alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4344-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2017-0001]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of California (FEMA-4344-DR), dated October 10, 2017, and related determinations.

# DATES:

This amendment was issued October 14, 2017.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of California is hereby amended to include the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of October 10, 2017.

Butte, Lake, Mendocino, and Yuba Counties for Individual Assistance (already designated for debris removal and emergency protective measures [Categories A and B], including direct federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program).

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Brock Long,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2017-23065 Filed 10-23-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


AND
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In
connection with this Quarterly Report of Green Planet Solutions, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2007, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Herbert Schaffer, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:




1.
            Such
      Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31,
      2007, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.
            The
      information contained in such Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB for
      the period ending December 31, 2007, fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      Green Planet Solutions, Inc.




Dated:
March 3, 2008




By: /s/
Herbert Schaffer


Herbert
Schaffer


Chief
Executive Officer,


Chief
Financial Officer
#### Keith Russell JUDD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR the FIFTH CIRCUIT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2008-1303.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 18, 2008.

Keith Russell Judd, pro se.

ORDER

The appellant having failed to pay the docketing fee required by Federal Circuit Rule 52(a)(1) within the time permitted by the rules, it is

ORDERED that the notice of appeal be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED, for failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Sabrina Naraine, Appellant. John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 844]

—Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 24, 1997, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Claimant was employed as a customer service representative for a retail store until she was terminated for violating the employer’s cash-handling procedure. Claimant acknowledged that she had received a copy of the employer’s cash-handling policy and procedure, which stated that an employee’s failure *933to comply therewith would result in disciplinary action, including termination. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that claimant lost her job under disqualifying circumstances. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Failure to comply with an employer’s established policies or procedures has been held to constitute disqualifying misconduct *(see, Matter of Rothman [Sweeney],*242 AD2d 818; *Matter of O’Shea [Sweeney],*233 AD2d 736). Claimant’s exculpatory explanation for the incident which caused her discharge raised a credibility issue which the Board was free to resolve against her *(see, Matter of Perkov [Sweeney],*231 AD2d 780; *Matter of Johnson [Ross],*81 AD2d 681, 682).

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Yesawich Jr., Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### Amar GUEYE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carlos M. GUTIERREZ, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-0662cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 7, 2008.

*71Amar Gueye, Cincinnati, OH, Pro Se, Appellant.

Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Lawrence H. Fogelman and Jeffrey S. Oestericher, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York, NY, for Appellee.

Present: JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN and ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges, DENISE COTE,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Denise Cote, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Amar Gueye appeals from the District Court’s summary-judgment dismissal of his Title VII claims for racial, religious, and national origin discrimination and retaliation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, proceedings below, and specification of issues on appeal.

We agree with the District Court that Gueye did not assert a prima facie claim for religious discrimination because he did not allege that he was disciplined for failing to comply with an employment demand that conflicted with his religious beliefs. *See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health,*275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir.2001). Assuming without deciding that Gueye established a prima facie case of racial or national origin discrimination or retaliation, defendant articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged adverse employment actions — refusing to transfer Gueye, demoting him, and ultimately terminating his employment. Gueye, therefore, was required to offer evidence from which a rational fact finder could find that defendant’s reasons were pretextual and its true motivation discriminatory or retaliatory. *See D’Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp.,*479 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). Because he did not do so, judgment was properly entered against him.

In the memorandum submitted on this appeal, Gueye complains that the District Court granted extensions of time to defendant and failed to provide for depositions of defendant’s employees. These claims lack merit because (1) the District Court has discretion to grant extensions of time, *see*Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), and Gueye does not establish that the District Court abused its discretion; and (2) Gueye does not claim and the record does not demonstrate that he requested that the District Court order the deposition of any of defendant’s employees.

We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the District Court.
**EXHIBIT 31.2(b)**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Tony Oviedo, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2013 of GeoMet, Inc.; and

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 

Date: April 28, 2014

 
| By     | /s/ TONY OVIEDO             |   |
|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
|   | **Tony Oviedo,**            |   |
|   | **Chief Financial Officer** |   |

 

1

----
* After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 20, 2010 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-8001 v. (D. of Wyo.) GILBERTO PINON-AYON, Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. No. 09-CR-210-CAB)

ORDER

Before HARTZ, ANDERSON , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. *
Gilberto Pinon-Ayon was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and appealed the district court’s decision to enhance his sentence. The United States of America has filed an unopposed motion to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we GRANT the motion. We agree the district court should review the evidence and make specific and independent findings to justify an obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to-2- USSG § 3C1.1. See United States v. Mares , 441 F.3d 1152, 1160–61 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Markum , 4 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1993). We therefore VACATE Pinon-Ayon’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Because we are vacating Pinon-Ayon’s sentence, we do not address his arguments regarding whether the district court erred in including additional methamphetamine in calculating his relevant conduct. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge
Exhibit 10.3


FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THE

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO

ARBITRATE, NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT AND

NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT


THIS FIRST AMENDMENT (this “Amendment”), executed on
April 11, 2007 (effective as of January 1, 2007 (the “Effective Date”)), is
entered into between Patrick F. Hamner (“Employee”) and Heeling Sports Limited,
a Texas limited partnership (the “Company”).


WHEREAS, Employee and the Company desire to amend
Exhibit 1 to that certain Employment Agreement, Including Agreement to
Arbitrate, Noncompetition Agreement and Nondisclosure Agreement dated as of
September 18, 2006 between Employee and Company (the “Agreement”), as herein
provided;


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:


1.             Defined Terms.   Capitalized terms used but not otherwise
defined in this Amendment shall have the respective meanings assigned to such
terms in the Agreement.


2.             Amendment.   Exhibit 1 to the Agreement is hereby
amended and restated in its entirety as of the Effective Date as set forth on Exhibit
1 attached hereto.


3.             Relationship to Agreement.   The
terms and provisions of the Agreement, as amended hereby, are hereby ratified,
confirmed, and approved in all respects, and shall continue in full force and
effect.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is adopted as of the Effective Date.


	
  HEELING SPORTS LIMITED

  	
   

  	
  EMPLOYEE

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  HEELING MANAGEMENT CORP.,

  its sole general partner

  	
   

  	
  /s/  Patrick F. Hamner

  	
   

  
	
  Patrick F. Hamner

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Michael G. Staffaroni

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Title:

  	
  Chief Executive Officer

  	
   

  	
   

  
								



 











Exhibit 1


Salary and Benefits


Reference Section 4, part a.


1.               Salary to be $19,250.00 month - $231,000 per
year.


2.               Bonus Plan:    An Annual
Bonus amount as determined by the Company’s Compensation Committee and for
purposes of such Bonus Plan, Employee’s “Target” amount is 50% of Employee’s
then current base salary.


Reference Section 4, part b.


1.               Employee to receive four weeks paid vacation
each calendar year.


2.               Employee to receive life, medical and dental
insurance through the plan adopted by the Company for its full time employees.


3.               Employee shall be entitled to participate in
a 401(k) plan adopted by the Company for its full time employees, including any
matching arrangements in effect from time to time.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ismael GASPARI-CORONA, also known as Ismael Gaspari Corona, also known as Ismael Gaspar-Corona, also known as Ismael Gasperi-Corona, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-20531

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Sarah Beth Landau, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Laura Fletcher Leavitt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Ismael Gaspari-Corona presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by *United States v. London,*568 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir.2009), *cert. denied,*— U.S. *376-, 131 S.Ct. 631, 178 L.Ed.2d 507 (2010). The Supreme Court adopted the position advanced in *London. See Abbott v. United States,*— U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 18, 23, 178 L.Ed.2d 348 (2010) (holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) even if the defendant received a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction). The appellant’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated Balance Sheet of AOA Holding LLC and Subsidiaries as of June 30,
2000 and the related Statements of Operations and Cash Flows and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,463
<SECURITIES>                                     3,174
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,289
<ALLOWANCES>                                    (1,296)
<INVENTORY>                                        522
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,875
<PP&E>                                         136,621
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (73,751)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 133,496
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           11,406
<BONDS>                                        213,848
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (98,476)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   133,496
<SALES>                                         21,610
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,610
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,734
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,785
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,364
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,626
<INCOME-TAX>                                        69
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,557
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,557
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Todd C. Coningsby, Appellant, v New York State Department of Corrections et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[667 NYS2d 101]

Yesawich Jr., J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed January 17, 1997, which ruled that claimant did not sustain an accidental injury in the course of his employment and denied workers’ compensation benefits.

Claimant, a correction officer at Cayuga Correctional Facility in Cayuga County, was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving to work in his personal vehicle. Fully uniformed, he had driven two miles past the facility to a local restaurant, to purchase a sandwich for his lunch, and was traveling back to the facility to commence his shift when the accident occurred, approximately one mile from the facility entrance. Al*1010though claimant was required to eat at his post, food was available for purchase on the facility premises. Claimant was not reimbursed for time spent commuting, nor was he required to travel to work in his personal vehicle or to wear his uniform while commuting. Denied workers’ compensation benefits on the ground that the accident did not occur in the course of his employment, claimant appeals.

There being substantial evidence in the record to support the Workers’ Compensation Board’s findings, its decision must be upheld. Because the risks inherent in traveling to and from work relate to the employment in only a marginal sense *(see, Matter of Greene v City of New York Dept. of Social Servs.,*44 NY2d 322, 325), accidents that occur during such a commute are generally not compensable as work related except under limited circumstances *(see, Matter of Gigliotti v Niagara County Sheriff’s Dept.,*202 AD2d 715, 716; *Matter of Stead v Rockland County,*195 AD2d 668, 669), not present here. Inasmuch as claimant’s employer neither encouraged him to purchase his lunch at the restaurant in question nor derived any benefit therefrom *(see, Neacosia v New York Power Auth.,*85 NY2d 471, 478), he was not, as he contends, engaged in a special errand at the time of his accident. Nor can we conclude that the trip served a dual purpose, given the absence of proof that it was necessary to carry out a function of the employment *(see, Matter of Callanan v Town of Clarkstown,*191 AD2d 861, 862). In sum, despite claimant’s physical proximity to the facility at the time of the accident, there was an insufficient nexus between the accident and claimant’s work to warrant an award of workers’ compensation benefits.

Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### Rafael LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R. DION; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-15995.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 17, 2011.

Rafael Lopez, Moorpark, CA, pro se.

David E. Brice, AGCA — Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Rafael Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials deprived him of his personal property in violation of his due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, *Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 393*F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

In his complaint, Lopez alleges that defendants violated his due process rights when they ceased storing his property after he was reclassified. Lopez contends that defendants were not authorized to donate his property without a hearing and that prison regulations required that his property be stored until his return to the general population.

“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is *591available.” *Hudson v. Palmer,*468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); *see also Barnett v. Centoni,*31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994) (“[Negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner’s property fails to state a claim under section 1983 if the state has an adequate post deprivation remedy.”). We have specifically held that the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 810 et seq., provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for loss of property. *See Barnett,*31 F.3d at 816-17. Therefore, because Lopez had an adequate state law tort remedy for the taking of his electronic property, he did not allege a cognizable due process claim and his complaint was properly dismissed.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.