United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1314

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Robert Bennett

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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Submitted: September 19, 2022

Filed: November 7, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM. 

Robert Bennett pled guilty to knowingly violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) for 

failing to register as a sex offender. The district court1 sentenced him to 15 months 

in prison. He appeals, asserting that the sentence was substantively unreasonable 

1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Missouri.
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for failing to consider relevant mitigating factors. Having jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I. 

Due to a New Jersey conviction, Bennett was subject to the registration

requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 

U.S.C. § 2250. He absconded from parole to live with his son in Kennett, Missouri. 

Bennett lived there for over a year, never registering as a sex offender under

SORNA. Bennett pled guilty to knowingly violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) for 

failing to register as a sex offender. The district court adopted a Guidelines range of 

15-21 months and imposed a sentence of 15 months in prison. Bennett appeals, 

arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court 

failed to consider relevant mitigating factors. 

This court reviews “the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Werlein, 664 F.3d 1143, 

1146 (8th Cir. 2011), citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But if a 

defendant asserts specific claims that were not raised with the district court at

sentencing, this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Saddler, 538 F.3d 

879, 891 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. O’Connor, 567 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 

2009).

Bennett argues that his 15-month sentence for failure to register under 

SORNA is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to consider 

relevant mitigating factors, including his history of childhood abuse, exposure to 

violence, lack of parental support, intellectual disability, and congestive heart 

failure. Bennett did not raise these issues with the district court. Cf. United States 

v. Krzyzaniak, 702 F.3d 1082, 1085 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Failure to make a timely 

objection that gives the district court an opportunity to correct any deficiency should 

waive, not merely forfeit, the issue.”). 
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The 15-month sentence was the bottom of the Guidelines range of 15-21 

months. “If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but 

is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

The district court received the presentence investigation report, which detailed facts 

about each mitigating factor that Bennett presents on appeal. The district court “read 

very closely” Bennett’s sentencing memorandum, which did not mention any of the 

mitigating factors presented on appeal (nor were they mentioned at sentencing). 

The district court announced the 15-month sentence after referencing “the 

provisions of Title 18, United States Code, § 3553(a) and all the factors thereunder.” 

“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing 

so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 356-57 (2007). “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) 

factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in 

determining an appropriate sentence.” United States v. Stone, 873 F.3d 648, 650 

(8th Cir. 2017). “The district court may give some factors less weight than a 

defendant prefers or more to other factors, but that alone does not justify reversal.” 

United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2010). 

The district court made no error. See United States v. Harris, 964 F.3d 718, 

724 n.3 (8th Cir. 2020) (not reaching the effect of Holguin-Hernandez on the 

standard of review of alleged procedural errors that defendant failed to object to in 

district court because the “district court made no error, plain or otherwise”). See

generally Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 767 (2020) (finding 

abuse-of-discretion review appropriate where defendant advocated for a shorter 

sentence). Cf. id. (Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]e do not decide what is sufficient to 

preserve any ‘particular’ substantive-reasonableness argument . . . we do not suggest 

that a generalized argument in favor of less imprisonment will insulate all arguments 

regarding the length of a sentence from plain error review.”).

The sentence was substantively reasonable.
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The judgment is affirmed.

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