COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Causey

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

RONALD DEAN NORTHCRAFT

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 1067-21-2 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX

SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

W. Reilly Marchant, Judge

Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Appellate Counsel (Virginia 

Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

A jury convicted Ronald Dean Northcraft (“appellant”) of three counts of grand larceny of a 

motor vehicle, in violation of Code § 18.2-95, five counts of unlawfully obtaining documents from 

the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), in violation of Code § 46.2-105.2(A), five counts of 

making a false statement on an application for a certificate of title, in violation of Code § 46.2-605, 

one count of money laundering, in violation of Code § 18.2-246.3(A), and one count of attempted 

money laundering, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-26, -246.3(A). On appeal, he argues that the trial 

court erred in: (1) failing to strike a juror for cause, (2) denying his motions to strike the evidence on 

all charges, and (3) denying his proposed jury instructions. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Virginia’s Abandoned Vehicle Process

Code §§ 46.2-1200 through -1207 establish Virginia’s abandoned vehicle process 

(“AVP”) allowing applicants to dispose of an abandoned motor vehicle, trailer, or manufactured 

PUBLISHED
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home left on a highway, public property, or private property. An applicant initiates the process 

by completing an online application for an abandoned vehicle record request through the DMV’s 

website. After the online application is submitted, the DMV conducts a record search and sends 

a certified letter to the vehicle’s owner or lienholder. See Code § 46.2-1202(A) (directing that 

“[a]ny person in possession of an abandoned motor vehicle shall initiate with the [DMV], in a 

manner prescribed by the Commissioner, a search for the owner and/or lienholder of record of 

the vehicle”).1 The notice letter advises the vehicle’s owner or lienholder that the AVP is in 

progress for the vehicle and that they have 15 days from the date of notice to reclaim and remove

the vehicle. Code § 46.2-1202(B). If the vehicle remains unclaimed following the 15-day notice 

period, the owner or lienholder “shall have waived all right, title, and interest” in the vehicle. Id. 

After the 15-day reclamation period expires, the applicant seeking title to an abandoned 

vehicle must post an “intent to auction” notice on the DMV website for at least 21 days. See

Code § 46.2-1202.1. Once the 21-day “intent to auction” notice period expires, the applicant 

may obtain title to the vehicle. 

At trial, Alacia Moore, the DMV employee in charge of the agency’s AVP, testified 

about the online record request application as it existed in 2018.

2

 When an AVP applicant 

initiated the record request on the DMV’s website, the website told the applicant to “[u]se this 

transaction to . . . [o]btain title for or sell an abandoned vehicle . . . in your possession.” After 

viewing this information, applicants then entered the vehicle’s Vehicle Identification Number 

1 Virginia’s AVP statutes were amended in 2020 and 2021. See 2020 Va. Acts chs. 964, 

965; 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I ch. 374. The amendments did not substantively change the 

language relevant here, and we cite the versions of the statutes in effect when the offenses 

occurred.

2 The Commonwealth also introduced a series of slides showing how an online record 

request application would have been completed in 2018. 
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(“VIN”).3 They next chose from three options indicating that they were “in possession of a 

motor vehicle” that “[1] [w]as left unattended on public property for more than 48 hours in 

violation of a state law or local ordinance[,] [2] has remained for more than 48 hours on private 

property without the consent of the property’s owner . . . [,] [or] [3] was left unattended on the 

shoulder of a primary highway.” To continue with the application, the applicant had to then 

certify that the information they provided in their application was “true and correct.” Following 

this, after the applicant paid a fee, the DMV would process the transaction, and a record request 

receipt was generated that contained the vehicle’s information.

After an applicant completed the online record request application, the DMV required an 

applicant to produce three documents at a DMV customer service center in order to process a 

title for vehicles obtained via the AVP: (1) an application of certificate for title, (2) a vehicle 

removal certificate, and (3) the record request receipt. The application for certificate of title is

the application form used to apply for the title to an abandoned vehicle. This form requires an

applicant to list the vehicle owner’s contact information. It also includes a certification section 

where the applicant affirms that “all information presented in this form is true and correct, that 

any documents I . . . have presented to DMV are genuine, and that the information included in all 

supporting documentation is true and accurate.” The vehicle removal certificate is the transfer of 

ownership document used for abandoned vehicles. The top section of the form requires the 

applicant to state where the vehicle is located and the address of the “person/authorized agent in 

possession of vehicle.” 

After an applicant presented a record request receipt, an application for certificate of title, 

and a vehicle removal certificate, a DMV customer service representative processed the 

3 Moore testified that a VIN is a number used to identify a particular vehicle. At trial, a 

car dealership parts manager testified that an individual could find the VIN for a particular 

vehicle by looking at the VIN plate visible through a vehicle’s windshield.
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documents, collected any fees, and gave the vehicle’s title over to the applicant. Once an 

applicant was issued the title, the DMV recorded that individual as the owner of the vehicle. 

When processing these documents, the DMV customer service representative did not 

have access to the information provided on the online record request application. Moore testified 

that the DMV’s role in the AVP was “just to implement the process” and that the DMV did not 

“have a role in making sure that the person who applies is who is allowed to apply.” 

Moore further testified that anyone could use the AVP “[a]s long as they are in 

possession and meet the requirements” and that the program was not limited to local 

governments. But Moore also testified that it was her understanding that if a vehicle was 

abandoned on public property, the program was intended for local governments’ use. She 

acknowledged that in 2018 there was no information provided during the process indicating that 

the AVP for vehicles on public property was limited solely to local governments.4 

The Offenses

In May and early June of 2018, appellant completed an online record request application 

for five vehicles: a 2006 Kia Optima, a 2016 Mini Cooper, a 2014 Chevrolet Camaro, a 2009 

Mini Cooper, and a 2012 Toyota Camry. On his applications, appellant stated that the vehicles 

were respectively located on the following public streets: 5400 Montbrook Circle; 2234 Park 

Avenue; 700 North Davis Street; “Grove Avenue/Roseneath”; and “Hancock Street.” On each 

online record request application, appellant listed his reason for possession as “possession of a 

4 Moore acknowledged that the AVP procedure had changed since 2018. Currently, a 

private individual may only use the online record request application if they are in possession of 

a vehicle that had remained for more than 48 hours on private property without the consent of the 

property’s owner; the other two AVP options, a vehicle on public property or on the shoulder of 

a highway, are limited to use by government localities. See Code § 46.2-1200.3 (effectuated 

January 1, 2022 and providing that “[n]o person may remove or sell any abandoned vehicle left 

on public property or the shoulder of a primary highway unless such person is acting pursuant to 

an agreement for such removal or sale with a local government entity or law-enforcement agency 

and has actual possession of the vehicle”). 
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motor vehicle . . . that was left unattended on public property for more than 48 hours in violation 

of a state law or local ordinance.” 

Nathaniel White, Rebecca Shaw, Austin McCune, Billy Gilmore, and Altonia Foster

were the owners of vehicles connected with appellant’s online record request applications. From 

May through July 2018, these individuals usually parked their vehicles on the public streets 

listed on appellant’s online record request applications.

5

 At least four of the owners did not have 

current registration stickers displayed on their vehicles during this time. In July 2018, four of the 

owners noticed that the vehicles were not where they usually parked them.

6

 Three of the 

vehicles were never returned to their owners, and one vehicle was returned to its owner months 

after it went missing. 

The DMV sent notice letters to each owner at their last known address informing them 

that appellant was claiming that he was in possession of their vehicles and was seeking to have 

them declared abandoned. Each individual testified that they had not given appellant possession 

or ownership of their vehicle.

On July 6, 2018, appellant filled out an application for certificate of title and vehicle 

removal certificate for the 2006 Kia Optima and 2016 Mini Cooper, and on July 12, 2018 he 

filled out these same forms for the 2014 Chevrolet Camaro, the 2009 Mini Cooper, and the 2012 

Toyota Camry. On the applications for certificate of title, appellant listed himself as the owner 

of the vehicles. On all five vehicle removal certificates, appellant listed himself as the 

“person/authorized agent in possession of vehicle.” 

5 Because he was ill at this time, Gilmore’s vehicle was driven by his wife, Mildred 

Gilmore.

6 McCune’s vehicle was never taken from him.
- 6 -

On July 6, 2018, Shakeima Chisholm, a DMV employee, processed appellant’s 

applications for certificates of title for the 2006 Kia Optima and 2016 Mini Cooper. Chisholm 

thought it was unusual that appellant possessed two abandoned vehicles and asked him if he 

worked for a towing company or dealership. Appellant responded that he did not and said that 

the vehicles had been left on his property. Chisholm processed the applications and gave 

appellant the titles to the two vehicles. Although Chisholm thought it “odd that it was two 

abandoned vehicles on someone’s property,” she testified that if someone had all the necessary 

paperwork to complete the application for certificate of title, she was unable to reject the 

application even if she thought “something might not be right on the form.” 

On July 12, 2018, Ebony Bell, another DMV employee, processed appellant’s 

applications for certificates of title for the 2014 Chevrolet Camaro, the 2012 Toyota Camry, and 

the 2009 Mini Cooper. Bell thought that appellant’s applications were “unusual” because he 

used the AVP for three vehicles all at once and because the vehicles were all less than ten years 

old. In her experience, the AVP was used “for much older vehicles being left on the property.” 

She asked appellant if the vehicles were located on his property, and he said yes and that the 

vehicles “were just left on his property.” Before she gave appellant the titles, she spoke with her 

manager and was told to process the applications because appellant’s paperwork was in order. 

Bell issued titles for the three vehicles to appellant.

Also on July 12, 2018, appellant ordered a replacement key for the 2009 Mini Cooper.

Dwaine Tolliver, the owner of Autosource, LLC, auctioned vehicles on behalf of others 

for a portion of the proceeds. His business sold the vehicles through Richmond Auto Auction. 

He entered into an agreement with appellant to auction two vehicles, the 2009 and 2016 Mini 

Coopers. Appellant brought the vehicles to Tolliver and gave the vehicles’ titles to him. On July 

20, 2018, the 2009 Mini Cooper was sold at auction by Tolliver for about $4,800. That same 
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day, Tolliver tried to sell the 2016 Mini Cooper at auction. Richmond Auto Auction informed 

Tolliver that the vehicle had been reported stolen, and the vehicle was not auctioned. The 

vehicle was left at the auction by Tolliver, and he never received money for it. Tolliver also 

returned the money received for the 2009 Mini Cooper to Richmond Auto Auction after the 

second car was identified as stolen. 

Detective Alexandra Davila with the Richmond City Police Department began 

investigating the case after receiving multiple reports of stolen vehicles. Davila contacted 

appellant and told him she had received reports of stolen vehicles along with notice letters from 

the DMV indicating that he was the person the owners needed to contact. Appellant told her that 

the “vehicles were his, and in his possession, and he had obtained them legally.” After obtaining 

a search warrant, Davila searched appellant’s home. During the search, Davila found the 2009 

Mini Cooper’s license plate, along with several items that Shaw, the owner of the vehicle, 

identified as personal items she had left in the Mini Cooper.

After the Commonwealth presented its case-in-chief, appellant moved to strike the 

evidence on all of the offenses. The trial court denied appellant’s motions to strike. Appellant 

did not present any evidence. 

Appellant was convicted by the jury on all offenses. Appellant filed a motion to set aside 

the money laundering and attempted money laundering convictions, which the court denied. 

This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike Juror

During voir dire, the trial court asked the venire preliminary questions about the

presumption of innocence and the requirement to remain impartial and without bias to both 

appellant and the Commonwealth. Counsel for appellant then questioned the venire, asking, “Is 
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there anyone through hearing that the [Commonwealth] has charged [appellant] with 15 felony 

charges, so we are here for 15 separate felonies, who feels that [appellant] must have done 

something wrong?” In response, one juror said, “That actually was my initial thought when I 

first heard it is that I can understand one, maybe two . . . . But 15 felonies is just not, to me, an 

accident.” When asked if anyone else felt the same, Juror R.

7

raised her hand. Counsel for 

appellant asked Juror R., “do you feel as though you are going to be able to set aside that initial 

reaction?” She responded, “I have set it aside.” 

The following exchange then occurred between counsel for appellant, Juror R., and the 

trial court: 

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: So we were talking a little bit before 

the fact that [appellant] is charged and how that kind of gave you 

an initial reaction. So [the trial court] instructed you that you are 

not to consider and you will be instructed from the jury [sic] that 

you are not to consider the fact that he is charged as evidence 

against him. Do you think you will be able to set aside that initial 

reaction?

[JUROR R.]: I don’t know, because it kind of confused me. It 

seemed like a tow truck driver was taking (inaudible). You 

understand what I am saying?

THE COURT: Well, see, that’s the thing--

[JUROR R.]: And I have gave away a salvage car before.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Okay. 

[JUROR R.]: It just broke down, and I just called the tow truck 

people to come and get it and I salvaged it to them. I couldn’t deal 

with it. It was just kind of hard.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: And I know it is especially hard, 

because we were just giving you little tidbits of what the evidence

is going to be. But, I guess, the question that I am asking is your 

initial reaction to the number of charges was that he must have 

done something wrong. Am I correct on saying that?

7 We use the juror’s initial to protect her privacy. 
- 9 -

[JUROR R.]: Yes.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: But do you think that you would be 

able to set aside that initial reaction if you are--

[JUROR R.]: I guess I will have to listen to the evidence.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: So you think you could--

[JUROR R.]: (Inaudible) but I know I have to listen to the

evidence, though. But it kind of would still be in my head.

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: I appreciate that.

[JUROR R.]: I don’t want to--

THE COURT: Well, if I instruct you it’s not to be considered--

[JUROR R.]: Right. 

THE COURT: --would you be able to follow the law?

[JUROR R.]: Yes. 

THE COURT: I mean, there are a lot of facts here. And it is tough 

on you all to make -- answer some of these questions, because you 

don’t know the facts of the case.

[JUROR R.]: Yes. 

THE COURT: They just give you a little snippet and you started 

thinking this and you find out later, well, maybe--

[JUROR R.]: Right. 

THE COURT: But the key -- Because you don’t know the facts, 

the key is if I tell you the law, do not infer the fact that he is 

charged, and has been indicted, and is on trial, don’t infer that he is 

guilty. You can only find him guilty based on the law and the

evidence.

[JUROR R.]: Right.

THE COURT: Can you apply that fairly?

[JUROR R.]: Yes. 

THE COURT: You wouldn’t say I can’t apply that--

[JUROR R.]: No, no. That is your rule, and I have to do it the 

way you say do it.
- 10 -

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that’s fine. 

[JUROR R.]: Yes. 

THE COURT: I don’t want to put words in your mouth. I want 

you to understand that that’s the process.

[JUROR R.]: I understand. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

The Commonwealth asked no further questions of Juror R. Counsel for appellant moved 

to strike Juror R. for cause, which the court denied. 

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not striking Juror R. for cause 

because her voir dire demonstrated that she could not set aside the number of charges appellant 

was facing and the implication that this meant he must have done something wrong. Appellant 

contends that this opinion was “demonstrably fixed” because Juror R. told the court that while 

she knew she had to listen to the evidence, the number of offenses charged “kind of would still 

be in [her] head.”

Both the Virginia and United States Constitutions protect a defendant’s right to be tried 

by an impartial jury. Va. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Code § 8.01-358 

(providing that members of the venire must “stand indifferent in the cause”). “[A] prospective 

juror ‘must be able to give [the accused] a fair and impartial trial. Upon this point nothing 

should be left to inference or doubt.’” Bradbury v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 176, 180 (2003) 

(second alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 

(1879)). “[T]he Constitution does not require specific procedures or tests for determining the 

impartiality of a jury.” Morva v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 329, 341 (2009). However, “[b]y 
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ancient rule, any reasonable doubt as to a juror’s qualifications must be resolved in favor of the 

accused.” Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 (1976).8

“[A] trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause ‘will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless there has been manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.’” Townsend v. 

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329-30 (2005) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 

826 (2001)). An underlying question of juror impartiality is one of fact, and the trial court’s 

determination on the subject is “entitled to great deference on appeal” unless “plainly wrong or 

unsupported by the record.” Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 92, 121, 127 (2014). In 

addressing whether a juror should have been struck for cause, an appellate court must consider 

the juror’s “entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 

401 (2006) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 191 (2004)).

It is well settled that “[i]f [a juror] has any interest in the cause, or is related to either 

party, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, he is 

excluded by the law.” Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 42 (2020) (second alteration 

in original) (quoting Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 60-61 (2011)). “A 

manifest error in refusing to strike a juror ‘occurs when the record shows that a prospective juror 

cannot or will not lay aside his or her preconceived opinion.’” Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 

Va. App. 436, 454 (2023) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448, 456 (2017)). 

However, “[i]t is not uncommon to discover during voir dire that prospective jurors have 

preconceived notions, opinions, or misconceptions about the criminal justice system, criminal 

trials and procedure, or about the particular case.” Lovos-Rivas, 58 Va. App. at 61 (alteration in 

8

Juror R. was ultimately removed via a peremptory strike. “It is prejudicial error for the 

trial court to force a defendant to use peremptory strikes to exclude a venireman from the jury 

panel if that person is not free from exception.” Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 

(2005). “The striking of any individual potential juror for cause, however, is committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. 
- 12 -

original) (quoting Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761 (2000)). “The opinion 

entertained by a juror, which disqualifies him, is an opinion of that fixed character which repels 

the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, and in whose mind the accused stands 

condemned already.” Id. (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976 (1980)).

In this case, we conclude that Juror R.’s voir dire, viewed in its entirety, did not 

demonstrate that her opinion—that the number of charges appellant faced was indicative of his 

guilt—was a fixed opinion. Here, during individual voir dire, Juror R. first unequivocally stated 

that she had already set aside her initial reaction to the number of charges faced by appellant. 

She later made equivocal statements regarding her initial reaction, stating that she “guess[ed]” 

she would have to listen to the evidence, but that the number of charges “kind of would still be in 

[her] head.” However, upon the trial court’s questioning, Juror R. made clear that she would be 

able to follow the court’s instructions of law, including the instruction that she could only find 

appellant guilty based on the law and the evidence. Juror R. stated that she understood the trial 

process and would be able to follow the court’s instruction. Overall, these answers indicate that 

Juror R.’s initial opinion about appellant’s number of charges indicating his guilt was not fixed.

In addition, we note that “a trial judge who personally observes a juror, including the 

juror’s tenor, tone, and general demeanor, is in a better position than an appellate court to 

determine whether a particular juror should be str[uck].” Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 

458, 475 (2007). Here, the trial court had the ability to listen to Juror R.’s answers and 

determine what significance to give to her various statements, including her equivocal answer 

that her initial reaction “kind of would still be in [her] head.” (Emphasis added). 

Appellant argues, however, that the trial court inappropriately rehabilitated Juror R.

through its questioning of her. “The trial court’s role during the juror’s voir dire also impacts the 

extent to which we defer to its judgment.” Keepers, 72 Va. App. at 45. “We recognize that 
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‘when a trial court itself becomes involved in the rehabilitation of a potential juror, we must 

review the court’s decision to retain the person on the panel more carefully.’” Harvey, 76 

Va. App. at 456 (quoting Bradbury, 40 Va. App. at 181). “However, the judge may give basic 

instructions and ask general clarifying questions as ‘necessary to determine the presence of bias’

in the first instance.” Id. (quoting McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237, 243 (1990)). 

“Such questioning does not constitute rehabilitation.” Id. “If a trial judge adheres to this role, an 

appellate court may not set aside the trial judge’s determination of a juror’s impartiality if the 

juror’s responses, even though conflicting, support that determination.” Id. (quoting McGill, 10 

Va. App. at 243). 

