No. 2--07--0270 Filed: 2-13-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINO IS, ) of De Ka lb Co un ty. ) Plaintiff -Appella nt, )

) v. ) Nos. 06--DT--917 ) 06--TR--24714 ) TRAVIS J. WOOD, ) Honorab le ) Wi ll ia m P . B ra dy, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

____________________________________ __________

__________________________________ _ JUSTICE GIL LERAN JOHNSON de livered

the opinio n of the c ourt: Following a traffic stop, the defendant, Travis J. Wood, was charged by complaint in the circuit court of De Kalb C ounty

with drivi

ng unde r the infl uence o f alcoho l (DUI

) (625 I LCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 2006)). He was a lso notifie d of the st

atutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. The def endant pe titioned f or the re scission o f the susp ension an d moved toquash his a rrest and suppress evidence. Concluding that the tra ffic stop was invalid, the trial court rescinded the suspension and g rante d the def endant' s motion to qu

ash and su

ppress. T

he State appeals. We reverse and remand. The rescissi on petitio n an d the motion to quash and suppress were heard togethe r. At the hearin g, the defendant testified that in the early morning

hours of December 29, 2006, hedrove pa st his girlfr ie nd's home in Waterman. The defendant' s girlfriend had been working la te and he wasNo. 2--07--0270

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unable to reach her, so he wanted to make sure she had gotten home safely
. On the way back to hi s
ownhome in Hinckle

y, t he defe ndant saw

a police vehicle following

him. The defendant testified that he stoppe d at a stop

sign on Ce dar Stre et at the i ntersection wit

h Route 3 0. Buildings at the
corner obstruct ed his vie w of traf fic on Rou

te 30, so he

pulled forward. He then tu rned onto Route 30. The p olice ve

hicle continued to

follow him . The def

endant st opped at a

red lig ht at th e intersection

of Route 30 and Elm

Street. When the light turned green, the def endant proceeded throu gh the intersection. The police vehicle followed defendant for about a mile to the intersection of Route 30 and Route 23. The defendant came to a stop, and then proc eede d through the intersection. At that point, the defendant was pulled over. De Kalb Count

y sh eriff' s deputy

Craig Pa rnow test ified tha t at about 3:3 0 a. m., while on patrol in Waterman, he observed the defendant's vehicle traveling very slowly . The vehicle stopped inthe middle of the road at one point. Parnow followed the vehicle onto Cedar S tree t. Parnow testified that there is a stop sign at the intersection of Cedar Street and Route 30. The intersection is marked w

ith a stop li

ne and a crosswa lk. According to

Parnow, t he defe ndant' s vehicle

rolled pa st the "stoplight" at the intersection and stopped in the crosswalk. (Parnow acknowledged that from behind the stop line a

driver c ould

not see tr affic o n Route 30. ) The de fendant's vehic le turne d onto Route 30 and pr

oceede d east tothe inter

section o f Route 30

and Elm Str

eet, which is controlled by
a trafficlig ht and marked with a stop line and a crosswalk. The traff ic light was red. T h e defend ant's vehicle

stopped in the crosswalk, "almost a car leng th" past the stop line. When the light turned green , the def

endant' s vehicle

procee ded throu

gh the in tersec tion, cro ssed over

the cent e r l ine, and continued slowly toward Route 23. As the de fendant's vehic le approac hed the in tersec tion, it drifted to the rig ht onto the line between the eastbound lane and the right- turn lane . Accor

ding toNo. 2--07--0270

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Parnow, the vehicle "stopped approximately a vehicle length beyond the s top line at that intersection." Parnow pulled the defendant over and ti cketed him for disobey ing a traffic control device at the intersection of Route 30 and Route 23. Parno w's squad car was equipped with a video camer a. He activated the c amera as the defend ant's vehicle was approaching Route 30 from Ceda r Street. A videotape taken by the camera
was admitted i

nto evide nce and play ed in cour t. After viewing

the videotape, Parnow conceded that there was no stop line at the intersection of Route 30 and Route 23. However, the tape shows the presence of stop lines and crosswalks at the other tw o i nt er se ct io ns de sc ri be d i n P ar no w' s t es ti mo ny. Contrary to Parnow's testimony, the defendant's vehicle did not stop bey ond the stop line at each of theseintersections. Rather, the vehicle was straddling the stop line when it

