alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary  information   extracted  from  the  Company's
Financial  Statements  as of June 30, 2000 and is  qualified  in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001088771
<NAME>                        Lynch Interactive Corporation
<MULTIPLIER>                  1000
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollar

<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                         34,202
<SECURITIES>                                    1,602
<RECEIVABLES>                                  18,155
<ALLOWANCES>                                      370
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               64,572
<PP&E>                                        159,968
<DEPRECIATION>                                 64,141
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                249,839
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          46,936
<BONDS>                                       147,424
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                     27,810
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  249,839
<SALES>                                        89,418
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               89,418
<CGS>                                          76,655
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  82,817
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              6,459
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 7,273
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,425)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             3,685
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    3,685
<EPS-BASIC>                                      1.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.23



</TABLE>
Order entered August 1, 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 17
- 00973
- CV RIGGS & RAY, P.C., Appellant

V. STATE FAIR OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 116th J udicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 16
- 16070



### O RDER By letter filed July 25, 2018, appellee informs the Court that an exhibit admitted into evidence at a July 21, 2017 trial court hearing is missing from the reporter’s rec ord. That exhibit
is a compact disc containing video excerpts of two legislative hearings

. According to appellee, the court reporter confirmed the video files were transmitted “through the portal with the rest of the [r]eporter’s [r]ecord,” but a clerk o f this Court advised no video files were received. Appellee states it would like to be able to cite to the missing exhibit in its brief and requests the Court take appropriate steps to obtain the missing exhibit.
We c onstrue appellee’s letter as a motio n and note the reporter’s record of the July 21 st hearing is missing the exhibit. Accordingly, we GRANT the motion and OR DER Trashuna Salaam, the court reporter for the July 21 st hearing, to file a supplemental reporter’s recordcontaining the missing exh ibit. The supplemental reporter’s record shall be filed no later than

August 10, 2018. On our own motion, we EXTEND the deadline for appellee’s brief to September 5, 2018.
We DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of this order to Trashuna Salaam and the parties.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
#### Ralph Wolfanger, Appellant, v Town of West Sparta et al., Respondents.

[666 NYS2d 77]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff alleges that he was maliciously prosecuted for a building code violation by defendant code enforcement officer. Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of immunity. The code enforcement officer cited plaintiff within the scope of the discretionary authority vested in him by defendant Town of West Sparta, thus rendering both him and the Town immune from liability *(see, City of New York v 17 Vista Assocs.,*84 NY2d 299, 307; *Murphy v Town of Liberty,*220 AD2d 944, 945; *Manuli v Hildenbrandt,*144 AD2d 789, 790; *Matter of Town of Cheektowaga v City of Buffalo,*67 AD2d 812). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Livingston County, Alonzo, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Green, J. P., Pine, Wisner, Callahan and Fallon, JJ.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, George M.L. LaBranche, IV, hereby certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of LaBranche & Co Inc.; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to bedesigned under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

(c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting. 

Date: August 9, 2010 

 

 

1
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-20919 Summary Calendar

DENNIS W. HORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus WAYNE SCOTT, Etc; Et Al., Defendants, DR. COLEMAN; DR. CHERIAN; VERNETTE PORTER, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-99-CV-201

-------------------- April 25, 2002 Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Dennis W. Horton, Texas prisoner No. 622525, appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing his complaint as to the only defendants remaining in the suit, Dr. Cherian and Ms. Vernette Porter. The record supports the district court’s determination that Dr. Cherian providedNo. 01-20919 -2- constitutionally adequate medical treatment for Horton’s injured knee and that Ms. Porter was not deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need when she allowed a nurse to respond to two medical grievances filed by Horton, rather than responding personally to Horton’s complaints. See Reeves v. Collins , 27 F.3d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1994); Varnado v. Lynaugh , 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). We find no error in the district court’s determination that Dr. Cherian’s failure to order a change in Horton’s work assignment does not constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Johnson v. Treen , 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985). We note that Horton’s appellate brief does not challenge the district court’s rejection of his claims that he received improper medical treatment for hepatitis. This issue is thus abandoned. Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 208 (Monday, October 30, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 50121]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-23530]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

RIN 0648-XF795


North Pacific Fishery Management Council; Public Meeting

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of telephonic meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) Social 
Science Plan Team will meet telephonically on November 14, 2017.

DATES: The meeting will be held on Tuesday, November 14, 2017, from 10 
a.m. to 3 p.m. Alaska Time.

ADDRESSES: Teleconference only: (888) 456-5038; Participant passcode: 
8480290.
    Council address: North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 605 W. 
4th Ave., Suite 306, Anchorage, AK 99501-2252; telephone: (907) 271-
2809.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sam Cunningham, Council staff; 
telephone: (907) 271-2809.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Agenda

Tuesday, November 14, 2017

    The Social Science Planning Team (SSPT) will hold an organizational 
teleconference in advance of its inaugural annual meeting that will 
occur in Spring 2018. SSPT will elect an executive officer, establish 
contributing member roles and responsibilities, and discuss processes 
for public participation and reporting to the North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council and its advisory bodies. The meeting agenda also 
includes time to scope discussion topics for the Spring 2018 annual 
meeting; those topics should further the SSPT's objective of 
identifying information gaps or underutilized social science data 
collections, and strategizing to improve information resources over the 
medium- to long-term.
    The Agenda is subject to change, and the latest version will be 
posted at http://www.npfmc.org/committees/social-science-planning-team/
.

Special Accommodations

    The meeting is physically accessible to people with disabilities. 
Requests for sign language interpretation or other auxiliary aids 
should be directed to Shannon Gleason at (907) 271-2809 at least 7 
working days prior to the meeting date.

    Dated: October 25, 2017.
Tracey L. Thompson,
Acting Deputy Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National 
Marine Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-23530 Filed 10-27-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-P
#### Ayon SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:06 CV 458(RNC).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Sept. 24, 2007.

Edward McKeller, New Britain, CT, pro se.

*MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING ON MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL*

THOMAS P. SMITH, United States Magistrate Judge.

The plaintiff, Ayon Simpson, seeks to vacate District Judge Robert Chatigny’s judgment of dismissal in this case. (Dkt. 31). Plaintiff has accordingly filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment of Dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). (Dkt. 32.) The defendant, City of Hartford, has filed a memorandum in opposition to this motion. (Dkt. 39.) For the reasons set forth more fully herein, the plaintiffs motion should be DENIED without prejudice.

I. *BACKGROUND*

On May 7, 2007, after a lengthy settlement conference before U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas P. Smith, both parties explicitly agreed to terms that effectively settled this case. The parties were ordered to submit closing papers within 30 days. The parties had not submitted closing papers by June 27, 2007, on which date Judge Chatigny ordered that the case was dismissed. (Dkt. 31.) Plaintiff subsequently refused to sign a release in this matter, and seeks to vacate Judge Chatigny’s judgment and proceed to trial.

II. *DISCUSSION*

Plaintiff relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, on motion, for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Plaintiff argues that “he inadvertently consented to settlement while he was operating under a mistaken understanding of the full and complete nature of the settlement.” (Dkt. 32.) Plaintiff provides no further explanation for this contention in his motion. On July 18, 2007, plaintiffs attorney, Ronald S. Johnson, submitted a brief letter to the court (Dkt. 34) explaining his client’s refusal to accept the offered settlement. In that letter, Johnson stated that “my client misunderstood the nature of the settlement” and “through inadvertence, the plaintiff failed to take into account certain aspects of the case that would bear upon the settlement amount he would be finally entitled to.”

These filings fail to provide a sufficient basis for this court to grant plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Judgment of Dismissal. Plaintiffs statements—that he inadvertently entered *103into the agreement and operated under a mistaken understanding of the nature of the settlement—do fit within the language of Rule 60(b)(1). However, without further explanation and/or argument, this court is unable to determine either the nature or the legitimacy of the “inadvertence” and “mistake” complained of here. The statement that “he failed to take into account certain aspects of the ease” is simply too vague to serve as a basis for granting this motion.

III. *CONCLUSION*

Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Judgment of Dismissal (Dkt. 32) is therefore DENIED, without prejudice. Plaintiff may re-file this motion, with more complete discussion of pertinent facts and legal arguments, at his discretion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
#### Sheldon Peters WOLFCHILD, et al., petitioners, v. UNITED STATES, et al.

No. 13-794.

March 10, 2014.

Motion of Historic Shingle Springs Mi-wok for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae*granted. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.

Justice KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank A. Tusa, Appellant.

[670 NYS2d 116]

—Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated May 16, 1988 *(People v Tusa,*137 AD2d 151), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered August 26, 1986.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see, Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745). Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Thompson and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
#### John Alexander RODRIGUEZ, also known as John Alexander Rodriguez-Burgos, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-60203

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 23, 2010.

Mary Nicole Morrison, Esq., Morrison Law Firm, P.C., Houston, TX, for Petitioner.

Bernard Arthur Joseph, Tangerlia Cox, Scott Lawrence Rempell, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before DAVIS, SMITH and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John Alexander Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Rodriguez moves to supplement the record with updated documents. He also moves to consolidate this petition for review with a prior petition for review. These motions are denied.

Rodriguez argues that the BIA should have reopened his removal proceedings based on information that, after Rodriguez was ordered removed, his parents’ house in Colombia was firebombed by terrorists. He also argues that he submitted evidence of changed country conditions that warranted the reopening of his proceedings.

A motion to reopen should be based on new facts and must establish a prima facie case of eligibility for the underlying relief sought in order to be granted. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); *INS v. Abudu,*485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). “In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country *926conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.” *In re S-Y-G,*24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). The evidence submitted by Rodriguez did not show a change in conditions in Colombia since the time of his removal proceedings. Rather, it showed that any individual in Colombia could be kidnapped at any time for purposes of extortion or for use in trades for political prisoners. Nothing in the evidence submitted by Rodriguez established a prima facie eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. *See*§ 1003.2(c); *Abudu,*485 U.S. at 104, 108 S.Ct. 904.

The BIA’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion to reopen was rational and founded in the evidence submitted in support of that motion. Accordingly, that denial was not an abuse of discretion. *See Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales,*413 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir.2005). The BIA also held that, to the extent that Rodriguez’s motion to reopen could be construed as a motion for reconsideration, the motion was untimely and lacked merit. Rodriguez has clarified in this court that he was seeking only to reopen his removal proceedings and that he was not seeking reconsideration of the BIA’s order of removal.

Rodriguez’s petition for review is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 19

- 40559

**Michael Garrett,**

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus

**Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,** 

Defendant

— Appellee

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:13

- CV

- 70

Before **Owen,** Chief Judge **,** and **Graves** and **Ho,** Circuit Judges

**. Per Curiam**  **:** *

In 2013, p laintiff

- appellant and Texas inmate Michael Garrett filed a pro se complaint against the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) alleging a policy of sleep deprivation in violation of the Eighth Amendment at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, where he was housed

.

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 25, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-40559 Document: 00515796630 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/25/2021No. 19

- 40559

2 He now appeals a n advers e final judgment following a bench trial

. The
district court concluded that the sleep schedule at the McConnell Unit did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the facility’s sleep schedule is reasonably related to legitimate penological purpose s , and be cause Garrett had not proven that his sleep deprivation had caused him any physical injury.
Before we can reach the merits of the appeal, however, we must examine
whether this case is moot

. On January 7, 2021, counsel for the TDCJ informed us that, two day s prior, she learned that Garrett had been
transferred to the Estelle Unit in Hunt s ville , another prison facility within the TDCJ , on February 17, 2020 . As we do not presently have the facts
necessary to determine mootness, we remand to the district court to determine whether Garrett is similarly being deprived of sleep at the Estelle Unit and, if so, whether that deprivation violates the Eighth Amendment.
This matter is hereby REMANDED. Case: 19-40559 Document: 00515796630 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/25/2021
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Antonio TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10693

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kevin Joel Page, Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Antonio Trujillo has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Trujillo has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with *374counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.