alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1


SOX 302 CERTIFICATION

I, Tommy Harris, Senior Vice President of CitiMortgage, Inc., certify that:

1. I have reviewed the reports on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D
required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form
10-K of Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc., Series 2006-AR1 (the "Exchange Act
periodic reports");

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as
a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other
information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
the report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the master
servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in
preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item
1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic
reports, the master servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing
agreement, in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for
asset backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of
compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be
included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of
noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on
Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.


March 30, 2007

By: /s/ Tommy Harris
Name:  Tommy Harris
Title: Senior Vice President of CitiMortgage Inc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus FRANCISCO CARRILLO, a/k/a Kiko, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Salisbury. William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge. (CR-91-256-S) Submitted: December 19, 1996 Decided: January 6, 1997 Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Francisco Carrillo, Appellant Pro Se. David Bernard Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* For the purposes of this appeal we assume that the date Appellant wrote on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it would have been submitted to prison authorities. See Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). 2 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss theappeal for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have sixty days within which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).The district court entered its order on June 9, 1995; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on July 19, 1996. Appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal * or to obtain either an extension or a reopening of the appeal p eriod leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-3 sional process. The motion for clarification and equitable relief is denied.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                            MATTSON TECHNOLOGY, INC.

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

                           Mattson International Inc.
                      Mattson International GmbH (Germany)
                      Mattson Technology Center KK (Japan)
                    Mattson International Korea Co. (Korea)
                   Mattson Technology of Singapore Pte. Ltd.
                    Mattson International Inc. Taiwan Branch
                              Concept Design Inc.
                         Concept Design FSC (Barbados)
                       Mattson Technology FSC (Barbados)
                           Mattson Technology Cayman
                   Mattson Technology Holding GmbH (Germany)
                    Mattson Thermal Products GmbH (Germany)
                      Mattson Wet Products GmbH (Germany)
             STEAG Electronic Systems Semiconductor GmbH (Germany)
                         Mattson Technology srl (Italy)
                        STEAG CVD Systems Ltd. (Israel)
                          STEAG CVD Systems Inc. (US)
                        STEAG Electronic Systems UK Ltd.
                    STEAG Electronic Systems Japan Co. Ltd.
                      STEAG Electronic Systems Korea Ltd.
             STEAG Electronic Systems SE Asia Pte. Ltd. (Singapore)
            STEAG Electronic Systems SE Asia Pte. Ltd. Taiwan Branch
                  STEAG Electronic Systems Semiconductor, Inc.
                       STEAG Electronic Systems Inc. (US)
                             STEAG Cutek, Inc. (US)
                          STEAG RTP Systems Inc. (US)
                             CFM Technologies, Inc.
                            CFM Holdings, Inc. (US)
                          CFM International FSC (Guam)
                           Mattson Technology UK Ltd.
                                 CFMT Inc. (US)
                  CMF Technologies Ltd. (UK) Singapore Branch
                    CMF Technologies Ltd. (UK) Taiwan Branch
                         CFM Technologies SARL (France)
exv10w11



 





Exhibit 10.11




AMENDMENT TO COMMISSION AGREEMENT



DATED JULY 2004




This Amendment made as of the 1st day of July, 2006.



	 	 	 
	BETWEEN:
	 	Champion Communication Services, Inc.

	 	 	A corporation under the laws of the State of Delaware
(“Corporation”)

	 	 	 

	and
	 	 

	 	 	 

	 	 	Albert F. Richmond, an individual residing in the County of
Harris in the State of Texas (“Executive”)







WHEREAS the Corporation and the Executive entered into a Commission Agreement dated July 2004 for
Executive Services to be rendered and desires to amend the consideration and compensation to be
provided under the Agreement.



NOW THEREFORE this Amendment sets forth that the consideration to be paid each calendar year in
exchange for the Executive Services shall be the sum of fifty thousand ($50,000),



AND the Compensation as addressed in item 6 of the Agreement, comprised of commission to be paid to
Richmond Holdings, Inc. (“RHI”), a Texas Corporation shall be reduced from 15% of the gross sales
price of any part of the asset sales to 10% of such sales.



All other terms and conditions shall remain I full force and effect.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have duly executed and delivered this Amendment on the date
first above written.



	 	 	 	 	 
	Champion Communication Services, Inc.	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:
	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Pamela R. Cooper, E. Vice President	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	EXECUTIVE
	 	WITNESS
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 
	 	 
	 

	 	Albert F. Richmond
	 	Alfonso Hernandez
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 15

- 00228

- CR

Manuel Fuentes v. The State of Texas

On a ppeal from the 24th District Court of Calhoun County , Texas Trial Cause No. 2014

- 06

- 7434

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. October 13, 2016.
Microsoft Word 10.0.6754;                                           Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  on  Form  10-Q  of  Lynch
Interactive  Corporation (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2005, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  Mario J. Gabelli,  Chief  Executive  Officer of the Company,  hereby
certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



                                                 /s/ Mario J. Gabelli
                                                 --------------------
                                                 Name: Mario J. Gabelli
                                                 Title: Chief Executive Officer
Date: August 15, 2005



This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Miguel Angel GUTIERREZ-VICENTE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-2276.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 12, 2011.

David N. Williams, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kenneth Del Valle, Law Office of Kenneth Del Valle, El Paso, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KELLY, LUCERO, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver contained in defendant Miguel Angel Gutierrez-Vicente’s plea agreement. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute 50 kilograms and more of a substance containing marijuana and one count of reentry of a removed alien. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant waived his right to appeal his conviction or his sentence, provided his sentence was within the statutory maximum authorized by law. The *780district court sentenced the defendant to 46 months’ imprisonment, well below the statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment. Nevertheless, the defendant filed a notice of appeal.

The government filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement pursuant to *United States v. Hahn,*359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) (per curiam). In response, the defendant’s counsel stated that there are no non-frivolous arguments that can be presented in response to the motion to enforce, citing *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). This court gave the defendant an opportunity to file a pro se response, *see id.,*but to date, the defendant has not filed a response to the motion to enforce.

Under *Anders,*we have reviewed the motion and the record and we conclude that the defendant’s proposed appeal falls within the scope of the appeal waiver, that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights, and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. *See Hahn,*359 F.3d at 1325 (describing the factors this court considers when determining whether to enforce a waiver of appellate rights).

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to enforce the appeal waiver and DISMISS the appeal.

*

 This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-88,882-01

EX P ARTE JAYMES HARG ROVE, Appl icant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 2009-423,135-A IN THE 137th DISTRICT COURT

F ROM LUBBOCK COUN TY

Per curiam . O R D E R Pursuant to the provisi o n s o f Ar t icle 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant wa s convicted of two counts of sexual assault of a child. He was sentenc ed to twenty y ear s’ imprisonment in count one and fiftee n y ear s’ imprisonment in count two. He did not appea l his conviction. Applicant contends, among other things, that his trial counsel rende red ineffe ctive assistance beca use counsel err oneously advised him that “he would b e el i gi ble for parole shortly there afte r enter ing prison.” Applicant alleg es th i s er ro n eo u s advice by counsel cause d him to enter an involuntary

plea of g uilty in this case.2

Applicant has alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson , 993 S.W .2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). I n these circ umstances, additional fac ts are neede d. As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez , 334 S.W .2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropr iate forum for finding s of fac t. The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim o f i n ef fec tive assistance of counsel. The trial court may

use any means set out in T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07, § 3(d)

. I f t he trial court elects t o hold a hearing , it shall deter mine whether Applican t is indige nt. I f Applicant is indige nt and wi s h es to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an attorney to repre sent Applicant at the hear ing. T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 26.04. The trial court shall make fi n d i ng s of fac t and conclusions of law as to whether the perf ormanc e of Appl i ca n t ’s trial counsel was defic ient and, if so, whether counsel’s defic ient perf ormanc e prejudice d Applicant. The trial court shall also make any other finding s of fac t and conclusions of law that it deems rele vant and appropr iate to the dispositi on of Applicant’s claim for habea s corpus re lief. This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fac t issues. The issues shall be resolved within 90 day s of this order

. A sup p l em en t al t ranscript containing all aff idavits and int err og atories or the t ransc ription of t he court repor ter’s notes from any hear ing or deposition, along with the trial court’ s supplemental finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, shall be for war ded to this Court within 120 day s of the date of this order. A ny extensions of ti me must be re quested by

the trial cour

t and shall be obtaine d from this Court. Filed: September 12, 2018 Do not publish
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of G+G Retail, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending November 1, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jay
Galin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Jay Galin
-------------------------------
Jay Galin
Chief Executive Officer
December 15, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Nahshon Jackson, Appellant.

[670 NYS2d 117]

—Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated July 21, 1997 *(People v Jackson,*241 AD2d 526), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County, rendered January 25, 1995.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see, Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745). Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Domiko Derrill DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-4805.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 29, 2011.

Decided: April 8, 2011.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM.

Domiko Derrill Davis appeals his fifty-seven-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). We affirm.

*262Davis argues that the district court committed procedural sentencing error by failing to consider an amendment to the Guidelines, pending at the time of Davis’s sentencing, that would eliminate the recency enhancement of *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*(“USSG”) § 4Al.l(e) (2009). Davis contends that despite the absence of an objection below, “proper consideration of the [Guidelines by the district court would have given deference to the [Sentencing] Commission’s considered view that recency points did not serve the purpose of sentencing under [18] U.S.C. § 8553(a) (2006).” The Government asserts that Davis’s explicit waiver of this argument at the sentencing hearing waived his right to appeal this issue. We agree.

“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ” *United States v. Olano,*507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting *Johnson v. Zerbst,*304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). When a defendant fails to raise an argument before the district court, it is forfeited and we review the issue for plain error. *United States v. Massenburg,*564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir.2009). In contrast, waiver extinguishes potential error under Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). *Olano,*507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770. When a claim of error has been waived, “it is not reviewable on appeal.” *United States v. Claridy,*601 F.3d 276, 284 n. 2 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting *Olano,*507 U.S. at 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770).

We conclude that Davis did not merely fail to raise before the district court the argument he now advances; Davis raised the argument and waived it. Counsel indicated that Davis had asked him to waive two objections to the Presentence Report, including application of USSG § 4Al.l(e). Davis confirmed his intention to waive these arguments. Moreover, he maintained this position throughout the hearing. Therefore, the issue is not reviewable by this court.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

         In connection with the Form 10-QSB of China Direct, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
James Wang, CEO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

                                      /s/ James Wang
                                      --------------
November 14, 2006                     James Wang, CEO,
                                      principal executive officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                       OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Amazon Biotech, Inc., a Utah
corporation, (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending April 30,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Philip Drachman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.



/s/ Philip Drachman
----------------------------------------
Philip Drachman, Chief Financial Officer
June 17, 2004