Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

RONALD ANDREW MANLEY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ELLEN H. MEILAENDER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RONALD A. MANLEY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 29A05-1306-CR-306

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Paul A. Felix, Judge

Cause No. 29C01-9506-CF-106

April 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

Ronald Manley appeals the denial of his pro se Motion for Modification of Sentence. 

Manley asserts that the trial court failed to consider his argument under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-

23.

1

 We dismiss. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997, Manley was convicted of three counts of Class B felony child molestation,

2

one count of Class B felony attempted child molestation,

3 one count of Class C felony child 

molestation,

4 and one count of Class A misdemeanor impersonation of a public servant.5

 

Manley pursued a direct appeal, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. Manley v. 

State, No. 29A05-9807-CR-343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Manley filed a petition for postconviction review, and a post-conviction court denied his petition in December of 2009. We

affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Manley v. State, No. 29A04-1002-PC-60 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010). On May 15, 2013, Manley asked the court to award him credit time for 

various programs that he claimed he completed, but for which he alleged the Department of 

Correction gave him no credit. The trial court denied the motion.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We note Manley proceeds pro se, but even pro se litigants without legal training are 

required to follow procedural rules. Wright v. State, 772 N.E.2d 449, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002). Post-conviction proceedings are the appropriate procedure for presenting claims for 

 

1 This statute is the version of 35-50-6-3.3, dealing with credit time for completion of educational degrees, in 

effect when Manley committed his offenses. 

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).

3

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(c).

4

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).

5

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-6.
3

educational credit time. Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (Ind. 2008). If the petition is 

not the first the petitioner has filed for post-conviction relief, the petitioner must follow the 

procedure outlined in Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) for successive petitions in order to have the 

filing authorized. Id. at 1257. 

Manley has already litigated one post-conviction petition in this case, and he did not 

receive, or even request, authorization to file a successive petition. Manley argues his motion 

was for modification of sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 and it is therefore not a 

successive post-conviction petition. We disagree. Manley asked for educational credit time 

for programs he claimed he completed but for which the Department of Correction allegedly 

has never given him credit. Post-conviction proceedings are the appropriate vehicle for 

requesting such relief. See Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1256. Because Manley has already 

litigated one post-conviction petition in relation to this case, he must follow the procedure 

outlined in Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) for successive post-conviction petitions. See id. at 

1257. 

CONCLUSION

Manley’s motion was an unauthorized successive petition for post-conviction relief. 

Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal. 

Dismissed.

KIRSCH. J., and BAILEY, J, concur.