UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION NATIONAL INDUSTRY PENSION FUND, et al ., Plaintiffs,

v. HARBORVIEW HEA LTHCARE CENTER, INC., Defendant
. Civil Action No. 15-0627 (ESH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiffs Service International Union National Industry Pensi on Fund (the “Fund”) and its Trustees bring this action f or unpaid contributions, intere st, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs again st defendant Harborview Healthca re Center Inc. (“Harborview”), pursuant to the Employee Retir ement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), (d)(1), (g)(2) a nd 1145, and the Labor Management R elations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). (Comp l. at 1.) Before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Pls.’ Mot . for Summary Judgment, Dec. 21, 201 5 [ECF No. 15] (“Pls.’ Mot.”)), which, for the reasons stated herein, will be granted.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTS Unless otherwise noted, the f acts set forth here are undispute d, taken from the Joint Stipulations of Fact and the unc ontroverted portions of plainti ffs’ statement of undisputed2 material facts. 1 ( See Joint Stipulations of Fact (“Joi nt Facts”) (Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 7); Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which The re is No Genuine Dispute (“Pls .’ Facts”).) In 2010, Harborview entered into a “ valid collective bargainin g agreement (“CBA”) with 1199 SEIU Healthcare Workers East , New Jersey Region” (the “Uni on”). ( See Joint Facts ¶ 1; Pls.’ Facts ¶ 4; see also Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 1 (CBA).) Pursuan t to the CBA, which remains i n effect today, 2 Harborview became a “participating employer in the Fund,” a mu ltiemployer pension plan within the meaning of ERISA t hat “provides pension benefit s to eligible employees of contributing employers.” (Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 1, 6; see also Anderson Decl. ¶ 34; CBA art. 25.2.) As a result, Harborview became “obligated . . . to pay pension con tributions to the [] Fund on behalf of its eligible employees.” (Joint Facts ¶ 2; see also Pls.’ Facts ¶ 6; CBA art. 25.1.) Under the

1 As required by Local Civil Rule 7(h), plaintiffs’ motion for s ummary judgment is “accompanied by a statement of mater ial facts as to which the m oving party contends there is no genuine issue,” with “references to the parts of the record rel ied on to support the statement.” See LCvR 7(h); see also Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 1-33 (citing P ls. Exs. 1-7 & the Declaration of Kenneth Anderson).) Defendant’s opposition is accompanied by a “Respo nse to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” and a “Counterstatement of Material Facts.” The first document indicates whether defendant adm its, denies, or “lack sufficient information to admit or deny” the facts set forth in plaintiffs’ statement. ( See Defs.’ Response ¶¶ 1-33.) The second document purports to comply with Local Civil Rule 7(h), which requires “ a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there still exists a genuine issue necessary to be li tigated, which shall include re ferences to the part s of the record relied on to support the statemen t.” LCvR 7(h). However, it is mostly a restatement of defendants’ legal arguments aga inst summary judgment in paragra ph form (with citations to a declaration prepared by defendant’s counsel). ( See Def.’s Counterstatemen t of Material Facts ¶¶ 1-17.) Having closely examined a ll of these documents and any record evidence cited therein, the Court finds that defendant has effectively conceded that th ere are no genuine disputes with respect to the facts set fo rth in paragraphs 1-25 and 31-33 of plaintiffs’ statement of material facts. See Defs.’ Response ¶¶ 26-30 (“spec ifically controvert[ing]” ¶¶ 26 -30 of plaintiffs’ statement of undisputed facts a nd “in that regard,” referring t he Court to defendant’s counterstatement).
2 The CBA initially covered t he period of April 1, 2010, through March 31, 2014, but it automatically renewed for an additional four years. ( See CBA art. 34; see also Joint Facts ¶ 2 (“CBA in effect for the per iod of April 1, 2010[,] through the present”).)3 CBA, covered employees include a ll “[r]egular full-time and reg ular part-time employees . . . after the completion of 90 days of e mployment, measured from th eir date of hire.” (CBA art. 25.3(a).) In addition to the CBA , Harborview also agreed to be bound by the “Trust Agreement” that established the Fund and the “ Statement of Policy for Coll ection of Delinquent Contributions” (“Collection Po licy”) adopted by the Fund’s Trus tees. 3 ( See Joint Facts ¶ 4; see also Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 7-8; CBA art . 25.4; Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 2 (Trust Agr eement); Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 3 (Collection Policy).) Effective April 1, 2010, Harborvi ew agreed to contribute to th e Fund on behalf of its covered employees at the initia l rate of “2.2% per paid hour . . . excluding overtime pay, uniform allowance and unused sick leav e payout.” (CBA art. 25.3(a); see also Joint Facts ¶ 2; Pls.’ Facts ¶ 22.) Thereafter, Harborview’s contribution rate increased an nually: to 2.37% (effective April 1, 2011), 2.55% (effective April 1, 2012), 2.75% (effective Apr il 1, 2013), 2.97% (effective April 1, 2014), and 3.20% (effective April 1, 2015). ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 20- 25; Joint Facts ¶ 3; CBA art. 25.3(a).) 4

3 The Trust Agreement empowers t he Fund’s Trustees to “establish such procedures, rules and regulations . . . as shall be necessary to carry out the operat ion of the [Fund] and effectuate the purpose thereof.” (Trust Agreement § 5.1(22).)
4 Pursuant to the Pension Pr otection Act of 2006 (“PPA”), Pub. L . 109-280 (2006) (“PPA”), the Fund was determined to be in criti cal status for the plan years 2009 through 2015; accordingly, it implemented a Rehabilitation Pla n which required participating employers to make supplemental contributions. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 16-18; see also Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 5 (Rehabilitation Plan).) The supplemental contributions were built into the CBA for 2011 and 2012 and thereafter determined by the “Preferred Schedule for S upplemental Contributions” in t he Fund’s Rehabilitation Plan. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 19-24.) The 2.2% rate for 2010 reflects a base contribution rate of 2.0% per paid hour plus a 10% supplementa l contribution; the 2.37% rate reflects an 18.5% supplemental contribution; the 2.55% rate ref lects a 27.7% supplemental cont ribution; the 2.75% rate reflects a 37.6% supplemental contribution; the 2.97% rate reflects a 48.3 % contribution; and the 3.20% rate reflects a 59.8% suppl emental contribution. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 20-24; Rehabilitation Plan at 4.)4 Harborview’s contributions, along with “supporting remittance reports,” are due by “the 15th day of the month following the month in which the work was performed for which the contributions are owed.” (Collection Policy § 2.1; see also Pls.’ Facts ¶ 9; Trust Agreement § 3.1; CBA art. 25.3(b), (c).) The r emittance reports show the “ monthly paid hours reported by [Harborview] and the monthly pe nsion contributions paid to the . . . Fund.” (Joint Facts ¶ 8; see also Pls.’ Facts ¶ 9 (“remittance reports include hours paid, exclud ing overtime, for all eligible . . . employees”).) For delinquent contributions, the Fund is entitled to collect “interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and any other e xpenses incurred by the Fund in collecting any delinquency.” 5 (Collection Policy §§ 1.5, 5.3-5.4; see also CBA art. 25.6; Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 11-13.) For contributions that are over 15 da ys late, the Fund charges inte rest at the rate of 10% per annum, calculated from the due date for the delinquent contributions t hrough and including the date the payment is actually received by the Fund. ( See Collection Policy §§ 2.4, 5.1; Pls.’ Facts ¶ 11.) For contributions that are over 30 days late, where litigation has commenced, 6 the Fund assesses liquidated damages, calculated as the greater of the interest d ue or 20% of the delinquent contributions. ( See Collection Policy §§ 2.4, 5.2; P ls.’ Facts ¶ 12.) According to plaintiffs, over the past six years Harborview ha s failed to remit in full its required contributions for empl oyees in three classifications c overed by the CBA: certified assistant nurses, dietary a nd housekeeping employees, and recre ational employees. ( See Pls.’

5 The Collection Policy further p rovides that an employer’s obli gations to pay inter est, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs are contractual obligations independent of the provisions of ERISA Section 502(g)(2). (See Collection Policy § 5.5; see als o Pls.’ Facts ¶ 14.)
6 Prior to litigation, liquidated damages are 5% of the amount o wed or $50.00, whichever is greater. ( See Collection Policy § 2.4.)5 Facts ¶ 26.) As a result, plain tiffs claim that Harborview owe s the Fund a total of $36,766.17 in unpaid contributions, interest as of December 21, 2015, and liq uidated damages, plus a yet to be determined amount in attorneys’ fees and costs. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 26-30; see also Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 31-33 & Exs. A-C theret o.) Specifically, plaintiffs c alculate that Harborview owes the following: (1) for certifie d assistant nurses, $12,869.02 in unpaid contributions, $4,761.03 in liquidated damages, and $1,724.72 in int erest, for a total of $ 19,354.77; (2) for dietary and housekeeping employees, $8,766.58 in unpaid contributions, 4,64 3.27 in liquidated damages, and $1,557.38 interest, for a tot al of $14,967.23; and (3) for recreational employees, $1,413.29 in unpaid contributions, $742.84 in liquidated damages, and $288.0 4 in interest, for a total of $2,444.17. (Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 28-30 7 ; see also Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 25-33 & E xs. A-C thereto.) Harborview denies owing the am ounts calculated by plaintiffs. ( See Defs.’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undis puted Material Facts ¶¶ 26-30 (“D efs.’ Response to Pls.’ Facts”).) The Fund is also authorized to c onduct a payroll review audit of any contributing employer for the purpose of ensur ing that such employer has com plied with the contribution requirements. ( See Trust Agreement § 5.1(14); Collection Policy § 4.1; Pls.’ Fact s ¶ 10; CBA art. 25.5.) When an audit disclo ses an underpayment, the Fund sends a letter to the employer requesting payment of the underpay ment, interest, and liquidate d damages. ( See Collection Policy §§ 4.7, 4.10.) If the employer fails to pay after three notices, the Fund files suit. ( See Collection Policy § 4.7.) The Fund i s also authorized to colle ct attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the payroll review. ( See Collection Policy §§ 5.3-5.4.)

7 Although paragraph 30 in plaintiffs ’ statement of facts actual ly refers to “dietary and housekeeping employees,” (Pls.’ Facts ¶ 30), it is apparent fro m the Anderson Declaration and the exhibits thereto the numbe rs in paragraph 30 pertain to rec reational employees. ( See Anderson Decl. ¶ 33 & Ex. C thereto.)6 The Fund conducted a payroll review audit of Harborview for th e period of April 1, 2010, through December 31, 2011, with resp ect to two groups of employ ees: its certified assistant nurses and its recreational em ployees. (Pls.’ Facts ¶ 31; see also Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 6 (audit-related documents).) The conclusion of t he audit was that Harborview h ad underreported the paid hours of eligible employees during t he period covered by the audit, r esulting in it owing unpaid contributions, interest and liqui dated damages. (Pls.’ Facts ¶ 32; see also Pls. Mot. Ex. 6, at 1-2 (letters from the Fund to Ha rborview dated September 21, 2012, and November 8, 2012, attaching results of a udit and seeking payment).) As of Novemb er 30, 2012, the Fund calculated that Harborview ow ed a total of $1,893.08 for its certified ass istant nurses ($1440.54 in unpaid contributions, $125.82 in liquidated damages and $326.72 in int erest) and $143.37 for its recreational employees ($75.18 in unpaid contributions, $50.00 in liquidated damages, and $18.19 in interest), for a total of $2,036.45. ( See Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 6, at 1.) Harborview has “stipulated that it has no basi s to contest the findings of the Pension Fund’s payroll audit.” (Joint Facts ¶ 7.) As of December 21, 2015, with the addi tional accrued interest and increased rate of liquidated damages due to litigati on, plaintiffs calculate that Harborview owes a total of $3,389.73 for its certified assi stant nurses ($1440.93 in unpai d contributions, $228.19 in liquidated damages, and $1,720.16 in i nterest) and a total of $ 221.61 for its recreational employees ($75.18 in unpaid contributions, $50.00 in liquidated damages, and $97.43 in interest), for a total of $3,611.34. 8 ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 32-33; A nderson Decl. ¶¶ 24-36.)

8 Plaintiffs appear to have made a minor mathematical error in t otaling these numbers as the sum of the numbers listed for recreational employees comes to $222. 61, not $221.61, which would make the total amount due $3,612.34, not $3,611.34.7 Defendant denies owing these amounts. ( See Def.’s Response to Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 32-33.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 24, 2015, plaintiffs filed sui t against Harborview se eking to recover the amounts they believed Harborview owed the Fund pursuant to the payroll audit ( see Compl. ¶¶ 21-27) and as a result of other de linquent contributions (Compl . ¶¶ 37-43), plus interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 9 After discovery was completed, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on bot h claims. Defendant opposes s ummary judgment on the ground that there is a genuine di spute regarding the amount Har borview owes. ( See Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. at 3-6.)
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL STANDARD “A party may move for summar y judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on whi ch summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute a s to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigat ion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there i s enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The inquiry under Rule 56 is essentially “whether the e vidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submi ssion to a jury or whether it is s o one-sided that one party must

9 The complaint also included a c laim for missing remittance rep orts ( see Compl. ¶¶ 28-37), but that claim has presumably been r esolved or abandoned as it is n ot mentioned in plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.8 prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52. The moving pa rty bears the initial burden of identifying portions of t he record that demonstrate t he absence of any genuine disputes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. In response, the non-moving party must point to portions of the records that reveal a genui ne dispute or show that the materials cited by the moving part y do not establish the absenc e of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324. Inferences must be analyzed in the light mo st favorable to the non-movant, see Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, but concluso ry assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issu e for trial. See Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
II. PAYROLL AUDIT Plaintiffs’ motion for summar y judgment on the payroll audit c laim is supported by a declaration from Kenneth Anders on, the Fund’s Contribution Comp liance Manager (“Anderson Decl.”), and copies of the audit-related documents. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 32-33; Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 34-36; Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 6.) Plainti ffs contend that this evidenc e establishes as an undisputed fact that as of December 21, 2015, Harbor view owed the Fund a total of $3,611.34 due to the payroll audit. ( See Pls.’ Facts ¶¶ 32-33; Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 34-36; Pls.’ Mot. Ex. 6.) In response, defendant has admitted that “it has no basis to contest the fin dings of the . . . payrol l audit” (Joint Facts ¶ 7), and it has not cited any evidence that controverts the Anderson De claration. Accordingly, there is not a genui ne dispute as to the amount Ha rborview owes pursuant to the payroll audit, and plaintiffs a re entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
III. DELINQUENT CONTRIBUTIONS Plaintiffs’ motion for summa ry judgment on the delinquent cont ributions claim is also supported by the Anderson Declarat ion, along with the spreadshe ets attached thereto, and other9 documentary evidence. ( See Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 25-33 & Exs. A -C (spreadsheets showing plaintiffs’ calculations of amount s owed); CBA; Trust Agreement ; Collection Policy.) Plaintiffs contend that this evidence esta blishes as an undisputed fact th at as of December 21, 2015, Harborview owed the Fund a n additional $36,766.17 in unpaid con tributions, interest, and liquidated damages. (Pls.’ Fact s ¶¶ 26-30.) Defe ndant again d oes not contest liability, but argues that plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on damages because there are genuine disputes as to the amount that Harborview owes. The Co urt disagrees. Defendant first argues that the Anderson Declaration and attac hed spreadsheets are inadequate support for plaintiffs’ damages calculation because they fail to “provide a conclusive figure or a defined methodology a s to how the Pension Fund calc ulated the alleged amounts owed.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 4.) Ne ither criticism is well-founded . The Anderson Declaration includes both the amounts that the Fund has calculated it is du e from Harborview and a detailed explanation of how those amounts were calculated. ( See Anderson Decl. ¶¶ 25- 33 & Exs. A-C.) In addition, the spreadsheets, w hich summarize 557 pages of Har borview’s remittance reports and records of contributions pai d to the Fund, are admissible s ummaries of the voluminous underlying evidence which may be u sed “to prove the content” of the underlying documents.
See Fed. R. Evid. 1006 10 ; see Service Employees International Union National Industry Pension
Fund v. Bristol Manor Health Care Center , No. 12-cv-1904, 2016 WL 354873, at *8 (D.D.C.

10 Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides: The proponent may use a summar y, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent m ust make the originals or du plicates available for examination or copying, or bot h, by other parties at a reas onable time and place. And the court may order th e proponent to produce them i n court. Fed. R. Evid. 100610 Jan. 28, 2016). Thus, plaintiffs have in fact provided the Cou rt with both a “conclusive figure” and a “defined methodology.” Defendant next argues that plai ntiffs’ evidence is insufficien t because “none of the documents produced by Plaintiffs i ndicate what eligibility crit eria the Pension Fund applied when determining whether Harborvi ew paid the requisite contribu tion amounts for a given month.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 5.) Mor e specifically, defendant sug gests that plaintiffs may have erroneously included overtime hour s or other ineligible hours ( e.g . hours worked by employees who have been employed for fewer than 90 days) in the gross pay roll numbers and thus miscalculated the contribu tions owed by Harborview. ( See Def.’s Opp’n at 5.) As plaintiffs point out, though, the spreadsheets are based on defendant’s re mittance reports and thus include only “covered” hours. Moreover, the remittance reports were pr oduced by Harborview, so defendant has possession of any evi dence that might contradict plaintiffs’ evidence and, thus, has the ability to offer its own analysis. Under such circumstance s, defendant cannot avoid summary judgment simply by speculating tha t plaintiffs may have erroneo usly included ineligible hours without offering any evidentiar y support for that contention. 11 See, e.g. , Bristol Manor , 2016 WL 354873, at *9 (“If [the defendant ] believes the summary evid ence to be inaccurate, then the burden falls on [the defendant] t o rebut it with affirmative ev idence of its own.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“A party asse rting that a fact . . . is genui nely disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particul ar parts of material in th e record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible eviden ce to support the fact.”). Yet , that is precisely what

11 The declaration from defendant’s attorney statin g that he beli eves such an error might have occurred is not the same as evi dence that such an error in fact occurred.11 Harborview has done here. Accord ingly, Harborview has failed t o show that there is a genuine dispute as to the gross payro ll numbers the Fund used in its ca lculations. Defendant’s final argument is t hat the spreadsheets are unreli able evidence because plaintiffs’ interest calculations are “wildly inconsistent,” sp ecifically that the spreadsheets reflect that no interest was charged for months in which plaintiffs’ co ntributions were allegedly hundreds of days late or that inte rest was erroneously charged where a contribution was paid on time. (Def.’s Opp’n at 4.) A close look at the spreadsheets r eveals that defenda nt’s analysis is flawed. First, the spreadsheets that defendant is referring to , which were submitted by defendant as attachments to a declarati on by defendant’s attorney, are no t the same as the spreadsheets attached to the Ande rson Declaration. ( Compare Anderson Decl. Exs. A-C (spreadsheets dated December 21, 2015) with Jasinski Decl. Ex. A (spread sheets dated October 14, 2015).) Second, defendant’s spreadsheets are not admissible evidence because th ey were prepared by plaintiffs for the purpose of settlement discussions. See Fed. R. Evid. 408; Bristol Manor , 2016 WL 354873, at *9. Third, to the extent defendants’ criticisms rem ain applicable to plaintiffs’ spreadsheets, in all but one insta nce where defendant contends that interest should have been charged but was not, plaintiffs ha ve explained that the interes t due appears in the “additional interest due” column instead of first “interest” column. 12 ( See Anderson Decl. Ex. A (showing $958.42 in “additional interest du e” for certified assistant nu rses in August 2013; showing $28.32 in interest and $36.73 in “additional interest due” for certified assista nt nurses in July

12 There is one example given by de fendant that plaintiffs have n ot addressed: that the spreadsheets do not show an inter est charge for dietary and hou sekeeping employees in August 2012, even though that payment was 1066 days late. The Court a grees with defendant that this appears to be a mistake, but a s the mistake redounds to defenda nt’s benefit, it is not a basis for denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.12 2015); id . Ex. B (showing $492.47 in “additiona l interest due” for dieta ry and housekeeping employees in August 2013; showing $8.83 in additional interest due for dietary and housekeeping employees for A ugust 2015).) Finally, although de fendant contends t hat plaintiffs have incorrectly assessed the Fund $2.45 worth of interest for its July 2011 dietary and housekeeping payment, 13 plaintiffs have explained that , even though the payment was on time, the interest due is ac cruing on the $12.82 underpayment. 14 In the end, none of defendant’s a rguments challenging the suff iciency of plaintiffs’ evidence raise material issues of fact. See, e.g ., Bristol Manor , 2016 WL 354873, at *9 (where the employer has “produced no admi ssible evidence contradicting [p]laintiffs’ sp readsheets, nor any colorable argument calling t he spreadsheets’ accuracy into doubt,” “it therefore has not met its burden to point to specific f acts in the record that reveal a genuine issue for trial”). Accordingly, plaintiffs are e ntitled to summary judgment on the ir delinquent contributions claim.

13 In its opposition, defendant refers to the June 2011 payment, but the $2.45 in interest corresponds to the July 2011 payment. ( See Anderson Decl. Ex. B.)
14 The Court notes that in a recent case brought by the same plai ntiffs against a different employer, another district court denied plaintiffs’ initial mot ion for summary judgment because it concluded that the spreadsheets in that case “left the Court sufficiently skeptical of the Fund’s numbers that it [wa]s unwilling . . . to enter judgment for the amount the Fund request[ed].” See Serv. Employees Int'l Union Nat'l Indus. Pens ion Fund v. Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr. , No. 14-cv-0084, 2016 WL 183505, at *2 ( D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2016). In r eaching that conclusion, the court indicated it needed to “ma ke[] an “independent determinat ion of the sum to be awarded in judgment.” See Hamilton Park , 2016 WL 183505, at *2 (quoting Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier Drywall, LLC , 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008).) The “independent determination” re quirement, though, arises in the context of a default judgment, where, unlike a motion for summary judgment, there is no opposi ng party. Accordingly, this Court does not agree that it ha s an obligation in the summary j udgment context to make an “independent determination” of damages.13 CONCLUSION Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ mot ion for summary judgment will be granted. A separate J udgment Order [ECF No. 20] accomp anies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge Date: June 10, 2016