In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1559

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL HORTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13-cr-30042 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 9, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2014 

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Christopher Horton, a karate instructor who

used his iPhone to film himself sexually molesting three of his

youngstudents,pleadedguiltytosixcountsof sexuallyexploiting

a child. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Horton’s guidelines range was

life, subject to a statutorymaximumsentenceof 30 yearsoneach

count.Seeid. §2251(e).Thedistrict courtimposeda 90-yearprison

sentence, which Horton argues is substantively unreasonable.
2 No. 14-1559

Because Horton has failed to rebut the presumption of

reasonableness afforded to his within-guidelines sentence, we

affirm.

Duringa9-monthperiodwhileHortonwasemployedatThree

Tigers Karate in Belleville, Illinois, Horton created 37 videos

depictinghimselfengaginginsexuallyexplicit conductwiththree

ofhismale students (ages6,7,and10),andanothervideoshowing

himselftrying to convince another student (age 7) to display his

genitals. Horton created the videos in variousplaces: his home,

the karate studio, a public park, and the San Antonio home of

one the victims.

Horton, then 20, was living with his mother in Highland,

Illinois when, in early 2013, she noticed child pornography on

his phone. She told her boyfriend, who reported Horton to the

policeonFebruary11.LaterthatdaypolicevisitedHorton’shome

and spoke with his mother, who confirmed that she had seen

animageonhisphoneofHortonperformingoral sexona 10-yearold boy. The police then went to the karate studio and arrested

Horton. During a police interview, Horton admitted that he

sexuallyabusedthreeminorboyswhoattendedthekarate studio

and used his phone to film the acts, which included oral sex.

The investigation revealedhowHorton gained access to the

victims outside of class andconvinced them to engage in sexual

activity.Hortonsucceededingettingthevictimsalonebyearning

their parents’ trust andoffering private karate lessons, at which

he molested the students in their own home or in the karate

studio’sback roomwhile other students were in themainstudio

taking lessons. Hortonconvincedone ofthe victims to touchhis,

Horton’s, privates by promising to buy him a Nintendo 3-DS.
No. 14-1559 3

There were also text files on Horton’s cell phone containing

messageshehaddraftedinstructingtheboysonsex,masturbation,

and orgasms; encouraging them to send him pictures of their

penises; and giving them code words to use in text messages

to avoid detection by their parents. 

Hortonenteredanopenpleaofguiltytofive countsof sexually

exploiting a minor, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and one count of

attempting to do the same, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). 

A probation officer prepared a presentence report and

calculated a total offense level of 43 (which would have been

48 but for the ceiling at 43, see U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2) and

criminal history categoryofI,yielding a guidelines range of life.

But the offense carries a 30-year statutory maximum sentence

for eachcount, sothe statutoryceilingreplacesHorton’sguidelines

range.See18U.S.C. § 2251(e).Andwhenthere aremultiple counts

of conviction, as there are here, the guidelines instruct the

sentencing courttoimposemaximumandconsecutive sentences

to achieve what the guidelines sentence would have been but

forthe statutorymaximum. SeeU.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d);United States

v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.

Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 357 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v.

Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 2010).

At his lawyer’s request, Horton was evaluated before

sentencing by clinical psychologist Dr. Daniel Cueno, who

conducted a sexual offender assessment. During his formative

years, Horton recounted to Dr. Cueno, his mother worked as

a stripper andescort andwouldleavepornographic magazines,

sex toys, and drug paraphernalia strewn around the house. His

father was as an alcoholic and drug abuser. Horton watched a
4 No. 14-1559

XX-rated movie when he was seven and acted out what he saw

inthemovieby having oral sex withother children.Infirst grade

he was forced to perform oral sex on a classmate, and he began

having consensual intercourse when he was 12. According to

Dr. Cueno, the “roots for [Horton’s] difficulties can be traced

back to a childhood where he was sexualized at an early age,

had little stability, and was raised by a drug abusing,

stripper/escort mother who provided him with little, if any

stability.” In Dr. Cueno’s opinion, Horton was a high risk for

reoffendingbecausehehad“noreal conceptofwhatisappropriate

sexuality”and“noconceptoflimits,”andrecommendedtreatment

for his “psychological and sexual difficulties.”

While awaiting sentencing, Horton penned a 35-page letter

tothe courtinwhichhe triedtoexplainwhyhe sexuallyassaulted

his students.

I think I did what I did because ... I didn’t know why

or what made me the way I was or am. I needed

someone like me, to see if they would grow to be like

me one day. My theory was, if they were introduced

to it at a certain age, would they too, be sexually

confused, or share similar desires in the future.

He recounted the “horrible people” who surrounded him

in his youth, asserted that he wanted to be cured of his

dysfunctional sexual compulsions, and expressed regretthat he

was “too smart” for counseling—in which he participated from

age2to18—tohavebeensuccessful.He alsoassertedthatitwould

be “ridiculous” to imprisonhimfordecadesbecause,he insisted,

mass murderers get lighter sentences.
No. 14-1559 5

Both parties argued for a guidelines sentence but disputed

what length would be appropriate. Horton sought a 25-year

sentence,pointingtohis“highlyunusualandextreme”upbringing

and the prospect that his youthwouldallowhimtobenefit from

treatment while incarcerated; if treatment proved ineffective,

he added, the government could petition to stay his release and

initiate civil commitment proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248. The

government sought60to70years,whichitbelievedwasnecessary

topunishHortonfor exploitinghispositionoftrustanddestroying

the lives of four young childrenandtheir families, and to assure

that adangerous sex offender wouldnotbe releasedinto society.

Theprosecutoralsopresentedvictimimpact statementswritten

by the relatives. The families recounted that the boys suffered

from nightmares, sleeplessnights, anger, bedwetting, andpoor

concentration at school, and asked the judge to lock up Horton

for the rest of his life.

The district court sentenced Horton to 90 years. The court

acknowledgedHorton’s abnormal childhoodbut concludedthat

aggravating factors “weigh heavily, heavily against him.” For

example,thiswasnot a typical childpornography case,the court

explained,becauseofthe “predatorynature”ofHorton’s repeated

acts in soliciting his young students for sexual encounters.

Horton’s case,the judge continued, was “one ofthemost serious

and heinous” he’d seen in his 15 years on the bench:

[T]he statement thattheDefendant made in his letter

that one of the reasons why he did this was to seek

out people that he could see ifthey were like him and

see if they would grow to be like him one day. [The

prosecutor] used the phrase “an experiment”, and it
6 No. 14-1559

is horrifying to think that somebody would use little

childrenas thoughthey were some sort ofpetridishes

ortest tubes to see ifthey couldturnout tobe like him

becauseofwhathewentthrough,knowing his terrible

background. And that is ... an indication that the

Defendantisaverydangerousperson.Anddangerous,

I would suggest, like the guideline computation, off

the chart.

OnappealHortoncontends thathis90-yearwithin-guidelines

sentence—effectively a life sentence—exceeds the bounds of

reason. He insists that his sentencedoes not adequately account

for his unstable upbringing, which included living in an

“environment devoid of appropriate boundaries regarding sex

and children.” His relative youth also should have been taken

into account, he adds, because he was still maturing and would

gain better impulse control with time.

Because Horton’s guidelines range was life, any prison

sentence ineffect wouldbepresumptively reasonableonappeal.

See United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 908 (7th Cir. 2010). “To

sustain the presumption, a district court need provide only a

justification for its sentence adequate to allow for meaningful

appellatereviewandtopromote theperceptionoffair sentencing.”

United States v. Pilon, 734 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). And the presumption

maybe rebuttedonlybyshowingthatthesentence isunreasonable

when measured against the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); this

includesdemonstrating that the district court failed to properly

consider mitigating factors.SeeUnited States v. Singleton, 588 F.3d

497, 501 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606,

608 (7th Cir. 2005).
No. 14-1559 7

Horton has not demonstrated that his de facto life sentence

is unreasonable. Although a sentence that is effectively for life

“is not to be ordered lightly,” we have upheld such sentences

where the sentencing judge recognized “the likelihood of a

defendant’s death in prison, but concluded that other factors

warranted the particular sentence.” United States v. Vallar, 635

F.3d271,280 (7thCir. 2011)(internalquotationmarks andcitation

omitted); see United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 492–93, 500–01

(7th Cir. 2009)(80-year sentence reasonable for producing child

pornography where defendant did not molest victim); United

States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 915–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (40-year

sentence reasonable for 46-year-old defendant who produced

childpornography).Here,thedistrict courtappropriatelyweighed

Horton’s age and difficult upbringing,see 18U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),

against the “extremely serious nature of this crime” and the

vulnerability of the victims, see id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A); New

York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758–60 & n.9–10 (1982), the need to

protect thepublic fromadangerous child molester, see 18U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A),(C), andthe availabilityof sex-offendertreatment

inprison,seeid. § 3553(a)(2)(D).AndthoughHortonwouldhave

preferred the district court to have given more weight to his

dysfunctional childhood, the court had the discretion to assign

it less weight than the other § 3553(a) factors. See United States

v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2013).

AFFIRMED.