alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60589 Conference Calendar

GARRY LEE MOORE; JERRY LEE QUINN, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus H. E. COOPER, JR.; LAWANDA IRBY MORRIS, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:96-CV-126 D-D

- - - - - - - - - - February 10, 1998 Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Garry Lee Moore, Mississippi prisoner # 46504, and former prisoner Jerry Lee Quinn request leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in their appeal from the district court’s denial of Moore’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Quinn did not sign the Rule 60(b) motion, and thus, he was not a party to the motion. His appeal from the district court’s denial of the motion is without basis in law or fact and, thus, frivolous. Howard v.No. 97-60589 -2- King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). His request for IFP is DENIED. The appeal as to Quinn is DISMISSED. Moore is BARRED from proceeding IFP under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) because, on at least three prior occasions while incarcerated, Moore has brought an action or appeal in a United States court that was dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is in prison unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Moore’s request for IFP is DENIED, and the appeal as to Moore is also DISMISSED. Moore has 30 days from the date of this opinion to pay the full appellate filing fee of $105 to the clerk of the district court, should he wish to reinstate his appeal.
IFP DENIED. APPEAL DISMISSED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Junior Polanco, Appellant.

[859 NYS2d 436]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edwin Torres, J.), rendered March 14, 2006, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the third degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 3V2 years and 1 to 3 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The evidence of defendant’s unlawful entry into the victim’s building was legally sufficient. Although defendant argues that a surveillance video shows the victim permitting defendant to enter the building, the victim testified that he did not open the door for defendant, but he held it open to prevent it from hitting himself.

Defendant’s argument that the evidence failed to establish his intent to commit a crime at the time he entered the building is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject it on the merits. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant followed the victim home and entered his building as part of a preconceived plan to rob him.

Defendant did not preserve any of his arguments, including *292constitutional claims, concerning the prosecutor’s opening statement and summation and the court’s main and supplementary jury charges, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal.

We find that defendant received effective assistance of counsel under the state and federal standards *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]; *see also Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]). Even if we were to find that trial counsel should have made the objections and arguments suggested by defendant on appeal, we would find that her failure to do so did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or cause him any prejudice *(see People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143, 155-156 [2005]; *People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1024 [1995]; *compare People v Turner,*5 NY3d 476 [2005]). Concur—Tom, J.P, Mazzarelli, Gonzalez, Sweeny and DeGrasse, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2
 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Annual Report of Covenant Transportation Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard B. Cribbs, the principal financial officer of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, hereby certify, that to the best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Date:   March 1, 2011
/s/ Richard B. CribbsRichard B. CribbsPrincipal Financial Officer
 
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Covenant Transportation Group, Inc. and will be retained by Covenant Transportation Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
   Back to Form 10-K
##### 



Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Susquehanna Media
Co. (the Company) for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John
L. Finlayson, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

|                                                                                                     
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ John L. Finlayson

John L. Finlayson
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
November 12, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Susquehanna Media Co. and will be retained by Susquehanna Media Co.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Rodrigo POLVOS-MELCHOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-40745

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Sarah Beth Landau, Molly Estelle Odom, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

*385PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Rodrigo Polvos-Melchor (Polvos) has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Polvos has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
1

The Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1699

___________

Carol Vanerka Stephens, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Estate of Raymond Clifford Ulmer, *

deceased, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: September 5, 2003

 Filed: September 26, 2003

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Carol Stephens appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of her civil action against

the Estate of Raymond Clifford Ulmer. After de novo review, see Charchenko v. City

of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1995), we conclude that the district court

properly dismissed Stephens’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We
-2-

decline to address the issues Stephens raises for the first time on appeal. See

Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc., 189 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-18-0000532

19-DEC-2018

08:22 AM
EXHIBIT
32.1








CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT


TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Quick-Med
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, J. Ladd Greeno, Chief Executive Officer and principal executive
officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter 63 of
Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(a)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and







(b)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.

















Dated:  May
15,
2009                                                                                  /s/  J. Ladd
Greeno


J. Ladd Greeno


Chief Executive
Officer (Principal Executive Officer)
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D19-1055

_____________________________

RACHEL WAGNER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

John Jay Gontarek, Judge.

July 18, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Rachel Wagner, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### Veronica Edbauer, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Phoebe Yelle, Deceased, Respondent, v Harris Hill Nursing Facility, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 573]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff, Veronica Edbauer, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Phoebe Yelle (decedent), commenced this action on June 8, 1995, alleging that defendant, Harris Hill Nursing Facility (Harris Hill), was negligent in its care and supervision of decedent while she was a patient there. Decedent, who was 93 years old at the time of her admission to Harris Hill on June 12, 1992, allegedly fell in a hallway at the facility on June 13, 1992. She was discharged to Harris Hill from a hospital where she had been a patient since June 2, 1992. She was admitted to that hospital after suffering a severe fainting spell and falling in her home.

