IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 11–0326

Filed August 5, 2011

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY

DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

ERIC K. PARRISH,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission reports that respondent has committed 

ethical misconduct and recommends a public reprimand. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

David L. Brown, Des Moines, for respondent.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

This attorney disciplinary proceeding comes before us on the 

report of a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of 

Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board alleges the respondent, Eric K. Parrish, violated 

multiple Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct as well as Iowa Court Rules. 

The basis of these violations involve his handling of his trust account for 

two clients in which Parrish withdrew funds from his trust account 

before they were earned, failed to promptly notify his clients of the 

withdrawals, did not earn the amounts withdrawn, and did not return 

the remainder of funds upon request.

The commission found Parrish violated several of the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct and Iowa Court Rules. The commission

recommended Parrish receive a public reprimand, be ordered to 

immediately refund the unearned fees, and attend continuing education

classes on billing and timekeeping. Upon our consideration of the 

commission’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, 

we find Parrish violated several of our ethical rules and suspend his 

license for sixty days.

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 

2011). The board must prove an attorney’s ethical misconduct by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. A convincing 

preponderance of the evidence is more than the preponderance standard

required in a typical civil case, but less than proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d 

33, 36 (Iowa 2011). Although the commission’s findings and 
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recommendations are not binding on us, we give them respectful 

consideration. Id. “Upon proof of misconduct, we may impose a greater 

or lesser sanction than the sanction recommended by the commission.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 

764 (Iowa 2010).

II. Findings of Fact.

The parties entered into a stipulation and agreement which

stipulates numerous facts. A stipulation of facts is binding on the 

parties. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gailey, 790 N.W.2d 

801, 803 (Iowa 2010). A hearing was conducted in this matter resulting 

in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation from the 

commission. Based upon our de novo review of the stipulation and 

agreement, and the hearing record, we find the following facts.

Parrish has been a licensed attorney in Iowa since July 1999. 

Parrish is licensed to practice law in the courts of this state and has 

maintained a law practice in Des Moines, Iowa, during all times material 

to this matter. During the past ten years, Parrish developed a practice in 

criminal defense and personal injury law. The board’s complaint alleges 

Parrish engaged in multiple rule violations. The alleged misconduct 

primarily concerns trust account violations.

A. Montgomery Ward Representation (Count I). In June 2005, 

Montgomery Ward was arrested in Marion County, Iowa, on suspicion of 

selling methamphetamine. At the time, he was also a suspect in a theft 

case. On October 7, he was formally charged with possession of 

methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, a class “C” felony, and theft 

in the second degree, a class “D” felony.

Ward entered into an attorney fee agreement with Parrish on 

October 20, indicating Ward would be billed for Parrish’s services at a 
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rate of $175 per hour. Ward’s mother paid the Parrish Law Firm a 

$10,000 retainer, which Parrish deposited into the firm’s trust account 

on October 21. Parrish filed an appearance for Ward in Marion County.

Between October 25 and December 7, Parrish withdrew fees and 

expenses from Ward’s trust account on six separate occasions. Parrish’s 

withdrawals totaled $10,000, Ward’s entire retainer. Parrish did not 

provide Ward with a contemporaneous written notice of the withdrawals 

from the trust account or a complete accounting.

Parrish negotiated a plea agreement with the Marion County 

Attorney’s Office. On June 30, 2006, Ward pled guilty to possession of 

methamphetamine, a serious misdemeanor, and theft in the second 

degree. At sentencing on August 11, Ward received a deferred judgment 

and two years of probation.

Immediately after sentencing, Ward requested a final bill. After 

numerous contacts to the Parrish Law Firm, Parrish finally provided

Ward a final bill on March 9, 2007. This bill reflected a statement for 

fees and expenses incurred totaling $1532.54 with a credit balance of 

$8467.46. The statement informed Ward that as soon as he received the 

statement and agreed to its terms, the firm would send a refund of his

retainer within 30 days. While Ward agreed to the statement, no refund 

was ever received by Ward, even after telephone and fax demands were 

made on Parrish by an attorney who was then representing Ward.

On July 23, Parrish sent Ward a revised billing statement for fees 

and expenses totaling $3693.54, with a credit balance of $6306.46. 

Parrish explained that the changes in the statement reflected that he had 

used the wrong hourly rate in his previous billing. On September 25, 

Parrish sent a second revised billing statement for fees and expenses 

totaling $3008 with a credit balance of $6992. On October 9, Parrish 
5

sent a letter to Ward’s attorney indicating he would be providing a refund 

based upon his previous billing statements. Parrish never issued a 

refund. 

Parrish sent yet another billing statement, which was created on 

November 15, claiming Parrish had earned $3020 and Ward had a credit 

of $6980. After no resolution to the fee dispute, Ward filed a complaint 

against Parrish with the Polk County Fee Arbitration Committee on 

December 17. Both Ward and Parrish participated in the hearing before 

the committee. On January 5, 2009, the committee determined Parrish 

had earned $1532.54 in fees and expenses and directed him to refund 

$8467.46 to Ward. No refund has been issued.

After Parrish’s adverse arbitration decision, and after Ward filed a 

complaint against Parrish with the board, Parrish undertook a review of

Ward’s file for the purpose of providing more complete billing information 

to the board. Upon completing his review, Parrish provided a billing 

statement, dated May 12, 2009, which indicated he had earned 

$10,325.01 for his work in representing Ward. At his disciplinary 

hearing, Parrish explained that he believed he earned the entire $10,000 

retainer during his representation of Ward. Parrish contended that his 

billing statements did not fully reflect the actual amount of work he 

conducted in the case. However, Parrish acknowledged his system for 

tracking the hours he worked was not adequate and further admitted 

that he could not provide the commission with an accounting. Parrish 

also acknowledged that he did not provide a contemporaneous 

accounting of the amounts he withdrew from the trust account. Lastly, 

Parrish acknowledged that no refund has yet been issued to Ward.

B. James Bixler Representation (Count II). In August 2009, 

James Bixler retained Parrish to represent him in a South Dakota matter 
6

involving a criminal charge for possession of cocaine and the civil 

forfeiture of Bixler’s Harley Davidson motorcycle. On August 11, Bixler

signed a fee agreement retaining Parrish at an hourly rate of $175. 

Bixler paid a $5000 retainer, which was deposited into the firm’s trust 

account on August 12. On September 28, Bixler paid Parrish an 

additional $3000.

After being retained, Parrish conducted research into South 

Dakota law and had some communication with officials in South Dakota. 

Parrish was not able to negotiate a plea agreement. Bixler’s motorcycle 

was also forfeited, although this forfeiture was later set aside.

On October 5, Bixler terminated Parrish’s representation in both 

the criminal and civil matters. Bixler requested a full refund of his 

$3000 payment and also requested a refund of the unused portion of his 

$5000 retainer. On October 8, Parrish provided a full refund of the 

$3000 payment. He did not provide a refund or an accounting regarding 

the $5000 retainer.

The records reflect that Parrish withdrew fees from Bixler’s trust 

account on four separate occasions between August 10 and October 21. 

Based upon a billing statement Parrish provided on March 10, 2010, the 

records reflect that Parrish withdrew more in fees than what he had 

earned. Parrish also did not provide Bixler with a contemporaneous 

written notice when he withdrew these funds. Lastly, Parrish’s March 10

billing statement shows Bixler was charged, at times, an hourly rate of 

$200 per hour as opposed to the $175 per hour rate specified in the fee 

agreement. Parrish acknowledges that a refund is owed to Bixler, but he 

has refunded no money to him.
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III. Ethical Violations.

A. Client Funds/Trust Account and Accounting. The board 

alleged Parrish violated rules 32:1.5(a), 32:1.15(c), (d), and (f), as well as 

rule 32:1.16(d). Rule 32:1.15(f) incorporates Iowa Court Rules 45.7(3) 

and 45.7(4). We will address these alleged rule violations together 

because they all apply to the handling of client funds.

Rule 32:1.5(a) prohibits counsel from making an agreement for or 

collecting “an unreasonable fee.” Rule 32:1.15 reads in relevant part: 

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account 

legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to 

be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or 

expenses incurred.

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 

client or a third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 

promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated 

in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 

with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 

or a third person any funds or other property that the client 

or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by 

the client or third person, shall promptly render a full 

accounting regarding such property.

. . . .

(f) All client trust accounts shall be governed by 

chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules.

Rule 32:1.16(d) provides upon termination of representation, a lawyer 

shall refund any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been 

earned or incurred.

Iowa Court Rules 45.1, 45.2(2), 45.3, 45.4, and 45.7 generally set 

forth the details a lawyer needs to know and follow when administering 

his or her trust accounts. These rules generally require a lawyer to place 

client funds into a separate subaccount, withdraw payment from the 

trust account only once the fee is earned, notify the client when the 

attorney anticipates making a fee withdrawal, and provide the client a 
8

complete accounting of any such withdrawal. The attorney must also 

transmit the notice of such withdrawal and accounting no later than the 

date of withdrawal.

From this court’s de novo review of the record, we find the 

convincing preponderance of the evidence establishes that Parrish has 

violated several ethical rules. Pursuant to Iowa Supreme Court Board of 

Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Iowa 

1998), the $10,000 fee paid by Ward and the $5000 fee paid by Bixler to 

Parrish were both “advance fee payments.” These funds remain the 

property of Ward and Bixler until Parrish earned them. Id.

Rule 32:1.5(a) provides that a lawyer shall not charge or collect an 

unreasonable fee or violate any restrictions imposed by law. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. D’Angelo, 619 N.W.2d 333, 

337 (Iowa 2000). “[T]aking fees in advance of earning them is illegal.” Id.

(referring to former Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers 

DR 2–106(A)). It is also illegal to fail to return unearned portions of 

advance fees. See Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 58 (determining failure to 

return unearned portion of advance fees constitutes collection of an 

excessive fee under the same rule). We find Parrish withdrew Ward and 

Bixler’s entire advance fees before they had been earned and then 

subsequently failed to return the unearned portions. As such, he 

collected an unreasonable fee in violation of rule 32:1.5(a).

We also find Parrish violated rule 32:1.15(c) and rule 45.7(3) by 

withdrawing funds from the trust accounts before the fees were actually 

earned. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c) (withdrawing fees only as 

earned); Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(3) (same). Parrish stipulates to withdrawing 

fees in both the Ward and Bixler matters before earning them. The 

record supports the stipulation.
9

We find Parrish violated rule 32:1.15(d) and rule 32:1.16(d) in the 

Ward matter by failing to render an appropriate accounting and failing to 

return advance payments which had not been earned. Ward immediately 

requested a final bill following his sentencing on August 11, 2006. After 

numerous telephone calls to Parrish’s office and other correspondence, 

Ward received a billing statement for fees and expenses totaling 

$1532.54. However, Parrish had withdrawn Ward’s entire $10,000 fee 

advance from the trust account by December 7, 2005. Clearly, Parrish

had not yet earned these fees. Even after several attempts to justify the 

fees, Parrish was never able to account for the $10,000 advance fee paid 

to him. When all else failed, a hearing was conducted before the fee 

arbitration committee. As a result of this hearing, Parrish was ordered to 

return to Ward $8467.46 as his unearned retainer. The amount so 

ordered to be refunded to Ward has yet to be paid.

Rule 32:1.15(f) incorporates rule 45.7(4) and requires attorneys to 

notify their clients in writing and provide contemporaneous accounting 

when the attorney withdraws fees from the trust account. Parrish did 

not advise Ward contemporaneously as to when he withdrew fees, and he 

did not provide Ward a full accounting regarding these fees. We find 

Parrish violated these rules.

Parrish also violated rules 32:1.15(d) and (f), 32:1.16(d), and 

45.7(4) in the Bixler matter based upon the same type of conduct set 

forth above. While he did properly deposit the advance fees into a client 

trust account, he failed to notify Bixler in writing and provide a 

contemporaneous accounting when he withdrew fees from the client’s 

trust account and failed, upon the termination of his representation of 

Bixler, to provide a prompt accounting and a refund of any unearned 

fees. In each case, Parrish has violated the Iowa Rules of Professional 
10

Conduct as set forth above, and the Iowa Court Rules as alleged by the 

board and found by the commission.

B. Rule 32:8.4(c). This rule states, “It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 

or misrepresentation[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). The board

contends Parrish violated this rule by repeatedly misrepresenting to

Ward that a refund was forthcoming. We require a reasonable level of 

scienter to find an attorney violated rule 32:8.4(c). Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa 2011). “In the 

legal sense, a misrepresentation usually requires something more than 

negligence.” Id. Accordingly, an attorney must act with some level of 

scienter greater than negligence to violate rule 32:8.4(c). Id.

We have previously found that Parrish violated rules 32:1.15(d) 

and 32:1.16(d) when he failed to promptly render an accounting to his 

client and promptly refund any unearned fees. When an attorney’s

conduct violates a specific rule involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation, we will not find the same conduct to also violate a

general rule prohibiting that conduct, such as rule 32:8.4(c). Id. While 

the court finds no reasonable excuse for Parrish’s failure to promptly 

refund retainers to either Ward or Bixler, from the record we cannot 

conclude Parrish made knowing misrepresentations of material facts by 

failing to return the retainers as promised. Therefore, we find Parrish did 

not violate this rule.

C. Rule 32:8.4(d). “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 

engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). There is no typical form of conduct that 

prejudices the administration of justice. Generally, acts that have been 

deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice have “ ‘hampered the 
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efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon 

which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Iowa 2007)).

Examples of conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice include paying an adverse expert witness for 

information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, 

demanding a release in a civil action as a condition of 

dismissing criminal charges, and knowingly making false or 

reckless charges against a judicial officer.

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768.

Under the facts and circumstances involved in this case, this court 

cannot conclude that Parrish’s failure to adhere to the requirements 

involving his client trust account and fees hampered the efficient and 

proper operation of the courts or of an ancillary system upon which the 

courts rely. Accordingly, we find Parrish’s conduct did not violate this 

rule.

IV. Discipline.

“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, 

and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an 

appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each 

case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley (Earley I), 729 

N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007). In determining an appropriate sanction, 

we consider: 

[T]he nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to 

continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from 

those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public 

confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of 

the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances.

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 

(Iowa 2008). The court has recognized, “Where there are multiple 
12

violations of our disciplinary rules, enhanced sanctions may be 

imposed.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 

574 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Iowa 1998). When determining appropriate 

discipline, this court also considers aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances present in the disciplinary action. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley (Earley II), 774 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Iowa 2009). 

Significant aggravating factors for punishment include “ ‘the existence of 

multiple instances of neglect, past disciplinary problems, and other 

companion violations.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2006)).

When dealing with client trust account violations, our sanctions 

have ranged from a public reprimand when the violation was relatively 

minor and isolated, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Piazza, 756 

N.W.2d 690, 700 (Iowa 2008), to license suspension when the violation 

involved poor office management and neglect, Earley I, 729 N.W.2d at

443–44, to license revocation when the violation amounted to a 

misappropriation of client funds, Earley II, 774 N.W.2d at 309. Based 

upon the record in this case, we are not faced with a single incident, nor 

are we dealing with a case of misappropriation. Therefore, the 

suspension cases are most helpful in determining the ultimate sanction 

to impose in this case. Cases involving suspension for client trust 

account violations range from two months in less serious cases, Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Plumb, 589 N.W.2d 746, 749

(Iowa 1999), to eighteen months in very severe cases when the violations 

combine with multiple instances of neglect and other ethical violations, 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Plumb, 766 N.W.2d 626, 634–

35 (Iowa 2009).
13

The commission has recommended that Parrish receive a public 

reprimand. The board has recommended that Parrish’s license to 

practice law be suspended for a period of no less than four months. In 

considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the prior 

disciplinary history of an attorney is a factor we must consider in 

imposing discipline. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 2000). Since that decision, this 

court has repeatedly considered prior admonitions as aggravating 

circumstances that relate directly to an appropriate sanction. See, e.g., 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cohrt, 784 N.W.2d 777, 783 

(Iowa 2010) (“A prior admonition is properly considered in determining 

discipline, especially when it involves the same type of conduct as the 

conduct subject to discipline.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129, 132, 140 (Iowa 2009) (noting prior disciplinary 

history included private admonition for a conflict of interest); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 821 

(Iowa 2007) (prior discipline included two private admonitions); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d 115, 117, 120

(Iowa 2007) (included in the parties’ stipulation was a prior admonition 

for similar conduct).

Without setting forth specific details, Parrish has been the subject 

of six private admonitions dating back to December 2001. The genesis of 

each of the admonitions involved Parrish’s failure to provide an 

itemization of services provided, and in at least two of the previous 

admonitions, the conduct involved the withdrawal of funds from a client 

trust account in excess of the fees that were actually earned. While an 

error in judgment or mere negligence by an attorney is not an 

appropriate basis for discipline, Parrish’s conduct over the last ten years 
14

has now developed into a pattern of violating the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct and the rules of this court relating to the 

administration of trust accounts. An additional aggravating 

circumstance involves his failure, now over many years, to return funds 

to his former clients. In the case of Ward, his refusal or inability to 

return these funds is now approaching five years. While less egregious

due to the amount in question, it is instructive that Parrish likewise has 

still not refunded the unearned fees to Bixler.

We also consider any mitigating circumstances. Parrish has been 

involved in providing pro bono legal services to individuals, and he is also 

active and involved in the community. Additionally, Parrish has 

indicated that he is attempting to take remedial actions to improve the 

billing and accounting problems that have plagued him in his practice. 

This has included the firm updating both its billing system and case 

management software so that this conduct will not be repeated. 

However, as noted by counsel, none of these remedial actions excuse 

Parrish’s failure to actually account for the time billed to his clients, to 

withdraw the proper funds based on the billings, or to provide a 

contemporaneous notice of withdrawals to his client. Finally, the court 

notes that Parrish has taken full responsibility for his failures, and 

Parrish cooperated fully in responding to the complaints.

Having considered all the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, and in our de novo review, a public reprimand under this 

set of facts would not be adequate. Such a sanction might have been 

appropriate had this case involved only a single incident of misconduct. 

See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel, 779 N.W.2d 

782, 789–90 (Iowa 2010) (publicly reprimanding attorney for failure to 

provide accounting for an advance fee payment); Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 
15

231 (finding an attorney who failed to dismiss an appeal after his client 

was unable to raise enough funds warranted a public reprimand); Piazza, 

756 N.W.2d at 700 (attorney received public reprimand for failing to 

place advance fee payment in trust account and to provide an 

accounting); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 730 

N.W.2d 202, 207–08 (Iowa 2007) (publicly reprimanding attorney for 

failing to provide an accounting and neglect in timely closing an estate). 

Unfortunately, the recurring pattern of conduct in this case warrants a 

stiffer sanction—namely a suspension.

V. Disposition.

We have carefully considered the respondent’s current violations, 

his prior history of ethical infractions, and his current fitness to practice 

law. Accordingly, we suspend Parrish’s license to practice law in the 

State of Iowa for sixty days. This suspension applies to all facets of the 

practice of law. See Iowa Court Rule 35.12(3). Parrish must comply with 

Iowa Court Rule 35.22 dealing with the notification of clients and 

counsel. Parrish is also ordered to refund to Ward the amount of 

$8467.46 and to Bixler the sum of $187.51. Prior to reinstatement, 

Parrish shall provide to the court proof that these sums have been paid. 

Parrish is also ordered to attend continuing education with respect to 

billing, timekeeping practices, and client trust accounts, and to submit 

proof of his attendance to the court prior to reinstatement. The costs of 

this action are taxed to Parrish pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26. 

Absent an objection by the board, and under the conditions set forth 

above, we shall reinstate Parrish’s license to practice law on the day after 

the sixty-day suspension period expires. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.