### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Se pte m be r 21, 200 4 S es sio n JE RRY BALES v . DIALYSI S CLI NIC, I NC. Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 00C2117 Hon. Samuel H. P ayne, Circuit Judge

No. E2003-03059-COA- R3-CV - F ILED NOVEMBER 29, 2004
Action alleg ed re taliatory disc harg e for

filing w orker s compensation cla im. Employ er de fende d termination on g rounds employ ee w as unable to pe rform his job due to disa bility

. The Trial Court g rante d d e fe nd a nt s umm ary jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

De nn y E. Mo bb s, Cle ve la nd , T e nn e sse e , f or Ap pe lla nt. Tim K. Garr ett, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or Appe llee.

OP IN ION

I n this a ction for reta liatory discharg e for filing a wor kers c ompensation claim, the Trial Court g rante d defe ndant employ er summary judgme nt. Plainti ff ha s appea led. I n th e Complaint , Pl a int if f a ve rr e d th a t he wa s te rm inate d f ro m hi s e mpl oyme nt i n reta liation for having filed a w orker s compensation cla im. He alleg ed he i n j u re d h is shoulder on May 22, 1999, while lifting a

patient at wor

k, and under went medical tre atment and surg erie s for the injury

. He stated he was unable to work since Aug ust 1999, was still being tr eate d by the doctor, ha d restric tions on the use of his arm, and was y et to r ece ive a perma nent disability rating

. He stated he was c ontinuing to re ceive temporary total disabilit y

benef its from the insuranc e ca

rrier

.-2- Plaintiff further

alleg ed that he w as p u t o n medical lea ve on Aug ust 6, 1999, and exhausted the t welve weeks the employ er a llowed, but he wa s then g iven additional thirty day s of persona l leave by the employ er, which expired on Dec ember 3, 1999. At that point, his position was terminated. Def

endant in its answer , essentially admitted most of the fac tual allegat i o n s i n the Complaint, but stated that plaintiff wa s discharg ed beca use there was no light duty work a vailable. Def endant then f

iled a Motion for Summary J udg ment, and the Court, in its Order g ranting summary

judgme nt, stated that plaintiff did not file for worke rs compensation benefits, but the ca rrier filed the c laim, and when pla inti ff wa s rele ased to re turn to work on Aug ust 16, 1999, with restrictions of no lifting with his left arm and no use of hi s left arm for half the day , the defe ndant terminate d plaintiff bec ause he was not able to perf orm his job. The Court conc luded by finding that the pl aintiff could not establish a ca usal link as he cla imed, beca use the e vidence was undisputed that plaintiff co u l d n o t perf orm the esse ntial functions of his job, and was te rminated pursuant to def

endant’ s leg itimate policy

. The issue on a

ppeal is whe ther a

presumption of re taliation s h o u l d arise when an employ er discha

rg es an e mploy ee prior to the employ ee rea ching maxi mum medical improvement a f t e r a w o rk e r s c o m p e n s a t i o n i n j u r y. To establish a re taliatory d i s ch arg e for filing a worke rs compensation claim, the plaintiff must show:

(1) The plaintiff was a n employ ee of the defendant at the t ime of the injury ; (2) the plaintiff made a

claim ag ainst the defendant for worke rs' compensation benefits; (3) the de fe nd a nt t e rm inate d th e plaint if f' s e mpl oyme nt; a nd(4 ) the c la im f or wo rk e rs ' c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts w a s a su bs ta nti a l f

a c tor in the emp loy e r' s mo tiv a tio n to te rm inate the e mpl oy e e ' s e mpl oyme nt. The burden of proof rests, of c ourse, upon the pla intiff to prove the e lements of the c aus e of a c tio n, inc lud ing a

c aus a l r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e cla im fo r w or ke rs ' co m p en s at i o n b en ef

i t s an d t h e t er m i n at i o n o f e m p l o y m en t
. P ro o f o f d i s ch ar ge without evidence of a c ausal re lationship between the claim for be n ef i t s an d the discharg e does not pre sent an issue for the jury

. Anderson v. Standard Re gister Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 558-559 (Te nn. 1993).

Plaintiff conce des he ha s no rea l evidence of a c aus al re lationship between the worke rs compensation claim and h i s t er m ination, but asked the Court to adopt a r ule of law that termination of an injure d worke r prio r t o h i s medical tre atment being completed a nd maxi mum medical improve ment being rea ched is c ompelling circumstantial evidence of a causal link betwee n-3-

the exercise of worke rs compensation rig hts and termination, thus satisfy ing the “substantial fa ctor” re qu ir e me nt. To a do pt this ru le , h ow e ve r, wo uldre qu ir e this Co urt to ov e rr ule pr e c e de nt o f this Court and offe r some compe lling and ove rriding rea son why we should not follow Supreme Court pr e c e de nt. I t is well-settled that termination without any evidenc e of a causal link to the worker s compensation claim i s insufficient to prove reta liatory discharg e. See Anderson . I n Anderson , the proof wa s that the plaintiff could not re turn to work due to me dical restric tions whic h rende red he r un able to pe rf

orm he r job

. Pla int if

f’ s te sti mon y wa s that he r e mpl oyme nt wa s te rm inate d b e c aus e "I 'd been ou t so lo ng .. . t heydi dn 't hav e th e ti me t o wa it ." Id

. at 559. The Anderson Court found that since ther e wa s no ev i d en ce o f a causa l relationship betwee n the worke rs comp cla im and the plaintiff’s termination, summ ary judgme nt was prope rly

g ra n t ed to t he employ er. Id ., se e als o Conatser v

. Clarksville Coca-Cola Bottling C o. , 920 S.W .2d 646 (Tenn. 1995) (termination allowe d if employ ee is not phy sically able to do the wor

k require d by

the job). Acco rd : Ree d v. Alamo Rent-A- Car, Inc. , 4 S.W. 3d67 7, 68 5 (Tenn

. Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) ; se e als o Tho ma so n v . B e tte r- Bi lt Aluminum Products, Inc

. , 8 31 S.W. 2d29 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; L ea t h er w o o d v. United Parc el Servic e , 708 S.W .2d 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

Ba sed on the above pr ece dent, it is clear the Trial Court prope rly g rante d summary judgme nt. Th e Judg me nt o f the Tria l Co urt is a ff ir me d an d the c os t of the app e a l is a sse sse d to Jer ry B a le s.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.