Docket No . 109698.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

GR EG OR Y D ABB S, A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed November 18, 2010.

JUSTICE GARMA

N deliv ered t he j udg men

t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justic e K i l bri de an d Jus tic es F reem an , T h oma s, K

arm ei er, Bur ke, and T heis co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Af ter a j ury tri al

i n th e c i rcu i t cou rt of Ta zew ell Cou nt y, de fendant Gregory Dabbs was c o nvi

cted o f domestic b att ery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(1) ( We st 20 06 ) ) ag ain st his g irlfr ien d. At t r ial, his ex- wife
was permi

tt ed to t estif

y purs uant to sect ion 115–

7. 4 of the Code of Crim in al Procedure o f 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/ 115–7.4 (West 2008) ) that he h

ad phy si cally abused h er. Defen dant argued

on appeal that section 115–7.4 of the C ode is un constitut i ona

l . His c onv

i cti on was affir med , wit hone just ice disse nt ing. 3 96 I ll. App. 3d 6 22. We granted leave to ap pe al p ur su an t t o Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 3 15 ( 21 0 I ll. 2d R. 31 5)

. We affir m.-2- BACK GROUND Amy De W ee se

went to th

e p ol i ce sta

ti on on A pri l 28 , 20 08 , to reportt hat she had been battered by de fen

dant, who was then h

er bo yfr ie n d. The poli

ce off ic er who in

terviewe d her testif

ie d that DeWees e report ed defe

ndan t had b atte re d a n d th re ate n ed to kil l h er several days earl ier. She had not repo rted the inci dent soo ner because he wou l d n ot allo w her to leave the house. The off ic er testifi ed that she appea red“dist ra ught , q uit e sha ken u p and ner vou s” a nd t hat she had a bl ack eye and b

ruises on her arms. The off ic er further testif

ie d that when

h e went to defendant’s home , defend ant ad

m i tted h av i n g a n “ argu men t” wi th DeWe ese and stated t ha t sh e b ec ame “hys t erical ,” requ i ri ng h i m to restrai

n h er, whi ch caus ed b

rui ses on her a rms. Defend ant was ar re st ed a nd ch arge d w i th dom esti c b atte ry an d u n l aw f ul re strai n t. Pri ort o t r ial, the Stat e m

oved t o a dmit e vidence of a pr ior incident of domesti c vi

olen ce comm itted by defen dant agai nst his ex-wi

fe, Ka t ie Ba iley, as pe r mit t ed by sec tion 115–7 .4 of

the C ode. A f

ter a he ari ng, th e tri al court al l owed th e m

otion

. Defendan t also f i l ed a p re trial moti on , s eeki

n g to bar DeWeese’s t est imony at tr ia l on the b asi s that sh

e suf f ere d f rom a men tal il ln ess that rendere d her i

ncom petent to testify

. The trial

court ruled that DeWeesewas competent t o t estify , but t hat she could be crossexam in ed regard in

g her men tal il ln ess. At tr ial , DeWeese testifi

ed that she had m

oved in with d efenda nt in Feb ruary 2008, a f ter h avi ng dat ed him for abo ut t hre e year s. S he acknowl edged

that she had b een

di ag n ose d w i th del usi onal di sorder, bi pol ar disorder, and borderli ne personal

ity dis order. S he stated that her men tal i l l ne ss d i d not i nterf erewi th h er ab i l i ty to t es t ify t rut hfu lly. DeWeesetestifi

ed that after she

and def endan t ret urned hom

e after
a trip to t he v

ide o st o r e o n S at ur da y, A pr il 26, 2008, she went to bed wh ile h e stay ed up and dran k beer. She estim

ated that he consume d
an en tire cas e of be er. Afte r midnight , she was awa kene d by defend ant sitt ingon he r c hest , w ith his kne es p inning down her arm

s. He shouted at her and c al le d her nam es and sa id that he

wanted to kil l h

er. He b eg an to cal m down a nd wen t t o t he ki tchen to get her som

e water. Wh en he r et ur ne d, he be ca me angry agai n an d poured t he water

in her face

. The n he dr agg ed he r by t he hair int o t he bat hro om, wher e he-3- pushed her hea d in to the toi l e t , hit t ing her head on t he r im of the bo wl. He tol d he

r he wan ted to teach

her a less on. E ve nt ua lly, he cal me d down, and they

talked. On Sunday, DeWeese a

nd def endan t went to breakf

ast and then remai ned home to gether until that eveni

ng, when s he we nt t o he r e xhusba nd’s ho us e t o visit he rch ildr en

. Sh e r et ur ne d t o t he ho me sh e sh ar ed wi th de f en da n t. O n Mon da y , s h e w en

t to wo rk an d to school befo re she w ent t o t he po lice st at ion. Ka t ie Ba iley t es t ified t ha t she ha d p r ev io us ly b een mar ried to def endan t. Bef ore t he ir ma rriage, he once got very drunk a nd struck he rrepeatedly

with a bel t. She got away

from hi m a nd drove to th e police station. Def

endan t was arrested. Defend ant t es t ified t ha t he wa s “r ea lly dr un k” wh en he r ep ea t ed ly st ru ck B ailey with a bel

t. With regard to t he attackon D eWee se, he expl ai ned th at she wa s me nt ally ill a nd fr eq ue nt ly t alk ed t o pe o ple who were not there. She bel ie ved that her doctor s had i mpl anted a d evi ce in her br ain and t hat t hey want ed t o k ill her . D efend an t des cri be d he r as “del usi onal .” A s f or t he eve nt s o f April 26- 27, defend ant des cr ibed r et ur ning f rom the video st or e and DeWeese’s go ing t o be d while he watched tel ev i si on and drank a

bout six beer s. T he nex

t morni ng, they went out f orbr ea kf as t an d c am e h ome. A cc ordi ng to d ef endant, DeWeese returnedfrom

her vi si t t o her ex-hus

ban d’s h ouse in tears, cl ai ming that her ex- husba nd ha d hit her . S he we nt dire ct ly to bed. The next da y, defen

dant wen t to wor k a s u sual . W

h en th e of f i cer c am e to que sti on hi m , h e a dmi tt ed that he and DeW eese ha d argued about
mone y on Saturday ni

ght. He denied tel li

ng the off

ic er that he had restrai ne d DeW ees e to cal

m her. The j ury f ound d ef endan t guil ty of domesti c b attery and the trial
co ur t sent ence d him to t hre e year s in priso n. On ap pe al, de f

en da nt a rgued tha t se cti on 1 15– 7.4of t he Co de is
unco ns ti tut iona

l in that it violates the equal prot ection an

d due pro cess guarantees of the Un ited St at es a nd

Illinois Co nst itu t ions. The appe l l ate co ur t r elie d o n o ur de cis io n in People v. Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d 159, 177 (2003) (f

i ndi ng s ection 115 –7.3 o f t he Co de co nst it ut io na l) to conclude that sect ion 115–7.4 is co nsti tut iona l. 396 Il l. A pp. 3d 622.1 T his common la w ru le ha s b een codi fied i n th e Feder al Rule s o f Evide nce as Ru le 404(b), which

state s, in pe rtin en t part: “E videnc e of ot her crimes, wrongs, oract s is not admiss ible to pr ove the char act er of a pers on in order t o show act ion in conformity t herewith. It ma y, h ow ev er, be admissible for oth er purpo se s, such as proo f o f m

oti ve , opp ortun

ity , in ten t, pre par at ion, pla n, knowledge, identity, or a bsence of mist ake or a ccident
** *.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). This court has r ece

ntly cod ified the law o f eviden

ce in Illinois. Effect ive Jan uary 1, 20 11, t he co m mon law pr opens ity ru le will be r epla ced by Illinois Rule of Evi de nce 404(b), w

hi ch state s: “Ev

id en ce of o the r crim es, w rong s, orac ts is no t a dmiss ibl e to p ro ve the c ha ra ct er of a pers on in order t o show act ion in conf orm ity the rew ith exc ept as pro

vi ded by sec tion s 115–7.3, 115 –7. 4, an

d 1 15– 20 o f t he Co de of Cri m in al Pro cedu

re [c itat io ns ]. Such eviden ce may also be admissible for ot her pu rp oses, such a s pr oof of mot ive, oppor tunit y, intent, pr epar at ion, pla n, knowledge, identity, or a bsence of mi stake or acci de

nt.” Ill . R. Evid. 404(b) (e ff. Jan. 1, 2011).

-4- AN AL YSIS As a c om mon law rule o f ev ide nc e in I llino is, it is well s ettled that evi dence o f o t he rcr imes is a dmis sible if relev ant for any

purpose ot her than to show a def

endan t’s propensi

ty to commi

t cr im es. People v. Wilson , 214 Il

l . 2d 127 , 135-3 6 (200 5). Such pu rposes i nc l ude b ut are not li mi ted to : motiv

e (People v. Mo ss , 205 Il l . 2d 139 , 156 (2 001 ) (evidence t ha t de fen da nt pr ev io us ly se xu ally a ss au lt ed ch ild pr o pe r ly adm itted t o sho w h is mo t iv e f

or m urder of chi l d an d he r m other)), intent ( Wilson , 214 I ll. 2 d a t 14 1 ( ev ide nc e t ha t t ea ch er pr ev io us ly to uched other

stu den ts i n si m i l ar man n er pr ope rl y ad m i tted to sh ow intent in prosecution for aggravated cri mi nal sexua lab us e of studen ts)), ide n ti ty (People v. Robinson , 167 Ill . 2d 53, 65 (1995) (evidence that de fen da nt pr ev io us ly at t ac ke d o t he rsimila rvic t ims in si mi la rma nne rproperly adm itted un de r th eory

of modus op erandi to sh owi den tity of p erpetra

tor in prosec uti on f or a rmed r obbe ry and armed violence )) , a nd ac cident or absence of mi stake ( Wilson , 21 4 I ll. 2d at 14 1 ( ev ide nc e t ha t t ea ch er pr ev io us ly t o uc he d o t he rst ud en t s in si mi la rma nne r properly a

dmi tt ed to show lack of mi st ak e in prosec uti on f or aggra va ted cri m i na l sex ual abuse of studen ts)). 1 E ve n if of f ere d f ora p erm i ss i bl e p urp ose , su

ch ev i de nc e wi l l

not be adm itted if its prej ud icia l e f

f ec t su b sta n ti al l y outw ei gh s i ts-5- proba tiv e v al ue. Moss , 2 05 I ll. 2d a t 156 . T he adm i ssi bi l i ty ofothercrim es evi dence is withi n the sound discretion of the tri al co ur t , a nd it s de ci si on on the matte r wi l l not be dist ur bed a bsent a c l ea r ab us e of that discre

tion

. Wilson , 214 Ill . 2d at 136. The rati onal

e f or thi s rul e i s n ot that a def

endan t’s b ad ch aracter, as evi nced b y other bad a

cts, is i rrelev ant when h e is ch arge d w i

th a crim e. Rather, the rule is grounded i n the concern

that such evi dence proves t oo much. People v. Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d 159, 170 (2 003 ). As
a matt er of jur ispru dent ial policy, t he r ule exp re sses t he concern that wh ile “ev

ide nce of b ad character would n ot be i rrelev an t, *** pa r t icu lar ly

in the setting of

the jury trial , the dangers of prej udic e, con f us i on an d t ime- co nsu mpt io n ou t weigh t he pr oba t ive value. ” K. Broun , McC ormi

ck on Evi den ce §1 90, at 75 2-53 (6 th ed . 2006)

. T he com mon l aw ru l e h as b een ab rog ate d i n pa rt by th e statut e chal le nged by def endan t. S ec ti on 115–7.4 of the Code, titled “Evi dence in domestic vi

olence cases,” provides: “(a) I n a cr iminal p r o se cu t io n in w hic h t he de fen da nt is accused of an of fen se of dom

estic v iolence as de fine d in par agr aphs (1) an

d (3 ) of Se ct io n 1 03 o f t he I llino is D o mes t ic Violence Act of 1986, evidence of the defendant ’s com m i ss i on of another o ff

ense or o ff

enses o f domes t ic v io len ce is
a dmi ssi ble, and may be c ons ider ed fo r it s bea ring o n any matte r to w h i ch i t i s rel ev an t. (b) In wei ghi ng the probativ

e val ue of the ev

ide nce agains t und ue pre j udice to the d

ef endan t, the court m

ay cons i der: (1) the proxim

ity in tim e to t he charged

or p re di ca te off ense; (2) th e deg ree

of f ac tua l si m i l ari ty to the ch arg ed or pre dica te of f en se ; or (3) o ther relevant facts and circum stances. (c) In a crim in al case i n wh i ch th e p ros ecuti

on i n ten dsto off er ev i den ce un der thi s Section , it m

us t disclo se t he evi dence, including sta

tem en ts of wi tne ss esora sum

mary of t he su bs tan ceof an y tes ti mony , at a rea son abl e t ime in advan ce of trial , or dur in

g trial if the court excuses

pretrial not ice o n go od cau se sho wn. (d) In a cri

mi nal ca se in w hich ev

ide nce is off ered under-6- t his Secti on, p ro of may be mad e b y sp ec i f i c i ns tan ce s of
co nduc t , t est imony

as to repu

tation , or testi

mony i n the f orm of an ex pe rt opini

on, except that t he prosecution m ay off er rep uta ti on t est imony only afte r t he opposing party has of fered that testi mony .” 725 ILCS 5/115 –7.4 (W est Sup p. 2007 ). The sta tute wa s e n ac ted i n 20 07 an d w en t i n to eff ect on August 23 of that y ear. Pu b. A ct 95–3 60, §5, e f

f . Au gust 23 , 2007. T his enac t ment fo llowed t he legislat ur e’s e na ctm en t of se cti on 115–7 .3 of the Code, titled “ Evidence i

n certain cases,” wh

ic h created
a si m i l ar exce pt ion t o t he co mmon law pr op ensit y rule. When a defend ant i s ch arg ed

wi th c erta i n c ri mesi nv ol vi ng sexu al as sa ul t or abuse, t his st at ut e allow s t he ad mission of e vi dence of previous off enses of t he sa me type . I n per t inent pa rt, s ec ti on 115–7.3 pro vides: “(b) If the def

endan t is accus ed

of an o ffen se se t fo r t h in paragraph (1) or(2) of

su bs ec ti on ( a) or

the defe ndan t is tried
orre t ried for any

of the off enses setf orth i n p ara gra ph (3) of sub sect io n

(a) , ev i de nc e of the de f en da nt’ s c om m i ss i on of
an oth er of f ense or of f ense s s et f

orth i n pa ragra ph ( 1), (2) , or (3) of subse ction (a), or eviden ce to rebut t hat proo f or an in feren ce fr o m t ha t pr o o f, may be ad miss ible (if that evi dence is ot herwi se adm

is si ble under the rules of evi

dence) and m

ay be cons i dered

f or its be ari ng o n an y mat t er t o wh ich it is
re l ev an t. (c) In weigh

in g the pro bative v

alue of the evi

dence against und ue pre j udice to the d

ef endan t, the court m

ay cons i der: (1) the proxim

ity in tim e to t he charged

or p re di ca te off ense; (2) th e deg ree

of f ac tua l si m i l ari ty to the ch arg ed or pre dica te of f en se ; or (3) ot her relevan

t facts and ci

rcumstances.” 725 ILCS 5/115 –7.3 (W

est 200 8). T his section was

enacted i n 19 97 an d w en t i n to eff ect on January

1, 1998. Pub. Act

90–132, §5, eff

. January 1, 1998. It hassu bse qu en t ly been am ended twi ce. Pub. Act 90–735, §10, eff . Augu st 11, 1998; Pu b. Ac t 95 –8 92 , §5 , ef f. Ja nu ar y 1 , 2009. The l anguage quoted abo ve was in effect when t his co ur t held in Donoho tha t se cti on 115–7 .3 does not viol ate the co nsti tut iona l gua rantee of equal-7- protecti on. Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d at 178. Bef ore this court , defen

dant argu es t hat sec t ion 1 15– 7. 4 o f the Code is unco nst itu t ional and t hat it “pr ovid es a sec ond -c lass t rial and al ters t he judicial syst em fro m one o f a co nf r o nt at io n be

tween advocates o ve rt he ele me nt s cha rge d i nto a one -s i de d i

nv es ti ga ti on i nto the c ha racter of the a ccus ed.”

Statu tory In terpreta ti on De f en da nt a rguestha t ap pl i ca ti on of se cti on 115–7 .4 re sult s in a “seco nd-class

trial ” b ec au se i t doe s n ot re qui reth e tr i al cou rt to det er mine whether other-crim

es evide n ce o ffer ed by t he St at e is
re levant or t o ba lance t he pr oba t ive value o f the evidenc e ag ainst t he prej udic ia l eff

ect to the defe

ndan t. Because the statut e say s that “ev ide nceof the def

enda nt ’s com m i ss i on of an othe r of f en se or off enses o f do mes t ic violen

ce i s adm is si ble” (725 ILCS 5/115–7.4(a) (West 2008) ) i

n c ert ai n ca se s, de f

en da n t as se rtsth at th

e statu te “m andates the

ad m i ss i on of prop en si

ty ev i de nc e, reg ard

l es s of whether it i s rel evan

t.” He not es that this l

an guage i s d

i f f ere nt f rom that used i

n section 115–7.3, whic h say s that the ot her-cri

me s evi dence “may be adm is si ble (if that evi dence

is o t he rwis e a dmis sible under the rules of evidence).” 725 I LCS 5/115–7. 3(b) (West 2008)

. The pri nc i pl es g ui di ng our a na

l y si s of a que sti on of

statutory i n ter pr eta ti onar e w el

l estab l i sh ed . O ur pri mar y ob j ec ti v e is to as ce r t ain and gi

ve ef fect to legi slative

in tent, t he s urest a nd m

ost
r eli ab le i n di

ca tor of wh i ch i s th e statu tory l an gu ag e i tse l f , gi v en i ts pla in an d ordi na ry mean i ng. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum , 159 I ll. 2d 469, 479 ( 1994 ). In d

eterm i ni ng th e pl ai n m ean i ng of statutory terms, we consider the statut e i n i ts entirety , keepin

g i n mi nd t he subj ect it ad dr esse s and the ap pa r en t int en t o f t he leg isla t ur e in
enac t ing i t. People v. Davis , 199 Il

l . 2d 130 , 135 (2 002). W

here t he la nguage of the stat ute is clear and unam biguous, we mus t ap ply

it as
wr itt en, without resort to extrinsi c ai ds to st at uto ry co nst ru ct ion. People v. Collins , 214 Il

l . 2d 206 , 214 (2 005). Defend ant ar gue s t hat t he phrase “is adm is si ble” means tha

t othercrim es ev id e nce mus t be ad mitt ed if pr offer ed by t he St at e in a do me st ic violence prosecut ion. He focuses on the wo rd “is” an d
ar gue s t hat it means “sh all” o r“mu st ” a s o pp o se d t o “may, ” b ut fails-8- to consi der the m ean i ng of the e nti re ph rase “is ad m i ssi bl e.” The word “ ad m i ss i bl e”i s n ot de f i ne d i n th e s tatute . In

com mon usage, t he su ffi

x “-able” means ca pabl e o rpe r miss ible. T hu s, so me beverage contai

ners are returnab l e an

d som e are non returnab l e. To say that a g lass

m i l k b ottl e “ i s r etu

rnab l e”i s n

ot t o s ay tha t it must be returned to the store, but only that it may

be returned. The wo r d is us ed wit h su fficie nt fr eq ue nc y in leg al w r it ing t ha t it is defi ned i n the l awdicti ona ry . “ In de term i ni ng the pl ai n m ea ni ng of
a st at ut o ry t er m, i

t i s enti rel y appropri ateto l ook

to the dicti ona ry f or a defi ni tion.” People v. Perry , 22 4 I ll. 2d 312 , 330 (2 007). “A dmi ssi ble” is defi ned as “ [a]ll

owabl e; perm

is si ble.” Indee d, th e exam pl e that is gi

ven i s “admi ssibl

e evidence.” Black’s La w Dicti onary

48 (7th ed. 19 99). Thus, t he phr a se “is a dmis sible ” in se ct io n 1 15 –7

. 4 is
unam biguous. In the contex t o f the statut e, it m eans that not wit hst anding t he comm on la wpropensi

ty rul e, proffered ev

ide nce of a nothe r si m i l ar cri me m ay be adm i tted. D efe ndant al so argues that t he statute makes suc h ev ide nce a dmis sib le wi

thou t reg ard to i ts re l evan

ceor to th e b al

an ce of pr oba t ive value a nd r isk o f undu e pr ejudice . H e is mista ken. By enacti ng section 115–7.4 of the Code, the legisl atur e has abrogated, i

n pa rt, a l ong-stand

i ng c omm on l aw rule of e

vi den ce. It is we ll est ablished t hat a st at ut e t hat re pr ese nt s a d epa rt ur e fro m the
co mmo n la w s ho uld be n

arrowly construed in

fav or o f those against wh om i t is di rected

. Harr is v . Walker , 119 Il l . 2d 542 , 547 (1 988). Thus, we m us t con str ue th e stat ut e in a m

an ne r th at p res erv

esf or de f en da n t, as muc h a s is pos sible co nsist ent wit h t he legislat ive purpose, al

l of th e p rote cti

ons that othe

rwise ex i st i n ou r rul esof evi dence. So me rul esof ev i de nc e p erm

i t the ad m i ss i on of a type of e

vi dence if certa in conditions are met, such as t he r ule al l owi ng ad m i ss i on of evi dence of habit o r r ou t inepr act ice o r t he r ule go ver ning t he t aking of judicial not ice. The se c an be d esc ribed as p os itive r ules be caus e they al l ow evi den

ce to com e i n. Ot her ru les b ar t he a dmiss io n o f a certain ty pe of evi dence. Such rules, such a s the

he arsa y rule or the r

ul e b arr in g e vi dence of ple a discussi ons, can b e descri

bed as n egative rules

becau se t he y ke ep-9- evidence out . These negative rules m ay h ave exceptions, such

as t he hearsay exce ption f or dy i ng de cl ara ti ons . Thes e e xc ep ti ons

f un cti on as positi ve rules, becaus e they

o ve r co me t he effe ct o f a n eg at ive rule
and al l ow the i tem of e vi den ce to be adm i tted. Furth er, a s ing le evi

dentia ry issuemay be subject t o mo re t han o ne rule. Thus, whi

le a positi ve rule m ay al low a certai

n type of evi dence,
a ne ga t ive rule ma

y proh i bi t i ts adm i ss i on. For

exam ple, a n e xc ep ti on to t he he ar sa y ru le ma

y pe rmi t t he adm is si on of evi

dence contai

ned in
a pa r t icu lar t yp e of d oc ument , su ch as a bus iness r eco rd , bu t if the do cument is

not pro perly

authen ticated as requi

red by another rule, t he evi de nce wi

ll not be allowed. In thi s way, the rules of evi den c e fu nc t io n a s a un ifie d s ch eme , r at he rt ha n in di vid ua lly. The propensi

ty rul e i s a negat ive rul e, w hi ch proh i bi ts u se of evi dence of a def endan t’s prior bad act s to s h ow h i s prop ensi

ty to co mmit crim

e. Exceptions

to the rule al

low the use of

such evi dence f or a limit ed pu r

po se , su ch as t o sho w mo t ive , ide nt it y, o rla ck o f mi stake. Even wh

en al lowed b

y a n ex ception, other-crim

es evi dence
ma y be ex cl ud ed by t he operation of an ot her rul e. Three exam

ple s com e to mi nd. Fi rs t, the evi

dence m ay be ex cl uded becaus e i

t is i rrelev ant

. Relev ance i s a threshold requirement that must be m et by every item of evidenc e. “All

re levant evi

dence is adm issi ble, except as o therwise provided by law

. E vid en ce wh ich is no t r ele va nt is not adm i ssi bl e.” I ll. R. Ev id. 40 2 ( eff. Ja n. 1, 20 11 )

. Alt ho ug h r ec en t ly co difie d, t his r ule ha s al way s b een a part of our com mon l aw rul es of evi den ce. Second, the ot her-cri

me s evi dence may be exclud ed be cau se t he risk of undue prej udic e outweighs i ts probative val

ue. “A lthough
re l ev an t, ev ide nc e ma y be e xc lud ed if i ts pro ba t ive va lue is
su bst an t ially

out wei ghed b

y the danger of unf ai r prej udi ce , con f us i on o f the is sues, or mi sl eadi

ng the j ury, or by

considerations of un

du e de lay, waste o f tim

e, or needles s pr ese nt at ion o f cumulat ive
evi den ce.” Il l . R. Evi d. 403 (ef

f. Ja n. 1, 20 11 )

. Ag ain , wh ile t his codif ie d v er si on of th e ru le s i s of recen

t o rigi n, the need to bal

ance pr oba t iveval

ue and the ri sk of unfai

r prejudi ce has l ong been a pa rt of
our co mm

on la w. Thi rd, the evi

dence ma y b e exclud ed be cau se it is offer ed in t he f orm of a hearsay statement that does not meet a re cog ni ze d e xc ep ti on-10- to the he ars ay rul e. “ He ars ay i s n ot adm is si ble except

as p ro vided by these rules , by

ot her rul es prescrib ed

b y th e Su pr eme Co ur t , o r by sta tute as pr o vid ed in Ru le 1 01

. ” I ll. R. Evi d. 802 (e f f . Jan . 1, 2011 ). Giv en the u nifie d s ch eme o f t he rule s o f ev ide nc e, t he t hr es ho ld
re quir ement of rel evan

ce would appl

y to the admi ss ion of

evi dence pur sua nt to section 115 –7.4 even if t he leg isla t ur e h ad no t sp ec ifica lly
me ntioned thi s req ui rem en t. Howev er, the

l egi slature was ap pa r en t ly
awar e of the re l ev ance re qui

rem en t whe n i t enacted s ection 115 –7.4 because it sp ec ifica lly

provided that

the other-crim

es evi dence “ ma y be considered for i

ts beari ng on an y m atter to whi

ch it i s rel ev an t.” 725 ILCS 5/115 –7.4(a

) (We st 2008 ). Cl ea

rl y , su ch ev i de nc e i s n

ot ad miss ible un

de r th e s tatute

i f i t i s n ot re l ev an t to an i ssue i

n the case

. Furth er, the legi slature was a ls o aware of the need to balance pr oba t iveval

ue wi th the risk of

unduepr eju dic e w he n a n o bje ct io n is rais ed to t he adm

is si on of a other-crim

es evi dence. The s

tatut e does not ab r o ga t e t his r ule or th e ru l e that the d ec i si

on r eg ard i ng ad m i ss i on of evi dence is wi

thin the sound di sc retionof the trial court . Indeed, t he st at ut e lists t hre e fact or s t o be co nsider ed “[ i]n we ighing t he pr oba t iveva lueo f the evidenc e ag ainst undu e pr ejudice t o t he de f en da n t” (725 ILCS 5 /115–7. 4 (West 2008) ), in addit ion t o a ny other f actors the court m

i ght ordi na ri l y cons i der. We h old, therefore, tha

t the pl ai n m ea ni ng of se cti on 1 15– 7.4of t he Cod e is th at ev i den ce

of a def en da n t’s com m i ss i on of oth er ac ts of domesti c vi

olen ce m ay be adm itted in a pr os ecu t ion fo r o ne o f the off enses enum erated in the

statut e, so long ast he ev ide nc e is re levant and it s p r o ba t ive va lue is not s ub sta nti al l y outwe i ghed

by the ri sk of undue prej udic e.

Constitutional Chal le nge We begi n by noting that st at ute s c arr

y a s trong pr

esum ption of
con sti tuti on al i ty and that a pa rty ch al l en gi ng the con sti tutiona l i ty of
a stat ute ha s the

bur den of re butti ng th at pres um pti on. People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill. 2d 178 , 1 89 ( 200 4) . T o r ebut t he pr esu mpt ion, t he challenging pa r t y mus t cle ar ly es t ab lish a co nst it ut io na l v iolat ion. People ex rel . Birkett v. Konets ki , 233 Il l . 2d 185 , 200 (2 009). In add itio n, thi

s c ourt h asa d uty to u phold t he c o nst it ut io nalit y of a st at ut e if it i s rea sona

bl y possi bl e to do so. People

v. Dinelli , 21 7 I ll.-11- 2d 387, 397 (2005). Accordingl y, we will reso lve any do ubt as t o t he
con stru cti on of a statute i n f av or of i ts va l i di ty. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdal e , 229 Ill . 2d 296, 307 (200 8)

. Whe t he ra s t at ut e is constitutional

is a question of

la w, which we rev

ie w de novo

. People v. Guevara , 216 Il

l . 2d 533 , 541 (2 005). Defend ant urges t his co ur t t o ex amin e o ur na t io n’ s h ist o ry, le gal trad itions, an

d pr ac ti ce s to c on c lud e t ha t t he lo ng - st an din g r ule lim iting the use of propensi

ty ev ide nce is of consti

tut iona l ma gni tude. He arg ue s f urth er th at the u se of pr op ensit y evidence unde rmines t he pre su m ption of i nnocen ce as wel l a s statut es of l

im itat ion a nd t he do ub le j eop ardy

pr otecti on

of th e f i f th am en dm en t. He co mpar es t he
use of propensi

ty ev ide nce i n a domest ic violence t rial t o s ubject ing t he defen dant to t rial

on a “stale cl ai

m,” an d argues that he was f

orced to def end aga i nst a coll ateral

matter. At oral argum

ent, defense counsel

argu ed th at a l l pr ope n si ty ev id enc e is unco nst itu t ional unles s its use is co nfined t o o ne o f the recogniz ed

pe rm i ss i bl e p urp ose s. S he

pre dicte d the e xte

ns i on of such statutory excepti ons as those in sect ions 1 15– 7. 3 and 115 –7. 4 o f the Code to cases i

nvol vi ng drugpossession, drivi

ng unde rthe in fl uence, and o t he rch ar ge s a nd ur ge d t his c o ur t t o st o p t he ex pa nsio n o f t his trend to abrogate “a m

ost ancien t and revered rule.” As we have noted previously, t he propensity rul e is o f com mon la worigi n. It i s n ot of con sti

tution al magn i tude. Donoho , 20 4 I ll. 2d at 18 0, 18 2. De sp it e its long h is to ry as a part of Angl

o-Ameri can com mon la w and t he fac t t ha t it may be co nsis t en t wit h c er t ain fun dam ental co nst it ut io na l val

ue s s uc h as th

e p res um ption of in nocence, de f

en da n t ca n ci te n o ca se h ol di n g th at th e admi ssi on of pr open si ty evi dence f or the purpose of showi

ng propensi

ty vi olates due process

. In ad dit io n, he fail s to ide ntif y the applic abl

e constitutional stan dard of r evi ew . W

h er e, as h er e, a statu

te d oes n ot af f ec t a fun dam ental co nst it ut io na l rig ht , t he t es t fo rde t er mining wh et he rit compl ie s wit h subs t ant ivedue process is the rational

ba si s test. People
v. Williams , 23 5 I ll. 2 d 1 78 , 20 5 ( 20 09 )

. A st at ut e w il lbe up he ld unde r t he r at ional bas is te st so long as i t bea rs a r at io na l re lat io nsh ip to a le git imate l eg i sl

ati ve pur pos e, a nd i t i s n ei the r ar bi trar y nor unr eas onab l e. Napleton , 229 Il l . 2d at 30 7.2 We are aw ar e tha t do mes tic violence may als o be perp etra ted by a
wo man aga inst a man or by

a ma n or a w oma n a ga ins t a member of t he s a me sex. We use gendered terms in t his opinion beca use t hey are cons istent wi th the f ac ts of t he pr esent ca se.
-12- In Donoho , we not ed that the legi sl at ive hi story of se cti on 115–7 .3 reveal

ed an in tent t o “use other-crim

es evi dence to prot ect soc i ety ag ain st se x o ffen de r s w ho ha ve a p r o pe nsit y t o r ep ea t t he ir cri mes.” Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d at 174. The legi timate purpo se ser ved by t he statut e w as to respond to t he problem of “reci div is m b y s ex off enders .” Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d at 174. W e c on cl ud ed th at th e statu te me t t he r at io na l ba sis t es t un de req ua l pr o t ec t io n a na lysis “ be ca us e it also pr omo t es e ffect ive pr os ecu t ion of se x offense s and st re ngt hens evi dence in sexual abuse cases.” Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d at 178. T hus, we he ld t hat t he class ifi

cat ion cr eat ed by se ct ion 1 15– 7. 3, t re at ing accused se x o ffend er s d iffer ent ly fro m o t her de fe ndant s, bore a rational re l ati on sh i p to a l egi tim ate legi slati

ve purpos e. Donoho , 204 Il l . 2d at 17 8. Wh en a stat ut e is challenge d o n due pr oc ess g ro unds , no cl as si f i ca ti on is a t iss ue

. Ra t he r , t he r at io na l ba sis test requires that we
exam in e the substance of the statute t o determin e whether it bears a rational rel ati on sh

i p to a l eg i ti mate l eg i sl ati v e pur pos e. The S tate argues that section 115–7.4 serves a purpose sim

il ar to that served

by
se cti on 11 5–7.3 an

d i s, th er ef

ore , ra ti on al l y re l ate d to a

l eg i ti mate l egi slati ve purpos e. We agre e. Wh en it ena cted this statute, t he Gen eral A ssem bl y was leg it imat ely

concerned wi

th the eff ective prosecu ti onof

cri mesof dom es ti c violen

ce, which pose som

e of the sam

e concerns a s sex crim es. A n a bus er m ay ha ve a pattern of targ eti

ng v i cti m s wh o are v ulne rable. Such a v

ictim ma y b e reluctant t o t estif

y a gai nst her abuser, or th e e f

f ec ti ve ne ss of her t est imony in cou rt may beaff ected by f ea r or anx ie ty. The ab user m ay al so be adept at pr es en t ing himse lf
as a ca lm a nd

rea son ab l e p ers on a

nd hi s v i cti m ashy sterical or men t ally ill . E vidence t hat t he defen dant has b een i

nvol ved i n a si mi la r incident may pers uad e a jur y that t he pre sent v i cti m i s w orth y of bel ie f because her experience

is corro borated by the e

xperience of

another vi cti m of the sa me ab user. 2-13- Thus, we findth at s ec ti on 11 5–7.4 se rves a l eg i ti mate legislat ive purpo se and t hat t he ad mission o f evidence t hat t he defend ant has
comm itted o t he rcr imes o f d o mes t ic v io len ce is r at io na lly r el ate d to that pur pose. In addi tion , whi l e our d ecisio n in Donoho addressed an equal prote cti on claim, we did co mment o n t he pos si bi l i ty of a due pro cess chal le nge to the stat ute, as noted by the appel la te court bel

ow:

“‘[C]ourt s hav

e hel d that admi

tt in g ot her-cri

me s evi dence does n ot im

p l i cate the due

proces s ri

ght to a f ai r tri al wh ere t he ev ide nc e is r ele va nt an d it s p r o ba t iv e va l uei s n ot outw ei ghed

by its prej udic ia

l e ff ect [citation]; these

two lim itat ions ar e in co r

po r at ed int o se ct io n 1 15 –7

. 3. ’ ” 39 6 I ll. App. 3d at 627, quot in

g Donoho , 204 Ill . 2d at 177. Because we hav

e concl uded that section 115– 7. 4 pe rmits t he ad m i ss i on of rel evan

t o ther-crim

es evi dence i n dome stic v

iolence casesonly

if the pro bative v

alue i s notoutwe i ghed

by the ri sk of und ue pre j udice, we

reach the sa

me con cl usi on i n the pres en

t case

. In hi s petiti on for l eave to appeal, de fenda nt also ra ised t he que sti on of whether s ection 115–7.4 vi olates the equal

prot ec ti o n cl auses of the state and f

ederal constituti ons. H owev er, hi s brief does not i nc l ude a ny argum en t on thi s i ssue. Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 3 41 ( h) ( 7) r eq uir es t ha t t he br ief c o nt ain

“ [a ]rg um en t, wh ich sha ll co nt ain t he co nt ent ions of t he ap pellant and the rea sons th

ere f or, w i th c i tati on of the authoriti es and the pa ges of t he rec ord rel

i ed on. ” In addi ti on, “ [p] oi

nts not argued ar e wa ived and sha ll no t be r ais ed in

the rep l y br i ef , i n or al arg um en t, or on pe ti ti on f or rehe ari ng.” 210 Il l . 2d R. 3 41(h

)(7). The Sta te p oi n ts o ut th i s om i ss i on i n i ts brief, y et d efendant’s r ep ly bri ef makes no ment ion o f an equ al pr ot ect ion a r gume nt. At oral
argu men t, de fen se co un se l did no t make a n eq ual prote cti on argu men t. Further, after the State po in ted out t his f

orf ei tur e d uri n g i ts
argu men t, defen se counsel did n ot ma ke an eq ual prote cti on ar gument on reb uttal

. Theref or e, we mus t co nc lud e t ha t de fen da nt ha s a ba nd o ne d h is eq ua l pr o t ec t io n c laim.-14- CONCLUSION For the foregoin

g reasons, we hold that section 115 –7.4 of t he Co de of Cr imi

nal Pr oc edu re is co nst itu t ional and t hat it p er mits t he trial cou rt to al l ow a dm i ss i on of evi dence of ot her cri me s o f do mes t ic violen ce to establi sh

t he p ro pe nsit y of a de fen da nt t o co mmit a c r ime of dom es ti c v i ol en cei f the req ui rem en ts of the s tatut e and of other ap plic ab le ru les o f evid enc e a re met . T he ju dg ment o f t he a pp el l ate court is aff irm ed. Aff irmed

.