Opinion filed March 23, 2023

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00287-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF I.H., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10513-CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the mother and the father of I.H. The father filed this appeal. On appeal, 

he presents one issue in which he challenges the trial court’s finding that the 

termination of his parental rights would be in I.H.’s best interest. We affirm the order 

of the trial court. 

I. Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate parental 
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rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has 

committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court found 

that Appellant had committed two of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those 

found in subsections (E) and (O). Appellant does not challenge these findings on 

appeal. 

The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination 

of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges both the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding.

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, 

we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the 

evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine 

whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility 

and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In 

re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)). 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 
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programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

II. Evidence and Analysis

The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective 

Services became involved with I.H. shortly after her birth—when she tested 

positive for methamphetamine. I.H.’s mother tested positive for marihuana and 

methamphetamine. As a result of these drug test results, the Department removed 

I.H. from her parents’ care. Not long thereafter, Appellant also tested positive for 

methamphetamine. 

After I.H. was removed, Appellant was ordered by the trial court to comply 

with the requirements set forth in his family service plan. The family service plan 

required that Appellant complete a substance abuse assessment, submit to random 

drug tests as requested by the Department, submit to a psychological evaluation,

attend counseling, successfully complete parenting classes, regularly visit the child, 

and maintain legal employment. Appellant participated in some services but did not 

successfully comply with the requirements of his service plan.

Furthermore, Appellant continued to test positive for methamphetamine while 

this case was pending in the trial court. Six months prior to trial, Appellant’s hairfollicle test revealed methamphetamine at a level of 33,789 pg/mg. Three months 

later, Appellant’s hair-follicle test revealed methamphetamine at a level of 82,491 

pg/mg. The level of methamphetamine, and the fact that the level increased 
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drastically just three months prior to the commencement of trial, is particularly

concerning when considering the return of I.H. to Appellant. 

The record shows that Appellant had prior history with the Department: he 

and other members of his family physically assaulted a family member’s child to 

such an extent that the child required hospitalization. The child had ligature marks 

around his neck, a black eye, and kick marks on his back, chest, and abdomen. 

During the Department’s investigation of the incident, Appellant admitted that he 

had “hit the child in the head with a log.” The record also shows that domestic 

violence occurred between Appellant and I.H.’s mother and that Appellant was the 

aggressor.

Also concerning was Appellant’s behavior during the supervised visitation

with I.H. Although Appellant regularly attended visitation when allowed to do so, 

he was often confrontational and argumentative—even while holding I.H. in his 

arms. The police were summoned multiple times to Appellant’s visitation. The 

permanency case manager acknowledged, however, that there was no question that 

Appellant loves I.H. and that he had developed a bond with her.

Appellant testified that he loved his daughter and would never let anything 

happen to her. Appellant believed, and expressed his belief quite emphatically, that 

it would be in I.H.’s best interest for her to be returned to and raised by her family, 

specifically Appellant or his mother.

The Department’s plan for I.H. was for her to remain in the care of her foster 

parents—with whom I.H. had been placed since she was released from the hospital 

after her birth. The foster parents wish to adopt I.H. if she becomes available for 

adoption, and they have provided I.H. with a safe and stable home. The permanency 

case manager testified that I.H. was “doing great” there and was bonded to her foster 

family. The permanency case manager also testified that it would be in I.H.’s best 

interest for Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated.
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The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility.

A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503. We are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the 

trier of fact as long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 

at 573. Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence 

presented at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be 

in the best interest of I.H. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering the 

record as it relates to the desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs of 

the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the plans for the child by 

the Department, Appellant’s continued drug use, and Appellant’s erratic and violent

behavior, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the 

finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of I.H. 

See id. We defer to the trial court’s finding as to I.H.’s best interest, see C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in this case that the trial court’s finding as to best 

interest is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we overrule 

Appellant’s sole issue. 

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the order of the trial court. 

BRUCE WILLIAMS

JUSTICE

March 23, 2023

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.