Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David W. Stone, IV

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. Mackenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jose G. Echartea-De La Suente,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 23, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1706-CR-1280

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David A. Happe, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C04-1212-FA-2249

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 2 of 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jose G. Echartea-De La Suente (Echartea-De La 

Suente), appeals his conviction for two Counts of child molesting, Class A 

felonies, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1); two Counts of child molesting, Class C 

felonies, I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b); and one Count of attempted child molesting, a 

Class C felony, I.C. §§ 35-42-4-3(b); -41-5-1.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Echartea-De La Suente presents us with three issues on appeal, which we 

restate as: 

(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 

to support Echartea-De La Suente’s conviction for one Count of child molesting 

as a Class A felony;

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Echartea-De La 

Suente to an aggregate sentence of seventy years based on multiple aggravating 

factors and no mitigating factors; and 

(3) Whether his aggregate sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 3 of 15

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In 2005, C.S., then nine years old, was living with her mother, her younger 

sister O.M., her younger brother J.M., and her grandmother in Anderson, 

Indiana. C.S.’s mother was dating Echartea-De La Suente and he would visit 

occasionally; they married in 2009. On one such visit, C.S., along with 

Echartea-De La Suente, her mother, sister, brother, and cousin, T.K., were all 

sleeping in her mother’s bedroom. C.S. was between T.K., who was facing 

away from C.S. playing a Gameboy, and Echartea-De La Suente. While 

everyone was asleep with the exception of T.K., Echartea-De La Suente started 

to “rub [C.S.’s] shoulder down to [her] leg and then, eventually, he made his 

way down inside [her] pants and started fingering and putting his finger in [her]

vagina continuously.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 52). C.S. “tried to close [her] legs 

as tight as [she] could.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). The next day, C.S. informed T.K.

of what had happened. She did not tell her mother because “[a]s a child [she] 

had seen [her] cousin get taken away into foster care and [she] just didn’t want 

anything to change between [her] family.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). 

[5] In 2010, Echartea-De La Suente started molesting C.S.’s younger sister, O.M., 

who was then eleven years old. At that time, O.M. shared a bedroom with her 

brother, C.S. had her own bedroom, her mother and Echartea-De La Suente 

shared a room, and O.M.’s grandmother slept on the couch. At night, 

Echartea-De La Suente entered O.M.’s bedroom and “got in [O.M.’s] bed.” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 68). “[H]e put his hand under [her shirt] and” started rubbing 

her breasts and vagina. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 68). O.M. did not tell anyone what had 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 4 of 15

happened because she was afraid. Echartea-De La Suente continued to molest 

her “almost every night.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 70). 

[6] Eventually Echartea-De La Suente escalated his behavior. After he had 

touched O.M.’s breasts and rubbed her vagina, he lifted up O.M.’s shirt and 

started kissing her back. He tried to kiss O.M. on her mouth but she “was 

holding [her] teeth closed, so he pulled down [her] pants and [her] underwear to 

[her] ankles.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 71). O.M. tried to get up “but he held [her] down 

and he started licking [her] vagina.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 71). The following 

morning, O.M. wrote her friend a note about the incident and asked her friend 

to give the note to O.M.’s mother because O.M. was too embarrassed and 

afraid to hand her the note herself. After O.M.’s mother read the note, mother

became angry and started “yelling at [O.M.] because [she] told [her friend] and 

it could’ve gotten [her] brother and [her] sister taken away, and the house taken

away, and [O.M.] taken away.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 74). 

[7] On another occasion, O.M. was alone in the living room as she had just gotten 

up and her mother and grandmother had left to get breakfast. C.S. and her 

brother were still asleep. O.M. was on the couch watching television when 

Echartea-De La Suente “came in and laid behind” her. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 75). 

O.M. immediately got up and started walking to her room. However, 

Echartea-De La Suente “grabbed [her] and took [her] to [his] room” where he 

threw her on the bed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 75). As he tried to pull O.M.’s pants 

down, she pushed him off and ran to her room, locking her bedroom door. 

Echartea-De La Suente tried to break into her bedroom by using a credit card to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 5 of 15

open the door. Through the door, he was telling O.M. that if she “didn’t let 

him in that [her] mom was going to be mad at [her].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 75). 

When he realized that he could not get inside, Echartea-De La Suente went to 

the bathroom to take a shower. O.M. texted her mother about the incident but 

“nothing really happened.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 76). O.M. disclosed the abuse to 

T.K. and T.K. began sleeping in O.M.’s room “to protect” her. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

124). 

[8] With the exception of grandmother and C.S., the family moved to a new 

apartment. There, O.M.’s mother questioned O.M.’s attitude, and O.M. told 

her that she was continuously angry because her mother knew Echartea-De La 

Suente had molested her, yet refused to do anything. O.M. disclosed the abuse 

to law enforcement after mother took O.M. to the emergency room for an 

examination. 

[9] On December 4, 2012, the State filed an Information, charging Echartea-De La 

Suente with two Counts of child molesting as Class A felonies, two Counts of 

child molesting as Class C felonies, and one Count of attempted child 

molesting, as a Class C felony. However, Echartea-De La Suente had left 

Indiana and was wanted on a warrant for approximately four years. On April 

6, 2017, after his arrest and extradition to Indiana, Echartea-De La Suente was 

found guilty as charged following a jury trial. On May 22, 2017, the trial court 

conducted a sentencing hearing. At the close of the evidence, the trial court 

sentenced Echartea-De La Suente to thirty-five years each on the two Class A 

felonies, to be served consecutively, and four years on each of the Class C 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 6 of 15

felonies, to be served concurrently to the Class A felonies, for an aggregate 

sentence of seventy years.

[10] Echartea-De La Suente now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as 

necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Echartea-De La Suente contends that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for Count I, the 

Class A child molestation pertaining to C.S.1

 Our standard of review for a 

sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. In reviewing sufficiency of the 

evidence claims, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the 

witnesses. Moore v. State, 869 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all 

reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. The conviction 

will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the 

conviction of the trier of fact. Id. It is well-established that “the uncorroborated 

testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on 

appeal.” Scott v. State, 871 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Toney v. 

State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999)), trans. denied.

 

1 Echartea-De La Suente does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on his other charges.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 7 of 15

[12] To convict Echartea-De La Suente of Class A felony child molesting, the State 

had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Echartea-De La Suente, being 

at least twenty-one years of age, “knowingly or intentionally perform[ed] or 

submit[ted] to sexual intercourse or other sexual misconduct” with a child 

under fourteen years of age. See I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a). Here, C.S., being nine 

years old at the time of the molestation, testified that Echartea-De La Suente 

rubbed her shoulder, then her leg, and then proceeded “fingering or putting his 

finger in [her] vagina continuously.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). She described that 

Echartea-De La Suente put his finger “all the way inside” her vagina and that 

she “just tried to close [her] legs as tight as [she] could.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). 

[13] Echartea-De La Suente now challenges C.S.’s testimony as incredibly dubious. 

Specifically, he asserts that “[i]t is contrary to human experience that an adult 

would attempt to molest a child with that many potential witnesses in close 

proximity and one of whom was awake playing a game.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

12). Under the incredible dubiosity rule, “a court will impinge on the jury’s 

responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when it has 

confronted ‘inherently improbable’ testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly 

uncorroborated testimony of ‘incredible dubiosity.’” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 

749, 755 (Ind. 2015) (citing Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994)). 

A court will impinge upon a jury’s duty to judge witness credibility “where a 

sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the 

result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the 

appellant’s guilt.” Moore, 27 N.E.2d at 755. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 8 of 15

[14] We find the incredible dubiosity rule inapplicable to the case at hand. Even 

though we agree with Echartea-De La Suente that T.K. was not a witness as 

she failed to observe the molestation, we cannot agree that C.S.’s trial testimony 

was “inconsistent within itself.” See id. at 758-59. Even under crossexamination, C.S. was consistent in her responses and confident in what had 

happened that night. The jury was free to decide whether “to believe or 

disbelieve” C.S. See Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002). 

Furthermore, it is not uncommon for child molesters to offend when other 

people are in the home or even in the same room. We agree with the State that 

the decision to commit a crime in the presence of potential witnesses without 

first isolating the victim does not make the commission of that crime 

improbable. Accordingly, as the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain 

Echartea-De La Suente’s conviction for Class A felony child molesting, as 

pertaining to C.S., we affirm the trial court’s decision.

II. Aggregate Sentence

[15] Next, Echartea-De La Suente contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

in sentencing him to an aggregate sentence of seventy years based on “improper 

aggravating factors and the failure to recognize the lack of any real criminal 

history as a mitigating factor.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). Sentencing decisions 

are a matter of trial court discretion and are reviewed on appeal only for an 

abuse of that discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490, clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if its 

decision “is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 9 of 15

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). A trial 

court “may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to 

the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id. at 489. If the trial court 

“‘finds’ the existence of ‘aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances’ 

then the trial court is required to give ‘a statement of the court’s reasons for 

selecting the sentence that it imposes.’” Id. at 490 (quoting I.C. § 35-38-1-3(3)).

[16] On appeal, a trial court may be found to have abused its discretion by failing to 

enter a sentencing statement at all; entering a sentencing statement that explains 

its reasons for imposing a sentence where such reasons are not supported by the 

record or are improper as a matter of law; or entering a sentencing statement 

that omits reasons which are clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration. Id. at 490-91. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by 

failing to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 491. If we 

find that the trial court has abused its sentencing discretion, our court will 

remand for resentencing only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial 

court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered 

reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id.

[17] Child molesting as a Class A felony is punishable by a fixed term of between 

twenty and fifty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. See I.C. § 

35-50-2-4(a). Echartea-De La Suente’s Class C felonies are punishable for a 

fixed term of between two and eight years, with the advisory sentence being 

four years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6. In this case, as factors warranting an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 10 of 15

aggravated sentence, the trial court cited: 1) Echartea-De La Suente’s prior 

criminal history; 2) multiple victims and multiple offenses committed over a 

very long period of time; and 3) Echartea-De La Suente’s violation of his 

position of trust. The trial court specifically noted that it could “find no 

mitigation in the record” to weigh against several aggravators. (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 

61-62). Accordingly, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of thirtyfive years each on the Class A felonies, to be served consecutively, and the 

advisory sentence of four years on each of the Class C felonies, to be served 

concurrently to the Class A felonies, for an aggregate sentence of seventy years. 

[18] Challenging the trial court’s finding of all three aggravators, Echartea-De La 

Suente first contends that his criminal history should actually be considered as a 

mitigating factor as it only consists of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in 

2008 and three operating while intoxicated offenses based on a single incident 

in 2012. Considering that Echartea-De La Suente did have “some prior 

criminal history,” the trial court also recognized that this history is “[n]ot prior 

to these offense[s] being committed necessarily but prior to sentencing here 

today.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 61). While “the significance of criminal history varies 

based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the 

current offense,” the trial court here merely noted Echartea-De La Suente’s 

criminal record without awarding it significant weight. Garcia v. State, 47 

N.E.3d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Accordingly, as the 

aggravator is supported by the record, the trial court properly considered 

Echartea-De La Suente’s criminal history.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 11 of 15

[19] Turning to the trial court’s aggravator of “multiple victims and multiple 

offenses committed over a very long period of time,” Echartea-De La Suente 

argues that the trial court improperly relied on “acts of molestation with which 

the defendant was not charged.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 61; Appellant’s Br. p. 15). In 

this instance, Echartea-De La Suente alludes to the trial court’s statement that 

“there is evidence from which the court can certainly conclude[], and does 

conclude, that there were more incidents that occurred than were charged in 

this case” to contend that the aggravator was improper. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 61). 

However, our review of the record indicates that the trial court explicitly 

identified the existence of multiple victims and multiple offenses committed 

over a long period of time as an aggravator, while the contested statement was 

merely an elaboration on the trial court’s thought process. At no point did the 

trial court characterize these uncharged offenses as a separate aggravator. 

[20] Lastly, Echartea-De La Suente disagrees about having ever been in a position of 

trust with the victims and thus also challenges this aggravator as improper. At 

the time of C.S.’s molestation in 2005, Echartea-De La Suente was dating 

C.S.’s mother and was a visitor at the residence. Apparently, he was close 

enough to the victims that C.S.’s mother allowed him to sleep in the bedroom 

with the entire family. In Rodriguez, we concluded that this type of behavior is 

sufficient to establish a position of trust. Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551, 555 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the position of trust aggravator applies when 

the defendant “has a more than casual relationship with the victim and has 

abused the trust resulting from that relationship” and that “generally, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 12 of 15

cohabitation arrangements of nearly any character between adults do in fact, 

and should, establish a position of trust between adults and minors living or 

staying together”). Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s consideration of 

this aggravator was appropriate.

[21] Insofar as Echartea-De La Suente argues that his thirty-five-year aggravated 

sentence for Count I, the child molestation of C.S., constitutes an abuse of 

discretion as it is supported by improper aggravators pertaining to this specific 

Count, we note that Indiana does not require trial courts to specify aggravators 

and make separate findings regarding each individual offense. In Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224-25 (Ind. 2008), our supreme court clarified that 

In the case of some crimes, the number of counts that can be 

charged and proved is virtually entirely at the discretion of the 

prosecution. For that reason, appellate review should focus on 

the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—

consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.

[22] In sentencing Echartea-De La Suente to an aggregate sentence of seventy years, 

the trial court found multiple proper aggravating factors and no mitigating 

factors. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing an aggravated sentence. 

II. Inappropriate Sentence Review

[23] Echartea-De La Suente also claims that his seventy-year sentence is 

inappropriate. As we previously indicated, “‘sentencing is principally a 

discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 13 of 15

considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) 

(quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). However, our court may revise a 

statutorily permissible sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, [we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).

[24] Appellate Rule 7(B) provides for sentence review in an “attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Ultimately, 

“whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our 

sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 

done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id.

at 1224. Our court focuses on “the length of the aggregate sentence and how it 

is to be served.” Id. Echartea-De La Suente bears the burden of persuading this 

court that his sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Echartea-De La Suente seeks a reduction in his sentence 

to the minimum sentence on Count I and the advisory sentence on the other 

Counts, with all Counts to run concurrent, for an aggregate sentence of thirty 

years. 

[25] With respect to the nature of the offense, “the advisory sentence is the starting 

point [that] our legislature has selected as [an] appropriate sentence for the 

crime committed.” Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009). Here, the trial court sentenced Echartea-De La Suente to an aggregate, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 14 of 15

aggravated term of seventy years. Echartea-De La Suente now claims that this 

is inappropriate because he “did not physically harm either of the girls. He did 

not have intercourse with either of them nor did he have either of them perform

fellatio on him. His actions consisted of fondling, cunnilingus and digital 

penetration.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 18). However, our supreme court has held 

that “the absence of physical harm is not an automatic mitigating circumstance 

such that it would require a lesser sentence than would otherwise be imposed.” 

Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind. 2005). Echartea-De La Suente only 

received sentences above the advisory for his Class A felony Counts, both of 

which were aggravated by five years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4(a).

[26] The record indicates that Echartea-De La Suente abused his position of trust 

with his two young victims, which allowed him to molest them over an 

extended period of time. Echartea-De La Suente initially molested C.S. by 

“continuously” inserting his finger into her vagina while she tried to resist by 

holding her legs together as tightly as she could. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 52). Gradually 

over time, Echartea-De La Suente’s behavior escalated to the point where, in an 

attempt to molest O.M., he threw her on the bed in his room and, after O.M 

escaped, he attempted to break into her locked bedroom. At sentencing, O.M. 

testified that as a result of the prolonged molestation, she no longer has a 

relationship with her mother, had to switch schools several times, and was 

barely graduating. 

[27] Turning to his character, the trial court noted that Echartea-De La Suente did 

not express any remorse; rather, he increased the victims’ harm by fleeing the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1706-CR-1280 | January 23, 2018 Page 15 of 15

state. “Years went by that the victims lived with the uncertainty of what was 

going to happen with these charges.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 61). He has shown 

contempt for the justice system as evidenced by his conscious decision to avoid 

turning himself in on a warrant for many years. Accordingly, we cannot say 

that Echartea-De La Suente’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character. 

CONCLUSION

[28] Based on the foregoing, we hold that: (1) the State presented sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to support Echartea-De La Suente’s conviction for 

one Count of child molesting as a Class A felony; (2) the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in sentencing Echartea-De La Suente to an aggregate 

sentence of seventy years based on multiple aggravating factors and no 

mitigating factors; and (4) his aggregate sentence is appropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. 

[29] Affirmed.

[30] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur