alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arthur Wayne CLEMMER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-7716.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 3, 2011.

Decided: April 15, 2011.

*303Arthur Wayne Clemmer, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Suzanne Skalla, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Wayne Clemmer seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2010) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motions. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.*

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order denying Clem-mer’s § 2255 motion was entered on the docket on July 29, 2010 and its order denying his timely Rule 59(e) motion was entered on the docket on August 18, 2010. Clemmer asserts he placed his first notice of appeal in the prison’s internal mailing system for mailing on November 3, 2010. *See Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). Crediting this version of events, Clem-mer’s first notice of appeal was nevertheless untimely by over two weeks. Because Clemmer failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 Clemmer has filed a notice of appeal from a district court order purporting to deny his first notice of appeal as untimely. Because the district court is without the authority to deny an appeal, even if apparently untimely, we treat this as an appeal solely from the orders denying Clemmer’s § 2255 and Rule 59(e) motions.
Order entered September 27, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00494-CR

RONNIE DILLARD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MB12-63717-M

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On August 28, 2013, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why 

appellant’s brief has not been filed. We ADOPT the findings that: (1) appellant desires to 

pursue the appeal; (2) appellant is indigent and represented by court-appointed counsel Nanette 

Hendrickson; (3) Ms. Hendrickson’s explanation for the delay in filing appellant’s brief is her 

workload; and (4) Ms. Hendrickson requested thirty days from the September 18, 2013 hearing 

to file appellant’s brief.

We ORDER appellant to file his brief by OCTOBER 18, 2013. Because appellant’s 

brief is already two months overdue, no further extensions will be granted. If appellant’s brief is 

not filed by the date specified, we will order Nanette Hendrickson and the Dallas County Public 
Defender’s Office removed as counsel and will order the trial court to appoint a new attorney to 

represent appellant in this appeal.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Honorable Jeffrey Rosenfield, Presiding Judge, County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 2; 

Katherine Drew, Appellate-Chief, Dallas County Public Defender’s Office; Nanette 

Hendrickson, Dallas County Public Defender’s Office; and the Dallas County District Attorney’s 

Office.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
Exhibit Number 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Great Western Bancorporation, Inc. (Great Western) on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended September 30,
2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, James R. Clark, Chief Financial Officer of Great Western, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Great Western.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |                        
| |  | -----------------------
| |  | /s/ James R. Clark     
| |  | James R. Clark,        
| |  | Chief Financial Officer



18
<PAGE>
Exhibit 13.2

                  CERTIFICATION BY THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form 20-F filed
by Central Minera Corp. (the "Issuer") for the year ended June 30, 2005, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in that report fairly
present, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Issuer on the dates and for the periods presented therein.

                                        CENTRAL MINERA CORP.


                                        /s/ Michael Cytrynbaum
                                        ----------------------------------------
December 26, 2005                       Michael Cytrynbaum
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
#### Bruce E. GAMBILL, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; State of Washington, Defendants.

No. 12-36071.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 21, 2014.*

Filed Jan. 28, 2014.

Bruce E. Gambill, Jr., Puyallup, WA, pro se.

Before: CANBY, SILVERMAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Bruce E. Gambill, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his request to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing his action alleging claims arising from divorce, foreclosure, and bankruptcy proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and de novo a determination that a complaint lacks substance in law or fact. *Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust,*821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir.1987). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gambill leave to proceed in forma pauperis because Gambill failed to allege a claim against any defendant under any cognizable legal theory. *See id.*at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”); *Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.,*864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir.1988) (court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to state a claim without notice or an opportunity to respond where plaintiff cannot possibly win relief); *see also McHenry v. Renne,*84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.1996) (Rule 8 is an independent basis of dismissal and requires each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct, stating which defendant is liable to the plaintiff for which wrong).

Gambill’s “Response to Case cv-06004-BHS, *et al.”*filed on September 26, 2013 and subsequently construed by this court as a request for judicial notice, is denied. *See*Fed.R.Evid. 201(a).

Gambill’s “Motion to file and act upon previously filed motions, *et al.”*and “Emergency Motion & Notice, *et al.”*filed on December 26, 2013 and January 6, 2014, respectively, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-00-00746-CR

Christine Lee Mead, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. CR-94-0060, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

Christine Lee Mead appeals from an order revoking community supervision. She was

placed on supervision following a conviction for felony driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a), .09(b) (West Supp. 2001). The court imposed sentence of imprisonment for

five years and a $750 fine.

Appellant’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d

807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v.

State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App.

1969). A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant, and appellant was advised of her right

to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
2

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree that the appeal is frivolous

and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

The order revoking community supervision is affirmed.

__________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Puryear

Affirmed

Filed: August 9, 2001

Do Not Publish
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-14-0001135

30-OCT-2018

08:27 AM
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Dina Velasquez Pereira v. Leonel Antonio Lopez Bustillo

Appellate case number: 01

- 16

- 001 36

- CV

Trial court case number: 2015

- 19994

- 7

Trial court: 2 47 th District C ourt of Harris County

On November 10 , 20 16 , we abated this appeal and remanded the case to permit the
trial court to render a final judgment

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 27 .2. On January 4 , 201 7 , the

district clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record that contai ns the trial court’s “Final

O rder in Suit Affecting the Parent

- Child Relationship,” signed on December 22, 2016

. Accordingly, w e REINSTATE this case on the Court’s active docket.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

 Acting individually

Date: February 2, 2017
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, James R. Tolonen, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/Aof Business Objects, S.A.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand we have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the internal control overfinancial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.
Date: April 29, 2004   /s/ James R. Tolonen  James R. Tolonen Chief Financial Officer and Senior Group Vice President
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3406 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 

amounts reimbursed by an individual’s employer for certain dietary supplements and meal replacement products. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 30, 2009 

Mr. BLUMENAUER (for himself and Ms. GINNY BROWN-WAITE of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude 

from gross income amounts reimbursed by an individual’s 

employer for certain dietary supplements and meal replacement products. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act shall be known as the ‘‘Tax Equity for Meal 

5 Replacements and Supplements Act of 2009’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3406 IH

1 SEC. 2. EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME OF AMOUNTS RE2 IMBURSED BY AN EMPLOYER FOR CERTAIN 

3 DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS AND MEAL RE4 PLACEMENT PRODUCTS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 105 of the Internal Rev6 enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following new subsection: 

8 ‘‘(k) QUALIFIED DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS AND MEAL

9 REPLACEMENT PRODUCTS TREATED AS MEDICAL

10 CARE.—For purposes of subsection (b), the term ‘medical 

11 care’ includes— 

12 ‘‘(1) dietary supplements, as defined in section 

13 201(ff) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 

14 Act— 

15 ‘‘(A) that are permitted under section 

16 403(r)(5)(D) of such Act to bear labeling mak17 ing a claim described in such section (relating 

18 to health claims), or 

19 ‘‘(B) that are permitted by the Food and 

20 Drug Administration to bear labeling making a 

21 claim that characterizes the relationship of a 

22 nutrient to a disease or a health-related condi23 tion and which does not meet the standard set 

24 forth in section 403(r)(3)(B)(i) of the Federal 

25 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3406 IH

1 ‘‘(2) meal replacement products that may, 

2 under section 403 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 

3 Cosmetic Act, bear labeling providing that the prod4 ucts are low fat and are a good source of protein, 

5 fiber, and multiple essential vitamins and minerals, 

6 and— 

7 ‘‘(A) that are permitted, under section 

8 403(r)(3) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos9 metic Act, to bear labeling making a claim de10 scribed in such section (relating to health 

11 claims), or 

12 ‘‘(B) that are permitted by the Food and 

13 Drug Administration to bear labeling making a 

14 claim that characterizes the relationship of a 

15 nutrient to a disease or a health-related condi16 tion and which does not meet the standard set 

17 forth in section 403(r)(3)(B)(i) of the Federal 

18 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.’’. 

19 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

20 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

21 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Isaiah C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 226]

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Isaiah C. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Olshansky, J.), dated June 6, 2013, which, upon an order of fact-finding of the same court dated April 22, 2013, made upon his admission, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 11 months.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant on probation for a period of 11 months is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that period of placement has expired; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

Despite the fact that the term of the appellant’s probation has already expired, there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency and, therefore, the appeal from the portion of the order of disposition that adjudged the appellant to be a juvenile delinquent has not been rendered academic *(see Matter of Ashanti D.,*100 AD3d 886 [2012]; *Matter of Natasha G.,*91 AD3d 948 [2012]).

The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders, and its determination is accorded great deference *(see Matter of Ryan G.,*112 AD3d 712 [2013]; *Matter of Eunique B.,*73 AD3d 764 [2010]; *Matter of Ashanti B.,*62 AD3d 790 [2009]). Here, the Family Court providently exercised its broad discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent instead of granting the appellant an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. The disposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the seriousness of the incident which led to the appellant’s adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, his subsequent arrest for a similar incident, his poor school attendance record, and the recommendation of the New York City Department of Probation *(see Matter of Antoine H.,*81 AD3d 646 [2011]; *Matter of Eunique B.,*73 AD3d 764 [2010]; *cf. Matter of Jonathan M.,*107 AD3d 805, 807 [2013]).

Skelos, J.E, Dillon, Roman and Maltese, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Polymer Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 3,
2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Willis C. Moore III, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|Date: March 30, 2004 | /s/WILLIS C. MOORE, IIIWillis C. Moore, III Chief Financial Officer
|-------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
**EXHIBIT 35.2**

**WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.**

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATEANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE**

            I, Barbara Campbell, an authorized officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (the “Administrative Agent”), dohereby certify to WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. (the “Depositor”) and Washington Mutual Bank (the “Servicer”), pursuant to the Amended and Restated Administrative Agent Agreement dated as of February 1, 2005 (the“Servicing Agreement”) by and between the Servicer, and the Administrative Agent the following with respect to Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2006-2 Trust for the 2006 fiscal year (the “Relevant Year”):

 1.                  A review of the activities of the Servicer during the Relevant Year and of performance under the Servicing Agreement has beenmade under my supervision.

2.                  To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the ServicingAgreement in all material respects throughout the Relevant Year.

Dated as of February 22, 2007.
|  

/s/ Barbara Campbell________________Name:  Barbara CampbellTitle:    First Vice President |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### Kanwaljeet Singh, Appellant, v Laureen D. Reagan, Respondent.

[988 NYS2d 807]

*1475Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.), entered December 11, 2012. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when, as a pedestrian, he was struck by a motor vehicle operated by defendant. Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that plaintiff stepped into the roadway from between stopped vehicles, two or three car lengths behind the crosswalk and directly into the path of defendant’s vehicle, “leaving the defendant driver unable to avoid contact with” plaintiff *(Jahangir v Logan Bus Co., Inc.,*89 AD3d 1064, 1064 [2011]; *see Green v Hosley,*117 AD3d 1437, 1438 [2014]; *Rodriguez v Catalano,*96 AD3d 821, 822 [2012]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a material issue of fact with respect to defendant’s alleged negligence *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Plaintiffs contention that defendant failed to observe what she should have observed is merely an attempt “to ferret out speculative issues ‘to get the case to the jury’ ” *(Andre v Pomeroy,*35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

Present— Centra, J.E, Lindley, Sconiers, Valentino and DeJoseph, JJ.
Exhibit 4.65







FILE NOTE



Employee – Chris Tovey



Date - 13/04/17



Base Pay Increase/Bonus and Removal of Allowances



Base Pay increase to £273,881 per annum with effect from
1/1/17.



Annual Bonus of £215,234 for 2016 paid with February 2017's
pay.



GW Pension Contributions and Car Allowance
have been aggregated in to 2017 base pay.



|/s/
    Philippa Crompton      | 
|------------------------------ | 
|Philippa Crompton, HR Director | 
|                               | 
|Date - 13/04/17                | 



GW Pharmaceuticals plc Sovereign House Histon
Cambridge United Kingdom

Telephone: +44 (0)1223 266800 Facsimile: +44
(0)1223 235667 www.gwpharm.com

Company No. 4160917
Registered in England and Wales