IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2022 WY 12

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2021

January 26, 2022

ANDREW WAYNE STEPLOCK,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-20-0160, S-21-0050

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable Daniel L. Forgey, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public 

Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Robin S. Cooper, Senior 

Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Cooper.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Catherine M. 

Mercer, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Mercer. 

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

*Justice Davis retired from judicial office effective January 16, 2022, and, pursuant to Article 5, § 5 of the 

Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 2021), he was reassigned to act on 

this matter on January 18, 2022.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Andrew Wayne Steplock confessed that he broke into his parents’ house and killed 

his mother. The jury convicted him of felony murder, second-degree murder, aggravated 

burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, Mr. Steplock argues that the 

district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the trial and erred by 

rejecting his W.R.A.P. 21 motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

We affirm the conviction but remand for correction of illegal sentence. 

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Steplock presents two issues, which we have rephrased:

1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s morning of trial motion to continue?

2. Did the district court err in denying Appellant’s Rule 21 

motion for new trial due to ineffective assistance of 

counsel?

FACTS

[¶3] On the morning of February 25, 2019, Mr. Steplock, who had a key to his parents’ 

home, went to their house where he argued with his mother about his custom of making 

unannounced visits to the home. Following the argument, Mr. Steplock asked, and his 

mother agreed, that he could take a shower there. While Mr. Steplock showered, his mother 

switched his house key with a fake key hoping to prevent further uninvited visits. After 

showering, Mr. Steplock left. 

[¶4] Later that evening, Mrs. Steplock and her husband, Dr. Steplock, watched television 

until around 10:30 p.m. when Dr. Steplock went to bed. Mrs. Steplock followed him to 

the bedroom to settle the family dogs before returning downstairs. Dr. Steplock fell asleep 

until sometime after 12:56 a.m. when he was awakened by the security alarm. After calling 

out to Mrs. Steplock and receiving no response, he ran downstairs to the den because he 

knew Mrs. Steplock, who often stayed up until three or four in the morning, was usually 

there. He did not see her in the den but spotted her lying unconscious on her back near the 

front door. As he frantically called out and shook her, he noticed a small pool of blood on 

the floor just below her left ear. He called 911. 

[¶5] Shortly thereafter, the police arrived. One officer applied pressure to Mrs. 

Steplock’s head while the other searched the house for an intruder. The officer discovered 

the back door was open with its window broken from the outside. He continued to sweep 
2

the house but did not find anyone else inside. The paramedics arrived and transported Mrs. 

Steplock to the hospital where she later died.

[¶6] During the investigation, the police learned of Mr. Steplock’s argument with his 

mother. The police also learned that Mr. Steplock appeared unconcerned when family 

members had called to tell him that his mother was hurt and in the hospital. Based on the

information, Mr. Steplock became a suspect in his mother’s shooting. The police made 

several attempts to reach Mr. Steplock, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Casper police 

detective, Jesse Jones, tracked Mr. Steplock’s cell phone and discovered that on the day of 

the murder, Mr. Steplock’s phone had traveled from Casper to Cheyenne and then to 

Aurora, Colorado, before heading back north. Using this information, the police located 

Mr. Steplock at a truck stop north of Denver, Colorado, and arrested him. 

[¶7] Following his arrest, Mr. Steplock confessed to killing his mother. He told the 

police that he went to his parents’ house to steal money. When he arrived, his house key 

would not unlock the front door, so he went to the back door where he broke the door 

window, reached inside, and turned the deadbolt key to gain entry to the house. His mother, 

who was in the living room, asked what he was doing. Instead of answering, he walked 

toward her, pointed the gun, and pulled the trigger. The security alarm sounded, and he 

fled. 

[¶8] Mr. Steplock was charged with felony murder, second-degree murder, aggravated 

burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason 

of mental illness (NGMI). Prior to the initial date of trial, August 26, 2019, the district 

court ordered a psychological evaluation. Dr. Elizabeth Donegan, a licensed psychologist 

with the Wyoming State Hospital, evaluated Mr. Steplock. Her report was originally due 

July 29, 2019, but technology issues had prevented access to Mr. Steplock’s police 

interviews, so the Wyoming State Hospital requested a thirty-day extension. The district 

court granted the extension and, to accommodate the new deadline, continued the trial until 

November 18, 2019. Dr. Donegan conducted her evaluation on June 25, 2019. Mr. 

Steplock claimed for the first time during this evaluation that he was suffering from 

hallucinations and demons directed his actions. In her report, submitted on August 28, 

2019, she concluded that Mr. Steplock did not “lack[] substantial capacity, as a result of 

mental illness or deficiency, to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform 

his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the alleged offenses.” Mr. Steplock 

moved for a second psychological evaluation, which the court granted on September 11, 

2019. 

[¶9] Defense counsel then submitted a request for funding for the evaluation to the public 

defender committee—a five-member committee composed of experienced defense 

attorneys. This committee evaluates and approves or denies any funding request in aid of 
3

trial that exceeds $1,500.1 In determining whether to approve or deny funding, the 

committee reviews any information that the attorneys provide. For NGMI cases, the 

information provided may include prior evaluations, history of psychiatric treatments or 

diagnoses, social history, and other relevant background information. Here, Mr. Steplock’s 

prior treatment records were unavailable. The committee relied on Dr. Donegan’s 

evaluation in making its decision. It denied funding for a second psychological evaluation. 

At the Rule 21 hearing, the State Public Defender testified: 

[E]ssentially, the committee felt that there didn’t seem to be 

evidence consistent with . . . [a] defense for not guilty by reason 

of mental illness. Not [a] lot of talk about whether or not the 

State Hospital report was valid; but that there didn’t seem to be 

any evidence that Mr. Steplock was struggling to conform his 

conduct or didn’t understand right from wrong.

Mr. Steplock did not receive a second psychological evaluation. 

[¶10] A few weeks before trial, defense counsel made a request to the State for Dr. 

Donegan’s litigation support package (her notes and the basis for her evaluation) to 

determine whether she had conducted any testing on Mr. Steplock during her evaluation. 

The State told defense counsel to make his request directly to the Wyoming State Hospital, 

which he did. When the hospital indicated there was no litigation support package, defense 

counsel attempted to contact Dr. Donegan directly. Dr. Donegan did not return his calls 

until the Thursday preceding trial scheduled to begin on Monday. On that Thursday, Dr. 

Donegan told defense counsel that she did not conduct any testing and her report was based 

solely on her notes and observations. The next day, defense counsel hired Tricia Miller, a 

licensed counselor, to conduct a series of personality tests on Mr. Steplock. On Monday, 

the first day scheduled for trial, defense counsel supplemented his witness list adding Ms. 

Miller. The State objected to Ms. Miller as an expert witness arguing unfair surprise and 

that Ms. Miller, a licensed counselor, did not qualify as a designated examiner pursuant to 

statute.2

 The district court accepted the State’s objections and ruled that Ms. Miller would 

not be allowed to testify.3

 Despite being previously denied funding and having taken no 

1 The State Public Defender formed this committee to provide more guidance to public defender trial 

counsel on when to hire experts. She explained that the purpose of the committee is not to solely approve 

experts but “anytime an attorney needs something in [a] case above and beyond what my office generally 

provides, they have to fill out what is called an Expense Authorization Form.” 

2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(c) states “[o]nly the designated examiners who examined the defendant 

pursuant to W.S. 7-11-303 or 7-11-304 are competent witnesses to testify as to the defendant’s mental 

responsibility.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(c) (LexisNexis 2021). A designated examiner is defined as 

“a licensed psychiatrist, or other physician with forensic training or a licensed psychologist with forensic 

training[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301(a)(i). Ms. Miller, a licensed counselor, is neither a licensed 

psychiatrist nor psychologist and did not qualify as a designated examiner. 

3 Defense counsel was able to use Ms. Miller’s testing on Mr. Steplock to attack Dr. Donegan’s report and 

testimony at trial. 
4

alternative measures to secure a second psychological evaluation, Mr. Steplock also moved 

for a continuance claiming that he needed a second evaluation. The district court denied 

the motion, finding:

[T]here’s not good cause to continue the trial at this time. 

There’s been plenty of time and opportunity to try to address 

those issues in advance of trial. The Court has already granted 

a continuance due to the State Hospital[’s] problems,

[4] and it’s 

been several months since the evaluation was received. So if 

that’s the reason, I think we need to proceed.

[¶11] The trial proceeded as scheduled. As part of Mr. Steplock’s NGMI defense, his 

counsel cross-examined Dr. Donegan challenging her evaluation; cross-examined Mr. 

Steplock’s father about Mr. Steplock’s behavior as a child and behavior changes through 

his teenage years; presented testimony from Mr. Steplock’s sister on her observations of 

her brother’s personality and temperament; and Mr. Steplock testified in his own defense. 

Dr. Donegan’s testimony is addressed below. See infra ¶ 25. Dr. Steplock testified, that 

as a teenager Mr. Steplock started getting into trouble at school and began performing 

poorly academically, and then as an adult he started isolating himself from friends and 

family. Mr. Steplock’s sister testified that in the last four years Mr. Steplock isolated 

himself by not attending family functions, struggled to keep a job, and told her that he felt 

out of his mind. 

[¶12] Mr. Steplock testified that when he broke into his parents’ house he was suffering 

from hallucinations. These had started around February 19 or 20—a few days before the 

murder. His hallucinations started with the appearance of two human girls, who he 

believed were demons. These demons accepted him into the blood god’s army,

5 trained 

him, and told him what to do. He testified that on the night of the murder: 

[T]here was a newer demon that had showed up. . . . [S]he told 

me she was 9,000 years old and that she was helping me run 

from all of these other demons that had been released from hell. 

She told me she was there to help me and this and that. So we 

spent the majority of the night running around—running 

around from other demons. And then once it was all gone 

away, done away, she convinced me to go to my parents’ house 

and told me that they weren’t going to be home; the alarm was 

off; and the doors were unlocked; and I could actually use their 

4 The district court’s reference to the State Hospital’s problems is directed at the thirty-day extension and 

the continuance granted for the submission of Dr. Donegan’s psychological evaluation report. See supra

¶ 8. 5 Dr. Donegan researched the blood god’s army and discovered that the blood god, Khorne, and his army 

are from the video game Warhammer.
5

. . . house for safekeeping, I guess, for a little bit and . . . live a 

little bit nicer.

According to Mr. Steplock, when he arrived at his parents’ house:

[The demon] told me to go pull into the garage. She told me 

to go to the back door and try that. When that didn’t work, she 

told me to go to the front door and try that door. And when 

that didn’t work, she told me to go back to the back door and 

break out the window. And so I did that. And then when I got 

. . . inside the house, walked through the kitchen and that other 

room in front of my mom, she told me to shoot [my mom]. So 

I shot her. And the alarm started going off and I ran. 

His hallucinations continued as he drove to Colorado:

And then it was somewhere on that road that it made . . . 

me wonder if this was even a demon. I remember saying that; 

are you even that—are you even that demon. And she turned 

into Satan. Now it was no longer that 9,000-year-old demon 

sitting next to me. There’s a tall, large object. He was red. He 

was tall and lengthy, with a human body, and . . . it looks like 

Satan. So it turned out to be Satan.

[¶13] A jury convicted Mr. Steplock of all counts for which he was charged—felony 

murder, second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and possession of a deadly weapon. 

He was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder, fifty-five years to life for seconddegree murder, ten to fifteen years for aggravated burglary, and three to five years for 

possession of a deadly weapon, all sentences to run concurrently. Mr. Steplock filed a 

W.R.A.P. 21 motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district 

court denied the motion. Mr. Steplock appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for 

continuance and his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Additional facts will be presented as relevant. 

DISCUSSION

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s morning of 

trial motion to continue?

A. Standard of Review

[¶14] “[T]he grant or denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary ruling of the 

district court and, unless a clear showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest 
6

injustice has been shown by the challenging party, we will not disturb that ruling.” 

Pickering v. State, 2020 WY 66, ¶ 78, 464 P.3d 236, 259 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Palomo v. 

State, 2018 WY 42, ¶ 10, 415 P.3d 700, 703 (Wyo. 2018)). “The determination of whether 

the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance is highly dependent 

upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case.” Shields v. State, 2020 WY 101, 

¶ 23, 468 P.3d 1097, 1105 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶ 75, 367 

P.3d 1108, 1131–32 (Wyo. 2016)). “On review, [the] primary consideration is the 

reasonableness of the district court’s decision.” Pickering, ¶ 78, 464 P.3d at 260 (quoting 

Palomo, ¶ 10, 415 P.3d at 703).

B. Analysis

[¶15] Mr. Steplock argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

continue because without a second psychological evaluation to support his NGMI defense, 

he was unprepared for trial, which resulted in manifest injustice. We disagree.

[¶16] Several cases are instructive. In Shields, the defendant moved for a continuance on 

the Friday preceding trial scheduled on Monday. Shields, ¶¶ 12, 24, 468 P.3d at 1103, 

1105. The defendant argued that two new witness statements provided by the State had 

“significantly altered the planned defense” and warranted a continuance. Id. ¶ 24, 468 P.3d 

at 1105. The district court disagreed, finding that the witness statements consisted of two 

emails originally sent to DFS and then forwarded to the County Attorney’s Office the

previous year. Id. ¶ 25, 468 P.3d at 1105. The district court also noted the defense could 

have interviewed the foster parents or subpoenaed DFS records during that time. Id. ¶ 26, 

468 P.3d at 1106. The district court further found the defendant would not be prejudiced 

if the trial proceeded as scheduled. Id. On appeal, we held that the district court’s ruling 

was reasonable under the circumstances and that the defendant had failed to meet her 

burden of establishing manifest injustice. Id. ¶ 27, 468 P.3d at 1106.

[¶17] In Steinfeldt, five days before sentencing, the defendant’s newly hired counsel 

requested a continuance which the district court granted. Steinfeldt v. State, 2018 WY 20, 

¶ 5, 411 P.3d 418, 419 (Wyo. 2018). Shortly before the rescheduled sentencing hearing, 

the defendant again changed counsel. Id. Prior to the rescheduled sentencing, the 

defendant moved for a second continuance to obtain a psychological evaluation. Id. The 

district court denied this motion. Id. The defendant renewed her motion for a continuance 

at the sentencing, and the district court again denied the motion. Id. ¶ 6, 411 P.3d at 419. 

The defendant appealed arguing that the psychological evaluation “might have resulted in 

potentially mitigating evidence that she should have been able to present prior to the 

imposition of sentence” and that it “could have affected the sentence, even if it was only a 

slight reduction.” Id. ¶ 10, 411 P.3d at 420. On appeal, we affirmed, finding “[t]o the 

extent that Ms. Steinfeldt’s psychological history was a relevant consideration for 

sentencing, or that a psychological evaluation might be warranted, those facts were 

apparent upon the filing of the presentence report in November [2016]. However, it 
7

appears that Dr. Turlington was not contacted until February 2017.” Id. ¶ 12, 411 P.3d at 

421. Moreover, we found “[n]either Dr. Turlington’s report, nor Ms. Steinfeldt’s motion, 

indicated how her treatment history or her anxiety and depressive disorders may have 

affected her behavior in any way that might influence the court’s sentencing 

determination,” and “[s]he has provided no such explanation to us on appeal.” Id. ¶ 17, 

411 P.3d at 422. 

[¶18] Here, the district court denied Mr. Steplock’s motion for continuance after 

considering that he had the time and opportunity to secure a second psychological 

evaluation. The court granted his motion for a second psychological evaluation on 

September 11, 2019. Trial did not start until November 18, 2019. Mr. Steplock requested 

funding for a second evaluation. When his request was denied, Mr. Steplock did not seek 

reconsideration of the denial and made no effort to obtain a second psychological 

evaluation. 

[¶19] Mr. Steplock bears the burden of establishing the denial of a continuance prejudiced 

his defense and resulted in manifest injustice. See Shields, ¶ 23, 468 P.3d at 1105. As in 

Steinfeldt, he does not show how a second psychological evaluation would have changed 

or contradicted Dr. Donegan’s conclusions. He has failed to demonstrate how the district 

court’s denial of his motion to continue prejudiced his defense, much less how it resulted 

in manifest injustice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. 

Steplock’s motion to continue trial. 

II. Did the district court err in denying Appellant’s Rule 21 motion for new trial due 

to ineffective assistance of counsel?

A. Standard of Review

[¶20] The standard by which we review ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims is well established:

A criminal defendant has the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wyo. 

Const., art. 1, § 10; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)

(“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel.” (quotations omitted)). When a 

defendant claims he has been denied that right, he must 

show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, 

and he was prejudiced as a result. Galbreath v. State,

2015 WY 49, ¶ 5, 346 P.3d 16, 18 (Wyo. 2015); 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel 

acts deficiently when he “fail[s] to render such 
8

assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably 

competent attorney.” Galbreath, ¶ 5, 346 P.3d at 18 

(quoting Bloomer v. State, 2010 WY 88, ¶ 18, 233 P.3d 

971, 976 (Wyo. 2010)). “Prejudice occurs when there 

is ‘a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s 

deficient assistance, the outcome of [appellant’s] trial 

would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Bloomer, 

¶ 18, 233 P.3d at 976). A failure to establish one of the 

two prongs dooms an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d 

376, 382 (Wyo. 2007).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “mixed 

questions of law and fact.” Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 

16, ¶ 37, 367 P.3d 1108, 1124 (Wyo. 2016). We defer 

to a district court’s factual findings unless clearly 

erroneous; we review de novo the court’s legal 

conclusions, including whether counsel’s conduct was 

deficient and whether defendant was prejudiced as a 

result. Id. We “invoke[] a strong presumption that 

counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

judgment. [T]he paramount determination is whether, 

in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel’s acts or 

omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.” Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 

45, ¶ 47, 228 P.3d 874, 889 (Wyo. 2010) (citations and 

quotations omitted).

Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 53, 482 P.3d 337, 351–52 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting 

Shields, ¶ 44, 468 P.3d at 1109–10); see also Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, ¶¶ 11–12, 446 

P.3d 191, 198–99 (Wyo. 2019).

B. Analysis 

[¶21] Mr. Steplock argues that his defense counsel performed deficiently in failing to 

obtain a second psychological evaluation and by failing to timely recognize that Dr. 

Donegan had not performed testing. He argues that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for these errors, the result of his trial would have been different. 

[¶22] “We may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim solely on the prejudice prong.” 

Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, ¶ 37, 491 P.3d 273, 285 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Sides v. 

State, 2021 WY 42, ¶ 34, 483 P.3d 128, 137 (Wyo. 2021)); see also Richmond v. State, 
9

2021 WY 111, ¶ 13, 496 P.3d 777, 781 (Wyo. 2021) (“[A] court can decide an ineffective 

assistance claim on the prejudice prong without considering the deficient performance 

prong.” (quoting Yazzie v. State, 2021 WY 72, ¶ 21, 487 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2021))). 

Indeed, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

Leners v. State, 2021 WY 67, ¶ 21, 486 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 2021), cert. denied, 142 

S.Ct. 410 (2021) (quoting Fairbourn v. State, 2020 WY 73, ¶ 62, 465 P.3d 413, 428 (Wyo. 

2020)); see also McNaughton v. State, 2016 WY 112, ¶ 12, 384 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2016); 

Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 39, 301 P.3d 106, 121 (Wyo. 2013). Here, we address only 

the dispositive element of prejudice. To show prejudice, Mr. Steplock must show that 

absent defense counsel’s deficiencies “there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the 

trial would have been more favorable to the appellant.” Richmond, ¶ 12, 496 P.3d at 781 

(citing Yazzie, ¶ 20, 487 P.3d at 562). 

[¶23] It is undisputed that Mr. Steplock shot his mother. The issue is whether defense 

counsel’s failure to secure a second psychological evaluation and failure to timely 

recognize that Dr. Donegan had not performed testing prejudiced his NGMI defense.

[¶24] At trial, Mr. Steplock testified that he broke into his parents’ house and killed his 

mother because he was experiencing hallucinations. He described a 9,000-year-old demon 

who had convinced him to go to his parents’ house and told him to shoot his mother, which 

he did. This is not the story he told in his police interview which was played for the jury. 

He told the police that he went to his parents’ house to steal money from the wine cellar. 

When he arrived, his front door key would not work, so he broke in through the back door. 

When he saw his mother, he shot her. He made no mention of the blood god’s army, 

demons, or hallucinations on the day of the murder up to his evaluation by Dr. Donegan, 

where he described these influences for the first time. These inconsistent versions of what 

drove him to break into his parents’ house where he shot his mother weakened his NGMI 

defense. 