came to a halt at each intersection. Ina resci ssion hea

ring, a motorist ma

y challeng e the pro

priety of a tra ffic stop

leading to his
or her arrest for DUI
. People v. Crocker , 267 Ill. App. 3d 343, 345 (1994). A reviewing court wil l notdist urb th e tria l cour t's fi ndin gs of fact unle ss against the manifest weight of the evidenc e. Peoplev. Rush , 319 I ll. App. 3d 34, 38 (2001). Howeve r, the tri al court's ultima

te concl usion as to the legality of

the stop is reviewed de novo
. Rush , 319 Ill. App. 3d at 38-39. The same standar d of review applies to the trial court's ruling on a motion to quash an arrest and suppress evidence. Rush , 319 Ill. App. 3d at 38-39. "A traffic violation

gener ally provides a s ufficient b asis for a traf fic stop." People v. Cole , 369 Ill. App. 3d 960, 9 66 (2007 ). At issue here is whether the defendant violated a ny traffic law. According

to the State, the defendant failed to come to a proper stop at the intersection of Route 30 and Cedar Str

eet and a t the intersection o f Route 30 and Elm Str

eet. The State maintains that theNo. 2--07--0270

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defendant stopped im

properl y be cause hi s vehicle

came to r

est strad dling the stop lines a

t both intersec tions. The State contends that the trial court's conclusion that the defendant proper ly brought his vehic le to a stop

was base d on a misin

terpretation of t

he applic able sta

tutes. The defenda

nt respon ds that the

trial cou rt "did not misinter

pret the statute[s], b

ut corre ctly found that the version of

the incident presented by the arresting officer wa s not credible because the videotape of the traffic stop contradicted his testimony ." It is true that after viewing the videotape the trial court

rejected much of Parnow's testimony . The trial court discredited Parnow's testimony that defendant's vehicle crossed the c enter line after proceeding

through the intersection of Route 30 and Elm Street and

that the v ehicle s topped in t he crosswalk

at the inte

rsection of Route 3 0 and Elm Stree t. Mo reover , as no ted, t he vid eotap e clear ly refutes Parno w's testimony that there was a stop line at the inter secti on of R oute 3 0 and R oute 2 3. How ever, t he tri al cou rt's findings on these matters have no bearing on the issue raised by the State--whether the defendant violated any traffic law by bringing his vehicle to a stop s traddling the stop lines. The f

acts re levant to

this issue a

re not in dispute. The trial court expressly found tha t, at the intersection of

Route 30 and Elm Street, "[t]he front portion of [the defendant's] vehicle was over the stop line." More ove r, in his brief , the defendant sp ec if ic al ly s ta te s t ha t " [t ]h e t ap e d is pl ays *** a brief, complete stop straddling thestop line" at the intersection of Route 30 and Cedar Street. The question presented is whether the tr ial court properly a

pplied the law to these facts in concluding that the defendant violated no traffic law. Becau se the que stion is one of law, o ur revie w is de novo
. Section 11--306(c)(1) of the Illinois Vehic le Code (C ode) (62 5 IL CS 5/11--3 06(c)( 1) (West 2006)) provides that at a red light a driver "sha ll stop at a clearly

marked stop line, but if there is no such stop line, before entering the crosswa lk on the near

side of the intersection, or if there is no suchNo. 2--07--0270

1 Where section 1 1--306( c)(1) u ses the ph rases " but if ther

e is n o such stop line" and "or if there is no such crosswalk," section 11--904(b) use s the phrases "but if none" and "or if none." -5- crosswalk, then before entering the intersec tion." With slight variations in wording that are of no significance here, section 11--904(b) of the Code (625 IL CS 5/11--904(b) (West 2006)) imposes the
same requirement on a driver approaching an intersection

at which a stop sign is posted. 1 Incontras t, section11--1204(b) of t he Code (625 IL CS 5/11--1204(b) (West 2006)) requires a driver approaching

a stop sign to stop before entering the cr osswalk, or, if there is no crosswalk, to stop at
a clearly ma

rked stop line. The defendant argue s that, because there was a cro sswalk at the intersection

of Route 30 and

Cedar Street, section 11--1204(b) did not mandate that he stop at the stop line. The argument ignores section 11--904(b)'s independent requirement that a dr iver stop at a stop line. Thus, the defendant was required to stop at the stop line at that intersection as well as at the tra ffic-li ght-controlled i

ntersection of Rout

e 30 and E lm Street. T he trial court concluded that the defendant complied with the applicable statutes eve n thou gh it is undisputed that he sto pped his ve

hicle as tride the

stop lines r

ather th an behind

them. The court explained

that, "a s Miriam [ sic ] Webster would tell us, 'at' is used as a func tion word to indicate presence or occurrenc e in, on, or near." The State arg ues that this interpretation of th e relevant statutes i s errone ous. We ag ree. " In int

erpret ing a sta tute, thiscourt' s primary

objectiv e is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the bes t indicat or of which is the langua ge of the statu te." Harroun v. Add is on Police Pension Board , 372 Ill. App. 3d 260, 263 (2007). The trial court expressed the correct dictionary definition of the word "at." See Webs ter's Third New International Dictionary 136 (1986). However, the task of interpreting the language of
a statute cannot alway s be reduced to "the mechanica l application of the dictionary definitions of

theNo. 2--07--0270

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individual words and ph rases invol ved." Whelan v. County Office rs' El ectora l Board of Du P age County , 256 I ll. App. 3d

555, 558 ( 1994). Mo reover , courts m ust be careful not

to read statutory langua ge in an overly litera l manner. Whelan , 256 Ill. App. 3d at 558 ("Courts must shy away f rom reading l anguage too litera

lly" ). Our su

preme c ourt has s tated tha t "[a] statu

te or ord inance m ust receive a sensible c onstr uction, e ven thoug

h such co nstruction qualifie s the unive rsality of its language." In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation , 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246 (1994). The trial co urt cho se a literal interpretation over a sensible one. I f a vehicle stops "at" the stop line b y straddl ing i t, the line do es not mark a definite stopping point; it marks a range of stopping points that varies with the length of a partic ular veh icle involved. In the

case of a relati vely small passenger automobile, it may notmake much differ

ence, in terms of road safety , whether the vehicle stops behind the line or astride it. Howev er, the v ehicles that trav el on I llinois roa ds come inall shapes and sizes. The trial court's interpretation become s significa ntly more p roblema

tic if applied to a 40-foot-long bus that coul d projec t well into a n interse ction bef

ore its re ar whee ls reach the st op line. Under the trial court's interpretation of the a pplicable statutes, the bus would have made a proper stop. We conclude that the General Assembly

did not conte mplate tha

t stopping astride a clearly marked stop line would constitute compliance with sections 11--306(c)(1) and 11- -9 04(b) of the Code. Because the defendant violated both of the se provisions, Parnow w as entitled t o pull him
over. The defenda

nt also co ntends tha

t even if he was g uilty of a "te chnic al" vio lation, the trial court did not er r in concludi ng that t he traf fic stop w as unlaw ful. The only authority he cites is a trio of cases-- Peoplev. Faletti , 215 Ill. App. 3d 61 (1991), People v. Decker , 181 Ill. App. 3d 427 (1989),No. 2--07--0270

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and People v. Collins , 154 Ill. App. 3d 149 (1 987)--holding that a police officer may not stop a vehicle merely bec ause it momentarily crosse s the center line. As the State n otes, how ever, th is court has expressly re

jected the holdings of these cases. Rush , 319 I ll. App. 3d at 39. In Rush we held that an officer may

stop a vehicle that has momentarily crossed the center line unless the officer knows of additional facts that make it reasonably apparent that it was legal for the vehicle to do so. Rush , 319 Ill. App. 3d at 40. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the or der o f the cir cuit cour t of De Ka

lb County rescindingthe statutory summary suspension of the defendant's driving privileg es and g

ranting his motion to quash and suppress, and we remand the cause. Reversed and remanded. McLAREN and CAL

LUM, JJ., concur.