### FILED OCTOBER22, 2015 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A State CourtofAppeals, Division III

INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OFTHE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISIONTHREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 32553-9-111 Respondent, ) ) 

### v. ) ) SUSANJAYNELASTER, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )

FEARING, J.

- Susan Laster appeals herconviction forresisting arrest. She also contendsthatthe trial court erredwhenimposing a mentalhealth evaluation as a conditiontoprobation. We affirm bothher conviction and sentence. FACTS Sixty-four-year-old SusanLasterdwelled withher dog Sarah in a truck on Clark Street, in Republic. Laster stored all ofherpossessions inthe truck oran attached trailer. A Republic ordinance prohibited the parking ofa car for morethantwelve consecutive hours in designated zones. Lasterparkedhertruck andtrailerin front ofAnderson'sNo. 32553-9-III State v. Laster Grocery in violation ofthe city ordinance. On five occasions, Republic Police ChiefJan Lewis instructed Susan Laster to

move her truck from the front ofthe grocery store. Lasterignored ChiefLewis' demand. She also declined Lewis' offer to fill the truck with gas with city funds. Thetruck's battery died and its radiator fluid bled from the truck. Laster rejected the assistance ofa mechanic sentby a local church. The truck languished in front ofAnderson's Grocery. Lasterreceived aparking ticket. During a frozen early morning, Susan Laster shuffled down a Republic main street to earn $5 by shoveling snow. Sarah remained in the truck. City Police ChiefJan Lewis, OfficerMatthew Beard, OfficerLoren Culp, and a tow truck driverwith his truck went to Laster's truck and trailer with the intent ofimpoundingthe vehicles. Officer Culp wore a body camera. ChiefLewis knew that Lasterpawned many firearms, but believed Laster might still possess a pistol. Laster saw lights nearhertruck and returned to her wheeled home. Culp blockedtraffic for the tow truck operator, while ChiefLewis and Officer Beard hindered Laster. Thetow truck reversed toward Susan Laster's truck, at which time Laster screamed. Officer Matthew Beard testified at trial: [Laster] was very agitated, was screaming that we were goingto kill her dog. And ChiefLewis tried to explain to her that we were not going to kill her dog and as soon as the vehicle was loaded we would retrieve the animal for her.

2No. 32553-9-II1 State 

### v. Laster Report ofProceedings (RP) at 87. Laster struck ChiefJan Lewis on the shoulder. Lewis infonned Laster that she was under arrest for assault. Lewis later testified: A I tried to explain to Ms. Laster why we were there, what we were going to do, and-she kept-she started offby yelling we were there to kill herdog, andthen she struck me. Q Okay. And [where] did she strike you? A My shoulder. Q Okay. What was your reaction to that? A I advised her she shouldn'thave done that because now I was going to arrest her. Q Okay. And what was her reaction to that? A Not happy with it. Andwe-Off. Beard and I started tussling with herto gethandcuffs onher. She resisted the whole time. And seeOff. Beard got kicked numerous times in-in one ofhis legs, and we were finally able to handcuffher. RP at 63-64. Susan Laster kicked MatthewBeard in the leg three times. Afterhearing a scream, Loren Culp triggeredhis body camera and ran towardthe skinnish. Officer Culp testified: [Laster] was struggling, trying to get away from ChiefLewis and Off. Beard.

... Flailing her arms around, screaming and hollering. Kicking her legs. Just basically trying to get away. RP at 106. ChiefJan Lewis and OfficerMatthew Beard grabbed opposite arms ofSusan Laster. The two men handcuffed Laster. Laster continued to flail and kick. When Lewis, Beard, and Loren Culp sought to seat Laster in a patrol vehicle, Laster distended her legs so that she could not fit into the vehicle. The officers next strived to consign 3No. 32553-9-111 State v. Laster

Laster into a larger truck. Laster grew limp. Laster screamed she would not leave without a matron. The three officers eventually landed Laster into a police van, which transported her tojail. The Republic officers spent ten minutes strugglingto place Laster into a vehicle. During impound ofthe truck, Officers Loren Culp and MatthewBeard inventoried Susan Laster's belongings. Beard found a loaded .22 pistol near the driver's seat. PROCEDURE The State ofWashington charged Susan Laster with two counts ofthird degree assault and one count ofresisting arrest. The State later amended the charges to include

one count ofunlawful carrying a loaded pistol in a vehicle. Injail, Susan Laster refused water and food because she suspected both to be poisoned. Ron Casebeer, a mental health professional evaluated Laster. Casebeer concluded thatLaster showed signs ofmental illness, including paranoia. Thetrial court orderedEastern State Hospital to evaluate Susan Laster's competency to stand trial. Eastern State Hospital issued a report that found Laster competent to stand trial. A psychologist at the state hospital diagnosed Laster, however,

as having a "Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified with Borderline and Schizotypal Traits." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 24.

4

### No. 32553·9·111 State 

### v. Laster During trial, ChiefJan Lewis, OfficerMatthewBeard, and OfficerLoren Culp testified for the prosecution. When testifying, each officerdescribed Susan Laster's conduct as "resisting." Laster did not objectto the testimony. The trial court admitted as an exhibit the video from Officer Culp's body camera and permittedtheplaying ofthe video to thejury. When the video begins, Susan Laster is already in handcuffs. During the video, Laster screams wildly, while thethree officers oscillate betweentrying to calm Laster and lifting her into a vehicle. Afterthe State's case-in-chief, the court dismissed the unlawful weapons charge because the Statepresented no evidencethatLaster lacked a concealedweapons permit. Susan Lastertestified in her own defense. Laster denied hitting ChiefJan Lewis and declared: they were coming at me. 1putmy hand out. 1did touch him on the shoulder.

. .. Itwasjust a defense thing. Yes[, the righthand]. It'sjustto stop him. RP at 

### 131. Laster admitted to struggling with the officers, but repudiated that she tried to escape from their clutch. Laster also denied kicking OfficerBeard. Susan Lasterbelieved the officers conspired to arrest her. She explained to the

They were intent on arresting me. 1had no idea whatthey were going to do with my dog. And they hadplanned it. I knew that. AndI wasn'tgoing to cooperate with them. RP at 

### 133. When askedby the prosecution why she did not willingly enterthe patrol car, 5No. 

### 32553-9-111 

### State v. 

### Laster

Lasterresponded: 

### 1had my hands behind my back, 

### 1had two coats on. 

### 1had been arrested for no reason. 1had three guys on me. 1 didn'tknow wherethey were going to take me. This is a small town, and I'm not liked very much here. RP at 139. During closing argument, Susan Laster did not argue that her arrest was unlawful. Laster contendedthat she did not intend to elude arrest. Her counsel told thejury: That's where we start coming into the issue with regard to resisting arrest. And we have to take a look atthe definitions there. And again, we'retalking about words. And you look atNo. 

### 12, which is the elements. Again, the acthas to be an intent, and it has to be one oftwo things: eitherpreventing the arrest from occurring, or attempting to prevent the arrest from occurring. So how do you prevent an arrest from occurring? Youcan tum and run-an officer who's out ofshape and can'tkeep up with you. You can hide someplace. You'veprevented your arrest. How do you attempt? Same situation. Say, you startrunning. But the officer's in good shape. And maybe you slip and fall, and he gets you. You attempted to preventthe arrest. Now, the two officers have come up the street, the chiefsays, "You struck me; you're under arrest for third degree assault." That'sbefore the video starts. The arrest has occurred. How has she attempted toprevent an arrest? Howhad she prevented an arrest? She's already been arrested. And that's why the video doesn't count. Anything that has happened afterthat has nothing to do with whether ornot she was arrested [prior to any resistance, as the officers had already succeeded in handcuffing her.] RP at 207. The trial court instructedthejury on the charge ofresisting arrest:



### 6No. 32553-9-111 State 

### v. Laster

A person commits the crime ofresisting arrestwhenhe or she intentionally prevents orattempts to prevent apeace officer from lawfully arresting him or her. To convict the defendant ofthe crime ofresisting arrest, each ofthe following elements ofthe crime must be provedbeyond a reasonable doubt: 1) That on or about the 7th day ofFebruary, 2013, the defendant prevented or attempted toprevent a peace officer from arresting her; 2) That the defendant acted intentionally; 3) Thatthe arrest or attemptto arrest was lawful; and 4) That any ofthese acts occurred in the State ofWashington. CP at 110-11; accord 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL §§ 120.05, 120.06 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC). The trial court did not direct thejury to determine whetherLaster's arrestwas lawful. Susan Laster didnot request such an instruction. The courtdefined "assault" in ajury instruction as: An assault is an intentional touching or striking ofanotherperson, with unlawful force, that is harmful or offensiveregardless ofwhether any physical injury is done to theperson. A touching or striking is offensive if the touching or striking would offend an ordinary person who is not unduly sensitive. CP at 108. During deliberations, thejury asked the trial court: When does an arrest start and when does it end[?] When the cuffs go on? When they are in the car? Orwhen she's injail? RP at 218. Defense counsel recommended furnishing thejury with a supplemental instruction that would define "arrest." The court rejected the suggestion and told thejury to referto the existing instructions. An undeterredjurythen asked: "Ifan officer arrests a

7No. 32553-9-II1 State v. Laster

person, is he liable to rescind the charge and arrest[?]" RP at 221. The trial court again directed thejuryto referto the existing instructions. Thejuryfound Susan Laster guilty ofresisting arrest. Thejury failed to render unanimous verdicts on the two charges ofthird degree assault. The trial court sentenced Susan Lasterto ninety days injail with seventy-five days suspended contingent on Laster complying with the conditions ofher probation. One probation conditionrequired Lasterto procure a mental health evaluation from a state licensed mental health professional, file a copy ofthe evaluation within thirty days, begin any recommended treatment or education within sixty days, and file proofoftimely enrollment and completion. The trial court did not cite any statute as a,basis for imposing this condition. During sentencing, the trial court notedthe officers' "remarkablepatience" in responding to Susan Laster's "profound anger." RP at 247. The court addressed Laster: I like to view it as an opportunity, a way to breakthis impasse, here, and let you go on living in this community but without all these problems. RP at 248. LAW AND ANALYSIS On appeal, SusanLaster contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports her conviction for resisting arrest, (2) the trial court failed to instructthejury on determining whether Laster's arrest underlying herconviction for resisting arrest was lawful, (3) the



### 8No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

trial court erroneously permittedthe arresting officers to use the word "resist" and to thereby testify to an ultimate issue offact, and (4) the trial court exceeded its sentencing authority when it ordered her to undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment. We reject Laster's contentions and affirm her conviction and sentence. Sufficiency ofthe Evidence Susan Laster contends insufficient evidence supports her conviction for resisting arrest. We disagree. Evidence is sufficient ifa rational trier offact could find each element ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980). Both direct and indirect evidence may support thejury's verdict. State v. Brooks, 45 Wn. App. 824, 826, 727 P.2d 988 (1986). This court draws all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe State. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899,906-07,567 P.2d 1136 (1977). Onlythe trier offact weighs the evidence andjudgesthe credibility ofwitnesses. State v. Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 789 P.2d 306, 781 P.2d 1308 (1989). Susan Lasterwas convicted ofresisting arrest in violation ofRCW 9A.76.040, whichprovides: "Aperson is guilty ofresisting arrest ifhe or she intentionallyprevents

or attempts to prevent apeace officer from lawfully arresting him orher." RCW 9A.76.040(1) (emphasis added). Lasterchallenges two elements ofher conviction for insufficient evidence: intent and the lawfulness ofthe underlying arrest. "Aperson acts with intent orintentionally when he or she acts with the objective 9No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

orpurpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010(l)(a). Susan Lasterposits that she intended to stop officers from harming her dog and truck and to protectherselfby asking for a matron. Her argument falsely assumes that an act can be motivated by only one ortwo objectives. Regardless ofher underlying or mixed motives, sufficient evidence supports thejury's finding that Laster intended to prevent her arrest. Lastertestified that she "wasn't going to cooperate" with the officers. RP at 133. Officer Loren Culp described Laster as struggling, flailing her arms, kicking her legs, and attempting to free herselfbefore Officer Matthew Beard and ChiefJan Lewis handcuffed her. A rational trier offact could have found an intent to prevent arrest. Insertion ofthe word "lawful" in RCW 9A.76.040(l)prevents the State from prosecuting one who used force to prevent an unlawful arrest. State v. Goree, 36 Wn. App. 205, 209, 673 P.2d 194 (1983); State v. Hoffman, 35 Wn. App. 13, 18,664P.2d 1259 (1983). Therefore, we must address the lawfulness ofSusan Laster's arrest. A law enforcement officer may arrest a citizen on probable causeto believe that the citizen has committed a crime. RCW 10.31.100. ChiefJan Lewis arrested Susan Lasterbased on his beliefthat she committed third degree assault against him. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) defines third degree assault and provides in part: A person is gUilty ofassault in the third degree ifhe or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree

... [a]ssaults a law enforcement officer or other employee ofa law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time ofthe assault. 10No. 32553-9-II1 State v. Laster

The primary purpose ofthe statute is to prohibit assaultive behavior which interferes with the custodian's lawful obligations to ensure a peaceful and orderly custody. State v. Goree, 36 Wn. App. at 209 (1983); State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 269, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978). "Assault" is not defined in the criminal code. Common law, not the criminal code, supplies several definitions ofassault. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217-18,883 P.2d 320 (1994). One ofthese definitions is '"putting another in apprehension ofharm whether or not the actor intends to inflict oris capable ofinflicting that harm.'" Wilson, 125 Wn.2d at 218 (quoting State v. Bland, 71 Wn. App. 345, 353,860 P.2d 1046 (1993». A touching may also be unlawful because it was neither legally consented to nor otherwise privileged and was either harmful or offensive. State v. Jarvis, 160 Wn. App. 111, 118,246P.3d 1280 (2011); State v. Thomas, 98 Wn. App. 422, 424, 989 P.2d 612 (1999).Susan Laster struck ChiefJan Lewis on his shoulder before Lewis stated she was under arrest. The State presented no evidence that the touching harmed ChiefLewis. Nevertheless, when assessingthe evidence in a light most propitious to the prosecution, Lewis had reason to consider the touching offensive. Therefore, the facts presented at trial support thejury's finding that the arrest ofSusan Laster for third degree assault was lawful. Since some facts support the verdict, this court does not question the validity or

11No. 32553M 9-II1 State v. Laster

wisdom ofprosecuting a sixty-fourMyearMold mentally ill, homeless womanwho hits a police officer on the shoulder because ofa misguided concern about the safety ofa dog who could be her only companion. Susan Laster emphasizes her lack ofconviction on each charge ofassaulting a police officer. She may suggestthat these State deficiencies conclusively establish that law enforcement officers lackedprobable cause to arrest her for assault and it follows that she could notbeprosecuted and convicted ofresisting arrest. Nevertheless, an absence of

a conviction on a charge does notprove an absence ofprobable cause to arrest for that charge. A police officer need not establish proofbeyond a reasonable doubt to hold probable cause. SusanLaster fails to concede that thejury did not acquit on the two charges of assault. Thejury instead did notreach a verdict on those charges. A hungjury does not preclude retrial. State v. Russell, 101 Wn.2d 349, 351, 678 P.2d 332 (1984). A laterjury could still find Laster guilty ofassaUlting the officers. SusanLaster mentions in herbriefing a person's right to resist an unlawful arrest. A person may resist an unlawful arrest only ifnecessary to prevent injury, and the resistance mustbeproportional to the goal ofpreventing injury. State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120,131,713 P.2d 71 (1986); State v. Mann, 157 Wn. App. 428, 438, 237 P.3d 966 (2010). The use offorce to prevent even an unlawful arrest that threatens only a loss offreedom is notreasonable. State v. Goree, 36 Wn. App. at 209 (1983). Susan Laster 12No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

did not argue at trial that sheresisted an unlawful arrest. Facts do not support this defense. Lack ofJury Instruction Ajury found SusanLaster guilty ofresisting arrest in violation ofRCW 9A.76.040(1), which reads: "Aperson is guilty ofresisting arrest ifhe or she intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him

orher." The trial court instructed thejury on the elements ofresisting arrest. One of those elements is "the arrest or attempt to arrest was lawful." CP at 111. Thejury instruction followed the language encouraged by WPIC 120.06. Susan Laster contends the trial court shouldhave delivered an additional instruction directing thejury on how to judgewhetherthe arrest underlying her conviction for resisting arrest was lawful. WPIC

