### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 417 -CV

P aul M. Werc han an d Mary A. We rchan , Appellan ts
v. Lakew ood Estates Association , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126 TH JUDI CIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0039 80 , HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Dr. Paul W erc han and Mary Ann W erc han appe al a district cour t judgment de clar ing that they have no r ights in a w ater front par k owned by

appellee L akew ood Estates Association (L EA) and g ranting injunctive and decla ratory relief prohibiting them from installing or maintaining a

boat do c k o r o the r i mpr ov e me nts the re . We wi ll a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND The waterfr ont park at issue is located in L akew ood Estates, a subdi vision on the south shore of L ake T ravis nea r the Briar cliff community
. I n 1971, appellant Ma ry Ann Wercha

n, with her late husband, L eroy Wercha n, purcha sed a lot in L akew ood Estates. They boug ht a sec ond lot in 1974. L eroy

constructe d a we ekend or summer home on the site. After L eroy died in 1997,Photogra phs of t he dock a

re in the r ecor d. I t is a cover ed structur e, with what a ppear to be 1 wo od e n f loo rs and thr e e sli ps fo r w a te rc ra ft . T he re wa s a lso e vid e nc e that the Wer c ha

ns ’ dock wa s sufficiently

larg e to constitute a “ residenti al marina ” under L ower Colorado River Autho ri ty re g ulatio ns . 2 h is s o n , a p p e ll an t Pa

u l We r c h an , inh e r it e d L e r o y ’ s in te r e s ts in h is L a k e w o o d E s tate s p r o p e rty
. We will refe r to Mary

Ann, L eroy , and Paul Wercha n simply as “the Wercha

ns” except where the distinction i s releva

nt. The orig inal L akew ood Estates subdi vision plat, recor ded in 1947, set aside la nd for
a waterfr ont park (the “P ar k ”)

— the prope rty at issue her e. In 1948, the deve loper re corde d a docume nt titl ed, “Re strictions,” and subtitled “L akew ood Estates.” I n addition to impos ing se vera l de e d r e str ic tio ns of

L a ke wo od

Es ta te s lo ts, the Re str ic tio ns , in pa ra g ra ph14 , “ sti pu la ted that a ll purcha sers a

nd owner s of t rac ts in L akew ood Estate shall have perma nent use of the water front par k and roa ds in L akew ood Estate, as shown on r ecor ded plat of sa id addition.” Howeve r, par ag raph 15 of the Restrictions, the c oncluding para g raph, state d, “The se restrictions shall rema in in force and shall remain e ffe ctive until J une 1st, A.D. 1973.”

The lake shore at the Pa rk i s ro ck y and, in pl ace s, steep. Ove r the y ear s, sever al L akew ood Estates prope rty owner s have a

nchore d private f

loating doc ks off the Par k shore, providing better a cce ss to the lake for swimming, boating and other water rec reation. The Wercha ns
moo re d a do c k at th e Park

a s e arl y a s 1 97 1; there was e vid e nc e that th e y we re the fi rs t pe rs on s to do so . In 1 97 9, the Wer c ha ns , w ithfi ve oth e r fa

mil ie s wh o w e re fe llo w L a ke wo od Es ta te s p ro pe rt

y
owner s, purcha sed a f

ifty -six by

thirty -four

foot floating boat dock and a tta c he d it

by tw o c a ble s to 1 Park prope rty . One c able is attac hed to a stake , the oth er t o a t ree . The doc k has re mained ther e,3

moored by

the same two c ables to the same stake a nd tree , ever

si n ce . Throug hout the dock’s exis tence , a si g n has been posted on the structure itself stating, “ Private dock. K eep of f.” I n 1997,
a ft e r L e ro y

die d, Pa ul i nh e ri te d h is i nte re st i n th e do c k. Mean whi le , th e Wer c ha ns g ra du a lly purcha sed ea ch of the ir co-ow ners’ share s of the dock, ultim ately acquir ing sole owner ship in 2001.

I n 1980, the dock owne rs installed an e lectric al outlet near the dock. The y obtained service throug h a meter

box locate d i n a uti lity

ease ment in the Park appr ox imately 400-450 fe et inl and . F ro m th e me te r box, the do c k own e rs ra n w ir e s und e rg ro un d thro ug h a tr e nc h th e y

du g to
a loc a t i o nn e ar

t h e d o c k
. H e r e t h e y

s e tane l e c t r i c p o l e i nc o n c r e t e , a n d r ant h e w i r e s u

p t h e po le to an outlet with a locking cover . When desiring elec tricity on the dock, the ow ners would turn the po we r o n b a c k at the me te r box, the n run an exte ns ion c or d to the do c k fr om t he ou tle t, a

nd re ve rs e the process when they left. The electric pole rema ined i ntact in that location from 1980 until 2002, when it was de stroy ed in a f lood. Flood wate rs pre vented r einstallation until 2005. Until 1995, tit le to t h e P ark r emained in the L akew ood Estates deve loper a nd his he ir s. Th e de ve lop e r h a d ma de no pr ov isi on fo r a pr op e rt y ow ne rs a sso c ia tio n o r s imi lar e nti ty to m ana g e or

ma int a in t

he Park . In 1 96 9, a

g ro up of su

bd ivi sio n r e sid e nts fo rm e d a no n- pr of it voluntary association, the L akew ood P ro p erty Owner s Protective Association (POPA). POPA’s article s of association ind i ca t ed t h at i ts purposes included r aising funds to pay for c onstruction and maintena

nce of a boat r amp in the Park that some residents had previously built. The a rticles stated that the org anization would charg e fe es for ac ce ss to the ramp. In the y ear s that followed, POPA functioned esse ntially as a voluntar

y neig hborhood or homeow ners a ssociation for L akew ood Estates prope rty

owner s, providing a forum for a ddressing residents’ issues, c oordinating volunteer4

eff orts to maintain o r i m p ro v e t he Park, a nd funding these a

nd other ser

vices throug h voluntary
me mbe rs hip du e s. POP A a lso pa id p ro pe rt y ta xes on the Park
. Th e re wa s als o e vid e nc e that PO PA bo ard me mbe rs un dert oo k e ff

or ts t o li mit a c c e ss t o th e Park

so le ly to L a ke wo od

Es ta te s p ro pe rt

y
owner s, including e rec ting sig ns at the Park a dvising that a cce ss was limited to the subdivis io n’s proper ty owner s an d gu est s only . The pa rties hotly

disputed, howeve r, whe ther POPA went further in attempting to limit P ark a cce ss solely to its dues-paying me mbers. The Wercha ns joined POPA after pur chasingtheir first lot, paid annua l dues for e ach y ear at least through 1993, a nd
wer e ac tive in the association, with Mary Ann servingas the g roup’s tre asure r and se cre tary betwee n 1981 and 1991.

POPA’ s article s of association provided for a twenty -five y ear

term of e x istence, which ende d in J une 1994. The article s were not rene wed. How ever , in Dec ember 1994, a g roup of L ake w o o d

E s tate s r e s id e n ts f

o r me d a p p e ll e e L E A , a

T e xa s n o n - p r o f

it c o r p o r a ti o n , f

or pu r p o s e s i n c l u d i n g “ r e p r e s e n t [i n g ] t h e c o m m o ni n t e r e s to f

o w n e r s o f

r e a l p r o p e rt y

s i tu a t e d in L AKEWOOD ESTATES” and “ assist[ ing] in the enfor ceme nt of subdivision restrictions and other rule s and re g ulations imposed by g overnme ntal authority

so as t o protec t and enha nce the value of

proper ty within the subdivision.” L ike POPA, L EA func tioned simil arly to a voluntary neig hborhood assoc iation for subdivis i o n residents, fundingits activities with volunt ary annual
m em b er s h i p d

u es . T h e W er ch an s we re d u es -p ay i n g m em b er s o f L E A ea ch y ea r f ro m 1 9 9 7 t h ro u gh 2006, when litiga

tion arose. On J une 1, 1995, L EA purc hased the fee title in the Park from the he ir to L akew ood Es tat e s’ de ve lop e r, a nd

thu s b e c a me the ow ne r o f t he Park . L EAun de rt oo k f or ma l me a sure s toL EA later resc inded this chang e on proc edura l gr ounds in 2000. 2 There was evidenc e that at least some individuals in the L EA leade rship had ex p re ssed 3 c o n c e r n s a s e ar l y a s 1 9 9 5 r e g ar d i n g t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d an c h o r i n g o f p r i v a t e d o c k s o n P a r kp r o p e r t y. Th e se c on c e rn s in c lud e d a dv e rs e e ff e c ts o n s a fe ty

and a pe rc e pti on

that it wa s unf a ir to a llo w a sma ll number of long time L akew ood Estates prope rty o wn er s wh o had pre viously place d docks along the wate rf

ro nt e sse nti a lly

to mo no po li z e the e nti re su bd ivi sio n’ s la

ke a c c e ss. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e numbe r o f d oc ks a t th e Park ha d g ro wn

ste a dil y , in c reas in g fr om f ive do c ks in 1 98 0 to tw e lve by tim e of tr ia l. P a ul We rc ha

n, a mon g oth e r w itn e sse s, ind ic a te d th a t th e re wa s li ttl e if any room left at the Par

k for a dditional docks. T h e re co rd also sugg ests that these impetuses for c ha ng e c or re spon dedto an ev ol ut io n o f L akew oo d E st ate s’ d emo graphi c s f ro m c hie fl y

“ we e ke nd e rs ” (as the Wer chans w ere ) to full-time reside nts and a c hang e in the L EA boar d’s composition from dock owne rs to non-dock ow ners. 5 restric t Park ac cess to dues- paying L EA member s, enac ting a by law cha

ng e in 1998 and , in

the same 2 ye ar , p r o v i d i n g n e w s i g n s f o r t h e P ar k a d v i s i n g t h a ta c c e s s w a s r e s t r i c t e d t o L E A m e m b e r s o n l y. The immedi at e d i s p u te ar ose af ter the L EA member ship voted in 2005 to approve
ne w r ule s r e g ulatin g pr ivate do c ks a tta c he d to Park pr op e rt y . T he Werch ans , a s L EAme mbe rs , attended two L E A m eeting s at which the r ule proposals we re discusse d—in 2000 and 2005—and Paul Werchan s p oke in opposition to t he rule s on both occa sions. As adopted, L EA’s doc k rules re quire that e ach ow ner de siring to plac e a pr ivate dock in the Par k are a must sign a

n annual lic e ns e a g re e me nt a

nd pa y an an nu a l f

e e ba se d o n th e do c k’ s sq ua re fo ota g e . A mon g oth e r t e rm s of the “ L ic e ns ing Ag re e me nt, ” the do c k ow ne r a g re e s that he “ ha s n o r ig hts , in te re sts , ti tle s, e state or privileg es re lated to or in the [Park]” bey ond the “limited privileg es” “ temporar ily allowed” under the ag ree ment; that he would place his dock in a spac e desig nated by L EA; that t h e li cense was conditioned on his maintaining c urre nt L EA membership; that the owne r would pay the license fee ; that c ha ng e s to the do c k r e qu ir e d L EAbo ard a pp ro va l; and that the a g re e me nt w a s te rm ina ble a t w ill and would automatically terminate “ when the lice nsee use s the proper ty of the L icensor be y ond the scope of authority g rante d here in.” 3At tr ia l, P a ul We rc ha

n s ug g e ste d th e L EAle a de rs hip ha d mo re sini ster mot ive s, condemninga “g ood old boy sy stem” he pe rce ived amongL EA boar d i n s i d er s wh o, in his view, wer e ang ling to drive awa y longtime doc k owner s “to cre ate r oom so that special people in the know c ou ld n owpu t th e ir

ow n d oc ks ou t th e re .” Dr . We rc ha n a lso a c c us e d th e L EAle a de rs hip of “ dir ty tricks” including “[n] ot notify ing us of meeting s in time for us to make ar rang ements,” “ damag ing my dock for months and months on end without offeringany sort of apolog y

or any thing,” and eve n disconnec ting the Wer chans’ elec tric wire s from their mete r box in the Park and r unning w ires fr om the box t o an L EA-owne d pavilion. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 2008). 4 At tr ia l, t he Wer c ha

ns a lso c la ime d that th e y

ha d e sta bli sh e d p re sc ri pti ve e a se me nts wi th 5 reg ard to improveme n t s t hey helped make in the Park, including a roa d they helped build in 1978 from the POPA b o at ra m p t o the ar ea w here they later moore d their dock, a small boat ramp they helped build nea

rby in the same y ear , and nearby concr ete steps they helped build in 1979. They do not press these c laims on appea l. 6

Al tho ug h e a c h o f t

he oth e r d oc k o wn e rs signed the lic e ns inga g re e me nt a nd pa id the fe e, t h e W er chans, while rene wing their L EA member ship for 2006, re fused to sig n the ag ree ment or pay

the fe e. The y

took the position that they wer e not subject to any L EA re strictions
or ru le s r e g ulatin g the ir

do c k b e c a

us e the y po sse sse d e ith e r a

fe e int e re st or ease men t, b y e xpre ss g rant or pr escr i p t i o n , p er mitti ng them to continue mooring their dock to the Par k and re ceiving elec trical ser

vice f rom their ele ctric pole, as t hey had in y ear s past, without interfe renc e or restriction from L EA. L EA sued the Wer chans unde r the Unifor m Decla ratory J udg m en t s Act (U DJ A), 4 seekingdecla

rations that the Werc hans had n o fe e or ea sement intere st in the Park, as we ll as decla ratory and inj unctive relief prohibit ing the Wercha ns from installing or

maintaining a

boat dock or improvements on a

ny portion of the Park. The Wercha ns counterc laimed un d er t he UDJA for decla rations establishing their rig hts to co n t i n u e maintaining their doc k, its mooring ca bles
c on ne c tin g it t o s ho re , a

nd the ir e le c tr ic a l outle t. Of re levanc e to this appea l, the parties joined issue 5Th e pa rt ie s a lso a sse rt e d c omp e tin g a tto rn e y ’s fe e s c la ims un de r t he UD JA, b ut a g re e d to 6 a ba nd on the m a t tr ia l. 7 r e g ar d in g ( 1 ) w h e th e r p ar a g r a p h 1 4 o f th e 1 9 4 8 Re s tr ic ti o n s , g r an ti n g “ p e r ma n e n t use of the water front par

k ” to subdivisi on residents, ha d rema ined in eff ect or terminated, pe r par ag raph 15, in 1973; (2) assuming any rig hts the W er ch ans possessed unde r par ag raph 14 ha d not terminated, whether the L EA ha d n o n etheless ex tinguished the m throug h adver se possession; (3) whe ther the Wercha

ns h ad es t abli shed a pr escr iptive ease ment permitting the m to continue using the Park proper ty for mooring t h ei r d o ck and rec eiving elec tricity , as they had in y ear s past, without restric tion from the L EA. 6

Following a benc h trial, the district court r ender ed judg ment i n L E A’ s favor . The jud g me nt d e c lare d th a t:

• the Wercha

ns “have neither a

fee interest nor an easement interest of a ny ty pe in or to any p o rti o no f th e [P ar k ]”

• “the r ights c laimed by the Wercha

ns under Parag raph 14 of t he Restrictions terminate d along with the Restriction[s ] as a whole on June 1, 1973, pursuant t o P ar agra ph 15 of the Re str ic tio ns ”

• “if the r ights c laimed by t h e W erchans under Parag raph 14 of

the Restrictions terminated al o n g wi t h t h e R es t ri ct i o n s a s a w h o l e o nJ u n e 1 , 1 9 7 3 , t h ey we re ex t i n gu i s h edt h ro u gh [L EA ’s ] ad

ve rs e po sse ssi on

of the m”

• “if the r ights c laimed by the Wercha

ns under Par ag raph 1 4 o f t h e Restrictions did not terminate on June 1, 1973 and we re not e x tinguished throug h [L EA’s] adve rse possession of them, such r ights do not in any event include the rig ht to inst all a boat doc k or other improvements in the Park.”8

The district cour

t a lso r ender ed judg ment that the Wercha ns take nothing on their counte rcla ims, and perma nently enjoined them fr om “installing or ma intaining a boat do ck (i n cl uding the ir exist ing do c k) or any othe r i mpr ov e me nt o n a ny po rt ion of the pa rk wi tho ut t

he As so c ia tio n’ s e xpre ss permission.” This appe al ensue d.
AN AL YSI S

I n t wo i ssues, the Wercha ns contend that the district c ourt err ed in dec laring they ha d n o in te re st o f a

ny kin d in the Park , r e nd e ri ngjud g me nt t hat the y take no thi ngon

the ir counter claims, and pe rmane ntly enjoining the m from installing or ma intaining a boat dock or

any other improveme nt on any portion of the Park w i t h o ut L EA’s e x press pe rmission. They advanc e essentially

three arguments. I n their first issue, they urg e that the district cour t erre d in holding that their rig hts under para g raph 14 of the 1948 Restrictions ha d terminated, pur suant to para g raph 15, in 1973. I f we ag ree with them and re verse the district court’s j u d g ment that para g raph 14 te rm inate d in 19 73 , the Wer c ha ns a sse rt , in the ir se c on d iss ue , that the re is le g a ll y or f act ua lly insufficient e vidence to support the district court’s a lternative holdin g t h at L EA extinguished those rig hts through a dverse possession. We “do[] not need to re ach t h i s co n t i ng ent issue,” the Wercha ns expl ain, unless we hold that pa rag raph 15 did not terminate par ag raph 14 a long w ith the oth e r R e str ic tio ns .

Also, as par

t of their first issue, the Werc hans cha lle n ge the leg al and f actua l
su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su pp or tin g the dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s le g a l con c lus ion , impl ic it in its ju dg me nt, th at t he Werc hans did not establish a pre scriptive ea sement per mitti ng them to continue using the Park prope rty

to moor their dock a

nd mai n t ain an electric pole. We observe that, even if we9

su sta in t he ir c on te nti on s r e g ard ingpa ra g ra ph14 of the Re str ic tio ns , th e Wer c ha ns sti ll mus t a lso preva il on this challeng e in orde r to obtain appel l at e re l i ef from the judg ment prohibiting them from maintaining their dock mooring s and electric pole in the P ark. At trial, the Wercha ns took the position t hat their uses of Park prope rty

to moor their dock and maintain an electric pole wer e not within the scope of any permissive use authorized by para g raph 14. Consistent with this posi tion, the Wer c ha

ns on a pp e a l ha ve no t cha lle ng e d the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s a lte rn a tiv e ho ldi ng that “if the ri g hts claimed by

the Wercha

ns under Par ag raph 14 of

the Restrictions did not terminate on June 1, 1973,
and were not e xtinguis he d thro ug h [L EA ’s ] ad ve rs e po sse ssi on

of the m, s uc h r ig hts do no t in
an y e v e n ti n c l u d e t h e r i g h tt o i n s t a l l a b o a td o c k

o r o t h e r i mp r o v e m e n t s i nt h e P ar

k
. ” C o n s e qu e n t l y,
re g ard le ss o f w he the r p ara g ra ph14 did or did no t ter

min a te , the Wer c ha

ns ’ spe c if ic ri g ht t o ma int a in their dock, mooringcab l es , and electric pole outlet in the Park ultimately turns on whether

they have e sta bli sh e d a pr e sc ri pti ve e a se me nt e nti tli ng the m to that r ig ht. We t ur n to that qu e sti on

fi rs t,
a s t h e s e s p e c i f

i c u s e s ar e a tt h e h e arto f

t h e c o n t r o v e r s y.
P r e sc r ipt ive e as e m e nt

The Werc hans cha lleng e the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence supporting the district court’s c onclusion that they did not esta b l i s h a p re scriptive ea sement per mitti ng them to continue attaching their dock’s mooring cables and maintaining their utilit y pole in the Park. As the p arti e s a s s e rti n g th e r ig h t to a p r e s c r ip ti v e e a s e me n t, th e We r c h an s h a d th e b u r d e n of proving
e a c h e le me nt r e qu ir e d to e sta bli shon e ; na

me ly , th a t th e y

have so us e d th e Park

in a mann e r t hat is (1) ope n, (2) notorious, (3) continuous, (4) ex clusive, (5) adver se, and (6) f or a pe riod of ten y ear s10

or more. See Brooks v. J

ones , 57 8 S. W.2 d 6 69 , 6 73 (T e x. 19 79 ); Scott v. Cannon , 959 S.W .2d 712, 721 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied).

To pr e va il o n th e ir

le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle nge , th e Wer c ha

ns mus t de mon str a te that the evidenc e conc lusively established ea ch of these eleme nts as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001)
. Evidence conclusively establishes a vital fac t when the evidenc e is such that rea sonable pe ople could not disag ree in their conc lusions. City of Keller v. W ilson , 1 6 8 S.W .3d 802, 814-17 (Te x . 2005). In conductinga leg al-suff iciency revie w of the evidenc e, we must consider all of the e vidence in the light m o s t favorable to the district cour t’s fi nd in gs of

(o r f a ilure s to fi nd ) t

he se e le me nts and

ind ulg e e ve ry

re a so na ble inf e re nc e that w ou ld support them. Id. at 822. Simil arly , to preva il on their fac tual-suffic iency challeng e, the Werc hans must demonstrate that the district co u rt ’s adver se finding s are ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Dow Chem. Co. , 4 6 S
. W
. 3 d at 2 4 1
. W e m u s tco n s i d er an d we i gh
a ll o f t he e vid e nc e , a

nd c an s e t a sid e a fi nd ing on ly if the e vid e nc e is so we a k o r i f t he fi nd ingis s o ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that it is cle arly wrongand unjust. Id
. There is no dispute that the Werchans’ use of Par k proper ty to moor t h ei r dock and obtain ele ctrica l service has bee n open, notorious, and continuous for more than ten y ear s. The parties’ dispute, rather , cente rs on the ele ments of exclusivit y and adve rsity
. The e x clusivity element require s that the claimant’ s use be e x clusive of a ll other persons, e specia lly the prope rty

owner . See B r ooks , 5 7 8 S. W. 2 d a t 6 7 4 ( “ Wh il e o th e r ju r is d ic ti o n s d o n o t r e q

u ir e th e p r e s c r ip ti v e u se to be
e xclu siv e by us e of the ow ne r of the land , thi s ru le of pr op e rt y ha s lon g be e n the e sta

bli sh e d r ule in Te xas. ” ); Sc ott , 959 S.W .2d at 721-22. The adver sity element r equire d to establish a pres criptive11

ease ment is the same re quired to prove adver se possession. Id . at 722. I t require s that a cla imant
mus t ha ve a sse rt e d a

“ c la im o f right” in th e land in q ue sti on fo r t he re qu isi te pe ri od . T hat is , the claimant must intend to obtain a per manent rig ht to do what the claimant i s d o i n g on the other pe rson’s land. See E llis v. Jansing , 620 S.W .2d 569, 571 -7 2 (T ex . 1981). This “doe s not require an intention to dispossess the rightf ul owner, or

even know

there is one.” See M

inh Thu T ran v. Mac ha , 2 13 S .W .3 d 9 13 , 9 15 (T e x. 20 06 ) ( pe r c ur iam) . Wh a t it do e s r e qu ir e is i nte nt t o perma nently appropr iate the r ight in the land “ as one’ s own to the exclusion of all others; ‘[m] ere occupa ncy of land without any

intention to appr opriate it will not suppor t the statute of limitations.’” Id. (q u o t i n g El lis , 6 2 0 S
. W
. 2 d at 5 7 1 (q u o t i n g W

right v. Vernon Compress Co. , 296 S.W .3d 517, 522 (Tex. 1956))). F or example, possessing or using proper ty in the mistaken beli ef t h at one owns or ha s a ri g ht i n it wi ll n ot g ive ri se to p re sc ri pti on if un a c c omp anie d b y

int e nt t o a

pp ro pr ia te that r ig ht. Se e El lis , 620 S.W .2d at 571-72 (no evidence of adverse possession where c laimant’s pre dece ssor possessed s trip of neig hbor’s prope rty but “neve r cla imed or intended to c laim any proper ty other than that desc ribed in his deed, or what he thoug ht was conta ined in his de ed, and he never intended to claim any

proper ty owned by

the abutting proper

ty owner s”). The claim of rig ht must also be “hostile,” or one whose outward manifestations ar e of such nature and cha

rac ter a s to notify

the true ow ner that the claimant is asser ting a claim in the land inconsistent with the claims of the owner. Se e Sc ott , 959 S.W .2d at 722. “As this Court has stated, there must be a distinct

and positive assertion of a rig ht which is broug ht to the servient owne r’s attention and which is hostile to the owner ’s rig hts.” Id. (c i t i n g W iegand v. Riojas , 547 S.W .2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1977, no writ)).12 On e imp lic a tio n of the se pr inc ipl e s is the lon g sta nd ing ru le that “ the us e by e xpre ss or impl i ed p er m i ssion or license, no matter how long continued, ca

nnot ripen into an ea sement b y p re scription.” Vrazel v. Sk rabanek, 7 2 5 S
. W
. 2 d

7 0 9 , 7 1 1 (T ex . 1 9 8 7 ) ( ci t i n g O th e n v . R o s ier , 226 S.W .2d 622, 626 (Tex. 1950)). When the original use of the land in controve rsy is permissive, it is presumed that the continued use there of is also permissive in the abse nce of notice to the true
owner o f t h e claimant’s repudiation of the permissive use a nd asser tion of an adve rse c laim. See Commander v. W

inkler , 6 7 S. W.3 d 26 5, 27 0 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 20 01 , pe t. d e nie d) ; se e als o S c ott , 959 S.W .2d at 722-2 3 (r ec o gn i z i n g t h at “i n d ep en d en tac t s t o s h o w a d v er s i t y ” b ey o n d m er e c ontinued use of r oad could “ transfor m permissive use” of

road “ into an adver se use” ). The district cour

t hear d evidenc e that was leg ally and fac tually sufficie nt to support its failure to find that the W erc hans m et t he adversity and exclusivity

elements of the ir presc riptiveease ment claim. Much of the evidenc e wa s to the eff ect that, over the y ear s, the Wercha ns relied on wh a t th e y pe rc e ive d to be a rig ht to use the Park in c omm on

wi th o the r L a ke wo od

Es ta te s p ro pe rt

y
owner s—not, a s t h e W erc hans must prove, that they intended to per

manently appropr iate, for their exclusive, persona l use, t he portions of t he P ark where they have moored their doc k and er ecte d their ele ctric pole
.

