alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jesus VAZQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50819

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 18, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

*356Philip J. Lynch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Henry Joseph Bemporad, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for DefendanL-Appellant.

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jesus Vazquez appeals the 37-month sentence he received following his guilty-plea conviction for possession with the intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). As he did below, he objects to the district court’s failure to award him a two-level reduction, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, for his minor role in the offense.

Vazquez contends that he was entitled to the reduction because he was only a courier and therefore far less culpable than the people who acquired the drugs, placed them in the trailer, and hired him as the driver. He argues that the large quantity of drugs involved in the offense does not change the fact that he was simply a transporter and less culpable than others.

The district court’s denial of a reduction for a mitigating role is a factual determination that is reviewed for clear error. *United States v. Villanueva,*408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir.2005). It is not sufficient for a defendant to show that he was less involved than other participants; rather, he must show that he was “peripheral to the advancement of the criminal activity.” *United States v. Martinez-Larraga,*517 F.3d 258, 272 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted).

As Vazquez did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his role in the instant offense was peripheral, the district court did not clearly err by not awarding him a minor-role adjustment. *See Villanueva,*408 F.3d at 203-04 & n. 9.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
EXHIBIT 32.1








Section
906 Certification by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer




Each
of Thomas J. Mazzarisi, Chief Executive Officer, and Stephen J. Schoepfer, Chief
Financial Officer, of JAG Media Holdings, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the
“Company”) hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as added by ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to their knowledge:




(1)
The Company’s periodic report on Form 10-Q for the period ended January 31, 2009
(“Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)
The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
Company.


CHIEF
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER
            
            CHIEF
      FINANCIAL OFFICER/s/
      Thomas J. Mazzarisi
            
            /s/
      Stephen J.
  SchoepferName:
      Thomas J. Mazzarisi
            
            Name:
      Stephen J. SchoepferDate:
      March 20, 2009
#### Gary MOSHER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Cindy KEANSTER; Douglas Jones; Juan Gutierrez-Garralda; John Does, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-20492

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 6, 2011.

Gary Mosher, Mendham, NJ, pro se.

Douglas Jones, Lakewood, CO, pro se.

Before KING, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gary Mosher filed a complaint against several defendants alleging claims of copyright infringement, defamation, and libel. This court vacated a judgment dismissing the suit based on Mosher’s failure to appear personally for a scheduling conference. Following additional proceedings on remand, the district court dismissed Mosh-er’s complaint because it failed to state a claim and because Mosher had not served three of the four named defendants. The court also denied a motion for recusal. Mosher moved for reconsideration, which the court also denied. Mosher then filed a notice of appeal.

The timing of Mosher’s notice of appeal raises an issue regarding this court’s jurisdiction, which we must examine sua sponte. *See Bailey v. Cain,*609 F.3d 763, 765 (5th Cir.2010), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 931, 178 L.Ed.2d 774 (2011). In a civil case, the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement that is not subject to equitable exceptions. *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214-15, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007); *Bailey,*609 F.3d at 765. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order or judgment being appealed. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The notice is deemed filed on the date it is actually received by the district court and not the date it is mailed. *Ludgood v. Apex Marine Corp. Ship Mgmt.,*311 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir.2002).

Mosher’s motion for reconsideration suspended the running of the 30-day period as to the underlying judgment until entry of the order disposing of his motion. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v), (vi). The court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration was entered on June 15, 2010. Mosher then had 30 days to file his notice of appeal, or until July 15, 2010. Mosher’s notice of appeal was not filed until July 19, 2010, four days beyond the deadline. Thus, it was not timely and we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. *See Bowles,*551 U.S. at 214-15, 127 S.Ct. 2360; *Matter of Lacey,*114 F.3d 556, 556-57 (5th Cir.1997).

Finally, we caution Mosher that the abusive and insulting language directed at the district court and the judiciary is inappropriate, and the use of such language in future filings will result in the imposition of sanctions.

*382DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit
      32.1




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE**


**SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Viva International, Inc. (the “Company”)
      on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), the undersigned certifies,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge,
      that:




(1)       The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
            The information contained in the Report
      fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
      of operations of the Company.







Dated:
                November 19, 2007
            By:
            /s/
                Calvin HumphreyCalvin
                Humphrey, Chief Executive Officer(Principal
                Executive Officer)






Dated:
                November 19, 2007
            By:
            /s/
                Robert J. ScottRobert
                J. Scott, Chief Financial Officer(Principal
                Financial Officer)
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOHN CALVIN GERMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0118

[March 27, 2024]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge;

L.T. Case No. 562007CF005089B.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

No brief filed for appellee.

KUNTZ, J.

In German v. State, 284 So. 3d 572, 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), this Court 

“reverse[d] the order on appeal and remand[ed] for the circuit court to 

reinstate its original order granting resentencing. The trial court should 

resentence appellant to a lawful sentence on remand, based on the 

controlling law at the time of resentencing.” The State neither sought 

rehearing nor review in the Florida Supreme Court.

On remand, the circuit court entered an order requiring resentencing 

pursuant to our mandate. Three years after the mandate issued, the 

resentencing had not occurred. So the State sought to take advantage of 

a subsequent decision from the Florida Supreme Court. The circuit court 

agreed and declined to follow our mandate in light of the new authority.

There is no doubt that the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent 

decision would have been advantageous to the State had it been issued in 

2019. But the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was not issued until years 

later. Instead, our mandate was this Court’s judgment requiring the 

circuit court to carry out a resentencing. And, as to the original 
2

sentencing, “our judgment wiped the slate clean.” State v. Okafor, 306 So. 

3d 930, 933 (Fla. 2020) (internal citation omitted); see also Morris v. State, 

328 So. 3d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Our opinion and mandate

clearly required the circuit court to “resentence appellant to a lawful 

sentence on remand, based on the controlling law at the time of 

resentencing.” German, 284 So. 3d at 573.

Contrary to the State’s argument, the circuit court could not revive the 

original sentence unless we recalled our mandate. But, as the Florida 

Supreme Court has explained, we lack the authority to do so more than 

120 days after the mandate issued. Okafor, 306 So. 3d at 933 (citing §

43.44, Fla. Stat. (2019) and Fla. R. App. P. 9.340(a)).

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court’s order reinstating 

German’s prior sentence and remand to the circuit court with instructions 

to comply with this Court’s 2019 mandate.

Vacated and remanded.

MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
## State of N ew York Su p reme C ou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: December 11, 2014 518754

________________________________ In the Matter of ANTHONY DAVIS, Petitioner, v MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, as Acting Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

________________________________ Calendar Date: October 21, 2014 Before: Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ.

__________ Anthony Davis, Stormville, petitioner pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Marcus J. Mastracco of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules. Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with assault, committing a sex offense, interfering with staff, being out of place, and leaving an assigned area without authorization. The charges stem from an incident wherein petitioner, while working as a porter in the infirmary, allegedly touched a nurse's buttocks and, after being rebuked by the nurse, left his assigned area and returned to his cell without authorization. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty of all charges. On administrative appeal, the determination was modified to the extent that the assault charge was dismissed and-2- 518754

the penalty reduced. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued. We confirm. The misbehavior report, unusual incident report and testimony at the hearing, including that of the nurse involved in the incident, provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt (see Matter of Lewis v Leclaire, 48 AD3d 875, 875 [2008]). Contrary to petitioner's contention, the intentional and unprovoked rubbing of an intimate part of the nurse's body constitutes a violation of the rule charged (see 7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [2] [ii]; see also Matter of Gibson v Coughlin, 142 AD2d 862, 863 [1988]). We are also unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that he was improperly denied the right to call a witness. The record reflects that the requested witness was not present during the incident and could offer no material or relevant information with regard to the charges (see Matter of Credell v Fischer, 120 AD3d 857, 857 [2014]). We have reviewed petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
**EXHIBIT      32.2 **

**CERTIFICATION      **

| (1) | The                Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section                13(a) or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The                information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in                all                material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                of                the company at the end of the periods covered by the Quarterly Report. |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By:    | /s/                Kirk R. Rowland     |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   |   | Kirk                R. Rowland         |
|   |   | Chief                Financial Officer |
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 4.28
                               THOMAS J. MAZZARISI



January 31, 2004


JAG Media Holdings, Inc.
6965 S.W. 18th Street, Suite B13
Boca Raton, FL  33433


Re:      Promissory Note dated April 1, 2002 in the principal amount of $200,000
         between JAG Media Holdings, Inc. (f/k/a JagNotes.com Inc.), as
         borrower, and Thomas J. Mazzarisi, as lender, with a maturity date of
         January 31, 2004 ("Promissory Note")

Gentlemen:

This will serve to confirm that the "Maturity Date" of the Promissory Note is
hereby extended from January 31, 2004 to the earlier of (i) April 30, 2004 or
(ii) the effective date of a "Change in Control" as that term is defined in the
Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended.

Except for the foregoing changes, the Promissory Note remains unchanged and in
full force and effect.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Thomas J. Mazzarisi
------------------------
Thomas J. Mazzarisi
Depositor: Structured
      Asset Securities Corporation


745
      Seventh Avenue , 8th
      Floor


New
      York , NY
      10019





Trustee:  LaSalle
      Bank , N.A.


135
      S.
      LaSalle Street , Suite
      1625


Chicago , IL
      60603


Attention:
      Global Securities and Trust Services





Securities
      Administrator:








Subject: Annual
      Officer's Certification


Fiscal
      Year: 2006


Securitization: LMT
      2006-2





I,
      E.
      Todd Whittemore, the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Aurora Loan
      Services LLC (the “Master Servicer”), do certify the following for the Calendar
      Year 2006:




1.
      A
      review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding calendar
      year (or portion thereof) and of its performance under the Agreement for such
      period has been made under my supervision.




2.
      To the
      best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled
      all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material aspects throughout
      2006 (or applicable portion thereof), or, if there has been a failure to fulfill
      any such obligation in any material respect, I have specifically identified
      to
      the Depositor, and the Trustee each such failure known to me and the nature
      and
      status thereof, including the steps being taken by the Master Servicer to remedy
      such default.





Certified
      by:  AURORA
      LOAN SERVICES LLC







By:
      /s/ E. Todd Whittemore





Name:
      E.
      Todd Whittemore


Title:
      Executive Vice President
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk December 26, 2012

h1217 

# Order

December 26, 2012

145639

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145639

COA: 309196

Jackson CC: 08

- 004718

- FH

WILLIAM JOE BLANKENSHIP, a/k/a

WILLIAM JOE BLANKINSHIP,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 13, 2012 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
EXHIBIT 35.2
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                               GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC
              RFMSI SERIES 2006-S2 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized  officer of GMAC Mortgage,  LLC, as servicer
(the "Servicer")  pursuant to the applicable  servicing  agreement,  does hereby
certify that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under  the   applicable   servicing   agreement  has  been  made  under  my
     supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable  servicing  agreement
     in all material respects throughout such period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:    Executive Vice President
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ANDRE VEIRA,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-832

[October 21, 2021]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael A. Usan, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 15006923CF10A.

Andre Veira, Arcadia, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, CIKLIN and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Demondra Lana ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 10-10018, 10-10019

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

Nancy E. Larson, James Michael Worley, Sr., Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District *382of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

William Reynolds Biggs, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fort Worth, TX, Matthew Kyle Belcher, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.

Demondra Lana Allen, Seagoville, TX, pro se.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Demondra Lana Allen has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Allen has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeals present no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEALS ARE DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 7673** 

JOHN L. CORRIGAN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. FRED C. PFLANZ; A. HILLE, Judge; D. BARGER, Sheriff; B. SCUDDER, Deputy Prosecutor; ADAMS COUNTY; PAUL L. KIRKPATRICK , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Leonie M. Brinkema , District Judge. ( 1:12

- mc - 00012

- LMB

- TRJ )

Submitted : December 13, 2012 Decided: December 19, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
John L. Corrigan , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this c ircuit.2 PER CURIAM: John L. Corrigan appeals the district court’s order denying his Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district cou rt. Corrigan v. Pflanz , No. 1:12

- mc - 00012

- LMB

- TRJ (E.D. Va.
Sept. 14 , 2012) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Notice of Early Termination



     

     

    March
      12, 2007

    


    To: Mr.
      Mahmood Mawji & Mr. Karl Dhillon

    Re: Notice
      of Early Termination

     

    Dear
      Sirs:

     

    Let
      this letter be served as your early termination notice pursuant to the terms
      of
      the Consulting Agreement you entered into with the Company on November 29,
      2006.
      On February 08, 2007, Company sent an email request for services to complete
      our
      annual report 10-KSB to Mr. Dhillon and Mr. Mawji which remained non-responsive
      until March 12, 2007 (over 30 days) by both contractors. 

     

                Pursuant
      to section
      4.2 (d) of the consulting agreement, without prejudicing any other rights that
      the Company may have hereunder or at law or in equity, the Company hereby
      terminates Consulting Agreements immediately upon delivery of this written
      notice to the Contractors, the Company finds, the Contractors are unable or
      unwilling to perform the Services under their respective consulting agreements.
      Furthermore, Company finds Mr. Dhillon to be engaged as CFO and Mr. Mawji as
      VP
      of Service Air Group Inc. (BC, Canada) which may cause (1) conflict of interest
      between the Company and its former affiliate and (2) cause violation under
      section 4.2 (c ) of the consulting agreement. The Company determined that from
      the effective date of the consulting agreement (December 1, 2006) to March
      12,
      2007, both contractors have not rendered any services to the Company and
      therefore, the Contractors are not entitled to receive any compensation upon
      this termination as per section 4.4 of the agreement.

    


    If
      you have any question(s) and/or concern(s), please do not hesitate to
      communicate the undersigned via email or registered mail. 

    


    Best
      Regards:

    


    /s/
      Mohammad Sultan

    Mohammad
      Sultan (CEO)

    For
      and on Behalf of:

    Service
      Air Group Inc. (NJ, USA) 

    


    Enclosure:

    
      	·  	
              Consulting
                Agreements