alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3211 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3211

   To amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide that the 
 percentage increase applied to benefits each year as a cost-of-living 
increase under such title shall in no case be less than the percentage 
increase in compensation of Members of Congress specified for such year 
            under section 31 of title 2, United States Code.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 14, 2009

  Mr. Kagen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide that the 
 percentage increase applied to benefits each year as a cost-of-living 
increase under such title shall in no case be less than the percentage 
increase in compensation of Members of Congress specified for such year 
            under section 31 of title 2, United States Code.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Cost of Living Equity Act''.

SEC. 2. ADJUSTMENT TO PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN BENEFITS UNDER TITLE II 
              OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT TO ENSURE THAT SUCH INCREASES 
              ARE IN NO CASE LESS THAN PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN 
              COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

    (a) In General.--Section 215(i)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 415(i)(2)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new clause:
    ``(iv) Notwithstanding clause (ii), the Commissioner shall, 
effective with the month of December of each year as provided in 
subparagraph (B), irrespective of whether the base quarter in that year 
is a cost of living computation quarter, apply and adjust the increases 
described in subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of clause (ii) as 
necessary so as to result in a percentage increase in the amounts 
described in such subclauses (including each of those amounts as 
previously increased under this subparagraph) which is not less than 
the percentage increase in compensation of Members of Congress 
specified under section 31(2) of title 2, United States Code, for the 
first applicable pay period after such month to which such increase 
applies (as determined without regard to any other applicable provision 
of law affecting such compensation). Any percentage increase determined 
under this clause shall be treated as a percentage increase determined 
under clause (ii).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
with respect to increases determined under section 215(i)(2)(A) of the 
Social Security Act occurring after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Timothy D. Gay, Appellant, v Maria Gay, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[987 NYS2d 288]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Kevin G. Young, J.), entered October 3, 2012 in a divorce action. The order, among other things, denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to renew and/or reargue.

It is hereby ordered that said appeal from the order insofar as it denied leave to reargue is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.

Same memorandum as in *Gay v Gay*([appeal No. 1] 118 AD3d 1331 [June 13, 2014]).

Present — Smith, J.P, Peradotto, Sconiers, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT OCTOB ER 11, 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1257 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00394 -CR- S UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,
ve rs us MIC HAEL L EW IS IVORY, a. k.a. Black Mike, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (O ct ob er 11, 200 6) Before AN DE RSO N and DU BIN A, Circuit Judges, and VINS ON ,* D istrict Judg e. PE R CU RIA M:

____ ____ ____ ____ ___ *Honora ble C. Roge r Vinson, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of F lorida, sitti ngby desig nation.We decline to addr ess the inef fec tive assistance of counse l claim on this direct 1 a pp e a l. 2 A ft er or al arg um en t and c ar ef

ul c onsi de ratio n, w e co nc lud e that the j udgm ent of the district court shou ld be affir m ed for the r easons fully discussed at
or al arg um en t. 1 AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.22

First Amendment to the Management Agreement

This First Amendment to the Management Agreement(this Amendment) is made effective as of the 31stday of March, 2006 by and among Teletouch
Communications, Inc. and Teletouch Licenses, Inc., on the one hand (collectively, the Seller), and Teletouch Paging, LP (the Buyer), on the other hand. Capitalized terms not defined in this Amendment shall have
the meanings set forth in the Agreement (as defined below).

RECITALS:

WHEREAS, the Buyer and the Seller entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement, dated as of August 18, 2005 and subsequently amended (the
APA), in connection with the sale of the paging business assets of the Seller to the Buyer; and,

WHEREAS, the
Buyer and the Seller entered in a Management Agreement (the MA) to address the respective parties duties and responsibilities under the APA; and,

WHEREAS, the Buyer and the Seller now desire to amend the MA.

NOW THEREFORE,for valuable consideration, the
receipt and adequacy of which are expressly acknowledged, accepted and agreed, the Buyer and the Seller hereby agree and consent, that Section 4. COMPENSATION of the Agreement shall be amended and restated in its entirety and shall read as
follows:

Section 4. COMPENSATION. Commencing on April 1, 2006 the Agent shall receive, as compensation for the services
to be provided under the terms of this Agreement, the sum of $100,000 per month, payable in two equal installments of $50,000 on the 1st and 16th day of each month during the term of this Agreement if the Closing under that certain Asset Purchase
Agreement has not occurred on or prior to the date such payment is due, starting with the 16th day of the first full month in which service to the public is provided under the management of Agent.

This Amendment is acknowledged and agreed to this 31stday of March, 2006.



|                               |  |                        
|------------------------------ |  | -----------------------
|TELETOUCH PAGING, LP          
|                               | 
|By:                            |  | /s/ Robert Albritton   
|Name:                          |  | Robert Albritton       
|Title:                         |  | Managing Member        
|                              
|TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
|TELETOUCH LICENSES, INC.      
|                               | 
|By:                            |  | /s/ Thomas Hyde, Jr.   
|Name:                          |  | Thomas Hyde, Jr.       
|Title:                         |  | Chief Executive Officer
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3093 

To require the Transportation Security Administration to engage in a negotiated rulemaking process for the purposes of creating a security regiment 

for general aviation aircraft. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 26, 2009 

Mr. DENT (for himself, Mr. OLSON, Mr. EHLERS, Mr. MOORE of Kansas, Mr. 

PERLMUTTER, Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, Mr. PETRI, Mr. MICA, and Mr. 

CAMPBELL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 

A BILL 

To require the Transportation Security Administration to 

engage in a negotiated rulemaking process for the purposes of creating a security regiment for general aviation 

aircraft. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘General Aviation Secu5 rity Enhancement Act of 2009’’. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3093 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITION. 

2 In this Act, the term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Sec3 retary of Homeland Security. 

4 SEC. 3. GENERAL AVIATION NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING. 

5 (a) NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING COMMITTEE.—Sub6 ject to subsection (b), the Secretary may not issue a rule, 

7 interim final rule, or a new rulemaking intended to ad8 dress, in whole or in part, the proposed rulemaking enti9 tled ‘‘Large Aircraft Security Program, Other Aircraft 

10 Operator Security Program, and Airport Operator Secu11 rity Program (TSA–2008–0021)’’ unless the Secretary— 

12 (1) establishes a negotiated rulemaking com13 mittee in accordance with the requirements for es14 tablishing an advisory committee under section 871 

15 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 

16 451); and 

17 (2) receives a written report from the advisory 

18 committee chosen pursuant to paragraph (1) de19 scribing in detail its findings and recommendations. 

20 (b) RULE EXCEPTION.— 

21 (1) URGENT THREAT.—The Secretary may 

22 issue a rule prohibited by subsection (a) if the Sec23 retary determines, based on a credible and urgent 

24 threat, that an emergency exists that necessitates 

25 the immediate issuance of such a rule to save lives 

26 or protect property. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
3 

•HR 3093 IH

1 (2) REVIEW OF EMERGENCY DETERMINA2 TION.—Not later than 30 days after such a rule is 

3 issued under this subsection, the Inspector General 

4 of the Department of Homeland Security shall deter5 mine if a credible and urgent threat existed that ne6 cessitated issuing an immediate rule and report its 

7 findings to the Committees on Homeland Security 

8 and Transportation and Infrastructure of the House 

9 of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

10 Science, and Transportation of the Senate. 

Æ 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
Exhibit 21

                             Subsidiaries of the Registrant
Parent
------

Cascade Financial Corporation

                                          Percentage        Jurisdiction or
Subsidiaries (a)                         of Ownership    State of Incorporation
---------------                         -------------    ----------------------

Cascade Bank                                 100%             Washington
Cascade Capital Trust I                      100%              Delaware
Cascade Capital Trust II                     100%              Delaware
Cascade Investment Services, Inc. (b)        100%             Washington


(a)  The operation of the Corporation's wholly owned subsidiaries are included
     in the Corporation's Financial Statements contained in the Annual Report
     attached hereto as Exhibit 13.

(b)  Wholly-owned subsidiary of Cascade Bank.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-01-1999
<CASH>                                          92,781
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,656
<ALLOWANCES>                                       234
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                96,523
<PP&E>                                           9,876
<DEPRECIATION>                                     970
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 106,773
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,153
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            35
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,006
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   106,773
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,367
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,861
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,400
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  90
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6,590)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (6,590)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (6,590)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.24)


</TABLE>
Opinion issued June 25, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-13-00127-CV

PAUL OUZENNE AND OUZENNE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 

Appellants

V.

LEON SHANKLE AND MARGIE BENTON SHANKLE, Appellees

On Appeal from the 129th Civil District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2003-13270

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Paul Ouzenne and Ouzenne Construction Company, have

neither paid the required fees nor established indigence for purposes of appellate 
2

costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 20.1; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.207 (West

Supp. 2012), § 51.941(a) (West 2005), § 101.041 (West Supp. 2012); Order 

Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of 

Appeals and Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket 

No. 07-9138 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2007), reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. app. A § B(1). 

After being notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal, appellants did not 

adequately respond. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5; 42.3(c).

We dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees. We dismiss any 

pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Brown, and Huddle.
[No. 66524-3-I.

Division One.

November 5, 2012.]

#### Jon L. Wilkerson, *Appellant,*v. The City of SeaTac, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-2-23226-1, Michael Hayden, J., entered December 10, 2010. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Schindler, J.,

concurred in by Grosse, J., and Ellington, J. Pro Tern.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1916

Filed October 10, 2018

FORREST TRAUSCH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J. 

Shubatt, Judge.

Appeal from an order of the district court affirming agency action. 

AFFIRMED.

Eric D. Puryear and Eric S. Mail of Puryear Law PC, Davenport, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2

McDONALD, Judge.

The Iowa Department of Human Services founded a report of child abuse, 

denial of critical care, against Forrest Trausch. Trausch sought judicial review of 

the final agency decision, and the district court affirmed the agency’s decision. 

Trausch timely filed this appeal.

Trausch challenges the department’s factual findings and its application of 

fact to law. Our review is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 

Iowa Code chapter 17A (2015). See Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 743 N.W.2d 169, 

172 (Iowa 2007). The standard of review differs depending on the error alleged. 

See Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris, 778 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2010). Factual 

challenges are reviewed for substantial evidence. See id. “Evidence is substantial 

if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach a conclusion.” Quaker Oats 

Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1996). “We are bound by [factual] findings 

. . . supported by substantial evidence.” Sunrise Retirement Cmty. v. Iowa Dep’t 

of Human Servs., 833 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 2013). When we review the 

agency’s application of law, we will reverse only if the agency’s action is irrational, 

illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(i), (m). 

We begin and end our analysis with the following observation: “The 

administrative process presupposes judgment calls are to be left to the agency. 

Nearly all disputes are won or lost there.” Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 531 N.W.2d 

645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). It is a rare case reversing final 

agency action on the ground the agency’s action is unsupported by substantial 

evidence or is irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. After conducting review 

of the agency record, this case is not the rare case requiring reversal of an agency 
3

decision. Trausch’s conduct caused the child harm within the meaning of the 

relevant authorities. See Iowa Code § 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b); Taylor v. Iowa Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 870 N.W.2d 262, 271 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). We thus conclude the 

agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and its application of fact 

to law is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed without further opinion. See 

Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(a), (b), (d), (e).

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE ANNUAL
10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>        1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           2,317
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      573
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,867
<PP&E>                                         314,319
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,205
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 308,725
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,304
<BONDS>                                         63,255
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           129
<OTHER-SE>                                     215,567
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   308,725
<SALES>                                         42,499
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                43,442
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,251
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,114
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,190
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,796
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,796
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,796
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.46
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.46
        

</TABLE>
[No. 67440-4-I.

Division One.

November 13, 2012.]

#### American Express Centurion Bank, *Respondent,*v. Zaakera R. Stratman, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 11-2-09592-4, Theresa B. Doyle, J., entered June 17, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Verellen, J.,

concurred in by Schindler and Lau, JJ. Now published at 172 Wn. App. 667.
#### Robert Nagel, Respondent, v Mette Nagel, Appellant.

[859 NYS2d 639]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ellen Gesmer, J.), entered August 29, 2007, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment directing the sale of the parties’ former marital residence and the payment to her of $100,000 from the proceeds of same, implicitly awarding plaintiff summary judgment on the issue, unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate the award of summary judgment to plaintiff, and otherwise affirmed, without costs, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

At issue is whether the following provision of the oral stipulation incorporated in the parties’ judgment of divorce imposes an obligation upon plaintiff to sell the marital residence by the time of the emancipation of their youngest child: “[I]n the event the marital residence shall be sold no later than the emancipation of the parties’ child and that Sophie, since the house is go*259ing to remain titled as it is today, in the event of the death of [defendant], the proceeds to which she is entitled under this agreement shall be—shall inure to the benefit of [defendant] ’s heirs, distributors, or assignees, whoever she decides.”

Agreeing with plaintiff, the motion court found that this provision, while “not the model of clarity,” does not set a deadline for the sale of the residence, but provides only that if the residence is sold after defendant’s death and before Sophie’s emancipation, defendant’s share will inure to the benefit of her heirs, rather than to the benefit of plaintiff. The court held that, even if the stipulation set a deadline, it would be superseded by a subsequent written agreement, which was incorporated in the judgment to clarify the stipulation and which includes no provision for the sale of the marital residence upon Sophie’s emancipation. The court thus concluded that plaintiff is not required to sell the residence and that defendant is entitled to receive the $100,000 payment only when plaintiff chooses to do so.

While the court correctly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it incorrectly found that the stipulation is unambiguous, i.e., that plaintiffs is the only reasonable interpretation of it *(see LoFrisco v Winston & Strawn LLP,*42 AD3d 304, 307-308 [2007]). Nor does the extrinsic evidence, which consists of each party’s self-serving and cursory statement of the meaning of the stipulation, permit a determination of the parties’ intent as a matter of law *(see NFL Enters. LLC v Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,*51 AD3d 52 [2008]; *Executive Off. Network v 666 Fifth Ave. Ltd. Partnership,*294 AD2d 166 [2002]). We also note that the stipulation would not be superseded by the terms of the subsequent written agreement. The agreement incorporated by reference all terms and conditions of the stipulation not inconsistent with it, and the stipulation’s purported establishment of a deadline for the sale of the residence is not inconsistent with anything in the written agreement. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Nardelli, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.
[No. 29754-3-III.

Division Three.

November 8, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Jeffrey Scott Norman, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Stevens County, No. 05-1-00098-2, Allen Nielson, J., entered March 1, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Siddoway, A.C.J.,

concurred in by Brown and Kulik, JJ.