alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       1,691,650
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,534,297
<ALLOWANCES>                                    35,887
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      70,333,099
<DEPRECIATION>                              12,189,573
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              87,755,105
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  86,288,561
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                87,755,105
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,939,148
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,422,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,902
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,392,494)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,392,494)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,392,494)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
32.2
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
 TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Quick-Med
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2008
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Nam H. Nguyen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:
 
 (a)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
 
  (b)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 
 
 Dated:  May
15,
2008                                                                                            /s/ Nam H.
Nguyen______
 Nam H.
Nguyen
 Chief Financial
Officer
#### Isaac A. ISAIAH, M.D., Plaintiff—Appellant, v. WESTERN MARYLAND HOSPITAL SYSTEM, (WMHS), et al.; James M. Raver, MD-WMHS; W. Royce Hodges, III, MD of WMHS; William F. Kellermeyer, MD of WMHS; Brian T. Tucker, Esq., et al. WMHS; Robert S. Paye, et al., WMHS; Jack C. Tranter, Esq. et al., WMHS, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 10-2235.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 4, 2011.

David Hart Nelson, Charlottesville, VA, for Appellant. Thomas Christopher Dame, Steven G. Metzger, Gallagher Evelius & Jones, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Jeffrey Schuyler Getty, James Matthew Gilmore, Geppert, McMullen, Paye & Getty, Cumberland, Maryland, for Appellees.

*302Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Isaac A. Isaiah appeals the district court’s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss his civil action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Isaiah v. Western Maryland Hosp. Sys.*No. 1:10-cv-01873-JFM, 2010 WL 4009036 (D.Md. Oct. 8, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joshua Bynum, Appellant.

[858 NYS2d 902]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Konviser, J.), dated May 22, 2006, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court’s determination designating him a level three sex offender was supported by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore should not be disturbed *(see*Correction Law § 168-n [3]; *People v McLaughlin,*40 AD3d 832, 833 [2007]; *People v Hyson,*27 AD3d 919, 920 [2006]). Fisher, J.P, Miller, Garni and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
#### Baskin *vs.*Vernon.

1. Whether or not a mortgage executed in Alabama conveyed title, and whether or not it would be enforced in this state as title, the fact that such a mortgage was recorded in Alabama was no proof of its execution, on a trial in Georgia, and in the absence of other proof of execution, it was properly rejected from evidence 27 *6a.,*96

2. Trover having been brought to recover a mule, and the plaintiff having shown no title in writing, and no possession by him, a non-suit was properly awarded.

Judgment affirmed.

December 2, 1885.

Jackson, Chief Justice.

[Baskin brought bail trover against Yernon for a mule. On the trial, the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff, as to *371the title, was, in brief, as follows: In January, 1881, Baskin instructed one Cooper to buy a mule to cultivate a-crop on the place of the former, and agreed to give a joint note with Cooper therefor, with the understanding that he • (Baskin) was to “have a prior lien on the same until paid, ■for.” This was done, and subsequently Baskin paid the note. He had received from Cooper only $26.77 on the: purchase money. Cooper took the mule and worked it on. the plantation of Baskin, keeping it in the stable on the-place until about November, when he “ absconded,” carrying the mule with him. All this was in Alabama. In December, the animal was found in the possession of defendant in Bartow county, Georgia, and the latter did not deny that he bought it from Cooper. Plaintiff never consented to any transfer of the mule. He offered to testify that he considered the mule in his possession, but this was - ruled out.

Plaintiff offered in evidence a mortgage from Cooper to ■ him, executed in Alabama and recorded there, giving a statutory lien upon the crop of Cooper, under the statute • of that state, and conveying the mule to plaintiff with a condition to be void on payment of his indebtedness, and. a right to seize and sell on failure to pay, or in case of an attempted removal without plaintiff’s consent.. This was-attested by two witnesses, and an endorsement showed that it had been recorded as a mortgage in the office of the ■ judge of the probate court of Etowah county, Alabama.. On objection, this was rejected, and a non-suit was granted. Plaintiff excepted.]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS PEREZ-ANDRADE,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 13-70937

Agency No. A070-929-764

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 14, 2015** 

Before: SILVERMAN, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Carlos Perez-Andrade, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

FILED

OCT 20 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility findings. See Zamanov v.

Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011). We review de novo due process

challenges. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004). We deny

the petition for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination

based on the inconsistencies regarding when Perez-Andrade experienced harm at

the hands of political rivals and when he entered the United States, as well as the

vague nature of his testimony and declaration. See Cortez-Pineda v. Holder, 610

F.3d 1118, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2010) (change in date of entry and inconsistencies

regarding the date of past threats went to the heart of the claim); see also Singh v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004) (lack of detail in testimony

regarding alleged political activities supported adverse credibility determination). 

We reject Perez-Andrade’s contention that the IJ failed to properly consider his

explanations for the inconsistencies. See Zamanov, 649 F.3d at 974. In the

absence of credible testimony, Perez-Andrade’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because Perez-Andrade’s CAT claim was based on the same statements that

were found not credible, and the record does not otherwise compel the conclusion

2 13-70937
that it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with consent or acquiescence

of the government if returned to Mexico, his CAT claim fails. See Farah, 348 F.3d

at 1156-57. We reject Perez-Andrade’s contention that the agency violated due

process in its analysis and rejection of his CAT claim. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d

1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim).

Finally, we deny Perez-Andrade’s motion to refer the case to mediation.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 13-70937
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felix Santiago LEMUS-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10505.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed Feb. 23, 2011.

Robert Lally Miskell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USTU-Offiee of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Roger H. Sigal, Esquire, Law Office of Roger H. Sigal, Tucson, AZ, for Defen-dani>-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Felix Santiago Lemus-Rodriguez appeals from the 41-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lemus-Rodriguez contends that the district court committed procedural error by: (1) relying on a clearly erroneous fact; (2) *679failing to explain adequately its reasons for rejecting his arguments; and (3) failing to explain adequately the reasons for and the extent of variance from the guidelines range.

Lemus-Rodriguez has not demonstrated that the alleged factual error by the district court affected his substantial rights. *See United States v. Dallman,*533 F.3d 755, 761-62 (9th Cir.2008). LemusRodriguez’s other contentions of procedural error are belied by the record. It is clear the district court considered LemusRodriguez’s sentencing arguments. *See United States v. Perez-Perez,*512 F.3d 514, 516 (9th Cir.2008).

Finally, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the sentence is not substantively unreasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                          JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                            JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                      603336
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                               291177
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                 115690
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           1946543
<PP&E>                                      171269
<DEPRECIATION>                              (68746)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             2049066
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       499798
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                  11454871
<OTHER-SE>                               (10139239)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               2049066
<SALES>                                     519682
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            519682
<CGS>                                       329392
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              3630001
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             29678
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           15051
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (2942441)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (2942441)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                              (2942441)
<EPS-BASIC>                                 (.16)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (.16)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1













CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the quarterly report of Greystone Logistics, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending August 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Warren F. Kruger, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








February 9, 2012
/s/ Warren F. Kruger


Warren F. Kruger


President and Chief Executive Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Report and shall not be considered filed as part of the Report.
#### Jose Del REAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of KANSAS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-3199.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

Jose Del Real, Wichita, KS, pro se.

David Clay Britton, Esq., Attorney General for the State of Kansas, Topeka, KS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, MURPHY and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

NEIL M. GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

Jose Del Real, proceeding *pro se*here as in the district court, claims his rights were *676violated in his state court criminal trial. He says he was not allowed to present documents or to fully cross-examine two witnesses, and that one witness testified falsely. He asks us to reverse his conviction or grant him a new criminal trial. The district court dismissed his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See*Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6). In particular, it held that (1) Mr. Del Real’s claims, apparently based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, could not be brought against the State of Kansas because the state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983; (2) the Eleventh Amendment barred his claims; (3) the complaint was too vague to state a claim; and (4) the federal court was without subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine. *See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,*263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); *D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,*460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

Giving Mr. Del Real’s *pro se*filings the solicitous consideration they are due, and reviewing the district court’s dismissal order de novo, *see Kane Cnty. Utah v. Salazar,*562 F.3d 1077, 1085 (10th Cir.2009) (reviewing de novo dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) *&*(6)), we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal for substantially the same reasons the district court gave in its thorough order entered July 27, 2010.

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Exhibit
99.4








CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the Annual Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10K of Grosvenor
Explorations Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended June 30, 2009, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Rizanina
Raneses, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:





1.    The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.     The
information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.








August
10, 2009


RIZANINA
RANESES


Rizanina
Raneses


Chief
Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director











-1-
1 The Hon. Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 98-3134MN

_____________ Westchester Fire Insurance Company, * * Appellant, * * On Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Minnesota. * JHC Insurance Group, Inc., * [To be published] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 10, 1999 Filed: May 21, 1999

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In this case the plaintiff, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, claims that the defendant, JHC Insurance Group, Inc., a wholesale insurance broker, was at fault in not clearly transmitting to the insured the substance of a certain change in coverage. The District Court 1 granted summary judgment, and we affirm.-2-

The crux of the case is that Westchester cannot prove that the omission on the part of JHC, even if negligent, caused any loss. Westchester wound up having to pay aloss incurred by its insured because of our holding, see Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v. West chester Fire Ins. Co. , 159 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 1998), that the policy change was substantial, and that insufficient notice of the change had been given to the insured to makeit effective under Minnesota law. The difficulty with the present claim, however, is that Westchester cannot show that anything would have come out differently if JHC in fact had transmitted the information in question to Hawkins. Westchester cannot show what would have happened if Hawkins had refused to accept the change. It cannot show, in other words, that it, as the insurer, would have insisted on the change, so that the coverage afforded by the policy would in fact have been reduced, and Westchester

would not have been liable to pay the loss. As evidence on the point, Westchester

offered the testimony of its underwriter that he would not have renewed the policy if the insured had rejected the change in question, but this testimony is inconsistent withtestimony given by that same underwriter in the previous litigation. Westchester

argues that the testimony was not inconsistent, but we are not persuaded by this argument. We agree in substance with the reasoning of the District Court's opinion. We do not think that this case has enough precedential significance to warrant a fuller treatment, and, in the interests of a prompt disposition, we therefore affirm in this abbreviated form. Affirmed. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
(June 24, 2014)

#### In the Matter of Elizabeth Mason, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent, and Michael Strohbehn, Respondent.

[987 NYS2d 844]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Geoffrey D. Wright, J.), entered January 27, 2012, which, following an evidentiary hearing, found that respondent/cross-petitioner-respondent Michael Strohbehn was not discharged for cause and is entitled to receive a quantum meruit attorney’s fee in the amount of $109,425.39, unanimously modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, to the extent that the quantum merit at*595torney’s fee is reduced to $72,220, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The hearing court’s determination, based largely on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, is supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Thoreson v Penthouse Intl.,*80 NY2d 490, 495 [1992]). Thus, there is no basis to disturb its finding that Strohbehn was not discharged for cause.

Given Strohbehn’s experience, the difficulty of the case, and the amount of work he and his staff dedicated to the matter prior to and during the first trial, the hearing court providently exercised its “broad discretion” in finding that he is entitled to a quantum meruit attorney’s fee *(Matter of Hofmann,*38 AD3d 366, 367 [1st Dept 2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 801 [2007]). However, in the exercise of our discretion, we find that the court gave undue weight to Strohbehn’s contribution to the ultimate result in the case. Therefore, we reduce the attorney’s fee to $72,220.

We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Gonzalez, EJ., Sweeny, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.