alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
      32.2




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Amazon Biotech, Inc., a Utah corporation
      (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the period ended April 30, 2007, as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Simcha Edell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
      to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the


Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Dated:
              June 19, 2007
            
            /s/
              Simcha EdellSimcha
              Edell, Chief Financial
              Officer
#### William P. COX, Third Radio Squadron Mobil G, Detachment B, and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, Max Cleland, Washington, D. C., Jack Coker, Waco, Texas, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. CA-5-79-14.

United States District Court, N. D. Texas, Lubbock Division.

May 21, 1979.

William P. Cox, pro se.

*1209Kenneth J. Mighell, U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., Roger L. McRoberts, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lubbock, Tex., for defendants.

ORDER

WOODWARD, Chief Judge.

The court has received and considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss the above-styled cause for lack of jurisdiction and other grounds, and the briefs in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and the court hereby ORDERS:

The defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

It is the opinion of the court that judicial review of a denial of veterans’ benefits or compensation is barred by 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which deprives the court of jurisdiction over decisions of the Veterans Administration concerning veterans’ benefits unless a constitutional challenge is levelled at the validity of underlying statutes concerning such benefits. See *Johnson v. Robison,*415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), and *Anderson v. Veterans Administration,*559 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1977).

As the plaintiffs in this case are clearly asking only for a review as to their eligibility for benefits, the requisite constitutional challenge is not present so as to remove the jurisdictional bar of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a). Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction over this cause of action, and must dismiss this case accordingly.

The Clerk will furnish a copy hereof to the plaintiff who is proceeding *pro se*and to each attorney of record.
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of

orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 5/15/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

________________________________

LEE TRAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )

)

v. ) No. 95-6348

) (D.C. No. CIV-93-847-W)

ROBERT K. DENTON; ROB P. ) (W.D. Okla.)

MELTON; and DOUGLAS BYRD, )

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

_______________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

________________________________

Before PORFILIO, McKAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a);10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted

without oral argument.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment after remand from a prior
2

appeal. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not respond to the

renewed motion for summary judgment with sufficient facts to defeat the motion.

The judgment is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge
<PAGE>

                                                                EXHIBIT 10.29(b)

                            CARSON PIRIE SCOTT & CO.

                             OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

      WHEREAS, Carson Pirie Scott & Co. (the "Company") has adopted and
currently maintains the Carson Pirie Scott & Co. Supplemental Executive
Retirement Plan (the "Plan"); and

      WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to clarify certain Plan
provisions; and

      WHEREAS, by resolutions dated October 4, 1994, the Carson Pirie Scott &
Co. Compensation Committee authorized the Company's Vice President and General
Counsel to make any amendments to the Plan as may be necessary to clarify the
Plan or otherwise;

      NOW, THEREFORE, the Carson Pirie Scott & Co. Supplemental Executive
Retirement Plan is hereby amended as follows:

      1.    The definition of "Average Compensation" in Section 1.3 of the Plan
            is amended by replacing the reference to "five fiscal years" with
            the phrase "five calendar years."

      2.    The definition of "Compensation" in Section 1.7 of the Plan is
            amended in its entirety to read as follows:

            "Compensation" means, with respect to any Participant during a
            calendar year, the base salary plus regular annual bonuses awarded
            under the Carson Pirie Scott & Co. Executive Bonus Plan, if any,
            paid to such Participant for service as an Eligible Employee during
            such calendar year, including salary deferral contributions made in
            accordance with Section 401 (k) of the Code and deferrals to the
            Carson Pirie Scott & Co. Deferred Compensation Plan, but excluding
            any other compensation (including, but not limited to, amounts
            payable under the P. A. Bergner & Co. Incentive Compensation Plan,
            the Carson Pirie Scott & Co. 1993 Stock Incentive Plan, the Carson
            Pirie Scott & Co. Long-Term Incentive Plan, and any similar
            long-term incentive plan or incentive compensation plan, any special
            bonuses or any non-cash compensation, and any severance payments).
            Compensation paid to a Participant for service as an Eligible

<PAGE>

            Employee for less than a full calendar year shall not be
            annualized."

      3.    The first sentence of Section 3.1 dealing with vesting shall be
            amended In its entirety to read as follows:

            "No participant (other than members of the Senior Executive
            Committee on January 1, 1991) shall become vested under the Plan
            with respect to any Accrued Benefit prior to attaining age 55 while
            an Employee."

      The above amendments are intended to clarify the Plan document to reflect
the Plan's current administration of the Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan.

                                      -2-
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2669 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act to provide for the authority to reimburse local governments or 

electric cooperatives for interest expenses, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 20, 2021 

Mr. DUNN (for himself, Mr. SOTO, Mr. RUTHERFORD, Mr. GRAVES of Louisiana, Mr. LAWSON of Florida, Mr. GIMENEZ, and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide for the authority to 

reimburse local governments or electric cooperatives for 

interest expenses, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FEMA Loan Interest 

5 Payment Relief Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2669 IH

1 SEC. 2. REIMBURSEMENT OF INTEREST PAYMENTS RE2 LATED TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Title IV of the Robert T. Stafford 

4 Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 

5 5170 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol6 lowing: 

7 ‘‘SEC. 431. REIMBURSEMENT OF INTEREST PAYMENTS RE8 LATED TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. 

9 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, acting through 

10 the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 

11 Agency, shall provide financial assistance to a local gov12 ernment or electric cooperative as reimbursement for 

13 qualifying interest. 

14 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the following 

15 definitions apply: 

16 ‘‘(1) QUALIFYING INTEREST.—The term ‘quali17 fying interest’ means, with respect to a qualifying 

18 loan, the lesser of— 

19 ‘‘(A) the actual interest paid to a lender 

20 for such qualifying loan; and 

21 ‘‘(B) the interest that would have been 

22 paid to a lender if such qualifying loan had an 

23 interest rate equal to the prime rate most re24 cently published on the Federal Reserve Statis25 tical Release on selected interest rates. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2669 IH

1 ‘‘(2) QUALIFYING LOAN.—The term ‘qualifying 

2 loan’ means a loan— 

3 ‘‘(A) obtained by a local government or 

4 electric cooperative; and 

5 ‘‘(B) of which not less than 90 percent of 

6 the proceeds are used to fund activities for 

7 which such local government or electric coopera8 tive receives assistance under this Act after the 

9 date on which such loan is disbursed.’’. 

10 (b) RULE OF APPLICABILITY.—Any qualifying inter11 est (as such term is defined in section 431 of the Robert 

12 T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

13 Act, as added by this Act) incurred by a local government 

14 or electric cooperative in the 5 years preceding the date 

15 of enactment of this Act shall be treated as eligible for 

16 financial assistance for purposes of such section. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 AND
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  In
connection with this Quarterly Report of Green Planet Solutions, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending December 31, 2007,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Herbert Schaffer, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:
  1.
              Such
      Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending December
      31, 2007, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
  2.
              The
      information contained in such Yearly Report on Form 10-KSB/A for
      the period ending December 31, 2007, fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      Green Planet Solutions, Inc.
  Dated:
July 25, 2008
  By: /s/
Herbert Schaffer
 Herbert
Schaffer
 Chief
Executive Officer,
 Chief
Financial Officer
exv10w36xcy



 





EXHIBIT
10.36(c)



SECOND AMENDMENT TO LEASE




     This Second Amendment to Lease dated October 1, 2001 is executed by and between Syufy
Enterprises, a California limited partnership, hereinafter called “Landlord,” and Century Theatres,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, hereinafter called “Tenant.”



WITNESSETH:




     WHEREAS, Landlord and Century Theatres of California, Inc., entered into an Indenture of Lease
on September 30, 1995, hereinafter referred to as the “Lease,” for land and a theatre building
located in Citrus Heights, California, and



     WHEREAS, Landlord and Tenant entered into that certain First Amendment to Lease dated
September 1, 2000, and



     WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend said Lease as hereinafter provided,



     NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto mutually agree that the Lease shall be amended as follows:



     1. Tenant shall be allowed to demolish the existing Theatre Building and Improvements.
Tenant shall be responsible for all costs of the demolition and removal of debris.



     2. Tenant shall be allowed to re-develop the Entire Premises in order to construct a new
multi-screen theater complex and provide for surface parking in connection therewith. Tenant shall
be responsible for all costs to re-develop the property for Tenant’s use.



     3. The term “Leased Premises” as defined in Section 1.02 — Definitions in Article I of the
Lease shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following definition:




     The term “Leased Premises” shall mean Tenant’s Building and the land adjacent
thereto as described in Exhibit A and as shown on Exhibit B, and the rights,
easements and privileges granted to Tenant in the Lease.



     4.  Section 2.01 of the Lease shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:




     Landlord leases to Tenant and Tenant leases from Landlord, the Entire Premises,
upon the terms and conditions contained herein.



     5. Section 14.06 Partial Taking — Option to Terminate shall be amended by deleting the
phrase “if more than thirty percent (30%) of the Building or”.



 









 






     6. Section 7.01 (C) of the Lease shall be deleted in its entirety.



     7. Section 9.01 of the Lease shall be deleted in its entirety.



     8. Section 9.04 (B) of the Lease shall be deleted in its entirety.



     9. Section 7.02 of the Lease shall be amended by deleting the parenthetical phrases
“(exclusive of Landlord’s Buildings)” and by deleting the reference to the “Common Area.”



     10. This Amendment shall be effective on the date first set forth above.



     11. All other conditions and provisions of the Lease shall remain in effect.



     Executed as of the date first written above.



	 	 	 
	SYUFY ENTERPRISES, L.P.

	 	CENTURY THEATRES, INC.
	 
	 	 
	/s/ Alan Steuer 
	 	/s/ Raymond W. Syufy 
	By:     Alan Steuer

	 	By:     Raymond W. Syufy
	Its:     CFO

	 	Its:     CEO




[STAMP]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos Tiran MCCRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-14735

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 12, 2008.

Gwendolyn L. Spivey, Randolph P. Mur-rell, William Rourk Clark, Jr., Federal Defender Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Carlos Tiran McCray appeals his sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. McCray invites us to revisit our holding in *United States v. Burge,*407 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (11th Cir.2005), that juvenile adjudications provide sufficient safeguards to ensure the reliability required by *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and thus under the Sixth Amendment are a permissible basis on which to classify a defendant as an armed career criminal and enhance his sentence accordingly. McCray asserts circuit courts are divided over whether Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions extends to juvenile adjudications that were not tried by a jury.

We review *de novo*legal questions concerning the Constitution. *United States v. Noel,*231 F.3d 833, 836 (11th Cir.2000). In *Apprendi,*120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, the Supreme Court held “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Recognizing this exception, we have stated “[t]he government need not allege in its indictment and need *875not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.” *Burge,*407 F.3d at 1188 (quotations omitted). In *Burge,*we held prior juvenile adjudications fell within Apprendi’s prior conviction exception. *See Burge,*407 F.3d at 1191 (“At a minimum, however, *Appren-di’s*prior conviction exception is based on the procedural safeguards that attach to a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication.”). “[Ojnly the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior panel decision.” *United States v. Marte,*356 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir.2004).

As McCray concedes, *Burge*decides this issue. A prior juvenile adjudication that is not subject to a jury trial can be used as a basis for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Thus, the district court did not err by categorizing McCray as an armed career criminal based on prior juvenile adjudications.

AFFIRMED.
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 

No. 19-0429V 

UNPUBLISHED 

JEFFREY CROSSE, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, 

 Respondent. 

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: May 13, 2020 

Special Processing Unit (SPU); 

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession; 

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; 

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA) 

   

Jessica Olins, Maglio Christopher & Toale, PA, Washington, DC, for petitioner. 

Mollie Danielle Gorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

 On March 21, 2019, Jeffrey Crosse filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he received an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on 

November 22, 2017, and subsequently suffered left shoulder injuries. Petition at 1-3. 

The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters. 

On May 13, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes 

that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report 

at 1. Specifically, Respondent states that “petitioner has satisfied the criteria set forth in 

the revised Vaccine Injury Table and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation, which 

                                                            

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am 

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to 

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to 

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such 

material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012). 
2

affords petitioners a presumption of causation if onset of SIRVA occurs within forty-eight 

hours after receipt of a seasonal flu vaccination and there is no apparent alternative 

cause.” Id. at 5-6. Respondent further agrees that the medical records demonstrate that 

Petitioner has experienced the residual effects of his SIRVA for more than six months, 

and that therefore, Petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under 

the Act. Id. at 6. 

 In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Brian H. Corcoran 

 Brian H. Corcoran 

 Chief Special Master
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NATASHA SHPAK; et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

 v. 

MALCOLM CURTIS and JUDITH 

CURTIS, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

BELZONA SYSTEMS OF CALIFORNIA, 

INC.; et al., 

Defendants.

No. 16-56323 

D.C. No. 

5:16-cv-01687-MWF-KK 

ORDER*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 8, 2018**

Pasadena, California

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 12 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, *** District 

Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court’s rejection of a “notice of removal,” 

which sought to “remove” an action pending in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York to the Central District of California. The notice, 

however denominated, was in substance a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a), and the district court’s order thus effectively was a denial of the requested 

transfer. That order was not a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Pac. Car 

& Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[O]rders respecting 

venue entered under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) are interlocutory in nature and are not 

appealable prior to final judgment.”). We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. This order shall constitute the mandate of this court.

 

*** The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0258-11

MICHAEL ANGELO BERBER, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON REHEARING OF APPELLANT’S

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TRINITY COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to confinement for life. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Berber v. State, (Tex. App. — Tyler, No. 12-

10-00041-CR, delivered January 12, 2011). Appellant’s petition for discretionary review

was dismissed as untimely filed on June 22, 2011. Appellant has filed a motion for

rehearing requesting reinstatement of his petition so that it will be considered by this
Berber - 2

Court. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. His petition filed in this Court on

June 15, 2011, is reinstated as of August 24, 2011, and will be considered in accord with

Tex.R.App.P. 68. Appellant must file copies of his petition for discretionary review with

this Court within 14 days of the date of this opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 9.3(b).

Delivered August 24, 2011

Do not publish