Mary Ann We rc ha

n te sti fi e d th a t w he n th e Wer c ha ns fi rs t pu

rc ha se d a lot in L akew ood Estates i n 1971, they “thoug ht we saw in those restric tions that we’ d have a perma nent use of the pa

rk.” She w as then immediately asked a bout the first dock they attache d to the Park later that y ear , and testified that the Wer chans “ [a] bsolutely ” thoug ht they wer e entitled to place the dock the re . B oth

Mary Ann a nd Pa ul We rc ha

n tes tif ie d tha t the Wer c ha

ns did no t the re a ft e r c omm un ic a te13

wi th L a ke wo od

Es ta te s’ de ve lop e r o r his he ir s, wh o the n h a d ti tle to t he Park , b e fo re moo ri ngthe ir second doc k in 1979 and er ectingthe elec tric pole in 1980.

Al tho ug h r e pe a te dly

qu est io ne d at tr ia l bo th b y c ouns e l and

the dis tr ic t c ourt , Ms. We r c h an c o u ld n o t r e c a ll an y in s ta n c e in w h ic h th e We r c h an s to ld an y o n e , p r io r to the 2006 onset of li tigation, that they wer e claiming a persona l ease ment in the Park. Ther e wa s also evidenc e that when the Wercha

ns attended the 2000 and 2005 L EA mee tings at which the propose d dock rule s
wer e discussed, the objections voiced by Paul Werchan did not include a claim t hat the Werc hans had an e aseme nt in the Park permitting the m to continue using the proper ty in the same man n er. Ms. Wercha

n rec ounted t hat t hey told L EA “they do not have the r ight to do that, to cha rg e us fe es
and a ll of that be c a

us e we we re tol d we ha d pe rm ane nt us e of the wate rf ro nt. An d pe rm ane nt is perma nent, as fa

r as we wer e conc erne d.” Other attendee s tes t i fi ed that Paul’s conc erns in 2000
wer e limited to a notice issue—he c laimed the boar d h ad failed to mail not ice of the dock r

ules discussion to the Wercha

ns (deliber ately , he sugg ested at trial)—and that his conc erns in 2005 we re limit ed to his objections to paying the fee
.

The Werc hans empha siz e what they term “two a

bsolute demarc ation points where the Wer c ha

ns ’ a nd the se rv ie nt e state ow ne r’ s ri ghts cam e to a he a d a nd the la tte r b e c a me fu lly
awa re of the c la ims ma de by

the L a ke wo od

Es ta te s p ro pe rt

y own ers , inc lud ingthe Wer c ha ns , re g ard ingthe ir

e xistin g ri ght to us e the Park .” Th e fi rs t oc c ur re d in the 19 80 s. Joe T . G ibb s, the or ig ina l de ve lop e r o f L a ke wo od Es ta te s, die d in 1971
. F oll ow ing the de a th o f G ibb s’ s w if e in Fe bruar y 198 3 , Gi b b s ’s son, Dr. Joe T. Gibbs, J r., who a ppare ntly desired to build a house there , beg an asse rting a cla im to the Park, taking the positi on that any rig hts in the Park confe rre d by14

para gra p h 1 4 o f t h e 1948 R estrictions had ter minated in 1973. Dr. Gibbs and his wife attended a POP A m e e tin g in O c tob e r 1 98 3 at w hic h M ary Ann We rc ha

n, a s PO PA s e c re tary , to ok no te s. A c c o r d i n g t o M s . W e r c h an ’ s n o t e s , “ T h e y w e r e t r yi n g t o m a k e a c l a i m t o t h e p ar k , an d a p p ar e n t l y, the y we re c omi ngthe re to t

ry to g ive a his tor

y and make the ir c la im to the As so c ia tio n. ” Th e POP A bo ard a pp oin te d a

c omm itt e e to s tud

y the ma tte r, and

the POP A b oard mee ti ng minut e s r e fl e c t a
se ri e s o f m e e tin g s in

wh ic h th e bo ard

a sse sse d it s le g a l op tio ns . A t a F e b r u ar y 1 9 8 5 me e ti n g , L a k e w o o d E s tate s p r o p e rty o w n e r s v o te d

to a u th o r iz e P O P A ’ s p r e s i d e n t , E u g e n e R
. W i s s e n , t o s i g n an d f i l e an a f f i d a v i t o n t h e i r b e h a l f

. W i s s e n d id s o in 1 98 5. Wiss e n ave rr e d, in r e le va nt p art :
Iand other

purcha sers of lots in L akew ood Estates purc hased a nd took possession of su c h lo ts i n r e lia

nc e up on the Plat . .
. and ma de e xpe ns ive , e xten siv e , a nd va lua ble improvements to such lots in reliance there on and with full knowledg e of Joe T. Gibbs and his family
. As a re sult of the fore g oing, I and other o wn er s of lots in L akew ood Estates have used and uti li ze d

th e Ro a d s an d

th e Pa r k s h o w no nth e Pl a t c o n ti n u o u s ly s inc e a c qu ir ingsu c h lo ts. Spe c if ic a lly , the Park ha s be e n u se d f or the fo llo wi ngpurp os e s: Family reunions and othe r family outings; picnics; mee ti n g s of the L akew ood Property Owner s Protective Association; company functions; mooring of docks and a c c e ss t o d oc ks , f

ish ing , a nd oth e r g e ne ra l r e c re a tio na l us e s. Acc ording ly , Iand all o ther lot owner s in L akew ood Estates have claims and do here by claim ea sements appur t enant to our respec tive lots to ut iliz e the Roads f or ing r e s s an d

e g r e s s an d

to u ti li ze th e Pa

r k f o r r e c r e a ti o n a l p u r

p o s e s an d th e normal uses associated with Park land.
Th e re a ft e r, the ma tte r w a s n ot r e so lve d unti l July 19 95 , w he n D r. Gi bb s’ s so n a nd he ir ultimate ly convey ed the Par

k to L EA.15 The Werc hans’ se cond “a bs o l u t e p oint of demarc ation” is an a rticle in a September 1995 L EA new sletter discussing “What to Do About Docks a nd Park,” incl u d ing the “nee d to take for

mal action to control their pr operty , to prec lude any action in the future about proper ty owner s’ claims or pr ior rig hts of use.” The Wercha ns view this article a s evidenc e that L EA was on notice of their pr ior use and the potential that its property rig hts were being app ro p ri at ed. Although the se fa cts may

