Moreover, a trial court “can reasonably consider the services 

offered by the [DCS] to the parent and the parent’s response to 

those services.” [McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & 

Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)]. In addition, 
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“[w]here there are only temporary improvements and the pattern 

of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably 

find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will 

not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). 

Id. (some citations omitted).

[23] Here, trial court made the following findings and conclusions in this regard:

f. The conditions that led to the Children’s removal or placement 

and retention outside the home of Mother are her continued 

failure to demonstrate the ability and willingness to meet her 

parental responsibilities and provide for the Children’s short-term 

and long-term needs due to failure to address her substance use, 

and her failure to show that she has stable, appropriate housing 

or employment.

g. These conditions have not been remedied.

h. It is highly probable that these conditions will not be 

remedied, even if Mother is given additional time to remedy the 

conditions. The Children’s CHINS case has been open two 

years. Although Mother testified that she completed detox and 

that she started treatment at Journey Road, she did not begin 

detox or treatment until nearly two years after the CHINS matter 

began. Mother has not verified her involvement or progress in 

treatment. Mother has previously said that she intends to engage 

in services only to fail to follow through and become difficult to 

reach. Mother has not signed releases so that DCS can obtain 

information regarding her treatment and progress.

i. Mother lives in a two-bedroom home with a family member, 

and had not started her employment with Finish Line at the time 
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of the TPR trial. She is unaware of what her hourly rate would 

be.

j. Mother has maintained contact with the Children, but has not 

demonstrated an ability to parent them throughout the pendency 

of the CHINS case. The Children have been in relative care for 

the entirety of the CHINS matter, and have never been returned 

to Mother’s care. Mother has also never progressed to 

unsupervised parenting time.

k. Mother demonstrated a lack of commitment to remedy the 

conditions and she is responsible for her failure to engage with 

the service providers. Mother failed to successfully complete 

services despite FCM making several referrals for court-ordered 

services.

l. There is a substantial probability that future neglect or 

deprivation will occur because of Mother’s failure to remedy the 

conditions.

m. The Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of Mother will not be remedied....

Appendix at 28-29.

[24] The evidence overwhelmingly shows that at the time of the final hearing 

Mother was not in any position to care for her children. She did not have 

adequate housing or stable employment and, at most, had been sober for less 

than two months. Further, she engaged in the recent treatment only on the eve 

of trial and provided no documentation or drug screens to show her progress. 
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Under the circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion in weighing 

more heavily Mother’s pattern of conduct during the almost two years leading 

up to the termination hearing. Contrary to her assertions on appeal, it is not 

evident that Mother had finally “turned a crucial corner” after four days of inpatient treatment and a couple therapy sessions. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Mother 

had claimed to be clean and had sought services in the past, only to disengage 

shortly thereafter and return to using drugs. While we hope, for her own sake, 

that Mother is now adequately addressing her substance abuse issues, which 

have clearly devastated her life, we cannot say that the trial court’s conclusion 

that she will not remedy these conditions is clearly erroneous.

[25] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court’s determination that termination of 

parental rights is in the children’s best interests. In making this best-interests 

determination, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by 

DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The court must subordinate the interest of the parent to 

those of the children and need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed 

before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199. 

Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]ermanency is a central consideration 

in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 

(Ind. 2009). “Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendations of 

the case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in 

addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
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termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re. J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

[26] The trial court made the following findings in support of its best-interests 

determination:

e. Permanency is in the Children’s best interests.

f. Mother has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to 

parent the Children, to provide the Children with a permanent, 

safe and stable home environment free from substance abuse, or 

to provide for the Children’s long-term and short-term needs.

g. The Children have been in relative care for the entirety of the 

CHINS matter, and they have both been placed with their 

paternal grandmothers for more than eight months. The 

Children have support and stability, and they are thriving in their 

respective relative care placements. 

h. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from her court-ordered 

services on several occasions despite multiple referrals and 

opportunities. Several providers also ignored their respective 

agency policies requiring discharge in order to attempt to assist 

Mother with meeting her goals. Mother did not begin services on 

her own until nearly two years after the inception of the CHINS 

matter, and approximately five months after the TPR petition 

was filed.

i. Both the FCM and the GAL believe that termination of the 

parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children, and 

the adoption of the Children by their relative caregivers, is in the 

Children’s best interest.
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Appendix at 30-31.

[27] Mother correctly observes that her constitutional right to raise her children may 

not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for them and 

that termination should be a last resort, available only when all other 

reasonable efforts have failed. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151-52 (Ind. 

2016). In this case, DCS referred and re-referred services for Mother time and 

again, and Mother regularly rebuffed service providers, who bent rules in order 

to try to help her. She barely ever engaged in services, and she made no 

progress for nearly two years. In other words, the record establishes that all 

reasonable efforts had failed and termination was in the best interests of the 

children.

[28] Judgment affirmed.

Riley, J. and May, J., concur.