NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-4126

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALEXAMUEL GLENN, JR.,

a/k/a Prieto

ALEXAMUEL GLENN, JR.,

 Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 1-10-cr-00005-002

District Judge: The Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 11, 2013

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 3, 2013)

_____________________

OPINION

_____________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
2

On January 30, 2012, Alexamuel Glenn Jr. pleaded guilty in the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a two-count felony 

information charging him with one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess 

with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 

one count of conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). The plea agreement contained stipulations to two 

significant matters affecting the calculation of Glenn’s advisory guideline range 

under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. First, Glenn acknowledged that he 

was responsible for more than 500 grams but less than 2 kilograms of cocaine 

hydrochloride. Second, Glenn conceded that three drug-related robberies or 

attempted robberies were attributable to him for sentencing purposes—a robbery 

on Ann Street in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and attempted robberies in Dauphin 

County and East Petersburg, Pennsylvania. In addition, the government agreed 

that any information provided by Glenn would not be used against him in any 

subsequent prosecutions, but it reserved the right to use such information at 

sentencing. 

At the change of plea hearing, Glenn indicated that he had carefully 

reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney and voluntarily entered into it. 

When the factual basis for the guilty plea was placed on the record, Glenn offered 

only one clarification as to the Dauphin County attempted robbery—that until his 
3

coconspirators pulled out their weapons, he thought he was driving his 

coconspirators to a drug deal and not a robbery. Otherwise, Glenn admitted to all 

the other facts placed in the record by the prosecution, including that the Ann 

Street robbery involved the pistol whipping of a customer.

The United States Probation Office assembled a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) 

and submitted it to the parties on April 2, 2012. Both parties objected to the report. 

Eventually, a revised PSR dated August 20, 2012, calculated Glenn’s base offense 

level at 29 with a criminal history level V, yielding an advisory guideline range of 

140 to 175 months’ imprisonment. After hearing from witnesses, receiving 

exhibits, and hearing objections, the District Court adopted the PSR in its entirety 

and sentenced Glenn to 140 months’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.1

Glenn argues that the District Court erred by improperly calculating his 

sentencing guideline range. Glenn makes four arguments: (1) that the District 

Court improperly calculated his guideline range by grouping offenses for which he 

was neither convicted nor charged; (2) that the government failed to carry its 

burden of proof that he was involved in all the robberies used to calculate his 

guideline range; (3) that the District Court made a clear error in adopting the 

findings of the PSR in its entirety; and (4) that the District Court should not have 

 

1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

allowed Glenn’s proffer statements to be used against him at sentencing. These 

errors, according to Glenn, resulted in a procedurally unreasonable sentence.2

We have carefully reviewed the sentencing transcripts and the PSR. We 

conclude that the District Court correctly applied the grouping rules and 

appropriately computed Glenn’s base offense level. Although Glenn may not have 

been convicted of the robbery and attempted robberies at issue, the plea agreement 

and Glenn’s own testimony during the change of plea hearing confirmed that they 

were attributable to Glenn and, therefore, were appropriately considered in 

computing the base offense level. 

In light of Glenn’s stipulation in the plea agreement, his admissions during 

the change of plea hearing, and the evidence presented by the witnesses called to 

testify on behalf of the government, we conclude that the government adduced 

sufficient evidence to carry its burden of proof. Indeed, the stipulations, Glenn’s 

admissions and the testimony of the witnesses demonstrate that the District Court 

did not err in adopting the PSR because the factual findings set forth therein were 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

 

2

 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the sentencing 

guidelines. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

District courts make factual determinations during sentencing by a preponderance 

of the evidence and we review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear 

error. Id. at 568, 570. 
5

Glenn’s assertion that the District Court erred by allowing the government to 

use his own proffer against him at sentence lacks merit. The robberies were the 

subject of a stipulation by the parties as set forth in the plea agreement, which

specified that the government was “free to use at sentencing” any of Glenn’s 

statements and the evidence he provided.

Because the District Court did not commit any procedural errors at 

sentencing, we conclude that Glenn’s sentence of 140 months is not procedurally 

unreasonable. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.