Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 1, 2024.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00361-CR

MONTEZ ANTONIO ASHBY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-20-75720-V

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justice Pedersen, III, Justice Garcia, and Justice Kennedy 

Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

Montez Ashby appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of murder. 

A jury found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at forty years’ 

imprisonment. Appellant raises three issues on appeal arguing (1) the evidence is 

insufficient to disprove self-defense, (2) the evidence is insufficient to disprove the 

justification of using deadly force, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury that the State has the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. As to appellant’s sufficiency issues, we conclude the jury rationally could 

have found each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
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rationally could have rejected appellant’s self-defense claims. Thus, we overrule 

appellant’s first and second points of error. As to appellant’s third issue, we note the 

trial court delivered a charge that properly instructed the jury to acquit appellant if it 

believed he acted in self-defense to protect his life and property or if it had a 

reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense. Thus, the trial court did not 

err by submitting the jury charge without including an instruction that the State was 

required to disprove the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we also overrule appellant’s third issue and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On the night of April 10, 2022, Travis Crowder picked up his friend Teresa 

Hall, and the two spent the evening at his residence smoking Phencyclidine [PCP]. 

At around 2:00 a.m., the PCP ran out, and Hall asked Crowder to take her home. As 

Crowder drove Hall home, the two encountered appellant driving in his vehicle in 

the opposite direction. Appellant and Crowder had been childhood friends. 

Appellant invited Crowder over to his residence to smoke more PCP. 

After Hall and Crowder arrived at appellant’s house, they sat in appellant’s 

living room and smoked PCP with him. Hall did not hear much of the discussion 

between Crowder and appellant because she had “earbuds” in her ears and spent 

most of her time on Facebook listening to music. At some point in the evening, 

appellant and Crowder walked to a back room in the house. While they were in the 
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back room, Hall thought she heard some “play fighting” but no “scuffling” or anyone 

“fearing for their life.” 

After Crowder failed to return from the back room, Hall saw appellant pacing 

back and forth and then noticed that Crowder was dead. Crowder had been shot six 

times. Hall observed that appellant was holding a gun. She was in fear for her life 

and believed that appellant would also kill her. Hall called 911 to report the shooting. 

Hall later told police that she did not observe Crowder acting angry or 

aggressive towards appellant. She told police that neither she nor 

Crowder intended to rob appellant of his drugs and that neither of them had a gun. 

Officer Corey Wheeler with the Dallas Police Department was the first officer 

on the scene. Appellant approached Wheeler with his hands up and stated that 

somebody had “tried to jack him.” Wheeler entered the residence and found Crowder 

lying in a chair unresponsive and not breathing. Dallas Fire Rescue pronounced 

Crowder dead at the scene. Wheeler briefly checked Crowder’s pockets and did not 

locate any drugs or weapons on his person or near him.

Madison Gaytan, a crime scene investigator formerly with the Dallas Police 

Department, located four spent 380 caliber cartridge casings in the kitchen. The 

spent cartridge casings were confirmed to belong to the handgun recovered from 

appellant’s back pocket.

Detective Frank Serra with the Dallas Police Department interviewed 

appellant. During the interview, appellant alleged that at some point in the evening, 
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while all three individuals were smoking PCP, he discovered that his glove that 

contained the rest of the PCP went missing from his bag. Appellant suspected 

Crowder had taken it and demanded it back. Appellant claimed that at that point, 

Crowder struck him on his jaw causing appellant to push him back. Appellant stated 

that the punch did not “faze” or hurt him because he was “ready to fight.” Appellant 

demonstrated for Serra that after being punched, he pushed Crowder back, pulled 

out his handgun, and “unloaded the clip.” Appellant admitted to shooting Crowder. 

Multiple times during the interview, Serra asked appellant if he had seen any 

weapons in Crowder’s hands, but appellant refused to answer his question. And 

when Serra asked appellant if Crowder verbally threatened him, appellant stated only 

that Crowder “growled” at him. At no time during the interview did appellant tell 

Serra he shot Crowder to defend himself, instead, he repeatedly stated, “you come 

off getting in my business, you fuck with me,” followed by “he got what’s coming.” 

Further, appellant never told Serra he had been in fear for his life during his 

encounter with Crowder. Appellant, did however, repeatedly state that he felt no 

remorse for killing Crowder because “no one fucks with [him] point blank.”

Serra’s investigation demonstrated that appellant wielded a deadly weapon 

during his encounter with Crowder, but that Crowder did not. Serra believed that 

based upon the bullet holes in appellant’s kitchen wall, appellant had Crowder 

cornered when he shot him five times. Additionally, according to Serra, the evidence 

showed that Crowder stumbled to a chair where appellant fired a sixth shot into 
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Crowder at close range. The medical examiner confirmed Serra’s conclusion and 

testified that one of the gunshot wounds was consistent with someone being seated 

in a chair with his head leaned back.

Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with murdering Crowder. 

During a jail call, appellant told the caller that he should have killed Hall as well. 

At trial, Serra testified that based on the totality of the circumstances, the use 

of force by Crowder during the physical altercation did not rise to the level justifying 

deadly force.

A jury found appellant guilty of murdering Crowder and after finding the two 

punishment enhancement paragraphs true, assessed his punishment at forty years’ 

incarceration. 

II. SUFFICIENCY POINTS1

A. Standard of review and applicable law 

To prevail on a claim of self-defense with the use of deadly force, a defendant 

must prove: (1) he would have been justified in using force against the other person; 

and (2) it was reasonable to believe that “deadly force [was] immediately necessary 

[for protection] against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” 

TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 9.32(a). A person is justified in using force against another 

when and to the degree that person reasonably believes the force is immediately 

 

1We will address appellant’s self-defense sufficiency points together. 
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necessary to protect himself from another’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. 

Id. § 9.31(a). The use of deadly force may be justified when a person reasonably 

believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the 

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. at § 9.32 (a)(2)(A). 

Additionally, the use of deadly force may be justified when a person reasonably 

believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the other’s imminent 

commission of robbery. Id. § 9.32 (a)(2)(B). Deadly force is “force that is intended 

or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable 

of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3).

In a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce some 

evidence that supports his claim of self-defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 

594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once a defendant produces some evidence raising the 

issue of self-defense, the State bears the burden of persuasion to show beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were not justified. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d 

at 594; Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To meet its 

burden of persuasion, the State is not required to produce additional evidence.

Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. The burden of persuasion requires only that the State 

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, 

it has made an implicit finding against any defensive theory raised by the defendant. 

Id. at 914; see also Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202 
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(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that a jury verdict of guilty is an 

implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory).

Accordingly, when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury’s implicit rejection of his self-defense claim, “we look 

not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-defense 

testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the 

essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have 

found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). 

In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

B. Discussion 

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

jury’s finding of the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Instead, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s 

rejection of his self-defense claims. This is consistent with his requesting a selfdefense instruction at trial since “a defensive instruction is only appropriate when 

the defendant’s defensive evidence essentially admits to every element of the offense 

including the culpable mental state, but interposes [a] justification to excuse the 
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otherwise criminal conduct.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). 

With that in mind, we note that with regard to the essential elements of the 

offense, the jury was charged that it must find appellant committed the offense of 

murder if, if it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about 

April 11, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas, the Defendant, did unlawfully then and 

there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Travis Crowder, an individual, 

by shooting deceased with a firearm, a deadly weapon. The jury was also charged 

that they must find appellant guilty of murder if they found from the evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about April 11, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas, 

the Defendant, did unlawfully then and there intend to cause serious bodily injury to 

Travis Crowder, an individual, and did then and there commit an act clearly 

dangerous to human life, to-wit: by shooting Travis Crowder with a firearm, a deadly 

weapon, and did thereby cause the death of Travis Crowder.

The evidence is undisputed that appellant shot Crowder—an act clearly 

dangerous to human life and—Crowder died as a result. Accordingly consistent with 

appellant’s request for the self-defense instruction, the evidence establishes every 

essential element of the offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.2 See Saxton, 

 

2A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an 

individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 190.02 (b)(1). Alternatively, a person commits murder when he 

intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the 

death of an individual. Id. § 19.02 (b)(2). 
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804 S.W.2d at 914. Therefore, we examine whether the evidence is insufficient to 

support the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.

Initially, we note that Officer Cory Wheeler, the first officer on the scene, 

testified that appellant said to him, “I really messed up this time, haven’t I?” We also 

point out that during appellant’s video-recorded interview, which was played for the 

jury, appellant admitted he shot and killed Crowder. At one point during the 

interview, conducted by Serra, appellant demonstrated how he pulled out his 

handgun and unloaded the clip after Crowder punched him. Additionally, appellant 

stated that when he confronted Crowder about his alleged missing PCP, Crowder 

“walked up” on him, and the two began to fight. Appellant told Serra that Crowder 

struck him once on his jaw, but the strike did not “faze” him because he was “ready 

to fight.” In fact, appellant repeatedly stated that he was not “fazed” by Crowder’s 

punch and that he shot Crowder because he “was not playing no games.” 

Multiple times during the interview, Serra asked appellant if he had seen any 

weapons in Crowder’s hands, but appellant refused to answer his question. And 

when Serra asked appellant if Crowder verbally threatened him, appellant stated only 

that Crowder “growled” at him. At no time during the interview did appellant tell 

Serra he shot Crowder to defend himself, instead, he repeatedly stated, “you come 

off getting in my business, you fuck with me,” followed by “he got what’s coming.” 

Further, appellant never told Serra he had been in fear for his life during his 
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encounter with Crowder. Appellant, did however, repeatedly state that he felt no 

remorse for killing Crowder because “no one fucks with [him] point blank.”

Serra testified that his investigation demonstrated that appellant wielded a 

deadly weapon during his encounter with Crowder, but that Crowder had never 

utilized a deadly weapon. Serra further testified that in his twelve years of experience 

as a police officer, the individuals that he encountered who had recently participated 

in fistfights exhibited “scrapes, bruising, swelling, blood, and discoloration to or cuts 

on the face, knuckles, [or] hands.” But according to Serra, appellant did not exhibit 

any injuries consistent with someone who had been in a fistfight. The jury was shown 

images of appellant’s face and hands on the day of the shooting—images devoid of 

any visible cuts, scrapes, or bruises. 

Finally, Serra testified that based upon the bullet holes in the kitchen wall, it 

appeared that appellant had Crowder cornered when he shot him five times. 

Additionally, according to Serra, the evidence showed that Crowder stumbled to a 

chair where appellant fired a sixth shot into Crowder at close range. The medical 

examiner confirmed Serra’s conclusion and testified that one of the gunshot wounds 

was consistent with someone being seated in a chair with his head leaned back. 

In sum, Serra testified that he believed the use of force by Crowder during the 

physical alteration did not rise to the level justifying deadly force. The evidence 

supports the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he was forced to immediately 
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use deadly force against Crowder to protect himself from Crowder’s use of deadly 

force. See TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 9.31(a). 

As it relates to appellant’s self-defense robbery claim, the evidence also 

supports the jury’s rejection of appellant’s claim that he was forced to immediately 

use deadly conduct to protect Crowder’s imminent commission of the robbery of his 

property; namely his PCP. See id. § 9.32 (a)(2)(B). During his interview, Appellant 

alleged that at some point in the evening, he went to his bathroom and discovered 

that his stash of PCP was missing. Appellant suspected Crowder stole it. But several 

witnesses testified there was no PCP found on Crowder’s person. Moreover, Hall

testified that neither she nor Crowder intended to rob appellant and that neither she 

nor Crowder possessed a weapon that night. 

In our review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the 

witnesses, and the jury in this case could have found and in fact did find the elements 

of the charged offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and disbelieved 

appellant’s claim as it relates to his claim of self-defense of his person as well as to 

his claim that deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent Crowder’s 

imminent commission of robbery. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 910 (holding that as 

the fact finder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the jury was free 

disbelieve the testimony tending to show that the victim had been the aggressor, 

thereby rationally determining that the appellant’s use of deadly force was not 

immediately necessary); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston 
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[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (noting defendant’s testimony does not conclusively 

prove a claim of self-defense because the jury could reject the testimony). Based on

these facts, we hold that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 

against appellant on the self-defense issues. We overrule appellant’s first and second 

points of error. 

III. JURY CHARGE ISSUE

In his third point, appellant claims the trial court erred by refusing to include 

additional language in the trial court’s self-defense instruction in the jury charge. 

Specifically, appellant claims the jury should have been instructed that the State has 

the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. But here, the trial 

court delivered a charge that properly instructed the jury to acquit appellant if it 

believed he acted in self-defense or if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether he 

acted in self-defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to include 

appellant’s requested language in the self-defense charge.

A. Standard of review and applicable law 

In analyzing a jury-charge issue a reviewing court should first determine

whether error exists. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

If error exists, the court must next determine whether the error caused sufficient 

harm to warrant reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005). When, as in this case, the error was objected to, reversal is warranted only if 
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the reviewing court finds any actual harm to the defendant. Barrios v. State, 283 

S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and 

guide the jurors in applying it to the facts of the case. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 

244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure, the trial court shall deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting 

forth the law applicable to the case[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ann. art. 36.14; 

Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This duty exists even 

when defense counsel fails to object to inclusions or exclusions in the charge and 

thus may require the trial court to sua sponte instruct the jury on the law applicable 

to the case. Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 486.

When a defense is raised by the evidence at trial, the trial court is required to 

instruct the jury it must acquit the defendant if it has reasonable doubt on the 

existence of a defensive issue. TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 2.03(d). 

As discussed above, the defendant has the initial burden to produce evidence 

supporting self-defense. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. Once 

the defendant produces some evidence, the State bears the ultimate burden of 

persuasion to disprove the raised defense. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14. This 

burden does not require the State to produce evidence refuting the self-defense 

claim; rather, the burden requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. The Penal Code places the burden on the State to prove each element of 
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the offense charged; it does not require the State to “negate the existence of a 

defense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ann. § 2.03(b).

B. The trial court’s self-defense charges

The jury was instructed on two theories of self-defense—defense of a person 

and defense of a person—prevention of robbery. After setting out the applicable 

definitions for each theory, the jury charge’s application paragraphs were set out as 

follows: 

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of 

Travis Crowder, by shooting him with a firearm, a deadly weapon, as 

alleged in the indictment, but you further find from the evidence, as 

viewed from the standpoint of the Defendant at the time, that from the 

words or conduct, or both, of Travis Crowder, that it reasonably 

appeared to the Defendant that his life or person was in danger, and 

there was created in his mind a reasonable expectation of fear of death 

or serious bodily injury, from the use of unlawful deadly force at the 

hands of Travis Crowder, and that acting under such apprehension and 

reasonably believing that the use of deadly force on his part was 

immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis Crowder’s use 

or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, he did shoot Travis 

Crowder, then you should acquit the defendant on the grounds of selfdefense; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 

Defendant was acting in self-defense, then you will give the Defendant 

the benefit of that doubt and say by your verdict, not guilty.

If you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

that at the time and place in question the Defendant did not reasonably 

believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury at the 

hands of Travis Crowder, or that the Defendant, under the 

circumstances as viewed by him from his standpoint at the time, did not 

reasonably believe that the degree of force actually used by him was 

immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis Crowder’s use 

or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, then you will find against 

the Defendant on the issue of self-defense.
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And as it relates to deadly force in defense of a person: robbery, the trial court 

set out the application as follows: 

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the Defendant, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of 

Travis Crowder, by shooting him with a firearm, a deadly weapon, as 

alleged in the indictment, but you further find from the evidence, as 

viewed from the standpoint of the Defendant at the time, that from the 

words or conduct, or both, of Travis Crowder, that it reasonably 

appeared to the Defendant that it was necessary to prevent Travis 

Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, and that acting under such 

apprehension and reasonably believing that the use of deadly force on 

his part was immediately necessary to protect himself against Travis 

Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, he did shoot Travis 

Crowder, then you should acquit -the defendant on the grounds of selfdefense; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 

defendant was acting in self-defense, then you will give the defendant 

the benefit of that doubt and say by your verdict, not guilty. 

If you unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

that at the time and place in question the Defendant did not reasonably 

believe that the commission of robbery by Travis Crowder was 

imminent, or that the Defendant, under the circumstances as viewed by 

him from his standpoint at the time, did not reasonably believe that 

deadly force actually was immediately necessary to protect himself 

against Travis Crowder’s imminent commission of robbery, then you 

will find against the defendant on the issue of self-defense.

The trial court also instructed the jury that the burden of proof of beyond a 

reasonable doubt was on the State and that the presumption of innocence was 

sufficient to acquit the defendant. 

Here, the charge adequately instructed the jury on the State’s burden and the 

jury’s consideration of appellant’s claim of self-defense and deadly conduct in 

defense of person: robbery. See id.; Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 1979) (op. on reh’g); Brotherton v. State, 666 S.W.2d 126, 127–28 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err 

by submitting the jury charge without including an instruction that the State was 

required to disprove the issue of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We 

overrule appellant’s third point of error. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled appellant’s three points of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

220361f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

/Bill Pedersen, III/

BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

MONTEZ ANTONIO ASHBY, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00361-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-20-75720-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Kennedy and 

Garcia participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1

st day of March, 2024.