1 Filed 4/8/15 In re J.G. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re J.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JESSICA G., Defendant and Appellant. A143009
(Marin County Super. Ct. No s. JV25895A, JV25896A, & JV25897A)

Jessica G. (Mother) appeals an order re moving her two daughters from her care.
She asserts the evidence was in sufficient to support the re moval findings and orders.
Because the issues are moot , we dismiss the appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL BACKGROUND In February 2014, Marin County Health and Human Services (the Department)
filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition, asserting Mother’s 13 and 11- year-old daughters were at s ubstantial risk of suffering harm due to instances of domestic violence and Mother’s substance abuse, as well as due to the abuse of a sibling, 7-month old J.G. The Agency deta ined all three children. At the jurisdictional hearing in April 2014, Mother submitted on the Department’s amended petition, which the juvenile court su stained under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). In August 2014, follo wing the contested dispositiona l hearings in July 2014, the2 juvenile court found the two daughters to be dependents and ordered their removal from Mother’s care. In September 2014, Mother appealed from that order. On December 19, 2014, the da ughters were returned to Mo ther’s care. Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, following Mother’s comp letion of various treatment programs,
continued attendance in counse ling and therapy, along with her continuous sobriety for more than one year, the juven ile court terminated its jurisd iction and dismissed the case.
II. DISCUSSION The Agency moves to dismiss the appeal as moot. An appeal from an order in a juvenile dependency matter may be rendered moot by the dismissal of dependency jurisdiction during the pe ndency of the appeal if the dism issal of jurisdiction deprives the appellate court of the power to grant the relief sought in the appeal. ( In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.) The purpose of the dependenc y proceedings is to reunify children with a parent. ( In re Tania R. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 447, 451.) He re, the court placed the daughters
with Mother in December 2014 and terminated jurisdiction in March 2015. 1 As a result, the Department maintains that the issues on appeal are moot. In Mother’s opposition to the motion dism iss, she argues that the appeal is not moot because it still presents just iciable issues, particularly in light of the fact that she has appealed from the juvenile court’s March 2015 order. 2 According to Mother, dismissing

1 J.G., who was also a dependent child , had been returned to Mother’s care prior to the disposition hearing; the juvenile court also dismissed the case pertaining to J.G. We grant the Agency’s request and take judicial notice of the court’s minute orders terminating jurisdiction. (Evid.Code, §§ 452, 459.) We recognize the Supreme Court has stated postjudgment evidence may not, except in extraordinary circumstances, be used as a basis to reverse a termination of parental rights on appeal. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413.) However, because this appeal is not from an order terminating parental rights and we are not reversing, taking judicial no tice here is not prohibited by In re Zeth S.

2 The notice of appeal was filed on Ma rch 19, 2015, and th e appeal is still pending.3 the appeal would have the eff ect of an affirmance, insula ting the jurisdictional rulings
from review. “[W]here a judgment dismissing the depe ndency action is challenged on appeal
the case ‘is not moot if the purported error is of such ma gnitude as to infect the outcome of [subsequent proceedings] or where the alleged defect unde rmines the juvenile court’s initial jurisdictional finding. Consequently th e question of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.Ap p.4th 1544, 1547, original italics ( Joshua C. ).) For example, in Joshua C.
, supra , the children’s father argue d on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to supp ort the jurisdictional findings as to the children and that the juvenile court erred by refusing to gran t certain discovery orde rs thereby denying him due process. ( Joshua C.
, supra , 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 15 46.) Respondent agency
contended that the issues coul d not be reached as dismissal of the dependency action at the dispositional hearing rendered the case moot. ( Ibid. ) The dispositional orders had awarded sole physical and lega l custody of the children to their mother and restricted visitation for the father. ( Id. at p. 1547.) The appellate cour t held that the fact that the dependency action had been dism issed should not preclude re view of a significant basis for the assertion of jurisdiction where exercise of that jurisdiction resulted in custody and
visitation orders that continued to adversely affect the father. ( Id. at p. 1548.)
Joshua C. is distinguishable from the instant case. The appellant in Joshua C. was challenging visitation and cu stody orders that continue d to affect him adversely after termination of the proceeding; in such a case, an appellant s hould be permitted to challenge the jurisdictional findings in his att ack on the orders. Here, by contrast, there is no ongoing order that continues to adversely affect Mother. Mother next argues that the appeal shou ld not be dismissed as moot because the jurisdictional finding might have an adverse effect in some future proceedings. She does not, however, point to any actual proceeding in which the findings would be used. Moreover, the juvenile court’s order terminat ing the dependencies declared that there is no basis for juvenile court jurisdiction, and th us went a long way to removing any stigma4 of the jurisdictional findings. The court reco gnized that Mother had completed “several drug/alcohol treatment programs, and she con tinues to attend counseling and therapy, . . . and skills development programs.”
While the court’s order falls short of sa ying that the conditions never supported a finding under subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300—which is what Mother urges
here—the distinction does not warrant a departure from the well-established mootness
doctrine under the circumstances before us. Th e final word of the j uvenile court is that
the conditions do not exist and th at there is no need for the Department to protect the
children. She also argues that dismissal will likely result in further adverse collateral consequences by requiring her to pay for the costs of support and legal services for her children while they were in the system. Whereas, if she is successful in challenging the jurisdictional findings, she would not be s ubject to such reimbursement. (See, e.g., § 903.1, subd. (b) [specified persons not liable for costs of support and legal services if § 300 petition dismissed at or before the jurisd ictional hearing].) We decline to set aside the mootness doctrine based on speculation as to what might happ en in the future. Finally, Mother argues we should decide the appeal, notwithstanding the mootness
doctrine because it raises a matte r of continuing public interest in reso lving the issue of “the right of capable parents in treatment pr ograms to delegate care of their child or children to a capable caregiver” while they are comp leting a residential treatment

program. We have discretion to resolve an appeal, even if technically moot, when it raises a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur. ( In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622.) Here, however, Mother does not ask us so much to clarify a legal standard that will likely recur in litig ation among other parties, but rather to
determine whether the evidence was sufficient in this particular case that she had reasonable means to protect her children by delegating a capable caretaker. We decline
to exercise our discretion to d ecide the matter on this basis.5 III. DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.6 _ ____________ ____________ RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ REARDON, J.

_____________ ____________ STREETER. J.