UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4362

THOMAS DAVE BRATCHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.

William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-878)

Submitted: January 30, 1998

Decided: February 23, 1998

Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Bratcher appeals from a district court judgment order

entered pursuant to his guilty plea to a charge of knowingly making

a false statement to a federally insured financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). The district

court sentenced Bratcher to 30 days in custody, with credit for time

served, effectively releasing him from custody. The court also sentenced Bratcher to five years supervised release, a condition of which

was that Bratcher be subject to home confinement and monitored

electronically for 150 days.

On appeal, Bratcher's attorney has filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), addressing whether the

court conducted a proper plea hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11,

whether the court erred by imposing the maximum allowable term of

supervised release, and whether the court erred by including home

confinement as a special condition of his supervised release. Counsel

concedes, however, that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.

Bratcher was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief,

but failed to file one.

We accord great deference to the district court's conduction of the

Rule 11 hearing, and evaluate alleged Rule 11 violations under a

harmless error standard. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114,

116-17 (4th Cir. 1991). We will vacate a conviction resulting from a

guilty plea only if the trial court's violation of Rule 11 affected a

defendant's substantial rights. Id. at 117. Our review of the record discloses that in this case the district court fully discussed the nature and

elements of the charge against Bratcher, the applicable penalties he

faced, including the effect of supervised release, and ensured that he

consulted with and was satisfied with his counsel. The court also

addressed the rights Bratcher forfeited by virtue of his plea, the

impact of the Sentencing Guidelines, and ascertained that there was

a factual basis for the plea. Finally, the court questioned Bratcher to

ensure that his plea was voluntary. Accordingly, we find no violation

of Rule 11, much less one that affected Bratcher's substantial rights.

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Bratcher also challenges his subjection to home confinement and

the term of his supervised release. We lack authority, however, to

review a sentence that falls within a correctly calculated guideline and

applicable statutory maximum. See United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d

789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, Bratcher's applicable guideline

range was six months. The maximum statutory term of incarceration

was 30 years. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

Because he was sentenced to 30 days in custody and 150 days of

home confinement, Bratcher's sentence did not exceed the maximums

provided by the guidelines or the statute.

Similarly, Bratcher's term of supervised release falls within the

range permitted by the guidelines and the applicable statute. Bratcher

was convicted of a Class B felony. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559(a)(2)

(West Supp. 1997). For a Class B felony, the district court was authorized to impose a term of supervised release of not more than five

years by statute, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997),

and a term between three and five years under the applicable guideline. See USSG § 5D1.2(b)(1).* Accordingly, because Bratcher's term

of supervised release fell within the ranges authorized by applicable

law, we lack authority to review it.

In accordance with the requirements of Anders , we have examined

the entire record and find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment order of the district court. This court requires

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave

to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a

copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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*United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1995).

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