be probative of whe ther the G ib b s family or L EA had notice of potentially

adver se cla ims in t he Park, the y do not nece ssarily

tend to prove that the Wercha ns
we re in f a c t a sse rt ing a c la im of ri g ht that c ou ld r ipe n in to t he pr e sc ri pti ve e a se me nt t hat th e y c la im here . The presc riptive ease ment that the Wercha ns now claim would entitle them to exclusive and
un imp e de d us e of the po rt ion s of the Park wh e re the ir do c k’ s mo or ingc a

ble s are a tta c he d a

nd the ir elec tric pole stands. The Wis sen af fidavit, like Mary

Ann Wercha

n’s testimony , tends to show that the Wer c ha

ns we re ins te a d a sse rt ing a c la im to use the Park in c omm on wi th o the r r e sid e nts . T his is n ot t he int e nti on

to a pp ro pr ia te the us e of

pr op e rt y a s one ’s ow n “ to t

he e xclu sio n o f a ll o the rs ”
nece ssary to “support the statute of limitations.” Minh Thu Tran , 2 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d at 9 1 5 (q u o t i n g El lis , 6 2 0 S
. W
. 2 d

at 5 7 1 (q u o t i n g W

right , 296 S.W .3d at 522)). Additionally , L EA pre sented e vidence

— albeit hotly disputed—that dock owne rs
moo re d at th e Park

a c c e de d to a

re g ime in wh ic h POPA re str ic te d use of the Park so le ly to i ts d ue spaying me mbers. This included the te stimony of Mar lene Va

n Rens, a resident of

L akew ood Estates since 1978 who, like Ma ry Ann Wercha

n, serve d as a POPA off ice r. Ms. Van Rens re counted that she purc hased a

dock ar ound 1980 from one of the Wercha ns’ orig inal co-ow ners in their doc k, B.E. Williams. According t o Van Rens, Park acc ess was limited solely to POPA dues-paying16

me mbe rs , a ll d oc k o wn e rs pa id P OPA du e s, and that it wa s POP A that “ a llo we d the m to pu t th e ir dock there .” I n fac t, V an Rens added, B.E. Wil liams, the Werchans’ co-ow ner in their doc k, play ed
an ac tive role in enf

orcingthe re strictions. Si milarly , J err y Rankin, a former L EA president, testified that all of the doc ks on the Park betwe en 1995 to 2000 wer e ther e with L EA’s pe rmission.

Mary Ann Wercha

n, on the other ha

nd, den ie d

th a t POPA ever soug ht to ex clude nonmembers (as oppos ed to non-prope rty owner s) from the P ark, although she acknow ledg ed that L EA undertook such e ffor

ts (to her disli ke) in the l ate 1990s. Howeve r, consist ent with the exist ence of the re g ime Va

n Ren s des c ri be d, the Wer c ha ns and e a c h o f t

he ir do c k c o- ow ne rs in 1 97 9 w e re POP A dues-pa y ing me mbers. F u

r th e r mo r e, as note d, the Wercha ns were dues-pa

y ing POPA member s eac h y ear betwee n 1971 and 1993, and pa id dues to L EA ea ch y ear from 1997 to 2006. Fr om this evidence, the district court re asonably could h av e found that the Wer c ha ns —o r at le a st the ir

do c k c o- ow ne rs wh os e int e re sts the y no w o wn —yie lde d to the a

uth or ity claimed by

POPA to require POPA membership in order to attach docks a nd otherwise use the Park. Although the Wercha

ns question how POPA would have possesse d any leg itimate authority

to do so, evidenc e that dock ow ners none theless ac cede d to that reg ime is further e vidence that the Wercha ns were not asserting the sort of unqua lified claim of a n exclusive right in Park pr operty that could ripen into the pre scriptive ea sement they now claim. See id. We hold that the evidenc e does not c onclusively establish the elemen t s o f t he Wer c ha ns ’ p re sc ri pti ve e a se me nt c la im, no r i s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fai lu re to f ind tho se e le me nts
a g a ins t th e gr e a t w e ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in
re nd e ri ngjud g me nt t

hat th e Wer c ha

ns take no thi ngon

thi s c la im.17

Expr e ss e as e m e nt

Altho u gh o u r h o l d i n g co n ce rn i n g t h e W er ch an s ’ pre scriptive ea sement cla im resolves the controve rsy

conce rning whether

they have r ights to continue mooring their dock and maintaining their ele ctric pole in the P ark, the parties also prese nt a broader dispute conce rning the district court’s judgme nt that the Wercha ns “have neither a

fee interest nor an ease ment interest of any type in or to any portion of

the [Par k]” and that “ anyrig hts claimed by the Wercha ns under Par ag raph 14 of t h e R e s t r i c t i o n s ”

—

w h i c h ar e n o tl i m i t e d

t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r

d o c k m o o r i n g s an d

e le c tr ic pole—“ter

minated alongwith the Restrictions as a whole on J une 1, 1973.” (Emphasis added.) The
rec o rd re fl ects that, in addition to their spec ific dispute re g ardingthe Wercha ns’ dock, the pa

rties contest whe ther, in lig ht of the Restric t i o n s , L EA has the pow er to e x clude the Wer chans f rom the Park e nti re ly if the y are no t du e s- pa

y ingme mbe rs of

the or g ani z ati on . Acco rd ing ly , w e mus t addre ss both issues. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1.

The L akew ood Estates subdivision was orig inally develope d in the 1940s by J oe T. Gibbs, Sr
. , fr o m ap p rox imately 107.9 acr es of land he owned. Gibbs filed the orig inal plat in the Travis County rea l pr operty rec ords in 1947. This plat subdivided the land into 145 lots, dedicated
sever al ro ad s t o t h e public, and, a s noted, desig nated a strip of land fr onting L ake T ravis as “Park” —the Park at issue here
. I n 1948, Gibbs, as the sole owne r of L akew ood Estates, re corde d the “Restrictions.” The “ Restrictions” consisted of f ifteen numbe red pa

ragraphs. The first twelve para g raphs contained restric tive covena nts addressingsuch matters a s use of the lots, spac ing a nd siz e of struc tures, and utility ease ments. Howeve r, par ag raph 14 of the “Restric tions” provided:See, e .g. , W ebster’s Third New International Dictionary 1683 (1986). 7 18 I t is e xpre ssl y

sti pu la te d th a t a ll p ur c ha se rs and ow ne rs of

tr a c ts i n L a ke wo od

Es ta te shall have pe rmane nt us e o f t h e wa terfr ont park a nd roads in L akew ood Estate, as shown on rec orded plat of said additi on. These roads and water front par k are for the benef it a n d u s e o f o w n e r s o f

p r o p e rty in L a k e w o o d

E s tate , an d

th e o w n e r s of proper ty in subsequent additions to, and of L akew ood Estate.
Be low this, para g raph 15, the concluding parag raph, stated, “The se re strictions shall remain in forc e and shall re main eff

ective until J une 1st, A.D. 1973.” The pa rties dispute the proper construction of para g raph 14 vis-a-vis para g raph 15. The Werc h an s emphasize that para g raph 14 g rante d “ permane nt

use of the w ater front par k and
ro a ds in L a ke wo od

Es ta te s. ” “ Pe rm ane nt, ” the y su g g e st, c iti ngdic tio na

ry de fi nit ion s, or din a ri ly de no te s “e xistin g pe rp e tua lly ,” “ e ve rl a sti ng ,” “ int e nd e d to e xist f or a lon g , in de fi nit e pe ri od

of tim e wi t h o u tre gar d

t o u n f o r e s e e a b l e c o n d i t i o n s , ” o r “ l o n g-l as t i n g o r n o n fa d i n g” —in oth e r w or ds , 7 not terminating . As for the termination lang uag e in par ag raph 15, the Wercha ns sugges t t h at the provision refe rs to “[t] hese r estrictions” (a small “ r” g ener ic ref ere nce to thing s that restric t), not “the R e str ic tio ns ” (t

he c a pit a lize d tit le of

the ins tr ume nt) . G ibb s’ s c ho ic e no t to c a pit a lize “ re str ic tio ns ” in para g raph 15, the y

urg e, indi ca tes that he wa s ref err ing only

to provisions of “the R e str ic tio ns ” that actua lly

res t ri ct u s e of lots, i.e., the r estrictive c ovenants found in pa rag raphs 1- 12. They distinguish para g raph 14 a s a “g rant,” not a “r estriction.”

Fur ther c onfirming that para g raph 15 w as not intended to terminate ever y para g raph of the Re str ic tio ns , th e Wer c ha ns su g g e st, is p ara g ra

ph13 of the Re str ic tio ns , w hic h s ta te s:19

I t is ex pressly

stipulate d that all trac ts that are be low the 715 contour line, or any pa rt s o f s a id tr a c ts be low the 71 5 c on tou r lin e , are so ld su

bje c t to an e a se me nt h e ld by the L ow e r C olo ra do Riv e r Auth or ity fo r t he purp os e of

imp ou nd ingwate r. Th is e a se me nt i s r e se rv e d b y

the L ow e r C olo ra do Riv e r Auth or ity to pr e ve nt a

ny lia bil ity on the par t of said authority

in the event of

excessive hig h water
. The Werc hans obs er v e that the Restric tions’ termination could not, by its own force , cause the L CRA easeme nt refe renc ed in par ag raph 13 to ter minate. Ba sed o n t h i s construction of the Restrictions, the Wercha ns conclude that pa ragraph 14 wa s n ot w ith in t he “ re str ic tio ns ” te rm inate d b y pa ra g ra ph15 of the Re str ic tio ns in 19 73 . In th e a lte rn a tiv e , the Wer c ha ns c on te nd that if

pa ra g ra ph14 and 15 ir re c on c ila bly c on fl ic t, para g raph 14, a s a g rant, must preva il over par ag raph 15. See A lford v . Krum , 671 S.W .2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Luc k e l v . W hit e , 8 19 S.W .2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (whe re provisions within a deed a re inc onsistent, court should give ef fec t to the “controlling lang uag e of the deed and not a llow a

mbiguities to de stroy the key expression of intent inc luded withi n t h e d eed’s te rm s” ). I n t h e f

u rt h e r a l t e r

n a t i v e , t h e W e r c h an s u r g e t h a t i f t h e R e s t r i c t i o n s ar e a m b i g u o u s a s to whether para g raph 14 w as terminate d under pa rag raph 15, a ll of the extrinsi c evidence of Gibbs’s intent presente d at trial indicate d that he intended to g rant L akew ood Es t ates prope rty owner s
a pe rm ane nt ea se me nt al low ing “ us e of the wate rf ro nt park .” I n an y c a se , the Wer c ha ns ur g e , th e ir “per manent” r ight to use the Park as L akew ood Estates l ot owner s never terminated. L EA is subject to p ara g ra

ph14 , th e Wer c ha

ns add , becaus e the ir

19 95 de e d to the Park

is e xpre ssl y

su bje c t to “ea sements, right-of-w ay s and pre script i v e r i gh t s ” a n d “a l l p re s en t l y

re co rd edi n s t ru m en t s , o t h er than liens and conve y ance s, that aff ect the pr operty .”20 L EA re sponds that para g raph 15 unambig uously means that all rig hts or limit ations included wi t h i n t he Restrictions terminate d on J une 1, 1973. To g ive ef fec t to parag raph 15, L EA re asons, “permane nt” as used i n para g raph 14 must nece ssarily mean only “for the entire life of the re strictions.” I t finds support for this view in par ag raph 8, w hich contains a rac ially restric tive
covena nt—unenforc eable today —providing that L akew ood Estates lots shall “neve r be sold, le a se d, or tr ans fe rr e d” to any on e oth e r tha n Ca uc a sia ns . “ Th ou g h the te rm ‘never’ s uggest s pe rp e tui ty ,” L EA ur g e s, “ Para g ra ph 8 is un argua

bly a us e re str ic tio n and so su bj ect to auto ma tic te rm inatio n und e r P ara g ra ph15 e ve n und er th e Ap pe lla nts ’ a na ly sis .” Thus , L EAc on c lud e s, any rig hts the Werchans w ould have possesse d under the para g raph 14 of the Restrictions terminated on J une 1, 1973.

Our disposition of these conte ntions, as the W er chans acknowle dg e, is controlled by the principles g overningconstruction of r estrictive covenants—the g ener al rules of contra ct construction. Pilarcik v. Em mons , 9 66 S.W. 2d 47 4, 47 8 ( Te x. 19 98 ); Owens v. Ouse y , 241 S.W .3d 124, 129 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). I n construing a re strictive cove nant, a c ourt’s p ri m ary task is to determine the intent of the framers. W ilmoth v. W

ilcox , 7 3 4 S. W. 2 d

6 5 6 , 6 58 (Tex
. 1 9 8 7 ). The languag e will be g iven its plain gr ammatical, or dinary and commonly

acc epted
me anin g , in te rp re te d with in the c on te xt of the e nti re ins tr ume nt. Travis Heights Improve ment Ass’n

v . S ma ll , 662 S.W .2d 406, 409 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ). W e must construe r estrictive
covena nts as a whole, g ive ef fec t to every

sentenc e, cla

use, and w ord of a

covena nt, and avoid construc tions that would render parts of the covena

nts superfluous or inoper ative. Se e City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W .3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)
. “L ike a c ontrac t, covena nts areC. Edward G ood, A Grammar Book 133-35 (2002)
. 8 21 unambig uous as a matter of law if the y can be g iven a de finite or ce rtain leg al meaning .” Pi larc ik, 96 6 S. W.2 d at 47 8 ( qu otatio ns omi tte d) . “ On the ot her han d, if

the c ov e na

nts are su sc e pti ble to
more than one rea sonable interpre tation, they are ambig uous.” Id. Whether a c ovenant is ambig uous and, if not, its leg al meaningprese n t q u es tions of law that we r eview de novo. Id. ; Owens , 241 S.W .3d at 129.

Ap ply ingthe se pr inc ipl e s, we c on c lu de th a t th e Re str ic tio ns un a mbi g uo us ly provide th at all of their pr ovisions—including par ag raph 14—w ould terminate on June 1, 1973. A l t h o u g h G i b b s d i d n o t c a p i t a l i z e t h e “ r e s t r i c t i o n s ” t h a t ar e t o t e r m i n a t e u n d e r p ar a g r a

p h 1 5 , i t is nonetheless sig nificant that (1) Gibbs used “r estrictions”—a term cor respondingto the title of the instrument—and not a more limit ing refe renc e to particula r provisi ons within the i nstrument, like “re strictive cove nants” or “ para g raphs 1- 12”; (2 ) Gibbs used “ The se re str ic tio ns ” —“ the se ” is a de mon str a tiv e pr on oun d e no tin g a c los e sp a c ia l or te mpo ra l re la tio ns hip to “ re str ic tio ns ” —and not 8
more re mote alternat i v es l ike “the” restric tions or “any” re strictions; and (3) pa rag raph 15 is the
c on c lud ingpa

ra g ra phfo r t he e nti re “ Re str ic tio ns ,” fo llo wi ng no t on ly the re str ic tiv e c ov e na

nts in para g ra p h s 1 -1 2 , b ut also para g raph 14. G iven these c hoices of w ording and the struc ture a nd order ing of the provisions, w e conclude that “The se re strictions” in para g raph 15 ma nifests intent to inc lud e a ll of the pr ov isi on s of the Re str ic tio ns , inc lud ing the pa ra g ra ph 14 th at imme diate ly prec edes it. Contrary

to the Wercha

ns’ ar g ument, this construction of par ag raph 15 doe s not imply that the Restrictions purport to te rminate the L CRA easeme nt refe renc ed in par ag raph 13. A sTh e c on c ur re nc e su g g e sts that pa

ra g ra ph14 ’s pr ov iso that L a ke wo od Es ta tes pr op e rt

y 9 ow ne rs “ sh a ll h a ve pe rm ane nt u se of the wate rf

ro nt p ark and ro a ds in L a ke wo od Es ta te s” is s imi larl y a dv iso ry be c a us e bo th t he Park and the ro a ds a

pp e ar o n th e re c or de d plat
. I t is tr ue that th e plat, a s n ote d, de sig nate d th e ro a ds and de dic a te d th e m to the pu bli c . H ow e ve r, wh ile the plat a lso desig nated a

“Park” in the L akew ood Estates subdivision where house s and roa ds would not be c on str uc te d, the Wer c ha

ns have no t c on te nd e d th a t th e plat in de pe nd e ntl y g ra nte d th e m a

ri g ht t o u se the Park. I nstead, they have relied solely on the 1948 Restrictions, w hich, we c onclude, ter minated under pa rag raph 15. 22 the Wercha

ns acknow ledg e in their br i ef, pa rag raph 13 me rely

“advise s the potential owner of a lot that the L ower

Colorado River Authority (L CRA) has a flood ease ment up to the 715 foot contour line.” Thus, while pe rhaps r einforc ing that not all parag raphs of the “Restrictions” contained small-r
re str i c t i o n s , p ar a g r a

p h 1 3 d i d n o t p u r

p o rt t o c r e at e t h e L C RA e a s e m e n t t o w h i c h i tre fe rs . Con se qu e nt ly , parag ra

ph13 ’s te rm inatio n und e r p ara g ra ph15 wo uld

no t im pa c t th e L CRA
ease ment itself. 9

Although para graph 14 doe s purport to g rant “ perma nent” use of the Park, w e
c an n o t r e a d th a t te r

m in isolation. See O wens , 2 41 S.W. 3d a t 13 0. “ Pe rm ane nt, ” lik e “ ne ve r” in para g raph 8, must be c o n strued in context with parag raph 15. Tog ether , para g raphs 14 a nd 15
manif e st i nte nt t

hat L a ke wo od

Es ta te s lo t ow ne rs wo uld have “ pe rm ane nt” or un in terru pte d u se of the Park a s long a s the Restrictions were in effe ct. We addre ssed a similar issue in Owens
. See Owens , 2 41 S.W. 3d a t 12 9- 31
. Ap pe lle e s, ne ig hb or ing land ow ne rs to t he Ow e ns e s, argue d th a t a restric tive covena

nt provision permitting alter ations or amendme nts “at any time” authorized them to “ame nd ” c ov e na

nts that ha d p re vio us ly

e xpir e d u

nd e r a no the r p ro vis ion

statin g the c ov e na

nts “shall be in full for ce a

nd eff ect f or a pe riod o f t we n t y -five y ear s.” See id. at 130. Althoug h we
a g re e d th a t “ a t any

tim e ,” if re a d li te ra lly and

in i so la tio n, mig ht h a ve a uth or ize d a

pp e lle e s’23

“ a me ndme nt, ” we he ld t hat c on str

uc tio n “ is i nc on sis tent

wi th t he de e d r e str ic tio ns a s a wh ole and rende rs the expli cit 25-y ear term super fluous.” Id. “Rea d in its proper conte x t,” we c oncluded, “the pr ovision necessa

rily means that t h e re s t ri ctions may be ame nded ‘at any

time’ while they
rema in in effe ct.” Id. Si mi la r ly , w e mu s t c o n s tr

u e p ar a g r a

p h 1 4 ’ s “ p e r

ma n e n t” g r an t i nth e c o n te xt of p ar a g r a

p h 1 5 , an d w e c an n o t a

p p ly a c o n s tr

u c ti o n o f th e f

o r me r th a t w o u ld n e g a te the latter’ s provision gove rning how long “[t] hese r estrictions” will rema in in effe ct. See id.

We hold that any

rig hts the Werchans posse ssed under para g raph 14 te rminated, along with the rest of the Restrictions, on J une 1, 1973. Consequently , the district court did not
err in rende ring a judg ment decla ration to that eff

ect. I n light of this holding, we do not rea ch the Wercha ns’ conting ent sec ond issue reg ardingL EA’s a dverse possession.
CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: August 21, 2009