### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 369 -CR

Cr ae Ro be r t P e as e , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

FROM THE COUN TY C OURT A T LA W N O. 7 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 7208 28 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM E. BENDER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N The jury convicted Cra e Robert Pea se of the of fense of re ckless driving
. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.401(a ) (West 1999). Punishment was assesse d at 30 day s in jail and
a $2 00 .0 0 fi ne , bu t imp os iti on of the se nte nc e wa s su sp e nd e d a nd Pe a se wa s p la c e d o n c omm un ity supervision for two y ear s. I n three points of error , Pease a sserts that the jury char g e aut h orized a non-unanimous ver dict, challeng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence , and cla ims that his c on vic tio n is “ nu ll a

nd vo id” be c a

us e the tr ia l jud g e wa s no t qu a lif ie d. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that in the ear ly morning hours of November 3, 2004, Offic er Kelly Gutierre z of the Austin Police D epar tment was driving eastbound on Willi am Cannon Drive in south Austin when she witnessed a red truc k speed pa st her patrol vehicle. Gutierrr ez testified that the truck ’s h i gh ra t e of spe ed ca used her vehicle to shake and sw ay . Gutierre z then observed the2

tr uc k ma ne uv e r i nto the mid dle lane of tr a ff ic , f or c ingano the r c ar t o s we rv e e va siv e ly int o th e ri g hthand lane to avoid being rea r-e nded. Gutier

rez turned on he r over

head lig hts and siren and spe d up to catch the truck. She observed that the truck w as g oing 80 miles pe r hour in a 40- miles-per- hour residential zone. The driver of the t ruck, who was later identified a s Crae Pea se, did not pull over. Gutierre z testi fied that in her experience , drivers who ref use to pull over are “usually DWI .” Af ter being pursued f

or about ha lf a mile, Pease turned rig ht onto a “small, narr ow” neighbor hood street thr ou g h w hic h o nly

on e c ar c ou ld p a ss t

hr ou g h at a

tim e . G uti e rr e z ha d “no id ea” wh e re Pe a se was lea ding he r.

Gutierre z testi fied that Pea se finally turned into a s t ee p d ri vewa y and par ked. A fe ma le pa sse ng e r g ot o ut o f t he tr uc k, ig no re d G uti e rr e z, a

nd wa lke d in sid e the ho us e . Pe a se a lso exit ed the truc k, looked at Gutier rez but “complete ly blew her off” and starte d walking towards the ho us e . G uti e rr e z as ke d Pe a se to sho w he r his ha nd s but he re fu se d, c on tin uin g to i g no re he r. At

thi s point, fea ring that Pease mig ht have a wea pon, Gutierre z gra

bbed him, threw him ag ainst the truck,
an d p u th i s h an d s b eh i n d

h i s b ac k
. Gu t i erre z p l a c e d P e a s e u n d er arre s tfo r r ec k l es s dri v i n g. Gutie rr e z expl a ine d th a t she c ou ld sme ll “e xtre me a mou nts of a lc oh ol” on him and ha d to ho ld h im ag ainst the truck be cause of how much he was stumbling an d s wa y ing. G utierre z testi fied that Pease’ s speec h was slurred, and that he r esisted her eff orts to lead him towards he r vehic le: “He kept on g oin g a g a in s t th e h an d c u f f s , I w a s tr

y in g to ma

n e u v e r h im to w ar d s my v e h ic le , h e k e p t on stumbl ing , k e pt o n le anin g ba c k, tr y ingto s top walkin g , p lanti nghis fe e t, h e ke pt o n d ra g g inghis fee t.” Fina lly , Gutierre z was able to g et P ease to her vehicle. A videotape fr om Gutierre z’s patrol
c ar r e c or de d th e inc ide nt f ro m the tim e Pe a se tur

ne d into the ne ig hb or

ho od un til he wa s p la c e d in3

the patrol c ar, a

nd the tape w as admitted into evidenc e and pla y ed for the jury . Finally , Gutierre z testified that Pease ref

used a br eath test onc e they arr ived at the police station. Pease w as cha

rg ed by information with rec kless driving . The infor mation alleged various wa

y s in which Pease e ng ag ed in this conduct: “by driving 80 miles pe r hour in a 40 mile per hour zone, and by

passing a poli ce vehicle at an ex tremely high rate of speed, a nd by almost striking
ano the r ve hic le wh ile tr a ve lin g a t a hig h ra te of sp e e d, and

by dis re g ard ingpatr ol c ar o ve rh e a d li g hts for se vera l blocks, and by consuming alcohol and ope rating a motor vehic le.” The alleg ations in the jury char g e mirrore d the alleg ations in the information, except th at each a lle g a tio n w a s su

bmi tte d d isj un c tiv e ly

to t he jur y . In o the r w or ds , f

oll ow ingthe fi rs t alleg ation of driving 80 miles per hour in a 40-mil es-pe r-hour zone, eac h subsequent alleg ation was pr e c e de d b y

an “ and /or ” c on jun c tio n. Th e jur

y c on vic te d Pe a se of re c kle ss dr ivi ng and the c ounty court at law place d him on community supervision. This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Jury unan im ity

I n his first point of er

ror, Pea se asse rts that by

submitt ing disjunctively

the var ious
a lle g a tio ns in t

he jur y c ha rg e , th e c ounty

c ourt a t la w a llo we d f

or a no n- un anim ou s v e rd ic t. The rig ht to a unanimous jury verdic t is constitut ionally and statutorily

g uara nteed. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd s. VI , XI V; Te x. Con st. art . V , § 13 ; T e x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt s. 36.29(a) , 37.03 (W es t 2006). The una nimity require ment ensure s that eac h juror is convince d bey ond a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t t h a t t h e p r o s e c u ti o nh a s p r o v e d e a c h e s s e n ti a l e le me n t o f th e o f f e n s e. J e ffe rso n v . S

tat e , 1 89 S.W. 3d 30 5, 31 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). B ut w hil e jur y un anim ity

is4

require d as to th e es s ential eleme nts of the offe nse, if the statute in que stion establishes differ ent mod e s or me ans by wh ic h the of fe ns e may be c omm itt e d, un anim ity is g e ne ra lly no t r e qu ir e d a s to t he alter nate modes or

means of c ommissi on. Id
. O r d i n ar i l y , t h e n , t h e f i r s ts t e p i na

u n an i mit y
c ha lle ng e is a

n e xami natio n o f t

he stat ut ory

langua g e to d e te rm ine the e le me nts of the c ri me and w h e th e r th e le g is latu r e h a s c r e a te d a s in g le o f f e n s e w it h mu lt ip le o r a lt e r

n a te mo d e s of commission. Id
.

The statutory

lan gu age o f t h e o ff

en s e o f r ec k l es s dri v i n g i s s t ra i gh t fo rw ar d : “A per son commits an o f

f e n s e if th e p e r s o n dr iv e s a v e h ic le in w il f u l o r w an to n d is r e g ar d f

o r th e s afe ty

of persons or pr operty .” Te x . Transp. Code A nn. § 545.401(a) . The statute doe s n o t s p ec i fy any p art i c u l ar m an n e r o r m e an s o f c o m m i t t i n g t h e o f f e n s e , p r o b a

b l y b e c a u s e t h e r e ar e c o u n t l e s s w a ys in which a pe rson ca

n drive a vehicle in wilful or w anton dis re gar d for the safety of per sons or proper ty , including e ach of

the way s alleg ed in the information. We c onclude that the lang uag e of the statut e ind ic a te s th a t th e le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to pe na lize the a c t of re c kle ss d

ri vin g , r e g a rd le ss of the sp e c if

ic wa y s in wh ic h th a t a c t ma

y be c omm itt e d. Th e re fo re , w e ho ld t hat th e un anim ity requir e me n t g o e s to th e a c t o f dr iv in g a v e h ic le in w il f u l an d w an to n d is r e g ar d f o r th e s a f e ty of persons or pr operty , while the jury need not be unanimous on the manner or mea ns of committing the ac t. Se e Ngo v . S

tat e , 175 S.W .3d 738, 746 n.27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Pease attempts to compare his ca se to Stu hle r v . S tat e , 218 S.W. 3d

70 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2007), a

nd Ngo v . S

tat e , cited above . Howeve r, these case s are inapplicable here . I n Stuhler , the de f e n d a n t w a s c o n v ic te d o f th e o f f e n s e o f in ju r y to a c h il d p u r s u an t to s e c ti o n 2 2
. 04(a) of the penal code. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 22.04(a) (West Supp. 2006). Howeve r, the de fenda nt was5

char g ed with both causing “ serious bodily injury ” to a c hild pursuant to subsection (a) (1), a nd causing“ser ious mental deficie ncy , impairment, or injury ” to a child pursuant to subsection (a )(2)
. The a lleg ations were submitt ed disjunctively to the jury . The court aff

irmed t he interme diate cour t’s
re ve rs a l of

the c on vic tio n, ho ldi ngtha t “ the L e g isl a tur e int e nd e d the se pa ra te re su lts sp e lle d o ut i n the var ious s u b s ections of the statute to be eleme ntal and thus requir ed jury unanimity .” Stuhler , 218 S.W .3d at 719.

Simi larly , in Ngo , the State so ug ht to pr ov e that th e de fe nd ant c omm itt e d o ne c re dit
c ard a bu se of fe ns e by pr ov ing thr e e dif

fe re nt c ri min a l a c ts, oc c ur ri nga t th re e dif

fe re nt t ime s, and in thr ee differ ent way s: ( 1) stealingthe victim’s cre dit card; (2) rec eiving the victim’s car d; or (3) fraudulently prese nting the car d with intent to obtain a benef it. Ngo , 17 5 S.W. 3d a t 74 4. Th e se three theories we re submitted disjunctively to the jury , and the jury

returne d a g ener al ver dict. The court he ld that stealin g, re ceiving , and pre senting a cr edit car d wer e ea ch sepa rate offe nses, and submitt ing the m to the jury disjunctively

violated the unanimity

require ment. Id . at 749. I n contra st to Stuhler , there are no “sepa rate results” or “var ious subsections” in the
rec kles s driving statute. I n contra st to Ngo , th e re is o nly a sin g le of

fe ns e c ha rg e d in thi s
case —driving a vehicle in w ilful or wanton disreg ard for the safe ty of persons or proper t y . T he various alleg ations in the char g e we re simply differ ent manner s and m ea n s of committing that of fe ns e , a nd the jur y did no t hav e to una

nim ou sly a g re e on the m. We ove rr ule Pe a se ’s fi rs t po int
. Legal and factual su ff

iciency I n his second point, Pease a sserts that the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his convic t i o n . P ea s e intertwines this point with hi s previous point, arguing that if thePease a lso asserts under this point that there is a varia nce be tween the evidenc e off ere d at 1 trial and the alleg ations in the char g ing instrument. Se e Go lli ha r v . S tat e , 4 6 S. W. 3 d

2 4 3 , 2 4 6 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2001). Howe ver, Pea se does not identify what this varianc e is nor does he explain how the var iance is materia l to his case . There fore , we find this argument to be inadequately briefe d. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(h). 6 State is a llo we d to int

ro du c e e vid e nc e “ to sup po rt su c h a la un dr y lis t of pr e jud ic ia l a c ts a lle g e d in the information, the State ha s the burden of pro v i n g all the ac ts in tot ality in order to support a conviction.” 1

First, we note t hat when alternate m anner s and mea ns of committing an of

fense are
su bmi tte d to the jur

y , it is a pp ro pr ia te fo r t

he jur y to r e tur n a general v e rd ic t f

or that of fe ns e if th e e v id e n c e s u

p p o rts a c o n v ic ti o n u n d e r an y o n e of them. Mari no s v . S tat e , 186 S.W .3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (ci t i n g Kitc he ns v . S tat e , 823 S.W .2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

Fur thermore , we f

ind that there is leg ally

and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence of ea ch of the manner s and mea

ns of re ckless driving alleg ed by the State. When there i s a cha lleng e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vi d en ce t o s u stain a cr iminal conviction, the question prese nted is whether a
ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of th e offe ns e be y on d a re a so na ble d oubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 4 3 U
. S. 3 0 7 , 3 2 4 , 9 9 S. Ct
. 2 7 8 1 , 6 1 L
. E d
. 2 d 5 6 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ( le g al
su ff ic ie nc y ); Gr iff in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 158-59 (Te x . Crim. App. 1981) (leg al suffic iency ); J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S
. W
. 3 d 1 , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (fa ctual suff iciency ). In a leg al
su f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w , a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i s r e v i e w e d i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e ve rd ic t; i t is assumed that the trie r of fact re solved conflicts in the testimony , weig hed the e vidence , and dre w
rea sonable infe renc es in a manne r that supp o rt s t h e verdict. Gr iff in , 614 S.W .2d at 159 (c iting7

Jack son , 443 U.S. at 318-19). I n a fac tual sufficie ncy revie w, we view the evidenc e in a neutra l light and ask w hether

a jury was rationally

justified i n fi n d i ng g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. See W a t s o n v . Stat e , 2 0 4 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then determine w hether the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is so weak that the ver dict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust or whether the verdic t is a g ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the conf licting e vidence
. Id
. a t 41 5. We wi ll no t re ve rs e a c a se on a fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e un le ss w e c an s ay , w ithso me objective basis in the record, that the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s ver dict. Id . at 417.

I n this case, the pr imary evidenc e off

ere d at trial wa s t h e t est imony of Off icer Gutierre z. Pease offer ed no evidenc e in his defe nse. Gutierre z testi fied to ea ch of the alleg ations in the jury

char g e. Gutier

rez testified th at , d u ri n g h er pur suit of Pease, he r spee dometer r ead 80 miles p e r h o u r . G u ti e r

r e z a ls o te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e w a s p u r s u in g Pe a s e in a 4 0

- mi le s - per- hour
re sid e nti a l are a . T his te sti mony su pp or ts the a lle g a tio n that Pe a se wa s dr ivi ng80 mil e s p e r h our i n
a 40 -m ile s- pe r- ho ur

zon e . Gut ie rr e z fu

rt he r te sti fi e d tha t whe n Pea se pa sse d he r, he wa s d ri vin g so fast that her

patrol ca r shook and swa

y ed. This testimony supports the alleg ation that Pease pa ssed
a po lic e ve hic le a t an e xtre me ly hig h ra te of sp e e d. Gutie rr e z al so te sti fi e d th a t sh e ob se rv e d Pe a se
maneuve r into the middle lane of tr aff ic and c ause a

nother ve hicle to swer

ve into the rig ht-hand lane to a vo id b e inghit . T his te sti mony su pp or ts the a lle g a tio n tha t Pea se a lmo st s tr uc k a no the r v e hic le while trave ling at a hig h rate of spee d
. Gutierre z further testified that she turned on he r over head lights and siren and that Pease did not pull over during the pursuit, which lasted at least half a mile. This testimony

supports the alleg ation that Pease disre g arde d patrol ca r over head lig hts for seve ral8

blo c ks
. Fin all y , Gut ie rr e z te sti fi e d th a t Pe a se ha d a n e xtre me ly

str on g od or

of a lc oh ol o n h im,
e xhibi te d s lur

re d s pe e c h d

ur inghis arr e st, wa s st

umb lin g and

sta g g e ri ng , a

nd re fu se d a br e a th t e st at the police station. This testimony supports the allegation that Pease w as consuming alcohol and operating a

motor vehicle. The jury is the exclusive judge of the fa cts, the cr edibility of t h e witnesses, and the weig ht to b e gi v en to t he witnesses’ testimony
. J ag ge rs v . S tat e , 125 S.W .3d 661, 670 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n [ 1 s t Di s t
. ] 2 0 0 3 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Pe nagrap h v . S tat e , 623 S.W .2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ). An appellate court must be appropr iately defe rential to the fa ct-finde r’s role at trial. Ha rv e

yv . S tat e , 1 3 5 S
. W
. 3 d

7 1 2 , 7 1 7 (T ex . Ap p . — Da l l as 2 0 0 3 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Jones

v . S tat e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). T he jury may believe a ll, some, or none of any witness’s testimony
. Sh ar p v . S tat e , 7 07 S.W. 2d

61 1, 61 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); J ag ge rs , 125 S.W .3d at 670. The jury could have rat i o n al l y ch osen to believe the testimony of Off icer Gutie rr e z, e sp e c ia lly

in t he a bs e nc e of any c on tr ov e rt ingte stimo ny . W e ho ld t hat th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o su

pp or t Pe a se ’s c on vic tio n fo r re c kle ss dr ivi ng . We o ve rr ule his
se c on d p oin t. Judi c ialqual ific at ion s

I n his third point, P ease asser ts that his conviction is “null and void” beca use the trial judge , who is retire d and wa s sitti ng by assig nment, “did not take the oath of offic e as r equire d by the Texas Constit ution” and, ther efor e, “la cked the qualifications to preside over the case .” See T e x. Const. art. XVI , § 1. Pease did not raise this iss ue at tria l. Howeve r, a c halleng e to a tria l judge ’sI n a ca se involving a peac e officer who had alleg edly failed to take the constitutional oath, 2 this Court, i n an opinion authore d by J udg e John Onion, di sag ree d with the rea soning in Pr ie to : The Pr ie to c a se le a ve s ma ny qu e sti on s. I f a retir e d s e nio r j ud g e op ts t o r e ta in h is jud ic ia l c a

pa c ity a s p e rm itt e d by law an d ac c e pts te mpo ra ry a ssi g nme nts fr om t ime to time to differe nt courts, what appointed de jure office does he or she hold? Who is the appointing a

uthority ? What is t h e t er m o f s uch off ice? How ofte n must the c o n s ti tuti o n a l o a th s b e ta

k e n b y th e s e n io r ju d g e ? We d is a g r e e w it h th e rea soning of the Pr ie to c ourt
. De lam ora v . S

tat e , 128 S.W .3d 344, 358-59 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d). 9 qualifications may be raised for the first time on appea l. W ils on v . S tate , 977 S.W .2d 379, 380 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

Pe a se ’s argume nt o n th is i ssu e is a s f oll ow s: The trial judg e in this case, Judge Bill Be nder, r etired on Ma rch 24, 2000 a

nd submitt ed the r eq u i re d oath at that time. No oath ha s been submitted since the n. Retired judg es must take the same oaths require d of appointed judge s and as suc h are su bje c t to the same tim e -f

ra me re qu ir e me nt. El e c te d judg e s must take an oa th w ith e a c h n e w t e rm . Jud g e B e nd e r h a s n ot t a ke n th e oath f or a lmo st s e ve n y e ars . Pe a se pr ov ide s n o e vid e nc e to s up po rt the a bo ve c on te nti on s. C i t i n g Pr ie to Ba il Bo nd

s v . S tat e , 994 S.W. 2d

31 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 99 , p e t. ref ’d), Pea se ar g ues that re tired senior j u d ges must take the oaths re quired of a ppointed office rs under the Texas Consti tution. Se e id . at 32 0- 21 . Eve n ass umi ng the va lid ity of thi s a rgume nt, “we

2 ‘must indulge e very

presumption in favor of the regularity of the proc eeding s and docume nts’ in the trial court.” Mu rp hy

v . S tat e , 95 S.W .3d 317, 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2002, pet. re f’d) (c i t i n g Mc Clo ud

v . S tat e , 527 S.W .2d 885, 887 (Tex. Cr i m . App. 1975)). “ The pre sumption of regu l ar ity is a judicial construc t that require s a re viewing court, ‘a bsent evidenc e of impropr iety ,’10

to indulge e very

presumption in favor of

the r egu l arity

of the trial c ourt’s judg ment.” Id . (citing Lig ht v . S tat e , 15 S.W .3d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). This presumption of re g ularity applies to appe llate cha lleng es of visiting tria l court judge s for a lleg ed f

ai l u re s to take their c onstitut ionally require d oaths. Id . Fur thermore , “an appellant who makes such a challeng e must make a prima fac ie showing that the trial judg e did not take the r equire d oaths befor e we will consider the issue on the me rits.” Id
.

Pe a se ha s f

a ile d to me e t this bur de n. With ou t citi ng to any pr oo f i n th e re c or d, Pe a se
me re ly a lle g e s th a t Judg e B e nd e r fa ile d to take the re qu ir e d oaths
. Th a t is no t e no ug h to o ve rc ome the pre sumption of reg ularity
. Se e id
.

I n addition to the consti tutional oath require ments, Pease a lso refe rs to the statutory require ment that retire d judge s sitti ng by assig nment cer tify to the presiding judg e a w illingness not to a ppear and plead as an attorney in T exas courts for a period of two y ear s. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.055(c)(6) ( West 2003). Once ma de, this cer tification rene ws by

operation of law eve ry two y ear s, unless the retire d judge revoke s it in writing. Se e id . § 74.0551(b), ( c), ( d) (West 2003). Pease c oncede s that the trial judg e submitted the requir ed ce rtification on Mar ch 24, 2000. Ag ain, Pe a se pr ov ide s n o e vid e nc e tha t th is c e rt if

ic a tio n h a s sinc e be e n r e vo ke d. On thi s r e c or d, we mus t p re s u m e t h at J udg e B ender has not revoke d his certific ation. See M urphy , 95 S.W .3d at 320 (pre sumption of reg ularity in proce eding s absent contrary evidenc e). We ove rrule Pea se’s third po int
. CO NC LU SION

Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d Pe a se ’s po int s of e rr or , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.11 _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 9, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh