IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyson Shared Services, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Perez), : No. 1048 C.D. 2019

Respondent : Submitted: November 8, 2019

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: February 3, 2020

Tyson Shared Services, Inc. (Employer) petitions this Court for review 

of the Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) July 11, 2019 order 

affirming, as modified, the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision granting 

Gualberto Perez’s (Claimant) Petition to Reinstate WC Benefits (Reinstatement 

Petition). The issue before the Court is whether the Board erred by modifying the 

WCJ’s decision. 

On December 3, 2014, Claimant injured his right shoulder while

working as a mechanic for Employer. Claimant returned to work in a light-duty 

janitorial capacity. On December 30, 2014, Claimant underwent right shoulder 

surgery during which Claimant’s surgeon, Joel A. Horning, M.D. (Dr. Horning),

performed a torn rotator cuff repair and a decompression. On January 15, 2015, 

Claimant filed a Claim Petition for his right shoulder injury. On February 2, 2015, 

Employer filed an answer to the Claim Petition, in which it denied Claimant’s 

material allegations. On February 9, 2015, Dr. Horning released Claimant to return 
2

to work with restrictions. By February 20, 2015 letter, Employer requested Claimant 

to return to work on March 2, 2015, in a modified-duty janitorial position consistent 

with Dr. Horning’s work restrictions and with no earnings loss (2015 Job Offer). 

Claimant did not return to work. On March 4, 2015, Employer issued a medical-only 

Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) that described Claimant’s December 3, 2014 

injury as a work-related, right shoulder rotator cuff tear.

The WCJ held hearings on February 25, June 5, and July 27, 2015, and, 

on November 2, 2015, denied and dismissed the Claim Petition. The WCJ also 

suspended Claimant’s disability benefits as of March 2, 2015, due to the 2015 Job 

Offer and Claimant’s failure to return to work. The WCJ concluded that Claimant 

failed to meet his burden of proving that he suffered ongoing disability beyond March 

2, 2015, due to his work injury.

On March 3, 2017, Claimant filed the Reinstatement Petition, alleging 

that his right shoulder injury worsened after a third right shoulder surgery on August 

10, 2016. Employer filed its answer thereto, admitting that Claimant underwent 

work-related shoulder surgery and was entitled to reinstatement of temporary total 

disability benefits for a limited time period.

On March 27, 2017, Claimant testified at a WCJ hearing in support of 

his Reinstatement Petition. According to Claimant, Dr. Brian Brislin (Dr. Brislin)1

performed Claimant’s August 10, 2016 shoulder surgery. Claimant stated that (at the 

time of his testimony) he could not return to work in any fashion. On crossexamination, Claimant admitted that he last saw Dr. Brislin on December 6, 2016,

and that, consistent with Dr. Brislin’s office notes, Dr. Brislin imposed a 20-pound

lifting restriction when lifting with both hands, with no more than 10 pounds of 

lifting using just the right arm. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 195a. Claimant 

 

1 Dr. Brislin did not testify. 
3

also acknowledged that Dr. Brislin had released him to light-duty work before the 

December 6, 2016 visit, but Claimant could not recall the specific date. See id. at 

196a.

Norman B. Stempler, D.O. (Dr. Stempler) testified on Claimant’s behalf

that he treated Claimant both before and after the August 10, 2016 surgery. 

According to Dr. Stempler, he first examined Claimant after the surgery on December 

16, 2016, and found him to have pain and very limited movement. Dr. Stempler 

explained that he prescribed Claimant a course of physical therapy. Dr. Stempler saw 

Claimant again on February 15, 2017, at which time he observed that Claimant had 

some improved but limited range of motion, but had continuing pain. Dr. Stempler 

described that he also treated Claimant on March 10 and May 5, 2017. On May 5, 

2017,2 Dr. Stempler recalled that he re-enrolled Claimant in physical therapy because 

he believed Claimant’s condition had regressed. Dr. Stempler recounted that as of 

the last office visit, Claimant was still experiencing right shoulder pain, and also 

complained of left shoulder pain caused by overcompensating for the right shoulder. 

Dr. Stempler opined that Claimant was not capable of returning to full-duty work

after the August 10, 2016 surgery. Further, Dr. Stempler stated that he did not 

believe Claimant could perform any work, given the right shoulder restricted 

movement and pain, and the “significant amount of internal derangement of 

[Claimant’s] left shoulder.” R.R. at 57a. However, on cross-examination, Dr. 

Stempler admitted that, as of February 15, 2017, he believed that Claimant was 85%

to 95% recovered from the work injury, and he released Claimant to modified-duty 

work. Nonetheless, Dr. Stempler believed that Claimant’s condition regressed 

thereafter.

 

2 Although Dr. Stempler’s notes prescribing physical therapy were dated May 2, 2017, Dr. 

Stempler believed the notes were dated incorrectly and referred to the May 5, 2017 visit.
4

Matthew J. Espenshade, D.O. (Dr. Espenshade), a board-certified 

orthopedic surgeon, testified on Employer’s behalf that he performed Claimant’s 

independent medical examination (IME) on August 8, 2017. Dr. Espenshade 

described that he reviewed Claimant’s treatment records and noted that Dr. Brislin 

placed Claimant on light-duty work restrictions on October 25, 2016.3 

On March 1, 2018, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony credible in part

- specifically, that Claimant was unable to work while he recovered immediately 

following the August 10, 2016 surgery. However, based on Dr. Brislin’s October 25, 

2016 office notes clearing Claimant to return to modified-duty work, the WCJ 

rejected Claimant’s testimony that he remained unable to work thereafter. The WCJ 

also rejected Dr. Stempler’s testimony in its entirety on the basis that it was 

inconsistent and lacked credibility. Instead, the WCJ credited Dr. Espenshade’s 

testimony as “much more credible and worthy of belief.” R.R. at 32a, Finding of 

Fact (FOF) 15. 

The WCJ found relative to Dr. Espenshade’s testimony:

Dr. Espenshade reviewed the February [] 2015 modifiedduty job offer letter that was submitted in the prior round of 

litigation . . . [and] reviewed the testimony . . . concerning 

the duties of the offered position. Based upon his review of 

the testimony and the job offer letter and physical 

restrictions placed upon Claimant by Dr. Brislin and 

himself, Dr. Espenshade opined that Claimant was 

physically capable of performing the duties of the offered 

position as of the October 25, 2016 release to modified-duty 

work by Dr. Brislin[.]

 

3 Claimant did not object to Dr. Espenshade’s testimony referencing Dr. Brislin’s October 

25, 2016 modified-duty work restrictions, or that Dr. Brislin’s office notes upon which Dr. 

Espenshade relied were not offered into evidence.
5

R.R. at 31a, FOF 5(f). The WCJ also found:

Dr. Espenshade opined that there is no material difference 

between the work restrictions placed upon Claimant by Dr. 

Horning in reference to the 2015 modified-duty job offer, 

and the work restrictions placed upon Claimant by Dr. 

Brislin [on] October 25, 2016, or the work restrictions he 

himself has placed upon Claimant in August of 2017.

Id., FOF 5(g). The WCJ further stated:

Dr. Espenshade credibly found based upon his review of the 

medical records that Claimant was capable of returning to 

modified-duty work, as per Dr. Brislin, as of October 25, 

2016. Dr. Espenshade pointed out that the restrictions 

placed upon Claimant by Dr. Brislin as of October 25, 2016 

were essentially the same as the work restrictions placed on 

Claimant by Dr. Horning in February of 2015. Dr. 

Espenshade conducted his own extensive physical 

examination of Claimant on August 8, 2017, and 

determined that Claimant could return to modified-duty 

work with the similar restrictions placed on Claimant by 

both Dr. Horning and Dr. Brislin. Dr. Espenshade carefully 

reviewed the [2015 Job Offer] letter regarding the light-duty

janitorial position and determined that this position fell 

with[in] the work restrictions as outlined by Dr. Brislin as 

of October 25, 2016, and certainly fell within the 

restrictions he placed upon Claimant following the August 

8, 2017 evaluation.

R.R. at 32a, FOF 15. Accordingly, the WCJ found that Claimant was unable to work 

from August 10, 2016 through October 25, 2016, when Dr. Brislin cleared Claimant 

for modified-duty work. 

In addition, the WCJ 

f[ou]nd[] as fact[,] based [on] the testimony of Dr. 

Espenshade[,] that Claimant regained the ability to perform 

modified-duty work as per Dr. Brislin on October 25, 2016, 

and that this work release was essentially the same level of 

modified-duty work that Dr. Horning had cleared Claimant 

to perform in 2015. 
6

R.R. at 32a, FOF 17. Finally, the WCJ found

as fact that[,] as of October 25, 2016, Claimant had 

recovered sufficiently to perform the [duties of the 2015 Job 

Offer] he refused in 2015 [and] . . . that the previously 

refused modified-duty janitorial job fell not only within the 

restrictions as outlined by Dr. Brislin as of October 25,

2016, but was also within the restrictions as determined by 

Dr. Espenshade as of his August 8, 2017 evaluation of 

Claimant.

R.R. at 33a, FOF 18. Therefore, the WCJ concluded that Claimant had failed to 

prove an ongoing disability after October 25, 2016, since, as Dr. Espenshade

explained based on Dr. Brislin’s restrictions, Claimant became capable of performing 

the previously refused janitorial job as of October 25, 2016. Under the 

circumstances, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition in part and

directed Employer to pay Claimant benefits for the period from August 10, 2016 

through October 24, 2016.

Claimant appealed to the Board arguing, inter alia, that substantial 

record evidence did not support the WCJ’s finding that Claimant was capable of 

returning to modified work on October 25, 2016. Specifically, Claimant contended 

that the WCJ erred because Dr. Espenshade did not examine Claimant until August 8, 

2017, Dr. Espenshade improperly relied on Dr. Brislin’s hearsay opinion to conclude

that Claimant was capable of performing the duties of the 2015 Job Offer as of 

October 25, 2016, and Dr. Brislin was the only expert who could testify with respect 

to Claimant’s condition on October 25, 2016, but did not do so.

By July 11, 2019 decision, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision 

suspending Claimant’s wage loss benefits, but modified the suspension date from 

October 25, 2016 to August 8, 2017, the date of Dr. Espenshade’s IME. The Board 

explained:
7

A medical expert is permitted to express an opinion based, 

in part, upon reports of others that are not in evidence but 

upon which the expert customarily relies in the practice of 

his profession. Here, however, Dr. Espenshade did not rely 

on Dr. Brislin’s October 2[5], 2016 work restrictions to 

opine that Claimant was capable of returning to the 

previously offered, modified[-]duty job as of October 2[5], 

2016. Rather, Dr. Espenshade opined that the work 

restrictions were similar. No evidence was introduced that 

Dr. Brislin expressed an opinion that Claimant was capable 

of returning to that job offer, nor did [Employer] introduce 

the testimony of Dr. Brislin, which it could have done. 

Additionally, Dr. Espenshade admitted that his opinion 

about Claimant’s work restrictions was limited to the time 

of the IME. We therefore modify the WCJ’s suspension of 

Claimant’s wage loss benefits . . . to a suspension as of 

August 8, 2017, the date of the IME, because we determine 

that the WCJ improperly relied upon hearsay evidence that 

was not corroborated by any other competent evidence of 

record.

Board Decision at 5-6, R.R. at 18a-19a (citation omitted). Employer appealed to this 

Court.4

At the outset, 

[o]rdinarily, a claimant seeking reinstatement of suspended 

benefits must establish that the reasons for the suspension 

no longer exist. Specifically, the claimant must establish 

that, through no fault of his or her own, his or her earning 

power is once again adversely affected by his or her 

disability and that the disability which gave rise to the 

original claim continues. However, in cases where the 

suspension of benefits is based on a finding that the 

claimant has failed to pursue job(s) in good faith, the 

claimant’s burden of proof in a reinstatement petition is 

different; specifically, the claimant must prove a change 

in his or her condition such that he or she can no longer

 

4

“This Court’s scope and standard of review of an order of the Board is limited to 

determining whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether 

Board procedures were violated, whether constitutional rights were violated or [whether] an error of 

law was committed.” World Kitchen, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rideout), 981 A.2d 342, 

346 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
8

perform the job(s) offered to him or her which served as 

the basis for the earlier suspension.

Douglas v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harmony Castings, Inc.), 819 A.2d 136, 140 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Employer argues that, in faulting the WCJ for crediting Dr. Brislin’s 

restrictions where Dr. Brislin did not testify, the Board misstated the burden of proof 

in a reinstatement petition by ignoring Claimant’s burden to prove ongoing 

disability. Specifically, Employer contends that the Board mistakenly placed the 

burden on Employer to prove that Claimant was no longer disabled and concluded 

that evidence of Dr. Brislin’s October 25, 2016 release to modified duty was hearsay 

and, as such, extended benefits until the August 8, 2017 IME date. Employer asserts 

that the WCJ properly suspended benefits as of October 25, 2016. 

In placing the burden of proof on Employer, the Board stated:

Here, both parties agreed that Claimant suffered a workrelated injury of a right shoulder rotator cuff tear and that he 

had a period of temporar[y] total disability resulting from 

his right-shoulder surgery on August [10], 2016. As 

Claimant was entitled to a reinstatement of benefits, 

[Employer] thus bore the burden of proof that [sic] to show 

that [Claimant’s] loss in earnings was not caused by the 

disability arising from the work-related injury. [Employer]

was able to meet its burden of proof because it was able to 

show under [Pitt Ohio Express v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Wolff), 912 A.2d 206 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006),] 

that Claimant made a bad-faith rejection of a previously 

modified position.[5] Therefore, the WCJ did not err in 

suspending Claimant’s wage loss benefits.

 

5

“In this context, bad faith does not mean ‘overt malfeasance on the part of the claimant, but 

is merely the characterization of [the c]laimant’s action for refusing to follow up on a job referral 

without a sufficient reason.’” Napierski v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Scobell Co., Inc.), 59 A.3d 

57, 61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (McCarter Transit, 

Inc.), 650 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)).
9

Board Decision at 4, R.R. at 17a (citation omitted). Although the Board concluded 

that the WCJ properly suspended Claimant’s benefits, the Board effectively imposed 

a burden on Employer to provide evidence that Claimant was no longer disabled so as 

to entitle Employer to a suspension of Claimant’s benefits. 

In Soja v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hillis-Carnes 

Engineering Associates), 33 A.3d 702 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), the claimant suffered a 

work-related back injury in 2005 while working as a manual laborer for Hillis-Carnes 

Engineering Associates (Hillis). Hillis accepted the injury under an NCP and the 

claimant thereafter returned to work. In January 2006, while working for a different 

employer, the claimant exacerbated his 2005 work-related back injury. Hillis 

accepted liability and paid total disability benefits for one month after which benefits 

were suspended. In October 2006, while working for a different employer, the 

claimant experienced intense back pain while bending which radiated down his leg 

into his foot. The claimant filed a reinstatement petition seeking temporary total 

disability benefits as of November 1, 2006. The claimant testified about his ongoing 

physical condition and disability and offered medical evidence that he could not 

return to work due to the original work-related injury. Hillis presented medical 

testimony that the claimant’s injury was unrelated to the original work-related injury 

and also offered an April 24, 2008 surveillance videotape of the claimant (the same 

day he testified for the third time before the WCJ) which depicted claimant moving 

without difficulty and performing work. 

The WCJ concluded that the claimant was disabled from performing his 

usual occupation as of November 1, 2006, due to the original work-related injury. 

The WCJ reinstated benefits from November 1, 2006 until April 23, 2008, and 

suspended benefits as of April 24, 2008, the date of the surveillance videotape. The 

Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. The claimant appealed, arguing that the Board 

applied an incorrect burden of proof because, once he established a disability, the 
10

burden shifted to the employer to prove that his ongoing earnings loss was not caused 

by the work injury.

This Court affirmed the Board’s decision, explaining:

Where an injured worker petitions for reinstatement, he 

needs to establish that ‘his or her earning power is once 

again adversely affected by his or her disability, and that 

such disability is a continuation of that which arose from his 

or her original claim.’ Bufford v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal 

B[d.] (N[.] Am[.] Telecom), . . . 2 A.3d 548, 558 ([Pa.] 

2010). A reinstatement petition may be prompted by a 

number of circumstances. Here, [the c]laimant asserted that 

his disability was caused by pain when he aggravated his 

2005 injury while tying his shoe. In Bufford, the claimant 

sought a reimbursement of total disability when the 

employer ended his light[-]duty job. Because every 

reinstatement is different, the claimant’s burden of proof 

will be different.

Where a claimant seeks a reinstatement of benefits 

following a suspension, there remains a presumption that 

the work-related injury has not fully resolved. In a 

suspension, the claimant’s work injury, although not fully 

resolved, does not adversely affect his ability to work. 

Thus, when petitioning for reinstatement the claimant ‘is 

not required to produce medical evidence on the cause of 

his disability.’ City of Phila[.] v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal 

B[d.] (McGinn), 879 A.2d 838, 842 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). 

However, the claimant must establish ‘that his earning 

power is once again adversely affected’ and that ‘it is the 

same disability . . . for which he initially received [WC]

benefits.’ Riley Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v. Workmen’s 

Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (DeGroft), . . . 608 A.2d 598, 600 

([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992) (emphasis omitted). The claimant 

may seek reinstatement of partial or total disability.

Here, [the c]laimant sought ‘temporary total disability,’ and 

he proved that as of November 1, 2006, his back and leg 

pain rendered him unable to work. His medical evidence 

correlated that pain to his 2005 work injury. Such evidence 

was appropriate to support reinstatement. [The c]laimant 

argues that once he met that burden, he was entitled to 

continued total disability unless and until [the e]mployer 
11

showed that his loss of earnings was not caused by his 2005 

injury. We disagree.

Soja, 33 A.3d at 707-08 (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis added). 

In Soja, “the factual issue in the reinstatement petition was whether the 

[c]laimant’s loss of wages was caused by ongoing pain. Given this issue, . . . it was 

[the c]laimant’s burden to prove that the pain . . . persisted, not dissipated, 

through the pendency of the reinstatement proceeding.”

6

Id. at 708-09 (emphasis 

added). This Court further noted that the employer “did not have [the] burden of 

proof in [the] reinstatement petition, unlike a reinstatement where [a] claimant’s 

light[-]duty job has ended[.]” Id. at 708. The Court concluded:

[The c]laimant offered evidence to prove a continuing 

disability. When that evidence was found to be false, [the 

c]laimant argued that proof of disabling pain for a 

single day . . . shifted the burden to [the e]mployer to 

prove a cessation of pain. [The c]laimant cites no 

precedent to support that broad proposition. The nature of 

the reinstatement and the issue raised therein determines the 

burden of proof. Here, [the c]laimant’s evidence did not 

prove a continuation of disabling pain through the 

pendency of the reinstatement petition.

 

6

See also Mader v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (USAir, Inc.), 669 A.2d 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1996) (affirming the WCJ’s reinstatement of benefits for a closed period where the claimant failed 

to prove that loss in wages beyond the closed period resulted from a work-related injury). In Miller 

v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Johnson Matthey Holdings, Inc.), (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 167 

C.D. 2011, filed June 16, 2011), relying in part on Mader, this Court explained:

This case involves a reinstatement petition filed by [the c]laimant. 

Therefore, [the c]laimant was required to prove that his disability 

had increased or reoccurred and that his physical condition had 

actually changed in some way, along with the duration of his 

disability. In other words, in this proceeding, the WCJ, based upon 

the evidence presented, could have approved compensation for an 

indefinite period of time, for a closed period of time, or not at all.

Miller, slip op. at 4 (citations omitted; bold and underline emphasis added). Pursuant to Section 

414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), unreported opinions 

are not binding precedent, but may be cited for their persuasive value. Miller is cited for its 

persuasive value.
12

Id. at 709 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in the instant case, the factual issue is whether Claimant’s loss 

of wages was caused and continued to be caused by his work-related injury. Given 

that Claimant was found to have wrongly refused the 2015 Job Offer, Claimant had 

the burden to demonstrate “through the pendency of the reinstatement 

proceeding[,]” Soja, 33 A.3d at 709 (emphasis added), “a change in his . . . condition 

such that he . . . [could] no longer perform the job(s) offered to him . . . which served 

as the basis for the earlier suspension.” Douglas, 819 A.2d at 140.

Thus, the burden was on Claimant to demonstrate that he was disabled 

for the period in question. The WCJ found credible7 Claimant’s testimony that he 

was unable to work immediately following the August 10, 2016 surgery. However, 

the WCJ rejected Claimant’s assertion that Claimant continued to be “unable to work 

in any capacity” because it was inconsistent with both Dr. Espenshade’s testimony 

and Dr. Brislin’s office notes clearing Claimant to return to modified-duty work on 

October 25, 2016. WCJ Decision at 6, R.R. at 32a, FOF 13. The WCJ also found 

that Claimant’s assertion lacked credibility based on Claimant’s demeanor and 

appearance before the WCJ. Essentially, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony 

regarding disability credible only in part, and rejected Claimant’s testimony of 

ongoing disability beyond the date Dr. Brislin released Claimant to modified-duty

work. Further, the WCJ “reject[ed] [Dr. Stempler’s] testimony in its entirety.” WCJ 

 

7 The law is well established that ‘[t]he WCJ is the ultimate factfinder 

and has exclusive province over questions of credibility and 

evidentiary weight.’ Univ. of Pa. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Hicks), 16 A.3d 1225, 1229 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). ‘The WCJ . . .

is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any 

witness, including medical witnesses.’ Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Red Lobster), 760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Easterling), 113 A.3d 909, 918 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015).
13

Decision at 6, R.R. at 32a, FOF 14. Thus, Claimant’s evidence that he continued to 

be disabled beyond October 24, 2016, was found not to be credible, and there is no 

other credible evidence supporting Claimant’s position.

8

 Accordingly, Claimant did 

not meet his burden of proving ongoing disability beyond October 24, 2016, and the 

Board erred when it modified the WCJ’s decision. 

For all of the above reasons, the Board’s decision is vacated and the 

WCJ’s decision is reinstated.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

 

8 To the extent Claimant challenges Dr. Espenshade’s use of Dr. Brislin’s office notes on the 

basis that such office notes were hearsay, this Court explained: 

[I]t has long been held that a medical witness may express an opinion 

based upon medical records of others even if those records were not 

introduced into evidence[,] so long as they are the kind of records 

upon which the medical profession customarily relies in the practice 

of [its] profession.

Mithani v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mt. Airy Lodge), 730 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained:

[A] physician will often base his or her diagnosis on information 

obtained through other sources such as statements from patients, 

nurses’ reports, hospital records, and laboratory tests. [Primavera v. 

Celotex Corp., 608 A.2d 515, 520 (Pa. Super. 1992)]. ‘The fact that 

experts reasonably and regularly rely on this type of information 

merely to practice their profession lends strong indicia of reliability to 

source material, when it is presented through a qualified expert’s 

eyes.’ Id. ‘When the expert witness has consulted numerous sources, 

and uses that information, together with his own professional 

knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is 

regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in disguise.’

Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 

1971)).

Woodard v. Chatterjee, 827 A.2d 433, 444 (Pa. Super. 2003).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tyson Shared Services, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Perez), : No. 1048 C.D. 2019

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of February, 2020, the Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board’s July 11, 2019 decision is VACATED, and the Workers’ 

Compensation Judge’s March 1, 2018 decision is REINSTATED.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge