alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-1766

EUGENE GRAY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CHESTERFIELD-COLONIAL HEIGHTS DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CA-98-8)

Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: October 14, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eugene Gray, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Latham Micas, County Attorney, Michael Steven Jonas Chernau, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Eugene Gray appeals the district court’s order dismissing his

defamation and various constitutional violations claims. We have

reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. Gray v. Chesterfield-Colonial Hgts. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., No. CA-98-8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 1998). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
CERTIFICATIONS OF CEO PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS
I, John E. Rea, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of RG America, Inc.(the
"Registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the consolidated financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the consolidated financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the Registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant's independent registered public accounting firm and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

November 15, 2004

/s/ John E. Rea
---------------
John E. Rea
Principal Executive Officer
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED 6/30/00 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<CASH>                                           6,426
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,101
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                16,166
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,171
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,046)
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</TABLE>
#### Anthony Cambio, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant.

[988 NYS2d 176]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Kathryn E. Freed, J.), entered July 19, 2013, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff, who is legally blind, alleged in his notice of claim that he fell at a street corner because of defects in the roadway that the City negligently failed to prevent from becoming a “traplike condition.” In his complaint, however, plaintiff alleged that the City negligently failed to maintain the sidewalk, curb *578and roadway, negligently caused and permitted damage thereto, rendering the location dangerous, and failed to properly inspect and repair the location. At the General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, plaintiff testified that the curb was higher than he expected, and in his bill of particulars he alleged that the accident occurred because, when he “stepped off the curb, he was caused to fall into the roadway due to the improper unexpected sudden and excessive drop of the curb to the roadway.”

The City correctly argues that plaintiff raised a new theory of liability in the complaint and bill of particulars by alleging that the City caused and created the defect, since the notice of claim alleged negligent maintenance and did not alert the City that plaintiff would allege a theory of affirmative negligence, or negligent design *(see Rodriguez v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y.,*107 AD3d 651 [1st Dept 2013]; *Sutin v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth.,*54 AD3d 616 [1st Dept 2008]). Plaintiffs time to seek leave to file a late notice of claim has expired *(see*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

In any event, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact as to the City’s negligence or malpractice in the design of the subject curb. Plaintiffs expert relied on the Department of Transportation’s Standard Details of Construction *(see*34 RCNY 2-09 [a] [2]) in asserting that curbs must be seven inches over the adjacent roadway. However, that publication does not impose “a particularized mandate or a clear legal duty” *(see Fazzolari v City of New York,*105 AD3d 409, 409-410 [1st Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see also Hotaling v City of New York,*55 AD3d 396, 398 [1st Dept 2008], *affd*12 NY3d 862 [2009]).

Concur—Tom, J.P, Moskowitz, DeGrasse, ManzanetDaniels and Clark, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<MULTIPLIER>                  1
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                  AUG-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                          1
<CASH>                                           1,311,905
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      123,595
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,491,757
<PP&E>                                             163,219
<DEPRECIATION>                                      33,003
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,778,857
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              516,160
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                               148
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,262,549
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,778,857
<SALES>                                            831,875
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   831,875
<CGS>                                            4,703,385
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,703,385
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,885,548
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (9,628,790)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (9,628,790)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (9,628,790)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (.68)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Francisco Trejo MONTOYA, also known as Francisco Montoya Trejo, also known as Francisco Trejo, also known as Francisco Rivera, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-20388

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Francisco Trejo Montoya, Pollock, LA, pro se.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Francisco Trejo Montoya has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Trejo Montoya has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Second Department,

December, 1997

(December 1, 1997)

#### Muriel Abrahams, as Executor of Sonia Glovinsky, Deceased, Appellant, v King Street Nursing Home, Inc., Respondent.

[664 NYS2d 479]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered May 6, 1996, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and order a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and (2) a judgment of the same court, dated June 14, 1996, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment in this action *(see, Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see,*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The plaintiff’s claim that the jury verdict should have been set aside as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence is without merit. The operative factor in the court’s determination as to whether to set aside a jury verdict is a finding that the jury could not have reached its verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence *(see, Lolik v Big V Supermarkets,*86 NY2d 744).

Here, the defendant nursing home presented evidence that the plaintiff’s decedent’s hospital release form listed her as “able to ambulate”, her doctor did not order that she be restrained during the day, and the defendant’s policy was that residents were not to be restrained without a doctor’s order. Moreover, the plaintiff did not produce any meaningful evidence showing that the defendant was negligent in its supervision of the decedent. Therefore, the jury could reasonably have *252reached the conclusion it did, and the trial court correctly denied the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict. Rosen- - blatt, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Florio, JJ., concur.
J. 

Pal-raguirre 

to include the sentence enhancements, see NRS 173.095 (providing that an 

information may be amended at any time before the verdict or finding "if 

no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the 

defendant are not prejudiced"); Phipps v. State, 111 Nev. 1276, 1279, 903 

P.2d 820, 822 (1995) (observing that oral amendments to a complaint or 

information are permissible "where they are detailed and specific and are 

eventually memorialized"). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

r----7\-e--14,4 

Douglas 

cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. 20 

Pitaro & Fumo, Chtd. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) (94Th (404.)
#### NSK CORPORATION, NSK Ltd., and NSK Europe Ltd., PlaintiffsAppellees, and FAG Italia, S.P.A., Schaeffler Group USA, Inc., Schaeffler KG, The Barden Corporation, and the Barden Corporation (U.K.) Ltd., Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants, and JTEKT Corporation and Koyo Corporation of U.S.A., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and SKF Aeroengine Bearings UK and SKF USA Inc., Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, and The Timken Company, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 2011-1362, 2011-1382, 2011-1383.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 17, 2011.

Max F. Schutzman, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, New York, NY, Herbert C. Shelley, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants.

Neil R. Ellis, Sidley Austin LLP, Matthew P. Jaffe, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Terence P. Stewart, Stewart & Stewart, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Timken Company submits a motion for a stay, pending appeal, of the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade.

Upon consideration thereof,

It Is Ordered That:

NSK Corporation et al. and JTEKT Corporation et al. are directed to respond no later than May 27, 2011. The CIT’s judgment is temporarily stayed pending this court’s consideration of the papers submitted.
#### Gerald L. SMITH, Claimant-Appellant, v. Eric K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2012-7023.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 9, 2012.

*332Gerald L. Smith, of Zephyrhills, FL, pro se.

Joseph A. Pixley, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Todd M. Hughes, Deputy Director.

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PLAGER, and LOURIE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Gerald L. Smith seeks review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”).1 That decision affirmed a June 29, 2010, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) that denied service-connected disability benefits for Mr. Smith’s prostate cancer. Because Mr. Smith does not raise any issues within our jurisdiction, we *dismiss*his appeal.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Smith served in the United States Navy from October 1955, through July 1976. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer in December 2004. In February 2005, he requested service-connected disability benefits, contending that his prostate cancer is due to exposure to Agent Orange during his military service.

The Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office denied Mr. Smith’s claim, and the Board affirmed. The Veterans Court agreed, holding that Mr. Smith was not entitled to a presumption of Agent Orange exposure under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) because he was not present “at some point on the landmass or the inland waters of Vietnam,” *Haas v. Peake,*525 F.3d 1168, 1197 (Fed.Cir.2008), and that his proffered evidence was not competent to establish that he was actually exposed to Agent Orange while in service. *Smith,*2011 WL 5041683, at *2. Mr. Smith now appeals to this court.

Discussion

This court’s review of Veterans Court decisions is strictly limited by statute. Unless an appeal presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). ■

This case falls well within the parameters of a case that turns on an application of established laws and regulations to the facts and circumstances of the case. Because we may not review these types of challenges, *see*38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), we dismiss Mr. Smith’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.2

DISMISSED.

1

. *Smith v. Shinseki,*memorandum decision, No. 10-3016, 2011 WL 5041683 (Vet.App. Oct.25, 2011).

2

. While this case was pending before this court, Mr. Smith submitted several pieces of additional material addressing the merits of his case. That material, if it is to now be considered, must be considered through the proper procedures of veteran administrative law. *See*38 U.S.C. §§ 5103A(f) and 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a).
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of Quest Oil Corp. (the Company), certifies that:

1.

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended December 31, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









|      |                                                                      
|----- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|By:   | /S/
Cameron King

Cameron King

President and Chief Executive Officer
|Date: | February 21, 2006                                                    



This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 205 (Wednesday, October 25, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 49425]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-23152]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--American Society of Mechanical Engineers

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 29, 2017, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (``ASME'') has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing additions or changes to its standards development 
activities. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending 
the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to 
actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, since April 
6, 2017, ASME has published two new standards, initiated four new 
standards activities, withdrawn one standard activity, and discontinued 
one standard activity within the general nature and scope of ASME's 
standards development activities, as specified in its original 
notification. More detail regarding these changes can be found at 
www.asme.org.
    On September 15, 2004, ASME filed its original notification 
pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice 
published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of 
the Act on October 13, 2004 (69 FR 60895).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on April 10, 
2017. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on May 22, 2017 (82 FR 23297).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2017-23152 Filed 10-24-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P