#### William C. WILSON, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Heiskell H. WINSTEAD, Defendant.

No. CIV-2-78-52.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, Northeastern Division.

July 13, 1978.

*272Carleton W. Smith, Greeneville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Charles R. Terry, Morristown, Tenn., and N. R. Coleman, Jr., Milligan, Coleman, Fletcher, Gaby & Kilday, Greeneville, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEESE, District Judge.

A United States magistrate of this district recommended on June 13, 1978 that the motion herein of the defendant for a dismissal of this action for the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against him upon which relief can be granted, Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, be denied. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A copy of such recommendation was mailed by the clerk to counsel of record herein on the same date. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The plaintiff responded timely to such recommendation stating that he had no objection thereto; the defendant did not serve and file any timely written objection thereto. *Idem.*

The foregoing recommendation hereby is ACCEPTED. *Idem.*In this circuit dismissals of complaints such as this, brought under the civil rights statutes, are scrutinized with particular care, *Westlake v. Lucas,*C.A. 6th (1976), 537 F.2d 857, 858[1]; and dismissal is not proper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief, *Scheuer v. Rhodes*(1974), 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90, 96[3—5]. Construing the allegations of the complaint herein most favorably to the plaintiff, *Ott v. Midland-Ross Corporation,*C.A. 6th (1975), 523 F.2d 1367, 1369[4], this Court cannot say at this stage of the proceedings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief herein.

The plaintiff claims, *inter alia,*that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, terminated him summarily from his position as a public employee; that, thereafter, the defendant made maliciously false and defamatory public statements concerning the reason for such discharge; and that he was denied due process of law, Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, “ * * * due to lack of hearing or other method of defending himself against such libelous charges. * * * ”

The concept of “ * * * liberty * * * ” protected by the due process clause of the Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, recognizes two particular interests of a public employee: (1) the protection of his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity; and (2) his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportuni*273ties. *Sullivan v. Brown,*C.A. 6th (1976), 544 F.2d 279, 283[4], citing *Board of Regents v. Roth*(1972), 408 U.S. 564, 573-574, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. Thus, where a nontenured public employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment, due process may require that he be accorded the opportunity for a hearing for the sole purpose of providing him an opportunity to clear his name. *Codd v. Velger*(1977), 429 U.S. 624, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92, 96[2]; see also *Paul v. Davis*(1976), 424 U.S. 693, 709-710, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 418-419. “ * * * Only if the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination is such a hearing required. * * * ” *Codd v. Velger, supra,*429 U.S. at 628, 97 S.Ct. at 884, 51 L.Ed.2d at 97[2]. Such is essentially what the plaintiff has alleged herein.

The motion of the defendant hereby is

DENIED.