Th e H o n o r a b le C. Ro g e r V in s o n , Se n io r U n it e d St a te s D is tr ic t Ju d g e f o r th e Northern * District of F lorida, sitting by desig nation. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0804n.06 F iled: Novem ber 15, 2007 No. 05-5684 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DONAL D C. MCCAR Y, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. VI RGI NIA L EWI S, W arde n, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Be fore : DAUGHT REY and COOK, Circ uit J udg es; and VI NSON, District J udg e. *
PER C URI AM. Donald C. McCar y appea ls the di strict court’s or der de nying his pe tition for ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f gro un de d o n th e pr os ecutor ’s re fe re nc e s to re lig ion duri ngc los ingargume nt. Giving that decision fre sh review , J os e ph v . Co y le , 469 F.3d 441, 469 ( 6th Cir. 2006), having had the bene fit of ora l argument, and having studied the rec ord on appea l and the par ties’ brief s, we a re not persuade d t h at t h e d i s t rict cour t erre d in denying Mc Cary ’s petition. Be cause the re asons for denying the petition have bee n fully articulated by

the di strict court, the issuanc e of a detailed opinion by

this c ourt would be duplicative and serve no useful purpose . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s judg ment upon the re asoningset out by that court in i ts order

dated Ma rch 29, 2005,No. 05-5684

Mc Car yv . Le wis

- 2 - but w iththe fo llo wi ngbr ie f d isc us sio n ame nd ing the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on a s to the a

pp ro pr iate standard f or asse ssing ha

rmless err or.
As the district court r ecognized, prosecutoria l misconduct is subject to harml ess-e rror analy sis on feder al habe as re view. Macias v. M akowski , 291 F .3 d 447 , 451 (6 th Cir . 2 00 2) ; Pr itc he tt v. Pitche r , 1 17 F .3 d 9 59 , 9 64 (6 th C ir . 1 99 7) . “ Th e re le va nt q ue sti on is wh e the r t

he pr os e c uto rs ’ comments ‘so i nfec ted t he trial with unfairne ss as to make the r esulting c onviction a denial of due proce ss.’” Darden v . W

ainwright , 4 7 7 U. S
. 1 6 8 , 1 8 1 (1 9 8 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Do nn e lly v . D e Chr istofo ro , 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
Prior to the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act (“A EDPA”), the Supreme Court articulated two har

mless-err or standar ds. W

ils on v . M itc he ll , 498 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2007). On dir e c t r e vie w, “ be fo re a

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l e rr or c an b e he ld ha

rm le ss, the c ourt mus t be a ble to decla re a belief that it was harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt.” Cha pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 3 86 U. S. 18, 24 (1967). On collater al revie w, a more state-f riendly standard pr evailed: c ourts should consider
an er ror ha rmless unless the error “‘had substantial and inj urious eff ect or influence in determining the jury ’s ver dict.’” Brecht v . Abrahamson , 5 0 7 U. S
. 6 1 9 , 6 3 7 (1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Congr ess compl ic a

te d this dichotomy

when it ena cted AE DPA beca use AEDPA dictates that fede ral courts shall not gr ant habe as re lief unless the state- court de cision was either (1) c ontrary

to, or involved an u n re as o n able a pplication of, cle arly

established fe dera l law as de termined by theNo. 05-5684

Mc Car yv . Le wis

- 3 - Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unrea sonable deter mination of the fac ts in light of the evidenc e prese nted to the state c ourts. W ilson , 4 98 F .3 d at 502 (q

uo tatio n mar

ks omi tte d) ; see also 28 U. S.C. § 2254(d). Post-AEDPA, we continued to apply only the Br e c ht standard, r easoningthat if a petitioner satisfies that standa rd, “he will surely have de monstrated that the state court’s f inding that the er ror wa s harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt . . . resulted fr om an unre asonable application of Chapman .” Never

s v. K i l l inger , 169 F.3d 352, 371–72 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Revisiti ng the standar d following the Supreme Court’s d ecision in Mi tc he ll v . E sp ar za , 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (pe r cur iam), which sug g ested that c ourts should apply only the Chapman -plus-AEDPA- def ere nce sta ndard of revie w, we a g ain alter ed our vie w of the pr oper inquiry . We decided in Eddleman v. Mc Kee , 471 F.3d 576, 585 (6th Cir. 2006) , to ask whethe r the state c ourt’s har mless-err or dec ision “was contr ary to, or an unre asonable application of, Chapman .”
Whil e McCar

y ’s appe al was pe nding, the Supreme Court in Fry v. P liler , 127 S. C t
. 2 3 21 (2007), una

nimously reje cted this altere d approa ch and specifie d the prope r test. The Fr yCou rt he ld that a fe dera l habea s court “must asse ss the prejudicia l impact of constitutional error in a state- court criminal trial under the ‘subst antial and injurious eff ect’ standard set forth in Brecht , whether or not the state a pp e llate c ourt re c og nize d the e rr or and re vie we d it

fo r h arm le ssn e ss u

nd e r t he ‘h arm le ss beyond a re asonable doubt’ stand ar d s et forth in Chapman .” Id. at 2328 (c itations omi tted). Acc ording ly , we now a sk whether the constitutional violation “‘had substantial and injurious ef fec t
o r in f lu e n c e in d e te r mi n in g th e ju

r y ’ s verdic t.’” Brecht , 5 0 7 U. S
. at6 2 3 (q u o t i n g Kotteakos , 328 U.S. at 776).No. 05-5684

Mc Car yv . Le wis

- 4 - Ap p l yi n g Brecht ’s more state -def ere ntial harmless- err or standar d, and for the re asons identified by

the district court, we cannot sa y that t h e p rosecutor’s improper rema rks “‘ had substantial an d i n

j u ri ous eff

ect or influence in determiningthe jury ’s ver dict.’” Id. (quoting Kotteakos , 328 U.S. at 776).
We acc ording ly

aff irm.