In the instant case, after counsel for appellant’s questioning of Juror R., the court gave the 

juror a clarifying instruction, informing her that she could only find appellant guilty based on the 

evidence and could not infer guilt from the fact that he had been charged with an offense. When 

asked by the court if she could “apply that fairly,” she stated, “Yes.” However, rather than 

merely providing assent to the court’s questioning, Juror R. further stated, “That is your rule, and 

I have to do it the way you say do it.” When the trial court told her that it did not “want to put 

words in [her] mouth” and wanted her “to understand that that’s the process,” Juror R. told the 

court, “I understand.” “Mere assent to a trial judge’s questions or statements . . . is not enough to 

rehabilitate a prospective juror who has initially demonstrated a prejudice or partial 

predisposition.” Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619, 625 (1995). Evidence of a 

venireman’s impartiality “should come from him and not be based on his mere assent to 

persuasive suggestions.” Bradbury, 40 Va. App. at 181 (quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 300). We 

conclude that Juror R.’s own responses, which were not merely “yes” answers to the trial court’s 

questioning, provided evidence that her initial reaction upon hearing the number of charges 

against appellant was not fixed. Rather, she indicated in her own words that she understood the 
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legal instruction regarding the presumption of innocence after being instructed on it and could set 

aside her prior opinion. 

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record demonstrates that the trial court’s 

questioning and instruction of Juror R. constituted clarification and not improper rehabilitation. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike the 

juror.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to strike the evidence 

for his charges of unlawfully obtaining DMV documents, making a false statement on an 

application for a certificate of title, grand larceny, and money laundering and attempted money 

laundering.

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask 

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether 

‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might 

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 

69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).
- 15 -

“Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at 

trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Vay v. 

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 242 (2017) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 

625, 629 (2009)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict 

with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the 

Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Parks v. 

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).

“To the extent our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to examine the 

statutory language, we review issues of statutory construction de novo on appeal.” Hillman v. 

Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 585, 592 (2018) (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 

527, 537 (2015)).

1. Unlawfully Obtaining DMV Documents 

Code § 46.2-105.2(A) provides

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to obtain a Virginia driver’s 

license, special identification card, vehicle registration, certificate 

of title, or other document issued by the [DMV] if such person has 

not satisfied all legal and procedural requirements for the issuance 

thereof, or is otherwise not legally entitled thereto, including 

obtaining any document issued by the [DMV] through the use of 

counterfeit, forged, or altered documents.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under Code 

§ 46.2-105.2(A) because there was insufficient evidence of an unlawful act. He contends that 

there was no evidence in the record that he did not “satisf[y] all legal and procedural 

requirements” to receive title to the vehicles because he met all of the requirements set out in the 

AVP at the time of the offense. 

Code § 46.2-1200, the definitional section governing Virginia’s AVP, defines an 

“[a]bandoned motor vehicle,” in relevant part, as one that “[i]s left unattended on public property 
- 16 -

for more than 48 hours in violation of a state law or local ordinance.” Code § 46.2-1200(2). As 

noted above, to obtain the title to an abandoned vehicle, an applicant must first complete an 

application for a record request through the DMV to determine who is the owner or lienholder of 

the vehicle. The code section discussing this process directs that “[a]ny person in possession of

an abandoned motor vehicle shall initiate with the [DMV], in a manner prescribed by the 

Commissioner, a search for the owner and/or lienholder of record of the vehicle.” Code 

§ 46.2-1202(A) (emphasis added). The statutory scheme clearly sets out that to utilize the AVP, 

the applicant must be in possession of the abandoned vehicle. 

The threshold question here, then, is whether appellant was in possession of the vehicles 

for which he obtained titles from the DMV. Code § 46.2-1200 does not provide a definition for 

the term “in possession of.” Appellant argues that the word “possession” is ambiguous in this 

context because “no person or entity would have keys, title, or a way to control a car left on the 

side of the road” and that there is “no obvious way one could inherently or obviously ‘possess’ 

an abandoned car.” Thus, appellant claims, the only sensible interpretation is that an individual 

possesses a vehicle under the statute if the person knows where the vehicle is located and also 

knows that the vehicle was abandoned on the side of the road for more than 48 hours, in 

violation of a state or local ordinance.

9

“We apply the plain meaning of the language appearing in the statute unless it is 

ambiguous or applying the plain language leads to an absurd result.” Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 

69 Va. App. 75, 82 (2018) (quoting Harvey v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 280, 285 (2015)). A 

statute is ambiguous if “the text can be understood in more than one way or refers to two or more 

9 Because we conclude that the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to establish that 

appellant was not in possession of the vehicles, we need not determine whether it established that 

the vehicles were abandoned on the side of the road for more than 48 hours, in violation of a 

state or local ordinance. 
- 17 -

things simultaneously” or if “the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or 

lacks clearness or definiteness.” Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375, 381 (2014) (quoting 

Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 n.8 (2006)). 

“Where a ‘statute’s terms are undefined’ by the legislature, we give those terms ‘their 

“ordinary meaning,” in light of “the context in which [they are] used.”’” Eley v. Commonwealth, 

70 Va. App. 158, 165 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Va. Marine Res. Comm’n v. 

Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 371, 384 (2014)). “‘Possession’ is defined as: ‘the act or condition of 

having in or taking into one’s control or holding at one’s disposal.’” Shifflett v. Latitude Props., 

Inc., 294 Va. 476, 483 (2017) (quoting Webster’s 3rd International Dictionary 1770 (1993)). 

Applying this definition, we conclude that the plain meaning of “possession” in Code 

§ 46.2-1202(A) is neither ambiguous nor creates absurd results when applied in the context of 

the statute. Rather, under this definition, it is clear that the evidence established that appellant 

did not have possession of the vehicles in question. The owners of the vehicles testified that they 

did not know appellant, did not give him possession or ownership of their cars, and instead 

regularly parked their vehicles themselves during the relevant time period. There is no 

indication that anyone but the owners had control of or held at their disposal the vehicles prior to 

appellant using the AVP to obtain the vehicles’ titles. Because the vehicles were not in 

appellant’s possession, he was not entitled to use the AVP to obtain their titles. Thus, it is clear 

that appellant obtained the titles from the DMV without “satisfy[ng] all legal and procedural 

requirements for the issuance thereof,” or “otherwise [being] legally entitled thereto,” in 

violation of Code § 46.2-105.2(A).

