UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RANDALL CARL WALLACE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL H. HOLLAND, Trustee;

DONALD E. PIERCE, JR., Trustee;

No. 98-1350

ELLIOT A. SEGAL, Trustee; JOSEPH J.

STAHL, III, Trustee; UNITED MINE

WORKERS OF AMERICA HEALTH AND

RETIREMENT FUNDS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.

Joseph Robert Goodwin, District Judge.

(CA-97-94-5)

Submitted: November 10, 1998

Decided: December 4, 1998

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

S. F. Raymond Smith, RUNDLE & RUNDLE, L.C., Pineville, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Glenda S. Finch, Deputy General Counsel,

Matilda A. Brodnax, Assistant General Counsel, UMWA HEALTH

AND RETIREMENT FUNDS, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randall Carl Wallace was injured in a mining accident on November 2, 1992, which was diagnosed as a contusion to his left thigh and

a mild sprain to his left knee. His doctor released Wallace to return

to work on November 30, 1992; Wallace, however, was laid off

November 28, 1992, prior to returning to work. Wallace first was

diagnosed with depression, anxiety and related disorders in March

1994 by a psychologist and has since undergone evaluation and treatment by other health care providers for these problems. Based upon

this medical evidence, Wallace was found disabled and qualified for

Social Security benefits beginning on December 13, 1993, due to

affective and anxiety disorders. Wallace then applied to the United

Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan ("Plan") for a disability

pension, which was denied. Wallace filed an action in the district

court against the Trustees of the Plan seeking benefits. The district

court found the action was governed by the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act (ERISA), see 29 U.S.C.A.§§ 1001-1461 (West

1985 & Supp. 1998), and granted the Plan's motion for summary

judgment, upholding its denial of benefits. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant summary

judgment. See Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672,

675 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Traditionally, district courts upheld

pension plan eligibility decisions of trustees if they were supported by

substantial evidence and were not arbitrary and capricious. See

DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1184-85 (4th Cir. 1989). The

United States Supreme Court has held, however, that review of plan

trustees' decisions should be reviewed de novo unless the benefit plan

grants the plan administrators or fiduciaries discretionary authority to

determine eligibility for benefits, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), in which case the decision is

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reviewed for an abuse of discretion only.* See Boyd v. Trustees

UMWA Health & Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989).

We have held that the instant Plan confers "full and final" authority

on the Trustees to determine eligibility for benefits, see Lockhart v.

UMWA 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77 (4th Cir. 1993), and thus,

we review the decision of the Trustees for an abuse of discretion. See

id.

In an ERISA action the award of any benefits is governed by the

Plan itself. See id. at 78. The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that:

Any Participant who (a) has less than 10 years of signatory

service prior to retirement and (b) becomes totally disabled

as a result of a mine accident . . . shall, upon retirement . . .

be eligible for a pension while so disabled. A participant

shall be considered totally disabled only if by reason of such

accident such Participant is subsequently determined to be

eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act or its successor.

See Plan, Art. II, Pt. D. (S.J.A. at p. 2). We have interpreted "as a

result of a mine accident" to mean that the total disability must have

been:

proximately caused by the mine accident. That is, if the

plaintiff was injured in a mine accident and that injury,

whether in combination with a previous or subsequent condition, is substantially responsible for plaintiff's inability to

perform his job and for whatever medical and vocational

reasons he is unable to perform an alternative job, then his

total disability results from a mine accident.

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*It is unclear whether the Bruch abuse of discretion standard is synonymous with the pre-Bruch arbitrary and capricious standard used in the

Fourth Circuit. However, a decision which was arbitrary and capricious

under pre-Bruch standards would be an abuse of discretion under the

Bruch test. See Richards v. Health & UMWA Retirement Funds, 895

F.2d 133, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1990).

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Boyd, 873 F.2d at 59 (citation omitted).

Wallace's medical records reveal that his affective and anxiety disorders were adversely affected by his unemployment, abuse as a

child, his mother's illness, and other similar problems. The record,

however, does not reveal a causal connection between Wallace's relatively minor thigh and knee injury in November 1992 and his ultimate

finding of disability on mental grounds, beginning in December 1993,

e.g. that the injury is "substantially responsible for plaintiff's inability

to perform his job." Id. Thus, we affirm the Trustees' decision denying Wallace benefits under the Plan. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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