1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 23-3162 (TJK)

TOURAJ ZAKERI,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTONY J. BLINKEN et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

In August 2022, Plaintiff applied for a tourist visa to visit the United States. Two months 

later, he interviewed with a consular officer. His application was then refused and placed in administrative processing. A year after his interview, Plaintiff sued several U.S. Government officials, alleging that he has waited too long for an adjudication. Defendants move to dismiss for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over claims against some Defendants and will dismiss them for that reason. As for the 

claims that remain, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for unreasonable delay. Thus, the 

Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss the case. 

I. Background 

According to his complaint, Plaintiff was born in Iran and is a Canadian citizen. ECF No. 

2 ¶ 8. In June 2022, he tried to board a flight from Calgary to the United States. Id. ¶ 13. But 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection informed him that he needed to provide evidence that he 

never served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Id. Several weeks later, Plaintiff returned

to the airport with that evidence. Id. ¶ 14. After an interview, CBP told Plaintiff that he was
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inadmissible to the United States as “an intending immigrant without an immigrant visa.”1 Id.

¶ 16. At that point, Plaintiff decided to apply for a tourist visa.2 Id. ¶ 17. He submitted his Form

DS-160 on August 24, 2022. ECF No. 2 ¶ 18. On October 20, 2022, he appeared for an interview 

with a consular officer at the U.S. Consulate in Calgary. Id. ¶ 19. His case was then refused and 

placed in administrative processing. Id. ¶ 20.

One year later, Plaintiff sued the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Consul 

General of the U.S. Consulate in Calgary. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. He alleges that he has been waiting too 

long for an adjudication on his application, invoking both the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 

and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). See generally id. Defendants 

move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

II. Legal Standards

To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must establish the Court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). When evaluating a Rule 

1 Plaintiff was apparently found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). See

ECF No. 1-1 at 1 (“Subject appears to be inadmissible 212a7A1 Immigrant without an immigrant 

visa.”). That statute reads: “Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any immigrant at the time of application for admission—who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document 

required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such document is required under the regulations issued by the 

Attorney General under section 1181(a) of this title . . . is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

2 To obtain a tourist visa, an alien must show that he (1) intends to leave the United States

at the end of his temporary stay, (2) has permission to enter a foreign country at the end of his 

temporary stay, and (3) has adequate financial arrangements to enable him to carry out the purpose 

of the visit to and departure from the United States. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.31(a). The alien must first 

submit an online Nonimmigrant Visa Application, or Form DS-160, and then appear before a consular officer for an interview. 22 C.F.R. § 41.103. At the interview, the consular officer determines “the proper nonimmigrant classification” and the “alien’s eligibility to receive a visa.” 22 

C.F.R. § 41.102(a). The alien bears the burden of establishing eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
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12(b)(1) motion, the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint 

and ‘construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be 

derived from the facts alleged,’ . . . and upon such facts determine[s] jurisdictional questions.” 

Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 

394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Without subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim, the Court 

must dismiss it. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant can move to dismiss an action for “failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.” To survive at this stage, a complaint must “plead[] factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[T]he Court must construe 

the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can 

be derived from the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Yet even assuming all the 

facts are true, the complaint has to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[M]ere conclusory statements” will not be enough 

to establish that a claim is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Analysis

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims of unreasonable delay in 

processing his visa application against the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate in Calgary, although not over those against the Attorney General and Secretary of State. But he has failed to 

state a claim for unreasonable delay. So while Defendants raise several other non-jurisdictional 

arguments for dismissal in their motion, the Court need not address them. See, e.g., Dastagir v. 

Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2021).
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A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue the Attorney General and Secretary of State

Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing 

controversies,” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988), of which “the core component of standing 

is an essential and unchanging part,” Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To

establish standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable 

to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Standing “is not dispensed 

in gross.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). That is, standing “must be demonstrated for each claim against each defendant.” Whitlock v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-cv-807 (DLF), 2022 WL 424983, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 

11, 2022).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing because aliens have no right to a visa or to 

travel to the United States, and so Plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable injury in fact. As many 

judges in this District have found, they are mistaken. True, when a plaintiff sues based on a “procedural injury,” like an unreasonable delay, that harm “must be tethered to some concrete interest 

adversely affected by the procedural deprivation.” WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 

305 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But Plaintiff has made that showing. Specifically, he alleges that he “has 

struggled with his business with being unable to visit the U.S. and this caused him a great amount 

of stress and anxiety.” ECF No. 2 ¶ 34. And “monetary harm[]” relating to a business has been 

held to “readily qualify as [a] concrete injur[y] under Article III.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 

594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). Other judges in this District have consistently held likewise in the visadelay context. See, e.g., Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419 (JEB), 2023 WL 6065095, at *4 

(D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (holding that Iranian nationals’ concrete professional and financial interests were sufficiently tethered to their procedural right to a reasonably expeditious agency 
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adjudication).

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims against some of them 

specifically. As noted above, to establish standing as to each defendant, Plaintiff must show that 

hisinjuries are “causal[ly] connect[ed]” to each defendant’s conduct and “likely” can be “redressed 

by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the Attorney General and the Secretary 

of State because he has failed to establish the causation and redressability prongs against these 

officials. Beginning with the Attorney General, Plaintiff fails to “allege any involvement of . . . 

the Attorney General . . . with respect to [his] visa application[].” Siddiqui v. Blinken, 646 F. Supp. 

3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2022) (dismissing Attorney General from immigration mandamus suit). Thus, 

Plaintiff has failed to establish that “the disputed delay here is traceable to [any of] the Attorney 

General’s actions.” Nusrat v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-2801 (TJK), 2022 WL 4103860, at *4 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 8, 2022). Indeed, the parties have not brought to the Court’s attention any similar visa case 

in which a court has held that a plaintiff had standing to sue the Attorney General. And as for the 

Secretary of State, his role in the visa-adjudication process has been circumscribed by statute. As 

the D.C. Circuit has held, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “grants consular officers 

‘exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding even the Secretary of State from 

controlling their determinations.’” Id. (quoting Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 

1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021) and Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 

“Because only the consular offices, and not the Department of State, can grant [Plaintiff’s] application[] . . . [he] cannot show that his injury is redressable by the [Secretary of State].” Siddiqui, 
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646 F. Supp. 3d at 75.

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The Consul General is a different story. Plaintiff alleges that she “is responsible for oversight of all consular activities of the Consulate,” including the processing of Plaintiff’s visa application. ECF No. 2 ¶ 10. And unlike the Secretary of State, who has been statutorily excluded 

from the visa adjudication process, the Consul General may enforce duties relating to visa adjudications because she “appear[s] to qualify as [a] ‘commissioned consular officer[]’ with authority 

over visa adjudications.” Liew v. Sanders, No. 24-cv-342 (TNM), 2024 WL 3026538, at *3 

(D.D.C. June 17, 2024) (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(d); then citing 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)). Thus, a 

court order directed at the Consul General could redress Plaintiff’s injuries. And so Plaintiff has 

standing as to the Consul General. See Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187 (ACR), 2024 WL 

1076810, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (finding standing as to consul general).4

3 Plaintiff argues that the Secretary can redress his injury because “nothing . . . precludes 

the Secretary . . . from directing consular officers ‘to conclude . . . matter[s] presented to [them]’ 

‘within a reasonable time.’” Al-Gharawy v. DHS, 617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting 

5 U.S.C. § 555(b)); see ECF No. 12 at 3. But focusing on the statutory text, the Secretary is expressly precluded from “those powers, duties, and functions . . . relating to the granting or refusal 

of visas,” which would include administrative guidance for the pace of adjudicating visas or completing administrative processing. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the Secretary of 

State’s ability to redress his alleged injury has been circumscribed by statute.

4 Defendants also argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction for another reason. 

They contend that the case is moot because Plaintiff’s application has already been adjudicated 

and refused under INA § 221(g). See ECF No. 11 at 21–23. But Defendants’ argument conflates 

standing with mootness. “Standing ‘assesses whether [a plaintiff’s personal interest] exists at the 

outset, while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists throughout the proceedings.’” 

Nepal v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 602 F. Supp. 3d 115, 123 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Uzuegbunam v. 

Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021)). “A case is moot only ‘if events have so transpired that 

the decision will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative 

chance of affecting them in the future.’” Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 93 (D.D.C. 

2020) (quoting ABA v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). And Defendants do not point 

to anything that has happened since this suit’s filing to moot Plaintiff’s legally cognizable interest 

in the completion of the administrative processing of his application. Cf. Didban v. Pompeo, 435 

F. Supp. 3d 168, 175 (D.D.C. 2020).
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B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Against the Consul General for Unreasonable Delay Under the Mandamus Act or the APA

Plaintiff brings his unreasonable delay claims under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 

and § 706(1) of the APA. See ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 21–37. The Court applies the same legal standard to 

these claims. Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (D.D.C. 2017). In essence, the Court must

determine “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” In re Core 

Commc’ns, Inc. 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

To help guide this inquiry, the D.C. Circuit has laid out a six-factor test:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory 

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less 

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;

(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority;

(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests 

prejudiced by delay;

(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order 

to hold that the agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Telecomms. Rsch. and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”) (cleaned 

up); see also Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“[T]o 

guide our unreasonable-delay analysis, we ordinarily look to six non-exclusive TRAC factors.”). 

These factors “are not ‘ironclad,’ but rather are intended to provide ‘useful guidance in assessing 

claims of agency delay.’” In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d at 855 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). 

Courts often address the factors by addressing them under “four basic inquiries.” Rashidi v. U.S. 

Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-1569 (JEB), 2023 WL 6460030, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2023).
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“First, is there any rhyme or reason—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for 

an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, what are the consequences of 

delay if the Court does not compel the agency to act (factors three and five)? Third, 

how might forcing the agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities 

(factor four)? Finally, is the delay intentional or due to any impropriety on the part 

of the agency (factor six)?”

Rahman v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-2732 (JEB), 2023 WL 196428, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2023) 

(cleaned up).

1. TRAC Factors 1 and 2

The first two TRAC factors are typically considered together. Milligan v. Pompeo, 502 F. 

Supp. 3d 302, 317 (D.D.C. 2020). And the first is often considered the “most important.” In re 

Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d at 855. These factors evaluate “whether the agency’s response 

time complies with an existing specified schedule and whether it is governed by an identifiable 

rationale.” Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. FDA, 74 F. Supp. 3d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 2014). “Congress 

has given the agencies wide discretion in the area of immigration processing.” Skalka, 246 F. 

Supp. 3d at 153–54. And because there is no “set timeline, the Court looks to case law for guidance.” Dastagir, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 165.

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 In Da Costa, the D.C. Circuit found a four-and-a-halfyear delay not unreasonable. 80 F.4th at 342. And “[d]istrict courts have generally found that 

immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three 

to five years are often not unreasonable.” Lee v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1783 (DLF), 2024 WL 

639635, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2024) (citation omitted). Further, “delays of around two years are 

5 Plaintiff argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) supplies the relevant timetable. See ECF No. 2 

¶ 33. Not so. That statute provides: “It is the sense of Congress that the processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of 

the application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). “By its plain text, § 1571 applies to Immigration and Naturalization Service, not the State Department, and it governs ‘immigration benefit application[s],’

not the nonimmigrant visa application at issue here.” Ahmadi v. Scharpf, No. 23-cv-953 (DLF), 

2024 WL 551542, at *4 n.9 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024). To the extent it has any impact on the first 

two factors—or the TRAC factors as whole—it does not tip them in in Plaintiff’s favor.
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usually considered reasonable.” Noori v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1463 (TJK), 2024 WL 939990, at *3

(D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2024); see also Ghadami v. DHS, No. 19-cv-397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1308376, at *8 

(“[M]any courts evaluating similar delays have declined to find a two-year period to be unreasonable as a matter of law.”). Because “[c]ourts measure the period of delay from the last government 

action to the issuance of the opinion,” Nusrat, 2022 WL 4103860, at *6 n.6, and Plaintiff’s consular 

interview took place in October 2022, the delay here comes to about 20 months. As reflected 

above, that delay falls well within what courts in this jurisdiction have consistently determined not 

to be unreasonable. That is so even considering delays only in the nonimmigrant visa context. See 

Shen v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-1263 (ABJ), 2021 WL 1246025, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2021) (holding 

that a 21-month delay in adjudicating a nonimmigrant visa was not unreasonable).

6

 For these 

reasons, factors one and two, taken together, favor Defendants.

2. TRAC Factor 4

The fourth factor “carries the greatest weight in many cases.” Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at

319. It examines the effect of expediting Plaintiff’s application on the agency’s other competing 

priorities. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Courts “are generally hesitant to direct agencies which tasks to 

prioritize, particularly if such intervention would move petitioner to ‘the head of the queue’ and 

‘simply move[] all others back one space.’” Lee, 2024 WL 639635, at *6 (quoting In re Barr 

Lab’ys, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75–76 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). In other words, granting expedited agency 

action is inappropriate when that relief “would necessarily come ‘at the expense of other similarly 

situated applicants’” with “‘no net gain’” in adjudications achieved. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 343–

6 Still, the Court may consider caselaw addressing delays in adjudicating nonimmigrant 

visa applications, like the one here, as well as immigrant visa applications. See Sawahreh v. U.S. 

Dep’t of State, 630 F. Supp. 3d 155, 162 (D.D.C. 2022) (declining to distinguish between treatment 

of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applications).
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44 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and In re Barr Lab’ys, 

Inc., 930 F.2d at 75). That is exactly would happen here if Plaintiff receives his requested relief. 

Ordering consular officials to process his application on his preferred timeline would “necessarily 

require [the agency] to prioritize [his] application[] ‘at the expense of other similarly situated applicants.’” Rashidi, 2023 WL 6460030, at *5 (quoting Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344). And this 

“would erode the ability of agencies to determine their priorities.” Tate v. Pompeo, 513 F. Supp. 

3d 132, 150 (D.D.C. 2021). Factor four thus heavily favors Defendants.

3. TRAC Factors 3 and 5

Factors three and five involve “the interests prejudiced by delay,” including possible effects 

on “human health and welfare.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80; see also Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 177 

(considering the third and fifth factors in tandem). Plaintiff alleges having suffered “immense” 

consequences. ECF No. 2 ¶ 34. He “has struggled with his business . . . and this has caused him 

a great amount of stress and anxiety.” Id.; see also ECF No. 12 at 2 (discussing Plaintiff’s “mental 

anguish”). The Court is sympathetic to these hardships. Yet Plaintiff is no different than many 

others in similar circumstances. Palakuru v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp. 3d 46, 53 (D.D.C. 2021)

(“While the Court does not doubt that [Plaintiff] has an interest in prompt adjudication, so too do 

many others facing similar circumstances.”). “Thus, these factors largely do not weigh in Plaintiff[’s] favor because there is no reason why [his] private interests in ‘health and welfare’ deserve 

special treatment relative to other visa applicants’ interest in the same.” Noori, 2024 WL 939990, 

at *4. And even if they do weigh in his favor to some extent, it is clear “[t]hey do not ‘overcome 

the other factors that weigh strongly in the Government’s favor.’” Dastagir, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 

168 (citation omitted).

4. TRAC Factor 6

Factor six insists that a plaintiff need not show bad faith or impropriety on the part of the 
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agency to prevail on an unreasonable delay claim. Plaintiff asserts that “the U.S. government has 

already issued an absurd finding of inadmissibility due to immigrant intent” and that this finding 

“is clearly a fig leaf to cover a discriminatory decision to not let someone of Iranian descent enter” 

the United States. ECF No. 2 ¶ 36. But Plaintiff alleges no specific facts in support of these 

accusations. And in any event, he does not challenge the agency’s inadmissibility finding, but the 

delay in completing further administrative processing. So the Court assesses this factor as neutral. 

And even if it did weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, it, too, would “not ‘overcome the other factors that 

weigh strongly in the Government’s favor.’” Dastagir, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (citation omitted).

* * * 

The Court takes notice of the “troubling backlog of petitions waiting for . . . adjudication.” 

Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344. As the D.C. Circuit has noted, those problems are serious. Id. But 

after weighing all the TRAC factors, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim for unreasonable delay of adjudication of his visa application. In fact—unfortunately—his wait time “pales in comparison to the longer delays other applicants have unsuccessfully challenged in this district.” Mohammad v. Blinken, 548 F. Supp. 3d 159, 169 (D.D.C. 2021). 

In the end, delays “stemming from resource-allocation decisions simply do not lend themselves to 

judicial reordering of agency priorities.” Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 319 (cleaned up). And 

Plaintiff offers no reason for the Court to bump him to the front of the line. 

IV. Conclusion 

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11, 

and dismiss the case. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly 

TIMOTHY J. KELLY

United States District Judge

Date: July 2, 2024