2019 IL App (3d) 180424

Opinion filed June 21, 2019 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2019 

In re Z.M., )

 ) 

 a Minor ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

Donald W., ) 

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant). ) 

)

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-18-0424 

Circuit No. 16-JA-42 

The Honorable 

Paula A. Gomora, 

Judge, presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 The respondent, Donald W., appeals from the circuit court’s order terminating his 

parental rights as to his minor daughter, Z.M. On appeal, the respondent argues that (1) his right 

to due process was violated throughout the proceedings terminating his parental rights, (2) the 

trial court’s finding that he was an unfit parent was against the manifest weight of the evidence, 
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and (3) the trial court’s finding that it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate his parental rights 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On March 22, 2016, the State filed a petition alleging that Z.M., who was almost two 

years old, was a neglected minor pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 

(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. On 

the same day, a shelter care hearing took place. 

¶ 4 A. Shelter Care Hearing

¶ 5 At the shelter care hearing on March 22, 2016, Minnie Carr, a child protection specialist 

with the Department of Children Family Services (DCFS), testified that on March 20, 2016, she 

investigated a report of a domestic dispute at the apartment where Z.M. resided in Rockdale, 

Illinois. A police officer told Carr that the apartment had “reeked of marijuana upon his entry” 

and that respondent had called the police because someone had pulled a knife on him. Z.M.’s 

mother was not at the apartment when Carr arrived. At the time of the incident, respondent had 

not yet established paternity regarding Z.M. 

¶ 6 Carr testified that respondent told her that, when he awoke that morning, Z.M.’s mother 

and the cousin of Z.M.’s mother were in the living room smoking marijuana and he confronted 

them. According to respondent, he was going to remove Z.M. from the home, but a knife was 

pulled on him and he called police. Respondent indicated that he lived in the apartment and that 

he has had custody of Z.M. for the past 11⁄2 years. Respondent later gave Carr an address for 

where he actually resides in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent could not participate in a safety plan 

for Z.M. because his paternity of Z.M. had not been established. 
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¶ 7 Carr spoke with Ariel, the cousin of Z.M.’s mother. Ariel indicated that she lived in the 

apartment but Z.M.’s mother did not live in the apartment. Another cousin of Z.M.’s mother—

Yolanda—indicated that respondent did not live in the apartment but he was allowed to visit 

Z.M. whenever he wanted and he sometimes spent the night. Ariel and her children lived in the 

apartment, and Yolanda was in the process of moving into the apartment. Yolanda showed Carr a 

letter from Z.M.’s mother granting Yolanda permission to care for Z.M. until further notice. Carr 

also spoke with Z.M.’s mother, who indicated she was unsure if respondent was the father of 

Z.M. 

¶ 8 The trial court found probable cause to believe that Z.M. was neglected due to an 

injurious environment. The factual basis for the trial court’s finding was that a domestic dispute

took place between Z.M.’s mother and respondent at 4 a.m. after respondent attempted to remove 

Z.M., Ariel pulled a knife on respondent, and the apartment reeked of marijuana. The trial court 

also noted that respondent had not established paternity. The trial court placed Z.M. in shelter 

care and reiterated that the basis of its finding was “the domestic dispute between the parents, 

smoking of marijuana, and the natural father not establishing paternity of the minor.” The trial 

court ordered that Z.M. be placed in the temporary custody of DCFS and admonished respondent 

and Z.M.’s mother to fully cooperate with DCFS to correct the conditions that required Z.M. to 

be removed or they would risk the termination of their parental rights. 

¶ 9 The trial court also ordered respondent to submit to a paternity test. The results of the 

paternity test confirmed respondent’s paternity of Z.M. 

¶ 10 B. Adjudication Hearing 

¶ 11 On July 28, 2016, at the adjudication hearing, the parties stipulated that Z.M.’s 

environment was injurious to her welfare and that Z.M. was a neglected minor, with the factual 
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basis being that there had been “a domestic disturbance where [her] mother’s cousin had pulled a 

knife on [her] father and the minor was present” and cannabis was being used in the home where 

the minor was residing. The trial court accepted the stipulation of the parties and found that Z.M. 

was neglected in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. At that time, a service plan 

had not yet been established for respondent because he had missed two different appointments 

for an assessment interview. The trial court ordered respondent to complete the assessment 

interview with DCFS to determine what services he may need. The trial court admonished 

respondent as follows: 

“So you are going to need to do that fairly quickly because 

in the next 30 days, we are going to have what is called a 

disposition, which will determine whether or not [Z.M.] should be 

made a ward of the Court. 

And you will want to go through the service plan with your 

attorneys so that they can kind of, they can look at the service plan 

and decide also with you whether or not the services are those that 

would be beneficial to you so that you regain custody of your 

child. 

 * * * 

This is your child. So you should be as involved as you can 

be at this point. That means visiting, engaging the services, making 

an effort, making progress with regard to the services. 

If you are not getting the services in a timely fashion, you 

need to talk with your lawyers. That is what they are here for. They
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will in turn contact the caseworker and hound her to make sure that 

you get into the services that you need or let me know about it the 

next time we get together so I know that you are not getting the 

services that you need in order to get your child back. 

Our intention is not to keep your child in foster care for any 

longer than we have to. And the ‘have to’ portion depends on you.

Okay. So it is very, very important that you are compliant with the 

agency, that you do the services that are requested and demonstrate 

that you are able to safely and appropriately parent your child. That 

is all we are looking for.”

¶ 12 The trial court indicated that respondent’s interview would determine which services 

would be necessary so respondent should set that up as soon as possible. 

¶ 13 C. Dispositional Hearing 

¶ 14 On October 26, 2016, a dispositional hearing took place. The State entered into evidence 

the dispositional report, an addendum to the dispositional report, and the service plan dated 

October 13, 2016, with no objection from respondent. In the dispositional report and addendum, 

the caseworker indicated that respondent had been attempting to complete substance abuse 

treatment since March 2016, tested positive for marijuana several times since the beginning of 

the program, “recently” tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine (in September 2016), and 

was referred to an intensive outpatient program due to the positive drug screen and missed drug 

drops. The caseworker noted respondent’s substance abuse would have to be continually 

monitored “due to extensive use since eighteen.” Respondent was to complete services of

substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, individual psychotherapy, and domestic 
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violence classes. He was also required to maintain adequate housing and income, improve his

parenting skills, and maintain an interest in the case. No other evidence was presented. 

Respondent’s attorney noted that respondent was scheduled to complete parenting classes on 

October 29, 2016, and he was “actively involved” in substance abuse classes, had stable housing

in Chicago, Illinois (although he admittedly still needed to provide proof of his housing to the 

caseworker), had “income from a legal settlement that occurred sometime ago,” and was 

working (although he admittedly still needed to provide his pay stubs to the caseworker). 

¶ 15 The trial court found that it was in the best interest of Z.M. to make her a ward of the 

court and found both parents unfit to care for, protect, train, or discipline Z.M., with the factual 

basis being that “both parents have yet to complete services outlined in their service plan in order 

for the minor to be returned home safely.” The trial court ordered that Z.M. be placed in the 

custody and guardianship of DCFS, granted visitation at the discretion of DCFS, and set the 

permanency goal for Z.M. as returning home within 12 months. The trial court did not admonish 

respondent that he had the right to appeal. 

¶ 16 D. Proceedings Following the Dispositional Hearing 

¶ 17 1. Permanency Review Hearings

¶ 18 On April 26, 2017, at a permanency review hearing, respondent’s attorney indicated that 

respondent had completed substance abuse treatment (on November 15, 2016), was in individual 

counseling, and had supervised visits with Z.M. multiple times per week. The guardian ad litem

reported that, while respondent had completed his substance abuse program, he “tested dirty a 

week before he was discharged” and had missed a random drug drop in December 2016. The 

trial court ordered that drug screens be performed more frequently to determine “with certainty 
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that there is progress.” The trial court found respondent had made substantial progress toward the 

goal of returning Z.M. home and set the permanency goal as returning home within 12 months. 

¶ 19 On October 3, 2017, at a permanency review hearing, respondent’s attorney 

acknowledged that respondent needed to “work on his drug drops” but indicated that respondent 

had been visiting Z.M. and had completed individual counseling. Reports from the guardian 

ad litem and the caseworker indicated that respondent had completed substance abuse treatment 

on November 15, 2016, failed to appear for a drug screen on June 21, 2017, had a clean drug 

screen on July 12, 2017, failed to complete a drug screen on August 4, 2017 (due to respondent 

producing too little urine and then leaving the building even though he had been asked to remain 

in the building to try again), and failed to appear on September 15, 2017. The result of the drug 

screen performed on September 27, 2017, was still pending. The caseworker reported that since 

the last court date respondent had completed individual therapy, was currently addressing 

domestic violence issues in therapy, and had two-hour supervised visits with Z.M. once per

week. Respondent was allowed to visit Z.M. twice per week but failed to indicate another day 

that he was available to do so each week. On September 20, 2017, respondent had submitted 

proof of employment at a temporary staffing agency and three check stubs, each for one day of 

employment. The trial judge stated, “I am going to order that the agency take the case to legal 

screening, whatever the results are,” and changed the permanency goal to “return home pending 

status.” 

¶ 20 On November 6, 2017, at a status hearing, the caseworker indicated that the legal 

screening had not yet taken place. The respondent’s attorney indicated that she was concerned 

that respondent had not been receiving any drug testing. The caseworker explained that she had 

not been requesting drug drops because respondent had tested positive for marijuana at the end 
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of September and was still “dropping dirty” after completing treatment. The trial court indicated 

that the permanency goal was still returning home “so services should continue.” 

¶ 21 On November 17, 2017, the caseworker confirmed that the matter had passed legal 

screening. The trial court continued the case until January 3, 2018, for a status on the filing of the 

termination petition. On January 3, 2018, the assistant state’s attorney stated: 

“My first nine-month period is from July of 2016 to April 

of 2017. Dad was satisfactory during that period. I don’t have a 

second nine-month period. My second nine-month period doesn’t 

end until January 28th. 

So I can’t file anything until after January 28th. 

Now, during the second nine-month period, there is no 

progress; but during the first nine-month period, I’ve got 

progress.” 

¶ 22 On February 21, 2018, at a status hearing, the assistant state’s attorney confirmed that she 

had not filed a termination petition because during the first nine-month period respondent had 

been rated as “satisfactory” and she had been waiting for the completion of the second ninemonth period.1 The assistant State’s attorney indicated that she wanted to review the 

caseworker’s report to “determine whether or not there ha[d] been any changes or if [she could] 

file a petition to terminate.” The caseworker reported that respondent had tested positive for 

marijuana in September 2017 and January 2018. The caseworker indicated that she offered to 

refer respondent to substance abuse treatment in his area but respondent had indicated that he 

 1

As noted above, Z.M. was adjudicated neglected on July 28, 2016, and at a subsequent 

permanency review hearing on April 26, 2017, the trial court found respondent had made “substantial 

progress.” 
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had a provider and he would contact the caseworker with the information of that provider so that 

she could provide a referral. Respondent confirmed that he was waiting on “Gateway to call 

[him] back.” The following colloquy ensued: 

“[RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY]: Isn’t the agency 

supposed to be making referrals instead of having dad do it? 

THE COURT: Yes. 

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: I believe she 

indicated that she was having him call her with places in his area 

so that she can refer him.

THE COURT: Can’t you reach out to DCFS in Chicago to 

see what services are available near him so he doesn’t have to hunt 

them down. I mean I understand if there are services in his area, 

but it may be beneficial to have some assistance. 

[CASEWORKER]: Okay. I will try DCFS in his area. 

There are services in his area that he was aware of. I gave him 

those. 

 THE COURT: He lives in Chicago. 

[CASEWORKER]: I gave him those in his area when the 

case first started, like five or six places, but he wanted to do 

Stepping Stones which he attempted like three or four times. 

THE COURT: Okay. We need a PRH [(permanency review 

hearing)].

 * * * 
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THE COURT: Is it going back to legal screening?

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: It doesn’t need to 

go back to legal screening. I can make that determination based on 

the information that [the caseworker] did provide me today. 

THE COURT: Why don’t we have a status? 

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Judge, it passed 

legal screening. It was my determination [that] I didn’t have 

enough that first nine-month period. I was waiting for the second.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don’t we have a status on the 

filing of the petition. I want to make sure that we don’t lose the 

PRH [permanency review hearing] date.

¶ 23 The case was set for a status on the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights on 

March 26, 2018, and a permanency review hearing on April 18, 2018. 

¶ 24 On March 2, 2018, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, 

alleging that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and 

responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(b) (West 2016)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were 

the basis for the removal of Z.M. (from April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018), pursuant to section 

1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) failed to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of Z.M. during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine months 

following the adjudication of neglect (from April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018), pursuant to 

section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). 
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¶ 25 On April 18, 2018, a permanency review hearing took place. The most recent service 

plan, dated March 20, 2018, indicated that respondent had provided proof of employment from 

October 2017 through January 10, 2018, but provided no proof of employment thereafter.

Respondent did not make himself available for home visits, did not provided a new lease or rent 

receipts, and did not communicate with the caseworker as requested. Respondent’s last positive 

urine screen was on January 24, 2018, and he was assessed by his new substance abuse treatment 

provider (Healthcare Alternative Systems (HAS)) on March 5, 2018. Respondent was 

recommended for intensive outpatient treatment. He needed to sign consents for the caseworker 

to receive reports from HAS. Without objection from respondent, the trial court found 

respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and changed the 

permanency goal to substitute care pending the court’s determination of the termination petition. 

¶ 26 On May 18, 2018, Z.M.’s mother surrendered her parental rights. The case was continued 

for a trial on the termination petition as to respondent. 

¶ 27 2. Unfitness Hearing 

¶ 28 On July 12, 2018, at the unfitness hearing, the caseworker testified that Z.M. was four 

years old, and Z.M.’s mother had surrendered her parental rights to Z.M. the previous month.

Two service plans covering the six-month period of February to August 28, 2017, and the sixmonth period of September 2017 to March 20, 2018, were entered into evidence. The services 

that respondent was expected to perform, as outlined in the service plans, were to provide proof 

of and maintain adequate housing; allow monthly home visits; provide proof of working utilities 

and landlord information; provide monthly check stubs to show proof of employment; keep 

DCFS informed of any changes in address, phone number, employment, or household 

composition; sign releases and consents; complete a domestic violence assessment and any 
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recommended treatment; participate in individual therapy; submit to random urine screens; 

complete a substance abuse assessment and any recommended treatment (including parenting 

classes); attend all court dates; attend visits with Z.M. as scheduled; and call the caseworker at 

least once a month to inform her of progress or problems. 

¶ 29 The service plans and the testimony of the caseworker indicated that respondent had 

initially attempted substance abuse counseling shortly after Z.M. had been removed in March 

2016 but he had trouble maintaining sobriety. He tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine 

on August 30, 2016, and was recommended for intensive outpatient treatment, which he 

completed in November 2016. The caseworker had attempted to allow unsupervised visits 

between respondent and Z.M., but respondent did not perform the requested drug drop for her to 

do so in December 2016. 

¶ 30 During the six-month time period of February through August 2017, respondent was a 

“no show” from some requested drug screens (which are considered to be positive for drugs). 

Respondent attended individual counseling and domestic violence treatment from March to June 

2017 and was successfully discharged. On August 4, 2017, respondent missed a drug drop after 

he left the building following a visit with Z.M., even though he had been requested to remain in 

the building to redo a drug screen because he had produced too little urine in his first attempt. As 

of August 31, 2017, respondent’s visits with Z.M. had become “sporadic,” with respondent 

visiting three out of the eight available times per month. Respondent could have visited Z.M. 

twice per week, but he failed to relay to the caseworker his availability for a second day per 

week.

¶ 31 During the six-month time period of September 2017 to March 2018, the issues 

respondent still needed to address were additional substance abuse treatment and consistent 
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visitations with Z.M. During that time, respondent’s visits with Z.M. remained inconsistent, with 

respondent still only averaging three visits per month. Respondent missed a drug drop on 

September 5, 2017, and tested positive for marijuana on September 27, 2017. The caseworker

spoke with respondent on October 4, 2017, and again on January 24, 2017, about which 

substance abuse treatment provider he had chosen so she could provide a referral. 

¶ 32 On January 24, 2017, respondent was asked to provide a urine screen after his visit with 

Z.M., but respondent claimed not to have identification. After the caseworker verified 

respondent’s identification, respondent submitted a clear urine specimen that did not have a 

“temperature” after having refused to leave his coat in another room and turning away from the 

person observing the drop. Respondent was instructed to give a second urine sample, which had 

color and “temperature” and which was positive for marijuana. Respondent returned to substance 

abuse treatment in March 2018, in Chicago. The caseworker did not have verification that 

respondent had completed the program. The caseworker also did not receive another lease from 

respondent after his lease expired in October of 2017. 

¶ 33 Respondent testified that, during the pendency of this case, he had worked at a Pizza Hut 

and he currently worked at a different fast food restaurant. He also testified that he had stable 

housing in Chicago. Respondent testified that he was referred for substance abuse treatment in 

October 2017 and January 2018, but he did not start treatment until March 2018 due to a problem 

with his insurance. Respondent testified he had canceled or rescheduled some visits because he 

“didn’t have car fare” to travel to Joliet from Chicago. Respondent testified that, during his visits 

with Z.M., they played with toys and Barbie dolls and read books. Respondent brought fast food 

to the visits and fed Z.M. Respondent also attended most court dates regarding Z.M. and 

contacted his attorney when he was unable to do so. 
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¶ 34 After the State had presented its evidence and prior to the respondent testifying, the 

respondent’s attorney had motioned the trial court for a directed finding. At that time, the trial 

court found that the State did not present sufficient evidence that respondent had failed to make 

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of Z.M.’s removal. After 

respondent testified and the attorneys gave closing arguments, the trial court found, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that respondent was unfit in that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree 

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare and failed to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of Z.M. after Z.M. was adjudicated neglected, during the nine-month period of 

April 29, 2017, to January 28, 2018. The trial court noted “the heart of the case [was] substance 

abuse treatment as well as domestic violence” and respondent continued to test positive for 

drugs, failed to show for requested drug screens, had difficulty obtaining and maintaining 

sobriety, failed to complete intensive outpatient treatment (after being provided with treatment 

facilities in his area), and only visited Z.M. once per week rather than twice per week, averaging 

only three visits per month. The trial court also noted that respondent had tested positive for 

marijuana on September 27, 2017, and January 24, 2018, and had been recommended for 

intensive outpatient treatment, which he did not did not begin until after the applicable ninemonth period had ended. 

¶ 35 3. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 36 At the best interest hearing directly following the unfitness hearing, the caseworker 

testified that Z.M. had been placed in relative foster care with her maternal great aunt and uncle,

who are in their late forties and live in a three-bedroom home. The caseworker visited the home 

at least once per month and had not observed any safety concerns. Z.M. had her own bedroom, 

furniture, and toys. Z.M. called her aunt “mama” and her uncle “uncle.” The couple treated Z.M. 
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in a “loving and caring way.” The caseworker testified that Z.M. is closely bonded with her 

foster mother. Z.M.’s foster parents viewed Z.M. as their daughter and viewed themselves as her 

main caregivers. Interactions between Z.M. and her foster parents were appropriate, and Z.M. 

appeared to be a happy child. Z.M. was doing well in preschool and had made friends. Z.M.’s 

foster parents take Z.M. on various outings, do various activities with Z.M., and keep Z.M. 

involved with her maternal extended family. Z.M.’s foster parents were able to provide for

Z.M.’s financial, medical, and emotional needs and were willing to adopt Z.M. The caseworker 

testified that she believed it was in Z.M.’s best interest if Z.M.’s foster parents adopted Z.M. 

Z.M. appeared to love her foster parents, and they love her. 

¶ 37 The caseworker also testified that Z.M. was bonded to and loved respondent. Z.M. called

respondent “dad,” and their visits together were appropriate. During visits, respondent and Z.M. 

played. Respondent talked with Z.M. and remained engaged with Z.M. throughout the entire

visit. He would also bring Z.M. food each visit and brought gifts at times as well. 

¶ 38 Respondent testified that he last visited with Z.M. the day prior to the court hearing, and 

Z.M. was “very happy” to see him. During the visit they played with toys and ate fast food.

During their other visits, respondent and Z.M. would also play and eat together. Respondent 

testified that he loved Z.M. and that he was willing to continue to engage in services. He also 

testified that he was able to financially support Z.M. through his employment and a monthly 

settlement payment that he receives for $2100. 

¶ 39 In ruling, the trial judge stated: 

“I could say unequivocally, I understand that [respondent] loves 

his daughter. 
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It’s also this Court’s responsibility to make sure that the 

minor is provided permanency in their [sic] life and are able to 

reside in a home where she’s going to be taken care of. 

During the time period that was alleged by the State, the 

services that needed to be completed mainly again, substance 

abuse treatment, was not completed. Again, the matter came in in 

2016.” 

¶ 40 The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was in the best interest 

of Z.M. that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. Respondent appealed. 

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 42 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights 

should be reversed because (1) his right to due process was violated during the termination 

proceedings by the trial court failing to admonish him of his right to appeal following the entry 

of the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016, the State not having an objective reason 

to recommend substance abuse treatment as part of respondent’s service plan, the trial court 

ordering DCFS to take the case to legal screening sua sponte, DCFS failing to refer respondent 

to additional substance abuse treatment in September 2017, and his parental rights having been 

terminated for no reason other than a recreational use of cannabis; (2) the trial court’s findings 

that respondent was unfit pursuant to sections 1(D)(b) and section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption 

Act were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that 

it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 43 A. Due Process
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¶ 44 Pursuant to the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution no person shall 

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, 

§ 1. The due process clause provides “ ‘heightened protection against government interference 

with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ ” In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (2001) 

(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). These liberty interests that are 

protected by the due process clause include a parent’s fundamental right in the care, custody, and 

control of his or her children. Id. at 362-63. Due process in the context of interference with 

parental rights is achieved by compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

and fundamental fairness. In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 23. Claims of due process 

violations are questions of law that we review de novo. In re A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723 

(2010); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (2005). 

¶ 45 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the United States Supreme Court 

identified three factors to be considered when determining what due process safeguards require 

in proceedings that implicate fundamental liberty interests: (1) the private interest implicated by 

the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the 

proceedings used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and

(3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards would entail. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148,

165 (2003) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Mathews factors have been applied to cases 

involving the termination of parental rights. Id.

¶ 46 1. Right to Appeal the Dispositional Order 

¶ 47 First on appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by failing to admonish him of his 

right to appeal following the entry of the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016, and 
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requests that this court vacate all proceedings subsequent to the entry of the dispositional order. 

Respondent did not raise this issue in the trial court and requests that we review the issue for 

plain error. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005) (the plain error doctrine allows 

this court to consider forfeited issues when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is 

closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights). Respondent notes that he had stipulated 

that Z.M. was neglected and contends that “[h]is stipulation to neglect was in essence a guilty 

plea.” Analogizing the stipulation in this case to a guilty plea in a criminal case, respondent 

argues he would have had to have filed a motion to withdraw his stipulation that Z.M. was 

neglected in order to appeal the dispositional order entered in this case and, thus, should have 

received admonishments “similar to the requirements of Rule 605(b).” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(b) 

(eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (providing, inter alia, that when a judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, at 

the time of imposing sentence, the defendant should be admonished that prior to taking an appeal 

the defendant must file a written motion asking the trial court to reconsider the sentence or 

vacate the judgment and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty). Respondent contends that, as a 

result of the trial court’s error of failing to admonish him of his right to appeal the dispositional 

order, “all proceedings subsequent to October 26, 2016, including the termination of [his] 

parental rights should be vacated and the case remanded for a redo.” 

¶ 48 In response, the State concedes the trial court’s error in failing to admonish respondent of 

his right to appeal the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016. The State, however,

argues that respondent’s argument is an attack on the dispositional order entered on October 26, 

2016, over which this court lacks jurisdiction because respondent failed to file a timely notice of 

appeal or late notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
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The State, therefore, contends that this court should dismiss respondent’s appeal “relative to the 

arguments regarding the original dispositional order.” 

¶ 49 In reply, respondent reiterates that he is not contesting the entry of the dispositional order 

or the neglect finding but that he is “appealing the trial court’s failure to advise him of his 

appellate right which denied him due process.” 

¶ 50 Here, as the State concedes, the trial court erred by failing to admonish respondent of his 

right to appeal following the entry of the dispositional order. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West 

2016) (providing that, at the dispositional hearing, “the court shall inform the parties of their 

right to appeal therefrom as well as from any other final judgment of the court”). We agree with 

the State that we lack jurisdiction to review the adjudication and dispositional orders entered in 

this case because respondent did not file a timely notice of appeal or motion to file a late notice 

of appeal in regard to the adjudication or dispositional orders. See In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App 

(1st) 170971, ¶ 65 (citing In re Barion S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113026, ¶ 36 (the dispositional 

order is a final and appealable order)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017) (a notice of appeal in a 

civil case must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final order, unless the appellant files a 

motion to file a late notice of appeal within 30 days after the expiration of time to file the notice 

of appeal showing a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely notice of appeal). Contrary to 

the State’s assertion, respondent has not raised any issue pertaining to the validity of the 

dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016. Rather, respondent argues that “all proceedings 

subsequent to October 26, 2016, including the termination of [his] parental rights should be 

vacated and the case remanded for a redo.” This appeal, which is from the final order terminating 

respondent’s parental rights, was timely filed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). We, 

therefore, have jurisdiction to review respondent’s arguments on appeal. 
- 20 -

¶ 51 In applying the Mathews factors in this case, we do not find that due process requires this 

court to vacate the proceedings subsequent to the dispositional hearing. Here, the private interest 

at stake is respondent’s interest in the control, custody, and care of his child, Z.M., which is a 

fundamental right that will not be terminated lightly. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 362-63. The trial 

court’s procedural error of failing to admonish respondent of his right to appeal following the 

entry of the dispositional order increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent’s 

rights, which implicates the perceptions of judicial fairness and the integrity of the judicial 

proceedings. See A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 725. However, there would be little value in vacating 

the proceedings subsequent to the dispositional hearing as a substitute safeguard because there is 

no indication that respondent would have appealed from the dispositional order or that there was 

any issue of merit that could have been raised in such an appeal. See In re S.P., 2019 IL App (3d) 

180476, ¶ 48. Additionally, in considering the governmental interest involved, vacating the 18 

months of proceedings subsequent to the entry of the dispositional hearing in this case would be 

unduly burdensome upon the State’s interests of preserving and promoting Z.M.’s welfare and 

reducing the cost and burden of the termination proceedings. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 367 (the 

State’s interests in parental termination proceedings are an interest in preserving and promoting 

the welfare of the child and an administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such 

proceedings); A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 725 (delays in termination of parental rights proceedings 

impose a serious cost on the function of the government and intangible costs to the lives of the 

children involved). Therefore, our application of the Mathews factors indicates that due process 

does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the entry of the dispositional 

order entered in this case. 

¶ 52 2. Requiring Substance Abuse Treatment 
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¶ 53 In so far as respondent is arguing that “due process require[d] the State to have an 

objective reason to recommend substance abuse treatment,” we find the issue to be without 

merit. “Any tasks the court requires of the parents, guardian, or legal custodian or child prior to 

returning the child home, must be reasonably related to remedying a condition or conditions that 

gave rise to or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.” 705 ILCS 405/2-

28(2) (West 2016). 

¶ 54 In this case, requiring respondent to complete substance abuse treatment as part of his 

service plan was reasonably related to remedying the condition that gave rise to Z.M. being 

removed from the home on March 20, 2016. At the adjudication hearing on July 28, 2016, 

respondent stipulated that Z.M. was neglected, with the factual basis being that a knife had been 

pulled on respondent and cannabis was being used in the home where Z.M. resided. Although 

respondent claimed that Z.M.’s mother and her cousin were responsible for the marijuana smell 

in the home, the fact remains that Z.M. was removed, in part, because of drug use in the home. 

At the time of the adjudication hearing on July 28, 2016, there was no service plan for 

respondent in place because respondent had failed to attend two scheduled assessment interviews 

with DCFS, but he had begun substance abuse treatment shortly after Z.M. was removed in 

March 2016, and respondent had tested positive for marijuana “several times in the beginning of 

[that] program.” Additionally, on August 30, 2016, respondent submitted a urine sample that was 

positive for both marijuana and cocaine. Based on the record before us, there is no merit to 

respondent’s assertion that there was not an objective reason for the State to recommend 

substance abuse treatment. 

¶ 55 3. Legal Screening
- 22 -

¶ 56 Respondent contends the manner in which this case was referred to legal screening 

violated his right to due process. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court improperly 

“assumed a prosecutorial function” by sua sponte ordering DCFS to send the case to “legal 

screening.” The State argues that the trial court had ordered DCFS to take the case to legal 

screening “whatever the results are,” which was not a predetermination by the trial court as to 

whether respondent’s parental rights should have been terminated. 

¶ 57 In this case, at the time of the permanency review hearing at which the trial court ordered 

DCFS to send the case to legal screening, it had been 15 months since Z.M. had been adjudicated 

neglected. Since the adjudication of neglect on July 28, 2016, respondent completed outpatient 

substance abuse treatment on November 15, 2016, but continuously missed drug drops for the 

next year. At the permanency hearing on October 3, 2017, the trial court ordered DCFS to take 

the case to legal screening and changed the permanency goal to return home pending a status 

hearing, as the trial court was authorized to do so pursuant to section 2-28(2)(B-1) of the 

Juvenile Court Act of 1987. See id. § 2-28(2)(B-1) (at the permanency review hearing, the trial 

court shall set one of the listed permanency goals, which includes the goal of the minor being “in 

short-term care with a continued goal to return home pending a status hearing”). Pursuant to the 

Illinois Administrative Code, “[w]hen one of the grounds for termination of parental rights 

appears to exist and return home as a permanency goal for the child is no longer appropriate, 

[DCFS] shall conduct an internal legal screening.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 309.80(a) (2018). We find 

no error committed by the trial court in ordering DCFS to take the case to legal screening where 

grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights appeared to exist and the trial court had 

changed the permanency goal to return home pending a status hearing. See id. 
- 23 -

¶ 58 Moreover, respondent’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court ordering 

the case to go to legal screening. The trial court made no determination as to whether the State 

should file a termination of parental rights petition. The purpose of DCFS conducting an internal 

legal screening is to determine (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that 

there are grounds for termination of parental rights, (2) whether it is in the best interest of the 

child to seek termination of parental rights, and (3) steps that need to be completed to permit the 

filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 309.80(b) (2018). Here, there 

was no risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent’s parental rights solely because the trial 

court ordered that the case be submitted for a legal screening where the permanency goal 

remained returning home and DCFS was still obligated to provide reunification services. See 705 

ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2016) (where the court has selected a permanency goal other than 

returning home for a child age 15 or under, DCFS shall not provide further reunification 

services). Thus, we find no violation of respondent’s due process rights as the result of the 

manner in which this case was referred to legal screening. 

¶ 59 4. Failure to Refer Respondent to Additional Substance Abuse Treatment 

¶ 60 Respondent argues that he should have been referred to additional substance abuse 

treatment in September 2017. He contends that DCFS requiring him to find a treatment provider 

in his area was a “delaying tactic” that was used while “the State waited for the clock to run out 

on the second nine month period to file a petition to terminate parental rights.” 

¶ 61 Here, during the relevant nine-month period respondent missed a drug drop on September 

15, 2017, and tested positive for marijuana on September 27, 2017. At the permanency review 

hearing on October 3, 2017, the trial court ordered that the case be submitted to legal screening 

and changed the permanency goal to returning home pending a status hearing (id. § 2-28(2)(B-
- 24 -

1)). Respondent acknowledges that on October 4, 2017, the day after the permanency review 

hearing, he and the caseworker met “to discuss substance abuse providers in his area.” The 

caseworker had previously given respondent information for numerous service providers in 

respondent’s area and attempted to coordinate further services for respondent when they met on 

October 4, 2017. Respondent hindered those efforts by indicating that he would choose the 

treatment provider but failing to relay the provider’s information to the caseworker so she could 

provide a referral. Respondent failed to select a treatment provider and again tested positive for 

marijuana in January 2018. Based on this record, there is no merit to respondent’s argument that 

DCFS had “given up” on him or that DCFS did not refer him to relapse counseling or additional 

treatment in an attempt to “run out the clock” on his parental rights. 

¶ 62 5. Recreational Use of Cannabis 

¶ 63 Respondent also argues that his right to due process was violated because his parental 

rights were terminated over a “recreational” use of cannabis, which he contends was conduct that 

was “less serious than a speeding ticket.” We interpret respondent’s arguments to be that due 

process required the State and the trial court to view his marijuana use as a nonfactor in this case. 

¶ 64 In examining the Mathews factors, we again note that respondent has a private interest in 

the control, custody, and care of his child. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 362. The trial court 

considering respondent’s marijuana use did not create a risk of an erroneous deprivation of 

respondent’s parental rights in this case where there is no indication that the trial court failed to 

comply with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 in doing so. See D.T., 2017 IL App 

(3d) 170120, ¶ 23 (due process in the context of interference with parental rights is achieved by 

compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and fundamental fairness).

Additionally, ignoring respondent’s marijuana use in this case would have been of little value 
- 25 -

when balanced against the government’s interests of preserving and promoting Z.M.’s welfare 

and reducing the cost and burden of the termination proceedings. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 367. 

Regardless of whether respondent’s suspected substance abuse pertained to marijuana, alcohol, 

prescription medication, or any other substance, whether legal or illegal, respondent’s right to 

due process was not violated where Z.M. was not returned home partly because the issue of 

respondent’s suspected substance abuse remained unresolved as the result of respondent 

continuing to miss requested drug screens, testing positive for marijuana, and failing to comply 

with securing an additional treatment provider. See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001) 

(the benchmark for measuring a parent’s progress toward the return of the child encompasses the 

parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives in light of the conditions 

that gave rise to the removal of the child and in light of other conditions that later become known 

that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent). In applying the 

Mathews factors, we do not find that due process required the trial court or the State to ignore 

respondent’s marijuana use in this case. See Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 (citing Mathews, 424 

U.S. at 335). 

¶ 65 B. Unfitness 

¶ 66 On appeal, respondent also argues that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence where the trial court found that respondent was unfit for failing to 

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare 

pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act and for failing to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of Z.M. during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine months 

following the adjudication of neglect pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, with 

the nine-month period being April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018. The State and the guardian 
- 26 -

ad litem for Z.M. both argue that the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

¶ 67 In reviewing a trial court’s finding of parental unfitness, the trial court’s decision will not 

be reversed on appeal unless the finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N., 

196 Ill. 2d at 208. Only if the record shows that it is clearly apparent that the trial court should 

have reached the opposite conclusion should the trial court’s decision be deemed to be against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. 

¶ 68 In this case, the trial court found respondent was unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of 

the Adoption Act because he failed to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period of 

April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016) (a ground of 

parental unfitness is the failure “to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the 

parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of” neglect). Our supreme court has 

interpreted section 1(D)(m)(ii) as requiring a parent to make demonstrable movement toward the 

goal of reunification. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 211. The benchmark for measuring a parent’s 

reasonable progress includes compliance with service plans and court directives in light of the 

condition that gave rise to the removal of the child and other conditions that later become known 

that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. at 216-17. 

Reasonable progress occurs when the trial court can conclude that the progress being made by a 

parent to comply with the directives given for the return of the minor is sufficiently demonstrable 

and of such quality that the court would be able to order the child returned to the parent’s 

custody in the near future. In re J.H., 2014 IL App (3d) 140185, ¶ 22. In determining whether a 

parent has made reasonable progress toward the return home of the minor, the trial court is to 
- 27 -

consider evidence occurring only during the relevant nine-month period. In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 

329, 341 (2010). 

¶ 69 During the relevant nine-month period in this case, respondent failed to comply with 

requirements of the service plans and the court’s directives. Respondent failed to complete 

requested drug screens on June 21, August 4, and September 5, 2017, and he tested positive for 

marijuana on September 15, 2017, and January 24, 2018. In the beginning of the case, the 

caseworker provided respondent a list of substance abuse providers near where respondent 

resided in Chicago. In October 2017 and January 2018, the caseworker and respondent discussed 

respondent’s needing to secure additional substance abuse treatment. Respondent indicated that 

he would contact the caseworker with the information of his preferred treatment provider so that 

she could give a referral for treatment, but respondent failed to do so. Respondent did not start

treatment until March 2018, which was beyond the relevant nine-month period. Additionally, 

during the nine-month period, respondent’s visits with Z.M. had become sporadic. While 

respondent testified he canceled or rescheduled some weekly visits because he did not have “car 

fare” to travel to Joliet, there is no indication that he relayed this issue to the caseworker or to the 

trial court at any point during the relevant nine-month period. Rather, the evidence is clear that 

while respondent could have visited Z.M. twice per week, he only attended visits approximately 

once per week and averaged only three visits per month. 

¶ 70 Therefore, based on our review of the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing, the 

trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant ninemonth period was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because only one ground for 

a finding of unfitness is necessary to uphold the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness, we 

need not review the other basis for the court’s unfitness finding. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 
- 28 -

340, 349 (2005) (a parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness 

is supported by the evidence). 

¶ 71 C. Best Interest

¶ 72 Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of 

Z.M. to terminate his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State 

and the guardian ad litem argue the trial court did not err in finding that it was in Z.M.’s best 

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 73 At the best interest stage, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 365-66 

(2004). In making its determination, a court must consider several factors “in the context of the 

child’s age and developmental needs,” including (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare, 

including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the 

child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious background; (4) the 

child’s sense of attachment, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships 

with parent figures; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) community ties, including

church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every 

family and every child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the 

persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016). At this stage of the 

proceedings, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the 

child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Once a trial court has 

found that a parent is unfit, all considerations yield to the best interest of the minor and the 

minor’s interest in a stable, loving, and safe home environment. Id. A trial court’s best interest 
- 29 -

determination will only be disturbed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re 

Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 51-52 (2005). 

¶ 74 Here, the evidence shows that Z.M. lived with her great aunt and uncle in a threebedroom home, with no safety issues. Z.M. appeared to be happy, and her aunt and uncle were 

able and willing to meet her financial, medical, and emotional needs. She was bonded with her 

foster mother, and she participated in activities with her extended family members. While there 

was evidence that Z.M. was bonded with respondent, the evidence also indicated that Z.M. was 

in need of permanency. Z.M. had been living with her aunt and uncle since she was removed 

from the care of her mother and respondent in March 2016 and her foster parents were willing to 

adopt her. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that 

it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 75 CONCLUSION

¶ 76 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 77 Affirmed. 

¶ 78 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring: 

¶ 79 Due Process Violation 

¶ 80 Relying on what I believe to be the fundamental justice and fairness that the due process 

clause protects (Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004) 

(“[t]he due process clause protects fundamental justice and fairness”)), I cannot agree with the 

majority’s ultimate finding that no due process violation occurred in this case. I, therefore, 

respectfully dissent from that conclusion. 
- 30 -

¶ 81 The essence of respondent’s argument on this issue is that the trial court’s failure to 

admonish him of his right to appeal the adjudicatory order making Z.M. a ward of the court 

violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. It seems clear to me that he is 

correct in this conclusion. 

¶ 82 A parent has a fundamental due process right to the care, custody, and control of his 

children. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (2003). However, the right is subject to 

termination. Id. Because of this, “the procedures employed in this type of proceeding must 

comply with the requirements of procedural due process.” Id. “Procedural due process claims 

question the constitutionality of the procedures used to deny a person’s life, liberty, or property.”

Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 272. The due process clause mandates that the opportunity to be heard occur 

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 277. A due process issue presents a 

question of law reviewed de novo. In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 674, 677 (2002). 

¶ 83 The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), classified three factors 

that this court must consider in determining whether due process was given in a proceeding:

(1) the private interest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation 

of that interest through the proceedings used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 

substitute safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the 

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards would entail.

Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165. “These same factors are considered in resolving what procedural 

safeguards are required by the due process clause of the Illinois constitution.” Id. Our supreme 

court has applied the Mathews factors in cases involving the termination of parental rights. Id.

¶ 84 In the instant situation, all of the relevant questions have been answered for us by higher 

authorities. Relative to the first factor, the founding fathers and the Supreme Courts of the United 
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States and the State of Illinois have determined that a parent has a fundamental due process right 

to the care, custody, and control of his children and that a parent cannot be deprived of that right 

without due process of law. The second and third factors relating to the risk of erroneous 

deprivation and the government’s interest have been evaluated and resolved by the Illinois 

legislature through its enactment of section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 

405/1-5(3) (West 2016)). The legislature implicitly determined that the removal of a child from 

the custody of his or her parent through an adjudication transferring wardship to the State

(1) posed a risk of erroneous deprivation requiring an opportunity to appeal and (2) that any 

fiscal and administrative burdens of an appeal did not override the need to provide appellate 

review. Accordingly, the opportunity to appeal the adjudication of wardship is necessary to due 

process and, therefore, to fundamental justice and fairness. 

¶ 85 The State has conceded that the trial court did not admonish respondent of his right to 

appeal and presumably also concedes the resulting denial of due process. But the State argues 

that none of that matters because respondent did not timely file a notice of appeal from the 

specific orders and this court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to hear his challenge to the 

adjudicatory and dispositional orders that were entered in October 2016. 

¶ 86 The majority agrees, making a specific finding that we do not have jurisdiction to review 

the October 2016 orders because no appeal was timely filed. Supra ¶ 50. Although the majority 

acknowledges the potential of a due process violation, it finds, as did the State, it does not matter 

but for a different reason. The majority relies on the fact that respondent is not actually 

challenging those orders that the legislature deemed he had a right to appeal. The majority has 

that “out” because, in order to avoid jurisdictional preclusion, respondent has forgone the direct 

challenge and has instead argued that all orders subsequent to the 2016 orders are void because 
- 32 -

of the due process violation. The majority finds that we do have jurisdiction to review that claim. 

Although not explicitly stated, I believe the majority applied a variant of the “step in the 

procedural progression” rule in reaching its conclusion. See Burtell v. First Charter Service 

Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979) (“the unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a step in the 

procedural progression leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). I accept that conclusion.

¶ 87 Turning to the merits of the due process argument, I have no problem finding that the 

trial court’s error did, in fact, deprive respondent of notice and an opportunity to be timely heard 

on the removal of his daughter from his custody and her placement under the wardship of the 

State. I would also find it beyond dispute that this error constituted an actual and complete 

violation of respondent’s right to due process—a violation that cannot be eradicated or negated 

by the majority’s post facto assessment that respondent would not have appealed even if he had 

known he possessed the right. 

¶ 88 Unlike the majority, I believe that, although the question is irrelevant, there is a 

reasonable likelihood that respondent would have challenged the order of wardship had he 

known he could. He had joined in the stipulation that Z.M.’s environment was injurious to her, 

but he was not responsible for that environment. Z.M. was removed from the custodial residence 

by police who had been called to the home by respondent, who was there by permission for 

agreed-upon visitation with his daughter. He awoke from sleep to the odor of marijuana, and 

when he objected to its use in the child’s presence, he was physically attacked by either the 

child’s mother or the mother’s cousin. In an appeal of the wardship decision, respondent could 

have advanced a reasonable argument that he was fit to have custody and there is a notunreasonable chance that, absent all of the subsequent proceedings and the mistakes and missteps 
- 33 -

he later made, he might have succeeded in securing custody of his daughter. He was actually 

prejudiced by being caught up long term in the often-flawed process for dealing with children 

deemed to be abused and neglected.

¶ 89 Clearly respondent’s constitutional right to due process was violated. The real question is 

whether the violation can be redressed either by the relief sought by respondent or in any other 

way. The complete do-over that respondent seeks in this case has some appeal for me simply 

because it seems fair and is, perhaps, in the ultimate best interest of Z.M. Unfortunately I think 

any meaningful relief of this violation is precluded by the concept of timeliness, not in the 

jurisdictional sense but by the requirement that notice and the opportunity to be heard occur at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 277. Here I believe the 

potential for relief has been mooted by all of the very real circumstances that have occurred 

within this family between October 2016 and now. They all happened, and we cannot make them 

unhappen, and we cannot rewrite their consequences. In my opinion, there was a due process 

violation, and we cannot redress it.

¶ 90 Fitness and Best Interest Findings 

¶ 91 Turning to the merits of respondent’s appeal from the finding of unfitness and the 

termination of his parental rights, I reach the same conclusion as that reached by the trial court 

and the majority. I start with a truth that seems to be frequently ignored or discounted by the 

State in its zealous judicial advocacy for uprooted children: there are no perfect parents; there are 

only degrees of parental imperfection. In this case, the majority has found that Donald failed to 

comply with the directives in his service plan during the relevant nine-month period, as 

designated by the State. I would note that he had, nonetheless, taken substantial steps in 

complying with that plan during the initial nine-month period. During that time, Donald 
- 34 -

maintained adequate housing and income. He also completed domestic violence courses, 

completed individual therapy, and completed substance abuse treatment, which included 

parenting classes. When it became apparent that Donald would need to undergo a second round 

of substance abuse treatment, a miscommunication between Donald and his caseworker about 

the source of provider information resulted in a delay in his commencement of treatment until 

March 2018. He did, however, begin the treatment after the designated nine-month period had 

ended. 

¶ 92 Although Donald’s visits with his daughter became “sporadic,” this was largely due to his 

lack of transportation. Even given this limitation, Donald participated appropriately in visits with 

Z.M., and they had a great relationship. Indeed, although the child called her foster mother 

“mama,” she referred to her foster father as “uncle” and continued to call Donald “dad.” Notably, 

the trial court observed “I could say unequivocally, I understand that [respondent] loves his 

daughter.” Clearly, Donald and his daughter were strongly and lovingly bonded. 

¶ 93 Nonetheless, the statutory directive of section 1(D)(m), which states that “ ‘failure to 

make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent’ includes a parent’s failure 

to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 

2016)), compels a finding that, based on the facts, the trial court’s finding of unfitness was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 94 For these reasons, I concur with the majority’s finding that Donald was properly found 

unfit and his parental rights were appropriately terminated.