Filed 4/27/23 In re A.G. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081179

 (Super. Ct. No. J520082)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Margie G. Woods, Judge. Affirmed.

Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
2

This is the second of two appeals in this juvenile dependency case. In 

the first appeal, filed by D.G. (Mother), we reversed the juvenile court’s order

terminating parental rights to her minor daughter, A.G., pursuant to Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 366.261 on the ground that we were unable to 

determine whether the juvenile court had applied the correct legal standard

under In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) in finding the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. 

(In re A.G. (Mar. 1, 2022, D079606) [nonpub. opn.] (A.G. I, the prior opinion).) 

We additionally concluded the San Diego County Health and Human Services 

Agency (Agency) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under the Indian 

Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We instructed the 

juvenile court on remand to conduct further proceedings consistent with 

Caden C. and ICWA.

On remand, the juvenile court held another section 366.26 hearing and 

again terminated parental rights. R.G. (Father) now appeals, contending 

only that the juvenile court erred by not applying the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception to preclude the termination of his parental rights. We 

conclude there was no error and affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

I. Prior Proceedings3

 In July 2019, police searched Mother and Father’s home and found 

methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded 

.32 revolver, some of which was accessible to A.G. Mother and Father were 

arrested and charged with drug-related offenses. A.G. was taken into 

protective custody and placed with paternal uncle and paternal aunt 

(caregivers).

At the detention hearing, the court declared A.G. a dependent and 

ordered voluntary services and liberal, supervised visitation for Mother and 

Father. During the six- and twelve-month review periods, the parents had 

several supervised visits with A.G. The caregivers reported that A.G. was 

“always excited” to see them and enjoyed their visits. These positive reports 

led the Agency to briefly lift the supervision of the visits. But during the 

unsupervised visitation period, the caregivers reported A.G. was returned to 

them unfed, “dirty and messy,” and with bug bites on her back. The parents 

were also often tardy picking her up, sometimes appearing hours late without 

notice.

The Agency expressed concerns about the parents’ mental health, 

substance abuse, and inability to control their anger. At A.G.’s third birthday 

party in July 2020, Father became angry and belligerent, yelled at A.G. and 

other adults, pushed the paternal uncle, tried to push the paternal 

2 Because the juvenile court’s ICWA findings are not at issue in the 

present appeal, we limit our discussion to the facts relevant to application of 

the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

3 We take the factual background in part from our prior opinion. (A.G. I, 

supra, D079606.)
4

grandmother, and at one point raised his hand as if to hit Mother. Mother 

also became upset, screaming and yelling at family members. A.G. appeared 

afraid and made comments afterwards (“ ‘[poor] mommy, daddy hit her’ ”) 

suggesting she had previously witnessed Father hitting Mother. During 

another incident in August 2020, Father kicked in the front door of the 

maternal grandfather’s house, pulled out a pocket knife, and threatened to

kill him. The Agency reverted the parents’ visits with A.G. to supervised.

During the 18-month review period, Mother and Father continued to 

visit A.G. often, and the visits were generally positive. A.G. eagerly waited to 

be picked up for the visits, was always happy to see Mother and Father, 

hugged and kissed them, and “truly appear[ed] to love” them. Mother

brought games and toys for A.G., talked and played with her, and sometimes 

read to her. Father, too, would sometimes play with A.G. At other times, 

however, Father would “just stare[ ] at [A.G. and Mother],” would not say 

much, and usually would not play unless Mother told him to. At the 

conclusion of the visits, A.G. would tell her parents she loved them but would 

appear ready to leave.

Not all of the parents’ visits with A.G. were positive. Sometimes after a 

visit, A.G. would tell the caregivers, “no more mommy and dada.” She went 

home early from one visit crying because her parents were arguing and 

yelling. She would occasionally say she did not want any more visits with her 

parents because she did not like to see them fight. She also asked the 

caregivers to wait in the car during visits until she knew what mood the 

parents were in, describing them as “ ‘good gummybears’ ” or “ ‘bad 

gummybears.’ ” The caregivers reported that at times A.G. “seem[ed] so 

exhausted” and “completely drained,” and “want[ed] to be comforted” after 

the visits.
5

At the 18-month review hearing in March 2021, the juvenile court 

terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for 

July 2021. The parents continued to visit with A.G. In July 2021, A.G. acted 

lovingly toward her parents, and Mother held and rocked her while telling 

her that she loved her. When Mother began to cry, A.G. wiped her tears with 

a napkin. Meanwhile, Father had fallen asleep. A.G. started cleaning and 

putting on her shoes and repeatedly asking, “where is my aunt, where is my 

aunt?” When the caregiver arrived, A.G. jumped and shouted, “Tia! Tia!” 

Father told A.G. to give Mother a kiss goodbye, and A.G. made a moaning 

sound, quickly got a kiss from Mother, and then began walking toward her 

caregiver. After running to her caregiver shouting “[T]ia! [T]ia!,” A.G. 

shouted back to Mother and Father, “I love you mommy, I love you daddy,” 

only stopping after each parent said it back to her.

At the September 1, 2021 section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court 

found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply and 

terminated parental rights. Mother appealed. (In re A.G. I., supra, 

D079606.) In our March 1, 2022 opinion resolving that appeal, we explained 

we were unable to conclude the juvenile court had applied the correct legal 

standard in determining the beneficial parent-child relationship exception

did not apply. Rather, the totality of the juvenile court’s comments at the 

hearing, including the use of a complex analogy, suggested that the court had 

improperly focused both on whether Mother held a typical “parental role” and 

on her continued struggles with the issues leading to the dependency, both 

factors the California Supreme Court in Caden C. had cautioned should not 

be dispositive of the exception’s application. We reversed and remanded the 

matter “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” (In re A.G. I., 

supra, D079606.)
6

II. Current Proceedings

Between the September 2021 order terminating parental rights and 

approximately March 2022, the parents had reached out to the caregivers 

only once to request a visit with A.G., and the caregivers had declined. 

During the same period, the Agency evaluated A.G. every month and 

reported that she was “thriving in her placement.”

On March 3, 2022, two days after we issued the A.G. I opinion, the 

Agency made a referral for the parents to resume visitation with A.G. The 

Agency observed the parents’ first visit on March 24.4 A.G. waved at her 

parents as they approached and jumped up and down. She hugged her 

parents and opened a stocking of Christmas gifts they brought. Mother 

interacted with A.G. more than Father, who often remained silent and 

watched A.G. and Mother, even at times when Mother and A.G. tried to 

engage him in play. Toward the end of the visit, Father lay down on the 

ground and remained quiet. At the end of the visit, the parents hugged and 

kissed A.G. Mother repeatedly shouted “I love you,” and A.G. would respond 

the same. On the drive back to the caregivers’ home, A.G. said she loved her 

parents, liked seeing them, and wanted to see them again. When she saw her 

caregiver, she shouted, “[T]ia!” and hugged her. After her second visit with 

her parents on April 1, A.G. again stated that she loved her parents and 

wanted to see them again.

Mother and Father continued to attend supervised visits over the next 

few months, but Mother often attended them without Father. Mother and 

Father usually brought new toys and snacks for A.G., played, and multiple 

times asked A.G. if she wanted to go to Disneyland with them. Mother 

generally behaved appropriately, but Father was less engaged and would sit 

4 Further undesignated date references are to 2022.
7

quietly and sometimes fall asleep during the visits. Sometimes the parents 

did not show up at all. A.G. never indicated any distress at the end of these 

visits or sadness about leaving her parents.

In May, the social worker informed Mother that she and Father could 

call the caregivers to check on A.G. or speak with her on Tuesday nights at 

8 p.m. According to the caregivers, however, the parents called once on May 

10 around 8:30 p.m., and Father did not participate in any other phone calls.

When Mother and Father cancelled their May 23 visit, the Agency 

ended the parents’ visitation services due to their inconsistent attendance, 

including the parents’ no show on April 4; Father’s no show on April 11; and 

Mother’s cancellation and Father’s no show on May 9. As of May 27, Mother 

and Father had not called the caregivers to talk with or ask about A.G. for 

two weeks.

The A.G. I. opinion became final on June 16. At a July 6 special 

hearing, the juvenile court noted its receipt of the remittitur, ordered the 

parents’ rights reinstated, and scheduled a new section 366.26 hearing for 

September.

In June and July, Mother called and spoke to A.G. four times, and A.G. 

was excited to speak with Mother. During the June 21 call, A.G. asked to 

speak with Father, but Mother said he was not available. Mother also called 

several other times in July, but because she did so on days other than 

Tuesday or very late, the caregivers did not answer. The social worker 

repeatedly reminded Mother of the agreed-upon time for calls.

At Mother’s request in late June, the Agency re-referred the parents for 

visitation services. Only Mother attended the next visit on July 22. A.G. ran 

to Mother, yelled “mommy,” and hugged her, and they played with the new 

toys Mother brought. A.G. was not upset at the end of the visit, which 
8

Mother ended early due to not feeling well. The same day, the Agency 

discovered through a search that Father had been incarcerated for felony 

robbery since June 2.

According to the Agency’s September 7 report, the caregivers had 

repeatedly expressed disappointment in the parents’ “lack of consistency” and 

had indicated this “hurt [A.G.]” The report noted that A.G. was too young to 

fully understand the concept of adoption but when asked who she wanted to 

have in her life forever, she identified her caregivers and Mother. Regarding 

visitation, the Agency stated that Father had not had a visit with A.G. since 

May 16, and even before that date, he had missed two of his six visits and 

was late to two other visits. Mother had missed or canceled three of her 

10 visits, was late to two other visits, and ended two visits early.

Between mid-August and October, Mother stopped consistently calling 

A.G. and had called only four of the seven scheduled Tuesdays. During this 

time, Mother attended additional visits with A.G. on August 19, August 25, 

and September 8. As before, A.G. did not exhibit any distress at the 

conclusion of visits.

After not having visited A.G. since May, Father joined Mother for three 

visits on September 15, September 22, and September 29. During these 

visits, A.G. hugged and kissed her parents, and Father sometimes played 

with A.G. on the playground. At the September 29 visit, A.G. showed her 

parents a gift her “mom” bought her. Father corrected A.G., saying she 

meant her “tia” and pointed to Mother saying, “That’s your mom.” A.G. said, 

“My other mom,” and Father said, “[No,] ‘[t]hat’s not your mom[,] that is your 

aunt.’ ” In apparent confusion, A.G. lowered her head and looked down. At 

the end of these visits, A.G. and the parents hugged and kissed one another, 
9

and A.G. called out “goodbye” as she walked to the social worker’s car. She 

was fairly quiet on the car rides to and from the visits.

Only Mother visited A.G. again on October 20, but both Mother and 

Father visited on October 27 and carved pumpkins. A.G. made a paper with 

stickers for her parents that said, “I love you mommy and daddy.” At the end 

of the visit, A.G. hugged and kissed her parents and said goodbye. She was 

again quiet on the car ride to and from the visits.

The Agency’s September, October, and November reports 

recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of 

adoption for A.G. In the Agency’s September report, the social worker noted 

that five-year-old A.G. had spent the first 23 months of her life with her 

parents and a little over three years with her caregivers. The social worker

opined that A.G. did not have a substantial, positive, emotional attachment 

with Father, particularly given that A.G. rarely sought interaction with him 

during visits and did not show distress when leaving him. As to A.G.’s 

relationship with Mother, the social worker opined that, although it was 

evident A.G. loved Mother, often initiated physical and verbal affection 

toward her, and asked her for help, A.G.’s positive relationship with Mother 

did not rise to the level of a substantial emotional attachment. The worker 

explained that A.G. did not show distress or sadness at the conclusion of her 

visits with Mother and had been negatively impacted by Mother missing 

visits.

The social worker further reported that the Agency had observed A.G. 

after the initial termination of parental rights, and for the six months that 

A.G. lacked any contact with Mother and Father, she continued to grow and 

thrive in her placement and did not appear negatively impacted by the loss of 

her parental relationships. Finally, the social worker acknowledged A.G. 
10

might struggle with emotional difficulties due to the termination of parental 

rights but that this potential detriment would not outweigh the benefits of 

adoption and that the stability and support offered by her caregivers would 

help negate any such possible trauma.

According to the Agency’s November 2022 addendum report, a social 

worker asked A.G. who she would live with if she could live with anyone, and 

A.G. indicated her uncle, aunt, and their two sons. When the social worker 

asked A.G. how she would feel if she did not have any more visits with 

Mother, A.G. replied, “I would be happy because I live here.” Neither Mother 

nor Father had called A.G. in October. The caregivers reported that after 

A.G. returned home from visits, she did not talk about the visits with her 

parents or ask about her parents.

At the November 3 section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court received 

into evidence two March 3 reports and reports dated March 28, July 6, 

September 7, October 26, and November 3. The parents declined to crossexamine the two social workers and did not offer any testimony or affirmative 

evidence. The court found A.G. was both generally and specifically adoptable.

As to visitation, the court observed, “It may be, to some degree, 

arguable, that there wasn’t regular visitation and contact between [M]o[ther] 

and child. It is clear, as far as [F]ather . . . that visitation was less.” The 

court went on to find that “regular visitation and contact did take place 

between [M]o[ther] and [A.G.], . . . after she was given the opportunity to 

resume her contact and visitation . . . from March 2022 to the present,” 

despite “some gaps.”

The court next considered A.G.’s relationship with Mother, stating that 

it was clear A.G. knew Mother was her mother, as evidenced by her positive 

reactions and greetings toward her. The court found there was “a visible and 
11

understandable emotional attachment” between A.G. and Mother and that 

for the most part, their interactions had been positive. The court, however, 

observed that A.G.’s development “continued” and “remained stable,” even 

during the period when she lacked contact with Mother. The court then 

stated its intention to consider whether the harm of severing A.G.’s 

relationship with Mother “outweigh[ed] the security of, say, belonging to a 

family that is where her aunt is the mother figure and her uncle is the father 

figure.” The court observed that the caregivers had “done their best . . . to 

maintain a neutral and supportive role,” had been consistent and supportive, 

and had reported their observations “in an overall neutral way” that when 

visits did not take place, A.G. “showed disappointment [and] stress.” The 

court acknowledged A.G.’s relationship with Mother was “substantial” and 

usually involved “fun,” “playing,” and “pleasant discussions” but that the 

relationship was “not one that is contemplated in determining what’s in the 

best interest of the minor child.” The court concluded the potential detriment 

posed by severing that relationship did not outweigh the benefit of adoption 

for A.G., terminated parental rights, and freed A.G. for adoption.

DISCUSSION

Father asserts the juvenile court erred by terminating his parental 

rights because the court should have applied the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We 

disagree.

I. Legal Principles

The permanency planning hearing aims “to end the uncertainty of 

foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional 

attachment to a permanent caretaker.” (In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 

734, 742.) The Legislature prefers adoption where possible. (In re L. Y. L.
12

(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs 

only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the 

child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the 

parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive 

placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 

(Jasmine D.), disapproved on another ground by Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 636, fn. 5.)

Once the juvenile court finds a child is adoptable, the parent bears the 

burden of proving that one of the exceptions to terminating parental rights 

exists. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343.) One such 

exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).) For this exception to apply, the parent must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence: (1) regular visitation and contact with the 

child; (2) a beneficial parent-child relationship; and (3) that terminating the 

relationship would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against 

the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent 

home outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a 

continued parent-child relationship, the court should order adoption. (Id. at 

p. 634.)

We apply a hybrid standard of review on appeal. (In re J.C. (2014)

226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530–531 (In re J.C.).) We review the juvenile court’s 

findings as to whether the parent has maintained regular visitation and 

contact with the child, as well as the existence of a beneficial parent-child 

relationship, for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 639–640.) As a reviewing court, we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and 
13

will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations even where substantial 

evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.) We review for abuse of 

discretion the juvenile court’s finding that the termination of parental rights 

would not be detrimental to the child. (Ibid.; see also Jasmine D., supra, 

78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [practical difference between pure substantial 

evidence standard of review and hybrid standard of review is insignificant].) 

A court abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or 

patently absurd decision.’ ” ’ ” (Caden C., at p. 641.)

II. Analysis

The first element required for the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception to apply⎯regular visitation and contact⎯is “straightforward” and 

“[t]he question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account 

‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 632; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

At the outset, Father complains the juvenile court failed to address 

whether he satisfied the visitation requirement for the exception to apply. 

The section 366.26 hearing transcript, however, shows otherwise. 

Specifically, the juvenile court observed, “It may be, to some degree, arguable, 

that there wasn’t regular visitation and contact between [M]o[ther] and child. 

It is clear, as far as [F]ather . . . that visitation was less.” The court then 

went on to find that “regular visitation and contact did take place between 

[M]o[ther] and [A.G.], . . . after she was given the opportunity to resume her 

contact and visitation . . . from March 2022 to the present.” Thus, a fair 

reading of the court’s ruling is that, although it found Mother satisfied the 

visitation prong, it found Father did not.

Moreover, even construing the juvenile court’s finding about Father’s 

inconsistent visitation to be merely an implied one, that implicit finding is 
14

supported by substantial evidence. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 

1156 [no requirement that “the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit 

exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions 

regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception”].) In the first year 

of the dependency proceedings, the caretakers reported that Father (as well 

as Mother) missed visits without canceling and often showed up hours late 

without calling. The Agency similarly opined during the reunification period 

that “[F]ather’s visits [we]re not always consistent,” including missing two 

December 2020 visits. Between April and September 2021, the parents 

missed another four visits and asked to shorten two of them.

After the reversal on appeal, the parents began supervised visits again 

in March 2022. But Mother often attended those visits without Father. 

Within a couple of months, the Agency ended the parents’ visitation services 

because of their poor attendance. The Agency noted that, in April and May 

2022, Father missed four visits with A.G., and had not visited A.G. once in 

the nearly four months between May 16 and September 7, 2022.5 Father 

showed up to only one of two visits in October. And despite being encouraged 

to call A.G. at the caregivers’ home on Tuesday nights, Father called only 

once—with Mother—on May 10, 2022. Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supported the court’s finding, implied or not, that Father did not carry his 

burden to establish regular and consistent visitation with A.G.

But even assuming Father had made this showing, substantial 

evidence also supported a finding that A.G. did not have the requisite 

5 Even disregarding the period of time during which Father was 

incarcerated beginning on June 2, the record still contains substantial 

evidence supporting a finding that his visitation with A.G. was not regular 

and consistent.
15

“significant, positive, emotional attachment” to Father.6 (In re B.D. (2021) 

66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) Factors relevant to this determination include 

the child’s age, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody, the 

interaction between parent and child, and the child’s needs. (Caden C.,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court should also examine “how children 

feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about” the parent. (Ibid.)

To be sure, A.G. had a relationship with Father. As Father contends, 

she called him “daddy,” jumped up and down in excitement when she saw her 

parents again in March 2022, often greeted Father warmly with hugs and 

kisses, played with the parents during visits, and exchanged “I love yous.” In 

March and April, A.G. told the social worker that she loved her parents and 

wanted to see them again.

Substantial evidence in the record, however, supports a finding that 

A.G.’s relationship with Father fell short of the significant emotional 

attachment required for the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to 

apply. Five-year-old A.G. spent the first 23 months of her life with her 

parents and a little over three years—more than half of her life—with her 

caregivers. Although Father sometimes played with and interacted with A.G. 

during visits, at other times, he would fall asleep during visits, lay on the 

floor, or sit silently and not engage with her. The social worker observed that 

6 We also reject Father’s contention that the record is unclear about 

whether the juvenile court found the second prong satisfied only for Mother 

or instead, for Father, too. The juvenile court clearly limited this finding to 

Mother, including prefacing its examination of the beneficial parent-child 

relationship with, “[S]o the court has to go to the next prong to ask, the 

relationship between [Mother] and [A.G.], is this relationship beneficial to the 

child?” (Italics added.)
16

A.G. rarely tried to interact with Father during visits and never showed 

distress when leaving him, including during his most recent visits in 2022.7

Moreover, some of Father’s visits with A.G. caused her fear, confusion, 

or sadness. For example, during the July 2020 incident when Father yelled 

at Mother and relatives, A.G. was scared and sad, saying “Daddy[,] no, no,

no.” A.G. would say things to the caregivers like “Daddy don’t hit mommy” 

and “[poor] mommy, daddy hit her.” During visits in 2021, A.G. would return 

home to the caregivers exhausted and drained, sometimes saying “No more 

momma or dada.” She previously asked her caregiver to stay in her car 

during some of these visits, and A.G. would tell the caregivers whether her 

parents had been good or bad “gummybears,” sometimes calling them “ugly 

gummy bear[s].” And in September 2022, when Father corrected A.G. after

she referenced her caregiver as “mom,” A.G. responded with confusion by 

lowering her head and looking down.

7 In a one-sentence argument, Father additionally complains the section 

366.26 report lacked an assessment of “the duration and character of the 

relationship” between A.G. and the parents. Because Father failed to object

to the sufficiency of the Agency’s reports during the section 366.26 hearing, 

this argument is forfeited. (See, e.g., In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 

407, 411-412 [mother’s failure to object to sufficiency of assessment reports at 

section 366.26 hearing waived argument on appeal].) Regardless, even if we 

considered the argument, we would reject it based on the Agency’s September 

7, 2022 report’s opinions and observations about A.G.’s relationship with the 

parents. Indeed, as to Father’s relationship with A.G., the social worker 

specifically opined that A.G. and Father lacked a substantial positive 

emotional attachment based on the 23-month duration of A.G.’s care with her 

parents, the lack of consistent visitation and contact with Father, that A.G. 

“rarely sought out interaction/attention” from Father, and that A.G. never 

showed distress upon leaving him. Moreover, to the extent Father contends 

the juvenile court erred by not ordering a bonding study, he is incorrect. 

(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [no legal requirement that 

court must secure bonding study before terminating parental rights].)
17

When she would arrive home from her visits in 2022, A.G. would never 

talk with the caregivers about her visits or ask about Father. And although 

A.G. was too young to understand adoption, when a social worker asked her 

who she would live with if she could live with anyone, she indicated her 

caregivers (her uncle and aunt) and their two sons.

Accordingly, substantial evidence supported a finding that A.G.’s 

relationship with Father lacked the required significant emotional 

attachment for the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to apply. 

(See, e.g., In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229 [a parent must 

demonstrate something “more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional 

bond with the child, or pleasant visits”]; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 

454, 468 [“the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be 

that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly 

nonparent relative, such as an aunt”].)

Finally, even assuming there was a beneficial parent-child relationship

between Father and A.G., we nevertheless conclude the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion by implicitly finding that the benefits offered by adoption 

outweighed any detriment caused by terminating his parental rights. 

Father’s attorney did not present any evidence that A.G. would be greatly 

harmed by severing Father’s relationship with her, or that the security and 

stability of adoption would not outweigh the loss of this relationship. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Instead, the social worker’s 

assessment concluded that terminating Father’s parental rights would not 

outweigh the benefits of adoption and the stability and support offered by the 

caregivers would help negate any such possible trauma. Indeed, the social 

worker also emphasized that it had observed A.G. after the initial 

termination of parental rights and, despite lacking any contact with Father 
18

for those six months, A.G. continued to grow and thrive in her placement and 

did not appear negatively impacted by the loss of her parental relationships. 

Thus, on this record, there was no abuse of discretion.8 (See In re J.C., 

supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530–531.)

Father suggests the court “may have considered improper factors” by 

comparing A.G.’s relationship with her parents9 to her relationship with her 

caregivers. Although it is true that a juvenile court cannot consider a minor’s 

relationship with her caregivers when determining whether the minor has a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment to a parent, the record does not 

show that the court did so here. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 864-

865 [application of exception “is not a contest between two potential custodial 

caregivers”].) Rather, the court stated its intention to evaluate “if the harm 

of severing the relationship outweighs the security of, say, belonging to a 

family that is where [A.G.’s] aunt is the mother figure and her uncle is the 

father figure.” Thus, the court indicated it was considering the benefits of a 

new adoptive home in conducting the weighing analysis, not in evaluating 

8 To the extent Father intended to assert the juvenile court also erred in 

finding the exception did not apply to preclude termination of Mother’s 

parental rights, it is unclear whether he has standing to do so. (See, e.g., 

In re Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190 [holding that a mother 

challenging an order terminating the parental rights of both herself and the 

child’s alleged fathers lacked standing to contend the alleged fathers failed to 

receive proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing]; In re Jasmine J. (1996) 

46 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1806 [parent may not raise issues on appeal which do 

not affect his or her own rights].) Regardless, and even considering such an 

argument, we would conclude the court’s findings as to Mother were 

supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion.

9 Notably, the court’s statements with which Father takes issue concern 

the beneficial parent-child relationship exception’s application to Mother, not 

Father.
19

A.G.’s attachment. This was proper. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634

[“[T]he court acts in the child’s best interest in a specific way: it decides 

whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and 

the sense of belonging a new family would confer’ ”].)

Father similarly claims that the court impermissibly compared the 

caregivers’ attributes with those of the parents by describing the caregivers 

as “neutral,” “consistent,” and “supportive.” When read in context, however, 

these statements indicate the court was explaining why it found the 

caregivers’ observations and reports during the dependency to be credible, 

not—as Caden C. cautions against—making “a contest of who would be the 

better custodial caregiver.”10 (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) This, 

too, was not error. (Id. at p. 640 [as a reviewing court, we do “ ‘not reweigh 

the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary 

conflicts’ ”].)

Finally, Father cites to various cases in which courts found the 

beneficial relationship exception applied. But because these cases are 

distinguishable on their facts, they do not compel a different conclusion. 

(See, e.g., In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 295, 298 [bonding study 

supported beneficial parent-child relationship, and minor was upset when 

10 The court stated in relevant part: “There were reports and 

observations made of – by the – caregivers. And the court understands, 

certainly, they are doing their best to, and they have done their best, to 

maintain a neutral and supportive role, albeit, the report does show some 

frustration, based on what happened in the outcome of the appeal that 

resulted in, now, a second .26 hearing. But that doesn’t mean that they are 

against, specifically, the parents . . . . The court finds that the evidence 

shows they’ve been consistent. They’ve been supportive. They’ve been as 

neutral as humanly possible. And they also have reported what they’ve seen 

in an overall neutral way, that the minor, when visits were not taking place, 

had a – had a reaction that showed disappointment, stress, and that 

happens.”
20

visits with father ended, did not want to leave, and said she wished she lived 

with father]; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689-690 [parent 

completed her case plan, sought minor’s return via section 388 petition, 

CASA recommended minor’s return to parent, and bonding study showed a 

“ ‘primary attachment’ ” between parent and another minor]; 

In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1535-1538 [affirming order 

applying exception where mother and grandmother testified to beneficial 

relationship between minors and mother].)

Accordingly, for the previous reasons, Father has not demonstrated 

error, and it will not be presumed here. (See People v. Tang (1997) 

54 Cal.App.4th 669, 677 [“ ‘We must indulge in every presumption to uphold 

a judgment, and it is [appellant’s] burden on appeal to affirmatively 

demonstrate error—it will not be presumed”].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.