IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

November 1, 2011 Session

 CHARLES BRAUN V. NITA LYNN BRAUN 

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Roane County

No. 9774A Dennis W. Humphrey, Judge

No. E2011-01401-COA-R3-CV-FILED-NOVEMBER 1, 2011

In this divorce case involving a minor child of the parties and the appellant Charles Braun’s

stepson, the record before us does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified by the

trial court clerk as being entered by that court. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows

that the trial court has not yet made a final decision as to an amount of child support to be

paid by Charles Braun. Therefore, we are persuaded that there is no final judgment in this

case. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., D. MICHAEL SWINEY, AND JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ.

Robert W. Wilkinson, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, Charles Braun.

Lisa A. White, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Nita Lynn Braun.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

1

The “final decree of divorce” was entered by the trial court on May 9, 2011. It

incorporates, by reference, “findings of fact and conclusions of law and order to prepare final

decree of divorce” (“the incorporated order”) apparently entered by the trial court following

a trial on December 1, 2010. This case involves two children; one of the children is Mr.

Braun’s biological child and the other is his stepson. In the incorporated order, the trial court

decreed as follows:

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides as follows: 1

ThisCourt, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum

opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When

a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated

“MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be

cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
The Court proposes imputing to Mr. Braun thirty days of

parenting time with [the stepson] and sets for calculation of

child supportsuch number of days as histime with [the stepson].

His parenting time with [the son] shall be every other weekend.

Without a presumption of correctness, the support for the

children shall be set at $600 a month, all matters subject to

appeal, and a conference between the parties be scheduled

within a month after entry of this Order. If needed, permission

to appeal, is granted. On the issue of Mr. Braun being required

to pay child support for [the stepson], should permission of the

Court be required, such is certainly granted.

As can be seen, the record before us fails to reflect a final setting of child support.

Furthermore, the record does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified as such by the

trial court clerk although counsel for Mr. Braun has included with a motion to supplement

the record what he asserts is the permanent parenting plan of the parties. It is clear to us that

the trial court’s judgment of May 9, 2011, from which this appeal is being pursued is not a

final judgment.

“A final judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, ‘leaving nothing else

for the trial court to do.’ ” In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003)

(quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)).

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a) provides, in relevant part, that “any order that adjudicates fewer than

all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or

appealable. . . .” “Such an order is interlocutory or interim in nature and generally cannot be

appealed as of right.” In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d at 645. This court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal if there is no final judgment. See

Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (“Unless an appeal from an

interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction

over final judgments only.”).

As this appeal was taken from a judgment that was not final, we lack subject matter

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.

The appeal of this matter is dismissed and this case is remanded to the trial court.

Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Charles Braun.

PER CURIAM

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