alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Dismiss and Opinion Filed July 3, 2014 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00381-CV ROBERT NOEL AND AMBE R NOEL, Appellants V. MARY R. CRAVEY, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-01133-E



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang-Miers Opinion by Justice Bridges Both the filing fee and the clerk’s record in this case are overdue. By postcard dated March 27, 2014, we notified appellants the $195 f iling fee was due. We directed appellants to remit the fee within ten days. We cautioned appella nts that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of this appeal wit hout further notice. By letter dated May 23, 2014, we informed appellants that we had been no tified by the Dallas County Clerk that the clerk’s record in this case had been prepared but had not been filed because appellants had not paid for or made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. We directed appellants to provide the Court with written verification that they had paid for or ma de arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record or that they had been found entitled to proceed w ithout payment of costs within ten days. We cautioned appellants that if we did not receive the required verification, we might dismiss the–2– appeal without further notice. To date, appell ants have not paid the filing fee, provided the required verification, or otherwis e corresponded with the Court re garding the status of this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 37.3(b); 42.3(b), (c).

140381F.P05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE–3– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ROBERT NOEL AND AMBER NOEL, Appellants
No. 05-14-00381-CV V. MARY R. CRAVEY, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-14-01133-E. Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Francis and Lang-Miers participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellee MARY R. CRAVEY rec over her costs of this appeal from appellants ROBERT NOEL AND AMBER NOEL.
Judgment entered July 3, 2014
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3433 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3433

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 14, 2009

 Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 
                              Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To amend the North American Wetlands Conservation Act to establish 
requirements regarding payment of the non-Federal share of the costs of 
  wetlands conservation projects in Canada that are funded under that 
                      Act, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PAYMENT OF NON-FEDERAL SHARE OF PROJECTS IN MEXICO AND 
              CANADA UNDER NORTH AMERICAN WETLANDS CONSERVATION ACT.

    (a) In General.--Section 8(b)(3) of the North American Wetlands 
Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 4407(b)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(3) The non-Federal share of the United States contribution to 
the costs of such projects may not be derived from Federal grant 
programs. In the case of a project carried out in Canada or Mexico, the 
non-Federal share of the costs of the project may include cash 
contributions from non-United States sources that are used to pay costs 
of the project. In the case of a project carried out in Canada, funds 
from Canadian sources may comprise up to 50 percent of the non-Federal 
share of the costs of the project.''.
    (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply 
with respect to any approved and active wetlands conservation project 
(as that term is used in section 8(b)(1) of such Act) carried out with 
assistance provided under such Act, including such a project approved 
before the date of the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives October 13, 2009.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
NUMBER 13-13-00320-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

COREY SATTERWHITE A/K/A 

CORY SATTERWHITE, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 214th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria

Order Per Curiam

Appellant, Corey Satterwhite a/k/a Cory Satterwhite, filed a notice of appeal with 

this Court from his conviction for aggravated assault. The record currently before the 

Court fails to include a certification of appellant’s right to appeal. Based upon 
information provided by the district clerk’s office, a certification has not yet been entered 

by the trial court. Accordingly, this matter is ABATED and REMANDED to the trial court 

for entry of a certification of the appellant’s right to appeal. On remand, the trial court 

shall immediately issue notice of a hearing and accordingly conduct a hearing addressing 

the foregoing matter. We further direct that, after conducting the hearing, the trial court 

certify whether appellant has the right of appeal. The trial court's certification, and any 

orders it enters, shall be included in a supplemental clerk's record. The trial court is 

directed to cause the supplemental clerk's record to be filed with the Clerk of this Court 

within thirty days of the date of this order. Should the trial court require more time to 

comply with the directions of this Court, it shall request an extension prior to the expiration 

of this deadline.

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

4th day of November, 2013.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13** 

**- 6**  **437**

DEREK CURTIS

,

P laintiff

- Appell ant

,

v.

KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, Attorney General; PAUL EBERT, Esquire, Commonwealth Attorney; JEANICE WEITHOP, Esq. Asst. Commonwealth Attorney; ANGELA HORAN, County Attorney; COLONEL MELETUS, Superintendent; CHERYL ANN WALTON, CAC; CAPTAIN GEORGE HURLOCK, Director of Security; CHARLIE DEAN, Chief of Police; HEATHER DARLING, Detective; SERGEANT BREWER, Deputy Sheriff; OFFICE R PEACEMAKER, Deputy Sheriff; CAROLYN OLIVER, Social Worker II; SERGEANT LAUREL WHITAKER, Supervisor

,

Defendants

- Appell ee s ,

and

CHERYL WALTON, Attorney; UNKNOWN CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, Prince William County Regional Adult Detention Center;

BRANT, Correctional Officer; TED BODIE, Attorney,

Defendants

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria

. Claude M. Hilton

, Senior District Judge. ( 1 :1 2

- cv

- 00 296

- CMH

- IDD )

Submitted : July 18, 2013 Decided: July 23, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.2 Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Derek Curtis , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:

Derek Curtis appeals the district court ’ s order

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) (200 6 ). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated

by the district court. Curtis v. Cuccinelli , No. 1:12

- cv

- 00296

-

CMH

- IDD (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 19 & entered Feb. 21, 2013) . We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

th is court and argument would not aid the d ecisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

ROBERT MICKENS, SR.,

Petitioner

v.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY COURT OF

COMMON PLEAS,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 10 WM 2019

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 21st day of March , 2019, the Application for Leave to File Original

Process and the Request for Permission to File Objection are GRANTED, and the Petition

for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief is DENIED.
#### Robert B. KEENAN, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. FIRST CALIFORNIA BANK, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 06-56481.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 1, 2008.

Donald E. Chadwick, Esq., Northridge, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Barry A. Smith, Brian H. Newman, Esq., Buchalter Nemer, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Robert B. Keenan appeals the district court’s order dismissing his action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), as well as state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), *Arrington v. Wong,*237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.2001), and we reverse.

The district court erred in dismissing the complaint with regard to Keenan’s § 1983 claims because he sufficiently alleged that First California Bank deprived him of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), and acted under the color of state law by surrendering Social Security funds in his bank account at the explicit direction of the California Franchise Tax Board. *See Franklin v. Terr,*201 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a § 1983 plaintiff must allege deprivation of a right under federal law and that defendant acted under color or state authority); *Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,*827 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cm.1987) (concluding that where the state commanded a phone company to take specific action with regard to a customer it “converted its otherwise private conduct into state action for purposes of § 1983”).

Contrary to First California Bank’s contentions, California Revenue and Taxation Code § 18674(a) does not provide immunity from Keenan’s § 1983 claims. *See Rimes v. Stone,*84 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir.1996) (“the existence of § 1983 immunities is a matter of federal law” and “[cjonduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law”).

Because it is unclear whether the district court premised dismissal of the state law claims on dismissal of the § 1983 claims, we reinstate the state claims and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Minnie Pearl THOMAS, a.k.a. Nick, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-12004

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 10, 2010.

*486Minnie Pearl Thomas, Tallahassee, FL, pro se.

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Minnie Pearl Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for a reduction of sentence. Thomas was convicted for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Pearl to two mandatory life sentences as a career-offender. She sought a reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 706, which provides a two-level reduction in the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. After review, we affirm Thomas’ sentence.1

Sentences based on career-offender status or on a statutory minimum are not based on a range that has “subsequently been lowered” within the meaning of § 3582(c)(2), and district courts are not authorized to reduce a sentence under that statute. *See United States v. Williams,*549 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th Cir.2008); *United States v. Moore,*541 F.3d 1323, 1327-28 (11th Cir.2008). Thomas concedes she was sentenced as a career offender, and her prior convictions for drug offenses resulted in mandatory minimum life sentences. *See*21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851. Consequently, any adjustment to her advisory guideline range would not affect the length of her prison terms and she is ineligible for a sentence reduction.

AFFIRMED.

1

. We review *de novo*a district court's conclusions about the scope of its legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). *United States*v. *Moore,*541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir.2008).
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 24, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49229-49230]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22988]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

[Investigation No. 731-TA-1189 (Review)]


Large Power Transformers From Korea; Notice of Commission 
Determination To Conduct a Full Five-Year Review

AGENCY: United States International Trade Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission hereby gives notice that it will proceed with a 
full review pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930 to determine whether 
revocation of the antidumping duty order on large power transformers 
from Korea would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of 
material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time. A schedule for 
the review will be established and announced at a later date.

DATES: The determination was made on October 6, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Casanova (202-708-2719), Office 
of Investigations, U.S. International Trade Commission, 500 E Street 
SW., Washington, DC 20436. Hearing-impaired persons can obtain 
information on this matter by contacting

[[Page 49230]]

the Commission's TDD terminal on 202-205-1810. Persons with mobility 
impairments who will need special assistance in gaining access to the 
Commission should contact the Office of the Secretary at 202-205-2000. 
General information concerning the Commission may also be obtained by 
accessing its internet server (https://www.usitc.gov). The public 
record for this review may be viewed on the Commission's electronic 
docket (EDIS) at https://edis.usitc.gov.
    For further information concerning the conduct of this review and 
rules of general application, consult the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, part 201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 
201), and part 207, subparts A, D, E, and F (19 CFR part 207).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 6, 2017, the Commission 
determined that it should proceed to a full review in the subject five-
year review pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
U.S.C. 1675(c)). The Commission found that both the domestic and 
respondent interested party group responses to its notice of 
institution (82 FR 30896, July 3, 2017) were adequate. A record of the 
Commissioners' votes, the Commission's statement on adequacy, and any 
individual Commissioner's statements will be available from the Office 
of the Secretary and at the Commission's Web site.
    Authority: This review is being conducted under authority of title 
VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to 
section 207.62 of the Commission's rules.

    By order of the Commission.

    Issued: October 18, 2017.
Lisa R. Barton,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2017-22988 Filed 10-23-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
## In **T he**  **Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo**  No. 07 - 22 - 00207 - CV DAVEON ELLIS , A PPELLANT V. JACQUELINE TERRIAULT , APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 264th District Court Bell County, Texas Trial Court No . 310173 , Honorable Paul L. LePak , Presiding 

### September 21 , 2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. Appellant , Daveon Ellis , proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’ s “findings, conclusions, or recommendations which were made by [the] Honorable Judge Paul Lepak on May 17, 2022.” 1 We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, th is appeal was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 73.001.2 We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or from an interlocutory order made immediately appealab le by statute. See Lehmann v. Har - Con Corp ., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord , 967 S.W.2d 352, 352 - 53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). The trial court clerk has notified the Court that no signed judgment or order has been filed. Moreover , the pu rported findings and recommendations of the trial court are not a final judgment, nor an interlocutory order made immediately appealable by statute. By letter of August 10, 2022 , we notified Ellis that it did not appear that a final judgment or appealab le order had been issued by the trial court and directed him to show how we have jurisdiction over th is appeal. To date, Ellis has n either filed a response n or had any further communication with this Court
. Because Ellis has not presented this Court with a final judgment or appealable order, t h e appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 42.3(a).
Per Curiam
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

Honorable Mark E. Fuller, United States Chief District Judge for the Middle District of *

Alabama, sitting by designation.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 04-13140

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-14009-CR-DMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

TIMOTHY RAY DARNALL, 

a.k.a. Timothy Ray Darnell, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(September 23, 2005)

Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and FULLER , Chief District *

Judge.
2

PER CURIAM:

Having reviewed the briefs and considered argument of counsel, we find no

error as to Appellant’s conviction or sentence. See United States v. Lebovitz, 401

F.3d 1263 (11 Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11 Cir. th th

2005); United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11 Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the th

conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Santiago Alvarez, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 862]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated July 12, 2011 *(People v Alvarez,*86 AD3d 578 [2011]), affirming a sentence of the County Court, Orange County, imposed January 11, 2010.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz, 2*NY3d 277 [2004]).

Dickerson, J.E, Hall, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

JASON FITZGERALD, 

 

Defendant Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

 Plaintiff Below, 

Appellee.

§ 

§ No. 117, 2022 

§ 

§ 

§ Court Below–Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 2007010286 (N) 

§ 

§

 

 Submitted: April 14, 2022 

 Decided: April 21, 2022 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 

Justices. 

ORDER 

After careful consideration of the notice to show cause and the appellant’s 

response, it appears to the Court that: 

(1) On April 6, 2022, the appellant, Jason Fitzgerald, filed a notice of 

appeal from his criminal conviction and sentence for second-degree assault. The 

Superior Court sentenced Fitzgerald on November 8, 2021. Under Supreme Court 

Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal was due on or before December 8, 2021.1

(2) On April 7, 2022, the Senior Court Clerk issued a notice directing 

Fitzgerald to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely filed. 

1

 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(iii). 
2

In his response to the notice to show cause, Fitzgerald alleges that he failed to file a 

timely notice of appeal due to, among other things, court delays attributable to the 

COVID-19 pandemic and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

(3) Time is a jurisdictional requirement.2 A notice of appeal must be 

received by the Court within the applicable time period to be effective.3 An 

appellant’s prisoner pro se status does not excuse his failure to comply strictly with 

the jurisdictional requirements of Supreme Court Rule 6.4 Unless an appellant can 

demonstrate that his failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to courtrelated personnel, the appeal cannot be considered.5

 

(4) The record does not reflect that Fitzgerald’s failure to file a timely 

notice of appeal in this case is attributable to court-related personnel. Consequently, 

this case does not fall within the exception to the general rule that mandates the 

timely filing of a notice of appeal, and this appeal must be dismissed. To the extent 

that Fitzgerald alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective, he may pursue those 

claims in the Superior Court by filing a timely motion for postconviction relief under 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. 

2 Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989). 

3

 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 10(a). 

4 See Smith v. State, 47 A.3d 481 (Del. 2012). 

5 Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979). 
3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, under Supreme Court 

Rule 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice
Exhibit 32.1


Section 1350 Certification





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of China Direct Industries, Inc. (the "Company") for the nine month period ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Yuejian (James) Wang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Andrew X. Wang, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:





1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date: August 12, 2010



/s/    Yuejian (James) WangYuejian (James) Wang

Chairman, President and Chief Executive OfficerDate: August 12, 2010



/s/    Andrew X. WangAndrew X. Wang

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer





This certification accompanies this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.