1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s LEDBET T ER v . GOODYEAR TI RE & RUBBER CO., I N C. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 05–1 07 4. Ar g u ed November27, 200 6—D e c i ded May29, 200 7 Durin gmos t of t h e time tha tpetit i oner Ledb ett e r w a s employed b y

res p ondentGoodyea r , s a la r i ed employees a tt h e pla n t where s h e worked were given or de nied ra is es b a sed on perfor ma nce eva l ua tion s. Ledbett e rsu bmitted aqu estion n a ir e to th e Equ a l Employ m en t O ppor t u n i tyC o mmis s ion(EEO C) inM a rch1998 an d a for m al EEO C cha rge in J u l y1 9 9 8

. Aft e r her Novemb er1 9 9 8ret i rement , s h e filed s u it , a s s e rting, a m ong ot her t h ings , as e x dis crimina t i on cla i m under Title VII of th e Civ il Righ ts Ac t of 1964. Th e D i str i c tCou r t allowed h e rTitle VI I paydisc r i min ationc l a i m to pr oc eed to tr ial. Th er e, Ledbetter alle g e d th at sev e r a l su perv isor s h a d inth e p a st giv e nh e r poorev alu ation s bec a u s e of h e rsex; th at as a r e su lt, h e r payh a d n o t increa s ed a s much a s itwould have if s h e ha d b e en ev a l ua t e d fairly; that those p a st pay decision s affecte dthe amount of her pay through

outher employment ; a n d t h a tb y t h e end of her employment , s h e wa s ea rning s i gnifi c a n t l y les s t h a nher ma le collea g ues . Goodyea rma in

tain e d th a tth e ev alu ation s h a d beenn o n d isc r i min ator y , bu t th e ju r y fou n dforLedbetter , aw ar di n gbac kpayan d damag e s. O nappeal, Goodyear contended that the pay dis crimina t i on claim wa s t i me b a rred wit hrega rd t oa ll pa y decis i ons ma de b efore S e pt emb e r 2 6 , 1997—180 d a ys before Ledbetter f iled her EEOC questio nnaire—and t h a tno dis crimina t o ry a c trela t i ng t oher pa y occ urre d a f t e r t h a t date. Th e Elev en thCir c u i t r e v e r s ed, h o ldin gth at a Titl e VII paydis

c r i min ationc l aim c a n n o t be based onalle g e dlydisc r i min ator yev en ts that occurred before the last pay decisi on that affected th e employee’s pa y during t h e EEOC cha rging period, a n d concludin g t h a tt h ere wa s in su ffic i en t ev iden c eto pr ov e th at G o ody e arh a d ac ted w i thdisc r i mi

n ator yin ten tinmakin gth e on lytw o paydec i sion s du r i n gth at pe

r i od, den i als of r a ises in199 7 an d 199 8.2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Sy llabu s Held: Because the later effects of past d i sc rimination do not restart the

clock for filing an EEOC charge, Ledbetter’s claim i s untimely. Pp. 4–24.

(a) Anin div i du al w i sh in gto br in ga Title VII law s u i t m u st fir s t fil e anEEO C c h a r g e w i th in , as relev a n th e r e , 180 d a y s “af te rth e alleg e d u n l aw fu l employ men tpr ac tic eoc cu rr ed.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e –2(a)( 1 )

. Inaddr essin gth e issu e of anEEO C c h a r g e’s timelin ess, th is Cou r t has stressed the need to identify wit hca r et h e s p ecific employmen t pr ac tic eat i s s u e. Ledbette r ’ s ar g u men t s—th at th e pa y c h e c k s th at s h e received during t h ech a r ging perioda n d t h e 1 9 9 8ra is e denia l ea ch viola t e d Tit l e VII a n d t r iggered anew EEOC cha rging period— fail because they would requ ire the Court in effect to je ttison the de

fining element of the disp arate-t rea t m en tcla i m on which her Tit l e VII recovery wa s b a s e d, discrimina t o ry in t e nt

. Un ite d A i rLine s, In c. v. Evans , 431 U. S. 55 3, Delaware State Collegev. Ricks , 449 U. S. 250, Lorancev. AT&T Technologies, Inc. , 4 90 U. S. 90 0, a n d National Railroad Pass enger Co rpora t ionv. Morga n , 536 U. S. 101, c l ear l yin

s t ructt h a t t h e EEOC cha rging period is t r iggered wh en adis crete unla w ful pra c t i ce t a k es pla c e. A new viola t i on does not occur , a n d a new cha rgi n g period does no tcommence, u p on t h e o ccu rr ence of s u b

sequ en t n o ndi s c r i min ator yac ts th at en ta il adv e r s e effec t s r e su ltin g from the past discrimination

. But if an e m ployer engages in a series of separ a telyac tion ab le i n ten t ion a lly disc r i min ator yac ts, th ena fr eshv i olatio ntakes pl ac e w h e neac ha c t is c o mmi tt ed. Ledbetter ma kes no cla i m t h a tint e ntiona lly dis crimina t o ry con d uctoccu rred during t h e ch a r ging period or t h a tdis crimina t o ry decis i ons occurri n g b efore t h a tperiod were not communica t e d t oher. S h e argues s i mply t h a tGoodyea r ’s nondis crimina t o ry condu c tduring t h e c h a r ging pe

riod gave present effect to d i scrimi natory conduct outside of that pe

riod. But current effects alone ca nnot breathe life into prior, un

cha rgeddis crimina t i on. Ledb et t e r s h ould have filed a n EEOC cha rge w i th in180 da y s aftereac h alleg e dlydisc r i min ator yemploy men tde

c i sionw a s ma de an d c o mmu n i c ated to h e r . Herattempt to sh ift for

w a r dth e in te n tas soc i ated w i thpr iordisc r i min ator yac t s to th e 19 98 pa y decis i on is uns ound, foritwould s h iftint e nta w a yf r om t h e a c t th at c o n s u mmated th e disc r i min ator yemploy men tpr ac tic eto a later ac t n o t per for med w i thbi as ordisc r i min a t o r ymotiv e , imposin gliab il

it y in t h e ab s ence of t h ere q u is it e int e nt

. Her a r gume ntwould a l s o distor t T i tle V II’s “in t egr ate d, mu ltis tep e n for c e men tproc edu r e .” Oc

cide ntal Life I ns. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 35 9. Th e sh or t EEOC filing deadline reflects Congress’ strong p r eference for the promptres o lut i on of employmentdis crimina t i on a llega tions t hrough v o lu n tar y c o nc iliationan d c o oper ation

. Id., at 367–3 68

. Noth in gi n Title VII su pp or ts tr eatin gth e in ten telemen t of Ledbetter ’ s dispa

-3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s
r ate-tr e atmen t c l aim an yd i ffer e n t lyfr om th e emp l oy men tpr ac tic e elemen t of th e c l aim. Pp. 4–13.

(b) Bazemorev. Friday , 47 8 U. S. 38 5 (per cu riam) , which co n cerned adis p a r a t e-t rea t mentpa y cla i m, is entirely cons is t e ntwit h Evans , Ricks , Lorance , and M o rga n . Bazemore ’s ru le is th at ane m ploy erv i olates Title VII an d tr ig g e r s a newEEO C c h a r gin g per i od whene ver t h e employer is s u es pa ychecks us ing adis crimina t o ry pa y s t ruct ure. Itis not , a s Ledbet t e r cont ends , a“ p a y check a ccrua l rule” under whic he a ch pa yche ck, even if nota ccompa n ied b ydis crimina

t o ry int e nt , t r iggers anew EEOC cha rgi n g period du ri ng w h icht h e compla ina n t ma y properly cha llenge a n y prior dis cri mina t o ry con du c tth at imp a c t ed th at pay c h e c k ’s amou nt, n omatterhowlon gag o t h e dis criminat i on occur red. Beca us e Ledbet t e r ha s not a dduced evi

den c eth at G oody e arin itiall yadopted i t s per f or man c e-based p a ysy s tem inor derto disc r i min ate based on sexorth at it l aterapplied th i s sy stem to h e rw i th inth e ch ar gi n g period w i t hdis criminat o ry a n imus , Bazemoreis of n oh e lp to h e r. Pp. 13–21.

(c) Ledb et t e r’s “ p a y check a ccrua l rule” is a l s onot s u pport ed b yei

th eran alogies to th e st atu to r yr e gi mes of th e Equ a l P a yAc t of 19 63, th e FairLaborStan dar d s Ac t of 1938, orth e Nation al LaborRela

tion s Ac t, or polic yar g u men t s forgiv i n gspec ialtr eat m en t to p a y c l aims. Pp. 21 –24. 421 F. 3d 11 69 , affir m ed.

ALITO , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., an d S CALIA , K ENNEDY , and T HOMAS , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., filed a dis s e nt ing opinion, inwhi chS TEVENS , S OUTER , an d B REYER , JJ., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 07 4 LILLY M. L E DB ETT E R, PETITI ONE R v. T H E GO OD

YEAR TI R E & RU BB ER C O MPA NY, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [M ay29, 2007 ] J USTICE ALI T O delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. This case calls upon u s to apply established precedent in a slightly different context. We h a ve previou s ly held tha t the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission (EEO C) begins when the discriminatory actoccurs. We have explained that this rule applies to any “[d]iscrete ac[t]” of di scrimination, including discrimination in “ter

mination, failure to promote, denial of tra nsfer, [and] refusal to hire.” Natio n al Railroa d Pass enge rCorpora t ion v. Morgan , 536 U. S. 101, 114 ( 2002). Because a paysetting decision is a “discrete act,” it follows that the pe

riod for filing an EEO C charge begins when the act occur s . Petitioner, having abandoned herclaim und er the Equal Pay Act, asks us to deviate from our prior decisions in order to permit her to assert her claim under Title VII. Petitioner also contends that discrimination in pay is different from other types of em ployment discrimination and thus should be governed by a different rule. But because a pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a partic u lar point in time, these arguments must b e2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt rejected. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Le dbetter) worked for respon

dent Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Go o dyear) at its Gads den, Alabama, pla n t from 1 9 79 until 19 98. Du rin g much of th is time, sal a ried employees at the plant we re given or de nied raises based on their supervisors’evalua

tion of their performa nce. In March 1998, Ledbette r sub

mitted a qu estionnaire to the EE O C allegin gc e rtain a cts of sex dis crim i nation, an d in Jul yo f tha t yearshe filed a formal EE OC c h ar ge. After ta king early r e tirement i n Novembe r 1998, Ledb etter com m enced thi s action, i n whichshe asserted, a m ong o t herclaims, a Title VII p a y discri minati on claim an d a claim u n der the Eq ual PayAc t of 1963 (EPA), 29 U. S. C. §206(d). The Distric tCourt gra n ted summary judgme nt in favor of Goodyearon several of Ledbetter’s claims, i n cluding her Equal Pay Act claim, but allowed others, including her Title VII pay discrimi nation claim, to proce e d to trial. In support of t h is latter claim, Ledbetter introduc e d evidence that du ringthe course of her employment several supervi

sors had given her poor evaluati o ns becaus e of her s e x, that as a result of these evaluati o ns her pay was not i n creased as much as it would have been if s h e had been evaluated fairly, and that thes e past pay decisions conti n ued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her em

ployment. Toward the end of her time with Goodyear, s h e was being paid signifi c antly less than any of her mal e colleagues. Goodyear m a intain ed that the eval uations had been nondi s criminatory, but the jury found for Ledbette r and awarde d her backpay and dam a ges. On appeal, Goodyear contended that Ledbetter’s p a y discrimination claim was time barred with respect to all pay decisions made prior to September 26, 1 997—that is,3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 180 days b e fore the filing of her EEOC qu estionnaire. 1 And Goodyear argued that no dis criminatory act relating to Ledbetter’s pay oc cu rred after t hat date. The Court of Appeals for the Elev enth Circui treversed , holding that a Title VI I pay discri mination claim cannot be based on any pay decision that occurredprior to t h e last pay decision that affe cted the employee’ s pay during the EEOC charging period. 421 F. 3d 1169, 1182–1183 (2005). Th e Court of Appeals then concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove t hat Goodye ar had acte d with discri minatory intent in making the only two pay decisions t hat occurre d within th at time span, namely, a decision made in 1997 to deny Ledbetter a raise and a similar deci sion made i n1998. Id. , at 1186–1187. Ledbetter fi led a petition fo r a wri t of certiora r i but di d not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ holdings regard

ing the sufficiency of the evidence in relationto the 1997 and 1998 pay decisions. Rather, she sought review of the following question: “Whether and under what circu mstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 all e ging illegal pay discri mination when the disparate pay is received during th e statu

tory limitations period, but is the result of intention

ally discriminatory p a y decisions that occu rred out

side the limitations period.” Pet. for Cert. i. In light of disagreement among the Courts o f Appeals as to the proper application of the li mitations period in Title VII disparate-treatment pay cas e s, compare 421 F. 3 d

——————

1 The pa rt ies ass u me t h att h e EEOC cha rging period runsb a c kwa r ds fr om th e date of th e qu estio n n a ir e, ev enth ou ghLedbett er ’s disc r i min a tory pay clai m was not added until the July 1998 formal charge. 421 F. 3d 116 9, 1 178 ( CA1 1 2 0 05). We like w ise as su me forth e sake of argument that the filing of the questionnaire, r ather than the form al c h a r g e, is th e appr opr i ate d ate.4 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt 1169, with Forsythv. Federat i on Employment& Guidance Serv. , 409 F. 3d 565 (CA2 2005); Sheav. Rice , 409 F. 3 d 448 (CADC 2005), we granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ___ (2006). II Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ma kes it an “unlawful employment practice” t o discriminate “against any individ ual with re spect to hi s compensation .

. . be

cause of su ch individual’s .

. . s e x.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 2(a)(1). An individual wishing to challenge an empl oy ment practi ce under this provision must first file a charge with the EEOC. §200 0e–5(e)(1). Sucha ch arge must be filed within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending on the State) “after the alleged unlawful em

ployment p r actice oc c u rred,” ibi d

. , and if the employee does not submit a timely EE OC charge, the employee may not challen g e that pra c tice in court, §2000e–5(f )(1). In addressing the issue whether an EEOC charge was filed on time, we have stressed the need to identify wit h care the s p ecific employment pr actice thatis at issue. Morgan , 53 6 U. S., at 110–111. Ledbetter points to two different employment practices as possibl e candidates. Primarily, she urges us to focus on the pa ychecks tha t were issued to her du ring the E E O C chargin gperiod (th e 180-day period preceding the filing of her EEOC question

naire), each of which, she contends, was a separate act of discrimination. Altern atively, Ledb etter direc t s us to the 1998 decisi on denying her a raise, and she argues that thi s decision was “unlawful because it carried forward inten

tionally discriminatory dispariti e s from prior years.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. Both of these arguments fail because they would require us in effect to jettison the defining element of the legal claim on which h e r Title VII recovery wa s based. Ledbetter asserted dispar ate tre atment, th e central5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt element of which is discriminatory intent. See Chardon v . Fernand ez , 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981) (p er cu riam); Team sters v . United States , 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977); Wa tson v. Fort WorthBank & Trust , 487 U. S. 977, 1002 (199 8) (Blackmun, J., joinedby Brennan, and Marshall, JJ ., concurring in part a n d concurring in judgment) (“[A] disparate-treatment challenge f o cuses exclus ively on th e intent of t h e employer”). Howe ver, Ledbetter does not assert that the relevant Goodyear decisionmakers acted with actualdiscriminatory intent either when they issued her checks during the EEO C char ging period or when the y denied her a raise in 1998. Rather, she argues that the paychecks were unlawful because they would have been larger if sh e had been evaluated in a nondiscriminatory manner prior to the EEOC charging period. Brief for Petitioner 22. Simila rly, she maintains that the 1998 decision was unlawful because it “ca rried f o rward” th e effects of prior, uncharged discrim i nation deci sions. Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. In essence, she sugges t s that it is sufficient that discrim i natory act s that occu rred prior t o the chargi ng period had cont inuing effects during that period. Brief for Petitioner 13 (“[E]ach pa ychec kthat offers a wo man less pay than a similarly situated ma n because of her sex is aseparate violation of Title VII wit h its own limitations period, regardless of whether the pay

check simp ly implements a prior discriminatory decision made outside the limitations period”); see also Reply Brief for Petitioner 20. This argument i s squarely foreclosed by our precedents. In UnitedA i r Lin es, In c. v. Ev ans , 431 U. S. 5 53 (1977), we rejected an argument that is basically t h e same as Ledbetter’s. Evans wa s force d to resign because the air

line refusedto employ married flight attendants, but she did not file an EEOC charge regarding her termination. Some years later, the airlin e rehi red her but treated her as a new employee for seniority purposes. Id

. , at 554–555.6 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt Evans then sued, arguing that, while any su it based on the original discrimination was time barred, the airline’ s refusal to g i ve her cre dit for her prior servic e gave “p re sent effect to [its] past ille gal act and thereby perpetu

ate[d] the consequences of f o rbidden discrimi nation.” Id

. , at 557. We agreed with Evans that the airline’s “seniority sys

tem [did] in deed have acontinuing impact on her pay an d fringe benefits,” id., at 558, but we noted that “the critical question [was] whether any pres ent violationexist[ed].” Ibid. (emph a sis in original). We concluded that the con

tinuing effects of the prechargi ng period discrimination did not make out a present violation. As J USTI CE S T EVE NS wrote for th e Court: “United wa s entitled to treat[Evans’ termination] as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge of dis

crimination within the 90 days then allowed by §706(d). A discriminatory act wh ich is not made the basis for atimely charge .

. . is mer e ly an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal conse

quences.” Ibid. It would be difficult to spea k to the point more directly. Equally ins tru cti ve is De la wa re S t a t e Collegev. Ricks , 449 U. S. 2 50 (1980), which con c erned a coll ege libraria n , Ricks, who alleged th at he had bee ndischa rged because o f race. In M a rch1974, Ricks was denied tenu re, but he was given a fin a l , nonrenew able one-year con tra ct that e x pi re d on June 30, 1975. Id. , at 252–2 53. Ricks dela yed filin g a charge wi ththe EEOC until April 1975, id. , at 254, but he argue dt h atthe E E O C char gin gpe riod r a n f r om the d a te of his actual termina t ionrathe rtha nfrom the date w h en tenure was denied. In rejectin gt h is argume nt, we reco g nized that “one of the eff e c t s of the denial of tenure,” namely, hi s ultimate terminatio n, “did notoccur un t il later. ” Id., at 25 8 (e mphasis inoriginal). But beca u s e7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt Ric k s failedto identif y any spe c ificdiscrimi nat o ry a ct “tha t continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment,” id. , at 257, we held th at the EE O C char gin gpe riod ran fro m“the tim ethe tenur e decision w a s made and communic a ted to Ric k s , ” id ., a t258

. This same approach di ctated the outcome in Lorancev. AT&T T ech nologies, Inc. , 490 U. S. 900 (1989), which gre w out of a ch ange in the wayin wh ich seniority was calcu

lated under a collective-bargaining agreem ent. Before 1979, all employees at the plant in question accrued sen

iority based simply on years of em ployment at the plant. In 1979, a new agreement made seniority f o r workers in the more highly paid ( and tra ditionally male) position o f “tester” dep e nd on time spent in that position alone and not in other positions in the plant. Several years later, when female testers were laidoff due to lowseniority a s calculated under the new provisi o n, they filed an EEOC charge alleging that the 1979 scheme had been adopted with discri minatory intent, namely, to protect incumbent male tester s when women with substantial plant seniority began to move into the traditio nally male tester positions

. Id. , at 902–903. We held that the plaintiffs ’ EE OC charge was not timely because it was not fil e d within t h e specified period afte r the adoption in 1979of the new s e niority rule. We noted that the pl aintiffs had not alleged that the new seniori t y rule treated men and women differently or that the ru le had been applied in a discriminatory manne r. Rathe r , their complaint was that the rule was adopted originally with discri minatory intent. Id. , a t905. And as in Evans and Ricks , we held that the EEOC charging period ran from the ti me when t h e discrete act of alleg e d intentional discrimination occurred, not from the date when the ef

fects of this practice were felt. 49 0 U. S., at 907–908. We stated:8 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt “Because the claimed i n validity of the facially nondis

criminatory and neutra lly applied tester seniority sys

tem is who lly dependent on the alleged illegality of signing the underlying agreement, it is the date of that signin g whichgo verns the l i mitations period.” Id. , at 911. 2 Our most recent decision in this area confirms this understanding. In Morgan , we explained that the statu

tory term “employment practi ce” generally refers to “a discrete actor single ‘occurrence’ ” that ta ke s place at a particular point in time. 536 U. S., at 110–111. W e pointed to “termination, failu reto promo t e, denial of transfer, [a nd] refusal to hire” as examples of such “di s crete” acts, and we held that a Title VII plain t iff “can onl y file a charg e to cover discrete act s that ‘oc c u rred’ withi n the appropriate time pe riod.” Id. , at 114. The instruction provided by Evan s , Ricks , Lo rance , an d Morganis clear. The EEO C cha r ging periodis trig g ered when a discrete unlawful pra cti ce takes pl ace. A ne w violation does not occu r, and a ne w cha r ging period does

——————

2 After Lorance , Congres s amended Title VII t ocover t h e s p ecific situat ion involved in that case. Se e 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 5 (e)(2) (allowing for Title VII liab ility ari s ing from an intentionally discriminatory sen i or itysy ste mboth at th e time of it s ad optionan d at th e time of it s applic a t ion)

. Th e dissen t a ttac h e s g r eat sig n ific an c eto th is amen d

men t , su g g e stin gth at it sh ow s th at Lora nce wa s wron gly rea s oned a s an initia l m a t t er. Post , at 10– 12 (op in ionof G IN S B U R G , J

. ). Howeve r, th e v e rylegi slat iv e h i stor yc i ted by the dissen tex plain s th at th i s amen dmen t a n d th e oth e r 1991 Ti tle VII amen dmen ts “ ‘ expand[ ed] the sc ope of r e levan tc iv il r i ghts st atu tes inor der to pr ov ide adequ ate protection to victim s of dis crimina tion.’ ” Post , at 11 (emph asi s adde d). Forpr esen t pu r p oses, w h at is mos tim por t an t abou t th e amen dmen t in qu estionis th at it appl ied on lyto th e adoptionof a disc r i min ator y s e niorit y s y s t em, nott oot her t y pes of employmentdis crimina t i on . Evansan d Ricks , uponwhi c h Lorancer e li ed, 490 U. S., at 90 6–9 08, a n d which employed identical reasoning, w e re left inplac e, an d th ese decis i ons a r e more t h a ns u ff icientt os u pportourholding t o da y.9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt not commence, upon the occurre nce of subsequent non

discriminatory acts th at enta il adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. B u t of course, if an em

ployer engages in a se ries of acts each of which is inten

tionally dis criminatory, then a fresh violationtakes place when each act is committed. See Morgan , su pra, at 113. Ledbetter’s arguments here—thatthe pay c h e cks tha t she received during th e charging period and the 1998 raise denial eachviolated Ti tle VII andtriggered a new EEOC charging pe riod—cannot be reconciled with Evans , Ricks , Lorance , and Morgan

. Ledbette r, as noted , makes n o claim that intentionall ydi scriminatory cond uct occurre d during the charging period or that discrim i natory deci

sions that occurred p r ior to t hat period were not communi

cated to her. Instead, she argues simply that Goodyear’s conduct du ring the ch arging pe ri od gave pre s ent effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period. Brief for Petitioner 13. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination; a s we held in Evans , such effects in themselve s have “no present legal consequenc es.” 431 U. S., at 558. Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedl y discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her. She did not do so, and t h e paychecks that we re issued to h e r during the 180 days prior to the filing of h e r EEOC charge do not p r ovide a ba sis for over coming tha t prior failure. In an e f fo rt to ci rcu mvent the nee dto pro v e dis c ri mi na to ry i n ten tdu ri n g th e ch a r gin g pe rio d , L e db e tte r rel i es o n thei nt e n t asso ci a t e d wi tho th e r de cis i on s m a deb y oth e r pe rso n s at o the r ti mes . Re ply Brie f fo r Pe ti tion er 6 (“In te n ti onal di scri minati on . . . occ u r s wh en . . . diff erential tr eat

men tta kes pla c e, e v e nif the in te n tto e n ga ge in th at c o n du c tfo r a di sc ri mi na to ry p u rpo s e w a s ma de p r e vio usly”)

. Ledbetter’s attemptto take the intent associated wit h the prior pay decisions and shift it to the 1998 pay deci

-10 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt sion is unsound. It wo uld shift intent from one act (the act that consummates the discriminatory employment pra c tice) to a later act th at was notperformed with bias or discriminatory motive. The eff e ct of this shift would be to impose liab i lity in the absence of the requisite intent. Our cases r e cognize this point. In Evans , f o rex amp l e, we did not take the airline’s discriminatory intent in 1968, when it discharged th e plaintiff because of her sex, and attach thatintent to its later act of neutrallyapplying its seniority rules. Simila rly, in Ricks , we did not take the discriminatory intent that th e coll ege allegedl y possessed when it denied Ricks tenure and attach thatintent to it s subsequentact of terminating his employment when his nonrenewable contractran out. On the cont rary, we he ld that “the o n ly alleged discrimination occurred—and th e filing limit ations periods therefore commenced—at th e time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks.” 449 U. S., at 25 8. Not only w o uld Ledbetter’s argu ment effectively elimi

nate the defining el ement of her disparate-treatment claim, but it would distort Title VII’s “integrated, multistep enforcement procedure.” Occid e ntal Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EE OC, 4 32 U. S. 35 5, 359 (1977). We have previously noted the legislative compromises that p r e ceded the enactment of Title VII, Mohasco Corp. v. Sil v er , 447 U. S. 8 07, 819–821 (1980); EE OC v. Com m ercialOffi ce Products Co. , 486 U. S. 107, 12 6 (1988) (S TEVE NS , J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and S CALI A , J. , dissenting). Respectful of the legislativ e process that crafted this scheme, we must “give effect to the statute as enacted,” Mohasco , supra, at 81 9, and we have repeatedly rejected suggestions that we extend or truncate Con gress’ dead

lines. See, e.g. , Elec tr ical Workersv. Robbin s& Myers, Inc. , 429 U

. S. 229, 23 6–240 (197 6) (union gr ievance pro

cedures do not toll EEOC filing deadline); Alexanderv. Gardn er- De nver Co. , 4 15 U. S. 36 , 47–49 (1974) (arbitra l11 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt decisions do not foreclose acce ss to c o urt following a timel y filed EEOC complaint). Statutes of limitations serve a poli cy of repose. Ameri

can Pipe & Constr. Co

. v. Ut a h , 414 U. S. 5 38, 554–555 (1974). They “represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adve rsaryon notice t o defend within a sp ecified period of time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ ” UnitedStatesv. Ku

brick , 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Tele gra p hersv. Railw ay Expres s Agency, Inc. , 321 U. S. 342, 349 (1944)). The EEOC filing deadli ne “protect[s] employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are lon gpast.” Ri c k s , supra, at 256–25 7. Certainly, the 180-day EEOC charging deadline, 4 2 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1), is short by any measu r e, but “[b]y choosing what are obviously quite short de adlines, Con

gress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination.” Mohasco, supra, at 825. This short dea d line refl ects Congress’ strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination al legations through voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Oc ci dentalLife Ins. , supra, at 367–36 8; Alexander , supra, at 44

. A disparate

- treatment claim comprises two elements: an employment pra ctice, and discrim i natory inte nt. Nothin g in Title VII supports treating the intent element of Ledbetter’s claim any differe ntly from the employmen t practice element. 3If anything, co ncerns rega rding stale

——————

3 Of cours e, t h ere ma y b eins t a nces whe re t h e elemen t s forming a c a u s e of ac tionspanmor e th an180 day s . Say , forinstan c e , anem ployer forms an illegal discriminatoryintent towards an employee but does n o t ac t onit u n t il 181 day s later

. Th e ch ar gi ngper i od w o u l d not12 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt claims weigh more h e avily withrespect to proof of t h e intent associated withemployment practices th an withthe practices th emselves. For exampl e, in a case such as this in which the plaintiff’s claim concerns the den i al of raises , the employer’ s challenged acts (the decision s not to in

crease the employee’s pay at the times in question) will almost alw a ys be docu mented an d will typically not even be in dispute. By contrast, th e employer’ s intent is almost always disp uted, and evidence relating to int e nt may fade quickly wit htime. In most disparate-trea t ment cases, much if notall of the evidence of intent is circumstantial. Thus, the critical issue in a case involvin g a long-pas t performance evaluation will often be whethe r the evalu a tion was so far off the mark tha t a sufficient inference of discriminatory intent can be dra w n. See Wa tson , 4 87 U. S., at 1004 (Blackm un, J., join ed by Brennan and Mar

shall, JJ., concurring i npart an d concurring in judgmen t) (noting tha tin a disparate-treatment claim, the McDo n nell Dougla s factors establish discrimination b yinference). See also, e.g. , Zhuang v. Dataca r dCorp. , 414 F. 3d 849 (CA8 2005) (rejecting inference of discrimination from performance evaluations); Cooper v. Southern Co. , 390 F. 3d 695, 732–733 (CA11 2004) (same). This can be a subtle determination, and the pa ssage of time may seri

ously diminish the ability of the parties and the factfinder to reconstru ct wha tact ually happened. 4

—————— b e gin t orun unt il t h e employmentpra c tice wa s execut ed on da y 1 81 bec a u s e u n t il th at poin t th e employ ee h a d n oc a u s e of ac tion

. Th e ac t a n d int e ntha d notyetb e e nj o ined. He re, b yco nt ra s t , Ledb et t e r’ s c a u s e of ac tionw a s fu llyfor m ed an d presen t at th e time th a tth e dis crimina t o ry employmenta c t i ons were t a k en a g a i ns ther, a tw h ich points h e coul d have, a n d s h ould have, s u e d

.

4 Th e dissen tdismi sse s th is c o n c e r n , post , at 15– 16, b u t th is c a se illustra tes the problems created by tar dy lawsuits. Ledb etter’s cla i ms of s e x dis crimina t i on t urned principa lly on t h e mis c on ductof a s i ngle G oody e arsu perv isor , wh o, Ledbetterte st ified, r e talia te d ag ain s t h e r when s h e rej e ct ed his s e xua la dva nces du ring t h e ea rly 1 9 8 0 ’ s , a n d did13 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt Ledbetter contends that em ployers would be protected by the equitable doctri ne of laches, but Cong ress plainly did not think that lac h es was sufficient in t h is context. Indeed, Congress took a diametrically different approac h , including in Title VII a provision allowing only a fe w months in most cases to file a charge with th e EEOC. 4 2 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1). Ultimately, “exper ienc e teaches t h at str i ct adher e nc e to the proc edura l re q u ir em ents spec if ied b ythe leg i s l a ture is th e be st guar a n te e of eve nhand ed a d min i str a ti on of th e l a w.” Mohasc o, 447 U. S., at 826

. By oper ati o n of §§200 0 e –5 ( e )( 1) a n d 2 000 e– 5(f) (1 ), a T i tl e VII “c la im is time barr e d if it i s n o t fi led within th es e t i me li mit s . ” Morgan , 53 6 U. S. , at 109 ; Electrical Workers, 42 9 U. S

. , at 2 36. We th er ef ore rej e ct t h e suggesti o n that an em ploy ment practic e committ e d wit h no improper purpose and n o di scrimi nat o ry int e nt i s render ed un l a wful n o ne theless b e c a us e it giv e s s o me e f f e c tt o a ni n t e n t i o n a l discr i minat o ry act that occu rr e douts id e the ch argi ng period. L e dbett e r’s c l aim is , for t h is reason, untimely. III A In advanci n g her t w o theories Ledbetter does not seri

ously contest the logic of Evans , Ri c k s , Loran c e , and Mor

ganas set out above, but rather argues that our decision in Bazemorev. Fr i d a y , 478 U. S. 385 (1986) (per curiam ) , requires different treat ment of her claim because it relates to pay. Ledbetter focuses specifi c ally on ou r statement

—————— so ag a i ninth e mid- 199 0’s w h e nh e fa ls ified deficiency report s ab out her wo rk. His mis c onduct , Ledb et t e r a r gues , wa s “ aprincipa l b a s is for [her] perform a nce evaluati o nin199 7.” B r ief forPetitio n e r6; see al s o id. , at 5– 6, 8, 11 (s tr ess i n gth e same su perv isor ’s misc on du c t). Y e t, by the time of trial, this sup e rvisorhad died and therefore could no t t e s t ify. A timely cha rge mighthave permit t e d his evidence t obe weighed cont e m pora neous l y.14LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt that “[e]achweek’s paycheck tha tdelivers les s to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII.” Id. , at 395. She argues that i n Bazemore we adopteda “paychec k acc r ual r u le” under which each paycheck, even if not accompa n ied by discriminatory intent, trig g ers a new EEO C char ging period during whic h the complainant may properly challenge a n y prior di s criminatory conduct that impacted the amount of th at paycheck, no matter how long ago the discrimination occurred. On this rea d ing, Bazemoredispensed with the need to prove actual discriminatory intent in pay cases and, withou t givingan y hint tha t it was doin g so, repudi

ated the very different approach taken previously in Ev

ansand Ricks

. Ledbett e r’s interpr e tation is unsound. Bazemore concerned a disparate-treatment pay claim brought ag ainst the North Ca rolina Agricu ltural Exte n sion Service (Service). 478 U. S., at 389–3 90. Service employees were originally se gregated into “a white branch” an d “a ‘Negro branch,’ ” with the la tter receivi n g less pay, but in 1965 the two bra n ches were merged. Id. , at 390–391. After Title VII was extended to public em

ployees in 1972, black employees brought s u it claiming that pa y di sparities attributable t o the old dual pay sca l e persisted. Id. , at 391. The Court of Appeals rejected thi s claim, which it interpreted to be t hat the “ ‘di s criminatory difference in salaries should h a ve been affirmatively eliminated.’ ” Id., at 395. This Court reversed in a per curia m opinion, 478 U. S., at 386–388, but all of the Memb ers of the Court joined Justice Brennan’s separate opinion, see id., at 388 (opi n ion concurring in part). Justice Brennan wrote: “The error of the Cour t of Appeals with respe ct to sal

ary disparities created prior to 1972 and perpetuated thereafter is too obvio u s to warrant extended discus

sion: that t h e Extension Service discriminated with15 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt respect to salaries priorto the time it was covered by Title VII does not excuse perpetuating that discrimi

nation afterthe Extension Service became covered by Title VII. To hold otherwise would have the effect of exempting from liabili ty those employers who were historically the greatest o ffenders of the rights of blacks. A p a ttern or p r actice that would have consti

tuted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a viola

tion upon Title VII’s effective date, and to the extent an employer continued to engage in that act or prac

tice, it is liable under that statu t e. While recovery may not be permitted for pre-1972 acts of di scrimina

tion, to the extent tha tthis discr i mination was per petuated after 1972, liability may be imposed. ” Id. , at 395 (emphasis in origin al). Far from adopting t h e approach that Ledbetter ad

vances here, this passage made a point that was “too obvious to warrant extended discussion,” ibi d .;namely, that when an employer adopts a facially di scriminatory pay structure that puts some em ployees on a lower scale because of race, the employer engages in intentional di s crimination whenever it issues acheckto one of thes e disfavored employees. An empl oyer that adopts and inten

tionally retains such a pay stru cture can s u rely be re

garded as intending to discriminate on the basis of race as long as the structu re is used. Bazemore t hus is entirely consistent with our prio r precedents, as Justice Brennan’s opinion took care to point out. Noting that Eva n sturned on whether “ ‘any pre sent violationexist[ed],’ ” Justice Brennan stated that th e Bazemore plaintiffs were allegi ng that th e defendan ts “ha[d] not from the date of the Act forward m a de all their employmen tdecisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way,” 478 U. S., at 396–397, n. 6 (emphasis in origi nal; internal16 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt quotation marks andbrackets o m itted)–wh i ch is to say that they had engage d in fresh discrimination. Justice Brennan added that the Court’s “holding in no sense g[ave] legal effect to th e pre-1972 actions, but, consistent with Evans

. . . focuse[d] on the p r esent salary st ruc t ur e, which is ill egal if it is a mere continuation of the pr e-196 5 discrimina tory pay str u ctur e .” Id ., at 397, n. 6 (emphasis added). The sentence in Justice Brenna n’s opinion on which Ledbetter c h iefly relies come s directly after the passage quoted above, and makes a simi larly obvious point: “Each week’s pa ycheck thatdelivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wron gaction

able under Title VII, regardless of the fact t hat this pattern wa s begun pri o r to the ef fective date of Title VII.” Id. , at 395. 5

——————

5 Th at th e foc us in Bazemore wa s on acur rentviola t i on, nott h e ca r rying fo rwa rdof apas t a c t of dis crimina tion, wa s ma de clea rly b yt h e side opinion in the Court of Appeals: “[T]h emajor i t yh o lds, ineffec t , th at bec a u s e th e patter nof disc r i mina

tory salaries here challenge dorigin ated before applicable provisions o f the Civil Rights Act m a de their pa yment illegal, any ‘li n gering effect s ’ of th at ear lierpatter nc a nn ot (pr e su mablyonanin defin i telymain

t a i ned ba s i s ) b econs idered in a s s e s s i ng acha llenge t opos t -a ctcon tin u ationof th at pat t er n .

“Hazelwoodan d Evansinde ed ma de itclea r t h a ta nemployer ca nnot b efound liab l e, or s a nct ion e d wit hremedy, for employmentdecis i ons made before they were de clared illega l oras to which the claimant h a s lost an yr i gh t of ac tionbyla pse of time. F o rth is r e asonit is g e n e r a lly t rue t h a t , as the ca t ch-phra s eha s it , Title VII impos e d ‘ n o ob liga t ion to catch-up,’ i.e., affirmatively to re medy p r esent effects of pre-Act dis

crimina t i on, whet h er in co mpos ing awork force or otherwis e . But th ose c a ses c a n n o t be th ou gh t to in su la te employ men t dec i sion s th a t presently are illegal on th e b a si s that at on e time compar able dec i sion s were legal when made by the parti cular employer. It is therefore one thing to say that an e m ploy er who up on the effective date of Title VI I finds it s e lf with ara cia lly u nb a l a nced wor k -forceneed n o ta c ta ffirma

tiv e lyto r e dr ess th e b a lan c e ; an d qu ite an oth e rto s a yt h at itm a yal s o17 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt In other words, a freestanding violation may always be chargedwi thin its ow n char gingperiod reg a rdless of its connection to other violations

. We repeated this same point more recently in Morgan:“The existence of past acts and the employee’ s prior k n owledge of their o ccurrence . . . does not ba r employees from filin g charges about related discrete act s so long as the acts are independently dis

criminatory and charges addressing those acts are them

selves timely filed.” 5 36 U. S., at 113. 6Neit her of these opinions st ands for the proposition that an action not comprising an employment prac tice and alleged discrim i

natory inte nt is separately chargeable, just because it is related to some past act of discrimination. Ledbetter attempts to elim inate the obvious inconsis

tencies between her interpretati on of Bazemoreand the Evans/Ri ck s/Loranc e/ Morganline of cases o nthe ground that none of the latter cases involved pay rai s es, but the logic of our prior cases is fully applicable to pay cases. To take Evans as an example, the employee there was unlaw

fully terminated; this caused her to lose seni ority; and the loss of sen i ority affected her wages, among other things. 431 U. S., at 555, n. 5 (“[S]eniority determin e[s] a flight

—————— cont inue t oma ke dis crimin a t o ry hiri ng decis i ons b e ca u s e it wa s b yt h a t mea n s t h a tit s pres entwork force wa s compos ed. It ma ynot , in s h ort , under the Haze lwood/Evans principle cont inue pr ac tic e s n o wv i olativ e simplybec a u s e at on e time th eyw e r en o t.” Bazemore v. Fri d ay, 751 F. 2d 662, 69 5–6 96 (CA 41 984) (Ph illi ps, J., c o n c u r r i nginpar tan d dissenting in part) (emphasi s inoriginal; footnotes omit t e d).

6 The briefs filed with this Court in Bazemorev. Fr i d a y, 4 78 U. S. 385 (198 6) (per cu riam), fu r t h e r elu c i date th e poin t. Th e petition er s de

s crib e d t h e Service’s cond u c ta s “ [ t] he c o nt inued us e of a ra cia l ly explicit base wage.” Brief f o r Petition er Bazemor eet a l . in Bazemore v. Friday, O

. T. 198 5, No. 85– 93, p. 33. Th e Un ited St at es’ br ief a l s o properly dis t inguis hed t h e commis s ion of adis cret edis crimina t o ry a c t wit hcont inui ng a dvers e re s u lt s from t h e int e nt iona l ca rryingforwa rd of adis crimina t o ry pa y s y s t em. Brief for Federal Petitioners in Bazemore v. Friday, O

. T. 198 4, Nos. 85 –93 an d 85 –4 28, p. 17. This c a se in v o lv es th e for mer, n o tth e latter

.18LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt attendant’s wages; the duration and timing of vacations; rights to retention in t h e even t of layoffs and rights to re

employmen tthereafter; and righ ts to preferential selection of flight as signments”). Th e relationship between past discrimination and adverse present effects was the sa me in Evansas it is here. Thus, the argument th at Ledbetter urges us to accept h e re would necessarily have com

manded a different outcome in Evans

. Bazemorestands for the proposit ion that an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC chargi ng period whe n ever the e m ployer issues payche ck s using a discriminatory paystr u cture. Bu t a new Tit l e VII viola

tion does not occur an d a new ch arging period is not trig

gered whenan employer issues paychecks pursuant to a system that is “faciall y nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied.” Lorance , 49 0 U. S., at 911. The f a ct that precharging pe riod discri mination adversely affects the cal c u lation of a neutral factor (like seniority) tha tis used in determining futu re p a y does not mean th at each ne w paycheck constitutes a new violation and restarts th e EEOC charging period. Because Ledbetter has not adduce d evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its perf ormance-based pay system in order to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later applied this system to her within the chargingperiod with any discrim i natory animus, Bazemorei s o f n o h e l p t o h e r . Rather, all Ledbetter has alleged i s that Goodyear’s agents discriminated against her individually in the past an d that this di scrimination reduced t h e amount of later pay

checks. Because Ledbetter did not file timely EEOC charges relating to h e r employer’s disc riminatory pay decisions inthe past, s h e cannot maintain a suit based on that past di scrimination at this time. B The dissent also argue s that pay claims are different.19 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt Its principal argument is that a pay discrimination claim is like ah o stile work envi ronment claim b e cause bot h types of cl aims are “ ‘based on the cumulative effect of individual acts,’ ” post , at 6–7, but this analogy overlooks the critical conceptual distinction between these two typ e s of claims. And altho u gh the di ssent relies heavily on Morgan , th e dissent’s argument is fundamentally incon

sistent with Morgan ’s r e aso n ing. Morgandi stinguished between “discrete” acts of dis

crimination and ahostile work environment. Adiscret e act of disc rimination is an act tha tin itself “c onstitutes a separate actionable ‘u nlawful employment practice’ ” an d that is temporally distinct. Morgan , 536 U. S., at 114, 117. As examples we identifi ed “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” Id ., at 114

. A hostile work environ m ent, on the other hand, typically comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which “may not b e actionable on its own.” In addition, a hosti l e work environment clai m “cannot be said to occur on an y particular day.” Id ., at 115–116. In otherwords, th e actionable wrong is the environ m ent, not the individual acts that, ta ken together, create th e environment. 7 Contrar yto the dissent’s assertion, post , at 6–7, what Ledbetter alleged was not a si ngl e wrong consisting of a succession of acts. Ins t ead, she al leged a seri es of discret e discriminatory acts, see Brief for Petitioner 13, 15 (argu

ing that pa yment of each paychec kconstitute d a separat e

——————

7 Moreo v er , t h epropos ed hos t ile sa la ry environmentcla i m would go fa r b e yond Mo rgan ’s limits. Mor ganstill required at least so me of the disc r i min ator i ly -motiv ated a c ts pr edic a t eto ahos t ile wor kenvironment claim to occur within the charging period. 536 U. S., at 117 (“Provided th at an act contrib u ti ng to t he claim occu rswithin t he fil ing perio d , the entire time pe riod of the ho stile environmentma y b e cons idered b ya court” (empha s is a dded)). Butt h e dis s e nt would permit cla i ms wh ere n oon e ac ted inan yw a y w i thanimpr opermotiv edu r i n gth e c h a rgin g period. Post , a t7, 16.20 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt violation of Title VII), each of w h ich wasindependently identifiable and actionable, and Morgan is perfectly clear that when an employee alleges “s erial violati o ns,” i.e. , a series of actionable wrongs, a tim e ly EEOC charge mus t be filed with respect to eachdiscrete alleged vi olation. 53 6 U. S., at 11 3. While this fundamental misinter pretation of Morganis alone suffic i ent to show that the dissent’ s approach must be rejected, it should a l so be noted thatthe dissent is c o y as to whether it would appl y th e same rule to all pay discrimination claims or whetherit would lim it the rule t o cases like Ledbetter’s, in which multiple di scriminatory pay decisions are al le ged. The di ssent rel i e s on thefa ct that Ledbet ter was allegedly s ubjected to a series of dis

criminatory pay decisions over a period of time, and the dissent suggests that she did not realize for some time that she ha d been victi mized. But not all pay cases share these characteristics. If, as seem s lik ely, the dissent would apply the same rule in al l pay cases, then, if a si ngle discriminatory pay decision made 20 yea r s ago continued to af fect an em

ployee’s pay today, th e dissent would pres umably hold that the employee coul d file a timely EEOC charge today. And the dissent would presumably allow this even if the employee had full knowledge of all the circumstances relating to the 20-year-old decision at the time it w a s made. 8 The dissent, it appears, proposes that we adopt a special rule for pay cases based on the partic u lar charac

-

——————

8 Th e dissen t admi ts as m u c h , r e spon din gon lyth at anemploy er could res o rtt oeq uit ab le doct rines s uch a s la ches

. Post , at 16. Bu t firs t , as we have not e d, Congres s h a s alr e adydeter m in e dth atdefen s e to be in su ffic i en t. Supra , at13

. S e cond, itis fa r from c l ea r t h a ta s u it filed under t h e diss ent ’ s t h eory, a lleging t h a ta pa ychec kpa id recent ly w i th inth e char gin gper i od w a s itself a fr eestan din gv i olationof Titl e VII because it reflected the effects of 20-year-old discrimination, would ev enbe bar r e d bylac h e s.21 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt teristics of one case that is certai n ly not rep r esentative of all pay cases and may not even be typical. We refuse t o take that a pproach. IV In addition to the arguments previously discussed, Ledbetter relies largely on analogies to other statutory regimes and on extrastatutory policy argum e nts to sup

port her “pa y chec k acc r ual rule.” A Ledbetter places significant weight on the EPA, whi c h was enacted contemporaneously with Title V II and prohib

its paying unequal wages for equ a l work because of s e x. 29 U. S. C. §206(d). Stating tha t“the lowe r courts ro u tinely hear [EPA] clai ms challen ging pay di sparities that first arose outside the limitations period,” Le dbetter sug

gests that we should hold that Title VII is violated each time an e m ployee re ceives a pa ychec kthatreflects past discrimination. Brief f o r Petitioner 34–35. The simple answer to this argument is that the EPA and Title VII are not the same. In particular, the EPA does not require the filing of a charge with t h e EEOC o r proof of int e ntional dis crimination. See §206( d)(1) (asking only wheth e r the alleged inequality resulted from “an y other facto r other th an sex”). Ledbetter originally as serted an EPA claim, but that claim was dismissed by the DistrictCo urt andis not befo re us. If Ledb etter had p u r sued her EPA claim, she would not face the Title VII obstacles that she now confronts. 9

——————

9 Th e M a gi str ate Ju dg e r e c o mmen d ed di s m iss a l of Ledbetter ’ s EPA c l aim on th e g r oun dth at G o ody e arh a d demon s tr a t e dth atth e p a y dis p a r it y res u lt ed from Ledb et t e r’s cons ist e nt ly wea kperforma nce, n o t h e rsex . App. to Pet. forCer t . 71a– 77 a. Th e M a gi str ate Ju dg e al s o r e c o mmen d ed dismi s s i n gth e Title VII di sp ar ate-payc l a i m onth e s a m e bas is. Id. , at 65a– 69 a. Ledbetterobjec t ed to th e M a gistr ate Ju dg e’s dispos itionof th e Title VII an d EPA c l ai ms, ar g u in g th at th e M a gi s -22 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt Ledbetter’s appeal to the Fair L abor Stand ards Act of 1938 (FLSA) is equ a lly unavailing. Stating th at it is “wel l establishedthat the statute of limitations for violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the [FLSA] runs anew with each paychec k ,” Brief for Petitioner 35, Ledbetter urges that the same should be true in a Tit l e VII pay case. Again, however, Ledbetter’s argumen t overlook s the fact that an FLSA minimum wage or over time claim does not require proof of a speci f ic intent to discriminate. See 29 U. S. C. §207 (establish i ng overtime rules); cf. §255(a) (establishing 2

- year statu t e of limita

tions for FLSA claims, except for claims of a“willful viola

tion,” whichmay be commenced within 3 years). Ledbetter is on firmer groundin suggesting that we loo k to cases ari s ing underthe Natio nal Labor Relations Act (NLRA) since the NLRA provided a mode l fo r Title VII’ s remedial provisions an d, like Title VII, requir e s the fi lin g of a timely administrative charge (with the Na tional Labor Relations Board) before suit may be maintained. Lorance, 490 U. S., at 909; Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 45 8 U. S. 219, 226, n. 8 (1982). Cf. 29 U. S. C. §160(b) (“[N]o complaint shall issu e based upon any unfair labor practice occurrin g more than s i x months prior to the f iling of the charge with the Board”). Ledbetter argues that the NLRA’s 6-month statute of limitations begins an ew for each paycheck reflecting a prior violation of thes t atute, but our precedents suggest

—————— tr ate Ju dg e h a d impr oper lyr e solv eda d i spu t ed fac t u a l is su e. See Pla i nt iff’s Object ions t oMa gis t ra t eJ u dge’s Reporta n d Recommenda

t i on, 1 Record in No. 03 –1 52 4 6

– G(CA1 1 ) , Doc. 3 2

. The Dis t rict Court su sta i n e d th is objec t iona s to th e “di s par ate pay” c l ai m, bu t w i th ou t s p ecifica lly ment ioning t h e EPA claim, w h ich ha d b e en dismiss e d b y th e M a gi str a t eJu dg e onth e same bas is. S e e App. to Pet. forCer t . 43a– 44a. Wh ile th e r e c o r dis n o ten tir e ly c l ear , it appear s th at at th is poin t Ledbetterelec ted to ab an donh e rEPA c l aim, pr oc eedi n gto tr ial w i t h on lyth e Title VII dispar a t e - payc l aim, th u s giv i n gr i se to th e dispu t e t h e Courtmus tnow res o lve

.23 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt otherwise. In Machinists v. NLRB , 362 U. S. 411, 416–417 (1960), we held that “where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance onan earlierunfair labor practice[,] the use of the earlier unfair labor practic e [merely] serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful.” Thi s inte rpreta tion corresponds closely to our anal ysis in Evansand Ricksand supports our hold

ing in the present case. B Ledbetter, finally, makes a variety of policy arguments in favor of giving the a lleged victims of pay d i scrimination more time before theyare re quir e d to fil e acharge with the EEOC. Among other things, she claims that pa y discrimination is harder to detect than other forms of employmen tdiscrimination. 10 We are notin a position to evaluate Ledbetter’s polic y arguments, and it is not our prero g ative to cha n ge the wa y in which Title VII ba lances the interests of aggrieved employees against the interest in encouraging the “prom p t processing of all charges of employment discrimination, ” Mohasco , 447 U. S., at 825, and the interest i nrepose. Ledbetter’s policy ar g u ments for givingspecial treat

ment to pay claims find no support in the statute and are inconsistent with our precedents. 11 We apply the statute

——————

10 We have previously declined to address w h ether Title V II suits are amen able to a disc ov er yru le. National Railroad Pass en ger Corporation v. Mo rgan , 536 U. S. 101, 1 14, n

. 7 (2002)

. Bec a u s e Ledbetterdoes n o t a r gue t h a ts u c har u le woul d cha nget h e out c ome in he r ca s e , wehav e n oocc a sionto addr ess th is i s su e.

11 Ledbetterar g u es th at th e E E O C ’s en dor s emen t of h e r appr oac hin its Comp lian c e M a n u a l and inadmin i s t r ativ eadju di c ation s mer i t s deference. But we have previously declined to extend Chevron defe r ence t ot h e Complia nce Ma nua l, Mor gan, sup ra , at 1 11, n

. 6, a n d similarly decline to defer tothe EEO C’s adjudicatory positions. The EEOC’s views in ques tion are based on its mi sr eadin gof Bazemore

.24LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. Opinion of t h eCourt as written, and this means that any unlawful employmen t practice, in cluding tho s e involving compensa tion, must be presented to the EEO C within t h e period prescribed by statute. * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed. It is so orde red.

—————— See, e.g. , Amf t v. Mi neta , No. 07A4 0 1 16, 200 6 WL 9 8 5 183, *5 ( EEO C Office of Fed. Operations, Apr. 6, 2006); Albrittonv. Postmaste r Ge n eral , No. 01A4 406 3, 20 04 W L298 36 82, *2 (EEO C O ffic eof Fed. O p er a tion s, D e c . 17, 2004). Ag en c i es h av en os p ec ial c l aim t odefer en c ei n th eirin ter p r e tationof ou rde c i sion s. Renov. Bossie rPari sh School Bd. , 528 U. S. 3 20, 33 6, n

. 5 (20 0 0 ). Nordo w e see r e a s on ab l eam big u ityin t h e s t at ut e its e lf, which ma kes no dis t inct ion b e t w een compens a t i on a n d ot her s o rt s of cla i ms a n d which cl ea rly req u ires t h a tdis cret e employ men ta c tion s alleg e dto be u n l aw fu l be motiv a t e d “bec a u s e of such individua l ’s . . . sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–a( a)(1)._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 07 4 LILLY M. L E DB ETT E R, PETITI ONE R v. T H E GO OD

YEAR TI R E & RU BB ER C O MPA NY, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [M ay29, 2007 ] J USTICE G INSBU R G , with who m J U S TI CE S TEVE NS , J USTICE S OUTER , and J USTICE B RE YERjoin, dissenting. Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber’s pl ant in Ga dsden, Alabama, from 1 979 until her retirement in 1998. For most of those years, she worked as an area manager, a positionla rgely occupied by men . Initially, Ledbetter’s salary was in line with the salaries of men performing substantially similar work. O v er ti me, however, her pay slippe d in co mparison to the pay of male area managers with eq ual or less seniority. By the end of 1997, Ledbetter was the only woman worki n g as an area manager and the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and her 15 male counterparts was stark: Ledbett e r was paid $3,727 per month; the lowest paid male a r ea manage r received $4,286 per month, the hi ghest paid, $5,236. See 421 F. 3d 1169, 1174 (CA11 2005); Brief for Petitioner 4. Ledbetter launched charges of discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March 199 8. Herfor m al administrative co mplaint speci

fied that, in violationof Title VII, Goodyear paid her a discriminatorily low salary because of her sex. See 42 U. S. C. §2 000e–2(a)(1) (rendering it unlawful for an em

ployer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation

. . . becaus e of such in dividual’ s . . . sex”). Thatcharge wa s eventually tried to ajury, whic h2 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting found it “more likely thannot that [Go o dyear] pa id [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her sex.” App. 102. Inaccord with the jury’s liab ility determination, the District Court enteredjudgmentf o r Ledbetter for backp ay and damages, plus cou n sel fees an d costs. The Court of Appeals for the Elev enth Circui treversed

. Relying on Goodyear’s system of annualmerit-based raises, the court held that Le dbetter’s claim , in relevant part, was time barred. 421 F. 3d, at 1171, 1182–1183. Title VII provides that a charge of discrimination “shallb e filed within [180] days after the al leged unla w ful employ

ment practice occurre d.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(e)(1). 1 Ledbetter c harged, an d proved a ttrial, tha twithin th e 180-day period, her pay was substantially less than th e pay of men doing the same work. Further, sh e introduced evidence sufficient to establish that discrimination against female ma nagers at the Gadsden plant, not performa nce inadequacies on her pa rt, accounte dfor the pay differen

tial. See, e.g. , App. 36 –47, 51–68, 82–87, 90–98, 112–113. That evidence was unavailing, the Eleventh Circuit held, and the Court today a grees, because it was incumbent on Ledbetter t o file charges year -by-year, each t i me Goodyear failed to inc r ease her salary commensurate with the sala

ries of mal epeers. Any annual pay decision n o t contested immediatel y (within 1 80 days), th e Court affirms, becomes grandfathered, a fait accomplibeyond the province of Title VII ever to repair. The Court’ s insistence on immedi ate contest overlook s common characteristic s of pay discrimination. Pay dis

parities often occur, a s theydid in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; cause to suspect tha tdisc rimination is

——————

1 If th e c o mplai n an t h a s fir s t in stitu t ed pr oc eedin g s w i tha state or local agency, the filing period is exte nded to 30 0 d a ys or30 days after th e den i al of relief byth e agen c y . 42 U. S. C. §2000e –5(e )(1). Bec a u s e th e 180- dayp e r i od applie s t oLedbet ter ’ s c a se, th at f i g u r ew ill be u s e d t hroughout

. S ee ante , at 3, 4.3 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting at work develops only over time. Comparative pay infor

mation, mo reover, is often hidde n from the employee’ s view. Employers may k eep underwra ps the pay differe n tials maintained among supervis ors, no less the reasons for those differentials. Small initia l discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a federal case, particula rly when t h e employee, t r ying to succeed in a nontraditional environ

ment, is averse to making waves. Pay disparities are t hus signifi c antly different from adverse actions “such as termi nation, fai l ure to promote,

. . . or refu sal to h i re, ” all involving fully communicated discrete act s , “easy to identi fy” as discriminatory. Se e National R a ilroad Pa s senger Cor p orationv. Morgan , 53 6 U. S. 101, 114 (2002). It is only when the disparity be

comes apparent and sizable, e.g ., through future raises calculated as a percentage of current salaries, that an employee i nLedbetter’ s situation is lik ely to comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial rea d i

ness to giv e her empl oyer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from later challenging the then curren t and continuing payment of a wa ge depressed on account of her sex. On questions of time under Title VII, we have identified as the critical inquiries: “What constitutes an ‘unlawful employment practi ce’ and when has that practice ‘oc

curred’?” Id

. , at 110. Our precedent sugges t s, and lower courts have overwhelmingly held, that the unlawful prac

tice is the c u rren t pay mentof salaries infected by genderbased (or race-based) discrimination—a practice tha t occurs whe n ever a paycheck deliv ers less to a woman than to a similarly situated man. See Bazemorev. Friday , 47 8 U. S. 385, 395 (1986) (Brennan, J., joinedby all oth e r Members of the Court, concurring i npart). I Title VII p r oscribes as an “unlawful employ ment prac

-4 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting tice” discrimination “ a gainst any individual with respect to his compensation .

. . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or n a tional origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 2(a)(1). An individual seeking to ch allenge an employment practice un der this proscriptio n must file acharge with the EE OC within 180 days “afte rthe alleg e d unlawfu l employmen tpra ctice o ccurred.” § 2000e–5(e)( 1 ). See ante , at 4; supra , at 2, n. 1. Ledbetter’s petition presents a question important to the sound application of Ti tle VII: Wh at activity qualifies as an unlawful employment practice in cases of discrimina

tion with r e spect to co mpensation. One answer identifies the pay-setting decision, and that decision al one, as the unlawful p r actice. U n der this v i ew, each p a rticular sa l

ary-setting decision is discre te from prior and subsequent decisions, a n d must be challenged within 180 days on pai n of forfeiture. Another response counts bo th the pa y setting decision and the actual payment of a discrimina

tory wage as unlawful practi ces. Under this approach, each payment of a wage or salary infectedby sex-bas ed discrimination constitu tes an unla w ful employment prac

tice; prior decisions, outside the 180-day charge-filin g period, are not themselves actionable, but they are re le

vant in det e rmining t h e lawfulness of conduct within t h e period. The Court adopts the first view, see ante , at 1, 4, 9, but the second is more faithful to prece d ent, more in tune with t h e realities of th e workplace, and more respect

ful of Title VII’ s remedial purpose. A In Bazemore , we unanimously hel dthat an employer, the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, co m mitted an unlawful employment practice eachtime it paid black employees les s than simila rly situated white em

ployees. 47 8 U. S., at 3 95 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Before 1965, the Extension Service was divide d into two5 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting branches: a white branch and a “Negro bra n ch.” Id ., at 390. Emplo y ees in the “Negro b r a n ch” were paid less than their white counterpar t s. In response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , which included Title VII, the State merge d the two bra n ches into a single organization, made adjust

ments to reduce the salary disparity, and began givi ng annual raises based onnondiscriminatory factors. Id ., at 390–391, 394–395. Nonetheless, “ s ome pre-existing salary disparities continued to linger on. ” Id ., at 3 94 (internal quotation marks omit ted). We rejected the Court of Ap peals’ conclusion that the plaintiffs could not prevail be

cause the lingering disparities were simply a continuing effect of a d e cision lawfully ma de p r ior to the e ffective dat e of Title VII. See id ., at 395–396. Ra ther, we reasoned, “[e]ach wee k’s paycheck tha tdelivers less to a black tha n to a similarly situated white is a wrong actio nable under Title VII.” Id ., at 395. Paychecks perpetuating past dis

crimination, we thus recogniz ed, are actionable not simpl y because they are “related” to a dec i sion made outside the charge-filing period, cf. ante , at 1 7 , but because they dis

criminate anew each time they issue, see Bazemore , 478 U. S., at 39 5–396, and n. 6; Morgan , 536 U. S., at 111–112. Subsequently, in Morgan , we set apart, for p u rposes of Title VII’s timely filing re quirement, unla w ful employ

ment actions of two kin d s: “discret e acts” thatare “easyt o identify” as discrimina tory, anda cts tha t recur andar e cumulative in impact. See id., at 110, 113–115. “[A] [d]iscrete ac[t] such a s termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hi re,” id. , at 114, we ex

plained, “ ‘occur[s]’ on t h e day thatit ‘happen[ s].’ A part y , therefore, must file a charge with in .

. . 180 .

. . days of t h e date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.” Id ., at 110; see id

. , at 113 (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable i f time barred, even when they a r e related to acts alleged in timelyfiled char ges. Each discrete dis

criminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleg

-6 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting ing that act.”). “[D]ifferentin kind f r om di screte acts,” we m a de clear, are “claims .

. . based on the cumulative effect of individ

ual acts.” Id. , at 115. The Morgan decision p l aced hostil e work envir o nment claims in that categor y . “Their ver y nature involves repeated conduct.” Ibid

. “The unlawful employment prac tice” i nhost ile work environ m ent claims, “cannot be said to occur on any pa rticular da y. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct con

trast to discrete acts, a single actof harass m ent may not be actionable on its own.” Ibid . (i nternal quotation marks omitted). The persistence of the discriminatory conduc t both indicates that management should have known of its existence and produce s a cognizable harm. Ibid

. Because the very nature of th e hostil e w o rkenvironment claim involves repeated conduct, “[i]t does not matter, for purposes of the stat ute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work envi

ronment fall outside the statutory time period. Pro

vided tha tan ac t co ntributing to the clai m occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile envi ronment may be consi d ered by a court for the purposes of determi n ing liabilit y.” Id ., at 117. Consequent ly, althoughthe unlawful conduct began in th e past, “a charge may be fil e d at alater date and still en

compass the whole.” Ibid

. Pay dispari t ies, of the kind Ledbe tter experie n ced, have a closer kin s hip to hos t ile wo rk environment claims than to charges of a single episode of discrimination. Ledbetter’s claim, resembling Morgan’s, reste dnot on one particular p a ycheck, bu t on “th e cu mulative effect of indi

vidual acts.” See id ., a t115. See also Brief f o r Petitioner 13, 15–17, and n. 9 (a nalogizing Ledbetter’s claim to the recurringa n d cumulat i ve harm atissue in Morgan); Rep l y Brief for P e titioner 13 (distinguishing pay di scrimination7 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting from “easy to identify” discre te acts (internal quotation marks omitted)). Sh e charged insidious discrimination building up slowly but steadily

. See Brief for Petitioner 5– 8. Initia lly in lin e wi th the sala ries of menperforming substantially the same work, Ledb etter’s salary fell 15 to 40 percent behind her male coun terparts on ly after suc

cessive evaluations and perce ntage-based pay adju st

ments. See supra , at 1–2. Ove rtime, she alleged and proved, the repetition of pay decisions undervaluing her work ga ve rise to the currentdis crimination of which s h e complained. Though componen t acts felloutside t h e charge-filing period, with each new paycheck, Goodyea r contributedincrementally to the accumulating harm. See Morgan , 53 6 U. S., at 117; Bazem o re , 478 U. S., at 395– 396; cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Sho eMachiner y Corp. , 392 U. S. 481, 502, n. 15 (1 968). 2 B The realities of the wo rkplace rev e al why th e discrimi

nation with respect to compen sation that Ledbetter suf

fered does not fit within the ca tegory of singular discrete acts “easy t o identify.” A wo rk er knows imme diately if sh e is denied a promotion o rtransfer, if she is fire d or refused employmen t

. And promotions, transfers, hirings, and firings are generally public events, known to co-workers. When an employer mak e s a decision of su ch open and definitive character, a nemployee can immediately seek out an explanation and evaluate itfor pretext. Compensa

tion disparities, in con trast, are o f ten hidden from sight.

——————

2 National Rail road Pass en ge r Corporation v. Mo rgan , 536 U. S. 101, 117 ( 200 2), th e Cou r temph asize s , r e qu ir ed th at “ a nac t c o n t r ibu tin gto the claim occu[r] within th e [charge-]filing period.” Ante , at 1 9 , an d n

. 7 (emph asi s del e ted; in ter n a l qu otationm a r k s omitte d). Her e , eac h paycheck with in the filing periodcompounded the discrimina ti on Ledb et t e r encount ered, a n d t hus cont rib u t e d t ot h e “ a c t i onab l e wrong ,” i.e. , the succes s ion of acts co mposing th e p attern of d i scriminatory pay , of which she complained.8 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting It is not u nusual, decisions in p o int illustr a te, for ma n agement to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to k eep private their own salarie s . See, e.g. , Goodwin v. Gener al Motors Corp ., 275 F. 3d 1005, 1008– 1009 (CA10 2002) (pl a intiff did not know what her col

leagues ear n ed until a printout listing of sala ries appeared on her desk, seven years after herstarting sa lary was set lower than her co-workers’ salaries); McMilla n v. Massa

chuse t ts So c. for th e Pr evention of Cruel t y to Animals , 1 40 F. 3d 288, 296 (CA1 1 998) (plaintiff worked for employer for years before learnin gof sa lary disparity published in a newspaper)

. 3Tellingly , as the record in this case bear s out, Goodyear k e pt salaries conf idential; e m ployees h a d only limited access to info rmation regarding their col

leagues’ earnings. App. 56–57, 89. The problem of concealed pay discrimination is particu

larly acute where the disparity arises not because the female emp l oyee is flat ly denied a raise but because mal e counterpart s are givenlarger raises. Havin greceived a pay increase, the fema l e employe e is unlik ely t o discern at once that she has ex perienced an adverse employme nt decision. She may have little reason even to suspect dis

crimination until a pattern deve lops incrementally and she ultimately becomes aware of the disparity. Even if an employee suspects tha tthe reaso nfor a comparatively l o w raise is n o t performance but se x (or another protected ground), th e amount involved may seem too small, or the employer’ s intent too ambiguous, to mak e the issue imme

diately acti onable—or winnable. Further se paratingp a y claims f r om the di screte em

-

——————

3 S ee a l s oBierma n & Gely, “ L ove, S e x a n d Polit ics ? S ure. S a la ry? No Way” : Wor k plac e Soc i al No r m s an d th e Law , 25 Ber k eleyJ. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 67, 1 68, 1 71 ( 2 0 04) (on e-th ir d of pr iv ate sec t or employ er s h av e adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from di s cus s i ng t h eir wa ges wit hco -workers ; o n lyone in t e n e m ployers ha s a d opt e d apa y openness policy).9 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting ployment actions identified in Mor gan , an employer gains from sex-based pay disparities in a way it does not from a discriminatory denial of promotion, hiring, or transfer. When a male employ ee is sel e cted over a female for a higher levelposition, so meone stil l gets the pro m otion and is paid a higher salary; the employer is not enriched. But when a woman is paid less than asimilarly situated ma n, the employer reduces its costs each time the pay differe n tial is impl emented. Furthermore, decision s on promo tions, like decisions installing s e niority systems, often implicate the interests of third-party employees in a way that pay differentials do not. Cf. Teams t ersv. United Sta t es , 431 U. S. 324, 352–353 (1977) (recognizing tha t seniority systems involv e “vested .

. . rights of employees” and conclud i ng that Tit l e VII was not intended to “destro y or water do wn” those r i ghts). Dis p arate pay, by contras t , can be remedied at an y time solel yat the expense of th e employer who acts in a discriminatory fashion. C In light of the significant differences between pay dis

parities and discrete employ men tdecisions of the type identified i n Morgan , the cases on which th e Court relies hold no sway. See an te , at 5–10 (discussi ng United Ai r Lines, Inc. v. Ev ans , 4 31 U. S. 55 3 (1977), De lawareStat e Collegev. Ricks , 449 U. S. 250 (1980), an d Lorancev. AT&T Te c hnologies, Inc. , 490 U. S. 900 (1989)). Evans and Ricks both involved a single, i mmediately identifiabl e act of discrimination: i n Evans , aconstruc t iv e discharge , 431 U. S., a t554; in Ricks , a denial of tenure, 449 U. S., a t 252. In each case, th e employee filed charges well after the discret e discriminatory ac t occurred: W h en United Airlines forced E v ans to resign b e cause of its policy bar

ring married female flight a ttenda n ts, she filed no charge; only four years later, when Evan s was rehired, did she allege that the airline’s former no-marriage rule was10 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting unlawful and therefore shou ldn o t operate to deny he r seniority cr edit for her prior servic e. See Evans , 431 U. S., at 554–557. Similarly, when Delaware State College denied Ricks tenure, he did not object until his terminal contract ca me to an end, one year later. Ricks , 449 U. S., at 253–254, 257–258. No repetitive, cumulative discrimi

natory employment practice was at issue ineither case. See Evans , 431 U. S., at 557–558; Ricks , 449 U. S., at 25 8. 4 Loranceis also inapposite, for, in this Court’s view, it too involved a one-time discrete act: the adoption of a new seniority system that “had its gen e sis in sex discrimina

tion.” See 4 90 U. S., at 902, 905 (in t ernal quotation marks omitted). T h e Court’s extensive reliance on Lorance , an te , at 7–9, 14, 17–18, moreover, is pe rplexing for that decision is no longer effective: In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Co n gress superseded Lora nce ’s holdin g. §112, 10 5 Sta t . 107 9 (codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 5 (e)(2)). Re

pudiating o u r judgment that a fa cially neutral seniority system adopted withd i scriminatory intent m u st be chal

lenged imm e diately, Congress provided: “For purposes of this se ction, an unlawful employment practice oc curs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, when an indi vidual becomes subject to the

——————

4 The Courta l s orelies on Ma chini stsv. NLRB , 362 U. S. 411 (1 96 0), which like Evansan d Ricks , concer n ed adis cret ea c t : t h e execut ion of a collect ive b a r ga ining a g ree m entcont a i ning au n ion s e curit y cla u s e . 362 U. S., at 4 12, 4 17. In M a chini sts , it w a s u n d ispu tedth at under t h e Nation a lLabo rRelation s Ac t (NLRA), a u n i onan d anemploy erma y n o t agr ee to a u n i onsec u r i ty c l au se “if at t h e time of or igin al ex ec u t ion th e u n i on does n o t r e pr esent a major i tyof th e employ ees inth e [bar

gaining] unit.” Id., at 412–4 14, 41 7. Th e complain an t s , h o w e v e r , failed to file a charge within the NLRA’s six- month charge filing period; in stead, th eyfiled c h a r g es 10 an d 12 mon t h s afterth e ex ec u t ionof the a g reement , obj e ct ing t oit s s u b s eq uentenforcement

. S e e id ., at 41 2, 414. Th u s , as in Evansan d Ricks , b u tin cont ra s tt oLedb et t e r’s ca s e , the employment decision at issue wa s eas ily ident i fiab l e a n d occu rre d on a single day.11 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting seniority system, or when a pers on aggrieved is in

jured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.” Ibid. Congress t hus agreed with the di ssenters in Loranceth at “the harshreality of [that] decis i on,” was “ glaringly a t odds with the purposes of Title VII.” 490 U. S., at 9 1 4 (opinion of Marshall, J

. ). See a l so §3, 105 Stat. 1071 (199 1 Civil Rights Act was designed “to respond to recent deci

sions of th e Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection t o victims of discrimination”). True, §112 of the 19 91 Civil Ri ghts Act directly ad

dressed only seniority systems. See ante , a t 8, and n. 2. But Con gre ss made clear (1) its vi ew thatthi s Court ha d unduly contrac t edthe scope of protection afforded by Title VII and other civil righ ts statutes, and (2) its aim to gen

eralize the ruling in Bazemore

. As the Senate Report accompanyi n g the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, t h e precursor to the 1991 Act, explain e d: “Where, as was alleg e d in Lora nce , an employer adopts a rule or decisi on with an unlawful discrimina

tory motive, each application of that rule or decision is a new viola t ion of the law. In Bazemore. . ., for ex

ample, .

. . the Supreme Court properly held th at each application of th[e] r a cially motivated salary struc

ture, i.e. , each new paycheck, constituted a distinct violation of Title VII. Section 7(a)(2) generalizes the result correctly reache d in Bazemore .” Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. Rep. No. 101–315, p. 54 (1990). 5 See also 1 37 Cong. Rec. 29046, 29047 (1991) (Sponsors’ Interpretati ve Memorandum) (“ Th is legislati o n should be interpretedas disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to

——————

5 No Sen ate Re por tw a s su b m itted w i thth e Civ il Righ ts Ac t of 199 1, w h i c hw a s in all ma ter i al r e spec ts iden tic a l to th e pr oposed 1990 Ac t.12 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting cont exts ou tsid e of se n i or ity sy ste m s.”)

. B u tcf. an te , at 18 (relyi ngon Loranc e to conc lude that “w hen an em

ploy er iss u es p a ych e ck s pursu a n t to a sy stem that is faci al ly nondiscr imin atory and neutr a l l y a ppli e d” a n e w Titl e VI I vio l at io n doe s not oc cur (int ern a l qu otat i o n marks om it ted))

. Until today, in the more than 15 years since Congress amended Title VII, the Court had not once relied upon Lorance

. It is mistake nto do so now. Just as Congres s ’ “goals in enacting Titl e VII .

. . never included conferring absolute i mmunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority systems that survive their first [1 80] days,” 490 U. S., at 914 (Marshall, J., diss enting), Congress never intended to immunize f o rever discriminatory pay differentials unchal

lenged within 180 days of their ad option. Thi s assessment gains weight when one comprehends that even a relatively minor pay disparity will exp and exponentially over an employee’ s work ing life if rais es ar e set a s apercentage of prior pay. A clue to co ngressionalintent can be found in Title VII’s backpa yprovision. The stat ute expressly provides that backpa ym a y be awarded for a p e riod of up to two year s before the discrimin a tion char ge is filed. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(g)(1) (“Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the fili ng of a charge with the C o mmission.”). This p r escription indicates th at Congress contemplated challenges to pay di scrimination commencing before, but continuing into, the 180-day filin g period. Se e Morgan , 536 U. S., at 119 (“If Congress in

tended to limit liability to co nduct occurring in the perio d within whi c h the par t y must file the charge, it seems unlikely that Congress would have allowed recovery f o r two years o f backpa y .”)

. As we rec o gnized in Morgan , “the fact that C o ngress expressly limit ed the amount of recov

erable damages elsewhere to a particular time period [ i.e. , two years] i n dicates th at the [180-day] timely filing provi

-13 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting sion was not meant to serve as a specific limitation .

. . [on] the conduct tha tmay be considered.” Ibid

. D In tune wi th the real ities of wage discrimi nation, the Courts of Appeals have overwhelmingly judged as a pre

sent violation the pay m ent of wa ges infected by discrim i

nation: Each paycheck less than the amount payable had the employer adhered to a nondi s criminatory compensa

tion regime, courts h a ve held, c o nstitutes a cognizable harm. See, e.g. , Forsyt h v. Federat i on Employmentand Guidanc eServ. , 409 F. 3d 565, 573 (CA2 2005) (“An y paycheck gi ven within the [charge -filing] period .

. . woul d be actionable, even if b a sed on a discriminatory pa y scal e set up outsi d e of thestatutory period.”); Shea v. Rice , 409 F. 3d 448, 452–453 (CADC 2005) (“[An] em ployer com

mit[s] a separate unlawful employment pra c tice each ti me he pa[ys] one employee les s than another for a discrimina

tory reason” (citing Bazemore , 478 U. S., at 396)); Goodwin v. Gene ral Motors Cor p . , 275 F. 3 d1005, 100 9–1010 (CA10 2002) (“[Bazemore] ha s taughta crucial dist inction wit h respect to discriminatory disparit ies in pay, establishing that a discriminatory salary is not merely a lingering effect of pas tdiscrimination—instead it is its e lf acontinu

ally recurri ng violation.

. . . [E]ach race-based discrimina

tory salarypayment c o nstitutes a fresh violation of Tit l e VII.” (footnote omitted)); Anderso n v. Zubieta , 180 F. 3 d 329, 335 (CADC 199 9) (“The Co urts of Appeals have re

peatedly re ached the .

. . conclusion” that pa y discrimina

tion is “actionable upon receipt of each paycheck.”); accor d Hildebrand t v. Illinois Dep t. of Natu ral Resources , 34 7 F. 3d 1014, 1025–1029 (CA7 2003 ); Card enas v. Ma ssey , 269 F. 3d 2 51, 257 (CA3 2001); Ashley v. B oyle’s Famo us Corned Beef Co. , 66 F. 3d 164, 1 67–168 (CA8 1995) (en banc); Brin kley-Obu v. Hughes Training, In c. , 36 F. 3d 336, 347–349 (CA4 1 994); Gibbs v. Pier ceCounty La w14LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting Enforcem en t Sup p ort Agency , 78 5 F. 2d 139 6, 1399–1400 (CA9 1986). Similarly in line with the real-world charac teristics of pay discri mination, t h e EEOC

—the federal agency re

sponsiblef o r enforcing Title VII , see, e.g. , 42 U. S. C. §§2000e–5(f ) , 2000e–1 2(a)—has interpreted the Act to permit employees to challenge dis p arate pay each time it is received. The EEOC’ s Compliance Man ual provides that “repeated occurre nces of th e samedis criminatory employment action, su ch as discri minatory p a ychecks, c a n be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occu rre d within the charge filing pe riod.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §2–IV–C(1)(a), p. 605:002 4, and n. 1 83 (2006); cf. id ., §10–III, p. 633:000 2 (Title VII requires anemployer to eliminate pay disparities a ttributable to a discriminatory system, even if that system has been discontinued). The EEOC has given effect to its interpret a tion in a series of administrativ e decisions. See Alb r itton v. Potter , No. 01A44063, 2004 WL 2983682, *2 (EEOC Office of Fe d. Operations, Dec. 17, 2 004) (a lthough disparity arose and employee became aware of the disparity outside the charge-filing period, claim was not time bar red because “[e]ach paycheck that compla inant receives which is less than that o f similarly situated employees outside of h e r protected cl asses could support a claim under Title VII if discrimination is foun d to be the reason for the pay dis

crepancy. ” ( c iting Bazemore , 478 U. S., at 39 6)). See al so Bynum-Doles v. Winte r , No. 01A53 973, 2006 WL 2096290 (EEOC Offi ce of Fed. Operations, July 18, 2 006); Ward v. Po tte r , No. 01A60047, 2006 WL 7 21992 (EEOC Office of Fed. Opera t ions, Mar. 10, 2006). And in thi s very case, the EE OC urged the Eleventh C i rcuit to re cognize tha t Ledbetter’s failure to challeng e an y particular pay-setting decision when that decision was made “does not deprive her of the right to seek relie f for discriminatory pay c hecks she received in 1997 a n d 1998.” Brief of EEOC in Support15 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting of Petition f o r Rehearing andSuggestion for Rehearing En Banc, in No. 03–15264–GG (CA11), p. 14 (hereinaf ter EEOC Brief ) (citing Morgan , 536 U. S., at 113). 6 II The Court asserts thattreat ing pa y discrimin a tion as a discrete act , limited to eachparticular pay-s e tting deci

sion, is necessary to “ p rotec[t] em ployers from the burd e n of defendin g claims arising from employme nt decision s that are long past.” An te , at 11 (q uoting Ricks , 449 U. S., at 256–257). But the discrimination of which Ledbett e r complained is no t longpast. As she al leged, and as the jury found, Goodyear continue d to treat Ledbetter differ

ently because of sex each payperi od, with mo unting har m. Allowing employees t o challeng e discrimination “that extend[s] over long periods of time,” into the charge-filing period, we have pre viously explained, “does not leav e employers defenseless ” against u n reasonabl e or prejudi

cial delay. Morgan , 536 U. S., at 121. Employers disa d

vantaged by such delay may raise various defenses. Id ., a t 122. Doctrines such as “waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling” “allow us to honor Ti tle VII’s remedial purpose without ne gating the particular purpose of the filing re quirement, to give pro m pt notice to the employer.” Id ., at 121 (quotin g Zipesv. T rans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U. S. 385, 398 (1982)); see 536 U. S., a t121 (defense of laches may be invoked to block an employee’s suit “if he unrea

-

——————

6 The Courtdis m iss e s t h e EEOC’s cons iderab l e “ e xperience a n d in

formed judgment,” Firefigh t ersv. Clevela n d , 478 U. S. 501, 51 8 (1 98 6 ) (internal quotation marks o m itted), as unworthy of a n y defe rencei n th is c a se, see ante , at 23– 24, n

. 11. Bu t th e EEO C’s in ter p r e tatio n s mir r o rw o r k pl ac e r e alit ies a n d mer i t atle astr e spec tfu l atten t ion

. In any event, the level of deference du e theEEOC here is an acade m ic qu estion , forth e ag en cy ’s c o n c l u s ionth at Ledbetter ’ s c l aim i s n o t tim e bar r e d is th e best r e ad in gof th e sta t u t e e v enif th e Cour t “w er e in ter

preting [Title VII] from scratch.” See Edelmanv. Lync hb urg Colle ge , 535 U. S. 10 6, 114 (2 00 2); see supra , at 4–14.16 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting sonably del a ys in filin g [charges] and as a result harms the defendant”); EE O C Brie f 15 (“[I]f Ledbetter unrea

sonably del a yed challenging an earlier decis i on, and th at delay significantly impaired Goodyear’s ability to defend itself . . . Goodyear can raise a defense of laches. . . .”). 7 In a last-ditch argum e nt, the Court asserts that thi s dissent would allow a plaintiff to sue on a single decision made 20 ye ars ago “e ven if the employee had full k n owl

edge of all t h e circumst ances relating to the .

. . decision at the time it was made.” Ante , at 20

. It suffices to point out that the defenses just noted would make such a suit fool

hardy. No sensible judge would to lerate such inexcusable neglect. See Morgan , 536 U. S., at 121 (“In such cases, the federal courts have the discreti onary power . . . to locate a just result in light of the circum s tances peculiar to the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ledbetter, the Court observes, ante , at 21, n. 9 , dropped an alternative remedy she cou l d have pursued: Had she persisted in pressing her claim under the Equ a l Pay Ac t of 1963 (EPA), 29 U. S. C. §206(d), she would n o t have en

countered a time bar. 8 See ante , a t21 (“If Le dbetter had pursued her EPA clai m, she would not face the Title VII obstacles that she now confronts.”); cf. Corning Gla s s Worksv. Brennan , 41 7 U. S. 188, 208–210 (1974). Nota

-

——————

7 Furt he r, a s the EEOC a p propria t e ly recognized in it s b r ief t o t h e Elevent hCirc uit , Ledb et t e r’s fa ilure t ocha llenge pa rt icula rpa y ra is es within the charge-filing period “s igni ficantly limi t [s] the relief she can s eek. By wa it ing t ofile a ch a r ge, Ledb et t e r los ther oppo rt unit yt os e ek r e lief foran y disc r i min ator ypay c h e c k s she r e c e iv ed betw een1979 an d late 1 997.” E E O C Br ief 14. See also supra , at 12– 13.

8 Un derth e EPA 29 U. S. C. §206(d), w h i c his su bjec t to t h e FairLa

b o r S t a n da rds Act ’ s t i me pres cript ions , acla i m cha rging denia lof eq ua l pa y a ccrues a n ew wit hea ch pa ycheck

. 1 B. Lindema nn & P. G r o ssman , Employ m en t D i sc r i min ationLaw529 (3d ed. 1996); c f

. 2 9 U. S. C. §255(a) (pr e sc r ibin ga tw o-y e ar statu te of limit ation s for violations ge nerally, but a three-year limit ation per i od for willful violations).17 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting bly, the EPA provides no relief w h en the pay discrimina

tion charge d is based on race, religion, nat ional origin , age, or disability. Thus, in truncating the Title VII rule this Court announced in Bazemore , the Cou rt does not disarm female workers from achie ving redress for unequal pay, but it does imped e racial an d other mi norities from gaining similar relief. 9 Furthermore, the difference between the EPA’ s prohibi

tion against paying unequal wages and Title VII’s ban on discrimination with regard to compensation is not as larg e as the Court’ s opinion might suggest. See an te , a t21. The key distinction is tha tTitl e VII requires a showing of intent. In practical ef fect, “if the trier of fact is in equi

poise aboutwhether th e wage diff erential is motivated b y gender disc rimination,” Title VII compels a verdict for th e employer, while the EPA compels a verdict f o r the plain

tiff. 2 C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer, & R. White, Employment Discrimination: Law and Practi ce §7.08[F][3], p. 532 (3d ed. 2002). In this case, Ledbetter carried the burden of persuading the jury that the pay disparity she suff ered was attrib u table to intentional sex discrimination. See supra , at 1– 2; infra , this page and 18. III To show how far the C o urt has str a yed from i n terpreta

tion of Title VII with fidelity to t h e Act’s cor e purpose, I return to the evidence Ledbett e r presented at tria l

. Ledbetter proved to t h e juryth e following: She was a member of a protected class; she performed work substan

-

——————

9 For e x a m ple, under t o da y’sdecis i on , if ablack supervi s or initially received t h e s a me s a la ry a s his whit ecollea g ues , b u ta nnua lly receiv e d s m a l ler ra is es, t h ere would b eno rightt os u e under Tit l e VII outs ide th e 180-d a y w i n d owfollow i n geac hann u a l sal a r ych an g e , h o w e ver s t rong t h e cu mula t ive evidence of dis cri mina t i on mig h tb e . The Court would t hus fo rce pla i nt iffs , in ma ny ca s e s , t os u e t o o s o on t opre v a il, while cutting them off as time barred once the pay diffe rential is larg e enought oenab le t h em t omountawinnab l e ca s e .18LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting tially equal to work of the dominant class (m en); she was compensated less for that work; and the d i sparity wa s attributable to gender-based discrimination. See supra , at 1–2. Specifically, Ledbetter’s evidence demonstrated that h e r current pa ywas discriminatorilylow due to a long series of decisions reflecting Goodye ar’s pervasive discrimination against wo men managers in general and Ledbetter in particular. Ledbetter’s form er supervisor, for example, admitted to the jury t hat Ledbet ter’s pay, d u ring a par

ticular one-year period, fell belowGoodyear’s minimum threshold for her position. App. 93–97. Although Goodyear claimed the pay disparity was due to poor perform

ance, the su pervisor ack n owledg edthat Ledbetter receive d a “Top Performance Award” in 19 96. Id., at 90–93. Th e jury also h e ard testimony that another supervisor—who evaluated Ledbetter in 1997 andwhose eval uation led t o her most recent raise denial—was openly biased against women. Id. , at 46, 77– 82. And two women who had previ

ously worked as managers at the plant told the jury they had been s ubject to pervasive discrimination and were paid less th an their ma le counterparts. One was paidless than the men she sup e rvised. Id ., at 51–68. Ledbetter herself testi f ied about the discriminatory animus conveyed to her by plant officials. Toward t h e end of her career, fo r instance, the plant manager told Ledbetter that the “pla nt did not need women, that [women] didn’t help it, [and] caused problems.” Id ., at 36. 10After weighing all the evidence, the jury found for Ledbetter, concluding that t h e pay disparity was due to intentiona l discrimination. Yet, under the Court’s decision, the discrimination Ledbetter proved is not redressable under Title VII. Each

——————

10 G iv e n th is ab u n d an t ev idenc e , th e Cour t c a n n o t ten ablymain tain t h a tLedb et t e r’s ca s e“ t urned principa lly on t h e mis c onductof as i ngle Goodyear supe rvisor.” See an t e , at 12–1 3, n

. 4.19 Cite as: 55 0 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting and every pay decision she did notimmediately challenge wiped the slate clean. Consideration may notbe given to the cumulative effect of a series of decisions that, together , set her pay well below that of every male are amanager. Knowingly carr ying pa st pay discr i mination forward mu st be treated as lawful conduct. Ledbetter ma y not be com

pensated for the lower pay she was in fact rec e iving when she complained to the EEOC. Nor, were she still em

ployed by Goodyear, could she gain, on the proof she pre

sented at trial, injunctive relief r e quiring, prospectively , her receiptof the same compensation men receive for substantiall y similar work. The Court’s approbation of these consequences is totally a todds wit hthe robu st protection against wo rkplace di scrimination Congress intended Title VII to secure. See, e.g. , Team ste rsv. Uni t ed Sta t es , 431 U. S., at 34 8 (“The pri m ary pu rpo s e of Title VII was to assu re equality of employment opportu nities and t o eliminate

. . . discriminatory pra ctices and devices . . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitte d)); Albema rle Pa per Co . v. Moody , 4 22 U. S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is .

. . the purpose of Title VII to make pe rsons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”). This is not the first timethe Court has ordered a cramped interpretatio nof Title VII, incompatible with the statute’s broad remedi al purpose. See supra , at 10–1 2. See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio , 490 U. S. 642 (1989) (superseded in part b ythe Civil Rights Act of 1991 ); Price Wa te r h ousev. Ho pkins , 490 U. S. 228 (1989) (plural

ity opinion) (same); 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Em

ployment Discrimination Law 2 (3d ed. 1996) (“A spate o f Court decis i ons in the late 1980s drew congressiona lfire and resulted in deman d s for legis l ative change[,]” culmi

nating in the 1991 Civil Rights Act (footnote omitted)). Once again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.20 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RU BBER CO. G IN SB U R G , J., dissenting * * * For the re asons stated, I would hold that Ledbetter’s claim is not time barred and would reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s ju dgment.