alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.205.3



 





Exhibit 10.205.3




STATEMENT OF WARRANT EXERCISE INDUCEMENT AND PRICE PROTECTION



In March 2007 the Company unilaterally
offered a Warrant Exercise and Price Protection arrangement
to second tranche warrant holders of the 2006 Private Placement. The Warrant Exercise Price
Protection arrangement included a special warrant exercise inducement whereby (i) the warrant
holder would receive 2.5 shares of our common stock for each $2.00 of warrant exercise price paid
to us (this equates to an effective price of $0.80 per share) and (ii) the warrant holder would
receive short-term ratchet-style price protection (through
September 30, 2007) on March 2007 warrant exercises.
EXHIBIT 35.1
                  SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT (ITEM 1123)
                        RESIDENTIAL FUNDING COMPANY, LLC
             RASC SERIES 2006-EMX2 TRUST (THE "ISSUING ENTITY")

The undersigned,  a duly authorized officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC,
as servicer (the  "Servicer")  pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing  Agreement,
dated as of February 1, 2006 (as amended  from time to time,  the  "Agreement"),
among  Residential  Asset  Securities  Corporation,  as  depositor,  Residential
Funding  Company,  LLC (formerly  Residential  Funding  Corporation),  as master
servicer,  and U.S. Bank National  Association,  as trustee, does hereby certify
that:

1.   A review of the  Servicer's  activities  during the  period  covered by the
     Issuing  Entity's  report  on Form 10-K and of the  Servicer's  performance
     under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2.   To the  best of my  knowledge,  based  on such  review,  the  Servicer  has
     fulfilled  all of its  obligations  under  the  Agreement  in all  material
     respects throughout such period.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 26th
day of March 2007.

By:      /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      ------------------------
      Name:  Anthony N. Renzi
      Title:    Managing Director
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

THOMAS G. CURRY

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 3196

[ January 9, 2020 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County ; Sherwood Bauer , Judge;

L.T. Case No. 432006CF001743A

.

Thomas Curry, Jasper, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

C IKLIN

, G ERBER and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
### NUMBER 13 - 12 - 00 115 - CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ COPPERFIELD PLAZA, LTD. , APPELLANT,

v. COMPASS BANK F/K/A LAREDO NATIONAL BANK , APPELLEE.

____________________________________________________________

On a ppeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez an d Justices Garza and Vela

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant perfected an appeal from a judgment entered by the 275th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas, in cause number C

- 2694

- 08

- E . Appellant has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the parties have reached an agreement to settle and compromise their differences. Appellant requests that this Court dismiss the appeal.2

The Court, having considered the documents on file and appellant = s unopposed
motion to dism iss the appeal, is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. See
T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(a). Appellant = s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. In accordance with the agreement of the parties, costs are taxed against the party incurring same. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(d) ("Absent agreement of the parties, the court will tax costs against the appellant."). Having dismissed the appeal at appellant's request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will
issue forthwith.

PER CURIAM
D elivered and filed the 21st day of June , 20 12

.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A21E0026. KATHY D. COOTE v. OMAR COOTE.

The Appellant in the above-styled case hasfiled a Court Rule 40(b) emergency

motion entitled Motion For Extension Of Time To File Discretionary Application. 

Pursuant to OCGA sec. 5-3-39(a)(5) and (c), said motion is hereby DENIED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

January 11, 2021

01/11/2021
Exhibit 32.1



TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.



OFFICERS CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2005
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Thomas A. Hyde, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of his
knowledge:



1. The Report is in full compliances with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Thomas A. Hyde, Jr.
|Thomas A. Hyde, Jr.    
|Chief Executive Officer
|November 8, 2005
Exhibit 32.2 Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code  I, Michael J. Marx, the Chief Financial Officer of Nano Mask, Inc. (Nano Mask), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (i) the accompanying Form 10-Q of Nano Mask for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (ii) the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Nano Mask.   /s/ Michael J. Marx Michael J. Marx Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)  August 1, 2011
EXHIBIT 32.2





OFFICER’S CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),  the undersigned, Douglas E. Sloan, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge:





1.
The Report is in full compliance with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





/s/ Douglas E. SloanDouglas E. SloanChief Financial OfficerAugust 29, 2011
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.0

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 Nos. 333-42670 and 333-84331) pertaining to the 1999 Stock Option Plan, As
Amended, 1995 International Employee Stock Purchase Plan, As Amended, and the
French Employee Savings Plan, As Amended, of Business Objects, S.A. of our
report dated January 30, 2001, except for Note 11, as to which the date is March
12, 2001 with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
Business Objects, S.A. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended December 31, 2000.


                                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

San Jose, California
March 26, 2001
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                                 0001088205
<NAME>                                                SOLID MANAGEMENT CORP.
<MULTIPLIER>                                          1
<CURRENCY>                                            US

<S>                                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                         6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                     MAR-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                                        APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                          SEP-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                       1
<CASH>                                                0
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCES>                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      0
<PP&E>                                                4,500
<DEPRECIATION>                                        0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 0
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                              1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                            12,524
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          (4,500)
<SALES>                                               0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      0
<CGS>                                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      5,041
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      5,041
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                    0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       0
<INCOME-TAX>                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   0
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (5,041)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (0.01)


</TABLE>
#### Gregory Richard TORREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL and Charles L. Ryan, Interim Director of Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 09-16577.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 9, 2011.

Gregory Richard Torrez, Florence, AZ, pro se.

Sherri Tolar Rollison, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Gregory Richard Torrez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying and dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as *678untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Torrez contends that the district court erred by treating his second state petition for post-conviction relief as a collateral attack on his conviction rather than as an amendment to his original Rule 32 petition for purposes of calculating the timeliness of his petition. The district court did not err. *See Summers v. Schriro,*481 F.3d 710, 715-17 (9th Cir.2007). Accordingly, Torrez’s federal petition was properly dismissed as untimely.

We construe Torrez’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. *See*9th Cir. R. 22-l(e); *see also Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1104—05 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*678ed by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Joyce E. PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-3065.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted May 11, 2011.*

Decided May 18, 2011.

Joyce E. Phillips, Muncie, IN, pro se.

Joshua P. Dehnke, Social Security Administration, Office of the Regional Chief Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge, KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

ORDER

Joyce Phillips applied for Social Security benefits in 2004, claiming — as she did in two earlier applications that were denied— that she had been disabled since February 2002 by pain in her lower back, right hip, and right leg. In 2008 an administrative law judge denied her disability insurance benefits but awarded her supplemental security income beginning that year. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Ms. Phillips contends on appeal that the ALJ “overlooked” her 2002 injuries or mistakenly set July 2008 as the onset date of her disability. She seeks “back pay,” by which she appears to mean a retroactive award of benefits for the period from February 2002 to July 2008.

Ms. Phillips, however, is mistaken about the nature of the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ acknowledged her claim that she had been disabled since 2002 but implicitly rejected it, concluding that she became disabled for purposes of supplemental securi*529ty income only on July 29, 2008, five months before her 50th birthday. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ generously gave Ms. Phillips the benefit of a “borderline” age determination as a “person closely approaching advanced age” rather than a “younger person.” *See*20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (defining “younger person” as one under age 50), 416.963(d) (defining “person closely approaching advanced age” as one who is age 50 to 54); SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *8 (1983). With the change in her age category, Medical-Vocational Guideline 201.10 directed a finding that Ms. Phillips was disabled. *See*20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.10. Because Ms. Phillips was not disabled as of March 31, 2007, her date last insured for disability benefits, the ALJ properly concluded that she was not entitled to disability benefits. *See*42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131; *Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart,*425 F.3d 345, 348 (7th Cir.2005).

Ms. Phillips offers no legal or factual basis for disturbing the ALJ’s decision, which reflects thorough consideration of the record. To the extent Ms. Phillips believes that the ALJ needed to reconsider her previous applications, she is incorrect; the doctrine of res judicata applies to them. *See*20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); *Keith v. Barnhart,*473 F.3d 782, 784 n. 6 (7th Cir.2007).

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

LARRY CHAMBERS AND ABIE 

WOLF,

Appellants

V.

JUAN CARLOS GARAY,

Appellee

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-18-00213-CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 3

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2018DCV1553)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal is before the Court on its own motion to determine whether the appeal of Abie 

Wolf should be dismissed for want of prosecution. Finding that Wolf has failed to pay the case 

filing fee, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. 

Larry Chambers and Abie Wolf, pro se, are appealing an order dismissing their suit against 

Juan Carlos Garay. Both Chambers and Wolf personally signed the notice of appeal, but neither 

of them submitted the case filing fee. The Court sent requests for the case filing fee to both 

Chambers and Wolf. Chambers paid the filing fee for his appeal, but Wolf did not. There is 

nothing in the record before us to indicate that Wolf is indigent or otherwise excused from paying 

the case filing fee. On December 20, 2018, the Clerk of the Court sent Wolf a second request for 

payment of the case filing fee. The letter also notified Wolf that failure to pay the case filing fee
- 2 -

within twenty days could result in dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution pursuant to 

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.3(b) and (c). Wolf has not paid the filing fee or otherwise responded to our 

notice. Pursuant to Rule 42.3(b) and (c), we dismiss the appeal brought by Appellant Wolf for 

want of prosecution. See TEX.R.APP.P. 42.3(b), (c). The Clerk of the Court is directed to change 

the style of the appeal to Larry Chambers v. Juan Carlos Garay.

January 18, 2019

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3304 

To designate the current and future Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 

Center in Louisville, Kentucky, as the ‘‘Robley Rex Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2009 

Mr. YARMUTH (for himself, Mr. ROGERS of Kentucky, Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky, Mr. GUTHRIE, Mr. WHITFIELD, and Mr. CHANDLER) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To designate the current and future Department of Veterans 

Affairs Medical Center in Louisville, Kentucky, as the 

‘‘Robley Rex Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 

Center’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF ROBLEY REX DEPARTMENT 

4 OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Department of Veterans Af6 fairs Medical Center in Louisville, Kentucky, and any suc7 cessor to such medical center, shall after the date of the 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3304 IH

1 enactment of this Act be known and designated as the 

2 ‘‘Robley Rex Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 

3 Center’’. 

4 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any law, regula5 tion, map, document, record, or other paper of the United 

6 States to the medical center referred to in subsection (a) 

7 shall be considered to be a reference to the Robley Rex 

8 Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32: Rule 13a-14(b) Certifications







The undersigned officers certify that this report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of China Digital Animation Development, Inc.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to China Digital Animation Development, Inc. and will be retained by China Digital Animation Development, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





October 13, 2011
/s/ Fu QiangFu Qiang (Chief Executive Officer)October 13, 2011
/s/ Hu YumeiHu Yumei (Chief Financial Officer)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60305

Conference Calendar

 

MILTON LEON SIMPSON, ET AL

 Plaintiffs,

MILTON LEON SIMPSON; CHARLES TORNS, JR.;

LONNIE LONDON KENNEDY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

KIRK FORDICE; MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE;

MISSISSIPPI JUDICIARY; MISSISSIPPI

EXECUTIVE; MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:95-CV-398-B-A

- - - - - - - - - -

June 17, 1998

Before DAVIS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mississippi prisoners Milton Leon Simpson, #A84045; Walter

Coleman, Jr., #37410; Charles Torns, Jr., #85825; and Lonnie

London Kennedy, #63279; appealed the dismissal of their civil
No. 96-60305

- 2 -

rights suit as frivolous. Coleman has since withdrawn from the

complaint. Because Torns and Kennedy failed to comply with the

district court’s order with respect to their in forma pauperis

applications, their appeals are DISMISSED for failure to

prosecute. See 5th Cir. R. 42.3.

Simpson contends that the Mississippi Habitual Offender

Statutes, under which he is presently incarcerated, are

unconstitutional. Claims that directly or indirectly challenge 

the constitutionality of the state sentencing decision are not

cognizable under § 1983 unless the sentence “has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-

87 (1994); Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d

1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987). Because Simpson is seeking a court

order that would reduce the length of his sentence, his sole

federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

This appeal is without arguable merit and, thus, frivolous. 

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because

the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

Simpson’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. 

Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
No. 96-60305

- 3 -

We caution Simpson that any additional frivolous appeals

filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid

sanctions, Simpson is further cautioned to review any pending

appeals to ensure that the appeals do not raise arguments that

are frivolous.

 APPEAL DISMISSED. MOTION DENIED. SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
EXHIBIT
32.2
 
 CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
 TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Quick-Med
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended September 30,
2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Nam H. Nguyen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:
 
 (a)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
 
  (b)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 
 
 Dated:  November
14,
2008                                                                                                                                    
 /s/ Nam H.
Nguyen__
 Nam H. Nguyen
 Chief Financial Officer