alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, Steve M. Hanni, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report of Emergency Filtration Products, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2006;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The small business issuer=s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer=s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer=s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer=s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer=s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer=s internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The small business issuer=s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer=s auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer=s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer=s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer=s internal control over financial reporting.



Date: May 10, 2006



/s/Steve M. Hanni

Steve M. Hanni, Principal Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18            U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I,            James Shepard, President of Typhoon Enterprises Inc., hereby certify, pursuant to            18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley            Act of 2002, that:

 
| (1)    | the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Typhoon Enterprises Inc.                        for the year ended May 31, 2007 (the "Report") fully complies with the                        requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of                        1934; and |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| (2)    | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in                        all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of                        Typhoon Enterprises Inc..                                                                             |

 
| Dated: August 30, 2007 |   |                                                                                 |   |
|------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                   |   |                                                                                 |   |
|                   |   |                                                                                 |   |
|                   |   | /s/ James Shepard                                                                    |   |
|                   |   | James Shepard                                                                        |   |
|                   |   | President and Director                                                               |   |
|                   |   | (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial                        Officer) |   |
|                   |   | Typhoon Enterprises Inc.                                                             |   |

 

 

A            signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document            authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in            typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section            906, has been provided to Typhoon Enterprises Inc. and will be retained by Typhoon            Enterprises Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff            upon request.
THIS AMENDMENT TO FEE AGGREEMENT


Exhibit 4.12

THIS AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY NOTES




Is dated effective this 19th day of April, 2006




BETWEEN




DataJungle Ltd., a Canadian corporation having an office at 1 Hines Road, Suite 202, Ottawa, Ontario, K2K 3C7

(Hereinafter, the “Company”)

AND




Capital House Corporation, a corporation having an office at 30 Metcalfe Street, Suite 620, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5L4

(Hereinafter, “Lender”)




WHEREAS:




i.

Lender advanced funds to the Company and the Company executed promissory notes in favor of Lender for $7,000.00 CAD dated November 25, 2005 and $41,000 CAD dated November 30, 2005 (the “Notes”) to evidence the funds advanced;

ii.

Lender requested that the Company modify the Notes to provide for, amongst other modifications, provisions to convert the Notes into shares of common stock and warrants to purchase shares of common stock of DataJungle Software Inc. (“DJSW”) on terms and conditions consistent with other sources of funding to the Company;  

iii.

The Board of Directors of DJSW approved the renegotiation of the Notes at a meeting on March 31, 2006 and informed Lender of that approval;

iv.

Company and Lender desire to amend the Notes. 




THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and Lender agree as follows:




1.

Paragraph b. of each of the Notes is deleted in its entirety and replaced with:




The Loan together with any other obligations owing to Lender in accordance with this Note is secured by and repayable in full from receipt by Borrower of proceeds from the present and future accounts receivables due to Borrower.




2.

The following paragraph is added to each of the Notes:




The Lender or holder may at any time and from time to time on notice to the Company and DJSW require that all or any portion of the outstanding principal and accrued interest be converted into shares of common stock of DJSW plus warrants for the purchase of shares of common stock of DJSW at the conversion rate of $0.20 U.S. per share plus a warrant exercisable for the number of shares of 








common stock equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the number of shares of common stock purchased by the Lender or holder.  The warrant will be exercisable until December 31, 2010 and will have an exercise price equal to $0.30 U.S. per share. 




3.

All other terms and conditions of the Notes shall remain the same.




In Witness Whereof, Company and Lender have executed this Amendment to Promissory Notes this 16th day of April, 2006




Capital House Corporation

DataJungle Ltd.







/s/ Bruce Benn

/s/ Denes Bartakovich

Per: Bruce Benn

Per:  Denes Bartakovich

        President

         COO




/s/ Larry Bruce

Per: Larry Bruce

        CFO




DataJungle Software Inc.




/s/ Denes Bartakovich

Per:  Denes Bartakovich

        COO




/s/ Larry Bruce

Per: Larry Bruce

        CFO
#### Marwan Abo EID, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-75090.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 15, 2011.

Marwan Abo Eid, Yucca Valley, CA, pro se.

William Clark Minick, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Marwan Abo Eid, a native and citizen of Syria, petitions for review of the Board of

*718Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and review de novo claims of due process violations. *Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Eid’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than five months after the BIA’s December 21, 2007, order dismissing his underlying appeal, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Eid failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, *see Iturribarria,*321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”). It follows that the BIA did not violate due process by not reaching the merits of Eid’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error and prejudice for a petitioner to prevail on a due process claim).

Eid’s remaining contentions are unavailing.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Saribek SARKISYAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-73857.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 24, 2011.

Artem M. Sarian, Esquire, Sarian Law Group, APLC, Glendale, CA, for Petitioner.

CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, David V. Ber-nal, Assistant Director, Liza Murcia, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Saribek Sarkisyan, a native of the Soviet Union and a citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen proceedings due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen and review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. *Mohammed v. Gonzales,*400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

We agree with the agency’s conclusion that Sarkisyan failed to establish that former counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, and thus his claim of ineffective assistance fails. *See Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir.2003) (prejudice results when the performance of counsel “was so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the proceedings”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Sarkisyan’s remaining contention is unavailing.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Lawrence E. PALMER, Claimant-Appellant, v. Eric K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2010-7054.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 25, 2011.

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

RADER, Chief Judge.

ORDER

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves without opposition to vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and to remand for further proceedings.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Veterans Claims more than 120 days after the Board of Veterans’ Appeals mailed its decision in his case. That court dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the 120-day appeal period established by 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) for seeking review of Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The appellant sought this court’s review.

This court stayed the briefing schedule in this appeal pending the United States Supreme Court’s review of our decision in *Henderson v. Shinseki,*589 F.3d 1201 (Fed.Cir.2009) (en banc) (affirming Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determination that period to appeal to that court is not subject to equitable tolling). In *Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki,*- U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision and concluded that the 120-day deadline for filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims does not have jurisdictional consequences. Because the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims erred in concluding that the appeal deadline established by § 7266(a) is jurisdictional, we vacate the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Accordingly,

*965It Is Ordered That:

(1) The motion is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

(2) All sides shall bear their own costs.
#### WEI CHEN, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-60432

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 11, 2011.

Wei Chen, Pearsall, TX, pro se.

Annette Marie Wietecha, Trial Attorney, Tangerlia Cox, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

*464Wei Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions this court for review of an order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordering him removed to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal of the denial of relief by the Immigration Judge (IJ).

Chen makes no argument challenging the determination that he was not eligible for protection under the CAT. He has thus waived any such argument. *See Calderon-Ontiveros v. I.N.S.,*809 F.2d 1050, 1052 (5th Cir.1986).

We review questions of law de novo and review factual findings “under the substantial evidence test, reversing only when the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the petitioner statutorily eligible for relief.” *Arif v. Mukasey,*509 F.3d 677, 679-80 (5th Cir.2007) (footnote, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). The determinations that an alien is not eligible for asylum or for withholding of removal are factual findings reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. *Chen v. Gonzales,*470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.2006).

Chen contends that the BIA erred as a matter of law in concluding that his credible testimony was insufficient to meet his burden of proving that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. An alien’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain his burden if it is credible, is persuasive, *and,*contains sufficient specific facts to prove he is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). Accordingly, the BIA did not err as a matter of law by finding that Chen’s credible testimony failed to meet his burden of proof.

Chen argues that the BIA and IJ erred by determining that (1) he did not show past persecution, (2) he failed to establish past persecution on account of his imputed affiliation and membership in Falun Gong, and (3) he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. The evidence in this case is not “so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the petitioner statutorily eligible for relief.” *Arif,*509 F.3d at 679-80. Thus, the determinations that Chen was not eligible for asylum or for withholding of removal will not be disturbed.

Chen’s petition for review is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *464published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4564

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD LEE JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00326-NCT-1)

Submitted: December 17, 2013 Decided: December 19, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Richard Lee Jones appeals his eighty-seven-month 

sentence following his guilty plea to possession with intent to 

distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). In accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Jones’ counsel has filed a 

brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal but questioning whether Jones’ sentence is substantively 

reasonable. Jones has not filed a supplemental brief despite 

receiving notice of his right to do so. We affirm.

We review Jones’ sentence for reasonableness, using an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). We first review for significant procedural errors, 

including improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, sentencing under 

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

sentence. Id. at 51; see United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 

(4th Cir. 2008). Only if we conclude a sentence is procedurally 

reasonable may we consider its substantive reasonableness. United 

States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).

Here, the district court correctly calculated Jones’ 

Guidelines range and fully explained its reasoning supporting 

Jones’ sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence is 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. See United States v. 
3

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (affording 

within-Guidelines range sentence presumption of reasonableness

on appeal). 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may 

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED