alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Dawn M. Brown, Appellant, v Richard Bussey et al., Respondents.

[666 NYS2d 15]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Jiudice, J.), entered November 27, 1996, which granted the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration as moot.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

On a motion to compel or stay arbitration, the court must determine, in the first instance, whether the parties made a valid agreement to arbitrate (see, *Sisters of St. John the Baptist v Geraghty Constructor,*67 NY2d 997, 998; *see also, Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, 85*NY2d 193, 201-202). “Once it is determined that the parties have agreed *256to arbitrate the subject matter in dispute, the court’s role has ended and it may not address the merits of the particular claims *(see, Matter of Praetorian Realty Corp. [Presidential Towers Residence], 40*NY2d 897, 898; *Matter of Prinze [Jonas],*38 NY2d 570, 577; *Stadier v Findley,*148 AD2d 600)” *(Dazco Heating & Air Conditioning Corp. v C.B.C. Indus.,*225 AD2d 578). When a substantial question is raised as to whether a valid agreement was made or complied with “the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate. Where any such question is raised, it shall be tried forthwith in said court” (CPLR 7503 [a]).

Here, the court should have first determined whether a valid arbitration agreement existed. If it concluded that no such agreement existed, only then should it have considered the cross motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for a determination as to whether the parties had made a valid arbitration agreement. We note that we have not considered the merits of the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
(December 8, 1997)

#### Allstate Financial Corporation, Appellant, v Access Bag N Pack, Inc., Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 28]

—In an action to recover on two “Acknowledgement[s] of Payment Due” by motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213, the plaintiff appeals from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered February 6, 1997, as denied its motion, and (2) an order of the same court, dated March 6, 1997, which *sua sponte*amended the order entered February 6, 1997, by dismissing the action.

Ordered that, on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal purporting to appeal from the order dated March 6, 1997, is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that order, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered February 6, 1997, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated March 6, 1997, dismissing the complaint; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated March 6, 1997, is reversed, on the law, the order entered February 6, 1997, is vacated, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of an appropriate judgment; and it is further,

*326Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.

The plaintiff met its evidentiary burden of showing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proving the existence of two documents entitled “Acknowledgement of Payments Due”, dated May 16, 1996, and May 21, 1996, respectively (hereinafter the Acknowledgements), and the defendant’s default in its payment obligations thereunder *(see, Bennell Hanover Assocs. v Neilson,*215 AD2d 710; *Dvoskin v Prinz,*205 AD2d 661; *Mlcoch v Smith,*173 AD2d 443). Once the plaintiff has met its burden, it is incumbent upon the defendant to establish, by admissible evidence, that a triable issue of fact exists *(Silber v Muschel,*190 AD2d 727, 728).

Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the Accounts Receivable Factoring and Security Agreement between the plaintiff and Acme Brief Case Co., Inc., was not “intertwined” with the Acknowledgements executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff *(see, Cohen v Marvlee, Inc.,*208 AD2d 792; *East N. Y. Sav. Bank v Baccaray,*214 AD2d 601, 602). In any event, the defendant expressly waived “defense [s] of any kind or nature” with respect to its obligations under the Acknowledgements *(see, SCP [Bermuda] v Bermudatel Ltd.,*224 AD2d 214).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint must be granted. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lerner, JJ., concur.
Opinion issued October 8 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 15
- 00720
- CR

——————————— IN RE RONALD LEE TRA HAN , Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION Relator , Ronald Lee Trahan , has filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that we compel the Galveston County District Clerk to transmit to the trial court certain papers that relator contends relate to a motion for DNA testing. * Our power to issue writs i s defined in Section 22.221 of the Texas Government Code, which grants the courts of appeals the authority to issue (1)

* The underlying case is State of Texas v. Ronald Lee Trahan , cause number CR

X36166, pending in the 2 12 th District Court of Galveston County , Texas, the Honorable Patricia Grady presiding.2

writs of mandamus and other writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction; (2) writs of mandamus against a judge of a district or county court in the court of appeals’ district; and (3) writs of habeas corpus under specifically defined circumstances involving contempt orders in civil cases. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 22.221 (West 2004). This court has mandamus jurisdiction over a district court clerk only when the district court clerk’s actions interfere with this court’s jurisdiction. See id .; In re Smith , 263 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding). Trahan has not established that the district court clerk’s actions interfere with this court’s j urisdiction or that a writ is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction

. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Lloyd. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b).
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.3

                      CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David A. Simon, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of National Property Analysts
Master Limited Partnership ("NPAMLP");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: March 29, 2005

By: EBL&S Property Management Inc., Agent for NPAMLP

By: /s/ David A. Simon
    -----------------------
    Name: David A. Simon
    Title Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Alarion Financial Services, Inc. (the Company), on Form 10-KSB for the
period ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Robert L. Page, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as added by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the period covered by the Report.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                            
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------
|Date: March 29, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Robert L. Page         
|                     |  |     |  | Robert L. Page,            
|                     |  |     |  | Principal Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3250 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 385
111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3250

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 22, 2010

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

                              May 18, 2010

              Reported by Mr. Lieberman, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1210 West Main Street in Riverhead, New York, as the ``Private First 
           Class Garfield M. Langhorn Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PRIVATE FIRST CLASS GARFIELD M. LANGHORN POST OFFICE 
              BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 1210 West Main Street in Riverhead, New York, shall be known 
and designated as the ``Private First Class Garfield M. Langhorn Post 
Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Private 
First Class Garfield M. Langhorn Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 385

111th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 3250

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 1210 West Main Street in Riverhead, New York, as the ``Private First 
           Class Garfield M. Langhorn Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                              May 18, 2010

                       Reported without amendment
```
#### Dykes *vs.*McClung.

Incases °£ foreclosure of mortgages,, the service must be personal, or by publication under Code, section 3962. Service by leaving a copy at the residence ot the defendant is not sufficient. Code, §§3962, 3339.

2. Whore it appears on the face of the record that the mortgage foreclosed was made by a wife to pay the debt of her husband out of her property, and the rule *nisi*and rule absolute show the same facts, such a judgment may be set aside within three years, on motion. (Jackson, C. J., alone.*

Judgment affirmed.

October 2, 1884.

Jackson, Chief Justice.

[Mrs. Bettie McOlung filed her petition to set aside a judgment against her in favor of W. M. Dykes, based on the foreclosure of a mortgage on certain realty. Two grounds for the motion were stated:

*383(1.) Because the only service of the rule *nisi*to foreclose the mortgage was by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendant, as appeared from the entry of the sheriff.

(2.) Because the record showed on its face that the judgment against her was illegal.

The record of the foreclosure showed that J. II. McClung, the husband of the movant, made a note to J. F. Lewis & Son, with Dykes as security; that to secure the latter against loss, McClung and his wife made the mortgage to him; that he was compelled to pay the debt, and thereupon proceeded to foreclose the mortgage against the husband and wife; that service was made by the sheriff by leaving a copy at the residence of the defendants; and that no cause being shown against the foreclosure, a rule absolute was granted.

The court granted the motion and set aside the judgment as to the movant. Respondent excepted.]
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 205 (Wednesday, October 25, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 49481]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-23171]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

United States Mint


Notification of Citizens Coinage Advisory Committee October 25, 
2017, Public Meeting

    Pursuant to United States Code, Title 31, section 5135(b)(8)(C), 
the United States Mint announces the Citizens Coinage Advisory 
Committee (CCAC) public meeting scheduled for October 25, 2017.
    Date: October 25, 2017.
    Time: 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. EST.
    Location: This meeting will occur via teleconference. Interested 
members of the public may dial in to listen to the meeting at (866) 
564-9287/Access Code: 62956028.
    Subject: Review of candidate designs for the Bob Dole Congressional 
Gold Medal, and consideration of themes for the 2019 American Legion 
100th Anniversary Commemorative Coin Program.
    Interested persons should call the CCAC HOTLINE at (202) 354-7502 
for the latest update on meeting time and room location.
    In accordance with 31 U.S.C. 5135, the CCAC:
    [ssquf] Advises the Secretary of the Treasury on any theme or 
design proposals relating to circulating coinage, bullion coinage, 
Congressional Gold Medals, and national and other medals.
    [ssquf] Advises the Secretary of the Treasury with regard to the 
events, persons, or places to be commemorated by the issuance of 
commemorative coins in each of the five calendar years succeeding the 
year in which a commemorative coin designation is made.
    [ssquf] Makes recommendations with respect to the mintage level for 
any commemorative coin recommended.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Betty Birdsong, Acting United States 
Mint Liaison to the CCAC; 801 9th Street NW., Washington, DC 20220; or 
call 202-354-7200.
    Any member of the public interested in submitting matters for the 
CCAC's consideration is invited to submit them by fax to the following 
number: 202-756-6525.

    Authority: 31 U.S.C. 5135(b)(8)(C).

David Motl,
Acting Deputy Director, United States Mint.
[FR Doc. 2017-23171 Filed 10-24-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P
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<NAME> FORESTAY CORPORATION

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
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</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gary Marcus SMITH, Appellant.

No. 07-2676.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 1, 2008.

Filed: May 6, 2008.

George C. Vena, Karen Whatley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Little Rock, AR, for Appellee.

Sara F. Mexaitt, Sherwood & Merr-itt, North Little Rock, AR, Gary Mar-cus Smith, U.S. Medical Center For Federal Prisoners, Springfield, MO, for Appellant.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Gary Smith (Smith) challenges the 108-month prison sentence the district court1 imposed following Smith’s guilty plea to securities fraud and failure to register as a broker-dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348 and 2(b), and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o and 78ff(a). Smith argues (1) the district court erred in refusing to depart downward from the advisox-y Guidelines sentencing range based on Smith’s extraordinary restitution efforts, and (2) his sentence is unreasonable.

*535Upon careful review of the record, we conclude the district court’s decision not to depart downward is unreviewable, because the court was aware of its authority to depart and of the arguments advanced in support of a downward departure, and determined a departure was not warranted. *See United States v. Miles,*499 F.3d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir.2007) (explaining a district court’s awareness of the defendant’s arguments precludes a conclusion the court abused its discretion in failing to adopt them); *United States v. Frokjer,*415 F.3d 865, 875 (8th Cir.2005) (stating a district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward is unreviewable; declining to review the defendant’s claim that she was entitled to a departure when the court clearly recognized it had authority to depart and declined to exercise that authority). We further conclude Smith’s sentence, at the bottom of the uncontested, advisory Guidelines range, is not unreasonable. *See United States v. McGhee,*512 F.3d 1050, 1051 (8th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (holding, after *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), this court reviews a sentence to determine whether the sentence is unreasonable with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, citing *Gall v. United States,*— U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)); *United States v. Haack,*403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir.2005) (declaring a district court abuses its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence when the court overlooks a relevant factor, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or makes a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors).

We affirm.

1

. The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.