Jud ges I vers and Stei nb erg part i ci p at ed i n de ci d i ng t hi s m at t er pri o r t o t hei r r et i rem ent

. Judge s M o o rma n, * L a n c e , D a v is, an d S c h o e le n , a ll o f w h o m b e g a n re g u la r ac tive se rv ic e o n the C o u rt a fter full-C o u rt d e lib e ra tio n s o n this
m a tter , d id no t p a rtic ip a te in c o n sid e ra tio n o f t h e a p p e a l. See C o urt ' s Int ernal O p erat i ng P roce d ures at V (b)(1)(C ).



### UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 02-2259

B AR NE Y 

### O. P AD GE TT 

### , A PP EL L ANT 

### ,

V



### . R

. J A M ES 

### N I C HOL S ON 

### , S EC RE T A RY O F 

### V ET ER A N S 

### A FF A I RS 

### , A PPEL L EE



### .

Be fore GREENE, Chief Judge , and IVERS, STEI NB ERG, KASOLD, and HA GEL , J ud ge s. *



### O R D E R
On Dec ember

6, 2002 , the appe llant, through counsel, filed a Notice of

Appea l from an Au gus t 8, 20 02 , Bo ard of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls (B oa

rd) de c isi on in wh ic h the B oa rd de nie d h is c la im fo r VA d isa

bil ity c omp e ns atio n f

or se rv ic e -c on nected

os te oa rt hriti s o f t he ri ght h ip o n d ir e c t, presumptive, and se condar y bases. On A

pril 19, 2005, in a

full-Court opinion, the Court rever sed the B oa rd ' s d e c isi on

wi th r e g ard

to M r. Pa dg e tt' s se c on da

ry-s e rv ic e -c onne c tio n right- hip dis a bil ity
c la im. In s o d oin g , th e Court c on c lud e d th at " the

onl y pla usib le re so lution o f t he ke y fa c tua l issue on th e rec ord in t

his case is that Mr. Padgett's right -hip disability w as aggravated by his s ervic ec onne c te d le

ft -k ne edis ab ili

ty ." ( emphasis adde d). The Co u rt we n t on to set aside the B oard decision as to direct and presumptive service connec tion for the right-hip disability , and re manded the entire matter for

further proce eding s consistent with its o p inion. On April 21, 2005, the appellant' s counsel informe d the Court o f t h e ap p el l ant' s death in Nove mber 2004. On Ma y 19, 2005, the Secr etar

y filed a motion to rec all judgme nt and dis miss the appeal; that motion was later opposed. On its own ac cord, the Court, on J une 17, 2005, rec alled judgme nt. O n J uly 21, 2005, Mr. Padg ett' s widow filed a motion for substitution or, in the alternative, intervention.
Th is C ourt

a dh e re s to thec a se -o r- c ontr ov e rs y jurisd ic tio na l re str a int s pr ov ide d fo r in Art ic le I I Iof the U.S. Constitut ion. See M okal v. De rwinski , 1 V e t

. Ap p
. 1 2 , 1 3

- 1 5 ( 1 9 9 0 )

. C o n s e qu e nt l y, beca use cla ims for disability

compensation under chapter 11 of title 38, U.S. Code, do not survive a vete ran, when a ve tera

n dies while appe alinga B oard de cision to the Court, there no longer rema ins
a ca se or c ontroversy

and the Court must dismis s the ap peal. Se eLan dic ho v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 42 (1 99 4) ; se eals o Ze v alk ink v . B ro wn , 102 F.3d 1236, 1243- 44 (F ed. Cir. 1996) (e x pressly agree ing wi th t his Court ' s Landicho ho ldi ng ); Ri c ha rd v . W est , 161 F.3d 719, 721 (F ed. Cir. 1998). I f, af ter a vete ran' s death, the Court issues order s in which it enter s its judgment on the ve tera n' s appea l and

### 2

acts on an application for EAJA fees a nd those order s constitute the mandate of the Court, the Court must rec all those mandate s and re voke those orde rs. Se e Kaw ad v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 61, 62 ( 1998) (p e r c uriam orde r) ; Ke e l v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A pp
. 12 4, 12 6 ( 19 96 ). In a dd iti on , th e Cou rt mus t va c ate the underlying B oard de cision to prevent it from a ctingas a ba rri er to the suc cess of

any claimant seekingacc rued be nefits. S e eY om a v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 298, 299 ( 1995) (pe r curiam order) (explaining that va catur

of B oard de cision cause s vacatur of u n derly ing r eg ional officedecision beca use latter w as subsumed by former). He re, Mr

. P adgett died while a ppealingthe August 8, 20 02 , B oa

rd de c isi on to t he Court

. Th e Court

wi ll the re fo reva c ate that B oa rd de c isi on and dis mis s the appe al for la ck of jurisdiction.
On c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , it

is
ORDERED that th e S ec re t ary' s motion t o dismiss is gr anted. The Court's A pril 19, 2005, opinion is withdrawn. It is further ORDERED that the August 8, 2002, Board decision is VACATED. It is further ORDERED that this appea l is DI SMI SSED for lack of jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that the mot ion for substi tution or, i n the alternative, i nterve ntion is denied as
moo t.
DA TE D: Se pte mbe r 7 , 2 00 5 PER CU RIAM

. S T E I N B E R G , J

udge , d issen ti n g: I w o u ld d en ythe S ecretary ' s m o ti o n to d ism iss an d w o u ld
r e e nt e rj udg men t an d i ssue m anda t e i n d ue c our s e
. I s e e no g ood r e a s on t o d i s t urb the i mpor t a nt p reced en ts estab li sh ed b ythe C o u rt ' s A p ri l 19 , 2 0 0 5 , o p inio n o r to d ep ri v e a p o ten ti al accru ed -be n efit s cl ai m ant of

the ben ef

i t of t he C ou r t ' s r eversal of t he B oard of V et er ans' A pp eal s deci si on den y i ng an a w a r d o f s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o n

– t h a t i s , s e c o n d a r y s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o n fo rth e v e t e r a n 's ri gh t

- h i p d i s a b i l i t y. T h e v aca tur o f this C o u rt ' s o p inio n an d the d ism issal o f this ap p eal m ayad v erselyaff ect M rs. Pa d gett , who ha s s ubmi t t e d t o the De pa r t men t of Ve t e r a ns Af

f a i r s ( VA ) un de r38 U. S. C. § 5121 ( a ) a n a c c rue db en efit s claim

. B ase d o n t h is C o u rt ' s rev ersal, M rs. Pa d gett , if q u alif ied as an accru ed -be n efit s c l a i man t , woul d b e e nt i t l e d t o a c c rue d b e ne f i t s be c a us e t he me r i t s of he r c l a i m woul d n e c e s s a r i l yha ve b e e n d e c id e d b yth is C o u rt' s fu ll-C o u rt d e c is io n to aw a rd se rv ic e co n n e c tio n
. See B r owd e rv

. B r own , 5 V e t.A p p . 2 6 8 , 2 7 0 -7 1 (1 9 9 3 ) (citin g Ci t y of Cl e v e l and v

. Fe de r al Po werCommi s s i on , 561 F

. 2d 344, 346 ( D. C. Ci r
. 19 77) ( not i ng t ha t , un de rl a w- of

- t he

- c a s e do c t r i ne , a dmi ni s t r a t i ve a g e nc y" i s wi t hout p o w er" to act in m an n er inc o n sisten t w it h m an d ate o f rev iew ing ap p ellate co u rt ' s d ecisio n in th e cas e)). Bas e d o n the a c t i on be i ng t a k e n b yt he C ou r ti n v a c a t i ng t ha t r e ve r s a l , Mr s
. Pa dg e t t wi l l no w be req u ir ed to h av e V A r ev iew the m erit s o f h er claim start ing at th e reg ion al-office lev el.

As t h e a u t h o rof

bo t h Landi c ho v

. B r own , 7 Vet

. App. 42 ( 1994 ) , a nd Ze v al k i nk v

. B r own , 6 V et. A p p
. 4 8 3 ( 1 9 9 4 ) (en b an c), a ff’d , 10 2 F

. 3d 12 36 ( F ed. C i r
. 19 96 ) , I beli eve iti s t i m e t o rec on si der t his C ou r t ' s op i nion s i n tho se cases i n l i g ht of t he c i r cum st ances of t his case and i n l i g ht of t he F ederal C irc u it' s s u gges tio n in affirm in g Ze v alk i nk t ha t t hi s Cour t " c oul d p e r ha ps r e man d [ t o VA] t he qu e s t i on

### 3

o f w h e th e r [th e v e te ra n ' s w id o w ] q u a lifie s as an ac c ru e d [-]b e n e fits cla im a n t"

. Ze v alk i nk , 10 2 F

. 3d at 1244

. 

### KASOLD, Judge , dis se nti ng : F or ov e r 12 ye ars , Wor ld War I I ve te ra n B arn e y O. P a dg e tt purs ue d h is c la im f

or se rv ic e -c onne c te d d isa

bil ity c omp e ns atio n f

or his ri ght- hi p disa

bil ity . H is claim was r epeatedly

reje cted by

the Secr etar

y on t h e b as i s that his disabili ty was not ser

vice
connec ted. The C o urt, on J uly 9, 2004, initially

aff irmed the B oard' s finding on this matter, but
s u b s equ en t l y , s i tt i n g enb an c, wi th dre w i t s p re v i o u s o p i n i o nan d re v er s edth e B o ar d 's fi n d i n g.
Sub se qu e nt t o is su ingtheCourt ' s e n ba nc op ini on , c ouns e l f

or Mr . Pa dg e tt l e arn e d th at hi s client had died sever al months earlier , and he so infor med the Court. The Sec reta ry moved to have the en ba nc opinion withdrawn. Mr . Padg ett' s surviving w idow, Sue Padg ett, opposed this acti on and sought, inter alia, pe rmission to be substi tuted for he r dec ease d husband. Succinctly

stated, Mrs. Padg ett opposes withdraw al of the C ourt' s en banc opi nion and see ks substitut ion beca

use her claim for a ccr

ued benefits is direc tly derivative of her husband' s claim. She is e ntitled to any acc rued be nefits arising fr om her husband' s right-hip disability if, and only

if, that disability is found to be servic e conne cted. Withdraw al of the Court's en banc opinion and va catur of the B oard decision will require Mrs. Padg ett to undertake the time-consumingburden of trying to establish that her husband' s right-hip disability was service connec ted, and do so befor e the ve ry ag ency that repe atedly , for ove r 12 year s, denied that his disability was ser vice c onnecte d. My c on c e rn s w iththeCourt ' s a c tio n toda y are fi ve fo ld. F ir st, the Court ' s o rd e r p e rf un c torily dismiss es the a

ppeal of Mr. P adg ett for lack of jurisdiction and declare s Mrs. Padg ett' s reque st for substitut ion to be moot, without any discussion of the basis for he r re quest. Mrs. Padg ett notes that the opinion beingwithdrawn toda y is the first one invol ving an en banc opinion of the Court that has
reve rsed a Boa

rd decision below. She further notes that the law w ith reg ard to a ccr ued bene fits has chang ed and no longe r limit s survivors to two year s' worth of a ccr ued bene fits, seePub. L . 108-183, § 1 04 (a) & (d), 11 7 Stat. 2 65 1, 26 56 (e lim inatin gtw o- ye ar c e ili ngon pa y me nt o f a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts wher e, as he re, the veter an died o n o r after Dec ember 16, 2003), thus callinginto question the
conce rns ra ised by

the U.S. Court of Appea ls for the Fed era l Circuit that a succe ssful acc ruedbenef its beneficia

ry might b e awa

rded a highe r amount of be nefits if substituted for the ve tera n ra t h er t han proc eedingwith a sepa rate claim for a ccr

ued bene fits. Se eRi c ha rd v . W est , 1 6 1 F .3d 719, 722-23 (F ed. Cir. 1998) (c iting 38 U.S.C. § 5121 (West. Supp. 1998) (limit ing sur vivors to a maxi mum of two year s of the vete ran' s due but unpaid bene fits)). Counsel for Mrs. Padg ett fu rt h er n otes that a re versa l of the B oard de cision avoids the prec lusive eff

ect of a negative Boa

rd dec ision, a fac tor underpinningmany of the Court' s previous decisions and, indee d, the orde r issued today

. Counsel a lso note s that the U.S. Supreme Court has he ld t hat "[j]u dic ia l pr e c e de nts arepr e sumpt ive ly c or re c t and va lua bleto t he le g a l c omm

un ity a s a whole. The y

are not merely

th e p ro perty

of private litigants and should stand unless a court con clu des th at the p ub l i c i n t e r e s twou ldbe s erve d b y a vacatur." U.S. Bancorp M ortgage Co. v. Bo nn er M

al l P ' sh ip , 5 13 U. S. 1 8, 26 (1 99 4) (( c itatio n o mitte d) ); see also Morton v. Gober , 14 Ve t.A pp . 174 , 1 75 (2 00 0) (c iti ngpu bli c int e re st a s a

fa c tor wh e n c on sid e ri ngwh e the r t o v a c ateI s ep arat el y no t e t hat the C o urt is sued t he und erl y i ng m eri t s case i n t he no rma l co urs e o f i t s b usi ness , wi t ho ut 1 k n owl edg e of

M r
. Padg et t ' s N ov embe r 2004 de at h , w h i ch oc cu r r ed s u bs equ en t t o t h e Se pt embe r 14, 2004, s u bmi s s i on o f t h e m a tt e r f

o r d e c isio n to the e n b a n c C o u rt a n d in the a b se n c e o f an y ind ic a tio n tha t eith e r o f t h e p a rtie s w ithh e ld k n o w le d g e o f t h e d e a th o f M r. P a d g e tt. In a sim ilar situa tio n , t h e U .S . S u p re m e C o u rt fo u n d it a p p ro p ria te to issu e it s o p inio n , nu n c p ro tun c , t o p re -d a te the d e a th o f t h e inte re ste d p a rty a n d re ta in th e d e c isio n
. See Harr i s v. Co m m i s s i on er , 340 U

. S. 106, 112- 13 ( 1950) ( r ev er s i n g cou r t of a ppea l s j u dg men t r eg ar di n g pr oper t y - s et t l eme n t a g r ee men t ' s e f f ec t on gi f t

- t ax l i ab i l i t y of p et i t i o ner and, because p et i t i o ner had d ie d s i nce case was s ub m i t t ed t o Sup rem e C o urt , ent eri ng j udgment on dat e of

he r deat h "i n pur s uan ce of t he prac t i ce ob t ai ni ng i n t hos e ci r cums t anc es " and ci t i ng f or t hat pra ct i ce M i t che l lv. O ve r m an , 1 0 3 U

. S. 6 2 , 6 4

- 6 5 , 1 3 O t t o 6 2 , 6 4

- 6 5 (18 8 0 ) (al l o wi ng st at e co urt o p i ni o n t o s t and even t ho ugh p a r t y h a d d i e d f

o u r y e a r s b e f

o r e i t w a s i s s u e d , w h e n c a s e h a d b e e n s u b m i t t e d t o s t a t e c o u r t f o r d e c i s i o n b e f

o r e a p p e l l a n t 's d e a th a n d la c h e s o f p a rtie s d id n o t e n te r into ti m ing o f d e c isio n )) ; see a lso M ort on v. G ob er , 14 V et

. App. 174, 174- 75 ( 20 00 ) ( ci t i ng f

aul t , o r lac k t here of

, at t r i but abl e t o an a pp el l ant as a f act or w hen cons i deri ng wh et her t o vac at e a judgm ent ).



### 4 a jud gme nt) . And , c ou nselno te s th at th e Court wa s e sta bli sh e d und e r Art ic le Iof theU. S. Constitution and is only

bound by the ca se-or -controve rsy

require ment as a p ru dential matter a nd not as a c onstitut ional jurisdictional matter. See M okal v. De rwinski , 1 Vet. App. 12, 15 ( 1990). 1 

### Ibe lie ve the se argume nts de se rv e mor e tha n a pe rf un c tor y dis mis sa l.
A sec ond conce rn wi t h t o d ay' s order is that the majority ' s relianc e on Lan dic ho v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 42 (1994), for the proposition that " claims for disability compensation under cha

pter 11 of title 38, U.S. Code, do not survive a vete ran," is too broadly stated. The F eder al Circuit, in case s rende red subse quent to Landicho , has st ated that "a fter a veteran' s death, the claim i s no longe r one for di sab il ity compen sat io n but rather o ne fo r accru ed b enef it s, " se e Ze v alk

ink v . B ro wn , 102 F.3d 1236, 1244 (F ed. Cir. 1996), a nd that the " acc rued be nefits provision thus creates a na rrowly limit ed
e xce pti on to t he g e ne ra l r

ulethat a ve te ra n' s c la im f

or be ne fi ts d oe s n ot s ur

viv e theve te ran," see Ha ine s v . W est , 154 F.3d 1298, 1300 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998) (citingZevalkink, su pra ). M oreove r, the Fe dera l Circuit specifica lly noted the p o s s i b i l i t y

that our Court could re mand the matter for
cer tification of a pa

rty seekingsubstitut ion as an ac crued-bene fits benef iciary under statute. See Zevalkink, 1 02 F .3 d at 12 44 ; see also 38 U.S .C

. § 512 1( a ) ( a uth orizin gpa

y me nt t o c e rt a in individuals, in cl u d i n g a v eter an' s spouse, of bene fits that are "dueand unpaid" at the time of the veter an' s death); 38 C.F .R. § 3.1000(a) ( 2004) (same).
A third conc ern, c losely

related to my

second c oncer

n, is the fac t that the Cou rt has neve r a dd re sse d theF e de ra l Cir c uit ' s r e c ognit ion of an a c c ru e d- be ne fi ts c la im a s an e xce pti on to t he ru le that a vete ran' s claim dies with him, see H aines , su pra , or the possibility of the Court establishing a proc edure p ermit ting substitution of a party once that person has be en ce rtified as a statutory ac cr u ed -benefits benef

iciary, s e eZeva lkink, su

pra . Be fore withdrawingan en ba nc opinion reve rsing a B oard de cision, and thereby placinginto question a benef iciary' s right to accr

ued bene fits, we
s h o u l d a d dr e s s th e d e c i s i o n s o f

th e F e d e r a l C i r c u i ts u g g e s t i n gs u c ha c t i o ni s n o tm an d at o r y. My fourth conc ern is that today' s order is prese nted as an order of the Court sitting en ba nc, and is there fore appropriate in its action withdrawingthe en banc opinion re ndere d in the underlying merits case . Howeve r, the unde rlying merits case was submi tted for decision befor e the a ppointmentO n A ugust 4, 2 0 0 5 , t he C o urt accep t ed f o r f i l i ng, p urs uant t o R ul e 2 7 (b) of t he C o urt ' s R ul es of P ract i ce and 2 P r ocedur e, t he Secr et ar y ' s t i mel y opp osi t i on t o M r s
. P adget t ' s mo t i on f or s ubs t i t ut i on. T he op po s i t i on was f orwa r ded f or cons i dera t i on by t he ori gi nal f i ve- j udge en banc panel on A ug us t 8, af t er C hi ef Judge I ver s and h i s s ucc es s or Chi ef Ju dg e St ei n ber g h ad r et i r ed.

I not e t he cont r as t bet ween a newl y ap po i nt ed j udge s t at i ng a po s i t i on i n a mat t er pri or t o and upon i s s uan ce 3

o f a d eci si o n and a Jud ge who st at es a p o si t i o n b ut t hen ret i res b ef o re i ss uance o f

t he d eci si o n. A newl y ap p o i nt ed Jud ge ha s t he op po r t un i t y t o re vi ew a l l pl eadi ng s , cons i der al l s epar at e opi ni ons an d di s cus s i on dur i ng t he wr i t i ng p ro ce ss, cha ng e h i s or her mi nd as t he proces s procee ds, and r evi ew hi s or her posi t i on up t o i s s uan ce of t he deci s i on. As not ed i n t he t ext , a Jud ge who ret i res be f o re a decis i o n i s i ss ued , pa rt i cul a rly when ret i rem ent oc curs be f o re al l pleadings
u lti m a te ly f

iled in the c a se ha v e b e e n fil e d a n d w h e n su c h re tire m e n t o c c u rs d u rin g the w riting p e rio d a n d m a n y d a ys b ef o re i ss uance o f

a de ci si o n, ne ver has the o p p o rt uni t y to revi ew al l the p l ead i ngs f i l ed i n t he m at t er and never has t he
o p p o rtu n ity to c o n sid e r a n y se p a ra te o p inio n s o r d isc u ssio n tha t en su e s a fter re tire m e n t.



### 5 of four judge s curr ently

sitti ngand ther efor e, pursuant to se ction V(b)( 1)(C) of the Court' s Interna l Oper ating Procedur es (I OP), the appe al re mained bef ore the en banc panel of

five judg es to which the matter had been prese nted. In contra st, the reque st of the Secr etar y to have that e n banc opinion wi thd ra wn is a n is su e pr e se nte d to the Court wh e n nine jud g e s w e resittin g , r e nd e ri ngqu e sti on a ble thea pp lic a bil ity of I OP V (b )( 1) (C ) a

nd thede signatio n o f t od ay' s o rd e r a s an en ba nc or de r. Th is, in turn, rende rs questionable the appropriateness of a non-e n banc pa

nel of five judge s withdrawing
an o pin ion

of a pr op e rl y de signate d e n b anc pa

ne l of fi vejud g e s. My fifth conc ern, which is relate d to my fourth conc ern a

nd the proprie ty

of less-than- en banc panel withdra

wingan en ba

nc opinion, is that the order issued today is be ing issued many day s after two of the pa

nel member s have r etired f rom the Court, and i t s issuance c annot be c onsidered a
mere ly minist eria l matter. Their retire ment came befor e either J udg e had the opportunity to review all of the f

ilings in this matter. The re tirements also ca me bef ore the writingperiod ha d passed, 2


### nece ssarily

precl u d i n g the Judg es' participation in the discussions undertaken duringthe writing proce ss or their conside ration of a ny s ep arate opinions filed in this matter. Although I do not 3 

### dispute the repr esentation of the positions of the two retired Judge s as of the da te they retire d, Ido question the Court' s relianc e on those positions to iss ue an order, unde r the ci rc umstances noted above, to withdra

w an e n banc opinion.

F or thefo re g oin gre a so ns , I

wo uld su bmi t Mr s. Pa dg e tt' s re qu e st fo r su bs tit uti on to t he fu llCourt , a dd

re ss h e r a rgume nts , a

nd c on sid e r h e r re qu e st fo r sub sti tut ion in l ight o f t

he F e de ra l Cir c uit
c a se s n ote d a

bo ve . A c c or din g ly , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.