### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00086

- CV

Texas Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant

v. Hofer Builders, Inc. and Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, Appellee s

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1- GN -17-005825, THE HONORABLE JESSICA MANGRUM, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this worker s’ compensation case, Texas Mutual Insurance Company appeals
from the trial court ’ s rulings in favor of Hof er B uilders, Inc. (HBI) and Hartfor d Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford) on the par ties ’ cross motions for summary judgment in the underlying declaratory judgment action. For the following reasons, we reverse and render judgment in favor of Texas Mutual. 1

BACKGROUND
Th e parties ’ d isp ute concerns w hether Texas Mutual is contr ac tually liab le to
reimburse HBI or Har tf ord for Louisian a workers ’ compen sation b enefits that Hartford paid to

1 Because t he parties ’ cross motions for summ ary judgment re ly on evid ence that we described in a prior appeal from the unde rly ing proceed ing , we do not restate the evidence here
e xcept as is necessary to address the issues raised

. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 , .4 ; Texas Mut. Ins. v. Hofer Builders, Inc. , No. 03 -17-00741- CV , 2019 Tex. App. LEX IS 5 562 , at *2

– 6, *16 –19 (Tex. App.— Au stin July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).2 HBI ’ s e mployee David Hope

. Hope , who res ided in F lorida, was injured in December 2014 at a
Lou i si a na constr uction worksite

. H artford wa s the w orkers ’ compensat ion insur er for the

g e neral contractor , H B I was a subc ontractor , and Texas Mutual was the workers ’ c ompensation
insurer for HBI

. See Tex. Ins . Code § 2054.151 (explaining that Texas Mutual se rv es as “ insurer
of last resort ” ).

HBI ’ s wo rkers ’ c ompensation insurance policy with Texas Mut ual in cluded a
standard form en dorsement , entitled “ Limited Reimbursement for Texas Emp loyees Inju red in
other Jurisdictions ” ( the End orsement)

. S e e Tex. Lab. Code § 406.051(b) (“The contract for

coverage must be written on a policy and endorsements approved by the Texas Department of Insurance.”); see also Tex. Ins. Code § 2052.002(b) (prohibiting insurance company from using form other than one pre scribed unde r sec tion for workers’ compensation insurance unless form is endorsement that is “appropriate to company’s plan of operation” and “submitted to and approved by the department”). The Endorsement references Texas Labor Code sections 406.071
and 406.072 and incor porate s statutory l angua g e from section 4 06

. 071

. S ee Tex. Lab. Code § § 406.071

– .072

. 2

2 S ubsec tions 406. 071(a) and (b)( 1) provide : (a ) An employee who is injured while working in another jurisdiction or the employee’s lega l beneficiary is entitled to all rights an d remedies under this subtitle i f: (1) the injury woul d be compens able if it h ad occu rred in this state; and ( 2) the empl oyee has significant contacts with this state or the employment is principally located in this state. (b) An employee has significant contacts with this state if the em ploy ee was hired or recruited in this state and the employee: (1) was injur ed not late r than o ne year after the date of hire;

. . . .3 The Endorsement state s in relevant part:

This policy does not provide “ other states ” insura nce coverage. This endorsement provides reim burs ement cov erage to you for t h ose Texas employees who are described i n the Texas Labor Code §§ 406.07 1

– .072. Therefore the coverage is for injuries to your Texas employees that occur in another state if (i) t he injury would have been compensable had it o ccu rred in T exas and (ii ) the e mployee has signific ant contacts with T e xas or the employment is princi pally located in Texas. An employee has significant contacts with Texas if the employee was hired or recrui ted in Texas, and (i) the employee was in jured no t later t han one year after the date of hire; or (ii) has worked i n Texas for at least ten working days during the twelve months preceding the date of injury. Employees hired or recruited by you outside Texa s to work in another state are specifica lly exclu ded from the terms an d prov i sions of this policy

. If you conduct b u siness in states other than Tex as, you must comply with those state laws. You must promptly notify your agent before you begin work in any jurisdiction other than Texas. We are not autho rized to provide work ers ’ c o mpensation insurance in any jurisdicti o n other than Texas. You are res ponsible for all of your legal obligations for your failure to comply with requirements of the workers ’ comp ensation laws of any jurisdiction other than Texa s.

See i d

. When the Endors emen t applies , Texas M u tual is contractually liable to reim b urse
workers ’ c ompensation bene fits paid to Texas e mployees in jure d out of state , including in
Lou isiana

. This is the second a p peal from the un derlying pro ceeding

. See generally Tex as
Mut. Ins. v

. Hofer Builders, Inc. , No. 03

- 17

- 00741

- CV , 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5562 (Tex. App.

— Austin July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). T h e prior ap peal was also from summary judgment rulings in fa vor of HBI a nd Hartford and co ncern ed the sc ope of th e ext raterritori al

c overage provided by the Endorsement and the Texas Labor Code

. See id

. Beca use Hope ’ s inju ry occurred within a year of bei ng hired by HB I and his injury would ha ve been compensable

Tex. Lab. Code § 406.071 (a) , (b) (1)

.4 if it had occur red in Texas , 3 t h e parties pri marily jo i ned iss ue as to wh e ther Hope had

“ s ignificant contact s ” with Texas because he was “ hired or recruited ” in Texas

. S ee id. at *19

– 20; Tex. Lab. Code § 406.071(a )(2), (b) (1) (setti ng forth test for determining if emplo y ee inju r ed within one year of hire dat e has significan t co nt acts with Texas)

. We affirmed th e por tion of the
trial court ’ s order d enying Texas Mut ual ’ s motion for s ummary judgment , re versed th e portion
of the order gr ant ing summary judgment in f av or of HBI and H art f ord , and remanded the case to
the trial cou rt f or further proceedings. See Hofer Build ers , 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 5562 , at * 1.
In determ ining that the evidence did not establish that Hope was “ hi red or

rec ruited ” in Texas , we noted th at Hope ’ s physi cal location was in Fl orida durin g the h iring

pro cess and explained that our inte rpre t ation of the Endorsement was consisten t with the
extraterritorial stat ute s as a whole :

We further observe that inter preting the phrase “ hired or recruited in this state ” by f ocusing on the emp loye e ’ s phy sical location i s co nsistent with extraterritorial statutes as a whole. [ El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. v. Murphy , 518 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. 2017)

. ] Consistent with dete rmining whether an employee has sign ific an t contacts base d on the employee ’ s location at the time the empl oyee is hired or recruited, the focus of the inquiry as to the p rincipal location of employment is on the employee ’ s location afte r he or she has begu n working

— it is either “ where ” “ the empl oy er has a pl ace of business at or from which the employee reg ular ly works ” or “ the employee resides and spends a substantial part of the employee ’ s working time. ” See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.072; We bster ’ s Third New I nternat ’l Dict. at 2602 (defining “ where ” to mean “ at or in wha t place ” and stating th at “ where ” refer s to “ location ” or “ place ” ). This interpretation also adheres to the intent of Texas workers ’ compensation laws that the “ entire statute is intended for th e benefit of Texas employees and becau se industry i n Te xa s sh ould not hav e the burde n of providing i nsur ance to employees

3 B ecaus e Hope received Louisian a workers ’ comp e ns ation benefits, he was not eligi ble for Texas worker s ’ compensati on be nefits

. See Tex. Lab . Code § 40 6.075 ( a) ( “ An inj ured empl oyee who elects to pursue the employee’s remedy under the workers’ compensation laws o f another jurisdiction and who recovers benefits under those laws may not reco ver under this s ubtitle. ” )

.5 of other states. ” Texas Emp ’ rs ’ Ins. Ass ’ n v. Dossey , 402 S.W.2d 153 , 15 5 (Tex. 1996 ) (quoting Hale v. Texas Emp ’ rs ’ Ins. Ass ’ n , 23 9 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1951)).

Id

. at *26

– 27

. W e further exp la ined th at the tr ial court d id not err i n de nyin g Texas Mutual ’ s motion for summary judgment because “ even if the su mmary judgment evidence co nclusively established that Hope was not hired or recrui ted in Texas, Texas Mutual would have ha d to specific ally a rgue in its moti on for summ ary judgment and the n conclusively establish that Hope ’ s employment was not principally located in this state to b e entitled to summary judgment ”
and that Texas Mutual “ d id not expressly make this argument in i ts motion for sum ma ry judgm ent

. ” I d. at *32 ( citing Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a (c) ( “ Issues not expressly present ed to the trial court by wri tten motion, answer or other respons e shall not be considered on appeal as ground s
for reversal. ” ) ).
On rem and , the part ie s again fi led c ross motions for summary jud gment , joining
i ssue as to the principal location of H ope ’ s employ men t

. See Tex. Lab

. Code § 406.07 1(a)( 2) ( providing that employee who is injured while workin g out of state i s entitled to benefits if injury

wou ld have be e n comp en sable in Texas and “ the e mployment is pr i nci p a lly located in this

state ” )

. Th e “ principal location of a person ’ s employment is where: (1) the employer has a place
of business at or from which the employee regularly works ; or (2) the emp loyee resid es and

s pends a subst a ntial part of the emp loyee ’ s w orking time. ” Id. § 406.072. It was undisputed that (i) Hope ’ s injury would have been compensable ha d it occurred in Texas ; (ii) b ec ause Hope was

a Flo rida res ident but spent hi s work ing t ime e xclusivel y i n Louisiana , s ubsec tion (2) o f section
406.0 7 2 wa s inapplicable ; and (iii) Texas Mutual was li able under t he End orse ment if Hope ’ s employ ment was principally located in Texas

.6 In their motion for summary judgment , HBI an d Hartford ass e rted that Texa s was the pri nc ipal lo cation of Ho pe ’ s employment beca use HBI ’ s only pla ce of busi ness was its office
in Saginaw, Texas

. In its cross motion, Texas Mutual c ountered that Hop e ’ s employ ment was

not principally located in Texas because afte r h e was hired, he wor k ed exclusiv ely in Louis iana
until he was inju red

. Texas Mutual also asserted that Hope ’ s injury was not covered under part
one of HBI ’ s po licy bec ause Hope rece ived workers ’ comp ensation bene fits from Louisiana , see
id. § 406. 075(a) , a nd that the Endor se men t did not prov ide coverage for Ho pe ’ s injur y be cause
he was not hired or recruit ed in Texas , see id

. § 406.071(b)

. With out stating its reasonin g , the
trial cou r t granted final summary judgment in favor of HBI and Har tford an d deni ed Texas
Mutual ’ s mo ti on
. This ap peal follow ed.

AN ALYS IS
In one a pp e l late issue , Texas Mutual challenges t he trial court ’ s summary judgment rulings, contend ing that , as a matter of law , neither HBI nor Hart for d is entitled to

re imbursement from Texas Mut u al for Louisiana w orkers ’ compen sation bene fits paid to Hope

.

Stan dard s of Review

“ A trial court ’ s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is rev iewed de novo. ”
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass ’ n , 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018) (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture , 145 S.W.3 d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004)). “ To prev ail on a traditiona l motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no ge nuine issue of material fact
exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ” Id. (ci tin g Tex. R. Civ. P. 1 66a(c)). When comp eting motions for summary judgment are filed, a s is the case here, “ each party bears the burden of establishing tha t it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

. ” Id. (quoting City of7 Garland v. Dallas Morning New s , 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000)). “ Wh en faced with competing summary ju dgme nt motions where the trial court denied one and granted the other,
we conside r the summary judgment evidence presented by bo th sides, determine all questions presented, and if th e t rial court erred, r en der the judgment the trial court should have rende red. ” Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett , 459 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. 2015)

. Resolution of Texas Mutual ’ s issue also requi res this Court to interpret the
Endorsement. “ When co nst ruing an insurance policy, we ordinaril y ‘ ascertain and give effect to
th e pa rties ’ intent as expressed by the words they chose to effectuate their ag re ement. ’ ” Wausau
Underwriters Ins. v. Wedel , 557 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Deepwate r Horizon , 470 S.W.3d 4 52, 464 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)). Because the Endo rsement incorporates sections 406.071 and 406.072 of the Labor Code, we also must consider statutory language. See
In gram v. Deere , 288 S.W.3d 886, 899 (Tex. 2009) (a ppl ying r ules of construction t o contract governed by statuto ry terms)

. Statutory co nstr uction similarly “ ‘ begins with the Legislature ’ s words, ’ looking first to their plain and common meaning. ” Murphy , 51 8 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting Fitzg erald v. Advan ced Spine Fi xa tion Sys. , Inc. , 996 S .W.2d 864, 865

– 66 (T ex. 1999)) ; see also
Presidio Inde p. S ch. Dist. v. Scott , 309 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. 2010) ( constru ing text a ccording

to “ plain and common mean ing unless a contrar y intention is app arent from the context or unless

s uch a construction lea ds to abs urd results ” (citing City of Rockwall v. Hugh es , 246 S.W.3d 621,
625

– 26 (Tex. 2008)) )

. “ In conducting this analysis, ‘ we look at the entire act, and not a single
section in isolation. ’ ” Murphy , 518 S.W.3d at 418

. T his “ tex t

- ba sed approach to st atutory
construction requires us to stu dy the language of the specific provision at issue, within the
context of the statute as a whole, endeavoring to give effect to every word, cla use, and sentence. ”
Id. (quoting Ritchie v. Rupe , 4 43 S .W.3d 856, 867 (Te x. 2014)).8 Part One of HBI ’ s policy
As one of its g roun ds supporting summary judgment , T exas Mut u al asser ted in its
moti on that it was not l iab le under part one of HB I ’ s poli cy
. In respon se, HBI and Hartford
make cl ea r that t hey only seek reimburs ement under the Endorseme nt

. In their briefing to this
Cou rt, t hey affirmatively state that they “ are not seeking to reco ver un der Pa rt One of the policy ”
and “ have not asserted a c la im for coverage unde r Pa rt One b ec ause Hop e pursue d an d recovered
Lo uisi ana , not Texas, workers ’ compensation benefits

. ” Based on HBI and Hartford ’ s
concession that Texas Mut ual is not liable under p art one of the policy, we need not address this

grou nd

. See, e.g. , Wojcik v. Wesolick , 97 S.W.3d 335, 336

– 37 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pe t.) (concluding that appellee had aban doned ground asserted to trial court by affirmatively “ st ating in its brief that it ‘ does not contend at this t ime [gro und asserted to trial court] ’ ” ); Hall v. Tom ball Nur sing Ctr., Inc. , 926 S .W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no wri t) ( concluding that appellate court did not need to address g round where counsel affirmatively “ conceded ” du ring or al argum ent that “ judgment could not stand if it wer e
based on t his ground ” ).

S ignificant Contacts
Texas Mutual also asserted in its motion for s umma ry judgment that it was not
liable under t he En dorsement because Hope did not have significant contacts with Texas and was

not hired or recruited in Texa s
. See Tex. Lab. Code § 40 6.0 7 1 ( a) ( 2 ), (b). Concerning th is ground, HBI and Hart ford refer this Court to our analysis in the prior appeal that addr essed
whet her Hope was hired or recruited in Texas and st ate that “ it is not necessary for this Court to
addr ess Texas Mutual ’ s arguments concerning recru it ment ” beca use “ the dispositive issue in this9 cas e centers on the principal location of Hop e ’ s employ ment and not where he was hired or

rec r uited. ” However , section 406.07 1 (a)(2) provides the alternati ves of a n em ployee ’ s significant con tact s with Texas or his princ ipal location of employ ment . Th us , it was Te xas
Mutual ’ s burden to establish that neithe r alternative applied to conclusively establish that it was

ent itled to summary judgment

. See id. § 406.07 1 (a)(2) ; Tex . R . Civ. P. 166a(c ); Tarr , 556 S.W.3d at 278

. After re mand , Texas Mutual ’ s subse quen t motion for summary judgment

r a is ed additional grounds but was supported by the same e vi dence concerning HBI ’ s hiring and
recruitm ent of H ope that we addressed in the prior appeal

. Follow ing our anal ysis of t his
evid ence in our prior opinion , we conc lude that Texas Mutual estab lished as a matter of law t hat Hope was n ot hired or recruited in Texas. See Hofer Builders , 2019 Tex. App . LEXIS 5562 , at

* 19

– 32

.

Prin cipal L ocation of Employ ment
Texas Mutual fu rt her assert ed in its motion for s umma ry judgm ent that it was not
liable under the En dorsement because Hope ’ s employ ment was not princi pally located in Texas

. See Tex. Lab. Code § § 40 6.0 7 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) , .072

. HBI and Hartford ’ s motion for sum mary judgment joined iss ue on t his ground

. T he remaining questio n in this appeal then is whether the tr ial court erred in its summary judgment rulings because Texas Mutual conclusively estab lishe d that

H ope ’ s employment was not principally located in Tex a s
. Texas Mutual relies on the undisputed
evidence that (i) HB I c ondu cts its cons tru ction business in many states ; (ii) after being hir e d b y
HBI in N ove mber 2014 , Hope traveled d irectly from his Florida r e sidence to L ouisiana and began working for HBI at t he Louisiana work site ; (iii) Ho pe did not tra vel to HBI ’s Texas o ffic e10 during the h iring process or after he started working for HBI in November 2 014 ; and (iv) Hope exclusively worked at the Louisia na w ork s ite until he was inju red in Dece mber 2014

. As su pport for their assertion that H ope ’ s employ ment was principally loca ted in Texas, HBI a nd Hartford rel y on the ev id ence of Hope ’ s prior assignmen ts in Texas when he was empl oy ed with re late d comp an ies ; HBI ’s pla ns for Hope ’ s assignments after the Louisi an a project , which i ncluded wor k i ng on projects in Te xas as he had done with th e re la ted comp an ies ;
and the location of H BI ’s only office in Texas

. HBI and Hartford characterize th e constr uc ti on project at the Lo u isiana work site and Hope ’ s ass ignment there as “ tem porary ” and ar gue that ( i) under sect ion 406. 072 , “ the re h as t o be a si ngle principal location ( ‘ the p rincipal location ’ ) , and it is l imited to one of two op tions listed in the s tatute ” ; (ii ) because subsection (2 ) of section
406.072 does not apply, it f ollows that subsection (1) applies ; an d (iii) the principal loca tion of Hope ’ s em ployment was HBI ’ s Texas office

— HBI ’ s place of business “ f rom wh ich H ope
worked

. ” Although he was not phy s ical ly prese nt at t he Texas o ffice , Hop e communicated with

peop le who were there to receive hi s ass ig nment s and to provide repor ts , and he received
payments from there

. F or purposes of this appeal, we need not decide the prin cip al location of Hope ’ s empl oyment

. The dispositive question is whether the evidence con clusively established that HBI
d i d or did not have “ a place of busi ness [in Texas] at or from which [Hope] regularly work [ed]. ”
See Tex. L ab. Code § 406.072 (1) ; see also W ebster ’ s at 3 02 (de fini ng “bu siness ” as “activi ty
directed tow ard some end ” and “ com mercial or merc antil e act ivity c u stomarily enga ged in as a
means of liv elihood ” ), 172 7 ( defining “place” as “physical environment: space” a nd “physical11 surroundings ” )

. 4 Our dete r minat ion of this question “ focuses on the employee ’ s location once he
or she has begun working (after employm e nt)

. ” 5 Hofer Builders , 2019 Tex. App

. LEXIS 5562,

at *24

. Because the evidence established that Hope w as located in Lo uisia na during the entirety o f his e mplo yment , we a pply t he plain meaning of the phrase “ place of busi ness a t or from which the employe e regu larly works ” to conclude th a t Te xas Mutu al es tablished as a matter
of law that Hope ’ s employment wa s not principally located in Texas

. See Tex. La b. C ode § 406.072 (1) ; Scott , 309 S.W.3d at 930

. T he evidence was undi s puted that after Hope was hired
in November 2014 , he was never phy sica lly at HBI ’ s Texas office but worked exclusively “ at ”
the Louisi ana work site until he was injured. See We bst er ’ s at 136 (defining “ at ” as “ function word to indicate presence in, on, or near : as (1) presence or occurr ence in a particular place ” )

. HBI and Ha rtford focus o n the phrase “ from which ” in the statute and def ine “ from ” as “ out of ”
to suppo rt their position tha t Ho pe work ed “ from ” th eir Texas office

. See Black ’ s Law
Dic tionary 668 ( 6th e d. 1990). 6 But, appl y ing the plain meaning of the words in context , a place

4 We observ e that the plain meaning of “pla ce of busin ess” encompasses more than an employe r ’ s office and could include a location where an e mployer is eng aged in c ommercial activity

. See TGS

- NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 34 0 S.W.3d 432, 43 9 (Tex. 2011) ( “ We presu me that the Legislature cho oses a statute ’ s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting word s not chosen. ” )

. Had the Legisla ture i n te nded for the p rincipal location in qu i ry to be limite d to offices, it could h ave eas ily said so.

5 Focusi ng on the e mployee ’ s location conforms with t he Texas Worker s Compensation Act ’ s purpos e to provide benefi ts for work

- related injuries that , by defi nition , occur where the employee i s lo cated

. See In re Poly

- America, L.P. , 262 S.W.3d 337, 349

– 50 (Tex. 200 8) ( “The Te xas Workers Compens ation Act was enacted to protect Texas workers and employees.” )

.
6 HBI and Hartford re ly on the definition from the s i xth edition o f Black ’ s Law Dicti onar y that defines “ from ” as fo llows:12 of bu siness “ fr om whic h ” an em pl oyee works still would require the employee ’ s physical

presen ce at t he p lace of business at some point. See W ebster ’ s at 913 ( defin ing “ fro m ” as

“ fu nction word to indic ate a starting point: as (1) a po int or place where an actual p hysi cal

movem ent .

. . has its beginning ” ) ; see also Murphy , 518 S.W.3d at 418

. Thus, th e e v idence established that HBI did not have a pl ace of busine ss in T e x as

“ at or from which ” Hope regu larly wor ked

. See Tex. La b. Code § 40 6.072 (1)

. To hold
oth erwise w ould require us to ignore the stat utory language and the intent of our workers ’

com pen sati on laws

. See Murphy , 518 S.W.3d at 418 ; see als o Scott , 309 S.W. 3d at 93 1 ( “ Courts must not give the words used by the Legislature an “ exaggerated, forced, or constrained meaning. ”). The “entire sta tute is intended for the benefit of Texas employees and because industry in Texas should not have the burden of providing insurance to employees of other
states.” Dossey , 402 S.W.2d at 15 5 (q uoting Hale , 239 S.W.2d at 608).
O ur interpretation of secti on 406.072 (1) that f ocus es on the e mployee ’ s locatio n i s
consi st ent with related sections of the Labor Code

. See Rail roa d Comm ’ n v. Texas Citizens for a
Sa

fe Future & Clean Water , 336 S.W.3 d 61 9, 628 (Tex. 2011) (explaining that courts “ generally
avoid co nstruing i ndividu al provisions of sta tute in isolati on f rom the statut e as a whole ” ) ; see

As used a s a function word, i mplies a starting point, whether it be of time, place,
o r c ondition ; and meaning having a starting point of motio n, noting the point of d eparture, origin, withdrawal, etc., as he tr avelled “ fr om ” New York t o Chicag o
. . . . One me aning of “from ” i s “out of

. ” Word “from ” or “after ” an event or day does not have abso lute a nd invariable mean ing, but each should receive an inclusion or e xclusion const ruction a ccording to intention with which
s uch word is used.

. . . Words “from ” and “to , ” used in contract, ma y be given meaning to which reason and sense en titles t h em, under c ircumstances of case. Black ’ s Law Dic tionary 668 (6 th e d. 1990) (citations omitted)

.13 also Tex as Dep’t of Ins. v. Jon es , 498 S.W.3d, 610, 615 (Tex. 2016 ) ( “ We const rue the Workers’ Compe nsat ion Act, like other s tatutes, by considering the plain meanin g of the te xt, giv en the

statute as a whole.”)

. A s with section 406.07 2 , t he s ub ject i n s ection 406.071 is the “ employee

. ”
See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.07 1(a) (entitling “ employee who is in jure d wh ile worki ng in another jurisdiction or the e mploye e ’ s le gal benefic ia ry ” to rights and remedies), (a)( 2) ( addres sing

“ employee ” who has significant contacts with st ate ), (b) ( sta ting that “ employee has significant

cont acts if the employee was hired or recr u ited in this state and the employe e ” wa s in jured within
des ignated times)

. Similarly, the subject of s ec tio n 4 06.073 is the employee ’ s locat ion. It allows

“ [a]n employee whose work requires regular travel between th e state and at least one other jur isdi ction ” to “ agree i n writing ” with his or her emplo y er on the employ ee ’ s “ principal location
of th e emp loym ent

. ” See id. § 406.073(a) ; Celadon Trucking Servs. , Inc. v. Martinez , 320 S .W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. App

. — El Paso 2 010, pet. denied) (enforcing agree ment between employee and employer t hat emp l oyee’s em ploymen t is “principally localized in Indi ana” )

. W e also observe that HBI and Hartford ’ s proposed interpretation would lead to
ill ogi cal and unreaso nable results and c on flict s with other provisions in the standard form
Endorsement

. See Railr oad Com m’n , 336 S .W .3d at 628 ; Scott , 309 S.W.3d at 930

. Under their proposed interpre tation , Texas Mutual ’ s po licies issued to employer s with offices only in Texas
would co ver the employ er s ’ nation wide b usiness

. But t he Endorsement ex pressly pro vides th at

“ [e] mpl oyees h ired or recruited by you outside Te xa s to work in another state are specifica lly
exclu ded from the terms and provisions of this policy ” and that Texas Mutual is “ no t autho rized to provide workers ’ c ompe nsation insurance in any jurisdiction other tha n Texas

. ” Cf. Tex. L ab. Code § 406.053 (a dd re ssing “ All States Co verage ” ) ; In re Poly

- America, L.P. , 262 S.W.3d 337,
349

– 50 (Tex. 200 8) ( “The Texas Workers Compens ation A ct was enacted to protect Texas14 wo rker s and employees.” ) ; see also Texas Em p s’ I ns. v. Miller , 370 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. A pp.

— Tex arka na 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that “ extra

- territorial provision of the Texas
Work men ’ s Compensation Act is mainly to p rotect Texas employees temporarily out of the State of Texas, wh ose employ ment ta kes them periodical ly out of the State ” ).
Fo r these reasons , we conclude that the trial court err ed in granting summary j udgment in fa vo r o f HBI and Hartford an d d e nying Tex as Mutu al ’ s motion for summary jud gmen t. See Emmett , 459 S.W.3d at 583

. Thus, w e sustai n Texas Mutual ’ s issue.

C ONCL USION Having sust ained Texas Mutual ’ s issue , we r everse t he trial court ’ s or der and render judgm e nt declar ing th at Texas Mutual is not l iable t o HBI or Har tford for the Lou i siana

w orkers ’ c ompen sat ion ben efits paid to Hop e
.

___ ______________ __ _________ _______ _______ Melis sa Goodwi n , Justi ce
Before Justices Goodwin , Ba ker, and Smith
Reversed and Rendered
Filed: August 25, 2022