IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50490

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

SAMANTHA CASTRO,

also known as Samantha Moreno Castro,

also known as Samantha M. Castro,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. DR-10-CR01561-AM

Before DAVIS, DeMOSS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Castro appeals her sentence of eighteen months in connection with 

revocation of her supervised release. On appeal, Castro argues that the district 

court did not consider the proper factors in imposing her sentence, and that 

the sentence is an unreasonable departure from the sentencing guidelines. 

* Pursuant to Fifth Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth 

Cir. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 29, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-50490

Because we find that the district court properly considered and applied the 

relevant factors in imposing Castro’s sentence, we AFFIRM. 

I.

On January 20, 2010, Castro was detained and charged with one count 

of transportation of aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1). Castro was 

released on bond and instructed to attend a substance abuse treatment 

program for methamphetamines. She fled the treatment center and a warrant 

for her arrest was issued. Thereafter, she was taken into custody. She was

subsequently sentenced to one year of supervised probation. On May 9, 2011 

Castro’s probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to eight months 

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On February 19, 

2014, the government filed a petition to revoke Castro’s supervised release. 

The district court held a revocation hearing on May 19, 2014, and imposed a 

revocation sentence of eighteen months of imprisonment, to run consecutively 

to any state charges, followed by a second supervised release term of eighteen 

months. 

The following facts and events were considered at the May 19, 2014 

revocation hearing. Among other conditions of her probation, Castro was 

required to: (1) abstain from the use of alcohol and/or all other intoxicants 

during the term of supervision; (2) answer truthfully all inquiries by the 

probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer; and (3) 

refrain from committing another federal, state, or local crime. 

Castro had a suspended driver’s license dating back to unpaid tickets in 

2008. On January 19, 2014, Castro was pulled over and cited for driving on a 

suspended license. She was instructed to find alternate transportation. On 

January 31, 2014, Castro was arrested for public intoxication and driving with 

license suspended. The arresting officer stated that he was not certified to 

perform the breathalyzer test required to arrest Castro for driving while 

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intoxicated, but that had the breathalyzer been available, Castro would have 

been arrested for DWI. On February 4, 2014, Castro advised the probation 

office of the arrest for driving with a suspended license. According to the

probation officer, at a February 4, 2014 administrative hearing, Castro 

attempted to downplay her arrest. The probation officer recommended that 

Castro’s term of supervision be revoked.

II.

Sentences imposed on revocation of supervised release are reviewed 

under a “plainly unreasonable” standard. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 

841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 496 (2011). However, if the 

defendant fails to make a sufficient objection in the district court, this circuit 

uses a “plain error” standard of review. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321,

326 (5th Cir. 2013). “[U]nder plain error review, the defendant bears the 

burden to show: (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial 

rights”; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceeding. Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Here, because Castro did not make a sufficient objection in 

the district court, we use the plain error standard of review. 

III.

A district court’s imposition of sentencing upon revocation of supervised 

release is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Under § 3583(e)(3), after 

considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), 

(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7), the district court may “revoke a term of 

supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of 

the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously 

served on postrelease supervision. . . .” § 3583(e)(3).

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The original charge underlying Castro’s supervised release is the 

transportation of an alien offense, in violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii). 

This is a Class D felony. Under § 3583(e)(3), where the underlying offense of 

conviction is a Class D felony, the statutory maximum for sentencing in 

connection with revocation of supervised release is two years. § 3583(e)(3). 

The district court imposed a sentence of eighteen months, which is less than 

the two year maximum permitted under § 3583(e)(3). 

Castro argues that the district court did not adequately consider the 

relevant factors when determining her sentence.1 Castro further argues that 

the district court provided insufficient reasons for imparting the eighteenmonth sentence, which was above the sentencing range in the advisory 

guidelines. The district court may impose a sentence outside of the advisory 

guidelines’ range, so long as the court does not exceed the statutory maximum. 

Warren, 720 F.3d at 332 (citing United States v. Casey, 340 F. App’x 199, 200 

(5th Cir. 2009)).

Through the revocation hearing, the district court explained precisely 

why it was choosing to impart a lengthy sentence upon Castro, given the 

specific circumstances of her violations and her history while on supervised 

release. The district court considered the multiple opportunities Castro had 

received, including being part of an extremely small minority of defendants 

who were initially granted probation. The district court also considered 

Castro’s failure to reform her behavior after receiving previous warnings and

directives from her probation officers. The court also stated that it considered 

the ineffectiveness of her previous incarceration at rehabilitating her behavior 

1 Castro argues that the district court did not properly consider the factors under § 

3583(c). Because this is a sentence imposed in connection with a revocation of supervised 

release, it is properly governed by § 3583(e), not § 3583(c). Under § 3583(e), the relevant 

factors are those listed in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and 

(a)(7). 

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and deterring her from future offenses. On this record, the district court’s 

decision was not “plain error.” 

Because Castro fails to show that the district court’s sentence was in 

error, we AFFIRM. 

 

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