1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2012-NMCA-044

Filing Date: March 20, 2012 

Docket Nos. 30,458 and 30,459 (consolidated)

LOS CHAVEZ COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,

et al.,

Petitioners-Appellees,

v.

VALENCIA COUNTY and the BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Respondents,

and

JOHN WHISENANT and ELIAS BARELA,

Interested Parties-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY

John F. Davis, District Judge

Hunt & Davis, P.C.

Catherine F. Davis

Julie J. Vargas

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellees

Chavez Law Firm, P.C.

Steven M. Chavez

Los Lunas, NM

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.

Edward Ricco

Jocelyn Drennan
2

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellants

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} The issue in this case is whether a county commissioner is required to recuse herself

from voting on an application for a zoning map amendment if she is a first cousin to one of

the applicants. We conclude that the due process protections of the state and federal

constitutions, as well as the language in Article VI, Section 18 of the New Mexico

Constitution, require recusal. Thus, we affirm the decision of the district court.

BACKGROUND

{2} The facts are not in dispute. Appellants John Whisenant and Elias Barela

(Appellants) applied to the Valencia County Board of County Commissioners (Board) for

a zone change to allow a planned residential subdivision on adjacent properties they own in

Valencia County. Appellants sought to turn three parcels of land encompassing about forty

acres into fifteen residential lots of between two and two-and-a-half acres in size. The

Board, on a 3-2 vote, approved the change in zoning status from Agricultural Preservation

to Rural Residential 2, which would allow division of the land into the smaller lot sizes.

Commissioner Georgia Otero-Kirkham, who is a first cousin to Barela, voted in favor of the

change. Before the vote was taken, a neighborhood resident asked Commissioner OteroKirkham at the public hearing whether she would recuse herself from the vote because of her

family ties to Barela. Commissioner Otero-Kirkham stated that “we’re not that close” and

that she had sought an opinion from the Board’s attorney who informed her that she need not

recuse herself.

{3} After the Board approved the zoning change, Los Chavez Community Association

and a number of individuals (Los Chavez) appealed the decision to district court. Los

Chavez sought reversal on the grounds that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and

capricious and that it lacked substantial evidentiary support. Los Chavez also maintained

that the group was denied fundamental due process because Commissioner Otero-Kirkham’s

refusal to recuse herself presented an appearance of impropriety and bias, essentially denying

Appellants’ opponents of an opportunity for a fair hearing before the Board. The district

court reversed the decision of the Board, relying on the “spirit” of the New Mexico

Constitution and citing the failure to recuse as a due process violation. The court remanded

the case for a hearing without Commissioner Otero-Kirkham’s participation, and Appellants

filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION
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{4} In addition to the question of recusal and due process, we asked the parties to brief

two threshold issues: whether the district court’s order is final for purposes of this appeal

and whether the issue is properly before us pursuant to a discretionary petition for writ of

certiorari from the district court’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or as a direct appeal

as of right from the district court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction. We address those

threshold issues before proceeding to the main issue.

The Doctrine of Practical Finality Applies Here

{5} We first decide whether this appeal is properly before us on a final order from the

district court. “In general, the right to appeal is restricted to final judgments and decisions.”

High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 29, 33, 888 P.2d 475,

479 (Ct. App. 1994). “A final order is commonly defined as an order that decides all issues

of fact and law necessary to be determined or which completely disposes of the case to the

extent the court had the power to dispose of it.” State v. Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, ¶ 11, 148

N.M. 685, 241 P.3d 1125. “Ordinarily, an order remanding a case for further proceedings

in a lower court is not considered ‘final’ for purposes of appeal.” State v. Ahasteen, 1998-

NMCA-158, ¶ 11, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328, abrogated on other grounds by State v.

Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20. But some appeals from cases

otherwise not considered final may be permitted under the doctrine of “practical finality.”

High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture, 119 N.M. at 34, 888 P.2d at 480. The issue of finality is

not to be treated robotically but instead “is to be given a practical, rather than a technical,

construction.” Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038

(1992), limited on other grounds by Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe, 115 N.M. 397, 398, 851

P.2d 1064, 1065 (1993). In reversals and remands by a lower reviewing court, it is helpful

to consider “the context in which the district court ordered the remand.” Alba v. Peoples

Energy Res. Corp., 2004-NMCA-084, ¶ 11, 136 N.M. 79, 94 P.3d 822. We consider this

flexible approach, though, in light of “the strong policy in New Mexico disfavoring

piecemeal appeals.” Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc., 113 N.M. at 239, 824 P.2d at 1041.

{6} Despite the policy against piecemeal litigation, “our jurisprudence has permitted

appeals from certain orders even though a disputed issue remains.” Roark v. Farmers Grp.,

Inc., 2007-NMCA-074, ¶ 42, 142 N.M. 59, 162 P.3d 896. “Such interests must be of the

greatest importance, given the countervailing powerful interest in avoiding piecemeal

appeals.” State v. Apodaca, 1997-NMCA-051, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 372, 940 P.2d 478. We note

that “[t]he considerations that determine finality are not abstractions but have reference to

very real interests—not merely those of the immediate parties, but, more particularly, those

that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial system.” Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc., 113

N.M. at 239, 824 P.2d at 1041 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). We take note of that philosophy in the case before us, where “the underlying legal

issue . . . is important to the continuing ability of the [c]ommission to function[.]” Cox v.

Mun. Boundary Comm’n, 1998-NMCA-025, ¶ 12, 124 N.M. 709, 954 P.2d 1186. Thus, we

are mindful of “the policies of judicial efficiency and facilitation of meaningful appellate

review.” Roark, 2007-NMCA-074, ¶ 45.
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{7} In the matter at hand, we find two bases for allowing this appeal to proceed under the

doctrine of practical finality. First, we agree with Appellants that the question of when a

county commissioner must recuse herself in deciding a zoning-use matter involving a

relative is one of continuing importance to the Board in Valencia County and to other such

bodies statewide. As noted above, even though the circumstances in this case can be

distinguished, the reasoning in Cox applies because the issue before us affects the operation

of the Board and potentially other county boards across the state. The issue of the

impartiality of a county zoning board commissioner in cases involving a relative is likely to

be repeated in Valencia County and elsewhere. The policies of judicial efficiency and

meaningful appellate review apply here.

{8} Second, fairness to the parties dictates that we accept this appeal. Appellants should

not have to go back to the beginning of the application process if there is a chance that

appellate review by this Court would spare them that time and expense in a process that

could be burdensome and wasteful. See Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, ¶ 14 (accepting appeal

and refusing to subject a defendant to a potentially needless revocation hearing at the

magistrate court level). We also agree with Appellants that a change in the makeup of the

Board (since the election in 2010) and the effect of the current economic climate could make

the district court’s remand order tantamount to a denial because of the constantly shifting

political and economic landscape. If this Court refuses to hear the appeal, the matter would

be reconsidered by the Board absent Commissioner Otero-Kirkham, and if the application

were rejected, Appellants would be faced with deciding whether to appeal on the same

grounds as in the present case: that the district judge’s decision regarding recusal was error.

See id ¶ 13. Deciding the issue now would eliminate the possibility of more years of

litigation and appeal only to end up in this very spot. For the foregoing reasons, we

conclude that practical finality is present in this case.

This Appeal Arises From the District Court’s Original Jurisdiction

{9} We also asked the parties to brief whether the issue before us is a discretionary

appeal pursuant to a writ of certiorari or if it is an appeal of right based on the district court’s

original jurisdiction. We agree with both parties that this appeal properly arises from the

district court’s original jurisdiction. “Whether the district court is possessed of jurisdiction

over the subject matter of a case is a question of law that we review de novo.” Ottino v.

Ottino, 2001-NMCA-012, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 168, 21 P.3d 37.

{10} When appeals arise out of administrative proceedings, we distinguish between issues

that the district court takes up under its appellate jurisdiction and those it addresses under

its original jurisdiction. Our district courts are recognized as courts of general jurisdiction.

See id. A district court is given “original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted

in this [C]onstitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be

conferred by law, and appellate jurisdiction of all cases originating in inferior courts and

tribunals in their respective districts[.]” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13. We have previously

acknowledged that, regarding the appellate role of district courts in the administrative
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scheme, the idea of original jurisdiction “may appear to be contrary to the rule that when the

district court sits as an appellate tribunal, in the absence of a statutory exception, it is limited

to consideration of the record below.” Maso v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-

NMCA-025, ¶ 16, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276, aff’d, 2004-NMSC-028, 136 N.M. 161, 96

P.3d 286. But in Maso, we observed that due process claims are appropriately addressed by

the district court under its powers of original jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 15. “To hold otherwise

would effectively foreclose any due process challenges to the administrative process, which

would impermissibly constrain the right of access to the courts.” Id. ¶ 16. Thus, we

reasoned, a district court “can simultaneously exercise its appellate and original

jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 17. And we concluded that “[w]ithout question, the district court has the

authority to consider constitutional claims in the first instance.” Id. ¶ 14.

{11} In the case before us, as in Maso, the district court was faced with a constitutional

question of due process. And here, the district court based its ruling exclusively on the

question of Commissioner Otero-Kirkham’s refusal to recuse herself, which the district court

concluded was a violation of Los Chavez’s due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal.

The fact that Los Chavez’s original appeal to the district court invoked only that court’s

appellate jurisdiction is not fatal to our analysis. See State v. Roybal, 2006-NMCA-043, ¶

17, 139 N.M. 341, 132 P.3d 598 (stating that “it is the substance of the [pleading], and not

its form or label, that controls” the question of jurisdiction). Thus, Los Chavez’s appeal is

properly before this Court through an appeal of right based on the district court’s original

jurisdiction.

Due Process Requires Recusal

{12} We now turn to the merits of the case. “We review questions of constitutional law

and constitutional rights, such as due process protections, de novo.” N.M. Bd. of Veterinary

Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 27, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947.

{13} Under the zoning ordinance for Valencia County, the Board is the ultimate decisionmaking body for zone changes such as the one requested by Appellants. Valencia County

Ordinance No. 2004-05, § 154.061(B)(3)(a) (2004). When making this type of decision, the

Board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Id. § 154.061. Appellants recognize that when

Board members act in a quasi-judicial capacity, they “must act like a judicial body bound

by ethical standards comparable to those that govern a court in performing the same

function.” Albuquerque Commons P’ship v. City Council of Albuquerque (ACP), 2008-

NMSC-025, ¶ 33, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

{14} Relying on West Bluff Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Albuquerque, 2002-NMCA075, ¶ 52, 132 N.M. 433, 50 P.3d 182, overruled on other grounds by Rio Grande Chapter

of the Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 16 & n.10, 133 N.M. 97,

61 P.3d 806, Appellants argue that not all allegations of bias or prejudice are the same and

not all render a proceeding fundamentally unfair. Appellants’ position is that quasi-judicial
1 We recognize that the terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are often used

interchangeably. See Rule 21-211comm. cmt. at ¶ 1.

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adjudicators are presumed to be impartial and that the measure of the appearance of bias on

the part of such a fact-finder is found in ethical standards comparable, but not identical, to

those to which we hold judges. They suggest a “flexible and pragmatic” approach to

gauging the impartiality of quasi-judicial decision-makers whereby a court would consider

whether the relevant circumstances would lead an objectively reasonable individual to doubt

the decision-maker’s impartiality. Appellants point out that the Valencia County zoning

ordinance is silent on the issue of recusal and further, that the New Mexico Code of Judicial

Conduct, specifically Rule 21-211(A)(2) NMRA, requires recusal only when a party to the

proceeding is within the third degree of relationship to the judge. Appellants’ position is that

because first cousins are fourth-degree relatives, they are not covered by the Code, and

actual bias must be shown. Appellants argue that Commissioner Otero-Kirkham’s firstcousin relationship is an insufficient basis for recusal in light of the fact that there is no claim

of actual bias. Appellants urge reversal of the district court’s determination because “the

record reveals no circumstance that would disqualify Commissioner Otero-Kirkham from

acting on the [Appellants’] zone change application.”

{15} To evaluate Appellants’ arguments, we begin by looking to the history of judicial

disqualification.1

 “Under early English law[,] a judge could be disqualified from presiding

over a matter only when he could be shown to possess a disqualifying pecuniary

interest—and then only when another judge was available to hear the cause.” Richard E.

Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges § 1.4, at 7 (2d ed.

2007). Essentially, a judge’s bias or prejudice was not enough to require disqualification.

Throughout the United States’ early independence, the narrow recusal standards of the

common law prevailed, but near the turn of the nineteenth century, both federal and state

governments began attempts to restrain judicial bias through statutory control. Id. at 8-9.

{16} Disqualification of judges based on kinship is found in Rule 21-211(A)(2)(a) and

requires disqualification when the judge knows that a “person within the third degree of

relationship . . . is . . . a party to the proceeding[.]” The New Mexico Constitution sets a

higher standard with regard to judges and the parties who appear before them.

No justice, judge or magistrate of any court shall, except by consent

of all parties, sit in any cause in which either of the parties are related to him

by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin, or in which he

was counsel, or in the trial of which he presided in any inferior court, or in

which he has an interest.

N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18.

{17} The New Mexico Legislature has imposed the higher constitutional restriction on
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other quasi-judicial tribunals. For example, quasi-judicial unemployment compensation

hearing officers are prohibited from sitting “in any administrative or adjudicatory proceeding

in which . . . either of the parties is related to the hearing officer, member of the board of

review or secretary by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin[.]” NMSA

1978, § 51-1-8(E)(1) (2004). Similarly, the language of Article VI, Section 18 of the New

Mexico Constitution is repeated in NMSA 1978, § 35-3-8(A)(1) (1968), and it states that no

magistrate shall sit in any action in which “either of the parties is related to him by affinity

or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin[.]” In determining that Commissioner

Otero-Kirkham should have recused herself, the district court referred to these constitutional

and statutory requirements.

{18} Los Chavez agrees with the district court’s approach. They argue that quasi-judicial

decision-makers should be held to the same constitutional standard as judges. Clearly,

judges and unemployment compensation hearing officers are restricted from sitting on cases

with parties who are related to them within the degree of first cousin. The New Mexico

Constitution does not specifically mention quasi-judicial decision- makers, and there is no

statute that deals specifically with disqualification of New Mexico county commissioners

when they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Thus, our question is whether board

members who sit in a quasi-judicial capacity should be bound by the kinship-based

disqualification requirements found in the language of Article VI, Section 18 of the New

Mexico Constitution based on due process protections of the state and federal constitutions,

as construed in applicable case law. We conclude that they do.

{19} We begin by reaffirming the proposition that those who sit on boards adjudicating

individual property applications for changes in zoning designations act in a quasi-judicial

capacity. See ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 32-33. “Small-scale zone changes” are quasijudicial when they “involve[] a determination of the rights, duties, or obligations of specific

individuals on the basis of the application of currently existing legal standards.” Id. ¶ 32

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a quasi-judicial zoning hearing

“carries with it important procedural consequences.” Id. ¶ 33. Such zoning matters “are not

politics-as-usual as far as the municipal governing body is concerned[,]” and the presiding

board members “must act like a judicial body bound by ‘ethical standards comparable to

those that govern a court in performing the same function.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting

High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture, 119 N.M. at 40, 888 P.2d at 486).

{20} The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

state action that leads to “deprivations of liberty and property without due process of law.”

Mills v. State Bd. of Psychologist Exam’rs, 1997-NMSC-028, ¶ 14, 123 N.M. 421, 941 P.2d

502. The New Mexico Constitution’s Due Process Clause echoes the federal one: “No

person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law[.]” N.M.

Const. art. II, § 18. “Procedural due process requires a fair and impartial hearing before a

trier of fact who is disinterested and free from any form of bias or predisposition regarding

the outcome of the case.” Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). These principles of fairness are basic to our justice system.
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{21} The substance of Article VI, Section 18 has been part of the New Mexico

Constitution since statehood. “[T]he disqualification of judges for certain causes, raising a

presumption of partiality, has been ever present in our Constitution[.]” State ex rel. Hannah

v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 83, 28 P.2d 511, 516 (1933). The purpose of this provision is based

on due process considerations—“to secure to litigants a fair and impartial trial by an

impartial and unbiased tribunal.” State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 102 N.M. 592, 603, 698

P.2d 462, 473 (Ct. App. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The recusal

grounds listed in Article VI, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution are “recognized

dangerous sources of partiality” and were included in the Constitution so as to prevent “the

possibility of legislative detraction in any legislative scheme of disqualification of judges on

account of partiality.” Hannah, 38 N.M. at 82, 28 P.2d at 515-16. A judge “is

presumptively partial or biased if he is related to any party to the proceeding[.]” State ex rel.

Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 704, 410 P.2d 732, 733 (1966).

{22} Our Supreme Court has determined it to be “imperative” that when governmental

agencies adjudicate the legal rights of individuals they “use the procedures which have

traditionally been associated with the judicial process.” Reid v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs of

Optometry, 92 N.M. 414, 416, 589 P.2d 198, 200 (1979). And, while such procedural

matters as the rules of evidence or hearsay need not be adhered to by administrative agencies

to the same degree as in a court of law, the right to an impartial tribunal is held to the higher

standard.

The rigidity of the requirement that the trier be impartial and unconcerned in

the result applies more strictly to an administrative adjudication where many

of the customary safeguards affiliated with court proceedings have, in the

interest of expedition and a supposed administrative efficiency, been relaxed.

Id.; see also Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 304 (1937) (suggesting

of the adjudicative role of administrative agencies: “All the more insistent is the need, when

power has been bestowed so freely, that the inexorable safeguard of a fair and open hearing

be maintained in its integrity.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

{23} Due process requires a “neutral and detached judge in the first instance.” Ward v.

Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972). The “requirement of impartiality applies not

only to judicial officers but also to private persons who serve as adjudicators.” Rissler v.

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 321, 328 (W. Va. 2010). These principles

are equally applicable to administrative proceedings. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S.

188, 195 (1982) (stating that “due process demands impartiality on the part of those who

function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities”). By incorporating Article VI, Section 18

into our Constitution, New Mexicans have decided that absent consent, a judge cannot hear

a case in which a first cousin to the judge is a party, and this is because there is a

presumption of bias. As Reid advises, this type of a requirement is even more relevant at the

quasi-judicial level, where other trial-like rules of administrative proceedings are relaxed.

92 N.M. at 416, 589 P.2d at 200. Here, Los Chavez had a right to expect that the hearings
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before the Board would be conducted under the basic rubric of fairness and impartiality by

the decision-makers. We cannot ignore the plain language of our Constitution and the clear

mandate of Reid and its progeny, which, when combined, tell us that the presumption of bias

is fatal to the due process rights of parties appearing before quasi-judicial administrative

tribunals. See, e.g., Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, ¶ 27 (“[D]ue process protections apply to

administrative proceedings.”); City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 11, 123

N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509 (stating that due process guarantees that “a person . . . with interests

terminated by an arm of the state receive a fair, adjudicative-style hearing”).

{24} As Appellants recognize, New Mexico law binds quasi-judicial decision- makers to

“ethical standards comparable to those that govern a court in performing the same function.”

ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellants

argue, however, that “comparable” does not mean “the same.” But the basic safeguards

established by standards set out in the federal and state constitutions, as well as in New

Mexico statutes and rules, all have one goal—to ensure that the decision-maker is not biased.

There is no principled reason to apply the prohibitions in Article VI, Section 18 of the New

Mexico Constitution to judges but not to board members who are acting in an adjudicatory

capacity. Our Constitution and our case law mandate that the Board member in this case,

Commissioner Otero-Kirkham, should have recused herself from consideration of the zoning

amendment sought by her first cousin, Barela, the co-applicant before the Board.

{25} Appellants also argue that such a restriction on local board members adjudicating

matters involving first cousins could present hurdles in small communities where relation

by blood may be harder to avoid. We also recognize Appellant’s arguments that this

Opinion could at times hamper administrative efficiency or the rights of residents to fully

serve their communities. We have previously observed that city council members are not

expected to be “so insulated from their community as to require them to be detached from

all issues coming before them.” Siesta Hills Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Albuquerque,

1998-NMCA-028, ¶ 20, 124 N.M. 670, 954 P.2d 102. In Siesta Hills Neighborhood Ass’n,

a city councilor participated in a zoning-change application by a day-care center to which

the councilor had previously sent her children to attend a program. Id. ¶ 17. We concluded

that because there was no evidence that the city councilor had prejudged the merits of the

petition and because the councilor’s actions did not “give rise to an appearance of

impropriety[,]” her participation did not invalidate the proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. In our

case, the family ties between adjudicator and applicant are not tenuous in any way; they are

obvious and direct. Although our Opinion could in some instances affect the processing of

zoning applications in smaller counties of New Mexico, we are not convinced by Appellants’

conjecture that such a restriction on local board members would create difficulty in

adjudicating zoning matters. We do not see the occasional recusal of one zoning board

member causing a significant or detrimental effect on local government decisions. When

acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, board members are bound by the requirements of the New

Mexico Constitution that they be impartial. We do not agree that this due process safeguard

will materially inhibit the carrying out of governmental business in Valencia County or other

smaller counties around New Mexico.
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CONCLUSION

{26} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court and remand to

the Valencia Board of County Commissioners for action not inconsistent with this Opinion.

{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

____________________________________

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge

Topic Index for Los Chavez Community Assn. v. Valencia County, Docket Nos.

30,458/30,459

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CT-DP Due Process

GV GOVERNMENT

GV-CM Commissions

GV-CU Counties

GV-ZL Zoning Law

JM JUDGMENT

JM-FJ Final Judgment

JG JUDGES

JG-EX Excusal or Recusal

JD JURISDICTION

JD-DC District Court