alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered July 29 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 15
- 00526
- CR
CHRISTIAN LANE
- CLEMENT COOK, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas T rial Court Cause No. 416
- 81198
- 2013



### O RDER
The Court GRANTS court reporter Susan Maienschein’s July 28, 2015 request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record. We ORDER Ms. Maienschein to file the complete reporter’s record within THIRTY DAY S of the date of this order.
We ORDER the Collin County District Clerk to file the clerk’s record within FIFTEEN
DAYS of the date of this order.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to Andrea Stroh Thompson, Collin County District Clerk; Susan Maienschein, official court reporter, 416th Judicial District Court, and to counsel for all parties.
/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Houghton, Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 884]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Dorothy Cropper, J.), rendered July 13, 1995, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of arson in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 8V3 to 25 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s mid-trial request for an adjournment to secure the services of a voice analysis expert witness who was not identified and the value of whose *136testimony was speculative at best. We note that defendant was aware for more than five months prior to trial that the prosecution had a tape recording purporting to be of defendant’s voice but defendant took no steps to pursue this issue until the trial had started *(see, Matter of Anthony M.,*63 NY2d 270, 283-284; *People v Santos,*179 AD2d 790, *lv denied*79 NY2d 953).

We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion. Concur— Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Ellerin, Nardelli and Colabella, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rudy Holder, Appellant.

[664 NYS2d 790]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered September 1, 1994, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees, and sentencing him to consecutive terms of 4 to 12 years and 2 to 6 years for the assault convictions, concurrent to concurrent terms of 4 to 12 years and 2V3 to 7 years for the weapon possession convictions, unanimously affirmed.

Evidence bearing on defendant’s consciousness of guilt was properly admitted. In light of defendant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of a rebuttal witness that lent support to strong eyewitness testimony disproving the justification defense, evidence of an attempt by defendant to coerce that rebuttal witness was admissible as particularly relevant to the issue of justification *(People v Leyra,*1 NY2d 199, 209-210). The witness’s credibility was a jury question.

The challenged portion of the court’s justification charge did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Although defendant was permitted to elicit evidence that one of the shooting victims and three of his friends had consumed alcohol prior to the incident, and argued in summation that this victim and his friends were “drunk and violent”, the trial court was not required to set forth, in its charge regarding justification, that evidence, or any of the other specific contentions of the parties *(see, People v Saunders,*64 NY2d 665). Further, in the absence of any evidence that, at the time of the altercation, defendant was aware of additional drinking, as well as marihuana use by one of the individuals in question, those circumstances were irrelevant to the justification defense *(see, People v Pizzaro,*184 AD2d 448, *lv denied*80 NY2d 908). The justification charge as given adequately conveyed the appropriate legal principles, *36properly instructed the jury to apply those principles to the pertinent facts as found by the jury *(People v Saunders, supra),*and did not undermine defendant’s defense *(compare, People v Chevalier,*220 AD2d 114, *affd*89 NY2d 1050).

The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion, following reasonably thorough inquiry, in replacing two ill jurors with alternate jurors on the grounds that, in each case, an indeterminate delay of at least one day would result in undue inconvenience to witnesses, disrupt the presentation of evidence, and pose a threat of a mistrial because of time constraints involving at least one other juror *(see, People v Robustelli,*189 AD2d 668, *lv denied*81 NY2d 975).

We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing. Concur— Milonas, J. P., Rubin, Tom, Mazzarelli and Colabella, JJ.
Exhibit
      10.68

     

    AMENDMENT
      TO WARRANT AGREEMENT

     

    This
      Amendment to Warrant Agreement (this “Agreement”)
      is
      made and entered into as of March __, 2007.

     

    RECITALS

     

    A. The
      undersigned, Contango Capital Partners, L.P. (the “Holder”)
      is the
      holder of a warrant dated April 13, 2006 issued by Trulite, Inc., a Delaware
      corporation (the “Company”)
      to
      purchase 592,500 shares of the Company’s common stock, $0.0001 per share (the
“Warrant”).

     

    B. The
      Warrant provides that unless earlier terminated in accordance with its terms
      the
      Warrant may only be exercised through 5:00 p.m. CST on April 13, 2007 (the
      “Exercise
      Termination Date”).

     

    C. The
      Board
      of Directors of the Company has determined that it is desirable and in the
      best
      interest of the Company to extend the Exercise Termination Date until 5:00
      p.m.
      CDT on April 13, 2008 and, accordingly, has approved the amendment of the
      Warrant to so provide.

     

    NOW,
      THEREFORE,
      for and
      in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained herein, the
      receipt and sufficiency of which is acknowledged, the parties hereto agree
      as
      follows: 

     

    1. The
      Warrant is hereby amended so that each reference therein to “April 13, 2007” is
      a reference to “April 13, 2008.”

     

    2. Except
      as
      amended herein, the Warrant remains unchanged.

     

    IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first
      written.

    
      	 	 	 
	 	TRULITE,
              INC.
	 
 	 
 	 
 
	 	By:  	 
	 	
              
Jonathan
              Godshall, President
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          12
Motion Granted; Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed as Moot and 

Memorandum Opinion filed April 19, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00057-CV

____________

IN RE NELSON T. HENSLEY, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

257th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2006-14036

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On January 25, 2011, relator Nelson T. Hensley filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P.

52.1. In the petition relator asks this court to order the respondent, the Honorable Judy 

Warne, presiding judge of the 257th District Court, Harris County, Texas, to vacate orders 

signed December 16, 2011.
On April 13, 2012, relator filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of 

mandamus because the underlying suit was dismissed pursuant to settlement. The motion 

is granted.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is ordered dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Seymore and Boyce.
EXHIBIT 10.8

[GRAPHIC OMITTED]
 BRIGHTEC
    ooo Be Brilliant.
                                     ADVANCED LUMITECH INC. d/b/a BRIGHTEC
                                     8c Pleasant Street, First Floor
                                     South Natick, MA 01760

                                     508/647-9710 T
                                     508/647-9711 F

                                     pplanche@brightec.com
                                     www.brightec.com

December 22, 2004

Patrick Planche
15 A Moccasin Path
South Natick, Massachusetts 01760


Dear Patrick:

         This will confirm the agreement between Advanced Lumitech, Inc. d/b/a
Brightec (the "Company") and you concerning your agreement to allow the Company
to redeem, effective as of the date hereof, 77,620 shares (the "Shares") of the
Company's common stock, $.001 par value (the "Common Stock"), owned by you in
order to allow the Company to fulfill its commitments to issue shares of its
Common Stock to certain consultants and investors in the Company. In connection
with the Company's redemption of the Shares, the Company and you agree that the
Company shall not pay you any consideration in connection with the redemption,
provided, however, that the Company will use its best efforts to increase the
number of authorized shares of its Common Stock as soon as reasonably
practicable after the date hereof and that, upon such event, it will issue
77,620 replacement shares (the "Replacement Shares") to you (adjusted for any
stock split, stock dividend or similar recapitalization occurring after the date
hereof and prior to such issuance) for no additional consideration. The Company
further agrees that if the Company is sold prior to the issuance of the
Replacement Shares, whether pursuant to a merger, sale of all or substantially
all of the Company's assets or otherwise, you shall be treated as the owner of
such Replacement Shares for purposes of determining any proceeds of such
transaction distributable to you.

         Please execute the counterpart copy of this letter in the space
provided to indicate your agreement to the foregoing upon which this letter
shall become a binding agreement between the Company and you.


