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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 115,483

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

ARCHIE L. ROBINSON,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

If the State charges felony murder in a case in which several individuals commit 

the inherently dangerous felony, it is irrelevant which individual shot the victim. All 

participants in an underlying felony are principals to felony murder when a death occurs

during the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous 

felony. As a result, the State does not have to prove who committed the act that resulted 

in a death—e.g., fired the gun or struck the lethal blow. 

2.

By operation of the felony-murder statute, a complaint or information stating a 

defendant killed a victim during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony does 

not necessarily charge that a defendant personally committed the act that resulted in a 

death. 

3. 

The trial court does not err in instructing the jury on the elements of felony murder 

by stating the defendant or another killed the victim even though the complaint or 

information stated the defendant killed the victim. The law considers all who commit an 
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inherently dangerous felony to be a killer if the fatal blow occurs during the commission 

of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony, and the instruction 

informs the jury a defendant may be guilty whether the defendant or another committed 

the fatal act. 

Appeal from Douglas District Court; PAULA B. MARTIN, judge. Opinion filed June 29, 2018.

Affirmed.

Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 

brief for appellant. 

Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Charles E. Branson, district 

attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LUCKERT, J.: Archie Robinson appeals his conviction for felony murder. He 

argues three different grounds for reversal: (1) Insufficient evidence supports his 

conviction because the State charged him as the killer, but the trial evidence established 

his cousin fired the fatal shot; (2) the felony-murder instruction impermissibly broadened 

the information filed by the State against him; and (3) the felony-murder elements 

instruction did not conform to the evidence presented at trial. We reject Robinson's 

arguments and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of March 8, 2014, Cousins Dustin Walker and Archie 

Robinson broke into Marilyn Howard's residence, where she lived with two sons and a 

grandson. One of her sons, Patrick Roberts, sold marijuana from his bedroom, and the 
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cousins went directly to his room once inside the residence. According to the testimony 

of the surviving residents, one of the cousins demanded, "Where is it?" Roberts

responded, "I don't know what you are talking about." One of the cousins then shot 

Roberts, who died from his wounds. Roberts' brother struggled with the shooter before 

the gun went off a second time. Evidence at trial pointed to Walker as the shooter. 

During the altercation, Howard called 911. The first law enforcement officer 

arrived at the apartment a little after 3 a.m., by which time both Robinson and his cousin 

had fled. Roberts' brother and son told the officer the shooter wore a black shirt and the 

second man wore light clothes. Shortly after, officers began searching the area and found 

Walker and Robinson, who had separated, Walker wore a black jacket and jeans, and 

Robinson wore a cream-colored shirt and khaki pants.

Additional evidence introduced at trial implicated Robinson and Walker. 

Surveillance video from a nearby gas station showed the two men around 2:45 a.m., 

minutes before the shooting. Both men wore the same clothes at the time of their arrests. 

Stains on Robinson's pants and shirt matched Roberts' blood. Robinson was not wearing 

shoes when arrested, but officers found a size 9 shoe at the crime scene that did not 

belong to the residents. An officer found a matching shoe, stained with blood that 

matched Roberts', on the grounds of a nearby apartment complex. Robinson requested 

size 9 jail footwear during his police interview. The gun, which the intruders left at the 

scene, belonged to the mother of Walker's children. Finally, at trial, the mother of 

Robinson's children testified she asked Robinson why he did it and he said he "was being 

greedy and he said he fucked up." 

The jury convicted Robinson of both charges—aggravated burglary and felony 

murder. The court sentenced Robinson to a controlling hard 20 life sentence. Robinson 
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appeals. This court has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3601(b) (off-grid 

crime). 

ANALYSIS

Each of Robinson's issues rests on application of Kansas law about felony murder. 

The Kansas Legislature defines felony murder as "the killing of a human being 

committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently 

dangerous felony." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402. The Legislature created a list of 

"inherently dangerous" felonies. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402. That list includes 

aggravated burglary, which the jury determined Robinson committed. 

Significant to Robinson's arguments, if the State charges felony murder in a case 

in which several individuals commit the inherently dangerous felony, "[i]t is irrelevant 

which [individual] actually shot [the victim], as all participants to an underlying felony 

are principals to felony murder when death occurs." (Emphasis added.) State v. Chism, 

243 Kan. 484, 491, 759 P.2d 105 (1988); see State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 393-94, 373 

P.3d 811 (2016). This means "'all the participants . . . [are] equally guilty of the felony 

murder, regardless of who fired the fatal shot.'" Dupree, 304 Kan. at 393. As a result, the 

State need not prove the identity of the triggerman because that question lacks relevance. 

See State v. Littlejohn, 260 Kan. 821, 822, 925 P.2d 839 (1996); State v. Thomas, 239 

Kan. 457, 462, 720 P.2d 1059 (1986); State v. Myrick & Nelms, 228 Kan. 406, 416, 

616 P.2d 1066 (1980). 

With these principles in mind, we turn to the specifics of Robinson's issues. 
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ISSUE 1: Sufficient evidence supports Robinson's conviction of felony murder.

First, Robinson raises a sufficiency of evidence issue. He concedes the State 

"likely" proved he committed felony murder. That said, he argues the State accused him 

of being the shooter and, because it did so, it had to prove that fact but failed. His 

argument has aspects suggesting the State filed a defective information. But he has 

phrased the question as one relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. In that regard, we 

review all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine 

whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In making that determination, we do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 

852, 874, 348 P.3d 583 (2015).

The amended information charged: 

"That on or about the 8th day of March, 2014, in Douglas County, Kansas, one 

Archie L Robinson, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously kill a human being, towit: Patrick D. Roberts, in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any 

inherently dangerous felony, to-wit: Aggravated burglary, as defined in subsection (b) of 

K.S.A. 21-5807, and amendments thereto, all in violation of K.S.A. 21-5402(a)(2). 

(Murder in the First Degree, Off Grid/Person/Felony)." (Emphasis added.)

Robinson argues the emphasized language identified him as the triggerman and, in 

this way, the amended information acted like a bill of particulars. If a court orders the 

prosecutor to provide a bill of particulars, the State's trial "shall be confined to the 

particulars of the bill." See K.S.A. 22-3201(f). We conclude, however, that Robinson's 

arguments confuse the roles of the information and a bill of particulars.
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An information "shall be a plain and concise written statement of the essential 

facts constituting the crime charged." K.S.A. 22-3201. This means the State must "allege 

facts that, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, would constitute a Kansas crime 

committed by the defendant." State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 811, 375 P.2d 332 (2016). 

Thus, the State had to state the essential facts constituting felony murder, which

"is the killing of a human being" in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. 

K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402. The statute does not restrict its applicability to the one who 

commits the fatal act. Instead, the law considers Robinson to have "kill[ed] a human 

being"—the words used in the information—because he participated in the aggravated 

burglary, not because he pulled the trigger. See Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 393-94; Chism, 

243 Kan. at 491. The State merely alleged the essential fact that Robinson acted as a 

principal in the crime being committed when the bullet hit Roberts. After stating this 

essential fact, the State did not need to identify the triggerman, an irrelevant fact. In fact, 

"'the information need not set forth all the specific evidentiary facts relied on to sustain 

the charge.'" State v. Wright, 259 Kan. 117, 122, 911 P.2d 166 (1996) (quoting State v. 

Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 166, 708 P.2d 946 [1985]). 

In contrast, a bill of particulars informs a defendant of the evidence against him or 

her and, at trial, the State cannot deviate from those particulars. K.S.A. 22-3201(f); State 

v. Bischoff, 281 Kan. 195, 207, 131 P.3d 531 (2006). Here, had the State filed a bill of 

particulars and identified Walker as the triggerman, it could not have introduced evidence 

that Robinson fired the fatal shot. But the court did not order the State to file a bill of 

particulars. Moreover, proof that Walker fired the shot did not prove that Robinson did 

not cause the killing of Roberts under the felony-murder statute. 

The trial record provides sufficient evidence that Robinson committed felony 

murder—that is, he participated in the crime of an aggravated burglary during which 
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Roberts was killed. Whether he was the triggerman bears no relevance to that 

determination. As a result, the information stating Robinson killed a victim during the 

commission of an inherently dangerous felony does not necessarily allege Robinson fired

the fatal shot. 

We have no hesitation in concluding a rational factfinder could have found 

Robinson guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard we 

use for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. See Woods, 301 Kan. at 874. 

ISSUE 2: The felony-murder elements instruction was not overly broad.

Next, Robinson argues the felony-murder elements instruction impermissibly 

broadened the complaint by instructing the jury that he "or another" killed Roberts. See 

State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 802, 217 P.3d 15 (2009) ("A jury instruction on the 

elements of the crime that is broader than the complaint charging the crime is 

erroneous."). As a result, Robinson argues the instruction was not legally appropriate. See 

State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (delineating steps in jury 

instruction analysis and specifying the steps of finding an instruction to be legally and 

factually appropriate). At oral argument, Robinson's appellate counsel conceded that his 

first two issues rise or fall together; in other words, because we have rejected his first 

argument, he also loses on this issue. 

In essence, the instruction simply explained the elements of felony murder and the 

principles incorporated in those elements: The State need only prove one of the 

participants in an inherently dangerous felony killed Roberts during the commission of an 

inherently dangerous felony and that Robinson participated in the commission of that 

felony with the necessary mental culpability. It need not prove who pulled the trigger, 
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and the instruction essentially informs the jurors they do not have to determine whether 

Robinson or another principal pulled the trigger. 

Here, the instruction using the words "the defendant or another" did not broaden 

the information beyond the crime charged, and it was legally appropriate. 

ISSUE 3: We find any alleged error in the felony-murder elements instruction harmless.

At trial, Robinson objected to the use of the words "the defendant or another" in 

the instruction as factually inappropriate because the evidence proved Walker fired the 

gun. See Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163. On appeal, Robinson also argues the felony-murder 

instruction did not conform to the evidence because it allowed the jury to convict him

even though the evidence established he did not pull the trigger. 

In the State's brief, it conceded the instruction's factual inappropriateness, stating 

"the State acknowledges that, from a factual standpoint, the evidence presented at trial 

does not support including Robinson's name in the elements instruction." The State then 

focused on whether the error was harmless. At oral argument, however, the State 

acknowledged its concession may have been hasty and substantively inconsistent with its 

arguments on the first and second issues. Even so, we assume without deciding that 

Robinson established factual error in the jury instruction and turn our analysis to whether 

any error was harmless. See Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163 (after an appellate court 

determines a trial court erred in giving an erroneous, objected-to jury instruction an 

"appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and 

degree of certainty set forth in Ward [v. State, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011)]").

As for the harmless error inquiry, Robinson and the State dispute which harmless 

error standard applies: the constitutional or statutory harmless error standard. We assume 
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without deciding that Robinson correctly argues the constitutional harmless error 

standard applies. Under this standard, we must determine whether the State has proved

there is "no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict." Ward, 292 Kan. at 

569-70.

As we have discussed, the fact question raised by Robinson does not matter; the 

jury did not have to determine who fired the fatal shot as long as it was convinced beyond 

a reasonable doubt one of them had done so during the aggravated burglary. The 

instruction explained this principle—i.e, that the jury need not determine who shot 

Roberts. The outcome would have been the same whether Robinson or Walker fired the 

fatal shot. Thus, we conclude no reasonable possibility exists that the language of the 

instruction changed the jury's verdict. 

Affirmed.