alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### R.P., A Minor, by His Parents and Next Friends, Dietra Pinn, et al., Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and Michelle Rhee, Chancellor, District of Columbia Public Schools, Appellees.

No. 07-7051.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

March 28, 2008.

John O. Iweanoge, II, Jude Chidedu Iweanoge, Iweanoge Law Center, Washington, DC, for Appellants.

William J. Earl, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Edward Eugene Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Office of the Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 34(j). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

More than 90 days after a hearing officer dismissed their claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400*et seq.,*the appellants filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Because the IDEA, as amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, grants parties only 90 days in which to bring such an action, *id.*§ 1415(i)(2)(B), the district court correctly dismissed the suit as untimely filed.

In support of their contention that their civil complaint was timely, the appellants cite procedural rules that grant a party several additional days to act after service is made. Fed. R. Civ. P 6(e) (“Whenever a party must or may act within a prescribed period after service ..., 3 days are added after the prescribed period would otherwise expire.... ”); D.C. Cir. R. 26(c) (same); D.C. Ct. App. R. 15(a) (granting 5 additional days from the date a decision is mailed). These provisions, however, all relate to filing periods that do not begin until after service or notice. By contrast, under the plain language of the IDEA, the 90-day period in which a party must file a civil action runs from the date of the hearing officer’s decision, rather than from the date of service or notice. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (“The party bringing the action shall have 90 days *from the date of the decision*of the hearing officer to bring such an action .... ” (emphasis added)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e), D.C. Circuit Rule 26, and D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 15(a) therefore do not extend the 90-day period, which is mandatory. The appellants raise no other argument on appeal.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36(b), this decision will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold the issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after the disposition of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. RApp. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).
#### Nancy Hecker, Appellant, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.

[665 NYS2d 660]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Salvador Collazo, J.), entered on or about May 20, 1996, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by plaintiffs brief, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied and the complaint reinstated.

Plaintiff sustained injuries after she slipped in the stairway of her building, which is owned by defendant. She was taken to the hospital, where she remained for two weeks. Upon her release, she returned to the site of the accident and noticed a large chip missing from one of the steps in the area where she fell. At her General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing and deposition, plaintiff testified that the chip in the stair must have been the cause of her fall, since she held the banister while walking and was neither rushing nor walking in a haphazard manner when she fell. The IAS Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting plaintiffs claim that her testimony created triable issues of fact on the questions of causation and constructive notice.

We reverse and deny summary judgment. Plaintiffs testimony that she slipped on the stairs between the second and third floors of defendant’s building, and returned soon after and noticed a large chip missing from one of the steps, is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the chipped step was a substantial cause in plaintiffs fall and resulting injuries *(Mazzella v Bronze Plumbing & Heating Corp.,*194 AD2d 327; *Farrar v Teicholz,*173 AD2d 674, 676). Further, her description of the defect as a five-inch wide and three-inch deep “big chip” created an inference that the condition came into being over a sufficient period of time such that defendant should have acquired knowledge thereof and corrected it *(see, Taylor v New York City Tr. Auth.,*48 NY2d 903, *132904; *Blake v City of Albany,*48 NY2d 875, 877-878; *Batton v Elghanayan,*43 NY2d 898, 900; *Farrar v Teicholz, supra; Ferlito v Great S. Bay Assocs.,*140 AD2d 408, 408-409; *Karten v City of New York,*109 AD2d 126, 127-128; *see generally, Gordon v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836). Concur—Nardelli, J. P., Mazzarelli, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                    ------------



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the quarterly report of PalWeb Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending August 31, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert H. Nelson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.




October 20, 2004                       /s/ Robert H. Nelson
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Robert H. Nelson, Chief Financial Officer




     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

     The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Report and shall not be considered
filed as part of the Report.
#### Joe Ann HAMILTON; Ernest Hamilton; Allean Brooks, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Carolyn Johnson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Kimberly Williams-Thompson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated; Suzanna L. Brown, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs — Appellees v. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant — Appellant.

No. 10-10571.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 27, 2011.

Eric G. Calhoun, Travis & Calhoun, P.C., Dallas, TX, Edward W. Ciolko, Peter A. Muhic, Esq., Barroway, Topaz, Kessler, Meltzer *&*Check, L.L.P., Radnor, PA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Charles A. Newman, Esq., Michael Joseph Duvall, Esq., Elizabeth T. Ferrick, Esq., Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, L.L.P., Darci F. Madden, Bryan Cave, L.L.P., St. Louis, MO, Kenneth Chaim Broodo, Gardere Wynne Sewell, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Richard M. Zuckerman, Esq., Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, L.L.P., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This court recently affirmed the denial of class certification in a suit involving title insurance premium discounts allegedly due under Texas law. *Benavides v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,*636 F.3d 699 (5th Cir.2011). Since the present case involves issues similar to those addressed in *Bena-vides,*we VACATE the district court’s class certification order and REMAND for reconsideration in light of *Benavides.*

Without expressing a view on the merits of this case, we also caution plaintiffs counsel to avoid unnecessarily extending this litigation if *Benavides*compels an end to it. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1927.

VACATED and REMANDED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**EXHIBIT      32.1 **

**CERTIFICATION      **

| (1) | The                Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section                13(a) or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in                all                material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                of                the company at the end of the periods covered by the Quarterly Report. |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By:    | /s/                Steven Malone                       |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | Steven                Malone                           |
|   |   | President                & Chief Executive Officer |
#### Gregory Batties, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[986 NYS2d 349]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated October 31, 2013, which denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On January 20, 2012, at approximately 6:30 p.m., the plaintiff was crossing Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn when he allegedly was struck by an Access-A-Ride van, operated by Francis D. Leon. The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the City of New York, the New York City Transit Authority, and Leon to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and the Supreme Court denied the motion.

The plaintiff made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that, before entering the crosswalk on Eastern Parkway, he looked both ways for oncoming vehicles, and that, as he was crossing Eastern Parkway within the crosswalk, with the pedestrian control device and the traffic light in his favor, Leon failed to yield the right-of-way to him. Thus, the plaintiff demonstrated that Leon violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (a) and that the plaintiff was free from comparative fault *(see Ramos v Bartis,*112 AD3d 804 [2013]; *Moreira v M.K. Travel & Transp., Inc.,*106 AD3d 965, 966 [2013]; *Klee v Americas Best Bottling Co., Inc.,*60 AD3d 911 [2009]; *Sulaiman v Thomas,*54 AD3d 751 [2008]; *Voskin v Lemel, 52*AD3d 503 [2008]). However, in opposition to the motion, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to how the accident occurred *(see Thoma v Ronai,*82 NY2d 736, 737 [1993]; *Pieper v Hussein,*102 AD3d 760, 761 [2013]; *Azeem v Cava,*92 AD3d 821, 821 [2012]; *Yi Min Feng v Jin Won Oh,*71 AD3d 879 [2010]; *Cator v Filipe,*47 AD3d 664 [2008]; *Dragunova v Dondero,*305 AD2d 449, 450 [2003]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Rivera, J.P, Austin, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ, concur.
#### In Re: Michael Leshawn BANKS, Debtor. Patina, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Leshawn Banks, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-13598.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 11, 2011.

Jamie Blucher, Richard B. Webber, II, Zimmerman Kiser Sutcliffe, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kenneth D. Herron, Jr., Wolff, Hill, McFarlin & Herron, P.A., Orlando, FL, Howard S. Marks, Burr & Forman LLP, Winter Park, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before MARTIN, FAY and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant obtained a judgment against the appellee/debtor in Alabama. The appellee/debtor filed for bankruptcy in Florida and obtained relief from the judgment. The district court affirmed the rulings of the bankruptcy court. After carefully reviewing the issues on appeal, studying the briefs and the record, and having the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 346 

To repeal the provision of law that provides for automatic pay adjustments 

for Members of Congress. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 8, 2009 

Mr. PLATTS (for himself and Ms. FOXX) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on House Administration, and in addition 

to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to 

be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 

concerned 

A BILL 

To repeal the provision of law that provides for automatic 

pay adjustments for Members of Congress. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF AUTOMATIC PAY ADJUST4 MENTS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (2) of section 601(a) 

6 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 

7 31) is repealed. 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•HR 346 IH

1 (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

2 Section 601(a)(1) of such Act is amended— 

3 (1) by striking ‘‘(a)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘(a)’’; 

4 (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), 

5 and (C) as paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; 

6 and 

7 (3) by striking ‘‘, as adjusted by paragraph (2) 

8 of this subsection’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
---

CONSENT OF EXPERT

March 1, 2007

Augusta Resource Corporation

United States Securities and Exchange Commission

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Re: Augusta Resource
Corporation

I, Michael R. Pawlowski, do
hereby consent to the filing of the written disclosure of the technical report
entitled Mineral Resources Estimate  Revised Technical report for the Rosemont
Deposit, Pima County, Arizona dated April 21, 2006 (the Technical Report) and
any extracts from or a summary of the Technical Report in the Form 40-F Annual
Report dated March 1, 2007 (the Form 40-F Annual Report) of Augusta Resource
Corporation (the Company), and to the filing of the Technical Report and this
consent with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission as part of the
Companys Form 40-F Annual Report.

I also consent to the use of my
name in the Companys Form 40-F Annual Report.

| | By: | (Signed) Michael R. Pawlowski   
| | --- | --------------------------------
| |     | Name: Michael R.
      Pawlowski
| |     | Title: Consultant               
| |     | Location: Gilbert, Arizona      

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

P.J.A.,

Petitioner

v.

H.C.N.,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 211 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 5th day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowa nce of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Anthony L. McNAIR, Apostle, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCKY MOUNT DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Defendant-Appellee. Anthony L. McNair, Apostle, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rocky Mount Police Department; J. Wayne Sears; Jenny L. Matthews, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 11-1161, 11-1162.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 11, 2011.

Decided: April 15, 2011.

*302Anthony L. McNair, Appellant Pro Se.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony L. McNair appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendations of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006). Because McNair’s informal briefs fail to address the district court’s basis for dismissing his complaints, this issue has been abandoned. *See*4th Cir. R. 34(b); *Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc.,*562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir.2009), *cert. denied,*- U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1140, 175 L.Ed.2d 991 (2010). Accordingly, we deny McNair’s motions for protection and affirm the district court’s order. *McNair v. Rocky Mount Dist. Att’y’s Office,*No. 5:10-cv-00546-FL; *McNair v. Rocky Mount Police Dep’t,*No. 5:10-cv-00561-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2011; Jan. 25, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 7295** 

ALONZO KEY , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,
v. SOUTH CAROLINA, STATE OF; AIKEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; BADGE 450 PHILLIP S. MIANO; BADGE 545 MATHEW BARNWE LL; BADGE 520 CPL SPANN; BADGE 159 CPL SMITH; CPL EAGERTON, Officers of Aiken Department of Public Safety , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Aiken
. David C . Norton , District Judge. ( 1:11

- cv - 01613

- DCN

- JRM )

Submitted : February 9 , 2012 Decided: February 14, 2012

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Alonzo Key, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublish ed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Alonzo Key seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing Defendants State of South Carolina and Aiken Police Department wit hout prejudice from Key’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) proceeding . This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (200 6 ), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (200 6 ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. B eneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 , 545

- 46 (1949). The order Key seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny Key’s motion for a transcript at Government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3544 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3544

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide guidelines for the 
 establishment of new national cemeteries by the Secretary of Veterans 
                    Affairs, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 9, 2009

  Mr. Filner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide guidelines for the 
 establishment of new national cemeteries by the Secretary of Veterans 
                    Affairs, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Cemeteries Expansion Act of 
2009''.

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW NATIONAL CEMETERIES BY THE SECRETARY OF 
              VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    Section 2404 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(h)(1) In selecting a location for the establishment of a new 
national cemetery under this chapter, the Secretary shall give priority 
to a location where at least 110,000 veterans reside within a 75-mile 
radius of the location.
    ``(2) In conducting an annual performance measure of the percentage 
of veterans who are served by any cemetery, the Secretary shall--
            ``(A) use census tracts, rather than counties, as the 
        primary geographic unit to test and identify potential 
        locations for new national cemeteries and to determine the 
        percentage of veterans served;
            ``(B) use methods to avoid the double counting of veterans 
        in overlapping service areas; and
            ``(C) count veterans who reside in counties bisected by a 
        service area using a proportional overlay method.''.
                                 <all>
```
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
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THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE NINE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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