                                       Very truly yours,

                                       Advanced Lumitech, Inc.
                                       d/b/a Brightec

                                       By: /s/ PATRICK PLANCHE
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Patrick Planche

Agreed and acceptable
this 22nd day of December, 2004

/s/ PATRICK PLANCHE
--------------------------------
Patrick Planche
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-0429V

UNPUBLISHED

JEFFREY CROSSE,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: May 13, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU); Ruling on Entitlement; Concession; Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Jessica Olins, Maglio Christopher & Toal e, PA, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Mollie Danielle Gorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

On March 21, 2019, Jeffrey Crosse f iled a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensat ion Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.

, 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he received an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on November 22, 2017, and subsequently suffered left shoulder injuries. Petition at 1-3. The case was assigned to the Special Processi ng Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On May 13, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, Respondent stat es that “petitioner has satisf ied the criteria set forth in the revised Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualif ications and Aids to Interpretation, which

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required to post it on the United States Court of Fe deral Claims' website in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified mate rial fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Ac t will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012).2 affords petitioners a presumption of causation if onset of SIRVA occurs within forty-eight hours after receipt of a seasonal flu vacci nation and there is no apparent alternative
cause.” Id. at 5-6. Respondent furt her agrees that the medica l records demonstrate that Petitioner has experienced the residual effects of his SIRVA for more than six months, and that therefore, Petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequ isites for compensation under

the Act. Id. at 6.

In view of Respondent’s position a nd the evidence of record, I find that Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran Chief Special Master
#### In re RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC. Paul N. Papas, Claimant-Appellant, v. Residential Capital, LLC, Debtor-Appellee.

No. 13-2023.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 27, 2014.

*101Paul N. Papas, Phoenix, *AZ,*pro se.

Stefan W. Engelhardt, Morrison *&*Foerster LLP, New York, NY, Mark A. Hearron, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

Appellant Paul Papas, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment of the district court affirming a bankruptcy court order, which denied Appellant’s motion to convert the Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings of Appellee Residential Capital, LLC, to a Chapter 7 liquidation, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.

In the bankruptcy context, a case may be equitably moot when, “even though effective relief could conceivably be fashioned, implementation of that relief would be inequitable.” *In re Chateaugay Corp.,*988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1993) *(“Chateaugay I*”). Generally, an appeal is equitably moot once the debtor’s plan of reorganization has been “substantially consummated.” *See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),*10 F.3d 944, 952-53 (2d Cir.1993) *(“Chateaugay II”).*A plan is substantially consummated when all or substantially all of the proposed transfers in a plan are completed, the successor company has assumed the business or property dealt with in the plan, and the distributions contemplated by the plan have begun. *See*11 U.S.C. § 1101(2). Here, Appellee auctioned off substantially all of its assets in October 2012; it made most of the transfers contemplated in its confirmed reorganization plan, transferred control of its business and property to the Liquidating Trust, and began distributions in December 2013. Accordingly, its reorganization plan is substantially consummated.

Relief from a consummated plan is inequitable if it would “unravel intricate transactions” or if the party seeking to undo the plan did not seek a stay below. *Chateaugay II,*10 F.3d at 952-53. Here, Appellant asks us to unwind all of the transactions that have already occurred. Moreover, although Appellant asked the district court to stay the bankruptcy proceedings, he did not make his request in accordance with local court rules or first seek a stay in the bankruptcy court as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8005.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED as moot with prejudice.
#### In the Matter of CRUSADER ENERGY GROUP, INCORPORATED, Debtor Earthwise Energy, Incorporated, Appellant v. Crusader Energy Group, Incorporated, Appellee.

No. 13-10176.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 11, 2014.

David H. Ammons, James David Sheppard, Esq., Diamond McCarthy, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Marie Roach Yeates, Esq., Russell Thornton Gips, Mark C. Rodriguez, Catherine Bukowski Smith, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Earthwise Energy appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Crusader Energy Group in this title dispute over oil and gas leases in north Texas. Earthwise Energy contends the court erred in concluding that the assignment from Gulftex Operating, Inc. to Earthwise of certain interests in oil and gas leases did not include the disputed interests Gulf-tex had formerly conveyed to Crusader Energy Group.

Our review of a grant of summary judgment is *de novo. Greenwood 950, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P.,*683 F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir.2012). We also conduct *de*
      *270
      *novo*review of the district court’s interpretation of a contract and its determination of whether a contract is ambiguous. *Id.*The parties are familiar with the facts of this case. We have considered the district court’s decision, the briefing, and the oral arguments. For the reasons expressed by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we AFFIRM.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
SHELDON KRESLER,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND FLORIDA 

COMMISSION ON OFFENDER 

REVIEW,

Respondents.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-1113

Opinion filed October 20, 2015.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari -- Original Jurisdiction.

Sheldon Kresler, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee (no appearance); Kenneth S. 

Steely, General Counsel, and Barbara Debelius and Beverly Brewster, Assistant 

General Counsels, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; and Sarah J. 

Rumph, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee,

for Respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The Department of Corrections’ motion to remand is treated as a confession of 

error. The lower tribunal’s order rendered February 24, 2015, is QUASHED, and this 

matter is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings.

LEWIS, SWANSON, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
#### Ronald Griffo, Jr., Appellant, v Daniel Colby et al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Ronald Griffo, Jr., Appellant, v Samuel R. Scime et al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.)

[988 NYS2d 763]

*1422Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Timothy J. Walker, A.J.), entered December 31, 2012. The order granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs complaints.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced these actions seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained in two motor vehicle accidents. Plaintiffs bills of particulars alleged that, as a result of each accident, he sustained serious injuries under the permanent loss of use, permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and 90/180-day categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in each action on the ground that there was no material issue of fact that plaintiff had sustained a serious injury.

Defendants met their respective burdens with regard to the permanent loss of use, permanent consequential limitation of use, and significant limitation of use categories by submitting the affirmed reports of a physician retained jointly by defendants, for both accidents. The physician, who examined plaintiff and his medical records, concluded that plaintiff had sustained only sprains and strains in the accidents, that those injuries had resolved, and that plaintiffs limitations in his range of motion were evidenced solely by subjective complaints of pain *(see Scheer v Koubek,*70 NY2d 678, 679 [1987]; *Rabolt v Park,*50 AD3d 995, 995 [2008]; *see also O’Brien v Bainbridge,*89 AD3d 1511, 1512 [2011]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). The affidavit of his chiropractor failed to set forth any objective evidence, including the results of any tests performed, and merely noted that plaintiffs limitations in his range of motion shortly after each accident were accompanied by pain *(see Weaver v Town of Penfield,*68 AD3d 1782, 1784-1785 [2009]). The chiropractor’s conclusory recitation of statutory language was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Carfi v Forget,*101 AD3d 1616, 1619 [2012]). With respect to the 90/180-day category, defendants met their respective burdens by submitting plaintiffs deposition testimony, which established that he was not prevented “from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted his usual daily activities” for at least 90 out of the 180 days following each accident *(Licari v Elliott,*57 NY2d 230, 238 [1982]).

Present—Scudder, RJ., Centra, Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
July 6, 2016

In accordance with the enclosed Memorandum Opinion, below is the judgment in the numbered cause set out herein to be entered in the Minutes of this Court as of the 6th day of July, 2016.

10-15-00393-CV	THOMAS RAY SIDES v. MARCO CONEY, ET AL - ON APPEAL FROM THE 52ND DISTRICT COURT OF CORYELL COUNTY - TRIAL COURT NO. CIO-15-43506 – DISMISSED - Memorandum Opinion by Justice Scoggins:

“This cause came on to be considered; and because appellant failed to file a brief within the time prescribed by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is the opinion of this Court that the appeal should be dismissed; it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the appeal be, and hereby is, dismissed for want of prosecution.  It is further ordered that appellant pay all costs in this behalf expended and that this decision be certified below for observance.”

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