#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Matthew Raymond OLSSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-2376.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 11, 2013.

Filed: Feb. 12, 2014.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 25, 2014.

Elizabeth Unger Carlyle, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Steven R. Berry, Spec. Asst. U.S. Atty, Jefferson City, MO (David M. Ketchmark, Acting U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellee.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. *See Olsson v. United States,*— U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 530, 187 L.Ed.2d 361 (2013). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment in *United States v. Olsson,*713 F.3d 441 (8th Cir.2013), and remanded the case for further consideration in light of *Descamps v. United States,*— U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). *Descamps*held a sentencing court must apply the categorical approach to sentencing when the crime serving as the basis for an enhancement has a single, indivisible set of elements.1 133 S.Ct. at 2285. The categorical approach “focus[es] on the elements, rather *856than the facts, of a crime,” and it compares those elements with the elements of the generic offense. *Id.*

Matthew' Raymond Olsson was convicted under the Missouri second-degree burglary statute, which served as a basis for his sentencing enhancement: “A person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 569.170. The basic elements of the generic burglary offense are “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” *Taylor v. United States,*495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Because the basic elements of the Missouri second-degree burglary statute are the same as those of the generic burglary offense, Ols-son’s prior conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the categorical approach. See *Descamps,*133 S.Ct. at 2283.2

The Supreme Court’s remand based on *Descamps*did not disturb the remaining portions of the panel opinion. Therefore, we reinstate those portions of our vacated opinion holding that the district court3 did not abuse its discretion in limiting Olsson’s ability to cross examine government witnesses. *Olsson,*713 F.3d 441.

Accordingly, we again affirm Olsson’s conviction and sentence and deny his motion for supplemental briefing.

. Descamps interpreted "violent felony” under the ACCA. *Descamps,*133 S.Ct. at 2282. Olsson’s sentencing enhancement was based on his conviction qualifying as a "crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. We treat authority interpreting the term "violent felony” from the ACCA as applicable in interpreting the similarly defined term "crime of violence” from U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). *See*
        *856
        *United States v. Vinton,*631 F.3d 476, 484 (8th Cir.2011).

. Olsson conceded that he has a prior conviction for a controlled substance offense. Thus, he has at least two prior convictions which qualify him for an enhancement. See United States Sentencing Commission, *Guidelines Manual,*§ 4B1.1(a) (Nov.2012).

. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.