120.07 proposes such an instruction. WPIC 120.07 reads, in part: An arrest is [also} lawful ifthe arresting officerhad probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed the crime of(name of crime) [in the officer'spresence]. "Probable cause" means facts that would cause a reasonably cautious officerto believe that theperson had committed that crime. In determining whether the facts known to the officerjustifiedthis belief, you may take into account the officer's experience and expertise. (Emphasis added.) Susan Laster did not request WPIC 120.07 at trial. She argues instead that she challenged the incomplete instructions when her counsel requested a supplemental instruction defining "arrest" when thejury asked its first question. This argument fails 13No. 32553-9-111 State v. Laster

for two reasons. First, aparty must notify the trial court ofa claimed instructional error before the charge to thejury. Ribletv. Ideal Cement Co., 57 Wn.2d 619,624,358 P.2d 975 (1961); Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wn.2d 433,449,275 P.2d 736 (1954). Second, the late request did not seek an instruction on when an arrest was lawful, but rather what police action constituted an arrest. SusanLaster forwards two other contentions to obtain appellate review ofher second assigned error in the event we conclude she failed to properly preserve the error at trial. First, she argues the error comprises manifest constitutional error. Second, she contends her trial counsel was ineffective by not seeking the additionaljury instruction. We address these twin contentions in such order and reject both. Under RAP 2.5(a), an appellate court may decline to hear assignments oferror not raised before the trial court. One exception to this declinationrule is a party's assertion of"manifest error affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). Underthis exception,

an appellant must demonstrate (1) the error is manifest and (2) the error is truly of constitutional dimension. State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91,98,217 P.3d 756 (2009). Washington courts have announced differing formulations for "manifest error." One articulation is that the error is one "truly ofconstitutional magnitude." State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 688, 757 P.2d492 (1988). Another test is whether the alleged error actually affected the defendant's rights. A showing ofactual prejudice makes the error "manifest," allowing appellate review. State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99 (2009). 14No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

Susan Laster contends that a "to-convict"jury instruction violates due process ifit permits conviction absent proofofeach element ofa charged offense. We agree, butthe argument fails in this appeal, because the trial court's instruction listed each element of the crime ofresisting arrest, including the element ofa lawful arrest. The gist ofLaster's argument is something different than the failure to itemize each element ofthe crime. Her claimed error is that ofnot defining some ofthe words in one ofthe elements. Susan Laster advances no decision in which a court held that a failure to define a term orphrase in a "to-convict" instruction violates the defendant's dueprocess rights. We do not consider conclusory arguments that are unsupported by citation to authority. Joy v. Dep 't of Labor & Indus., 170 Wn. App. 614, 629, 285 P.3d 187 (2012), review denied, 176 Wn.2d 1021,297P.3d 708 (2013). An error not supportedby citation is not obvious error and thus not manifest constitutional error. Susan Laster never argued to thejurythat she was unlawfully arrested. Her defense was that she did not resist arrest. She emphasized that she couldnot resist arrest when she took no physical action until after her arrest. Thus, she cannot establish any harm by the failure to give an instruction circumscribing a lawful arrest. Susan Laster cites City of Tacoma v. Nekeferoff, 10 Wn. App. 101,516 P.2d 1048 (1973) for theproposition that thejury must be instructed on what constitutes a lawful arrest and what a defendant's rights are in resisting an unlawful arrest. Nevertheless, such an instruction was important in Nekeferoffbecause the defendants interposed the 15No. 32553-9-111 State v. Laster

defense ofunlawful arrest. While Lasterbelieved her arrest to be the result ofa spiteful conspiracy, she did not contend at trial that the arrest was unlawful. Susan Lasterbriefly asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting further instruction on the meaning of"lawful." A claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel requires a showing that (1) counsel'sperformance was deficient and (2) the deficient performanceprejudiced the defendant. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-26,743 P.2d 816 (1987). Torebut the strong presumption that counsel's performance was effective, the defendant bears the burden ofestablishing the absence of any conceivable legitimate tactic explaining counsel'sperformance. State 

### v. Hamilton, 179 Wn. App. 870, 879-80, 320 P.3d 142 (2014). Further instruction onthe meaning of "lawful" may have harmfully highlighted Laster's conflict with law enforcement. Thus, a tactical reason existed for defense counsel to have withheld a request for the instruction. Opinion Testimony Duringtrial testimony, ChiefJan Lewis, OfficerMatthew Beard, and Officer Loren Culp all uttered the word "resisting" when portraying Susan Laster's conduct. The word "resisting" is not employed in thejury instruction's elements ofthe crime. The instruction instead utilized the phrase "prevented orattempted to prevent a peace officer from arresting her." CP at 111. Nevertheless, the crime's label is "resisting arrest." CP at 110-11. Susan Laster contends that the trial courtpermitted the arresting officers to testify 16No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

to ultimate issues offact orconclusions oflaw by mouthing the term "resisting." Accordingto Laster, the testimony, in turn, invaded the province ofthejury. Laster argues use ofthe word "resisting" was tantamount to testifYing that she was guilty ofa
cnme. Susan Laster did not object to the officers' testimony duringtrial. Therefore, the State argues that Laster failed to preserve this issue for review and that any error was harmless. Laster argues that allowingthe testimony constituted manifest constitutional

error. We have already outlined a manifest constitutional error analysis. The appellate court may refuse to review any claim oferror that was not raised in the trial court. RAP 2.5(a). However, a manifest error affecting a constitutional right may beraised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). Our Supreme Courthas ruled that admission of witness opinion testimony on an ultimate fact, without objection, is not automatically reviewable as a manifest constitutional error. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 936, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). To be manifest, the testimony must be an explicit or nearly explicit opinion on a victim's credibility or the defendant's guilt. State v. King, 167 Wn.2d 324, 332,219P.3d 642 (2009). Susan Laster cites to State v. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d 191,340P.3d 213 (2014). In Quaale, a drunk drivingprosecution, a troopertestified over defense counsel's objection that he had "nodoubt [the defendant] was impaired." 182 Wn.2d at 195. Quaale is 17No. 32553-9-111 State v. Laster readily distinguishable onthe ground that the issue was preserved for appeal because of the contemporaneous objection. Also, the trooper's opinion addressed the core issue of whether Quaale drove while under the influence ofalcohol, the only disputed element of the crime. In the case on appeal, SusanLaster admitted to not cooperating. An officer's body

camera video showed Laster's recalcitrance. Whether she resisted was not the issue at trial. Instead, Laster asserted a defense that she was already safely in police custody at the time ofher resistance. The core issue was whetherLaster was already under arrest. Assuming the testimony constituted error, the evidence was harmless and did not constitute manifest error. Mental Health Evaluation and Treatment Susan Laster last contends the trial court committed error when it ordered herto undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment. Laster argues that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under RCW 9.94B.080, a section ofthe Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW that reads: The court may order an offenderwhose sentence includes community placement or community supervision to undergo a mental status evaluation and to participate in available outpatient mental health treatment, ifthe court finds that reasonable grounds exist to believethat the offender is a mentally illperson as defined in RCW 71.24.025, and that this condition is likely to have influencedthe offense. An order requiring mental status evaluation ortreatment must be based on a presentence report and, ifapplicable, mental status evaluations that have been filed with the court to determine the offender's competency oreligibility for a defense of 18No. 32553-9-III State 

### v. Laster insanity. The court may order additional evaluations at a later date if deemed appropriate. Susan Laster's evaluation ofRCW 9.94B.080 is misplaced. The trial court did not order Laster to undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment under that statute. Laster was found guilty ofa misdemeanor, not a felony. The Sentencing Reform Act, including RCW 9.94B.080, applies only to felonies and does not operateto limitthe traditional discretion that courts have when sentencing a misdemeanor offender. Harris

v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d 455,465,256 P.3d 328 (2011). Courts possess wide discretion when setting probation conditions for misdemeanors. State v. Deskins, 180 Wn.2d 68, 78,322 P.3d 780 (2014). Misdemeanor sentencing courts have the discretion to issue suspended sentences or to impose sentences and conditions with carrot-and-stickincentives to promote rehabilitation, a goal of misdemeanor sentencing. Harris 

### v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d at465 (2011); Wahleithner 

### v. Thompson, 134 Wn. App. 931, 941,143 P.3d 321 (2006). Thetrial court did not abuse its discretion. Susan Lasterrefused water and food in jail on the fear both werepoisoned. A psychologist diagnosed Laster with a personality disorderwith borderline and schizotypal traits. Laster, when testifying, referenced her struggles with the community. CONCLUSION We affirm Susan Laster's conviction for resisting arrest and her sentence.

19No. 32553-9-III State v. Laster

A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not beprinted in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public recordpursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:



### BroWn, A.CJ.Q

20