COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray 

Argued by teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0178-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 AUGUST 4, 1998 

EDWARD LEE DOUGLAS, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Christopher C. Booberg (Michael Morchower; 

Morchower, Luxton and Whaley, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 The Commonwealth appeals a pretrial order of the trial court 

suppressing evidence obtained during a stop of a car driven by 

Edward Lee Douglas, Jr. (defendant). It contends the trial court 

erred when it concluded there were no exigent circumstances 

justifying the stop and search of defendant's car without a 

warrant. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. 

 Defendant was indicted for possessing cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. Prior to his 

scheduled trial, he moved to suppress all of the evidence 

obtained during a search of his car that occurred on April 4, 

1997. Defendant argued that both the initial stop and subsequent 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

search of his car were conducted without probable cause. 

Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion 

to suppress, reasoning that "there are no exigent circumstances 

in this case which brings into play any of the parameters of the 

automobile stop cases . . . ." 

 Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires that 

"searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an 

independent judicial officer," one of the specifically 

established and well-delineated exceptions to this requirement is 

the so-called "automobile exception." California v. Carney, 471 

U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985); see 

also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 

1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). Under this exception, "a 

warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to 

believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in the light 

of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the 

vehicle, [does] not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 

Amendment." Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569, 111 S. Ct. at 1986 (citing 

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59, 45 S. Ct. 280, 

287, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). The "ready mobility" of an automobile 

provides all the exigent circumstances necessary to justify a 

warrantless search of its interior, as long as there is probable 

cause to search. The capacity of an automobile to be quickly 

moved "'creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a 

practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant 
 3 

requirement is impossible.'" Carney, 471 U.S. at 391, 105 S. Ct. 

at 2069 (citation omitted). Thus, as the Supreme Court recently 

emphasized, "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause 

exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment 

thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." 

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487, 

135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). 

 We hold that the trial court erred when it concluded there 

were insufficient exigent circumstances to justify the search of 

defendant's car under the automobile exception. The record 

clearly indicates that defendant's brown Honda Accord was 

operational at the time of the stop. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 

569-70, 111 S. Ct. at 1986 (stating that "the existence of 

exigent circumstances was to be determined at the time the 

automobile is seized"). Because defendant's car was readily 

mobile, the "exigent circumstances" prong of the automobile 

exception was satisfied, regardless of whether the police had 

ample time to obtain a search warrant beforehand.1

 We next consider the legality of the stop of defendant and 

the search of his car. Upon appeal from an order granting a 

defendant's motion to suppress, the Commonwealth has the burden 

 

 1Defendant does not argue that the officers in this case 

were not faced with an exigency sufficient to trigger the 

application of the automobile exception. Instead, he contends 

only that the informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable to 

provide the officers with probable cause to stop and search his 

vehicle. 
 4 

to show that the trial court's decision was erroneous. See

Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 874, 433 S.E.2d 512, 

513 (1993). We review the trial court's findings of historical 

fact only for "clear error" and "give due weight to inferences 

drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). "[W]e review 

de novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards 

to the particular facts of a case," including determinations of 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Jefferson v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 1, 11, 497 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1998) 

(citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 697-98, 116 S. Ct. at 1663, 

1662). Because the record indicates the evidence regarding the 

stop and search in this case was fully developed at the hearing 

on defendant's motion and is essentially unconflicted2 and that 

the dispositive issues are purely legal ones that we ordinarily 

review de novo, we may rule on defendant's motion to suppress 

without remanding this case for further consideration by the 

trial court. 

 "A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an 

automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has 'a 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, 

that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" Freeman 

 

 2The transcript of the trial court's ruling from the bench 

indicates the court deemed credible the testimony of Detective 

Orgon and Sergeant Herring. 
 5 

v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 

(1995) (citation omitted). To determine whether there was a 

reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, we must 

examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of 

a "reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training, and 

experience of the investigating officer." Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989). 

 Information provided by an anonymous or known informant may 

establish an articulable, reasonable suspicion for a police 

officer to execute a Terry stop if the information possesses 

"sufficient 'indicia of reliability.'" See Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 328-31, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-16, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 

(1990); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 

1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993); Beckner v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1993). 

Specifically, the officer must have some objective basis for 

assessing both the informant's personal reliability and "the 

reliability of the informant's knowledge of the information 

contained in the report." Beckner, 15 Va. App. at 535-36, 425 

S.E.2d at 532. The indicia of reliability required for an 

informant's tip to provide reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect 

is less than is required for such a tip to establish probable 

cause to search or arrest. See White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 

S. Ct. at 2416. When determining whether an informant's tip 
 6 

possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to establish 

articulable reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances "taking into account the facts 

known to the officers from personal observation, and giving 

the . . . tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of 

reliability . . . ." Id. at 330-31, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. 

 We hold that the stop of defendant in his car did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers involved had a 

reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was in possession 

of illegal drugs. In light of the informant's prior history of 

providing reliable information to the police, her purchase of 

cocaine from defendant on April 2, and the corroboration by the 

police of portions of her tip prior to stopping defendant, we 

conclude that the informant's tip contained sufficient indicia of 

reliability to justify the officers' reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that defendant was in possession of illegal drugs as he 

drove into Chesterfield County. Also, based on the circumstances 

regarding the informant's past reliability, defendant's pattern 

of arriving at a designated location fifteen-to-twenty minutes 

after being contacted, and the fact that defendant was seen 

driving into Chesterfield County about fifteen minutes after 

Detective Orgon last spoke with the informant, the officers' 

conclusion that the informant did, in fact, contact defendant 

about purchasing cocaine after Detective Orgon left her presence 

was reasonable. 
 7 

 We also hold that, at the scene of the stop, the officers 

had probable cause to search defendant's car and were not 

required to obtain a warrant before doing so. The record 

established that, following the stop, defendant was removed from 

his car and detained next to it. In "plain view" on the front 

passenger seat or console was a small plastic "ziplock" bag that 

appeared to contain cocaine. The observation of this item 

provided the officers with probable cause to believe that illegal 

drugs would be found inside defendant's vehicle. Because 

defendant's car was readily mobile, the police were justified in 

searching the car's interior without obtaining a search warrant. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's 

order suppressing the evidence seized from defendant's car on 

April 4, 1997 and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded. 
 8 

Benton, J., dissenting. 

 Counsel for Edward Lee Douglas, Jr. filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence gained from a warrantless search of his 

automobile. The motion alleged that "[t]he initial stop of the 

motor vehicle was done without probable cause in violation of 

Douglas' rights as guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United 

States of America and the Commonwealth of Virginia." Following 

the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge granted the motion to 

suppress. On this appeal, the Commonwealth presents the issue 

whether "[t]he trial court erred when it ruled that the officers 

were required to have a warrant in order to stop and search the 

defendant's vehicle." 

 "'Ultimate questions of . . . probable cause to make a 

warrantless search' involve questions of both law and fact and 

are reviewed de novo on appeal." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. 

App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). However, in our review, "we are bound by the trial 

[judge's] findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or 

without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the 

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges." Id. at 

198, 487 S.E.2d at 261. 

 The evidence proved that when the police stopped the vehicle 

they had no information that the informant had contacted Douglas 

and arranged for a delivery of cocaine. Absent that information, 

the police had no basis to believe that Douglas had cocaine in 
 9 

his vehicle. The trial judge ruled as follows: 

 THE COURT: Well, I'm finding as a matter of 

law there was no exigent circumstances in 

this case, nada, zip. This was not the 

classic case. Telephone call comes in. CFI 

or confidential informant says look, subject 

is moving. He's got ten pounds of dope in 

the trunk of his car. He is going to be 

coming across the Martin Luther King Bridge 

from Petersburg into Colonial Heights. The 

vehicle will be coming in the next ten 

minutes. 

 The police go into a flurry of activity. 

Lo and behold, defendant's vehicle is seen as 

described coming into the city and the stop 

is met. Now, those are exigent 

circumstances. You don't have that in this 

case. 

 Although I believe the trial judge misspoke when he referred 

to the lack of "exigent circumstances," the reasonable inference 

to be drawn from his finding is that the police lacked knowledge 

that the informant had made the telephone call to Douglas and, 

thus, could not have entertained even a reasonable belief that 

cocaine was in the vehicle. The evidence proved that the police 

did not know whether the informant had contacted Douglas. 

Therefore, the police could not have had a reasonable belief that 

Douglas was responding to deliver cocaine. The police merely 

acted upon a hunch. That hunch did not rise to the level of 

reasonable suspicion that a violation of law was occurring. See

Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 612, 363 S.E.2d 708, 710 

(1988). 

 For these reasons, I would affirm the order suppressing the 

evidence.