21-6506

J.P.B. v. Garland

BIA

Reid, IJ

A070 524 933

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 21 3 st day of September, two thousand

4 twenty-three.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 ROBERT D. SACK,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 J.P.B.,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 21-6506

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent. 20 1

1 The Clerk of Court is instructed to amend the caption as set forth above. We 

have elected, nostra sponte, to abbreviate the Petitioner’s name in this summary 

order. See 2d Cir. Local Rule 27.1(j). 
2

1 _____________________________________

2

3 FOR PETITIONER: Craig Relles, Esq., Law Office of Craig Relles, 

4 White Plains, NY.

5

6 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant

7 Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, 

8 Assistant Director; A. Ashley Arthur, Trial 

9 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

10 United States Department of Justice, 

11 Washington, DC.

12 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

13 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

14 DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

15 Petitioner J.P.B., a native and citizen of Liberia, seeks review of a September 

16 14, 2021, decision of the BIA reversing a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

17 that granted his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against 

18 Torture (“CAT”). In re J.P.B., No. A 070 524 933 (B.I.A. Sept. 14, 2021), vacating

19 No. A 070 524 933 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 28, 2020). We assume the parties’ 

20 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21 When the BIA reverses an IJ’s grant of relief, we treat the BIA’s decision as 

22 the final agency determination. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d 

23 Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of 
3

1 law de novo. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020); Manning v. Barr, 

2 954 F.3d 477, 484 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 134 

3 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that the likelihood of a future event is a finding of fact). 

4 “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 

5 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 

6 § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

7 However, the BIA is not authorized to engage in independent factfinding, 

8 and it may review an IJ’s factual findings “only to determine whether [those] 

findings . . . are clearly erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). 2 9 “A finding is 

10 ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 

11 court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

12 mistake has been committed.” Wu Lin v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2016) 

13 (quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the BIA’s finding of clear error, we do 

14 not reach our own determination as to whether the IJ clearly erred, but rather 

15 review the BIA’s decision to “determine whether the BIA has provided sufficient 

16 justification for its conclusion” and to confirm “that the BIA has not violated the 

17 prohibition against making its own findings of fact.” Id. at 129. 

2 All citations refer to regulations in effect at the time of the agency decision. 
4

1 To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant has the burden to show that he 

2 would “more likely than not” be tortured by or with the acquiescence of 

3 government officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1). Where 

4 the risk of torture relies on a sequence of possible events, “an alien will never be 

5 able to show that he faces a more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the 

6 chain cannot be shown to be more likely than not to occur,” because “a chain of 

7 events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 

8 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration omitted) (quoting In re J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. 

9 Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)). 

10 J.P.B. asserted that he feared torture in Liberia, and that the government 

11 would not protect him, because of his family’s violent history with supporters of 

12 former Liberian President Charles Taylor, who killed some of his immediate 

13 family members in the 1990s and more recently attempted to kill his distant cousin, 

14 and because a current political figure suspected J.P.B. of cooperating against him 

15 with U.S. authorities. The IJ agreed that J.P.B. was more likely than not to be 

16 tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government on those grounds. In 

17 concluding that the IJ clearly erred in making those predictive findings, the BIA 

18 found clear error in the IJ’s underlying factual findings that Taylor’s supporters 
5

1 would likely target J.P.B. based on his association with his cousin, who had 

2 testified against Taylor, and that the current political figure suspected J.P.B. of 

3 cooperating against him. For the reasons discussed below, the BIA failed to give 

4 sufficient justification for those findings.

5 We begin with the threat of torture based on J.P.B.’s suspected cooperation. 

6 It is undisputed that J.P.B. cooperated with U.S. authorities to some extent and that 

7 this cooperation is public information, as he testified in a public trial that was 

8 reported in the press. About five years after that testimony, upon a Government 

9 motion, J.P.B.’s almost twenty-year federal sentence was reduced to 

10 approximately ten years. The person whom J.P.B. fears is prominent in Liberia 

11 and was present at J.P.B.’s arrest, giving federal authorities reason to ask about 

12 him. And while an innocent person might be confident that no one had 

13 cooperated against him, J.P.B. testified that this person had engaged in criminal 

14 activity, and that J.P.B. shared this information with federal authorities.

15 The BIA’s decision overlooks material aspects of this record, including 

16 J.P.B.’s testimony about the criminal activity; we view that testimony as strong 

17 evidence that, once it became public knowledge that J.P.B. was cooperating, the 

18 person J.P.B. fears would suspect J.P.B. of cooperating against him. Nor did the 
6

1 BIA give any reason to disturb the IJ’s determination that J.P.B. was credible. See 

2 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (holding that “if no adverse credibility determination 

3 is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of 

4 credibility on appeal”). The BIA need not “expressly parse or refute on the record 

5 each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” so long 

6 as it “has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate 

7 findings.” Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation 

8 marks and citation omitted). But “we require a certain minimum level of analysis 

9 from . . . BIA opinions” and “some indication that the [BIA] considered material 

10 evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim.” Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 

11 (2d Cir. 2005). Absent some discussion of this testimony, the BIA failed to satisfy 

12 those requirements. And while the Government argues that there is no objective

13 evidence of cooperation against this person, it does not explain why the BIA was 

14 entitled to overlook J.P.B.’s testimony. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (“The 

15 testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of 

16 proof [under CAT] without corroboration.”). 

17 Instead of discussing this testimony, the BIA disagreed with three aspects 

18 of the IJ’s reasoning, but none of those disagreements, singly or in combination, 
7

1 provides sufficient justification for the BIA’s decision. First, the BIA faulted the 

2 IJ for relying on a Liberian news article as evidence of cooperation. While we 

3 agree that the IJ erred to the extent that she characterized the article as stating that 

4 there was cooperation, when read with the other evidence in the record, this article 

5 tends to support the conclusion that the person whom J.P.B. fears believes that his 

6 connection with J.P.B. has exposed him to criminal liability in the United States. 

7 Second, the BIA faulted the IJ for relying on J.P.B.’s sentence reduction as evidence 

8 of cooperation against this person. But the IJ said only that the sentence reduction 

9 was evidence of cooperation—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeded to 

10 identify other evidence about the subject of that cooperation, which the BIA failed 

11 to address. Third, the BIA relied in part on the content of the Government’s

12 sentence reduction motion. But that motion was sealed and has no bearing on 

13 what others would reasonably infer to be contained in that motion. And, again, 

14 J.P.B. was found credible. Accordingly, before finding that J.P.B.’s testimony that 

15 he cooperated against this person failed to satisfy his burden on that issue because 

16 it was inadequately corroborated, the agency should have explained what 

17 reasonably available evidence was lacking and evaluated J.P.B.’s explanation for 

18 not providing it. See Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2018). J.P.B. was 
8

1 not given an opportunity to explain the absence of further corroboration here, and 

2 we can readily imagine that documentary evidence on this sensitive subject may

3 be difficult to obtain. 

4 The BIA also noted that J.P.B. had not spoken to the person he fears since 

5 his arrest, and this person had not directly threatened him. Clear error may exist 

6 “where the evidence opposed to the claimant’s version, though not indisputable, 

7 has overwhelming persuasive force.” Wu Lin, 813 F.3d at 127. But under the 

8 circumstances, including J.P.B.’s conviction and incarceration, this contrary 

9 evidence is far from overwhelming. Additional countervailing evidence 

10 discussed in the Government’s brief was not relied on by the BIA, and is not 

11 overwhelming. See Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that, 

12 when the agency’s evaluation of the record contains errors, the Court can affirm 

13 “only when remanding the case to the agency would be futile,” such as “when 

14 overwhelming evidence in the record makes it clear that the same decision is 

15 inevitable on remand” (quotation marks omitted)). 

16 Turning to the relationship between J.P.B. and his third cousin, the BIA’s 

17 decision is similarly flawed. The BIA is correct that the blood relation is not close. 

18 However, the IJ did not rely on the closeness of the blood relation, but rather on 
9

1 evidence that Taylor supporters shot the cousin on J.P.B.’s family property, and—

2 given the prominence of J.P.B. and his family in Liberia—likely inferred that J.P.B. 

3 was helping the cousin based on the cousin’s presence on the property. The BIA’s 

4 decision does not mention where the cousin was shot, and it mentions the evidence 

5 of J.P.B.’s notoriety only in its summary of the IJ’s findings, not in its own analysis. 

6 Nor did the BIA give a reason not to credit J.P.B.’s testimony about the location of 

7 this shooting, which was corroborated by his sister. Having failed to discuss the 

8 factual findings underlying the IJ’s reasoning, the BIA failed to sufficiently explain 

9 why those findings were clearly erroneous. See Wu Lin, 813 F.3d at 129; 

10 Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77.

11 The BIA discussed other evidence supporting its conclusion that J.P.B. failed 

12 to carry his burden to show that this group was more likely than not to torture him 

13 but, again, that evidence is not overwhelming. The BIA correctly noted that there 

14 were no allegations of direct threats against J.P.B. from this group. But that is not 

15 strong evidence under the circumstances because J.P.B. has been in the United 

16 States for many years and incarcerated for a substantial length of time, so there 

17 might not be reason or opportunity to threaten him; J.P.B. testified that only two 

18 relatives were even briefly in Liberia after the 1990s; one of those relatives (the 
10

1 third cousin) was shot by Taylor supporters upon his return; and the other (a 

2 nephew) visited briefly in 2019, but left immediately upon hearing that members 

3 of his family—including J.P.B.—were still targets for harm. Cf. Melgar de Torres v.

4 Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim of well-founded fear of 

5 persecution diminished where similarly situated relatives remained in country of 

6 origin without harm). The BIA did not mention the evidence regarding J.P.B.’s

7 nephew. Instead, it emphasized the time that had elapsed since J.P.B. was last in 

8 Liberia, which was shortly before some immediate family members were 

9 murdered. But that reasoning does not account for the subsequent events on 

10 which J.P.B.’s claim relied. 

11 In sum, the BIA failed to sufficiently justify its finding of clear error because 

12 it overlooked material evidence cited by the IJ that supported J.P.B.’s claim that he 

13 is likely to be tortured and that the government is unlikely to protect him, it 

14 required corroboration of J.P.B.’s credible testimony without giving him an 

15 opportunity to explain why it was not available, and the countervailing evidence 

16 that it identified was not strong. See Wu Lin, 813 F.3d at 129; Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 

17 31. We remand because we cannot be confident that the BIA would reach the 

18 same conclusion absent these errors. See Gurung, 929 F.3d at 62. 
11

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case 

2 is REMANDED for further proceedings. All pending motions and applications 

3 are DENIED and stays VACATED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

6 Clerk of Court