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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 9, 2016 

v No. 324026 

Ingham Circuit Court 

COREY RAY TOWLES, LC No. 13-001088-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit a 

felony, MCL 750.110. The trial court sentenced defendant to 18 to 120 months’ imprisonment 

and ordered him to pay $11,192.83 in costs and fees, including $635 in court costs. Defendant 

now appeals only the imposition of court costs by delayed leave granted.1

 We affirm. 

 Defendant argues in his brief on appeal that because plaintiff had no objection to vacating 

the court costs when the issue was raised below, it cannot now take a contrary position. See 

Blazer Foods, Inc v Rest Prop, Inc, 259 Mich App 241, 252; 673 NW2d 805 (2003) (“A party 

may not take a position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court that 

is based on a position contrary to that taken in the trial court.”). However, as plaintiff points out, 

the law changed after it responded below, as the Legislature thereafter amended MCL 769.1k 

and gave the amendment retroactive effect. There is no reason why plaintiff’s legal argument 

cannot change when the law itself has changed. We therefore decline to grant defendant relief 

on that basis, and will evaluate on its merits the issue of whether the trial court properly imposed 

court costs. 

 Defendant argues that MCL 769.1k, as interpreted by People v Cunningham, 496 Mich 

145; 852 NW2d 118 (2014), did not provide the trial court with statutory authority to impose 

court costs at sentencing. Further, he argues, the Legislature’s post-Cunningham amendment of 

§ 1k, 2014 PA 352, cannot be given retroactive effect because to do so would violate the state 

 

1 People v Towles, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 21, 2014 

(Docket No. 324026). 
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and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses. We disagree. We review issues of statutory interpretation de 

novo. People v Earl, 495 Mich 33, 36; 845 NW2d 721 (2014). 

 Resolution of this issue is directly controlled by this Court’s recent published decision in 

People v Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich App 345; 869 NW2d 651 (2015). Konopka explains: 

 If the Legislature had not amended MCL 769.1k, the cost award in this 

case would have been invalid under Cunningham. . . . 

 However, the trial court’s cost award is authorized by the amended version 

of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). This amended version became effective on October 17, 

2014, and applies to all fines, costs, and assessments under MCL 769.1k before 

June 18, 2014, and after the effective date of the amendatory act. The amended 

act was a curative measure to address the authority of courts to impose costs 

under MCL 769.1k before the issuance of Cunningham. “ ‘When a new law 

makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in 

reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was 

enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.’ ” [Id. at 356-357 (citations 

omitted).] 

Because the trial court sentenced defendant on February 12, 2014, the imposition of court costs 

was authorized and valid. 

This Court in Konopka also held that the costs imposed under MCL 769.1k(b)(iii) are not 

a form of punishment. Id. at 370. Further, the Court concluded that the costs provision in 

MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is not “so punitive in purpose or effect that it negates the Legislature’s 

civil intent.” Id. at 376. Therefore, the retroactive application of court costs does not violate the 

Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions. Id. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray