UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4595

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDWIN LEO BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (7:16-cr-00110-D-1)

Submitted: April 24, 2018 Decided: July 3, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Acting 

First Assistant United States Attorney, Donald R. Pender, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Edwin Leo Brown appeals the 210-month, upward departure sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012), and one count of possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) 

(2012). On appeal, Brown argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because 

the district court did not adequately address his arguments for a lower sentence. Brown 

further challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, claiming that a sentence 

within the original Sentencing Guidelines range would have been sufficient to satisfy the 

goals of sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence 

is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In determining 

procedural reasonableness, we consider, among other things, whether the district court 

addressed the defendant’s nonfrivolous sentencing arguments. See United States v. Blue, 

877 F.3d 513, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2017).

If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” we then review it for 

substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). “When 

reviewing a departure, we consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both 

with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the 
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divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 529 (4th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). While “a major departure from the 

Guidelines range should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor 

one,” we owe “defer[ence] to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it is 

unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been our choice.” United States v. 

McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Our review of the record confirms that the district court properly considered 

Brown’s arguments for a sentence within the original Guidelines range. By cataloging 

the many favorable sentences that Brown had previously received, the court clearly 

rejected Brown’s contention that his criminal history category sufficiently captured his 

extensive criminal history. In addition, by emphasizing that, on the night of Brown’s 

arrest, Brown precipitated an altercation with law enforcement that could easily have

turned deadly, the court indisputably entertained Brown’s claim that the application of

two Guidelines enhancements adequately accounted for his egregious behavior that night. 

We thus detect no procedural error in the court’s discussion of Brown’s sentencing 

arguments.

We further conclude that Brown’s sentence is substantively reasonable. In 

weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the district court reasonably relied on Brown’s substantial 

criminal history, his lenient treatment by the criminal justice system, and the serious 

nature of the underlying offense conduct, which included a brutal assault on a police 

officer.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED