IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30129

Summary Calendar

SHARON CLINE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JEFFERSON PARISH, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:14-CV-1956

Before JOLLY, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sharon Cline appeals the summary judgment dismissing her age 

discrimination claims against her employer, Jefferson Parish. We AFFIRM.

I.

Cline has been employed by Jefferson Parish since 1990. Her current 

position is Administrative Assistant. At age 52, Cline applied for the position 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 14, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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of Executive Assistant. The Parish selected a 28-year-old employee, Maria 

Cooper, for that position. Cline filed suit against the Parish, alleging age 

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 621, et seq.1 The Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that 

Cline was not selected for the position because she lacked the technical 

knowledge and skill required for the position.

The Parish supported its motion for summary judgment with the 

Executive Assistant job description and several affidavits. According to the job 

description, the essential functions of the Executive Assistant position include 

responsibility for the maintenance and updating of all computers, servers, and 

wiring of the computer network, as well as experience in setting up Excel 

spreadsheets. Amber Breaux, Cline’s immediate supervisor for the previous 

eight years, stated in her affidavit that although Cline is efficient in her 

current position, she lacks the technical knowledge, skill, and experience for 

the Executive Assistant position. 

Randy Nicholson, Director for the Jefferson Parish Department of 

Streets, stated in his affidavit that he made the decision to hire Cooper rather 

than Cline, because Cooper was the strongest candidate on all levels. He 

stated that his decision was based on the candidates’ skills, experience and 

qualifications in the light of the job requirements, as well as his personal 

experience in working with each of them. Based on his direct, personal 

experience in working with Cooper, he observed her to have extensive 

knowledge and technical skill in various software programs, network 

maintenance, and data system development. He stated that he was also aware 

that Cooper had worked closely with Richard Lamoureux, the former Executive 

 

1 Cline also asserted state law claims, but states in her brief that she has abandoned 

them.

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Assistant, and took on his duties and responsibilities when he was out on 

extended leave. Nicholson also had experience working with Cline. When 

reviewing drainage cost reports that she had submitted, he found them to 

contain unnecessary information and to lack the information he needed. He 

stated that he personally observed her limited technical skill while working 

with her. 

Richard Lamoureux stated in his affidavit that he was the former 

Executive Assistant and retired at age 74. While Cooper served as his 

administrative assistant, he trained Cooper on the use of the inventory and 

automotive vehicle locator systems that he had developed for the Department. 

He stated that he could rely on Cooper to execute tasks efficiently without 

supervision or monitoring, and that she handled his duties and responsibilities 

when he was on extended leave for six months.

Cooper’s affidavit described her positions with the Jefferson Parish 

Department of Streets and stated that she had extensive knowledge and skill 

in all of the various software programs used by the Department. 

In opposition to summary judgment, Cline argued that the affidavits 

presented by the Parish were self-serving and not “hard evidence” that Cooper 

was more qualified for the Executive Assistant position. Cline asserted that 

she is qualified for the position and that any shortcomings or lack of experience 

resulted from the Parish’s age-based refusal to allow her the same 

opportunities to train or get experience that it offered Cooper. She also 

submitted a certificate reflecting training in Microsoft Excel Basics and 

claimed knowledge and skill in all relevant software programs as well as 

network maintenance. In addition, she submitted an unsigned statement and 

various emails evidencing work that she had performed for the Parish.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Parish. It held 

that Cline failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not present 

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evidence that she was qualified for the position of Executive Assistant. It held 

further that, even if Cline had established a prima face case, the Parish offered 

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for selecting Cooper for the position, 

and Cline failed to offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact that the reason offered by the Parish is a pretext for age discrimination.

II.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Reed v. Neopost 

USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012). We “draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and avoid credibility 

determinations and weighing of the evidence.” Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, 

Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove age 

discrimination, we apply the three-part burden-shifting analysis from 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by 

showing that (1) she was forty years of age or older at the time she was not 

selected; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was not selected; and (4) 

either (a) a candidate outside her protected class was selected; (b) someone 

younger was selected; or (c) she otherwise was not selected because of her age. 

See Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005); McClaren 

v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, Inc., 420 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2005). If the 

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. If the 

employer meets that burden of production, the plaintiff, to withstand summary 

judgment, must offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether “the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not 

its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Squyres v. Heico Cos., 

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L.L.C., 782 F.3d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Cline argues that the Parish provided training to Cooper, but not to her, 

based on age, and then used that training to justify its decision to hire the 

younger woman. She contends that, despite the Parish’s effort to keep her 

from getting the training she needed, she is nevertheless better qualified for 

the position than Cooper. 

The Parish argues that Cline did not establish a prima facie case because 

she failed to show that she was qualified for the position. It asserts that the 

affidavits it presented in support of its motion for summary judgment establish 

that Cooper was selected for the position because of her technical training, 

skill, and experience in not just comparable work, but in the actual position for 

which she interviewed. Finally, the Parish argues that even if Cline did 

establish a prima facie case, she failed to rebut the Parish’s non-discriminatory 

reasons with sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that age was a 

determinative factor in the decision.

Reviewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable 

to Cline, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment for the Parish. Assuming, without deciding, that Cline established 

a prima facie case, she did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that 

a material question of fact exists as to whether the Parish’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting Cooper for the position were a pretext for 

age discrimination. Evidence that the plaintiff is “clearly better qualified” than 

the candidate selected can support a finding of pretext. See Price v. Federal 

Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). To show that she was “clearly 

better qualified” than Cooper and raise a fact question as to whether age 

discrimination was a factor in the Parish’s hiring decision, Cline bore the 

burden of presenting evidence “from which a jury could conclude that ‘no 

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reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen 

the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.’” Moss v. BMC 

Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 923 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Deines v. Texas Dep’t 

of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280–81 (5th Cir. 1999)). The 

district court properly concluded that Cline’s evidence failed to create a fact 

issue tending to show that she was “clearly better qualified” than Cooper for 

the position of Executive Assistant. Cline’s subjective belief that age was the 

motivation for the training that Cooper received from Lamoureux while 

serving as his administrative assistant is insufficient to defeat summary 

judgment. See Waggoner v. City of Garland, Tex., 967 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th 

Cir. 1993).

Although she did not raise it as a separate issue, Cline complains 

throughout her brief that discovery should have been allowed. She does not, 

however, cite any record evidence that she requested an opportunity to conduct 

discovery in the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Nor does she explain 

what evidence she sought to obtain through discovery or how any such evidence 

would create a genuine issue of material fact. See Krim v. BancTexas Grp., 

Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1443 (5th Cir. 1993).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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