alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

**Certification of CEO and CFOPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,As Adopted Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection withthe Annual Report on Form 10-K of Building Materials Corporation ofAmerica (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),Samuel J. Heyman, as Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and John F.Rebele, as Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and ChiefAdministrative Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge and belief:

(1)         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)         Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| /s/ SAMUEL J.  HEYMAN |                           |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Name:                 | Samuel J. Heyman               |   |
| Title:                | Acting Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

Date:  March 29, 2006
| /s/ JOHN F.  REBELE |                                                                             |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:               | John F. Rebele                                                                   |   |
| Title:              | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and  Chief Administrative Officer |   |

 

Date:  March 29, 2006

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent requiredby the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposesof Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6559

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DARNELL FREEMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (CR-02-427)

Submitted: October 20, 2004 Decided: November 22, 2004

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Darnell Freeman, Appellant Pro Se. LeDora Knight, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Darnell Freeman entered into an agreement with the

Government to plead guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams

or more of cocaine base. In the agreement, the Government reserved

the sole discretion to decide whether to file a motion for a

substantial assistance departure. Following his direct appeal,

Freeman filed a motion to enforce his plea agreement, seeking an

order requiring the Government to file a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

motion to reduce his sentence based on his cooperation. The

district court denied the motion, and Freeman timely appealed. 

“[A] claim that a defendant merely provided substantial

assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to

discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor would additional but

generalized allegations of improper motive.” Wade v. United

States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). A defendant must make a

“substantial threshold showing” of improper motive to warrant an

evidentiary hearing. Id. “This court has followed the Supreme

Court’s lead and strictly interpreted the Wade exceptions, holding

that the decision not to make a downward departure motion is

properly within the government’s discretion.” United States v.

Butler, 272 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, unless the

Government’s refusal to file a motion is based on an

unconstitutional motive such as race or religious animus, or is not

rationally related to a legitimate governmental end, district
- 3 -

courts are without authority to review a prosecutor’s discretionary

decision not to file a substantial assistance motion. Id.

Thus, Freeman’s assertions that he provided substantial

assistance do not entitle him to any relief. Further, his claim

that the Government breached the plea agreement by declining to

investigate Freeman’s information is belied by the plea agreement.

The plea agreement gave sole discretion to the Government to

determine whether to file a motion for departure and did not

require any specific investigation on the Government’s part.

Finally, Freeman does not even allege that the Government’s failure

to so move was based on an unconstitutional motive.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court

and deny Freeman’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3354 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the 7.5 percent 

threshold on the deduction for medical expenses. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 27, 2009 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the 7.5 percent threshold on the deduction for medical 

expenses. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF 7.5 PERCENT THRESHOLD ON DE4 DUCTION FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 213 of 

6 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to deduction 

7 for medical expenses) is amended by striking ‘‘to the ex8 tent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted 

9 gross income’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3354 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

3 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 99.2


                                  CERTIFICATION

     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, the undersigned officer of PalWeb
Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies that the Company's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB for the Period Ended February 28, 2003 (the "Report"),
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

Dated: April 14, 2003                      /s/ William W. Rahhal
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           William W. Rahhal
                                           Chief Financial Officer





     The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C.ss.1350.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-20609

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIO HUMBERTO GUERRERO-CABRERA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CR-14-1

--------------------

February 20, 2003

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Mario Humberto Guerrero-Cabrera appeals his conviction for

reentering the United States without permission after deportation

following an aggravated felony. Guerrero-Cabrera concedes that

this court held that felony possession of a controlled substance

is a drug-trafficking offense, and therefore is an “aggravated

felony” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). United States

v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d 697, 706-11 (5th Cir. 2002). 
No. 02-20609

-2-

Accordingly, the district court did not err in overruling

Guerrero-Cabrera’s objection to the eight-level enhancement

imposed for his prior felony conviction for possession of

cocaine. 

Guerrero-Cabrera argues that the felony conviction that

resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)

was an element of the offense that should have been charged in

the indictment. He acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed

by the Supreme Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). This court must follow that

decision until it is overruled by the Supreme Court. United

States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). 

AFFIRMED.
#### Jesus Mario SANCHEZ-SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-72041.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 22, 2011.

Nicholas W. Marchi, Carney & Marchi, PS, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Margot Nadel, Trial, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jesus Mario Sanchez-Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to continue and de novo claims of constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, *Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey,*526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and we deny the petition for review.

The IJ did not abuse his discretion or violate due process in denying a continuance because Sanchez-Sanchez did not demonstrate good cause. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (an IJ may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown); *Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error for a petitioner to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
# I **OFFICE OF**  **THE AmORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS &:v-** **‘ ~**  **AUSTIN h** Tour Uttar Ooes not ti.sclose whsthar the Job of **superlntwdlne tha**  **proposed laterul**  road **OOSI** 6Wotioa in your 00Ullt~ lnvolr*athe P~i>liOatiOll Oi crn&w3rine prlnaiplw &ad illtSlTj.Wt~tiOA Of wl&sering d&a, but if At &@I, xe think that Artlote S27la wxA,d re;ire a llaansbdprotensionalengineerto o+etintend your road oonatruation. ii0 SUg&p3St tlrat you oootiidor

the Catire 

### thntwill be ret,uired oi y&P road **superl.ntondsnC** then mad tha quotedport1011 of .Scotlon

2, Arti 327la.md ii the Gtitiss repuired of the mperintendent are ocjvsred by any oi the phaaon OS this aootion,you must have a lloenssd profession- (11 e&near. U ycu are unable to snwer your queetim froi- the rxwlnatlon of the etittutes <ux:. n:l.l ~$VS UQ iLore taots, inforla.ln?;

us of the euties of the mall to be hired, SIB

will endeavor to u:@y t;lo law to the SitWtiOIl&Id AAS*Or YOUI '?;Lc?St,tiCZl.

. ‘ic;u

trill notice from ti

OOIrsldaratloA

Of .wtic1e 327& tAl!iL

iirQA 'IfiLly e llcmrmidprofessionalen**ginoerr** and yet may not be fpaduatscivil ongtioera. 218 h~ortant reqdrenent is thc&tiy be liaonsedby 0-a 9.at.e

imrZ of Heglatratlonror **pr0mlimal** en&- IIC?BTIJ If they aro to ysriorm any of the phaoe8 of eA;lneerL~ oat out in s8ut1Gn 2 or .;rtiole 327lJ3. ;ie trust that **tfiB Will**  an~blo YOU **to** (u1SWW your qucotion,lf not plsrrea sublsit co t&o requested mlGitior?zl

faoto and we wlll endeavorto MSW~P four iLIt’*Y. Y~u.7~ very truly
Ex-10.3



 





EXHIBIT 10.3




EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AMENDMENT




     This Employment Agreement Amendment (“Amendment”) is made and entered into as of March 31,
2007 (the “Effective Date”) by and between Wright Medical Technology, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(the “Company”), and F. Barry Bays (the “Employee”).



     WHEREAS, the Company and Employee are parties to an Employment Agreement entered into as of
November 22, 2005 (the “Agreement”);



     WHEREAS, the terms of the Agreement provide that it should expire on March 31, 2007; and




     WHEREAS, the parties desire to extend the term of the Agreement for an additional one (1) year
term;



     NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, and for and in consideration of the mutual covenants
contained herein, the parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as follows:



     1. The Agreement is hereby amended by replacing “March 31, 2007” in Paragraph 7(a) with “March
31, 2008” thereby extending the term of the Agreement for an additional one year period.



     2. All other terms and conditions of the Agreement not specifically amended herein shall
remain in full force and effect.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the Effective Date. This
Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an
original, and such counterparts together shall constitute one and the same instrument.



AGREED AND ACCEPTED




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC.	 	 	 	F. BARRY BAYS	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	/s/ Gary D. Henley
 

Gary D. Henley
	 	 	 	/s/ F. Barry Bays
 

	 	 
	 

	 	President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                                  SUBSIDIARIES

Mymetics Corporation has two subsidiaries:

1.   6543 Luxembourg S.A. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mymetics Corporation) is
     a joint stock company organized under the laws of Luxembourg and does
     business under the name "6543 Luxembourg S.A."

2.   Mymetics Management Sarl (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mymetics
     Corporation) is a company organized under the laws of Switzerland and did
     business under the name " Mymetics Management Sarl " during 2008.

Mymetics S.A. (a 99.9% owned subsidiary of 6543 Luxembourg S.A.), a company
organized under the laws of France, was dissolved under the control of the
French court appointed judicial administrator in 2008. As a legal consequence of
this court order, Mymetics Corporation has formally lost control over its French
subsidiary.
1The Hon. Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 98-3134MN

_____________

Westchester Fire Insurance Company, *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

*

JHC Insurance Group, Inc., * [To be published]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: May 10, 1999

Filed: May 21, 1999 

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this case the plaintiff, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, claims that the

defendant, JHC Insurance Group, Inc., a wholesale insurance broker, was at fault in not

clearly transmitting to the insured the substance of a certain change in coverage. The

District Court1 granted summary judgment, and we affirm. 
-2-

The crux of the case is that Westchester cannot prove that the omission on the

part of JHC, even if negligent, caused any loss. Westchester wound up having to pay

a loss incurred by its insured because of our holding, see Hawkins Chemical, Inc. v.

Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 159 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 1998), that the policy change was

substantial, and that insufficient notice of the change had been given to the insured to

make it effective under Minnesota law. The difficulty with the present claim, however,

is that Westchester cannot show that anything would have come out differently if JHC

in fact had transmitted the information in question to Hawkins. Westchester cannot

show what would have happened if Hawkins had refused to accept the change. It

cannot show, in other words, that it, as the insurer, would have insisted on the change,

so that the coverage afforded by the policy would in fact have been reduced, and

Westchester would not have been liable to pay the loss. As evidence on the point,

Westchester offered the testimony of its underwriter that he would not have renewed

the policy if the insured had rejected the change in question, but this testimony is

inconsistent with testimony given by that same underwriter in the previous litigation.

Westchester argues that the testimony was not inconsistent, but we are not persuaded

by this argument. 

We agree in substance with the reasoning of the District Court's opinion. We do

not think that this case has enough precedential significance to warrant a fuller

treatment, and, in the interests of a prompt disposition, we therefore affirm in this

abbreviated form. 

Affirmed. 

A true copy. 

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 21 - Subsidiaries



The following is a list of all subsidiaries
of the Company:



|Name of Subsidiary         |  | Jurisdiction
        of Incorporation |  | Ownership
        Percentage
|-------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------------
|Progressive Concepts, Inc. |  | Texas                                 |  | 100%                        
|Teletouch Licenses, Inc.   |  | Delaware                              |  | 100%                        
|Visao Systems, Inc.        |  | Delaware                              |  | 100%                        
|TLL Georgia, Inc.          |  | Delaware                              |  | 100%
<PAGE>   1


                                                                      EXHIBIT 23




                        CONSENT OF KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP




The Board of Directors
Florsheim Group Inc.:

We consent to the use of our report dated February 3, 1997, on the consolidated
balance sheets of Florsheim Group Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 28, 1996
and December 30, 1995, the related consolidated statements of operations, cash
flows, and shareholders' equity for the years ended December 28, 1996, December
30, 1995 and December 31, 1994 and related schedule, in the December 28, 1996
annual report on Form 10-K of Florsheim Group Inc.








KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
Chicago, Illinois
March 25, 1997
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2008 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Terry M. Copeland, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)The Report fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and





(2)The information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.








/s/  Terry
      M. CopelandTerry
      M. Copeland, President
              May 8, 2008
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

September 9, 2 019

No. 04

- 19

- 00206

- CR

Joel ALEJANDREZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 381st Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- CR

- 101 Honorable Jose Luis Garza, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

After we granted court reporter Dora Canizales’s first motion for extension of time to file the reporter’s record, we set the record due on September 3

, 201 9

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. R. 35.3(c). On the extended due date, the court reporter filed a second request for an extension of time to file the record until October 3

, 201 9

. The reporter’s request is GRANTED. The reporter’s record must be filed with this court by October 3 , 201 9

. See id.

If the c ourt reporter is unable to file the completed record by October 3 , 2019 , any further request for additional time to file the record must be accompanied by a signed, written status report. The report must describe the transcript by day with the date, desc ription, page counts, and remarks for each day. The page counts must include the total number of pages, the number of pages edited, proofread, and formatted into the required electronic form (including bookmarks).
The report may describe any unusual asp ects of the record. The report must describe any problems the court reporter reasonably believes may delay the completion of the record beyond the requested date.
The preferred form for the status report, with an accompanying example, is attached._________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 9th day of September, 2019

.

___________________________________ Keith E . Hottle

, Clerk of Court
#### In the Matter of Gilberto Silva, Petitioner, v Hans Walker, as Superintendent of Auburn Correctional Facility, Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 96]

—Petition unanimously dismissed without costs. Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking to annul a determination that he violated inmate rule 100.13, prohibiting fighting (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [1] [iv]). After the proceeding was transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), respondent issued an administrative order reversing the determination and directing that all references to the disciplinary proceeding be expunged. Because petitioner has obtained the relief he seeks, this proceeding is dismissed as moot (see, *Matter of Free v Coombe,*234 AD2d 996). (CPLR art 78 Proceeding Transferred by Order of Supreme Court, Cayuga County, Corning, J.) Present—Law-ton, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Habib Johnson, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 866]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed (see, *People v Saunders,*190 AD2d 1092, 1093, *lv denied*81 NY2d 1019). (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, Drury, J.—Robbery, 2nd Degree.) Present— Denman, P. J., Lawton, Hayes, Balio and Boehm, JJ.