NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 2 2

- 3344

_____________ SAMUEL SPALTER ,

Appellant

v.
PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2

- 21

- c v - 08843 ) District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

_______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 17 , 2023
Before: CHAGARES , Chief Judge , MATEY and FUENTES , Circuit Judges. (Filed : February 16, 2024 )

_______________ OPINION 

_______________ MATEY, Circuit Judge

.

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2

Samuel Spalter bought life insurance from P rotective Life Insurance (“PLI”) and fell behind on his premium payments in 2016. Despite a notice to pay up or lose his policy, he sent PLI less than what he owed

. PLI cancelled the policy, and Spalter sued

. But Spalter’s payment was too little, his suit too late , and the District Court granted PLI summary judgment

. Finding no error, w e will affirm

. I. In 2007, PLI issued a $3 million life insurance policy to Spalter. Like most life insurance, Spalter’s Policy required reg ular premium payments to remain active. The Policy included a 61

- day grace period maintaining coverage if Spalter failed to make a required payment. Under that provision, Spalter would remain insured, and receive a warning that, without sufficient payment by the end of the grace period, the Policy would terminate without value. Spalter’s Policy also include d a “Lapse Protection
Endorsement , ” App. 3 , a n add

- on that established a separate Lapse Protection Account (“LPA”) “for the sole purpose of determining whether lapse protection applies to the
Certificate.” App. 52

. If the LPA value “equals or exceeds” what is owed annually on the life insurance policy, the P olicy will not lapse. App. 52. Spalter failed to make his premium payments, triggering a series of 52 grace periods. The Lapse Protection began shifting between active and inactive status based on Spalte r’s insufficient premium payments. Beginning in 2012, and every year after that, Spalter’s annual Policy report, issued by PLI, contained a notice that Lapse Protection was no longer in effect for the Policy because it was insufficient ly fund ed

. In February3

2016, Spalter received what would be his final grace notice. The notice warned Spalter that if he failed to act by March 12, 2016, to fund his Policy, “all coverage” w ould end. App. 3. The notice did not state how much Spalter had to pay; instead, he was given a
customer service number to call. And the notice reminded Spalter that, should his Policy lapse, he could still apply to reinstate his Policy within five years o f the end of the grace period. Spalter called PLI customer service, and a representative advised him that $16,034.14 was due by March 12, 2016. On March 10, 2016, PLI received a payment of only $15,425.00 from Spalter. On March 21, 2016, PLI notified Spalt er the Policy lapsed for insufficient funds. Spalter did not apply for reinstatement within the specified five

year window

. Instead , Spalter sued PLI in New Jersey state court, alleging PLI unlawfully terminated his Policy and seeking a declaratory judgmen t that his “Policy is in full force and effect.” App. 4, 18

– 21. PLI removed to federal court and, following discovery, the parties cross

- moved for summary judgment

. The District Court granted PLI’s motion and denied Spalter’s. 1

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of the decisions of the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). See Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC , 11 F.4th 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2021). We “may affirm on any ground supported by the record.” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC , 57 F.4th 131, 1 40 (3d Cir. 2023).4 II. Spalter first argues that PLI failed to perform its obligations under the Policy
because its notices were deficient as a matter of law

. 2 PLI was required, according to Spalter, to “request the correct amount” from Spalter i n the notices he received. Openi ng Br. 8. Since the ones Spalter received never specified an amount due, Spalter says the
notices were invalid. We agree with the District Court’s contrary conclusion. An insurance policy is interpreted according to the “plain and ordinary meaning.” Voorhe es v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. , 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992). 3 The Policy states that during a grace period, “[PLI] will notify you in writing that a premium grace period has

2 Spalter argues that he is not alleging breach of contract , as he only seeks a declaratory judgment that the Policy is still in effect. Not so. His suit is based on the terms and alleged breach of the Policy as a contract. See, e.g. , App. 20

– 21 (asserting in the Complaint that PLI “did not comply with” various provisi ons of the Policy, that Spalter fulfilled his duties and obligations, and that PLI’s actions violated the Policy)

.

3 A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction looks at the forum state’s choice

of

- law rules. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Spalter filed his suit in New Jersey state court

. Under New Jersey law, where parties lack a contractual choice

- of

- law clause, as here , we first “determine whether an actual conflict exists” by assessing the “substance of the pot entially applicable laws.” P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee , 962 A.2d 453, 460 (N.J. 2008) ; Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp. , 709 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2013). Life insurance contract s are governed “ by the local law of the state where the insured was domiciled at the time the policy was applied for.” Restatement ( Second ) of Conflict of Laws § 192 ( Am. L. Inst. 1971 ) ; see also id. cmt. b ( “ [ T ] he insured will be held to be domiciled in the state of which he describes himself as a resident in his application to the insurance company.” ) Here, Florida. Comparing Florida and New Jersey law , we see no conflict

. Compare Voorhees , 607 A.2d at 1260 (“[A] n insurance policy should be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” ) , with Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 845 So.2d 161 , 165 (Fla. 2003) (“ [ I] nsurance contracts must be construed in accordance with the plain language of the policy.”). So “ the forum state applies its own law to resolve the disputed issue.” Rowe v . Hoffman

- La Roche, Inc. , 917 A.2d 767, 771 (N.J. 2007).5

begun. If we do not receive sufficient premium to keep the Certificate in forc e before the end of the premium grace period, the Certificate will terminate without value as of that date.” App. 48. A contractual obligation that PLI satisfied in its notice dated February 8,
2016. PLI had no obligation , contractually or otherwise, 4 to state in each notice how much Spalter owed. Because PLI did all it had to do, Spalter’s argument about the
notices’ content fails.
Next , Spalter argues that PLI’s quoted premium payment of $16,034.14 was too high and the $15,425.00 he paid PLI was the true amount he owed. A curious claim since he never disputed the amount due upon receiving previous grace notices , or challenged the quote when it was provided (or any time there after). But i t is barred by the New
Jer sey six

- year statute of limitations beginning “after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” N.J.S.A. § 2A:14

- 1(a) ; see also Crest

- Foam Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co. , 727 A.2d 1030, 1034 (N.J. App. Div. 1999)

. New Jersey starts the limitations clock when “ the injured party knows, or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered the injury.” Sodora v. Sodora , 768 A.2d 840, 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). Spalter learned of the alleged miscalculatio ns in 2009, the first time he received a grace notice.
And in each of t he 50 grace notices after that. All w arn ed that his Lapse Protection
Account was underfunded , and the early notice places his claim well beyond the six

- year statute of limitations.

4 There is no New Jersey law governing lapse notices, which Spalter admits

.6 * * * *
The District Court did not err in granting PLI’s motion for summary judgment , and we will affirm.