IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0057

Filed April 15, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF D.G. and M.L.,

Minor Children,

J.L., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Thomas Mott, Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her 

children. AFFIRMED.

Alexandra M. Nelissen of Advocate Law, PLLC, Clive, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Magdalena Reese of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney, and 

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two1 of her 

children, D.G., born in 2013, and M.L., born in 2018.2 The mother purports to 

challenge whether the children could be returned to her care at the time of the 

termination hearing in December 2019, if termination is in the children’s best 

interests, and whether a permissive factor in section 232.116(3) precludes 

termination. Yet the mother did not testify or present evidence at the termination 

hearing. While she did not consent to the termination, she did nothing to rebut the 

evidence for termination the State presented—just several exhibits admitted by the 

court.

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 The juvenile court referenced minimal fact findings in its order terminating 

the mother’s parental rights. That being said, there were no factual or credibility 

issues in dispute.

First, we question whether the mother waived her right to challenge at least 

some issues she now brings up on appeal. Not because she did not present 

 

1 The mother has another child, C.L., who is over the age of ten and is not at issue 

in this appeal. The State initially petitioned to terminate the mother’s rights to C.L. 

as well, but, at the termination hearing, the State orally moved to remove the oldest 

child from the petition. The State asked the court to set a separate hearing on 

permanency for the oldest child and to establish a guardianship in the maternal 

aunt—with whom C.L. was already living—rather than terminate the mother’s 

parental rights. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(d)(1) (2019). The Iowa Department 

of Human Services (DHS) and the guardian ad litem joined this request. The court 

clarified it would note the change in the permanency goal for C.L. and schedule a 

hearing. No parent’s rights were terminated as to C.L.

2 The fathers’ parental rights were also terminated. Neither father appeals. 

3 The termination proceedings were originally scheduled for September 16 and 

then October 25. Over issues about a conflict of interest with at least one of the 

attorneys representing a parent, the proceedings were ultimately continued until 

December 12. But the exhibits entered at the December 2019 termination hearing, 

such as progress reports from the family safety, risk, and permanency provider 

and the social worker’s report to the court, are only current through early October 

2019. 
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evidence—we acknowledge she could still challenge the juvenile court’s 

conclusions without presenting independent evidence—but because of her 

attorney’s statements made on the record, which conveyed that the mother knew 

she could not resume care of the children. The mother’s attorney stated:

Most recently met with her yesterday evening. At that point in time, 

we had conversations regarding the termination, and she 

understands what her position is at this point in time. She does not 

believe that she can consent to a termination, but certainly is not 

offering any independent evidence.

She loves her children deeply and has some pretty significant 

concerns, but understands kind of where we’re at with respect to a 

termination of parental rights.

. . . .

With respect to the termination, as I stated, I commend [the 

mother], quite frankly. I think that I have many clients who come in 

kicking and screaming when they know what they have done or have 

not done. And I understand that it is extremely difficult to put your 

pen to paper—your name to paper and indicate that you are, in her 

opinion, giving up on her children. But to be able to recognize where 

we’re at and not draw this out for the children, I think, is something 

that should be commended on her behalf.

“[T]he mother cannot be heard on appeal to complain about a ruling she agreed 

was appropriate.” In re H.S., No. 17-1902, 2018 WL 540998, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Jan. 24, 2018); see also Jasper v. State, 477 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991) (noting 

a litigant “cannot deliberately act so as to invite error and then object because the 

court has accepted the invitation”).

Even if the mother has preserved a challenge to whether the children could 

be returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing, see Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010), we have 

little trouble determining they could not. The children were removed in July 2018 

after M.L. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. The mother admitted 

using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. And she continued to use it, 
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seemingly up until the December 2019 termination proceedings. Over the course 

of the case, the mother had some negative drug tests, but she also missed many 

tests and never completed substance-abuse treatment. When she last entered 

treatment, in September 2019, she reported using methamphetamine daily. She 

left treatment less than three weeks later against the advice of staff. The report 

from the mother’s discharge notes that “she lacks personal accountability and the 

motivation to change.” And at discharge, with her severe alcohol dependency, the 

mother revealed doubts she could stay sober if her rights to her children were 

terminated. The mother also experienced serious issues with depression during 

the case—a barrier the mother struggled to overcome. DHS tried to help the 

mother address her mental health with services for therapy and medication 

management, but she was unable or unwilling to follow through with those services 

consistently. 

Now the mother argues termination of her rights to these children are not in 

the children’s best interests because her rights were not terminated to C.L. and 

these children will be harmed by that knowledge.4 Knowing their sister continues 

 

4 The mother also claims termination is not in these children’s best interest 

because “the children will be deprived of unique important cultural opportunities by 

being placed outside of an African American home or a culturally aware home.” 

We have little information about the family with whom the children were placed at 

the time of the termination proceedings. The maternal great grandmother cared 

for the children for much of the pendency of the case, but the children moved into 

the home of the great grandmother’s neighbors in September 2019 due to the

grandmother’s health issues. We know nothing else about the neighbor family. 

And it is unclear where the children would be placed after the termination of the 

mother’s parental rights. As part of the termination order, the juvenile court 

ordered that the custody of the children was to transfer to DHS for an appropriate 

placement. Nor have we found in the record where the mother raised this concern 

to the juvenile court. We do not consider this complaint.
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to have a relationship with the mother may cause these children some emotional 

turmoil. But our review of best interests requires us to focus on the children’s 

“safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of 

the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of 

the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) 

(providing that the court must use the framework of section 232.116(2) rather than

“using its own unstructured best-interest test”). The mother could not provide 

stability and a safe home for the children—not now and possibly not in the future. 

Termination of her parental rights is in D.G.’s and M.L.’s best interests. See In re 

J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) (identifying 

“a child’s safety and his or her need for a permanent home as the defining elements 

in a child’s best interests”).

Finally, the mother argues section 232.116(3)(b) and (c) should be applied 

to save the parent-child relationship. We refuse to consider these claims. The 

parent has the burden to prove an exception to termination, see In re A.S., 906 

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018), and as we noted before, the mother did not present 

any evidence nor make any argument in favor of the preservation of her rights. 

She did not even attempt to meet this burden at the termination proceedings, and 

she cannot try now on appeal for the first time. In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“As a general rule, an issue not presented in the juvenile 

court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.