FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOC’S DREAM, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DOLORES PRESS, INC. AND MELISSA 

SCOTT,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 18-56073

D.C. No.

2:15-CV-02857-

R-PLA

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 6, 2020*

Pasadena, California

Filed May 13, 2020

* The court is of the unanimous opinion that the facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the 

decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.

Accordingly, this case was submitted on the briefs and record, without 

oral argument, on Wednesday, May 6, 2020. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan and John B. Owens, Circuit 

Judges, and Edward R. Korman,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

SUMMARY***

Copyright / Attorney’s Fees

The panel vacated the district court’s order denying 

defendant’s motion for recovery of attorney’s fees under the 

Copyright Act and remanded.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

defendant on a complaint seeking a declaration that the 

works at issue were abandoned to the public domain. The 

district court denied defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, 

holding that fees were not available under 17 U.S.C. § 505 

because the determination of copyright abandonment did not 

require construction of the Copyright Act.

Vacating the district court’s order, the panel held that, 

even when asserted as a claim for declaratory relief, any 

action that turns on the existence of a valid copyright and 

whether that copyright has been infringed invokes the 

Copyright Act, thus giving the district court discretion to 

award reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to § 505.

** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge 

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 3

COUNSEL

Benjamin G. Schatz, Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Los 

Angeles, California; Kevin J. Leichter and Andrew E. 

Hewitt, The Leichter Firm APC, Los Angeles, California; 

Mark S. Lee, Rimon PC, Los Angeles, California; for 

Defendants-Appellants.

Carlos A. Leyva and Linda S. McAleer, Digital Business 

Law Group PA, Palm Harbor, Florida, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Since 2014, two camps have battled over the ownership 

rights and usage of video-recorded sermons created by the 

late religious leader Dr. Eugene Scott. One camp—

copyright claimants Dolores Press, Inc. and Melissa Scott 

(collectively, Dolores)—alleges that the other camp—

Patrick Robinson, Truth Seekers, Inc., Doc’s Dream, LLC, 

and Bobbi Jones (collectively, Doc’s Dream)—infringed 

copyrighted broadcasts via the Internet. Amid the litany of 

claims, counterclaims, and motions, the district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Dolores on Doc’s 

Dream’s complaint seeking a declaration that Dr. Scott 

completely abandoned his works to the public domain. 

Doc’s Dream appealed and we affirmed. Doc’s Dream, LLC 

v. Dolores Press, Inc., 766 F. App’x 467 (9th Cir. 2019).

Dolores then moved for recovery of attorney’s fees under 

the Copyright Act, which allows the court to award “a 

reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party “[i]n any 
4 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

civil action under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The district 

court denied Dolores’ motion, holding that attorney’s fees 

were not available under § 505 because the determination of 

copyright abandonment in this case did not require 

“construction” of the Copyright Act.

Dolores timely appealed the district court’s denial of 

attorney’s fees, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We hold that, even when asserted as a claim for 

declaratory relief, any action that turns on the existence of a 

valid copyright and whether that copyright has been 

infringed invokes the Copyright Act, and thus attorney’s fees 

may be available pursuant to § 505.

I.

The underlying facts are undisputed. Dr. Eugene Scott 

worked as an ordained minister for nearly half a century, the 

last 35 years as the pastor of the Wescott Christian Center 

and Faith Center in Glendale, California. In 1983, he 

launched the first 24-hour-a-day religious television 

network, reaching audiences throughout North America. In 

1995, he licensed Dolores Press, Inc. to distribute his works 

to the public, with profits going to his church. During this 

time, Dr. Scott made his works available for online viewing 

through websites bearing his name. When Dr. Scott died in 

2005, he bequeathed all his copyrights to his widow, Pastor 

Melissa Scott. Ms. Scott continued the license agreement 

with Dolores Press, Inc.

In 2014, Patrick Robinson, a Georgia minister and sole 

owner of Doc’s Dream, requested permission to share 

Dr. Scott’s works with his students online. When Ms. Scott 

refused his request, Robinson launched a website sharing 

Dr. Scott’s works in order “to stick it to the devil” and “get 
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 5

the ball rolling in this legal battle.” Robinson succeeded in 

the latter.

Initially, the parties filed four actions. In three of the 

lawsuits, Dolores alleged copyright infringement by Doc’s 

Dream. Doc’s Dream, 766 F. App’x at 469. In the fourth, 

Doc’s Dream claimed that Dr. Scott had abandoned rights to 

his works before his death. Id. The district court dismissed 

Dolores’ three suits and granted summary judgment in favor 

of Dolores as to the fourth. Id. at 469–70. On appeal, we 

reversed all three dismissals and affirmed the summary 

judgment. Id. at 470.

