### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

ROBERT L. TAYLOR v. MICHELLE TA YLOR BOWERS Appeal by permission from the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section

Chancery Court for Unicoi County No. 5619 G. Richard Johnson, Chancellor

No. E1999-01774-SC-R11-CV - Filed February 23, 2001

We granted permission to appeal in this case to de termine whether or not incarceration is an available sanction under Te

nnessee Rule

of Civil Procedure 11. We conclude that incarceration is not an available sanction under Rule 11 and therefore vacate that portion the trial court’s order imposing a jail sentence a s a Rule 11 sanction . We remand this c ase to th e trial court to consider whether a Rule 11 sanction is warranted, and if so, for imposition of an appropriate Rule 11 sanction.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals Reversed in Part; Case Remanded to Trial Court
F RANK F. D ROWOTA , III, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. R ILEY A NDERSON , C.J., A DOLPHO A. B IRCH , J R ., J ANICE M. H OLDER , and W ILLI AM M. B ARKER , JJ., joined. Robert L. Taylor, Johnson City, Tennessee , Pro Se Appellant. Judith Fain, Johnson City , Tennessee, for

the appellee, Mic

helle Taylo

r Bowers. OPINION The appel lant, Rober t L. Taylor, and the appellee, Michelle Tay lor Bowers, were granted a divorce on December 20, 1994. Bowers was awarded custod y of their minor child. Thereafter, Taylor has filed numerous motions relating to visitation and custody issues. This case arose when Taylor filed a petition seeking, among other things, a change of custody. The trial court conc luded that Taylor had failed to prove that a change of custody was wa rranted, and thus, denied Taylor’s petition. In addition, the trial court ordered Taylor to pay his child support arrearage.
In addition to issuing these rulings, at the conclusion of the hearing the trial court

found that Taylor had violated Tenness

ee Rule of Civil Proc

edure 11 by

filing a “frivo

lous, meritless, wo

rthless claim for change of custody.” The trial court furthe r found t hat Ta ylor had filed the claim for the-2-

purposes of harassment and being vexatious. The trial court then sentenced Taylor “to two days in the county jail for his Rule Eleven violations.” Taylor appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision without addressing Taylor’s challenge to the purported Rule 11 sanction of two days in jail. Tay lor then filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We have concluded that the applicati

on should be granted and ha

ve filed an order

contemporaneou

sly with this op

inion granting

th e applic ation. In addition, we have concluded that Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(f) relative to briefing should be suspended to expedite the case because there is no dispute among the parties about either the law or the facts controlling the issue raised in the application. See Tenn. R. App. P. 2 (“For good cause, including the inte

rest of expediting

decis ion u pon any matter, the Supreme Court . . . may suspend the requirements or provisions of any

of these rules in a

particular cas

e on motion of a par

ty or on its motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its discretion. . . .”). Taylor asserted in his application for permission to appeal that “incarceration is not an allowable sanction” under Rule 11 and therefore the trial court “overstepped It’ s bounds.” Bowers apparently

agrees with Taylor because she has filed a respons e stating that on “ two separate occasions she has had her c ounsel write

to [Taylor] off

ering to submit a M

otion to the trial co

urt to rescindits Rule 11 sanction regarding the imposition of a jail sentence.” We agree with the parties that incarceration

is not an appropria

te sanction for Rule 11 violations. In pertinent part, Rule 11.03 provides that (2) A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition

of such conduct or

comparable con

duct by othe

rs simil arl y situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (a) and (b), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of nonmonetary nature, an order to pay

a penalty in

to court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, and [sic] order directing payment to the

movant of some

or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. (a) Monetary sanctions may not be awa rded agai nst a

represented party for a violation of subdivision 11.02 (2). (b) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the

court’s initiative unless the court issues its orde r to s how cause before a voluntary dismissal or settl em ent of the claims ma de by or ag

ainst the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(2). Nothin g in this rule authorizes a trial court to impose a jail sentence as a sanction for a vio

lation of Rule 11. Ac

cordingly , we conclude tha

t the trial court e

xceeded its authority in t his case . We therefore va cate that portion

of the trial court

’s order imposing

a jail sentence as a sanctio

n for a Rule 11 violation and remand to the trial court for consideration of-3-

whether a sanction is warranted, and if so, for impos ition of an appropr

iate sanction. Cost

s of this app eal are t axe d to the app ell ant , Ri char d Ta ylor , fo r wh ich exe cut ion may i ssu e if nece ssa ry.

___________________________________ FRANK F. DROWOTA

, III , JUSTICE