RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4705-17T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.E.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

J.M.,

Defendant.

IN THE MATTER OF M.M., 

a Minor.

Submitted August 5, 2019 – Decided August 9, 2019

Before Judges Sabatino and Rose.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4705-17T1

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,

Docket No. FN-02-0295-17.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Fabiola E. Ruiz-Doolan, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs.)

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jason Wade Rockwell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Victoria Kryzsiak, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief.)

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Danielle Ruiz, Designated Counsel,

on the brief.)

Defendant M.E. appeals from the Family Part's January 16, 2018 order 

concluding, after a fact-finding hearing, she abused and neglected her sevenyear old daughter, M.M. (Maria).1

 We affirm substantially for the reasons set 

forth in Judge Jane Gallina-Mecca's cogent oral opinion. 

The judge's opinion, spanning twenty transcript pages, sets forth the facts 

in detail, and we incorporate by reference her findings here. Judge GallinaMecca conducted the fact-finding hearing on October 26, 2017, at which 

plaintiff Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) presented the 

 

1

 Due to the similarity of family names and initials, we use pseudonyms for ease 

of reference and privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
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testimony of caseworker Lori Laverty; Maria's father, J.M. (John)2; and New 

Milford Police Officer Bryan Mone; and introduced documents in evidence, 

including Division investigation reports and police reports. Neither defendant 

nor the law guardian presented any witnesses or documentary evidence at the 

hearing. 

 In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Gallina-Mecca carefully reviewed 

the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. She found the testimony 

of Laverty, John, and Mone credible, based on their manner of testifying, 

personal knowledge, and lack of inconsistent or contradictory statements. The 

judge noted Laverty and Mone also lacked a personal interest in the outcome of 

the proceedings. Although John's interest in the proceedings was obviously 

personal, the judge recognized he had Maria's "best interest at heart." The judge 

also determined Maria's statements concerning defendant's conduct were 

corroborated. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4) (providing "previous statements made 

by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in 

evidence; provided, however, that no such statement, if uncorroborated, shall be 

sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect"). 

 

2

 John was named as a defendant, but is not a party to this appeal.
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Judge Gallina-Mecca concluded the Division established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that defendant abused or neglected Maria under 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The judge elaborated: 

A review of the material, relevant and competent 

evidence in this case leads to the inexorable conclusion 

that the Division has proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant mother placed [Maria] at a 

substantial risk of harm when she was intoxicated and 

unable to care for her daughter and allowed her to be 

driven by a drunk driver. . . . 

The [c]ourt finds that [Maria]'s disclosures

concerning parental behaviors were corroborated by the

admissions made by the defendant mother and 

information [ob]tained by the Division during its

investigation. Specifically, [defendant] admitted to

drinking frequently to the point of intoxication. She

also admitted that she had previously been referred to

substance abuse treatment. These admissions are 

sufficient to corroborate [Maria]'s report concerning

her mother's relationship with alcohol.

[Maria] described her mother as drinking wine

and alcohol every day. She explained that her mother

often has too much to drink causing her to act

differently. [Maria] described her mother when drunk

as shaking, not walking properly, slurring her words,

melting to the floor and being unable to get up or do

things for herself when she drinks.

[Maria] is fearful when her mother drinks and she 

has devised an escape plan if her mother ever becomes 

too drunk. By her own admissions, it is abundantly 

clear that the defendant mother has a serious untreated 

alcohol issue and the uncontroverted evidence 
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establishes that [Maria] was exposed to and [a]ffected

by her mother's drinking.

This fact is not, however, of any consequence in 

analyzing the defendant mother's actions on the 

evening of the referral incident to determine whether 

those accidents rose to the level of abuse or neglect. It 

is uncontroverted that [defendant] was inebriated while 

in the caretaking role of her daughter at the party on 

December 19, 2016 [(the incident date)].

[Defendant] admitted that she consumed a

significant amount of alcohol and was unable to drive

herself and [Maria] home from the party. Nevertheless,

in her impaired state she determined that her paramour

[Michael] was indeed the appropriate choice of driver. 

While [defendant] surmised that [Michael] was not 

drunk since he only arrived to the party an hour before, 

her seven-year-old daughter was able to recognize that 

he was under the influence.

[Maria] observed her mother at the party to be 

walking side-to-side with shaking arms. She described 

[Michael] as also shaking but not as much as her 

mother. These observations were corroborated as to 

[defendant] by her own admission and as to [Michael]

by Officer Mone.

As the Appellate Division concluded in [Division

of Child Protection & Permanency v.] J.A., [436 N.J. 

Super. 61, 68 (App. Div. 2014),] a parent or guardian 

who permits a child to ride with an inebriated driver 

acts inconsistently with N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). It is 

not less reckless but more so that [defendant] was not 

in a position to assess the condition of her paramour 

because she too was inebriated. 
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[Defendant] was responsible for her daughter's 

safety yet she was in an intoxicated state so that she

could neither ensure her child's safety nor make an 

appropriate plan for her. Even if [Michael] had only 

one beer at the party and arrived late, [defendant] had 

no idea where he was previously and whether he had 

been drinking. Without any inquiry and a complete 

lack of judg[]ment, [defendant] permitted her child to 

ride with a drunk driver placing her precious child in 

peril because she was too intoxicated to adequately 

provide for her daughter's safety.

It is unquestionable that [defendant] acted with 

reckless disregard for her child's safety that could have 

resulted in an unspeakable tragedy. Therefore, the 

[c]ourt finds that [defendant] failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care in caring for her child and as 

such, the [c]ourt finds that the Division has successfully 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that 

[defendant] committed an act of abuse or neglect 

against her minor child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4).

Following a dispositional hearing, the judge determined there was no 

longer a need to continue litigation and dismissed the matter. Defendant now 

appeals. She argues the record is insufficient to establish abuse and neglect by 

a preponderance of the evidence. In particular, she claims the judge's finding 

that she was "intoxicated to the point she was unable to care for her daughter"

is contradicted by Mone's response after he arrested Michael for driving while 

intoxicated, i.e., Mone did not arrest defendant and permitted Maria to return 
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home with her. The Division and law guardian urge us to affirm the judge's 

order. 

 Our standard of review of the Family Part's fact-finding determination is 

limited. On appeal from orders issued in Title 9, we accord considerable 

deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and findings of fact, as

long as those findings are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible 

evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 

(2007). We maintain that deference "unless the trial court's findings 'went so 

wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" Id. at 279. Moreover, 

we do not readily second-guess the factual findings of the Family Part in general, 

given that court's special expertise in matters concerning children. N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014). Applying that limited 

and well-settled scope of review, we affirm the trial judge's finding of abuse and 

neglect, substantially for the sound reasons expressed in Judge Gallina-Mecca's 

opinion. We add only a few comments. 

 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) defines various circumstances that can comprise the 

abuse or neglect of a child. Among other things, the statute specifically covers: 

[A] child whose physical, mental, or emotional 

condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger 

of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his 
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parent or guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a 

minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with 

proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably 

inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or 

substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of 

excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of 

a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the 

court . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).] 

 Our Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he law's paramount concern is the safety 

of the children, and not the culpability of parental conduct." N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 18 (2013) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 177 (1999). "The focus in abuse and neglect matters . . . 

is on promptly protecting a child who has suffered harm or faces imminent 

danger." A.L., 213 N.J. at 18 (emphasis added) (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)). 

Relevant here, a court need not wait until a child is actually harmed or 

neglected before it can act in the welfare of that minor. N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. V.M., 408 N.J. Super. 222, 235 (App. Div. 2009) (citing In re 

Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)). Thus, "[i]n the absence of 

actual harm, a finding of abuse and neglect can be based on proof of imminent 
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danger and substantial risk of harm." A.L., 213 N.J. at 23 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b)). 

 A court's finding of abuse or neglect must be based on a preponderance of 

the evidence when the proof is considered in its totality. N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(b)(1); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.M., 181 N.J. Super. 190, 

201 (App. Div. 1981) ("In child abuse and neglect cases the elements of proof 

are synergistically related. Each proven act of neglect has some effect on the 

[child]. One act may be 'substantial' or the sum of many acts may be 

'substantial.'"). Notably, the Title 9 proof standard is less stringent than in 

guardianship cases for the termination of parental rights, which must instead be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The 

proofs adduced before Judge Gallina-Mecca amply met these evidentiary 

standards. 

As the judge aptly found, the Division established, by a preponderance of 

the credible evidence, defendant abused or neglected Maria by failing to 

recognize in her intoxicated state that Michael was too intoxicated to drive. 

Defendant also later acknowledged her brother, who had not been drinking on 

the incident date, was a viable alternative to drive Maria home. Although the 

judge was careful to limit her findings to the incident date, she also aptly cited 
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Maria's continued trepidation that defendant's ongoing inebriation would 

interfere with her ability to parent. Notably, Laverty testified that in the course 

of her ten-year employment with the Division, she had never experienced a child 

of Maria's age "formulating an escape plan" under similar circumstances. 

 The evidence of neglect is readily apparent from the record. Defendant's 

ongoing inebriation impacted Maria's welfare. Indeed, Maria's disclosures to 

Laverty about defendant's appearance when she drank were remarkable for a 

seven-year-old child. Maria said defendant's "arms shake, . . . she slurs her 

words together . . . [she] walks side to side." Maria further told Laverty that 

defendant and Michael "drink together sometimes and [Maria] thinks at least 

one of them shouldn't be drinking . . . because at least one of them should have 

a brain." Defendant and Michael "don't make good decisions when they're drunk 

and at least one of them should have good ideas." Maria was "afraid when her 

mother . . . drink[s] because when her mother melts to the floor, she can't take 

care of herself and [Maria] knows that she can't take care of [Maria] either."

Defendant did not dispute Maria's account. Although defendant denied 

she was an alcoholic, she admitted she "sometimes" drank alcohol to the point 

of intoxication. Defendant also acknowledged a prior family court order 

directing her to attend substance abuse treatment, but claimed she failed to do 
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so for financial reasons. Thus, Maria's claims of abuse or neglect are amply 

corroborated by defendant's own statements. 

Contrary to defendant's contention, her actions on the day of the incident 

placed Maria in imminent danger, even though Mone permitted the child to 

return home with defendant. When Mone pulled over Michael's car, "[r]ight 

away [he] smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle." Michael 

admitted he consumed "about five beers," failed the standard field sobriety test, 

and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.15 percent, supporting Mone's field 

test findings. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) (providing a person who operates a motor 

vehicle is considered under the influence of intoxicating liquor if his or her BAC 

is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood). 

We therefore conclude the Division introduced substantial credible 

evidence to demonstrate defendant abused or neglected Maria by allowing her 

daughter to ride in an automobile Michael was driving while legally intoxicated. 

As Judge Gallina-Mecca recognized, a parent "who permits a child to ride with 

an inebriated driver acts inconsistently with N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)." J.A., 436 

N.J. Super. at 68. "[N]o reasonable person could fail to appreciate the danger 

of permitting children to ride in a motor vehicle driven by an inebriated 

operator." Id. at 69. Thus, in J.A., we found that a father "was grossly negligent 
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in failing to protect the children from the imminent risk posed by [their mother's] 

driving." Id. at 69-70. Here, defendant's gross negligence was underscored by 

her inability to recognize Michael's intoxication.

 Affirmed.