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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 40818, 40819, & 40820

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEFFERY ALAN CHAMBLISS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 527

Filed: May 28, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Fred M. Gibler, District Judge. 

Orders revoking probation and requiring execution of concurrent unified five-year

sentences, with two-year determinate terms, for three counts of possession of a 

controlled substance, affirmed; orders denying I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of 

sentences, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 40818, Jeffery Alan Chambliss pled guilty to possession of a controlled 

substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c). In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. 

The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of one and one-half years; suspended the sentence; and placed Chambliss on 

probation.

In Docket No. 40819, Chambliss pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, I.C. 

§ 37-2732(c), and admitted to violating the terms of his probation in Docket No. 40818. In 

exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges and an allegation that Chambliss was a persistent 
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violator were dismissed. The district court sentenced Chambliss to a unified term of five years, 

with a minimum period of confinement of two years, to run concurrent with Chambliss’s 

sentence in Docket No. 40818. The district court also revoked Chambliss’s probation in Docket 

No. 40818 and ordered execution of his sentence. The district court, however, retained 

jurisdiction in both cases. Following successful completion of his rider, the district court 

suspended Chambliss’s sentences in both cases and placed him on probation. 

In Docket No. 40820, Chambliss pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, I.C. 

§ 37-2732(c), and admitted to violating the terms of his probation in Docket Nos. 40818 and 

40819. In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district court 

sentenced Chambliss to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of 

two years, to run concurrent with Chambliss’s sentences in Docket Nos. 40818 and 40819. The 

district court also revoked Chambliss’s probation in Docket Nos. 40818 and 40819 and ordered 

execution of his sentences. However, the district court suspended all three sentences and once 

again placed Chambliss on probation. 

Thereafter, Chambliss admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The district court 

revoked probation in all three of Chambliss’s cases, but retained jurisdiction. Following 

successful completion of his rider, the district court suspended the sentences and placed 

Chambliss on probation. Once again, Chambliss admitted to violating the terms of his probation, 

and the district court revoked probation and ordered execution of Chambliss’s original sentences. 

Chambliss filed I.C.R. 35 motions for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied. 

Chambliss appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking 

probation and that the sentence is excessive, that the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 

motions for reduction of sentences, and that the district court should have sua sponte reduced his 

sentences upon revocation of probation.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. 

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 
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P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation 

has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the 

court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 

325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). 

The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 

162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal 

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the 

conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 

618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 

record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly 

made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review 

and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well 

established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 

P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-

73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. 

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 

probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 

judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our 

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 

between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Thus, this Court will 

consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record 

on appeal and are relevant to the defendant’s contention that the trial court should have reduced 

the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. Morgan, 153 Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 

838. 

Chambliss also argues the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction 

of his sentences. A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for 

leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 
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144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In 

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of 

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our 

review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the 

same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 

113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); Lopez, 106 Idaho at 449-51, 680 P.2d at 871-

73. 

Applying the foregoing standards and having reviewed the record in this case (assuming 

Chambliss can challenge the district court’s failure to sua sponte reduce his sentence), we cannot 

say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering 

execution of Chambliss’s original sentences without modification. Therefore, the orders

revoking probation and directing execution of Chambliss’s previously suspended sentences and 

the orders denying his Rule 35 motions for reduction of sentences are affirmed.