IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30151

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ALMOND J. RICHARDSON,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CR-34-1

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Almond Richardson stands convicted of selling drugs to confidential

informants on two occasions, the second occasion while on bail for his first crime. 

Richardson was indicted in seven counts stemming from both incidents. Before

trial, Richardson filed several motions to suppress evidence, a motion for a

Franks hearing, and a motion to proceed pro se. The district court denied all of

these motions. Richardson was convicted of five counts and acquitted on two

counts.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 27, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court erred by denying each

of his motions and thus raises Fourth and Sixth Amendment issues. We find no

merit to Richardson’s contentions that the district court erred by denying his

motions to suppress and his motion for a Franks hearing, and we therefore

AFFIRM the district court’s rulings on those motions. We do, however, hold 1

that the district court erred by denying Richardson’s motion to proceed pro se. 

We therefore hold that Richardson is entitled to a new trial and thus VACATE

all convictions and sentences and REMAND for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion. 

I. 

During the last week of February 2006, the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s

Department received a tip that there was rampant drug dealing in Apartment

Two of the O’Neal Lane apartment complex. On March 1, four members of the

East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department’s Special Community Anti-Crime Team,

Officers Kenneth Huber, Malcom Hall, Kama Roussell and John Knapp, began

surveillance of Apartment Two.

Officer Huber,the leader of the surveillance operation, who was positioned

inside one of the O’Neal Lane Apartments, observed people entering and exiting

through Apartment Two’s side door. Officer Huber saw a white male visit

Apartment Two, walk to the complex’s parking lot, and sell drugs to Barry

Anderson, a white male sitting in a pick-up truck. Officer Huber radioed

Officers Roussell and Knapp about the drug deal, and they followed Anderson’s

truck out of the apartment complex’s parking lot. The officers stopped the truck

and searched Anderson for drugs. The officers found a rock of crack cocaine in

Anderson’s pocket and arrested him.

A Franks hearing is a hearing to determine whether a police officer’s affidavit used

1

to obtain a search warrant was based on false statements by the police officer. Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

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Following the arrest, Officers Roussell and Knapp questioned Anderson,

who said that he knew a black male named “Omar” who was selling drugs in

Apartment Two. Anderson informed the officers that he wanted to work as a

confidential informant and buy drugs from “Omar.” 

Officers Roussell and Knapp took Anderson to the sheriff’s department

substation for booking. After the booking, Officer Hall searched Anderson for

contraband and then drove him from the station back to the apartment complex

in an unmarked car. With Officer Huber still watching the side door of

Apartment Two, Anderson went to the side door and asked Almond Richardson,

whom Anderson knew as “Omar,” for forty dollars worth of crack cocaine. At

that point, Anderson entered the apartment, and the officers did not see any

more of Anderson’s interaction with Richardson. After Anderson left the

apartment, he immediately returned to Officer Hall’s truck and told Officer Hall

that he bought forty dollars worth of crack cocaine from Richardson. After

another search of Anderson’s person, Officer Hall recovered almost a gram of

crack cocaine from Anderson.

The next day, on March 2, Officer Huber filed a warrant affidavit, seeking

a search warrant for Richardson’s apartment and vehicle (“March 2 warrant”

or the “March 2, 2006 warrant”); the warrant was primarily supported by the

controlled buy. The affidavit for the search warrant stated that a confidential

informant contacted Huber and that the confidential informant volunteered to

participate in a controlled buy. The affidavit further indicated that the officers

had constant visual surveillance of the outside of Apartment Two before and

after the buy. A state court magistrate granted the sheriff’s department the

search warrant on the basis of the facts contained in Officer Huber’s warrant

affidavit.

The sheriff’s department executed the warrant on that same day. After

a search of Richardson’s apartment, the police found crack cocaine, a loaded

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rifle, marijuana, and marijuana plants. The police found more marijuana in

Richardson’s car.

After finding Richardson’s collection of various and sundry drugs, the

officers read Richardson his Miranda rights; Richardson stated that he

understood his rights and signed a form to such effect. Richardson told the

police that he sold cocaine and marijuana and that the marijuana plants

belonged to him. Richardson was then arrested.

On February 15, 2007, a federal grand jury returned a four-count

indictment charging Richardson with crimes related to the March 2, 2006

warrant, including: distribution of cocaine base (Count 1), being a felon in 2

possession of a firearm (Count 2), possession with the intent to distribute

3

marijuana (Count 3), and possession of marijuana plants (Count 4). 4 5

In May 2007, more than a year after Richardson’s previous arrest and

when he was out on bail, Richardson began selling drugs from his girlfriend’s

apartment in the St. Jeanne apartment complex. A confidential informant

(“CI”), who lived in the apartment complex and was tired of the seedy

characters that Richardson’s drug dealing attracted to the apartment, contacted

the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department. The CI informed the department

that Richardson was selling drugs from the apartment as well as his business,

Just 4 U Fashion. The CI further volunteered to participate in a controlled buy

from Richardson.

 Distributing cocaine base violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 2

 Felons possessing firearms violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 3

 Possession with the intent to distribute marijuana violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 4

 Growing marijuana plants violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 5

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On May 17, the CI approached Richardson’s girlfriend’s apartment and

bought fifty ecstasy pills from Richardson with five bills previously marked by

the sheriff’s department.

With probable cause established by the controlled buy, the sheriff’s

department obtained a search warrant for Richardson’s girlfriend’s apartment

and an arrest warrant for Richardson. The sheriff’s department delayed

execution of the warrants because they did not yet have probable cause to

obtain a search warrant for Richardson’s store, Just 4 U Fashion.

The next day, May 18, the sheriff’s department started surveilling Just

4 U Fashion, which was not yet open to the general public, as indicated by a

sign outside the store that stated “Just For You Coming Soon.” A white Honda

Civic soon pulled up to the store. Three people got out of the car, knocked on

the store’s door, entered the store, and returned to their car three to four

minutes later. Shortly afterward, another car pulled up to the store. 

Richardson went up to the car and conducted a hand-to-hand deal with the

driver. Finally, a four-wheeler ATV pulled up to the store, and the officer saw

Richardson conduct another hand-to-hand deal. After this third, apparent drug

deal at Just 4 U Fashion, two officers knocked on the business’ door to execute

Richardson’s arrest warrant. After the arrest, the officers conducted a search

of Richardson, and recovered two of the marked, one-hundred-dollar bills that

the CI had used the day before in the controlled buy.

During the time that Richardson was being arrested at the store, other

officers executed the search warrant at Richardson’s girlfriend’s apartment,

which did not yield any contraband. However, based on the information

obtained from the CI and the officer’s observation of three apparent drug deals,

the sheriff’s department decided to obtain a search warrant for Just 4 U

Fashion. That night, an officer contacted Judge Marabella, a Louisiana state

magistrate judge, via telephone and read a warrant affidavit to the judge (the

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“May 18 warrant” or the “May 18, 2007 warrant”). The warrant affidavit

indicated that the surveilling officer had observed several hand-to-hand drug

transactions, that customers had to knock on the business’ door to enter into the

business, and that customers did not stay longer than five minutes. The

warrant affidavit did not mention that Richardson’s store was not yet open to

the public and had a “coming soon” sign outside. 

After the judge approved the warrant affidavit, the sheriff’s department

searched Richardson’s store. The officers found 287 ecstasy pills and 11.2

grams of marijuana.

On October 17, 2007, a grand jury returned a seven-count superseding

indictment against Richardson. The first four counts related to the March 2,

2006, search warrant and were identical to the charges listed in the first

indictment. The additional three counts related to the May 18, 2007, search

warrant and included: distribution of MDMA (commonly referred to as ecstasy)

(Count 5), possession with the intent to distribute MDMA (Count 6), and 6 7

possession of marijuana (Count 7).8

As we have earlier noted, Richardson filed several pre-trial motions to

suppress evidence against him, which were addressed in three suppression

hearings conducted by the district court. In addition to filing motions to

suppress, Richardson effectively requested a Franks hearing to allow him to

offer evidence calling into question the truth or falsity of the sheriff’s

department’s statements in the warrant affidavits.

 Distribution of MDMA violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 6

Richardson’s possession with the intent to distribute MDMA violated 21 U.S.C. §

7

841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1).

The indictment alleged that Richardson’s possession of marijuana violated 21 U.S.C. 8

§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1).

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The district court conducted suppression hearings on February 5, May 14,

and June 3, 2009. The court considered whether there was probable cause

supporting the March 2 and May 18 warrants and whether the warrants were

otherwise flawed. The district court also stated that it would accept testimony

during the suppression hearings as part of a Franks hearing or find that a

Franks hearing was unnecessary. On August 5, 2009, the district court issued

an order denying each of Richardson’s motions to suppress, finding that the

sheriff’s department had probable cause to initiate and execute the warrants.

The district court further held that “[t]o the extent the defendant is also asking

for a Franks hearing, that motion is also denied.”

Four days before trial, Richardson’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw

as Richardson’s counsel, because Richardson had invoked his right to act as his

own counsel. On August 10, 2009, one day before trial was supposed to start,

the district court held a Faretta hearing. The court denied Richardson’s motion 9

to proceed pro se, holding that “the defendant’s method of insisting on what he

believes to be the law and what he believes lawyers should do or not do will

interfere with his right to a fair trial.” 

Richardson went to trial on August 11, 2009. After a three-day trial, the

jury convicted Richardson on the counts relating to being a felon in possession

of a firearm (Count 2), possession of marijuana plants (Count 4), distribution

of MDMA (Count 5), possession with the intent to distribute MDMA (Count 6),

and possession of marijuana (Count 7). Richardson was acquitted of two of the

charges relating to the March 2, 2006, warrant: distribution of cocaine base

A Faretta hearing is a hearing conducted to gauge whether a defendant has invoked 9

his or her right to self-representation knowingly, voluntarily, and competently; the judge

conducting the hearing must also warn the defendant of the dangers and pitfalls of selfrepresentation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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(Count 1) and possession with the intent to distribute marijuana (Count 3). The

district court sentenced Richardson to serve 240 months of imprisonment. 

Richardson now appeals arguing that the district court erred by denying

his motion to suppress the evidence seized in the execution of the March 2, 2006

search warrant, that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

the evidence seized in the execution of the May 18, 2007, search warrant, that

the district court erred by denying his motion for a Franks hearing, and, finally, 

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court denied

him the right to act as his own counsel at trial.

II.

A.

We are now prepared to address Richardson’s arguments. His first

argument is that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence seized in the execution of the March 2, 2006, search warrant.

When considering an appeal of a denial of a motion to suppress, we review

legal questions de novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, we

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed

in district court. Id.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The

exclusionary rule mandates that “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the

illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)

(citations omitted). When considering cases where a search is supported by a

warrant, we employ a two-step process for reviewing the district court’s denial

of a motion to suppress. See United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th

Cir. 1999). First, we establish whether the good-faith exception to the

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exclusionary rule applies. Id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-

21 (1984). The good faith exception applies unless “a reasonably well trained

officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s

authorization.” Id. at 922 n.23. Thus, the good-faith exception does not apply

if the warrant affidavit contains a false statement that was made intentionally

or with reckless disregard for the truth. United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706,

709-10 (5th Cir. 2002). If the good-faith exception applies, the police officer is

assumed to have acted reasonably under the circumstances and we must deny

a motion to suppress, regardless of whether the warrant is actually supported

by probable cause. United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 2010).

If the officer’s conduct is such that the good-faith exception does not

apply, we must progress to the second step and determine whether, without the

false or misleading information, the magistrate issuing the warrant had a

substantial basis for believing there was probable cause for the search. Cherna,

184 F.3d at 407; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 710.

Here, Richardson argues that he presented incontrovertible evidence

indicating that the controlled buy between Anderson and Richardson, which

was the primary source of probable cause in the March 2 warrant affidavit,

never happened. More specifically, Richardson points to the testimony of

Officer Roussell, who indicated that he arrested Anderson and transported

Anderson to parish prison. Roussell testified that the controlled buy did not

occur and that it could not have happened, because it was not mentioned in his

arrest report. OfficerKnapp, the other officer present during Anderson’s arrest,

also testified at the suppression hearing that the controlled buy did not occur.10

Richardson further argues that there was no evidence linking Richardson

to the identity of “Omar,” nor was there any corroborating evidence supporting

 At trial, Officer Knapp stated that the controlled buy did occur and that his earlier 10

testimony was mistaken.

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the controlled buy. The sheriff’s department did not use marked bills or a wire

when the purchase was allegedly made. Thus, Richardson contends that he

established that the controlled buy was fabricated in the warrant affidavit and

that the district court erred by upholding the search warrant and by allowing

the admission of the fruits of the warrant.

Although Richardson has introduced evidence that challenges Officer

Huber’s truthfulness in the warrant affidavit, both officers Hall and Huber

testified at the suppression hearing that the controlled buy did, in fact, occur. 

Thus, the district court was presented with conflicting evidence concerning the

existence of the controlled buy. We are not in the position to reweigh and

second-guess the district court’s consideration of valid, contradictory evidence,

especially on questions of credibility. Thus, we reject Richardson’s argument

that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence

seized in the execution of the March 2 warrant on the grounds of conflicting

evidence as to whether the controlled buy actually occurred.

B.

Richardson also argues that the March 2 warrant should be invalidated

on the grounds that Officer Huber purposefully omitted facts from the warrant

affidavit which would call into question Barry Anderson’s reliability as an

informant. Richardson also argues that Officer Huber lied in the warrant

affidavit about how he came into contact with Anderson. 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that information fabricated

by officers be excluded from a warrant affidavit. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924. 

Similarly, the Fourth Amendment forbids officers from omitting information

from a search warrant affidavit if (1) the omission was knowingly and

intentionally made or was made in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) the

inclusion of the omitted information would render the affidavit insufficient to

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support a finding of probable cause. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328

(5th Cir. 1980). 

The record indeed shows that Anderson never approached Huber and

volunteered to perform the controlled buy, as is suggested by Huber in the

search warrant affidavit. Furthermore, Huber, in fact, excluded information

that might reflect negatively on Anderson’s reliability as an informant. 

Nevertheless, the fact remains that even if the warrant affidavit was amended

to correct Huber’s misstatements and omissions, the affidavit still establishes

probable cause to search Richardson’s apartment. The remaining affidavit

contains all of the pertinent information relating to Anderson conducting the

controlled buy with Richardson, as set out earlier in this opinion, including

that: officers searched Anderson before the buy and found that he was

contraband-free, Huber saw Anderson approach the side door of Apartment

Two; officers saw Richardson answer the apartment door; officers heard

Anderson tell Richardson that he wanted to buy forty dollars worth of crack

cocaine; and, upon his return from the buy, Anderson gave Officer Hall the

crack cocaine that he had purchased from Richardson. This evidence is

sufficient basis for probable cause to search Richardson’s apartment.

III.

Thus, having rejected Richardson’s arguments for suppressing the

evidence seized in the execution of the March 2 warrant, we will proceed to

address Richardson’s second argument: that the May 18, 2007, warrant was

insufficiently supported by probable cause. 

Richardson argues that the sheriff’s department made misleading

statements and significant omissions in its affidavit for a search warrant for

Just 4 U Fashion. For example, Richardson contends that the warrant affidavit

did not mention the fact that Just 4 U Fashion had a “coming soon” sign outside

and was not yet open for business, which would have clarified the erroneous

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impression that all of the visitors to Richardson’s store had to knock to enter as

in a “speak easy” context. In fact, only one transaction involved a door knock,

and the other transactions occurred in the business’ parking lot. Nevertheless,

even if the warrant affidavit had stated that the store was not yet open and not

all of Richardson’s customers had to knock to enter, it is difficult to see how

these facts make a notable difference. There was probable cause to issue the

warrant based on the information provided by the CI, including that Richardson

kept most of his narcotics at his store, the controlled buy involving the CI, that

officers found two of the marked bills used during the controlled buy when they

executed the arrest warrant on Richardson (which occurred before the officer’s

application for a search warrant of the business), that Richardson was under

surveillance based on the sheriff’s department’s suspicion of his drug dealing,

and that an officer observed Richardson initiate drug deals. This is sufficient.

Richardson also argues that the alleged facts asserted by the officers call

into question the affidavit’s credibility. First, Richardson contends that

although the officers stated in the warrant affidavit that they saw two drug

transactions occur in Just 4 U Fashion’s parking lot, the officers did not stop or

question the persons involved in the alleged transactions. Thus, Richardson

argues that the officers’ failure to pursue the people involved in the transactions

shows that these hand-to-hand transactions never occurred. Moreover, the

warrant affidavit is suspicious because it contains a file stamp date for May 21,

2007, three days after the search occurred. 

Richardson’s contentions involve factual determinations resolved by the

district court. The testimony showed that, before conducting the search, the

officers called Judge Marabella from Just 4 U Fashion for judicial authority to

conduct the search. It is not clearly erroneous for the district court, based on

the testimony before it, to have concluded that Judge Marabella authorized the

search of Richardson’s business on May 18 and the warrant affidavit was

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processed by the clerk’s office on May 21. Nor is it clearly erroneous for the

district court to have concluded that the credibility of the officers is not affected

by the fact that the officers did not immediately arrest the buyers of the

narcotics. 

In sum, the district court did not err in denying Richardson’s motion to

suppress the evidence seized in the execution of the May 18 warrant.11

IV.

Finally, we now take up Richardson’s fourth claim of error: that the

district court erred by violating his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself

at trial.

Because we are addressing a constitutional right, we review de novo the

district court’s denial of Richardson’s motion. United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d

587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court’s factual findings to support its

ruling are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 361

(5th Cir. 2005).

A competent criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to

represent himself at trial if he knowingly and intelligently waives his right to

counsel. Id. at 363; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Furthermore, “forcing a lawyer

upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if

he truly wants to do so.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. Before granting a defendant’s

In addition to the claims of error regarding the suppression of evidence, Richardson 11

also contends that the district court erred by not conducting a Franks hearing addressing the

factual circumstances surrounding the warrant affidavits. Franks, 438 U.S. at 154. Although

the district court did not conduct a formal Franks hearing, during the suppression hearings,

the district judge allowed Richardson to introduce any and all evidence he had that might

prove that the officers included false statements and misleading omissions in the warrant

affidavits. Thus, because the judge heard all of Richardson’s evidence and considered the

truth or falsity of the officers’ statements in the warrant affidavits during the suppression

hearings, Richardson’s rights were protected; the purpose of a Franks hearing was served;

and, consequently, the district court did not err. See United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318,

328 (5th Cir. 1980); accord United States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1093 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982). 

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request to proceed pro se, however, the court must establish that the defendant

“knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Joseph, 333

F.3d at 590 (citations omitted). To determine whether a defendant has

effectively waived the right to counsel, the district court should consider various

factors, including the defendant’s “age, education, background, experience, and

conduct.” Id. The court must ensure that “the waiver is not the result of

coercion or mistreatment, and must be satisfied that the accused understands

the nature of the charges, the consequences of the proceedings, and the

practicality of waiving the right to counsel.” Id. 

Even so, the right of self-representation is limited by the trial court’s

responsibility to maintain order and safety and to prevent disruption and delay.

See United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 726 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Martinez

v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)

(“Even at the trial level, therefore, the government’s interest in ensuring the

integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest

in acting as his own lawyer.”). A defendant’s request to represent himself at

trial may be rejected if it is intended to cause delay or some tactical advantage.

Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 894 (5th Cir. 1977). However, we

consider a motion for self-representation timely so long as it is filed before the

jury has been impaneled. Id. 

An erroneous denial of the right of self-representation, if established,

requires reversal without further analysis for harmless error. United States v.

Majors, 328 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2003).

In addressing Richardson’s argument that he was constitutionally

entitled to represent himself, we begin by noting that it is uncontested on

appeal that Richardson was competent to represent himself and that

Richardson made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Furthermore,

Richardson repeatedly insisted that he wanted to proceed pro se, indicating the

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voluntariness of his request. The district judge thoroughly fulfilled his duty to

warn Richardson, stating: “If you represent yourself, you’re going to be

convicted because, you know what? You know a little bit [about the law] that’s

causing you to think you know a lot. And thinking you know a lot is going to

put you in the Bureau of Prisons for a long, long time.” In spite of the district

court’s graphic warnings about the practical consequences of acting as his own

counsel, Richardson maintained throughout the hearing that he was aware of

the consequences and that he wished to represent himself. 

The Government makes the following arguments supporting the district

court’s denial of self-representation: that Richardson’s motion to represent

himself was untimely, that it was made for the purpose of delay, and that

Richardson waived his right to represent himself by being disruptive and

disorderly. The Government’s arguments have no merit.

First, it is well established that a motion to represent oneself is timely so

long as it is made before the jury is impaneled. Chapman, 553 F.2d at 894-95. 

Because Richardson filed his motion four days before trial, his motion was

timely. Second, he expressly stipulated that he was not seeking a continuance

or any other delay of the trial. In short, there is no substantial basis to contend

that Richardson’s motion was a diversionary tactic.

Finally, there is no indication in the record that the district judge

determined that Richardson intended to be physically disruptive so as to

obstruct the trial. A review of the Faretta hearing transcript makes it quite

clear that the judge simply concluded that having professional counsel was a

wiser course of action that would make for a cleaner and fairer trial. The trial 12

We recognize that the district judge expressed concern that“based on the defendant’s

12

actions . . . and statements both in the in-camera proceeding as well as in open court, as well

as during the motions to suppress, that the defendant’s behavior – and I’m not talking about

trying to hurt someone – but his unwillingness to accept a ruling . . . will jeopardize his right

to a fair trial.” We understand the district court’s frustration. Pro se defendants are often

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judge explained that “the real concern of the Court is injecting extraneous and

irrelevant subject matter into the record” and that “the defendant’s method of

insisting on what he believes to be the law and what he believes lawyers should

do or not do will interfere with his right to a fair trial.” This is not, however, a

sufficient basis to refuse a defendant the right to act as his or her own counsel,

nor is it equivalent to finding that a defendant will obstruct justice by being

disruptive. Faretta itself appears to address and resolve the instant argument,

holding that “technical legal knowledge” is “not relevant” to an assessment of

his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836. 

In sum, because Richardson knowingly and voluntarily filed the pro se

motion and because there was no constitutionally permissible reason to deny

Richardson the right to represent himself under Faretta and its progeny, we

hold that the district court erred in denying Richardson’s Sixth Amendment

right to self-representation and therefore each of his convictions and sentences

are vacated. Richardson is entitled to a new trial on all counts of the indictment

for which he was convicted; the acquittals on the two counts remain.

V.

To review our resolution of this appeal, we hold that the district court did

not err in denying Richardson’s motions to suppress the March 2 and May 18

search warrants. Moreover, because the district court considered all of the

evidence that would have been presented during a Franks hearing, the district

court did not err by denying Richardson’s motion for a separate hearing to

burdensome on a trial judge’s time, resources, and patience. Yet, a court cannot deny a motion

for self-representation for reasons that would be common to most untrained pro se criminal

defendants. Cf. United States v. Vernier, 381 F. App’x 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that

a defendant did not have the right to represent himself at trial when he “posed a risk of

violence and escape, . . . was defiant and troublesome, and . . . boasted that he wanted to go

out in a bloody confrontation, to disrupt his trial, and to make news”); accord Buhl v. Cooksey,

233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000). Otherwise, the right to self representation would be

constructively abrogated.

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resolve his Franks claim. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of 13

Richardson’s motions to suppress and for a Franks hearing.

However, the right to self-representation in a criminal trial is a

constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment. Here, Richardson

competently, knowingly, and intelligently invoked this right. Because there

was no constitutionally cognizable justification for denying Richardson’s right

to self-representation, we VACATE each of his convictions and sentences and

REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

In the event a new trial is conducted on remand, our disposition in this appeal of all 13

motions, which were presented to the district court before Richardson invoked his rightto selfrepresentation, areunaffected by our vacatingRichardson’s convictions and sentences on Sixth

Amendment grounds and will be controlling in any proceeding on remand.

17

Case: 11-30151 Document: 00511838278 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/27/2012