Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-1373| December 21, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

C.G.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JV-1373

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Gary Chavers, 

Judge Pro Tempore

The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither,

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1712-JD-1782

Brown, Judge.
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[1] C.G. appeals the juvenile court’s true finding that she committed a delinquent 

act which would constitute battery as a level 6 felony if committed by an adult. 

C.G. raises three issues which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the juvenile court erred in admitting certain evidence;

II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile 

court’s true finding; and

III. Whether the lack of a charge against C.G.’s mother requires 

reversal.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 12, 2017, M.F. and his little brother and sister were at Walgreens 

buying candy when C.G. and her mother entered the store. C.G.’s mother said 

something, and M.F. texted his mother saying someone was bothering them 

because “they said something” and “they kept on watching us.” Transcript 

Volume II 7. M.F.’s mother drove to Walgreens and asked “where was the 

girl” that was picking on M.F. at school. Id. M.F.’s mother then asked C.G. 

what was “going on,” and C.G. said “B---- get the f--- out my face for I whop yo 

a--!” Id. at 12. C.G.’s mother walked over and said, “Don’t ask my daughter s-

--.” Id. at 13. 

[3] M.F.’s mother and siblings exited the store, and C.G. and her mother each had 

a can of pepper spray and sprayed M.F.’s mother and her children. M.F.’s 
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mother started fighting because she and her children were being pepper sprayed. 

They fought through the parking lot, a man yelled, “She got a gun!,” and C.G. 

and her mother “hopped” in their vehicle “to take off.” Id. at 15. 

[4] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Mitch Hubner arrived at the scene 

after receiving a report about women fighting. As he pulled in, he observed 

C.G. and her mother attempting to drive out of the parking lot and he waved 

them in. Officer Hubner’s field training officer noticed that C.G.’s mother had 

a gun on her right hip, removed it from her, and stored it in his vehicle. C.G. 

and her mother told Officer Hubner that “they were defending their selves by 

pepper spraying the other family.” Id. at 20. Officer Hubner and another 

officer arrested C.G. and her mother for battery. 

[5] On December 19, 2017, the State filed a petition alleging C.G. to be a 

delinquent for committing an act which would constitute battery as a level 6 

felony if committed by an adult. Specifically, the State alleged that C.G. “did 

knowingly or intentionally touch [L.B.], [M.B.], [M.F.], [V.J.] and/or [L.P.1] in 

a rude insolent or angry manner, which resulted in moderate bodily injury, to 

wit: facial pain, redness and swelling, [and] difficult breathing due to having 

been sprayed with pepper spray.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 17.

[6] On April 10, 2018, the court held a hearing. During direct examination, the 

prosecutor asked M.F.: “Okay so do you remember . . . [C.G.] macing you? 

 

1 L.P. is M.F.’s mother. 
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Do you remember her specifically doing that?” Transcript Volume II at 9. 

M.F. answered: “I don’t think I don’t think it was her.” Id. The prosecutor 

asked him: “Do you specifically remember [C.G.] macing you?” Id. M.F. 

answered: “No. I – I know somebody maced me, one of them.” Id. He also 

stated: “It was her or her mother.” Id. During M.F.’s testimony, the State 

introduced and the court admitted photos of M.F.’s face, pants, and jacket after 

being sprayed with mace. 

[7] M.F.’s mother testified that both C.G. and her mother had a pepper spray can

and “[b]ottles of mace came out and that’s when they start pepper spraying us 

and we started fighting.” Id. at 13. During the direct examination of M.F.’s 

mother, the State introduced and the court admitted photos of M.F.’s mother 

and clothing after being sprayed with mace. The State also moved to admit a 

photo of three cans of pepper spray. C.G.’s counsel objected on the basis that 

M.F.’s mother “did not gather information to take that photo.” Id. at 16. The 

prosecutor stated: “Your Honor [] State’s exhibit 8 shows pepper spray cans 

that [M.F.’s mother] can testify that she saw that day and can identify.” Id. 

The court overruled the objection and admitted the photo as State’s Exhibit 8. 

When asked if she recognized what was in State’s Exhibit 8, M.F.’s mother 

answered: “Yes I sent the pepper spray but the one that has the little key rings 

on it I seen it when they were in her hand wrapped up.” Id. Officer Hubner 

testified that C.G. and her mother stated that “they were defending their selves 

by pepper spraying the other family.” Id. at 20. 
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[8] After the State rested, C.G.’s counsel moved for dismissal and argued that 

M.F.’s mother did not specifically testify that C.G. deployed the pepper spray, 

and the court denied the motion. C.G.’s mother testified that C.G. was in the 

ninth grade, suffers from “a lot of mental stuff and meaning um with her not 

being able to um – ADHD is what they diagnosed her with.” Id. at 23. She 

testified that she and C.G. walked in Walgreens, she noticed a boy looking at 

her “up and down,” and the boy said, “She’s got a gun we can get a gun and we 

can shoot it up.” Id. at 24. She testified that she realized her “stuff was 

showing from . . . getting out of the truck” and she just politely pulled down her 

shirt to cover up her gun. Id. She stated that M.F.’s mother “kept on provoking 

and threatening” and said, “I’m tired of your daughter messing with my son” 

and “He’s gone [sic] fight her today!” Id. at 26. She testified: 

[M.F.’s mother] gone [sic] make her son fight my daughter and I 

kept saying ain’t nobody gone [sic] touch my daughter. But she 

was using profanity the B word, B B my daughter, A word, and I 

was like ain’t nobody gone [sic] touch my daughter and I’m 

going like this I’m still telling her ain’t nobody gone [sic] touch 

my daughter.

* * * * *

[W]hen we was out there [M.F.’s mother] kept trying to tell her 

son to run up on my daughter and beat her up and I kept saying 

he’s not touching my daughter. And I’m doing like this so I went 

and reached in my pocket because I seen it wasn’t no reconciling 

with them and as I kept trying to you know back off they kept 

coming so I was like okay. And then he went . . . when [M.F.’s 

mother] told him to run up he did and he pulled his pants up hut 

– hut hike and that’s when I maced them dead in the face. And I 
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told him before I even maced him though get back I said you bet 

not do it and he said “I am.”

Id. at 26-28. She testified that C.G. was “behind [her] the whole time” and “in 

the video too you see her spreading out running and then [C.G.] ended up 

coming back trying to help get them off.” Id. at 28. She testified that when the 

police arrived she was “already coming” and “was not trying to leave.” Id. at 

29. She also testified that C.G. did not have any pepper spray on her that day. 

On cross-examination, she testified that there was no contact outside “but they 

charged us.” Id. at 30. C.G.’s counsel introduced and the court admitted 

surveillance video from Walgreens. 

[9] On rebuttal and over C.G.’s objection, Officer Hubner testified that a bottle of 

pepper spray was found in the pocket of C.G.’s jacket. Specifically, the 

following exchange occurred:

Q Officer Hubner there was a . . . search done on the vehicle? 

Correct?

A Yes[.]

Q And well you – you didn’t make, who was involved during 

the search?

A Um it was Officer Hall and Officer Erwin were the two that I 

am aware that checked the vehicle.

Q And were you aware of what they found?

A Yes[.]

Q Um do you know if any of [C.G.’s] artifacts were searched?
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A I – I believe that her jacket was searched.

[Defense Counsel]: Um objection Judge. Um lack of personal 

knowledge.

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor um these questions are directed to 

impeach the mother’s um testimony that there was no pepper 

spray found on [C.G.] at the scene.

THE COURT: I allow it.

Q In [C.G.’s] jacket do you know if anything was found? To 

your knowledge were you informed?

[Defense Counsel]: [O]bjection Judge I he has no personal. He’s 

not he [sic] one that did the search. So he has no knowledge.

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor is – is it is for impeachment purposes 

rule it as not applied so he can testify as to what he learned on 

that day and hear or seen what come in.

THE COURT: Well what’s the bases of this knowledge?

[Prosecutor]: The bases of this knowledge that he was –

THE COURT: Well no you don’t know. You have to ask him.

Q Officer how did you learn about this?

A One of my fellow officers told me. He – he gave me the 

evidence that was found in the jacket.

[Defense Counsel]: So then we would object to hearsay Judge.

THE COURT: Well, if an item was handed to him so over 

ruled. Go head [sic].

Q Officer what um what was that item?

A It was a bottle of pepper spray.

Q And where was it found?
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A In her jacket pocket.

[Defense Counsel]: Again Judge I would object to hearsay and a 

lack of knowledge. Certainly he had to have been told as to 

where it was found.

THE COURT: Overruled. Noted.

Id. at 35-36. The court entered a true finding and scheduled a disposition 

hearing. 

[10] On May 15, 2018, the court held a disposition hearing. The court stated: “I’m 

going to . . . enter a true finding but I’m not going to order any services and I’m 

not going to place you on probation. I am going to close this matter out. 

[C.G.] you are discharged and free to go.” Id. 

Discussion

I.

[11] The first issue is whether the juvenile court erred in admitting Officer Hubner’s 

testimony regarding the pepper spray discovered in C.G.’s jacket. The 

admission and exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and we will review only for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. 

State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs “where 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances.” Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001). “Errors in the 

admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error 
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unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 

1140, 1141 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

[12] “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 

at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as 

provided by law or the rules of evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 802.

[13] C.G. contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting Officer Hubner’s 

testimony regarding the pepper spray found in C.G.’s jacket because it 

constitutes hearsay given that he had not searched the pocket and was relaying 

information provided to him by another police officer. The State argues that 

“the truth of the matter asserted – which was whether [C.G.’s mother’s] 

testimony that [C.G.] did not have any pepper spray – was the ultimate effect of 

admitting Officer Hubner’s testimony.” Appellee’s Brief at 9. The State also

argues that any error is harmless given that there was substantial independent 

evidence of guilt. 

[14] During the direct examination of M.F.’s mother, the following exchange 

occurred:

Q And do you remember who took out a pepper spray can?

A Both of them had one.

Q And do you remember seeing that?

A Yes.
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Transcript Volume II at 14. M.F.’s mother testified: “Bottles of mace came out 

and that’s when they start pepper spraying us and we started fighting.” Id. at 

13. During direct examination, Officer Hubner stated the following without 

objection:

[B]oth [C.G.’s mother] and [C.G.] both [s]tated the same thing. 

Um they said that they were at the store there were children 

involved, that both the children had fought at school, they were 

in the store together, mother showed up, and that they were 

asked to leave the store. They left the store and they were 

defending their selves by pepper spraying the other family.

Id. at 20. 

[15] In light of the testimony of M.F.’s mother and Officer Hubner as well as the 

other evidence, we conclude that any error in admitting Officer Hubner’s 

testimony regarding the pepper spray found in the pocket of C.G.’s jacket was 

harmless. 

II.

[16] The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile 

court’s true finding that C.G. committed a delinquent act which would 

constitute battery as a level 6 felony if committed by an adult. When the State 

seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated to be a delinquent for committing an act 

which would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. J.R.T. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 

300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Upon review of a juvenile 
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adjudication, this court will consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences supporting the judgment. Id. We will neither reweigh the evidence 

nor judge witness credibility. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative 

value from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant 

was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the adjudication. Id.

[17] The offense of battery as a level 6 felony is governed by Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1, 

which at the time of the offense provided that “a person who knowingly or 

intentionally . . . touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner . . 

. commits battery” and the offense is a level 6 felony if “[t]he offense results in 

moderate bodily injury to any other person.”2 

[18] C.G. argues that, although the State offered evidence that M.F. and his mother 

suffered injuries from pepper spray, it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that C.G. was the person who used the pepper spray. The State maintains that 

it presented sufficient evidence and that C.G. is requesting that we reweigh the 

evidence. 

[19] The evidence most favorable to the challenged true finding reveals that M.F.’s 

mother testified that C.G. told her: “B---- get the f--- out my face for I whop yo 

a--!” Trial Transcript Volume II at 12. M.F.’s mother testified that both C.G. 

and her mother had a pepper spray can. She also stated: “Bottles of mace came 

out and that’s when they start pepper spraying us . . . .” Id. at 13. Officer 

 

2

Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 80-2018, § 3 (eff. July 1, 2018).
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Hubner testified that C.G. and her mother said the same thing and that they 

said “they were defending their selves by pepper spraying the other family.” Id.

at 20. 

[20] Based upon the record, we conclude that the State presented evidence of a 

probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that C.G. 

committed an act which would constitute battery as a level 6 felony if 

committed by an adult.

III.

[21] The next issue is whether the lack of a charge against C.G.’s mother requires 

reversal. C.G. asserts that a juvenile involved in the same incident as a parent 

should not be adjudicated delinquent when the State did not pursue charges 

against the more culpable adult. C.G. cites Lee v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1271 (Ind. 

2015), in support of her position. She cites Article 1, Sections 1 and 12 of the 

Indiana Constitution and argues that juveniles are less culpable generally and 

C.G. in particular was less culpable than her mother.3 

 

3 Article 1, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “WE DECLARE, That all people are created 

equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments 

are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. 

For the advancement of these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform 

their government.” Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “All courts shall be open; and 

every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 

of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, 

and without delay.”
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[22] The State asserts that C.G. has waived this claim by failing to raise it before the 

juvenile court and that C.G. cites to no case law holding that, if the State does 

not charge and convict every accomplice or co-defendant who is a party to a 

criminal action, that no party can be rightfully convicted on principles of 

fairness. The State argues that the prosecuting attorney has broad discretion in 

determining what crimes to prosecute, that the juvenile justice system has a 

parens patriae function, and that Lee offers no relief to C.G. because that opinion 

did not hold that the State’s decision not to charge every accomplice invalidates 

a fellow accomplice’s conviction on the grounds of fundamental fairness. 

[23] Initially, we note that C.G. did not raise this argument before the juvenile court. 

In Love v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court held:

Regarding this subject, Professors LaFave and Israel state:

“Although some authority is to be found that a 

discriminatory prosecution claim is a ‘defense’ which is to 

be raised during the course of the trial and sent to the jury 

as part of the case just as with, say, a defense of selfdefense, this is not a sound procedure. Because the 

‘question of discriminatory prosecution relates not to the 

guilt or innocence of [the accused], but rather addresses 

itself to a constitutional defect in the institution of the 

prosecution,’ the claim ‘should be treated as an application 

to the court for a dismissal or quashing of the prosecution’ 

and thus should be decided by the court. Moreover, 

‘because a claim of discriminatory prosecution generally 

rests upon evidence completely extraneous to the specific 

facts of the charged offense,’ the better practice is to 

require the claim to be raised and resolved in a pretrial 
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setting.” (Citations omitted.) 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, 

supra, § 13.4(a) at 187.

We wholeheartedly ascribe to the above. 

468 N.E.2d 519, 521-522 (Ind. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104, 105 S. Ct. 

2335 (1985). In Albright v. State, this Court held:

The matter [of selective prosecution] should be brought to the 

attention of the court by written motion which, on its face, 

reveals a basis for such claim. A hearing must be set outside the 

presence of the jury at which both the defendant and the 

prosecuting attorney are given the opportunity to present 

evidence. The findings of the court, either granting the motion to 

dismiss or denying said motion, are then properly subject to 

appellate review.

501 N.E.2d 488, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), reh’g denied. We observed that no 

motion to dismiss on the basis of selective prosecution was found in the record 

and that “[t]he procedure for asserting and establishing selective prosecution in 

a criminal case was not followed by Albright and, therefore, her claim of being 

unfairly charged is without merit.” Id.

[24] Even assuming that C.G. did not waive this issue, we cannot say that reversal is 

warranted.4 To the extent C.G. cites Lee, in that case, the Indiana Supreme 

 

4 C.G. asserts that her mother “was arrested for battery along with C.G., but no charges were filed against 

her mother.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 75, 79). Page 75 of Volume 

II of the Appellant’s Appendix contains a pre-dispositional report which states: “Youth’s mother, [L.G.], was 

also arrested as a result of this matter. Her case was not filed by the Prosecutor’s Office.” Appellant’s 

Appendix Volume II at 75. The pre-dispositional report also states that C.G.’s mother “was checked on 
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Court observed that the State prosecuted three co-defendants on identical 

charges in the same trial. 43 N.E.3d at 1272. In a companion case, the Indiana 

Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two of those three co-defendants and 

remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgments of acquittal. Id.

(citing Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719 (Ind. 2015)). The Court applied that 

holding to the third co-defendant – Latoya Lee – whose case was 

indistinguishable except that she belatedly filed her petition to transfer. Id. The 

Court exercised its discretion to review the constitutional issue because the 

included-offense question was a matter of due process. Id. at 1275. The Court 

held that the case “implicates the ‘basic principle of justice that like cases should 

be decided alike,’ Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139, 126 S. Ct. 

704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (2005)—and that even more fundamentally, the very same

case should be decided the same way as to identically situated participants.” Id. 

The Court observed that Lee faced opposite results than her son and Young on 

the very same issue originating from the very same trial and stood convicted 

while the others stood acquitted, despite being identical in every way except 

their procedural postures. Id. The Court also observed that Lee stood 

convicted and another co-defendant stood acquitted, despite being identical in 

every way, including their procedural posture on the included-offense issue. Id. 

The Court held: “To avoid that serious injustice, we therefore choose to address 

Latoya’s case on its merits and reverse her conviction, consistent with our 

 

Odyssey and pre-Odyssey systems and was found to have a history under gallery number 795196 of one 

arrest. No charges were filed in this matter.” Id. at 79.
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decision in Young.” Id. The Court in Lee did not address a situation in which 

one individual is charged and another individual involved in the offense was 

not charged. Accordingly, we find Lee distinguishable. 

[25] The Indiana Supreme Court has held generally that “[a] prosecutor is vested 

with broad discretion in the performance of his or her duties” and “[t]he 

determination as to who shall be prosecuted and who shall not be prosecuted 

lies within the sole discretion of the prosecuting attorney.” Lamotte v. State, 495 

N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind. 1986). In Love, the Indiana Supreme Court recognized 

the right to challenge selective prosecution if the prosecution is discriminatory 

in nature. 468 N.E.2d at 521 and we have held:

The essential elements of a claim of selective prosecution are: 

“(1) that other violators similarly situated are generally not 

prosecuted; (2) that the selection of the claimant was ‘intentional 

or purposeful’; and (3) that the selection was pursuant to an 

‘arbitrary classification.’” 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal 

Procedure § 13.4(a), at 187 (1984). An “arbitrary classification” 

includes a classification based upon race, religion, sex or other 

constitutionally suspect distinction that bears no rational 

relationship with legitimate law enforcement objectives. See Love 

v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 519, 521 (“the defendant has the 

burden of proving that he was, in fact, the victim of selective 

prosecution, based upon ‘an impermissible classification such as 

race, religion or sex.’” (quoting 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal 

Procedure § 13.4 (1984))), cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1104, 105 S.

Ct. 2335, 85 L.Ed.2d 851[.]

Pruitt v. State, 557 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted), reh’g 

denied, trans. denied. C.G. has not demonstrated that reversal is warranted.
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[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s true finding that C.G. 

committed a delinquent act which would constitute battery as a level 6 felony if 

committed by an adult. 

[27] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., concurs. 

Bailey, J., concurs in result.