ALD-256-E NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 15-2379 

___________ 

IN RE: CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK, 

 Petitioner 

____________________________________ 

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(Related to E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001) 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 

June 30, 2015 

Before: RENDELL, Circuit Judge 

(Opinion filed: July 1, 2015) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Prada, citing the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 

(“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, presents a petition for a writ of mandamus. He describes 

claims relating to his criminal prosecution similar to those he raised in a previous 

mandamus petition, which we denied. See In re Womack, No. 15-2064, 2015 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 9393 (3d Cir. June 5, 2015) (per curiam). Essentially, he asserts that his criminal 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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prosecution, in which he pleaded guilty to charges of sex trafficking of a minor and sex 

trafficking by force, was a “complex fraud.” He alleges that the judge, prosecutors, and 

his former counsel violated several federal statutes by participating in his criminal case. 

Womack further alleges that his right, under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1), “to be reasonably 

protected from the accused” is being violated by his detention in a maximum security 

prison. He asks us, in the “interest of” § 3771(a)(1), to “remove [him] from any further 

harm.” In his petition, he also appears to seek “the right to be heard” under the CVRA 

and the right to initiate a criminal prosecution of (at least) the judge and prosecutors. 

 In appropriate circumstances, mandamus relief pursuant to the CVRA is available 

under a standard that is different from, and less demanding than, that used in traditional 

mandamus proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 

F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rigas, 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 

2005). However, relief under the CVRA is not available to Womack here. 

 First, while we have not yet considered exactly what is meant by the term “crime 

victim” under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2), see United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 

612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 462 & passim (D.N.J. 2009) (noting the same and providing a 

thorough overview of the caselaw discussing the term), it is difficult to see how the term 

could apply to Womack under the circumstances presented. However, even assuming 

that he could be considered a crime victim for whom mandamus and other relief is 

 

constitute binding precedent. 
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available under § 3771, he has in no way shown that he is being deprived of the rights 

accorded crime victims. 

 Womack’s right to “reasonable protection from the accused” under § 3771(a) is in 

no way compromised in this case by his imprisonment. The “right to be heard” that 

Womack seeks is a right to “be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district 

court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3771(a)(4). However, there are no such proceedings involving those whom Womack 

accuses of committing crimes. Womack additionally wants those persons he accuses of 

crimes to be prosecuted. Even if we believed prosecution to be appropriate (which we do 

not), we cannot order their prosecution as some form of relief to him because nothing in 

the CVRA “shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney 

General or any officer under [her] direction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 

 We note additionally that Womack appears to have applied for relief in the first 

instance in the wrong court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). There is no evidence that 

Womack filed a motion seeking relief under the CVRA in the appropriate district court 

before he filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. 

 For these reasons, we deny Womack’s petition for a writ of mandamus.