alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 21.1**

**Subsidiariesof Registrant**

| Name of Subsidiary                  | ** ** | ** **                      | ** ** | **Jurisdiction of Incorporation** |
|-------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------|
| Verigy (Canada) Inc.                |       | Canada                          |
| Verigy Germany GmbH                 |       | Germany                         |
| Verigy Italia S.r.L.                |       | Italy                           |
| Verigy (Japan) K.K.                 |       | Japan                           |
| Verigy (Korea) Ltd.                 |       | South Korea                     |
| Verigy France SAS                   |       | France                          |
| Verigy (Malaysia) Sdn.  Bhd.        |       | Malaysia                        |
| Verigy (Netherlands)  B.V.          |       | The Netherlands                 |
| Verigy (Singapore) Pte.  Ltd.       |       | Singapore                       |
| Verigy US, Inc.                |       | Delaware                        |
| Verigy (US)  Development, Inc. |       | Delaware                        |
| Verigy (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.          |       | People’s Republic of China |

 

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Business
Objects S.A. Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statements of Income and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         176,233
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   55,643
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,650
<INVENTORY>                                        153
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               244,173
<PP&E>                                          33,387
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,556
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 272,546
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          105,569
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         3,522
<OTHER-SE>                                     160,531
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   272,546
<SALES>                                        241,643
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               241,643
<CGS>                                           39,764
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,764
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               164,387
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (3,063)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 40,593
<INCOME-TAX>                                    16,813
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             16,813
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,780
<EPS-BASIC>                                      $0.66
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.60


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 205 (Wednesday, October 25, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 49425]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-23274]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME AND DATE: 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, November 15, 2017.

PLACE: NTSB Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza SW., Washington, DC 
20594.

STATUS: The one item is open to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: National Transportation Safety Board 2017-
2018 Most Wanted List mid-point progress report meeting.

NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: Telephone: (202) 314-6100.
    The press and public may enter the NTSB Conference Center 30 
minutes prior to the meeting for set up and seating.

FOR MEDIA INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher O'Neil at (202) 314-6100 or 
by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c5a6adb7acb6b1aab5ada0b7ebaaaba0aca985abb1b6a7eba2aab3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="187b706a716b6c7768707d6a3677767d717458766c6b7a367f776e">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Individuals requesting specific accommodations should contact 
Rochelle McCallister at (202) 314-6305 or by email at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d183beb2b9b4bdbdb4ff9cb292b0bdbdb8a2a5b4a391bfa5a2b3ffb6bea7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="386a575b505d54545d16755b7b595454514b4c5d4a78564c4b5a165f574e">[email protected]</span></a> by Wednesday, November 8, 2017.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Nicholas Worrell at (202) 314-6608 or 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#86f5e7e0e3f2ffe7e2f0e9e5e7e5ffc6e8f2f5e4a8e1e9f0"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2655474043525f474250494547455f664852554408414950">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Issued: October 23, 2017.
Candi R. Bing,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2017-23274 Filed 10-23-17; 11:15 am]
 BILLING CODE 7533-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
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### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03-0 7 -00 226 -CV Sue Co ok , A ppe lla nt v. Trinity Universal Ins urance Com pany , Appellee F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-03- 0006 80 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

ME MO R

A ND UMO P I N I O N Ap p el l ant Sue Cook filed a motion reque sting that he r appe al be dismissed. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 42 .1 (a)( 1) . We g ra nt t he mot ion

and dis mis s th e a

pp e a l.

_____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________ Diane H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Puryear and He nson Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: May

29, 2007
#### Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Respondent, v New York State Office *837of Mental Health et al., Appellants.

[666 NYS2d 351]

Spain, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.), entered November 8, 1996 in Albany County, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction.

In July 1996 plaintiff, asserting that defendants failed to give timely notice of “significant service reductions” at Hudson River Psychiatric Center in Dutchess County as required by Mental Hygiene Law § 7.17 (e) (3), commenced this action seeking to enjoin defendants from any further service reductions and moved for a preliminary injunction. Defendants cross-moved to dismiss the complaint. Supreme Court denied defendants’ cross motion in its entirety and granted plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants appeal.

We affirm. In our view, Mental Hygiene Law § 7.17 (e) (3) does not bar the issuance of a preliminary injunction where defendants are implementing a “significant service reduction” without providing the 12-month notice mandated by the statute (see, *Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v New York State Off. of Mental Health,*244 AD2d 206; *Shea v New York State Off. of Mental Health,*233 AD2d 925).

We also conclude that plaintiff has made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm to its members (see, CPLR 6301; *Grant v New York State Off. of Mental Health,*169 Misc 2d 896). Supreme Court properly rejected defendants’ contention that the 1991 and 1993 plans published pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 5.07 fulfilled the notice requirements of Mental Hygiene Law § 7.17 (e) (3).

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Casey and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           9,573
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,045,186
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (20,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    713,063
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,065,627
<PP&E>                                         139,988
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (20,671)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,756,826
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,107,254
<BONDS>                                        650,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         88
<COMMON>                                         9,829
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,989,656
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,756,826
<SALES>                                      1,420,939
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,357,938
<CGS>                                          337,870
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,160,121
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (159,182)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (14,625)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (311,936)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    74,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (237,936)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (237,936)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.026)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.023)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Jessie BLOOMFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-4394.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 18, 2013.

Decided: Dec. 4, 2013.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Par-ham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Jessie Bloomfield appeals the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a four-month sentence with no further term of supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether Bloomfield’s revocation sentence is reasonable. Because Bloomfield’s appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.

*316Bloomfield’s present term of supervised release began in September 2012. In March 2013, the probation officer petitioned the court for an arrest warrant, alleging that Bloomfield had violated several terms of his supervised release. After Bloomfield admitted to violating these terms of his supervised release, the court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment, but did not impose an additional term of supervised release.

During the pendency of this appeal, Bloomfield was released from imprisonment. Accordingly, his argument challenging the reasonableness of his revocation sentence is moot. *See United States v. Hardy,*545 F.3d 280, 282-85 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that, when defendant is no longer serving revocation sentence and no additional term of supervised release is imposed, appeal is moot); *Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap,*290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir.2002) (whether this court is “presented with a live case or controversy is a question [the court] may raise *sua sponte*since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In accordance with *Anders,*we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. This court requires that counsel inform Bloomfield, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Bloomfield requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Bloomfield.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3529 

To amend the Small Business Act to increase the maximum loan amount 

under the Express Loan Program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 31, 2009 

Mr. WELCH (for himself, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. MASSA, Ms. BORDALLO, and Ms. 

PINGREE of Maine) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Small Business 

A BILL 

To amend the Small Business Act to increase the maximum 

loan amount under the Express Loan Program, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INCREASE OF MAXIMUM LOAN AMOUNT UNDER 

4 EXPRESS LOAN PROGRAM. 

5 Section 7(a)(31)(D) of the Small Business Act (15 

6 U.S.C. 636(a)(31)(D)) is amended by striking 

7 ‘‘$350,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000’’. 

Æ 


PWALKER on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
#### Mark MILLER, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Jackie CRAWFORD; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 05-15829.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*669Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 2, 2008.

Mark Miller, Ely, NV, pro se.

Kelly S. Werth, Esq., Edward L. Oueilhe, Esq., Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, NV, Paul J. Anderson, Esq., Walther Key Maupin Oats Cox & Legoy, LLP, Reno, NV, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

Mark Miller, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials and medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary judgment. *Boston Mut. Ins. v. Murphree,*242 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir.2001). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, *Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t of Revenue,*176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1999), and the denial of appointment of counsel, *Terrell v. Brewer,*935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.1991). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Miller’s “motion to supplement complaint” because the addition of new claims and new defendants would have caused additional prejudice to the existing defendants and would have caused undue delay. *See Yakama Indian Nation,*176 F.3d at 1246.

In Miller’s prior preliminary injunction appeal, we concluded that he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. *Miller v. Crawford,*No. 03-15916 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003) (memorandum). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to appoint counsel to represent Miller. *See Terrell,*935 F.2d at 1017 (holding that only under “exceptional circumstances” is appointment of counsel proper and that a finding of “exceptional circumstances” requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the merits and other factors).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Miller’s motion for appointment of medical experts because his action did not involve complex scientific evidence or issues. *See McKinney v. Anderson,*924 F.2d 1500, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991), *vacated on other grounds sub. nom., Helling v. McKinney,*502 U.S. 903, 112 S.Ct. 291, 116 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991).

Finally, the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment because Miller’s contentions regarding appropriate treatment of hepatitis B and C amounted to a difference of opinion between Miller and the physicians, which is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. *See Jackson v. McIntosh,*90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996). Further, Miller failed to submit evidence that he has active hepatitis B and requires treatment, or that *670the tests he undergoes are grossly inadequate.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 31

CERTIFICATION



I, Reed T. Buley, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Remediation Services, Inc.



2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;



4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and



c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and



6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Date: April 2, 2008



/s/  Reed T. Buley

Reed T. Buley

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose Guadalupe CAMACHO-ESPARZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50310

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jose Guadalupe Camacho-Esparza, El Reno, OK, pro se.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Jose Guadalupe Camacho-Esparza has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Camacho-Esparza has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7716

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v. ANTHONY A. BLAGROVE, a/k/a Tony, Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (2:95-cr-00052-RGD-1)

Submitted: January 19, 2010 Decided: January 27, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony A. Blagrove, Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Anthony A. Blagrove appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Blagrove , No. 2:95-cr-00052-RGD-1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009). We further deny Blagrove’s motion for documents in his brother’s district court case. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED