Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 49197 

attack capability that is treaty compliant 

(no un-exploded ordnance). It provides 

a 24 hour, all weather, long range attack 

capability against personnel, soft and 

lightly armored targets, and air defense 

targets. The GMLRS–AW uses the same 

motor, guidance and control systems 

fuze mechanisms, and proximity 

sensors as the M31A1 GMLRS Unitary. 

The highest classification level for 

release of the GMLRS–AW is SECRET, 

based upon the software, sale or testing 

of the end item. The highest level of 

classification that must be disclosed for 

production, maintenance, or training is 

CONFIDENTIAL. 

4. The GPS PPS component of the 

HIMARS munitions (GMLRS Unitary, 

Alternative Warhead, and ATACMS 

Unitary) is also contained in the Fire 

Direction System, is classified SECRET, 

and is considered SENSITIVE. To that 

end, no GPS PPS design information, 

including GPS software algorithms, will 

be disclosed in the course of this sale to 

country. Susceptibility of GMLRS to 

diversion or exploitation is considered 

low risk. GMLRS employs an inertial 

navigational system that is aided by a 

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 

Module (SAASM) equipped GPS 

receiver. To that end, this system 

requires encryption keys controlled by, 

and issued by, the National Security 

Agency. 

5. AFATDS is a multi-service (U.S. 

Army and U.S. Marine Corps) 

automated, expert decision support 

system used for Command, Control, 

Communications and integration and 

synchronization of fires on ground 

targets during all phases of military 

conflict. AFATDS provides the 

automated tools that significantly 

augment the capability of fire support 

coordinators, fire support assets 

commanders, and their respective staffs 

at every echelon during the planning 

and execution of fire support on the 

dynamic battlefields in support of the 

Maneuver Commander and his plans. 

6. The classification of the request for 

assistance and customized AFATDS 

with sanitized and customized JMEM 

and LMM, and/or with functionally 

compatible but UNCLASSIFIED 

modular substitutes for COMSEC, 

JMEM, and LMM capabilities, is 

available for Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) with the following restrictions 

and caveats. The software source code 

and design specifications are 

UNCLASSIFIED but considered highly 

sensitive and are not available for FMS. 

The following items, while they are 

unclassified they are not individually 

freely and openly releasable, however, 

they can be offered for FMS as 

individually and specifically included 

items of complete system procurements: 

executable code, training manuals, user 

manuals, and system documentation 

such as external system architecture 

diagrams, high level internal software 

architecture diagrams, the Version 

Description Document, and the System 

Administrator Manual as customized for 

each individual FMS customer. The 

highest level of information that is 

necessarily disclosed during 

maintenance of these sanitized systems 

and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/ 

FOUO. The highest level of sensitive 

information that is necessarily disclosed 

by the sale of these sanitized systems 

and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/ 

FOUO. The highest level of information 

that is necessarily disclosed to allow 

system administration of these sanitized 

systems and applications 

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest 

level of information that is necessarily 

disclosed in training of these sanitized 

systems and applications is 

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest 

level of information that could be 

revealed by reverse engineering or 

testing of these systems is 

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. Through 

scanning or testing these sanitized 

systems and applications, specific 

vulnerabilities could be disclosed, and 

will be treated at UNCLASSIFIED/ 

FOUO. The identification of these 

vulnerabilities with U.S.-only systems is 

CLASSIFIED, per Section 6.3. 

Participants of the FMS process shall 

not make references to U.S.-only system 

maintenance, administration, or 

technical details because they could be 

considered SECRET. 

7. Susceptibility of ATACMS Unitary 

M57 FMS Variant, GMLRS M30A1 and 

M31A1 to diversion or exploitation is 

considered low risk. Components of the 

system are also considered highly 

resistant to reverse engineering. Detailed 

knowledge of the technical capabilities 

of the system could enable an enemy to 

tailor defenses and adjust tactics and 

procedures to minimize the 

effectiveness of the system. 

8. Susceptibility of AFATDS to 

diversion or exploitation is considered 

low risk. Software of the system are also 

considered highly resistant to reverse 

engineering. Detailed knowledge of the 

technical capabilities of the system 

could enable an enemy to tailor 

defenses and adjust tactics and 

procedures to minimize the 

effectiveness of the system. Training 

and user manuals are unclassified but 

considered sensitive and not for general 

release to foreign nationals, except that 

they will be provided with the system 

when the system is procured through 

foreign military sales. Installation 

instructions are unclassified but 

considered sensitive and not for general 

release to foreign nationals, except that 

they will be provided with the system 

when the system is procured through 

FMS. 

9. If a technologically advanced 

adversary were to obtain knowledge of 

the specific hardware and software, the 

information could be used to develop 

countermeasures, which might reduce 

weapon system effectiveness or be used 

in the development of a system with 

similar or advanced capabilities. 

10. This sale is necessary in 

furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy 

and national security objectives 

outlined in the enclosed Military Policy 

Justification. Moreover, the benefits to 

be derived from this sale outweigh the 

potential damage that could result if the 

sensitive technology were revealed to 

unauthorized persons. A determination 

has been made that Romania can 

provide the same degree of protection 

for the sensitive technology being 

released as the U.S. Government. 

11. All defense articles and services 

listed in this transmittal have been 

authorized for release and export to 

Romania. 

[FR Doc. 2017–22984 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal No. 17–28] 

Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency, Department of Defense. 

ACTION: Arms sales notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of an 

arms sales notification. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107, 

pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or 

Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217, 

kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/ 

DSA–RAN. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

36(b)(1) arms sales notification is 

published to fulfill the requirements of 

section 155 of Public Law 104–164 

dated July 21, 1996. The following is a 

copy of a letter to the Speaker of the 

House of Representatives, Transmittal 

17–28 with attached Policy Justification 

and Sensitivity of Technology. 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
49198 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 

Dated: October 18, 2017. 

Aaron Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICESEN24OC17.002</GPH>

DEFI::NS:E SECURITY COOf'E.HATION AGENCY 

Tile HnrlL'aahle Paul D. Ryllr"l 

S pef!ke1· of ~he H(II.J 91;, 

LT.S. H"01.1Se of R~;pr.:b.:m.ati·•l.:'~ 

WJ~bington, DC 2(1,'\:5 

Em:lC't!mf ~: 

l. Tnuumittal 

2. Poli~.:y Ju!l.tificat.ion 

1 St:-ll,il: .... ·H)• of TcJhnOloiJg)" 

<D I t:CH SFIFR !;C::ij rH, S IE.- 203 

.a!ll~.l\:ii!JN. \/A ;:z;,.•!XNi4JII 

4. Regior.al &lan_,;;;e (CI:u~;ifi.c-d d~umcnt provided t.md·::r sc-pl!ratc cov~.>r) 

0 
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 49199 

Transmittal No. 17–28 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of 

Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the 

Arms Export Control Act, as amended 

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi 

Arabia 

(ii) Total Estimated Value: 

Major Defense Equipment * $ 9 billion 

Other .................................... $ 6 billion 

TOTAL .............................. $15 billion 

(iii) Description and Quantity or 

Quantities of Articles or Services under 

Consideration for Purchase: 

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): 

Forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) Launchers 

Three hundred sixty (360) THAAD 

Interceptor Missiles 

Sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and 

Communications Mobile Tactical 

Station Group 

Seven (7) AN/TPY–2 THAAD Radars 

Non-MDE: 

Also included are THAAD Battery 

maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) 

prime movers (trucks), generators, 

electrical power units, trailers, 

communications equipment, tools, test 

and maintenance equipment, repair and 

return, system integration and checkout, 

spare/repair parts, publications and 

technical documentation, personnel 

training and training equipment, U.S. 

Government and contractor technical 

and logistics personnel support services, 

facilities construction, studies, and 

other related elements of logistics and 

program support. 

(iv) Military Departments: Missile 

Defense Agency (XX–I–WIB, XX–I– 

WIC); Army (XX–B–TFP, XX–B–BDP, 

XX–B–ZAO, XX–B–DAH, XX–B–ZAQ, 

XX–B–OZY, XX–B–HFA); NSA (XX–M– 

AAG) 

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR–I– 

WIA Basic, 2 February 2015; 

Amendment 1, 25 August 2016 

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, 

Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology 

Contained in the Defense Article or 

Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: 

See Attached Annex 

(viii) Date Report Delivered to 

Congress: October 6, 2017 

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the 

Arms Export Control Act. 

POLICY JUSTIFICATION 

Saudi Arabia—Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense and Related Support 

Equipment and Services 

The Government of Saudi Arabia has 

requested a possible sale of forty-four 

(44) Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) launchers, three 

hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor 

Missiles, sixteen (16) THAAD Fire 

Control and Communications Mobile 

Tactical Station Group, seven (7) AN/ 

TPY–2 THAAD radars. Also included 

are THAAD Battery maintenance 

equipment, forty-three (43) prime 

movers (trucks), generators, electrical 

power units, trailers, communications 

equipment, tools, test and maintenance 

equipment, repair and return, system 

integration and checkout, spare/repair 

parts, publications and technical 

documentation, personnel training and 

training equipment, U.S. Government 

and contractor technical and logistics 

personnel support services, facilities 

construction, studies, and other related 

elements of logistics and program 

support. The estimated cost is $15 

billion. 

This proposed sale will support the 

foreign policy and national security 

objectives of the United States by 

improving the security of a friendly 

country. This sale furthers U.S. national 

security and foreign policy interests, 

and supports the long-term security of 

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region in the 

face of Iranian and other regional 

threats. This potential sale will 

substantially increase Saudi Arabia’s 

capability to defend itself against the 

growing ballistic missile threat in the 

region. THAAD’s exo-atmospheric, hitto-kill capability will add an upper-tier 

to Saudi Arabia’s layered missile 

defense architecture and will support 

modernization of the Royal Saudi Air 

Defense Force (RSADF). Saudi Arabia 

will have no difficulty absorbing this 

equipment into its armed forces. 

The proposed sale of this equipment 

and support will not alter the basic 

military balance in the region. 

The principal contractors for the 

THAAD system are Lockheed Martin 

Space Systems Corporation, Dallas, TX, 

Camden, AR, Troy, AL and Huntsville, 

AL; and Raytheon Corporation, 

Andover, MA. There are no known 

offset agreements proposed in 

connection with this potential sale. 

Implementation of this proposed sale 

will require one hundred eleven (111) 

contractor representatives and eighteen 

(18) U.S. Government personnel in 

country for an extended period of time. 

There will be no adverse impact on 

U.S. defense readiness as a result of this 

proposed sale. 

Transmittal No. 17–28 

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of 

Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the 

Arms Export Control Act 

Annex Item No. vii 

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 

1. The Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense System (THAAD) Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD) System contains 

classified CONFIDENTIAL/SECRET 

components and critical/sensitive 

technology. The THAAD Fire Unit is a 

ground-based, forward deployable 

terminal missile defense system that 

represents significant technological 

advances. The THAAD system 

continues to hold a technology lead over 

other terminal ballistic missile systems. 

THAAD is the first weapon system with 

both endo- and exo- atmospheric 

capability developed specifically to 

defend against ballistic missiles. The 

higher altitude and theater-wide 

protection offered by THAAD provides 

more protection of larger areas than 

lower-tier systems alone. THAAD is 

designed to defend against short, 

medium, and intermediate range 

ballistic missiles. The THAAD system 

consists of four major components: Fire 

Control/Communications, Radar, 

Launchers, and Interceptor Missiles. 

2. The THAAD BMD System contains 

sensitive/critical technology, primarily 

in the area of defense and production 

know-how and primarily inherent in the 

design, development and/or 

manufacturing data related to certain 

critical components. Information on 

operational effectiveness with respect to 

countermeasures and countercountermeasures, low observable 

technologies, select software 

documentation and test data are 

classified up to and including SECRET. 

3. The THAAD BMD System contains 

Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI) 

that are used for both system internal 

links and for external communications. 

These items consist of key loading 

devices, network encryptors, secure 

telephones, voice radios, tactical data 

radios, and mission data radios. Specific 

CCI used for the Saudi Arabia case will 

be determined through the COMSEC 

Release Request (CRR) process, initiated 

through USCENTCOM once an 

interoperability requirement has been 

established. NSA will identify 

releasable items, in parallel with staffing 

and validation of the CRR by the Joint 

Staff. The Committee for National 

Security Systems (CNSS) reviews and 

provides final approval of the items and 

quantities. 

4. AN/VRC–90, AN/VRC–91, AN/ 

VRC–92 are different configurations of 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
49200 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 

the Single Channel Ground and 

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 

family. SINCGARS is a tactical radio 

providing secure jam-resistant voice and 

data communications of command, 

control, targeting, and technical 

information for the Terminal High 

Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. 

The spread-spectrum frequency hopping 

Electronic Counter-Counter Measures 

(ECCM) technology resident in the radio 

is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While 

sensitive, the frequency-hopping 

algorithms used to generate the ECCM 

waveform are unique to the country of 

ownership and cannot be manipulated 

by potential adversaries for use or 

interference with other countries 

possessing SINCGARS technology. 

Should a potential adversary come into 

possession of one of these radios, they 

would have the potential to intercept 

operational command, control, and 

targeting information. This potential 

problem is mitigated by the fact that the 

customer can secure information passed 

over the radio network using a 

commercial grade security capability 

equivalent to an Advanced Encryption 

Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption 

system whose keys are controlled by the 

customer country. 

5. As with the SINCGARS family of 

radios, the AN/PRC–117 is a tactical 

radio providing ECCM jam-resistant 

secure communications for exchange of 

command, control, and targeting 

information within the THAAD system 

tactical radio network. ECCM 

capabilities are sensitive but 

UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for 

these jam-resistant waveforms are 

unique to the customer country. Unlike 

the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC–117 

uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded 

with U.S. crypto keys, the system is 

then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. 

Should a potential adversary come into 

possession of one of these radios, the 

customer country can quickly remotely 

rekey remaining radios, preventing 

potential adversaries from 

understanding received command, 

control, and targeting information. 

6. The Defense Advanced Global 

Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 

(DAGR) is a handheld GPS location 

device with map background displaying 

the user’s location. Unlike commercial 

grade GPS receivers capable of receiving 

Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from 

GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of 

receiving Precise Positioning Signals 

(PPS). PPS satellite signals provide 

significantly more accurate location data 

than do SPS signals. This capability 

within DAGRs is possible due to the 

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 

Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an 

encrypted device permitting both 

receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of 

preventing potential adversaries from 

spoofing the system to display incorrect 

location information. The SAASM 

capability within the DAGR is sensitive 

but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM 

capabilities are sensitive due to the 

system’s ability to access restricted PPS 

GPS satellite signals and to prevent 

spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of 

potential adversaries to exploit the 

system is limited. 

7. The same SAASM capabilities 

resident in the DAGR are also resident 

in the THAAD GPS timing system. The 

THAAD system requires highly precise 

timing hacks in order accurately track 

and engage targets. The PPS signals 

generated by GPS satellites provide this 

precise timing information. The SAASM 

device resident in the timing system 

permits receipt of this precise PPS 

timing data. The SAASM is an 

encrypted device permitting both 

receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of 

preventing potential adversaries from 

spoofing the system to display incorrect 

data. The SAASM capability within the 

timing system is sensitive but 

UNCLASSIFIED. 

8. If a technologically advanced 

adversary were to obtain knowledge of 

specific hardware, the information 

could be used to develop 

countermeasures which might reduce 

weapons system effectiveness or be used 

in the development of a system with 

similar or advanced capabilities. 

9. A determination has been made 

that Saudi Arabia can provide 

substantially the same degree of 

protection for sensitive technology 

being released as the U.S. Government. 

This proposed sustainment program is 

necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. 

foreign policy and national security 

objectives outlined in the policy 

justification. 

10. All defense articles and services 

listed on this transmittal are authorized 

for release and export to the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia. 

[FR Doc. 2017–22965 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

Advisory Panel on Streamlining and 

Codifying Acquisition Regulations 

AGENCY: Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics), DoD. 

ACTION: Notice of Advisory Panel. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing this notice to encourage 

feedback for the Section 809 Advisory 

Panel on Streamlining and Codifying 

Acquisition Regulations (hereafter ‘‘the 

Panel’’). The Panel meets on a monthly 

basis and will provide a final report to 

the Secretary of Defense and Congress in 

2019. The agendas, meeting times, and 

contact information are posted on the 

Panel Web site: http://

www.section809panel.org. Public 

feedback can be submitted in the 

‘‘Contact Us’’ section of the Web site as 

either general comments or specific 

recommendations. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shayne L. Martin, Section 809 Panel, 

1400 Key Blvd., Suite 210, Arlington, 

VA 22209, email: shayne.martin@

dau.mil, phone: 703–571–2989. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

809 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 

(Pub. L. 114–92) required the Secretary 

of Defense to establish ‘‘an advisory 

panel on streamlining acquisition 

regulations.’’ The Panel was seated on 

August 12, 2016. By Statute, the Panel 

is exempt from the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Appendix). 

Public information, including 

opportunities for input, is posted and 

periodically updated at http://

www.section809panel.org. 

Dated: October 18, 2017. 

Aaron Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

[FR Doc. 2017–22987 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Navy 

Notice of Performance Review Board 

Membership 

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The purpose of the PRBs is to 

provide fair and impartial review of the 

annual SES performance appraisal 

prepared by the senior executive’s 

immediate and second level supervisor; 

to make recommendations to appointing 

officials regarding acceptance or 

modification of the performance rating; 

and to make recommendations for 

performance bonuses and basic pay 

increases. Composition of the specific 

PRBs will be determined on an ad hoc 

basis from among the individuals listed 

below: 

Mr. Mark Andress 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES