Filed 1/29/15 P. v. Hafezi CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

FARHAD FRED HAFEZI, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

__________________________________ 

In re 

 FARHAD FRED HAFEZI 

 on Habeas Corpus. 

 B249035 

 (Super. Ct. No. KA090841) 

 B254083 

 (Super. Ct. No. KA090841) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Tia 

Fisher, Judge. Judgment affirmed. 

 ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for writ of habeas corpus. Tia Fisher, 

Judge. Writ denied. 

______ 

 Jeffrey Brodey for Defendant, Appellant and Petitioner. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney 

General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

______ 
2

 An amended information, as relevant, charged Farhad Fred Hafezi with five 

counts of oral copulation with a minor (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (b)(1) (counts 1, 3, 7, 

8, 9))1

, one count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c) 

(count 2)) and one count of meeting a minor for lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (b) 

(count 6)). All counts related to Hafezi’s alleged conduct with a 17-year-old girl 

between August 1, 2009 and May 7, 2010. Hafezi, represented by private counsel, 

pleaded no contest to those charges. He then retained new private counsel and, before 

sentencing, filed a motion to withdraw his plea. After multiple hearing days with 

extensive testimony from various witnesses, which occurred over the course of about a 

year, the trial court denied the motion. The court suspended imposition of sentence and 

placed Hafezi on formal probation for three years, with 180 days in county jail as a 

condition of probation less credit for time served and good conduct. Hafezi obtained a 

certificate of probable cause and filed a notice of appeal contesting the denial of the 

motion to withdraw his plea. We find no error in the denial of the motion to withdraw 

Hafezi’s plea and thus affirm the judgment. Hafezi concurrently filed a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, which we deny. 

DISCUSSION 

 Although in the trial court Hafezi raised numerous grounds for withdrawal of his 

plea, his appeal relies on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial 

counsel’s (1) erroneous advice that the trial court’s indicated sentence would expire by 

the following Monday morning if he did not enter the plea on Friday afternoon after a 

long day in court; and (2) failure to advise Hafezi that if he went to trial a reasonable 

probability existed that he would obtain a more favorable result. These grounds do not 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, Hafezi has not demonstrated a 

basis on appeal for withdrawal of his plea. 

 “‘“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”’ 

[Citation.] ‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 

 

1

 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 

the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ [Citation.] ‘A convicted 

defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a 

conviction . . . has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both 

showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the 

adversary process that renders the result unreliable.’ [Citation.]” (In re Valdez (2010) 

49 Cal.4th 715, 729.) 

 “To make the required showings, [defendant] must show that his attorney’s 

‘representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ ‘under prevailing 

professional norms’ [citations] and ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome’ [citation]. ‘This second part of the . . . test “is not solely one of outcome 

determination. Instead, the question is ‘whether counsel’s deficient performance renders 

the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.’ [Citation.]” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Valdez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 729.) 

 “‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all 

too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or 

adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it 

has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 

unreasonable. [Citation.] A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 
4

evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might 

be considered sound trial strategy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Valdez, supra, 

49 Cal.4th at pp. 729-730.) In reviewing the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea, we 

adopt the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them (People v. 

Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254) and recognize that, in determining the facts, a 

trial court is not bound by defendant’s uncontradicted statements (People v. Hunt (1985) 

174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103). 

 Hafezi first claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s 

purported erroneous advice that the trial court’s indicated sentence would not be available 

on the following Monday morning, which forced Hafezi to enter the plea on Friday 

afternoon after a long day in court. According to Hafezi, despite it being late Friday 

afternoon, trial counsel advised him to plead to all counts and told him that the trial 

court’s indicated sentence of probation with a maximum one year in county jail, as 

opposed to state prison as sought by the prosecutor, likely would not be available if he 

did not enter the plea that day. Hafezi’s claim is contrary to the evidence adduced in 

connection with the motion to withdraw his plea. Trial counsel testified that he did not 

advise Hafezi to plead no contest to the charges. Rather, trial counsel advised Hafezi that 

whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial was Hafezi’s decision, but if trial counsel were 

in his place he would go to trial. To the extent trial counsel stated that the court’s 

indicated sentence might not be available the following Monday and pointed out that 

Hafezi might obtain advantages in sentencing by pleading that day, these were reasonable 

statements based on counsel’s testimony that in his experience trial courts may give 

leniency in sentencing to a defendant who accepts responsibility soon after an indicated 

sentence is presented. Indeed, in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court 

recognized Hafezi’s concern about being incarcerated and its statement made during the 

plea discussions that it would consider imposing “no time” if Hafezi entered a plea, 

despite the prosecutor’s evaluation of the matter as one warranting a state prison 
5

sentence. Moreover, given that the parties, along with the court, discussed a plea and the 

attendant consequences for a significant time on Friday, and Hafezi had consulted with 

both a licensing attorney regarding his medical license and an immigration attorney about 

his status as a Canadian citizen, entry of a plea that afternoon was in line with the day’s 

proceedings and taken only after trial counsel repeatedly had conferred with Hafezi. 

 Hafezi alludes to the potential consequences of his plea of losing his license to 

practice medicine and being deported, as well as to his claim that he was suffering from 

hypoglycemia at the time he entered the plea, to bolster his claim that trial counsel 

should have advised him to consider the plea over the weekend. As noted, however, 

Hafezi consulted with both a licensing and an immigration attorney before pleading to 

the charged counts and extensively discussed with the trial court and his trial counsel 

the possibility of entering a plea. Moreover, the trial court found, “Dr. Hafezi is 

an orthopedic surgeon who still practices medicine. Dr. Hafezi is still engaged in 

surgery. According to the testimony, still maintains, I believe, two offices, one in 

Beverly Hills. . . . [H]ere is testimony from a doctor who is basically wanting to withdraw 

a plea because of all of these significant health problems, all of the significant statements 

made by his significant other about how confused he can get, all of that. Yet, at the same 

time, I’m hearing this person, Dr. Hafezi, is performing orthopedic surgery, which is 

pretty serious stuff, a surgeon. Stop it, Dr. Hafezi, because this is exactly what happened 

during the plea. Dr. Hafezi knew exactly what was going on.” The court further 

concluded, “What I find very, very interesting, and I’ve watched this and I’ve seen 

Dr. Hafezi—because it’s now 4:50—involved, engaged, stopping, asking questions, 

concerned. No different picture today than what I saw that day [he entered his plea]. 

Same time of day. It’s been a long day. These are all hard days. Dr. Hafezi is a surgeon. 

He works in the afternoons over in Beverly Hills sometimes . . . . What the transcript 

reflects isn’t that the court was under some impression that I’m dealing with a very 

fragile, weak, confused person. It’s that I want to make sure, certain, that Dr. Hafezi was 

well aware of the consequences, all of them. And I’m satisfied that he was.” Although 

Hafezi contends that the “better advice” would have been for trial counsel to tell him to 
6

take the weekend to consider whether to enter a plea, claiming better advice could have 

been given does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a 

performance below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

 As to his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that 

if he went to trial a reasonable probability existed that he would obtain a more favorable 

result than if he entered a plea, Hafezi makes three claims: (1) trial counsel did not 

advise him that even if a jury convicted him on all charges he would not go to state prison 

because the trial court had indicated the case did not warrant a state prison sentence; 

(2) trial counsel did not advise him that he should not enter a plea because he had a viable 

defense to the charge of meeting a minor for lewd purposes because evidence was 

lacking that his “actions were motivated by an ‘unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in 

children’”; and (3) trial counsel did not advise him that if he were convicted of the crimes 

of oral copulation and sexual intercourse with a minor he would not necessarily have to 

register for life as a sex offender. None of these claims has merit. 

 The trial court’s expression that the case did not warrant a state prison sentence, 

contrary to the prosecutor’s opinion, was made in relation to the punishment that it 

considered imposing pursuant to a plea and based on its understanding of the case at that 

time. That view did not foreclose the possibility that trial might reveal the crimes were 

more serious than first understood and therefore warranted a state prison sentence. 

 As to the claim that trial counsel failed to advise Hafezi not to enter a plea because 

of the purported defense to the charge of meeting a minor for lewd purposes, Hafezi did 

not raise this argument as a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion to 

withdraw the plea. In any case, counsel, as noted, told Hafezi the decision whether to 

enter a plea was up to him and if it were counsel making the decision for himself he 

would opt to go to trial. Indeed, Hafezi states in his declaration that trial counsel told him 

“this was a very good case for the defense.” In addition, Hafezi chose not to testify at the 

hearings on the motion to withdraw his plea and did not state in his declaration that he 

would not have entered the plea had he known he had a viable defense to the charge of 

meeting a minor for lewd purposes. 
7

 Hafezi claims that trial counsel failed to tell him that convictions of the crimes 

of oral copulation and sexual intercourse with a minor, unlike the offense of meeting 

a minor for lewd purposes, gave the court discretion whether to impose lifetime sex 

offender registration. But whether the court would have exercised its discretion not 

to impose lifetime sex offender registration if Hafezi had been convicted of the oral 

copulation and sexual intercourse with a minor offenses, and acquitted of the charge of 

meeting a minor for lewd purposes, is sheer speculation. We do not know what the facts 

at trial would have been and whether they would have supported the discretionary 

imposition of lifetime sex offender registration. 

 To the extent Hafezi’s argument is that trial counsel should have advised him that 

he had nothing to lose by going to trial, the United States Supreme Court has rejected 

such an argument as a basis for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. (Knowles v. 

Morzayance (2009) 556 U.S. 111, 122 [“no Supreme Court precedent establishing a 

‘nothing to lose’ standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims”].) 

DISPOSITION 

 On the appeal, the judgment is affirmed. On the original proceeding, the petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 

We concur: 

 JOHNSON, J. BENDIX, J.*

 

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.