J-S64018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.Y.S. & E.M.S. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.J.H., NATURAL MOTHER

No. 1023 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered on May 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County

Juvenile Division at Nos.: RT-25-2014(B)

RT-26-2014(B)

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2015

T.J.H. (“Mother”) appeals the May 13, 2015 order that terminated her 

parental rights to D.Y.S. (born in September 2012) and E.M.S. (born in 

September 2013) (collectively “Children”). We affirm.

The trial court made the following findings of fact that summarize the 

factual history and the hearing on the petition for termination of parental 

rights:

1. [In September 2012, D.Y.S.] was born. At that time 

Mother was age 17 and living in the foster home of [T.W.] as a 

dependent child. She had been there since November 2011. 

[A.S.G. (“Father”)] was listed as the paternal parent on the birth 

certificate. [T.W.] reported that Mother was attentive to 

[D.Y.S.’s] needs while in her home.

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2. On November 15, 2012, Mother turned age 18 and left 

foster care to reside with Father’s family.

3. On April 3, 2013, Mother appeared at [Adams County 

Children & Youth Services (“ACCYS”)] and reported that she was 

pregnant and not getting along with Father’s family. 

Independent living was discussed with her and within one week 

she, Father and [D.Y.S.] were residing in an Independent Living 

apartment.

4. In August, 2013, Mother and Father were asked to leave 

the Independent Living apartment because they were not 

following the rules.

5. On September 4, 2013, the parents voluntarily agreed to 

place [D.Y.S.] with ACCYS for a period of no longer than 30 days 

because “the family is currently homeless, working through 

differences and feel that it is in the best interest of the child to 

be placed while they are working toward stability.” The child 

was placed in the Selby foster home in East Berlin, Adams 

County, Pennsylvania.

6. On September 20, 2013, [E.M.S.] and his sister, [E’m.S.], 

were born prematurely (29 weeks gestation) at York Hospital

and were placed in the [Neonatal Intensive Care] Unit. Father 

was not identified as the paternal parent on the birth certification 

but he subsequently acknowledged paternity.

7. Thereafter, Mother did not get to the hospital often 

because she lacked transportation. When able to get there, she 

would interact with the twins as much as possible.

8. On October 4, 2013, ACCYS took custody of [D.Y.S.] 

because the 30-day voluntary placement had expired and the 

parents were still homeless.

9. On October 5, 2013, Mother was cited for driving without a 

license, driving an unregistered vehicle and operating a vehicle 

without proper inspection. She entered pleas of guilty to each 

offense on November 18, 2013.

10. On October 7, 2013, the Juvenile Court of Adams County 

conducted an informal shelter care hearing for [D.Y.S.]. The 

parents did not appear. The court directed that the child remain 

in foster care. The parents appeared at [ACCYS] later and 

reported they had been pulled over for having no registration or 
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insurance on their vehicle even though records indicated that the 

event took place two days earlier.

11. On October 8, 2013, ACCYS filed a Dependency Petition 

. . . alleging [D.Y.S.] was a dependent child.

12. On October 15, 2013, ACCYS withdrew the Dependency 

Petition . . . and [D.Y.S.] was returned to the custody of Mother 

who was living with [D.W. and G.W. (“Foster Parents”)] in 

McSherrystown, Pennsylvania.

13. [T.W.] went with Mother to York Hospital to see the twins 

on three occasions and observed her as being attentive to them.

14. On October 31, 2013, Father was charged with Burglary, 

Aggravated Assault, Criminal Trespass and Simple Assault as a 

result of an incident occurring that date. Bail was set and Father 

was incarcerated.

15. On October 31, 2013, Mother moved from [Foster 

Parents’] home.

16. On November 12, 2013, ACCYS took custody of [E.M.S.] 

and [E’m.S.] for the reason that “since birth, the parents 

continue to have unstable housing, the mother has vacillated 

between giving up the child[ren] for adoption and caring for the 

child[ren], the mother’s plan for housing and support has 

changed from week to week, the child[ren are] ready for 

discharge and the mother could not present a solid plan to care 

for the child[ren].”

17. On November 13, 2013, the proposed foster mother, [Mrs. 

H.], completed the discharge training for the twins and they 

were moved to that foster home.

