NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

RAQUEL D., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, PRISCILLA K., O. D., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0029

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD21417

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Mother, Raquel D., appeals the termination of her parental 

rights to her child, O.1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. DCS Involvement

¶2 Raquel is the mother of O., who was born in April 2011. 

Prior to the birth of O., DCS2 became involved with Mother due to her 

history of substance abuse that resulted in the birth of two substance 

exposed newborns. Although DCS offered Mother programs to address 

her substance abuse issues, Mother did not participate in the services. 

¶3 In December 2011, Mother took eight month old O. to a 

hospital where the infant was diagnosed with a fracture of her right tibia. 

Given DCS’ prior involvement with Mother, DCS required her to undergo 

a drug test in January 2012, which returned a positive result. After 

Mother changed her story several times about how the infant injured her 

leg, and given the positive drug test result, DCS took custody of O., and 

later placed the infant in the care of a maternal aunt. 

II. Reunification Services

¶4 To regain custody of O., Mother was required to 

demonstrate sobriety, provide a drug free and stable environment, 

demonstrate effective parenting skills, and attend visitation sessions. As 

part of the permanency plan toward reunification, DCS “offered, made 

 1 The juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights. However, 

Father did not appeal the termination order, and is not part of this appeal. 

2 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) 

(enacted), the Arizona Department of Child Safety is substituted for the 

Arizona Department of Economic Security in this matter. See ARCAP 27.
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

referrals for and/or [was] requesting” individual counseling, substance 

abuse treatment, psychological consultation, psychiatric evaluation, 

urinalysis drug testing, and visitation services. In June 2012, December 

2012, and June 2013, the juvenile court found DCS had made reasonable 

efforts toward reunification of the family through its permanency plan. 

III. Substance Abuse Services

A. Psychological and Psychiatric Services

¶5 As part of the reunification services aimed at addressing 

Mother’s substance abuse issues, DCS referred Mother to TERROS 

Families F.I.R.S.T. outpatient services. Mother participated actively in the 

TERROS services beginning with her intake in March 2012, through 

September 2012, when Mother transitioned from group to individual 

counseling sessions. After graduating from standard outpatient services

(SOP), Mother engaged in trauma group counseling through EMPACT

Tempe, in October 2012, where she received a psychiatric evaluation. 

¶6 In March 2013, Mother underwent a DCS referred 

psychological evaluation, which indicated Mother experienced anxiety,

and manifested affective and physiological signs of depression. The 

evaluating psychologist opined there was a likelihood Mother had a 

bipolar disorder, but in order to administer the appropriate diagnostic 

tests, Mother was required to be substance free for at least six months. 

The psychologist also recommended a master’s level counselor to assist 

Mother with her posttraumatic stress in the form of individual therapy

and drug counseling, and recognized TERROS drug counselors as 

professionally sufficient to provide substance abuse therapy. 

Additionally, after reviewing the case records, the psychologist rated as 

poor Mother’s likelihood of demonstrating adequate parenting skills 

within the foreseeable future.

¶7 In May 2013, DCS referred Mother to the Arizona Center for 

Change (A.C.C.) for individual counseling. Although the case manager’s 

attempts to contact Mother to initiate counseling services in August were 

unsuccessful, Mother ultimately completed her intake in November 2013. 

DCS renewed support services in December 2013, so that Mother could 

continue counseling sessions and join a Dialectical Behavior Therapy 

(DBT) anger management group. 
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

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B. Drug Testing

¶8 DCS provided Mother drug testing, which required her to 

undergo urinalysis a total of 209 times from January 2012, to November

2013. Mother did not appear for drug testing on ninety-five occasions

(45%), which DCS considered positive results. In addition, Mother tested 

positive on two occasions for THC, three times for amphetamine use, and 

once for alcohol; an overall failure rate of 48%. By July 2013, DCS moved 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights, as O. had been in an outside 

placement for fifteen months or longer, DCS had made diligent efforts to 

provide appropriate reunification services, Mother was unable to remedy 

the circumstances that caused the child to be placed in DCS custody, there 

was a substantial likelihood Mother would not be capable of exercising 

proper and effective parenting and control in the near future, and 

severance was in the best interests of the child. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

(A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (2014).3 After DCS moved to terminate parental 

rights, Mother tested positive for THC on two additional occasions.

IV. Termination of Parental Rights

¶9 At the December 20, 2013 severance trial, Mother testified 

she had used marijuana on a daily basis since she was eighteen, and her 

last use occurred in October 2013. Mother also admitted using 

methamphetamine after DCS removed O., and again in June 2012. Given 

his review of the records, the evaluating psychologist determined Mother 

continued to abuse cannabis, had not remedied her substance abuse 

issues, and failed to see the seriousness of needing to resolve her drug 

problem. The psychologist further asserted there was a substantial 

likelihood Mother’s substance abuse problems would continue for a 

prolonged, indeterminate period. 

¶10 In January 2014, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights, and found DCS had proven by clear and convincing 

evidence the allegations of the severance motion, which included DCS’s

assertion it made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification 

services. The juvenile court also found Mother had failed to resolve her 

substance abuse issues, noting in particular that Mother’s positive test 

results occurred as recently as two months prior to the severance trial. 

The juvenile court further found that her positive test results, coupled 

with her inconsistent testing at TASC, indicated she had failed to rectify

 3 Absent material revisions, we cite the current version of the statutes and 

rules unless otherwise indicated. 
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

the issues that existed when DCS took custody of O., twenty-one months 

prior to the severance hearing. Finally, the juvenile court determined, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that termination was in the best interest 

of the child as credible evidence demonstrated “the child would benefit 

from the severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship;” 

noting O. could “have the stability she needs” and “[was] adoptable.” 

Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-

235(A) (2014), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2014), and 12-2101(A) (2014).

DISCUSSION

¶11 “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination 

proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate 

findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 

P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). Therefore, we will uphold the juvenile court’s 

termination of parental rights “unless its factual findings are clearly 

erroneous, that is, unless there is no reasonable evidence to support 

them.” Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 

1290, 1291 (App. 1998). To carry its burden on a petition to terminate 

parental rights, the petitioner must prove at least one statutory ground for 

termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence.

Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 9, 198 P.3d 1203, 

1206 (2009). The petitioner must also prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that severance is in the best interests of the child. Lawrence R. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 7, 177 P.3d 327, 329 (App. 

2008). We review interpretations of court rules de novo. Ruben M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 20, 282 P.3d 437, 441 (App. 2012). 

¶12 On appeal, Mother asserts the juvenile court order 

terminating her parental rights was invalid because 1) DCS failed to make 

diligent efforts toward reunification; and 2) the juvenile court did not find 

DCS had made diligent efforts to reunify the family. 

A. DCS Reunification Services

¶13 Once a child is placed in custody, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) 

requires the agency responsible for the child’s care to make a “diligent 

effort to provide appropriate reunification services.” In providing 

services, the agency is “not required to offer every conceivable service or

to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” In re Appeal in 

Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 

234, 239 (App 1994). The agency, however, must “undertake measures 
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

with a reasonable prospect of success.” Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999).

¶14 Mother asserts DCS failed to make diligent efforts to provide 

reunification services because it failed to offer the DBT anger management 

therapy recommended by her counselor to assist Mother in addressing her 

emotional issues connected with past trauma. Mother relies upon Mary 

Ellen C., for the proposition that DCS must offer “the very services that its 

consulting expert recommends” in order to meet the threshold 

requirement of making diligent efforts toward reunification. Id. at 192, ¶ 

37, 971 P.2d at 1053. We read Mary Ellen C. differently.

¶15 In Mary Ellen C., this Court addressed the preliminary 

question of whether DCS was obliged to make reasonable efforts to 

preserve the family relationship before seeking termination of parental 

rights on mental illness grounds, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).4 Id. at

191, ¶¶ 28-29, 971 P.2d at 1052. Finding DCS did not “prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that it had made a reasonable effort to provide Mary 

with rehabilitation services or that such an effort would be futile,” id. at 

193, ¶ 42, 971 P.2d at 1054, this Court reasoned:

[DCS] offered Mary no significant reunification services for 

almost a year after removing [the child] from her care. It 

waited more than a year after removing the child before 

referring a mother with a serious mental illness for a 

psychological evaluation and did not steer her to ComCare 

for treatment until three months more had passed. As for 

steering Mary to Comcare [sic], which was the sum total of 

[DCS’s] response to Dr. Bencomo’s recommendation of 

intensive psychiatric services, [DCS] gave Mary a phone 

number, encouraged her to self-refer, and never followed up 

sufficiently to secure ComCare records of her progress.

. . . Mary received six sessions of counseling at ComCare. 

This level of intervention obviously fell short of Dr. 

Bencomo’s recommendation.

 4 A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) states, in pertinent part: “Evidence sufficient to 

justify the termination of the parent-child relationship shall include . . . 

[t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of 

mental illness [or] mental deficiency . . . and there are reasonable grounds 

to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.”
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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Id. at 192, ¶¶ 35-36, 971 P.2d at 1053.

¶16 The case at bar, however, differs from Mary Ellen C. In the 

immediate case, when DCS assumed custody of O., it began providing a 

wide range of services aimed at assisting Mother in attaining and

maintaining sobriety. Some of those services included group and 

individual counseling at TERROS, as well as trauma group counseling at 

EMPACT Tempe where Mother received a psychiatric evaluation and 

medication for anxiety and depression. Further addressing Mother’s 

mental health needs, DCS provided two psychological consultations, a 

psychological evaluation, and additional individual counseling sessions at 

A.C.C., where the counselor recommended DBT anger management 

group therapy.

¶17 We disagree with Mother’s assertion DCS failed to provide 

reasonable reunification services because Mother did not receive the DBT 

anger management therapy that is the subject of her appeal. The record 

indicates DCS renewed Mother’s referral for services for the express 

purpose that she join a DBT anger management therapy group. Moreover, 

DCS approved the DBT recommendation expeditiously: Mother began 

counseling sessions at A.C.C. in late November 2013, and, either at that 

time or shortly thereafter, the counselor recommended the DBT therapy. 

Prior to the December 20, 2013 termination hearing, DCS renewed the 

services to allow Mother to continue individual counseling and to join a 

DBT anger management group. Even with DCS’ response, Mother 

testified she needed several additional sessions of individual counseling to 

prepare for DBT therapy. Though, arguably, the juvenile court’s 

severance of Mother’s parental rights on January 9, 2014, may have 

precluded Mother’s involvement in DBT therapy, we cannot agree with 

Mother’s contention that DCS did not make diligent efforts to reunify the 

family by failing to offer “the very services that its consulting expert 

recommends.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 37, 971 P.2d at 1053. 

B. The Juvenile Court’s Findings

¶18 Mother also asserts the termination order is invalid because 

the juvenile court failed to specifically find DCS made diligent efforts to 

reunify the family. Mother asserts the juvenile court failed to meet the 

requirements of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for 

the Juvenile Court 66(F)(2)(a) because rather than specifically finding DCS

made diligent efforts to provide reunification services, the juvenile court 

merely made legal findings pertaining to Mother’s inability to resolve 

issues present at the time DCS assumed custody of O.
RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

¶19 The record, however, indicates the juvenile court made the 

appropriate findings. On three occasions prior to the termination hearing;

in June 2012, December 2012, and June 2013, the juvenile court found DCS

had made reasonable efforts toward reunification of the family.

Furthermore, although the juvenile court did not specifically engage in 

reasonable efforts analysis in granting the termination motion, it did find

DCS met its burden of proof regarding the allegations in its severance 

motion; those allegations included DCS’ assertion it had made diligent 

efforts, as required by A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8), in providing services.

¶20 Most importantly, however, when sufficient evidence exists 

to support a termination order, we presume the juvenile court made the 

necessary findings even though the juvenile court did not explicitly 

engage in reasonable efforts analysis under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). Mary Lou 

C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 49-50, ¶¶ 16-17, 83 P.3d 43, 49-50 

(App. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, the record clearly indicates DCS

provided services necessary toward Mother regaining custody of her 

child. In addition to the drug testing and psychological and psychiatric 

services aimed at addressing Mother’s substance abuse issues, parenting 

classes, supervised visitation, and transportation services were made 

available. With that, we are satisfied sufficient evidence was presented to 

support a “diligent effort” finding.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights.