RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3033-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JULIUS AHEEBWA,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted February 13, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 16-02-0183.

Howard P. Lesnik, attorney for appellant.

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Jaimee M. Chasmer, Assistant Prosecutor, 

on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FUENTES, P.J.A.D.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 15, 2019
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In this child sexual assault case, we are asked to determine whether the 

trial judge erred when he: (1) denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State; (2) denied 

defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements he gave to the 

detectives who were investigating the allegations of sexual abuse; and (3) 

granted the State's motion to admit the testimony of the child's mother and older 

brother pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). After reviewing the record developed 

before the trial court and in light of prevailing legal standards, we affirm.

A Hudson County grand jury indicted defendant Julius Aheebwa, charging 

him with first degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), second

degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), second degree endangering the 

welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); and fourth degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 

9:6-1 and N.J.S.A. 9:6-3. The victim, M.O. (Maura),1 was eight years old at the 

time of the assault. Defendant resided in a basement apartment in the same 

multi-family building where the victim resided with her family. Defendant 

babysat the victim and her two siblings between four and six in the evening 

while their mother was at work.

 

1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the victim to protect her privacy and preserve 

the confidentiality of these proceedings. N.J.S.A. 2A:82-46(a); R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
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At approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 14, 2015, the Jersey City Police

Department contacted detectives from the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office, 

Special Victims Unit (SVU), to report the abuse. SVU detectives interviewed 

the child and her mother on September 15, 2015. In a report filed at 

approximately 6:00 p.m. on September 14, 2015, SVU Detective Kristen 

Mikulak documented Maura's account of how the assault occurred. Defendant, 

whom Maura referred to as "Uncle Julius," lured the child into his bedroom by 

telling her she could use his four-year-old daughter's IPad. Once Maura was in 

defendant's basement apartment, Maura claimed he "started asking her questions 

about having a boyfriend and kissing." When Maura was inside defendant's 

bedroom:

"Uncle Julius pulled up her skirt and took off her 

underwear and used his hand to touch her vagina. 

[Maura] demonstrated [how] Uncle Julius rubbed her 

vagina with his hand. She said Uncle Julius told her to 

lie down and he licked her private part twice and she 

started to cry. [Maura] said she was on top of the covers 

when this happened. She said he told her not to tell her 

mom or he would end up in jail. 

Detective Mikulak's summary of Maura's description of the sexual assault is

supported by the verbatim transcript of the child's interview conducted at the 

SVU's Duncan Avenue offices, at 10:53 p.m. on September 15, 2015. 
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Defendant executed a waiver of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), on September 14, 2015, the same day Maura 

claimed he sexually assaulted her. After obtaining defendant's signed Miranda

waiver, three SVU Detectives interrogated defendant about the child's sexual 

assault allegations. The interrogation began at 9:40 p.m. on September 14, 2015.

In the course of the interrogation, defendant admitted he sexually assaulted 

Maura by performing cunnilingus. When one of the Detectives asked defendant: 

"What made this happen?" Defendant responded: "I don’t know, I think it's the 

devil."

The State moved to admit the statements Maura made to her mother and 

older brother about the molestation pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). The 

Hudson County Public Defender's Office assigned a pool attorney2to represent 

defendant at this hearing. The trial judge conducted an N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing 

to determine whether "on the basis of the time, content and circumstances of the 

statement there is a probability that the statement is trustworthy." N.J.R.E. 

 

2 The Office of the Public Defender is authorized to maintain and compensate 

"trial pools of lawyers" on a case-by-case basis. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-7(c)-(d). 

Pool attorneys may be engaged "whenever needed to meet case load demands, 

or to provide independent counsel to multiple defendants whose interests may 

be in conflict." N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-9; see State v. Van Ness, 450 N.J. Super. 470, 

490 (App. Div. 2017) 
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803(c)(27); see also State in Interest of A.R., 234 N.J. 82, 103 (2018). The judge 

found the State satisfied the standard for admissibility and granted the State's 

motion. The State also sought to admit the self-incriminating statement 

defendant gave to the SVU Detectives after waiving his Miranda rights.

Defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to suppress the statement. The trial 

judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 12, 2016, and thereafter 

granted the State's motion and denied defendant's motion to suppress the 

statement. 

The trial was scheduled to begin on April 11, 2017. Defendant was 

represented by private counsel. Before the judge started the jury selection

process, defense counsel informed the trial judge that defendant had accepted 

the State's offer to plead guilty to first degree aggravated sexual assault pursuant 

to a negotiated agreement. At the plea hearing held that same day, the trial judge 

reviewed on the record every aspect of the plea the agreement with defendant; 

the judge also questioned defendant directly to ensure he understood the legal 

consequences of his decision to plead guilty. Defendant was thirty-nine years 

old at the time he pled guilty. He told the judge, under oath, that his educational 

background included "up to college." 
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Defense counsel assisted defendant in completing and answering every 

question on the standard plea form. Question seventeen asked defendant: "Are 

you a citizen of the United States?" Defendant answered: "No." The trial judge 

addressed this issue directly with defendant to ensure he understood the 

immigration ramifications of this conviction and offered him the opportunity to 

discuss the matter with an attorney who specializes in immigration law. The 

judge also apprised defendant of other legal consequences of his decision to 

plead guilty, and asked him if he wanted more time to discuss the matter with 

his attorney.

THE COURT: And if you need any time to speak to 

[defense counsel], just tell me, Judge, I want to speak 

with my lawyer. If I hear that, I'll stop and give you 

more time, do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now that's important, because 

once I accept your plea of guilty and once I sentence 

you this case is over, it is final, it is complete. Do you 

understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

At the conclusion of this thorough exchange with defendant, the judge 

asked the prosecutor to place the terms of the plea agreement on the record. As 

described by the prosecutor, in exchange for defendant pleading guilty to first
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degree aggravated sexual assault, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 

charges in the indictment and recommend the court sentence defendant to a term 

of nineteen years without parole, pursuant to the "Jessica Lunsford Act," as 

codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d). See State v. A.T.C, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2019), 

slip op. at 2.

Moreover, given the sexual nature of the crime, defendant was also 

required to submit to a psychological evaluation at the Adult Diagnostic and 

Treatment Center in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1, to determine whether 

his "conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior." 

Furthermore, although N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(d) requires defendant to serve the 

nineteen-year term of imprisonment without parole, the prosecutor noted 

defendant remained subject to the parole supervision provisions of the No Early 

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Finally, defendant was subject to the sex 

offender registration requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2. 

The judge asked defense counsel if the prosecutor's recitation accurately 

summarized the terms of the plea agreement. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, yes, that’s the 

agreement. I'm satisfied that Mr. Aheebwa understands 

the terms of the agreement.

Each of the forms that we've submitted to the [c]ourt in 

detail ask questions that require an understanding and 
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an answer to all those questions and what the

consequences of all of those provisions are. I answered 

all of Mr. Aheebwa's questions with regard to that. He 

initialed and signed each page and I'm satisfied that he 

understands the terms of the plea agreement as recited 

by the Prosecutor and as indicated in all the plea forms 

that we've submitted to the [c]ourt. 

The judge thereafter again addressed defendant directly to confirm 

defense counsel's representations. Through this meticulous process, the judge 

identified the material terms of the plea agreement, and took all of the steps 

necessary to ensure defendant understood the array of statutory requirements 

associated with this particular sexual offense. 

Defendant provided the following factual basis in response to his 

attorney's questions:

 Q. We've discussed that you have to admit to the . . .

assault, you understand that, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So I'm going to ask you questions regarding that. 

First, I'm going to ask you if you were present in Jersey 

City on September the 14th of 2015?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. And were you present in the company of a young 

girl who we stipulate at the time was less than 13 years 

of age, first name, [Maura]?

A. Yes.
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Q. And at that time and in that place and with that 

individual, did you commit an act of sexual penetration 

by performing cunnilingus on her body?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you that for your own sexual gratification?

A. Yes.

The prosecutor did not ask any questions. The trial judge found 

defendant's factual basis was sufficient to support his guilty plea to first degree 

aggravated sexual assault. 

On October 6, 2017, defendant, represented by a new private counsel, 

moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In a certification dated that same day, 

defendant asserted he "was wrongfully accused by [Maura] of raping [her], 

which I did not do." Defendant alleged he "attempted to retain the services of a 

DNA expert" and had "advised" his previous attorney "of his intention to 

withdraw my guilty plea because the DNA was never reviewed by an expert my 

behalf." Defendant also claimed his attorney "induced me to plead guilty . . .

[and] did not afford me the opportunity to consult with an immigration attorney 

prior to the entry of my guilty plea." 

Defendant's new privately retained attorney advised the trial judge that 

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was based on two claims: (1) 
10 A-3033-17T4

defendant's Miranda rights were not "clearly waived;" and (2) "he always wanted 

to have a D.N.A. expert." Counsel did not argue or mention the standards 

established by the Supreme Court in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 150 (2009). 

By contrast, the prosecutor carefully based her argument on the four factors in 

Slater, and urged the judge to find that "none of the Slater factors are present 

here. There's absolutely no grounds for this defendant to be able to retract his 

guilty plea[.]" 

At the conclusion of oral argument, the judge made the following findings:

I don’t have an affidavit from [defendant] telling me 

I'm innocent, I didn’t do this but I'll presume, the first 

part, the second one I'll presume that he's maintaining 

his innocence here today, I'll presume that. But there's 

not any affidavit telling me that he . . . and I don’t know 

what he spoke to his attorneys about nor should I know 

what he spoke to his attorneys about, I don’t listen in. 

I don’t have anything from him telling me that I spoke 

to [two prior private defense attorneys] about a D.N.A. 

expert[.] 

. . . .

There were discussions . . . on March 28, 2016 at which 

time Mr. Aheebwa was represented by [a pool attorney] 

. . . more than a year before [defendant] pled guilty, 

there was discussion on the record, these are my notes, 

new P.D. assigned. . . per the [p]rosecutor, the D.N.A. 

reports are positive for the defendant. There was a new 

offer of 18 [years] with 18 [years without parole] as the 

D.N.A. is positive and then there is a year of not . . . 

anything . . . not Mr. Aheebwa getting a D.N.A. expert, 
11 A-3033-17T4

not anything and this is not you, [addressing current 

defense counsel] you're not involved in the case but a 

defendant does have a responsibility for moving his 

own case[.]

In response to the judge's findings and observations, defense counsel 

requested the court to postpone the sentencing hearing to allow him the 

opportunity to address these concerns and present the necessary certifications 

from defendant. This prompted a strong objection from the prosecutor, who

pointed out that "the victim's family is here again." The prosecutor emphasized

that defendant had not made a colorable claim of innocence. After considerable 

discussion and argument from counsel, the judge decided to adjourn the 

sentencing hearing until October 20, 2017, to allow defendant the opportunity 

to cure these deficiencies.

For reasons not disclosed on the record, the hearing to adjudicate 

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea did not reconvene until 

November 2, 2017. A certification from defendant was the only new evidence 

submitted. The prosecutor again noted for the record that defendant had not 

made a colorable claim of innocence as required by Slater. The Judge reviewed 

the lengthy, detailed discussions he had with defendant during the plea hearing,

applied the four-factor analysis in Slater, 198 N.J. at 150, and denied defendant's 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On February 9, 2018, the judge sentenced 
12 A-3033-17T4

defendant in accordance with the plea agreement and as required by N.J.S.A. 

2C:14-2(d), to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment without parole.

Against this factual backdrop, defendant raises the following arguments

on appeal:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 

GUILTY PLEA.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING THE 

DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT TO THE HUDSON 

COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE WAS 

ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING THE 

STATEMENT MADE BY THE VICTIM TO 1) HER 

BROTHER J.O. AND 2) HER MOTHER A.O. AND 3) 

THE HUDSON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 

WERE ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL.

We reject these arguments and affirm. As a threshold issue, defendant 

pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated agreement with the State. Rule 3:9-3(f) 

provides in pertinent part: 

With the approval of the court and the consent of the 

prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a 

conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the 
13 A-3033-17T4

right to appeal from the adverse determination of any 

specified pretrial motion. If the defendant prevails on 

appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity 

to withdraw his or her plea.

The prosecutor placed the terms of the plea agreement on the record at the 

plea hearing. At the judge's request, defense counsel confirmed the prosecutor's 

recitation of the plea agreement was accurate. Defense counsel did not request 

or even mention that defendant preserved his right to challenge on appeal the 

trial court's pretrial rulings: (1) denying his motion to suppress the statement 

defendant gave to the SVU Detectives; and/or (2) granting the State's motion to 

allow Maura's mother and brother to testify at trial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 

803(c)(27).

Rule 3:5-7(d) permits a defendant to appeal "from a judgment of 

conviction notwithstanding that such judgment is entered following a plea of 

guilty." However, unless otherwise expressly reserved as part of the plea 

agreement, the scope of the right to appeal under Rule 3:5-7(d) is limited to the 

denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence. Here, the record of the plea 

hearing shows defendant waived all of his constitutional rights as part of his plea 

agreement. Notwithstanding this waiver, we have reviewed defendant's 

arguments, including the argument challenging the trial judge's decision to deny 
14 A-3033-17T4

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and conclude they all lack sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.