10

10 In his argument asserting that he lawfully followed the AVP, appellant emphasizes that 

on the 2018 online record request application, the AVP option for vehicles on public property

was available to be selected by private individuals as well as local governments. He contends 

that this means that he, as a private individual, could possess a vehicle on public property in the 

same way as a local government—finding the vehicle on the street and determining that it was in 
- 18 -

2. Making a False Statement on an Application for a Certificate of Title 

Code § 46.2-605 provides that “[a]ny person who . . . with fraudulent intent, makes a 

false statement on any application for a certificate of title . . . shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”

Appellant first argues that the evidence did not establish that his applications contained 

false information. He asserts that while the evidence at trial might have been sufficient to prove 

that he made false statements to DMV employees, it did not demonstrate that he made false 

statements on the actual applications for certificate of title. 

Appellant supports his contention by noting that the application for certificate of title 

itself does not ask whether the applicant is in possession of the vehicle for which title is sought. 

But although this is true, the application’s certification section makes an applicant certify that 

“all information presented in this form is true and correct, that any documents . . . presented to 

DMV are genuine, and that the information included in all supporting documentation is true and 

accurate.” Here, appellant’s supporting documentation included his record request receipts and 

vehicle removal certificates. Both documents require an applicant to state who is in possession 

of the vehicle. The online record request application requires the applicant to state that they are 

in “possession of [the] motor vehicle” and indicate a reason for their possession. Appellant listed 

his reason for possession of the vehicles as “possession of a motor vehicle . . . that was left 

unattended on public property for more than 48 hours in violation of a state law or local 

ordinance.” The vehicle removal certificate also requires an applicant to state the name of the 

violation of a state law or local ordinance. However, the fact that the DMV website was set up 

for individuals to use the AVP for vehicles on public property does not mean that the statutory 

scheme itself allowed for private individuals to use the AVP in that way. At the time of the 

offense, Code § 46.2-1201 provided that “[a]ny county, city, or town may take any abandoned 

motor vehicle into custody.” Accordingly, by statute, a local government had the authority to 

take an abandoned vehicle into its possession, but nothing in the statute established that the 

statute conferred to private individuals a right to take possession of an abandoned vehicle on 

public property. 
- 19 -

“person/authorized agent in possession of vehicle,” and appellant put his name on these forms as 

the person in possession of the vehicles.

Appellant provided the false information that he was in possession of the vehicles on both 

the online record request applications and the vehicle removal certificates. Because appellant 

provided false information on his supporting documentation, while certifying on the applications 

for certificate of title that his supporting documentation was true and accurate, the evidence 

established that he provided false information on his applications for certificate of title.

11

Appellant further argues that there was insufficient evidence of the fraudulent intent 

necessary for his convictions under Code § 46.2-605. He contends that the fact that he made no 

effort to hide his identity on the forms was evidence of his good faith belief that he was correctly 

following the AVP and therefore demonstrated his lack of intent to defraud anyone. 

A person acts with fraudulent intent when he acts “with an evil intent, or with the specific 

intent to deceive or trick.” Burrell v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 72, 86 (2007) (quoting 

Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 990 (1992) (en banc)). “Intent may, and most 

often must, be proven by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 

proven facts are within the province of the trier of fact.” Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 

56, 67 (2021) (quoting Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 349, 353 (1991)). “In 

determining a defendant’s intent, ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as 

much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v. 

11 On the same basis, appellant also challenges his convictions under Code 

§ 46.2-105.2(A) for unlawfully obtaining DMV documents—that he did not provide incorrect 

information while using the AVP. However, as we conclude for his convictions under Code 

§ 46.2-605, appellant provided the false information that he was in possession of the vehicles 

when he applied for titles to the vehicles via the AVP, and thus he obtained these titles without 

“satisfy[ing] all legal and procedural requirements for the issuance thereof,” in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-105.2(A).
- 20 -

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 (1983)). “[T]he conduct and representations of the defendant” 

are circumstances to consider in deciding whether fraudulent intent exists in a particular case, 

and “[w]hether fraud actually existed will depend upon the circumstances of each case.” Rader 

v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 325, 329 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 

518, 519, 520 (1986)). In addition, “[t]he statements and conduct of an accused after the events 

that constitute the charged crime may also be relevant circumstantial evidence of intent.” Simon 

v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 194, 206 (2011). “[W]hether the required intent exists is 

generally a question of fact for the trier of fact.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 746, 787 

(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551 (1977)).

Here, the conduct and representations of appellant plainly indicate his fraudulent intent in 

making false statements on his applications for certificate of title. He claimed on several forms 

that he was in possession of the vehicles when the evidence demonstrated that the owners of the 

vehicles did not know appellant and did not give him permission to control or have at his

disposal the vehicles in any manner. He also verbally misrepresented where the vehicles were 

located when he provided his paperwork to the DMV. He told two DMV employees that the 

vehicles were located on his property, instead of on public property, in an effort to conceal the 

fact that he was trying to use the AVP to gain title to vehicles not in his possession.12 In 

12 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his verbal statements to the 

DMV employees. “The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, 

and a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Warnick v. 

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 251, 263 (2020) (quoting Amonett v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 

1, 9 (2019)). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact in 

issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Va. R. Evid. 2:401.

Appellant contends that because Code § 46.2-605 criminalizes only “false statement[s] on any 

application for a certificate of title,” his verbal statements to the DMV employees were irrelevant 

and therefore inadmissible. However, the fact that appellant lied to two different DMV 

employees regarding the location of vehicles for which he sought title was relevant to show his 

fraudulent intent, because it demonstrated his intent to conceal the fact that he was not actually in 

possession of the vehicles and therefore was using the AVP unlawfully.
- 21 -

addition, appellant used the AVP five times to obtain titles to the vehicles. Evidence that the 

accused “perpetrated more than one fraud [at] about the same time is relevant to show his 

fraudulent intent.” Mughrabi v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 538, 546 (2002); see also 

Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 268, 273 (1976) (“[W]here an accused has perpetrated 

similar frauds and by false representation obtained valuable consideration, evidence of such acts 

has been held to be admissible as bearing on fraudulent intent.”). While appellant notes that he 

did not attempt to conceal his identity on the applications for certificate of title, this fact alone 

does not negate the other evidence in the record indicating his fraudulent intent in his use of the 

AVP. Accordingly, based upon appellant’s written and verbal representations, and the number 

of offenses he committed during a short period of time, we conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to prove that he had the fraudulent intent necessary for his convictions under Code 

§ 46.2-605.

13

13 On the same ground, appellant also challenges his convictions under Code 

§ 46.2-105.2(A) for unlawfully obtaining DMV documents—he argues that he lacked the 

requisite fraudulent intent necessary for a conviction under that code section. On brief, the 

Commonwealth argues that intent to defraud is not an element under Code § 46.2-105.2(A), 

noting that the jury instructions in this case only listed intent to defraud as an element for

appellant’s violations of Code § 46.2-605. We conclude that the best and narrowest ground for 

resolving this issue is to assume without deciding that even if Code § 46.2-105.2(A) contains an 

intent to defraud element, it was satisfied in this case by appellant’s conduct showing his 

fraudulent intent as described above. See Ali v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 16, 37 n.9 (2022) 

(noting that “[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint requires that appellate courts decide cases on the 

best and narrowest ground” and that “[t]he mechanism of assuming without deciding a particular 

point in issue sometimes facilitates the appellate court’s achievement of this goal”). 
- 22 -

3. Grand Larceny 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his three grand larceny 

convictions14 because there was insufficient evidence of a taking against the will or without the 

consent of the owner. 

“Larceny, a common law crime, is the wrongful or fraudulent taking of another’s 

property without his permission and with the intent to deprive the owner of that property 

permanently.” Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256 (2001). For statutes contained in 

Title 46.2, “owner” is defined as “a person who holds the legal title to a vehicle.” Code

§ 46.2-100; see also McDuffie v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 170, 175-76 (2006) (“[C]ertificate 

of title serves not only as a substitute recording system but also as evidence of ownership.”).

Appellant asserts that because the vehicles were taken after he obtained titles to them, 

they were not taken without their owners’ permission, as he was their owner after obtaining the 

titles. We reject appellant’s argument and conclude that because his titles to the vehicles were 

procured through his fraudulent actions, they did not convey legal title to him. Appellant’s 

fraudulent use of the AVP to obtain the vehicles’ titles was the first part of his larcenous scheme 

to deprive the rightful owners of their vehicles. He committed an initial larceny in obtaining the 

titles themselves—he used the AVP to fraudulently take another’s property, namely the titles to 

the vehicles that were issued to him by the DMV but which legally belonged to the vehicles’ true 

owners. He then committed the charged larcenies of the three vehicles themselves, physically 

taking the vehicles from the streets and later attempting to sell two of them at auction. In 

Virginia, “a thief takes no title in the property he steals and can transfer none.” Castle Cars, Inc.

v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 221 Va. 773, 778 (1981); see also Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. C.L. 

14 Appellant was convicted of grand larceny for the 2009 Mini Cooper, the 2016 Mini 

Cooper, and the 2012 Toyota Camry, the three vehicles which were stolen in the City of 

Richmond. 
- 23 -

Hyman Auto Wholesale, Inc., 256 Va. 243, 247 (1998) (“Longstanding Virginia law provides 

that one who does not have title to goods cannot transfer title to a buyer . . . . Thus, a thief 

cannot pass title to stolen goods even to an innocent purchaser who pays for the stolen goods.” 

(citation omitted)). Because he obtained the titles and vehicles through his larcenous actions, at 

the time he took the vehicles, appellant did not have “legal title” to them. Code § 46.2-100

(emphasis added). He merely had the physical certificates of title. Accordingly, he was not the 

owner of the vehicles at the time he stole them and the evidence was sufficient to support his 

larceny convictions. 

4. Money Laundering Offenses

Code § 18.2-246.3(A) makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly to conduct a 

financial transaction where the person knows the property involved in the transaction represents 

the proceeds of an activity which is punishable as a felony.” In turn, Code § 18.2-246.2 defines a 

“financial transaction” as 

any purchase, sale, trade, loan, pledge, investment, gift, transfer, 

transmission, transportation, delivery, deposit, withdrawal, 

payment, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, 

extension of credit, purchase or sale of monetary instruments, use 

of a safe-deposit box, or any other acquisition or disposition of 

monetary instruments by any means including the movement of 

funds by wire or other electronic means, which is knowingly 

designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, 

location, source, ownership or control of the property involved in 

the transaction. 

Appellant argues that a financial transaction under Code § 18.2-246.2 must involve the

“acquisition or disposition of monetary instruments” and that here the Commonwealth did not 

present sufficient evidence of a financial transaction, as it failed to present any evidence about an 

exchange of money. 

Assuming without deciding that a financial transaction under the statute must involve the 

acquisition or disposition of monetary instruments, we reject appellant’s contention that in this 
- 24 -

case, the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish that such a financial transaction occurred. 

Tolliver testified that he “enter[ed] an agreement to auction vehicles on behalf” of appellant and 

“ha[d] an agreement to pay [appellant] the money.” The 2009 Mini Cooper was sold at auction 

and Tolliver received about $4,800 for the vehicle. He did not actually give any of the proceeds 

to appellant because the second car for auction, the 2016 Mini Cooper, was identified as stolen. 

While appellant did not receive money from Tolliver, this is not dispositive as to whether 

a financial transaction occurred. Code § 18.2-246.3(A) makes it “unlawful for any person 

knowingly to conduct a financial transaction where the person knows the property involved in 

the transaction represents the proceeds of an activity which is punishable as a felony.” 

(Emphasis added). Code § 18.2-246.2 defines “conduct” as including “initiating, concluding, 

participating in, or assisting in a financial transaction.” Appellant initiated a financial transaction 

with Tolliver. He made an agreement with Tolliver to sell the vehicles, and Tolliver received 

money in exchange for auctioning the 2009 Mini Cooper. While appellant did not receive any 

money as a result of his agreement, he did initiate the transaction, thus we could conclude that 

the evidence was sufficient to prove that he conducted a financial transaction in this case. 

Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence of an attempt to conceal or 

disguise the ownership of the property involved. Code § 18.2-246.2 requires that the financial 

transaction be one “which is knowingly designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the 

nature, location, source, ownership or control of the property involved in the transaction.” 

Appellant asserts that the evidence demonstrated that he did not hide what he was doing, as he 

titled all of the vehicles in his own name, went to the DMV in person, and directly transferred the 

vehicles from his name to Tolliver. 

In resolving this issue, we find instructive the federal cases interpreting the federal money 

laundering statute. Similar to Code § 18.2-246.2, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the federal 
- 25 -

money laundering statute, occurs when a defendant conducts a financial transaction “knowing 

that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the 

location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In a prosecution under this statute, the government must prove “a 

specific intent to structure a transaction so as to conceal the true nature of the proceeds.” United 

States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1056 (4th Cir. 1992). “A conviction requires evidence of intent 

to disguise or conceal the transaction, whether from direct evidence, like the defendant’s own 

statements, or from circumstantial evidence, like the use of a third party to disguise the true 

owner, or unusual secrecy.” United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 483 (1st Cir.

2005). “The ‘most obvious type’ of evidence that would support a finding of intent to disguise 

the proceeds of unlawful activity is ‘that of employing a third party in order to conceal the 

defendant’s identity from others.’” United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)).

We find the principles articulated above applicable to this case and conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to establish appellant’s intent to conceal or disguise the source of the 

property involved. Here, appellant entered into an agreement with Tolliver to auction the two 

vehicles and signed over the titles of both vehicles to him. By employing a third party to sell the 

vehicles at auction, appellant demonstrated his intent to structure the transaction so as to conceal 

the true source of the property involved in the transaction. While it was relatively easy to trace 

the vehicles back to appellant, “the money laundering statute does not require the jury to find 

that [accused] did a good job of laundering the proceeds.” United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 

648 (8th Cir. 1991). In the instant case, appellant’s use of Tolliver, a third party, constituted 

sufficient evidence to show that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or 

disguise the source of the property involved in the transaction. 
- 26 -

Further, the evidence regarding appellant’s acts in relation to the 2016 Mini Cooper was 

sufficient to support his attempted money laundering conviction. “Whether the actions of a 

particular defendant rise to the level of an attempted crime is a fact-specific inquiry that must be 

decided on a case-by-case basis.” Ashford v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 676, 681 (2006). “An 

attempt to commit a crime is composed of two elements: (1) The intent to commit it; and (2) a 

direct, ineffectual act done towards its commission.” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 

493, 506 (2020) (quoting Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 565 (1995)). “The 

direct but ineffectual act is commonly referred to as an ‘overt act.’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 70 

Va. App. 307, 318 (2019) (en banc) (quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 525 (2008)). 

Appellant’s intent to commit the offense was evidenced by his agreement to sell the vehicles, the 

proceeds of his grand larcenies, at auction via Tolliver. His signing over the title and giving the 

vehicle to Tolliver was the direct act done toward the commission of the offense that was only 

ineffectual because the 2016 Mini Cooper was identified as stolen. 

Accordingly, because the evidence established that appellant conducted a financial 

transaction designed to conceal the source of the 2009 Mini Cooper and that he attempted to do 

so for the 2016 Mini Cooper, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the evidence 

sufficient to support both convictions.

15

 

15 Appellant also argues that his actions did not constitute money laundering or attempted 

money laundering because he did not know that the property involved in the transaction 

represented the proceeds of a felonious activity. Code § 18.2-246.3 provides that it is “unlawful 

for any person knowingly to conduct a financial transaction where the person knows the property 

involved in the transaction represents the proceeds of an activity which is punishable as a 

felony.” (Emphasis added). Appellant argues that the record demonstrates that he believed his 

use of the AVP was entirely legal. We reject appellant’s argument, which is belied by 

appellant’s fraudulent statements on the AVP documents concerning possession of the vehicles 

and his misrepresentations to the DMV employees about the locations of the vehicles.
- 27 -

C. Jury Instructions

Appellant argues that he was entitled to instructions on a good faith claim-of-right

defense and a good faith reliance defense. 

“As a general rule, the decision to grant or deny proffered instructions rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court.” Sarafin v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 320, 325 (2014). Our 

“responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is ‘to see that the law has been clearly stated and 

that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.’” Conley v. 

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 658, 674-75 (2022) (quoting Fahringer v. Commonwealth, 70 

Va. App. 208, 211 (2019)). “[W]hether a jury instruction accurately states the relevant law is a 

question of law that we review de novo.” Watson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 197, 207 (2019) 

(quoting Payne v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 855, 869 (2016)).

“[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” Dandridge v. 

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 669, 676 (2021) (quoting Lienau v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 

254, 260 (2018)). A trial court “may not refuse to grant a proper, proffered instruction” if there 

is more than “a scintilla” of evidence supporting the instruction. Id. at 680 (quoting King v. 

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 580, 587 (2015) (en banc)). “Whether there is more than a mere 

scintilla of evidence is determined on a case-by-case basis.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 

Va. App. 70, 94 (2019). “If the instruction is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the 

case, it should not be given.” Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729 (2001). “Thus, it is not 

error to refuse an instruction when there is no evidence to support it.” Id.

“A jury must be instructed on any theory or affirmative defense supported by the 

evidence.” McCoy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 227, 229 (1989). This Court must decide 
- 28 -

whether the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s theory required 

the requested instruction. Id. 

1. Claim-of-Right Defense

Appellant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on a good faith claim-of-right defense 

in relation to the three grand larceny offenses. His proposed instruction stated, “If you find that 

[appellant], in good faith, believed that the [vehicle] belonged to him at the time of the taking 

then you shall find [appellant] not guilty of grand larceny.” After noting that none of the 

witnesses had testified that they had allowed appellant to take their vehicles, the trial court asked 

counsel for appellant for the basis for the instruction. Counsel for appellant stated that “there is 

at least a scintilla of evidence here” because appellant “received title.” 

“[T]here can be no larceny of the property taken if it, in fact, is the property of the taker, 

or if he, in good faith, believes it is his, for there is lacking the criminal intent which is an 

essential element of larceny.” Pena Pinedo v. Commonwealth, 300 Va. 116, 122 (2021) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 811-12 (1926)). “When 

successful, a claim-of-right defense negates the defendant’s animus furandi—the ‘intent to steal’ 

mens rea element of larceny.” Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 57, 63 (2007) (quoting 

Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 265-66, 271 (2d ed. 1969)). “The claim-of-right defense 

requires a predicate showing of ‘good faith,’ a bona fide belief by the taking party that []he has 

some legal right to the property taken.” Id. (quoting Butts, 145 Va. at 812). “A claim-of-right 

defense may be based on a good faith, yet mistaken, claim to property.” Pena Pinedo, 300 Va. at 

122. “Any claim of right underlying the defense, however, must be sincere and not merely a 

dishonest pretense.” Id. “Where the evidence is conflicting the question of bona fides is for the 

trier of the facts.” Groves, 50 Va. App. at 63 (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 

534 (1964)). However, while “[u]sually the question of bona fides is one for the jury, . . .
- 29 -

where . . . the facts are undisputed, and only one conclusion could be fairly drawn therefrom by 

reasonable men, it is a question of law for the court.” Pena Pinedo, 300 Va. at 122 (quoting 

Butts, 145 Va. at 814).

Appellant asserts that there was evidence in this case showing the basis for appellant’s

good faith belief that he was entitled to the vehicles—he found the AVP, a legitimate process 

through the DMV, utilized that process, and subsequently received titles to the vehicles from the 

DMV. Therefore, he contends that the trial court should have left the question of whether this 

belief was reasonable to the jury and given the instruction. 

We disagree and conclude appellant’s actions did not demonstrate a “good faith, yet 

mistaken, claim to property.” Pena Pinedo, 300 Va. at 122. Appellant did not have a good faith 

belief that he owned the vehicles at issue because his obtaining of their titles was predicated on 

his fraudulent statements on the AVP documents that he was in possession of the vehicles. He 

could not have sincerely believed that he was in possession of the vehicles at the time he 

completed the applications for certificates of title because the vehicles were located on public 

streets and were regularly parked there by their true owners. All of the owners testified that they 

did not give appellant permission to use or take their vehicles. Further, appellant’s

misrepresentations to the DMV employees that the vehicles were located on his private property

contradicts his argument that he acted on a sincere belief, rather than a dishonest pretense. Thus, 

while a jury instruction should be given if there is more than “a scintilla” of evidence supporting 

the instruction, “it is not error to refuse an instruction when there is no evidence to support it.” 

Sands, 262 Va. at 729. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on a good faith
- 30 -

claim-of-right defense when there was no reasonable basis for appellant to believe that the 

vehicles, located on public streets, were possessed by him.

16

 

2. Good Faith Reasonable Reliance Defense

Appellant also asked the trial court to instruct the jury on a good faith reliance defense, 

pursuant to Miller v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 727 (1997), for the unlawfully obtaining 

documents from the DMV charges. Counsel for appellant told the court that the basis for giving

such an instruction was that “the evidence we have in this case [was] that [appellant] was 

informed it was lawful . . . off of the Virginia Code and the DMV website and the guidance on 

the website.” When asked by the court what evidence was presented as to whether appellant was 

given assurance that what he was doing was legal, counsel for appellant said, “certainly we 

didn’t present affirmative evidence in the way of [appellant]’s testimony or testimony from a 

witness that they made a specific verbal assurance,” but that there was “a scintilla of evidence in 

the fact that he was given the titles physically, that that is essentially the assurance I am 

arguing.” The court refused the instruction, noting that it thought “it is misleading of the law in 

the case” and that “more importantly, there is no affirmative evidence provided in accordance 

with Miller.” 

The due process defense articulated in Miller is one where “the criminal statute under 

which the defendant is being prosecuted cannot constitutionally be applied to the defendant 

without violating due process of law, where government officials have misled the defendant into 

believing that his conduct was not prohibited.” Miller, 25 Va. App. at 736 (quoting Jeffrey F.

16 Appellant also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his grand larceny 

convictions because he had a good faith claim-of-right to the vehicles and therefore lacked the 

necessary intent to support these convictions. Appellant maintains that once he obtained the 

titles to the vehicles, he had a reasonable, good faith belief that he legally owned them. As we 

determine above, appellant only obtained the titles through his fraudulent use of the AVP and 

therefore could not have had a good faith belief in his ownership of the vehicles, despite the fact 

that the DMV had issued the titles to him. 
- 31 -

Ghent, Annotation, Criminal Law: “Official Statement” Mistake of Law Defense, 89 A.L.R.4th 

1026, 1031 (1991)). “To avail oneself of this due process ‘defense,’ a defendant must prove 

three things.” Park v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 635, 652 (2022). First, he must establish 

“that he was assured that the conduct giving rise to the conviction was lawful.” Branch v. 

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 665, 671 (2004). Second, the defendant must demonstrate “that the 

assurance was given by a ‘government official,’ i.e., ‘a public officer or body charged by law 

with responsibility for defining permissible conduct with respect to the offense at issue.’” Id.

(quoting Miller, 25 Va. App. at 739). Third, he must prove “that, based on the totality of the 

circumstances, reliance upon the advice was reasonable and in good faith.” Id. “[I]t is the 

defendant’s burden to establish this ‘affirmative defense.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 25 Va. App. at 

737). 

Based on this record, we need only examine the first prong of this test. We conclude that 

the evidence clearly showed that appellant failed to receive assurances from DMV employees 

that his use of the AVP was lawful. “With respect to content, the defense is available only where 

the information upon which the defendant has relied is an affirmative assurance that the conduct 

giving rise to the conviction is lawful.” Miller, 25 Va. App. at 738. “In the absence of such an 

affirmative assurance,” therefore, “the due process concerns that the defense is designed to 

protect are not implicated, and the defense fails.” Id.

Appellant argues that a Miller instruction should have been provided to the jury for the

unlawfully obtaining documents from the DMV offenses. Here, the conduct giving rise to those

convictions was appellant’s statements on the AVP documents that he was in possession of the 

five vehicles at issue. Appellant asserts that he received affirmative assurances from the DMV

that he appropriately used the AVP through the acceptance of his paperwork and issuance of title 

to each of the cars. But the mere acceptance of paperwork and the issuance of the titles does not 
- 32 -

qualify as an affirmative assurance that the conduct giving rise to his convictions was lawful. Cf.

Claytor v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 644, 655-56 (2013) (holding that the Miller defense did 

not apply where the defendant subjectively interpreted a court order to have reinstated his driving 

privileges because the defendant “sought no determination of conduct,” and therefore “the court 

had no occasion to give an ‘affirmative assurance’ that such conduct was permissible”). 

Appellant did not receive an affirmative assurance on the lawfulness of his use of the AVP from 

any DMV employee. This was in fact conceded by counsel for appellant at trial when she stated, 

“certainly we didn’t present affirmative evidence in the way of [appellant]’s testimony or 

testimony from a witness that they made a specific verbal assurance.” Because there was not 

more than a scintilla of evidence supporting appellant’s claim that he was assured that the 

conduct giving rise to the convictions was lawful, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

refusing to give a Miller instruction.
- 33 -

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to strike a juror for cause, in denying 

appellant’s motions to strike the evidence, or in denying jury instructions on good faith claim-ofright and good faith reasonable reliance. Accordingly, we affirm.

17

Affirmed.

17 Appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in not setting aside the jury’s verdict 

because Virginia’s AVP statutes are void for vagueness. We do not address this argument on 

appeal because appellant failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on this issue. “It is the 

appellant’s burden ‘to obtain a clear ruling from the [circuit] court’ on an issue he wishes to raise 

on appeal. This burden stems from the requirement that a litigant state an objection ‘with 

reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.’” McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 299, 

313 (2021) (first quoting Young v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 646, 657 (2019); and then 

quoting Rule 5A:18). On September 20, 2021, appellant filed a pro se handwritten motion to set 

aside his convictions where he argued in part that the AVP statutes are void for vagueness. The 

sentencing order, entered October 1, 2021, does not address appellant’s pro se motion. On 

December 20, 2021, appellant filed a pro se motion asking the trial court to hear his pro se

motion to set aside. While appellant did file a motion asking the trial court to hear his motion to 

set aside, it was filed more than 21 days following the entry of the sentencing order in this case, 

and therefore the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the convictions. See Rule 1:1. 

Because there was no ruling on appellant’s void-for-vagueness argument in the trial court, this 

issue was not preserved for appellate review. See Westlake Legal Grp. v. Flynn, 293 Va. 344, 

352 (2017) (holding that assignments of error were not preserved for appeal where the arguments 

they contained were first made in a motion to reconsider and the record contained no indication 

that a hearing was requested or that the motion was heard or decided).