NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STEPHENIE LANEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

TOWN OF SPRINGERVILLE TOWN COUNCIL; COUNCILMAN 

RICHARD DAVID; COUNCILMAN DOUGLAS HENDERSON; 

COUNCILMAN ROBERT MACKENZIE; COUNCILMAN DON 

SCOTT; MAYOR PHIL HANSON, JR.; TOWN MANAGER 

CHRISTOPHER COLLOPY; and ZONING ADMINISTRATOR 

MICHAEL LARISH, Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0019 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County 

No. S0100CV202200142 

The Honorable Garrett L. Whiting, Judge Pro Tempore

APPEAL DISMISSED 

COUNSEL 

Stephenie Laney, Springerville 

Plaintiff/Appellant 

Sims Mackin, Phoenix 

By Kristin M. Mackin 

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 11-7-2023
LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 Stephenie Laney (“Laney”) appeals the superior court’s 

dismissal of her complaint against the Town of Springerville Town Council 

and others (collectively, the “Council”). Because the superior court 

dismissed Laney’s complaint without prejudice, we lack jurisdiction and 

dismiss this appeal. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Laney filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that, in 

2021, the Council voted on whether to re-zone certain property. The vote 

ended in a tie. Nine months later, the Council voted again. The re-zoning 

measure passed. Laney alleged this second vote violated town ordinances 

in various ways. 

¶3 The Council asked the superior court to dismiss Laney’s 

complaint for lack of standing and failure to serve a notice of claim. Laney 

responded, arguing the Council’s motion “focus[ed] on the nuisance to the 

property not the lack of proper procedures being questioned.” The superior 

court agreed with the Council and dismissed the complaint. But in so 

doing, the superior court did not indicate whether the dismissal was with 

(or without) prejudice or include language required to make the order final. 

Laney still appealed. 

¶4 Realizing the dismissal order lacked finality language, this 

Court stayed the appeal for the superior court to enter a new order 

containing that language. And anticipating that finality language may still 

be insufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction, this Court warned that it “does 

not express an opinion on whether . . . the order is substantively 

appealable.” The superior court entered a new dismissal order containing 

finality language but making clear that the dismissal was without prejudice.

This Court then lifted the stay. 
LANEY v. SPRINGERVILLE, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

DISCUSSION 

¶5 Although the Council does not challenge our jurisdiction, “we 

are obligated to examine our jurisdiction over an appeal” and to dismiss 

when we lack jurisdiction. Kool Radiators, Inc. v. Evans, 229 Ariz. 532, 534 

¶ 8 (App. 2012) (alterations and citation omitted). “The general rule is that 

an appeal lies only from a final judgment.” Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 

168 Ariz. 301, 304 (App. 1991); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101. A complaint 

dismissed “without prejudice” is not a “final, appealable order.” Kool 

Radiators, Inc., 229 Ariz. at 534 ¶ 8. Rule 54(c) finality language “does not 

render an otherwise non-appealable order or judgment appealable as a final 

judgment.” Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 426 ¶ 6 

(App. 2016). 

¶6 There is one potential exception to the general rule: this Court 

has jurisdiction when a dismissal without prejudice “in effect determines 

the action and prevents judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(3). The superior court did not deny Laney leave to 

amend her complaint. See Robert Schalkenbach Found. v. Lincoln Found., Inc., 

208 Ariz. 176, 179–80 ¶¶ 6, 13 (App. 2004) (finding jurisdiction when the 

trial court dismissed without prejudice but refused to grant leave to 

amend). And we cannot independently conclude that Laney’s legal claims 

are time-barred or that the superior court’s order would otherwise prevent 

a future appealable judgment. See Osuna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 214 Ariz. 

286, 290 ¶ 11 n.4 (App. 2007) (declining to adopt a rule that jurisdiction vests 

in dismissal without prejudice when claims are otherwise time barred 

because the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, can be waived, and 

the court would be “rais[ing] an affirmative defense on a defendant’s 

behalf”); McMurray v. Dream Catcher USA, Inc., 220 Ariz. 71, 74 ¶ 4 (App. 

2009) (dismissing appeal when appellants did “not argue the statute of 

limitations barred the refiling of any of the claims”). 

CONCLUSION

¶7 We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.