No. 13683 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977

STATE OF MONTANA ex rel. DALE BRACKMAN

### , Relator,

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS AND CLARK, and the HON. GORDON R. BENNETT, Presiding Judge, Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Relator: Leaphart Law Firm, Helena, Montana W. WilliamLeaphart argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: January 26, 1977 Decided:fEB 

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### Mr. Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Relator seeks a writ of supervisory control upon the following facts: On December 30, 1976,a criminal complaint was filed in the Justice of Peace court for Lewis and Clark County,charging relator with intimidation, a felony. A warrant for the arrest of relatorwas issued, relator was arrested the same day and released on his own recognizance. Relator appeared with counsel at an initial appearancebefore the justice of peace on January 3, 1977,and requested a preliminary examination which was scheduled for January 6, 1977. The county attorney was not present at this initial appearance and on January 5, 1977, filed a motion for leave to file the information directly with the district court. The county attorney presented witnesses in supportof thismotion and did not rely upon an affidavit. Thisprocedure of presenting testimony in support of a motion for leave to file is the common practice of the Lewis and Clark county attorney'soffice. Counsel for relator appeared at this proceeding and moved the district court for permission to cross-examine the State's witnesses. Thismotion was denied and the State'smotion for leave to filewas granted. The preliminary examination in justice of peace court was vacated and the complaint subsequently dismissed. Initial appearance in district court was scheduled for January 10, 1977,arraignment was held on January 17, 1977,and trial was scheduled for January 31, 1977. We assume jurisdictionof this applicationpursuant to Rule 17,M.R.App.Civ.P., however we perceive no need for an adversary hearing upon thematter. An adversary hearing will addnothing further to the factual situation surrounding the single issue raised before this Court. The relief prayed for by relator isdenied for the following reasons. The determinative issuepresented iswhether themotion for leave to file an information is a "critical stage" which entitled relator to the right to effective assistance of counsel. Relator relies upon Colemanv. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L ed 2d 387, 397, (1970)and Kirby 

### v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L ed 2d 411 (1971). Both of these cases hold that a defendant is entitled to assistanceof counsel at a preliminary hearing. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in Coleman,and stated on p. 397: "Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of witnessesmay expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogationof witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashiona vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the Statehas against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.

### " The judgment in Coleman was rendered by a majority of the court, themajority failed to agree on the reasons for the opinion.Alabama had at least two means of initiating a prosecution:

(1)a grand jury indictment without a preliminary hearing, or (2) a preliminary hearing before a magistrate to determinewhether

an offensewas committed and whether probable cause existed towarrant presenting the case to the grand jury. Montana provides threemeans: (1)a grand jury indictment; (2)

### a preliminary examination; or (3)leave to file the information directly in district court. The grand jury procedure isnot designed to be an adversary judicial determinationof probable cause. Sections 95- 1401 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. Furthermore,as Chief JusticeBurger notes in his dissent to Coleman, there is no constitutionalright to counsel at grand juryproceedings. The second procedure,preliminary examination, is designed to be an adversary judicial determinationof probable cause,where both theprosecution and the defense present witnesses and are entitled to cross-examination. Section 95-1202(a), R.C.M. 1947. Of course, Coleman dictates that an accused be afforded counsel if this procedure is followed. The third procedure, leave to file information in district court, is stated in section 95-1301,R.C.M. 1947: "(a) The county attorney may apply directly to the district court for permission to file an information against a named defendant. The application must be by affidavit supported by such evidence as the judge may require. If it appears that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the defendant the judge shall grant leave to file the information, otherwise the application shall be denied." This procedure is constitutionally acceptable as a means of initiating a prosecution in light of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 33 S.Ct. 783, 57 L.Ed 1340 (1913); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L ed 2d 98 (1962);Gersteinv. Pugh, 420U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L ed 2d 54 (1975). Gerstein, at p. 68, citing Lem Woon and Beck, states: "Inholding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty pending trial,we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. (Citationsomitted.)" Furthermore,we have held that a defendant does not havea vested right to a preliminary examination; and the Statemay proceed by filing an information directly in the district court before a scheduled preliminary examination is held. Statev. Dunn, 155Mont. 319, 472P.2d 288 (1970). Relator raises the issuewhether an accused is guaranteed the right to counsel when the State chooses to bypass a scheduled preliminary examination, and presents witness testimony at the proceeding on itsmotion for leave to file. As relator contends, it is true that both the preliminary examination and the motion for leave to file are concerned with determining the existence of probable cause that a crimewas committed by defendant. However, the answer to the issuepresented must be found, not merely by comparing the similarity of the determination to be made at each proceeding, but comparing how that determination ismade. United Statesv. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L ed 2d 619, 628, 631, (1973), a casedecided after Coleman, states: 

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## * * that the test utilized by the Court has called for examination of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. 

## * * *" Ash 

### -citing Coleman aswell as other decisions, traces the history of establishing the right to counsel at different stages of a criminalproceeding. The court then distinguishes these cases from the issuepresented in Ash 

## -stating: "A substantialdeparture from the historical test would be necessary if the SixthAmendment were interpreted to giveAsh a right to counsel at the photographic identification in this case. Since the accused himself isnot present at the time of the photographic display, and asserts no right to be present 

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## * no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiaritywith the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel guaranteewould not be used to produce equality in a trial-like adversary confrontation. Rather, the guaranteewas used by the Court of Appeals to produce confrontation at an event thatpreviously was notanalogous to an adversary trial." (Emphasissupplied.) This holding inAsh is applicable to the situation at 

## - hand. At a preliminary examination a defendant is entitled to be present and is granted the right to cross-examinewitnesses, and to present witnesses of his own. On the other hand, theproceeding on amotion for leave to filedoes not contemplate such an adversary judicial determination of probable cause. The relatorwas notpresent, nor was he entitled to be present at the proceeding on themotion for leave to file, As inAsh, there 

## - was no possibility that relatormight be misled by his lack of familiaritywith the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. Therefore,theproceeding upon amotion for leave to file is not a "critical stage" and relator is not entitled to the assistanceof counsel. Mr. Justice White expressed apprehension in concurring with the holding in Coleman at p. 401, stating: "Iagree with Mr. JusticeHarlan that recent cases furnish ample ground for holding the preliminary hearing a critical event in theprogress of a criminal case. I therefore join the prevailing opinion,but with some hesitation since requiring the appointment of counsel may result in fewer preliminary hearings in jurisdictions where the prosecutor is free to avoid them by taking a case directly to a grand jury. Our rulingmay also invite eliminating the preliminary hearing system entirely." We foreseea similarproblem. The county attorneywas not obligated to present witness testimony at this proceeding sincehe could have relied upon affidavits. Section 95-1301,R.C.M. 1947. To hold that relatorwas entitled to assistanceof counsel at this proceeding and to cross-examine the State's witnesses would tend to discourage the practice of presenting witness testimomy at such a proceeding,whereas thepolicy should be to encourage it. This decision is not intended to bar a pretrialmotion under section 95-1702,R.C.M. 1947,attacking the existence of probable cause once the information is filed,and seeking a hearingupon the same.

Chief Justice 

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Justices 

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