16-0348-cr United States v. Gonzalez


## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18 th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges , J. PAUL OETKEN, * District Judge

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_____________________________________ U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Appellee , v. 16-0348-cr
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UDI G ONZALEZ , Defendant-Appellant , V ICTOR J OSE C OSTE -D IAZ , AKA Victor Coste-Diaz, Defendant

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* Judge J. Paul Oetken, of the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.2 For Appellant: C OLLEEN P. C ASSIDY , Esq. Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY. For Appellee: D ANIEL B. T EHRANI AND M ICHAEL F ERRARA , Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Keenan, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Defendant-Appellant Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s order granting, in part, his
motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Following Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Gonzalez sought to reduce his sentence to 151 months’ imprisonment. The district court found Gonzalez eligible for a reduction and granted his motion but reduced his sentence only to 180 months’ incarceration rather than the requested 151 months.
Gonzalez contends that the district court abused its discretion when it reduced his sentence because it provided no reasons “whatsoever” in support of its 180-month sentence. Instead, Gonzalez asserts, the only factors discussed by the cour t were mitigating factors supporting a further reduction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, pr ocedural history, and issues on appeal.
This Court reviews de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. United
States v. Main , 579 F.3d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2009). We review a denial of a motion to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion, United States v. Borden , 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009), noting here that the Governme nt does not dispute Gonzalez’s eligibility for a
reduction. “A district court has abused its discreti on if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of th e evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be3 located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, citati ons, and alterations omitted). In determining whether to grant a defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), district courts employ a two-step approach. Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). First, the district court must evaluate whether the defendant is eligible for a sentence
reduction. Id. In determining whether a defendant is eligible for a reduction, “the court shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the [relevant amendment] had been in effect at the ti me the defendant was sentenced. In making such determination, the court shall . . . leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Second—if the defendan t is then eligible for a reduction—the court is required to “consider any applicable § 3553(a) facto rs and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the policies releva nt at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Dillon , 560 U.S. at 827. Gonzalez contends that
because the factors the district court relied on in redu cing his sentence are all mitigating factors that favor a further reduction, the court abused its disc retion in sentencing him to 180 months rather than the requested 151 months. We disagree.
Whether the district court noted factors that ma y be characterized as “mitigating” is of no consequence here. What is important is that the di strict court clearly noted that it was required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining the extent to which Gonzalez’s sentence should be reduced as well as considerations of public safety. The court then carried out its statutory obligation and discussed a number of factors justifying a reduction in Gonzalez’s sentence. Specifically, the court considered that Gonzalez behaved well in custody, completed several courses while incarcerated, and had no prior arrests or history of violence. It also acknowledged that Gonzalez’s crime did not involve violence of any kind. Because the district court clearly articulated a number of4 relevant sentencing factors, therefore, it properl y exercised its discretion in determining to reduce
Gonzalez’s sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); cf. United States v. Verkhoglyad , 516 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (“While our review is undoubtedly made easi er if a district judge explicitly references the § 3553(a) factors, we have declined to prescribe any specific verbal formulations to demonstrate the adequate discharge of the duty to consider matters re levant to sentencing.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Gonzalez’s argument that such factors support a further reduction is better construed as an objection to the weight the district court assigned to th e factors it found determinative. It is clear, however, that “the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable.” Verkhoglyad , 516 F.3d at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted). A mere disagreement with the manner in which the court has applied the § 3553(a) factors is likewise
insufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Raysor , 369 F. App’x 294, 296 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that expressing a mere disagreement “with the manner in which the court applied the § 3553(a) factors when resolving” § 3582(c)(2) motions is “insufficient to warrant relief from this Court”).
Gonzalez’s reliance on United States v. Christie is similarly unavailing. Here, unlike in Christie , the district court clearly articulated its reasons for the reduced sentence it imposed. Cf. United States
v. Christie , 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacatin g and remanding district court’s denial of defendants motion for a sentence reduction where the court “provided no explanation as to why it declined to reduce [the defendant’s] sentence.”). Because the district court’s articulation of its reasons for reducing Gonzalez’s sentence only by 36 months to 180 months’ imprisonment was clearly adequate, we conclude the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in imposing the new sentence it did.5 We have considered Gonzalez’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For all the foregoing reasons, the di strict court’s order reducing Gonzalez’s sentence
is AFFIRMED

. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk