Filed 12/13/22 P. v. Ramirez CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

OSCAR RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B315047

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PA095073

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Vacated in part, 

affirmed in part with modifications.

Larenda R. Delaini, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Oscar Ramirez pled no contest to receiving a 

stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d.

1) At a restitution hearing, the 

owner of the vehicle testified that two toolboxes had been 

removed from his truck between the time it was stolen and when 

it was returned. The trial court ordered Ramirez to pay the 

victim $400 in restitution as the value of the toolboxes. 

Ramirez appeals, asserting that there is no evidence 

connecting him to the theft of the toolboxes, as opposed to simply 

possessing the stolen vehicle. We agree, and therefore strike the 

restitution order from the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The People filed a complaint charging Ramirez with five 

felonies: one count of receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, count 1); 

and four counts relating to stolen U.S. Treasury checks (§§ 496, 

subd. (a), 475, subd. (a), counts 2 through 5). The complaint 

alleged the crimes occurred on or about May 25, 2020. 

Ramirez pled no contest to counts 1 and 2. Ramirez agreed 

to pay restitution on all counts, and agreed that the value of the 

property in each count exceeded $950. The court sentenced 

Ramirez to 16 months in county jail and ordered him to make 

restitution to the victims of his crimes in an amount to be set at a 

hearing. Ramirez waived his appearance at the restitution 

hearing. 

At the restitution hearing, victim Jesus D.2 testified that he 

discovered his pickup truck was missing on May 5, 2020. In the 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.

2 We omit Jesus’s last name to protect his privacy interests. 

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3

pickup truck were two toolboxes that Jesus used for his work as a 

carpenter. When the truck was returned to Jesus, the toolboxes 

were not in it. Jesus testified that the value of the stolen 

toolboxes was between $350 and $450. Jesus paid between $700 

and $900 to have new toolboxes installed to replace the stolen 

ones. No additional evidence was presented at the restitution 

hearing.

Defense counsel argued that the truck was stolen around 

May 5, 2020, but Ramirez was not found to be in possession of the 

truck until May 25, 2020. Defense counsel asserted there was 

not a “sufficient legal nexus between” the crime for which 

Ramirez pled no contest—receiving the stolen vehicle—and “this 

victim’s losses for the two boxes.” 

The court disagreed, stating, “I do think there is a 

sufficient nexus. I think it is very analogous to damage to the 

truck. It was damaged. Things were missing that used to be 

there.” The court ordered Ramirez to pay $400 in legal 

restitution. 

Ramirez timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Ramirez asserts the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 

restitution for the missing toolboxes because Ramirez “was 

convicted of receiving a stolen truck, not taking and driving the 

truck or stealing any of its contents.”3 The Attorney General 

asserts that the trial court was within its discretion to order 

restitution based on the evidence. We agree with Ramirez that 

3 Ramirez asserts that the toolboxes “were taken from a 

stolen truck that [Ramirez] later received.” In fact, there is no 

evidence suggesting whether the toolboxes were removed before 

or after Ramirez came to possess the truck. 
4

the People failed to meet their burden to show that Ramirez 

caused Jesus’s losses.

The California Constitution expresses “the unequivocal 

intention of the People of the State of California that all persons 

who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the 

right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of 

the crimes causing the losses they suffer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) “Restitution shall be ordered from the 

convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or 

disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Cal. 

Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).)

“Section 1202.4 implements this constitutional mandate.”

(People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1395 (Foalima).)

That section states, in part, that “in every case in which a victim 

has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, 

the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the 

victim . . . .” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) “To the extent possible, the 

restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient 

to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined 

economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal 

conduct, including, but not limited to, [f]ull or partial payment for 

the value of stolen or damaged property.” (§ 1202.4, subd. 

(f)(3)(A).) 

“The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is 

preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 

Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319 (Holmberg).) “Generally speaking, 

restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion and 

will be disturbed on appeal only when the appellant has shown 

an abuse of discretion.” (Id., at p. 1320.)
5

Ramirez asserts that the People failed to prove that Jesus’s 

losses were “the result of [Ramirez’s] criminal conduct.” 

(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).) California courts use the “substantial 

factor” test for analyzing proximate cause under section 1202.4. 

(See Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) “‘Under that 

standard, a cause in fact is something that is a substantial factor 

in bringing about the injury.’” (Ibid.) “[T]here can be more than 

one cause of injury and . . . multiple causes can combine to cause 

harm.” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.)

Here, the evidence showed that the toolboxes were removed 

sometime between when Jesus’s truck left his possession on May 

5 and when it was returned to him. Ramirez was convicted of 

receiving the stolen truck, but no evidence was presented as to 

whether the toolboxes were on the truck when Ramirez received 

it. 

Ramirez compares this case to People v. Scroggins (1987) 

191 Cal.App.3d 502 (Scroggins), in which four apartments were 

burglarized. Scroggins was found with some of the stolen items 

and was arrested. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, 

and the property in his possession was returned to the owners. 

The trial court ordered Scroggins to pay restitution to the owners 

of the property that was not recovered.

The Court of Appeal reversed. It stated, “Scroggins was 

never charged with or found to be criminally responsible for the 

burglaries. He was charged and convicted of receiving stolen 

property, and those items of property were recovered by the 

police and presumably returned to the rightful owners. 

Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Scroggins to pay restitution 

to burglary victims, whose losses were not connected to Scroggins’ 

crime. The court did not conclude—nor from this record could it 
6

have—that Scroggins was responsible for these other losses that 

it ordered paid.” (Scroggins, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 506.) 

The court continued, “In short, the instant restitution order has 

no relationship to the crime for which Scroggins was convicted . . 

. .” (Ibid.) 

Ramirez also cites People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 

1153, in which Rivera was convicted of receiving stolen property 

and was ordered to pay restitution for stolen tools that were 

never recovered. The Court of Appeal stated, “Here, as in 

Scroggins, there was no showing Rivera was responsible for the 

losses suffered by the burglary victim (Swett); that property 

which was the subject of the stolen property conviction was

returned to her and does not represent a loss suffered by her.”

(Id. at p. 1162.)

The Attorney General, on the other hand, contends this 

case is more like Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, in 

which three businesses were burglarized; the stolen items

included computers, USB backup drives, cables, a card scanner, 

credit cards, and cash. (195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Holmberg 

was discovered using one of the credit cards and a computer; a 

search of his home revealed more of the stolen equipment. He 

was convicted by plea of concealing stolen property and using a 

stolen credit card. (Id. at p. 1314.) At the restitution hearing, 

one business, Stonecrest, presented evidence that its operations 

were impacted by the loss of the equipment. The court ordered 

Holmberg to pay $18,072 in restitution, and Holmberg appealed. 

(Id. at p. 1318.) 

Holmberg argued that “his conduct was not a substantial 

factor in causing the victims’ losses because their losses were due 

to the burglary or theft and would have occurred without his 
7

conduct. He attack[ed] the entire restitution award and 

specifically challenge[d] the $10,000 awarded to Stonecrest for 

one week’s loss of use.” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1318.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting that 

although the burglary caused the victims’ initial loss, Holmberg 

contributed to the businesses’ continued operational loss 

attributable to loss of use of their property. The court stated that 

Holmberg’s “conduct was a concurrent cause of the victims’ losses 

and a substantial factor in depriving them of the use of their 

property. There was evidence that [Holmberg] received the 

stolen property on the day it was stolen. . . . [Holmberg] admitted 

he knew the property was stolen when he possessed it. . . . . 

[N]othing prevented [Holmberg] from turning over the known 

stolen items to the police. For these reasons, we conclude that 

[Holmberg’s] concealing of the stolen property was a concurrent 

cause in depriving the victims of the use of their property. It is 

significant that [Holmberg] obtained the property the day it was 

stolen. Had he contacted law enforcement about the items when 

he received them, Stonecrest would not have had to replace them 

or incur a one week loss of business and productivity.” (Id. at p. 

1322.)

The Attorney General asserts that, as in Holmberg, just 

because Ramirez was “convicted of receiving stolen property does 

not absolve him of contributing, even if only in a minor way, to 

[Jesus’s] loss of his toolboxes.” This argument would be 

persuasive if evidence had been presented that the mere 

deprivation of the vehicle caused Jesus to suffer a loss, as the 

deprivation of the computer equipment caused losses in 

Holmberg. Here, however, no such evidence was presented. 

Instead, the only loss alleged was the loss of the toolboxes, and 
8

the People presented no evidence connecting Ramirez with that 

loss. Thus, the case is more like Scroggins and Rivera, in which 

the evidence showed the property had been stolen, but no 

evidence connected defendants to the stolen property. 

Because there was no evidence connecting Ramirez to 

Jesus’s financial loss, the trial court abused its discretion by 

ordering Ramirez to pay restitution for the missing toolboxes. 

DISPOSITION

The order directing Ramirez to pay $400 as victim 

restitution is vacated, and the judgment is affirmed as modified.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

STONE, J. 

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution. 
9