IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 21, 2024

TYRONE E. MURPHY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 313133 Barry A. Steelman, Judge

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No. E2023-01243-CCA-R3-PC

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Tyrone E. Murphy, Petitioner, appeals from the Hamilton County Circuit Court’s denial of 

his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated 

murder and tampering with evidence. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court 

erred in denying relief based upon his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

John G. McDougal (on appeal), Christopher H. Jones (at post-conviction hearing), 

Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyrone E. Murphy.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney 

General; Coty Wamp, District Attorney General; and Miriam S. Johnson, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner’s convictions relate to the June 4, 2017 stabbing death of Ashley Cates. 

State v. Murphy, No. E2020-00658-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2206538, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. June 1, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2021). The victim’s mother and 

stepfather discovered her lying dead on the floor of her apartment in a pool of blood. Id. 

07/08/2024
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at *2. When officers arrived, they observed dried blood on the ground and on the doorknob 

of a nearby apartment on the same floor as the victim’s apartment. Id. at *3. Inside the 

apartment, they found Petitioner “acting like he was asleep.” Id. Petitioner had a “huge, 

freshly-stitched laceration on his hand.” Id. 

The victim’s autopsy revealed that she had been stabbed 22 times and that three of 

the wounds would have been fatal by themselves. Id. at *6. The victim was stabbed “with 

enough force to nearly sever her trachea, to penetrate her spine, to pierce all the way 

through her wrist, and to break off the tip of the knife into her temporal bone.” Id. at *14. 

The medical examiner found no evidence of sexual assault, but he testified that “based on 

the way the blood was smeared on the victim’s legs, that ‘a person was trying to pull her 

legs apart[.]’” Id. The victim also had several defensive wounds. Id. Petitioner’s DNA 

was discovered inside the victim’s apartment, on her body, and on her driver’s license. Id. 

at *5. 

Petitioner testified at trial that he acted in self-defense after the victim attacked him

with two knives in the hallway outside his apartment. Id. at *7. He said his hand was cut 

in the struggle. He said the victim was not “stuck until [they] got over [ ] to her door.” Id. 

He said the struggle continued into the victim’s bedroom and that was where most of the 

victim’s injuries occurred because he was “trying to shake [the knives] off of her[.]” Id. 

Afterwards, Petitioner “tried to clean” the hallway because “blood was everywhere and [ ] 

the floor was ‘unpassable.’” Id. Petitioner did not present expert DNA testimony. 

The jury convicted Petitioner of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to life in prison. Id. at *9. On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed 

the conviction. Id. at *1. The panel concluded that the evidence that Petitioner acted with 

premeditation was “overwhelming.” Id. at *14. 

Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The postconviction court appointed counsel, and appointed counsel filed an amended petition 

alleging that Petitioner’s trial counsel were ineffective for (1) failing to consult with an 

expert about the victim’s history of mental health problems, substance abuse, and violent 

behavior; and (2) failing to challenge the State’s use of peremptory strikes against four 

black jurors. 

At the post-conviction hearing, both of Petitioner’s trial counsel (“counsel” and “cocounsel”) testified that they worked for the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office at 

the time of Petitioner’s trial, and both testified that they had each handled thousands of 

cases and several jury trials. Counsel met with Petitioner “several times” before trial, and 

a defense investigator also “spent a substantial amount of time” with Petitioner. 
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Counsel recalled that of the four black jurors in the venire, the trial court dismissed 

all four for cause. One of the potential jurors said she could not view graphic photos; two 

expressed “religious objections to judging people”; and one said she knew the victim. 

Counsel testified that the jury was “all white” and that he “remember[ed] being upset 

because . . . it’s important to have diverse points of view on a jury, particularly when you 

have a black defendant like [Petitioner] was.” 

Counsel and co-counsel reviewed the State’s proof with Petitioner. They considered 

requesting an expert to testify at trial but did not because, counsel said, “there wasn’t really 

a factual dispute as to whether [Petitioner] had been there, whether his DNA was there or 

whether there was blood where they said there was blood.” Co-counsel explained, “any 

challenge [to] the DNA evidence would’ve only served to muddy the waters and more than 

likely weaken any self-defense claim that we made.” 

Counsel believed “the only possible defense was to attack premeditation” and that 

there was “very little [he] could’ve done to advance the self-defense argument if 

[Petitioner] didn’t testify,” so he and co-counsel “extensively prepared” Petitioner to 

testify. Counsel explained, “in a case where our theory was built around self-defense . . . 

[Petitioner’s] credibility [wa]s incredibly important.” Counsel said Petitioner’s testimony 

“did not go well” because Petitioner did not heed their advice. 

Counsel testified that Petitioner’s case was “very difficult” due to the “sheer amount 

of evidence involved in it.” Counsel testified, “I don’t know what I could have done 

differently to have affected the outcome of [Petitioner]’s trial, if anything.” Counsel did 

not recall any plea offers in Petitioner’s case. He testified that Petitioner’s age at the time 

of trial “was such that it would have been very difficult to settle this case on anything that 

wasn’t a de facto life sentence for [Petitioner].” 

Counsel agreed that he did not have a subpoena issued for the victim’s psychiatric 

or mental health records and said his reasoning was, “number one, we didn’t want to tip 

off the State that that was going to be our theory[,]” and secondly, he did not want to create 

sympathy for the victim by “attacking her[.]” Co-counsel recalled that a preliminary 

investigation into the victim’s mental health history did not reveal anything. He testified 

they did not want “to paint a victim who ha[d] been stabbed to death as an aggressor and a 

drug user and trying to paint her family, who’s obviously grieving through that process and 

still is, with mental health problems and drug abuse problems.” 

Petitioner testified that he had “four visits in 18 months” with counsel and cocounsel. He testified, “they were so pro-DA.” He asked co-counsel to hire a DNA expert 

to challenge the State’s DNA expert, and co-counsel “looked at [Petitioner] . . . like [he] 

was crazy.” Petitioner said his attorneys did not prepare him to testify at trial. When asked 
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by the post-conviction court what would be different if Petitioner was granted a new trial, 

Petitioner said that “questions [would] g[e]t answered[,]” that “some motions [would be] 

filed[,]” and that his attorney “would just focus on what we got to work with.” Petitioner 

did not deny that he was present in the victim’s apartment. He testified, “We could base 

[a new] trial on self-defense.” Petitioner recounted his version of the incident and testified, 

“I almost lost my life.” He recalled that he “was slipping around in the blood . . . and was 

just smearing it.” 

The post-conviction court addressed Petitioner’s claims in a written order denying 

relief. Regarding Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the postconviction court determined that any deficiency by counsel in not investigating the victim’s 

history of mental illness, substance abuse, and violence was not prejudicial because 

Petitioner presented no such evidence at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction 

court found that all four prospective black jurors were excused for cause unrelated to the 

jurors’ race; therefore, Petitioner’s counsel were not deficient for not raising a Batson

challenge.

1

 The post-conviction court made no explicit finding as to whether trial counsel 

were deficient for failing to adequately meet with Petitioner, nor did the court consider 

whether counsel were deficient for failing to call an expert witness to challenge the State’s 

DNA expert. 

Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s order.

Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his 

petition and that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) “[n]ot having experts to testify on 

blood, DNA or mental health of victim”; (2) “[n]ot challenging the strikes of the State of 

African American Jurors”; and (3) failing to meet with Petitioner adequately.2 The State 

contends that Petitioner has waived the issues and that the post-conviction court 

nevertheless properly dismissed the petition. 

To prevail on a petition for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove all factual 

allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tenn. 

 

1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 78, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor 

to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race of on the assumption that black jurors as a group 

will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.”). 

2 Petitioner identified other errors by the trial court and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

in his petition and amended petition for post-conviction relief that he does not pursue in this appeal; thus, 

Petitioner has abandoned those issues. See Jackson v. State, No. W2008-02280-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 

3430151, at *6 n.2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2009) (“While the Petitioner raised additional issues in his 

petition for post-conviction relief, he has abandoned those issues on appeal.”). 
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2003). Post-conviction relief cases often present mixed questions of law and fact. See 

Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). Appellate courts are bound by the postconviction court’s factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against such findings. 

Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015). When reviewing the post-conviction 

court’s factual findings, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own 

inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. Id.; Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456 

(citing Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997)). Additionally, “questions 

concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given their 

testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the [postconviction court].” Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 456 (citing Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579); see also 

Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457. The post-conviction court’s conclusions of law and 

application of the law to factual findings are reviewed de novo with no presumption of 

correctness. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457. 

The right to effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by the Constitutions of 

both the United States and the State of Tennessee. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. 

art. I, § 9. In order to receive post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the 

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 

see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that the same 

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies in both federal and Tennessee cases). 

Both factors must be proven for the court to grant post-conviction relief. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687; Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). 

Accordingly, this Court “need not address both elements if the petitioner fails to 

demonstrate either one of them.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457. Additionally, review of 

counsel’s performance “requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and 

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689; see also Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579. We will not second-guess a reasonable trial 

strategy, and we will not grant relief based on a sound, yet ultimately unsuccessful, tactical 

decision. Granderson v. State, 197 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).

As to the first prong of the Strickland analysis, “counsel’s performance is effective 

if the advice given or the services rendered are within the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases.” Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Baxter v. Rose, 523 

S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)); see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369. In order to prove that 

counsel was deficient, the petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s acts or omissions 

were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see 

also Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936.
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Even if counsel’s performance is deficient, the deficiency must have resulted in 

prejudice to the defense. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370. Therefore, under the second prong of 

the Strickland analysis, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner first argues that his attorneys met with him only four times before trial. 

Aside from his bare allegation that he was “prejudice[d] since [he] was found guilty[,]” 

Petitioner fails to state how trial counsels’ performance was deficient or how they failed to 

adequately communicate with him about his case. Moreover, Petitioner did not present 

this issue in his pro se or amended petitions, and the post-conviction court, therefore, did 

not make any findings as to the issue in its order denying relief. Generally, appellate review 

is not afforded to issues not addressed by a post-conviction court, and plain error review is 

not available in post-conviction proceedings. Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 458 

(Tenn. 2020); Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 561-62 (Tenn. 2010); Walsh v. State, 166 

S.W.3d 641, 645-46 (Tenn. 2005); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 219 (Tenn. 2009). 

An appellate court “may only consider issues that were not formally raised in the postconviction petition if the issue was argued at the post-conviction hearing and decided 

without objection.” Holland, 610 S.W.3d at 548.

Counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he met with Petitioner “several 

times” before trial and that a defense investigator “spent a substantial amount of time” with 

Petitioner. Counsel and co-counsel reviewed discovery with Petitioner, and they 

“extensively prepared” him to testify at trial. Notwithstanding his waiver of the issue, 

Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel were deficient. 

Next, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call expert 

witnesses to testify about the blood and DNA evidence or the victim’s mental health. As 

the post-conviction court recognized, Petitioner presented no evidence at the postconviction hearing as to the victim’s history of mental illness. Neither the post-conviction 

court nor this Court will speculate what a witness would have said. See Black v. State, 794 

S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (“When a petitioner contends that trial counsel 

failed to discover, interview, or present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses 

should be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.”). Moreover, counsel 

testified as to his strategy for not having a subpoena issued for the victim’s psychiatric or 

mental health records, and co-counsel testified that a preliminary investigation into the 

victim’s mental health history did not reveal anything. The record does not preponderate 

against the post-conviction court’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to show prejudice. 
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As to Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call a

DNA expert at trial, Petitioner did not present such a witness at the post-conviction hearing. 

See Plyant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757). 

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged how a DNA expert would have advanced his defense. 

Counsel and co-counsel testified that there was no factual dispute as to whether Petitioner 

was present in the victim’s apartment or that the stabbing occurred. Co-counsel believed 

that a challenge to the State’s DNA evidence “would’ve only served to muddy the waters 

and more than likely weaken any self-defense claim that we made.” Petitioner has not 

established that trial counsel were deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged 

deficiency. 

Finally, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge 

the State’s use of peremptory strikes against potential African-American jurors. However, 

Petitioner has failed to make any argument or cite any authority as to this issue in his brief 

to this Court. See Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by 

argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as 

waived in this court.”). Despite Petitioner’s inadequate brief, we conclude on the merits 

that the record supports the post-conviction court’s finding that all four prospective black 

jurors were excused for cause unrelated to the jurors’ race and its conclusion that trial 

counsel were not deficient for not raising a Batson challenge. Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed. 

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TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE