### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 23 , 200 5 S es sio n
RODNEY WI LSO N, ET AL 

### . v. GE RALD W. PICKE NS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 301614 T.D. John R. McCar roll, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-02966-C OA-R3-C V - F iled October 18, 2005

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d Pl a int if

fs ha d s ta nd ing to bri ng thi s ma lpr a c tic e a c tio n a g a ins t th e ir attorney and that they

proper ly filed the a ction within the statute of limit ations under the disc overy
ru l e

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t ap p o r t i o n e d f a u l tb e t w e e n P l a i n t i f

f s , D e f e n d a n t , a n d n o n p ar t y S h e l b y C o u n t y. Th e c ou rt a wa rd e d Pl a int if

fs da ma g e s for c os ts inc ur re d, bu t di d n ot a wa

rdda ma g e s f

or los t pr op e rt y value. We af

firm the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs ha d standing and broug ht the ir ac tion wi thi n th e lim itatio ns pe ri od . We re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing re g ard ing c a us a tio n, a ndho ld Plaintiffs were at least 50% at fault in this case. Judgment for Plaintiffs is reverse d.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Sa m F . Co le , Jr. , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ge ra ld W. Pic ke ns

.
Mimi P hil li p s a n d R. H

. Ch o c k le y , M e mp h is , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e s , Ro d n e y Wi ls o n and Robbie Wi lson.

OP IN ION

I n 1975, Plaintiffs Rodney Wil son (M r. W i lson) and Robbie Wilson (Ms. W ilson, collectively , “the Wil sons”) purcha sed a small house situated on an approximately seven- acr e par cel of land in an uninc orporated ar ea of northern Shelby

County . T h e p roperty

is z oned within the She lby Cou nty Ag ri c ultur a l (A G) Di stric t, wh ic h re qu ir e s a min imu m bu ild ing lot size of tw o a c re s. Th e Wils on s n e ve r l ive d in the ho us e , b ut r e nted t o s e ve ra l te na nts be fo re re nti ng the ho us e to Marsha ll and Rosa L aw ( “the L aws” ) in 1984. I n 1985, the Wils ons decide d to build an additional ho me (“ the big ho us e ” ), fo r us e a s the ir re sid e nc e , on the la nd

. Th e y ob ta ine d th e ne c e ssa ry pe rm its fr om She lby Cou nty a nd c omp le te d c on str uc tio n of the big ho us e in Au g us t 19 86

. She lby Cou nty-2-

assig ned a ne w house number , street a ddress, a n d s epar ate tax parc el number to the big house. A few months later, a tornado de stroy ed the big house. The Wilsons ag ain re ceive d permits from Shelby County and rebuilt the big house in 1988. When the house was near ly complete, a n unknown person, pr esumably

a Shelby Countyofficia l, appar ently saw the house under c onstruction and stated to Mr. Wil son that he could not build a house on the pr operty . Mr. Wils on responde d that he alr eady had a pe rmit, and no furthe r ac tion was taken by either the Wil sons or Shelby County

.
I n late 1991 or e arly

1992, the Wils ons decide d to s el l t h e o rig inal house to the L aws a nd hired th ei r at torney , Ger ald W. Pi ckens ( Mr. Pickens), to handle the sale. B ased on a survey completed in 1985, which divided the property into a 1.01 acr e lot and a 6.069 acr e lot and showe d the location of the orig inal house and the Wil sons’ proposed new house, Mr. Picke ns prepa red a rea l

e state no te , d e e d o f t

ru st, a ndc on tr a c t c on ve y ing the or ig ina l sma ll ho us e a nd 1. 01 a c re s to the L a ws , with titl e being “conve y ed subjec t to all restrictions, ease ments and covena nts of rec ord, and subjec t to zoni ng ordinanc es or law s of any g ov er n m ental authority .” The war ranty deed c onvey ing the property to the L aws wa s executed on F ebrua ry 15, 1992.

I n late 1997 or e arly

1998, the L aws de cided to re novate their home an d s oug ht the appropriate building pe rmits from Shelby County

. They wer e denied the permits and construction loans, howeve r, because their lot did not meet the minimum two acr es nec essary for a building lot

on the property , which was zoned AG. The L aws re tained leg al counse l who advised the Wilsons by le tte r o f A pr il 1 4, 19 98 , th a t th e y ha d “ ill e g a lly

su bd ivi de d [th e ir ] pr op e rt y a nd so ld an ill e g a l lo t” to the L aws. The L aws filed an action for breac h of wa rranty ag ainst the Wil sons, and the Wilsons fi le d s uit a g a ins t Mr . Pi c ke ns fo r l e g a l ma lpr a c tic e on Ma rc h 3 1, 19 99 . T he Wils on s su bs e qu e ntl y settled the ac tion broug ht ag ainst them by the L aws by fo rmally

subdividing the prope rty and conveying a n additional one-a cre parc el to the L aws.

In their complaint, t h e W i l s o n s al l ege d M r. P i ck en s ’ p ro fe s s i o n al n egl i gen ce ca u s ed d amag es arising from the sa le of a n illega l lot. They pray ed for a judgment of indemnity ordering Mr . Pickens to pay all sums ne cessa

ry to r ectify the illega l sale and to de fend the lawsuit broug ht ag ainst them by the L aws. The trial court hear d the matter in A pril 2004 and enter ed judgme nt on J une 18, 2004. Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d that the Wils on s ha d sta nd ing to su e Mr

. Pic ke ns a nd that they had prope rl y filed their c laim within the statute of limit ations under the discovery rule. The trial c ourt also found Mr. Pickens liable for

damag es arising fr om professional malpr actice . Howeve r, t he trial c ourt apportioned 20% of fault to S helby Countyfor issuing the Wils ons building permits i n violation of

zon ing re g ulatio ns in1 98 5 an d 198 8. Th e tr ia l cou rt fu rthe r ap po rt ion e d 2 0% of fa ult to the Wils on s, who were presumed t o know the zoning law s and due to their notice from the unidentifie d Shelby Countyemploy ee that they could not build their house on the lot. The trial c ourt apportioned the

rema ining 60% of fault to Mr. Pickens, and enter ed a judgme nt of $12,242.20 ag ainst Mr. Pickens for c osts associated with the re- subdivision of the property and leg al fe es. Howe ver, the trial court found the Wilsons had failed to prove damag es re sulting fr om the loss of one acr e of property

. Mr. Pickens filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this Court.-3- Issues Pr esente d
Mr. Pickens pre sents the following issues, as we slig htly restatethem, for our

revie w:
(1 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de te rm ini ng that the Wils on s ha d sta nd ing to
su e Mr . Pi c ke ns

. (2 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by fi nd ing that the Wils on s fi le d the ir su it w ith in the statute of limitations under the discove ry rule.
(3) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by determining the Wilsons’ damag es we re proxi mately

cause d by

profe ssional malprac tice.
(4) Whether the trial court err ed in f inding the Wil son’s wer e not at least 50% at fa ult

.
Th e Wils on s r a ise the fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l is su e s:
(1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to awa rd dama g es for

lost value to the W i l s o n s ’ p r o p e r t y.
( 2 ) Whe th e r th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in n o t ap p o r ti o n in g 1 0 0 % o f f a u lt to Mr. Pic ke ns

.
Stand ard of Review

We r e vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de novo upon the record with a pr esumption of

corr ectne ss. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bo wde n v . W ar d , 2 7 S.W. 3d 91 3, 91 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . We wi ll not reve rse the trial court’s f actua l findings unless they are contra

ry to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. I

d. I ns ofar as the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns are ba se d o n it s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss
cre dibilit y , appellate courts will not ree v al u ate that assessment absent e vidence of cle ar a nd

c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e to the contra ry

. J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002) . Our

re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o n matte rs of la w, ho we ve r, is de novo with no pr esumption of c or re c tne ss. Tay lor

v . F e ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005). We likewise revie w the trial

c ou rt ’s app lic a tio n of l a w t o th e fa c ts de novo , with no presumption of cor rec tness. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)

.
St andi ng

We tur n f ir st to Mr. Pic ke ns ’ co nte nti on that the Wils on s d id n ot h a ve sta nd ing to b ri ng the ir

cause of ac tion ag ainst Mr. Pi ck en s for pr ofessional malpra ctice. Mr . Pickens’ ar g ument, as we understand it, is that, assuming the sale of rea l property to the L aws wa s in violation of the zoni ng-4-

reg ulations, it was the L aws and not the Wil sons w ho suffe red damag es and had standing to bring

a ca use of a ction ag ainst Mr. Pickens. We disag ree

.
I n a leg al malpra ctice c ase, a plaintiff has been injured wher e there has been the imposit ion of a liability

ag ainst him or he h as suffe red the loss of “a le g al rig ht, remedy or intere st.” Koh l & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 977 S.W .2d 528, 532 (Tenn. 1998) . An in j u ry also occ urs wher e the plaintiff is “for ced to take some ac tion or otherwise suf fer ‘so m e ac t u al inconvenie nce,’ such as incurring an expense, a s a re sult of the defe ndant’s neg lige nt or wrong ful ac t.” Id. (quoting State v. McClellan , 85 S.W . 267, 270 (Tenn. 1905) ).

I n this case, the Wilsons contend that t hey convey ed property in violation of t he z oning a nd

s u b d i v i s i o n re gu l at i o n s b ec au s e Mr

. P i ck en s fa i l ed t o i n fo rm t h em o f t h es e r egu l at i o n s

. T h eyal l ege that Mr. Pickens’ f

ailure to inform them of the zoning a nd subdivision restrictions constitut es pr of e ssi on a l ma lpr a c tic e . I n th e ir c omp la int , th e Wils on s soug ht a j ud g me nt o f i nd e mni ty a g a ins t any judgme nt which might be enter ed ag ainst them in favor of the L aws a nd for a mounts necessa ry to r e c tif y the re g ulatory

vio la tio n. Th e L a ws did , in fa c t, b ri ng a c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t th e Wils on s, wh ic h th e Wils on s se ttl e d b y pr op e rl y su bd ivi din g the pr op e rt y a ndc on ve y ing a n a dd iti on a l a c re to the L aws. Although the questions of damag es, if any , and proxima t e ca u s e we re ma tters to be

a dju dic a te d a t tria l, the Wils on s a lle g e d b oth inj ury a ndc a us a tio n inthe ir c omp la int . F urthe r, it i s
u n d i s p uted that the Wilsons, and not the L aws, we re Mr . Pickens clients. Without opining on whether the L aws would ha ve had sta nding to bring a cause of action aga inst Mr. Pickens, we ag ree wi th the tr ia l c ou rt

that th e Wils on s h a d s ta nd ing to b ri ng thi s la ws uit

.

St at ut e of Lim it at ion s

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 28-3- 104(a) (2) pro v i d es a li mitations period of one y ear for leg al malpra ctice a ctions. The limit ations period, howe ver, is subjec t to the discovery rule, unde r which an a ction acc rues fro m t he time the plaintiff knows or should know, in the exercise of

re a so na ble c are , th a t he ha s su sta ine d a n in jury a s a re su lt of the de fe nd a nt’ s w ro ng fu l a c t. Koh l & Co. , 977 S.W .2d at 532. The pla intiff’s knowledg e of his i n j u ry m ay be esta

blished by

actua l or constructive know ledg e. Id. A c tu a l kn o w le d g e o f le g a l m a lp r a c ti c e may

b e f o u n d , f o r e xample, when the plaintiff is informed by another attorney that malprac tice has occur red. Id. Constructive kn ow le dg e ma y be fo un d, ho we ve r, wh e re the pla int if f r e a so na bly is a wa re of fa c ts tha t r e a so na

bly should put him on notice that he ha s been injure d as a r esult of the def endant’ s conduct. Id. at 533. I t is not necessary

that the plaintiff know that the de fenda nt’s conduct was, in fa ct, below the standard of

car e, and the plaintiff may not delay the filing of a suit unt il all the consequence s of the alleg ed malpra ctice a

