alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PR ECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Larry T. Chestnut, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212800

Appeal from Horry Count y Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-002 Heard September 24, 2014 – Filed January 14, 2015

AFFIRMED

Jeremy A. Thompson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General De borah R.J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Larry T. Chestnut appeals his conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter, challenging the ru le that where a defendant in a joint trial introduces evidence, the State is entitled to the final argument. State v.
Huckie , 22 S.C. 298, 300 (1885). In this cas e, however, neither Appellant nor hiscodefendant presented evidence, and as a result, Appellant and his codefendant had the final argument. We affirm pursuan t to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Freiburger , 366 S.C. 125, 135, 620 S.E.2d 737, 742 (2005) ("The rule is well established that if asserted errors are not presented to the lower Court, the question cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." (citation omitted)); State v. Schmidt , 288 S.C. 301, 303, 342 S.E.2d 401, 402–03 (1986) ("Ordinarily, this Court will not review alleged error of the exclusion of testimony unless a proffer of testimony is properly made on the record." (citation omitted)); Dillon Cnty. v. Maryland Cas. Co. , 217 S.C. 66, 76, 59 S.E.2d 640, 644 (1950) ("No one can obtain a decision as to the invalidity of a law on the ground that it impairs the rights of others, for one attacki ng the constitutionality of a statute is not the champion of any rights except his own." (citation and quotations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY , KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,

concur.
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*RALDY H. TEJEDA

(AC 31749)

Gruendel, Lavine and Espinosa, Js.

Argued January 10

officially released January 31, 2012

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30264

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SCOTT HASHIMOTO,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CR-101-R

- - - - - - - - - -

March 4, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Scott Hashimoto appeals his guilty-plea conviction and

sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and conspiracy

to launder monetary instruments, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1956 (a)(1)(A).

Hashimoto’s contention that the district court erroneously

relied on the hearsay statements of unnamed codefendants is not

supported by the record. See United States v. Manrique, 959 F.2d
No. 97-30264 

-2-

1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1992); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1); U.S.S.G. 

§ 6A1.3.

Hashimoto also argues that the district court clearly erred

in imposing a two-level offense-level enhancement based on his

role as a manager or supervisor in the offense, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The district court misapplied the guideline

when it determined that Hashimoto’s exercise of “independent

control over the drugs and money involved in the offense”

satisfied the guideline requirements. See id., comment. (n.2);

United States v. Giraldo, 111 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 322 (1997). A defendant’s exercise of

“management responsibility over the property, assets, or

activities of a criminal organization” may warrant an upward

departure, but not an offense-level enhancement under § 3B1.1. 

See § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2); Giraldo, 111 F.3d at 24. 

Accordingly, Hashimoto’s sentence is VACATED and this case is

REMANDED for resentencing as to this issue.

VACATED AND REMANDED.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3325 

To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to reauthorize for 1 year 

the Work Incentives Planning and Assistance program and the Protection 

and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 24, 2009 

Mr. TANNER (for himself and Mr. MCDERMOTT) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to reauthorize 

for 1 year the Work Incentives Planning and Assistance 

program and the Protection and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘WIPA and PABSS 

5 Reauthorization Act of 2009’’. 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3325 IH

1 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE WORK INCENTIVES 

2 PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 

3 Section 1149(d) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

4 1320b–20(d)) is amended by striking ‘‘2009’’ and insert5 ing ‘‘2010’’. 

6 SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PROTECTION AND AD7 VOCACY FOR BENEFICIARIES OF SOCIAL SE8 CURITY PROGRAM. 

9 Section 1150(h) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

10 1320b–21(h)) is amended by striking ‘‘2009’’ and insert11 ing ‘‘2010’’. 

Æ 


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EXHIBIT 31.1

             CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(D)/15D-14(D)
                  UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
I, Anthony N. Renzi, certify that:
1. I have  reviewed  this  report  on Form  10-K and all  reports  on Form  10-D
   required to be filed in respect of the period  covered by this report on Form
   10-K of RASC Series 2006-EMX2 Trust (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");
2. Based on my knowledge,  the Exchange Act periodic reports,  taken as a whole,
   do not contain  any untrue  statement  of a material  fact or omit to state a
   material  fact  necessary  to make  the  statements  made,  in  light  of the
   circumstances  under which such  statements  were made, not  misleading  with
   respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based  on  my  knowledge,  all  of  the  distribution,  servicing  and  other
   information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by
   this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;
4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities  performed by the servicers and
   based on my knowledge and the compliance  reviews  conducted in preparing the
   servicer  compliance  statements  required in this report  under Item 1123 of
   Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic  reports,
   the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements
   in all material respects; and
5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance  with  servicing  criteria for
   asset-backed  securities and their related  attestation reports on assessment
   of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to
   be included in this report in accordance  with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and
   Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this
   report,  except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances
   of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report
   on Form 10-K.

   In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
   information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
   Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. and U.S. Bank National Association.


Date:  March 26, 2007

By:   /s/ Anthony N. Renzi
      --------------------
      Name: Anthony N. Renzi
      Title: Managing Director
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVA NIA** 

IN RE: ORDER AMENDING RULES 410, 430, 1064, AND 1065 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE : : : : : : : NO. 656 CIVIL PROCEDURAL RULES DOCKET

**ORDER PER**  **CURIA M**  **AN D**  **NOW**, this 30th day of Decembe r, 2016 , upon the recommendation of the Civil Procedural Rules Committee ; the proposal having been submitted without publication pursuant to Pa.R.J.A. No. 103(a ) : It is **ORDERED** pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania that Rules 410, 430, 1064, and 1065 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are am ended in the attached form. This Order shall be processed in accordance with Pa.R.J.A. No. 103(b), and shall be effective January 1, 2017

.
Additions to the rule are shown in bold and are underlined. Deletions from the rule are shown in bold and brackets.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-18-00725-CV

Omar Weaver Rosales, Appellant

v.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline, Appellee

FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-GN-18-002039, THE HONORABLE BRANDON BIRMINGHAM, JUDGE PRESIDING

C O N C U R R I N G O P I N I O N

For the reasons I expressed in Rosales I, I cannot join the majority’s reasoning 

that an enforcement proceeding against a lawyer under the Disciplinary Rules of Professional 

Conduct is subject to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Commission for Lawyer 

Discipline v. Rosales, 577 S.W.3d 305, 319-22 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) (Kelly, J., 

concurring). As I said in Rosales I, that opinion will encourage attorneys who face credible 

accusations of misconduct to file TCPA motions to further delay the disciplinary process while 

they continue their unrestricted practice of law in Texas. Id. (explaining three levels of review 

by Chief Disciplinary Counsel and Board of Disciplinary Appeals before suit is filed in district 

court). While the Legislature amended the TCPA to expressly exempt these types of actions, 

there are disciplinary actions pending, such as this one, unaffected by this statutory change. See

supra at n.1.
2

I concur in the Court’s judgment, but not the majority’s reasoning.

__________________________________________

Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Kelly and Smith

Filed: April 22, 2020
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AU GUST 28, 2013

NO. 03

- 10

- 00555

- CV

In re Estate of Ruby Gr eer Wallace, Deceased

APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being

considered, it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the trial court’s judgment: IT

IS THEREFORE consider ed, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the trial court is in all

things affirmed. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellants Carole Ann Wallace and

Dennis Arthur Wallace Jr. pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this C ourt and the court

below; and that this decision be certified below for observance.
EYE CATCHING MARKETING CORP.

A Nevada Corporation



CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Eye Catching Marketing Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), we, Robert Hemmerling, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Devinder Randhawa, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









Dated February 10, 2005

/s/Robert Hemmerling



Robert Hemmerling,

President and C.E.O.





/s/Devinder Randhawa



Devinder Randhawa,

C.F.O. and Secretary
#### Brent Ray BREWER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 04-70034.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 27, 2007.

Michael Dennis Samonek, Denton, TX, for-Brewer.

Edward Larry Marshall, Austin, TX, for Quarterman.

*ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*

Before JOLLY, SMITH and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This court reversed the district court’s judgment conditionally granting a writ of habeas corpus. *Brewer v. Dretke,*442 F.3d 273 (5th Cir.2006) (reversing *Brewer v. Dretke,*2004 WL 1732312, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14761 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 2, 2004)). The Supreme Court reversed. *Brewer v. Quarterman,*— *U.S. —,*127 S.Ct. 1706, 167 L.Ed.2d 622 (2007).

The state acknowledges that in light of the denial of the petition for writ of *certiorari*in *Nelson v. Quarterman,*472 F.3d 287 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2974, 168 L.Ed.2d 719 (2007), this court should re*211mand for re-entry of the conditional grant of habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, this matter is REMANDED so that the district court can re-enter its judgment to provide that a writ shall issue, vacating the sentence and commuting it to life imprisonment unless, within 180 days of the reentry of judgment, the state grants a new sentencing hearing or commutes the sentence to life imprisonment.
#### Bonnie Lou Sharpe et al., Respondents, v Ulrich Development Company, LLC, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[859 NYS2d 851]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Frank Caruso, J.), entered May 24, 2007 in a personal injury action. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of defendants Ulrich Development Company, LLC and 111 Main Street, LLC for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.

It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted and the complaint against defendants Ulrich Development Company, LLC and 111 Main Street, LLC is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Bonnie Lou Sharpe (plaintiff) when she allegedly tripped and fell on the sidewalk while enter*1320ing the building where she had been employed for two years. We conclude that Supreme Court erred in denying the motion of Ulrich Development Company, LLC and 111 Main Street, LLC (collectively, defendants), the owners of the building, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she used the entrance at issue approximately half the time when entering and exiting the building, and she did not determine that *“a*raise in the sidewalk” caused her to fall until she returned to the scene some unspecified time after her fall. Plaintiff further testified that the height differential in the blocks of the sidewalk was one inch or less, the weather on the day of her fall was clear, sunny and warm, and she and a coworker were the only people entering the building at that time. After examining the photographs depicting the width, depth and irregularity of the defect in the sidewalk, and in view of the time, place and circumstances of plaintiffs injury, we conclude that defendants established as a matter of law that the defect is too trivial to be actionable *(see e.g. Stylianou v Ansonia Condominium,*49 AD3d 399 [2008]; *Zalkin v City of New York,*36 AD3d 801 [2007]; *Trionfero v Vanderhorn,*6 AD3d 903, 904 [2004]; *cf. Mishaan v Tobias,*32 AD3d 1000, 1001-1002 [2006]; *Billera v Paolangeli,*20 AD3d 743, 745 [2005]; *McKenzie v Crossroads Arena,*291 AD2d 860 [2002], *lv dismissed*98 NY2d 647 [2002]). We further conclude that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Present—Martoche, J.P, Smith, Centra, Lunn and Pine, JJ.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3034 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to adjust the credit percentage 

for qualifying advanced energy wind projects based on domestic steel content. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 24, 2009 

Mr. WILSON of Ohio introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to adjust 

the credit percentage for qualifying advanced energy 

wind projects based on domestic steel content. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investment in Amer5 ican Steel Act of 2009’’. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3034 IH

1 SEC. 2. CREDIT PERCENTAGE FOR QUALIFYING ADVANCED 

2 ENERGY WIND PROJECTS BASED ON DOMES3 TIC STEEL CONTENT IN SUCH PROJECT. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 48C of 

5 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding 

6 at the end the following new paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(4) SPECIAL RULE BASED ON DOMESTIC

8 STEEL CONTENT IN WIND PROJECTS.— 

9 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a quali10 fying advanced energy project designed to be 

11 used to produce energy from the wind, sub12 section (a) shall be applied by substituting ‘the 

13 applicable percentage’ for ‘30 percent’. 

14 ‘‘(B) APPLICABLE PERCENTAGE.—For 

15 purposes of subparagraph (A), the applicable 

16 percentage is the percentage of domestic steel 

17 content of such project is of the total steel con18 tent of such project. 

19 ‘‘(C) STEEL CONTENT.—For purposes of 

20 this paragraph, steel domestic and non-domestic 

21 steel content shall be determined under regula22 tions or other guidance prescribed by the Sec23 retary. 

24 ‘‘(D) DOMESTIC.—The term ‘domestic’ re25 fers to production of steel in the United States 

26 or in a possession of the United States.’’. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
3 

•HR 3034 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 this section shall take effect as if included in the amend3 ments made by section 1302 of the American Recovery 

4 and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009. 

Æ 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 22

- 00100

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348

- 317998

- 20

Before Walker, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Kerr , J. Per Curiam Memorandum Opi nion 

### A DELINA 

### E. G OVEA A 

### / K 

### / A 

### A DELINA 

### E STRADA 

### , Appellant

V



### .
R ANDY 

### P ERALES AND 

### L UCINDA 

### P ERALES 

### , Appellees2 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
On March 24, 2022, and April 5, 2022, we notified appellant, in accordance
with rule of appellate procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss this appeal unless
appellant paid the $205 filing fee. See Tex. R. App. P. 42 .3(c ), 44.3. Appellant ha s not

done so. See Tex. R. App. P. 5, 12.1(b).
Because appellant ha s not complied with a procedural requirement and the
Texas Supreme Cou rt’s order of August 28, 2015, 1 we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R.
App. P. 42.3(c), 43.2(f)

. Ap pellant must pay all costs of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

Per Curiam

Delivered: April 28, 2022

1 See Supreme Court of Tex., Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and Before the Judicial Panel on Multi

- District Liti gati on, Misc. Docket No. 15

- 9158 (Aug. 28, 2015) (listing courts of appeals’ fees).
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 20357 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
RAFAEL TERRONES

- GONZALEZ, also known as Rafael Terrones, also known as Mario Munoz Perez, also known as Rafael Terrones Gonzalez, also known as Mario M. Perez, also known as Elvin Munoz Estrada, also known as Rafael Gonzalez,

Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:14

- CR

- 74

- 1

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Rafael Terrones

Gonzalez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Terrones

- Gonzalez has filed a response. We have

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 2 1 , 2015 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-20357 Document: 00513012753 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/21/2015No. 14

- 20357

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected
therein , as well as Terrones

- Gonzalez ’ s response . We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2.

2 Case: 14-20357 Document: 00513012753 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/21/2015
#### JEREMIAH PEREZ *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 32159)

Robinson, Bishop and SchaUer, Js.

Argued November 17

officially released December 13, 2011

Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.
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