49200 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 

the Single Channel Ground and 

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 

family. SINCGARS is a tactical radio 

providing secure jam-resistant voice and 

data communications of command, 

control, targeting, and technical 

information for the Terminal High 

Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. 

The spread-spectrum frequency hopping 

Electronic Counter-Counter Measures 

(ECCM) technology resident in the radio 

is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While 

sensitive, the frequency-hopping 

algorithms used to generate the ECCM 

waveform are unique to the country of 

ownership and cannot be manipulated 

by potential adversaries for use or 

interference with other countries 

possessing SINCGARS technology. 

Should a potential adversary come into 

possession of one of these radios, they 

would have the potential to intercept 

operational command, control, and 

targeting information. This potential 

problem is mitigated by the fact that the 

customer can secure information passed 

over the radio network using a 

commercial grade security capability 

equivalent to an Advanced Encryption 

Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption 

system whose keys are controlled by the 

customer country. 

5. As with the SINCGARS family of 

radios, the AN/PRC–117 is a tactical 

radio providing ECCM jam-resistant 

secure communications for exchange of 

command, control, and targeting 

information within the THAAD system 

tactical radio network. ECCM 

capabilities are sensitive but 

UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for 

these jam-resistant waveforms are 

unique to the customer country. Unlike 

the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC–117 

uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded 

with U.S. crypto keys, the system is 

then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. 

Should a potential adversary come into 

possession of one of these radios, the 

customer country can quickly remotely 

rekey remaining radios, preventing 

potential adversaries from 

understanding received command, 

control, and targeting information. 

6. The Defense Advanced Global 

Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 

(DAGR) is a handheld GPS location 

device with map background displaying 

the user’s location. Unlike commercial 

grade GPS receivers capable of receiving 

Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from 

GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of 

receiving Precise Positioning Signals 

(PPS). PPS satellite signals provide 

significantly more accurate location data 

than do SPS signals. This capability 

within DAGRs is possible due to the 

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 

Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an 

encrypted device permitting both 

receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of 

preventing potential adversaries from 

spoofing the system to display incorrect 

location information. The SAASM 

capability within the DAGR is sensitive 

but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM 

capabilities are sensitive due to the 

system’s ability to access restricted PPS 

GPS satellite signals and to prevent 

spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of 

potential adversaries to exploit the 

system is limited. 

7. The same SAASM capabilities 

resident in the DAGR are also resident 

in the THAAD GPS timing system. The 

THAAD system requires highly precise 

timing hacks in order accurately track 

and engage targets. The PPS signals 

generated by GPS satellites provide this 

precise timing information. The SAASM 

device resident in the timing system 

permits receipt of this precise PPS 

timing data. The SAASM is an 

encrypted device permitting both 

receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of 

preventing potential adversaries from 

spoofing the system to display incorrect 

data. The SAASM capability within the 

timing system is sensitive but 

UNCLASSIFIED. 

8. If a technologically advanced 

adversary were to obtain knowledge of 

specific hardware, the information 

could be used to develop 

countermeasures which might reduce 

weapons system effectiveness or be used 

in the development of a system with 

similar or advanced capabilities. 

9. A determination has been made 

that Saudi Arabia can provide 

substantially the same degree of 

protection for sensitive technology 

being released as the U.S. Government. 

This proposed sustainment program is 

necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. 

foreign policy and national security 

objectives outlined in the policy 

justification. 

10. All defense articles and services 

listed on this transmittal are authorized 

for release and export to the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia. 

[FR Doc. 2017–22965 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

Advisory Panel on Streamlining and 

Codifying Acquisition Regulations 

AGENCY: Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics), DoD. 

ACTION: Notice of Advisory Panel. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing this notice to encourage 

feedback for the Section 809 Advisory 

Panel on Streamlining and Codifying 

Acquisition Regulations (hereafter ‘‘the 

Panel’’). The Panel meets on a monthly 

basis and will provide a final report to 

the Secretary of Defense and Congress in 

2019. The agendas, meeting times, and 

contact information are posted on the 

Panel Web site: http://

www.section809panel.org. Public 

feedback can be submitted in the 

‘‘Contact Us’’ section of the Web site as 

either general comments or specific 

recommendations. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shayne L. Martin, Section 809 Panel, 

1400 Key Blvd., Suite 210, Arlington, 

VA 22209, email: shayne.martin@

dau.mil, phone: 703–571–2989. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

809 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 

(Pub. L. 114–92) required the Secretary 

of Defense to establish ‘‘an advisory 

panel on streamlining acquisition 

regulations.’’ The Panel was seated on 

August 12, 2016. By Statute, the Panel 

is exempt from the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Appendix). 

Public information, including 

opportunities for input, is posted and 

periodically updated at http://

www.section809panel.org. 

Dated: October 18, 2017. 

Aaron Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

[FR Doc. 2017–22987 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Navy 

Notice of Performance Review Board 

Membership 

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The purpose of the PRBs is to 

provide fair and impartial review of the 

annual SES performance appraisal 

prepared by the senior executive’s 

immediate and second level supervisor; 

to make recommendations to appointing 

officials regarding acceptance or 

modification of the performance rating; 

and to make recommendations for 

performance bonuses and basic pay 

increases. Composition of the specific 

PRBs will be determined on an ad hoc 

basis from among the individuals listed 

below: 

Mr. Mark Andress 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES