UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5138

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDWARD HARDY LIGHT, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,

Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00017-JPB-DJJ-1)

Submitted: August 14, 2012 Decided: November 29, 2012

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William T. Rice, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Paul T. 

Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Edward Hardy Light, Jr., appeals the 262-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possessing 

firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). On appeal, 

counsel for Light filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there were no 

nonfrivolous issues, but asking this court to review the 

district court’s determination that Light had the requisite two 

prior felony convictions for crimes of violence such that he 

qualified for sentencing as a career offender. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1 (2010). Although 

advised of his right to do so, Light did not file a pro se 

supplemental brief. The Government did not file a response.

During our initial Anders review, we discerned three 

nonfrivolous issues related to the career offender designation

including whether, in light of our recent opinion in United 

States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012), the district 

court erred in its application of the modified categorical 

approach. We directed the parties to submit merits briefs on 

these points. Light’s attorney submitted a comprehensive brief, 

asking us to vacate the sentence and to remand this case for 

resentencing. The Government, in its brief, concedes that the 

district court’s use of the modified categorical approach in 
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this case runs afoul of Gomez, but argues that we should 

nonetheless affirm because the error is harmless. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies 

as a “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing 

enhancement. United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 278 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 

11-10786). To determine if a state conviction qualifies as a 

crime of violence, two interpretive methods — the categorical 

approach and the modified categorical approach — are 

“potentially applicable.” United States v. Clay, 627 F.3d 959, 

966 (4th Cir. 2010). Under the categorical approach, the court 

may “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory 

definition of the prior offense.” Taylor v. United States, 495 

U.S. 575, 602 (1990). The categorical approach should be 

utilized unless the “statute broadly criminalizes conduct that 

could be generally committed in multiple ways, some violent and 

some not.” Clay, 627 F.3d at 966 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02. As we recently 

stated, the sentencing court may utilize the modified 

categorical approach only when the statute of conviction is 

divisible on the use-of-force element. Gomez, 690 F.3d at 200. 

The Government contends that Light’s 1989 Virginia 

conviction for throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle, in 
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violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-154 (2009), qualifies as a 

categorical crime of violence such that his career offender 

designation should be affirmed despite the Gomez error. We 

agree. See USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) (defining “crime of violence” to 

include those offenses that have “as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person of another”); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–

46 (2008) (explaining that a predicate conviction under the 

residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)* must reflect the 

same type of “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” as 

the specifically enumerated crimes); see also Sykes v. United 

States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275-76 (2011) (reaffirming that 

sentencing courts must consider the “[s]erious and substantial 

risks” of physical injury “inherent” in a crime when determining 

whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony). 

Although Light asserts no other challenge to the

reasonableness of his sentence, because this appeal is taken 

pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the sentence and conclude 

 * We of course “rely on precedents evaluating whether an 

offense constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines 

interchangeably with precedents evaluating whether an offense 

constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the [Armed Career Criminal 

Act], because the two terms have been defined in a manner that 

is ‘substantively identical.’” King, 673 F.3d at 279 n.3

(quoting United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 231 n.* (4th 

Cir. 2010)). 
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that it is otherwise procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

The sentence is procedurally reasonable inasmuch as the district 

court properly calculated the applicable Guidelines range and 

appropriately explained the sentence in the context of the 

relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. See Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Further, the within-Guidelines 

sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable, and we 

discern no basis to rebut that presumption. United States v. 

Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).

Finally, in fulfilling our duty under Anders, we next 

review Light’s conviction. Because Light has not challenged the 

validity of his guilty plea in the district court, we review 

only for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 

524–27 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the record reveals that 

the district court fully complied with the dictates of Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 and committed no error warranting correction on 

plain error review. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no other potentially 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment 

of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform 

Light, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Light requests that a 
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petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Light. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED