This opinion is subject to revision before final 

publication in the Pacific Reporter 

2013 UT 38

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL R. MURRAY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, UTAH STATE PARKS AND RECREATION,

and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 

Respondents. 

No. 20120232 

Filed June 28, 2013 

On Certiorari from the Utah Court of Appeals 

Attorneys: 

Benjamin T. Davis, Salt Lake City, 

for petitioner 

James R. Black, Salt Lake City, Jamison D. Ashby, Sandy, 

for respondents 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, 

in which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, 

JUSTICE DURHAM, JUSTICE PARRISH, and JUSTICE LEE joined.

 CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court: 

INTRODUCTION

¶1 We granted certiorari in this case to determine two 

questions. First, we must decide whether the court of appeals 

erred in reviewing a Labor Commission decision, which applied 

law to fact, for an “abuse of discretion” rather than as a mixed 

question of law and fact. Second, we must decide whether the 

court of appeals erred in ruling that an employee who injured his 

back when a small wave unexpectedly rocked his boat failed to 

establish that it was his act of steadying himself, rather than a 

preexisting back condition, that was the legal cause of his injury. 

We conclude that the court of appeals should have reviewed the 

Labor Commission’s decision in this case as a traditional mixed 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

2 

question of law and fact. But we ultimately uphold the court of 

appeals’ conclusion that the employee failed to establish legal 

cause. 

BACKGROUND 

¶2 The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. On 

July 13, 2008, Petitioner Michael R. Murray was working as a park 

ranger for Utah State Parks and Recreation. At approximately 

11:00 a.m. that day, Mr. Murray was preparing to go on boating 

patrol at Red Fleet State Park. The patrol boat was tied by both the 

bow and the stern to the end of a dock that extended thirty-five to 

forty feet into the water. The boat and dock were located in an 

area that was “usually . . . a no-wake zone.” Mr. Murray started 

the boat and untied the bow. He then went to untie the stern. The 

cable at the stern was locked with a combination lock. Mr. Murray 

bent over the edge of the boat, the height of which was slightly 

above his knees, at a thirty-five to forty degree angle. He was 

holding the cable and the lock in his left hand and entering the 

combination with his right. At the time, Mr. Murray was wearing 

a fifteen-pound service belt and a one-pound inflatable life jacket. 

¶3 While he was in this position, a five- to six-inch wave 

from another boat’s wake unexpectedly rocked the patrol boat, 

causing Mr. Murray to lose his balance. Mr. Murray steadied 

himself by shifting his right foot against the side of the boat, 

grabbing the side of the boat with his right hand, and twisting his 

body. He immediately felt a slight pain in his lower back, but he 

nevertheless went on patrol. The pain worsened over the next two 

to three hours to the point that Mr. Murray was forced to leave 

work early. The pain continued to increase over the next several 

days, and he sought medical attention. 

¶4 On September 29, 2008, Mr. Murray filed a worker’s 

compensation claim with the Utah Labor Commission 

(Commission). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. 

Murray’s claim. She found that the accident aggravated a 

preexisting lower-back condition that had been “mostly 

asymptomatic” prior to the accident. She concluded that although 

the “unexpected” wave was the factual cause of Mr. Murray’s 

injury, it was not the legal cause because it did not cause him “to 

go through any unusual exertions. He lost his balance a little but 

did not drop the lock or fall and was able to steady himself 

easily.” 
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Opinion of the Court

3 

¶5 Mr. Murray petitioned the Commission to review the 

ALJ’s decision. The Commission affirmed, reasoning that “simply 

losing and regaining one’s balance while bending over slightly, 

even if unexpected, is not an unusual or extraordinary exertion.” 

¶6 Mr. Murray appealed the Commission’s order to the Utah 

Court of Appeals.1 The court reviewed the Commission’s order 

under an “abuse of discretion” standard,2 concluding that “the 

Legislature granted the Labor Commission discretion to apply the 

law to the cases before it.”3 Applying that standard, the court 

ruled that the Commission’s determination that Mr. Murray failed 

to prove legal causation was “reasonable” and affirmed.4

Mr. Murray filed a timely petition for certiorari, which we 

granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-3-102(3)(a) 

of the Utah Code. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶7 “On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of 

the court of appeals, not the decision of the [agency].”5 And “[t]he 

correctness of the court of appeals’ decision turns, in part, on 

whether it accurately reviewed the [agency’s] decision under the 

appropriate standard of review.”6 

ANALYSIS 

¶8 We first consider whether the plain language of the Utah 

Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)7 necessarily incorporates 

standards of review so as to preclude application of our wellestablished approach to mixed questions of law and fact. Second, 

we consider whether the Commission’s application of the law to 

the facts of Mr. Murray’s case involved discretion, which would 

1 Murray v. Labor Comm’n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 1, 4, 271 P.3d 

192. 

2 Id. ¶¶ 9–21. 

3 Id. ¶ 14. 

4 Id. ¶¶ 39–41. 

5 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 15, 144 P.3d 1096. 

6 Id. 

7 UTAH CODE §§ 63G-4-101 to -601. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

4 

qualify it for an “abuse of discretion” standard of review on 

appeal. Finally, we consider whether the court of appeals erred in 

concluding that Mr. Murray failed to establish that his workrelated accident, rather than his preexisting back condition, was 

the legal cause of his injury. 

I. UNDER A PLAIN-LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION OF UAPA, 

SECTION 63G-4-403 INCORPORATES STANDARDS OF 

REVIEW FOR SOME, BUT NOT ALL, AGENCY ACTION AND 

DOES NOT FORECLOSE OUR TRADITIONAL APPROACH 

FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF 

REVIEW 

¶9 The court of appeals relied on UAPA to determine which 

standard of review applies in this case,8 concluding that, under 

our UAPA precedent, “questions of law and mixed questions of 

law and fact are generally reviewed for correctness.”9 It also 

recognized an exception to this correctness standard that applies 

when “the [L]egislature has either explicitly or implicitly granted 

discretion to the agency to interpret or apply the law.”10 Relying 

on this approach, the court determined that when a statute 

delegates discretion to an agency, it must review the agency’s 

action for an abuse of discretion.11

¶10 Mr. Murray contends that we have effectively overruled 

the approach relied on by the court of appeals. He points out that 

in Drake v. Industrial Commission12 and Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor 

Commission,13 which both involved Commission decisions, we 

employed our traditional approach for determining the 

appropriate standard of review. Under this approach, we first 

characterize the “issue as either a question of fact, a question of 

law, or a mixed question requiring application of the law to the 

facts” and then apply the corresponding level of deference to the 

8 Murray v. Labor Comm’n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 192. 

9 Id. ¶ 12. 

10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

11 Id. 

12 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 

13 2007 UT 4, 153 P.3d 179. 
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Opinion of the Court

5 

decision under review.14 Mr. Murray claims that we should follow 

the same approach here and review his case as a traditional mixed 

question of law and fact. 

¶11 The court of appeals faced a difficult decision in this case 

given our inconsistent precedent on UAPA standards of review. 

The court was certainly correct that UAPA applies to 

Mr. Murray’s case. Because Mr. Murray seeks relief from the 

Commission’s order denying him compensation benefits, we 

agree that UAPA governs our review of his claims on appeal.15 

But under the interpretation of UAPA we announce below, we 

disagree that UAPA necessarily forecloses our traditional 

approach for determining the appropriate standard of review. 

¶12 In Morton International, Inc. v. Tax Commission, we stated 

that UAPA “incorporates standards that appellate courts are to 

employ when reviewing allegations of agency error.”16 We 

derived these standards from what is now section 63G-4-403 of 

UAPA, which addresses judicial review of formal adjudicative 

proceedings.17 Specifically, we considered what standard of 

review UAPA requires for an agency’s interpretation or 

application of the law under what is now section 63G-4-

403(4)(d).18 We concluded that UAPA incorporated a correctness 

standard for an agency’s “interpretation or application of a 

statutory term.”19 We further concluded that the only exceptions 

14 Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. 

15 UTAH CODE § 63G-4-105(1) (“The procedures for agency 

action, agency review, and judicial review contained in this 

chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 

commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988.”). 

16 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991), superseded by statute, UTAH 

CODE § 59-1-610(1)(b), with regard to administrative decisions by the 

Tax Commission, as recognized in LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 

¶ 7, 215 P.3d 135. 

17 Id. 

18 Id. at 588. 

19 Id.; see also SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 849 P.2d 

1167, 1172 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (discussing 

Morton’s analysis of subsection 4(d)). 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

6 

to this correctness standard are those instances where the 

Legislature has either explicitly or implicitly delegated discretion 

to an agency to interpret or apply the law.20 If an agency indeed 

has such discretion, then under our interpretation of UAPA in 

Morton, we must review the agency’s action for an abuse of 

discretion.21 

¶13 As the court of appeals recognized in its opinion in this 

case, we have a significant amount of precedent applying 

Morton’s interpretation of UAPA.22 But we took a different 

approach to reviewing agency applications of law to fact 

beginning with Drake v. Industrial Commission. In Drake, we 

analyzed the “special errand” rule to determine whether an 

employee was injured within the scope and course of her 

employment for purposes of receiving benefits under the Workers 

Compensation Act.23 In selecting a standard of review, we turned 

to State v. Pena, a criminal case that analyzed the level of deference 

appropriate for a trial court’s determination of a mixed question 

of law and fact.24 Relying on Pena, we recognized that “[w]hether 

an employee was injured while on a special errand is . . . [a] 

highly fact-sensitive [question of law].”25 Thus, we stated it “is a 

question that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case 

because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the 

law through a course of such decisions.”26 We accordingly applied 

20 Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. 

21 Id.; see also SEMECO Indus., Inc., 849 P.2d at 1172 (Durham, 

J., dissenting) (discussing subsection 4(d)’s interaction with 

subsection 4(h)(i) and concluding that “[i]f the specific agency 

interpretation or application was an exercise of the agency’s 

statutorily delegated discretion, then under subsection (4)(h)(i) . . . 

the agency’s interpretation or application of law should receive 

intermediate deference”). 

22 Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 25. 

23 Drake, 939 P.2d at 179–81. 

24 Id. at 181 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 

25 Id. at 182. 

26 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Opinion of the Court

7 

a standard of review affording some deference to the 

Commission’s decision.27

¶14 We later decided Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor 

Commission.

28 There, we relied on Drake for selecting a standard of 

review for a Commission decision applying the “going and 

coming” rule to determine if an employee was injured within the 

scope and course of employment.29 We characterized the standard 

of review applied in Drake as “conditionally deferential” and 

concluded that, like “special errand” cases, Commission decisions 

concerning the “going and coming” rule also required conditional 

deference.30 We accordingly adopted and applied Drake’s 

standard of review in Salt Lake City Corp.

31 

¶15 We decided both Drake and Salt Lake City Corp. well after 

UAPA became applicable in January 1988.32 Yet, in both cases, we 

failed to mention UAPA or explicitly overrule our interpretation 

of UAPA in Morton.

33 In light of this conflicting precedent on 

UAPA standards of review, we take the opportunity to clarify our 

interpretation of UAPA and the role it plays in our selection of a 

standard of review for agency decisions. 

27 Id. 

28 2007 UT 4. 

29 Id. ¶¶ 13–18. 

30 Id. ¶ 15. 

31 Id. 

32 UTAH CODE § 63G-4-105(1). We decided Drake in 1997 and 

Salt Lake City Corp. in 2007. 

33 In Drake, we recognized in a footnote that applying “the 

standard enunciated in Pena . . . to an agency’s application of the 

law to a particular set of facts is a departure from our prior 

decisions.” 939 P.2d at 181 n.6. We further stated that “we believe 

the Pena standard is a more accurate measure of the degree of 

deference to be given to an agency . . . rather than using 

undefinable labels such as ‘reasonableness.’” Id. But the case we 

cited as an example of our “prior decisions” is a pre-UAPA case. 

See id. (citing Tax Comm’n v. Indus. Comm’n, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 

1984)). 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

8 

¶16 Our decision in Morton seems to take for granted that 

section 63G-4-403 necessarily “incorporates standards that 

appellate courts are to employ when reviewing allegations of 

agency error.”34 Whether section 63G-4-403, in fact, incorporates 

standards of review presents a question of statutory 

interpretation. “When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give 

effect to the legislature’s intent and purpose.”35 “We ascertain the 

legislature’s intent by looking to the statute’s plain 

meaning . . . .”36 “Often, statutory text may not be plain when 

read in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic, 

structural, and statutory context.”37 “For this reason, our 

interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be 

construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 

produce a harmonious whole.”38 Finally, “[i]f the language of the 

statute yields a plain meaning that does not lead to an absurd 

result, the analysis ends.”39

¶17 Section 63G-4-403 governs judicial review of “final 

agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.”40 

Subsection (4) allows an appellate court to “grant relief only if . . . 

it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 

substantially prejudiced” by certain agency actions. Section 63G-4-

403(4)(a) through (h) identifies those agency actions: 

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 

the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 

face or as applied; 

(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 

conferred by any statute; 

34 Morton, 814 P.2d at 584. 

35 Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 

166. 

36 State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, ¶ 15, 63 P.3d 63. 

37 State v. J.M.S. (In re J.M.S.), 2011 UT 75, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 410 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

38 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

39 Carranza v. United States, 2011 UT 80, ¶ 8, 267 P.3d 912. 

40 UTAH CODE § 63G-4-403(1). 
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Opinion of the Court

9 

(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 

requiring resolution; 

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 

applied the law; 

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 

procedure or decision-making process, or has failed 

to follow prescribed procedure; 

(f) the persons taking the agency action were 

illegally constituted as a decision-making body or 

were subject to disqualification; 

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination 

of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 

supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 

light of the whole record before the court; 

(h) the agency action is: 

(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 

agency by statute; 

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 

(iii) contrary to the agency’s prior practice, 

unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 

giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 

and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 

¶18 While the above provisions clearly set forth and limit the 

types of agency actions for which appellate courts may grant 

relief, they do not expressly mandate standards of review courts 

must employ when reviewing those agency actions. The 

Legislature does not exhibit a clear intent—in section 63G-4-403 or 

UAPA generally41—to completely displace our traditional 

approach for selecting standards of review. Rather, by declining 

to expressly mandate standards of review for each type of agency 

action for which we may grant relief, the Legislature suggests the 

opposite intent to leave much of the normal appellate process in 

41 Section 63G-4-102, entitled “Scope and applicability of 

chapter,” states only that “the provisions of this chapter apply to 

every agency of the state and govern . . . judicial review of the 

[agency] action.” Id. § 63G-4-102(1). Section 63G-4-105, entitled 

“Transition procedures,” merely states that UAPA displaces other 

“[s]tatutes and rules governing . . . judicial review” of agency 

action after January 1, 1988. Id. § 63G-4-105(1)–(2). 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

10 

place.42 Thus, the plain language of section 63G-4-403 clearly sets 

forth the type of agency actions for which we may grant relief, but 

it does not expressly mandate the standards of review we must 

employ when reviewing those actions. 

¶19 Certain provisions of section 63G-4-403(4) do, however, 

imply a standard of review by the way in which the Legislature 

characterized the agency action. Section 63G-4-403(4)(g), for 

example, falls into this category. That provision allows us to grant 

relief for “agency action [that] is based upon a determination of 

fact . . . that is not supported by substantial evidence.”43 While this 

provision does not explicitly require a certain standard of review, 

it characterizes the agency action in such a way that implies a 

“substantial evidence” standard. This is because we can grant 

relief under this provision only after reviewing the agency’s 

determination of fact for a lack of substantial evidence. Sections 

63G-4-403(h)(i), (h)(iii), and (h)(iv) also fall into this category. 

¶20 Importantly, the Legislature’s characterization of some 

agency actions in terms of a standard of review is further evidence 

that it did not intend to completely displace our traditional 

standard of review framework. This is because the Legislature, 

while implying a standard of review for some agency actions, did 

not attempt to define what that standard requires. Thus, even 

where section 63G-4-403(4)(g) implies a “substantial evidence” 

standard on appeal, for example, we must look outside UAPA to 

determine what that standard means. 

¶21 But most agency actions listed in section 63G-4-403(4) do 

not imply a standard of review. Absent this implication, we 

conclude that the Legislature intended our traditional standards 

of review to apply. This category of agency action includes section 

63G-4-403(4)(d), which allows us to grant relief when an “agency 

42 See id. § 63G-4-403(2)(a) (directing “the petitioner [to] file a 

petition for review of agency action with the appropriate 

appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 

appropriate appellate court”); id. § 63G-4-403(2)(b) (stating that 

“[t]he appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall 

govern all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court” 

(emphasis added)). 

43 Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(g). 
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Opinion of the Court

11 

has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.” We stated in 

Morton that the term “erroneous” connotes a correctness standard 

for both interpretations and applications of law.44 But we now 

conclude that subsection (4)(d) does not imply a standard of 

review. While that provision empowers courts to grant relief 

when an agency commits an “error” in interpreting or applying 

the law, the term “erroneous” in this context does not imply a 

standard of review. Rather, the term simply means “mistaken,” 

indicating that we may grant relief when an agency 

misinterpreted or misapplied the law.45 Sections 63G-4-403(4)(a)–

(f) and (h)(ii) fall into this category as well. For this category of 

agency actions, we are free to apply our traditional approach for 

selecting an appropriate standard of review. 

¶22 Based on the above plain-language analysis, we conclude 

that section 63G-4-403 does not—contrary to our decision in 

Morton46—incorporate standards of review for each agency action 

listed in subsection (4). Accordingly, we overrule Morton as far as 

it is inconsistent with this conclusion. Going forward, the 

appropriate standard of review of final agency actions will 

depend on the type of action in question. In some instances, as 

discussed above, section 63G-4-403 will have characterized the 

action in such a way that the applicable standard of review will be 

obvious. But even there, we must turn to our case law to 

determine how that standard applies. For other agency actions, 

the applicable standard of review will depend on the nature of the 

agency action and whether it can be characterized as a question of 

law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact.47

Below, we apply this analysis to Mr. Murray’s case to determine 

the appropriate standard of review on appeal. 

44 Morton, 814 P.2d at 587. 

45 See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 423

(1988) (defining “erroneous” as “containing or characterized by 

error . . . [or] mistaken”). 

46 Morton, 814 P.2d at 584. 

47 See, e.g., Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 658 P.2d 

601, 608–10 (Utah 1983) (discussing the three traditional standards 

of review applicable to allegations of agency error). 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

12 

II. WE CONCLUDE THAT MR. MURRAY’S CLAIM PRESENTS 

A TRADITIONAL MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT 

AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE COMMISSION’S 

AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE LAW IN THIS CASE IS NOT A 

DISCRETIONARY ACTION WARRANTING AN “ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION” STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA

¶23 The appropriate standard of review in this case depends 

on the type of agency action alleged to be erroneous and whether 

that action incorporates a specific standard of review under 

section 63G-4-403(4) of UAPA. Mr. Murray contends that the 

Commission misapplied the Utah Workers’ Compensation Act, 

specifically section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code,48 to the facts of 

his case. His claim for relief accordingly falls under section 63G-4-

403(4)(d), which requires us to determine whether the 

Commission “erroneously . . . applied the law.” We concluded 

above that subsection (4)(d) is not the type of agency action that is 

characterized in such a way as to imply a specific standard of 

review. We are thus free to apply our traditional approach in 

selecting the appropriate standard of review for Mr. Murray’s 

claim. 

¶24 The first question under this approach is whether the 

Commission’s decision “qualifies as a finding of fact, a conclusion 

of law, or a determination of a mixed question of law and fact.”49 

Mixed questions “involv[e] application of a legal standard to a set 

of facts unique to a particular case.”50 Indeed, in the agency 

context, we have stated that we “use[] the terms mixed question 

of fact and law and application of the law interchangeably.”51

Accordingly, Mr. Murray’s claim that the Commission misapplied 

the law to the facts of his case presents a traditional mixed 

question of law and fact. 

48 This statute provides benefits for employees injured “by 

accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s 

employment.” UTAH CODE § 34A-2-401(1). 

49 Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, 

¶ 40, __P.3d__. 

50 Id. ¶ 42. 

51 Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 n.23 (Utah 

1991).
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Opinion of the Court

13 

¶25 But the court of appeals determined that section 34A-1-

301 of the Labor Commission Act “constitutes an express grant of 

authority” for the Commission “to apply the law in workers’ 

compensation cases.”52 That provision provides that “[t]he 

commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and 

authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter 

or any other title or chapter it administers.” Thus, the court of 

appeals concluded that under section 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) of UAPA, 

it must review the Commission’s decision to deny Mr. Murray 

benefits for an abuse of discretion.53 We disagree. 

¶26 The court of appeals’ decision was understandable in 

light of our past decisions concluding that we review an agency’s 

decision for an abuse of discretion when the Legislature has 

granted the agency discretion to interpret or apply the law.54 We 

last considered a delegation of discretion in LPI Services v. 

McGee.

55 There we recognized that “[t]he [L]egislature may grant 

an agency discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, to interpret 

specific statutory terms.”56 We have found implicit delegations of 

discretion where “the operative terms of a statute are broad and 

generalized” or “there is more than one permissible reading of the 

statute” and no basis in our rules of construction to prefer one 

interpretation to another.57

¶27 We have not clearly articulated what constitutes an 

explicit delegation of discretion, although we have offered 

examples. In LPI Services, we suggested that the Legislature 

explicitly delegated discretion by mandating that “[t]he [Labor] 

[C]ommission shall establish rules regarding part-time work and 

offset” to account for a permanently disabled employee’s income 

52 Murray v. Labor Comm’n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d 192. 

53 Id. ¶ 27. 

54 See, e.g., Morton, 814 P.2d at 587 (analyzing UTAH CODE 

§ 63G-4-403(h)(i)). 

55 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135. 

56 Id. ¶ 8. 

57 Id. ¶¶ 8, 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

14 

from medically appropriate part-time work.58 The court of appeals 

declined, however, to limit explicit delegations of discretion to 

only those instances where the Legislature directs an agency to 

define a statutory term by regulation.59 It instead adopted a 

broader approach, concluding that “an explicit grant of discretion 

can be found when a statute specifically authorizes an agency to 

interpret or apply statutory language.”60 The court of appeals has 

explained that “[w]hen the [L]egislature focuses on a specific 

statutory term and delegates to the agency the duty to either 

interpret or apply the term, . . . the agency necessarily is required 

to interpret the statutory language.”61

¶28 The above approach to identifying delegations of 

discretion has proved difficult to apply.62 And we now conclude 

that it is inconsistent with the interpretation of section 63G-4-

403(4) announced above. Specifically, under the plain language of 

section 63G-4-403(4), it is inaccurate to say that “authority” means 

“discretion,” as the court of appeals has done. There is no 

question that section 34A-1-301 of the Labor Commission Act 

“constitutes an express grant of authority” for the Commission “to 

apply the law in workers’ compensation cases.”63 But this grant of 

58 Id. ¶ 8 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

59 King v. Indus. Comm’n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 

1993), superseded by statute, UTAH CODE § 34A-1-301, on other 

grounds, as recognized in Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 17–18. 

60 Id. at 1287. 

61 Employers’ Reinsurance Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 856 P.2d 648, 

655 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Billings & Russon, JJ., concurring in the 

result) (articulating the holding of the court as to the standard of 

review), superseded by statute, UTAH CODE § 34A-1-301, on other 

grounds, as recognized in Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 17–18. 

62 See, e.g., Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax 

Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing 

that “[d]iscerning an implied or explicit grant of discretion from 

the governing statute is key” to selecting the appropriate standard 

of review but complaining that doing so “has become an 

increasingly complex endeavor”). 

63 Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 15. 
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Opinion of the Court

15 

authority does not turn an agency’s application or interpretation 

of the law into the type of action that would warrant an “abuse of 

discretion” standard of review under section 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). 

¶29 We have already recognized in past decisions that “an 

administrative grant to administer a statute is not to be confused 

with a grant of discretion to interpret the statute.”64 This is 

because “all agencies are necessarily granted authority by statute 

to administer portions of the code.”65 We now go a step further 

and conclude that, for an “abuse of discretion” standard to apply 

on appeal, the agency action under review must involve 

“discretion.” Only then can we properly review the action for an 

“abuse of discretion,” as required by the plain language of section 

63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). 

¶30 This conclusion requires us to determine whether the 

Commission’s decision in this case—a mixed finding of law and 

fact—is the type of decision that involves discretion. While the 

term “discretion” within the law defies precise definition,66 the 

Legislature’s use of the term in section 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) requires 

us to assign it at least some characteristics. Commentators have 

recognized that a basic feature of discretion is “choice.”67 That is, a 

discretionary decision involves a question with a range of 

“acceptable” answers, some better than others, and the agency or 

trial court is free to choose from among this range without regard 

to what an appellate court thinks is the “best” answer.68 We agree 

64 Airport Hilton Ventures, Ltd. v. Tax Comm’n, 1999 UT 26, ¶ 7 

n.4, 976 P.2d 1197 (citing approvingly to Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. 

Tax Comm’n, 845 P.2d 266, 268 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 

65 Belnorth Petroleum Corp., 845 P.2d at 268 n.5. 

66 See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (stating that 

“the term ‘abuse of discretion’ has no tight meaning”); see also

Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed 

from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 635 (1971) (“To speak of 

discretion in relation to law is to open a thousand doorways to 

discussion.”). 

67 E.g., Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond 

the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 246 (1991). 

68 See Hofer, supra ¶ 30 n.67, at 246 (characterizing 

discretionary decisions “as involving not right or wrong, but 

(continued) 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

16 

with this general characterization of discretion. Accordingly, we 

conclude that whenever the Legislature directs an agency to 

engage in this type of decision-making, regardless of whether it 

does so explicitly or implicitly, it has delegated discretion to the 

agency within the meaning of section 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). 

¶31 An example of such a delegation can be found in section 

54-3-2 of the Utah Code relating to schedules of utility rates and 

classifications. That section requires public utilities to file with the 

Public Service Commission (PSC) “schedules showing all rates, 

tolls, rentals, charges, and classifications collected or enforced.”69 

It further provides that “[t]he commission shall have power, in its 

discretion, to determine and prescribe, by order, changes in the 

form of the schedules referred to in this section as it may find 

expedient.”70 Under this provision, the PSC has both authority 

and discretion to change the form of schedules. Its authority 

derives from the Legislature’s grant of “power” while its 

discretion comes from the type of decision-making the Legislature 

directed the PSC to engage—not the phrase “in its discretion.” 

¶32 In order to properly “determine and prescribe, by order, 

changes in the form of the schedules,” the PSC need only find it 

“expedient” to do so. There are a range of “acceptable” fact 

scenarios that the PSC could either accept or reject as being 

expedient without risking reversal by an appellate court. And the 

appellate court will review the PSC’s discretionary decision for an 

“abuse of discretion” to ensure that it falls within the bounds of 

reasonableness and rationality.71 Reasonableness, in turn, is 

 

better or worse” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maurice 

Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 

176 (1978) (stating that, for discretionary decisions, “appellate 

courts will allow the trial judge wide scope for decision, free from 

normal restraints that apply to legal determinations” and that 

“[t]he trial judge acting in discretion is granted a limited right to 

be wrong, by appellate court standards, without being reversed”). 

69 UTAH CODE § 54-3-2(1). 

70 Id. § 54-3-2(3). 

71 See generally Dep’t of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 658 

P.2d 601, 610–11 (Utah 1983). 
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Opinion of the Court

17 

essentially a test for logic and completeness rather than the 

correctness of the decision.72

¶33 Admittedly, our characterization of discretion is broad 

and in need of refinement through application in future cases. But 

it adequately demonstrates that the Commission’s action in this 

case did not involve discretion. As we have already stated, a 

mixed question arises when an agency or lower court must apply 

“a legal standard to a set of facts unique to a particular case.”73

Importantly, the question of whether a set of facts falls within a 

legal standard is itself a question of law.74 And like all questions 

of law, the question of whether certain facts fulfill a legal standard 

has a single “right” answer in terms of the trajectory of the law.75 

Our precedent on mixed questions simply reflects the idea that 

we, as an appellate court, are not always in the best position to say 

what that “right” answer is.76 Thus, in the context of mixed 

questions, we sometimes afford deference to a trial court’s 

decision as a matter of institutional competency.77 But the trial 

72 Id. at 611 (discussing the “abuse of discretion” standard and 

stating that “[t]he test of rationality may be simply a matter of 

logic or completeness”). 

73 In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42. 

74 See Drake v. Indus. Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) 

(recognizing “that the legal effect of . . . facts is the province of the 

appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court’s 

resolution of such questions of law” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also Hofer, supra ¶ 30 n.66, at 246 (“In a mixed 

question, the usual formulation describing the nexus between fact 

and law is that whether the facts fulfill a particular legal standard 

is itself a question of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

75 Hofer, supra ¶ 30 n.66, at 236–37 (characterizing “law” as 

“rules and standards [that] optimally should be generally and 

uniformly applicable to all persons of like qualities and status and 

in like circumstances, and should be capable of being predicated 

in advance and which being so predicated, await proof of the facts 

necessary for their application” (footnote omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

76 See In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42. 

77 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 19, 144 P.3d 1096. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

18 

court does not have discretion to reach anything other than the 

“right” answer. In other words, “discretion” and “deference” are 

distinct concepts.78

¶34 Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Murray’s claim 

constitutes a traditional mixed question of law and fact and that 

the Commission’s authority to apply the law in this case is not the 

type of discretionary action that warrants an “abuse of discretion” 

standard of review under our plain-language interpretation of 

UAPA. 

III. ALTHOUGH THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE 

WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE, ITS ERROR 

WAS HARMLESS, AND WE AFFIRM ITS DECISION TO 

UPHOLD THE COMMISSION’S ORDER RELATING TO 

MR. MURRAY’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH LEGAL CAUSE 

¶35 Having determined that the Commission’s decision in 

this case constitutes a mixed finding of law and fact, we now 

consider (A) the amount of deference, if any, we should afford its 

finding on appeal and (B) whether the court of appeals erred in 

concluding that Mr. Murray failed to establish legal cause. 

A. The Commission’s Decision was “Law-Like” and Warrants a 

Nondeferential Standard of Review 

¶36 The standard of review we apply when reviewing a 

mixed question can be either deferential or nondeferential, 

depending on the following three factors: 

(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts 

to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the 

degree to which a trial court’s application of the 

legal rule relies on “facts” observed by the trial 

judge, such as a witness’s appearance and 

demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 

78 We recognize that our case law has often conflated the 

distinct concepts of “deference” and “discretion.” See, e.g., Drake, 

939 P.2d at 182 (analyzing a mixed question and stating that “the 

legal standard is one that conveys a measure of discretion to [the 

Commission] when applying that standard to a given set of facts” 

(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). But we clarify that in the context of UAPA the 

two concepts must be treated separately. 
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Opinion of the Court

19 

cannot be adequately reflected in the record 

available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy 

reasons that weigh for or against 

granting [deference] to trial courts.79

¶37 We recently analyzed these factors in In re Adoption of 

Baby B.

80 There we recognized that the deference granted under 

the factors “rests on the notion that the mixed finding is not ‘lawlike’ because it does not lend itself to consistent resolution by a 

uniform body of appellate precedent” or “is ‘fact-like’ because the 

trial court is in a superior position to decide it.”81 

¶38 We stated that an example of a mixed finding that 

warrants deference on appeal is a finding of negligence in a 

personal injury case.82 A negligence finding is not “law-like” in 

that it is so factually complex that “no rule adequately addressing 

the relevance of all [the] facts can be spelled out.”83 And it is “factlike” because a trial court will often “be affected by [its] 

observation of a competing witness’s appearance and demeanor 

on matters that cannot be adequately reflected in the record 

available to appellate courts,” thus placing it in a superior 

position to assess credibility.84 

¶39 On the other hand, “a finding that a common set of 

recurring law enforcement practices qualifies as a ‘reasonable’ 

search or seizure” would warrant nondeferential review.85 Such a 

finding is “law-like” in that law enforcement and the general 

public need “a consistent rule established by set appellate 

precedent.”86 And it is not “fact-like” because the ultimate 

79 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

80 Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, 

__P.3d__. 

81 Id. ¶ 42. 

82 Id. ¶ 43. 

83 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

85 Id. ¶ 44. 

86 Id. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

20 

determination will often rest on the “general reasonableness” of 

the facts rather than “the demeanor or credibility” of witnesses.87

¶40 Based on the above principles, we conclude that the 

Commission’s decision here that Mr. Murray failed to establish 

legal cause warrants nondeferential review. Its decision was “lawlike” in that, as in the context of a reasonable search or seizure, the 

Commission had to decide whether a set of facts qualified as 

“unusual” for purposes of determining legal cause. It is true that 

this can potentially be a fact-intensive inquiry. Indeed, we have 

generally recognized that “whether or not [an] injury arises out of 

or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular 

facts of each case.”88 But in this case the facts are not at issue. So 

the ultimate question is the legal effect of the facts rather than 

witness credibility or demeanor. In the context of a legal cause 

analysis for preexisting injuries, the legal effect of a given set of 

facts depends on their “unusualness.” And “unusualness”—like 

“reasonableness”—is an objective legal standard that we are in a 

better position to analyze than the Commission.89 

B. Even Applying a Nondeferential Standard of Review, We Agree with 

the Court of Appeals that the Commission Correctly Concluded that Mr. 

Murray’s Employment Activity was not “Unusual” 

¶41 Although the court of appeals applied the wrong 

standard of review in this case, its error was harmless. 

“[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential 

that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome 

of the proceedings.”90 We conclude that even if the court of 

appeals had applied a nondeferential standard of review, its 

decision regarding the Commission’s order would be the same. 

¶42 The court of appeals concluded that Mr. Murray failed to 

establish legal cause after considering “[Mr.] Murray’s exertion as 

well as the working conditions that [Mr.] Murray faced at the time 

87 Id. 

88 Drake v. Indus. Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

89 Id. at 181. 

90 H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 44, 203 P.3d 943 (alteration 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Opinion of the Court

21 

of the accident—including the outside force to which [Mr.] 

Murray reacted.”91 The court recognized that the standard from 

our decision in Allen v. Industrial Commission92 required 

Mr. Murray to demonstrate an “unusual or extraordinary 

exertion.”93 But it concluded that there was nothing unusual about 

the exertion required to withstand an unexpected five- to six-inch 

wave while standing “in an awkward position on an unsteady 

surface [and] leaning over to unlock a cable while wearing a 

fifteen-pound service belt and one-pound life jacket.”94

¶43 But Mr. Murray contends that our holding in Allen

applies only to “intentional and exertional workplace activities.” 

His injury, in contrast, was “for the most part . . . the result of an 

unexpected and sudden impact or force which knocked and threw 

him off balance—an impact against which he mostly reacted 

reflexively.” Mr. Murray argues that for injuries caused by 

nonexertional factors, it does not make sense to require an 

unusual exertion. We disagree with Mr. Murray’s view of the 

Allen standard. 

¶44 The Utah Workers’ Compensation Act provides that an 

employee injured “by accident arising out of and in the course of 

the employee’s employment . . . shall be paid . . . compensation for 

loss sustained on account of the injury.”95 We have recognized 

that “[t]his statute creates two prerequisites for a finding of a 

compensable injury.”96 “First, the injury must be ‘by accident.’ 

Second, the language ‘arising out of [and] in the course of 

employment’ requires that there be a causal connection between 

the injury and the employment.”97 Only the second prerequisite—

causal connection—is at issue here. 

91 Murray v. Labor Comm’n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 35, 271 P.3d 192. 

92 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 

93 Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

94 Id. ¶ 35; see also id. ¶ 36–37. 

95 UTAH CODE § 34A-2-401(1). 

96 Allen, 729 P.2d at 18. 

97 Id. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

22 

¶45 We have adopted a two-part test for establishing a causal 

connection. Under that test, a claimant must establish that the 

conditions or activities of his job were both the medical cause and 

the legal cause of his injury.98 In this case, the only dispute 

concerns whether Mr. Murray’s employment activities constituted 

the legal cause of his injury. If an employee does not have a 

preexisting condition that causally contributed to his injury, then 

the medical and legal causation requirements are one and the 

same, and the employee need only prove medical causation.99 

¶46 But medical and legal causation diverge for an employee 

with a causally contributing preexisting condition, and here it is 

undisputed that Mr. Murray had such a condition. In Allen, we 

held that to prove legal causation, an employee with a preexisting 

condition must show that “the employment contributed 

something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in 

everyday life because of his condition.”100 We recognized that this 

heightened showing of legal cause is “necessary to distinguish 

those injuries which . . . coincidentally occur at work because a 

preexisting condition results in symptoms which appear during 

work hours without any enhancement from the workplace.”101 

¶47 Our decision in Allen also recognized that the required 

workplace enhancement is “usually supplied by an exertion 

greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life.”102 Allen’s 

focus on “exertions” is understandable given that the facts of that 

case involved clear exertions—moving and lifting.103 But our 

decision in Allen ultimately considered the totality of the 

circumstances, including the employee’s exertions and the 

workplace conditions. For example, in Allen, the activity that 

precipitated the employee’s injury was “moving and lifting 

several piles of dairy products.”104 But we made clear that 

98 Id. at 25. 

99 Id. at 26. 

100 Id. at 25. 

101 Id.

102 Id. 

103 Id. at 28. 

104 Id. 
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Opinion of the Court

23 

consideration of this activity must account for “how many crates 

[of product] were moved . . . , the distance the crates were moved, 

the precise weight of the crates, and the size of the area in which 

the lifting and moving took place.”105 The court of appeals applied 

this approach in American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission.

106

There the precipitating employment activity involved 

“unload[ing] a thirty pound bucket of debris out of [a] truck.”107 

But the court of appeals’ consideration of the activity included 

“the weight, together with the manner in which [the employee] 

lifted the bucket and the fact that the bucket snagged.”108

Accordingly, in determining whether the employment activity 

that precipitated Mr. Murray’s injury was “unusual” under Allen, 

we must consider the totality of the circumstances. 

¶48 “Unusualness” is an objective standard. We compare the 

activity that precipitated the employee’s injury with “the usual 

wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.”109 The focus 

is on “what typical nonemployment activities are generally 

expected of people in today’s society, not what this particular 

claimant is accustomed to doing.”110 This question involves two 

steps: first, we must characterize the employment-related activity 

that precipitated the employees’ injury, taking into account the 

totality of the circumstances; and second, we must determine 

whether this activity is objectively unusual or extraordinary.111 

¶49 While the first step is a matter of fact,112 the parties in this 

case do not dispute the circumstances surrounding Mr. Murray’s 

accident. Mr. Murray bent over the edge of the boat, the height of 

which was slightly above his knees, at a thirty-five to forty degree 

105 Id. 

106 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 

107 Id. at 913. 

108 Id. at 915. 

109 Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 

110 Id. 

111 Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 

(Utah 1986). 

112 Id. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

24 

angle. He was holding the cable and the lock in his left hand and 

entering the combination with his right. At the time, Mr. Murray 

was wearing a fifteen-pound service belt and a one-pound 

inflatable life jacket. As he was in this position, a five- to six-inch 

wave from another boat’s wake unexpectedly rocked the patrol 

boat, causing him to lose his balance. 

¶50 Mr. Murray steadied himself by shifting his right foot 

against the side of the boat, grabbing the side of the boat with his 

right hand, and twisting his body. He immediately felt a slight 

pain in his lower back, but he nevertheless went on patrol. 

Accordingly, as the court of appeals recognized, the activity that 

precipitated Mr. Murray’s injury was the act of steadying 

himself.113 And we must account for the fact that he was bent over 

the edge of the boat at a thirty-five to forty degree angle, that he 

was wearing a fifteen-pound service belt and a one-pound 

inflatable life jacket, and that the five- to six-inch wave that hit his 

boat was unexpected. 

¶51 Having characterized the totality of Mr. Murray’s 

precipitating activity, we continue to the next step and determine 

whether Mr. Murray’s exertion and surrounding circumstances 

were objectively “unusual or extraordinary.”114 Utah courts have 

deemed employment activities to be “unusual” or “extraordinary” 

when they require an employee to endure jumping, lifting great 

weight, or repetition. For example, in Miera v. Industrial 

Commission, we concluded that an employee’s “jumps into an 

eight-foot hole from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute 

intervals” was unusual.115 And in Crosland v. Industrial 

Commission, the court of appeals recognized that moving a twohundred-pound sign qualified as an unusual activity.116 Likewise, 

in Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission, the court of appeals 

concluded that continually gripping high pressure hoses was 

unusual.117 But in Schreiber v. Labor Commission, the court of 

appeals determined that there was nothing unusual about the 

113 Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶¶ 35–36. 

114 Price River Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082. 

115 728 P.2d 1023, 1024–25 (Utah 1986). 

116 828 P.2d 528, 530 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 

117 801 P.2d 179, 182–84 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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Opinion of the Court

25 

force of a rubber ball that injured a playground supervisor when 

it hit her in the back.118 The court noted that “the direct force of 

the ball was relatively minor, comparable to the jostling one 

frequently encounters in crowds.”119 

¶52 While the facts of these cases are not directly on point 

with Mr. Murray’s, they exhibit the objective standard we must 

apply in this case, which is to determine “what typical 

nonemployment activities are generally expected of people in 

today’s society.”120 People are generally not expected to lift twohundred pounds, jump into eight-foot holes, or continually grip a 

high pressure hose. But they are expected to withstand minor 

force. 

¶53 In light of the above analysis, the court of appeals 

correctly upheld the Commission’s order in this case. The totality 

of Mr. Murray’s precipitating activity—both exertional and 

nonexertional—was not unusual. As the court of appeals 

recognized, the totality of Mr. Murray’s accident is comparable to 

nonemployment activities generally expected in today’s society.121

To borrow the court of appeals’ example, people are generally 

expected to travel in everyday life. They are expected to carry 

luggage or bags often heavier and less secure than Mr. Murray’s 

service belt and life jacket. And they are generally expected to 

encounter bumpy rides in planes or buses and maintain and 

regain their balance in the process. The unexpected force Mr. 

Murray experienced, his awkward position, and the service belt 

and jacket he was wearing when the small wave rocked his boat 

were not unusual given the unexpected rigors we expect people to 

endure while traveling with clumsy luggage. We agree with the 

court of appeals that the “whole” of Mr. Murray’s accident 

“entailed nothing unusual or extraordinary that could be 

presumed to have contributed something substantial to increase 

the risk of injury.”122Accordingly, even applying a nondeferential 

118 1999 UT App 376, 1999 WL 33244768, at *1. 

119 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

120 Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 

121 Murray, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 36. 

122 Id. ¶ 38. 
MURRAY v. LABOR COMMISSION

Opinion of the Court

26 

standard of review, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to 

uphold the Commission’s order denying benefits in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

¶54 The court of appeals erred in applying an “abuse of 

discretion” standard of review to the Commission’s decision 

denying Mr. Murray compensation benefits. The Commission’s 

decision constituted a mixed finding of law and fact that did not 

involve discretion. Under the plain language of UAPA, we apply 

our traditional approach to reviewing the Commission’s mixed 

finding. But even under a nondeferential standard of review, 

Mr. Murray failed to establish that his boat accident, rather than 

his preexisting back condition, was the legal cause of his injury. 

We therefore uphold the court of appeals’ ultimate decision to 

deny him compensation benefits.