J-S07031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: P.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3095 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000509-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: P.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3096 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000509-2022

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3097 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000510-2020
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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3098 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000506-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2023

Appellant, P.M. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees and orders entered 

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of 

Appellee, Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”), for 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor children, 

P.L.M. and A.M.M. (“Children”), and changing the placement goal to adoption. 

We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

P.L.M. was born in May 2008. A.M.M. was born in January 2010. DHS first 

became aware of the family in May 2020, when it received a General Protective 

Services report regarding Mother’s struggles with bipolar disorder, incidents 

of domestic violence, and sporadic periods of homelessness. (See Petition for

Goal Change for P.L.M., filed 8/24/22, at Exhibit A, ¶b). Specifically, Mother 

and Children were homeless in May 2020. Mother and Children went to New 
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Jersey to stay with Mother’s parents for a short time. Mother and Children 

left the home after Mother “had been aggressive with the children’s maternal 

grandmother ... resulting in [Mother] being charged with assault.” (Id.) 

Ultimately, Mother and Children returned to Philadelphia to reside with A.C. 

(“Father”).1 Father later informed DHS that Mother “was very unstable,” and 

Father “had never seen her exhibit such concerning behavior.” (Id.) 

On May 5, 2020, DHS employees went to the family home for further 

investigation. Upon arrival, DHS employees observed Mother speaking with 

police officers outside the residence. The police officers informed DHS that 

Mother had called for assistance alleging that Father was abusive. The DHS 

employees questioned Children about the incident separately. Children stated 

that their parents argued frequently, and Father would “beat the demons” out 

of Mother. (Id. at ¶d). Children also confirmed that during their most recent 

stay in the family home, Father “pinned [Mother] to the floor” during an 

argument. (Id.) 

On May 14, 2020, DHS filed separate dependency petitions for P.L.M. 

and A.M.M. The court adjudicated Children dependent on June 26, 2020. In 

conjunction with the dependency petitions, the court granted legal custody of 

Children to DHS. In turn, DHS placed Children into kinship care with their 

maternal uncle and aunt. Children have remained with their maternal uncle 

____________________________________________

1 Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights on November 9, 2022, and 

he is not a party to the current appeals. 
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and aunt ever since. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/9/22, at 14, 55-57). 

Mother received single case plan objectives, including referrals to the 

Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting classes, an evaluation 

from Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”), domestic violence and healthy 

relationship classes, and obtaining employment. (Id. at 16). Initially, Mother 

was slow to comply with her objectives. Nevertheless, Mother’s “compliance 

level went upward [in] May of 2022.” (Id. at 21). 

On August 23, 2022, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination 

of Mother’s parental rights to A.M.M. On August 24, 2022, DHS filed a petition 

for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to P.L.M. DHS also 

filed corresponding petitions seeking to change Children’s goals to adoption. 

The court conducted a termination hearing on November 9, 2022. At the 

hearing, the court received testimony from Mother and the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager. Following the hearing, the court 

entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. The court 

entered separate orders noting the change of Children’s goal to adoption. On 

December 6, 2022, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors. This Court consolidated the matters sua sponte on 

December 29, 2022. 

Mother now raises four issues for this Court’s review:

Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother ... pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1) without clear and convincing 
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evidence that Mother failed to perform her parental duties. 

Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the rights of Mother ... pursuant to 23 Pa C.S.A. 

Section 2511(a)(2) without clear and convincing evidence 

of Mother’s present incapacity to perform her parental 

duties. 

Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the rights of Mother ... pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

Sections 2511(a)(5) and 2511(a)(8) without clear and 

convincing evidence that the conditions that led to 

placement continue to exist when Mother presented 

evidence of compliance with the goals and objectives of her 

single case plan. 

Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the rights of Mother ... pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

Section 2511(b) without clear and convincing evidence that 

there is no parental bond between Mother and children and 

that termination would serve the best interest of the 

children. 

(Mother’s Brief at 7). 

Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the 

following principles: 

A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care, 

custody, and control of his or her children is among the 

oldest of fundamental rights. The time-tested law of the 

Commonwealth requires that we balance this intrinsic 

parental interest within the context of a child’s essential 

needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. We 

readily comprehend the significant gravity of a termination 

of parental rights, which has far-reaching and intentionally 

irreversible consequences for the parents and the child. For 

these reasons, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

the existence of the statutory grounds for doing so. [C]lear 

and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier 

of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 
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the truth of the precise facts in issue. Because of this 

serious impact attending the termination of parental rights, 

it is important that a judicial decree extinguishing such 

rights be based solely on competent evidence. 

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of 

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by 

competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds 

to the standard employed in dependency cases, and 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record, but it does not require the 

appellate court to accept the [trial] court’s inferences or 

conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are 

supported, we must determine whether the trial court made 

an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse 

for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have 

first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings. However, [w]e must employ a broad, 

comprehensive review of the record in order to determine 

whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent 

evidence. 

In re Adoption of C.M., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (2021) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights on the following grounds: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to 

a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately preceding 

the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or 

has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily 

terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along 

with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010).

2

 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 

____________________________________________

2 DHS also sought the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8), but we need only analyze Section 

2511(a)(1) for purposes of this appeal. 
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Mother’s issues are related, and we address them together. Mother 

contends that she successfully completed her case plan objectives by the time 

of the termination hearing. Mother emphasizes that she completed her 

referrals to ARC, obtained a BHS evaluation, and finished programs on 

domestic violence and healthy relationships. Although Mother had yet to 

obtain suitable housing, Mother maintains that a court cannot terminate 

parental rights based solely on an environment factor such as housing. 

Mother acknowledges that her visits with Children were virtual. Mother 

insists, however, that Children “came into care during the worst time of the 

COVID pandemic,” and she “always asked about the children” whenever she 

contacted the CUA case manager. (Mother’s Brief at 21). Mother also 

acknowledges that visitation is at Children’s discretion. To the extent that 

Children might have been reluctant to engage in visitation due to the family’s 

history with domestic violence, Mother notes that Father left the family

residence in January 2022. Mother complains that the CUA case manager 

failed to inform Children about Father’s departure, and Children might have 

desired more visitation if they had known that Father was no longer in the 

home. Under these circumstances, Mother asserts that she “never evidenced 

a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental rights nor has she refused to 

perform her parental duties.” (Mother’s Brief at 23). Thus, Mother insists that 

DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence warranting termination 
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under Section 2511(a)(1). 

Regarding Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the CUA case manager 

did not testify about the existence of a bond between Mother and Children. 

Mother posits:

It is impossible to assess the bond between Mother and ... 

Children and whether termination of Mother’s parental 

rights would have a detrimental effect on ... Children based 

on the fact that she [did not] have the opportunity to visit 

with ... Children for some time prior to the termination of 

parental rights hearing. Mother’s ability to deepen and 

strengthen the bond between her and her children was 

limited by the actions of [DHS] and [its] agents. 

(Id. at 31-32). Mother also insists that the CUA case manager’s testimony 

and the comments from Children’s legal counsel established that Children and 

Mother love each other. Based upon the foregoing, Mother concludes the 

court erred and abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights. We 

disagree. 

“A court may terminate parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1) 

when the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim 

to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at least six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 

2009). 

Though we do not adhere to any strict definition of parental 

duty, a child has a right to essential parental care, and our 

jurisprudence reveals certain irreducible qualities of a 

parent’s attendant obligation. Foremost, it is a positive duty 

requiring affirmative performance. [C]ommunication and 

association are essential to the performance of parental 

duty[.] [P]arental duty requires that a parent exert himself 
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to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. 

A parent must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting 

obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child 

relationship, or his rights may be forfeited. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

Adoption of C.M., supra at ___, 255 A.3d at 364 (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of his or her

parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the 

involuntary termination. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying 

close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” 

Id. (internal citations omitted). “In this context, the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether 
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termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

In re Z.P., supra at 1121. 

Instantly, the court received testimony from Kim Augustus, the CUA 

case manager. Ms. Augustus was assigned to this case in September 2021. 

(See N.T. Termination Hearing at 10). Nevertheless, she was familiar with 

the entire case file, which she was responsible for maintaining. (Id. at 11). 

Ms. Augustus identified Mother’s single case plan objectives, and she indicated 

that Mother had achieved substantial compliance with her objectives by the 

time of the hearing. (Id. at 16, 21). However, Mother’s compliance level was 

“minimal” when Ms. Augustus first inherited the case, and Mother compliance 

level began to “shift upward” as recently as May 2022. (Id. at 21). 

Ms. Augustus confirmed that visits occur at Children’s discretion. (Id.

at 22). P.L.M. no longer wished to visit with Mother at the time of the hearing, 

and her last visit occurred in November 2021. (Id.) Likewise, A.M.M. no 

longer wished to visit with Mother. (Id. at 56). Ms. Augustus could not 

provide the date of Mother’s last visit with A.M.M.3 Nevertheless, Ms. 

Augustus explained that A.M.M. did not want to continue visitation because 

“she does not like how she feels after visiting with her mother.” (Id.) 

Regarding a parent/child bond, Ms. Augustus could not state whether it 

exists. (Id. at 24, 57). Children, however, do not look to Mother for care, 

____________________________________________

3 Later in the hearing, the child advocate stated that A.M.M.’s last visit with 

Mother occurred during “holiday time last year.” (Id. at 71). 
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comfort, or support. (Id. at 24, 58). Rather, Children have developed a close 

relationship with their maternal uncle and aunt, on whom they rely for 

stability. (Id. at 25, 58). Consequently, Ms. Augustus opined that Children 

would not suffer irreparable harm if the court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights. (Id. at 58). Further, Ms. Augustus testified that a goal change to 

adoption was in Children’s best interests. (Id. at 27, 58). 

Following the testimony from Ms. Augustus, the court received 

argument from the guardian ad litem and the child advocate. The guardian 

ad litem agreed that termination was warranted. While the guardian ad litem

commended Mother for her efforts at compliance with the case plan objectives, 

he argued that Mother had done “[t]oo little, too late.” (Id. at 46). The child 

advocate agreed that termination was in Children’s best interests. (Id. at 49). 

The child advocate also provided insight into Children’s relationship with 

Mother and their desire to be adopted. The child advocate discussed P.L.M. 

as follows: 

She wasn’t angry. She wasn’t resentful. She just believed 

that Mother had issues. But she said she believes that her 

mother loves her. And she still doesn’t want any contact 

with her. Her concerns were Mother’s mental health. 

And she felt like Mother needed to prove to them, or to her 

... that she was in touch with her emotional and 

psychological needs before she would be able to care for 

[P.L.M.], which I thought was very mature. She also 

indicated that the home in which they lived, and she 

believes her mother still lives, was deplorable. And that 

even if her mother moved, she doesn’t want to go there. 

She stated that in her resource home she has a space. She 
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has her own room. She has a family that spends time with 

her, engaged in activities with her, is supportive of her. She 

also, which was striking to me, indicated that the resource 

parents have a good relationship. And that was very 

important to her. 

(Id. at 47). 

The child advocate expressed similar sentiments from A.M.M.:

And it’s interesting that she still does not want to see Mother 

based on the same fears, concerns about Mother’s mental

stability. Although she did not indicate that she had as 

much compassion for Mother. She wasn’t angry. But she 

just didn’t find that Mother’s issues were her concern. And 

she—as I said, she still does not want to see her. 

* * *

[A.M.M.’s] not an old soul, but she’s mature. And it’s 

apparent that whatever the parents were going through 

when she was living with them [has] left a scar on her as 

well. And so she said that she wants to have the resource 

parents as parents. 

She doesn’t want to have to go through ... what she went 

through with her mother and father. And that she wants to 

have her cousins as siblings. She too indicated she does not 

want to live in a place without her sister. And that she has 

found a place where she says she’s the most important 

person there. 

(Id. at 71-73). 

The court considered the testimony and determined that DHS had 

provided clear and convincing evidence in support of termination. When 

explaining its decision, the court stated: 

And while [Mother] may be substantially compliant at this 

time, her progress has been recent. And at this time she 

does not have appropriate housing for reunification to take 

place.... The testimony reflects that [Children] would not 
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suffer irreparable harm if [Mother’s] rights are terminated. 

Notwithstanding again [Mother’s] recent completion of 

some of the single case plan objectives, the children deserve 

permanency. They both want to be adopted. 

* * *

The developmental, physical, emotional needs and welfare 

of the children are being met by their foster parents. The 

inference would be that there is a bond with them. And they 

are in the home where they are well cared for and where 

they are currently thriving. 

(Id. at 75-76). We accept the court’s analysis, which is supported by the 

record. 

While Mother argues that she did not demonstrate a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her parental claim to Children, the record reveals a failure to 

perform any parental duties since Children’s initial placement in June 2020. 

See Adoption of C.M., supra; In re I.J., supra. Additionally, regardless of 

whether a bond exists between Mother and Children, terminating Mother’s 

parental rights would not destroy existing, necessary, and beneficial 

relationships for Children. See In re Z.P., supra. Based upon the foregoing, 

our review of the record confirms that clear and convincing evidence 

supported termination of Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1) 

and (b). Id. Consequently, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights and the orders changing the placement goals to adoption. 

Decrees and orders affirmed. 

Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.
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Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2023