alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Tjandani AMIN, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-74693.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 5, 2008.

Joseph S. Porta, Law Offices of Cohen Porta & Kim, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Ann Carroll Varnon, Alison Marie Igoe, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Tjandani Amin, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *see INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), and we deny the petition for review.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Amin produced evidence sufficient to establish past persecution. *See id.*at 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812; *see also Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that petitioner did not suffer past persecution, although she was pushed, teased, bothered, discriminated against and harassed, because she never suffered any significant physical violence). Further, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Amin failed to establish she had a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See Prasad v. INS,*47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir.1995); *see also Lolong**709*v. Gonzales,*484 F.3d 1173, 1179-81 (9th Cir.2007) (en bane).

Because Amin failed to meet the lower standard of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to show that she is entitled to withholding of removal. *See Pedro-Mateo v. INS,*224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.2000).

In her opening brief, Amin fails to address, and therefore has waived any challenge to, the IJ’s denial of CAT protection. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Bengal House Ltd., Respondent, v 989 3rd Ave., Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. (And Other Actions.)

[988 NYS2d 586]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (George J. Silver, J.), entered March 5, 2013, which granted plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal of the complaint and restore the action to the calendar and for leave to file a note of issue nunc pro tunc, unanimously affirmed, without costs, on condition that plaintiff, within 30 days of the date hereof, (1) file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court a stipulation waiving its right to recover statutory interest pursuant to CPLR 5001 and (2) pay to defendants the sum of $1,000 to compensate them for costs in opposing the motion. If these conditions are not complied with within 30 days, the order is reversed, and the motion is denied.

This action was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3126 after numerous delays by former counsel in filing a note of issue. Although no medical evidence was submitted, the motion court vacated the dismissal, accepting the affidavit of a family member and the affirmation of current counsel, former counsel’s son, that his 82-year-old father suffers from diminished mental acuity and memory problems *(see Goldstein v Meadows Redevelopment Co Owners Corp. I,*46 AD3d 509, 511 [2d Dept 2007]). On an application to vacate the dismissal of a complaint, assessment of the sufficiency of the excuse proffered for the delay and the adequacy of the merit of the action are consigned to the *576sound discretion of the court *(see Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp.,*100 NY2d 632, 633 [2003] [Appellate Division]; *Mediavilla v Gurman,*272 AD2d 146, 148 [1st Dept 2000] [Supreme Court]).

While we agree that the record does not disclose an intent to abandon the action *(see Di*Simone, 100 NY2d at 634), the court vacated the dismissal under the misapprehension that it was unable to impose conditions on the grant of relief. To the contrary, CPLR 5015 (a) provides that relief from an order or judgment may be granted “upon such terms as may be just” *(see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO,*293 AD2d 324, 325 [1st Dept 2002]), affording the necessary discretion, which extends to the Appellate Division *(see Smith v Daca Taxi,*222 AD2d 209 [1st Dept 1995]; *Wright v 145 Tenants Corp.,*151 AD2d 421 [1st Dept 1989]). We share the motion court’s stated concern that as a result of plaintiffs dilatory conduct defendants have been unnecessarily exposed to excessive statutory interest on any potential judgment, and we condition the grant of relief accordingly.

Concur — Tom, J.E, Renwick, Andrias, Freedman and Clark, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 30, 2005*

Decided April 1, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

CAROL L. DIETZLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 04-2747 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United

States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 04-C-525

J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

Order

When Carol Dietzler sought leave to pursue this suit in forma pauperis under 28

U.S.C. §1915, the district judge concluded that it failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted and dismissed it outright. The judge thought that Dietzler was

trying to obtain disability benefits on behalf of her ex-husband (who, the complaint

alleged, would “never cooperate or follow through” with an application) and dismissed the complaint because she could not make a claim on someone else’s behalf.

On appeal Dietzler has clarified her position. She seeks benefits on behalf of her

son, and the basis of these benefits would be her ex-husband’s disability (brain

 

* After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary, and the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R.

34(f).
No. 04-2747 Page 2

damage manifested in, among other things, inability to apply himself). See 42

U.S.C. §402(d); 20 C.F.R. §404.350–368.

The clarification does not, however, affect Dietzler’s fundamental obstacle: no 

one has applied for federal benefits. Not her ex-husband, not her ex-husband’s

guardian, not her son (now an adult), and not Dietzler herself. An application is essential. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976); Weinberger v.

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1975). If the agency tarries unduly in making a decision, it might be possible to use the Administrative Procedures Act to seek a resolution of the administrative claim. See 5 U.S.C. §706(1). But Dietzler, who has not

filed an application, lacks either a final decision or a claim of unwarranted delay.

What she contends is that preparing an application would be too cumbersome and

difficult, but no rule of federal law entitles a person to cut the agency out of the 

process and head straight to court. Until the agency has acted (or had a full opportunity to do so), there is no legal wrong to redress.

AFFIRMED
CERTIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS
                PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


                                   Exhibit 32

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Reality Wireless  Networks,  Inc., a
Nevada  corporation (the  "Company"),  on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March
31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission  (the "Report"),
Steve Careaga,  Chief Executive  Officer of the Company and Principal  Financial
Officer  of the  Company,  does  hereby  certify,  pursuant  to  ss.  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that to his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/
   ---------------------------------------------
By: Steve Careaga
Its:  Chief Executive Officer, Principal Financial
Officer/Acting Chief Financial Officer, Director
May 24, 2004

[A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided  to Reality  Wireless  Networks,  Inc.  and will be retained by Reality
Wireless Networks,  Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.]
EXHIBIT 32

                                  CERTIFICATION
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Independence Energy Corp.
(the "Company") for the year ended January 31, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Bruce
Thomson, as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


Date: April 29, 2009                        By: /s/ Bruce Thomson
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Bruce Thomson
                                               Chief Executive Officer
                                               Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Gerald A. KELLOGG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NIKE, INC. and Nike USA, Inc., Defendants-Cross Appellants.

Nos. 2010-1173, 2010-1174, 2010-1195, 2010-1196.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

July 11, 2011.

Mark J. Peterson, Stinson Morrison Hecker, LLP, of Omaha, NE, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Nora M. Kane. Of counsel on the brief were G. Thomas Williams and Mary C. Bonnema, McGarry Bair PC, of Grand Rapids, MI.

B. Trent Webb, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., of Kansas City, MO, argued for defendants-cross appellants. With him on the brief were Bart A. Starr, Jonathan N. Zerger and Angel D. Mitchell.

RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is

Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<CASH>                                           11563
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               470,074
<PP&E>                                         351,308
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,058,683
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
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<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 27,000
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (13,382,010)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.26)


</TABLE>
#### Michael A. HOELSCHER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. John M. HUFF, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-1907.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 3, 2013.

Filed Dec. 10, 2013.

Michael A. Hoelscher; Jefferson City, MO, pro se.

Theresa Hoelscher, Jefferson City, MO, pro se.

Jeffrey O. Parshall, Joshua C. Devine, Ford, Parshall & Baker, LLC, Columbia, MO, for appellees George S. Milnor, Miller’s Classified Ins. Co., and Miller’s First Ins. Co.

Scott T. Jansen, Armstrong Teasdale, L.L.P., Jefferson City, MO, for appellee Mike Haymart d/b/a G&C Adjusting Services, L.L.C.

Glen R. Ehrhardt, Elizabeth H. Weber, Rogers, Ehrhardt & Weber, L.L.C., Columbia, MO, for appellee Wayne Bernskoetter d/b/a Wayne Bernskoetter Construction.

James C. Leritz, Leritz, Plunkert & Bruning, P.C., for appellees Victor R. Sapp, and Sapp Home Pro, Inc.

John F. Cooney, Danna McKitrick, P.C., Clayton, MO, for appellee Jude Markway d/b/a Jude Markway Construction.

Mary A. Long, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for appellees John M. Huff, Carol A. Harden, and Mo. Dept, of Ins., Financial Institutions, and Professional Registration.

Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Hoelscher, Theresa Hoelscher, and C.M. Hoelscher, by Next Friend Theresa Hoelscher (the Hoelschers) appeal *806the district court’s1 dismissal of their action alleging federal and state claims and the denial of their motions for default and for post-judgment relief. Reviewing the dismissal de novo, *see LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv.,*450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2006), we agree it was proper. Because the Hoelschers were aware of their alleged injuries no later than December 2004, their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were time-barred by Missouri’s 5-year limitations period for personal-injury actions. *See Sulik v. Taney Cnty., Mo.,*393 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir.2005), and cases cited. Having properly dismissed the federal claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Hoelschers’ state law claims, *see*28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), or in denying their motions for default judgment and for post-judgment leave to amend their complaint. *See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard USA, Inc.,*559 F.3d 818, 822, 824 (8th Cir.2009).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny as without merit all pending appellate motions.

1

. The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
Exhibit 31.2


Certification of Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


I, Naveen Chopra, certify that:


1) I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of TiVo Inc.;


2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





Date:  January 24, 2013





/s/    NAVEEN CHOPRANaveen ChopraChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)





---
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE NEXTPATH
TECHNOLOGIES,  INC. CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  AND IS  QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.


<ARTICLE>                     5

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                            182,668
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     995,493
<ALLOWANCES>                                       41,480
<INVENTORY>                                       520,429
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                7,675,812
<PP&E>                                          1,328,404
<DEPRECIATION>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 34,581,977
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           9,470,165
<BONDS>                                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                           40,051
<OTHER-SE>                                              0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   34,581,977
<SALES>                                         2,438,375
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                2,438,375
<CGS>                                           1,722,883
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                9,859,849
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 21,838
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,766,806)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,766,806)
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<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,766,806)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.304)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           0



</TABLE>
NUMBER 13-23-00014-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

____________________________________________________________

JOHN AFIF DYE, Appellant,

v.

MARK SALAS, Appellee. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

This matter is before the court on its own motion. On May 3, 2023, the Clerk of the 

Court notified appellant that, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1), 

the appeal was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution unless, within ten days, 

appellant provided reasonable explanation for his failure to timely file a brief. See TEX. R.
2

APP. P. 38.8(a)(1). On May 25, 2023, appellant filed a motion for extension of time to file 

the brief. The request was granted and the deadline to file the brief was extended to June 

1, 2023. However, appellant failed to file a brief on or before the new deadline.

On June 8, 2023, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant that, pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1), the appeal was subject to dismissal for want of 

prosecution unless, within ten days, appellant provided reasonable explanation for his 

failure to timely file a brief. Appellant failed to respond to the notice and has not filed a 

brief.

Appellant neither reasonably explained his failure to file a motion for extension of 

time nor filed his brief. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c).

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the 

20th day of July, 2023.