alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 35.1

World Omni Financial Corp.

Servicer Compliance Statement

Pursuant to Item 1123

of
Regulation AB

I, Victor A. De Jesus, do hereby certify that I am the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of World Omni
Financial Corp., a Florida corporation, and further certify on behalf of World Omni Financial Corp. in its capacity as servicer (the Servicer) under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of March 1, 2006 (the
Agreement), among World Omni Auto Receivables Trust 2006-A, as Issuing Entity, World Omni Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor, and the Servicer, as follows:

(i) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the period covered by the issuing entitys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 (the Reporting Period), and
of its performance under the Agreement, has been made under my supervision.

(ii) To the best of my knowledge, based on the review described
above, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand as of March 30, 2007.



WORLD OMNI FINANCIAL CORP.By:

/s/ Victor A. De JesusName: Victor A. De Jesus Title: Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John L. Jarvis, Appellant.

[664 NYS2d 845]

Mercure, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (McGrath, J.), rendered December 1, 1995, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the second degree.

An indictment charged defendant with a single count of burglary in the second degree, allegedly committed on September 4, 1994. After defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds (see, CPL 30.30) was denied by County Court, defendant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced as a second felony offender to 5 to 10 years in prison. The plea was entered with the express understanding that defendant waived his right to appeal and withdrew all motions previously made. On appeal, defendant continues to assert that the indictment should be dismissed on statutory speedy trial grounds. Defendant’s right to claim that he was deprived of a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, however, was forfeited as a result of his entering a plea of guilty (see, *People v O’Brien, 56*NY2d 1009, 1010; *People v McDonald,*206 AD2d 562; *People v Cantie,*201 AD2d 805, 806, *lv denied*83 NY2d 850).

Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, Casey and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the quarterly report of Greystone Logistics, Inc. (the
"Company"), on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 30, 2008, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert H. Nelson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:


(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





January 20,
      2009
              
              /s/ Robert
      H. NelsonRobert
      H. NelsonChief
      Financial Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The
foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission as an exhibit to the Report and shall not be considered filed as part
of the Report.
#### Alberta BRAMBILA-MONTANO, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-71914.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*658Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 2, 2008.

Frank P. Sprouls, Esq., Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Joan E. Smiley, Esq., Thomas Fatouros, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alberta Brambila-Montano, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying her application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (“Special rule for battered spouse or child”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Brambila-Montano does not challenge the agency’s dispositive good moral character determination and has therefore failed to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A); *Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales,*405 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.2005). We therefore do not reach Brambila-Montano’s contentions concerning the agency’s extreme cruelty determination.

We lack jurisdiction to review Brambila-Montano’s procedural due process contention because she did not exhaust this argument before the BIA. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (the court lacks jurisdiction to review procedural process claims not raised during administrative proceedings).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A0238. JAMES ALEXANDER CARROLL v. THE STATE.

James Alexander Carroll was convicted of child molestation. He filed a motion

for new trial, which the trial court denied on June 9, 2014. Carroll filed his notice of

appeal on July 11, 2014. We lack jurisdiction.

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the

appealable order. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice

of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland

v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Because Carroll filed his notice of

appeal 32 days after entry of the trial court’s order, his appeal is untimely. 

Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. In light of 

this dismissal, this court’s October 14, 2014 order granting Carroll an extension of

time to file his brief is hereby VACATED and his motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

Because Carroll is represented by counsel, he is informed of the following in

accordance with Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995): This appeal

has been dismissed because of your counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 

If you still wish to appeal, you may request the trial court to grant an out-of-time

appeal. If the trial court grants an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days from that

grant in which to instigate an appeal. If the trial court denies your request for an outof-time appeal, you may appeal that denial by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days

of the denial. If you no longer wish to appeal your conviction, you need not do

anything else.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to Carroll as well as

to Carroll’s attorney, who is also directed to send a copy to Carroll. 

October 15, 2014
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

10/15/2014
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#### Joseph A. Sarmiento, an Infant, by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Susan Sarmiento, et al., Respondents, v Northern Woods Realty Corp. et al., Defendants, and Richard Babcock, an Infant, by His Guardian, Irene Babcock, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 439]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Richard Babcock appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Slobod, J.), dated October 7, 1996, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

*362The infant plaintiff sustained physical injuries, including a fractured skull, when he fell from his bicycle. The plaintiffs adduced evidence that the appellant, an older youth, chased the infant plaintiff on another bicycle and that contact between the two bicycles was a contributing cause of the fall. The appellant moved for summary judgment, contending, *inter alia,*that, as a matter of law, he could not be held liable on the sole negligence claim asserted against him because, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs’ evidence, the infant plaintiff was injured as a result of an unpleaded intentional tort *(see, e.g., Barraza v Sambade,*212 AD2d 655; *Panzella v Burns,*169 AD2d 824). We disagree.

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment. There are questions as to whether the appellant caused the infant plaintiff’s injuries and, if so, whether he was injured as a result of the appellant’s negligence or as a result of an unpleaded intentional tort. These are issues of fact for a jury’s determination *(see, Alford v St. Nicholas Holding Corp.,*218 AD2d 622; *McLaughlin v Thaima Realty Corp.,*161 AD2d 383). Miller, J. P., Pizzuto, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.1







CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report of Luna Medical Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2001 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I Brent Shaw, Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









/s/ Brent Shaw



Brent Shaw

Acting Chief Executive Officer

February 26, 2003
#### Fred Lewis WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. c/o STALLARD; c/o Everidge, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-7271.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 18, 2010.

Decided: Dec. 2, 2010.

*798Fred Lewis Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Fred Lewis Wilson appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Wilson v. c/o Stallard,*No. 7:10-cv-00237-gec-mfu, 2010 WL 3291798 (WD.Va. Aug. 19, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of CurrencySharesSMSwedish Krona Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Nick Bonos, Chief Financial Officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.



|                             
|-----------------------------
|Date: January 14, 2009       
|                             
|/s/ NICK BONOS               
|Nick Bonos*                  
|Chief Financial Officer      
|(principal financial officer)



|* | The Registrant is a trust and Nick Bonos is signing in his
capacity as the principal financial officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Registrant.
|- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMANDO VALLEJO MARTINEZ and

SANDRA VALLEJO MARTINEZ,

 Petitioners,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 14-70699

Agency Nos. A093-366-522

A200-795-615

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 24, 2016** 

Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Armando Vallejo Martinez and Sandra Vallejo Martinez, natives and

citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s

decision denying their applications for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is

FILED

MAR 04 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo constitutional claims and

questions of law. Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012). We

dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. 

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision, pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (final paragraph), that petitioners lacked good moral character. 

See Lopez-Castellanos v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2006). 

We do not reach petitioners’ contention that the agency’s good moral

character determination was based on a legally erroneous interpretation of the tax

laws because the good moral character determination was based also on

petitioners’ inconsistent testimony, and petitioners do not raise a question of law as

to that basis. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As a

general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the

decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). 

Petitioners’ contention that the agency violated their right to due process by

failing to provide them with a full and fair hearing is not supported by the record. 

See Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where

an alien is given a full and fair opportunity to be represented by counsel, prepare an

2 14-70699
application for . . . relief, and to present testimony and other evidence in support of

the application, he or she has been provided with due process.”). 

Petitioners’ contention that the agency failed to provide specific, cogent

reasons to support its determination is not supported by the record. See Najmabadi

v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (“What is required is merely that [the

BIA] consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to

enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely

reacted.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

3 14-70699
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Voiceserve, Inc. (the “Company”) for the for the year ended March 31, 2010 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Aron Sandler, Chief Financial Officer  and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.





Dated:  June 29, 2010





By: /s/ Aron Sandler


Aron Sandler


Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
#### Elpidio DELGADO, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. BUREAU OF PRISONS; Kathleen Hawk-Sawyer; M. Morrison, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-40959

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 14, 2008.

Elpidio Delgado, Jr., pro se.

Andrea Lynn Parker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Elpidio Delgado, Jr., federal prisoner #83283-079, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint challenging Bu*368reau of Prisons (BOP) Program Statement 1351.05 under the Administrative Procedures Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the First Amendment. Delgado does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims arising under the Administrative Procedures Act and the First Amendment. Because Delgado fails to brief these issues, they are deemed abandoned. *See Yohey v. Collins,*985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.1993); *Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner,*813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987).

Delgado’s challenge to Program Statement 1351.05 is without merit and fails to state a claim for relief under the Freedom of Information Act. *See Harris v. Hegmann,*198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1999). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew Evans DOWD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-30263.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 6, 2008.

Joshua A. Van De Wetering, Esq., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cynthia K. Smith, Esq., Smith Law Offices, P.C., Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.

*690Before: GRABER, FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds dais case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Matthew Evans Dowd appeals from the district court’s determination, following remand pursuant to *United States v. Ame-line,*409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc), that it would not have imposed a materially different sentence under an advisory Guidelines system.

Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Dowd’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.