J-S64011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAWRENCE J. MADISON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 160 WDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-63-CR-0000495-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2019

Lawrence Madison appeals from the January 2, 2019 order dismissing 

his petition for relief pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). We affirm.

The instant case began on January 27, 2016, in Peters Township, 

Washington County, Pennsylvania. On that date, Appellant was pulled over 

while driving by an officer of the Peters Township Police Department based 

upon his failure to stop at a red light. As the traffic stop progressed, Appellant 

consented to various searches and was ultimately found to be in possession 

of a large number of items that were determined to be stolen property

appropriated from cars and homes in the surrounding area including jewelry, 

clothing, credit cards, loose change, a wireless speaker, and a holstered 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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handgun. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/27/16, at 1; see also N.T. Guilty 

Plea Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 2 (Appellant stipulating to the 

contents of the aforecited affidavit).

On December 16, 2016, Appellant pled guilty to person not to possess 

a firearm, receiving stolen property, and firearms not to be carried without a 

license. See N.T. Guilty Plea Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 4-5. He 

was immediately sentenced to an aggregate term of five to ten years of 

imprisonment. Id. at 6-7. Although Appellant might have qualified for 

acceptance into the Washington County Veterans’ Court, the Commonwealth 

would not offer him a plea that would permit his participation therein. See 

Memorandum and Order, 4/28/17, at 3. Rather, Appellant was accepted into 

the Allegheny County Veterans’ Court and would be eligible to participate once 

he was paroled from the aforementioned sentence. See N.T. Guilty Plea

Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 4.

No timely post-sentence motion or direct appeal was taken. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel to represent Appellant, who ultimately filed a no-merit 

brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 

(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). In pertinent part, PCRA counsel averred that 

Appellant’s petition was untimely and that no exceptions to the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements were applicable. On December 5, 2018, the PCRA 

court granted counsel’s petition and provided Appellant with notice of its intent 

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition on jurisdictional grounds without a 
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hearing. Appellant swiftly filed a pro se response styled “Petitioner’s 

Memorandum and Proffer in Response to Rule 907,” wherein Appellant argued 

that the PCRA timeliness provisions at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) are 

unconstitutional and that his appellate rights under the PCRA should be 

reinstated, nunc pro tunc. See Petitioner’s Memorandum and Proffer, 

12/31/18, at 3-6. That same day, the PCRA court filed a memorandum and 

order denying Appellant’s request for reinstatement.

On January 2, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition 

without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.1 

Our standard and scope of review in this context is well-articulated 

under existing Pennsylvania precedent: “On appeal from the denial of PCRA 

relief, our standard and scope of review is limited to determining whether the 

PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013). We must view 

the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at 

the PCRA court level. See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 

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1

 The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and advised Appellant 

that “[a]ny issue not properly included in the statement timely filed and 

served, shall be deemed waived.” Order, 1/30/19, at unnumbered 1. 

Appellant failed to comply. Thus, no Rule 1925(a) opinion from the trial court 

was filed of record. Ordinarily, this oversight on Appellant’s part would result 

in waiver of all his claims. However, the PCRA court’s order was not docketed 

in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c). This renders the order 

unenforceable for the purposes of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 

163 A.3d 470, 472 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding order to file Rule 1925(b) 

statement was unenforceable where there was no indication on the docket of 

the date of service of the order requiring its filing).
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(Pa. 2012). However, we apply a de novo standard of review with specific 

regard to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 

A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011).

In light of the PCRA court’s holding, we must assess whether Appellant’s 

petition is timely or subject to one of the exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 

589, 591-92 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are 

jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address 

the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.”). In 

pertinent part, the PCRA provides as following regarding timeliness:

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation 

of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United 

Sates; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively.

. . . .
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(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in 

the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). In reviewing these statutory provisions, it is also 

important to note that “there is no generalized equitable exception to the 

jurisdictional one-year time bar pertaining to post-conviction petitions.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008).

Instantly, Appellant concedes that his PCRA petition was untimely,2 but 

argues that this Court should overlook the timeliness requirements of the 

PCRA and permit his appeal to proceed, nunc pro tunc, on equitable grounds. 

See Appellant’s brief at 1-2. Thus, Appellant has not asserted that any of the 

timeliness exceptions set forth at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) are applicable to his 

case in either his original PCRA petition, or in his appeal before this Court. As 

such, Appellant has failed to raise or prove the applicability of any operative

exceptions to timeliness, and his attempt to secure equitable reinstatement of 

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2 Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) contemplates a thirty-day window within which to appeal. 

Instantly, this thirty-day period from the trial court’s April 28, 2017 

memorandum and order denying Appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty 

plea began to run on May 6, 2017, or the day after its entry upon the record. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 108. Therefore, the final day for Appellant to file an appeal 

was June 5, 2017. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; see also Pa.R.A.P. 107, 903; 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1908. No appeal was ultimately filed, and Appellant’s sentence 

became final that same day. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Thereafter, the 

one-year time limit set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) began to accrue. 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was not filed until September 13, 2018, which 

renders it untimely by approximately three months. 
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his PCRA rights is unavailing. See Brown, supra at 267. Thus, his PCRA 

petition is untimely and the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to entertain 

his claims. See Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 936 A.2d 497, 500 

(Pa.Super. 2007) (“[F]ailure to allege a timeliness exception in the PCRA 

petition itself precludes the petitioner from raising it on appeal.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40, 46 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(“These exceptions must be specifically pleaded or they may not be 

invoked.”). 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2019