18. On November 13, 2013, Mother returned to [Foster 

Parents’] home.

19. On November 13, 2013, Father informed the caseworker 

that he [did] not want to see the children.

20. On November 15, 2013, the Juvenile court conducted a 

Shelter care hearing for [E.M.S.] and [E’m.S.]. The parents 

were present. It was alleged that . . . Father was incarcerated, 

that Mother’s circumstances were unstable and she did not have 

a specific plan for the children. [E.M.S. and E’m.S.] were 

maintained in foster care.
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21. On November 26, 2013, the Juvenile Court conducted an 

Adjudication Hearing for [E.M.S.] and [E’m.S.]. Both parents 

were present. At that time, the court determined that the 

parents had very limited contact with the children prior to their 

discharge from the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit on November 

13, and the hospital would not discharge them to the custody of 

their parents due to their lack of contact and failure to complete 

expected training for premature children. Mother was 19 years 

of age, living with her former foster mother, [G.W.], was 

unemployed, did not have a driver’s license or vehicle and had 

recently pled guilty to charges of driving without a license, 

invalid inspection and driving an unregistered vehicle. The twins 

had a lot of special requirements due to their premature birth. 

Mother indicated that she wanted to provide the care for the 

children even though she had not completed the aforementioned 

training nor demonstrated the expectations for caring for 

children born prematurely. Father was incarcerated and unable 

to care for the children. The court continued [E.M.S. and 

E’m.S.] in foster care.

* * *

23. On December 6, 2013, [ACCYS] conducted a family 

meeting to discuss moving the twins to [Foster Parents’] home. 

Mother was present but reportedly uncooperative with providers. 

A plan was discussed for Mother to work on her mental health, 

stability and parenting and for more visits to occur with the twins 

before they would be transitioned to Mother. She did visit with 

the twins that day.

24. On December 9, 2013, Mother and [Foster Mother] attended 

a visit with the twins.

25. On December 10, 2013, the Juvenile Court conducted a 

Dispositional Hearing . . . . Both parents were present. The 

parties agreed to the recommended dispositional plan. A 

primary permanency goal of reunification and a concurrent goal 

of adoption were established. The plan called for Mother to:

a. Maintain contact and cooperation with ACCYS;

b. Attend to her mental health by participating in 

counseling and/or medication management;

c. Consistently demonstrate appropriate parenting skill; 

and
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d. Establish and maintain stability regarding 

transportation, housing and employment.

Mother was still residing in the [Foster Parents’] home. It was 

understood that Mother and [Foster Mother] would complete 

neonatal discharge type training and when that was completed 

the twins would be transitioned to the [Foster Parents’] home.

26. On December 24, 2013, the twins moved to the [Foster 

Parents’] home.

27. After the move, Mother had difficulty caring for [D.Y.S.] 

and the twins at the same time. More often than not, [Foster 

Mother] would take care of [E.M.S.’] feeding, bathing, dressing 

and diapers while Mother cared for the other children.

28. In early January 2014, Mother became employed at a 

factory where she worked Sunday, Monday and Tuesday plus 

alternating Saturdays from 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. While Mother 

was working, [Foster Mother] would care for all the children. 

Mother was fired before the end of the month for not appearing.

29. On January 21, 2014 [E’m.S.] died at the foster home of 

[an] undetermined cause. Mother left the [Foster Parents’] 

home that same day and then spent time with Father’s family. 

Thereafter, she would call the foster home to see how [E.M.S.] 

was doing.

30. On January 28, 2014, Mother returned to the [Foster 

Parents’] home and a dispute arose over [D.Y.S.] playing with a 

feminine hygiene product. The incident escalated and resulted in 

Mother being escorted off the property by the police. She 

moved to the home of Father’s parents.

[Mother attended two visits in February 2014 with E.M.S.]

34. On February 18, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted a 

Permanency Hearing regarding [E.M.S.]. Both parents were 

present. The child was residing in the [Foster Parents’] home 

and doing well. At that time, the Foster Parents were reportedly 

not interested in being a permanent resource for the child. 

Mother was homeless, unemployed, had no transportation, had 

[D.Y.S.] in her custody and had not followed up with mental 

health services. [E.M.S.] was continued in foster care.

* * *
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36. On February 26, 2014, Mother began residing in an 

apartment [on] Chambersburg Street, Gettysburg provided by 

ACCYS’s Independent Living program.

37. Mother attended visits with [E.M.S.] on March 5, 12 and 

19, 2014 but was late for the visits on the 5th and 19th.

38. On March 12, 2014, Mother reported that she was 

employed at McDonald’s.

* * *

41. On March 31, 2014, ACCYS took custody of [D.Y.S.] 

because Mother indicated she could not care for the child at that 

time and she did not have family resources willing to care for 

him. Mother requested that [D.Y.S.] be placed in the [Foster 

Parents’] home where [E.M.S.] was residing. At this time, 

Mother was still living in the Independent Living apartment and 

Father was incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill.

42. On April 2, 2014, Mother did not attend the scheduled 

visit.

* * *

44. On April 3, 2014, ACCYS filed a Dependency Petition . . . 

alleging that [D.Y.S.] was a dependent child.

45. On April 9, 2014, Mother did not attend the scheduled visit 

because she was incarcerated.

* * *

48. On April 15, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted an 

Adjudication Hearing . . . for [D.Y.S.]. Mother was present and 

Father participated by telephone from SCI-Laurel Highlands. 

Mother agreed that she had requested [D.Y.S.] be placed in 

foster care because she was not able to care for him at that 

time. She had also not taken him for his one-year medical 

checkup or other periodic wellness checkups. Father was not 

able to confirm or deny many of the allegations but agreed that 

he was serving a minimum sentence of 18 months and then was 

facing federal deportation. Mother requested that [D.Y.S.] be 

placed in a different foster home, but [ACCYS] recommended 

that he remain with [E.M.S.]. The court agreed to keep [D.Y.S.] 

in the [Foster Parents’] home.
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49. Mother attended visits with the children on April 14, 16, 21 

and 23 but was late on the 14th and 16th. On April 21, Mother 

was observed “hitting” [D.Y.S.]. On April 23, Mother was 

observed on her cell phone for most of the visit.

50. On April 28, 2014, Mother tested positive for THC 

(marijuana).

51. Around this time, Mother lost her job at [McDonald’s].

[Mother missed visits on April 28 and 30, 2014.]

54. In early May, 2014, ACCYS recommended to Mother that 

she enroll in Haven Home in York but she refused to make the 

initial call. Around this time, Mother did agree to participate in 

the Incredible Years parenting program. She attended 4 of 5 

sessions before leaving the area and never finished the 

instruction.

55. On May 5 and 7, 2014, Mother attended scheduled visits 

with the children. On May 5, Mother was observed using 

intimidation with [D.Y.S.], texting on her cell phone, and not 

checking diapers. On May 7, Mother seemed moody and 

indicated that she could not wait to get to “D.C.” to go 

“clubbing.”

56. On May 5, 2014, Mother was provided a letter from the 

caseworker setting forth a visitation schedule for May 7, 12, 14, 

21, and 28. Mother was also advised about [ACCYS] concerns 

regarding Mother’s actions with the children during the visit on 

April 21; specifically as to “rough” discipline with [D.Y.S.] and 

placing [E.M.S.] flat on the floor to feed himself with a propped 

bottle.

57. On May 7, 2014, Mother was removed from the Supervised 

Independent Living apartment for a second time for not following 

the rules.

58. The following day, Mother moved to Washington, D.C. At 

[that] time, she was depressed over the loss of [E’m.S.].

59. On May 15, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted a Status 

Review [for E.M.S.] and a Disposition Hearing [for D.Y.S.]. 

Mother participated by telephone but Father did not participate. 

Mother was then living in Washington, D.C., with an aunt and 

cousin and reported that she was to begin employment at a 

restaurant the following day. With regard to [E.M.S.], it was 
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reported that during visits Mother would hold, feed or change 

the child’s diapers and that he seemed to enjoy her company but 

that Mother was not particularly responsive to redirection by 

others. . . . [T]he permanency goal for [D.Y.S.] was established 

as reunification with Mother along with a concurrent goal of 

adoption. ACCYS requested that Mother pursue mental health 

treatment to address family rejection, family violence and the 

death of her daughter. The court directed that Mother was to:

a. Maintain contact and cooperation with [ACCYS];

b. Attend to her mental health by participating in 

counseling and/or medication management;

c. Consistently demonstrate appropriate parenting skills;

d. Establish and maintain stability regarding 

transportation, housing, legal matters, drug free 

environment, and employment;

e. Attend to her grief/loss trauma through out-patient 

counseling or medications; and

f. Participate in a forensic psychological evaluation . . . 

when logistically able to do so.

60. Because Mother was in Washington, D.C., she did not 

appear for scheduled visits with the children on May 12, 14, 21, 

and 28, 2014.

61. During June and July, 2014, Mother did not have contact 

with ACCYS and had no visits with the children. There is no 

record that Mother called the children in May or June, however, 

she made at least two calls in July and two calls in August to the 

[Foster Parents’] home to speak with the children.

62. On July 8, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted a 

Permanency Hearing . . . . Neither parent participated. At that 

time, it was reported that Mother’s whereabouts were unknown 

and efforts to communicate with her had been unsuccessful. The 

aunt, with whom she reportedly was living, indicated to the 

caseworker that Mother was running the streets and was not 

employed. There were warrants for Mother’s arrest. [For 

E.M.S.], the court changed the permanency goal to adoption 

with a concurrent goal of permanent legal custodianship with a 

nonrelative. This modification was based on the level of 

progress with [E.M.S.], Mother’s lack of contact for two months 
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and Father’s inability to be a resource. [D.Y.S.] was 20 months 

of age and was reportedly doing well in the foster home and 

referring to the Foster Parents as mom and dad. The court 

directed that both children remain in foster care.

63. On August 1, 2014, Mother contacted the caseworker and 

indicated that she would turn herself in on August 8 but first 

wanted a visit with the children.

64. On August 21, 2014, Mother returned to Pennsylvania and 

requested ACCYS to transport her from York. Mother’s 

demeanor was reported to be erratic and her appearance 

disheveled. She was taken to a constable because of bench 

warrants and was incarcerated in the Adams County Adult 

Correctional Complex to satisfy financial obligations to a local 

magisterial district judge. She was released on September 7, 

2014.

* * *

66. On September 4, 2014, the Juvenile Court received a letter 

from Mother dated September 1, and forwarded a copy to 

ACCYS. The stated purpose of the letter was to explain “some of 

the choices I have recently made.” Mother wrote that after her 

daughter passed away she was feeling so much pain and guilt 

that she began “to smoke weed and drink.” She left 

Pennsylvania after losing her independent living apartment and 

“I take fully responsibility for losing it.” One month after moving 

in with her aunt “she kicked me out.” Mother stated that she 

planned to continue sessions [with a counselor] “for my mental 

health services as soon as I get my medical coverage.” She 

accused the foster mother of sabotaging her attempts to speak 

with [D.Y.S.] on the telephone. Mother also stated that she was 

“willing to allow [the children’s] biological [paternal] 

grandmother [M.G.] to adopt them . . . . All in all judge I am 

accepting the fact that I am just not capable of caring for my 

children and relay hope that you will help me help their 

grandmother obtain full custody of my boys. . . . I have prayed 

about this and cried many nights just knowing I have failed my 

children miserably.”

67. Around September 7, 2014, Mother was released from jail 

and began residing in a homeless shelter.

68. On September 9, 2014, a family meeting was arranged that 

involved Father’s family, who indicated they wished to be a 
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resource for the children. However, the paternal grandmother 

and the balance of the members of her household were 

reportedly illegal immigrants; therefore, [ACCYS] did not feel it 

could look to that family for permanency. [ACCYS] was willing 

to guide the family toward resources that would assist them in 

changing their immigration status. Mother was present for that 

meeting and appeared to the caseworker to be in a healthy 

frame of mind. It was revealed that she had been on medication 

for anxiety and depression while incarcerated, which was 

allowing her to think more clearly. However, Mother did not 

continue with her medication after being released from 

incarceration.

69. Mother visited with the children for 2 hours each on 

September 12 and 29. The visit on September 12 was her first 

physical contact with the children since May 7, a period in excess 

of four months. She did provide snacks for the children.

* * *

71. On October 1, 2014, Mother visited with the children but 

was observed yelling and cursing at [D.Y.S.].

* * *

74. On October 14, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted a 

Status Review . . . . Mother was not present but she was 

represented by counsel. Father participated by telephone from 

prison. It was reported that Mother was living at a local shelter 

and trying to secure housing. During October, Mother began 

employment at Kennies, a local supermarket, where her hours 

were Monday through Friday from 7:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. or 8:00 

a.m. – 4:30 p.m. Mother did not have insurance or independent 

transportation. She had been provided a weekly visitation 

schedule. The children appeared to be doing well in the foster 

home and the Foster Parents were now willing to be a 

permanent resource for them. The parents were opposed to 

adoption and Mother wanted the children returned to her care. . 

. . The court directed that the children remain in the foster 

home.

[Mother missed two visits in October 2014.]

77. Mother visited with the children on October 29, 2014. 

During that time, the caseworker asked Mother what schedule 

would work for her in November. Mother did not have an answer 
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but indicated that she would call the caseworker with her 

availability.

78. On November 14, 2014, the caseworker called Mother 

because she had not been informed of Mother’s availability for 

November visitation with the children.

* * *

81. Mother stopped by the foster home on November 24, 

2014. An argument arose when Mother became upset that the 

children referred to [Foster Father] as “dad”. Mother was asked 

to leave the residence after about 10 minutes.

82. Mother visited with the children for 2 hours on November 

26, 2014, but was observed to be engaged with her phone and 

not aware of some of the things the children were doing.

83. On December 9, 2014, the Juvenile Court conducted a 

Permanency Hearing . . . . Neither parent participated in the 

hearing. It was reported that Mother had quit her employment 

and continue[d] to reside in a local shelter. She was significantly 

in arrears to the Adams County Domestic Relations Office and 

avoided recent incarceration by borrowing a minimal sum of 

money to pay on the account. . . . The children were reported to 

be doing well in the foster home. The parents had been given 

the opportunity to grant permission for [E.M.S.] to be evaluated 

by Early Intervention but failed to follow through with that 

request[. T]herefore, the court was required to effectuate that 

permission. The court directed that the children remain in foster 

care.

* * *

85. On December 11, 2014 the instant Petitions were filed. As 

of [that] date [D.Y.S.] had been in foster placement for 9 1⁄2 

months and [E.M.S.] had been in placement for 13 months.

* * *

87. In December, 2014 the caseworker observed [D.Y.S.] 

becoming upset when Mother’s name was mentioned.

* * *
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90. On January 13 and 31, 2015 Mother visited with the 

children for one hour each. Mother was observed as not being 

engaged with the children and left each session early.

* * *

92. On February 12, 2015, Mother did not appear for her 

scheduled visitation with the children. That same day she tested 

positive for THC.

* * *

94. On February 23 and March 30, 2015, Mother failed to appear 

for scheduled visits.

* * *

96. On April 9, 2015 Mother did attend a scheduled visit. 

During the visit Mother asked [D.Y.S.] several times if he wanted 

to live with her and he responded negatively and identified 

[Foster Mother] as “my mommy.” No attachment was observed 

between the children and Mother by the caseworker.

97. Overall from February 2014 to April 9, 2015 there were 33 

visits scheduled for Mother and [E.M.S.] and 27 visits [of those 

visits included visitation with D.Y.S.]. Mother attended 20 of 

[E.M.S.’] visits (61%) and 14 of [those including D.Y.S.] (51%). 

She was late or left early for 7 visits, cancelled 2 visits and 

simply did not appear for 9 visits. Mother counters that if late 

she was relying on others for transportation and if she left early 

it was because she had to go to work.

98. The children recognize [Foster Parents] as their parent 

figures.

99. As of the date of the hearing on [the termination petitions, 

D.Y.S] has been in placement for 13 months and [E.M.S.] has 

been in placement for 18 months.

100. Overall, Mother has displayed a more aggressive approach 

toward [D.Y.S.] and a more affectionate approach with [E.M.S.].

101. The children do accept hugs and kisses from Mother but 

sometimes [D.Y.S.] will not return hugs to Mother.

102. When Mother and [Foster Parents] are in the same location 

the children seek out the Foster Parents. Mother acknowledges 

that [E.M.S.] does not know her well.
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103. [D.Y.S.] has been observed not wanting to attend visits 

with Mother and [crying en route] but calm[ing] down during the 

actual visit.

