Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1192

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

STEVEN A. MILKIEWICZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge *] *

Before

 Torruella, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

Terrance J. McCarthy for appellant.

Paul G. Levenson, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for

appellee.

December 6, 2006
 Following the government’s practice, we shall use the term 1

"USDC" to refer to the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts as a governmental purchaser of goods and

services, reserving the term "court" or "the district court" to

refer to the district court judge who handled the trial level

proceedings in this case. 

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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to consider

two unsettled issues in First Circuit law: the proper use of the

various evidentiary rules governing the introduction of document

summaries at trial, and the applicability of the constitutional

rule set out in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to

orders of restitution. The appellant, Steven A. Milkiewicz, was

convicted of defrauding the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts ("USDC") through a scheme in which he –

collaborating with a court administrator – sold office supplies to

the USDC at inflated prices and billed it for quantities of

products in excess of what he delivered.1

Appellant claims that he is entitled to a new trial

because the district court improperly allowed the jury to consider

two sets of summary charts, one depicting the allegedly fraudulent

sales transactions and the other showing discrepancies in his

income tax reporting. He also claims the district court's

restitution order, which was based on its own factual findings,

violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the principles set out in

Booker. Finding neither evidentiary nor constitutional error, we

affirm appellant's conviction and sentence.
Schroeder pled guilty and testified at Milkiewicz’s trial 2

pursuant to an agreement with the government.

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I.

A. Factual Background

We summarize the facts as the jury could have found them,

drawing all inferences in the light most consistent with the jury's

verdict. See United States v. Charles, 456 F.3d 249, 251 (1st Cir.

2006). Between February 1997 and June 2002, appellant Milkiewicz

and Timothy Schroeder, the Procurement Officer for the Clerk of the

USDC, used various techniques to ensure that Milkiewicz would win

the USDC's purchasing contracts and have the ability to overcharge

for the products provided. For example, to avoid the USDC 2

requirement that procuring officials obtain at least three

competitive bids for the purchase of goods or services over $2,500,

appellant – with Schroeder's complicity – sometimes submitted bids

from each of his two separate companies. The third bid at times

was forged, and at least once came from a sham entity created by

Schroeder. By eliminating competition, appellant not only was

assured that he would be given the business but also was able to

charge more and thereby elicit fraudulently inflated profits.

On other occasions, appellant's collaboration with

Schroeder allowed him to charge the USDC for items he never

delivered. This conduct occurred repeatedly with respect to

purchases of large amounts of paper and toner cartridges used for
 The government presented evidence showing that the 3

competitor, Richard Kelly of New England Office Supply ("NEOS"),

submitted what he knew would be losing bids to the USDC, but did so

because he also knew that, if Milkiewicz won the contract, NEOS

would be the actual supplier. 

-4-

photocopiers and computer printers. In one such transaction,

appellant billed the USDC $21,570 ($35.95 per carton) for 600

cartons of copier paper but arranged to deliver only 400 cartons.

The illicit gains from this purchase included not only the money he

received for the undelivered paper ($7,190), but also a fraudulent

mark-up of about $4,000 that he was able to obtain thanks in part

to cooperation from his supplier, who regularly submitted inflated

competitive bids at appellant's request.3

The evidence also showed that, during the years at issue,

appellant understated his taxable income and gave his tax preparer

false information about his gross receipts and business expenses.

The government used the evidence of his illicit transactions to

prove that he had earned income in excess of what he reported and

that he had spent less than he stated to purchase inventory from

his suppliers. 

In December 2004, Milkiewicz was charged in an indictment

with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; eight counts of presenting to the

United States false claims for payment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
These counts alleged eight specific episodes of over- 4

charging or under-delivering, including the one described above.

 The sentence also included a term of supervised release and 5

a special assessment of $1,300.

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§ 287; one count of bribery of a public official, in violation of 4

18 U.S.C. § 201; and five counts of filing false tax returns, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). At the conclusion of an eightday trial, a jury convicted him on all counts except the bribery

charge and one of the false tax return charges. He subsequently

was sentenced to a 41-month term of imprisonment and ordered to pay

restitution in the sum of $196,796.63, the latter a joint and

several obligation with his co-defendant, Schroeder.5

B. The Disputed Summary Charts

The evidence introduced at trial included several

thousand pages of financial records offered by the government to

prove specific transactions consistent with a more general

description of the scheme that Schroeder provided in his testimony.

Among these documents were approximately 600 pages of USDC records,

including vouchers and invoices that showed purchases from

appellant’s two companies. Another substantial set of documents

contained business records, including purchase orders and invoices,

from more than twenty vendors whom appellant allegedly used as

suppliers for the products he sold to the USDC. These suppliers

were identified by IRS investigators who had examined appellant’s

bank activity. The records were offered into evidence, by
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stipulation, through affidavits from the various keepers of

records.

Toward the end of its case, the government called an IRS

agent, Jonathan Wlodyka, to testify about a series of charts that

summarized the information contained in these voluminous financial

documents. Two sets of charts are at issue in this case – what we

shall call the “Transactions Set" and the “Tax Set.” The

Transactions Set summarizes data from the records that the

government offered as evidence of the fraudulent transactions with

the USDC. The Tax Set summarizes documents related to the tax

charges.

The Transactions Set consists of three relevant charts:

Exhibits 1, 1a and 1b. Exhibit 1a summarizes data from the USDC

records reflecting purchases from appellant. Exhibit 1b summarizes

data from the roughly 1,300 pages of authenticating affidavits and

vendor business records depicting appellant’s purchases from

suppliers. Also included in that batch of records were copies of

checks from appellant to the vendors, which the government offered

to supplement incomplete vendor records. The checks were used to

prove appellant’s purchases when vendors could not produce invoices

documenting those purchases. 

Exhibit 1 juxtaposes the information in the 1a and 1b

charts, providing a comparison in chronological order between what

appellant sold to the USDC and what he purchased from his vendors.
 For example, the chart lists two court invoices dated 6

October 9, 2001. The first listing shows that Milkiewicz billed

the USDC for 400 cartons of paper, at $36.95 per carton, for a

total price of $14,780. This is matched up with a vendor invoice,

dated October 17, for 300 cartons of paper, at $23.50 per carton,

totaling $7,050. The “Price Difference” column contains the figure

“$4,035,” reflecting the mark-up of $13.45 on the 300 cartons. The

“Quantity Difference Column” contains the figure “$3,695,"

reflecting the $36.95 payment for 100 undelivered cartons.

The second listing for October 9 is for 60 cartons of color

paper, at $45 per carton. It is matched with an invoice, also

dated October 17, showing the purchase of 60 cartons at $32.50 per

carton. The figure $750 appears in the “Price Difference” column

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The calculated differences are listed in columns labeled “Price

Difference” and “Quantity Difference.” The “Price Difference”

column shows the disparity between what appellant charged the USDC

for specific items on particular dates and what he allegedly paid

suppliers for those goods. The government presented evidence

suggesting that, if Milkiewicz and Schroeder had not manipulated

the competitive bid process, some of Milkiewicz’s suppliers would

have sold their products directly to the government at prices far

below what Milkiewicz charged. The “Quantity Difference” column

contains figures showing an amount appellant billed to the USDC

where records show no corresponding purchase from a vendor. In

some instances, the chart showed that appellant purchased fewer

goods than he sold to the USDC, and for which he received payment,

and at other times it showed no purchase at all of items for which

the USDC had paid. In the rows involving alleged non-deliveries,

the spaces in columns labeled “Quantity Purchased” and “Price Paid

Per Unit” are blank.6
(($45-$32.50) x 60), and the “Quantity Difference” column is blank.

The listing for October 5, 1999, depicts a complete nondelivery. Milkiewicz billed the USDC $8,760 for 240 cartons of

paper, but there is no corresponding purchase identified. The

columns showing “Quantity Purchased” and “Price Paid Per Unit” were

blank, and the “Quantity Difference” was listed as the full $8,760.

 Many of the documents underlying the Tax Set – such as the 7

USDC records – were the same as those used to generate the

Transactions charts. 

-8-

The government asserts that the “obvious inference” to be

drawn from the flow of money and product depicted in Exhibit 1 is

that appellant realized illicit profits both by charging prices in

excess of what would have been paid in a legitimate bid process and

by charging for some goods that he never delivered – either

providing a lesser quantity than ordered or by not delivering an

order at all. In closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury

to infer just that, and he emphasized in particular that where the

charts were blank – i.e., where there was no evidence that

Milkiewicz purchased an item from suppliers – he never delivered

the item to the USDC. 

The Tax Set similarly consists of three charts: Exhibits

2, 2a and 2b. Exhibit 2a lists the checks the government viewed as

evidence of the “gross receipts” of appellant’s office supply

business in each of the years 1997 through 2001. Documents

supporting the data were in evidence, including records of hundreds

of payments from the USDC. Exhibit 2b summarizes the documentary 7

evidence of appellant’s purchases from his suppliers, or, in tax
 Exhibit 2 is set up with five vertical boxes representing 8

each year from 1997 to 2001 and a column on the left side listing

various components of appellant’s income and expenses, including

“Taxable Interest,” “Business Income/Loss,” “Other Income,” and

“Credits.” The “Business Income” listing is subdivided into

separate lines for appellant’s and his wife’s income. His business

income is further subdivided into “Gross Income,” “COGS” (“cost of

goods sold”) and other expenses. Each of the boxes containing data

for a particular year is divided into two columns, one titled “Per

Return” and one titled “Per Investigation.” For 1998, for example,

the chart shows gross business income for appellant of $167,385 in

the “Per Return” column and “$188,929" in the “Per Investigation”

column. The corresponding amounts for “COGS” were $136,000 “Per

Return” and $58,647.05 “Per Investigation.” Each annual column also

included entries for the tax reported “Per Return” and the total

tax owed “Per Investigation.”

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terms, his “cost of goods sold.” Exhibit 2 compares the figures

appellant reported on his tax returns in the categories of “gross

income” and “cost of goods sold” with the data developed in the

investigation, as summarized in Exhibits 2a and 2b. Exhibit 2 also

calculates, for each of the five years, the additional tax due

based on the information compiled in the chart.8

Appellant’s counsel initially objected only to admission

of the charts as independent evidence, consenting to their use as

demonstrative jury aids, or “chalks.” He later opposed the court’s

decision to allow the jury to have the charts during their

deliberations, arguing that the summaries impermissibly shifted the

burden of proof to appellant. Counsel asserted that the blank

spaces on Exhibit 1 – which indicated that the government had found

no evidence that appellant purchased certain supplies for which he

charged the government – “cannot help but lead jurors to say, Well,
After generally advising the jury that the burden is on the 9

government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that no

presumption of guilt can be drawn from a defendant’s failure to

call witnesses or produce any evidence, the court added: 

In particular, I instruct you that Mr. Milkiewicz

has no burden to produce evidence that he purchased goods

that the government contends he did not deliver to the

Clerk’s Office. The burden of proof on this issue, as is

the case with all issues, remains with the government. 

Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence if “its 10

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice . . . .”

-10-

how come the defendant is not filling those gaps.” The court

rejected this objection, concluding that a similar “argument could

be made with respect to any piece of circumstantial evidence.” It

agreed, however, to specifically instruct the jury that appellant

had no burden to produce evidence that he had purchased such

goods.9

On appeal, Milkiewicz no longer pursues the burden of

proof issue, instead arguing that the jury should not have been

given the charts because the Transactions Set contained errors and

significant omissions, rendering the summaries unreliable, while

the Tax Set was improperly admitted through Agent Wlodyka, who was

not qualified as an expert. Appellant relatedly argues that the

summaries should not have been admitted because their probative

value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed.

R. Evid. 403.10
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II.

In deciding whether – and how – to admit the Transactions

and Tax summaries offered by the government, the district judge

carefully reviewed our precedent on summary evidence and, during a

lengthy explanation from the bench, admitted that he was perplexed.

As we shall discuss, the judge ultimately relied on Federal Rules

of Evidence 611(a) and 703 because he understood our precedent to

foreclose admission of the charts under Rule 1006, which explicitly

addresses the use of summaries, see infra at note 11. Noting that

“this is an area where it would be helpful for the Court to provide

some clarification to district judges,” he urged the First Circuit

to consider “a slightly different approach” than he believed our

case law required. Having done our own review, we agree that our

precedent is somewhat opaque – a reflection, we believe, of the

intricacies of the law generally – and we further agree with the

district court’s assessment of the correct approach to Rule 1006

summaries. Also, a proper understanding of the evidentiary rules

applicable to summaries is important because the basis for

admission can affect how a summary is used, including whether a

jury may rely on it as primary evidence and whether it is allowed

in the jury room during deliberations, see infra at note 14. We

therefore digress from appellant’s particular concerns to clarify

the landscape.
 The district court had the impression that Rule 1006 did not 11

apply in such a case:

I understand, based on my reading of the First

Circuit’s opinion in Air Safety . . . that the

distinction turns on whether the actual documents are

admitted into evidence . . . . I understand the Court to

say . . . that where the underlying documents are

themselves admitted into evidence, the use of a summary

is not justified by Rule 1006.

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A. Document Summaries: Legal Principles

The Federal Rules of Evidence offer multiple options for

an attorney who wishes to summarize complex evidence and bring it

to the jury’s attention in the form of a chart. The various rules

are not always mutually exclusive, and so it is unsurprising that

confusion sometimes arises – as it did in this case – over the

appropriate basis for admitting a particular summary. We

previously attempted to respond to the ambiguities in our own law

in Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 94 F.3d

1 (1st Cir. 1996), where we observed that, contrary to statements

in prior cases, evidence underlying summaries admitted under Rule

1006 need not be admitted into evidence and that “[t]he requirement

of prior admission actually applies to a different sort of

summary.” Id. at 7 n.14. We did not, however, identify the rule

under which such other summaries could be introduced and, indeed,

left ambiguous whether Rule 1006 was inapplicable if the underlying

documents were in evidence. We now give more focused attention 11

to each of the options and explicitly hold that summaries that are
 The rule states in full: 12

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or

photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in

court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary,

or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be

made available for examination or copying, or both, by

other parties at [a] reasonable time and place. The

court may order that they be produced in court.

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otherwise admissible under Rule 1006 are not rendered inadmissible

because the underlying documents have been admitted, in whole or in

part, into evidence.

 Rule 1006 allows “[t]he contents of voluminous writings

. . . which cannot conveniently be examined in court [to] be

presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.” Fed.

R. Evid. 1006. It creates an exception to Rule 1002, which 12

requires that originals be used to prove the content of writings,

recordings and photographs. Evidence admitted under Rule 1006 must

be otherwise admissible and remains subject to the usual objections

under the rules of evidence and the Constitution. “Most notably,

Rule 1006 evidence normally is objectionable if the voluminous

source material on which it is based is inadmissible.” 31 Charles

A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8043,

at 521-22 (2000). The proponent must show that the voluminous

source materials are what the proponent claims them to be and that

the summary accurately summarizes the source materials. Id. at

525.
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Under Rule 1006, the underlying documents must be made

available to the other parties, and “[t]he court may order that

they be produced in court.” The discretion accorded the trial

court to order production of the documents means that the evidence

underlying Rule 1006 summaries need not be introduced into

evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 272-73

(4th Cir. 2004); Air Safety, 94 F.3d at 7 n.14, but nothing in the

rule forecloses a party from doing so. For example, we can imagine

instances in which an attorney does not realize until well into a

trial that a summary chart would be beneficial, and admissible as

evidence under Rule 1006, because the documents already admitted

were too voluminous to be conveniently examined by the jury.

Most often, however, we think it likely that an attorney

would anticipate the benefits of summarizing voluminous writings

and would take advantage of the opportunity offered by Rule 1006 to

present only the summary at trial. Consequently, while in most

cases a Rule 1006 chart will be the only evidence the fact finder

will examine concerning a voluminous set of documents, see Air

Safety, 94 F.3d at 7 n.14; United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728,

736-37 (4th Cir. 1991); cf. 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A.

Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 1006.04[1] (Joseph M.

McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2000), in other instances the summary may

be admitted in addition to the underlying documents to provide the

jury with easier access to the relevant information. See, e.g.,
 Rule 611(a) provides: 13

Control by Court. The court shall exercise

reasonable control over the mode and order of

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to

(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for

the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless

consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from

harassment or undue embarrassment.

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United States v. Green, 428 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Stephens, 779 F.2d 232, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1985); United

States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

 This latter practice has drawn criticism as inconsistent

with the purpose of Rule 1006 to provide an exception to the “best

evidence rule” because, “[i]f the underlying evidence is already

admitted, there is no concern that a summary is used in lieu of the

‘best evidence.’” See Federal Practice and Procedure § 8043, at

523-24 n.8. We agree with the Fifth Circuit, however, that “[t]he

fact that the underlying documents are already in evidence does not

mean that they can be ‘conveniently examined in court.’” Stephens,

779 F.2d at 239 (quoting Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1347). Thus, in such

instances, Rule 1006 still serves its purpose of allowing the jury

to consider secondary evidence as a substitute for the originals.

A trial judge also may allow use of a chart or other

summary tool under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), which gives the trial

court “control over the mode . . . [of] presenting evidence.”13

See, e.g., United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir.
 Courts usually do not allow such charts to go to the jury 14

room absent consent of the parties. See Harms, 442 F.3d at 375;

see also 31 Federal Practice and Procedure § 8043, at 524 n.9

(“[C]ourts often do not permit demonstrative evidence in the jury

room.”); 6 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 1006.08[4] (“While a

court retains discretion to permit the jury to take such aids into

their deliberation, most courts do not allow it.”).

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2006); Janati, 374 F.3d at 273; United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d

1104, 1111 (6th Cir. 1998). Such summaries most typically are used

as “pedagogical devices” to “clarify and simplify complex testimony

or other information and evidence or to assist counsel in the

presentation of argument to the court or jury.” Bray, 139 F.3d at

1111; see also Janati, 374 F.3d at 273; 6 Weinstein’s Federal

Evidence § 1006.08[4]. A summary chart used as a pedagogical

device must be linked to evidence previously admitted and usually

is not itself admitted into evidence. Janati, 374 F.3d at 273;

Bray, 139 F.3d at 1112; Air Safety, 94 F.3d at 7 n.14.14

The lines between these two types of summary documents

are easily blurred. A summary that is admissible under Rule 1006

– and is thus most appropriately introduced under that rule – could

properly be offered under Rule 611(a) if the supporting material

has been admitted into evidence. Likewise, a chart that originally

was offered as a jury aid to assist with review of voluminous

underlying documents already in evidence – and which accurately

summarizes those documents – alternatively could be admitted under

Rule 1006 if the court concluded that the supporting documents

could not be examined conveniently in court. To complicate
 The records summarized must, of course, otherwise be 15

admissible. See, e.g., Janati, 374 F.3d at 273; United States v.

Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 409 (6th Cir. 2005). 

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matters, a court also has discretion under Rule 703 to provide the

jury in some circumstances with the “facts or data” underlying an

expert’s opinion, and such material may be presented in the form of

a summary chart. Fed. R. Evid. 703; Janati, 374 F.3d at 273.

In a case where voluminous underlying records are

involved, the key difference between these various approaches

appears to be the purpose for which the summaries are offered.

Charts admitted under Rule 1006 are explicitly intended to reflect

the contents of the documents they summarize and typically are

substitutes in evidence for the voluminous originals.

Consequently, they must fairly represent the underlying documents

and be “‘accurate and nonprejudicial.’” Bray, 139 F.3d at 1111

(quoting Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 803

F.2d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Janati, 374 F.3d at 272.15

By contrast, a pedagogical aid that is allowed under Rule

611(a) to illustrate or clarify a party’s position, or allowed

under Rule 703 to assist expert testimony, may be less neutral in

its presentation. Record support is necessary because such devices

tend to be “more akin to argument than evidence,” 6 Weinstein’s

Federal Evidence § 1006.08[4]; Bray, 139 F.3d at 1111, and “may

reflect to some extent, through captions or other organizational

devices or descriptions, the inferences and conclusions drawn from
 For example, it required that the comparison columns in 16

Exhibit 1 be re-labeled with less judgmental headings: “Profit by

Margin” became “Price Difference” and “Profit by Shortage” became

“Quantity Difference.” We note that, in requiring these

refinements to make the Transactions Set more neutral, the district

court undoubtedly was viewing them as Rule 1006 summaries, even

though it ultimately felt compelled to rely upon Rule 611(a) in

allowing them to be introduced.

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the underlying evidence by the summary’s proponent,” Bray, 139 F.3d

at 1111; see also Janati, 374 F.3d at 273. In some cases, however,

such pedagogical devices may be sufficiently accurate and reliable

that they, too, are admissible in evidence, even though they do not

meet the specific requirements of Rule 1006. Bray, 139 F.3d at

1112; 6 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 1006.04[2].

B. Appellant’s Objections to the Summary Charts

Our review of the court’s decision to allow the jury to

consider the summaries during its deliberations is highly

deferential: “It is hard to imagine an issue on which a trial judge

enjoys more discretion than as to whether summary exhibits will be

helpful.” Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 67

(1st Cir. 2002). The district court exercised that discretion here

with meticulous care. It required the government to modify the

summaries to eliminate unnecessary and potentially prejudicial

information and labels, and it explicitly considered “the 16

usefulness versus the potential misuse of summaries of this

nature,” concluding that the jurors needed the charts to be able to

sort through such “an extraordinarily complex document case.”
 Toward the end of his lengthy explanation for allowing the 17

jury to use the summaries, the court stated:

I’m going to follow what I think is the First Circuit

guidance on this. . . . So, I’m not admitting them

pursuant to Rule 1006, although I think if it were up to

me, I would.

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The court recognized the risk of prejudice inherent in

such a compact presentation of the evidence, but concluded that the

jurors “will clearly understand that those charts are based on

assumptions and they’re only as valid as the underlying assumptions

. . . .” In addition, although the general principles we have

outlined above would have permitted the court to admit most, if not

all, of the charts into evidence under Rule 1006, the court chose

not to do so because it read our precedents to foreclose admission

of a summary chart when the underlying documents already were in

evidence. The court instead allowed their use under Rules 611 and 17

703, but did not admit them into evidence. It gave a cautionary

instruction that typically is used to ensure that jurors

considering non-evidentiary summaries focus on the underlying

documents rather than on the summaries:

A witness for the government and a

witness for the defendant testified about

certain documents that purported to summarize

various documents that have been admitted into

evidence. Such summaries are not independent

evidence of their subject matter and are only

as valid and reliable as the underlying

evidence they summarize. You are free to

disregard them entirely. It is for you to
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decide whether they accurately, completely and

objectively reflect the content of the

underlying documents. Your evaluation of the

summaries should be based on your

consideration of all testimony you heard about

who prepared the summaries, the manner in

which they were prepared, and the reliability

and completeness of the underlying documents.

Despite these precautions, appellant argues that the

court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to consider the

summaries. We find his claims of error meritless. 

1. Flaws in the Data

Appellant initially complains about the records on which

the summaries were based, describing the data as unreliable and

“corrupted.” As noted earlier, much of the underlying financial

information was presented via affidavits by stipulation, and

appellant explicitly waived objection to the data’s admission. At

trial, seven keepers of records testified about their companies’

business dealings with appellant and were cross-examined by defense

counsel. Nonetheless, in his brief, appellant identifies errors or

omissions contained in the affidavits and asserts that the

summaries should have been excluded under Rule 403 because of

inaccuracies in the underlying data.

To the extent that appellant is attempting to mount a

challenge to the data on which the charts are based, it is much too

late to do so. When a defendant affirmatively agrees to the

government’s proposed use of evidence, there has been a waiver and

the defendant is not entitled even to plain error review of a claim
 For example, at least three of the company representatives 18

testified that their records dating to the relevant period were

incomplete or unavailable.

-21-

that the evidence was inadmissible. United States v. Medina, 427

F.3d 88, 91-92 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d

800, 807 (1st Cir. 1996).

Appellant fares no better to the extent his claim is

based solely on the jury’s access to the summaries during

deliberations. To be sure, the underlying records were imperfect,18

and, as a result, the summaries in all likelihood did not reflect

every relevant transaction. But defense counsel explored the

deficiencies during his cross-examinations of Agent Wlodyka and the

record-keeping witnesses, and gaps or other imperfections in the

underlying data do not necessarily undermine the value of the

summary charts as pedagogical aids under Rule 611(a). In United

States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1125-26 (1st Cir. 1989), we noted

that the government need not prove that it has uncovered all

records relevant to a case and may summarize the data it has

managed to collect through the exercise of “due diligence.” We

continued:

If defendants possessed exculpatory records

not in the government’s files, they could have

offered them at trial or prepared their own

summary. By the same token, if there were

gaps in the charts, the defense –

knowledgeable as to [the business’s] operation

– had every opportunity to exploit them. In

the last analysis, completeness of the

underlying records was for the jury.
 Appellant offers an undeveloped claim that Agent Wlodyka 19

lacked the expertise to justify the assumptions built into the

Transactions summaries about non-delivery of items to the USDC.

The links between products ordered and products delivered arose

logically, however, from the stipulated evidence. As the district

court observed, the charts suggest correlations “based on temporal

proximity, quantity, [and] product identification,” and “[t]hose

assumptions are plain for the jurors.” Moreover, the court

explicitly told Wlodyka not to express opinions about the

significance of the data on Exhibit 1. Following that admonition,

Wlodyka explained the charts but did not comment on them.

-22-

Id. at 1126; see also United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 740

(1st Cir. 1996).

Here, too, appellant had ample opportunity to expose his

concerns to the jury, and the court’s instruction that the jury

should base its evaluation of the summaries on “the reliability and

completeness of the underlying documents” underscored the jury’s

prerogative to make its own assessment of both the supporting

material and the summaries. Moreover, the court’s instruction on

the burden of proof, see supra note 9, met appellant’s concern that

the format of the summaries would lead the jury to infer guilt

solely from the gaps in the information provided.19

Appellant’s shifting grounds of argument about the jury’s

access to the summaries, see supra at 9-10, undoubtedly entitles

him only to plain error review on this issue. Even were it a

matter of discretion, however, we think it beyond debate that the

court properly could find that the jury’s need for the summaries

was substantial. In addition, the court’s efforts to excise

prejudicial content – imposing the neutrality requirements of Rule
-23-

1006, though he ultimately found the summaries inadmissible under

that rule – did much to diminish any harmful impact on appellant.

Given the court’s care both in crafting the versions given to the

jury and in guiding the jury’s use of them, we conclude that

appellant was adequately protected from unfair prejudice.

2. Agent Wlodyka and the Tax Exhibits

The district court admitted the tax return exhibits

pursuant to Rule 703, which addresses the admissibility of “facts

or data” that form the basis for an expert’s opinion. When such

information is “otherwise inadmissible,” it may not be

disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the

opinion or inference unless the court

determines that [the] probative value in

assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s

opinion substantially outweighs [its]

prejudicial effect.

Fed. R. Evid. 703. The court explained that it utilized Rule 703

for these summaries because the re-calculation of appellant’s tax

obligation that appeared in Exhibit 2 involved a “kind of expert

interpretation” and, as a result, that chart was “not, strictly

speaking, a summary of documents.” 

Appellant asserts on appeal that Agent Wlodyka lacked the

necessary qualifications as an expert to present the information

contained in the Tax Set and that, consequently, the district court

should have excluded the charts under the standards governing

admissibility of expert evidence that were outlined by the Supreme

Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
 One portion of testimony reflecting this assumption unfolded 20

as follows, with the questioning conducted by the prosecutor:

Q. And, so, have you done the same thing on each tax year

on your right-hand column where you’ve calculated – the

numbers in bold are the numbers you stuck in from

Exhibits 2a and 2b?

A. Yes.

Q. And you’ve gone through and made a calculation?

A. Yes.

Q. And then when you got a total for 1998, how much [tax

due] was reported on the tax return that was filed?

A. $22,668.

Q. And how much did you calculate as total tax based on

plugging in the numbers for 2a and 2b?

A. $55,194.41.

Q. And then did you do a subtraction to . . . find the

difference between those two numbers?

A. Yes.

Wlodyka confirmed that the same calculation was done for each of

the five years reported on the chart.

-24-

and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). As this

argument was not raised in the district court, it warrants only

plain error review. United States v. Torres-Rosario, 447 F.3d 61,

67-68 (1st Cir. 2006). At any level of scrutiny, however, the

claim fails.

The only arguably “expert” evidence in the Tax Set is

Exhibit 2's calculation of the new amount of tax owed for the years

1997 to 2001, based on the income and expense totals summarized in

the two related exhibits. Wlodyka was not asked how he computed

the amount of tax due; it appeared to be understood that he simply

applied the standard tax tables to the new income totals. Even 20

on appeal, appellant’s complaint does not appear to be about those
-25-

calculations; it is that the court “allow[ed] the jury to consider

the summary charts which had been prepared by one who[] does not

qualify as an expert.”

If appellant means by that complaint that Wlodyka did not

have the expertise to summarize the financial information contained

in the charts, his argument is hopeless. The invoices, checks, and

other documents were routine financial records, and creating

summaries of the data took patience but not expertise. Moreover,

even if he is challenging the agent’s credentials to do the tax

computations, that challenge would fail. An IRS agent is qualified

to express an opinion on the tax consequences of a transaction,

United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2004),

particularly where, as here, the computation required no subjective

judgment. See United States v. Serafino, 281 F.3d 327, 330 (1st

Cir. 2002) (noting that an IRS agent presumably is qualified to

testify as an expert regarding the amount of an outstanding tax

liability). The district court thus fully met any gate-keeping

responsibility to ensure the reliability and pertinence of expert

testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141; Daubert, 509 U.S.

at 597. There was no error – plain or otherwise – in the court’s

decision to allow the jury to consider the tax exhibits.

In sum, we find no error in the court’s handling of the

summary exhibits and consequently no basis for disturbing the

jury’s verdict.
 The record does not indicate whether the government sought 21

to collect the unpaid taxes reflected in Exhibit 2 outside of the

restitution order.

 The restitution provisions of the MVRA and the Victim and 22

Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, are both

enforced by means of 18 U.S.C. § 3664, which states in relevant

part:

In each order of restitution, the court shall order

restitution to each victim in the full amount of each

victim’s losses as determined by the court and without

consideration of the economic circumstances of the

defendant.

18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The later-passed MVRA supplemented the

VWPA by, inter alia, making restitution mandatory for certain types

of offenses. 

-26-

III.

The district court found that the losses attributable to

appellant’s crimes included $139,912.07 in payments made by the

USDC for goods that were never delivered and $56,884.56 in excess

payments that resulted from bid-rigging. Pursuant to the 21

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, the

court consequently imposed restitution on appellant, jointly and

severally with Schroeder, in the total amount of $196,796.63.22

Appellant argues that the court’s reliance on its own fact-finding

for the restitution amount violated his Sixth Amendment rights

under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

We begin by noting that the government urges us either to

deem this claim waived, foreclosing any appellate consideration, or

to review it only for plain error, in which case it would be
 The Court first articulated the principle in Jones v. United 23

States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999), where it stated: “[A]ny fact

(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty

for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,

and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

-27-

governed by United States v. Burnette, 423 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005).

We held there that a restitution order based on judicial factfinding was not plain error. Id. at 25. While we agree that

appellant is entitled to no more than plain error consideration, we

have chosen to fully address Booker’s impact on restitution here

because the issue is appearing with increasing frequency in our

cases. Moreover, at least nine other circuits already have held

that judicial fact-finding on restitution is permissible under

Booker, see infra at 30, and we see no reason to delay our

agreement with their conclusion.

In the well known trio of cases culminating with Booker,

the Supreme Court established that the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment and the jury trial guarantees of the Sixth

Amendment require a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact

that increases the maximum penalty for a crime, other than the fact

of a prior conviction. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In Blakely, the Court reviewed the 23

Washington state sentencing guidelines and, relying on the Sixth

Amendment, stated that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the

jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the
 Although restitution is “criminal” in many senses, see 24

United States v. Rostoff, 164 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The

nature of restitution is penal and not compensatory.”); United

States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that

restitution imposed under the VWPA “is not a civil affair; it is a

criminal penalty meant to have deterrent and rehabilitative

effects”), we note that some courts have concluded that restitution

is not the sort of “punishment” to which the Sixth Amendment

applies. See, e.g., United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316

(10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th

Cir. 2005); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir.

-28-

facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ . . . and

the judge exceeds his proper authority.” 542 U.S. at 304 (internal

citation omitted).

The Court in Booker extended this approach to the federal

Sentencing Guidelines, stating that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right “is implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence

that is not solely based on ‘facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.’” 543 U.S. at 232 (quoting Blakely, 542

U.S. at 303). The Court also reiterated the basic principle:

“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to

support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted

by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”

543 U.S. at 244.

The question before us is whether this Sixth Amendment

right to have certain facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt requires that the jury, rather than the judge, calculate the

loss underlying a restitution order. A literal application of the 24
2005). Such a view would, of course, render the Booker line of

cases inapplicable to restitution. We do not choose to evaluate

that alternate rationale here. Instead, for the reasons stated

herein, we conclude that the reasoning of Booker does not require

a jury to find the facts underlying a restitution order.

 Section 3664(a) states in relevant part: 25

For orders of restitution under this title, the

court shall order the probation officer to obtain and

include in its presentence report, or in a separate

report . . . information sufficient for the court to

exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution

order. The report shall include, to the extent

practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each

victim, any restitution owed pursuant to a plea

agreement, and information relating to the economic

circumstances of each defendant.

-29-

Supreme Court’s language might suggest the answer would be an

affirmative. If “the question is whether the verdict ‘alone’

allows the judge to impose restitution with no additional finding

of fact[,] [o]bviously, it doesn’t.” United States v. Leahy, 438

F.3d 328, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (emphasis in original)

(McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The

statutory procedure for fixing a restitution amount calls for factgathering by the probation officer after conviction, 18 U.S.C. §

3664(a), with any disputes to be “resolved by the court by the 25

preponderance of the evidence,” id. at § 3664(e). The court is

then directed to order restitution “in the full amount of each

victim’s losses as determined by the court.” Id. at 3664(f)(1)(A).

Thus, it can reasonably be argued that the “maximum” amount of

restitution based solely on the fact of conviction is zero dollars.
-30-

Because any increase in that amount depends upon additional facts,

one could argue – as did the dissenters in the Third Circuit’s en

banc decision on this issue – that Booker requires such findings to

be made by a jury. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 344 & n.15 (McKee, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that a

scheme allowing judge-made findings on restitution runs “afoul of

the Sixth Amendment” because “[r]estitution in any amount greater

than zero clearly increases the punishment that could otherwise be

imposed”).

While we understand the logic behind this approach, we

think it ignores important considerations and, like all of the

other circuits to consider this question, we conclude that Booker

and its antecedents do not bar judges from finding the facts

necessary to impose a restitution order. See United States v.

Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118-20 (2d Cir. 2006); Leahy, 438 F.3d at

337-38; United States v. Miller, 419 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 454, 461 (6th Cir.

2005); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005)

(per curiam); United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2005); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir.

2005); United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1144-45 (10th Cir.

2004). 
-31-

The statutory restitution scheme is materially different

from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely and Booker. Under

the latter, a judge determines the appropriate penalty from within

a specified range, based on a variety of facts and factors that are

not necessarily predetermined by the jury’s finding of guilt. For

restitution, however, the jury’s finding of guilt leads to only one

outcome; in every case in which such punishment is imposed, “the

jury’s verdict automatically triggers restitution in the ‘full

amount of each victim’s losses,’” Leahy, 438 F.3d at 338 n.11.

Post-conviction judicial fact-finding to determine that amount “by

no means impos[es] a punishment beyond that authorized by juryfound or admitted facts,” or “beyond the ‘statutory maximum’ as

that term has evolved in the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment

jurisprudence.” Id. at 336-37 (noting that the “relevant

‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence

a judge may impose based solely on facts reflected in the jury

verdict or admitted by the defendant”); see also Reifler, 446 F.3d

at 119. As the Third Circuit majority in Leahy stated in its

response to the dissenters:

[T]here is no restitution range . . . that

starts at zero and ends at “the full amount of

each victim’s losses”; rather, the single

restitution amount triggered by the conviction

under the MVRA, or permitted under the VWPA,

is the full amount of loss.

. . . [W]hen the court determines the amount

of loss, it is merely giving definite shape to
-32-

the restitution penalty born out of the

conviction.

438 F.3d at 337-38 (footnote omitted).

Hence, we agree with the other courts that have concluded

that the Booker-Blakely principles have “no application” to orders

of restitution. Reifler, 446 F.3d at 118; see also, e.g.,

Williams, 445 F.3d at 1311; Sosebee, 419 F.3d at 454; Wooten, 377

F.3d at 1144 n.1.

 IV.

We hold that the district court appropriately exercised

its discretion in allowing the jury to consider the government’s

summary charts during its deliberations under Rules of Evidence

611(a) and 703, but we clarify that the prior introduction of the

underlying documents would not have barred the court from admitting

the summaries into evidence under Rule 1006. We further hold that

the court’s restitution order did not violate appellant’s Sixth

Amendment jury trial right. Judicial fact-finding on the amount of

loss is permissible under Booker because it does not increase the

“maximum” punishment beyond that authorized by jury-found facts.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the judgment of

conviction and the sentence imposed.

So ordered.