*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 19, 2006*

Decided July 24, 2006

Before

 Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4331 Appeal from the United States

 District Court for the

ALVIN RICHARDS, Northern District of Indiana,

Petitioner-Appellant, South Bend Division.

 

v. No. 3:04CV0708 AS 

 

EDWARD BUSS, Allen Sharp, Judge.

Respondent-Appellee.

O R D E R

Indiana prisoner Alvin Richards petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the prison conduct adjustment board

(“CAB”) demoted him to a lower credit class and deprived him of earned good time

credits without due process. The district court found that the prison authorities acted

properly and denied Richards’s petition. We affirm.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4331 Page 2

In 2004 an officer at Indiana State Prison began investigating Richards after

thousands of dollars were deposited to his prison commissary account via money order,

bringing the balance of his account to over $10,000. Richards claimed that a relative

sent him the money to pay for his attorney. The officer’s investigation revealed,

however, that individuals from Greenwood, Wisconsin, paid the money to Richards for

contraband that he trafficked in the prison, and that they forged the signatures of

Richards’s relative on the money orders to avoid detection. The officer also secured

corroborating statements from fellow prisoners, some of whom stated that they had

received tobacco from Richards in the past. At the close of his investigation the officer

compiled a confidential report of his findings (the CAB would later refer to this

document as the “Case Report”) and placed it in Richards’s case file for review.

Based on this information, the CAB charged Richards with the infraction of

“giving or receiving anything of value without authorization.” Richards was provided

a “Notice of Disciplinary Hearing” a “Report of Conduct,” and “Report of Investigation”

summarizing the officer’s findings. Richards, however, requested the CAB to produce

additional information, which the CAB claimed it had either already done, was unable

to do because Richards had not specified what evidence he sought, or was not

empowered to do. After stating that it reviewed all of the evidence presented in

Richards’s case file, the CAB found that he “did receive a large amount of money” and

accordingly found him guilty. The CAB thus demoted Richards from a credit class of

I to II, and deprived him of 180 days earned credit time.

After Richards exhausted his appeals in the prison administrative system he

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the CAB violated due process

by denying him the opportunity (1) to review the “Report of Investigation” and money

order receipts; (2) to present the “Report of Investigation” and money order receipts to

the CAB; and (3) to call as witnesses the individuals from Wisconsin who forged the

signature of Richards’s relative on the money orders and the prisoner who stated

Richards sold him tobacco. He also argued that the CAB’s finding of guilt was not

supported by “some evidence,” and that it failed to state adequately the reasons

underlying its finding. The district court denied Richards’s petition in its entirety.

 

Richards now appeals, renewing the arguments he made to the district court.

Richards has a protected liberty interest in his earned good time credits and creditearning class and may not be deprived of either without due process. See Piggie v.

McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Due process in this context

requires advance written notice of the charges, a right to be heard before an impartial

decision maker, and a written statement presenting the evidence relied on and reasons

for the disciplinary action. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003)

(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974)). Prisoners also have a

conditional right to access and present documentary evidence and testimony. McBride,
No. 05-4331 Page 3

277 F.3d at 924-25. This right extends only to documentary evidence that is

exculpatory in nature, id.; Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.

1992), and the right to access and present such documentary evidence or testimony

may be limited if “institutional safety or correctional goals” are compromised by the

evidence or testimony, see Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam). A finding of guilt need only be supported by “some evidence in the record.”

See Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst., Wapole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)). 

Richards first asserts that the CAB violated due process by denying him the

opportunity to review and present the “Report of Investigation” and money order

receipts to the CAB. As a preliminary matter, the record shows that the CAB provided

Richards with this report when it gave him the “Notice of Disciplinary Hearing,” so his

argument fails on that score. We can assume, however, that Richards is also referring

to the confidential Case Report, see Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.

2001) (“[P]ro se pleadings are held to less exacting standards than those prepared by

counsel and are to be liberally construed . . . .”); the similarity in the names of the two

documents supports such an assumption. But even if Richards intended to refer to this

document his argument fails. A review of the Case Report reveals that it is not

exculpatory; it presents the investigative findings in detail, including the testimony of

prisoners who took part in Richards’s contraband trade. Furthermore, allowing

Richards access to this confidential report would provide him with the identities of the

prisoners who cooperated with the investigation, thus compromising their safety. See

Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A prison disciplinary board may

rely on the testimony of confidential informants, and it may keep their identities (and

information relating to their identities) secret, because ‘revealing the names of

informants . . . could lead to the death or serious injury of . . . the informants.’”)

(quoting Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Richards’s argument that he was deprived of the opportunity to review and

present the money order receipts likewise fails. He asserts that, had he been given the

opportunity to review the receipts, the signatures on the receipts would have shown

that he received money only from his relative. But the CAB reviewed the receipts (as

well as separate evidence that the signatures on them were forgeries) before reaching

its decision; it thus would have taken into account any exculpatory value that they

possessed. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that

there is no denial of opportunity to review and present evidence where CAB reviewed

the evidence in question as part of case file).

Richards next argues that the CAB impermissibly denied him the opportunity

to present testimony of the individuals from Wisconsin who forged the signatures of

his relative on the money order receipts and the prisoner who told the investigator that
No. 05-4331 Page 4

Richards sold tobacco. The CAB has no authority to compel out-of-state individuals to

testify. See id. (stating that CAB “lacked the compulsory process to require civilians

to appear before it”). It also acted within its authority to deny Richards’s request to

compel the testimony of the prisoner who told the investigator that Richards sold

tobacco. The CAB denied Richards’s request to compel the prisoner’s testimony on the

basis that Richards did not specify who that offender was. Richards, of course, was

trying to claim that he had not sold contraband to anyone; it therefore would have been

hard for him to identify which person had allegedly fabricated a claim against him.

Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the CAB’s denial of his request can stand.

First and most importantly, Richards lacks the right of confrontation in this context,

see Rasheed-Bey, 969 F.2d at 361, and compelling the prisoner to testify would

compromise his safety by revealing his identity, see Whitford, 63 F.3d at 535.

Additionally, we have held before that even a violation of the right to call witnesses is

harmless unless there is evidence that the testimony could have aided the prisoner’s

defense. See Piggie, 344 F.3d at 678. There is no such evidence here.

 

Richards’s final argument is that the CAB’s guilty finding is not supported by

“some evidence” and adequately explained. The “some evidence” standard requires no

more than a mere “modicum of evidence,” and we will uphold the CAB’s decision if

there is any evidence to support its finding of guilt. See Webb, 224 F.3d at 652 (7th Cir.

2000) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). Here, the Case Report showed that Richards was

paid to traffic tobacco, and the CAB succinctly explained that this evidence, coupled

with the fact that he received “a large amount of money” without proper authorization,

pointed to Richards’s guilt. The district court thus did not err in concluding that some

evidence supported the CAB’s finding of guilt, and that the CAB adequately explained

the reasoning underlying its finding. 

AFFIRMED.