COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GEORGE LINWOOD STEVENS, JR., A/K/A 

 SQUENCHIE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0846-01-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 AUGUST 6, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Craig W. Stallard, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

George Linwood Stevens, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial 

of attempted capital murder of a police officer, in violation of 

Code §§ 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(6).1 On appeal, he contends the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the 

Commonwealth failed to prove he had the requisite specific intent 

to kill a law-enforcement officer. We disagree and affirm the 

conviction. 

 1

 Based on his guilty pleas, Stevens was also convicted of 

driving after having been declared an habitual offender and of 

attempting to elude the police. He challenges neither of these 

convictions on appeal. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 On January 26, 1999, at approximately 10:25 a.m., Richmond 

Police Officer Steve Hines was in uniform on patrol on a marked 

police motorcycle when he observed Stevens driving a black Ford 

automobile with a cracked windshield. Although he knew Stevens, 

Hines did not initially recognize him as the driver. Hines saw 

Stevens stop his car in traffic at the intersection of Maury 

Street and 15th Street in Richmond with his right-turn signal on. 

Upon seeing Hines, however, Stevens drove forward through the 

intersection with his right-turn signal still on. 

 When Hines pulled his motorcycle into traffic directly 

behind Stevens' car and activated his emergency lights and siren, 

Stevens sped away. As Hines followed, Stevens drove at "a very 

fast pace," nearly hitting other vehicles and running several red 

lights. Eventually, Stevens reached Interstate 95, where he 

drove at speeds in excess of one hundred miles per hour. With 

Hines in pursuit, Stevens weaved in and out of traffic and drove 

on the shoulder. He then abruptly exited the interstate onto the 

exit ramp at Bells Road, still travelling between eighty and 

ninety miles per hour. 

 Hines followed him onto the exit ramp, passing at least one 

large truck near the entrance of the ramp. As he pursued Stevens 

around the curve at the middle of the ramp, Hines noticed 

Stevens' car begin to slow rapidly and come to an abrupt halt. 

Unable to stop as quickly, Hines veered to the left and went 

around Stevens. He ended up approximately ten feet beyond 

Stevens' car and to its left. 

 Stevens' car straddled two lanes on the ramp and was pointed 

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slightly to the right, away from Hines and his motorcycle. Hines 

testified that all other traffic on the ramp had stopped and 

there were no other people or vehicles near them. Thus, Hines 

testified, there was nothing in front or to the right of Stevens 

that would obstruct him from proceeding in those directions. 

Because Stevens was straddling two lanes of traffic, he had, 

according to Hines, "pretty much the entire travel lane on the 

right" to use if he wished. 

 Officer Hines, who was still on his motorcycle "in second or 

third gear with the clutch in" and "trying to put the kickstand 

down," drew his pistol and, pointing it at Stevens, ordered him 

to get out of his car. At that point, Hines saw "movement in 

[Stevens'] vehicle," and the car started moving forward. 

Accelerating "pretty rapid[ly]," the car turned to the left and 

headed directly at Hines. Hines saw Stevens sitting up in the 

driver's seat looking at him. Convinced the car was going to 

crash into his motorcycle and hit him, Hines lifted his exposed 

leg and fired his weapon in an attempt "to repel [Stevens] away 

from him." Stevens' car immediately veered to the right away 

from Hines. As the car went by "about a foot and a half" to his 

left, Hines fired a second shot, hitting the car's left front 

tire. Ducking down in the car, Stevens made a wide U-turn and 

got back on the interstate, driving in the wrong direction on a 

flat tire. Eventually, Stevens wrecked his car and fled on foot. 

He was apprehended by Officer Hines in the nearby woods. 

 In a statement to the police, Stevens indicated he initially 

fled from the police because he had several outstanding warrants 

and his driver's license had been revoked. He further indicated 

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that, after coming to a stop on the exit ramp, he first turned 

his car to the left in Hines' direction because he was blocked by 

a large truck on the right side. He never intended, he told the 

police, to hit Officer Hines. He admitted in his statement to 

the police that he and Hines "did not have a good relationship" 

and that they had "had problems in the past," but further stated 

that he did not know the police officer pursuing him was Hines. 

 Finding Stevens had the "intent . . . to run [Hines] down 

[until] . . . the bullet scared him off and he went to the 

right," the trial court found Stevens guilty of attempted capital 

murder. This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, the party prevailing below, 

and the reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence 

support each and every element of the charged offense. See Moore 

v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997); 

Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 

(1991). "In so doing, we must discard the evidence of the 

accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as 

true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and 

all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Watkins v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). 

We will not reverse the findings of the trial court, sitting as 

the finder of fact in a bench trial, unless they are plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support them. See Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

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We are further mindful that the "credibility of a witness, the 

weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from 

proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's 

determination." Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375, 

512 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1999). 

 Code § 18.2-31(6) provides that "the willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer . . . when such 

killing is for the purpose of interfering with the performance of 

[the officer's] official duties" constitutes capital murder. To 

prove an attempt of that offense, the Commonwealth must establish 

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the accused had the intent to 

commit capital murder and (2) made "some direct, but ineffectual, 

act toward its commission sufficient to amount to the commencement 

of the consummation of the crime." Brown v. Commonwealth, 33 

Va. App. 296, 311, 533 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2000); see also Wynn v. 

Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) 

(noting that the "intent required to be proven in an attempted 

crime is the specific intent in the person's mind to commit the 

particular crime for which the attempt is charged"). "A person 

cannot be guilty of an attempt to commit murder unless he has a 

specific intent to kill." Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 

562, 565, 458 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1995) (citing Merritt v. 

Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 661, 180 S.E. 395, 398 (1935)). 

 Here, Stevens challenges, on appeal, only the sufficiency of 

the evidence to prove the requisite intent. Relying on Haywood, 

he argues the Commonwealth failed to prove he intended to kill 

Officer Hines. He claims the Commonwealth presented "no evidence 

. . . to show . . . [he] ever aimed his vehicle at [Hines]." To 

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the contrary, he argues, "the evidence showed . . . [he] steered 

away from and around the officer, negating any intent to harm 

him." Alternatively, Stevens argues, the Commonwealth's evidence 

failed to exclude the hypothesis that he merely intended, like the 

defendant in Haywood, to avoid police apprehension "by driving in 

a reckless manner, indifferent to the consequences in risking a 

collision, because he believed . . . he could crash through any 

vehicle in his way or . . . the police would move out of his way." 

 The question before us, therefore, is whether the evidence 

presented was sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Stevens had the "specific intent to use his 

vehicle as a weapon for the unequivocal purpose of murdering" 

Officer Hines. Id. at 566, 458 S.E.2d at 608. "A motor vehicle, 

wrongfully used," the Supreme Court has observed, "can be a weapon 

as deadly as a gun or a knife." Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 

273, 281, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984). However, "'[i]t is not 

sufficient that [Stevens'] act, had it proved fatal, would have 

been murder.'" Merritt, 164 Va. at 661, 180 S.E. at 399 (quoting 

1 Bishop on Criminal Law 521-22 (9th ed.)). To be guilty of 

attempted capital murder, Stevens had to have specifically 

intended "to take [Hines'] life." Id.

 "[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question 

for the trier of fact." Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551, 

238 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1977). "Intent is the purpose formed in a 

person's mind which may, and often must, be inferred from the 

facts and circumstances in a particular case. The state of mind 

of an alleged offender may be shown by his acts and conduct." 

Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 

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(1979). The fact finder may draw reasonable and justified 

inferences from proven facts, including the inference "that a 

person intends the immediate, direct, and necessary consequences 

of his voluntary acts." Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 

706-07, 508 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1998). "[W]hen the fact finder draws 

such inferences reasonably, not arbitrarily, they will be upheld." 

Id. at 707, 508 S.E.2d at 356. 

 "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to 

as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 

876 (1983). "However, 'the Commonwealth need only exclude 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, 

not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.' 

Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a 

question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless 

plainly wrong." Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13, 492 

S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997) (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993)). "When facts are equally 

susceptible to more than one interpretation, one which is 

consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact 

cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation." Moody, 

28 Va. App. at 706, 508 S.E.2d at 356. 

 In Haywood, the defendant, who had been drinking heavily, 

fled the scene after hitting the hood of another person's vehicle 

with a baseball bat. Three officers in separate vehicles 

attempted to stop the defendant, who drove down the middle of the 

road at a high rate of speed. Twice, individual officers set up 

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roadblocks by positioning their vehicles in the defendant's path, 

but, each time, the defendant kept driving without slowing down or 

changing his course. Only last-second evasive action by the 

officers allowed them to avoid a collision. The defendant was 

convicted of two counts of attempted capital murder of a police 

officer. We reversed the convictions on appeal, finding that the 

Commonwealth's evidence did not exclude a reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence; namely, that the defendant was merely attempting to 

avoid apprehension. Haywood, 20 Va. App. at 567-68, 458 S.E.2d at 

609. In reaching that decision, we noted, however, that "[t]here 

was no evidence that [the defendant] ever swerved or aimed his 

truck to hit the police cars when they pulled out of his path or 

that he turned his truck around in an attempt to hit the police 

cars after passing by them." Id. at 567, 458 S.E.2d at 608-09. 

 In Moody, the defendant was leaving the scene in his truck 

after breaking into a car in a high school parking lot. A teacher 

who had heard the sound of shattering glass observed the 

defendant's vehicle moving toward the parking lot's only exit. 

With the defendant's truck still more than thirty feet away, the 

teacher stepped into the defendant's path and signaled for him to 

stop. Instead of stopping, however, the defendant accelerated 

toward the teacher and motioned for him to get out of the way. 

With little time to spare, the teacher was forced to jump out of 

the way as the defendant accelerated out of the parking lot. The 

defendant was convicted of attempted malicious wounding. In 

finding the evidence sufficient to prove the requisite intent, we 

noted that, despite seeing the teacher on foot, the defendant 

deliberately chose to accelerate his car 

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toward the pedestrian, never decelerating, 

braking, or swerving to avoid him, even when 

[the teacher] was only five to ten feet away 

from being struck. [The teacher] was spared 

certain injury only by jumping out of the 

vehicle's path at the last moment. Although 

[the defendant] warned [the teacher] to move 

out of his way with a wave, this act does not 

negate the trial court's reasonable inference 

that [the defendant] had formed the specific 

intent to run over [the teacher] should the 

pedestrian not move out of his way. 

Moody, 28 Va. App. at 707, 508 S.E.2d at 356. We further noted 

that, unlike in Haywood, the defendant in Moody was not 

"attempting to run through an inanimate object; rather, the 

obstacle in his path consisted exclusively of a pedestrian." Id.

at 708, 508 S.E.2d at 357. 

 In the present case, the evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes that Hines came to 

a stop on his motorcycle approximately ten feet beyond and to the 

left of Stevens' stopped car, which was pointing slightly to the 

right. Stevens then turned his car to the left, away from a clear 

travel lane, and, looking right at Hines, rapidly accelerated 

directly toward him. Convinced Stevens was going to run him 

over, Hines fired his weapon at Stevens. Only then did Stevens 

turn away, narrowly missing Hines. Moreover, Stevens' assertion 

that he merely intended to avoid apprehension is clearly belied by 

the evidence that he could have driven from the scene without 

steering his car toward Hines. The evidence proved that, to get 

away, Stevens could have simply driven straight ahead or to the 

right, in the direction his car was pointed. Instead, he 

deliberately turned his car in Hines' direction and drove toward 

him. 

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 From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably infer 

that Stevens intended "to run [Hines] down" with his vehicle and 

that, with little or no protection afforded Hines by his 

motorcycle, Stevens' act, if not thwarted, would have resulted in 

the immediate, direct, and necessary consequence of Hines' death. 

We hold, therefore, that the evidence presented at trial was 

sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Stevens had the requisite specific intent to use his vehicle 

as a weapon for the unequivocal purpose of murdering Officer 

Hines. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Stevens' conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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