COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Ch afin and Senior Judge Haley

LOTORIA CARLOS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1631-14-1 PER CURIAM MARCH 3, 2015 CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VI RGINIA BEACH H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge (Corrynn J. Peters; Phillips & Peters, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. (Mark D. Stiles, City Attorney; Ch ristopher S. Boynto n, Deputy City Attorney; Elena E. Ilardi, Associ ate City Attorney; Sharon Ann Hefner, Guardian ad litem for the infant children, on brief), for appellee.
Lotoria Carlos, appellant, appeals the order te rminating her residual pa rental rights to her eleven children. 1 Appellant contends that the trial court e rred by finding the evidence was sufficient to support by clear and convincing evidence that her residual parental rights should be terminated. Upon review of the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this ap peal is wit hout merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisi on of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. When addressing matt ers concerning the custody and care of a child, this Court’s pa ramount consideration is the child’s best interests. On appeal, we presum e that the trial court thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests. The trial court is vested with broad discreti on in making deci sions “necessary

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Appellant was pregnant when the eleven children were removed; upon the birth of the twelfth child, the Department removed that child and placed him with family members. That child is not a subjec t of this appeal.UNPUBLISHED‐ 2 - to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” We will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 211, 597 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). “Furthermore, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to th e prevailing party below and its evidence is afforded all reasonable infe rences fairly deducible therefrom.” Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Viewed in this light , the evidence adduced at trial es tablished that in 2005-2006, the Department removed five children from appellant’s home due to lack of supervision. Appellant complied with all servic es, and the children were returned to her home. In April 2013, the Department removed all of appellant’s eleven childr en. Appellant’s oldest ch ild called 911 to report that appellant was threatening the children with a knife. The child testified that appellant would often beat him and his siblings , ranging from 5 to 14 years of ag e, with their pants down to discipline them. She would use any object that wa s nearby, such as brooms, belts, or wires. Sometimes the objects would break the skin, and other times the ch ildren would be bruised. The children would sometimes have to we ar long sleeves or pants to cove r up their injuri es when they went to school. The oldest son also described appellant’s emotional breakdowns. During the pendency of the dispositional hearing, appellant completed all of the classes required by the Department, as well as the evaluations and counseling as directed. With the help of her case worker, appellant secured a seven-bedroom hom e and participated in supervised visitation. The therapeutic doctors that work ed with appellant could not reco mmend the return of even one child, much less eleven children, to appellant’s care. De spite all of the servi ces provided, appellant continued to deny that th e event in April occurred or that sh e threatened, abused , or neglected the children. After approximately fift y sessions with appellan t, one doctor stated appellant still had not‐ 3 - reached a point of talking about the April 2013 incident with the knife and the doctor could not provide an estimate for how long it would take to get to that point. The trial court found that the “therapy repor ts and CASA reports al l indicate that the children are thriving in foster care.” The trial court also recognized that appellant “did do a significant amount of things” and did all that the De partment asked her to do. Critical to the trial court’s consideration was that despite the reason able efforts of the Department and appellant, however, appellant could not, even when testifying before the court, admit that she threatened, abused, or neglected the children. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a le ngthy period of time waiting to find out when, or ev en if, a parent will be capable of resu ming his or [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The trial court terminated appellant ’s parental rights pursuant to Co de § 16.1-283(C)(2 ), finding that the conditions which led to foster placement could not be substan tially remedied to allow for the children’s return to appe llant and that appellant had been unable or unw illing to substantially remedy the conditions within a reasonable peri od of time. Despite appell ant’s efforts to complete services, she was unable to show th at she could apply what she had b een counseled to do in the best interest of the children. Further, all eleven child ren were thriving in foster care. The clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter supports the trial court’s finding s, and its judgment was not plainly wrong. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by termin ating appellant’s residual parental rights to the eleven children. For th e foregoing reasons, the tria l court’s ruling is affirmed. Affirmed.