COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

TROY LEE NEWTON 

v. Record No. 1245-94-2 OPINION BY 

 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 

 John R. Maus for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

 Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for 

 appellee. 

 

 Troy Lee Newton (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial 

of robbery and aggravated malicious wounding. On appeal, 

appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction for aggravated malicious wounding because the 

injuries sustained by the victim did not constitute permanent and 

significant physical impairment, as required by Code § 18.2-51.2. 

 We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 I. 

 On October 12, 1993, appellant entered Andy's Chevron Mart 

in Zion Crossroads at about 10:00 p.m. and purchased a can of 

beer from Harry Ross Bryant, the only employee working at the 

store. Appellant then left the store. As Bryant kneeled down to 

get a roll of quarters from the safe, he looked up and saw that 

appellant had returned to the store. 

 Appellant told Bryant to give him the money. Appellant 

waved his hand at Bryant, and Bryant could see that appellant had 

a box-cutter knife. Again, appellant told Bryant to give him all 
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the money. Bryant complied. After appellant took the money, he 

told Bryant to get down on his knees. Appellant then began 

cutting Bryant with the razor. He cut Bryant on the cheek, under 

his eye, on the wrist, on the ear, and several times on the back. 

 Appellant stepped on Bryant's glasses, which had fallen on the 

floor, and cut the cord to the telephone. 

 As he left, appellant told Bryant not to move. After a few 

minutes, however, Bryant called for help from the office 

telephone. He was taken to the emergency room at the University 

of Virginia Hospital, where doctors stitched wounds on his face, 

ear, and wrist. Other wounds were treated with antiseptic. 

 On October 17, 1993, appellant gave a statement to 

Investigator D. L. Bateman of the Louisa County Sheriff's 

Department. Appellant said that he was "high" on crack cocaine 

when he went into the store to buy beer, and as he left the store 

he thought about the money he had seen there. He said that he 

could not remember taking the money, but found a roll of money in 

his pocket and began having "flashbacks" in which he saw the 

clerk, who had been cut, lying on the floor. Appellant stated 

that he spent around $300 on cocaine the night of the robbery. 

He admitted to Bateman that he told his brother that he had cut 

someone. 

 At trial, Bryant displayed his scars for the judge. The 

judge noted that the scar on the right side of Bryant's face was 

"obvious and visible" and not covered, even by his beard. 

 Following the trial, the judge issued a letter opinion in 

which he found that appellant was guilty of aggravated malicious 
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wounding. The judge noted that the 1991 amendment to the 

aggravated malicious wounding statute "suggests that the 

legislature intended Aggravated Malicious Wounding to include 

injuries which do not prevent the victims functioning normally, 

but are nevertheless permanent and severe." 

 II. 

 Appellant argues on appeal, as he did at trial, that the 

disfiguring scars which Bryant suffered as a result of the attack 

do not satisfy the requirement of the aggravated malicious 

wounding statute that the victim's injuries constitute "permanent 

and significant physical impairment." 

 In 1991, the General Assembly amended Code § 18.2-51.2, 

which defines aggravated malicious wounding. The legislature 

changed the provision requiring that the victim be "totally and 

permanently disabled" by the malicious wounding, to requiring 

that the victim be "severely injured and . . . caused to suffer 

permanent and significant physical impairment." 

 Principles of statutory construction mandate that we "give 

effect to the legislative intent." Scott v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. 

App. 294, 296, 416 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1992). While penal statutes 

must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth, "[t]he 

plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always 

preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction; a 

statute should never be construed so that it leads to absurd 

results." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 

S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). 

 "Where possible, a statute should be construed with a view 
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toward harmonizing it with other statutes." Morris v. Morris, 4 

Va. App. 539, 543, 359 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1987). "Because the Code 

of Virginia is one body of law, other Code sections using the 

same phraseology may be consulted in determining the meaning of a 

statute." Branch, 14 Va. App. at 839, 419 S.E.2d at 425. This 

Court, in interpreting the prior aggravated malicious wounding 

statute, looked to the Workers' Compensation Act, Code 

§ 65.2-503, to determine the meaning of "totally disabled," 

because the Act used a similar phrase. See Branch, 14 Va. App. 

at 839-40, 419 S.E.2d at 425. 

 Title 51.5 of the Code, entitled, "Persons With 

Disabilities," defines "physical impairment" as "any physical 

condition, anatomic loss, or cosmetic disfigurement which is 

caused by bodily injury, birth defect, or illness." Code 

§ 51.5-3 (emphasis added). When the legislature amended Code 

§ 18.2-51.2, it is presumed to have known the definition of 

"physical impairment" found in Code § 51.5-3. Thus, it must have 

intended that the term would be given the same meaning in Code 

§ 18.2-51.2. See Branch, 14 Va. App. at 840, 419 S.E.2d at 425. 

 Bryant unquestionably suffered cosmetic disfigurement caused by 

bodily injury. 

 The record, moreover, supports the fact finder's 

determination that Bryant's physical impairment was "permanent 

and significant." One of the wounds to his face required ten to 

twenty stitches. At trial, five months after the attack, the 

scar from that facial wound was still "obvious and visible," even 

though Bryant had grown a beard. The scar resulting from the cut 
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to the ear also was still visible.1

 The trial court reasonably 

could have found from the number of wounds, the need for stitches 

for some of them, and the resulting scars, still visible after 

five months, that Bryant's injuries constituted "permanent and 

significant physical impairment." 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction for 

aggravated malicious wounding. 

 Affirmed. 

 

 1At trial, appellant conceded that "[p]resumably the scars 

would be permanent unless Mr. Bryant were to have a plastic 

surgery, . . . . "