1 No. 3-- 06--0656

______________________________________________________________________________ File d January

14, 2008 IN THE A

PPELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS THIRD DI STRICT A.D., 2008 AC ME MA

RK ETS, INC., ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) f or th e 1 2th Judi ci al Ci rc ui t, Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, ) Will Co un t y, I llino is

) v. ) ) Docket No . 02-TX-205 KA REN CAL

LA NA N, Coun ty Tr eas urer ) an d e x- o fficio Co un t y Co llec t o ro f Will ) County, Illi

nois, ) ) Defe ndan t-Appell ee, ) Honorable

) Herman

A. Haase, ) Judge, Presi din

g.

______________________________________________________________________________

JU STI CECA

RT ER de l i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t:

______________________________________________________________________________ Plaint iff t axpa yer Acme M ar ket s, I nc. , filed an o bject ion o ver a 20 01 p ro per t y tax levy impo se d b y de fen da nt Ka r en Ca llana n, co un t y t r ea su r er an d e x- o fficio co un t y co llec t o ro f Will County, to help pay

for the operation of the W il l C ounty detention f

acili ty. At a heari

ng the trial court found agai

nst pl ai ntif f, den yi ng pl ai ntif f rel ie f on i ts tax objection. The trial court la ter denied plaint iff

’s pe t itio n for a r ehea ring. Plaint iff now app eals t he finding o f the t rial co ur t and
we affir m. FA CTS In 199 7, th e W i l l Cou nty Boa rd v oted to i m pos e a prop erty tax l ev y to he l p pa y f or2

“Det ent ion Ho me - O per at ions” pur po ses u nder sec t ion 5 of t he Co unt y Shelt er Car e and De t en t io n H o me A ct ( 55 I LC S 75 / 5 ( We st 20 04 ) )
. Will C o un t y wa s, at t he t ime o f t he lev y, subj ect to the provis ions

of the Property Tax Extensi on Li mi tation Law (herei

naf ter PTE LL). (35 ILCS 200/18-185 et se

q. (West 2004)). Prior to the enaction of the levy in 1997, no referendum
was held and t he levy was ne ver submitt ed fo r a ppr ova l to t he vo t er s o f Wil l Cou nt y. The levy
wa s i m pos ed ev er y yea r b etw een 19 97 an d 2 00 1 a n d w as n ev er su b m i tted f or voter appr ov al at a referendum. Plain

tiff objected to the 2001 levy under PTE LL, conte ndi

ng that since this

was a “new r at e, ” t he law r equ ired t hat t he co unt y submit t he levy to a r efer endu m to be ap pr ove d by the v oters of Wi l l Coun ty p ursuan t to secti on 18- 190 (3 5 ILC S 200/ 18-19 0 (West 200 4)). Pl ai ntif f conten ded that si

nc e the l ev y wasi m posed i n 19 97 onl

y by a v ote of th e coun

ty b oard and no t by refer endu m, t he levy was vo id. At a hea ring be for e t he t rial co ur t in June 2 006 , t he court rej ected p l ai

ntif f ’snoti on tha

t the lev y wasa “ new rate” requi ri ng a ref eren dum . Furth

er, the court found that any

obje ctions pl

ai ntif f h ad to t he i mposi tion of the l

evy without referen

dum should have been

rais ed at the tim

e the l evy was i mposed i n 1997, not four yea

rs la ter. T he trial
cour t later denied plai

ntif f’s petition for rehearing on the matter , and this appeal f ollows. AN AL YSIS On appeal, this

cour t must det ermi

ne whether or no t t he “Detention Home - Operat ions” le vy (herei naf ter t he l evy ) was a “n

ew rate” for the purposes of the statut e, thereby requiri ng a referen dum b efore i

mposi tion. Further, if

this court determi

nes that the levy

was a “ new rate,” we must t hen de cide w het her t he failure t o ho ld a r efer endu m on t he t ax’s impo sitio n act s t o vo id t he prior tax l evi es i m posed i n 19 97, 199 8, 1999 , and 2000 , not j ust 200 1. On ap pe al, bo t h sid es ha ve st ipu lat ed as t o t he fac t s a nd t he st an da r d o f r ev iew
. T he r e is3

