DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER LAMAR SOLS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-763

[January 20, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward 

County; Joseph A. Murphy, III, Judge; L.T. Case No. 14-009630CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allan R. Geesey, Assistant 

Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, J.

Christopher Lamar Sols appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence for 

second-degree murder with possession and discharge of a firearm causing death. 

We affirm Sols’ conviction without comment regarding the issues he raised. 

However, we agree with Sols that the trial court misapprehended its discretion 

in imposing what it believed to be a mandatory life sentence for the crime under 

the 10-20-Life statute, section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2018). We therefore 

reverse his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

After the jury returned its guilty verdict and was dismissed, the following 

discussion ensued:

[THE COURT]: Is there any reason why a sentence shouldn’t be 

pronounced now or do you need some time to set it for a sentencing 

hearing? I don’t know exactly how you want to do it. My 

understanding is that this is a mandatory sentence of – Is he entitled 

to some type of pre-sentence investigation report [“PSI report”] or 

something along those lines? I’m not aware of that.

. . . .
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, the technical answer to that would be 

yes. But the first part of the Court’s query is also accurate that it is 

a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to statute.

. . . .

[THE COURT]: Is he entitled to [a PSI report]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe he is, Judge.

. . . .

[THE COURT]: Thank you. Well, it’s – My understanding is that 

sentence is not discretionary. So, I don’t know what [the PSI report] 

matters, to be candid with you.

The trial court set sentencing for a later date. At the sentencing hearing, after 

the trial court adjudicated Sols guilty of second-degree murder and confirmed 

that the jury found that Sols possessed, carried, and discharged a firearm during 

the crime, the following exchange occurred:

[THE COURT]: The sentence is life in prison, correct?

[THE STATE]: Yes, Your Honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, Judge.

[THE COURT]: So you’re sentenced to life in prison, Mr. Sols. Good 

luck. You have 30 days to appeal.

Sols subsequently moved to correct his sentence under Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) alleging that the trial court was under the 

mistaken impression that it had no discretion but to sentence Sols to life in 

prison. The trial court did not rule on the motion within sixty days and it was 

deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B). This proceeding followed. 

“The standard of review applicable to a trial court’s order on a motion to 

correct sentencing error is de novo.” Pitts v. State, 202 So. 3d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2016).

Second-degree murder is a felony of the first degree, which is “punishable by 

imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life.” § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. 

(2018). Second-degree murder is reclassified from a first-degree felony to a life 

felony, if “during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, 

uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use . . . [a] firearm.” § 775.087(1), Fla. 
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Stat. (2018). The statute that authorizes this reclassification is commonly 

known as the 10-20-Life statute. See Pitts, 202 So. 3d at 884. Under the 10-

20-Life statute, if a firearm is discharged and “as the result of the discharge, 

death or great bodily harm is inflicted upon any person, the convicted person 

shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years 

and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.” § 775.087(2)(a)3., 

Fla. Stat. (2018). The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that 

the trial court has discretion “to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five 

years to life.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 2010).

Citing to these relevant statutes and case law, Sols argues that although his 

sentence had to be at least twenty-five years in prison, it could have been 

anywhere between that and a term of life in prison. On this point, Pitts is 

instructive. In Pitts, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with a 

firearm. 202 So. 3d at 883. At sentencing, the court stated that the defendant 

would be sentenced to life in prison under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes 

(2011), with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years under the 10-20-Life 

statute. Id. at 883-84. However, after the prosecutor stated that the defendant’s 

sentence under the 10-20-Life statute had to be the same as his sentence under 

section 775.082, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison with a 

mandatory minimum of life under the 10-20-Life statute. Id. at 883. 

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court misapprehended its 

discretion “to sentence him to a mandatory minimum of less than life in prison 

under the 10-20-Life statute.” Id. at 884. This court agreed and reversed and 

remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 885. We noted that while the 

defendant’s sentence was legal, resentencing was warranted because the trial 

court “misapprehended its sentencing discretion under the relevant statutes.” 

Id. at 884; see Broadway v. State, 179 So. 3d 560, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (trial 

court erred in finding that the 10-20-Life statute mandated a life sentence). 

Finally, we confirmed that while the trial court had no discretion in deciding 

whether to sentence the defendant under the 10-20-Life statute (because he 

possessed and discharged a firearm during the commission of an enumerated

felony), the minimum mandatory sentence under that statute could have been

anywhere from twenty-five years to life. Pitts, 202 So. 3d at 884-85; see also 

Mendenhall, 48 So. 3d at 742 (same); Broadway, 179 So. 3d at 562 (same). 

Therefore, we agree with Sols that the trial court erred in concluding a life 

sentence was mandatory under the statute, and remand for a new sentencing 

hearing. Although Sols will still be subject to a life sentence under the 10-20-

Life statute at re-sentencing, a new hearing is required “so that the trial court 

may exercise its sentencing discretion with the express understanding that” the 

statute permits but does not mandate a life sentence. See Broadway, 179 So. 

3d at 562.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for re-sentencing.

DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.