alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6738** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. CHARLES LEE TORIAN , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Danville
. Norman K. Moon , Senior District Judge. ( 4:01

- cr - 70057

- NKM

- 1; 4:15

- cv - 80813

- NKM

- RSB )

Submitted : August 20, 2015 Decided: August 25, 2015

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Charles Lee Torian, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not bindin g precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Charles Lee Torian seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his motion to correct a clerical error as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion and denying it on that basis . The order is not appeal able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion st ates a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Torian has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bruce Retzer, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 534]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: County Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of defendant’s nephew regarding an altercation between the nephew and a prosecution witness. “While proof of bias or hostility of a witness is not collateral *(see, People v Gilland,*110 AD2d 1078), a court may, in the exercise of discretion, properly exclude such proof when it is too remote or speculative *(see, People v Thomas,*46 NY2d 100, 105-106, *appeal dismissed*444 US 891; *People v Stewart,*188 AD2d 626, 627)” *(People v Cullen,*236 AD2d 808, *lv denied*89 NY2d 1010). We reject the contention of defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial by less than meaningful representation *(see, People v Flores,*84 NY2d 184, 187). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621), is sufficient to support the conviction, and the verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). The court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence without conducting a hearing *(see, People v Mendoza,*82 NY2d 415, 426). The court’s limited disclosure of the contents of a prosecution witness’s psychiatric records “properly balanced the interests of justice against the witness’s needs for confidentiality’ *(People v Arnold,*177 AD2d 633, 634, *lv denied*79 NY2d 853). The sentence imposed is not unduly harsh or severe. (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, D’Amico, J.—Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present—Green, J. P., Lawton, Wisner, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.
Exhibit 31.02



Section 302 Certification



I, Lisa Terrill, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Intermix Media, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other
certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;



(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors:



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.



|                      |  |  |  |                              
|--------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------
|                      |  | 
|Date: August 15, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ Lisa Terrill             
|                      |  |  |  | Lisa Terrill                 
|                      |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer      
|                      |  |  |  | (Principal Financial Officer)
Exhibit 32.1

            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Amazon Biotech, Inc., a Utah
corporation, (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending January 31,
2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Angelo Chinnici, M.D., Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify the following pursuant to Section 18, U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ Angelo Chinnici, M.D.
----------------------------------------------
Angelo Chinnici, M.D., Chief Executive Officer
March 17, 2005
EXHIBIT 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Agile Software Corporation (the Company) for the quarter ended October 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Bryan D. Stolle, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to my knowledge:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.



|                        |  |                                        
|----------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|Date: December 12, 2005 |  | /S/    BRYAN D. STOLLE                 
|                        |  | Bryan D. Stolle Chief Executive
Officer
EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 17 CFR 240.13(a)-14(a)
(SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION) I, Dale Schwieterman, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Cardinal Ethanol, LLC;  2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.
    
    [Intentionally omitted.]  4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over
financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:  a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over
financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected,
or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting. Date:  July 13, 2009 /s/ Dale Schwieterman
Dale Schwieterman, Treasurer (Principal Financial Officer)  2
JEFFREY COPLIN,



### v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioner, Civil Action No. BRUCE PEARSON, 

### et al., ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Respondents. 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 

# FILED APR 222009 NANCyMAYER WHITTINGTON Cl£RK U.S. DISTRICTCOURT' 

# 09 0744

This matter is before the Court on petitioner's petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus and application to proceed informapauperis. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District ofPennsylvania, petitioner was convicted oftwo counts ofpossession with intent to distribute 50 grams ofcocaine base in violation of21 U.S.c. 

### § 841(a)(1) and two counts ofdistribution ofcocaine within 1,000 feet of
a public playground in violation of21 U.S.C. 

### § 860. CompI. at 1. 1 That court imposed concurrent sentences on all counts on December 18, 2002. Id. According to petitioner, "the judgment and commitment order is null and void because [the] [d]istrict [c]ourt did not have subject-matterjurisdiction to prosecute, convict or sentence the plaintiff," and, therefore, his "imprisonment violates the United States Constitution." Id. at 2. Challenges to thejurisdiction ofthe federal court imposing sentence and attacks on the constitutionality ofa federal prisoner's conviction must be presented to the sentencing court in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Ojo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,106 F.3d 680,
References to the complaint ("CompI.") in this Memorandum Opinion are references to the typewritten statement attached to the preprinted form submitted bypetitioner. 1

# , ..

683 (5th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. United States Board ofParole, 194 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Section 2255 provides specifically that: [a] prisoner in custody under sentence ofa court established by Act ofCongress claimingthe right to bereleasedupon the groundthat the sentence was imposedjn violation ofthe Constitution or laws ofthe United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess ofthe maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (emphasis added). Moreover, the ability to challenge a conviction by a motion to vacate sentence generally precludes a challenge by a petition for habeas corpus: [a]n application for a writ ofhabeas corpus in behalfof a prisoner who is authorizedto applyfor reliefbymotionpursuantto [28 U.S.C. § 2255], shall not be entertained ifit appears that the applicant has failed to applyfor relief, bymotion, to the courtwhich sentencedhim, orthat such courthas denied himrelief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.c. § 2255 (emphasis added). The Court therefore will dismiss the petition without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately on this same date.

Date: (.} 

# rv-**~** 

# ,.r; l-c>O 

### 9

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                       MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                             $    66,382
<SECURITIES>                       $         0
<RECEIVABLES>                      $    30,359
<ALLOWANCES>                       $         0
<INVENTORY>                        $    13,056
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   $   116,697
<PP&E>                             $   146,173
<DEPRECIATION>                     $    39,509
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     $   514,161
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              $   331,857
<BONDS>                            $         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>              $         0
<PREFERRED>                        $         0
<COMMON>                           $    50,528
<OTHER-SE>                         $    81,248
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       $   514,161
<SALES>                            $         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   $    55,973
<CGS>                              $    48,746
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      $   230,412
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   $         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                   $         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 $     3,938
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    $  (178,377)
<INCOME-TAX>                       $         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                $  (178,377)
<DISCONTINUED>                     $         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                    $         0
<CHANGES>                          $         0
<NET-INCOME>                       $  (178,377)
<EPS-BASIC>                        $     (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                      $     (0.04)


</TABLE>
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-13-00236-CV

VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,

Appellant

v.

JANICE KENOYER AND ELEKTA, INC.,

Appellees

From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 85321

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Varian Medical Systems, Inc., and appellees, Elekta, Inc. and Janice 

Kenoyer, have filed a joint motion to dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(2). 

Dismissal of this appeal would not prevent a party from seeking relief to which it 

would otherwise be entitled. The motion is granted, and the appeal is dismissed. 

Further, pursuant to their joint motion, the parties will bear their own costs.
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Kenoyer Page 2

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Motion granted; appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed August 8, 2013

[CV06]
[No. 67200-2-I.

Division One.

October 15, 2012.]

#### Indemnity Company of California, *Respondent,*v. Constantin Hapaianu, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-2-40632-4, Michael Heavey, J., entered April 22, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Lau, J.,

concurred in by Grosse and Becker, JJ.
Via Fax
(615) 224-1185 and Overnight Mail
 Attention
 Re:
    
    Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated October 13, 2006 (as at any
time amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified, the Credit
Agreement), among DELEK REFINING, LTD., a Texas limited partnership (Delek
Refining); DELEK PIPELINE TEXAS, INC., a Texas corporation (Delek
Pipeline; together with Delek Refining, collectively, Borrowers, and
each individually, a Borrower), the various financial institutions from time
to time party thereto as Lenders (collectively, Lenders), SUNTRUST BANK, in
its capacity as collateral and administrative agent for Lenders (together with its
successors in such capacity, Agent) and in such other capacities as set forth
therein, and the other parties named therein.
     To the fullest extent permitted by
Applicable Law, the parties hereto each hereby waives the right to trial by jury in any action,
suit, counterclaim or proceeding arising out of or related to this letter agreement




---



##### 



Remainder of page intentionally left blank; signatures begin on following page.




---



##### 



Sincerely,AGENT:SUNTRUST BANK,as Administrative
Agent, as Issuing Bank, as Swingline Lender
and as a LenderBy:
    /s/ Brian OFallonBrian OFallon,Director Signatures continue on following page




---



##### 



Accepted by:BORROWERS:DELEK REFINING, LTD.By:
    DELEK US REFINING GP, LLCTitle: General PartnerBy:
    /s/ Edward MorganName:Title:By:
    /s/ Gregory A. IntemannName:
    Gregory A. IntemannTitle:
    TreasurerDELEK PIPELINE TEXAS, INC.By:
    /s/ Gregory A. IntemannName:
    Gregory A. IntemannTitle:
    TreasurerBy:
    /s/ Edward MorganName:Title:
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company

Appellate case number: 01-13-00610-CV

Trial court case number: 2011-43156

Trial court: 189th District Court of Harris County

Appellee/cross-appellant TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company has filed a “Corrected 

Unopposed Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule,” requesting that we modify the briefing 

schedule to reduce the number of briefs to be filed in this appeal and to avoid repetition in the 

briefs. We grant the motion.

Accordingly, we ORDER that the briefing schedule in this case will be as follows:

 Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc.’s appellant’s brief will be due 30 days after the complete record 

is filed;

 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company’s combined response brief and cross-appellant’s 

brief will be due 30 days after Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc.’s brief is filed;

 Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc.’s combined reply brief and cross-appellee’s response brief will 

be due 30 days after TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company’s brief is filed; and

 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company’s reply brief will be due 20 days after Brenham Oil 

& Gas, Inc.’s combined reply brief and cross-appellee’s brief is filed.

We further DISMISS TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company’s previously-filed 

“Unopposed Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule” as moot.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:/s/ Michael Massengale

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: October 17, 2013
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-23-00403-CR

TYRONE SHEPARD,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 23-03774-CRF-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Tyrone Shepard appeals from the trial court’s ruling on a “Notice of 

Jurisdiction” in his underlying criminal case. The State has filed a motion to dismiss this 

appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing that there is no appealable order.

“Interlocutory appeals are generally not permitted in Texas criminal proceedings.” 

Leija v. State, 456 S.W.3d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (order) (per curiam) (quoting Ex 

parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam)). Intermediate 

appellate courts have no jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders absent express 
Shepard v. State Page 2

authority. Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found 

no grant of authority to review by interlocutory appeal the trial court’s ruling on a notice 

or plea to the jurisdiction in a criminal case. See Taylor v. State, Nos. 05-18-00691-CR, 05-

18-00692-CR, 05-18-00693-CR, 05-18-00694-CR, 05-18-00695-CR, 2018 WL 3215905, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Dallas July 2, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication); 

Stevens v. State, Nos. 03-15-00675-CR, 03-15-00676-CR, 2016 WL 286328, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Austin Jan. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Accordingly, we grant the State’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Want of 

Jurisdiction, filed on December 13, 2023, and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

MATT JOHNSON

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson, and

Justice Smith

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed January 4, 2024

Do not publish

[CR25]