J

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NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF D.N.L.H., MINOR CHILD

APPEAL OF: R.H., FATHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 865 WDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court at No(s): 021

- 2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J. *
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JANUARY 27, 2023
Appellant, R.H. ( “ Father ” ), appeals from the order entered on March 14,

2022 granting a petition filed by D.L. (“Mother”) to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights t o his son, D.N.L.H

. (“Child”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b)

. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case : [...] Child [was born] [i] n August [] , 2012. Following [] Child’s birth, Mother and Father began a co

- parenting relationship with [] Child , during which Father would occasionally stay with Mother and perform parental duties on behalf of [] Child. The extended family contacts for [] Child include Father’s own mother [] (hereinafter “Grandmother”), who passed away after appearing to provide testimony in this matter. While [] Child was s till at a very young age, Mother entered a job training program called “jo b corps,” which required her to reside separately from [] Child for a period of between six and nine months. During this time, Mother signed paperwork directing that the public assi stance she recei v ed

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J

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on behalf of [] Child be transferred to Grandmother. Father continued to maintain the same level of contact with [] Child during this time period. Following Mother’s return from the job corps program, Father became incarcerated [] aro und 2015. While incarcerated, Father lost contact with Mother, and by extension , [] Child. Upon his release, Father indicated that he attempted to see [] Child each day until Mother filed a Protection fr om Abuse (PFA) [p]etition against him. After a fin al PFA order was entered in January 2018, Father testified that he no longer had contact with [] Child out of an abundance of caution because he did not want to be accused of violating the PFA order. The PFA order did not include any specific custody term s , but only indicated that the parties were to abide by the terms of their current custody order , and that Father could modify those terms by petitioning the custody court. Mother [] married [another man ( “Stepfather”)] in September 2020. The PFA [order] expired in January of 2021, and shortly thereafter, [on February 19, 2021,] Mother petitioned [the trial c]ourt to terminate Father’s parental rights [so that , ultimately, Stepfather could adopt Child].

T rial Court Opinion, 8/ 18/2022, at 2

- 3. “ The hearing on Mother’s [p]etition
spanned several days, first taking place on July 22, 2021, then on Octo ber 13,
2021, and finally concluding after testimony was taken on February 22, 2022. ”

Id. at 1. At each hea ring, Mother and Father were represented by counsel

. Id. The trial court also appointed both an attorney to represen t Child’s legal
interests and a separate guardian ad litem who were both present for all three
hearings. Id. On March 14, 2022, the t rial court granted Mother’s petition
and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights . This timely appeal

resulted. 1

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 Due to a breakdown in the judicial system, Father was not properly served with the trial court order. As a result, the trial court granted Father additional time to file a notice of appeal. On Jul y 15, 2022, Father filed a timely notice (Footnote Continued Next Page)J

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On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) where [F]ather , based on all available resources and ability, exercise d reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in his path and maintaining a relationship with [Child]?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental right s pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where the evidence indicated the lack of integrity of the proposed adoption and the unlikelihood that the proposed adoption would occur[?]

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where [Mother] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
seve ring the parent

- child bond would not have a detrimental effect on [Child] and would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of [Child ?]

Father’s Brief at 4

- 5

. In his first issue presented, Father claims t hat the trial cour t erred by
involuntarily terminating his parental rights under Section 2511(a) because
“[M]other actively prevented contact between [F]ather and [Child].” Id. at

19. Father claims that he did not understand the terms of the PFA order
and/or the custody o rder that Mother subsequently obtained. Id. at 20.
Further, Father asserts that, following the issuance of the PFA order, Mother

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ of appeal , and a corresponding concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)( 2)(i). The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 18, 2022.J

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moved , did not disclose her new address to Father , and blocked Father and
paternal relatives on social media. Id. at 20

- 21. Finally, Father contends that
due to his “limited cognitive abilities and scar c e financial resources, it was
impossible for [F]ather to overcome the barriers to contact erected by
[M]other.” Id. at 23

. Father asserts that his status as a resident of Allegheny
County foreclosed his efforts to secure pro bono legal services in

Westmoreland County. Id. at 24. Father also maintains that his cognitive
impairments prevented him from handling this matter pro se , since he lacked
academic and computer skills needed to pursue litigation. Id. at 24

- 25.
We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,
which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudic e, bias, or ill

- will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K. , 265 A.3d
580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, appellate
courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the re cord. Interest of S.K.L.R. , 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re Adoption of C.M. , 255 A.3d
343, 358 (Pa. 2021).
Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of parental
rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101

- 2938. Sectio n 2511(a)
provides grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial
court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of
the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must thenJ

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consider whet her termination would best serve the child under subsection (b).

Id. § 2511(b).
Initially, t he trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) General rule

. -- The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled p urpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1).
Our Supreme Court has stated:
Appellate review in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights is limited to de termining whether the trial court's determination is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by evid ence of record. Where the trial court's factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found where ther e is a demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters not that an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, as it is well

- established that absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, o r insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand

. Parents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot be denied that significant and permanent con sequences for both the parent and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an undeniable importance in a child's relationship with a biologicalJ

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parent. In recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence; that is, evidence that is so c lear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the pr ecise facts in issue

. To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), the party seeking termination must prove that the parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evid enced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties

. Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts long have interpreted parental duties i n relation to the needs of a child, s uch as love, protection, guidance and support

. Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the parent

- child relationship. The roster of such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and associ ation. The performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life

. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent

- child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental responsibilities. Of importance is the General Assembly's emphasis in Section 2511(a)(1) on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition when evaluating a parent's conduct. Although courts are to avoid the mechanical application of the Adoption Act, we may not ignore that the General Assembly has drawn focus to the six months immediately preceding the filing of the ter mination petition. Indeed, [our Supreme] Court addressed this aspect of Section 2511(a)(1) and reaffirmed that for an analysis thereunder, the most critical period for evaluation is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petitio n. When considering a request to terminate rights under Section 2511(a)(1), a parent's failure or refusal to perform parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the
case. [Our Supreme Court ] has explained that: a finding of abandonment, which has been characterized as one of the most severe steps the court can take , will not be predicated upon parental conduct which is reasonablyJ

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- explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the paren t's control. It may only result when a parent has failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship. Decades ago, [our Supreme] Court clarified that a parent's efforts are always considered in light of existing circumstances. Thus, the focus of the inquiry is on whether, under the circumstances, the parent has acted with reasonable firmness in refusing to yield to the obstacles that have prevented the performance of parental duties. To that end, even where the evidence clear ly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative parental duties for a period in excess of six months as required by Section 2511(a)(1), the court must examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of parental rights

. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following: (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post

- abandonment contact between the parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the child pursu ant to Section 2511(b). [To] reiterate [] the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to [the] mandate that courts avoid a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of ser ving the needs and welfare of each individual child in his or her particular circumstances. It is within this framework that a court determines whether a parent has faced barriers that prevented the parent from maintaining the parent

- child relationship. What constitutes a barrier in the context of a Section 2511(a)(1) analysis is a finding within the discretion of the trial court, and what may constitute a barrier necessarily will vary with the circumstances of each case. In some instances, obstructive b ehavior by the child's custodian presents a barrier to the parent's ability to perform parental duties, which mitigates the parent's failure to maintain the parent

- child relationship. In other instances, trial courts have found substance abuse, mental he alth issues, homelessness, joblessness, criminal charges, or a confluence of some or all of these issues created barriers to the maintenance of the parent

- child relationship. In all instances, the trial court consider [s] the explanation offered by the par ent when deciding whether termination of parental rights was warranted.J

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In re Adoption of L.A.K. , 265 A.3d at 591

– 5 93 (Pa. 2021) ( internal citations,
quotations, and original brackets omitted).
Here, in involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights under Section
2511(a) (1) , the trial court opined:
The evidence presented [] indicated that [] Child had not seen Father since some time in 2017 , [ 2 ] prior to Mother obtaining a three

- year [PFA] order against him on January 24, 2018. The consent order entered on the PFA specifically states that the parties are to follow the current custody order and that, if Father wishes to modify the terms of the custody order, he was to utilize the court system. Father discontinued any c ontact with [] Child from that point forward. Father’s argument on this point is that Father did everything in his power to maintain a relationship with [] Child but was stone

- walled by Mother, thus, the fact that he had not maintained contact with [] Ch ild or performed parental duties should not be held against him. Father testified extensively as to his learning disabilities creating difficulty for him to read and comprehend the various court orders pertaining to the custody of [] Child, but Father als o indicated that he and [Grandmother] with whom [] Child resided on a temporary basis, were previously afforded some type of custody while Mother participated in her job corps program. He testified as to his reliance on family members and paramours to kee p him informed , especially after Mother obtained a PFA against him. He also testified that neither the Allegheny County court staff nor anyone in his personal life explained the terms of the PFA order and whether it had an impact on his custodial rights. He stated that he was una ware of where Mother resided after the PFA was entered, but this is not uncommon in custody matters involving instances of abuse. Mother also testified that she blocked Father on social media platforms because she did not want hi m to have contact with her while the PFA was in effect.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 We reiterate that Child was born i n August, 2012

. As such, Child was approximately five years old the last time Father s aw him.J

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The closest that Father came to taking any action on his own was to ask Mother’s brother and other people in his social circle if they could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to resume h aving contact with [] Child. While this may be considered minimal effort by Father , the notion that Father did everything in his power to overcome Mother’s efforts to keep [C]hild from him was not established by the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 4

- 5. We agree with the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate
Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(1). Here, while the trial court focused

on the six

- month period preceding the filing of Mother’s petition, it carefully

considere d Father’s failure or refusal to perform parental duties in relation to

the circumstances of the case. Here, there is no dispute that Father has not

seen or contacted Child since 2017

. Father has simply not carried out
parental duties such as providing love, protection, guidance and/or support
through affirmative actions such as communication and association to develop
and maintain the parent

- child relationship. The trial court considered Father’s
testimony regarding his learning disabilities and Father ’s argument that he
relied extensively on family members to keep him informed. See id. at 4

- 5.
Ultimately, however, the trial court determined that Father put forth “minimal

effort” when his only action “was to ask Mother’s brother and other people in

h is social circle if they could speak to Mother and ask permission for Father to
resume having contact with Child.” Id. at 5. The trial court also examined

the purported barriers that prevented Father from maintaining the
parent

- child relationship. While Mother filed a PFA against Father which

created a barrier for him , the trial court determined that Father did relativelyJ

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little to overcome that barrier. Moreover, we note that there is no dispute

th at Mother obtained a PFA against Father based upon his own conduct

. See
N.T., 7/22/2021, at 74 (Mother testified that she filed a PFA petition when

Father “found out that [she] was messing with someone else [and Father ]

sent some guy to [her] house to sho ot [her] house up ” while she was at home
with her children, but that the plan was later aborted ). Such conduct is
neither reasonably explained nor beyo nd Father’s control. Father has simply
failed to utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship
and, instead, creat ed his own impediments to having a relationship with Child

. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err
as a matter of law by involuntarily terminatin g Father’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(1).
Father’s next two issues pertain to the trial court’s application of 23

Pa.C.S.A . § 2511(b) and, therefore, we will examine them together. First,

Father asserts that “[a]lt hough [S]tepfather is willing to adopt [Child], the

int egrity of the proposed adoption is lacking[,]” and, therefore, the trial court
erred by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(b). Father’s Brief, at 28. Father avers that Stepfather has been married

three times , incl uding his current marriage to Mother, and ha s engaged in
“adulterous affairs” and “open sexual relationsh ips” in the past. Id. a t 28

-
29. Father also contends that Mother and Stepfather began their relationship
when Stepfather was still married to his se cond wife, there is a 36

- year age difference between Mother and Stepfather , they “have little in common,” andJ

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it “appears [S]tepfather and [M]other entered into this marriage as an aid to”
involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights. Id

. at 30

- 31. In sum mation
regarding the proposed adoption , Father argues :
[The] trial court should be concerned with not only whether the adoption will occur , but whether the family unit will remain intact in the future. Stepfather’s lack of respect for th e sanctity of marriage and a strong proc livity to move from relationship to relationship calls into question the integrity of the proposed adoption. If [S]tepfather moves on from his current relationship with [M]other, like he has done with so many other relationships in the past, [Child] will be left without a father for a second time.

Id. at 30

- 31. In his third issue presented, Father claims the trial court erred

as a matter of law or abused its discretion in generally applying Section
2511(b) because M other failed to prove that severing the bond between Father

and Child would not have a detrimental effect on Child. Id. at 32

- 36. Father
argues that Child ’s preference was not considered and that the trial court

failed to consider testimony from the cour t

- appointed guardian ad litem who

“did not believe that terminating [F]ather’s parental rights would be in the

best interests of the minor child.” Id. at 36. 3
This Court has previously determined:
A petition to terminate a natural parent's parental rights, filed by one natural parent against the other under Section 2512(a)(1), is cognizable only if an adoption of the child is foreseeable. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b); In re Adoption of L.J.B. , 18 A.3d 10 98, 1107 ( Pa. 2011) ; s ee also In re B.E. , 377 A.2d 153, 154 ( Pa. 1977) (stating petition filed by one biological parent for involuntary termination of other biological parent's parental rights

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 We note that neither the guardian ad litem nor Child’s counsel filed a brief in this case.J

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can survive only “in connection with a plan for adoption”; affi rming denial of biological mother's petition for involuntary termination of biological father's parental rights, even upon proof of natural father's abandonment of child, absent mother's plan to have child adopted by step

- parent or any other person). Even when a Section 2512(a)(1) petition might satisfy the statutory requirements for termination, a court still cannot grant the petition without a corresponding plan for an anticipated adoption of the child. In re Adoption of L.J.B. , supra at 228, 18 A.3d at 1107. See In re Adoption of J.F. , 572 A.2d 223, 225 ( Pa. Super. 1990) (construing language in subsection (b), albeit under a prior version, to mean that biological parent may not petition to terminate other biological parent's parental rights unless adopt ion is planned). A “contemplated adoption” is required in this context because Section 2512(a)(1) was not designed as a punitive measure to penalize an ineffective or negligent parent. In re B.E. , supra at 156.

In re E.M.I. , 57 A.3d 1278, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2012)

. Involuntary termination under Section 2512(a)(1),
is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide a means for changing the surname of the child. Rather, the purpose of involuntary termination of parental rights is to dispense with the need for parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has failed to meet the continuing needs of the child. Once a natural parent's rights are terminated, the concomitant adoption fosters a new parent

- child relationship. Such a rule is sound because termination of the natural parent's rights prior to adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for purposes of protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit.

In re Adoption of L.J.B. , 18 A.3d at 1107

– 1108 (Pa. 2011) (internal
citations, quotations, original brackets, and footnotes omitted). “Strict
compliance with the Adoption Act is a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction
to hear a petition to terminate parental rights in connection with a pr oposedJ

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adoption.” In re E.M.I. , 57 A.3d 1278, 1284

– 1285 (Pa. Super. 2012)
( citatio n omitted ).
Moreover,
[a] ssuming the termination pleading meets threshold requirements, the court proceeds with the two

- part test for termination of parental rights under Section 2511 of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The initial focus is on the conduct of the parent whose rights are at issue

.

* * * The second prong of the test [under Section 2511(b)] centers on the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P
. , 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). “A proper Section 2511(b) analysis focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re T.D. , 949 A.2d 910, 920 (Pa

. Super. 2008), appeal denied , 970 A.2d 1148 ( Pa. 2009). The court should examine intangibles such as “love, comfort, security, and stability” when determining the needs and welfare of the child. Id.
Current case law indicates that while an averment of a contemplated adoption might be sufficient to obtai n a hearing on the termination petition, at the termination hearing the petitioning parent must demonstrate the planned adoption is also in the child's best interests, before the court will terminate the parental rights of the responding parent. See In re Adoption of L.J.B. , supra at 1110

– 11 11 (implying no gain to child or society is achieved by terminating one parent's rights to permit adoption by another who is unwilling or unqualified to adopt). Thus, as part of its Section 2511(b) analysis of the needs and welfare of the child in this context, the court must address and evaluate the “proposed adoption” that was averred in the termination petition. See generally id

. Id. at 1287 (brackets added)

.

“ In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between th e parent
and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bondJ

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analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.” In re K.Z.S. , 946 A.2d 753, 762

- 7 63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). “ W hen conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to
use expert testimony. [Instead, s]ocial workers and caseworkers can offer

evaluations as well.” In re Z.P. , 994 A.2d at 1121. Further,

i n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with [a n adoptive ] parent.

I n re A.S

. , 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Above all else . . . adequate
consideration must be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s
own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination
of parental rights.” I n re Z.P. , 994 A.2d at 1121 (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
“We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate
support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious
disregard for competent and credible evide nce.” In re Adoption of R.J.S. , 901 A.2d 502, 506 ( Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “ The trial court, not
the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility
of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. ” Id. (citations
omitted). “ In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence. ” Id. (citation omitted).

On Father’s two issue s related to Section 2511(b) , the trial court found:J

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[]Fat her [contends] that the proposed adoption of [Child] would be sus pect[.] Father points to Stepfather’s history of courting younger women but not maintaining a longstanding relationship with them before ending the relationship in pursuit of another. Even if the [c]ourt did agree that Stepfather’s relationship history suggests what Father contends, the [c]ourt cannot speculate as to how long the current marriage between Mother and Step father will last. According to the testimony presented, the parties intend to form an intact family, and the [c]ourt judged this testimony to be credible. [...] In this matter, the [c]ourt found the evidence regarding the legitimacy of the intentions of Mother a nd Stepfather to move forward with the adoption process for [] Child to be credible. Father’s second point is also unpersuasive , in that Mother was able to establish that [] Child and Father have not had significant contact since prior to the filing of the PFA [petition] in 2018. Regardless of the reasons Father espoused for not pursuing a relationship with [] Child, the fact remains that for over four years, [] Child did not participate in building and maintaining a parent

- child bond with Father. To say that would be detrimental to sever such bond would imply that one exists at all. Possibly the strongest evidence of this fact is that [] when [] the paternal grandmother to [] Child [] passed away in between scheduled hearing dates, Mother testified that she had asked [] Child if he wished to attend [her funeral], and he declined to do so. [] Child did not express any desire to contact Father or even any concern for Father’s emotional well

- being following the passing of the paternal grandmother. As such, the [c]ourt found that no beneficial bond exists between [] Child and Father. Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/2022, at 6.
Upon our review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern

no trial court abuse of discretion or error of law in involuntarily terminating
Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). Mother and Stepfather
testified at length about their intent for Stepfather to adopt Child. The trial
court found this testimony credible and in Child’s best interest , and we will not
usurp th ose determination s

. While Father suggests that the trial court shouldJ

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have examine d whether the family unit will remain intact in the future, the
court was only required to address and evaluate the propos ed adoption and
the best interest of Child, which it did. Furthermore, as the trial court noted,

it would be mere speculation to guess how long the current marriage between
Mother and Step fa ther will last

. Additionally , there was no evidence of any

bond between Father and C hild and , therefore, it wa s reasonable for the trial

court to infer that no bond exists

. Whereas , in contrast, there was evidence
that Stepfather provide s financial , educational and emotional support for Child
and that they are bonded. Father ’s own feelings of love and affection for C hild,
alone, do not prevent termination of his parental rights

. Accordingly, Father’s
last two appellate issues lack merit. For all of the foregoing reasons, it was
proper for th e trial court to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to
Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/27/2023