The Honor able Rober t H. Cleland, United States District J udg e for the Eastern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0860n.06 F iled: Novem ber 22, 2006 No. 05-4629 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT KAREN SOSBY, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. MI L L ER BREWI

NG COMPANY, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: KEITH and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and CL ELAND, District Judge. * C LEL AND, Distr ict Judge. Af ter De fenda

nt-Appellee Miller Br ewing Company (“Miller” ) terminated Plaintiff-A

ppellant Kar en Sosby , she filed a complaint ag ainst Miller, alleg ing se x , rac e, and disability

discrimination, retaliation, and f ailure to a ccommodate under Ohio Revised Code § 41 12 , r a c e dis c ri min a tio n und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 81 , w ro ng fu l di sc ha rg e in vio la tio n of Oh io p ub lic policy , and an entitlement claim under the Family Medica l L eave Act (“ FML A”) , 29 U.S.C. § 2615. The district court gr anted Miller’ s motion for summary judgme nt on all of Sosby ’s claims. F or the
re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m.

I.No. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 2 - M i l l e r e mp l o y e d

P l a i n t i f f

- A p p e l l an tK ar e n S o s b y a s a f o r k l i f tdr i v e r i ni t s O h i o b r e w e r

y . In May 1998, Sosby

injured her

back in a forklift ac cident, but did not miss any work a s a re sult of her injury . Over

a y ear lat er , o n J u l y

8, 1999, Sosby ’s phy sician, Dr. G ula, prohibited Plaintiff from perf orming any

work until fur

ther notice. Dr. Gula

allowed Sosby

to return to wor

k on November 1, 19 99 . O n th e fi rs t da

y Sos by re tur ne d to wo rk , s he c la ime d s he inj ur e d h e r f oo t. S os by

sp ok e to Shari Moler, the pla

nt’s worke rs’ c ompensation manage r, an d claimed she returne d to work too
ear ly
. After Moler explained that Sosby was re lease d by

her ow n phy sician, Sosby completed he r shift, and re turned to work the nex t day . On Novembe r 8, 1999, Sosby saw Dr . Gula, who r estricted her f rom workingag ain until further notice
. Sos by wa s a ble to r e tur

n to w or k o n Jan ua ry 3, 20 00 wi tho ut r e str ic tio ns . Pl a int if f c la ims she re-ag g ravated her foot injury in Fe bruar y 2000. On Marc h 3, 2000, Plaintiff alleg edly injured he r f oo t a thi rd tim e a s sh e g ot d ow n f

ro m he r f or kli ft to h e lp a wo rk e r. Sos by

c ha ra c te ri zed thi s third injury

as “muc h worse” than her previous ones. Moler

claims she attempted to contact Sosby for more information, but was una ble to rea ch her

until March 10, 2000. Dur ing that conver sation, Moler r equeste d that Sosby come in for

an eva luation by

the company

doctor, but Sosby

ref used beca use sh e claimed that the FMLA does not re quire he r to submit to an ex amination by her employ er’ s company

doctor. Miller was suspicious of Sosby ’s alleg ed injuries. As a re s ult, Mil ler hire d Sur-Tec h I nvestig ations (“Sur-T ech” ) to conduc t surveillance of Sosby ’s home fr om March 10 to 14, 2000, wh ile Sos by

wa s a lle g e dly

on me dic a l le a ve . O n M arc h 2 2, 20 00 , M ole r r e je c t e d Pl a int if

f’ s w or ke rs ’ compensation claim for her Marc h 3, 2000 injury

beca use Sur-Te ch re ported that Sosby was not atNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 3 - home during this first surveillance pe riod. Sosby contends that she w as either at h o me or at the hospital th e e n ti r e ti me . O nM ar c h 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 , So s b y f il e d anO h io Ci v il Ri g h ts Co mm is s ion (“O CRC ”) ch ar ge ch al leng ing this denia l, which she withdre w in May 2000. On April 6, 2000, Sos by su bmi tte d to an in de pe nd e nt m e dical e xami na tio n w ithDr . Ra

nd olp h at Mi lle r’ s r e qu e st. Acc ording to Mill er, the results of Dr . Randolph’s examination w er e inconsist ent with Sosby ’s de sc ri pti on

of he r a c c ide nts
. Miller contends that beca

use t he re sults of the first surveillance and this medical e x amination bolstered its suspicions, it order ed S ur-Te ch to conduct additional surveillance . Sur-Tec h conducte d videotape sur

veillance of Sosby ’s home on May 6, 2000, and obser

ved Sosby

working in her y ard for thre e hours without difficulty . Sosby was still on medical leave at that time, a nd did not return to w or k u n t i l Jun e 5 , 2 0 0 0 b e c a u s e D r . G u l a d e t e r

m i n e d t h a t s h e w a s “ c o n t i n u o u s l y an d to ta lly disabled (una

ble to perf

orm any and all job duties).” The pa rties at t en d edan Au gu s t8 , 2 0 0 0 wo rk er s ’ c o mp ensation hea ring (“H earing” ) re g arding Sosby ’s Marc h 3, 2000 injury . At the Hea ring , Sosby g ave the following statements under oath: she
was in b e d u n ti l s h e w e n t b a c k to w o r k o n Ju n e 5 , 2 0 0 0 , an d d

u r in g th a t ti me s h e d id n o t do any housework sa

ve one attempt to do laundry
. Miller specific ally asked Sosby

if she did any

y ard w ork during this ti me, and she answe red “ No. No.” When the H ear ing c oncluded, Miller’ s attorney inf or me d So sb y

that he ha d a

ta pe of he r d oin g y ard

wo rk on May 6, 20 00 . Pl a int if

f d id n ot e xpla in thi s in c on sis te nc y . F oll ow ingthe He ari ng , Mole r dis c us se d Mille r’ s re sp on se wi th S te ve Me llo tt, Miller’s Human Resour ces M an age r, and Tom Mobley , Miller’s Employ ee Re lations Manag er. Mel lott d e te rm ine d th a t Mi lle r w ou ld p ur su e c ri min a l c ha rg e s a g a ins t So sb y

fo r w or ke rs ’No. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

I n h e r a pp e llate br ie f, Sos by

a lle g e s f or the fi rs t ti me tha

t he r yard wo rk wa s c on sis te nt w ith 1 he r tr e a tme nt sc he du le that re qu ir e d he r to sta nd fo r i nc re a sin g ly

lon g e r p e ri od s o f t ime to b e c ome acc ustomed to her foot bra ces. - 4 - c omp e ns a tion frau d. Mil le r w ou ld t he n u se Sos by ’s c on vic tio n to te rm inate he r e mpl oy me nt. Mellott alleg es that due to the duration and uncertainty of l itigation, he dir ecte d Mobley to beg in an internal investig ation instead. Sosby filed a r etaliation claim on August 9, 2 0 0 0, alleg ing that Mill er c onducted the surveillance in retaliation for her init ial OCRC char g e. On Aug ust 24, 2000, Pl aintiff re quested that the OC RC r e c on sid e r h e r w ith dr awn Marc h 2 9, 20 00 OC RC c ha rg e . T he OC RC d e nie d h e r r e qu e st. I n Aug ust 2000, Sosby also filed a FMLA complaint with the Depa rtment of L abor. Sosby was not
su c c e ssf ul i n a ny of the se c ha rg e s. On Aug ust 31, 2000, Mobley met wi t h S o s b y an d her union re prese ntative. Duringthe meeting , Sosby

ref used to explai n the inconsistency betwee n her swor

n statement and the videotaped
e vid e nc e . So sb y

saw the ta

pe wh e n t he par

tie s me t a g a in o n Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 00 . So sb y a g a in declined to c omment, despite Mobley ’s war ning that Mill er w as consider ing te rmination if So s by failed to e x plain her a ctions. During an Oc tober 5, 2000 mediation, Sos by ref used Miller’s off

er 1 to resig n in return for Miller’s ag ree ment to r efr ain from c halleng ing he r bene fits. Mill er te rminated Sosby on October

9, 2000, citing he r fa lse statement under oath at the He aringas it s b as i s for her dis mis sa l. Sosby filed her complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, Butler County , Ohio on October 9, 2002. The c om p l ai n t all eg ed (1) rac e discrimination, sex discrimination and retaliation underNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 5 - Oh io R e vis e d Co de § 411 2. 01 ; (2) dis a bil ity dis c ri min a tio n a

nd fa ilure to a c c omm od a te un de r O hio R ev i s edC o d e § 4 1 1 2
. 0 2 (A ); (3 ) ra ce d i s cr i m i n at i o n u n d er 4 2 U. S
. C
. § 1 9 8 1 ; (4 ) w ro n gfu l d i s ch ar ge in v iol a tio n o f O hio pu

bli c po lic y ; and

(5 ) a FM L A en tit le me nt cl a im. Mil le r r e mov e d th e c a se to the S o u th e r

nD is tr ic t o f

O h io
. I nr e s p o n s e to M il le r ’ s mo ti o nf o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t, So s by wi thd re w a n umb e r o f h e r c la ims , a

nd on ly c on te ste d h e r § 41 12 .0 1 r e ta lia tio n c la im, he r p ub lic policy claims and he r F ML A claim. The district court gra n t ed M iller’s motion for summary judgme nt on these re maining c laims, and S osby appea ls the district court’s or der. A lthough Sosby
wa s re p re s en t edb y

co u n s el at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt l ev el , s h e i s p ro ce ed i n g pro se on a pp e a l.

II. We reviewa district cour

t’s decision to g rant a motion for summary judgme ntde novo
. Birch

v . Cu y ah og a Co un ty Pr ob ateCou rt , 3 9 2 F. 3 d 1 5 1 , 1 5 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Cockrel v . Shelby Cou nty Sc h. Di st ., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 ( 6th Cir
. 2 001)). Summary judgme nt is proper “ if the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories , an d admissions on file, toge ther with the
a ff ida vit s, if a ny , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any ma te ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ingpa

rt y is entitled to a judgme nt as a m at t er o f l aw . ” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . When deciding a motion for summary judgme nt, the evidenc e must be viewe d in the light most favor able to the non- moving party
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Yet the “ mere exis tence of some a lle g e d f a c tua l di sp ute be tw e e n the pa rt ie s will no t def

e a t an o the rw ise pr op e rl y supported motion f

or summary

judgme nt; the require ment is that there be no genuine issue of

ma te ria l fac t.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).No. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

Sosby has supplemented he r appe llate brief w ith a rec ent Supreme Court c ase, Burlington 2 Nor the rn & Sa nta FeRy . Co . v . W hit e , 126 S.Ct . 240 5 (2006). While the Burlington Court did c lari fy wh a t c on sti tut e s an ad

ve rs e e mpl oy

me nt ac tio n, thi s cha

ng e is irr e le va

nt t o th e ins tant c a se beca use Miller does not deny

that Sosby ’s termination wa s an adve rse e mploy ment action. - 6 - III . The district cour

t gr anted Miller’ s motion for summary judgmen t on Sosby ’s re taliation claim. Under Ohio law, an employ er is prohibited from re taliating a g ainst an employ ee w ho “has made a char g e, testified, assisted, or participated in a ny manner in any investigation, procee ding, or he ari ng ” re la te d to the op po sit ion of un lawf ul d isc ri min a tor

y pr a c tic e s d e fi ne d in

the statut e . Oh io Rev. Code § 4112.02(I ). B e c a us e Sos by

do e s n ot a lle g e dir e c t e vid e nc e of re ta li ati on , sh e mus t make ou t a c la im using c ircumstantial evidenc e under the burden- shifting a naly sis espoused in McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Plumbers & Steamfitters J oint Appre nticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n , 4 21 N. E. 2d 12 8 (O hio 19 81 ) (f ind ing Ti tle VI I c a se law a pp lic a ble to
c a se s inv olv ing a lle g e d v iol a tio ns of Oh io R e vis e d Co de § 4 11 2) ; se e als o Ki rk lan d v . S t. E liz ab e th Ho sp. M e d. Ctr ., 34 F . App ’x 17 4, 17 7 n .2 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) (u np ub lis he d) (a

pp lyingTi tle VI Ic a se law to claims under Ohio Revised Code § 4112). Unde r McD onnell Douglas , a pla int if f m us t establish a prima f

acie case by showing that (1) she eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity ; (2) the e mploy er knew of her pr otected a ctivity ; (3) she suf fer ed an a dverse employ

ment action; and (4 ) there was

2

a ca usal conne ction betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse employ

ment action. W

renn v. Go uld , 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987). I f a pla intiff establishes a prima facie case , the burde n shifts to the employ er to de monstrate a le g itimate, non-reta liatory rea son for the a dver s e e mp lo y mentNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 7 - action. Man z er v. Diamond Shamroc k Chem. Co. , 29 F.3d 1078, 1082 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Texas De p’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 45 0 U. S. 24 8, 25 4 (1 98 1) ). I f the e mpl oy er m eet s its burden, the plaintiff must then show that the employ er’ s stated rea sons are a pre text for r etaliation. Id
. The district cour

t first determined that Sosby failed to e stablish a prima facie case of
re ta l i a t i o n b e c a

u s e h e r o n l y e v i d e n c e o f a l i n k b e t w e e n h e r p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i t y an d t he a dv e rs e employ ment action wa s the fac t that her termination occur red soon a fter he r sec ond OCRC charg e. Sosby does not contest the district court’ s finding on a ppeal, a nd has there fore waived the issue. See Priddy v. Ede lman , 8 83 F .2 d 4 38 , 4 46 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) (d e c lin ing to con si de r i ssu e s n ot r a ise d in
a pp e lla nt' s o pe nin g br ie f) ; W

right v. Holbrook , 794 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6 t h Cir. 1986) (finding that appellant wa ived an issue when he failed to raise it in his opening brief) . Neve rtheless, we also find that the district court did not err in finding that Sosby

failed to es t ab lish a prima facie case of reta liation as a matter of

law. To establish a c ausal c onnection betwe en the pr otected a ctivity and adve rse e mploy

ment
a c tio n, a pla int if f m us t pr e se nt e vid e nc e “ ‘s uf fi c ie nt to ra ise [an ] i nf

e re nc e that he r pr ote c te d a c tiv ity was the likely

rea son for the a dverse action.’” Z a n d e r s v . N a t ’ l R

. R

. P a s s e n g e r

C or p . , 8 9 8 F.2d 1 1 2 7 , 1 1 3 5 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Cohen v. Fred M eye r, Inc ., 686 F.2d 793, 796 ( 9th Cir. 1982)). I n her r esponse to Miller’s motion for summary judgme nt, Sosby re l i ed o n the fa ct that her t e r m i n a t i o no c c u r

r e d s o o na f t e r h e r O C R C c h ar g e . T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt f o un d t h i s t e mp o r a l p r o x i m i t y, standing alone, insufficient to establish a ca usal conne ction. I ndeed, Sosby prese nted no pre cede nt wher e a c ourt in this circuit found t empora l proxi mity alone sufficient t o satisfy this element. Eve nNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 8 - the cases S osby cited below specific ally stated that mere temporal proximit y was insuffic ient. See Nguyen v . City of Cl eve land , 229 F.3d 559, 567 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (re fusing to find t hat tempora l proxi mity was suff icient in itself to establish a ca usal conne ctio n , an d d eclining to decide “how
m u c h e v i d e n c e i na d d i t i o nt o t e mp o r a l p r o xi m i t y w o u l d b e r e qu i r e d” ); McNett v. H arden Comm. F ed

. Credit Union , 1 1 8 F
. A p p ’ x 9 6 0 , 9 6 5 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( u np u

b li s h e d ) ( “ [T ]h e e mp loy er’ s kn ow le dg e of

the pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

c ou ple d wi th an a dv e rs e a c tio n o c c ur ri ngc los e in t ime c an c re a te
an i n fe re n ce o f causation wh e r eth ep a r ti c u la r c ir c umstances strengthen theinferenceof causation .”) (e mph a sis a dd e d) (c itatio n o mit te d) . H e re , So sb y of fe rs no a dd iti on a l c ir c ums tances to su ppor t a finding of ca

usation. There fore , Sosby has fa iled to present a prima facie case of re taliation. Sos by a lso fa ils to de mon str a te that Mil le r’ s state d re a so n fo r h e r d ism iss a l, S os by ’s lie wh ile under oath at t h e Hea

ring , is a prete x t for discrimination. A plaintiff c an esta blish pretext by sh ow ing“ ‘( 1) that th e pr of fe re d r e a so ns ha d n o b a sis in fact , (2) that the pr offe red r easons did not

ac tua lly motivate the dischar g e, or ( 3) that they wer e insuffi cient to motivate discharg e.’” Manzer , 2 9 F
. 3 d at 1 0 8 4 (q u o t i n g McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth. , 1 0 F
. 3 d 5 0 1 , 5 1 3 ( 7 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 3 ) ). On a pp e a l, S os by c la ims that her fa lse te sti mony a t th e He ari ngdid

no t a c tua lly

mot ivate Mil le r t o terminate he r employ

ment. She attempts to suppor t he r claim of prete x t in a number of wa y s: (1) by arguin g that Mi lle r w a s mi sta ke n a nd sh e wa s e ith e r a t ho me or a tte nd ing me dic a l a pp oin tme nts during Miller’s initial surve illance; (2) by claiming that Miller knew Sosby ’s y ard w ork wa s part of her sc hedule of

rec overy , y et still t ried to set her up for workers’ compensation fraud by putting her
un de r s ur ve ill anc e and

qu e sti on inghe r a

t th e He ari ng ; ( 3) by

a tte mpt in g t o ju stify

he r f a lseNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

Sosby attempts to justi fy

the fa lse statements she made under oath by placing the blame on 3 Miller, arguing that (1) Moler’ s lies at the Hearing put her in shock; (2) the question was not aske d clea rly ; (3) she should not be e x pecte d to remembe r what she did months before; a nd (4) Miller’ s a lle g e dly fa lse pr e te ns e fo r the surv e ill anc e e na ble s h e r t o e sc a

pe re sp on sib ili ty

fo r h e r s ta te me nts
. Pla int if f a lso c la ims that her a tto rn e y and he r u nio n a dv ise d h e r n ot t o e xpla in t he inc on sis te nc ie s. Sosby never claims that she did not make a false s t atement at the Hea ring or that an 4 employ ee’ s false state ment under oath is an improper ba sis for termination. - 9 - testimony ; and (4) by

questionin g t h e nee d to wait until October 2000 to terminate her if the 3 d e c i s i o nw a s b a s e d

o nh e r A u g u s t2 0 0 0 t e s t i m o n y. Sosby ’s ar g ument t h at she wa s following he r doctor’ s order s during the two surveillanc e periods fa ils to establish pretext beca use Miller did not fire he r base d on her c ondu ct d u ri n g the surveillance , but rather

based on the false statements she made under oath at t he Hearing . Sosby ’s attempts to justify her false testim ony are irrele vant because they do not neg ate the f act that Miller leg itim at ely

perc eived he r statements unde r oath to be intentionally misleading , and could have proper ly fired he r on that basis. Fur thermore , Sosby ’s alleg ation that Miller conspired to se t her up 4

and a c c us e he r o f w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n f

ra ud is n ot s up po rt e d b y

any e vid e nc e and do e s n ot r a ise a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t reg ardingprete x t. Finally , while a long period of tim e betwe en the basis for ter

mination and the termin at i o n i t s elf may call into question an employ er’ s actua l motivations for the dischar g e, her e ther e was only one mont h betwee n the two eve nts. Further more, Miller has demonstrated that it waited to fire Sosby u n til October be cause it was looking into the pos s ib il it y o f c r im in a l p r o s e c u ti o n , an d th e np u r s u e d

c o n f li c t r e s o luti o nan d

me d iati o nb e f

o re making the dec ision to fire Sosby . As a result, Sosby has bot h failed to e stablish a prima facie c a seNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 10 - of re taliation and fa iled to demonstrate Miller’ s justification for her termination was a

prete x t for reta liation.

IV. Th e dis t r i c tc o u rta l s o g r an t e d M i l l e r ’ s m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n to nS o s b y ’ s pu bli c policy claims. On appe al, Sosby neither c ontests the district court’s ruling on thi s issue, nor does she mention public policy in he r brief. Sosby has there fore abandone d this iss ue. See Priddy , 883 F.2d at 446. Ev e n if Sos by ha d r a ise d th is i ssu e on

a pp e a l, Sosby ’s pu

bli c po lic y

c la ims we re pr op e rl y
su bje c t to su mma

ry jud g me nt f

or t he reas on s st a te d in

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on . So sb y ’s fi rs t public policy claim, based on Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(I ), was proper ly dismiss ed as a matter of law b e c a us e Oh io c ourt s have he ld t hat “ [a] c la im f

or wr on g fu l di sc ha

rg e in v iol a tio n o f p ub lic policy embodied in [a] s tatute prohibiting discr iminatory prac tices will fail if the unde rly i ng discrimination claim fails.” De sa nz o v . Titan ium Me tal

s Co rp ., 351 F.Supp.2d 769, 782-83 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (c itations omi tted). B eca us e t h e d i s t rict cour

t properly g rante d Miller’s motion for summary judgme nt on Sosby ’s re taliation c laim, he r public policy claim is subjec t to dismiss al on that ba sis
. Sosby also failed to r aise a

g enuine issue of materia l f act on he r public policy

claim base d on workplac e saf

ety . Although Sosby

claimed that she wa s t er m i n ated in retaliation for he r complaints reg ardingdang erous wor kplace conditions, the uncontrover ted evidenc e demonstrates that two of her

complaints were made y ear s befor e her termination. Fur

thermore , while Sosby

doesNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

Sosby contends that she ha d 125 hours of va cation time left, a nd there fore had no motive 5 to lie about her me dical condition to g et time off wor k for a vacation. - 11 - cite one c omplai n t s h e m ade w eeks be fore she wa s terminated, she has fa iled to contest Miller’s evidenc e that it both responded positively to he r complaints and re tained other employ ees w ho made the same c omplaints as Sosby . There fore , the district court properly g rante d Miller’s motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt o n So sb y ’s pu

bli c po lic y

c la ims
.

V. I n her brief, Sosby identifies a number of events to suppor t he r claim that Miller interfe red with her F ML A rig hts. Sosby alleg es that Miller did so by (1) r efusingto rec og nize that her Mar ch 2000 leave was appropriate medical leave under t he FML A; (2) misrepr esenting to the Depa rtment of L a bo r Sosb y ’s me dic a l con dit ion to und e rm ine he r cr e dib ili ty and je op ard ize he r F ML A c la im; (3) c laiming that Sosby

lied about her injuries to g o on vacation with family members be cause she did not have any vaca

tion time left, which constit utes worke rs’ compensation fra ud, to undermine 5 her credibility and jeopardize her FML A claim; (4) f ailing to c over the cost of her FMLA-qua lified po dia t r i s t c ar e ; an d ( 5 ) c o n d u c t i n g t h e M ay 6 , 2 0 0 0 s u r v e i l l an c e , w i t h o u t p r o b a

b l e c a u s e , t o sta lk her a nd threaten her

with prosecution for

worke rs’ c ompensation fraud in retaliation for her twowee k medical lea

ve and he r F ML A complaint. C laims broug ht under the F ML A ar e subjec t to a two-y ear statute of limitations. 29 U.S .C. § 2617(c)( 1). Sosby filed her complaint on October

9, 2002, exactly two y ear s afte r her termination. Be cause eac h alleg edly improper a ct mentioned above
occur red pr ior to Sosby ’s termination, these F ML A claims ar e time-ba rre d.No. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

The Six th Circuit has rec og nized that there a re “two distinct theories for rec overy under the 6 FMLA: (1) the ‘ entitlement’ or ‘ interfe renc e’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1); and ( 2) the ‘re taliation’ or ‘discrimination’ theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) .” Hodge v . Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc ., 384 F.3d 238, 244 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ). Be ca u s e there are two distinct theories for re c ov e ry un de r t he F ML A, and

Sos by c le arl y ple a de d only the e nti tle me nt t he or y in h e r c omp la int , we c onclude that Sosby

failed to plea d a cla im of FML A re taliation in her complaint.

- 12 - Un de r t he tw o- y e ar statut e of lim itatio ns fo r F ML A c la ims , So sb y ’s te rm inatio n is the on ly tim e ly e ve nt t hat sh e ra ise s in

he r a pp e llate br ie f. Sos by

c on te nd s th a t Mi lle r t e rm inate d h e r i n reta liation for Sosby ’s decision to e x erc ise her rig hts unde r the FML A. Sosby , howeve r, first ra ised her FML A retaliation claim i n her response to Miller’s m otion for summ ary judgme nt. The district 6 court found that allowing Sosby to amend her complaint to include a claim of FMLA re taliation at that late date wo uld sig nif ic antl y pr e

jud ic e Mil le r, and de c lin e d to do so on that ba sis . In h e r a pp e a l, Sosby does not contest the district cour t’s decision to deny

her a mendment. Ther efor e, Sosby has waived he r rig ht to arg ue her FMLA re taliation claim on appea l. See Priddy , 883 F.2d at 446. Even if Sosby

had proper ly

appea led the district cour t’s decision, the district cour t did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing he r ame ndment. I n decidingwhether to permit a plaintiff to ame nd,
a dis tr ic t c ourt c an c on sid e r “ un du e ‘d e lay in fi lin g , la c k of no tic e to t he op po sin g pa

rt y , b a d f a ith by the moving party , repe ated failure to c ure de ficienc ies by previous ame ndments, undue pre judice to the opposing pa

rty , and futility

of ame ndment.’” Gene ral Elec. Co. v. Sargent &Lundy , 916 F.2d 1 1 1 9 , 1 1 3 0 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Hageman v . Signal L. P. Gas, Inc. , 486 F.2d 479, 484 ( 6th Cir. 1973)). T h e district cour t found that Sosby ’s attempt to add a F ML A re taliation claim at the
summa ry j u d gment stag e of litig ation constituted undue dela y and would sig nificantly

prejudice Miller. This decision i s subject to an abuse of discre tion standard of r eview. Leary v. D aeschne r ,No. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

Acc ording ly , we need not r eview the district c ourt’s finding that Sosby ’s FMLA re taliation 7 c la im w a s n on e the le ss s ub je c t to su mma

ry jud g me nt. - 13 - 3 4 9 F. 3 d 8 8 8 , 9 0 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Duggins v. Steak 'N Shake, I nc ., 19 5 F. 3d

82 8, 83 3 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). Sosby ’s unexplained failure to raise he r F ML A ret ali ation claim until the summary judgme nt phase of the l itigation constit utes undue dela y . See W ade v. Knox ville Utils. Bd. , 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2001). Whil e the district cour

t did not make a deta iled fin d i n g o f prejudice , on appea l Mill er contends that be cause Sosby failed to ra ise a F ML A re taliation claim until after discove ry had conclude d and Miller filed its motion for summary judgme nt, Mill er c onducted d iscovery and prepa red its def

ense solely o n t h e entitlement theor y . Acc ording ly , the amendme nt would have
nece ssarily

delay ed trial. “A t l ea s t one Six th Circuit decision has held that allowingamendment afte r the c lose of discove ry cre ates sig nificant pre

jud i ce, and other Circ uits ag ree .” Duggins , 195 F.3d at 834 (citations omitted)
. Be cause the def endants in Duggins , like Miller, had alr eady filed
a mo t i o n fo r sum mary

judgme nt, the Duggins Court fo un d th a t a llo wi ngthe a me ndme nt w ou ld prejudice the defendants by denying them their “anticipated ‘c losure.’” Id
. Th e re fo re , in thi s c a se t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd i d

n o ta b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g S o s b y ’ s a t t e mp tt o a d d a c l a i m o f F M LA
re ta liatio n in

he r r e sp on se to M ill e r’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt. 7

VI . I n her a ppellate br ief, Sosby

lists a number of incidents to support her claim that Miller discriminated ag ainst her on the ba sis of rac e and se x . Sosby also alleg es that Miller discriminatedNo. 05-4629

Sosby v. M

iller Brewing Co.

- 14 - ag ainst her on the ba sis of her disability , and fa iled to acc ommodate her disability . I n Sosby ’s response to Mill er’ s motion for summary judgme nt, however , she expressly withdrew he r sex and
ra c e dis c ri min a tio n c la ims . In h e r r e sp on se , So sb y a lso un e qu ivo c a lly

c on c e de d th a t he r d isa

bil ity discrimination and fa ilure to ac commodate c laims were subject to summary judgme nt beca use she
c ou ld n ot p ro ve sh e wa s disa ble d. Sos by c ann ot now a tte mpt to re surr e c t the se argume nts on a pp e a l. Be cause Sosby

abandone d these c laims, the district court did not consider the m in its order , and we
are without jurisdiction t o revie w them now. See28 U.S.C. § 1291.

VI I. Sosby acc uses Miller of fra

ud throug hout he r appellate brief. Sosby also argues that Miller
ma n ip u late d th e w o r

k e r s ’ c o mp e n s a ti o n p r o c e s s , w h ic h v io late d h e r r ig h ts u n d e r th e F ree dom of I nformation Ac t beca

use she wa s not give n information reg arding her rights. W e nee d not consider the me ri ts o f S os by ’s la

rg e ly un su pp or te d a lle g a tio ns be c a

us e Sos by

fa ile d to ra ise the se c la ims below. United States v. Crismon , 905 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1990) (“ [O] bjections that appe ar f or the first time on appe al are conclusively deeme d to be waived, with the eff ect that we are deprive d of jur isd ic tio n. ” ). B e c a

us e Sos by ha s w a ive d th e se c la ims , w e la c k ju ri sd ic tio n to re vie w the m.

VI II. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.