Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published *

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50118

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JAIME TORRES; ROBERTO TORRES; BLANCA TORRES

Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(2:06-CR-76)

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellants, Jaime, Roberto, and Blanca Torres, jointly appeal from their

convictions on drug-related charges and for conspiracy to launder money. Before

their joint trial, the defendants sought to suppress evidence uncovered from a

2001 warrantless search of Jaime and Roberto Torres’s parents’ ranch. They also

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 6, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
08-50118

 Jaime Torres was charged with running the ranch and was allowed to use portions of the 2

property for his own commercial ventures. However, he has asserted no ownership interest in any of the

property the agents eventually searched on the grounds. 

2

sought to suppress the results of a 2006 warrant-based search of Jaime and

Blanca Torres’s home. The district court denied both motions and appellants

seek reversal on these grounds. Appellant Blanca Torres also seeks to have her

conviction for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(1) & (h) set aside for

insufficient evidence. Finally, each of the defendants requests we amend the

district court’s forfeiture judgment, entered under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) and 21

U.S.C. § 853(p), arguing that the district court incorrectly multiplied the jury

verdict from the forfeiture trial. As we hold that neither search violated the

Fourth Amendment and that, based on the deferential standard of review, there

was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Blanca Torres, we affirm

Appellants’ convictions. Moreover, as all parties agree that the monetary

forfeiture judgment entered by the district court was inconsistent with the jury

verdict, we order that judgment be modified. 

Background

In early 2001, Adrienne Martinez, a United States Border Patrol Agent,

located fresh footprints near the Texas-Mexico border. Thinking they were

the prints of an illegal entrant, Martinez and another agent followed those

tracks to the “Torres Ranch” property, owned and operated by the parents of

Jaime and Roberto Torres, solely for commercial purposes.2

The ranch was fenced, so, without a warrant, the agents climbed the

fence and entered the property. The smell of unburnt marijuana led the

agents to a vehicle. The agents opened the trunk and discovered bundles of

marijuana inside. Spurred by this discovery to look further, more marijuana
08-50118

 Agent Crist prepared a number of affidavits as part of his investigation. Appellants make 3

reference to several of these affidavits. However, it appears that their arguments on appeal turn on a

single affidavit submitted at the start of 2006 and thus we focus our discussion on this affidavit.

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was uncovered in another, nearby, vehicle. The agents then hid on the

property, waiting to see what else they would uncover. Eventually a truck

arrived carrying two men, one of whom the agents were later able to identify

as Jaime Torres. The men began to load the marijuana into their vehicle.

Then another truck arrived. The agents, fearing that their hideout had been

compromised, called for back-up. As other agents arrived, the two trucks fled

with their occupants. No arrests relevant to this appeal were made at this

time.

At the start of 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent

Noah Crist, who was assigned to the ongoing investigation of the Torreses’

activities, submitted an affidavit as part of his application for a search

warrant for Jaime and Blanca Torres’s home. In this affidavit Crist detailed 3

facts dated from 1997 through 2001, including the results of the 2001

warrantless search of the Torres Ranch, suggesting the Torreses’ involvement

with drug smuggling and money laundering. The affidavit also detailed wild

swings in the Torreses’ income, going from $26,000 to $1.4 million;

confidential informants describing the Torreses’ involvement with smuggling

routes; and that other members of the Torres family were arrested for drug

trafficking in 2003. Moreover, Crist stated that based on this evidence he

personally believed Jaime Torres was involved in illegal activities. As a result

of this evidence, the Magistrate Judge granted the warrant. The resulting

search of Jaime and Blanca Torres’s home uncovered what the government

later alleged was a ledger of drug transactions.
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Jaime and Roberto Torres were subsequently indicted on one count of

violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), intent to distribute more than

1,000 kilograms of marijuana, one count of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a),

960(a)(1) & (b)(1) and 963, conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of

marijuana into the United States, and one count of violating 18 U.S.C. §

1956(a)(1) & (h), conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. Blanca Torres

was indicted only on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) & (h). The

defendants filed joint motions to suppress the evidence uncovered during the

searches described above and the district court denied their motions. 

During their trial, among other evidence, the government presented

testimony from a number of alleged co-conspirators in the drug smuggling

operation, as well as the testimony of Juan P. Garza, who stated that he

laundered money for Jaime Torres. Moreover, the government showed that

Blanca Torres was the sole signatory on her and Jaime Torres’s business

bank account, which the government alleged contained deposits from the drug

smuggling operations. The government also demonstrated that Blanca made

deposits of several large sums from Juan Garza, without providing him the

services for which those payments were nominally made. In addition, it

showed Blanca made numerous large purchases from these accounts, living

well outside the income Jaime Torres claimed he received from their

legitimate business activities just a few years earlier, $23,000, including

buying several properties, a Rolex watch, and carrying over $11,000 in cash.

Blanca Torres’s only defense was that she lacked control over her husband’s

business decisions. The other defendants’ witnesses and arguments are not at

issue on appeal. 
08-50118

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Each of the defendants was convicted on all counts. Subsequently, the

court held a forfeiture trial in which the jury determined that $750,000 was

traceable to the defendants’ conspiracies. The district court later entered a

monetary judgment, holding them jointly and severally liable for forfeiture of

$2,250,000, appearing to multiply the $750,000 verdict by the number of

defendants. 

Appellants timely appealed their convictions, arguing that the evidence

from the 2001 and 2006 searches should have been suppressed and Blanca

Torres claimed her conviction was based on insufficient evidence. Moreover,

the appellants collectively moved to have the district court’s forfeiture

judgment modified to reflect the jury’s verdict.

Discussion

Appellants’ Fourth Amendment Claims

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “‘we review the district

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions, including its

ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement action,

de novo.’” United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting

United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002)). Of particular

relevance to applying this standard to this case, we have held that “[w]hether

a defendant has standing to contest an allegedly illegal search is a question of

law.” United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United

States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir. 1990)). 

The 2001 Search

The 2001 search of the Torres Ranch is best conceptualized as raising

two potential Fourth Amendment violations, first the agents’ entry onto the
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property and second the search of the vehicles. Yet both of these Fourth

Amendment concerns can be dismissed as the defendants lacked the

reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to have standing to challenge

these searches. See United States v. Gomez, 276 F.3d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 2001)

(“Whether there is standing to contest the validity of a search ‘depends on (1)

whether the defendant is able to establish an actual, subjective expectation of

privacy with respect to the place being searched or items being seized, and (2)

whether that expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize as

reasonable.’” (quoting Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d at 1037-38))).

The defendants lacked standing to challenge the agents’ entry, and

decision to remain, on the property because of the “open fields doctrine.” The

Supreme Court and this Circuit have recognized the stark distinction

between an “open field” and the “curtilage” of the home. “Open fields are

protected neither under the text of the Fourth Amendment nor under the

conception of the Amendment.” United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 274 (5th

Cir. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). They, by their

very nature, lack the social significance to create an objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in the property.

When determining whether an area is an open field or curtilage, the

Court has stated, “the central component of this inquiry [is] whether the area

harbors the ‘intimate activity associated with the “sanctity of a man’s home

and the privacies of life.”’” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987)

(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). The Court then

went on to list four factors that should be considered in this analysis, “the

proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
08-50118

 Such a conclusion is further supported by this court’s holding in Pace. In Pace, two officers 4

searching for drugs entered onto a property by one of them “squeezing through a gap between the main

gate and a fence post and the other by climbing over the gate.” Pace, 955 F.2d at 273. While searching

the property they “crossed at least two more gates” to look for signs of illegal activity. Id. The court

found that none of this conduct posed a constitutional concern, as it was merely an exercise of the

officers’ “privilege[] to stand in the open field.” Id. at 275. 

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included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to

which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area

from observation by people passing by.” Id. at 301. 

Based on this analysis, the Torres Ranch must be viewed as an open

field. The ranch was a commercial property separate and distinct from the

Torreses’ family home, not used for any form of domestic activity and

protected only by a scalable fence. Thus, the property was distinguished from

anything that could be characterized as typically containing the intimate

activities of a private home. Accordingly, no individual could claim a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. Without such an

expectation the defendants do not have standing to raise a Fourth

Amendment challenge to the agents’ warrantless entry.

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The defendants likewise lack standing to challenge the search of the

vehicles on the ranch. To determine whether any of the defendants had a

constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in this property this court

has said a number of factors must be weighed “includ[ing] whether the

defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched,

whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, whether he has

exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from

governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his
08-50118

 The government raised a number of other bases on which we could conclude that the search 5

was constitutional. We do not reach these arguments as we find the initial step of the Fourth Amendment

inquiry, standing, foreclosed to Appellants. 

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privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.” United States v.

Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981).

As with the agents’ entry onto the Torres Ranch, each of the factors

weighs against finding the defendants had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the cars. Both of the cars belonged to Jaime and Roberto’s parents,

and none of the defendants had any sort of possessory interest in the vehicles;

the record provides no indication that the defendants were empowered to use

the cars for any purpose, thus the record suggests that the defendants had no

authority to exclude others from using the vehicles; and the defendants did

not lock the vehicles’ trunks nor attempt to move the cars to a secluded

location, defeating any suggestion that they had a subjective expectation of

privacy or took normal precautions to ensure the vehicles would remain

private. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants did not have a

constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the vehicles or their

contents.

As a result, because we find the defendants lacked standing to

challenge the 2001 search, we affirm the district court’s denial of the

defendants’ motion to suppress.5

The 2006 Search

Appellants also argue that the search warrant for the 2006 search of

Jaime and Blanca Torres’s home lacked probable cause and thus the fruits of

that search should be suppressed. In particular, they suggest that the

affidavit supporting the warrant was deficient because it relied on stale and
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irrelevant evidence and that the officer applying for the warrant made

omissions and deliberately deceived the court as to the basis of his belief that

the Torreses’ were engaged in criminal activity. Yet, assuming arguendo that

Appellants’ claims are correct and render the warrant unsupported by

probable cause, the fruits of the search still fall cleanly within the “good faith

exception” to the exclusionary rule, creating a basis upon which to uphold the

district court’s ruling. 

Under the good faith exception, “[i]f an officer’s ‘reliance on the

magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of

the warrant he issues [is] objectively reasonable,’ a court need not suppress

the fruits.” United States v. Flanders, 468 F.3d 269, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006)

(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)) (second alteration in

original). Generally, we presume that it is objectively reasonable for an officer

to execute a warrant. See United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.

2006) (endorsing a district court’s statement that only in “exceptional

circumstances” does the good faith exception not apply to the execution of a

warrant). However, this court has recognized four primary situations where

this presumption will be overcome and the good-faith exception will not be

applied to an officer’s execution of a warrant:

i. when the magistrate or state judge issues a warrant in reliance

on a deliberately false affidavit;

ii. when the magistrate or state judge abandons his or her judicial

role and fails to perform in a neutral and detached fashion;

iii. when the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia

of probable cause as to render an officer’s belief in it

unreasonable; and

iv. when the warrant is so facially deficient that it fails to

particularize the place to be searched or the items to be seized.
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Id. at 916-17 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 914). Appellants’ arguments seek to

characterize the 2006 search as falling into either the first or third

circumstance. However, to overcome the presumption of reasonableness both

these exceptions-to-the-exception have their own requirements and we find

them unsupported by the evidence in this case.

Regarding the first circumstance, to suppress evidence because a

warrant omitted or mischaracterized relevant information, this court has

determined such an error must be shown to have been “knowingly and

intentionally made or [] made in reckless disregard for the truth.” United

States v. Cronan, 937 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.

Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980) (“a proven misstatement can vitiate

an affidavit only if it is established that the misstatement was the product ‘of

deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth’” (quoting Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978))). As these are factual predicates to

applying the legal standard of the good faith exception, we review the district

court’s determination for clear error. See United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d

392, 395 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 513 (2008). 

Appellants allege that the affidavit supporting the warrant omitted

information about the Torreses’ legitimate business operations—potentially

explaining the suspicious transactions and deposits described in the

affidavit—and other searches of the defendants’ property—which had failed

to uncover evidence of illegal activities. Moreover, they argue that Crist

misled the court to believe that the Torreses were engaged in illegal

activities, by stating his personal conclusion that they were engaged in

unlawful activities, which relied on out-of-date evidence and an inappropriate
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assumption that their relatives’ illegal activities indicated their involvement

in drug trafficking. However, Crist included with his affidavit information

about Jaime and Blanca Torres’s tax returns, which he noted reported

income, presumably from legitimate sources. Thus, the agents’ failure to

restate this potentially exculpatory information did not make out the

requisite mens rea. Moreover, Appellants fail to introduce any evidence that

would suggest Crist intended to or believed he was likely misleading the court

as to the basis for or strength of his belief that the Torreses were engaged in

criminal activity. Accordingly, we find the district court committed no clear

error in determining that the alleged omitted or misstated information was

not shown to be intentionally or recklessly placed in the affidavit and

therefore in applying the good faith exception.