Harris Hill moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is barred by the 21/2-year Statute of Limitations for medical malpractice actions *(see,*CPLR 214-a). Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff that the complaint sounds in common-law negligence and denied the motion on the ground that it is not barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations *(see,*CPLR 214).

Medical malpractice is a form of negligence, and “no rigid analytical line separates the two” *(Scott v Uljanov,*74 NY2d *1104673, 674). Conduct will be deemed malpractice, rather than negligence, when it “ ‘constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician’ ” *(Smee v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 210*AD2d 966, 967, quoting *Bleiler v Bodnar,*65 NY2d 65, 72). Additionally, where the allegations in the complaint challenge the facility’s assessment of a patient’s need for supervision, the conduct at issue constitutes “an integral part of the process of rendering medical treatment” *(Scott v Uljanov, supra,*at 675; *see, Smee v Sisters of Charity Hosp., supra,*at 967). By contrast, when “the gravamen of the complaint is not negligence in furnishing medical treatment to a patient, but the [facility’s] failure in fulfilling a different duty”, the complaint sounds in negligence *(Bleiler v Bodnar, supra,*at 73; *see, Weiner v Lenox Hill Hosp.,*88 NY2d 784, 788). We conclude that Harris Hill’s motion was properly denied, but for a reason different from that given by the court. No discovery has yet occurred, and in her bill of particulars plaintiff asserts only that the incident occurred on June 13, 1992 at approximately 10:30 a.m. and is believed to have occurred in a hallway at the facility. Plaintiff stated that she was unable to be more specific. We are unable to determine on this record whether the conduct at issue was “an integral part of the process of rendering medical treatment” so that the complaint sounds in malpractice, or whether the facility failed to fulfill a different duty so that the complaint sounds in negligence. Harris Hill may renew its motion after discovery, if so advised. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Sconiers, J.—Dismiss Complaint.) Present—Pine, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Balio and Fallon, JJ.
Exhibit 23.1

KPMG LLP
Suite 900
801 Second Ave.
Seattle, WA 98104

             Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors
Cascade Financial Corporation:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement dated
July 10, 1995 on Form S-8 and in the registration statements on Form S-8
(No. 333-32272 and No. 333-97929) of Cascade Financial Corporation of our
report dated February 20, 2004 relating to the consolidated balance sheet
of Cascade Financial Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and
the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity and
comprehensive income, and cash flows for the two-year period ended
December 31, 2003, which report is incorporated by reference into Cascade
Financial Corporation's 2004 Annual Report on Form 10-K from Cascade Financial
Corporation's 2004 Annual Report to Stockholders.


/s/ KPMG LLP

Seattle, Washington
March 9, 2005
[No. 68053-6-I.

Division One.

November 13, 2012.]

#### *In the Matter of the Parenting and Support of*J.A.M. Aleen Adams, *Respondent,*v. Douglas MacKenzie, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 10-3-05303-8, James A. Doerty, J., entered November 21, 2011. *Affirmed in part*and *remanded with instructions*by unpublished opinion per

Grosse, J.,

concurred in by Becker and Dwyer, JJ.
Exhibit 31.1







CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





REQUIRED BY RULE 13A - 14(A) OR RULE 15D - 14(A)





I, Adam Radly, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:





1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Q of Inova Technology Inc.





2.   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





4.   The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:




(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;





(b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and





5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):





(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and




(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.





Date:   March 19, 2010
/s/Adam RadlyChief Executive Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMARJEET GILL,

Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 73656 Agency No. A200

- 944

- 658

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 16, 2016 **
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Samarjeet Gill , a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 24 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 73656

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Jiang v. Holder , 754 F .3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014) . We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on the inconsistency between Gill’s statement at his credible fear interview
and his later statements regar ding his residence in England, the omission of his most severe incident of harm at his credible fear interview, the inconsistency as to why Gill supported his political party in India , and the inconsistency as to the alleged threatening telephone calls

. S ee Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency’s adverse credibility determination was reasonable under the “totality of circumstances”) ; see also Zamanov v. Holder , 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011) (“ Materi al alterations in the applicant’ s account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding. ”). T he record does not support Gill’s contention that the agency relied on speculation and conjec ture. We reject Gill’s contentions that the agency erred by rely ing on his credible fear interview, see Li v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 959, 962

- 63 (9th Cir. 2004), and his contentions that the agency did not analyze his claim properly, see Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 990

- 91 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency need not “write an exegesis on every3 14

- 73656

contention”). In the absence of credible testimony in this case , Gill’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Jiang , 754 F.3d at 740

. Gill’s CAT claim also fails because it is based on the same testimony the agency fou nd not credible, and Gill does not point to any other evidence that compels the finding it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to
India

. See id. at 740

- 41. We reject his contention that the BIA failed to analyze
his CAT claim properl y. See Najmabadi , 597 F.3d at 990

. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.