UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Service Employees International Union ) National Industry Pension Fund, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-00334 (APM) ) Castle Hill Health Care Providers, LLC, et al ., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION A party cannot avoid summary judg ment under Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 56(d) simply by claiming that it needs more time to discover facts to support its opposition. Rule 56(d) requires a party seeking relief under the rule to have shown di ligence in pursuing discovery. The party also must articulate what facts it hopes to discover and why those facts are needed. Defendants here have failed to demonstrate entitlement to relie f under Rule 56(d). They have not been diligent in their pursuit of discovery. Nor have they ide ntified what facts they hope to learn through discovery or stated why such facts are necessary to opp ose Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary2 Judgment. Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate that t hey are entitled to additional time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(d), the court will enter sum mary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Contractual History Plaintiff Service Employees Int ernational Union National Indust ry Pension Fund (the “Pension Fund”) is a multiemployer pension plan within the mean ing of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). P ls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No . 19 [hereinafter “Pls.’ Mot.”], Ex., Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 19-2 [hereinafter “Pls.’ Statement”], ¶¶ 1-2. The Pension Fund provides pension benefit s to eligible employees of contributing employers. Id. Defendants Castle Hill Healthcare Providers d/b/a Castle Hill H ealth Care Center and Alaris Health, LLC, d/b/a Castle Hill Health Care Center (colle ctively, “Castle Hill”), operate a long-term healthcare facility loc ated in Union City, New Jersey . Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 23, at 1- 2. In 1992, Castle Hill entered into a collective bargaining a greement (the “1992 CBA”) with Service Employees International Union, Local 1199NJ (the “Union ”), the collective bargaining agent for some of Castle Hill’s employees. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4. Ten years later, Castle Hill and the Union modified the 1992 CBA in a new agreement (the “20 02 Agreement”). Compl. at 4;
see also Compl., Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-2. To comply with Section 6 of the n ew 2002 Agreement— which required Castle Hill to provide pension benefits to emplo yees through the “SEIU Pension Plan”—Castle Hill entered into a participation agreement with P laintiff (the “Participation Agreement”) in November 2002. Compl. at 4-5; see also Compl., Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-3. The Participation Agreement stated that the “Employer,” i.e ., Castle Hill, “agrees to be bound by the3 provisions of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust establishi ng the Fund . . . and by all resolutions and rules adopted by the Trust ees . . . including c ollection policies, r eceipt of which is hereby acknowledged.” Compl . at 4 (quoting Compl., Ex. 3 at 2)

. Together, the 2002 Agreement and the Participation Agreement re quired Castle Hill to contribute 1.5 percent of each covered employee’s gross monthly wages to the Pension Fund starting in 2002. Compl. at 5. That amount increased in 2004 and 2005 to 1.7 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. Id. In addition, the Collection Policy, referenced in the Participa tion Agreement, provided that an employer that fell short of its con tributions to the Pension Fund would be liable for interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum, liqui dated damages at a rate of 20 percent after the commencement of legal action, and attorney’s fees and costs. Compl., Ex. 5, ECF No. 1- 5, at 9-10. In 2010, Castle Hill and the Union entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (the “2010 MOU”) extending the collective ba rgaining agreement and providi ng that the pension contribution rate would increase to 2.2 percent. Compl. at 5; Compl., Ex. 6 , ECF No. 1-6, at 3. The 2010 MOU also provided that the pension contribution rate would increase to 2.37 percent af ter one year, and to 2.55 percent after two years. Id.
2. The Rehabilitation Plan As a result of investment losses in 2008, the Pension Fund was deemed to be in “critical status” each year between 2009 through 2014. 1 Pls.’ Mot., Ex., Decl. of Kenneth J. Anderson, ECF No. 19-4 [hereinafter “Anderson Decl.”], ¶ 14; Compl., Ex. 9, ECF No. 1-9. In accordance with the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280 (2006) (“PPA”), the Pension Fund established a Rehabilitation Pla n, which required participating employers to pay surcharges (“PPA

1 Under federal pension law, a plan generally will be considered to be in “critical status” if, by certain statutorily defined measures, the plan’s funding is too low. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 432.4 surcharges”) and supplemental c ontributions to it under either one of two schedules—either a “Default” or “Preferred” Sche dule. Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. T he Pension Fund sent letters to participating employers notifying them of its critical status a nd the Rehabilitation Plan with its two scheduling options. Id. ¶¶ 14-16 (citing Compl., Ex. 8, ECF No. 1-8, and Compl., Ex. 9 , ECF No. 1-9). Castle Hill opted to make its supplemental contributions accord ing to the Preferred Schedule. Compl. at 8. Under th is schedule, Defendants owed, on April 1, 2010, a supplemental contribution of 10.0 percent of a ll contributions due; on April 1, 2011, a supplemental contribution of 18.5 percent of all contributions due; on April 1, 2012, a s upplemental contribution of 27.7 percent of all contributions due; and on April 1, 2013, a suppl emental contribution of 37.6 percent of all contributions due. Id.
3. Outstanding Payments According to Plaintiffs, for various months in the years 2010 t hrough 2014, Defendants failed to pay the required contri butions, interest charges, and liquidated damages as to three of its healthcare facilities. Pl.’s Statement ¶ 29. Based on Plainti ffs’ calculations, for Site 2815, otherwise known as “C.N.A.’s ,” Castle Hill owes $10,109.69 in c ontributions for certain months between April 2011 through September 2014; for Site 2354, other wise known as “Dietary/Hskpg,” Castle Hill owes $4,370.75 in contributions for certain months between November 2011 through September 2014; and for Site 2825, otherwise known as “Sunshine Recreation,” Castle Hill owes $43.28 in contributions for certain months between May 2012 thr ough July 2014. Id. ¶¶ 30-32.5 Defendants also owe interest and liquidated damage s of 20 perce nt on these unpaid contributions.
Id. ¶¶ 33-36.
4. Late Payments In addition, Defendants owe interest and liquidated damages as a result of late paying their contributions for Site 2815 (C.N .A.’s) and Site 2354 (Dietary/H skpg) for various months between April 2010 and September 2014. Id. ¶ 37. For Site 2815 (C.N.A.’s) , Plaintiffs calculate that Castle Hill owes $931.41 in interest and $8,342.09 in liquidate d damages. Id. ¶ 38. For Site 2354 (Dietary/Hskpg), Castle Hill owes $348.80 in interest and $2,38 5.85 in liquidated damages. Id. ¶ 39.
5. The Audit Plaintiffs conducted a payroll audit of Defendants for the cale ndar years 2010 and 2011. Compl. at 6 (citing Compl., Ex. 4). The audit revealed that De fendants owed the Pension Fund $4,479, including interest, because of a discrepancy between th e amount that Castle Hill reported it paid in employee salaries and the amount it actually paid. Pls.’ Mot., Ex., Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., ECF No. 19-1 [hereinafter “Pls.’ Mem.”], at 7 (cit ing Anderson Decl. ¶ 21). The amount the audit identified is separate and distinct from Castl e Hill’s outstanding balances resulting from its failure to pay or its late payment of the re quired contributions, as described above. Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 24 [ hereinafter “Pls.’ Reply”], Ex., Decl. of Andre Joseph, ECF No. 24- 1 [hereinafter “Joseph Decl.” ], ¶ 14. Defendants were notified by letters sent on September 19, 2012, November 8, 2012, Februa ry 6, 2014, and October 16, 2014, of the audit’s results as well as their obligation to pay the m issing amounts. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Compl., Ex. 4; Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 11, ECF No. 19-7). Interest continues t o accrue on this amount. Pls.’ Mem.6 at 7. To date, Defendants “have failed or refused [to] remit t he amounts owed” under the audit. Joseph Decl. ¶ 13.
6. The Missing Remittance Reports Section 3.1 of the SEIU Pension Fund’s Trust Agreement and Sect ion 2 of the Collections Policy provide that an employer must submit contributions and s upporting remittance reports to the SEIU Pension Fund by the fifteenth day of the month after t he month in which the work was performed. Compl., Ex. 4 at 3; Compl., Ex. 5 at 3. Defendants failed to provide remittance reports for certain mon ths at each of the three sites. For Site 2354 (Dietary/Hskpg), Castle Hill failed to submit rem ittance reports for the months of August 2012 and August 2013. Jose ph Decl. ¶ 15. For Site 2815 (C.N.A.’s), Castle Hill failed to submit a remittance report for the month of August 2013. Id. For Site 2825 (Sunshine Recreation), Castle Hill failed to submit remittance reports for the months of March 2010 through April 2012, June 2012 through August 2013, October 2013 through March 2014, and May 2014 through July
2014. Id.
B. Procedural History On February 28, 2014, the Pension Fund and its Trustees (collec tively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint alleging that Defendant s, for certain months in the y ears 2010 through 2014, had failed to make contribution payments a nd provide remittance reports, a s required by their agreements. Compl. at 7. The Complaint asserted two counts, both arising u nder Sections 502(a)(3) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3) and 1145. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiffs requested various forms of relief, including: (1) a declara tion that Defendants were delin quent in remitting owed contributions to the Pension Fund; (2) a judgment requiring Defendants to pay , for the periods specified, the delinquent contributions, interest , liquidated damages, PPA sur charges, and attorneys’ fees and7 costs; and (3) a permanent inj unction requiring Defendants to t imely file remittance reports and pay all owed contributions as they become due. Id . at 11-12. Defendants answered the Complaint on October 7, 2014. 2 On that same day, Judge Lamberth, who was then assigned to this matter, issued an Order requiring the parties to hold a Local Civil Rule 16.3 conf erence within 15 days and to f ile a report containing a proposed discovery schedule within 10 days. Order, ECF No. 15. The par ties never filed a Local Civil Rule 16.3 report with the court and the re is no indication on this r ecord that the parties met and conferred. Additionally, neither party moved for entry of a sc heduling order. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 29, 2015—before Defendan ts had taken any discovery—nearly three months after Judge Lamberth had ordered the parties to hold a Local Civil Rule 16.3 conference.
III. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56 provides that a court s hould grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a)). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). According to the Supreme Court, R ule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party wh o fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential t o that party’s case, [ ] on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

2 The over seven-month delay between the filing of the Complaint and the Answer was due to Defendants’ failure to answer within the time proscribed under Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 12 and subsequent litigation over the Clerk of the Court’s entry of a defau lt and Plaintiffs’ Motion for De fault Judgment. See ECF Nos. 7, 11-13. On October 7, 2014, the court issued an Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion f or Default Judgment, vacating the Clerk’s entry of default, and considering Defendants’ Answer filed on that date. ECF No. 15.8 The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial respon sibility of informi ng the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying those portio ns of the record that it believes “demonstrate the absence of a ge nuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set fo rth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose th e motion using “any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which [the Court has] referred.” Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 324. “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infe rences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted). However, “to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia , 795 F.Supp.2d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs’ Evidence in Support of Summary Judgment Plaintiffs have offered the following evidence to support their motion for summary judgment: (a) the parties’ vari ous agreements; (b ) letters and accompanying spreadsheets sent by the Pension Fund to Castle Hill describing the audit; (c) lette rs sent by the Pens ion Fund to Castle Hill notifying Defendants of their obligations under the Rehabi litation Plan; (d) a Declaration by Kenneth J. Anderson, the Pension Fund’s Contribution Compliance Manager (“Anderson Declaration”); (e) a Declarati on by Richard C. Welch, counsel t o Plaintiffs, setting forth the attorney’s fees incurred and accompanying timesheets; and (f) a Declaration by Andre Joseph, the9 Pension Fund’s Payroll Review Manager, providing further explan ation regarding the delinquent amounts (“Joseph Declaration”). 3 The court has reviewed the foregoing evidence and finds that it establishes Defendants’ liability for failing to make certain contributions payments an d to provide certain remittance reports, as well as a preliminary damages total. The Anderson Declaration summarizes the parties’ contractual obligations under th e various agreements. Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 6-9. Defendants have not disputed Anderson’s summary of the relevant contractual pro visions, and the court has reviewed and confirmed Castle Hil l’s general obligations under these agreements. To establish Defendants’ breaches of the agreements, the Anderson Declaratio n sets forth the dates and amounts of Castle Hill’s delinque ncies, Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 17-19 , and attaches as Exhibit 10 to their Motion for Summary Judgmen t a spreadsheet showing, for ea ch of the three sites, the “Total Due Per Month,” the “Amount Paid,” and “Contributions Due.” Pl s.’ Mot., Ex. 10, ECF No. 19- 6. The spreadsheet also shows, for each site, a monthly breakd own of the interest and liquidated damages on late paid contributions. Id. As for the unpaid audit amounts, the Anderson and Joseph Declarations and their accompanyi ng exhibits explain the paymen t deficiencies as determined by the audit. Anderson Decl. ¶ 20 ; Joseph Decl., ECF No. 24-1, ¶ 10-13. And, finally, the Anderson and Joseph Declarations set forth the months for which Plaintif fs have not received remittance reports for each of the three si tes. Anderson Decl. ¶ 22; Jose ph Decl. ¶15. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs calculate that Castle Hill o wes the following amounts for unpaid and late contributions , interest, and liquidated dam ages for the three sites: Unpaid Contributions $14,523.72 Interest on Unpaid Contributions $5,651.80 Liquidated Damages on Unpaid Contributions $2,904.74 Interest on Late Paid Contributions $1,280.21

3 Although Plaintiffs offered the Joseph Declaration for the fir st time with their reply brief, Defendants have not raised an objection to its timeliness or its content. Therefore, the court will consider the contents of the Joseph Declaration.10 Liquidated Damages on Late Paid Contributions $10,727.94 Amounts from Audit (including interest through October 17, 2014 ) $4,479.70 Daily Interest through January 20, 2015 $91.18
Total $39,659.29 Pls.’ Mot. at 7. Based on the foregoing evidence, w hich is recited in greater de tail in the factual summary at the start of this opinion, th e court finds that Plaintiffs h ave met their burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying tho se portions [of the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pr o. 56(c)).
B. Defendants’ Arguments Opposing Summary Judgment
1. Rule 56(d) Argument Defendants have not attempted to challenge any of the foregoing factual assertions by identifying “specific facts show ing that there is a genuine iss ue for trial.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote o mitted). Indeed, Defendants have produced no evidence whatsoever to support their opposition on the merits. See generally Defs.’ Opp’n. Instead, they claim to lack sufficient information to r espond to Plaintiffs’ factual contentions. Id. at 3-5. For instance, in their Response to Plaintiffs’ Stateme nt of Undisputed Material Facts, Defendants repeatedly state that “Castle Hill i s without sufficient information to admit or deny” Plaintiffs’ factual assertions. See, e.g. , Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 23-1 [hereinafter “Defs.’ St atement”], ¶ 29 (“Paragraph 29 purports to set forth certain failures by Castle Hill; however, without discovery, Castle Hill is without sufficient informati on to admit or deny.”). Of course, professing ignorance cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact under Rule 56(c). See 10B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.11 Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741 (3d ed.) (“[A] claim of ignorance of the truth of the allegations in the moving pa rty’s Rule 56(e) affidavits is insufficient to cre ate a genuine issue of material fact under [Rule 56(c)].”). So, instead Defendants ask the court to deny summary judgment, or defer ruling on the motion, under Rule 56(d) on the ground that they have not had a n adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. Defs.’ Opp’n at 3. Under Rule 56(d), a court may d efer consideration of or deny a motion for summary judgment, or permit additional time for disc overy when the nonmoving party “shows by affidavit or declarati on that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Here, Defenda nts argue that “[w]ithout more information, which is solely in Plaintiffs’ possession, Defenda nts are at an utter loss to determine necessary specifics as to Plain tiffs’ allegations.” Defs.’ Opp ’n at 5 (citations omitted). Generally speaking, pre-discovery summary judgment motions are premature unless all parties have had a full and fair opportunity for discovery. Convertino v. DOJ , 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257). For that reason, the Court of Appeals has directed trial courts to grant Rule 56(d) motions “‘almost as a matter of course.’” Id. (quoting Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co. , 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). But merely invoking Ru le 56(d) is not enough to defeat summary judgment. At a minimum, to ben efit from Rule 56(d), a party must show that it has dilige ntly pursued discovery. See Convertino , 684 F.3d at 99 (st ating that a Rule 56 motion requesting additional time for discovery should be granted “almost as a matter of course unless the non-moving party has not diligently pursued d iscovery of the evidence”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “In other words, Rule 56(f) [4] is designed to minister to

4 Resolution Trust Corp. and other decisions discuss then-Rule 56(f), which is now Rule 56(d). Rule 56(d) “carrie[d] forward without substantial change the provisions of former sub division (f).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee’s Notes to 2010 Amendments.12 the vigilant, not to those who slumber upon perceptible rights. ” Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Associates, Inc ., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (cited approvingly
in Convertino , 684 F.3d at 99). Furthermore, the affidavit required by Rule 56(d) must state “w ith sufficient particularity . . . why discovery [is] necessary.” Ikossi v. Dep’t of Navy , 516 F.3d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
In Convertino , the Court of Appeals explained that the affidavit must satisf y three requirements: First, it must outline the particular facts [the movant] intend s to discover and describe why those facts are necessary to the litigation. Seco nd, it must explain why [the movant] could not produce [the facts] in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment]. Third, it mu st show the information is in f act discoverable. 684 F.3d at 99-100 (citations and in ternal quotation marks omit ted). Following Convertino , in U.S. ex. rel. Folliard v. Government Acquisitions, Inc ., 764 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the Court of Appeals clarified that its st atement in Convertino that trial courts should grant Rule 56(d) motions “almost as a matter of course” was not intended to mean that “the non-movant’s diligence in pursui ng discovery trumps the three r equirements of Convertino .” Id. at 26. The court may consider the non-movant’s diligence as a factor, but diligence alone is not enough to satisfy Rule 56(d). See id. The Court of Appeals also made clear in Folliard that district courts “should resolve each request based on its application of the Convertino criteria to the specific facts and circumstances presented in the request.” Id. at 26-27. Folliard thus directs trial courts to scrutinize Rule 56(d) motions and not to reflexively grant them. Here, the court rejects Defendants’ Rule 56(d) request because their affidavit—submitted by their counsel David F. Jasinski, see Defs.’ Opp’n., Ex., Decl. of David F. Jasinski, ECF No. 23- 4 [hereinafter “Jasinski Decl.”]—fails to satisfy all three Convertino criteria. Starting with the second and most significant criteria in this case, the Jasinski Declaration makes no effort to explain why Defendants could not produce facts to oppose summary judgme nt. There is probably good13 reason for the Declaration’s sile nce: Defendants made no effor t to take discovery in this case, so they had nothing to report. See Folliard , 764 F.3d at 26, n.5 (“A district court may find the nonmovant’s diligence relevant to the requirement that the non-mov ant ‘explain why he could not produce the facts in opposition to the motion for summary judgm ent.’” (quoting Convertino , 684 F.3d at 99-100)). Defendants’ failure to take discovery was no t for want of opportunity. More than three months before Plaintiffs filed their Motion, Judge L amberth issued an order directing the parties to meet and confer under Local Rule 16.3 in order t o initiate the discovery process. Order; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (barring discovery until the parties hav e conferred under Rule 26(f)). Evidently, the parties ne ver met and conferred as dire cted, because the docket reflects no filing of a Local Civil Rule 16.3 statement. Nor does it refle ct the filing of a motion, by either party, requesting that the court issue a scheduling order. If Defendants truly needed discovery, they could have asked the court to issue a scheduling order at any time during the three months preceding Plaintiffs’ filing of t heir Motion. Because a party cannot invoke Rule 56(d) “to relieve counsel’s lack of diligence,” Berkeley , 68 F.3d at 1414, Defendants have failed to satisfy the second Convertino factor. Defendants also have not satisfied the first and third Convertino factors. As to the first factor, Defendants ha ve not outlined the fact s they intend to d iscover or described why such facts are necessary to the litigation. See Convertino , 684 F.3d at 99. Defendants complain that Plaintiffs have failed to specify the months for which Defendants were del inquent in making contributions and claim that they need discovery to “elucidate the issue or s upport [Plaintiffs’] assertions.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 4 (citations omitted); see also Jasinski Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. But Defendants’ professed uncertainty and confusion rings hollow in light of Plaintiffs’ summary spreadsheet, which shows precisely for which months in wh ich years Defendants were delin quent in making contribution14 payments to each facility. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 10. Defendants assert that the “spreadsheet is meaningless without more information regarding how the alleged deficiencies were determined,” Defs.’ Opp’n at 5 (citations omitted); Jasinski Decl. ¶ 9, but nowhere do they explain why the spreadsheet is “meaningless” or what facts they hope to obtain in discovery that would enable them to dispute Plaintiffs’ calculations. A conclusory demand for discovery, such as that made by Defendants here, does not sati sfy the first criteria of Convertino

. See also Strang v. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency , 864 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintif f’s statements that “discovery ‘would be invaluable in this case’ a nd would give her ‘an opportunity to test and elaborate the affida vit testimony already entered’” were too “vague” to require the district court to deny summary judgment); Messina v. Krakower , 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We will not find an abuse of discretion where the reque sting party has offered only a conclusory assertion without a ny supporting fact s to justify th e proposition that the discovery sought will produce the evidence required.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Defendants have not dem onstrated that the information they seek is in fact discoverable. See Convertino , 684 F.3d at 100. The Jasinski Declaration does not specify t he discovery Defendants claim they need from Plaintiffs. The Decl aration does not, for instance, identify the types of documents that Defendants would seek from Plaintiffs; nor does it identify any persons whom Defendants would attempt to depose. Defendant s do say that they need the “data and/or documents used to create” Plaintiffs’ summary spre adsheet. Jasinski Decl. ¶ 10. But it is not at all clear from the J asinski Declaration why Defend ants do not already possess the records needed “to determine what, if any, amounts are actually owed to Plaintiffs.” See generally Jasinski Decl. Defendants admit that they currently possess in formation regarding the monthly amounts due to the Pens ion Fund and the actu al amounts paid. J asinski Decl. ¶ 8 ( conceding that15 the “remittance reports and payment information” are in Defenda nts’ possession). Moreover, the percentages used to calculate in terest and liquidated damages, as reflected in the spreadsheet, are set forth in the relevant agreements, which are part of the rec ord. The Jasinski Declaration asserts that “[t]he remittance reports a nd payment information, which a re in Castle Hill’s possession, are not enough to allow Castle Hill to reconcile Plaintiffs’ allega tions against its own records so that it may appropriately defend this case.” Jasinski Decl. ¶ 8. B ut nowhere does the Declaration specify the types of documents Defendants need from Plaintiffs to “appropriately defend this case.” Thus, having failed to explain what discovery they seek to obta in from Plaintiffs that is not duplicative of records already in their possession, Defendants have failed to satisfy the third
Convertino factor. 5
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Plain tiffs’ motion for summary judgm ent is granted. The court orders as follows:
1. On or before January 5, 2016, Defendants shall disclose to Plai ntiffs the following: (a) a remittance report for Site 2815 (C.N.A.’s) for August 201 3; (b) remittance reports for Site 2354 (Dietary/Hskpg) for Augus t 2012 and August 2013; and (c) r emittance reports for Site 2825 (Sunshine Recreation) for March 2010 to April 2012, June 2012 t hrough August 2013, October 2013 through March 2014, and M ay 2014 through July 2014.

5 In a footnote in their opposition brief, Defendants assert tha t a settlement agreement between Castle Hill and the 1199 Healthcare Workers East entered into on September 20, 2010 [hereinafter “Settlement Agreement”] precludes Plaintiffs from recouping unpaid contributions, interest, and p enalties for January, Februar y, and March 2010. Defs.’ Opp’n at 2 n.1. But the Settlement Agreement is irrelevant to this case, because Plaintiffs seek to recover only delinquent payments outside the settlement period, except for p erhaps March 2010. See Anderson Decl. ¶ 26 (explaining that the delinquent payments Plaintiffs seek came d ue outside the time covered by the settlement agreement). To the extent that there remains a question as to whether the Settlement Agreement covers unpaid contribution payments for March 2010, the court will consider t hat question if Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ final damages computation on that narrow ground.16 2. The court will defer entering a final damages award. Within th irty days after receipt of the above remittance reports, Plaintiffs shall submit a supp lement to its Motion for Summary Judgment that sets forth the final award sought, including all known contributions, liquidated damages, interest, and surch arges owed to Plaintiffs.
3. The court will defer ruling on the issue of attorney’s fees and costs until entry of final judgment, whereupon the court will order the parties to a ttempt to reach an agreement on fee issues under Local Rule Civil Rule 54.2.
4. The court retains jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compl iance with its Order, to issue a final judgment, and to address any other matters tha t arise from further proceedings.

Dated: December 4, 2015 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge