UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BOSHRA ALSAIDI, Plaintiff,

v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NATIONAL PASSPORT CENTER, Defendants

. Civil Action No. 17-0465 (ESH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Boshra Alsaidi has s ued the United States Department of State (“State Department”) and the National Pa ssport Center (co llectively “de fendants”) alleging that defendants arbitrarily and capri ciously refused to renew her pa ssport based on an improper finding that she was not a citi zen by birth, or that the reason given was a pretext for an informal policy of discrimination against Mu slims or, more specifically, against people from Yemen. (Compl. ¶¶ 11–18, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff brings her claims unde r the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, and t he Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4), and requests that the Court order the State Department to renew her passport and award her attorney’s fees. ( Id. at 6, 7.) Defendants have file d a motion to dismiss the compl aint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Def.’ s Mot. Dismiss , ECF No. 12 (“Mot.”).) Upon consideration of the parties’ p leadings and for the reasons dis cussed herein, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and ther efore grants defendants’ motion to dismiss.2 BACKGROUND
I. FACTS Boshra Alsaidi was born in the United States in 1977. (Compl. ¶ 7.) At the time, her father was serving as Second Secr etary of the Permanent Mission of the Yemen Arab Republic to the United Nations. ( Id. ¶¶ 7–8; Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 12- 1.) Alsaidi applied for and wa s first issued a U.S. passport on March 25, 2003. (Mot. Ex. B at 1, EC F No. 12-2.) She applied to renew her passport on January 4, 2013. ( See Mot. Ex. A.) The National Passport Center denied her passport renewal application on February 23, 2013, stating that because Alsaidi was born while her father held a position that granted him and his immed iate family diplomatic immunity and privileges, Alsaidi was “notborn subject to the jurisdicti on of the United States” and therefore could not “benefit from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ci tizenship provision.” 1 (Mot. Ex. A; Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 15, 2017. The complaint contains two counts, each seeking the same remedy—an or der requiring the State Depar tment to renew plaintiff’s passport and award attorney’s fees. ( See Compl. at 6, 7.) She brings both claims under the APA and the Mandamus Act ( id. ¶¶ 1, 4), arguing that the State Department and National Passp ort Center denied her passport renewa l application o n the inaccurat e basis that she w as not a citizen

1 Although the denial letter was not attached to Alsaidi’s comp laint, it is referenced therein and defendants have attached a copy as Exhibit A to their motion to dismiss. (Mot. Ex. A); see Ward v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs. , 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2009)) (“In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court does not consider m atters outside the pleadings,” but may consider “the facts alle ged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint or ‘documents upon w hich the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if th e document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.’”).3 and pursuant to an informal po licy of discrimination based on r eligion or national origin. ( Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 16, 18.) The first count alleges that the State Department adheres to a discriminatory “double standard,” which provides evidenc e of “arbitrary and capricious conduct.” ( Id. ¶ 12.) Specifically, the complaint alleges that “[a]fter 9/11 all U.S. federal agencies were instructed to be very careful when it came t o renewing VISAS or passports or any other immigration documents pertaining to individua ls like the Plaintiff who had lived in Yemen.” ( Id. ) In addition, “[t]his special instr uction was particularly directed at individuals who came from countries that were largely Mus lim” and that “is the identical conduct that President Trump is engaging in today.” 2 ( Id. ) Thus, although the complaint makes no independent claim of discrimination, Alsaidi’s legal theory is that, based on the in structions of “unknown higher ups located in Washington D.C.,” passpor t center employees “searche d the records of the Plaintiff to see if they could find a basis to reject her passport renewal.” ( Id. ¶ 13.) The complaint alleges that “[t]hey seized on . . . [8 U.S .C. § 1401(a)] of the Immigr ation Nationality Act of 1952,” ( id. ), as a means of denying Alsaidi ’s passport renewal even though Alsaidi claims that she is a U.S. citizen and that the reason gi ven for the denial is legall y insufficient because she claims it misreads 8 C.F.R. § 101.3 ( id. ¶¶ 14–16), which defines the circumstances under which persons born to foreign government officers or employees are born subje ct to the jurisdiction of the United States and considere d U.S. citizens by birth. But see infra , note 6. The second count essentially reall eges the same facts under the rubric of a discrimination

2 In fact, Alsaidi was first issued a passport on March 25, 200 3, (Mot. Ex. B at 1), a little more than a year and a half after September 11, 2001. In addition, the National Passport Center denied Alsaidi’s passport renewa l application on February 23, 2013, (M ot. Ex. A), more than three and a half years before President Trump was elected.4 claim, but also premises her clai m for relief on the APA and th e Mandamus Act. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 1–4.) The second count alleges t hat “the State Department p rocedures and policies prohibited State Department officials from engaging in any discriminatory conduct,” that the passport center employees nevertheless en gaged in an “unlawful discrimin atory practice,” and that this was because they were “directed that whenever a Muslim applican t presented a request to have a passport renewed or a request fro m an individual with ties to a predominately Muslim country, that they had to deny those request s, whether there was a good faith basis to do so or otherwise.” ( Id. ¶ 18.) The complaint then realle ges that the State Department has an informal policy “much like all federal agencies post 9/11 . . . to prevent any Muslim from entering America,” and that, as a result, State Department employees “were directed to find some reason for denying Plaintiff’s application to have her passport renewed, whether j ustified or not.” ( Id. ) Although Alsaidi’s complaint inc ludes two counts , the factual u nderpinnings are exactly the same, the legal theories ar e the same, and the relief sough t is identical, that is, an order requiring that defendants renew her passport. ( Id. ¶¶ 12–18.) Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing that because plaintiff has an adequate alternative remedy available under 8 U.S.C. § 1503, she cannot bring her claims under the APA and the Mandamus Act. (Mot. at 3–4.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests th e legal sufficiency of a compl aint.” Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible c laim requires the plaintiff to plead “factual content that allows5 the court to draw the reasonabl e inference that the defendant i s liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This plausibility standard “as ks for more than a sheer possib ility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” because “[w]here a complaint pleads fact s that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line betw een possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557). While the Court does not “assume the truth of legal conclusions ” or “accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint,” Arpaio v. Obama , 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), the Court neverthe less treats “the complaint’ s factual allegations as true and must grant the plaintiff the be nefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”
L. Xia v. Tillerson , 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alteration omitted). Tha t said, a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertions devo id of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
I. Administrative Procedure Act Claim “[T]he APA provides that final a gency action is subject to judi cial review where there is no other adequate remedy.” Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 660 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704)). An adequate alternative remedy “need not provide relief identical to relief under the APA, so long as it offers relief of the ‘same genre.’” Garcia v. Vilsack , 563 F.3d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ct r. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. , 396 F.3d 1265, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). “[F]or example, relie f will be deemed adequate ‘where a statute affords an opportunity for de novo district-court rev iew’ of the agency action.” Id. at 522–523 (quoting Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr. , 396 F.3d at 1270). The question is therefore whether pla intiff has available an adequa te alternative remedy.6 In her complaint, plaintiff asks only that her passport be rene wed. She alleges the denial of her passport renewal applic ation was based wrongly on the gr ound that she is not a U.S. citizen. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), i f any person within the Un ited States “claims a right or privilege as a national of the U nited States and is denied such right or privilege by any department . . . or official the reof, upon the ground that [s]h e is not a national of the United States,” she may institute an action “for a judgment declaring [her] to be a national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a); see Xia , 865 F.3d at 655 (“Section 1503 provide s for judicial review of denials of any ‘right or priv ilege’ of citizenship, includin g invalidations of passports.”). To initiate such action, a “plainti ff need make only a prima facie case establishing her citizenship by birth or naturalization,” Xia , 865 F.3d at 652 (citing Perez v. Brownell , 356 U.S. 44, 47 n.2 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Afroyim v. Rusk , 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967)), which may be as simple as “[p]resenti ng proof of a naturalization certifi cate or passport—even if already administratively cancelled.” Id. at 656. “The government mus t then respond with clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidenc e rebutting the plaintiff’s showing of citizenship.” Id. at 652. Actions brought under sec tion 1503 “shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district in whic h such person resides or claims a residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a);
see Xia , 865 F.3d at 655–56. The D.C. Circuit recently held t hat where an individual’s passp ort has been revoked, “section 1503 provides plaintiffs an adequate avenue to assert . . . citizenship claims” and “requires a claimant to file in the district in which such pers on resides or claims a residence.”
Xia , 865 F.3d at 655. 3 In this context, passport revo cation and the denial of a pass port renewal

3 Courts have uniformly reached the same conclusion. See, e.g. , Ortega-Morales v. Lynch , 168 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1233–34 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“Because 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) affords Plaintiffs a right of action, the A PA does not apply.”); Hassan v. Holder , 793 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (D.D.C.7 application do not present mean ingfully different questions. See, e.g. , Villareal v. Horn , 203 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly d ismissed APA claims challenging the denial of a pass port application or a passport revocation on grounds that the holder is not a U.S. national, r easoning that . . . a judicial declaration of citizenship and entitlement to a passport [] ma y be directly sought through 8 U .S.C. § 1503(a).”) (collecting cases); see also Hassan v. Holder , 793 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (D.D.C. 2011). 4 Based on her complaint, plaintiff seeks the renewal of her pass port and nothing else. Plaintiff’s passport renewal application was denied based on th e National Passport Office’s assessment that she is not a ci tizen. To renew her passport, p laintiff will require proof of citizenship, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), she may accomplish t his directly through de novo review in the federal district c ourt where she resides (i.e., t he Northern District of California). This constitutes an adequate alternative remedy to achieve plai ntiff’s desired relief.
II. Mandamus Act Claim The Mandamus Act “grants district courts original jurisdiction over ‘any action in the nature of mandamus to compel a n officer or employee of the Unit ed States or any agency thereof

2011) (same); Garcia v. Clinton , No. 10-101, 2011 WL 2173689, at *3 ( S.D. Tex. June 1, 2011) (same); Raya v. Clinton , 703 F. Supp. 2d 569, 575 (W.D. Va. 2010) (“Because 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) provides an adequate rem edy by which the plaintiff ma y challenge the denial of her passport application, the court agrees with the defendants that Counts IV [APA claim] and V [request for mandamus relief] are subject to dismissal.”).
4 A similar but more drawn-out f act pattern underlay the opinio n in Hassan , where the plaintiff was first denied a passport based on his father’s position as a foreign diplomat. 793 F. Supp. 2d at 443. “Ten years later, plainti ff applied again, and this ti me his application was approved.” Id. His passport was confiscated tw o years after that by a U.S. Cit izenship and Immigration Services officer during an appointment relat ed to his wife’s lawful perm anent residence application. Id. Plaintiff then “applied for and s uccessfully received a replace ment passport in July 2009,” but two months after that, the Nati onal Passport Center “sent plain tiff a letter asking him to return the passport because the agency had ‘erred in issuing [it] in t he first place.’” Id. As is the case here, plaintiff brought his clai ms under both the APA and the M andamus Act, which the district court dismissed because section 1503 provided an adequate alter native remedy. Id. at 445.8 to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.’” Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius , 603 F.3d 57, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1361). “To secure mandamus relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) [s]he has a ‘clear right to relief’; (2) t he defendant has ‘a c lear duty to act’; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to plaintif f.” Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Servs. , 630 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Mandamus “is a law of la st resort, available ‘only if [the plaintiff] has exha usted all other avenues of rel ief and only if the defendants owes [her] a clear nondisc retionary duty.’” Chacoty v. Tillerson , No. 14-764, 2018 WL 443493, at *5 n.3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2018) (quoting Heckler v. Ringer , 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)). Here again, plaintiff cannot satisfy t hese requirements. The right to hold a passport “is subordinate to national securi ty and foreign policy considerations; as such it is subject to reasonable governmenta l regulation.” Haig v. Agee , 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981). So, while “pa ssports are issued to a ll law-abiding Ame rican citizens who apply for them and comply w ith the rules prescribed . . . i t is not obligatory to issue one to every citizen who desires it.” Kelso v. U.S. Dep’t of State , 13 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing 3 John Bassett Moore, A D igest of International Law 921 (1906) (statement of Secretary of State Hay to diplomatic a nd consular officers, Mar. 27 1899) ). And more to the point, “everyone who applies for a passport is required to present pro of of identity and citizenship.” Patel v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 11-cv-6, 2013 WL 3989196, at *5 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 2, 2013) (citing 22 C.F.R. § 51.23, 51.40–.41); see United States v. Ginsberg , 243 U.S. 472, 474–75 (1917) (“[E]very certificate of c itizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the government may challenge it . . . and demand its cancelation un less issued in accordance with [statutory] requirements.”). Moreover, as already noted, other means of relief are available to plaintiff, so under the9 Mandamus Act, judicial review is precluded. Hassan , 793 F. Supp. 2d at 445. Applying these governing principles of law, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants ow e her a clear nondiscretionary d uty, see Chacoty , 2018 WL 443493, at *5 n.3, nor has she demonstrated that she lacks an a dequate remedy, and for both reasons, she cannot secure mandamus relief. See Walpin , 630 F.3d at 187.
III. Discrimination Argument Plaintiff argues in her opposition that the relief available un der section 1503 is inadequate because—contrary to the relief requested in her complaint—she s eeks “for the Department of State Passport Office to end its blanket discriminatory policy, not a declaration of Plaintiff’s citizenship.” (Opp. at 4.) But pl aintiff cannot salvage her A PA claim by asserting that her “main objective is to address the la rger policy of discrimination.” ( Id. ) First, her complaint only request s that the Court order the Sta te Department to renew her passport and makes no mention of injunctive or any other form o f relief. Even if she had requested injunctive relief, how ever, she would also need to de monstrate that a court could not provide such relief under sect ion 1503 in order t o prove that t he statute could not serve as an adequate alternative remedy. See Villareal , 203 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74 (concludi ng that plaintiffs had failed to carry their bur den to show that section 1503 is a n inadequate remedy for their APA claims in part because they fa iled to establish that section 15 03 “divests a district court of its power to enter a preliminary inj unction”). “Unless a statute i n so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable infer ence, restricts the court’s jurisdiction i n equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell , 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wint er v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiff argue s that “a declaratory ju dgment regarding Plaintiff’s10 citizenship will do nothing to addres s the discriminatory polic y that Defendants uphold against Yemeni-Americans seeking to trave l or renew their passports.” (Opp. at 4.) That may be so, but plaintiff is not seeking redress for this putative policy nor h as she brought a discrimination claim based on her national origin or r eligion. Plaintiff’s complain t is limited to a challenge to the only final agency action she identif ies—the denial of her passport r enewal—under se ction 706(2)(a) of the APA and this challenge i s in turn precluded by the avail ability of relief under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Second, the APA is not a discovery mechanism. “Discovery or su pplementation of the administrative record is . . . not permitted ‘unless [a party] can demonstrate unusual circumstances justifying a depart ure from this general rule.” Chiayu Chang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 254 F. Supp. 3d 160, 161 (D.D.C. 2017). Obtaining even limit ed discovery requires a party to “ make ‘a significant showing—vari ously described as a strong, substantial, or prima facie showing—that it will find material in the agency’s possession indicative of bad faith or an incomplete record.’” Id. (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Nat’l
Mediation Bd. , 663 F.3d 476, 487–88 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff openly admits that she “needs discovery in this case to furth er prove the discriminatory poli cy in place.” (Opp. at 6.) This sentiment misconstrues judi cial review under the APA. See Kean v. Chertoff , 419 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (refusing t o permit plaintiff to simpl y explore whether the agency’s policy “falls within the scope of both the INA and federal regu lations”). Plaintiff cannot use the APA to justify a fishing expedi tion for evidence that defendant s were motivated, not by their stated reason for denying her passp ort renewal application (tha t plaintiff is not a U.S. citizen), but by a discriminatory policy th at plaintiff believes exists. Third, even if plaintiff could br ing a discrimination claim und er the APA, which she has11 not done here, there are several pr oblems with the allegations in her complaint and with the arguments in her opposition. For e xample, plaintiff does not a cknowledge or attempt to explain how her 2003 passport applicati on was granted, even though she alleges the discriminatory policy was instituted in 2001. See supra , note 2. Nor does she conte nd with the fact that the National Passport Center offere d a reasoned basis for denying h er passport renewal application. ( See Mot. Ex. A) 5 ; Dillmon v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd. , 588 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e defer to the wisdom of the agency, provided its decision is reasoned and rational, and even uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency ’s path may reasonably be discerned.”). Further, the comp laint’s allegations are “bare a ssertions,” which do not even amount to “a ‘formulaic recitati on of the elements’ of a consti tutional discrimination claim.” See Iqbal , 686 U.S. at 681. Conclusory allega tions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” id. at 680, and plaintiff offers no fact ual support for her claim o f discrimination other than conclusory allegations. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 682 (“As between t hat ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for [the denial] , and the purposeful, invidious di scrimination [plaintiff] asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plau sible conclusion.”). Finall y, the articles plai ntiff cites in her

5 Defendant explains the rationa le for the denial of the passpo rt renewal application as follows: The Secretary of State may onl y issue passports to U.S. nationa ls[,] . . . defined as individuals “born in the United States, and subject to the juri sdiction thereof.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). . . . [This defini tion] was intended to exc lude children of foreign ministers or diplomatic officers born within the United States from operation of the citizenship claus e of the Fourteenth Amendment

. United States v. Wong Kim Ark , 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898), and federal r egulations accordingly provide that “[a] person born in the United States to a foreign diplomatic officer accredited to the United States, as a matter of international l aw, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Unite d States.” 8 C.F.R. § 101.3(a). T he term foreign diplomatic officers includes secr etaries “with comparable diplo matic status and immunities who are accredited t o the United Nations[.]” 8 C.F.R . 101.3(a)(2). (Mot. at 6–7.)12 opposition offer no additional relevant evidence. 6 ( See Opp. at 8.) Both descr ibe a pattern of passport revocations occurring exc lusively in the United States Embassy in Saan’a, Yemen, not in passport offices in the United States. 7 Plaintiff submitted her application to renew her passport in the United States, not Yemen, and she was not accus ed of fraud; instead, the passport office denied her passport renewa l application for reasons that are facially coherent. See Fox v.
Clinton , 684 F.3d 67, 74–75 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“To survive arbitrary an d capricious review, an agency action must be the produc t of reasoned decisionmaking.”)

. To seek the relief she professe s to want, plaintiff must file h er claim under the proper statute—8 U.S.C. § 1503—and in the pr oper venue—the Northern Di strict of California. (Compl. at 1 & ¶ 2.) Since she has not done this here, the mo tion to dismiss will be granted.
CONCLUSION Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff’s compl aint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relie f can be granted. A separate Order, ECF No. 19, accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: February 20, 2018 /s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

6 The Court considers these artic les because “courts may take j udicial notice of matters of a general public nature without c onverting a motion to dismiss in to one for summary judgment.” Sodexo Operations, LLC v. Not-For-Profit Hosp. Corp. , 264 F. Supp. 3d 262, 264 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Duma v. JPMorgan Chase , 828 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85 n.3 (D.D.C. 2011)).
7 See Ramzi Kassem, Passport Revocation as Proxy Denatur alization: Examining the Yemen Cases , 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2099, 2100–102 (2014) ( explaining that off icials at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen have taken to se izing Yemeni-Americans’ passpo rts on suspicion of fraud and requiring some of these ind ividuals to wait up to two years for return of their passports); Smitha Khorana, Harrowing Treatment of Yemeni-Americans Demands Government Probe, Groups Say , The Intercept (Jan. 27, 2016) (de scribing Americans stranded in Yemen due to accusations of fraud related to their passports).