alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-6891

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DAVID PEREZ-GARCIA, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Lyle E. Strom, Senior District Judge. (3:01-cr-00036; 3:04-cv-00429) Submitted: September 13, 2007 Decided: September 19, 2007 Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David Perez-Garcia, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer Marie Hoefling, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: David Perez-Garcia seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Perez-Garcia has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit
10.2 


 


THIRD
MODIFICATION TO PROMISSORY NOTE


THIS
THIRD MODIFICATION TO PROMISSORY NOTE (this "Modification") is entered into as of December 23, 2014, by and between
ZAGG INC, a Nevada corporation ("Borrower"), and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ("Bank").


RECITALS


WHEREAS,
Borrower is currently indebted to Bank pursuant to the terms and conditions of that certain Revolving Line of Credit Note in the
maximum principal amount of $25,000,000, executed by Borrower and payable to the order of Bank, dated as of December 7, 2012 and
as amended from time to time (the "Note"), which Note is subject to the terms and conditions of a credit agreement between
Borrower and Bank dated as of December 7, 2012, as amended from time to time (the "Credit Agreement"), and which Note
incorporates the terms of an Addendum to Promissory Note dated as of the same date, as amended from time to time (the "Addendum").


WHEREAS,
Bank and Borrower have agreed to certain changes in the terms and conditions set forth in the Note, and have agreed to modify
the Note to reflect said changes.


NOW,
THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree
that the Note shall be modified as follows:


1.        
The maturity date of the Note is hereby modified to be December 1, 2016, with the understanding that Borrower shall continue to
make payments of principal and interest on the Note in the amounts specified therein until said new maturity date.


2.        
The effective date of the changes set forth herein shall be December 23, 2014.


3.        
Except as expressly set forth herein, all terms and conditions of the Note remain in full force and effect, without waiver or
modification. All terms defined in the Note shall have the same meaning when used in this Modification. This Modification and
the Note shall be read together, as one document.


4.        
Borrower certifies that as of the date of this Modification there exists no Event of Default under the Note, nor any condition,
act or event which with the giving of notice or the passage of time or both would constitute any such Event of Default.




 





[Signature
Page Follows]







 






    	 



    	 



    

 


 





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Modification to be executed as of the day and year first written above.


 










2
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                  1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                                 AUG-01-2001
<PERIOD-END>                                   OCT-31-2001
<CASH>                                         262,929
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  98,929
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               1,072,418
<PP&E>                                         802,030
<DEPRECIATION>                                 87,583
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 3,686,925
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,410,503
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       159
<OTHER-SE>                                     517,155
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   3,686,925
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               263,680
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  5,964,816
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             241,839
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,937,502)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,937,502)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,937,502)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.38)


</TABLE>
#### S.C.B., Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-1939.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 17, 2011.

Decided: April 8, 2011.

Diane E. McHugh Martinez, Law Office of McHugh Martinez, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Michelle G. Latour, Assistant Director, Jessica E. Sherman, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

*271Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

S.C.B., who claims to be a native and citizen of Togo, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We have reviewed the record and the Board’s order and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2010). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. *See In re: S.C.B.*(B.I.A. Jul. 16, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Barry TIKOTIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-50268.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 7, 2008.

Filed May 6, 2008.

Brent A. Whittlesey, Esq., USLA — Office of the U.S. Attorney Civil & Tax Divisions, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Andrew Edward Smyth, Esq., Law Offices of Andrew E. Smyth, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BEEZER, T.G. NELSON, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Barry Tikotin appeals the district court’s order authorizing the United States to sell residential real property to satisfy his debt to the government. We have considered the parties’ arguments and the record, and hold that Tikotin has not demonstrated an interest in the property sufficient to establish standing. We affirm the district court’s order authorizing the sale of the property.

Article III standing must be determined as a threshold matter in every federal case. *United States v. 5208 Los Franciscos Way,*385 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir.2004). To have standing, a party must have a sufficient interest in the property to create a case or controversy. *Id.*

We requested that counsel for both parties submit supplemental letter briefs to the court answering the question whether Tikotin has standing in this case. Tiko-tin’s counsel failed to file a supplemental brief. Tikotin had previously conceded that he transferred his interest in the property to his wife by quitclaim deed in 1995. He has failed to demonstrate that he retained, or has since acquired, any interest in the property. Tikotin failed to establish standing to object to the government’s motion to sell the property.

Tikotin’s motion to augment the record dated April 15, 2008 is DENIED. Because Tikotin lacks standing to object to the government’s motion for an order authorizing the sale of the property, the district court’s order of sale is

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### In re Wendy B. DAUBERMAN, Petitioner.

No. 10-2236.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 6, 2011.

Decided: April 14, 2011.

*348Wendy B. Dauberman, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Wendy B. Dauberman has petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus. In her petition, Dauberman asserts that the Government has refused to respond to her 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2010) motion and asks that this court order the district court to rule on her “unopposed” § 2255 motion. The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy and should be granted only in those extraordinary situations when no other remedy is available. *In re, Beard,*811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir.1987). Our review of the district court’s docket reveals that the Government filed its response to Dauberman’s § 2255 motion on August 20, 2010, and thus Dauberman’s motion has been ripe for the district court’s consideration for less than eight months. Accordingly, we conclude that there has been no undue delay in processing Dauberman’s motion and therefore deny the petition for mandamus relief without prejudice to Dau-berman’s right to refile if the district court does not act expeditiously. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3427 Engrossed in House (EH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3427

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend title 23, United States Code, to protect States that have in 
effect laws or orders with respect to pay to play reform, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``State Ethics Law Protection Act of 
2010''.

SEC. 2. PAY TO PLAY REFORM.

    Section 112 of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(h) Pay To Play Reform.--A State transportation department shall 
not be considered to have violated a requirement of this section solely 
because the State in which that State transportation department is 
located, or a local government within that State, has in effect a law 
or an order that limits the amount of money an individual or entity 
that is doing business with a State or local agency with respect to a 
Federal-aid highway project may contribute to a political party, 
campaign, or elected official.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 2010.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
111th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 3427

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend title 23, United States Code, to protect States that have in 
effect laws or orders with respect to pay to play reform, and for other 
                               purposes.
```
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Annual Report of Indalex Holdings Finance, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Timothy R.J. Stubbs, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934; and

(2)         The information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solelypursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 and is not being filed as part of the Reportor as a separate disclosure document.

Date: April2, 2007
| By:    | /s/ TIMOTHY R.J.  STUBBS |   |
|--------|-------------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Timothy R.J. Stubbs      |   |
| Title: | Chief Executive Officer       |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, orotherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within theelectronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, hasbeen provided to Indalex Holdings Finance, Inc. and will be retained byIndalex Holdings Finance, Inc. and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles PYNE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-7364.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 25, 2011.

Decided: April 15, 2011.

*304Charles Pyne, Appellant Pro Se. Bar-bai'a Suzanne Skalla, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions ai'e not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles Pyne seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 368-70 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that, although the district court may have procedurally erred in recharacterizing Pyne’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion as a successive § 2255 motion, application of an alternative procedural ground renders this appeal futile. *See Reid,*369 F.3d at 372 n. 5. Although Pyne was aware of the alleged error he asserted in his Rule 60(b) motion at the time he appealed the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief, he did not raise the issue on appeal. Because a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for an appeal, Pyne cannot assert in a post-judgment motion an issue available to him *305when he filed his appeal. *See Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co.,*993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir.1993). In addition, Pyne did not file his Rule 60(b) motion within a reasonable time, as required by Rule 60(c)(1), because he waited three years after the district court denied his § 2255 motion to file it. *See McLawhom v. John W. Daniel & Co., Inc.,*924 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (discussing reasonable time requirement).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit 10.31                                         Date: November 10, 2000



                             DEMAND PROMISSORY NOTE


     In  consideration  of a loan received by ComLinx,  Inc.  ("Borrower")  from
Archer  Systems   ("Lender")  in  the  principal   amount  of  $20,000.00   (the
"Principal"),  Borrower  promises  to pay to the order of  Lender at 75  Lincoln
Highway,  Suite 203,  Iselin,  New Jersey 08830 the  Principal  plus interest on
unpaid  principal  at the rate of 5.35% per annum until the  Principal  has been
repaid in full.  Borrower agrees to pay all  outstanding  Principal and interest
upon demand of the Lender.


                                            COMLINX, INC.

                                            By:/s/Eric R. Korb
                                            ------------------
                                                  Eric R. Korb, President & CEO


                                        4
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3132 

To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to 

reauthorize the Matching Grant Program for School Security through 

fiscal year 2012. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 8, 2009 

Mr. ROTHMAN of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 

Act of 1968 to reauthorize the Matching Grant Program 

for School Security through fiscal year 2012. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REAUTHORIZATION OF MATCHING GRANT PRO4 GRAM FOR SCHOOL SECURITY. 

5 Section 2705 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

6 Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3797e) is amended by 

7 striking ‘‘2009’’ and inserting ‘‘2012’’. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Verigy Ltd. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2009 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Keith L. Barnes, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and
consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: December 21, 2009 |  | /s/  KEITH L.
BARNES   
|                        |  | Keith L. Barnes        
|                        |  | Chief Executive Officer