no factual dis pute. Rather, t he i ssues b efore thi s court r est entirel y on s tatut ory and case law i nte rpreta ti on. A s th

i s is pure l y a q ue sti on of l aw an d s tatutor y i nte rpreta ti on, our stan

da rd of review is de novo
. Central Ill in ois Li ght Co. v. Department of Rev enue , 336 Ill .App.3d 908, 911, 784 N .E.2d 442 , 445 (2 003). Plai ntif f contends

that defenda

nt erred by

not subm ittin g the le vy to a voter referendum bef ore enactin

g the tax. In support o f this contention, pl ai ntif f argues that as a “ne

w rate” under section 18-190, def

endan t was required to subm

it the levy to voter considerati on and that de f en da nt’ s f ai l ure to do s o res

ul ts i n th e l ev y be i ng voi d. D ef en da nt c oun ters tha t the l ev y i s n ot a “ new rate” und er the statute an

d cas e law, an

d asa res ul t, no voter re f

eren dum wasrequi

red. Rat her , d efenda nt co nt ends t hat only t he ap pr ova l of t he Will Co unt y Boa rd , w hich was so ught
and obtai ne d, was requi red. The levy was i mposed to pay f

or t he operations of

the detention h

ome an d was authorized under section 5 of the Co unty Shel ter Car e and Detention Home Act (55 ILCS 75/5 ( West 20 04 )). The A

ct state s i n pa rt:
“[I]n count ies wi

th over 30 0,000 but less than 1,000, 000 inh

abi tants t hat establi sh
a she l ter c are or deten ti on h ome b y maj ori ty vote of the i r cou nty boa rds , tax esf or
con stru cti on a nd mai nte na nc e of the hom e m ay be ex ten de d w i thou t ad option of this A ct by the l egal voters o f the counties and wi thou t a referendum.” 55 ILCS 75/5 (W est 200 4).

Thi s provision then

fa l l s un der PTELL, wh

i ch states in

rel eva nt part:4

“If a new rate or a rate increase i s authorized b

y s tatut e to be im

posed without ref ere nd um or i s s ub j ec t to a b ac kdoor

ref ere nd um, as de f i ne d i n S ec ti on 2 8-2of t he E lect ion Co de [ 10 I LCS 5/ 28- 2 ( West 200 4) ], t he go ver ning bo dy of t he affect ed t axing dist rict befo re levying the ne w r at e o r r at e incre ase shall submit t he
ne w ra te or ratei

nc rea se to di rect ref ere nd um un de r th e p rovi si

ons of A rti cl e 2 8 of the Election Code [10 ILCS 5/28-1 et seq. (West 2004)].” 35 ILCS 200/18-190 (We st 2004 ).

Wi ll County f al ls under the provi si ons of PTELL. It is al so a county wi

th between 300,00 0 an

d one m i l l i on i nh ab i tants. F urthe r, the l ev y may be ex tended wi thout a ref

eren dum
. The ref ore, i f i t is a “ new rate,”

i t wi l l be sub j ect to voter ap

prova l of a ref eren dum und er PTELL. 35 IL CS 20 0/18-1 90 (W

est 200 4). Whether a tax of the t ype i mposed by

defendan t is considered new under PTELL was fi rst examined in In re Appl

ic ation of the Du Page C ounty Colle ctor for the Year 1993 , 288 Ill .App.3d 480, 68 1 N.E.2d

135 (1 997) (h

erei naf ter 1212 Associ

ates ). In 1212 Associ

ates , property

owne rs broug ht an action ag ai

nst a coun

ty c oll ector where they

obj ected to a tax

l evi ed b y a pub l i c l i bra ry di stri ct f or bui l di ng a nd e qui pm en t purpose s. 1212 Associ

ates , 288 Ill .App.3d at 481, 681 N.E .2d at 1 36. Th e ob

j ec tors a rgued tha t the 199 3 G l en si

dePub l i c L i

br ary Di stri ct l ev y vi ol ate d s ec ti on 18-190(a) of the Tax Cap A ct (35 ILCS 200/18-190(a) ( West 1994)) becaus e i t had not been approv ed b y a di rect ref eren dum
. 1212 Associ