104. [Foster Parents] are willing to adopt the children.

105. Kirsten Ritter, Permanency Specialist for the Bair 

Foundation, has been visiting with the children in the [Foster 

Parents’] home monthly since August 6, 2014. She has 

observed an attachment between the children and the [Foster 

Parents] and that the children are very comfortable in the 

[Foster Parents’] home. She noticed the children referring to the 

[Foster Parents] as mom and dad.

Trial Court Order & Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/13/2015, at 2-18 (citations to 

record omitted; modifications to capitalization).

On May 13, 2015, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1) and (5) and (b) and 

additionally, to E.M.S pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).1 The court 

found that ACCYS had not met its burden of proof to terminate Mother’s 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). On June 10, 2015, Mother 

filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) for each child. On June 

12, 2015, the trial court issued a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) in 

which it concluded that Mother’s issues on appeal were addressed in its May 

13, 2015 order and opinion.

Mother raises the following issues for review:

____________________________________________

1

Father’s rights were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) 

and (b).
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1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or made an 

error of law when it concluded there was clear and convincing 

evidence presented to involuntarily terminate [Mother’s] 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) when 

competent evidence provided that although [Mother] had 

been under severe emotional distress following the death of 

her infant daughter and, therefore, temporarily unable to 

perform her parental duties, this situation was improving at 

the time of the hearing.

2. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or made an 

error of law in concluding that there was clear and convincing 

evidence to involuntarily terminate [Mother’s] parental 

right[s] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) when the 

only issues cited by the Trial Court to support termination was 

[sic] [Mother’s] housing and employment history and the 

testimony at the hearing established that the housing 

situation had been resolved.

3. [Mother has withdrawn this issue and we need not address it. 

See Mother’s Brief at 24.]

4. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or made an 

error of law in concluding that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights would serve the best interests and welfare of the 

child(ren) when the court acknowledged there was no 

evidence presented of parental incapacity, neglect or abuse 

and the evidence regarding the child(rens) reluctance to visit 

with [Mother] was primarily provided by the foster parents 

who testified that they refuse to acknowledge [Mother] as 

“Mother” or even to speak of [Mother] in any capacity within 

their home.

5. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or made an 

error of law in concluding that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights would serve the best interests and welfare of the 

child(ren) (ages 2 1⁄2 years and 19 months at the time of the 

hearing) when the pre-adoptive foster parents are advanced 

in age and testified to an unspecified “back up plan” which 

would require the children to move in with an unknown family 

member if/when they can no longer care for the children.

6. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or made an 

error of law in concluding that there was clear and convincing 
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evidence that involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8) for [E.M.S.] 

when the Trial Court held that the conditions which led to 

removal as related to the child’s special needs are no longer 

an issue, there was competent evidence that [Mother’s] 

housing had stabilized, and [Mother] testified to supports in 

place to assist with transportation.

Mother’s Brief at 4-6.

Mother’s issues 1, 2, and 6 address the trial court’s decision pursuant 

to section 2511(a) and will be addressed together. Issues 4 and 5 involve 

the trial court’s conclusions regarding Children’s best interests pursuant to 

section 2511(b) and will be addressed together.

Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is as 

follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even 

though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have 

adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not 

evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible 

evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all 
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credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and 

deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve 

errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial 

court’s sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by clear and convincing 

evidence, which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re T.F., 847 

A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) General rule. – The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the 

parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 
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period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations. – The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

The trial court found grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (5), and (b) for Children and additionally, 

section 2511(a)(8) for E.M.S. However, this Court only needs to agree with 

the trial court’s conclusions with regard to one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination 

of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Termination is a two-step process, in which a trial court first 

must determine whether the grounds under subsection (a) are met, and 
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then it must consider subsection (b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 

A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). The focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is upon the parent, while section 

2511(b) focuses upon the child. Id. at 1008. 

Because we need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to one 

subsection of 2511(a), we focus upon subsection (a)(1). When considering 

that subsection, “we are instructed that we may not consider any effort by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described in subsection[] (a)(1) . . . if 

that remedy was initiated after the parent was given notice that the 

termination petition had been filed.” In re D.W., 856 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa. 

Super. 2004).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at least 

the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, 

which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. . . . It is 

well-established that a court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence 

in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants the 

involuntary termination.

Further, Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. 

Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.
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In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (citations 

omitted)) (emphasis in original). 

Parental duties have been defined as follows:

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a 

child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. 

These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court 

has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which 

requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child's life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his . . . 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Here, in the six months preceding the termination petition, Mother had 

moved to Washington, D.C. and had no physical contact with Children. 

Mother made a few phone calls in July and August of 2014, but did not visit 

with Children in person until September 12, 2014. Mother went four months 

without seeing Children. After returning to Pennsylvania and reestablishing 
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contact with Children, Mother continued to miss visits and court proceedings. 

The trial court determined that, in the six months preceding the filing of the 

petition, Mother only saw Children five times. T.C.O. at 27. 

Mother continued to experience instability with her housing and 

employment. While there is evidence that Mother recently had more 

stability in her housing, that occurred post-petition and we may not consider 

it. See D.W., supra. Further, there was no evidence that Mother was 

involved in Children’s medical treatment or that she provided court-ordered 

financial support beyond that required to keep Mother from being jailed for 

contempt.

Mother has cited her depression over her daughter’s death to explain 

why she failed to maintain contact with Children. Mother’s Brief at 19-22. 

While sympathetic to Mother’s loss, mental health counseling and medication 

management were recommended to Mother on more than one occasion and 

Mother refused to participate. Even when Mother experienced some relief 

from symptoms while on medication during her incarceration, Mother chose 

not to continue the medication regime upon her release. 

Based upon the evidence, the trial court concluded that Mother had 

not acted affirmatively to maintain her relationship with Children and had 

not used all resources available to her to overcome the obstacles to that 

relationship. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that ACCYS had met its burden of 

proving section 2511(a)(1).
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Mother’s remaining issues contest the trial court’s finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in Children’s best interests. Mother 

argues that she provided testimony that she has a bond with Children. 

Further, Mother asserts that Foster Parents have alienated Children from her 

by not talking about Mother to the Children and permitting Children to call 

them mom and Dad. Further, Mother asserts that Foster Parents are of 

“advanced age” and have a plan for who will care for Children if Foster

Parents are no longer able to do so. Mother argues that, because she has 

no physical impediments to caring for Children, it is in their best interest to 

be returned to her care. Mother’s Brief at 26-28.

The trial court determined that there was no beneficial bond between 

Children and Mother, but that a strong bond existed between Children and 

Foster Parents. T.C.O. at 28-29. D.Y.S. became upset when hearing about 

Mother, was reluctant to visit Mother, and, when asked by Mother, stated 

that he did not want to live with her. The caseworker testified that, at one 

home visit, she observed D.Y.S. become upset at the mention of Mother’s 

name. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 4/13/2015, at 70. E.M.S. was never in 

Mother’s sole custody, and Mother only resided in the Foster Parents’ home 

with him for a short time. Conversely, Children’s needs are met by Foster 

Parents. There was testimony opining that Children are bonded with Foster 

Parents and look to Foster Parents to care for them.

As to Mother’s contention that her testimony regarding alienation 

should have been given more weight, we must defer to the trial court’s 
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credibility determinations and decisions regarding what evidence to believe. 

See M.G., supra. Here, the trial court did not put great weight on Mother’s 

testimony in that regard, and we will not disturb that conclusion. As to 

Foster Parents’ age, Foster Mother testified that she and Foster Father were 

sixty-one years old. N.T. at 124. While Foster Parents intended to raise 

Children, they made plans for their daughter to take Children should 

anything happen to Foster Parents after Children are adopted that would 

prevent them from caring for Children.2 Id. at 117, 124. There was no 

indication of any current health concerns with Foster Parents, and the plan 

they made was similar to that made by many parents regardless of age. 

Given the bond between Children and Foster Parents and the lack of any 

current impediment to caring for Children, their age did not preclude the trial 

court from finding that it is in Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusions regarding Children’s 

best interest. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

section 2511(b) was satisfied.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

2

Foster Parents also have a six-year-old adopted child. N.T. at 101.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/2015