UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 91-5541

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BENJAMIN D. NAVEJAR, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

( June 8, 1992 )

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge:

Proceeding pro se and in form a pauperis Benjamin D.

Navejar, Jr. appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of

guilty to distribution of heroin and carrying a firearm during a

drug trafficking offense. For the reasons assigned we affirm.

Background

Navejar was indicted for distributing more than 100 grams of

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), carrying a firearm2

during a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm in

v iolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He reached a plea agreement

which called for him to enter a plea of guilty to t he first two

charges and the government would dismiss the felon in possession of

a firearm charge. The plea contained no provision relative to a

recommended sentence. The government advised the court of the plea

agreement but shortly thereafter, when Navejar appeared for entry

of his guilty plea, he informed the court that he wished to proceed

to trial.

The government responded to this change in circumstances by

giving notice that it would seek sentence enhancement of the felon

in possession charge because Navejar was a thrice-convicted felon.

The plea discussions were revived and Navejar subsequently pleaded

guilty to the first two counts based on an agreement substantially

similar to that earlier renounced. The new agreement, however,

contained a provision that the prosecution and defense co ncurred

that a sentence of 270 months incarceration would be an appropriate

disposition of the two charges.

Navejar was sentenced to jail for 210 months on the heroin

distribution charge and 60 months on the carrying of a firearm

during a drug offense charge, with the sentences to run

consecutively, together with a supervised r elease term of four

years and three years, respectively. He timely appealed, raising

four assignments of error: (1) the presentence report (PSR)

contai ned both procedural and factual defects; (2) the plea3

agreement was not binding because he was not adequately informed of

its contents; (3) the court e rred in its guideline calculations;

and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Analysis

In his first point of error Navejar contends that he was not

given an opportunity to review th e PSR before his sentencing

hearing, asse rting that his due process rights were violated

because the court failed to provide him and his counsel with copies

of the P SR at least ten days before sentencing as required by

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d). He further

contends that the PSR contains many factual errors.

The contemporaneous objection rule applies equally to

sentencing hearings as to trials. United States v. Vonsteen , 950

F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1992). Navejar did not object to these alleged

errors during the sentencing hearing and, accordingly, he may not

raise this objection for the first time on appeal absent plain

error. U nited States v. Lopez , 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), c ert

.

denied , 111 S.Ct. 2032 (1991).

"'Plain error' is error which, when examined in the context of

the entire case, is so obvious and substantial that failure to

notice and correct it would affect the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 50. "It is a

mistake so fundamental that it constitutes a 'miscarr iage of

justice.'" "Alternatively stated, when a new . . . legal issue is

raised for the first time on appeal, plain error occurs where our4

failure to consider the question results in 'manifest injustice.'"

Id.

We perceive no plain error on the PSR complaint. At the

sentencing hearing the court handed the PSR to Navejar and asked

whether he had had sufficient time to review it with counsel.

Navejar consulted privately with counsel and then answered in the

affirmative. Nothing in the record contradicts that in-court

statement. "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory

allegations unsupported by specifics" is inadequate to challe nge

such declarations. B lackledge v. Allison

, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97

S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 50 L.Ed.2d 136, 147 (1977).

Nave jar's complaints of error in the PSR are merely general

statements that it is inaccurate and misleading. He does not

identify any specific error nor does he identify the facts that

are, in his view, incorrect. In disputing factual assertions in a

PSR the defendant must show that the information is materially

untrue, inaccurate, or unreli able. U nited States v. Kinder

, 946

F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1991), cert

. denied

, 118 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992).

Navejar's obj ections are vague and general; they neither

demonstrate nor suggest material untruth, inaccuracy, or

unreliability.

In his second assignment of error Navejar contends that

although he signed the plea agreement, he was at no time "able to

review the new agreement or discuss it with his counsel." He

insists that it was not until months later that he realized that he5

had signed a plea agreement different from the earlier agreement.

The primary difference between the two is the provision relative to

a sentence of 270 months.

The transcript of the plea hearing belies Navejar's

contention. He testified that he had reached a plea agreement with

the government and that he had seen the written agreement. The

court, the pr o secutor, and defense counsel questioned Navejar

extensively about the plea agreemen t, its contents, and its

consequences. In turn, Navejar asked questions, all of which were

answered. The record of the in-court discussion of the plea

agreement spans 54 pages of transcript and the key challenged

provision of the agreement, the 270-month sentence, was referred to

no less than nine times. At the conclusion, the vastly experienced

trial judge made an express finding that Na vejar understood the

terms of the agreement. This assignment of error has no merit.

Navejar's third contention is that his sentence is " far above

the logical and fair punishment required" by the s entencing

guidelines. Once again Navejar failed to make this objection in

the district court and we review only for plain error.

Navejar has neither alleged nor identified any defect in the

calculatio n of the guidelines sentence. Only issues that are

speci fied and briefed are properly before the appellate court.

Price v. Digital Equip. Corp.

, 846 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1988), cert

.

denied

, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); Brinkmann v. Abner

, 813 F.2d 744 (5th

Cir. 1987). A p ro se appellant's one-page description of familiar

rules, "without even the slightest identificat ion of any error"6

made by the district court "is the same as if he had not appealed

that judgment." B rinkmann

, 813 F.2d at 748. Without being

informed of the asserted er ror(s) in the sentencing guidelines

calculation, we can make no meaningful review. This claim, too,

has no merit.

Finally, Navejar makes conclusionary charges of ineffective

assistance of counsel. He contends that his attorney failed to

represent him adequately when preparing the plea agreement, did not

provide evidence of mitig ation, failed to research the facts and

law of the case, and neither explained to him the consequences of

the PSR nor objected to its inaccuracies.

Our controlling precedent directs that a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel generally cannot be addressed on direct

appeal unless the claim has been presented to the district court;

otherwise there is no opportunity for the development of an

adequate record on the merits of that serious allegation. United

States v. Higdon , 832 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1987), cert

. denied , 484

U.S. 1075 (1988). We "resolve claims of inadequate representation

on direct appeal only in rare cases where the record allow[s] us to

evaluate fairly the merits of the cla im." I d. at 314. The case

before us is not one of those rare cases; Navejar's vague

allegations largely refer to matters outside of the record. We do

not consider this assignment of error.

The sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED.