SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1233.1 

CA 11-00893 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CARNI, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND GREEN, JJ. 

 

NATALIE M. BARNHARD, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CYBEX INTERNATIONAL, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

----------------------------------------------- 

CYBEX INTERNATIONAL, INC., THIRD-PARTY 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT,

V

 

AMHERST ORTHOPEDIC PHYSICAL THERAPY, P.C., 

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

 

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP, WHITE PLAINS (ROBERT

A. SPOLZINO OF COUNSEL), AND HURWITZ & FINE, P.C., BUFFALO, FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT. 

BAXTER SMITH & SHAPIRO P.C., WEST SENECA (SIM R. SHAPIRO OF COUNSEL),

FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP, BUFFALO (KEVIN J. ENGLISH OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal and cross appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court,

Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.), entered April 21, 2011. The

judgment awarded plaintiff money damages upon a jury verdict. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by granting the post-trial motion in

part and setting aside the verdict with respect to damages for future

“care for potential children” and damages for past and future pain and

suffering and as modified the judgment is affirmed without costs, and

a new trial is granted on damages for past and future pain and

suffering only unless plaintiff, within 20 days of service of a copy

of the order of this Court with notice of entry, stipulates to reduce

the award of damages for past pain and suffering to $3 million and for

future pain and suffering to $9 million, in which event the judgment

is modified accordingly and as modified the judgment is affirmed

without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries she sustained when an exercise machine tipped over and fell
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CA 11-00893 

on top of her, breaking her neck and rendering her a quadriplegic. 

The leg extension machine that caused plaintiff’s injuries (hereafter,

machine) was designed, manufactured and sold by a company that was

subsequently purchased by defendant-third-party plaintiff, Cybex

International, Inc. (Cybex). Plaintiff was employed as a physical

therapy assistant by third-party defendant, Amherst Orthopedic

Physical Therapy, P.C. (Amherst Orthopedic) and, at the time of the

accident, she was with her assigned patient in the gym area. 

Plaintiff stood on the weight-stack side of the machine, put her hands

on top of it and pulled on it in order to stretch her arms and

shoulder. The machine, which weighed more than 600 pounds, was not

secured to the floor and it toppled over onto her. Following a trial,

the jury apportioned liability for the accident 75% to Cybex, 20% to

Amherst Orthopedic and 5% to plaintiff. The jury awarded plaintiff

damages for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings and

benefits and pain and suffering, as well as damages for future “care

for potential children.” Supreme Court thereafter denied the posttrial motion of Cybex seeking to set aside the verdict.

Contrary to the contention of Cybex on its appeal, we conclude

that a fair interpretation of the evidence supports the jury’s verdict

that Cybex was negligent and that its negligence was a substantial

factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, the court properly

denied the post-trial motion of Cybex insofar as it sought to set

aside those parts of the verdict. The jury was entitled to reject the

position of Cybex that plaintiff was injured as the result of her

unforeseeable misuse of an otherwise safe product. Although it is

undisputed that plaintiff was not using the machine for its intended

purpose when she was injured, the designer of the machine testified at

trial that the use of exercise machines for stretching is common and

thus foreseeable (see generally Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div. of

Package Mach. Co., 49 NY2d 471, 480). In addition, the jury was

entitled to credit the testimony of plaintiff’s expert that the

machine was defectively designed, that it could have feasibly been

made safer and that the design defect was a substantial factor in

causing plaintiff’s injury (see Adams v Genie Indus., Inc., 14 NY3d

535, 542; Wengenroth v Formula Equip. Leasing, Inc., 11 AD3d 677,

680). Moreover, the adequacy of the warnings accompanying the machine

was an issue of fact for the jury (see Morrow v Mackler Prods., 240

AD2d 175), and the record supports the jury’s determination that the

failure of Cybex to warn purchasers and users of the machine’s

potential tipping hazard was also a substantial factor in causing

plaintiff’s injuries. The jury’s apportionment of 75% fault to Cybex

is supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Sydnor v 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 74 AD3d 1185, 1187-1188).

Contrary to the contention of Amherst Orthopedic on its cross

appeal, the evidence is legally sufficient to support those parts of

the jury’s verdict finding that Amherst Orthopedic was negligent, its

negligence was a substantial factor in causing injury to plaintiff and

the percentage of fault attributable to Amherst Orthopedic was 20%

(see Williams v City of New York, 71 AD3d 1135, 1137). We reject the

further contention of Amherst Orthopedic that the court erred in

discharging a juror during the trial after that juror advised the
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CA 11-00893 

court of his travel plans and the attorneys agreed to delay the trial

one day to accommodate those travel plans. The court was not bound by

the attorneys’ agreement, and it properly exercised its “ ‘broad

authority to . . . expedite the proceedings’ ” by replacing the juror

with an alternate (Peralta v Grenadier Realty Corp., 84 AD3d 486,

487).

None of the court’s evidentiary rulings requires reversal. 

Contrary to the contention of Cybex on its appeal, the court properly

permitted plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning other accidents

involving exercise machines manufactured by Cybex inasmuch as those

accidents were sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s accident to warrant

admission of that evidence (see generally Hyde v County of Rensselaer,

51 NY2d 927, 929). The court properly exercised its discretion in

excluding the lay opinion testimony of plaintiff’s patient

characterizing plaintiff’s conduct as “monkeying around” (see

Dombrowski v Moore, 299 AD2d 949, 951). In addition, the court

properly exercised its discretion in admitting in evidence a manual

for a later model leg extension machine. The inability of Cybex and

Amherst Orthopedic to locate the manual that accompanied the machine

when it was delivered in 1981 or 1982 goes to the weight, not the

admissibility, of the manual introduced by plaintiff (see Altamirano v

Door Automation Corp., 48 AD3d 308, 308-309).

Contrary to the contention of Cybex on its appeal and Amherst

Orthopedic on its cross appeal, the court properly allowed the

registered nurse who prepared plaintiff’s life care plan to testify as

an expert (see generally Matott v Ward, 48 NY2d 455, 459), and

plaintiff’s physical therapist was qualified to testify with respect

to the medical necessity of certain items of equipment included in the

life care plan (see Matter of Layer v Novello, 17 AD3d 1123, 1125). 

We conclude that the award of future medical expenses is supported by

the evidence inasmuch as plaintiff presented “competent proof of

necessary, anticipated medical costs” through those witnesses and her

expert economist (Petrilli v Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 40 AD3d

1339, 1344). The evidence supports the findings of the jury with

respect to plaintiff’s life expectancy (see Schifelbine v Foster

Wheeler Corp., 4 AD3d 736, 738-739, lv dismissed 3 NY3d 656), as well

as its award of future lost earnings, which is based in part on her

life expectancy.

We agree with Cybex on its appeal and Amherst Orthopedic on its

cross appeal, however, that the award of damages for future “care for

potential children” is based entirely upon speculation and must be set

aside (see generally Presler v Compson Tennis Club Assoc., 27 AD3d 

1096, 1097). We further agree with Cybex and Amherst Orthopedic that

the jury’s awards for past and future pain and suffering deviate

materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501

[c]). Based on the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that $3

million for past pain and suffering and $9 million for future pain and

suffering are the maximum amounts the jury could have awarded (see

Bissell v Town of Amherst, 56 AD3d 1144, 1148, lv dismissed in part

and denied in part 12 NY3d 878; Allison v Erie County Indus. Dev.

Agency, 35 AD3d 1159, 1160). We therefore modify the judgment
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CA 11-00893 

accordingly, and we grant a new trial on damages for past and future

pain and suffering only unless plaintiff, within 20 days of service of

a copy of the order of this Court with notice of entry, stipulates to

reduce the award of damages for past pain and suffering to $3 million

and for future pain and suffering to $9 million, in which event the

judgment is modified accordingly.

We have examined the remaining contentions of Cybex on its appeal

and Amherst Orthopedics on its cross appeal and conclude that none

requires reversal or further modification of the judgment.

Entered: November 18, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court