NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 2 0

- 2 2 4 2

___________

D W A Y N E K A M A R S Y B B L I S S

, Petitioner

v.

ATTORNE Y GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMER ICA

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Im migration Appeals

(Agency No. A 0 62

- 4 6 3

- 1 8 6 )

Immigration Ju dge: M i r l a n d e T a d a l

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circui t LAR 34.1(a)

J u n e 3

, 2 0 2 1

Before: G R E E N A W A Y

, J R

. , K R A U S E a n d B I B A S

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : August 5, 2021 )

___________

OPINION *

___________

P ER CURIAM

D w a y n e K a m a r S y b b l i s s petitions for review of his final ord er of removal. We

will deny the petition

.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.2 I.

S y b b l i s s i s a c i t i z e n o f J a m a i c a w h o e n t e r e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s a l a w f u l

p e r m a n e n t r e s i d e n t i n 2 0 1 2

. S y b b l i s s w a s l a t e r c o n v i c t e d t w i c e i n 2 0 1 5 a n d o n c e i n 2 0 1 8

o f p o s s e s s i n g 5 0 g r a m s o r l e s s o f m a r i j u a n a i n v i o l a t i o n o f N

. J

. S t a t

. A n n

. § 2 C : 3 5

-

1 0 ( a ) ( 4 )

. O n t h e b a s i s o f a l l t h r e e c o n v i c t i o n s

, t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y

c h a r g e d S y b b l i s s a s r e m o v a b l e f o r h a v i n g b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e

v i o l a t i o n “ o t h e r t h a n a s i n g l e o f f

e n s e i n v o l v i n g p o s s e s s i o n f o r o n e ’ s o w n u s e o f 3 0 g r a m s

o r l e s s o f m a r i j u a n a [

. ] ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i )

. ( A

. 2 7 2

. ) S y b b l i s s c o n c e d e d h i s

c o n v i c t i o n s b u t c o n t e s t e d t h e c h a r g e

. H e d i d n o t a p p l y f o r a n y r e l i e f f r o m r e m o v a l

. A n

I m m i g r a t i o n J u d g e ( “ I J ” ) s u s t a i n e d t h e c h a r g e a n d o r d e r e d S y b b l i s s ’ s r e m o v a l t o

J a m a i c a

. T h e B o a r d o f I m m i g r a t i o n A p p e a l s ( “ B I A ” ) a f f

i r m e d b y d i s m i s s i n g S y b b l i s s ’ s

a p p e a l o n t h e m e r i t s

. S y b b l i s s p e t i tio n s f o r r e v i e w

. 1

II.

S y b b l is s r a i s e s e s s e n t i a l l y fo u r ar g um e n t s o n r e v i e w

, b u t t h e y l a c k m e r i t

. F i r s t

,

S y b b l i s s a r g u e s t h a t h e i s n o t r e m o v a b l e p u r s u a n t to § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i ) b e c a u s e h e

q u a l i f i e s f o r t h e s o

- c a l l e d “ p e r s o n a l u s e ” e x c e p t i o n u n d e r t h a t s t a tu t e

. A s n o t e d a b o v e

,

t h e s t a t u t e r e n d e r s n o n c i t i z e n s r e m o v a b l e f o r c o ntr o l l e d s u b s t a n c e v i o l a t i o n s “ o t h e r t h a n

a s i n g l e o f f

e n s e i n v o l v i n g p o s s e s s i o n f o r o n e ’ s o w n u s e o f 3 0 g r a m s o r l e s s o f

1 W e have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) ( 1)

. S ybbliss ’ s convictions limit our

jurisdictio n to c o nstitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C),

(D). Sybbliss ’ s arg uments qualify, and we review them de novo. See Myrie v. A tt ’ y

Gen.

, 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).3 m a r i j u a n a [

. ] ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i )

. S y b b l i s s a r g u e s t h a t h e q u a l i f i e s for t h i s

e x c e p t i o n b e c a u s e h i s t h r e e o f f

e n s e s c o l l e c t i v e l y involved l e s s t h a n 3 0 g r a m s

.

T h e B I A p r o p e r l y r e j e c t e d t h a t a r g u m e n t

. T h e s t a tu t e exce p t s on l y a “ s i n g l e

o f f

e n s e

, ” a n d S y b b l i s s d o es no t q u al i f y fo r th e e x ce pt io n b e c aus e h e h a s b e en co n v i c t ed

o f t h r e e o f f

e n se s

, 2 n o t o n e

. S e e R o d r i g u e z v

. H o l d er

, 6 1 9 F

. 3 d 1 0 7 7

, 1 0 7 9

- 8 0 ( 9 t h C i r

.

2 0 1 0 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. N o n e o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o n w h i c h S y b b l i s s r e l i e s suggests o t h er w i s e

, 3

a n d hi s ar g u me nt s ab out C o n g r e ssio na l i nt en t an d the w i s d o m o f th e law 4 do n ot a ll ow u s

to d i s re ga r d the pl ai n l a n g u ag e o f thi s st at u te

. T h u s

, w e a g r e e w i t h t h e B I A t h a t S y b b l i s s

does n o t q u a l i f y f o r t h e p e r s o n a l

- u s e e x c e p t i o n

. 5

2 In his brief, Sybbliss asserts that his 2018 conv iction “ was ex punged by a St ate Judge. ”

S ybbliss has not provided any details or raised any arg ument in that rega rd, and he does

not appear to have r aised thi s issue before the BIA. In any event, the analysis he rein

would be the same if Sybbliss had two operati ve convictions rather than three.

3 Sybbli ss relies, for example, on Esquivel v. Lynch

, 803 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2015)

. In

that case, the court rejected the BIA ’ s conclusion that the personal

- use exception did not

apply to a conviction of possessing m ariju ana with in 1,000 feet of a school. See id. at

702

- 06. Esquivel did not involve multiple convictions and did not sugg est that the

personal

- use exceptio n applies despite multiple conviction. To the contrar y, the court

recognized that the exception appli es only when the conviction in question is the

noncitizen ’ s first controlled substance offe nse. See id. at 702.

4 S y b b l i s s n o t e s t h a t N e w J e r s e y v o t e r s have a p p r o v e d a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t

l e g a l i z i n g r e c r e a t i o n a l m a r i j u a n a

. H e d o e s n o t a r g u e t h a t t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t i n v a l i d at e s

h i s c o n v i c t i o n s o r t h e i r i m m i g r a t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s

, h o w e v e r

, a n d i t d o e s n o t

. C f

. K h a n v

. A t t ’ y G e n

. , 9 7 9 F

. 3 d 1 9 3

, 2 0 1

- 0 3 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 2 0 )

.

5 Fo r the sam e reason, we rejec t Sybblis s ’ s argument that he was eligible for a w aiver

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). That provision , i nter alia, allows the Attorney General to

waive inadmissibility under § 1182(a) (2)(A) (i)(II) “ insofar as it relates to a single offense

of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana[.] ” 8 U. S.C. § 1182(h) ; see also4 S e c o n d

, S y b b li s s a r g u e s t h a t h i s m a r i j u a n a c o n v i ctio n s a re n o t o t h e r w i s e

r e m ov a b l e offense s u nd e r § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i )

. H e r el i e s s o l e l y o n a sta t e m e n t b y a p a n e l

o f t h i s C o u rt i n S a u n d e r s v

. A t t o r n e y G en e r a l

, 1 9 7 F

. A p p ’ x 1 8 9 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( n o t

p re c e de n t ial )

. I n that c a s e

, t h e p a n e l c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e o f fe n s e o f s e l l i n g m a r i j u a n a i n

v i o l a t io n o f N e w Y o r k P e n a l L a w § 2 2 1

. 4 0 d i d n o t q u a l i f y f o r t h e p er s o n a l

- u se e x c e p t i o n

be c a u s e t h e o f f

e n s e r e q u i re d a s a l e r a t h e r t h a n m e r e p e rso n a l us e

. S e e i d

. a t * 1

. I n d o i n g

so

, t h e p a n e l s t a t e d tha t

, w h i l e § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i ) “ does no t require that petitioner have

engaged in ‘ tr afficking” in a controlled substance

, ” i t r e q u i re s “ that he has engaged in

something more than mere possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana. ” I d

.

S y b b l i s s a r g u e s t h a t h i s o f f

e n s e s a r e n o t r e m o v a b l e u n d e r t h e s t a tu t e b e c a u s e

, e v e n

c o n s i d e r i n g h i s t h r e e c o n v i c t i o n s c o l l e c t i v e l y

, h e d i d n o t e n g a g e i n “ s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n

m e r e p o s s e s s i o n o f l e s s t h a n 3 0 g r a m s o f m a r i j u a n a

. ” B u t t h i s s t a t e m e n t i n S a u n d e r s

, i n

a d d i t i o n t o ap p e a r i n g i n a n o n p r e c e d e n t i a l o p i n i o n

, m e r e l y d i s t in g ui s h e d b e t w e e n a n

o f f

e n s e i n v o l v i n g a s a l e a n d a n o f f

e n s e i n v o l v i n g p e r s o n a l u s e

. I t d i d not a d d r e ss the

e f f

e c t o f m u l t i p l e co n v i c t i o n s

. N o r d i d i t s u g g e s t t h a t c o n v i ctio n s o f m a r i j u a n a

p o s s e s s i o n t h a t d o n o t q u a l i f y f o r t h e p e r s o n a l

- u s e e x c e p t i o n a r e n o t c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n ce

v i o l a t i o n s

, w h i c h t h e y i n d i s p u t ab l y a r e

. 6

Sy b lis v. Att ’ y Gen. , 763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasizing tha t the waiver

applies only to a “ single offe nse ” ).

6 Before the IJ, Sybbliss filed a motion to terminate his removal proceeding and argued

that his convictions d o not qualify as removable controlled substance violations for the

different reason that New Je rsey law classifi es them as disorderly persons o ffen ses. He5 T h i r d

, S y b b l i s s a r g u e s t h a t th e I J d e n i ed h i m d u e p r o ce s s b e c a u se s h e a c t e d a s a n

a d v o c a t e fo r th e G o ver n me n t b y “ b r i n g i n g ” o r “ e x p a n d i n g ” t h e c h a r g e s a g a in s t h i m to

i n c l u de a l l t hr e e o f hi s c o n v ic t io n s

. S y b b l i s s c la i m s t h a t t h e I J d i d s o b e c a u se t h e

G o v e rn m e n t

, i n o p p o s i t io n t o h i s m o t io n t o t e r mi n a t e

, d i d n o t sp e c i f ic a l l y a r g u e t h a t h i s

t h r e e separate co n v i c t i o n s p r e v e n t e d h i m f rom q u a l i f y i n g f or th e p e rso n a l

- u s e e x c ep t io n

.

T h er e i s n o b a s is f o r thi s a r g u m e n t

. S y b b l i s s ’ s m o t io n t o t e rm i na t e was n o t b as e d

o n t h e p e r s o n a l

- u s e e x c e p t i o n

. I n an y e ve n t

, t h e G o v e rn m e nt e x p re s s l y c h a r g e d S y b b l i s s

a s r em ov a b l e o n t h e b a si s of al l t hr e e o f his c o n v ic t io n s a n d e x p re s s l y c h a r g e d t h a t h e

w as re mo v ab l e b e c a u se h e w a s convicted o f a c o n t r o l l e d s ub s t a n c e v i o l a t i o n “ o t h e r t h a n

a s i n g l e o f f

e n s e i n v o l v i n g p o s s e s s i o n f o r o n e ’ s o w n u s e o f 3 0 g r a m s o r l e s s o f

m a r i j u a n a [

. ] ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i )

. ( A

. 2 7 2

. ) T h e I J d i d n o t “ b r i n g ” a c h a r g e o r

“ e x p a n d ” t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t h i m b y s u s t a i n i n g t h a t c h a r g e

.

F i n a l l y

, S y b b l i s s a r g u es t h a t t h e I J e rr e d i n i n f o r m i n g h i m t h a t h e i s n o t e l i g i bl e f or

c a nce l l a t i o n o f r e m o v a l u n d e r 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 9 b ( a )

. S y b b l i s s r a i s e d t h i s a r g u m e n t b e f o r e

t h e B I A

, a n d t h e B I A d i d n o t a d d r e s s i t

, b u t w e n e e d n o t r e m a n d f o r t h e B I A t o d o s o

b e c a u s e S y b b l i s s i s i n e l i g i b l e f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f l a w

. S e e R i c k e t t s v

. A t t ’ y

G e n

. , 9 5 5 F

. 3 d 3 4 8

, 3 5 1

- 5 2 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 2 0 ) ; s e e a l s o Y u a n v

. A t t ’ y G e n

. , 6 4 2 F

. 3 d 4 2 0

,

4 2 7 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( a d o p t i n g h ar m l e s s

- e rr o r r e v i e w i n t h e i m m i g r a t i o n c o n t e x t )

.

ha s not raised that issue on review . Even if he had, th e IJ applied the proper framework

in reject ing tha t argument and we see no immedi ately apparent bas is to question her

conclusion. See Cast illo v. Att ’ y Gen.

, 729 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).6 Lawful permanent residents like Sybbliss are eligible for cancellation of removal

if, inter alia, they have “resided in the United S t ates continuously for 7 years after having

been ad mitted in any status[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2). T h e period of continuous

residence is deemed to end either “(A) . . . when the alien is served with a notice to

appear under section 1229(a) of this title

, or (B) when the alien has committed an

offense” t hat renders the alien inadmissible or removab le

, “ w h i c h e v e r i s e a r l i e s t

. ” 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) & (B) (emphasis added).

Sybbliss relies on the first of these provisions, as well as Pereira v. Session

, 138 S.

Ct. 2105 (2018), in arguing that he accrued seven year s of continuous residence before

t he DHS served his notice to appear in October 2019. But Sybbliss’s period of

continuous residence ended under the second of these provisions before he accrued s even

years. Sybbliss arrived in the United States in 2012, a nd he committed all three offenses

between 2015 and 2018, so his period of continuous residence e n d e d under the second of

these provisions before he accrued seven years. See Barton v. Barr , 140 S. Ct. 1442

,

1 4 4 9 (2020). Pereira did not involve the second of these provisions and does not

otherwise support any argument in this regard. See Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2110 n.3

(noting that § 1229b(d)(1)(B) “is not at issue here”).

III.

For these reaso n s, we wi ll deny S y b b l i s s ’ s petition for review. T h e G o v e rn m e nt ’ s

m o t io n t o d i s m is s h i s p e t i t i o n f o r l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n i s d e n i e d

.