2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 2-1-2005 

# Duns muir v

. M a y D ept S t or es C o P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 04-1413

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . vi l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" Dun s m uir v

. M a y D e pt S t or e s C o " (2005). 2005 D e cisio n s . P ape r 1523. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/1523NOT PRECEDE NTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT Case No: 04-1413 WILLI AM DUNSMUIR, Appellant
v. MAY DEPART MENT STO RES CO MPANY

On a ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania Distri ct Court No. 3:CV-01-1891 District J udge: The H onorable Thom as I. Vanaskie, C.J.

Submitte d Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a) January21, 2005 Be for e: A LIT O, M cK EE , and SM ITH , Circuit Judges (Fil ed: February 1, 2005)
OPINI ON OF THE COURT
SM ITH , Circuit

Judge
. In a one count

complaint , Will iam Dunsmuir al leged that his former employ er, t he May Department St ores Company, wrongfullydischarged him in re tali ation f or pursui ng a clai m for workers’ c ompensation be nefit s after sustai ning an inj ury at thedist ribution facility where he worked. The D istri ct Court granted the May Department Stores’1 Th e D istrict Co urt h ad d iver sity juris dicti on p ursu ant to 28 U .S.C . § 13 32 ( a) ( 1) . We

exe rcise app ellate juris dicti on p ursu ant to 28 U .S.C . § 129 1. 2 summary j udgment motion. 1 We wil l a ffirm. Ou r rev iew of th e de nial o f a m otio n fo r sum ma ry judg me nt is p lena ry. Rivas v. City o f Pas saic , 365 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2004). We “apply the same st andard that the Distri ct Court s hould have appl ied. ” Abramson v. Will iam Paterson College of New Jersey , 260 F.3 d 26 5, 27 6 (3 d C ir. 20 01) . Dunsmuir, a mai ntenance engi neer at a May Department Stores di stribution facil ity , frac tured hi s right arm on May 23, 2000 when the top step of a s tepla dder broke while he was on it . He was treated that day at a localhospit al and vi sit ed the fol lowing
mo rning by two of h is supe riors, Er ic Fritz a nd R ick C heev ers. C heev ers alleg edly told Du nsm uir th at he did not wa nt D uns mu ir to p ursu e w ork ers’ c om pen satio n be nef its. Inste ad, Cheevers encouraged Dunsmuir to use his s ick and per sonal time. Dunsmuir was not rece ptive to this suggesti on. No tice ofthe fa ct that D unsm uir had been injured , how ever, h ad be en pr ovid ed to the East ern RegionalClaims Office for May Department St ores on the veryday he was injured. As a res ult, Dunsmuir recei ved workers’ c ompensation be nefit s effective the follow ing d ay, Ma y 24, 200 0. Th ose b enef its we re term inated upo n D unsm uir’s retu rn to work on June 26, 2000. Thereafter , Dunsmuir committed sever al safe tyviolat ions: repeat edlycrossi ng a
mo ving conv eyor system ; steppin g m om entarily up on a w heele d cart to eleva te him self to3

a m oto r on wh ich h e w as w ork ing ; and step pin g do wn ont o th e top step of a tall lad der
. He was discipl ined for t he firs t two viol ations and was discharged on February20, 2001, afte r the third vio latio n. Dunsm uir contends that he was wrongfully discharged in February2001 because he pu rsued and c ollected wo rkers’ c om pens ation b enef its for the injury he s ustaine d in May 2000. In Shick v. Shirey , 716 A .2d 12 31, 12 38 (P a. 199 8), the P enns ylvania Supreme Court hel d that a “cause of action exis ts under Pennsyl vania l aw for wrongful discharge of an employ ee who files a clai m for workers’ c ompensation be nefit s.” Although the Penns yl vania courts have y et to e numerate t he elements of this cause of acti on, sever al feder al dis tri ct court s in Pennsylvania have analogi zed thi s cause of act ion to a r etalia tory dis cha rge claim und er T itle V II. See Landmesser v. United Air Lines, I nc. , 102 F.Su pp.2d 273 , 277- 78 (E .D. P a. 200 0); see als o Christman v. Cigas Machine Shop, Inc. , 293 F .Sup p.2d 5 38, 54 3 (E.D . Pa. 20 03); Kennelly v. Pennsylvani a Turnpike Com m’n , 208 F.S upp . 2d 5 04, 5 17 ( E.D . Pa. 2 002 ). Th is ap pro ach is so und in o ur v iew
. Thus, an employ ee must est ablis h: (1) that heengaged in pr otect ed acti vity ; (2) that he suffered an a dverse employment acti on eithe r afte r or contemporaneous with t he protec ted ac tivity; and (3 ) that the re is a ca usal co nnec tion be twee n his p rotecte d activ ity and the e mp loyer’ s ad ver se a ction
. See Shell enberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc. , 318 F.3d 183 , 187 ( 3d C ir. 2003 ). If the e mp loyee is ab le to sho w th ese ele men ts, the bu rden shifts to th e em plo yer to a rticu late a legit ima te, no n-d iscrim inato ry reas on f or its actio n. Id. If4

the employ er satisfi es thi s burden, the employ ee may defeat summaryjudgment by discrediting the pro ffered rea son or ad ducing e vidence to demo nstrate that retaliatory anim us w as a mo tivat ing fac tor in the e mp loyer’ s de cisio n. Fue ntes v. P erskie , 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 199 4). Here, theDistri ct Court c oncluded: (1) that Dunsmuir had failed to establ ish the prima faci e element of

causati on; and (2) that, even if a prima faciecase had been dem onstra ted, D unsm uir had not d emo nstrated that M ay Dep artme nt Sto res’ leg itimate
non discrim inatory rea son f or disc harg ing h im w as pre textua l. We agree . With respe ct to the el ement of causat

ion, we fi nd it s ignifi cant, as the Dis tri ct Court poi nted out, that t he decisi on to terminate Dunsmuir was made by Stephe n Zirnhel d, theVice Presi dent of Distribution and manager of the di stribution fa cili ty , who had no knowledge of Duns mui r’ s previ ous re ceiptof wo rk er s’ comp ens atio n be nef it s. The n ot ic e t o the c la ims department

of Dunsmuir’s i njuryon the very day of hi s accide nt furt her attenuates any infere nce of causation between Dunsmuir’ s coll ecti on of benefit s and his s ubsequent termination. In li ght of the se circumstances, Cheevers’s statement nine months earl ier that Dunsmuir

should re frain from pursuing a worker s’ compensation claim was nothing
mo re th an a stray re ma rk th at is in suf ficie nt to sup por t a cla im o f ret aliato ry disc har ge. See Walden v. Georgi a-Pacif ic Corp. , 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 1997) (fi nding st ray remarks b y non-decisionm aker insuff icient to support an inference o f discrimination). We also agree wit

h the Dist

rict Court that

Dunsmuir fail ed to est ablis h that t he5

reason for

discharging him was pretextual . We recognizethat Dunsmuir ’s expert opined th at M ay D ep ar tm en t S to re s’ s af ety p ro gr am w as in ad eq ua te b ec au se it f ail ed to id en tif y,
eva luate and con trol s afe ty haz ard s an d to com mu nica te thi s inf orm ation to its e mp loyee s. In li ght of the se inadequa cies, the expert concl uded that Dunsmuir did not

violate any spe cific saf ety rule and that M ay D epa rtme nt S tore s w as to blam e fo r D uns mu ir’s a ction s. This concl usion, however, ignores that the evi dence est ablis hed that May Department Store s wa s con cerne d w ith safe ty at its distributio n cen ter and regu larly discus sed sa fety
conc erns w ith its staff . It is also un dispu ted tha t Du nsm uir com mitted the saf ety violatio ns fo r wh ich he wa s discip lined a nd th at his ac tions w ere a g enuin e risk to his well-bei ng. Thus, t

he expert ’s repor

t merel y chal lenges t

he wisdom of discharging Dunsmuir under the circ umstances. It does not cast doubt on the e mployer ’s art iculated reason for discharging Dunsmuir. As Fuentes instruc ts, an em ployee d oes n ot discr edit his employ er’s proffered re ason by showing that it was wrong or mi staken. 32 F.3d at 765. That i s because t

he disposi tive i ssue is whether ret aliatoryanimus moti vated the
em plo yer’s d ecis ion
. Id. For th e fore goin g reas ons, w e w ill affirm the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt.