FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-1785

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AARON MATTHEW ERSKINE,

Appellant,

v.

LELA ANN ERSKINE,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

Marci L. Goodman, Judge.

December 14, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, the former husband, appeals the trial court’s nonfinal order on temporary relief for spousal support. In this marital 

dissolution case, Appellant raises two issues. 

First, he contends that he was entitled to a hearing on his 

exceptions to the magistrate’s order. We agree. Yoxsimer v. 

Yoxsimer, 918 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that 

trial court deprived the wife of due process and departed from 

essential requirements of law when the wife was denied a hearing 

on the exceptions); Knorr v. Knorr, 751 So. 2d 64, 65-66 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1999) (holding that Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure

12.490(f) derives from Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.490(h) and 

the language of the rule providing for a hearing on exceptions to a 
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magistrate’s report has been held to be mandatory); Gutierrez v. 

Gutierrez, 48 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that it 

is “reversible error for a trial court to fail to conduct a hearing on 

timely filed exceptions”); see also Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.490(f). On 

remand, the trial court shall hold a hearing on the Appellant’s 

Exceptions to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommended Order on 

Wife’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Second, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding alimony and fees in excess of Appellee’s need, funding an 

award by invading the principal of non-marital assets, and 

ordering alimony and child support in an undifferentiated amount. 

On this claim, we also agree. While temporary support awards are 

within the broad discretion of trial courts, the record must contain 

competent substantial evidence that demonstrates one party’s 

need and the other party’s ability to pay. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 

225 So. 3d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Awards, whether 

temporary or final, should not be in excess of a recipient spouse’s 

needs and an order awarding as much should be reversed. Lin v. 

Lin, 37 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Further, in awarding 

attorney’s fees, lower courts must make specific findings as to the 

hourly rate and number of hours expended. Giovanini v. 

Giovanini, 89 So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). When 

determining the amount of an award, trial courts must look to all 

financial resources of the parties, including cases in which “the 

parties’ standard of living required invading the principal of nonmarital assets.” Stacpoole v. Stacpoole, 856 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2003). Here, the record is unclear as to whether 

Appellant’s non-marital accounts were invaded during the 

marriage to maintain a standard of living. Additionally, a trial 

court’s determination of child support must begin with a 

calculation of the parties’ income. Shaw v. Nelson, 4 So. 3d 740, 

743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Thus, further factual findings regarding 

these accounts and a calculation of the parties’ incomes are 

necessary. 

Moreover, reversal is required when a trial court adopts a 

proposed order for temporary support where some findings in the 

order contradict the trial judge’s oral ruling. Duke v. Duke, 19 So. 

3d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). In the instant case, the trial court 

bypassed the oral pronouncement imputing minimum wage upon 
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Appellant and ordered an undifferentiated award to the Appellee 

in contradiction to the ruling at the hearing. An undifferentiated 

award such as this is improper because it renders this Court 

unable to determine whether the trial court properly applied the 

statutory child support guidelines. Nilsen v. Nilsen, 63 So. 3d 850, 

851 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, MAKAR, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Trevor A. Thompson, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Laura E. Keene, Pensacola, for Appellee.