alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
REGISTRANT'S  FORM  10-QSB  FOR THE  QUARTER  ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30,  1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY TO SUCH FORM 10-QSB.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         329,190
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   23,312
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               362,116
<PP&E>                                          46,301
<DEPRECIATION>                                  25,180
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,304,254
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          287,716
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        12,606
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,003,932
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,304,254
<SALES>                                         43,493
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                43,493
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  656,915
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (613,422)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (613,422)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (613,422)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### In re Scott C. TOWNLEY; Stephanie Tashiro-Townley, Debtors, Scott C. Townley; Stephanie Tashiro-Townley, Appellants, v. K. Michael Fitzgerald, Trustee, Appellee.

No. 12-60001.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 21, 2014.*

Filed Jan. 27, 2014.

Scott C. Townley, Maple Valley, WA, pro se.

Stephanie Tashiro-Townley, Maple Valley, WA, pro se.

*732Jason Wilson-Aguilar, Senior Staff, Office Of K. Michael Fitzgerald Seattle, WA, for Appellee.

K. Michael Fitzgerald, Seattle, WA, pro se.

Before: CANBY, SILVERMAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Scott C. Townley and Stephanie Tashi-ro-Townley appeal pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment dismissing as moot their appeal from the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan and dismissing their case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a determination that an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision is moot. *Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc. v. Stanley (In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc.),*152 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm.

The BAP properly dismissed the appeal as moot because the debtors failed to seek a stay of the foreclosure sale pending appeal. *See Onouli-Kona Land Co. v. Estate of Richards (In re Onouli-Kona Land Co.),*846 F.2d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.1988) (“Bankruptcy’s mootness rule applies when an appellant has failed to obtain a stay from an order that permits a sale of a debtor’s assets.”).

The debtors’ request, filed on March 9, 2012, that this court take judicial notice of a motion in another case is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2667 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit providers of broadband 

internet access service from charging consumers above certain amounts 

for certain equipment. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 19, 2021 

Mr. VAN DREW introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit providers of broadband internet access service from charging 

consumers above certain amounts for certain equipment. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Broadband Equipment 

5 Rental Reform Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2667 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CHARGING CONSUMERS ABOVE 

2 CERTAIN AMOUNTS FOR CERTAIN RENTED 

3 EQUIPMENT. 

4 Section 642 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 

5 U.S.C. 562) is amended— 

6 (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub7 section (e); and 

8 (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol9 lowing: 

10 ‘‘(d) PROHIBITION ON CHARGING CONSUMERS

11 ABOVE CERTAIN AMOUNTS FOR CERTAIN EQUIPMENT.— 

12 A provider of fixed broadband internet access service that 

13 enters into a contract with a consumer after the date of 

14 the enactment of this paragraph for the provision of such 

15 service may not charge the consumer for renting, leasing, 

16 or otherwise providing to the consumer equipment (such 

17 as a router or modem) employed on the premises of the 

18 consumer for the provision of such service, if the consumer 

19 has paid to the provider through monthly rental fees the 

20 price offered to the consumer by the provider (at the time 

21 the contract was entered into) for purchasing the equip22 ment from the provider.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 99.1**




**AGGREGATE
      SCHEDULE OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST DISTRIBUTIONS TO
      CERTIFICATEHOLDERS**


Class
              
              
              Interest
              
              
              Principal
              
              
              Losses
              
              
              Ending
                  Balance1A1
              
              
              11,010,387.41
              
              
              44,734,786.03
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              185,285,213.971A2
              
              
              690,482.73
              
              
              2,805,405.13
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              11,619,594.872A1
              
              
              9,655,228.24
              
              
              50,513,971.88
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              158,026,028.122A2
              
              
              1,072,797.99
              
              
              5,612,636.63
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              17,558,363.372AR
              
              
              5.18
              
              
              100.00
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              0.00B1
              
              
              724,941.85
              
              
              16,469.64
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              13,898,530.36B2
              
              
              276,795.98
              
              
              6,288.41
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              5,306,711.59B3
              
              
              210,892.17
              
              
              4,791.17
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              4,043,208.83B4
              
              
              144,988.37
              
              
              3,293.93
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              2,779,706.07B5
              
              
              105,446.09
              
              
              2,395.58
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              2,021,604.42B6
              
              
              92,305.72
              
              
              2,097.05
              
              
              0.00
              
              
              1,769,678.21
----

Exhibit 32

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United StatesCode)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a)and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each ofthe undersigned officers of SE Global Equities Corp., a Minnesota corporation(the "Company"), does hereby certify, [to such officer's knowledge], that:

The Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2005****(the "Form *10-QSB*")of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form*10-QSB*fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.Dated: August 15, 2005/s/ Toby Chu Toby Chu, Chief Executive Officer  Dated: August 15, 2005/s/ Time Leong Tim Leong, Chief Financial Officer
A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In re 213 PARTNERS, LLC.

No. 2011-1021.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

July 12, 2011.

Douglas Churovich, Polster, Lieder, Woodruff & Lucchesi, L.C., of St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant.

Brian T. Racilla, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appel-lee. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Thomas W. Krause, Associate Solicitor.

BRYSON, LINN, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This Cause having been heard and considered, it is Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### Mildred C. KNIGHT; Bobby Knight, III, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF the UNITED STATES; Bishop Katharine Jef-ferts Schori; Episcopal Diocese of Lower South Carolina; Reverend Mark J. Lawrence; Episcopal Church Home; Family Services Incorporated; Iris Albright; Irvin Condon; Walter Kauffman; Glenn Churchill; John Does; Jane Does; Linda K. Jones; C. Chloe; Frederick R. Tonney, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-1947.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 18, 2010.

Decided: Nov. 24, 2010.

Mildred C. Knight, Bobby Knight, III, Appellants Pro Se.

Before AGEE, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.*

*

 The opinion is filed by a quorum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Mildred C. Knight and Bobby Knight, III, appeal the district court’s orders denying their motion to reconsider the order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and dismissing their purported civil rights action for lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Knight v. Episcopal Church of the United States,*No. 2:10-cv-00516-DCN, 2010 WL 3009308 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010 & Aug. 10, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-15-0000684

28-MAR-2019

08:23 AM
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002
(18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted), James M. McCluney, Chief Executive Officer
of Vixel Corporation (the "Company"), and Kurtis L. Adams, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, each hereby certify that, to the best of their
knowledge:

1. The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three-month period ended
March 30, 2003, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 99.1 (the
"PERIODIC REPORT") fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of March 30, 2003
and the results of its operations for the three-month period then ended.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the
14th day of May, 2003.

                                        /s/ James M. McCluney
                                  ---------------------------------------------
                                  JAMES M. MCCLUNEY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

                                        /s/ Kurtis L. Adams
                                  ---------------------------------------------
                                  KURTIS L. ADAMS, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


                                       29
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant To

Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Form 10-Q/A for NetScreen
Technologies, Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert D. Thomas, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the quarter covered by the
Report.
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ ROBERT D. THOMASRobert D. Thomas President and Chief Executive Officer NetScreen Technologies, Inc.Date:

August 15, 2003




This certification accompanies
this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
----

Exhibit 32.1 Section 1350 Certifications 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Annual Reportof China Marketing Media Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for theperiod ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Yingsheng Li, the ChiefExecutive Officer and President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) The Report fully complies withthe requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and 

(2) The information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand result of operations of the Company. 

Date: April 17, 2007 

By: /s/ Yingsheng Li ----------------------------------------- Name: Yingsheng Li Title: Chief Executive Officer and President (Principal Executive Officer) 

----
#### Aaron KINSER v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Allen Russell Ford, Inc.

Civ. No. 3-79-102.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, N. D.

April 3, 1979.

William A. Allen, LaFollette, Tenn., for plaintiff.

George F. Legg, Jack W. Bowers, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

The complaint in this case lists a number of causes of action against defendants based upon various federal and state laws. This Court’s jurisdiction over the state law claims is based solely on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. During the pre-trial conference the Court became aware of a serious question as to whether diversity jurisdiction is present here. Since this question goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court, the defendants’ admissions in their answers are not controlling. The Court will now address this very important question on its own motion.

Plaintiff, according to his complaint, is a citizen of Tennessee. Defendant, Allen Russell Ford, Inc., is deemed to be a citizen of the State of its incorporation and in the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). It is alleged and admitted that Allen Russell Ford is incorporated somewhere other than Tennessee, but there is no allegation as to its principal place of business. (The Court can almost take judicial notice of the fact that Allen Russell Ford’s principal place of business is in Knoxville, Tennessee.) Thus, the complaint does not establish the requisite diversity of citizenship between the parties.

In addition, the Court seriously doubts that the complaint meets the $10,000.00 *87amount in controversy requirement for diversity cases. Plaintiff’s *actual*losses apparently consist of approximately $1,500.00 equity in the repossessed motor vehicle and approximately $1,500.00 in other property lost by virtue of the repossession. The Court can say to a legal certainty, *see Etheridge v. Piper Aircraft Co.,*559 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1977), that a plaintiff’s compensatory damages are limited to his actual losses, no matter how many legal theories there may be to justify their recovery. Plaintiff’s punitive damage claims for the repossession are hardly tenable since defendants obviously had a valid security interest in the vehicle (See Exhibit attached to Complaint) and in light of statutory and judicial authorization of self-help repossession procedures. Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-9-503; *Turner v. Impala Motors,*503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974).

Accordingly, this Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is not a proper jurisdictional basis in this case and all claims premised on diversity jurisdiction must be dismissed. It is ORDERED that plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims for relief be, and the same hereby are, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Order Accordingly.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen D. SATCHER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-7469.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 21, 2013.

Decided: Nov. 26, 2013.

Stephen D. Satcher, Appellant pro se. Odessa Palmer Jackson, Office of the United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Stephen D. Satcher seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2013) motion as untimely. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), *223unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T] he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2860, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on November 29, 2012. The notice of appeal was filed on September 12, 2013.* Because Satcher failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny Satcher’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUSANNA MONTANTE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

ANTHONY FOXX, Secretary of 

Transportation (Federal Aviation 

Administration), 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55340

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-00384-GAF-PJW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 14, 2016**

Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Susanna Montante appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in her employment action alleging retaliation and related constitutional 

claims. We have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 14-55340 

Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997), and we 

affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee 

on Montante’s Title VII retaliation claim because Montante failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s asserted non-retaliatory 

reason for not rehiring her in 2007 was pretextual. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 

F.3d 1234, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim 

under Title VII); see also Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“[The] plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing defendant’s stated reasons to 

be merely pretextual, once defendant has given legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds 

for its actions.”).

The district court properly dismissed Montante’s claim that she was forced 

to retire in 2004 in violation of the First Amendment because the Civil Service 

Reform Act is the sole remedy for constitutional claims arising from federal 

employment. See David v. United States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(holding the CSRA offered sufficient “meaningful remedies” to preclude a federal 

employee from pursuing a First Amendment claim). 

We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett 

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.