[¶25] Dr. Donegan’s testimony also cast doubt on Mr. Steplock’s claim that he was 

suffering from mental illness at the time of the murder. She explained that his selfdescribed symptoms were not consistent with those of someone experiencing 

hallucinations or delusions. “[T]ypically, people who experience psychotic symptoms, 

there’s not one minute they experience them and the next minute they don’t. . . . That’s not 

the course of typical hallucinations.” According to Dr. Donegan, Mr. Steplock’s 

description that he had heard certain voices in different areas of his head was also 

inconsistent. “Typically, with visual hallucinations, people see human content. They are 

not elaborate, bizarre, and they are of normal size. He . . . talked about them changing in 

size. So being regular size and then getting smaller and then going back to regular size.” 

She also identified the similarity between the hallucinations he described to the characters 

in the video game Warhammer. “He talked about a 9,000-year-old demon that was short, 

fat, pudgy, and brown. And at least in the . . . pictures that I saw when I was looking up 
10

information, Khorne [the blood god in Warhammer] is pictured as a short, fat, brown, 

pudgy kind of god.” Ultimately, she concluded that Mr. Steplock “was not experiencing 

symptoms of mental illness that were so prominent that he was out of touch with reality, 

that he was unable to discern things as being wrongful, or was unable to control his 

behavior.” 

[¶26] “A claim of prejudice must be supported by more than bald assertions or 

speculation.” Jackson v. State, 2019 WY 81, ¶ 28, 445 P.3d 983, 991 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting 

Castellanos v. State, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 99, 366 P.3d 1279, 1305 (Wyo. 2016)). Mr. Steplock 

does not argue that Dr. Donegan’s testimony is erroneous or that it would be contradicted 

by a second psychological evaluation. Mr. Steplock provides no evidence or argument that 

a second evaluation would have changed the results reached by Dr. Donegan. “[A]n 

appellant cannot prove ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate ‘where 

[he] fails to identify the favorable evidence or witnesses that additional investigation

would have revealed.’” Pickering, ¶ 66, 464 P.3d at 257 (quoting Winters, ¶ 46, 446 P.3d 

at 208). Mr. Steplock fails to establish a reasonable probability that if defense counsel had 

obtained a second psychological evaluation or timely knew that Dr. Donegan had not 

performed testing, that the outcome here would have been different. Mr. Steplock was not 

prejudiced.

[¶27] Although Mr. Steplock has not met his burden on prejudice, he argues that we 

should presume prejudice in his case. He relies on the special concurrence in Osborne 

where Justice Voigt in addressing the difficulty of proving prejudice said, “there should be 

some line of egregiousness that, when crossed, the presumption becomes one of 

ineffectiveness.” Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 31, 285 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2012) 

(Voigt, J., specially concurring). We have not adopted presumption of prejudice in 

ineffective assistance of counsel cases since Osborne. See Sides, ¶ 35, 483 P.3d at 137–

38; Leners, ¶ 25, 486 P.3d at 1018–19; Fairbourn, ¶¶ 63–64, 465 P.3d at 428. We decline 

to do so here. 

[¶28] “A failure to establish one of the two prongs dooms an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim.” Richmond, ¶ 13, 496 P.3d at 781 (quoting Yazzie, ¶ 20, 487 P.3d at 562). 

Mr. Steplock’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

III. Remand for Correction of Judgment and Sentence

[¶29] The district court sentenced Mr. Steplock to life in prison for felony murder and ten 

to fifteen years for aggravated burglary. We have previously held that “the imposition of 

multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony violates the Double 

Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions.” Hartley v. State, 2020 

WY 40, ¶ 17, 460 P.3d 716, 721 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1352–

53 (Wyo. 1992)); see also Schnitker v. State, 2017 WY 96, ¶ 21, 401 P.3d 39, 46 (Wyo. 

2017). As a result, sentencing Mr. Steplock to ten to fifteen years on the underlying 
11

felony—aggravated burglary—for first-degree felony murder was improper. We remand 

to correct this error. 

CONCLUSION

[¶30] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Steplock’s morning 

of trial motion to continue or in denying Mr. Steplock’s Rule 21 motion for new trial. We 

affirm, but remand for correction of the sentencing error.