### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 17

‐ 3545

L AITH W ILLIAM M URAD B IJAN

,

Petitioner

‐ Appellant

,

v.

U NITED S TATES C ITIZENSHIP & I MMIGRATION S ERVICES

, Respondent

‐ Appellee

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 10636

— Charles R. Norgle

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED J ULY 5, 2018

— D ECIDED A UGUST 20, 2018

____________________

Before W OOD

, Chief Judge

, and S CUDDER and S T

. E VE

, Cir

‐

cuit Judges

.

W OOD

, Chief Judge

. Five years after entering the United

States, ostensibly as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent

resident, Laith Bijan applied to become a naturalized citizen.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

denied his application, concluding that Bijan actually had

been married when he entered the country and had thus mis

‐ represented his eligibility for lawful permanent residence and2 No. 17

‐ 3545

citizenship. Bijan sought judicial review of that decision. Re

‐ viewing USCIS’s decision de novo

, the district court concluded

that Bijan had misrepresented his marital status and lied un

‐

der oath during a naturalization interview when he denied

giving “false or misleading information” while applying for

an immigration benefit. We affirm on the alternate ground

that Bijan previously had given the agency false information

when he failed to disclose on his visa application that he had

two children and later lied about that omission.

Claiming that he was the unmarried son of a lawful per

‐

manent resident, Bijan (a citizen of Iraq) entered the United

States in 2004. His authorization for doing so dated back to

1991, when his mother, already a lawful permanent resident,

filed an I

‐ 130 petition (“Petition for Alien Relative”) on his be

‐

half. On the petition, she identified Bijan as unmarried.

Twelve years later, in 2003, after fleeing Iraq for Jordan with

his two children and their mother, Bijan sought to enter the

United States based on his mother’s previously approved pe

‐

tition. On his visa application, consistent with his mother’s

petition, Bijan stated that he was unmarried and had no chil

‐

dren. He was granted lawful permanent residence and en

‐

tered the United States in January 2004.

Bijan and the mother of his children, Nahrain Shaoul, re

‐

mained apart for several years. In 2006 Bijan traveled to Jor

‐

dan, where Shaoul still lived, and, according to Bijan, the cou

‐ ple were married. Upon returning to the United States that

same year, Bijan filed I

‐ 130 petitions for his children. USCIS

denied these applications because Bijan had made conflicting

statements in communications with the agency and had not

previously identified his children on his 2003 visa application.

(The children were born in 1997 and 1999.)No. 17

‐ 3545 3

In 2009 Bijan applied for naturalization. USCIS inter

‐

viewed Bijan and denied his application, concluding that

there was evidence he had been married when he entered the

U.S. in 2004 under a status for unmarried sons or daughters of

lawful permanent residents. The agency also noted that Bijan

had omitted from his 2003 visa application the fact that he had

children.

Bijan requested a hearing and was interviewed again in

November 2012, under oath. During that interview, he testi

‐

fied that he had never “given false or misleading information

to any U.S. government official while applying for any immi

‐ gration benefit[.]” USCIS denied his application a second

time. The agency determined again that there was evidence

suggesting that Bijan had married Shaoul before he became a

lawful permanent resident in January 2004, and therefore he

had not established that he was eligible for naturalization.

And the agency reiterated that Bijan had falsely omitted his

children from his 2003 visa application.

Bijan then petitioned the district court under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1421(c) for relief from the denial of his application for natu

‐

ralization. He focused primarily on whether he had been mar

‐

ried in 2004 when he became a permanent resident. He sub

‐

mitted a marriage certificate showing that he did not marry

Shaoul until 2006, and a church certificate showing that he

had not been “bound to any previous engagement or mar

‐ riage” as of October 2003. USCIS responded by submitting a

set of marriage records from a church in Baghdad, Iraq. These

records were accompanied by the affidavit of the church’s

bishop, who explained that the records reflected the marriage

of “Laith William Murad” and “Nahrain Boutros Shaoul” on4 No. 17

‐ 3545

September 21, 1996. Bijan countered that these records con

‐

flicted with another certificate, signed by the same bishop,

that gave a marriage date of “1990” for “Laith W. Bijan” and

“Nahrain P. Shaoul.”

The court granted summary judgment for USCIS. It found

no tenable dispute of fact about Bijan’s marital status at the

time he entered the United States in 2004 as an “unmarried

son” of a permanent resident: the court thought it clear that

he was already married at that point and that he had not been

truthful about this fact during his naturalization interviews.

Bijan had lied further during those interviews, the court

added, when he denied giving false information to immigra

‐

tion officials: he had given false information when, among

other things, he had omitted from his 2003 visa application

the fact that he had two children. The court thus found that

Bijan was ineligible for naturalization for two reasons: first,

he had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence

as an “unmarried son” of a lawful permanent resident,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(2); and second, he

had lied under oath and thus not shown “good moral charac

‐

ter,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.2(a)(7),

316.10(b)(2)(vi).

On appeal Bijan argues that genuine issues of fact exist re

‐ garding his marital status when he became a lawful perma

‐

nent resident in 2004 and the truthfulness of the information

that he gave the government. He is entitled to pursue these

arguments because “Congress specifically calls for de novo re

‐

view in naturalization cases.” O’Sullivan v. USCIS

, 453 F.3d

809, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2006). They are thus not subject to the

rules governing typical immigration cases, in which we areNo. 17

‐ 3545 5

bound by an immigration judge’s factual and credibility de

‐

terminations. Further, although it is Bijan’s burden to estab

‐

lish eligibility for naturalization, see Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., INS

,

385 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1967), he needs only to raise a fact ques

‐

tion to survive summary judgment. See Injeti v. USCIS

, 737

F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2013).

We turn first to the question of Bijan’s marital status in

2004, when he became a lawful permanent resident. Bijan was

admitted for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1153(a)(2)(B), the provision for unmarried sons and daugh

‐

ters of permanent residents; no visa category exists for married

sons or daughters of permanent residents. See id

. § 1153(a)(1)–(4). Thus if, as USCIS contends, Bijan got married

after his mother’s 1991 petition but before he became a per

‐

manent resident in 2004, then his mother’s petition would

have been revoked automatically and he would have been in

‐ eligible for permanent residence. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(I).

Bijan’s mother did become a citizen in 2000, before Bijan be

‐

came a permanent resident, and she could have repetitioned

for him at that time under the visa categories for either mar

‐

ried or unmarried children of U.S. citizens, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1153(a)(1), (3). But she did not do so. This means that the

only way Bijan could have been “lawfully admitted for per

‐

manent residence” is if he was, in fact, unmarried at the time

of his 2003 visa application. His eligibility for naturalization

in 2009, see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(2), de

‐ pends on the same thing.

We conclude that genuine questions of material fact exist

with regard to Bijan’s marital status in 2003–04. It is possible

that, as Bijan testified, his children were born out of wedlock6 No. 17

‐ 3545

and that he and Shaoul did not tie the knot until 2006. Fur

‐

thermore, even if we were to ignore the 2006 marriage certifi

‐

cate, which the district judge found inadmissible, other evi

‐

dence supports Bijan’s contention that he was unmarried as

of 2004. The bishop who attested to the accuracy of the 1996

marriage records had previously given conflicting infor

‐

mation about Bijan’s marriage date and other details. This

constitutes specific impeachment evidence. See Outlaw v.

Newkirk

, 259 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, Bijan

explained that they did not marry until 2006 because Shaoul’s

parents did not consent to their marriage, and even after they

had children he did not tell his own family about Shaoul be

‐

cause he feared that the news would upset his ailing father.

Bijan is competent to testify to his own experiences, and that

testimony may raise an issue of fact. See McKinney v. Office of

the Sheriff of Whitley Cnty.

, 866 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir.

2017); Payne v. Pauley

, 337 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2003). Fi

‐ nally, Bijan’s mother and brother corroborated Bijan’s story

that he did not tell them about Shaoul or the children until

after his father died in 2004.

If this case were exclusively about marital status, we

would have to remand for further proceedings. But it is not.

The district court also concluded that Bijan had lied under

oath when he said he had “never given false or misleading

information to any U.S. government official while applying

for any immigration benefit[.]” The government highlights

two examples of false information: allegedly fraudulent bap

‐

tismal certificates that Bijan submitted for his children’s visa

petitions, and Bijan’s assertion that he had simply lost contact

with his children at the time he filled out his own visa appli

‐

cation.No. 17

‐ 3545 7

We need not address the baptismal certificates. A more ob

‐

vious example of falsification stands out to us—Bijan’s failure

to disclose on his 2003 visa application that he had any chil

‐

dren, anywhere. Given that glaring omission, Bijan’s testi

‐

mony in 2012 that he had never given “false or misleading in

‐

formation” while “applying for any immigration benefit” was

plainly false. True, the government did not spotlight this

omission in its brief, but our review is de novo

, and an appellee

need not raise all possible alternative grounds for affirming

the district court’s decision. Thayer v. Chiczewski

, 705 F.3d 237,

247 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court specifically found that

Bijan’s omission in his visa application of any reference to his

children, followed by his denial of having lied in any immi

‐ gration application, demonstrated that Bijan lacked good

moral character and thus was ineligible for naturalization. It

found unpersuasive Bijan’s effort to explain the omission by

saying that he had lost contact with his children when he

filled out his own visa application. (Losing contact with one’s

children in no way implies their nonexistence.) The Sixth Cir

‐

cuit has observed that lying about previous lies, as Bijan has

done, “reveal[s] a lack of good moral character,” United States

v. Haroon

, 874 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied

, 138 S.

Ct. 1576 (2018). We concur.

The undisputed facts show that Bijan was aware of the

misrepresentation on his visa application and thus that he in

‐

tended to obtain an immigration bene fi t—naturalization—by

denying that he had made it. See Kungys v. United States

, 485

U.S. 759, 779–80 (1988). During oral argument, Bijan’s counsel

questioned whether Bijan knew he had omi tt ed his children

from his visa application in 2003, given his limited English

and the fact that someone else had fi lled out the application8 No. 17

‐ 3545

on his behalf. But what ma tt ers for purposes of Bijan’s natu

‐

ralization application is his false testimony with USCIS in 2012.

See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(vi). Even if Bijan was unaware of

the omission at the time it was made, he was certainly aware

of it by the time USCIS brought it up— fi rst, when the agency

denied visas for his children in 2006, and second, when it ini

‐ tially denied his naturalization application in April 2012. By

the time Bijan testi fi ed in November 2012 that he had “never

given false or misleading information,” he had to have known

his statement was false. Because of this, Bijan cannot meet his

burden of establishing eligibility for naturalization.

We therefore A FFIRM the judgment of the district court.