alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jerry CHANCE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-40580

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston,'TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jose Eduardo Pena, Law Offices of J. Eduardo Pena, Laredo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Jerry Chance has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Chance has filed a response. The record is insufficiently developed to allow consideration at this time of Chance’s claim of ineffective assistance of *389counsel; such a claim generally “cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of the allegations.” *United States v. Cantwell,*470 F.3d 1087, 1091 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Chance’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kevin William KREJCE, Appellant.

No. 07-2197.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 29, 2008.

Filed: May 2, 2008.

David Genrich, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.

Caroline Durham, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Kevin William Krejce, Elk River, MN, pro se.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Kevin Krejce appeals the 151-month prison term that the district court1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He argues that his sentence is unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion by not properly considering relevant factors.

When the applicable Guidelines range is undisputed, as it is here, we consider whether the sentence is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. *See United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 261-62, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); *United States v. Mathis,*451 F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir.2006) (review for reasonableness is akin to review for abuse of discretion). We conclude that Krejee’s sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range is not unreasonable. The record shows that the district court considered only relevant factors — including Krejee’s two prior bank robbery convictions and his commission of this offense while on supervised release for a previous bank robbery, as well as the need to promote respect for the law and to afford adequate deterrence — and we see no clear error of judgment in the court’s weighing of those factors. *See United States v. Harris,*493 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir.2007) (sentence within advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1263, 170 L.Ed.2d 111 (2008); *United States v. Haack,*403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2005) (listing factors that might signal abuse of discretion); *see also Rita v. United States,*— U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (approving appellate presumption of reasonableness).

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Van Allen LOVE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-6348.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 22, 2008.

Decided: May 2, 2008.

Van Allen Love, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Van Allen Love seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing his Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and denying his subsequent Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend that ruling. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Love has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Love’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. *See United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir.2003). In order to obtain such authorization, a movant must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), *2702255(h). Love’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                     PSEG ENERGY HOLDINGS
                            Computation of Ratios to Fixed Earnings

                                                                                Quarters Ended March 31,
                                                                           --------------------------------
                                                                                 2001            2000
                                                                           -------------- -----------------
<S>                                                                              <C>            <C>
Earnings as Defined in Regulation S-K (A):
Pre-tax income from Continuing Operations                                        62,226         45,011
(Income)/Loss from equity investees, net of distributions                       (15,849)         1,911
Fixed Charges                                                                    38,604         39,831
Amortized of capitalized interest                                                    76          3,359
Capitalized interest                                                             (4,739)        (4,017)

                                                                             -----------   -------------
Earnings                                                                         80,318         86,095
                                                                             ===========   =============

Fixed Charges as Defined in Regulation S-K (B):
Total Interest expensed and capitalized                                          37,830         39,088
Interest in rental expense                                                          774            743

                                                                             -----------   -------------
Total Fixed Charges                                                              38,604         39,831
                                                                             ===========   =============

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                                                 2.08           2.16

<FN>
(A)  The term  "earnings"  shall be defined as pre-tax  income  from  continuing
     operations before adjustment for minority  interests or income or loss from
     equity  investees.  Add fixed charges adjusted to exclude (a) the amount of
     any  interest   capitalized   during  the  periods,   (b)  amortization  of
     capitalized interest and ('c') distributed income of equity investees. From
     the total subtract interest capitalized.

(B)  Fixed charges represent (a) interest, whether expensed or capitalized,  (b)
     amortization of debt discount,  premium and expense, and ('c') and estimate
     of interest implicit in rentals.

</FN>
</TABLE>
exv10w52



 





Exhibit 10.52




ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




     Notwithstanding any provision in the Employment Agreement between Keith Graves (“Executive”)
and TALX Corporation (the “Company”) executed on April 3, 2006, should Executive remain employed
with the Company following the closing of the Merger Agreement between the Company, Equifax, Inc.
and Chipper Corporation, if Executive voluntarily terminates his employment with the merged company
within twelve (12) months of the closing, Executive shall be entitled to receive the compensation
and other benefits as described in Section 7(c)(iv) of the Employment Agreement “Termination Based
on Actions Taken by the Company.” Payment of such compensation and benefits shall, to the extent
required to avoid adverse taxation under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (“Code”), be deferred until January 1, 2008.



     This Addendum shall be covered by and subject to the February 7, 2007 Modification Agreement
concerning compliance with Code Section 409A.



TALX CORPORATION




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
	 	/s/ William W. Canfield	 	 	 	4/12/07
	 

	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	William W. Canfield	 	 	 	Date
	President and Chief Executive Officer	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Executive
	 	 	 	 
	 
	
	 	/s/ L. Keith Graves	 	 	 	4/12/07
	 	 	 	 	 
	L. Keith Graves	 	 	 	Date
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3297 

To suspend temporarily the duty on 3,3′-dichlorobenzidine dihydrochloride. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 22, 2009 

Mr. GUTHRIE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on 3,3′-dichlorobenzidine 

dihydrochloride. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON 3,3′- 

4 DICHLOROBENZIDINE DIHYDROCHLORIDE. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

6 6 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 

7 is amended by inserting in numerical sequence the fol8 lowing new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.l.l 3,3′-dichlorobenzidine 

dihydrochloride (CAS No. 

612–83–9) (provided for in 

subheading 2921.59.80) ........ Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2012 ’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3297 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
# United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

October 16, 2014

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 12

‐ 1723

WARNETHER A. MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v.

CATERPILLAR, INCORPORATED,

Defendant

‐ Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 09

‐ cv

‐ 2172

Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.

O R D E R

On consideration of the Petition For Panel Rehearing filed by Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

on October 7, 2014, all members of the original panel have voted to DENY the Petition

For Panel Rehearing.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition For Panel Rehearing is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the opinion issued in the above

‐ entitled case on

September 9, 2014, is hereby amended as follows:

On page 5: in the second full paragraph, the last sentence

starting “We are not persuaded ...” is deleted;Appeal no. 12

‐ 1723 Page 2

On pages 5

‐ 6: the last paragraph of page 5 (starting “First,

Muhammad’s argument ...”) ending on page 6 is deleted.

On page 6: the first sentence of the first full paragraph is

modified so that “Second, even if we set that problem aside,

another more” is replaced by “A”, so that the sentence

reads “A fundamental obstacle ....”

On page 8: the first full paragraph (starting “The first

problem is ...”) is deleted, and the first two sentences of the

second full paragraph are deleted, such that the second full

paragraph begins with “Muhammad has not identified ...”

-2-
EXHIBIT 23


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in  Registration  Statement  Nos.
333-101800  and  333-110398  of  MidAmerican  Energy  Company on Form S-3 of our
report dated February 9, 2004 (March 1, 2004 as to Notes (1)(b),  (1)(c), (1)(j)
and (12)),  appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of MidAmerican Energy
Company for the year ended December 31, 2003.


/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Des Moines, Iowa
March 3, 2004
#### Kathleen B. Doyle, Individually and as Adminstratrix of the Estate of Kimmarie T. Bagley, Deceased, Respondent, v Health Care Plan, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Bahram Chubineh, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 60]

—Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint against Bahram Chubineh, M.D., dismissed. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of Bahram Chubineh, M.D. (defendant), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him in this action for medical malpractice. The complaint alleged that defendant was negligent in reading and interpreting X-rays of plaintiffs decedent. In support of his motion, defendant submitted his affidavit and the affidavit of a medical expert stating that defendant’s examination of the X-rays was in accordance with good and accepted practice in the field of radiology. Those affidavits established defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law and shifted the burden to plaintiff to come forward with expert medical proof sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact *(see, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324-327; *Santangelo v Crouse Med. Group,*209 AD2d 942, *appeal dismissed*85 NY2d 905; *Groeger v Col-Les Orthopedic Assocs.,*149 AD2d 973). The only expert medical proof submitted by plaintiff, however, was an unsworn report from a medical expert, which does not constitute proof in admissible form *(see, Grasso v Angerami,*79 NY2d 813, 814; *Lough v City of Syracuse,*191 AD2d 1018, 1019; *Rohr v Hoyt,*159 AD2d 980). Absent any expert medical proof in admissible form sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact, defendant was entitled to summary judgment *(see, Fileccia v Massapequa Gen. Hosp.,*99 AD2d 796, *affd*63 NY2d 639; *Santangelo v Crouse Med. Group, supra).*(Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Mintz, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Green, J. P., Law-ton, Hayes, Callahan and Fallon, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 96-6207
WILLIAM NATHANIEL AUSTIN, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versus WILLIAM SMITH, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Herbert N. Maletz, Senior Judge, sitting by designation. (CA-95-649-MJG) Submitted: May 29, 1997 Decided: June 5, 1997 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Nathaniel Austin, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., Kathryn Grill Graeff, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court'sopinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal; to the extent that a certificate of appealability is required, we deny such a certificate. We dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Austin v. Smith , No. CA-95-649-MJG (D. Md. Jan. 18, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Stephen W. GINGERY, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF The TREASURY, Respondent.

No. 2010-3123.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 12, 2011.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 24, 2011.

Richard S.J. Hung, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, of San Francisco, CA, argued for petitioner. On the brief was Henry C. Su, Howrey LLP, of East Palo Alto, CA. Of counsel was Christopher F. Jeu.

Dawn E. Goodman, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With her on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Kirk Manhardt, Assistant Director.

RADER, Chief Judge, LINN and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Spencer BOWENS, a/k/a Scooter, a/k/a Clyde, a/k/a Melvin McCurdy, a/k/a Doc Johnson, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-7679.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 10, 2011.

Decided: Feb. 23, 2011.

Spencer Bowens, Appellant Pro Se. David Novak, Office of the United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-lee.

Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Spencer Bowens appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Bowens,*No. 3:98-cr-00110-REP-1 (EJD.Va. Nov. 12, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2010-1164 

ADVANCED MAGNETIC CLOSURES, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROME FASTENER CORPORATION, ROME FASTENER SALES CORPORATION, 

ROMAG FASTENERS, INC., and RINGS WIRE, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

v. 

IRVING BAUER and G. BAUER INC., 

Movants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York in case no. 98-CV-7766, Judge Paul A. Crotty. 

ON MOTION 

Before RADER, ARCHER, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

O R D E R

 Irving Bauer and G. Bauer Inc. (Bauer) move for a stay, pending appeal, of the 

January 7, 2010 order entered by the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York denying their motion to quash and/or modify subpoenas duces 

tecum. The court considers whether Bauer’s appeal should be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

 The district court entered judgment in favor of Rome Fastener Corporation et al. 

(Rome) in the amount of $1,314,816.16. Advanced Magnetic Closures Inc. (AMC) 

appealed the judgment and that appeal, 2009-1102, is pending. After that appeal was 
2010-1164 2 

filed, Rome served subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum on AMC and Bauer. 

AMC and Bauer moved to quash or modify the subpoenas, and the district court denied 

that motion. Bauer appealed the district court’s order denying the motion to quash or 

modify and now seeks a stay, pending appeal. 

 In Connaught Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999), the court ruled that a nonparty could not obtain appellate review of a 

discovery order through direct appeal of an order denying a motion to quash. The court 

ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review such an order. The court further stated that 

relief through a writ of mandamus is also not available in this situation. Rather, the 

court held, “[n]onparties may secure review of a discovery order by refusing to comply 

with it and appealing a consequent contempt order.” Id. at 1370. See also In re Joint E. 

& S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1994) (order allowing postjudgment 

discovery is not appealable but immediate review may be sought of a contempt order if 

individual is held in criminal contempt for disobeying the previous order requiring 

production of documents). 

In this case, Bauer appeals an order denying a motion to quash. Such an order 

is not appealable. Connaught, 165 F.3d at 1370. Because this court lacks jurisdiction, 

the appeal is dismissed. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

 (1) The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

 (2) The motion is moot. 

 (3) The revised official caption is reflected above. 
2010-1164 3 

 FOR THE COURT 

 January 27, 2010 /s/ Jan Horbaly 

 Date Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk 

cc: Gerald Orseck, Esq. 

 Norman H. Zivin, Esq. 

s17