The third circumstance where the good faith exception may not apply is

if a warrant is unreasonably based on a “bare bones” affidavit. United States

v. Cordero, 465 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2006). Appellants raise the specter of

this exception by arguing that the 2006 affidavit relied on stale information.

To determine whether “stale” information in an affidavit makes a search fall

outside the good faith exception, this court has said that the proper inquiry is

whether the staleness caused the warrant to be “so deficient that no

reasonable officer could have believed that it established probable cause.”

United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1988). As this is also a

factual predicate to applying the exception-to-the-exception, we again review

the district court’s determination for clear error. See Looney, 532 F.3d at 395. 

As described above, Agent Crist’s affidavit detailed not only facts from

1997 to 2001, indicating the Torreses were engaged in illegal activities, but
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also income statements from 2006, showing vast and unexplainable influxes

of money and statements of confidential informants confirming Roberto and

Jaime Torres’s involvement with smuggling routes. Given the breadth and

variety of this information, spanning numerous years and demonstrating a

series of grounds to believe the Torreses were involved in illegal activities, we

cannot say that it was clear error for the district court to conclude a

reasonable agent could believe the warrant was issued based upon a

sufficient affidavit. 

Therefore, as the state is entitled to the fruits of a search conducted in

“good faith,” we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

Blanca Torres’ s Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

When considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “‘we determine

whether a reasonable jury could find that the evidence establishes the guilt of

the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt,’ viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government and with all reasonable inferences and

credibility choices made in support of a conviction.” United States v. Harris,

566 F.3d 422, 435 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th

Cir. 2007)). 

Blanca Torres was convicted of conspiracy to launder money. To prove

this crime at trial, the government must “show that [the defendant]

knowingly conspired with at least one other person to (1) conduct or attempt

to conduct a financial transaction; (2) with the knowledge that it involved

proceeds of specified unlawful activity (here controlled substance offenses);

and (3) with the knowledge that the transaction was designed in whole or in

part to conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds, or to
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avoid a federal or state reporting requirement.” United States v. Fernandez,

559 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2783 (2009)

(parenthetical in original). In making out these elements this court has stated

that “[d]irect evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary; each element may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600,

603 (5th Cir. 1994).

As described above, the evidence against Blanca Torres went almost

entirely uncontested and provided strong circumstantial inferences that she

was involved in laundering money from unlawful activities. The government

showed that Blanca Torres’s husband and brother-in-law were intimately

involved in large scale drug trafficking; that Blanca transacted directly with a

man involved in her husband’s money laundering operation for these drug

transactions, providing him monies for purchases the government alleged,

and Garza testified, were part of the laundering scheme and receiving money

back from him nominally for services, which were in fact never provided.

Moreover, the government showed that she made purchases that were well

outside the declared income provided by her and her husband’s legal business

operations. Thus, the government has brought forth direct evidence that

Blanca Torres engaged in financial transactions and sufficient circumstantial

evidence that she was aware that her transactions with Garza were part of

her husband’s money laundering connected to his illegal transactions and

distinct from her lawful business operations. At the same time, Blanca did

not offer any explanation, let alone a compelling one, for why she could have

concluded these transactions were part of anything but her husband’s illegal

operations. Her defense of ignorance does not defeat the reasonable
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inferences that conceivably could have been drawn from her actions and

contacts. True, the evidence is far from compelling. However, taking all the

inferences created by this evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, as we are required to do, we cannot say it is unreasonable for a

jury to have concluded that Blanca Torres was guilty of money laundering.

Accordingly, we affirm Blanca Torres’s conviction for conspiracy to launder

money. 

The Forfeiture Judgment

After a special forfeiture trial, the jury determined that $750,000 was

traceable to the conspiracies charged. All parties agree that this was the

entirety of the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the monetary judgment the district

court entered against the defendants, seemingly multiplying the jury verdict

by the maximum number of defendants—leading the court to hold the

defendants jointly and severally liable for $2,250,000—was in error. Thus, we

modify the district court’s order on the basis of plain error. See, e.g., Sparks v.

Baxter, 854 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1988) (modifying judgment on appeal for

plain error); Cage v. Cage, 74 F.2d 377, 378 (5th Cir. 1934) (same). 

Conclusion

For these reasons, the appellants’ convictions are AFFIRMED, and the

district court’s forfeiture judgment is amended to reduce the amount for

which Jaime, Roberto, and Blanca Torres are held jointly and severely liable

to $750,000, and, as amended, is AFFIRMED.