1

Filed 11/2/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re N.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A146637

 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.

 No. PJ51576)

 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.

 No. J1500733)

The Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act (CASE Act), enacted by the 

voters of the state as Proposition 35 at the general election on November 6, 2012,1

increased penalties for human trafficking, authorized the collection of fines to be used for 

victim services and law enforcement, required persons convicted of trafficking to register 

as sex offenders, and required such offenders to provide information regarding Internet 

access and identities they use in online activities. The CASE Act also added section 1161 

to the Evidence Code (section 1161). Subdivision (a) of that statute, which as we later 

explain, was amended by the Legislature in 2013, 2now declares that evidence that a 

victim of human trafficking “has engaged in any commercial sexual act as a result of 

 

1

Proposition 35 added section 1161 to the Evidence Code, amended Penal Code 

sections 236.1, 236.2, 236.4, 290, 290.12, 290.14, and 290.15; added section 290.024 to 

the Penal Code, and amended section 13159.14 of that Code. 

2

Proposition 35 provided, in section 15, that the CASE Act “may be amended by 

a statute in furtherance of its objectives passed in each house of the Legislature by rollcall 

vote entered in the journal, a majority of the membership of each house concurring.” 

(Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) p. 105.)
2

being a victim of human trafficking is inadmissible to prove the victim’s criminal liability 

for the commercial sexual act.” 

Appellant, a 17-year-old victim of human trafficking, was charged with 

prostitution under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), which provides that every 

person who “solicits or who agrees to engage in or who engages in any act of prostitution 

[is guilty of disorderly conduct]. A person agrees to engage in an act of prostitution 

when, with specific intent to so engage, he or she manifests an acceptance of an offer or 

solicitation to so engage, regardless of whether the offer or solicitation was made by a 

person who also possessed the specific intent to engage in prostitution. No agreement to 

engage in an act of prostitution shall constitute a violation of this subdivision unless some 

act, in addition to the agreement, is done within this state in furtherance of the 

commission of an act of prostitution by the person agreeing to engage in that act.”

3

At the commencement of the jurisdictional hearing, appellant moved under section 

1161 to exclude all evidence sought to be introduced by the district attorney to show that 

she solicited acts of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b). 

The district attorney opposed the motion on the ground that evidence is inadmissible 

under section 1161 only when offered to prove that a victim of human trafficking is 

criminally liable for a “commercial sexual act,” and the offense described by subdivision 

(b) of Penal Code section 647 is not such an act. According to the district attorney, the 

phrase “commercial sexual act” in section 1161 is defined by section 236.1, subdivision 

(h)(2) of the Penal Code, which states that a “commercial sex act” means “sexual conduct 

on account of which anything of value is given or received by any person.” As the 

district attorney emphasized, Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b) does not require, 

and appellant was not given and did not receive, anything of value as a result of her 

commission of that offense.

 

3

The nature of acts that may be deemed in furtherance of an agreement to engage 

in an act of prostitution, which may be verbal, are described in Kim v. Superior Court

(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-945 (Kim).
3

Accepting that argument, and also because it believed section 1161 inapplicable in 

juvenile proceedings, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to exclude.

Finding that section 1161 does apply in juvenile proceedings, and that the trial 

court’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s interpretation of that statute would virtually wipe 

out a significant protection afforded victims of human trafficking by the CASE Act, we 

shall reverse the judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On May 28, 2015,4the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a wardship 

petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) in case No. PJ51576A (Petition A), alleging that on 

May 12, appellant, age 17, committed misdemeanor disorderly conduct by soliciting or 

agreeing to engage in prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), 

and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602 

of the Welfare and Institutions Code. That same day, the district attorney filed a second 

petition in case No. PJ51576B (Petition B), alleging that appellant committed the same 

offense on May 27.

5

On June 10, appellant moved under section 1161 to exclude all evidence the 

district attorney planned to introduce to prove she engaged in commercial sexual acts,

because she was a “victim of human trafficking,” who had been coerced into performing 

those acts by a pimp who was a human trafficker within the meaning of Penal Code 

section 236.1, subdivision (c), which defines and criminalizes sex trafficking.6 The 

 

4 All dates are in the year 2015. 

5 As we later explain, Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), was amended by 

the Legislature during its current session, so that on January 1, 2017, when the 

amendment becomes effective, the present provisions of subdivision (b) no longer apply 

“to a child under 18 years of age who is alleged to have engaged in conduct . . . that 

would, if committed by an adult, violate the subdivision.” 

6

Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]ny person who 

causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade a person who is a 

minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act, with 

the intent to effect or maintain a violation of [specified statutes] is guilty of human 

trafficking.” 
4

motion also claimed that, since the evidence sought to be excluded consisted solely of the 

testimony of two undercover police officers regarding the alleged acts of commercial sex, 

the petitions should be dismissed after the exclusion of the officers’ testimony.

Before the presentation of evidence, the district attorney argued that the exclusion 

of evidence authorized by section 1161 did not apply to appellant because it only applies 

to evidence offered to prove the commission of a “commercial sexual act,” and neither 

petition alleged she had engaged in any such act. The acts with which appellant was 

charged, the district attorney emphasized, were not committed in return for “anything of 

value given or received by any person,” as required by the definition of “commercial sex 

act” set forth in Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2), which, like Evidence Code 

section 1161, is also a part of the CASE Act. As an offer of proof, the district attorney 

represented that neither of the officers who would testify “are going to testify that any 

sexual act was ever committed.” 

The trial court elected to defer ruling on that issue, and proceed with an 

evidentiary hearing, because it felt it appropriate to “make a record” with respect to two 

threshold legal questions: (1) whether section 1161 applies only in criminal cases and not 

in juvenile proceedings,

7

and (2) whether, even if it does apply in juvenile proceedings, it 

is inapplicable in this case because, as the district attorney claimed, no evidence shows 

that appellant engaged in a “commercial sex act” as defined in Penal Code section 236.1, 

subdivision (h)(2), as meaning “sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is 

 

7

This issue was raised not by the district attorney, who disassociated himself from 

it, but sua sponte by the court. The Attorney General stated in her brief that “we are in 

agreement with appellant that section 1161 applies to minors who have engaged in a 

commercial sexual act as a result of being a victim of human trafficking and who provide 

testimony against individuals charged with the crime of human trafficking.” (Italics 

added.) The record does not show appellant provided or was willing to provide 

testimony against her pimp, and indicates she did not. In any case, the Attorney General 

provided no authority for the proposition that the exclusion authorized by section 1161, 

subdivision (a), is available only to victims of human trafficking who testify against an 

alleged human trafficker, which was not asserted below by the district attorney, and we 

are not aware of any authority for that proposition. 
5

given or received by any person.” The trial court explained that no matter which way it 

ruled on these issues it was confident there would be an appeal and, “given the lack of

clear direction at the moment,” it was important “that we develop as full a record as 

possible. So . . . my inclination is to let the defense proceed with whatever showing it 

wants to make, and I’ll simply rule at some point after we put this on.” 

The court heard the testimony of the two undercover police officers and also that 

of Nadeah Vali, an expert on human trafficking appointed by the court.

Undercover Los Angeles Police Officer Peter Ruiz, who testified with respect to 

the facts alleged in Petition A, stated that on May 12, while a member of a task force 

monitoring prostitution near the intersection of Sepulveda Boulevard and Nordhoff Street 

“known for prostitution,” he approached appellant, who appeared to be in her early 20’s, 

she told him to meet her around the corner, which he did, and she then entered his 

unmarked car. After a discussion in which appellant and Ruiz discussed various types of 

sexual acts and the price Ruiz would have to pay for each act or combination of acts,

appellant agreed to engage in “sex and a blowjob” for $60. Appellant told Officer Ruiz

she had a room in a hotel at Sepulveda and Tupper Street and told him to drive there. 

When they arrived at the hotel’s parking lot, appellant was arrested by other members of 

the task force. The police contacted appellant’s mother, who lived in Antioch in Contra 

Costa County, and appellant was released to her the day after she was arrested. 

Undercover Los Angeles Police Officer Marcos Gutierrez, a member of an 

undercover task force monitoring prostitution near the intersection of Sepulveda and 

Wyandotte Streets in Los Angeles, testified regarding the allegations of Petition B. He

stated that on May 27, while he was posing as a “John,” appellant looked in his direction, 

walked over to the open window on the passenger side of his unmarked car, and stated 

that “she was only doing blow jobs” that night. He said “O.K.,” asked how much that 

would cost, and was told $40. Gutierrez drove the two of them to a location he and other 

officers had previously decided upon, and appellant was immediately arrested by other 

members of the task force. After her arrest, appellant refused to say whether she had a 
6

pimp or to otherwise cooperate. After she refused to telephone her mother, appellant was 

detained in juvenile hall. 

Nadeah Vali, a court appointed expert on human and sexual trafficking, was asked 

to assess whether appellant was a “victim of human trafficking” within the meaning of 

section 1161. After interviewing appellant and familiarizing herself with police reports 

regarding appellant’s present and prior arrests, and the probation reports relating to her 

detention and pre-plea hearings, Vali concluded that appellant had been exploited by two 

pimps, one known only as Victor, who had previously coerced her into engaging in 

prostitution in Oakland, and another known only as Michael, who later exploited her that 

same way in Los Angeles at the time she was arrested by Officers Ruiz and Gutierrez. In 

Vali’s opinion, appellant “exhibit[ed] the indicators of being a victim of human 

trafficking,” in that she exhibited “severe trauma” at the hands of “a third party exploiter” 

who controlled her choices and actions, abused her, transported her to and from certain 

locations, “coerced her into engaging in sexual acts, and confiscated the money she 

earned as a result of those acts. 8 Vali’s testimony established, and it is undisputed, that 

appellant committed the acts with which she was charged “as a result of being a victim of 

human trafficking.” (§ 1161, subd. (a).)

Although, without objection from the district attorney, the court found appellant to 

have committed the charged acts “as a result of being a victim of human trafficking,” it 

nevertheless denied her motion to exclude evidence after concluding that, as matters of 

 

8 Vali testified that Victor, who exploited appellant when she was in Oakland, 

“essentially kidnapped [appellant] while she was on the streets; then physically abused 

her on a daily basis and forced her to engage in certain . . . in commercial sex. He posted 

ads that advertised for services online on websites . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And he had a quota of 

$600 a night that he forced her to turn over. He also set prices. And he also abused her if 

she did not meet that quota . . . .” 

Vali testified much the same about Michael, who exploited appellant in Los 

Angeles at the time of the acts described in the petitions in this case. “She’s on the 

streets, needed a place to stay. He took her to a motel where she was confined. He 

transported her as well to and from the track. He also coerced her to engage in 

commercial sex and set prices and also took the money that she earned.” 
7

law, section 1161 does not apply in juvenile proceedings and, even if it did, section 1161 

does not apply to cases such as this, in which the victim of human trafficking did not 

actually engage in “sexual conduct on account of which anything of value is given or 

received by any person.” (Pen. Code, § 236, subd. (h)(2).)

On July 15, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal in the Los Angeles County 

Superior Court from the order finding true the allegations of the delinquency petitions.

On June 24, after the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services declined 

to accept appellant as a client because her family resided in Northern California, the court 

ordered the matter transferred to Contra Costa County for disposition.9

On November 2, the California Supreme Court ordered the notice of appeal filed

by appellant in the Second Appellate District transferred to this court. 

The appeal is from the orders of the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court on June 

16 and 24, sustaining the allegations of Petitions A and B that appellant committed the 

offenses of soliciting, engaging, or agreeing to engage, in prostitution, in violation of 

Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), a misdemeanor, and adjudging her a ward of the 

court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The appeal, which is 

authorized by section 800 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, was timely filed on July 

15, 2015.

DISCUSSION

 

9 After accepting the transfer on August 12, the Contra Costa County Juvenile 

Court ordered the probation department and a social service agency to evaluate appellant 

and determine whether she should be adjudicated a dependent child or a delinquent. A 

committee of eight persons representing the probation department and various social 

service agencies recommended appellant be adjudged a delinquent ward. Accepting the 

recommendation, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 602, committed her to the care and custody of the probation 

department, and ordered her placement at a group home for the regular six-month 

program. The dispositional orders of the Contra Costa County Superior Court are not 

before us. As earlier indicated, the appeal was filed before the matter was transferred by 

the Supreme Court to this court on October 28.
8

I.

Section 1161 Applies in Juvenile Proceedings

The trial court noted that several judicial opinions “touch upon” the issue of 

whether section 1161 applies in delinquency proceedings, citing In re M.D. (2014) 231 

Cal.App.4th 993, In re Aarica S. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1480, and In re M.V. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1495, but felt none actually addressed the purely legal issue. “They 

simply discuss it and suggest that it’s an issue for another day.” Observing that “[t]his 

may well be that other day,” the court stated that “since I’m ruling that [section] 1161 

does not apply to delinquency proceedings, it’s important for me to let the Court of 

Appeal know why I’m thinking that.” The court explained its thoughts as follows:

“As delinquency judges and advocates, our responsibility is not to punish a person 

who commits a crime. It is, rather, to rehabilitate and protect those who are under the age 

of 18 from the consequences of their conduct and perhaps get them to a position where 

they become law-abiding citizens in a way that does not leave them with an enduring or 

lasting criminal record.

“I think it’s great that [appellant’s] grandparents are willing to take care of her in 

these uncertain and difficult times, but as a judge who has observed [appellant’s] history, 

my biggest concern, and it’s a concern in all these sorts of cases, is that without court 

supervision, without becoming either a 300 or 602 ward, there is no incentive for her to 

follow through. She has not yet reached the maturity level that would satisfy any 

reasonable judge in believing that she might not run.” Believing appellant lacks “real 

adult supervision,” the court stated that “the bottom line is, without some kind of 

jurisdiction over the minor, this minor is in serious danger of, well, falling by the 

wayside, whether she runs away, whether she re-engages with one of the pimps that have 

been testified about. There is no way for a juvenile judge to protect a minor like this 

without a declaration of wardship, without gaining jurisdiction over the minor.” 

Moving on to the text of section 1161, the trial judge placed great weight on the 

fact that the “[e]vidence that a victim of human trafficking . . . has engaged in any 

commercial sexual act” which is excluded by the statute is that which “prove[s] the 
9

victim’s criminal liability.” (Italics added.) As the court stated, “I think it’s absolutely 

vital for me and the Court of Appeal to consider that word ‘criminal.’ The court 

emphasized that “if the Legislature had decided that [section 1161] should apply to 

delinquency proceedings, they could have clearly stated that.” The court acknowledged 

the many similarities between the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system, 

but it was also “mindful of the fact that there are significant differences, and one of the 

most important differences is that we adhere to protect [a juvenile] from herself, so to

speak in times of trouble. [¶] And so in an effort to prevent [appellant] from becoming 

essentially a revolving door where she gets off the bus at someplace between here and 

home and reconnects with a pimp, it’s important for me to adopt the position that [section 

1161] can’t absolve her from a declaration of wardship.” 

The trial court found section 1161 inapplicable in juvenile proceedings because 

the evidence inadmissible under the statute is only that offered to prove “criminal 

liability” and, as declared in Welfare and Institutions Code section 203, “[a]n order 

adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a 

crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal 

proceeding.”

The trial court’s determination is clearly unsustainable.

To begin with, Welfare and Institutions Code section 701 provides that at a 

hearing to determine whether a minor is a person described by sections 300, 601, or 602,

“[t]he admission and exclusion of evidence shall be pursuant to the rules of evidence 

established by the Evidence Code and by judicial decision.” Finding section 1161 

inapplicable to juvenile proceedings because it refers to “criminal liability” also ignores 

the reasoning of In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 as to why the “civil labels” employed 

in delinquency proceedings, and the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile law, provide no 

basis upon which to deprive minors of protections analogous to those conferred by the 

CASE Act, which would deny them a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 

defense. 
10

Finally, one of the chief purposes of the CASE Act is to protect minors, as the 

crime of “human trafficking” is specifically made applicable to “[a]ny person who 

causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a 

minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act with 

the intent to effect or maintain a violation of [various specified sexual crimes].” (Pen. 

Code, § 236.1, subd. (c).) Given the extraordinary number of minors trafficked for 

sexual purposes (see In re M.D., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 999; Office of the Attorney 

General, Cal. Dept. of Justice, The State of Human Trafficking in California (2012) at 

pp. 22-26, 48-56 (State of Human Trafficking) and the policy of the CASE Act to treat 

these minors as victims, not criminals (In re Aarica S., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1486), the inapplicability of section 1161 in juvenile proceedings would obstruct one 

of the chief purposes of the CASE Act: acknowledgment that minors sexually exploited 

by human traffickers are not criminals or delinquents, but victims. 

In any case, the question whether section 1161 applies in juvenile proceedings 

charging minors with commercial sexual acts will soon become academic. On September 

26, 2016, the Governor approved and filed with the Secretary of State, Senate Bill No. 

1322 (Mitchell), which amends Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b). As earlier 

noted, after January 1, 2017, present section 647 will “not apply to a child under 18 years 

of age who is alleged to have engaged in conduct to receive money or other consideration 

that would, if committed by an adult, violate the offense now described in subdivision 

(b). (Sen. Bill No. 1322 ( 2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) ch. 654, § 1.) Senate Bill No. 1322 also 

amends Penal Code section 653.22, which makes it a crime to loiter in any public place 

with the intent to commit prostitution, so that it too will no longer be applicable to 

minors. The amendments to Penal Code sections 647, subdivision (b) and 653.22—

which are commonly referred to as “the prostitution statutes” (In re M.V., supra, 225 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1524)—mean that juveniles whose conduct would be unlawful under 

those statutes if engaged in by an adult will no longer be prosecuted. In other words, 

after January 1, 2017, when the amendments become effective, section 1161 will relate 

only to criminal proceedings in which an adult charged with one or more “commercial 
11

sexual acts” maintains those acts were the “result of being a victim of human 

trafficking.”10

II.

Admitting Evidence of Conduct Punishable Under Penal Code

Section 647, Subdivision (b), in Prosecutions of Victims of Human

Trafficking for Sexual Acts Coerced by a Trafficker Would Deny Such 

Victims Protection Clearly Intended by the CASE Act and be Absurd 

The Attorney General agrees appellant committed the charged offenses “as a result 

of being a victim of human trafficking,” but claimed in her brief that this case is not 

within the ambit of section 1161 because, as the trial court agreed, appellant was not 

charged with a “commercial sexual act,” as defined by Penal Code section 236.1; that is, 

appellant was charged with an offense that does not require sexual conduct in return for 

money or anything else of value. (People v. Mecano (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1061,

1070.)

The issue before us is whether the “commercial sexual act” referred to in section 

1161 is the same as the “commercial sex act” defined in Penal Code section 236.1, 

subdivision (h)(2), or, as appellant maintains, “commercial sexual act” must be read more 

expansively so as to include uncompensated sexual conduct punishable under Penal Code 

section 647, subdivision (b). As previously indicated, this issue, which is one of first

impression,11 will soon be presented only in prosecutions in criminal proceedings against 

 

10 Because section 1161 will remain applicable to adult prosecutions for 

prostitution in violation of Penal Code sections 647, subdivision (b), and 653.22, 

subdivision (a), the parties have indicated their belief it is appropriate for us to certify this 

opinion for publication, in order to clarify that section 1161 protects adult victims of 

human trafficking by excluding evidence offered to prove their criminal liability for 

conduct proscribed by those prostitution statutes. 

11 The only extant opinion that even adverts to the issue is In re Aarica S., supra, 

223 Cal.App.4th at page 1486, a case in which the juvenile defendant was unable to show 

that her commercial sex act was the result of being a victim of human trafficking. After 

describing the purpose and intent of the voter who passed Proposition 35 and enacted the 

CASE Act, and quoting the statutory definition of the crime of “human trafficking” as 

causing or inducing, or persuading a minor to engage in a “commercial sex act” with the 
12

an adult claiming he or she engaged in the charged commercial sexual acts “as a result of 

being a victim of human trafficking.” 

We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (Carver v. Chevron, 

U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) Where the issue involves the proper 

interpretation of a statute and its application to undisputed facts our review is 

independent. (Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345, 357.) “Initially, 

‘[a]s in any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine afresh the intent of 

the Legislature by construing in context the language of the statute.’ [Citation.] In 

determining such intent, we begin with the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] That 

is, we look first to the words the Legislature used, giving them their usual and ordinary 

meaning. [Citation.] ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “then the 

Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the 

language governs.” ’ [Citation.] ‘But when the statutory language is ambiguous, “the 

court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction 

that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.” ’ ” (People v. 

Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192-193.)

As later described (see discussion, post, at p. 19, fn. 15), after the close of briefing, 

we determined that the legislative history of the 2013 amendment of section 1161, which

was neither included in the record before us nor described in the briefs, was a matter of 

substantial consequence to the determination of this appeal. Accordingly, as required by 

Evidence Code section 459, subdivision (d), we provided that history to the parties,

indicated our intention to take judicial notice of this information, and afforded the parties 

the opportunity to meet such information before judicial notice of the matter was taken. 

Less than a week later, on the day before oral argument, the Attorney General advised the 

 

intent to effect a violation of specified sex crimes (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)), the 

court observed that “ ‘[c]ommercial sex act’ is defined as ‘sexual conduct on account of 

which anything of value is given or received by any person,’ ” citing subdivision (h)(2) of 

Penal Code section 236.1. (In re Aarica S., at p. 1486.) The meaning of the phrase 

“commercial sex act” was not at issue in Aarica S., and the court’s gratuitous observation 

was merely in passing. 
13

clerk of this court that, after belatedly considering the reasoning of People v. Casas

(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 889 (Casas), she desired to withdraw the argument in her brief 

that the phrase “commercial sexual conduct” did not embody the unlawful conduct 

proscribed by subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 647. The Attorney General 

essentially acknowledges that the contrary determination of the trial court constituted 

reversible error. 

Casas involved Evidence Code sections 782 and 1103, which limit the 

admissibility of evidence of “sexual conduct” of the complaining witness when offered to 

attack the credibility of that witness, because such use of that evidence would deter rape 

victims from filing complaints. The trial court in Casas relied on these statutes to 

exclude evidence that the victim had offered a friend of the defendant sex for money 

shortly before the defendant appeared in the victim’s room. (Casas, supra, 181 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 894-895.) The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion because 

the victim’s statement reflected her “willingness to engage in sexual intercourse,” which 

constituted “sexual conduct” and therefore fell within the ambit of Evidence Code 

sections 782 and 1103. (Casas, at p. 895.)

We agree that Casas calls for a more expansive interpretation of the phrase 

“commercial sexual act” than the construction adopted by the trial court. The phrase

contemplates “the practice or occupation of engaging in sexual activity with someone for 

payment,” which is the Oxford English Dictionary definition of “prostitution.” 

Prostitution invariably commences, as it did in this case, with a discussion between the 

parties of the sexual activity or activities offered by one party and at what cost to the 

other party, an agreement as to the act and reciprocal payment, and conduct indicating a

specific intention to perform the agreement. Because this preludial conduct criminalized 

by Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), has both a commercial and a sexual aspect it 

may reasonably be thought to constitute a “commercial sexual act,” or at least an element 

of such an act, despite the fact that nothing of value has yet been given or received by any 

person as compensation for that sexual conduct. However, the reasoning of Casas is 

hardly the only justification for concluding that the phrase “commercial sexual act” is 
14

ambiguous and amenable to interpretation, and that the mere act of soliciting prostitution 

may properly be considered a “commercial sexual act” despite the absence of a 

completed and compensated sexual act. 

Although Evidence Code section 1161 refers to Penal Code section 236.1, the 

syntax of the single sentence that comprises subdivision (a) of section 1161 indicates that 

the reference to Penal Code section 236.1 is solely to its definition of “human trafficking” 

in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of that statute;

12 not to its definition in subdivision (h)(2) 

of “commercial sex act.” The distinction appears purposeful. The definition of 

“commercial sex act” in subdivision (h)(2) of section 236.1 tracks the definition of that 

term in the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.; see 

especially § 7102(3).) However, although the definition of human trafficking in Penal 

Code section 236.1 “is equivalent to the federal definition of a severe form of trafficking 

found in [the federal trafficking act]” (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (g), referring to 22 

U.S.C. § 7102(8)), the federal act provides no benefit to victims of human trafficking 

comparable to that authorized by section 1161. There was therefore no reason for our 

Legislature to adopt language from the federal act in section 1161, a novel provision of 

state law having no counterpart in the federal act.

We recognize that section 1161 and Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2), 

are both provisions of the CASE Act, and the latter statute defines language very similar 

to that used in the former. As has been said, “identical language appearing in separate 

statutory provisions should receive the same interpretation when the statutes cover the 

same or analogous subject matter.” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1269, 

fn. 6; People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 525.) But the phrase “commercial sexual 

 

12 Subdivision (a) defines labor trafficking, subdivision (b) defines deprivations of 

the liberty of another with the intent to effect a violation of specified statutes (relating to 

pimping, pandering, the possession, sale, advertising, and distribution of obscene 

materials, the exploitation of minors in certain sexual contexts, and extortion) as a form 

of human trafficking, and subdivision (c) defines inducing or attempting to induce a 

minor to engage in a commercial sex act with the intent to effect a violation of the same 

statutes specified in subdivision (b). 
15

act” in section 1161 is not “identical” to the phrase “commercial sex act” in Penal Code 

section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2) and, more importantly, the two statutes do not 

specifically relate to the same or analogous subject matter. Penal Code section 236.1 

defines the nature and punishment of various forms of human trafficking, while section 

1161 pertains to the exclusion of evidence in certain prosecutions of a victim of human 

trafficking.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, as used in section 1161, the phrase 

“commercial sexual act” is, at the very least, ambiguous. Where statutory language is 

ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation “ ‘we look to a 

variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be 

remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative 

construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]’ [¶] 

Furthermore, we must select a construction that comports most closely with the apparent

intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general 

purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd 

consequences. [Citation.]” (Kim, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)

The most helpful extrinsic aids are the legislative history of the 2013 amendment 

of section 1161, and the absurd consequences that would follow from the interpretation 

adopted by the trial court. The legislative history clearly shows the measure was 

intended to apply to acts of prostitution that resulted from “being a victim of human 

trafficking” even if the sexual conduct was not “on account of which anything of value is 

given or received by any person.” (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (h)(2).) The interpretation 

of section 1161 embraced by the trial court therefore cannot be reconciled with the 

apparent intent of the Legislature.

The original version of section 1161 enacted by passage of Proposition 35 

provided that “[e]vidence that a victim of human trafficking . . . has engaged in any 

commercial sexual act as a result of being a victim of human trafficking is inadmissible 

to prove the victim’s criminal liability for any conduct related to that activity.” (Italics 

added.) In 2013, the Legislature amended the statute by replacing the italicized words 
16

with “the commercial sexual act,” so that subdivision (a) of section 1161 will read: 

“Evidence that a victim of human trafficking, as defined in Section 236.1 of the Penal 

Code, has engaged in any commercial sexual act as a result of being a victim of human 

trafficking is inadmissible to prove the victim’s criminal liability for the commercial 

sexual act.” (Italics added.) 

Assemblyman Richard Bloom, the author of the amending measure, Assembly Bill 

No. 694 (AB 694), explained its purpose to the Assembly and Senate Committees on 

Public Safety and his views were reiterated in committee analyses of the measure made 

available to all members of the Legislature as follows: “Language from Proposition 35 

excludes evidence that a victim of human trafficking took part in a commercial sexual 

act, such as prostitution, in prosecutions related to that activity. However, the language 

as it reads now could reach beyond its intended use and potentially jeopardize other 

serious prosecutions, such as robbery or murder of the human trafficker, where that 

evidence may be key in establishing motive. By narrowing this section to apply only to 

prosecutions for the commercial sexual act, AB 694 makes a simple change that insures 

that Proposition 35 still protects victims of human trafficking but allows for this type of 

evidence to be used in other prosecutions.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of 

Assem. Bill No. 694 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) p. 3 (Analysis).) Assemblyman Bloom thus 

made clear that (1) prostitution is “a commercial sexual act,” (2) the voters who enacted 

Proposition 35 intended that section 1161 apply in prosecutions of victims of human 

trafficking for “prostitution,” and (3) AB 694 did not alter that application.13 

So did Los Angeles County District Attorney Jackie Lacey, the proponent of the 

amendment and, so far as the record shows, the only non-legislative source of 

information regarding AB 694 received by the legislative committees that analyzed the 

measure and placed it on consent calendars made available to all state legislators. In 

identical letters to the Chairpersons and members of the Assembly and Senate Public 

 

13 Assembly Bill No. 694 was introduced, enrolled and chaptered without any 

amendments in merely six months. 
17

Safety Committees dated, respectively, March 16 and June 3, 2013, and included in the

legislative bill analyses, Lacey stated that the original language of subdivision (a) of 

section 1161 “ ‘creates potential problems for the prosecution if a victim of human 

trafficking is being prosecuted for a crime other than a commercial sexual act related to 

human trafficking. For instance, if a defendant was a victim of human trafficking and 

murdered his or her pimp, the statute as currently enacted could be interpreted to make 

inadmissible evidence that the defendant was a prostitute and the that murder victim was 

the defendant’s pimp, thereby excluding important evidence connecting the defendant 

and murder victim and potential evidence of motive for the murder.’ ” (Analysis at p 6.)

Lacey acknowledged that “ ‘[c]learly, in a prosecution of a victim of human 

trafficking for an act of prostitution that is a product of the trafficking, [the initial version 

of] Evidence Code section 1161[, subdivision] (a), makes any evidence of a commercial 

sexual act related to that trafficking inadmissible.’ ” (Analysis at p. 6.) She then 

explained that the amendment proposed by AB 694 “would clarify” that, as expressed in 

the Official Voter Information Guide regarding Proposition 35, “ ‘the limitation on the 

admissibility of evidence that a victim of human trafficking engaged in any commercial 

sexual act, is intended to limit such evidence when being introduced to prosecute that 

person for a commercial sexual act crime, such as prostitution.’ ” (Analysis at p. 7, 

italics added.) 

As reflected in the bill analyses, the District Attorney also told the chairpersons of 

the policy committees that “ ‘[p]rior to proposing AB 694, our office met with Chris 

Kelly, the proponent of the CASE Act, who informed us that the intent of Evidence Code 

section 1161[, subdivision] (a) was to limit the prosecutions of the sexual act (i.e., 

prostitution), and that he supports our legislation that clarifies the intent of Proposition 

35.’ ” (Analysis at p. 7, italics added.)

In short, as set forth in the bill analyses, the representation to the Legislature of the 

Los Angeles County District Attorney reiterated that prostitution is a “commercial sexual 

act.” The Legislature was therefore assured by the author of the bill and by its proponent 

that the 2013 amendment, which was unopposed, would continue to protect victims of 
18

human trafficking by excluding evidence of commercial sexual acts they were coerced by 

human traffickers to perform when prosecuted by the state for those criminal acts, most 

specifically prostitution, the criminal act for which victims of human sex trafficking are 

most commonly prosecuted. (State of Human Trafficking, supra, at pp. 50-57; see Kim, 

supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [courts may look to legislative history to discern 

meaning of statutory language].) 

It is not entirely clear why legislative attention was never called to the possibility 

the phrase “commercial sexual act” in section 1161 might be seen as having the same 

meaning as that ascribed to the phrase “commercial sex act” by Penal Code section 236.1 

which, as we have explained, would render section 1161 largely meaningless. But 

whatever the reason, the legislative history reflects no legislative intention to render 

section 1161 inapplicable to the prosecution of a person for an act of prostitution, 

including the solicitation of prostitution, that resulted from “being a victim of human 

trafficking.” On the contrary, as the Los Angeles County District Attorney stated in her 

letter to legislators, AB 694 was designed to “clarify” that the exclusion of evidence 

authorized by section 1161, subdivision (a), is limited to evidence introduced to prosecute 

a victim of human trafficking “for a commercial sexual crime, such as prostitution,” and 

the measure was therefore consonant with the purpose of Proposition 35 and the CASE 

Act.

The trial court’s interpretation of section 1161 would not only defeat the general 

purpose of the CASE Act, but lead to absurd consequences.

Persons are rarely arrested for acts of prostitution “on account of which anything 

of value is given or received.” (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (h)(2).) Because law 

enforcement officers may not themselves engage in sex with suspected prostitutes, let 

alone compensate them with “anything of value” (ibid.), prostitution is in this state 

ordinarily punished “as a type of disorderly conduct” under Penal Code section 647, 

subdivision (b). (Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th Ed.) Sex Offenses and 

Crimes Against Decency, § 76, p. 480.) As explained in Kim, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 

937, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), in order “ ‘to give 
19

police another enforcement tool’ on ‘prostitution laws that [were] difficult to enforce.’ ” 

(Kim, at p. 942.) 

As indicated, at the present time, almost all persons arrested for prostitution in this 

state are charged with violating either Penal Code sections 647, subdivision (b), as was 

appellant, or 653.22, subdivision (a),14 which makes it unlawful for any person to loiter in 

any public place with the intent to commit prostitution.15 However, neither of these so

 

14 Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 653.22 states that “It is unlawful for any 

person to loiter in any public place with the intent to commit prostitution. This intent is 

evidenced by acting in a manner and under circumstances which openly demonstrate the 

purpose of inducing, enticing, or soliciting prostitution, or procuring another to commit 

prostitution.” Between 2007 and 2012 (through Sept. 30, 2012) 8,881 persons were 

convicted of this offense in California courts. (State of Human Trafficking, supra, at 

p. 57, Table 2.) 

15 The Special Enforcement Section of the Los Angeles Police Department, states 

that it “uses only 647 (B) for prostitution,” and that between January 1, 2012, and August 

6, 2016, it arrested 10,691 persons for prostitution under Penal Code section 647, 

subdivision (b). During that same period the department arrested 8,021 persons for 

loitering for purposes of prostitution in violation of Penal Code section 653.22. (Los 

Angeles Police Department, Special Enforcement Section, Detective Support and Vice 

Division, Reporting Generated on Aug. 6, 2016.) 

The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department reports that between January 1, 

2011, and July 31, 2016, it made 5,541 “prostitution arrests” under Penal Code sections 

647, subdivision (b) and 653.22. (L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. Prostitution Arrests by 

Penal Codes Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 2011; Jan. 1 July 31, 2016.)

Statistics reported by the Los Angeles City Attorney show that between January 1, 

2012, and December 31, 2016, officials prosecuted 10,065 cases in which count 1 was 

violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), of which 84.9 percent resulted in 

guilty pleas, 14.6 percent were dismissed, 0.25 percent resulted in a guilty verdict and 0 

percent resulted in a verdict of not guilty. (Los Angeles City Attorney, Case Disposition 

Status Reports for ALL BRANCHES, Reporting Generated Aug. 15, 2016.) 

Because the statistics and legislative history we have described and discussed were 

not a part of the record in this appeal or referred to by the parties in their briefs, we 

provided these materials to the parties, indicated we considered them matters which may 

be judicially noticed, and indicated our intention to take such notice. As required by 

Evidence Code section 459, subdivision (d), we also afforded each party a reasonable 

opportunity to meet such information, and the subject was discussed with counsel at oral 

argument. We hereby take judicial notice of the bill analyses of the Assembly and Senate 
20

called “prostitution statutes” (see, e.g., In re M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524),

requires that “anything of value be given or received.” (§ 236.1, subd. (h)(2).)16 

Therefore, if the interpretation of section 1161, subdivision (a), urged by the Los Angeles 

County District Attorney in this case and adopted by the trial court is correct, the CASE 

Act would provide no protection at all for victims of human trafficking prosecuted for 

acts of prostitution they were forced by traffickers to perform. Such a ridiculous result 

cannot, of course, be judicially countenanced.

Proposition 35 allowed that the CASE Act may be amended by the Legislature, 

but only by means of “a statute in furtherance of its objectives.” (Prop. 35, § 15.) 

Section 1161, as amended, is “in furtherance” of the objectives of the CASE Act only if 

the phrase “commercial sexual act” is construed so as to embrace the conduct punishable 

by subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 647. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 

denying appellant’s motion to exclude evidence offered by the prosecution to prove her 

criminal liability for commission of that offense. 

 

Committees on Public Safety, which include the text of the identical letters from Los 

Angeles County District Attorney Jackie Lacey dated March 16 and June 3, 2013, to the 

chairpersons and members of those committees (see People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

764, 780 [legislative staff analyses are subject to judicial notice]), and the statistical 

information reported by the offices of the Los Angeles County District Attorney, the Los 

Angeles City Attorney and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and referred to 

in this opinion, which information is “not reasonably subject to dispute and [is] capable 

of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable 

accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)

16 It is unclear whether persons are or may be prosecuted for prostitution under 

subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 647, which provides that every person “[w]ho 

solicits anyone to engage in or who engages in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public 

place or in any place open to the public or exposed to public view” is guilty of disorderly 

conduct, a misdemeanor. In any event, this offense also does not require the giving or 

receipt of anything of value, and is therefore also not within the definition of 

“commercial sex act” set forth in Penal Code section 236.1, subdivision (h)(2).
21

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. 

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

In re N.C. (A146637)
22

Trial Court: Los Angeles County Superior Court

Trial Judge Hon. Robert J. Schuit

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Theresa J. Canepa

Attorney for Appellant: Lynette G. Moore

Under Appointment by the Second

District Court of Appeal

Attorneys for Respondent: Kamala D. Harris

Attorney General of California

Gerald A. Engler

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Donna M. Provenzano

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Christina Vom Saal

Deputy Attorney General