UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM HOWARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JIM GILMORE, Governor, State of

No. 99-2285

Virginia; J. KIRK SHOWALTER,

Registrar, City of Richmond,

Virginia,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CA-99-329-R)

Submitted: January 25, 2000

Decided: February 23, 2000

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and MICHAEL,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William Howard, Appellant Pro Se. James Walter Hopper, Alice Ann

Berkebile, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William Howard appeals the district court's order summarily dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. We review de novo summary dismissals under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th

Cir. 1991). Finding no error, we affirm.

Howard complains that under Virginia law, his disenfranchisement

as a convicted felon violates the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994),

and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1994).

Howard first complains that cancellation of his voting privileges

violates the First Amendment. The First Amendment creates no private right of action for seeking reinstatement of previously canceled

voting rights. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Howard's claim to the extent it was founded upon the First Amendment.

As for Howard's claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments, in order to state a claim, Howard must establish that the

Commonwealth's decision to disenfranchise felons was motivated by

race. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,

279 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976). The

Commonwealth's decision to disenfranchise felons pre-dates the

adoption of both constitutional amendments as well as the extension

of the franchise to African-Americans. See Va. Const. art. 3, § 14

(1830). Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment itself permits the

denial of the franchise upon criminal conviction. See U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, cl. 2. Howard has therefore failed to state a claim under

either amendment. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54

(1974); Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 1996),

aff'd, 99 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1996).

 2
To the extent that Howard relies upon the Voting Rights Act of

1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1994), he fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Under the VRA, a plaintiff must

establish that the Commonwealth's act either was intended to, or had

the effect of, abridging or denying the right to vote based upon race.

See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). As noted above,

Virginia's exclusion of felons from the franchise pre-dates the enfranchisement of African-Americans. See Va. Const. art. 3, § 14 (1830).

Moreover, Howard has failed to plead any nexus between the disenfranchisement of felons and race. He has therefore failed to state a

claim under the VRA. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 882, aff'd,

791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1996).

To the extent that Howard relies upon the Nineteenth Amendment,

he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Nineteenth Amendment prohibits denying the franchise based upon the

basis of sex. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). Howard

makes no attempt to frame his claim in terms of discrimination based

upon sex. The Nineteenth Amendment is therefore inapplicable and

the district court correctly dismissed the complaint to the extent it

relies upon the Nineteenth Amendment.

Howard also claims that Virginia's practice of requiring him to pay

a $10 fee to the Circuit Court of Richmond in order to begin the process of having his civil rights fully restored (and hence his right to

vote), is an unconstitutional poll tax in violation of the Twenty-fourth

Amendment. To be sure, the Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibits

conditioning the right to vote upon payment of a fee. See Harper v.

Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-69 (1966). In Howard's

case, however, it is not his right to vote upon which payment of a fee

is being conditioned; rather, it is the restoration of his civil rights

upon which the payment of a fee is being conditioned. Consequently,

Howard states no claim under the Twenty-fourth Amendment.

As to appellant's final contention, that Virginia is estopped from

preventing him from voting because he has previously voted, the district court properly dismissed his complaint. Howard has produced no

factual basis nor legal authority upon which an estoppel theory could

be sustained. The district court did not therefore err in dismissing the

complaint as to this contention.

 3
We affirm the district court's order dismissing this action with prejudice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 4