United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-40356

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Rafael Villanueva, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:17-CR-508-1

Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A jury convicted Rafael Villanueva of six counts relating to drug 

trafficking and money laundering, and the district court imposed concurrent 

sentences that included terms of imprisonment for life. On appeal, 

Villanueva challenges the district court’s finding him competent to stand trial 

and its evidentiary ruling barring him from presenting evidence and argument 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 7, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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related to his intervening stroke and purported memory loss. He also 

challenges the constitutionality of the statutes of conviction and renews his 

objection to a jury instruction as well as several sentencing objections. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

In Villanueva’s view, the district court erred in finding him competent 

because loss of memory undermined his ability to testify or otherwise to assist 

his counsel in contesting the Government’s case. In reviewing competency 

determinations, we “re-analyze the facts and take a hard look at the trial 

judge’s ultimate conclusion,” which we leave undisturbed “unless it is 

clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” United States v. Doke, 171 F.3d 240, 247 

(5th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The standard for 

competency is “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to 

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—

and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); 

accord Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). Based on our review of the 

record, including the nature of the evidence against Villanueva and expert 

evaluations that undermine his claims of memory loss, the district court’s 

determination of competence was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.

Villanueva also contends that the district court erred by granting a 

motion in limine that largely barred him from presenting evidence about the 

stroke and its effect on his memory—a ruling we review for abuse of 

discretion and harmless error. See United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 287 

(5th Cir. 2009). In this instance, even assuming error, relief is unwarranted 

because there is not a reasonable probability that the exclusion of evidence 

contributed to the verdicts, given the ample evidence of guilt predating the

stroke.

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Relatedly, Villanueva argues that the district court erred by not 

permitting him to address his stroke and memory loss while cross-examining 

witnesses or in closing argument. The first of these claims is unavailing 

because Villanueva does not demonstrate that the restrictions on crossexamination violated his confrontation right or were clearly prejudicial. See 

United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438–40 (5th Cir. 2008). As for closing 

argument, a presiding judge has broad discretion in limiting its scope to 

ensure “that argument does not stray unduly from the mark.” Herring v. New 

York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). And because no evidence of memory loss was 

adduced during trial, Villanueva had no basis for addressing the subject in his 

closing. See United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The 

sole purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating 

and applying the evidence.”).

Next, Villanueva challenges the constitutionality of the statutes under 

which he was convicted. He acknowledges that his challenge to the 

Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is foreclosed by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 

1 (2005), but argues Gonzales was wrongly decided. To the extent Villanueva 

is asking this court to disregard Supreme Court precedent, we must refuse 

that request. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). His challenges to 

statutes other than the CSA are not considered because he failed to brief 

them. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Villanueva contends that it was error for the district court to instruct 

jurors that they must accept the law as explained to them by the court. We 

have held that “a district court does not err by giving a charge that tracks this 

Circuit’s pattern jury instructions and that is a correct statement of the law.” 

United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 507 (5th Cir. 2012). As the 

instruction at issue met those criteria, we conclude it was not erroneous.

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While Villanueva also asserts that the district court erred by 

overruling various sentencing objections, insufficient briefing as to most of 

these issues precludes our review. See Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 446-47. To the 

extent he contends that sentencing determinations should have been made 

by the jury, he is correct in conceding that his arguments are foreclosed. 

AFFIRMED.

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