alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2657 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2657

   To prohibit Federal funds from being used to develop, implement, 
                 support, or endorse vaccine passports.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 19, 2021

  Mr. Joyce of Pennsylvania introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit Federal funds from being used to develop, implement, 
                 support, or endorse vaccine passports.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Americans Safety, 
Security, and Privacy Over Repressive Tyranny Act'' or the ``Passport 
Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR DEVELOPING, 
              IMPLEMENTING, SUPPORTING, OR ENDORSING VACCINE PASSPORTS.

    No Federal funds may be used to develop, implement, support, or 
endorse a system under which an individual is required to provide 
documentation that shows the vaccination status of the individual in 
order for that individual to conduct an activity, including to travel 
or attend an event.
                                 <all>
```
# EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report
of CurrencySharesSM Mexican Peso Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended October 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Carl G. Verboncoeur, Chief
Executive Officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Trust, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

1.              The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2.              The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material           respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.

Date: January 29, 2007

/s/ Carl G. VerboncoeurCarl G.
Verboncoeur*Chief Executive Officer(principal executive officer)

*The Registrant is a
trust and Carl G. Verboncoeur is signing in his capacity as the principal executive
officer of Rydex Specialized Products LLC, the Sponsor of the Registrant.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis SOTO-GUEVARA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10320.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*593Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 17, 2011.

Robert A. Bork, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jason F. Carr, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Luis Soto-Guevara appeals from the 17-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Soto-Guevara contends that the staleness of his prior conviction and minimal criminal history renders his sentence substantively unreasonable. In light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, Soto-Guevara’s below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 991-93 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc).

Soto-Guevara also contends that his sentence is unreasonable because his prior conviction for sale a controlled substance, in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11352(a), would not have triggered the 12-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B) for a prior felony drug trafficking conviction before the November 1, 2008 amendments. The district court did not plainly err in applying the enhancement where Soto-Guevara committed the current illegal re-entry offense following the November 1, 2008 amendment’s addition of “offer to sell” to the 12-level enhancement.

Finally, Soto-Guevara contends that his sentence is unreasonable because his prior sale of a controlled substance conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony. The district court did not plainly err because Soto-Guevara concedes his prior conviction qualified as a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B), and thus, the 12-level enhancement was appropriate even though Soto-Guevara’s prior offense was not a statutory “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>   1




                                                                     EXHIBIT 21



                              Florsheim Group Inc.
                           Subsidiaries of the Company


The Florsheim Shoe Store Company - Northeast, a Delaware corporation

The Florsheim Shoe Store Company - West, a Delaware corporation

L.J. O'Neill Shoe Co., a Missouri corporation

Florsheim Occupational Footwear, Inc., a Missouri corporation

Florsheim Australia Limited, an Australian corporation

Florsheim Canada, Inc., a Canadian corporation

Florsheim Europe S.R.L., an Italian corporation

Florsheim Pacific Limited, a Hong Kong corporation

Florsheim S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation

Florsheim B.V., a Netherlands corporation

Florsheim Limited, a U.K. corporation

Florsheim France, SARL, a French corporation
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Brian Terrence WRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 10-2158.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 1, 2010.

Filed: Nov. 17, 2010.

Matthew C. Quinn, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Smith, AR, for Appellee.

William Arden McLean, El Dorado, AR, for Appellant.

Brian Terrence Wright, Dermott, AR, pro se.

Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Brian Wright appeals the 110-month prison sentence the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). His counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that Wright believes his sentence is too harsh but that our court lacks jurisdiction to review Wright’s within-the-guidelines sentence.

We have jurisdiction to review Wright’s sentence, and we conclude that the district court committed no procedural error and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (in reviewing sentence, appellate court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error, and then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard; if sentence is within applicable Guidelines range, appellate court may apply presumption of reasonableness); *United States v. Haack,*403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2005) (describing abuse of discretion).

Having reviewed the record under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

1

. The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.
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ADDENDUM






To The
"Exclusive and All Encompassing License on the




Magnegas
Technology" dated April 6, 2007




WHEREAS
HyFuels, Inc is the sole and exclusive owner of all intellectual property on the
Magnegas Technology as specified on the website www.magnegas.com(hereinafter
referred to as the "Technology.")




WHEREAS
HyFuels, Inc granted on April 6, 2007 to Magnegas Corporation the exclusive and
all encompassing rights on the Technology with a 5 year option to purchase all
said intellectual rights (hereinafter referred to as the "License") for all
countries of the American Continent, plus Alaska, Hawaii and all Caribbean
Islands (hereinafter referred to as the "Territory").




NOW,
THEREFORE, HYFUELS, INC CONFIRMS AND REAFFIRMS THE FOLLOWING:




1)  The above
quoted License is for the above quoted Territory consisting of the entire
American Continent, hereinafter defined and clarified as including all countries
of North America, Central America, and South America plus Hawaii, Alaska and all
Caribbean Islands.




2)  Said
License is permanent and irrevocable in the above identified Territory with the
sole exception of:




i)  the
bankruptcy or insolvency of Licensee,


ii)  the
filing of Licensee of a petition for bankruptcy


iii)  the
making by the Licensee of the assignment of this License for the benefit of
creditors


iv)  the
appointment of a receiver of the Licensee or any of its assets which appointment
shall not be vacated within sixty (60) days thereafter


v) the
filing of any other petition for the relief from creditors based upon the
alleged bankruptcy or insolvency of Licensee which shall not be dismissed within
60 days thereafter.




3)  As stated
in paragraph 6, said License grants to Magnegas Corporation an exclusive 5 year
option for the purchase of all intellectual rights in the Territory. In the
event Magnegas Corporation elects not to exercise it's right of said option,
then the License remains in full force and effect.




4)  Magnegas
Corporation has fulfilled each and every one of its obligations per said
License, including the issuance of all contractual shares. As a result, this
License is in full validity and effect without any reservation from HyFuels,
Inc. Hence,




5) The
above identified License in the above identified Territory is now permanent for
the entire life on the patents (described in detail in Schedule "A" of the
License) as above specified.











/s/
Ruggero Santilli


Ruggero
Santilli


President, HyFuels,
Inc


April 5,
2008






/s/
Bo Linton


Bo
Linton


President, Magnegas
Corporation


April 5,
2008
exv10w3



 





Exhibit 10.3




CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



We consent to the incorporation by reference in (i) the Registration Statements filed on Form F-3
(File Nos. 333-84226, 333-128361, 333-129962 and 333-130040) and in any related Prospectus and (ii)
the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos: 333-11368, 333-11414, 333- 13038, 333-13664,
333-13668, 333-14254, 333-14252, 333-81564, 333-92220, 333-108833, 333-125075 and 333-137354) of
our report dated March 19, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of ING
Belgium SA/NV (not included herein), which report appears in this December 31, 2006 Annual Report
(Form 20-F) of ING Groep N.V.




Brussels, Belgium




April 13, 2007




Ernst & Young Reviseurs d’Entreprises SCCRL




represented by




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	Marc van Steenvoort 	Pierre Anciaux
 	 
	 	 	 
	Partner 	Partner
#### Paul GARVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-56615.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 6, 2008.

Filed May 15, 2008.

John K. Grant, Esq., Kennerson & Grant LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

*772Edith S. Shea, Esq., Burke Williams & Sorensen LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FISHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and ROBART, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable James L. Robart, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Garver appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of Hartford Life *&*Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”) on his breach of contract claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

“When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible ...” Cal. Civ.Code § 1639. We conclude that the operative paragraph of the settlement agreement is ambiguous as to the parties’ intention with respect to the ongoing benefit payments. The district court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. *See WYDA*Assocs. *v. Merner,*42 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1709, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 323 (CtApp.1996). The district court’s interpretation is a reasonable construction and is supported by substantial evidence. *See*Witkin, *Summary of California Law*(10th ed. 2005) § 741 (where properly admitted extrinsic evidence is in conflict, any reasonable construction will be upheld). Hartford is therefore contractually obligated to pay Garver a maximum of $10,000 per month in disability benefits for the duration of his eligibility. We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that Hartford did not breach the settlement agreement. We do not reach the district court’s alternative finding of unilateral mistake.

We also conclude that the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is without merit. *See Karen Kane Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,*202 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.2000).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2744 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2744

To provide hazardous duty pay for Federal employees who may be exposed 
                  to COVID-19, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 21, 2021

  Mr. Payne (for himself, Mr. Brown, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Suozzi, Ms. 
    Norton, Mr. Vargas, Ms. Newman, and Mr. Carson) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                                 Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide hazardous duty pay for Federal employees who may be exposed 
                  to COVID-19, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hazardous Duty Pay for Frontline 
Federal Workers Act''.

SEC. 2. PAY DIFFERENTIAL FOR DUTY RELATED TO COVID-19.

    (a) In General.--Section 5545 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(e)(1) The Office shall establish a schedule or schedules of pay 
differentials for duty during which an employee is exposed to an 
individual who has (or who has been exposed to) COVID-19.
    ``(2) Under such regulations as the Office may prescribe, during 
the period beginning on March 15, 2020, and ending on September 30, 
2020, an employee to whom chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 
applies, and an employee appointed under chapter 73 or 74 of title 38, 
is entitled to be paid the differential under paragraph (1) for any 
period in which the employee is carrying out the duty described in such 
paragraph.''.
    (b) TSA Employees.--Section 111(d)(2) of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
                    ``(C) Hazardous duty pay for covid-19.--The 
                provisions of section 5545(e) of title 5, United States 
                Code, shall to apply to any individual appointed under 
                paragraph (1).''.
                                 <all>
```