re a ctually

known. Id. Thus, the plaintiff must be aw are o f fa cts which

rea sonably

put him on noti ce that he has suff ere d an injury

and that the injur y re s u l t ed fr o m the alleg ed prof

essional neg lige nce. Significa ntly , the fore g oing r equire s an ac tual injury . As this Court has noted,-5-

the rules g overning when a person suff

ers leg ally co gn i z able injury from litigation

ma lpr a c tic e mus t ta

ke int o a c c ou nt tha t no t e ve ry misst ep lea ds to a

fa ll. B e c a us e neg lige nce w ithout inj ury is not actionable, the le g al malpra ct ice statute of limit ations does not beg in to r un until an attorney ’s neg lige nce ha s actua lly injured the c lie nt.
Cherry v. W

illiams , 36 S.W .3d 78, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Wit hout an ac tual injury or dama g es which ca n be re dresse d by the court, a pers o n ca n n o t es t abli sh standing to bring his a ction. E.g., Petition of Y

oungblood , 895 S.W .2d 322, 326 (Tenn. 1995) (citations omitted).

I n this case, Mr. Pickens asserts the W ilsons’ cause of action acc rued on Fe bruary 7, 1992, the da y the y c on tr a c te d to se ll the 1. 01 a c re lot to the L a ws

. He a sse rt s th a t th e Wils on s’ a c tio n is ba rr e d b e c a us e the y

“ we re re qu ir e d, a s a

ma tte r of la w, to h a ve kn ow le dg e of the la ws app lic able to the l and they owned.” He contends that the W ilsons rea sonably should have know n that a two-a cre minimum was re quired to subdivide the prope rty to the L aws a t the t ime of the sale in 1992. The Wil sons, on the other ha nd, contend they wer e unaw are of any problem with the convey ance to the L aws until notified by

the L aws’ le g al counse l in April 1998.

Mr . Pi c ke ns ’ a

rg ume nt, a s w e pe rc e i v e i t , g oe s to c a us a tio n r a the r tha n d isc ov e ry . Re g ard le ss of whether Mr. Pickens’ alleg ed failure to a dvise the Wil sons of the zoning and s ubdivision

re qu ir e me nts wa s th e pr oximate c a us e of the Wils on s’ inj ury , th e Wils on s su ff e re d n o in jury un til April 14, 1998. The statute of limit ations did not beg in to run unt il the allege d neg lige nce r esulted in a c tua l da ma g e s.

Ca usa ti on a nd F aul t

We next turn t o wh ether Mr. Pickens alleg ed fa ilure to inform the Wilsons of the Shelby County zoning and subdivision re quirements was the proxim ate c ause of the Wils ons’ injury . Mr. Pickens asserts that he advised the Wilsons that “it wa s nece ssary to ha ve two ac res in a subdivided lot or a four

acr e unsubdivided lot to obta in a building permit.” The Wilsons , howeve r, asse rt Mr. Pickens neve r discussed the le g ality of the tra nsaction, building pe rmit issues, or subdivisi on or lot siz e re strictions. I n the abse nce of any documentary evidenc e, the factua l determination of whe ther Mr. Pickens advised the Wil sons of these require ments and reg ulations r equire s a determination of

cre dibilit y . I mplicit in t he trial c ourt’s judg ment is a cre dibilit y determination in favor of the Wils on s. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e wh ic h w ou ld w arr a nt r e ve rs a l of th e tr ial court ’s c re dib ili ty assessment in this case.

Mr. Pi ckens further a sserts, howeve r, that the Wilsons knew or should have know n of the zoning and subdivision re quirements and that the Wil sons a re at least 50% at fault in this case. The apportionment of f

ault in a non-jury

case is a question of fact which we review w ith a presumption of cor rec tness. E. g. , Le wis v . S tat e , 73 S.W .3d 88, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). H oweve r, in light of Mr. Wi ls o n ’ s te s ti mo n y

in th is c a s e , w e r e s p e c tf

u ll y d is a g r e e w ith th e tria l c o u r t th a t th e Wilsons

we re no t a t le a st 5 0% a t f a ult fo r the ir inj ur ie s.-6-

I n his deposition, Mr. Wil son testified that when he built the big house in 1985, he had the property survey ed and “ the house that [the L aws] [ have] was on the one acr e, and [his] house at that time was 6.8 acres.” He further testified that he knew he was require d to have a l ot of at lea st four

acr es in order

to build a house. Additionally , Mr. Wils on testified that he knew the L aws intende d to build on their property , and that the L aws would not have bought the property had they rea liz ed they wer e “g oing to ha ve a pr oblem with it.”

Ba sed on o u r r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d , w e ar e c o n v in c e d th a t a t th e ti me th e p r o p e r ty was
c on ve y e d to the L aws , ne ith e r the L a ws no r the Wils on s w e re in f a c t a wa re of the sp e c if

ic

re qu ir e me nts of

the She lby Cou nty

Cod e pe rt a ini ng to s ub div isi on min imu m lo t si ze r e qu ir e me nts

. We do not believe Mr. W ilson intended an illega l subdivision. Howeve r, according to Mr. Wils on’s deposition, Mr

. Wil son knew that a four- acr e minimum was require d to build on his l o t

. Which leads us to question the reasonablene ss of Mr. W ilson’s assertion that he be lieved he c ould sell the L aws a one-a cre lot and that the L aws wo u ld be permitted to buil d on that lot and not “have a problem with it.” Moreove r, we note t h at t h e W ilsons do not allege that they inquired about the zoning or subdivision reg ulations or that Mr. Pickens g ave the m incorre ct information re g arding the reg ulations. Rather, they assert only that Mr. Pickens should ha ve advised them of the subdivision

re g ulatio ns , th a t he fa ile d to do so , a ndthat th is f a ilu re pr oximate ly

c a us e d th e ir

inj ur ie s.

Mr. Wils o n u n am biguously testified in his deposition, however, tha t he knew the L aws int e nd e d to buil d on the c on ve y e d lot an d tha t he kne w m or e tha n o ne a c re wa s r e qu ir e d to ob ta in a building pe rmit. I n light of this knowledg e, the e vidence preponde rates ag ainst the trial court’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e Wils on ’s we re no t a t le a st 5 0% a t fa ult fo r the ir inj ur ie s in th is c a se , d e sp ite the alleg ed neg lige nce of

Mr. Pickens. Alt houg h, at t he ti me of the s ale, the Wilsons arg uably wer e not awar e of the subdivision reg ulations, or even tha t the sale resulted in a subdi vision, Mr. W ilson knew that one acr e wa s not sufficient for the intended use of the lot.

Ad dit ion a lly , w e a g re e wi th the Wils on s tha t the c omm e nt b y the un ide nti fi e d Sh e lby

Cou nty inspector a nd the issuance by Shelby County of a buildi ng permit to the Wil sons in 1985 and 1988 did not make Shelby

Countyliable for the improper subdivision of the Wil son’s property in 1992. When Mr. W ilson applied for permits to build on over four ac res of land in 1985 and 1988, Shelby Countywas unde r no duty to a dvise him that, if he decide d to subdivide his pr operty into buildi ng lots at a future time, two-ac re lots would be r equire d.

Hol ding

The Wilsons have failed to car ry their burde n of proof

to demonstrate that Mr. Picke ns was more than 50% at fault for t he inj uries they sustained. We acc ording ly reve rse the judgme nt of the tr ia l c ou rt app ortio nin g 60 % o f f

a ult to Mr . Pick e ns

. B e c a us e the Wils on s w e re a t le a st 5 0% a t f a ult f o r th e dam a g e s s u s ta in e d in th is c a s e , w e r e v e r s e th e a w ar d o f d a ma g e s to th e Wi ls o n s

. We additionally

vacate the apportionment of fault to Shelby County . I n light of the fore g oing, the-7-

rema ining issues a

re pr etermitted. Costs of this a ppeal are taxed to the Appellee s, Rodney Wil son and Robbie Wilson.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE