(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

WALDEN v. FIORE ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–574. Argued November 4, 2013—Decided February 25, 2014 

Petitioner Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a deputized Drug 

Enforcement Administration agent at a Georgia airport, searched respondents and seized a large amount of cash. Respondents allege

that after they returned to their Nevada residence, petitioner helped 

draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of the funds’ forfeiture and forwarded it to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia. 

In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and respondents’ funds 

were returned. Respondents filed a tort suit against petitioner in

Federal District Court in Nevada. The District Court dismissed the 

suit, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a 

basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit 

reversed, holding that the District Court could properly exercise jurisdiction because petitioner had submitted the false probable cause

affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with significant Nevada connections. 

Held: The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner. 

Pp. 5–14.

(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains a 

State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its 

courts, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291, 

and requires that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts” 

with the forum State, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U. S. 310, 316. The inquiry into the “minimum contacts” necessary to 

create specific jurisdiction focuses “on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 

Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775. For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, that relationship must arise out of contacts 

that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum, Burger King 
 

2 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Syllabus 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475, and must be analyzed with

regard to the defendant’s contacts with the forum itself, not with persons residing there, see, e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319. The 

plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, 788–789. Pp. 5–10. 

(b) Petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a

prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. No part of petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. The Ninth Circuit 

reached its contrary conclusion by improperly shifting the analytical

focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with 

respondents, obscuring the reality that none of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself. Respondents 

emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by the delayed return of their funds while residing in Nevada, but Calder made clear 

that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to

the forum. The proper question is whether the defendant’s conduct 

connects him to the forum in a meaningful way: Here, respondents’ 

claimed injury does not evince such a connection. The injury occurred in Nevada simply because that is where respondents chose to

be when they desired to use the seized funds. Other possible contacts

noted by the Ninth Circuit—that respondents’ Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, that cash seized in Georgia originated in 

Nevada, and that funds were returned to respondents in Nevada—

are ultimately unavailing. Pp. 11–14. 

688 F. 3d 558, reversed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–574 

ANTHONY WALDEN, PETITIONER v. GINA FIORE 

ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 25, 2014]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case asks us to decide whether a court in Nevada 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the

basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Georgia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with

connections to Nevada. Because the defendant had no 

other contacts with Nevada, and because a plaintiff ’s contacts with the forum State cannot be “decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are

violated,” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980), we 

hold that the court in Nevada may not exercise personal 

jurisdiction under these circumstances. 

I 

Petitioner Anthony Walden serves as a police officer for 

the city of Covington, Georgia. In August 2006, petitioner

was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport as

a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). As part of a task force, petitioner conducted

investigative stops and other law enforcement functions in 

support of the DEA’s airport drug interdiction program.

On August 8, 2006, Transportation Security Admin-
 

2 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

istration agents searched respondents Gina Fiore and

Keith Gipson and their carry-on bags at the San Juan

airport in Puerto Rico. They found almost $97,000 in

cash. Fiore explained to DEA agents in San Juan that she 

and Gipson had been gambling at a casino known as the 

El San Juan, and that they had residences in both California and Nevada (though they provided only California 

identification). After respondents were cleared for departure, a law enforcement official at the San Juan airport 

notified petitioner’s task force in Atlanta that respondents 

had boarded a plane for Atlanta, where they planned to 

catch a connecting flight to Las Vegas, Nevada.

When respondents arrived in Atlanta, petitioner and

another DEA agent approached them at the departure

gate for their flight to Las Vegas. In response to petitioner’s questioning, Fiore explained that she and Gipson were

professional gamblers. Respondents maintained that the

cash they were carrying was their gambling “‘bank’” and 

winnings. App. 15, 24. After using a drug-sniffing dog to

perform a sniff test, petitioner seized the cash.1 Petitioner 

advised respondents that their funds would be returned if

they later proved a legitimate source for the cash. Respondents then boarded their plane.

After respondents departed, petitioner moved the cash

to a secure location and the matter was forwarded to DEA 

headquarters. The next day, petitioner received a phone 

call from respondents’ attorney in Nevada seeking return

of the funds. On two occasions over the next month, petitioner also received documentation from the attorney 

regarding the legitimacy of the funds. 

At some point after petitioner seized the cash, he helped 

draft an affidavit to show probable cause for forfeiture of 

—————— 

1Respondents allege that the sniff test was “at best, inconclusive,”

and there is no indication in the pleadings that drugs or drug residue 

were ever found on or with the cash. App. 21. 
Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

the funds and forwarded that affidavit to a United States 

Attorney’s Office in Georgia.2 According to respondents,

the affidavit was false and misleading because petitioner 

misrepresented the encounter at the airport and omitted

exculpatory information regarding the lack of drug evidence and the legitimate source of the funds. In the end, 

no forfeiture complaint was filed, and the DEA returned

the funds to respondents in March 2007.

Respondents filed suit against petitioner in the United

States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking

money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Respondents alleged

that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by

(1) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping 

the money after concluding it did not come from drugrelated activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable 

cause affidavit to support a forfeiture action while knowing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully 

seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory information; and (5) withholding that exculpatory information

from the United States Attorney’s Office. 

The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Relying on this Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 

465 U. S. 783 (1984), the court determined that petitioner’s search of respondents and his seizure of the cash in 

Georgia did not establish a basis to exercise personal

jurisdiction in Nevada. The court concluded that even if 

petitioner caused harm to respondents in Nevada while 

knowing they lived in Nevada, that fact alone did not 

confer jurisdiction. Because the court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not determine 

—————— 

2The alleged affidavit is not in the record. Because this case comes to 

us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we take respondents’ factual allegations as true, including their allegations regarding the existence and 

content of the affidavit. 
 

 

 

4 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

whether venue was proper. 

On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of 

Appeals assumed the District Court had correctly determined that petitioner’s search and seizure in Georgia 

could not support exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada. The 

court held, however, that the District Court could properly

exercise jurisdiction over “the false probable cause affidavit aspect of the case.” 688 F. 3d 558, 577 (2011). According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner “expressly aimed”

his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by 

submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would

affect persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada.3 

Id., at 581. After determining that the delay in returning

the funds to respondents caused them “foreseeable harm” 

in Nevada and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over petitioner was otherwise reasonable, the court found 

the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to be 

proper.4 Id., at 582, 585. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, with eight judges, in two separate opinions, dissenting. Id., at 562, 568. 

We granted certiorari to decide whether due process 

permits a Nevada court to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner. 568 U. S. ___ (2013). We hold that it does not and 

—————— 

3The allegations in the complaint suggested to the Court of Appeals

that petitioner “definitely knew, at some point after the seizure but 

before providing the alleged false probable cause affidavit, that [respondents] had a significant connection to Nevada.” 688 F. 3d, at 578. 4 Judge Ikuta dissented. In her view, the “false affidavit/forfeiture 

proceeding aspect” over which the majority found jurisdiction proper

was not raised as a separate claim in the complaint, and she found it

“doubtful that such a constitutional tort even exists.” Id., at 593. After 

the court denied rehearing en banc, the majority explained in a postscript that it viewed the filing of the false affidavit, which effected a

“continued seizure” of the funds, as a separate Fourth Amendment

violation. Id., at 588–589. Petitioner does not dispute that reading 

here. 
 

 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

therefore reverse.5 

II
 

A 

“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler 

AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6).

This is because a federal district court’s authority to assert

personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of 

process on a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction

of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the 

district court is located.” Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A).

Here, Nevada has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons “on any basis not inconsistent with

. . . the Constitution of the United States.” Nev. Rev. Stat. 

§14.065 (2011). Thus, in order to determine whether 

the Federal District Court in this case was authorized to 

exercise jurisdiction over petitioner, we ask whether the 

exercise of jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed

by federal due process” on the State of Nevada. Daimler, 

supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6). 

B 

1 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident 

defendant to a judgment of its courts. World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980). 

Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the

territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the 

nonresident generally must have “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not 

—————— 

5We also granted certiorari on the question whether Nevada is a 

proper venue for the suit under 28 U. S. C. §1391(b)(2). Because we 

resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether 

venue was proper in Nevada. 
 

 

 

 

 

6 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 

310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 

463 (1940)).

This case addresses the “minimum contacts” necessary

to create specific jurisdiction.6 The inquiry whether a

forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant “focuses on ‘the relationship among the

defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775 (1984) (quoting 

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977)). For a State 

to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the 

defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial 

connection with the forum State. Two related aspects of

this necessary relationship are relevant in this case.

First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that

the “defendant himself ” creates with the forum State. 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985).

Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority 

principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties. See 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, at 291–292. We have 

consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendantfocused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating 

contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the 

forum State. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 

S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 417 (1984) (“[The] unilateral 

—————— 

6 “Specific” or “case-linked” jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] 

between the forum and the underlying controversy’ ” (i.e., an “activity or 

an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore

subject to the State’s regulation”). Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 2). This is in 

contrast to “general” or “all purpose” jurisdiction, which permits a court

to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection 

unrelated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile). Respondents rely on 

specific jurisdiction only. 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an

assertion of jurisdiction”). We have thus rejected a plaintiff ’s argument that a Florida court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a trustee in Delaware based solely on 

the contacts of the trust’s settlor, who was domiciled in 

Florida and had executed powers of appointment there. 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253–254 (1958). We 

have likewise held that Oklahoma courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an automobile distributor 

that supplies New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 

dealers based only on an automobile purchaser’s act of 

driving it on Oklahoma highways. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, at 298. Put simply, however significant the plaintiff ’s contacts with the forum may be,

those contacts cannot be “decisive in determining whether 

the defendant’s due process rights are violated.” Rush, 

444 U. S., at 332. 

Second, our “minimum contacts” analysis looks to the

defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the 

defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. See, 

e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319 (Due process “does 

not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual . . . with which

the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”); Hanson, 

supra, at 251 (“However minimal the burden of defending

in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon

to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that 

State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over

him”). Accordingly, we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who have purposefully “reach[ed] 

out beyond” their State and into another by, for example, 

entering a contractual relationship that “envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts” in the forum State, 

Burger King, supra, at 479–480, or by circulating maga-
 

 

 

8 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

zines to “deliberately exploi[t]” a market in the forum 

State, Keeton, supra, at 781. And although physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, 

Burger King, supra, at 476, physical entry into the State—

either by the defendant in person or through an agent, 

goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant 

contact. See, e.g., Keeton, supra, at 773–774. 

But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the

defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s 

conduct that must form the necessary connection with the

forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.

See Burger King, supra, at 478 (“If the question is whether

an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone 

can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts

in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer

clearly is that it cannot”); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 

City and County of San Francisco, 436 U. S. 84, 93 (1978) 

(declining to “find personal jurisdiction in a State . . . 

merely because [the plaintiff in a child support action] was 

residing there”). To be sure, a defendant’s contacts with 

the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions 

or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a 

defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, 

standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.

See Rush, supra, at 332 (“Naturally, the parties’ relationships with each other may be significant in evaluating 

their ties to the forum. The requirements of International 

Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant over 

whom a state court exercises jurisdiction”). Due process 

requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum

State based on his own affiliation with the State, not 

based on the “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts 

he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with 

the State. Burger King, 471 U. S., at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

These same principles apply when intentional torts are

involved. In that context, it is likewise insufficient to rely

on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” or on the “unilateral activity” of a plaintiff. Ibid. 

(same). A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an 

out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary

contacts with the forum. 

Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, illustrates the application of these principles. In Calder, a California actress 

brought a libel suit in California state court against a 

reporter and an editor, both of whom worked for the National Enquirer at its headquarters in Florida. The plaintiff ’s libel claims were based on an article written and 

edited by the defendants in Florida for publication in the 

National Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper with a

California circulation of roughly 600,000.

We held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction over

the defendants was consistent with due process. Although

we recognized that the defendants’ activities “focus[ed]” on

the plaintiff, our jurisdictional inquiry “focuse[d] on ‘the 

relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation.’” Id., at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 204). 

Specifically, we examined the various contacts the defendants had created with California (and not just with the 

plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous story.

We found those forum contacts to be ample: The defendants relied on phone calls to “California sources” for the 

information in their article; they wrote the story about the

plaintiff ’s activities in California; they caused reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous 

article that was widely circulated in the State; and the 

“brunt” of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that 

State. 465 U. S., at 788–789. “In sum, California [wa]s

the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.” 
 

10 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

Id., at 789. Jurisdiction over the defendants was “therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their 

Florida conduct in California.” Ibid. 

The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “effects” of the alleged libel connected the defendants to 

California, not just to the plaintiff. The strength of that 

connection was largely a function of the nature of the libel 

tort. However scandalous a newspaper article might be, it

can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to

(and read and understood by) third persons. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §577, Comment b (1976); see also 

ibid. (“[R]eputation is the estimation in which one’s character is held by his neighbors or associates”). Accordingly,

the reputational injury caused by the defendants’ story

would not have occurred but for the fact that the defendants wrote an article for publication in California that was

read by a large number of California citizens. Indeed, 

because publication to third persons is a necessary element of libel, see id., §558, the defendants’ intentional tort 

actually occurred in California. Keeton, 465 U. S., at 777 

(“The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the

offending material is circulated”). In this way, the “effects” caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to 

the plaintiff ’s reputation in the estimation of the California public—connected the defendants’ conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That connection, combined with the various facts that gave the article 

a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California 

court’s exercise of jurisdiction.7 

—————— 

7The defendants in Calder argued that no contacts they had with 

California were sufficiently purposeful because their employer was 

responsible for circulation of the article. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 

783, 789 (1984). We rejected that argument. Even though the defendants did not circulate the article themselves, they “expressly aimed”

“their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions” at California because they knew the National Enquirer “ha[d] its largest circulation” in 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

III
 

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that

petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that 

are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. 

Hanson, 357 U. S., at 251. It is undisputed that no part of

petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada. Petitioner approached, questioned, and searched respondents, 

and seized the cash at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is 

alleged that petitioner later helped draft a “false probable

cause affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to 

a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a 

potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds. 688 

F. 3d, at 563. Petitioner never traveled to, conducted 

activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or

anyone to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the

proper lens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him 

to the forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada. 

The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion by 

shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with

the forum to his contacts with respondents. See Rush, 444 

U. S., at 332. Rather than assessing petitioner’s own

contacts with Nevada, the Court of Appeals looked to

petitioner’s knowledge of respondents’ “strong forum 

connections.” 688 F. 3d, at 577–579, 581. In the court’s 

view, that knowledge, combined with its conclusion that

respondents suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada, satisfied the “minimum contacts” inquiry.8 Id., at 582. 

This approach to the “minimum contacts” analysis 

—————— 

California, and that the article would “have a potentially devastating 

impact” there. Id., at 789–790. 8Respondents propose a substantially similar analysis. They suggest 

that “a defendant creates sufficient minimum contacts with a forum 

when he (1) intentionally targets (2) a known resident of the forum (3) 

for imposition of an injury (4) to be suffered by the plaintiff while she is 

residing in the forum state.” Brief for Respondents 26–27. 
 

12 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

impermissibly allows a plaintiff ’s contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis. 

Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient

contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed

his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plaintiff ’s forum connections to the defendant and makes those 

connections “decisive” in the jurisdictional analysis. See 

Rush, supra, at 332. It also obscures the reality that none 

of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with

Nevada itself. 

Relying on Calder, respondents emphasize that they

suffered the “injury” caused by petitioner’s allegedly tortious conduct (i.e., the delayed return of their gambling

funds) while they were residing in the forum. Brief for 

Respondents 14. This emphasis is likewise misplaced. As 

previously noted, Calder made clear that mere injury to a

forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. 

Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is

jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the

defendant has formed a contact with the forum State. The 

proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a 

particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s 

conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.

Respondents’ claimed injury does not evince a connection between petitioner and Nevada. Even if we consider 

the continuation of the seizure in Georgia to be a distinct 

injury, it is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada

in any meaningful way. Respondents (and only respondents) lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because 

anything independently occurred there, but because Nevada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they 

desired to use the funds seized by petitioner. Respondents

would have experienced this same lack of access in California, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have

traveled and found themselves wanting more money than 
 

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

they had. Unlike the broad publication of the forumfocused story in Calder, the effects of petitioner’s conduct on respondents are not connected to the forum State 

in a way that makes those effects a proper basis for 

jurisdiction.9 

The Court of Appeals pointed to other possible contacts

with Nevada, each ultimately unavailing. Respondents’

Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, but that

is precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” of a third party

that “cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the 

forum State.” Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253. Respondents

allege that some of the cash seized in Georgia “originated”

in Nevada, but that attenuated connection was not created 

by petitioner, and the cash was in Georgia, not Nevada,

when petitioner seized it. Finally, the funds were eventually returned to respondents in Nevada, but petitioner had 

nothing to do with that return (indeed, it seems likely that

it was respondents’ unilateral decision to have their funds 

sent to Nevada). 

* * * 

Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction are 

sufficient to decide this case. The proper focus of the 

—————— 

9Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum contacts in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where intentional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic means 

(e.g., fraudulent access of financial accounts or “phishing” schemes). As 

an initial matter, we reiterate that the “minimum contacts” inquiry

principally protects the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the

interests of the plaintiff. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U. S., 286, 291–292 (1980). In any event, this case does not present 

the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual 

“presence” and conduct translate into “contacts” with a particular

State. To the contrary, there is no question where the conduct giving

rise to this litigation took place: Petitioner seized physical cash from

respondents in the Atlanta airport, and he later drafted and forwarded

an affidavit in Georgia. We leave questions about virtual contacts for 

another day. 
 

14 WALDEN v. FIORE 

Opinion of the Court 

“minimum contacts” inquiry in intentional-tort cases is

“‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and 

the litigation.’” Calder, 465 U. S., at 788. And it is the 

defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must 

create contacts with the forum State. In this case, the 

application of those principles is clear: Petitioner’s relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia, and the mere 

fact that his conduct affected plaintiffs with connections 

to the forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

It is so ordered.