As the prevailing party in the summary judgment ruling, 

Dolores sought recovery of attorney’s fees under the feeshifting provision within the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505. Dolores argued that it was eligible for attorney’s fees 

because Doc’s Dream’s claim for declaratory relief was: 

(1) unreasonable given its slim chance of success; 

(2) brought in bad faith because of Doc’s Dream’s 

underhanded tactics; and (3) worthy of deterrence as a 

meritless claim that forced Dolores to incur defensive legal 

costs. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 

1979, 1985 (2016). Dolores also asserted that its request for 

$307,689.93 in attorney’s fees was “reasonable.” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505.

The district court held that attorney’s fees were not 

available pursuant to § 505. It reasoned that generally “each 

party bears its own litigation expenses absent a statute, rule, 

or other ground entitling the moving party to recover 

expenses.” The Copyright Act is one such statute, but its 

application is not automatic. Noting that the Ninth Circuit 

had not explicitly held that attorney’s fees are available 

under the Copyright Act in declaratory relief actions, the 

district court turned to a leading treatise on copyright law. 
6 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on 

Copyright (Nimmer). In particular, the district court asserted 

“that courts generally award attorneys’ fees under the 

Copyright Act in declaratory relief actions so long as the 

action requires construction of the Copyright Act.” Nimmer 

§14.10[B][1][b].

The district court read Nimmer to indicate that if a 

declaratory relief action is only superficially related to 

copyright, it “does not arise under the Copyright Act,” and 

“fees could not be awarded under the Copyright Act.” 

Addressing the primary issue—whether Dr. Scott had 

abandoned his works—the district court explained that 

“[c]opyright abandonment is a judicially-created doctrine 

based in principles of equity; it is not based on any provision 

of the Copyright Act.” It noted that when Congress enacted 

the Copyright Act, 25 years after the creation of the 

copyright abandonment doctrine, it could have included the 

doctrine in the Act—but it did not.

The district court further asserted that copyright 

abandonment, like abandonment in other property contexts, 

requires certain elements not enumerated within the 

Copyright Act. Here, the critical elements were whether 

Dr. Scott displayed “intent to abandon ownership and some 

overt act manifesting this intent.” The district court 

concluded that determining whether these elements were 

met did not require it to construe the Copyright Act.1

1 The district court reasoned:

[C]opyright abandonment presumes that the creator 

initially enjoyed an intellectual property interest in his 

works. A court’s only task is to determine whether the 

creator subsequently manifested his intent to abandon 
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 7

II.

“We review the district court’s decision to award 

attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act for an abuse of 

discretion.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 556 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citing Maljack Prods. v. GoodTimes Homes 

Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, 

“‘any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation 

which figure in the district court’s decision are reviewable 

de novo.’” Id. (quoting Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1150 

(9th Cir. 1985)).

III.

This appeal raises an issue of first impression in the 

Ninth Circuit: whether Doc’s Dream’s underlying action 

seeking declaratory relief sufficiently invokes the Copyright 

Act as to allow for an award of attorney’s fees under 

17 U.S.C. § 505. That statute provides:

In any civil action under this title, the court in 

its discretion may allow the recovery of full 

costs by or against any party other than the 

United States or an officer thereof. Except as 

otherwise provided by this title, the court 

this interest. Such a task does not require—and in this 

case did not require—the court to construe the 

Copyright Act. See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 

154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing 

copyright abandonment without construing Copyright 

Act). . . . Accordingly, the Copyright Act cannot 

provide a basis for costs or fees in this action.
8 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to 

the prevailing party as part of the costs.

17 U.S.C. § 505.

The district court’s denial of attorney’s fees appears to 

be based on two leaps of logic. Neither is persuasive. First, 

it held that in order to be a civil action under the Copyright 

Act, a declaratory judgment must require “construction” of 

the Copyright Act. Second, the district court reasoned that 

because copyright abandonment is a judicially created 

doctrine based in principles of equity and not on any 

provision of the Copyright Act, a declaratory relief action 

based on abandonment does not invoke the Copyright Act.

A.

Although § 505 allows for the discretionary award of 

attorney’s fees in “any civil action under this title,” the 

district court focused on Nimmer’s use of the word 

“construction” to limit application of the Copyright Act. 

When read in context, Nimmer does not support this 

limitation.

Nimmer states that § 505 “prevents copyright 

infringements from going unchallenged” and “serves to 

penalize the losing party as well as to compensate the 

prevailing party.” Nimmer, supra, §14.10[A]. It then notes 

that “[c]lassically, when A sues B for copyright 

infringement, the prevailing party is eligible to recover its 

attorney’s fees. Accordingly, either A or B may become the

beneficiary of [§ 505], within the court’s discretion.” Id. 

§14.10[B][1][a].

The district court cited Nimmer’s discussion of 

declaratory relief in §14.10[B][1][b] to support its 
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 9

conclusion that attorney’s fees were not available because 

Doc’s Dream’s action did not require construction of the 

Copyright Act. A careful reading of the subsection is to the 

contrary:

[I]magine that C sues D for a declaration 

regarding copyright—for instance, that D

performed her services on a for-hire basis, 

meaning that she has no interest in the 

copyright. In reply, D counterclaims for a 

declaration that she worked outside of 

employment, and accordingly owns the 

copyright in the subject work, either outright 

or as an equal co-owner with C. In that 

instance, jurisdiction in federal court arises 

under the Declaratory Relief Act as well as 

being premised on the need to construe the 

provisions of the Copyright Act. So, the 

Copyright Act allows courts, in their 

discretion, to grant attorney’s fees to the 

prevailing party under those circumstances.

The same considerations would appear to 

control any time the action at hand requires 

construction of the Copyright Act—such as a 

case in which E sues F for a declaration that 

the work in question falls outside the scope of 

copyright protection or that the exploitation 

at hand falls outside the rights accorded to the 

copyright owner. But, at the limit, one could 

imagine a case requiring no construction of 

the Copyright Act—for instance, one in 

which G sues H for a half share of royalties 

due from exploitation of their shared work. 

In that instance, the case does not appear to 
10 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

arise under Title 17 of the United States 

Code, and fees therefore may not be awarded 

under the Copyright Act.

Id. §14.10[B][1][b].2

Among Nimmer’s explanatory hypotheticals, the one 

involving E and F is nearly identical to this case. Doc’s 

Dream sued Dolores alleging that Dr. Scott had abandoned 

his works, seeking “a declaration that the work[s] in question 

fall[] outside the scope of copyright protection.” Id. 

Following Nimmer’s E/F example, this requires 

consideration of the Copyright Act.

Without discussing any of Nimmer’s hypotheticals, the 

district court implicitly concluded that Nimmer’s G/H 

example—the only hypothetical Nimmer places beyond the 

limit of the Copyright Act—applies here. But that 

hypothetical involves a contract dispute over royalties due 

under an accepted copyright, not a dispute over copyright 

ownership. Nimmer notes that such “[a]ccountings between 

joint copyright owners are handled strictly under state law.” 

Id. at n.18. Doc’s Dream and Dolores contest, at a minimum, 

whether Dr. Scott abandoned his copyrights. Thus, the scope 

of the copyrights and their possible abandonment are very 

much at issue.

This is the critical distinction between Nimmer’s first 

three examples—A/B, C/D, and E/F—in which the parties 

dispute copyright ownership or usage, and the fourth, G/H, 

2 Nimmer’s discussion on declaratory relief contains no citation to 

any court decision. Indeed, it recognizes that the contours of “any civil 

action under this title” have not been delineated. Nimmer, supra, 

§14.10[B][1].
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 11

where they do not. Only in the fourth hypothetical is there 

no “construction” of the Copyright Act. We read § 505, as 

does Nimmer, to allow the discretionary award of attorney’s 

fees in any action where the scope of the copyright is at issue.

B.

We also reject the district court’s assertion that the 

genesis of copyright abandonment provides an alternate 

ground for denying attorney’s fees. The district court noted 

that Judge Learned Hand created the doctrine of copyright 

abandonment in Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 

191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (stating that abandonment 

requires “some overt act which manifests [the copyright 

holder’s] purpose to surrender his rights in the ‘work,’ and 

to allow the public to copy it”). We adopted this standard in 

Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 

(9th Cir. 1960). The district court deduced that because this 

doctrine predates the Copyright Act by 25 years and 

abandonment is not unique to copyright law, the doctrine of 

copyright abandonment exists outside the Copyright Act.

But the judicial origin of the copyright abandonment 

doctrine does not mean that an action alleging abandonment 

does not invoke the Copyright Act. The district court’s grant 

of summary judgment shows that Doc’s Dream’s complaint 

raised at least three aspects of the Copyright Act. First, the 

district court reasoned that Dr. Scott’s “attribution 

requirement is incompatible with copyright abandonment.” 

Copyright attribution is governed by 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 

Second, the district court stated that Dr. Scott’s free 

distribution of his works online “is more consistent with a 

license for use” than a relinquishment of his exclusive rights. 

The transfer of copyright ownership, including licensing, is 

defined within §§ 101 and 204. Third, the district court 

explained that because Dr. Scott affixed copyright notices to 
12 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

his works, he did not intend to abandon them. The legal 

effect of copyright notices is controlled by § 401. In sum, 

the district court’s summary judgment order required 

consideration of the Copyright Act.

Certainly, the elements required for copyright 

abandonment—overt acts and intent—parallel other forms 

of property abandonment. See United States v. Crawford, 

239 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (physical artwork); 

United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935, 945 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (water rights); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 

Zuckerman, 234 Cal. Rptr. 630, 650 (Ct. App. 1987) 

(underground gas rights). But it is difficult—if not 

impossible—to properly evaluate an intellectual property 

creator’s alleged abandonment without invoking the 

Copyright Act. The district court asserts that we did so in 

Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To the contrary, Micro Star’s finding of partial abandonment 

includes an analysis of whether Formgen had granted either 

an exclusive or non-exclusive license, requiring reference to 

§ 204(a). Id. at 1113–14. Micro Star did not deny that it 

was construing the Copyright Act and it did not mention 

attorney’s fees.

In sum, we think that a declaratory relief action alleging 

abandonment of a copyright invokes sufficient 

“construction” of the Copyright Act to allow for the 

discretionary award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505.

C.

In a final effort to defend the district court’s ruling, 

Doc’s Dream asserts that “this is not an action that was 

brought under the Copyright Act but rather one that was 

brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act (‘DJA’).” This 
DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS 13

assertion fails as it is based on a misunderstanding of the 

scope of the DJA and the interplay required between it and 

federal questions of law.

The DJA and Copyright Act work in tandem. In certain 

circumstances, “jurisdiction in federal court arises under the 

Declaratory Relief Act as well as being premised on the need 

to construe the provisions of the Copyright Act.” Nimmer, 

supra, §14.10[B][1][b]. The DJA alone does not create 

federal jurisdiction. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 

Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“[T]he kinds of issues which 

give right of entrance to federal courts . . . was not altered by 

the Declaratory Judgment Act.”). It is unclear how, absent 

the Copyright Act, Doc’s Dream would have asserted federal 

court jurisdiction.

In any event, Doc’s Dream’s complaint specifically 

invoked the Copyright Act. “[A]n action arises under the 

federal copyright laws if . . . the complaint is for a remedy 

expressly granted by the Act, . . . or asserts a claim requiring 

construction of the Act.” Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 

580, 584 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted). Doc’s Dream’s complaint “seeks a declaration 

from this Court concerning the Copyright Act,” and alleges 

jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) 

and 1338(a) (copyright). Indeed, in addition to alleging 

Dr. Scott’s copyright abandonment, the complaint requested 

reasonable attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505.

D.

Under § 505, an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing 

party is not automatic and instead lies within the discretion 

of the court. See Shame On You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 

893 F.3d 661, 665–66 (9th Cir. 2018). Section 505 gives 

“broad leeway” to the district courts, but the Supreme Court 
14 DOC’S DREAM V. DOLORES PRESS

has “established several principles and criteria to guide their 

decisions.” Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1985 (citing Fogerty v. 

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 519 (1994)). Here, the district 

court’s erroneous determination that copyright abandonment 

exists beyond the purview of the Copyright Act precluded 

such an evaluation.

IV.

The fee-shifting provision of § 505 applies to “any civil 

action under” the Copyright Act. We hold that any action 

that turns on the existence of a valid copyright and whether 

that copyright has been infringed sufficiently invokes the 

Copyright Act as to allow for the discretionary award of 

attorney’s fees. This ruling encompasses claims of 

copyright abandonment, even when asserted in a claim for 

declaratory relief. Accordingly, Doc’s Dream’s claim arises 

under the Copyright Act, giving the court discretion to award 

reasonable attorney’s fees to Dolores.

Because the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees was 

based on an erroneous view of the law, we vacate and 

remand for the district court to consider whether an award of 

attorney’s fees is appropriate under the guiding factors. See, 

e.g., Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19; Shame On You Prods., 

893 F.3d at 665–66.

Costs on appeal are to be taxed against Doc’s Dream. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 39.

VACATED and REMANDED.