Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Gregory L. Fumarolo Fort Wayne, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### I N T H E 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles D. Burrage , Appellant

- Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana , Appellee

- Plaintiff

. Octob er 9, 2018 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 02A04

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- 2877 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge Trial Co urt Cause No. 02D06

- 1705

- F4

- 32

Altice , Judge .Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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### Case Summary

[1] When police stopped the car in which Charles D. Burrage was riding as a backseat passenger, Burrage jumped out and fled. After chasing down Burrage, an officer returned to the vehicle and discovered a handgun on the back bench seat, in plain view, near wh ere Burrage had been seated before he exited the vehicle and ran from police. Burrage filed a pretrial motion to suppress the handgun, challenging the legality of the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, Burrage wa s convicted of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. He now appeals his convictions, raising the following restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its disc retion when it admitted the firearm into evidence at trial; and

II. Whether the State presented sufficien t e v i denc e to support Burrage’ s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

[2] We affirm. 

### Facts & Procedural History

[3] While driving her four

- door black Dodge Magnum on the evening of May 10, 2017 , Christina Green picked up her teenage son, I.C.C. , from work. Green’s

co - worker, Ayanna Weaver, was already seated in the front passenger seat , and I.C.C. entered the vehicle a nd sat in the back seat behind Weaver. A s a favorCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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for a friend, Green then drove to the Hickory Creek A partments to pick up a

man and give him a ride t o her own house, where he was to meet other individuals. When Gree n arrived at the Hickory Creek Apartments , the man, who Green did not know, but who was later identified as Burrage, entered her car and sat in the back seat, on the driver’s side.

[4] At that time, Fort Wayne Police Department (FWPD) officers , along with officers from the United States Marshal’s Task Force, were conducting

surv eillance a t the Hickory Creek Apartments , having received information that Burrage , who had a pending felony arrest warrant for a violation of hi s parole ,
was likely to be in that area

. Specifically, FWPD Detectiv e Derrick Demorest had obtained and executed a search warrant for “ping” information on Burrage’s pho ne, and it revealed that the phone was in the Hickory Creek complex. Motion to Suppress Transcript at 27. During surveillance at the apartment complex, F WPD Detective James Chambers observed a man matching Burrage’s general description get into the backseat of the Dodge Magnum . Already in the car, in addition to the driver, was a front seat passenger and another backseat passenger , who officers later iden tified as Green’s son, I.C.C.

[5] The Dodge Magnum left the Hickory Creek Apartments parking lot heading eastbound on Lower Huntington Road. Some of the surveilling officers followed, while others stayed, in case it was not Burrage who left in the Magnum. While following the Magnum, FWPD Detective Sergeant M ark Brooks observed it “cross the yellow line, the solid yellow line towards theCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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center four different times in about a half a mile” on Lower Huntington Road

. Transcript Vol. 1 at 115. The driver of th e Dodge Magnum did not sign al a lane change or a turn on these occasions. Because Detective Sergeant Brooks was in plain clothes and driving an unmarked FWPD vehicle that was not equipped with emergency lights , he was not permitted under Indiana law to in itiate a traffic stop, so he notified other officers that he had observed the vehicle “ cross the center line four times. ” Id . at 116.

[6] The Dodge Magnum then turned northbound onto Airport Expressway, and Detective Michael Long , who was in full uniform and was driving a vehicle equipped with lights and a siren, activated his vehicle’s lights and initiated a traffic stop. According to Green, Burrage told her from the backseat , “[D]on’t stop,” and she replied, “I’m not a criminal, I don’t have anything to hi de , ” at which time she pulled the car over to the right shoulder. Id . at 158 , 161

. I.C.C. noticed that , as the vehicle was pulling over, Burrage was trying to get out of the car, and I.C.C. told Burrage to “calm down and not to get out [sic] the car.” Id . at 175. As Burrage was exiting the Dodge Magnum , he pulled a gun out of his pants and tried to hand it to I.C.C., but I.C.C. turned away and did not take it. Burrage then exited the car and ran

.

[7] Meanwhile, as the Dodge Magnum stop ped on the shoulder , Detective Long saw an individual exit the vehicle from the back driver’s

- side door and run in a northeast direction down into an embankment

. Detective Long ordered the individual to stop and chased him a short distance before he deployed a taser causing t he man to fa ll. Detective Long arrested the man for resisting lawCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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enforcement and identified the individual a s Burrage. Detective Long’s vehicle was equipped with an in

- car camera that captured video of the traffic stop and chase.

[8] Detective Long return ed to the Dodge Magnum and saw that the remaining three occupants were inside but had their hand s extended outside of the windows

. Green w as in the driver’s seat, Weaver was in the front passenger
seat , and I.C.C. was seated behind Weaver. As Detective Long approached, I.C.C. told him that the person who ran had left a handgun in the vehicle. Detective Long looked inside and saw a black handgun laying o n the middle of the back bench

- style seat. The individuals in the car told him that they did not know the man who fled. Detective Long instructed the passengers to exit the vehicle, and t hey were patted down for officer safety . N o other weapons were found on the occupants or in the vehicle

.

[9] Detective Long retrieved the handgun, which was a loaded .40 c aliber semiautomatic. There was a bullet in the chamber and additional bullets in the magazine. During a search of Burrage, police discovered a baggie in his pocket containing a green weedy substance, later identified as marijuana.

[10] On May 1 6 , 2017, t he State charged Burrage with Count I, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Count II, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Count III, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In October 2017, Burrage filed a motion to sup press the handgun and marijuana, asserting that the search and seizure violated hisCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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state and federal constitutional rights. At the hearing, Burrage’s position was that the traffic stop was invalid because (1) the radioed traffic inf ractions were that the Dodge Magnum “crossed the center line” a number of times, (2) but the road was actually a three

- lane road in the relevant area

– one each direction and a center turn lane

– such that the Magnum did not cross any center line or violat e any statute that required it to s t ay on the right ha lf of the road, and (3)
t herefore, “ t her e was no violation that justified the stop [of] the vehicle , ” and the evidence should be suppressed. Motion to Suppress Transcript at 24, 30 . T he State responded that traffic violations justified the stop because officers observed the Magnum fail to stay in its lane. Furthermore, even if there was no traffic violation, the stop was valid for several other reasons: ( 1) there was a
warrant out for Burrage , and officers had a reasonable suspicion that he was in the car; ( 2) Burrage had no standing as a passenger to challenge the stop; and ( 3) Burrage abandoned the weapon when he ran from the car and thereby relinquished all interest in the p roperty. Follow ing a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Burrage’s motion to suppress, finding:
Defendant matched the description of the fugitive sought, the traffic stop was valid, the handgun seized was in plain v iew, was abandoned and Defendant had no s tanding to object to a search.
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 71.

[11] Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Count III

. At trial, when Detective Sergeant Brooks was cross - examined about having radioed to Detective Long that the Magnum drove “left of center” on fourCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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occasions, Detective Sergeant Brooks explained that the vehicl e had driven “into the turn lane four times.” Transcript Vol. 1 at 117. Detective Long testified that after learning that “the vehicle had committed a lane violation four different times” on Lower Huntington Road, he moved ahead of the surveillance detective and initiated the traffic stop. Id . at 126. Green testified that when she pulled over to the shoulder, “the per son that was in my backseat jumped out of my car, took off running,” and she heard her son scream, “[T]here’s a gun back here.” Id

. at 158 , 161

. She then turned and saw the gun for the first time. Green testified that the gun was not hers nor her son’s , who was less than eighteen years old. A man named Marcel Wheeler , who had been in a relationship with Green on

- and

- off for six years, testified that he owned the Dodge Magnum, but had not driven it in years. Wheeler testified that the gun was not his a nd that he did not own a gun or have a permit to carry

one. T he handgun was admitted into evidence over Burrage’s objection. N o fingerprints were found on the gun during forensic testing

.

[12] The jury found Bu rrage guilty of resisting law enforcement and car ryi ng a handgun without a license

. Burrage waived his right to further proceed with the jury trial and admitted to a prior qualifying felony required to prove he was a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm

. After entering judgments of convicti on, t he trial court sentenced Burrage to six years on Count I and one year on Count II, to run c onsecutively. Burrage now appeals.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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### Discussion and Decision I. Admission of Evidence

[13] Burrage argues the trial court abused its discre t ion when it admitted the handgun into evidence at trial o ver his objection. In ruling on admissibility following the denial of the motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Carpenter v. State , 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). It also considers the evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. Id

. Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, the appellate co urt will review the trial court’s rulings o n admissibility for abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Clark v. State , 99 4 N.E.2d 252, 26 0 (Ind. 2013). “ But the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo.” Carpenter , 18 N.E.3d at 1001.

[14] An investigatory stop of a citizen by a police officer does not v iolate that citizen ’ s constitutional rights if the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Lynch , 961 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Although “[r] easonable suspicion is a ‘ somewhat abstract ’ concept that is no t readily reduced to a ‘ neat set of legal rules ,’” i t is well settled that a police officer may briefly detain a person whom the officer believes has committed an infraction or ordinance violation. Id

. at 536

- 37 (citing Ind. Code § 34

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- 3 , stating that “ [w] henever a law enforcement offi cer believes in good faith that aCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the law enforcement officer may detain that person for a sufficient time”). A decision to stop a vehicl e is valid so long as the officer’s “ on - the

- spot evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred. ” Id . at 537. The determination of reasonable suspicion requires de novo review on appeal. Id

.

[15] Burrage contends that the officers did not have reasonable su spicion to initiate a traffic stop of the Dodge Magnum and that his convictions for unlawful possession of a handgun and resisting law enforcement therefore m ust be reversed. In particular, Burrage relies on the evidence that Detective Brooks had radioed to other officers and written in hi s report that the D odge Magnum “crossed the center line ” as it tra veled on Lower Huntington Road, but since Lower Huntington Road was a three

- lane road , “there was no center line to cross.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 , 21 ; Defendant’s Ex. B

. Thus, Burrage claims, “there was no traffic violation” and the stop was pretextual such that “everything that happened after the vehicle was stopped . . . is subject to be suppressed.” Id . at 21. A s he did at the motion to suppress he aring, Burrage urges that Ind

. Code § 9

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- 2 is the relevant statute and that there is no evidence that he violated it. Th at statute provid es in pertinent part:
Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway except as follows:
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the rules applicable to a roadway divided into three marked lanes.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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I.C

. § 9

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- 2(a)(3) (emphasis added). He argues tha t because Lower Huntington Road is a three

- lane roadway, “the driver of the Ma gnum was not required by statute to drive upon the right half of the roadway,” and, in any event, “there was no evidence presented . . . that the vehicle crossed over into the opp osite lane of travel.” Appellant’s Brief at 20

. Consequently, he argues the stop was invalid , and the firearm should not have been admitted at trial

. We disagree. 1

[16] Burrage’s exclusive focu s on the “ crossed the center line ” evidence is too

narrow . That is, while there was testimony that Detective Sergeant Brooks had radioed that the vehicle was “left of center” or “ crossed the center line ”

– which Burrage claims is impossible given that it is a three

- lane road

– Detective Sergeant Brooks gave additional and more explanatory testimony that he observed the vehicle “cross the yellow line, the solid yellow line towards the center four different times in about a half a mile” and described that it had driven “into the turn lane four times.” Transcript Vol. 1 a t 115, 117. He also stated that the driver never signaled a lane change . This evidence indicates that

1 Before proceeding with our analysis of the validity of the traffic stop, we note that, at the trial court level, the State argued that Burrage lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search under both the 4 th Amendment, because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which he was a passenger, as well as under Article 1 Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, because Burrage had disclaimed any interest in the handgun. In denying Burrage’s motion to suppress, the tria l court agreed and based its decision, in part, on the determination that Burrage “had no standing to object to a search.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 71. Although we, like the trial court, have concerns about Burrage’s standing to challenge the sear ch, we do not address it in our decision because the State on appeal does not raise any issue or argument concerning standing. See Bradley v. State , 4 N.E.3d 831, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ( in resolving a claim of unlawful search and seizure, an appellate court should not sua sponte invoke lack of standing) , trans. denied

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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the vehicle moved or veered into the center turning lane, which was marked with turning arrows, although the driver did not signal a lane change or turn

. Additionally, Detective Sergeant Brooks testified that, in his training and experience, this type of improper lane use “could mean that the driver was impaired or distracted, which are both reasons to cause traffic accidents.” Id

. at 115. Given these facts, we find that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of the Dodge Magnum. See Pridemore v. State , 71 N.E.3d 70, 74

- 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding reasonable suspicion existed to stop a vehicle that had crossed into median area lo cated between opposite lanes of travel, although officer testified to witnessing vehicle “cross left of center”).

[17] Furthermore, as the State points out, Burrage’ s argument that the driver did not violate I.C

. § 9

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- 2(a) because the vehicle did not leave “the right half of the roadway ” ignores another statute, I.C

. § 9

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- 11, which provides rules for roadways divided into three or more lanes. It states: Whenever a roadway has been divided into three (3) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the foll owing rules apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the person who drives the vehicle has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
(2) Upon a roadway that is divided into three (3) lanes, a vehicle may not be driven in the center lane except under any of the following conditions:Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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(B) In preparation for a left turn.
(C) Where the center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is signposted to give notice of the allocation.

I.C

. § 9

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- 11. 2

[18] Here, Detective Sergeant Brooks observed the Dodge Magnum “cross the yellow line, the solid yellow line towards the center four different times in about

a half a mile” on Lower Huntington Road and not display a turn signal

. Transcript Vol. 1 a t 115. This indicates that , in a short distance, the vehicle repeatedly left its lane of travel and moved “toward s the center,” which was a turning lane, but the vehicle neither slowed to a stop nor signaled a turn or lane change . T he driver thus failed to co mply with I.C

. § 9

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- 11 . Burr age argues on appeal that because the radio call and written report referred to the vehicle as having crossed the center line , the State on appeal was offering “new and different reasons” to “legitimize the stop,” namely I

. C . § 9

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- 11, which he claims should be rejected as contrary to the evidence. Reply Brief at 5, 7. It was

2 I

. C . § 9

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not a “new and different” reason nor contrary to the evidence, however, as Detective Long explained at the motion to suppress hearing th at what occurred

was not only crossing a center line; it was also considered “not maintaining a lane.” Motion to Suppress Transcript at 24. For the reasons stated , the officers had rea sonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of the Dodge Magnum, an d
t he trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the firearm into evidence at trial

. 3 

### II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[19] Burrage argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a ser ious violent felon. 4 In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Causey v. State , 808 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)

. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id

. We will affirm t he conviction “i f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the c onclusion of the trier

- of

- fact.” Id. T he evidenc e need not

3 The State also asserts that, e ven if the officers ’ stop for a violation of traffic laws was unsound, other reasons justified that stop, including: (1) “ the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying an identity check of the oc cupants to confirm that Burrage was in the vehicle ”; (2) “the seizure [of the handgun] was attenuated from the stop”; and (3) discovery of the gun was a result of Burrage’s own conduct, namely placing it on the seat, which left it in plain view

. Appellee’s Brief at 14, 16, 19. Because we find that the stop was justified for t raffic violations , we do not reach the State’s arguments.
4 Burrage concedes that “[i]f this [c]ourt finds that the traffic stop was justified, . . . his actions do constitute the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Having fou nd t hat the stop was valid, we confine our sufficiency analysis to the unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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overcome every reasonable hypothes i s of innocence

. Sallee v. State , 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016)

.

[20] To convict Burrage of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, the State was required to prove that (1) Burra ge was a serious violent felon as defined in Indiana and (2) he knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm. See Ind. Code § 35

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- 4

- 5. Burrage stipulated at trial that he was a serious violent felon under Indiana law. Thus, on appeal, Burrage’s clai m “deals solely with the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to Burrage being in possession of the firearm , ” which was found on the rear bench seat, near where he had been seated before he exited the car. Appellant’s Brief at 22.

[21] Here, at trial, I .C.C. testified that, as the vehicle was being stopped by police , Burrage “said he had a gun” and pulled the handgun out of his pants, from “inside the belt.” Transcript Vol. 1 at 173

- 74. I.C.C. further testified that Burrage “tried to hand it to me,” at which time I.C.C. “stopped looking” and did not see Burrage set the handgun on the s eat, but saw it there after Burrage had exited the car. After Burrage opened the door and fled, Green heard I.C.C. yell, “There’s a gun back here.” Id. at 161 . Green testified that the gun did not belong to her or to I.C.C. , and Wheeler, who owned but did not drive the car, testified that it was not his.

[22] Burrage concedes that I.C.C. ’s testimony was direct evidence “ that [he] actually possessed the firearm” a nd that I.C.C. ’s testimony was supported by Green ’s testimony

. Appellant’s Brief at 24. But he nevertheless contends that the StateCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04

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failed to prove he knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm because (1) the State was unable to provide evidence tha t Burrage was armed when he came out of the Hickory Creek Apartments; (2) there was no testimony that Burrage made furtive gestures as the vehicle was being stopped; (3) three other individuals remained in the automobile during the time Officer Long chased Burrage on foot, and “[t] his period was long enough for any of the three to place the firearm on the backseat of the vehicle”; and (4) there w ere no fingerprints linking Burrage to the firearm. Id

. We find that Burrage’s arguments in this regard are challenges to I.C.C. ’s eyewitness testimony to seeing Burrage with the gun in the back seat right before he opened the door and ran

. On appeal, we cannot reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Causey , 808 N.E.2d at 143. I.C.C. ’s testimony was su fficient to show that Burrage possessed the handgun and left it in the car when he fled. Accordingly,
t he State presented sufficient evidence to convict Burrage of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a handgun by a serious violent felon.

[23] Judgment affi rmed.

Brown, J. and Tavitas , J., concur.