ates , 288 Il

l .Ap p.3d a t 481, 681 N.E.2d a

t 136. (The statut e concerned i

n thi s case was

the Propert y Tax

Extensi on Li mi tation Act, or “Tax Cap5

A ct, ” a pri or ver si

on of PTE LL th at op erate d i

n th e s am e m an n er .) Th e tr

i al cou rt, s i di n g w i th t he o bject or s, r uled t hat t he t ax wa s invalid becau se se ct ion 1 8- 190 (a ) r equ ired a r efer endu m be he l d be f ore a “ new rate” or “ra te i ncreas e” was i

m posed
. 1212 Associ

ates , 288 Ill .App.3d at 481, 681 N.E.2d at 136. In reversi ng the trial

court ’s rul

in g in val ida ting the tax , the Second Di strict Appel la te Court , Justice McLaren, wrote:

“ A f ter re v i ewi n g th e te rm s ‘ n ew ra te’ an d ‘ ra te i n cr ea se ’ i n con tex t wi th the enti re provisi on, we determi

ne that the terms do not apply to the 1993 Gle nsid e P ub lic L ibr ar y Dis t r ict bu ilding an d ma int en an ce r at e. Whe n r ea d in
con tex t, the te rm s a recl ea r a n d u n am b i gu ous . Th

e te rm s ‘ n ew ra te’ an d ‘ ra te in crease’ are f

oll owed by the phrase ‘ authorized by statut e.’ Thus, section 18- 190 (a ) o f the Ta x Cap Act app lies only to ra t es t hat have be en new ly autho rized by statute or rate l

i m i ts that h av e b een i ncreas ed b

y statute. Si

nc e 197 8 pub l i c l

i bra ry di stri ctsha ve be en au thor ize d to lev

y a b ui l di ng an d m ai nte na nc e ta x a t a ra te of 0.02%. Pub. Act. 80-1152, eff . July 1, 1978. Because the tax was authori zed bef ore 1993, t he 1993 Gl

ensi de Publ ic Li brary Dis trict buildi

ng an d ma in tenance tax is not a ‘new rate.’ Further, because the tax rate li

mi t o f 0.02% has

not been i n cr ea se d, t

h e 1 99 3 G l ensi

de Li b ra ry Di str i ct b ui l di n g a n d m ai n ten an ce tax i s n ot a ‘rate in crease.’ Thus, se ction 18-190(a) does not apply and a di rect referendum was not r equired. Accordingly , t he trial court er roneo usly granted t he Obj ecto rs’ motion f or judgm ent on the pl eadi

ngs.” 1212 Associ

ates , 288 Ill .App.3d at 483, 681 N.E.2d at 137-38.6

1212 Associ

ates , h owe ve

r, w asl ater ca

l l ed i nto q ue sti on b y a sub se que

nt d ec i si on f rom the Se cond

Di stri ct al so wri

tten by Justic e Mc Lare

n, Al le gis Real ty Inv estors v. Novak , 356 Ill .App.3d 887, 827 N.E.2d 485 ( 200 5) . I n A l l eg i s R ea l ty , pr ope rty tax pa yer s f i l ed ob j ec ti on s to a tax i m posed by the Nape rvi l l e Townsh

i p Road Di strict, all

egi ng:

“ [T] h e c oun

ty cl er k e xten de d a h ard- road ta

x l ev y of $2 48 ,00 0 f

or 1 99 7, a

t a rate of $0.0127 per $100 of asses sed val uation, by in cl udin g that amount in

an an nual certif ic ate of lev

y. The purport ed authority f

or t he ex tensi on was a ref

erendum hel d at the annual

to wnsh ip m eetin g in 1979. That referendum

authorized a ‘speci al tax rate of $0.167 on the [ sic ] $ 100 of a sses sed valuat ion. ’ Ho weve r, t he 197 9 re f ere nd um wa s v oi d b ec au se

noti cewa s n ot prov i de d a s s pe cif i ed i n s ec ti on 6-601 of the Ill

in ois Hi ghway Code (Ill .Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 121, par. 6-601). ” A l l eg i s R ea l ty , 356 Ill .App.3d at 888, 827 N.E .2d at 486-87.

In A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , the relev

ant section un

der the Townshi

p Code (herei

naf ter Code) req ui red tha t be f ore e sta bl i sh i ng or i nc rea si ng an y town sh i p ta x r atetha t may be es tab l i sh ed or in creased by

the el ectors at the ann

ual to wnsh ip m eetin g, the to wnsh

ip c le rk must be

presented with a petition authori

zi ng that action si

gned b y n ot le ss than 10% of

the townshi

p’s regi stered vot er s. 6 0 I LCS 1/ 30- 20( b) ( West 199 6) . T he o bject or s co nt ende d t hat sec t ion 3 0- 20( b) applie d, and si

nce the peti

tions presen

ted at t he 1997 m

eetin g contain ed onl y 50 s ign atures, far less t han t he 10 % o f reg iste re d vo t er s re quir ed, t he r efer endu m violat ed t he Co de. In r eply, t he7

to wnsh ip road di strict contended that section 30-20(b) di d not apply, assertin

g that section 30- 20(b) was l

im ited to establishi

ng or in creasi ng a tax rate but that the distric t’s hard-road fund tax l ev y ha d b een a uthori ze d a nd ex ten de d f or m an y y ea rs be f ore 1 997an

d th usthe tax wa s n ot estab l i shed or i

ncreas ed f

or 1997. A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , 356 Il l .Ap p.3d a t 889, 827N.E.2d a

t 487-88. The tria l court gran

ted the di stri ct’smotion

f or sum mary j udgm en t. In r ever sing t he t rial co ur t , t he ap pellat e co ur t fou nd t hat sec t ion 3 0- 20( b) d id app ly. The dist rict , o n app eal, t ried t o u se t he de cision in 1212 Associ ates to argue that the 1997 referendum did not establi sh or increase a township tax rate because, r egardless of the district’s prior actions, the Gene ral A ss em bl y ha d l ong be f ore a uthori ze d the ta x r ate , an d the re f ere nd um wa s b as ed

on thi s l ong-stand i ng g ran t of l egi slati ve authority
. A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , 356 Ill .App.3d at 891, 827 N.E.2d at 489. The appel la te court dis agreed, and di stin guis hed 1212 Associ

ates , stating:
“[T ]he st at ut es a re dist inguishable. In 1212 Associ ates , we he l d that, i

n s ec ti on 18 -1 90 (a), th

e p h ra se ‘a uth ori ze d b y sta tute ’ d i re ctl y modi f i ed ‘n ew ra te or ra te increa se. ’ Thu s, a ‘new r at e o r r at e incre ase ’ meant a r at e o r incr eas e br ou ght ab out by the Ge ne ral A ss em bl y , not by the l ocal tax i ng bod y . How ever, se cti

on 30-20(b) contain s no such li mi tation.” A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , 356 Ill .App.3d at 891-92, 827 N .E.2d at 48 9.

T he co ur t r ea so ne d t ha t 30
- 20 ( b) ap plie d w he ne ve rt he ele ct o r s a t an an nu al t o wn ship meet ing vo t e o n whet her t o e st ablish or increa se t ow nship t axes , a s t he bo dy do ing t he incre asing or estab l i sh

i ng, b ase d on the statutory l anguag e, i s the

townsh i p, not the Gen eral As sem bl y .8

A l l eg i s R ea l ty , 356 Il l .Ap p.3d a t 892, 827N.E.2d a

t 489. Th us, 1212 Associ

ates was dist inguishable ba sed on t he ap plicable st at ut es. Ho weve r, t he co ur t went on t o c ast do ubt on t he
co nt inued va lidity of its ru ling in 1212 Associ ates . The court st ated:

“W e al so agree with pl

ai ntif fs that t he l egi sl ative hi story of secti on 18- 19 0( a) ca st s g re at do ubt o n t he p re ce de nt ial va lue o f 1212 Associ ates . Before we is sued our opini

on there, the legisl ature amen ded the statut e to specif

y tha t ‘[r]at es required to extend taxes on l evi es sub je ct to a backdoor referendum in each y ear there is a l evy are not new rates or rat e i ncreases under thi s Section i

f a l evy has been m ade for t he f

und in one or more preceding 3 lev y y ears. ***[ These changes] are decl arative of

exi stin g la w and n ot a new en

actmen t.’ Pub. Act 89-718, § 5, eff . March 7, 1997. Theref

ore, t he l egi sl ature intende d that t here coul d be a ‘n ew
ra t e o r r at e incre ase ’ even without action by the l egi slature, e.g. , when the l ocal taxi ng d i stri ct enacts a

l ev y af ter ha vi ng m ade n o le vy i n the prec edi

ng th ree y ears . A s a re su l t, e v en cou l d w e a n al ogi ze se cti on 30 -2 0(b ) of

th e T ownsh

i p C ode to section 18-190(a) of the tax cap a ct, we do ubt whether that would he lp the D is trict here, as the l atter m i ght a ppl y ev en i f the l egi slature h

as n ot acted rec en

tly.” (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , 356 Ill .App.3d at 892, 827 N.E .2d at 490.

A l l eg i s R ea l ty wa s eve ntu al l y tak en up a nd rev ers ed by our s upr em e c ourt, a l be i t on grounds dif

feren t from those presen

ted in the in stant case. See Al

le gis Real ty Inv estors v. Novak , 223 Ill .2d 318, 860 N.E. 2d 246 (2006). The supreme c ourt never passed j udgme nt on the di

cta9

co nt aine d a t t he e nd o f A l l eg i s R ea l ty where Justice McLaren

questioned the v

alidi ty of h is earli er op inion in 1212 Associ

ates re gar ding whe t her “new r at e” mea nt only new t axes aut hor ized by t he Ge ne r al As se mbly, as o pp o se d t o ex ist ing st at ut o r ily au t ho r ize d t ax es impo se d fo rt he firs t t ime by a lo ca l t ax ing bo dy. The regulations of

the Departmen

t o f Re ven ue construe “new

rate” or “n

ew tax” as
me ani ng a tax i mposed f or t he f irst tim e by the taxi ng body, not just the General Asse mbly , which supports plai

ntif f’ s position. In the techni cal ma nual “Property Tax Extens ion Lim itation L aw” publ i sh ed by the De pa rtm en t of Reve nu e, th e D ep artm

en t de f i ne s a “ ne w ra te”asone not pr ev io us ly levie d, as o pp o se d t o o ne ne wly a ut ho r ize d b y t he leg isla t ur e a ft er PT E LL be ca me ef f ec ti ve . How ever, the

reg ul ati ons of the De pa rtm en t of Reve nu e i n th e A dm i ni stra ti ve Code or its m anuals are not bi

ndi ng on thi s court if they

confl ict with the governi

ng statute. S ee Uni

ted Techni cal Corp. v. Department of Revenue , 107 Ill .App.3d 1062, 1067, 438 N.E. 2d 535, 539 (1982 ). In the i

nstant case, the question of whether or not the lev y i s voi d is dependen

t o n whether t he t ax wa s co nsider ed “ne w” u nder sec t ion 1 8- 190 . T his co ur t must det er mine whet her t he inter pr et at ion in 1212 Associ ates was correct o r if

as the di cta in A l l eg i s R

ea l ty sugg ests, 1212 Associ ates waswrong l

y deci ded. Wh at section 18-19 0 def

i ne s “ new rate” to be i s a m

atter of s tatutory i nterpretati on. When pr ese nt ed w ith an iss ue o f sta t ut or y cons t ru ct ion, t he r ole o f the co ur t is to asc er t ain and gi ve ef f ect to the i

nten t of the l egi slature. Gene

ral Motors Corp . v . Sta

te of Il l i noi s M otor Veh i cle Revi ew B oard , 2 24 I ll.2d 1 , 1 3, 862 N. E. 2d 2 09, 219 (2 007 ). Leg islative int ent can be determi ned f rom the language of

the statut e, which, i f un

am bi guous, should b e enf

orced as10

wri tten. General

Moto rs Corp. , 2 24 I ll.2d a t 13, 862 N. E. 2d a t 219 . Whe n co nsider ing t he inte nt behi nd the stat ute, the cou rt sho uld l oo k to the reaso n f

or t he law, t he problem

s the law remedi

es,
and the obj ects a nd p urpose s soug

ht, n ot just the statutory

l anguag e. General

Moto rs Corp. , 224 Il l .2d at 13 , 862 N .E.2d at 21 9. I n e xa mining t he co nst ruc t io n o f se ct io n 1 8- 19 0, we find t ha t it mea nt t o su bje ct o nly t axes newly aut hor ized by st at ut e t o t he po pular re fere ndum r equ irement . We co ncur wit h t he analysis co nduc t ed by t he co ur t in 1212 Associ ates . The terms are cl

ear and un

am bi guous. “New rate” and “rate increase” are followed by the phrase “author ized by stat ute. ” The phrase “a uthori zed b y statute” m

odi f i es the “ new rate” and “rate i

ncreas e” ph

rase s. 1212 Associ

ates , 288 Ill .App.3d at 483, 681 N.E .2d at 137-38. As t o t he c rit icism o f 1212 Associ ates in A l l eg i s R

ea l ty , it sho uld be r emembere d t hat t he
co ur t in A l l eg i s R

ea l ty did no t spe cifically

ove rr ule it s ea rlier d ecisio n in 1212 Associ ates , but rather chose i

nstead to distin

guis h the two stat uto ry s ections at i ssue an d only criticized 1212 Associ ates in di cta . F ur th er , that c

ri ti cism re l ate d m ost l y to s ub se qu en

t am en dm en ts d ea l i n g w i th

“ba ckdoor ref

ere nd um s.” Th e l ev y at i ss uei n th e p res en t ca se doe s n ot ha ve a b ac kdoor referen dum a nd thus does not fal

l un der that po rtion of the statute. Since the “ Detention Hom

eOp er at io ns” lev y is no t su bje ct t o a b ac kd o o rr efe r en du m, wh et he rit is a ne w r at e is st ill de term i ne d by whether i ts s tatutor

y au thor iza ti on, not u se , pred ate s th

e e f f ec ti ve da te of se cti on 18-190. Regardin

g the Departmen

t o f Re ven ue regula tions, those regula

tions are persuas iv

e but not bin din g and thi s court do es not have to follow those regul ations i f i t fi nds them in confl ict wit h t he plain meaning o f the st at ut e, as t hos e r ules c an neit her lim it no r e xt end t he sc op e o f the statut e. See Uni

ted Techni

cal Corp. , 107 Ill .App.3d at 1067, 438 N.E .2d at 539 ; Ac cord Du-11

Mont Ventil

ating C o. v. Department of Revenue , 73 Ill .2d 243, 247, 383 N.E .2d 197, 200 (1978 ). Based on the ab ove, we fi nd that “n ew rate” under the statut e m eans onl y those n ew taxes
newl y authorized b

y statutes e

nacted af ter the e f f ecti ve date of section 18-19 0, wh

i ch wasJan uary 1, 1994 (Pub. Act 88-455 (1993)). Theref ore, as t he “

Detention Hom

e-Operations” l

evy was authorized by

statut e as f

ar back as 1907 a

nd updated as recen

tly as 1967, no referen

dum was required before it could be i mposed. 55 ILCS Ann. 75/5, Historical & Stat uto ry Notes (West 20 04 ). S i n ce we h av e f oun d th at th e l ev y wa s n ot a “ n ew ra te, ” th e c oun ty wa s n ot re qui re d to hold ref erendum s on the tax i

mposi tion. The decisi on of the trial court is aff irm ed. Af fi rmed. JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring: I agree with the dissent, that a "new rate" is a tax that has not previously been assessed in a particular jurisdiction. I disagree with the Second District's interpretation of section 190 pronounced in In re Application of the Du Page County Collector for the Year 1993 , 288 Ill. App. 3d 480 (1997). The definition created by the Second District is at odds with the plain and ordinary meaning of "new rate" and seems stretched to accommodate the tax challenged in that case. Department of Revenue publication PTAX 1800 is not binding law, but it is ample evidence that the ordinary meaning of "new rate" is "any rate for a fund for which the district has never levied in the past." Department of Revenue, Property Tax Extension Limitation Law Technical Manual, 8 (2001).12

Unlike Justice Carter, I believe a referendum was clearly necessary to impose this tax in 1997. It was "new" then. Paying a tax one year does not, in and of itself, foreclose contesting its validity later. People ex rel. v. Tarman v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western R.R. Co. , 261 Ill. 582, 104 N.E. 252 (1914). But each year's tax bill represents a different cause of action with its own liabilities and defenses. People ex rel. Lloyd v. University of Illinois , 357 Ill. 369, 192 N.E. 243 (1936). Consequently, an objection that was relevant in 1997 and only in 1997 cannot be made in 2001. Plaintiffs do not allege a "rate increase" since 1997. Plaintiffs' arguments that they are acting as private attorneys general to save the citizens of Will County from an improper tax is disingenuous and belied by the record. The record shows that plaintiffs contested this tax when it was new. Instead of seeing their protest through to a court judgment forthe common good, they eked out a settlement in their own selfinterest. They did the same thing in following years. Now the tax is no longer a new rate and plaintiffs have lost their basis for objection. The tax was new in 1997, it was not new in 2001. Therefore, I concur with the judgment above. PRESIDING JU STICE McDA DE, di ssen

tin g: T he majo r it y affir ms t he de cis io n o f t he Will Co un t y Cir cu it Co ur t de nying pla int iff Ac me Ma rk ets , In c. Re l i ef on i ts ta x ob j ec ti on . F or th

e r ea son s th at f oll ow, I re sp ec tf

ul l y di ss en t.13

I w ou ld t end t o a gr ee w ith t he major ity and w ith t he se co nd dist rict in In re Application of the D u Pag

e County C

ollec tor for

the Y ear 1993, 288 Ill . App. 3d 480, 681 N.E.2d 135 ( 1997) (he rei naf ter 1212 Associates ), that the l an gua geof se cti on 1 8-1 90 of

the Prop erty Tax Ex ten si on Li m i tation Law (PTELL) (35 IL CS 20 00/18 -190 (W est 200 6)) i s pl

ai n a nd u na m bi guous. Ho we ve r , I t hink we wo uld all be wr o ng in r ea ch ing t ha t co nc lus io n be ca us e I be lieve pla int iff is correct that i

t, in f act, has a com pl etel y di f f eren t me an i ng th an that ad va nc ed b y the m aj ority
. That dif feren t reading i

s, in my opini on, at least equally

reasonabl

e, thus renderi

ng the l anguage
am bi guous.. The major ity finds, a s did t he co ur t in 1212 Associates , that "a uthori zed b y statute" r ef ers t o a nd so mehow ser ves t o d efine "new ra t e o r a ra t e incre ase ." I t hink plaint iff s ar e co rr ect and that it refers to the lan

guage that foll

ows it, so that it reads "authorized by statut e to be im

posed without r eferendum
... "rather t han "[i]f a new rate is authorized by stat ute. ..". I bel ie ve that what the statut e say s and m eans i s: i f a taxi ng body wants to levy

a "new rate" after January

1, 1994, pursuant to a statut e that had authorized l evy in g such a tax wi

thout referen dum or had m

ade i t subj ect to a backdoor referendum , it m ust now subm

it the proposed
ne w r at e t o dir ec t r efe r en du m. Fi rs t, su ch an i nte rpreta ti on m akespe rf ec t sy nta cti cal sens e. S ec ti on 1 8-1 90 d oesnot ref er to a "n ew tax ," b

ut rathe r a "n ew ra te." The app l i cab l e se cti on of the C ounty

She l ter Care and D et ent ion Ho me Act (5 5 I LCS 75/ 5 ( West 200 6) ) o riginally aut hor ized t he annu al levy and
co llec t io n o f "a t ax no t ex ce ed ing
. 01 5% o rt he r at e limit in e ffec t o n Ju ly 1, 19 67 , wh ich ev er is greater.. .for the purpose of...pro vi din g, establis hi ng, supporting an

d ma in taini ng such a shel ter
ca reor d ete n ti on h om e. " C oun ti es wi th moreth an

30 0,0 00 b ut l

es s th an 1,0 00 ,00 0 i

n h ab i tan ts14

wer e au t hor ized t o levy and co llect a larg er t ax ( .0 4% for co nst ru ct ion and .0 2% for op er at ion) "wit hou t ado pt ion o f this Act by the leg al vot er s o f the co unt ies and wit hou t a r efer endu m." T he statut e then authoriz es i

ncreases to "a rate

not exce eding . 10% ." The inter pr et at ion d evelo ped by 1212 Associa tes an

d adop ted b y th e m aj ori ty i n thi s c as e a

pp ea rsto re qui

rea n ew tax i n g s tatu te f or s ec ti on 1 8-1 90 to a

ppl y , an d I d o not b el i eve that. th

at i s w ha t the l eg i sl atu re e i the r s ai d or in tended. Sec ond , th e p urp ose

of the PTEL L is to p rovi degre ater ci

tizen c ontr

ol ove r th e l ev y of t he t axes t hey are re quir ed t o p ay. I t wo uld be c ont ra ry t o t hat pur po se ( or wo uld at least not be fu lly co ns ist en t wit h it ) t o ex clu de fr o m it s p r o t ec t io n a ny ne w in cr ea se s u nd er pr ev io us lyau t ho r ize d t ax ing st at ut es t ha t allo w t he ir imp o sit io n w it ho ut r efe r en du m. Third – and t his is a log ical ext ensio n of t he se co nd – s ect ion 1 8- 190 wo uld be
un ne ce ss ar y if it do es no t ap ply t o leg isla t io n p r e- da t ing it s e na ct men t . T he leg isla t ur e c o uld si mpl y m ake all n ew taxi ng statutes subj ect to referen dum;there would be

no need f or a remedial pro visi on such as P TELL. Fourth, subm

ittin g as I do that t he statute must be am bi guous because reas onabl

e m in ds dif f er on what i t ac tua l l y sa y s, I wou l d f i nd tha t the Il l i noi s D ep artm

en t of Reve nu e’ s def i ni ti on of a "ne w r at e" is fully consist ent wit h t he r ead ing o f the plaint iff s (a nd mine) a nd sho uld be dispositi ve of the question before us. The depar tment’s defi ni tion stat es: "4
. Whe n a lev y fo ra s pe cific fun d is mad e fo rt he firs t t ime, t his is a new rate under Secti on 18-190 without rega rd to whether it is a
new statutory authorization." (Emphasi s added.) Techni cal Manual, Ill

in ois Departm

ent of Revenue, 86 Ill. A

dm. Code15 110.190 The major ity ack now ledge s t hat t he r egu latio ns o f the Dep ar t ment o f Revenu e co nst ru ing "new ra te" or "n ew tax " as

wel l as the se cti on j ust ci

ted f rom th e m an ual supp ort the statutory
constructi on ad

va nc ed b y pl ai ntif f i n th i s action and wh i ch I am adv ocati ng b y way of th i s disse nt. The major ity disco unt s t hese re gulat ions a nd dir ect ions, how ever , sa ying: "t he r egu latio ns o f the De pa r t men t o f Re ve nu e in t he Ad minist r at ive Co de o rit s ma nu al a r e n o t bind ing o n t his c o ur t if they confl ict with the governi

ng statute. S ee United Technical Corp. V. Department of Revenue, 107 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 62, 106 7, 438 N .E.2d 535 , 539 (1 982)." Sli p op. at 9. It app ears , however, t hat Ju st ice Mc La re n’s unc er t aint y abo ut t he c o nt inue d va lidit y of 1212 Associa tes is s imilar ly based. The r eg

ul ator y /s tatu tory con f l i ct on wh i ch th e m aj ori ty re l i es i s on l y wi th wh at I b el i ev e to be a f la wed construction of the statute, not the statut e i tself . In the fa

ce of wh at seems to be a clear ambiguit y, we sho uld be a ble to ut ili ze t hos e r egu latio ns t o info rm o ur dec ision o n how t he l an gu ag e of th e statu te is prop erl

y con str ue d to e f f ec t th e l eg i sl ati v e i n ten t. In sum ma ry, I bel ie ve that: the statut ory language is am bi guous, t he construction of tha t langua ge in 1212 Associatesis flawed, t he inte rp re t at ion o f the dep ar t ment c har ged wit h t he i m pl em en tati on of th e statu te is a v ai l ab l e to u s f

or c on si dera ti on , a n d th at i n ter pr eta ti on i s q ui te per sua sive and sho uld be fo llowed by this co ur t . B eca use t his analysis differs fro m that of t he
maj ori ty , I d i ss en t.